In the 

United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________ 

No. 17-1400 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v.

LEON FADDEN, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

____________________ 

Appeal from the United States District Court for the 

Western District of Wisconsin. 

No. 15-cr-100 — William M. Conley, Judge. 

____________________ 

ARGUED SEPTEMBER 12, 2017 — DECIDED NOVEMBER 1, 2017 

____________________ 

Before EASTERBROOK, KANNE, and WILLIAMS, Circuit 

Judges. 

KANNE, Circuit Judge. A grand jury returned a three-count 

indictment against Leon Fadden for conduct related to bankruptcy fraud. Before trial, Fadden proposed a theory-of-defense jury instruction for Counts 1 and 2. The district court 

rejected that instruction, instead reciting the Seventh Circuit 

Pattern Instructions. A jury convicted Fadden of all three 

counts. Fadden now appeals his convictions on Counts 1 and 
2 No. 17-1400 

2, arguing that the district court denied him a fair trial by refusing to read the jury his theory-of-defense instructions. We 

affirm. 

I. BACKGROUND

Leon Fadden believed that the Internal Revenue Code did 

not apply to him. From 2005 to 2013, he earned over $100,000 

per year but did not submit tax returns. After an audit, the IRS 

determined that Fadden owed back taxes and began to garnish his wages. 

Facing further levies on his paycheck, Fadden filed for 

bankruptcy. This filing triggered an automatic stay that prevented the IRS from collecting during his bankruptcy case. 

The following month, Fadden filed bankruptcy schedules—

forms in which the debtor lists financial information such as 

debts, assets, income, and expenses. There, Fadden claimed 

that he had no legal, equitable, or future interest in any real 

property. He also claimed that he had no interest in any decedent’s life insurance policy or estate. 

But Fadden’s schedules did not tell the whole story. Before 

he filed for bankruptcy, Fadden knew that he would receive 

proceeds from the sale of his mother’s home—at the time 

listed by the executor of his mother’s estate for $525,000. And 

Fadden knew that he would receive thousands of dollars as a 

beneficiary on two of his mother’s life insurance policies. 

Three days before Fadden was scheduled to meet with the 

bankruptcy trustee—and more than a week after filing his 

schedules—Fadden spoke to a paralegal in the U.S. Trustee’s 

Office. During that conversation, Fadden mentioned for the 

first time that he was entitled to an inheritance and asked to 

postpone his bankruptcy. But when Fadden finally met with 
No. 17-1400 3

his bankruptcy trustee and an attorney for the U.S. Trustee, he 

confirmed that his schedules were accurate and denied receiving an inheritance. He also denied having spoken to the 

paralegal at the U.S. Trustee’s Office. 

A grand jury returned a three-count indictment against 

Fadden for his failure to report these assets and for his statements during the meeting. Count 1 charged him with violating 18 U.S.C. § 152(1) by concealing assets in bankruptcy. 

Count 2 charged him with violating 18 U.S.C. § 152(3) by making false declarations on his bankruptcy schedules and statement of financial affairs. Count 3 charged him with violating 

18 U.S.C. § 1001(a)(2) by making false statements during the 

investigation of his bankruptcy. 

Counts 1 and 2 required the government to prove that 

Fadden acted with an intent to deceive. At trial, Fadden 

planned to argue that the government hadn’t shown that he 

acted with that intent. To bolster this strategy, Fadden proposed the following theory-of-defense instruction: 

It is the theory of the defense that Mr. Fadden 

did not fail to disclose his inheritance on the 

schedules for the purpose of deceiving the 

bankruptcy trustee. Rather, his omissions were 

part of his continued failures to abide by the 

particulars demanded in the bankruptcy filings 

and his course of conduct throughout the bankruptcy, which is inconsistent with an intent to 

deceive. If you find that Fadden’s omissions as 

charged in counts 1 and 2 were not made with 

an intent to deceive you must find him not 

guilty of those counts. 

(R. 110 at 5.) 
4 No. 17-1400 

The court rejected Fadden’s instruction and instead recited 

the pattern instructions for the charged offenses. See Pattern 

Criminal Jury Instructions of the Seventh Circuit, 134, 136, 272

(2012 ed., rev. 2013). For the intent component of Count 1, the 

court instructed that “the government must prove ... [t]he defendant knowingly concealed [assets] ... [and] acted fraudulently, that is with the intent to deceive any creditor or the 

bankruptcy judge.” (R. 124, Trial Tr., at 136.) As to Count 2, 

the court told the jury that “the government must prove ... 

[t]he defendant made the declaration, certification or verification under penalty of perjury knowingly and with the intent 

to deceive any creditor, the trustee or the bankruptcy judge.” 

(Id. at 137.) In addition to delivering the elements of Counts 1 

and 2—both of which included the requirement that the government prove “intent to deceive”—the court told the jurors 

that “knowingly means that the defendant realized what he 

was doing and was aware of the nature of his conduct and did 

not act through ignorance, mistake or accident.” (Id. at 139–

140.) 

Throughout the trial, Fadden insisted that it was sloppiness rather than an intent to deceive that led him to omit assets from his schedules. During his opening statement, Fadden’s appointed counsel argued that Fadden is a tax cheat and 

that he doesn’t believe he has to pay taxes. Counsel then argued that Fadden was determined to use the bankruptcy proceeding’s automatic stay as a lifeline while he collected his inheritance. Fadden contended that he did so carelessly: he got 

his instructions from Google and did none of the things he 

needed to do when filing for bankruptcy. Fadden explained 

that “the heart of this case ... is whether ... [he] had an intent 

to deceive.” (R. 123, Trial Tr., at 28.) And he argued that the 

inconsistencies between his answers on his bankruptcy filings 
No. 17-1400 5

and his interactions with government officials demonstrate 

that he did not have that intent. 

Fadden returned to his theory-of-defense at closing. He related what he saw as the key details—his filing, his receipt of 

the inheritance, his failure to follow any of the requirements 

of the bankruptcy proceeding, and his conversations with 

government officials. Fadden told the jury that those details 

showed that “there just wasn’t an intent to deceive.” (R. 124, 

Trial Tr., at 169.) After closing arguments, the court read the 

jury its instructions. The jury found Fadden guilty of each 

count. 

On appeal, Fadden challenges the district court’s denial of 

his theory-of-defense instruction as to counts 1 and 2. This, 

Fadden argues, denied him a fair trial. We find that Fadden 

was not entitled to this instruction, so we affirm. 

II.ANALYSIS

In general, a defendant is entitled to a theory-of-defense 

instruction if: the instruction represents a correct statement of 

the law; the evidence supports the instruction; the theory of 

defense is not part of the charge to the jury; and the denial of 

the instruction would deprive the defendant a fair trial. E.g., 

United States v. Jackson, 598 F.3d 340, 349 (7th Cir. 2010). We 

review the district court’s denial of Fadden’s instruction de 

novo. United States v. Canady, 578 F.3d 665, 672 (7th Cir. 2009). 

In part, Fadden’s instruction fails because it restates the district court’s charge. To the extent that it does not, it misstates 

the law. Therefore, the district court correctly concluded that 

Fadden was not entitled to his theory-of-defense instruction. 

Fadden argues that his statement of law appears in the final sentence of his proposed instructions—“If you find that 
6 No. 17-1400 

Fadden’s omissions as charged in Counts 1 and 2 were not 

made with an intent to deceive you must find him not guilty 

of those counts.” In essence, this would tell jurors not to find 

Fadden guilty if they found that he acted without an intent to 

deceive. While that statement of the law is accurate, the court 

already told the jury all it needed to know. On both counts, 

the court instructed the jury that the government needed to 

demonstrate that Fadden acted with “intent to deceive.” A defendant is not entitled to the logical equivalent of an instruction the court provides. See Canady, 578 F.3d at 672. 

To the extent that Fadden’s instruction goes beyond the 

district court’s, it misstates the law. Fadden also asked the district court to instruct the jury that his “omissions were part of 

his continued failures to abide by the particulars demanded 

in the bankruptcy filings and his course of conduct throughout the bankruptcy, which is inconsistent with an intent to deceive.” (R. 110 at 5 (emphasis added).) Yet finding that Fadden 

was careless and that he acted with an intent to deceive would 

have been entirely consistent with the statute. Instructing the 

jury otherwise, as Fadden requested, would have misstated 

the law. 

III.CONCLUSION

The jury heard Fadden’s defense through the court’s 

charge and during opening and closing arguments. It wasn’t 

persuaded. Fadden’s argument that the district court erroneously denied his theory-of-defense instruction falls short as 

well. In part, Fadden’s instruction fails because it did not add 

any information beyond the court’s instruction. And the portion that went beyond the court’s instruction misstates the 
No. 17-1400 7

law. Fadden concedes that he lost a fair fight on Count 3. The 

same is true for Counts 1 and 2. 

AFFIRMED.