United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted November 4, 2008

Decided February 20, 2009

Before

William J. Bauer, Circuit Judge

Joel M. Flaum, Circuit Judge

Ann Claire Williams, Circuit Judge

No. 06‐3546

BENTON V. HUBBLE,

Plaintiff‐Appellant,

v.

MATTHEW VOORHEES, State Police

Officer, individually,

Defendant‐Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District

Court for the Southern District of

Indiana, Indianapolis Division.

No.  04 C 967

Sarah Evans Barker,

     Judge.

O R D E R

This case involves what passes for political shenanigans in Indiana.  In the late hours of an

election night, Indiana State Police Officer Matthew Voohrees pulled over Plaintiff Benton

Hubble’s car.  According to Voohrees, Hubble was speeding.  Hubble claims  that the traffic

stop was a retaliatory act made without probable cause and solely on account of his open

political support for a candidate running against the local sheriff in a primary election held

earlier that day.  Hubble sued Voohrees in his individual capacity and Montgomery County

Sheriff Dennis Rice and Deputy Sheriff Jake Watson in both their individual and official

capacities, alleging various civil rights violations.    The district court granted summary

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1
No. 06‐3546 Page 2

judgement for the defendants.    Hubble now appeals the district court’s judgment solely

regarding Voohrees.  For the reasons stated below, we affirm.  

BACKGROUND

On May 7, 2002, Montgomery County, Indiana held its Republican primary for County

Sheriff.  Dennis Rice, the incumbent, was running for re‐election against challenger Luther

Blanton.  Hubble backed Blanton’s bid to unseat Rice as sheriff, demonstrating his staunch

support for the challenger by placing campaign signs about his front lawn and in his car

windows.  Hubble’s conspiracy theory has its origins in this public pronouncement.       

Hubble believes that Sheriff Rice or his deputies spotted his car on the street that election

day, taking note of, and exception to, the endorsement for the opposition.  Rice attests that,

prior to the traffic stop that night, neither he nor his deputies had any knowledge of the type

of vehicle Hubble drove.  Nonetheless, Hubble theorizes that Rice must have observed his

green Lincoln Towncar during an investigatory visit to a local watering hole called the

Waveland Pub, where friends and supporters of Blanton had gathered to cheer on their choice

for County Sheriff.   

Under Indiana law, it is illegal to serve alcohol on election day when the polls are open.

Although the parties dispute whether the gathering was held in the establishment itself or on

the property adjacent to it, it is undisputed that Rice paid the pub a visit to have a look.  

Hubble did not attend the festivities, but his son Roger did, using the elder’s Lincoln

Towncar as transport.  The car may have been parked on the street at the time of Rice’s visit.

According to Rice, he did not make record of any vehicles in the area, but simply contacted the

Indiana State Excise Police to report his suspicion that alcohol was being served on the

premises.

When thepolls closedthat evening, bartender SallyOttenburg openedthepub to thepublic.

Shortly thereafter, she received a callfrom Rice.  The Sheriff had recently learned thatthe voters

of Montgomery County had given him another term in office.   As Rice tells it, the purpose of

his call was to notify the pub’s owner that he would no longer tolerate the all‐too‐frequent

shenanigans whichhadbeenoccurring atthe establishment.  According toOttenburg, however,

Rice informed herthat he had “beat Blanton in a landslide,” and that he would “have six squad

cars down at the pub,” and intended to arrest any intoxicated patrons.  

Later that night, Ottenburg gave a number of her patrons a ride home.   At that time,

Ottenburg says, she was stopped by a Montgomery County police officer.  The officer told her
No. 06‐3546 Page 3

that he had pulled her over because he had seen hertruck parked in front of the Waveland pub

for several hours that day.

Montgomery County Deputy Sheriff Jacob Watson testified that, while returning to the

Sheriff’s office that night via State Route 47, he noticed an oncoming vehicle traveling at a high

rate of speed.  Watson’s radar indicated that the vehicle was traveling 71 mph in a 55 mph

zone.  Although he could not determine the car’s make or model, Watson radioed Indiana State

Trooper Matthew Voohrees to alert Voohrees to the speeding vehicle.  Voohrees was on patrol

in the area at the time and was also traveling along State Route 47.  He did not remember

receiving a radio dispatch alert from another officer, but does remember observing a passing

vehicle traveling at a high rate of speed.  Voohrees’ radar returned the same results as had

Watson’s, showing that the car was traveling 16 mph above the posted speed limit.  Voohrees

turned his police car around, flashed its emergency lights, and pulled over the driver, later

identified as Hubble.  

When he approached Hubble’s vehicle, Voohrees noticed a strong smell of alcohol.  He

administered four field sobriety tests to Hubble, all of which Hubble failed.  Hubble also

provided breath samples on the scene, which indicated that he was in excess of the legal limit.

Voohrees brought Hubble to the Montgomery County Jail for a chemical blood‐alcohol test,

which Hubble refused to take.  Hubble later pleaded guilty to operating a vehicle with a blood

alcohol content of at least .08%.

Hubble disputes Voohrees’ account of events.  According to Hubble, minutes after he was

stopped by Voohrees, Deputy Watson arrived on the scene in his Sheriff’s car.  Watson walked

up to Hubble’s vehicle and stated, “[t]hat’s the green Lincoln with the Blanton signs.”

Voohrees then administered the breath sample test, but would not let Hubble see the screen

displaying the results.  Back atthe station, Voohrees intimidated Hubble into nottaking the test

by telling him, “[i]f you take the test, you’re gonna test a lot more than you did in the car, and

you was way over in the car.”    

Hubble brought suit alleging multiple civil rights violations.    Both sides moved for

summary judgment.  On August 29, 2006, the district court granted Voohrees’ motion for

summary judgment, finding that Hubble’s federally secured rights were not violated in

connection with the events detailed above.  This timely appeal followed.

DISCUSSION

On appeal, Hubble contends that there were genuine issues of material fact concerning

whether his vehicle was pulled over for reasons that were legitimate or merely pretextual.

First, Hubble  contends, the parties dispute whether Hubble was actually speeding at the time
No. 06‐3546 Page 4

he passed Voohrees’ vehicle.  In his pleadings, Hubble claimed that he was traveling within the

speed limit on the night in question and argued that the traffic stop was unsupported by

reasonable suspicion or probable cause and constituted an illegal search and seizure.  He

contends that the district court ignored his version of events and that summary judgment was

improper.

Hubble claims that he was not speeding at any time when he was within the radar zone of

Voohrees.  He knows this to be true, he asserts, because his car was armed with a radar detector

device that alertedhim to thepresence of Voohrees’ vehicle, prompting him to reduce his speed

to the posted limit of 55 mph.   Because this testimony directly contradicts that of Officer

Voohrees, he argues, issues of material fact remain in dispute.  However, it was undisputed

that Hubble was traveling in excess ofthe speed limit when he passed Voohrees’ police vehicle,

based on Hubble’s own admission.  In his deposition, Hubble stated that he was “probably”

traveling faster than the speed limit while driving on State Route 47 and that “normally you

can run the speed limit and a little bit over and nobody’s going to bother you.”  Hubble further

stated that he dislikes using cruise control on his car and was not using the speed‐regulating

feature that night.  Although Hubble does not believe that he could have been traveling faster

than approximately 61 mph, Voohrees and Watson each testified that theirradarindicated that

he was traveling 71 mph.  

In any event, the discrepancy is academic.  Because Hubble was violating Indiana law by

speeding, Trooper Voohrees’ decision to stop him was reasonable underthe circumstances and

supported by probable cause.

We are unpersuaded by Hubble’s argument that the district court improperly focused its

analysis on whether Voohrees had probable cause to arrest Hubble for driving while

intoxicated rather than on whetherthere was probable cause to stop him for a traffic violation.

Hubble’s claim is undermined by the district court’s language in its entry of summary

judgment, in which it stated, “Voohrees’ observation of the green Towncar during the late

evening of May 7, 2002, indicated that the Towncar was exceeding the posted speed limit.  This

violated a traffic law,Ind. Code § 9‐21‐5‐2, which in turn justified the initial stop ofthe vehicle.”

Although the district court went on to detail Voohrees’ observations that warranted the arrest,

including Hubble’s driving outside the highway lines, the smell of alcohol on his breath, and

the results of the on‐site breathalyser, it was readily apparent to the court, as it is to us, that

Voohrees first had probable cause to stop Hubble’s vehicle because he observed Hubble

speeding.  Whether Voohrees orhis colleagueshadsubjectivemotivations formaking the traffic

stop is irrelevant.  Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996) (“[s]ubjective intentions play

no role in ordinary, probable‐cause Fourth Amendment analysis”).  
No. 06‐3546 Page 5

Hubble also argues that his right to equal protection was violated when Sheriff Rice

conspired with Deputy Watson and other law enforcement officers for the purposes of

punishing those who supported Rice’s politicalrival.  Hubble acknowledges that this court has

consistently held that section 1985(3) does not cover alleged victims of nonracial political

conspiracies, but invites us to now reconsider this precedent and reinterpret the statute.  We

decline his invitation to do so.

We agree with the district court that Hubble failed to present triable questions of fact

concerning whether his federally secured rights were violated in connection with the events of

May 7, 2002, and decline to extend the reach of § 1985.  Accordingly, we AFFIRM the district

court’s granting of summary judgment.