IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA 

Department of Human Services, : 

 Petitioner : 

 : 

 v. : 

 : 

Paul Huffman, Jr. (Workers’ : 

Compensation Appeal Board), : Nos. 921 & 922 C.D. 2022 

 Respondent : Submitted: April 21, 2023 

BEFORE: HONORABLE RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, President Judge 

 HONORABLE CHRISTINE FIZZANO CANNON, Judge 

 HONORABLE LORI A. DUMAS, Judge 

 

OPINION NOT REPORTED 

MEMORANDUM OPINION 

BY JUDGE FIZZANO CANNON FILED: July 27, 2023 

 In these consolidated cases,1 the Department of Human Services 

(Employer) petitions for review of an August 3, 2022 order of the Workers’ 

Compensation Appeal Board (Board) affirming the order of a workers’ compensation 

judge (WCJ) granting the petitions filed by Paul Huffman, Jr. (Claimant) seeking 

reinstatement of total disability benefits. Employer contends that Claimant failed to 

meet his burden of proof. Upon review, we affirm the Board’s order. 

1

 Paul Huffman, Jr. (Claimant) suffered two work-related injuries – one on November 18, 

2005, and the other on January 21, 2006. A workers’ compensation judge (WCJ) rendered two 

identical decisions under separate docket numbers. The Board issued a single decision under two 

docket numbers. Board docket number A22-0206 relates to the November 18, 2005 injury, and 

Board docket number A22-0207 relates to the January 21, 2006 injury. Two separate petitions for 

review were filed with this Court. By order dated October 28, 2022, these cases were consolidated 

for disposition. 
2 

I. Background 

On November 18, 2005, Claimant, a Youth Development Aide 

Supervisor, sustained a work-related injury to his left knee and an injury to his left 

jaw temporomandibular joint. On January 21, 2006, Claimant sustained a second 

work-related injury, this time to his left eye and right knee. Both of these injuries 

were the result of assaults that occurred while Claimant was working in a juvenile 

detention center. In May of 2021, Claimant filed a reinstatement petition 

challenging the determination that his disability status changed from total to partial 

because it was based on an Impairment Rating Evaluation (IRE) done pursuant to 

former Section 306(a.2) of the Workers’ Compensation Act (Act).2

 The WCJ granted the reinstatement petition based on this Court’s 

decision in Whitfield v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Tenet Health System 

Hahnemann LLC), 188 A.3d 599 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2018). On appeal, the Board 

affirmed. Employer’s appeal to this Court followed. 

II. Discussion 

Before this Court,3 Employer argues that Claimant failed to meet his 

burden of proving total disability. Employer suggests that the WCJ erred in crediting 

the testimony of Claimant’s medical expert, Charles Cole, M.D., that Claimant was 

limited to “zero to one hour” of work per day, because that limitation “was just part 

2

 Act of June 2, 1915, P.L. 736, as amended, added by Section 4 of the Act of June 24, 

1996, P.L. 350, formerly 77 P.S. § 511.2, repealed by the Act of October 24, 2018, P.L. 714, No. 

111. Former Section 306(a.2) was declared unconstitutional in Protz v. Workers’ Compensation 

Appeal Board (Derry Area School District), 161 A.3d 827, 830 (Pa. 2017). 

3

 Our review is limited to determining whether the WCJ’s findings of fact were supported 

by substantial evidence, whether an error of law was committed, or whether constitutional rights 

were violated. Dep’t of Transp. v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (Clippinger), 38 A.3d 1037, 1042 

n.3 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2011). 
3 

of the overall restrictions given by Dr. Cole,” while other portions of his testimony 

indicated that Claimant “was NOT totally disabled.” Employer’s Br. at 10. We 

discern no merit in Employer’s argument. 

As this Court has frequently stated, 

[i]n workers’ compensation cases, the WCJ is the ultimate 

fact-finder and therefore has exclusive province over 

questions of credibility and evidentiary weight . . . . The 

WCJ may accept or reject the testimony of any witness in 

whole or in part . . . . Further, it is irrelevant whether the 

record contains evidence to support findings other than 

those made by the WCJ; our critical inquiry is whether 

there is evidence to support the findings the WCJ actually 

made. 

Smith v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (Supervalu Holdings Pa., LLC), 177 A.3d 394, 

401 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2018) (en banc) (first citing A & J Builders, Inc. v. Workers’ 

Comp. Appeal Bd. (Verdi), 78 A.3d 1233 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2013); and then citing 

Furnari v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (Temple Inland), 90 A.3d 53 (Pa. Cmwlth. 

2014)). 

Here, Employer previously submitted an application for supersedeas 

seeking to stay its payment obligations pending the outcome of its petitions for 

review. In support of its application, Employer asserted the same burden of proof 

argument it now presents on the merits. In denying the stay, this Court explained: 

It is well established that a stay is warranted where an 

applicant: (1) makes a strong showing that the applicant 

is likely to prevail on the merits; (2) has shown that 

without the requested relief, the applicant will suffer 

irreparable injury; (3) establishes that issuance of a stay 

will not substantially harm other interested parties in the 

proceedings; and (4) establishes that the issuance of a stay 

will not adversely affect the public interest. Pennsylvania 

Pub. Util. Comm’n v. Process Gas Consumers Grp. 

(Process Gas), 467 A.2d 805, 808-09 (Pa. 1983). The 
4 

applicant must make a strong showing on each of the 

above criteria in order for the stay to issue. Id. at 809. 

As to the first criterion of Process Gas, Employer argues 

that it is likely to prevail on the merits because Claimant’s 

evidence fails to satisfy the standard set forth by this Court 

in Whitfield because he is not totally disabled based on the 

credible testimony of Claimant’s medical expert, [Dr.] 

Cole[]. Specifically, Employer claims that Dr. Cole stated 

that Claimant is capable of working with restrictions. 

In Whitfield, this Court, citing the Supreme Court’s 

decision in Latta v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeal 

Board (Latrobe Die Casting Co.), 642 A.2d 1083, 1085 

(Pa. 1994), stated that when a claimant is seeking to 

reinstate benefits currently under suspension, “[a] 

claimant is not required to demonstrate with medical 

evidence that the work-related injury giving rise to the 

benefits continues; a claimant’s testimony to that effect 

satisfies the claimant’s burden of proof.” Whitfield, 188 

A.3d at 615. The claimant in Whitfield testified that she 

remained unable to work, and the employer did not present 

any evidence to the contrary. Because the workers’ 

compensation judge did not make credibility 

determinations, this Court remanded and noted that, 

pursuant to Latta, if the claimant’s testimony was credited, 

she would be able to satisfy her burden of proof . . . . 

This case differs from Whitfield in that, in addition to 

Claimant testifying, both Claimant and Employer 

presented medical evidence. Claimant presented Dr. 

Cole’s testimony, and Employer presented the testimony 

of Dr. Robert Grob and Dr. Brian Bora. However, the 

WCJ concluded that, to the extent that Dr. Grob’s opinions 

are inconsistent with Dr. Cole’s opinions, Dr. Grob’s 

opinions are rejected. Further, the WCJ rejected Dr. 

Bora’s opinions as not competent. Based on the evidence 

presented, the WCJ further found that Claimant “is totally 

disabled. Claimant’s credible testimony is that he is 

totally disabled. The credible medical testimony is that he 

can perform works functions for 0 to 1 hour, which is, in 

essence, total disability.” (WCJ’s 02/23/2022 Decision, 

Finding of Fact No. 43). As the WCJ credited Claimant’s 

testimony over any evidence that Employer presented to 
5 

the contrary, Whitfield, and also credited Dr. Cole’s 

testimony that Claimant was, for all intents and purposes, 

totally disabled, this Court fails to see how the WCJ and 

the Board misapplied Whitfield. In the end, this case 

appears to amount to no more than a dispute over 

credibility determinations, which is a subject outside of 

this Court’s scope of review. See Bloom v. Workmen’s 

Comp. Appeal Bd. (Keystone Pretzel Bakery), 677 A.2d 

1314, 1319 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1996) (this Court’s scope or 

review does not permit the reversal of a workers’ 

compensation judge’s credibility determinations). 

In summary, Employer has failed to make as strong 

showing that it is likely to prevail on the merits of its 

appeal and has thus failed to meet the first criterion of 

Process Gas . . . . 

Dep’t of Hum. Servs. v. Huffman (Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd.) (Pa. Cmwlth. Nos. 

921 & 922 C.D. 2022, filed Nov. 29, 2022), slip op. at 2-4. 

Because Employer simply repeats the same argument we previously 

rejected in denying a stay, we likewise reject that argument on the merits. 

Accordingly, we affirm the Board’s order granting Claimant’s reinstatement 

petitions. 

III. Conclusion 

Based on the foregoing discussion, the order of the Board is affirmed. 

 

 __________________________________ 

 CHRISTINE FIZZANO CANNON, Judge 
IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA 

Department of Human Services, : 

 Petitioner : 

 : 

 v. : 

 : 

Paul Huffman, Jr. (Workers’ : 

Compensation Appeal Board), : Nos. 921 & 922 C.D. 2022 

 Respondent : 

O R D E R 

 AND NOW, this 27th day of July, 2023, the order of the Workers’ 

Compensation Appeal Board dated August 3, 2022 is AFFIRMED. 

 

 __________________________________ 

 CHRISTINE FIZZANO CANNON, Judge