DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE APPROPRIATIONS 

FOR 2011 

HEARINGS 

BEFORE A 

SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE 

COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON DEFENSE 

NORMAN D. DICKS, Washington, Chairman 

PETER J. VISCLOSKY, Indiana 

JAMES P. MORAN, Virginia 

MARCY KAPTUR, Ohio 

ALLEN BOYD, Florida 

STEVEN R. ROTHMAN, New Jersey 

SANFORD D. BISHOP, JR., Georgia 

MAURICE D. HINCHEY, New York 

CAROLYN C. KILPATRICK, Michigan 

TIM RYAN, Ohio 

C. W. BILL YOUNG, Florida 

RODNEY P. FRELINGHUYSEN, New Jersey 

TODD TIAHRT, Kansas 

JACK KINGSTON, Georgia 

KAY GRANGER, Texas 

HAROLD ROGERS, Kentucky 

NOTE: Under Committee Rules, Mr. Obey, as Chairman of the Full Committee, and Mr. Lewis, as Ranking 

Minority Member of the Full Committee, are authorized to sit as Members of all Subcommittees. 

PAUL JUOLA, GREG LANKLER, SARAH YOUNG, PAUL TERRY, KRIS MALLARD, ADAM HARRIS, 

ANN REESE, BROOKE BOYER, TIM PRINCE, B G WRIGHT, CHRIS WHITE, 

CELES HUGHES, and ADRIENNE RAMSAY, Staff Assistants 

SHERRY L. YOUNG, and TRACEY LATURNER, Administrative Aides 

PART 2 

Page 

Navy and Marine Corps Posture ......................................... 1 

Contingency Contracting ...................................................... 113 

Air Mobility Programs ............................................................ 215 

Army Posture ............................................................................ 293 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Appropriations 


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PART 2—DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE APPROPRIATIONS FOR 2011 


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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE APPROPRIATIONS 

FOR 2011 

HEARINGS 

BEFORE A 

SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE 

COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON DEFENSE 

NORMAN D. DICKS, Washington, Chairman 

PETER J. VISCLOSKY, Indiana 

JAMES P. MORAN, Virginia 

MARCY KAPTUR, Ohio 

ALLEN BOYD, Florida 

STEVEN R. ROTHMAN, New Jersey 

SANFORD D. BISHOP, JR., Georgia 

MAURICE D. HINCHEY, New York 

CAROLYN C. KILPATRICK, Michigan 

TIM RYAN, Ohio 

C. W. BILL YOUNG, Florida 

RODNEY P. FRELINGHUYSEN, New Jersey 

TODD TIAHRT, Kansas 

JACK KINGSTON, Georgia 

KAY GRANGER, Texas 

HAROLD ROGERS, Kentucky 

NOTE: Under Committee Rules, Mr. Obey, as Chairman of the Full Committee, and Mr. Lewis, as Ranking 

Minority Member of the Full Committee, are authorized to sit as Members of all Subcommittees. 

PAUL JUOLA, GREG LANKLER, SARAH YOUNG, PAUL TERRY, KRIS MALLARD, ADAM HARRIS, 

ANN REESE, BROOKE BOYER, TIM PRINCE, B G WRIGHT, CHRIS WHITE, 

CELES HUGHES, and ADRIENNE RAMSAY, Staff Assistants 

SHERRY L. YOUNG, and TRACEY LATURNER, Administrative Aides 

PART 2 

Page 

Navy and Marine Corps Posture ......................................... 1 

Contingency Contracting ...................................................... 113 

Air Mobility Programs ............................................................ 215 

Army Posture ............................................................................ 293 

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 

65–008 WASHINGTON : 2011 


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COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS 

DAVID R. OBEY, Wisconsin, Chairman 

NORMAN D. DICKS, Washington 

ALAN B. MOLLOHAN, West Virginia 

MARCY KAPTUR, Ohio 

PETER J. VISCLOSKY, Indiana 

NITA M. LOWEY, New York 

JOSE ́ E. SERRANO, New York 

ROSA L. DELAURO, Connecticut 

JAMES P. MORAN, Virginia 

JOHN W. OLVER, Massachusetts 

ED PASTOR, Arizona 

DAVID E. PRICE, North Carolina 

CHET EDWARDS, Texas 

PATRICK J. KENNEDY, Rhode Island 

MAURICE D. HINCHEY, New York 

LUCILLE ROYBAL-ALLARD, California 

SAM FARR, California 

JESSE L. JACKSON, JR., Illinois 

CAROLYN C. KILPATRICK, Michigan 

ALLEN BOYD, Florida 

CHAKA FATTAH, Pennsylvania 

STEVEN R. ROTHMAN, New Jersey 

SANFORD D. BISHOP, JR., Georgia 

MARION BERRY, Arkansas 

BARBARA LEE, California 

ADAM SCHIFF, California 

MICHAEL HONDA, California 

BETTY MCCOLLUM, Minnesota 

STEVE ISRAEL, New York 

TIM RYAN, Ohio 

C.A. ‘‘DUTCH’’ RUPPERSBERGER, Maryland 

BEN CHANDLER, Kentucky 

DEBBIE WASSERMAN SCHULTZ, Florida 

CIRO RODRIGUEZ, Texas 

LINCOLN DAVIS, Tennessee 

JOHN T. SALAZAR, Colorado 

PATRICK J. MURPHY, Pennsylvania 

JERRY LEWIS, California 

C. W. BILL YOUNG, Florida 

HAROLD ROGERS, Kentucky 

FRANK R. WOLF, Virginia 

JACK KINGSTON, Georgia 

RODNEY P. FRELINGHUYSEN, New 

Jersey 

TODD TIAHRT, Kansas 

ZACH WAMP, Tennessee 

TOM LATHAM, Iowa 

ROBERT B. ADERHOLT, Alabama 

JO ANN EMERSON, Missouri 

KAY GRANGER, Texas 

MICHAEL K. SIMPSON, Idaho 

JOHN ABNEY CULBERSON, Texas 

MARK STEVEN KIRK, Illinois 

ANDER CRENSHAW, Florida 

DENNIS R. REHBERG, Montana 

JOHN R. CARTER, Texas 

RODNEY ALEXANDER, Louisiana 

KEN CALVERT, California 

JO BONNER, Alabama 

STEVEN C. LATOURETTE, Ohio 

TOM COLE, Oklahoma 

BEVERLY PHETO, Clerk and Staff Director 

(II)


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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE APPROPRIATIONS 

FOR 2011 

FRIDAY, MARCH 11, 2010. 

NAVY AND MARINE CORPS POSTURE 

WITNESSES 

SECRETARY RAY MABUS, U.S. NAVY 

ADMIRAL GARY ROUGHEAD, CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS, U.S. NAVY 

GENERAL JAMES T. CONWAY, COMMANDANT, U.S. MARINE CORPS 

OPENING STATEMENT OF MR. DICKS

Mr. DICKS. The committee will come to order. This afternoon, the 

committee will hold an open hearing on the posture of the Department of the Navy. We will focus on Navy and Marine Corps personnel, training, equipment readiness, and we will also touch on 

equipment acquisition issues to gain insights into the Department’s 

priorities and decision making. It will be extremely valuable to the 

committee to hear from Navy leadership about the fiscal year 2011 

budget, as well as their plans for the future years. Our discussions 

also may address Navy and Marine Corps supplemental budget requirements for the remainder of fiscal year 2010. 

We are pleased to welcome the Secretary of the Navy, Raymond 

Mabus, former governor, Chief of Naval Operations; Admiral Gary 

Roughead and the Commandant of the Marine Corps, General 

James Conway. These distinguished gentlemen comprise the Department of The Navy’s senior leadership team and they are well 

equipped to speak for the Department of the Navy regarding the 

Department’s current posture and the budget request for fiscal year 

2011. 

Secretary Mabus, Admiral Roughead, General Conway, thank 

you all for being here today. Our sailors and Marines are performing magnificently in Iraq, Afghanistan, across the world’s 

oceans and in many hot spots around the globe, and also in places 

where we have had some major earthquakes. In typical Navy and 

Marine Corps fashion, despite the difficult conditions in which they 

operate, we hear not a single complaint from these exceptional 

young men and women. We salute them. The members of this committee are dedicated to providing the resources and equipment that 

these sailors and Marines require to continue to defend our Nation 

on the high seas and on foreign shores. The committee is eager to 

hear what you consider to be the key issues facing the Department 

of the Navy and your strategy for addressing these issues. 

For instance, the Department is facing a large strike fighter 

shortfall in the very near term, which will ultimately mean there 


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will not be enough tactical aircraft to fill the decks of our carriers. 

That is worrisome to the committee since the carriers are the Nation’s most visible form of power projection. Even more concerning 

is that this is not a new issue. It has been creeping up on the Navy 

for several years. The Navy intends to manage this issue by doing 

such things as reducing the number of aircraft assigned to non-deployed squadrons and changing the order of transition of legacy aircraft squadrons into new aircraft. 

However, at the end of the day, none of the things that the Department is doing result in the procurement of additional strike 

fighter aircraft. In fact, the recent submission pushed out the final 

year of procurement of the Super Hornet F–18 aircraft to procure 

additional electronic attack aircraft, which only exacerbates the 

problem. The committee is also concerned with the nation’s shipbuilding program. To reach and sustain a force level of 300 ships, 

approximately 10 ships per year are required to be constructed, assuming a 30-year service life of those ships. However, the Navy has 

not constructed 10 or more ships in a single year since 1992. Over 

the last decade, you have averaged approximately seven new construction ships each year. This year’s submission shows the Navy 

plans to contruct 50 ships over the next 5 years which is encouraging; however the committee is somewhat skeptical as we have 

seen these promises of higher shipbuilding rates in the out years 

for the past several years, but they never seem to result in more 

ships. 

Gentlemen, we look forward to your testimony and to an informative question-and-answer session. Now, before we hear your testimony, I would like to ask Congressman Frelinghuysen if he has 

any comments and/or Mr. Lewis if he has any comments. 

REMARKS OF MR. FRELINGHUYSEN

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would also 

like to welcome our distinguished guests. Gentlemen, the Navy and 

the Marine Corps are the best equipped and best trained forces in 

the world, yet that does not mean that you are not facing significant challenges, as the fiscal year 2011 budget before us today 

highlights. The Navy has long been striving as the chairman said 

for a fleet size of 313 ships. Your budget funds only nine new ships. 

Although better than previous years it is still short of the minimum 10 to 11 ships needed to ultimately reach a 313-ship fleet. 

There is also a long-term risk being taken in our fast attack submarine fleet and the Marine Corps’s amphibious assault fleet that 

may be too much to bear. 

And still other challenges remain. While both services await the 

joint strike fighter which has only been further delayed, the budget 

does not address the significant fighter shortfall looming in the 

near future. While these are all significant challenges, I trust the 

Navy and Marine Corps will meet them head on and I look forward, as I am sure Mr. Lewis and all members do, to your testimony. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. DICKS. Mr. Secretary. 


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SUMMARY STATEMENT OF SECRETARY MABUS

Mr. MABUS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. To you, Mr. Chairman, 

to the distinguished members of this committee, it is a pleasure to 

be here today to testify with the House Appropriation Subcommittee on Defense. I would like to congratulate our new chairman today, and at the same time, remember the previous chairman 

who had such an impact on this committee and on the Navy and 

the Marines. 

Mr. DICKS. We thank you for that. 

Mr. MABUS. The CNO, the Commandant and I are very grateful 

for the commitment of the members of this committee, that they 

have shown to our men and women in uniform in the Navy and the 

Marine Corps. We are exceptionally proud to be here representing 

Sailors, Marines, civilians and their families who work in the Department. The Navy and Marine Corps remain the most formidable, expeditionary fighting force in the world, capable of global 

operations across the entire spectrum of warfare. Today, more than 

40 percent of our forces are deployed and over half of our fleet is 

at sea. 

In Helmand Province, Afghanistan, more than 16,000 Marines 

are engaged in major combat, counterinsurgency and engagement 

operations, including finishing up a successful effort to clear the 

Taliban’s stronghold of Marja. They are supported there by naval 

aircraft flying close air support from Eisenhower and our forward 

deployed expeditionary aviation assets. A total of 12,000 of our 

Sailors are on the ground in Iraq, Afghanistan and across the 

broader Middle East and another 9,000 Sailors and Marines are 

embarked on our ships at sea in Central Command. 

Off the coast of Africa, our ships are protecting international 

commerce over Somalia. Our ships are operating as partnership 

stations with our regional allies around Africa. Off the coast of 

South America, other ships are stemming the flow of illegal narcotics into the United States. Our ballistic missile defense forces 

are ready to defend against any threat, to international peace in 

Europe, the Middle East and the Pacific Rim. The Pacific Rim, 

where our forward deployed forces continue their role as a strategic 

buffer and a deterrent against rogue regimes and potential competitors alike. And in Haiti, today six ships and 1,200 Marines 

from the 22nd Marine Expeditionary Unit continue to provide humanitarian aid, medical assistance and disaster relief. The hospital 

ship COMFORT departed there after performing almost a thousand 

surgeries earlier this week. The Navy and Marine Corps are flexible, responsive and they are everywhere that our Nation’s interests 

are at stake. Our global presence reduces instability, deters aggression and allows us to rapidly respond to any crisis that borders the 

sea. 

I believe the President’s FY 2011 budget for the Department of 

the Navy is a carefully considered request that gives us the resources we need to conduct effective operations and meet all the 

missions we have been assigned. Our shipbuilding and aviation requests concur with the findings of the Quadrennial Defense Review 

(QDR) and its objectives of prevailing in today’s war, preventing 

conflict, preparing for future wars and preserving the force. 


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With this budget, the Navy and Marine Corps will continue to 

maintain the maritime superiority of our forces, sustain a strong 

American shipbuilding industrial base and ensure our capacity for 

rapid global response. Across the future year’s defense plan, we 

have requested the funds to build an average of 10 ships a year, 

including one carrier, one big deck amphib, 10 Virginia class submarines and 17 littoral combat ships. We will leverage the technologies captured from the cancelled CG(X) program and the truncated DDG 1000 program into what will become our flight 3 Burke 

class DDGs. These technologies include the SPY–3 and air and 

missile defense radar. 

Through the submitted shipbuilding plan we will increase the 

size of our fleet to approximately 320 ships in the early 2020s. In 

our shipbuilding program, I think we have made the most cost effective decisions to achieve the most capable force, one that 

achieves equal flexibility to confront missions across a spectrum of 

conflict, from the technically complex light ballistic missile defense 

and integrated air defense to low intensity humanitarian response 

and regional engagement. 

In aircraft procurement, we have requested just over 1,000 aircraft across the FYDP, including both fixed and rotary wing. Over 

the next year, the Navy and Marine Corps will continue to move 

ahead with changes to our acquisitions process. In compliance with 

the weapons systems acquisition reform, we are aggressively developing our acquisition strategies to ensure that on time and on 

budget become the standard for the Navy and Marine Corps. 

I am grateful for the support of this committee for the decision 

to recompete the LCS program when it failed to meet program 

standards. I assure you that we will not hesitate to recompete or 

cancel other programs when other substandard performance demands change. Change is also required to address the way in 

which the Navy and Marine Corps use and produce energy. Energy 

reform is an issue of national security and it is essential to maintaining our strategic advantage, warfighting effectiveness and tactical edge. By 2020, I have committed the Navy to generate half of 

all the energy we use from alternative sources. This is an ambitious goal, but a doable one. 

Forty years ago, I stood watch on the deck of the USS LITTLE 

ROCK as a very young junior officer. Today I have the solemn 

privilege of standing watch on behalf of our Navy and Marine 

Corps in a time of war. I am honored by the trust the President 

and the Congress have placed in me and fully recognize the solemn 

obligation I have to those that defend us. I, along with the CNO 

and the Commandant look forward to hearing your thoughts and 

answering your questions concerning our budget request, our programs and our policies. I also look forward to working closely with 

Congress as we move forward to sustain the Navy and Marine 

Corps as the most formidable expeditionary fighting force in the 

world. Thank you. 

[The statement of Secretary Mabus follows:] 


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Mr. DICKS. Admiral Roughead. 

SUMMARY STATEMENT OF ADMIRAL ROUGHEAD

Admiral ROUGHEAD. Chairman Dicks, Congressman Frelinghuysen and distinguished Members of the Committee, it is an 

honor to appear before you again today, and I echo the Secretary’s 

congratulations to you, Mr. Chairman, and as we recall the service 

and leadership of Chairman Murtha over his many years in service 

to our country. It is, indeed, my honor to be here representing more 

than 600,000 Sailors and Navy civilians and their families. 65,000 

of them are deployed, 12,000 on land and the Central Command 

area of operations and 55 percent of our Fleet is underway carrying 

out our maritime strategy, a prescient precursor to the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review. 

They are projecting power into Afghanistan, building partnerships in Africa, delivering relief in Haiti and providing ballistic 

missile defense in the Arabian Gulf, western Pacific and eastern 

Mediterranean with pride and determination. They are even deployed on the first Littoral Combat Ship 2 years ahead of schedule. 

And in the first weeks of that ship’s deployment, they have already 

seized nearly half a ton of cocaine. It is our Sailors and Navy civilians who make all things possible. 

And thanks to your support, we made important progress in 

building tomorrow’s Navy, remaining ready to fight today and supporting our Sailors, Navy civilians and families last year. This 

year’s budget submission will take us even further. As the high demand for our Navy continues apace, we have stabilized end 

strength and the tone of the force remains positive. We will continue to aggressively improve wellness programs and medical and 

social services for our Wounded Warriors, indeed for all who serve. 

Our Fleet, unlike other services, is a continuous deployed force 

that we reset in stride. Conducting routine, indeed regular maintenance and training is how our ships and aircraft reach their expected service lives. We increased our base budget and overseas 

contingency operation funding requests for operations and maintenance (O&M) in FY 2011 over last year. Our O&M requests are focused tightly on meeting increased OPTEMPO requirements, sustaining ships and aircraft to reach expected service lives, sustaining flying hour readiness requirements and funding price increases, notably in fuel. 

I strongly request your support for full O&M funding request. 

While we reset, we must also procure ships and aircraft to reach 

our requirement of more than 313 ships. Last year, we commissioned nine ships and over the next decade our plan procures an 

average of 10 ships per year, significant growth for the near term. 

For aviation, I remain committed to bringing new capabilities on 

line, the Joint Strike Fighter and unmanned aircraft. And to maintaining the readiness of our current Naval Air Force, all of which 

give our Nation flexibility and response unencumbered by overseas 

basing. 

Affordability for all of our plans will remain fundamental to our 

decisions. The effectiveness of our unmanned systems, ships and 

aircraft is a feature of the systems which connect them. Last year, 

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formation Dominance Directorate within the Navy staff and commissioned Fleet Cyber Command 10th Fleet. I see the benefits of 

this already. I am proud of our Navy’s accomplishments last year, 

and I am confident we can achieve more with this year’s budget 

submission. 

Our risk continues to trend towards significant and achieving the 

right balance within and across my priorities remains critical to 

mitigating it. But I remain optimistic because of our outstanding 

Sailors and Navy civilians and the spirit of our Nation. We have 

seen more challenging times and emerged prosperous, secure and 

free. I ask you to support our FY 2011 budget request and thank 

you for all you do to make the United States Navy a global force 

for good today and into the future. 

[The statement of Gary Roughead follows:] 


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Mr. DICKS. General Conway. And before you start, I just want to 

thank you for your remarks at Mr. Murtha’s funeral. They were 

well received. 

SUMMARY STATEMENT OF GENERAL CONWAY

General CONWAY. Thank you, sir. And with your indulgence, I 

would also observe that it is a bit unusual to be in this room and 

not see John Murtha somewhere near the center of that desk. But 

as I am sure he told his Marines many times, we the living have 

to collect our casualties, honor the fallen, reorganize and move out 

to accomplish the mission. And it is in that sense, I think, we convene the hearing today. 

Mr. DICKS. Thank you. 

General CONWAY. Sir, and distinguished members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to report to you on the posture of your Marine Corps. My pledge, as it has been over the 

years, is to provide you today a candid and honest assessment. 

Having recently returned from a trip to theater, I am pleased to 

report to you on the magnificent performance of Marines and Sailors in combat. If you count the 4-year enlistment as a generation 

of Marines, we are now experiencing our third generation of great 

young patriots since our Nation was provoked on 9/11. The first 

generation broke trail, leading strikes into Afghanistan and Iraq. 

The second generation quelled the once volatile province of 

Anbar. Today there are less Marines in Iraq, but our third generation has more than 16,000 serving in Afghanistan. Your Marines 

are fighting a skilled and determined enemy, but with the Afghan 

security forces, they are once again proving that they are the 

strongest tribe in the Taliban stronghold of Helmand. Let me assure you from what the Sergeant Major and I witnessed firsthand, 

the highest morale in the Corps resides in those units that are 

posted in Afghanistan. 

My written statement to the committee provides a snapshot of 

the Corps and describes our near-term focus, long-term priorities 

and our vision of the future. That vision matches closely the results 

of the QDR. The Secretary of Defense seeks to create a U.S. military more closely focused on hybrid threats, yet capable of responding to a major level contingency. That combination essentially describes the Marine Corps that we have built today, a Corps that 

we call a two fisted fighter, able to perform equally well in a counterinsurgency or in a high intensity combined arms fight. 

Our resource expenditures, moreover, reflect our dual or swing 

capacity, that is to say that 100 percent of Marine Corps equipment can be used in a hybrid conflict or in a major fight. Equipment procurement is indeed our primary concern as we look at the 

FY 2011 budget and beyond. Our requirements for equipment density in Afghanistan and our resolve to reestablish our maritime 

preposition squadrons have driven equipment stocks to an all-time 

low in our operating forces at home station. The ability to properly 

train for deployment and certainly the ability to respond to an unexpected contingency is at significant risk based on this increasing 

shortfall. 

Congress has promised us resources for reset and reconstitution, 

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ghanistan for such an effort to begin. We ask for your help in this 

critical area. Our military construction accounts in the FY 2011 

budget and the FYDP are sufficient to help maintain a promise we 

have made to our Marines, that they will have quality living spaces 

while home between deployments. 

One need only visit some of our major bases and stations to realize that we waited too long to begin the effort. Similarly, we believe 

that even in wartime we must continue a heavy emphasis on education of our officers and staff Non-Commissioned Officers (NCOs). 

A strong reservoir of strategic and operational thinkers is a must 

on sophisticated joint and combined battlefields. Therefore a quality Marine Corps University with facilities to match our already 

world class student body, faculty and curriculum is a major priority. We trust that you will receive—that we will receive your full 

support for our MILCON investments that will repay huge dividends in the years to come. Ladies and gentlemen of the committee, I must admit my own surprise that our Corps of Marines 

and their families have remained so resilient over these 9 years of 

conflict. 

They have been incredibly determined, loyal and courageous in 

an effort to see these two wars to a successful close. Much of the 

credit goes to you in the Congress for providing them with the finest in terms of equipment, warrior care, quality of life for families 

and compensation. The number one question in the minds of our 

troops is always is the country behind us? The Members of Congress have answered that question in spades, both by your apportionment of the nation’s precious resources and also through your 

personal efforts to visit the troops in theater and see our wounded 

at Bethesda and Walter Reed. As a result of the above and the natural tendency for Marines to stick around for a fight, our recruitment and retention are at all-time highs. 

I predict that for the second year in a row, we will close out reenlistment opportunities for the first term and the career force 

halfway through the fiscal year. Clearly, such a phenomenon would 

not be possible if Marines and their families were not happy in the 

service of their country. One day this long war with terrorists and 

Islamic extremists will be over. Your Marine Corps will cease being 

a second land army and will gladly rejoin our Navy brothers 

aboard amphibious ships in order to project America’s global presence, demonstrate American goodwill and if need be, protect America’s vital interests. 

Until that day comes however, for your Corps as we say ‘‘to do 

windows;’’ that is, we will continue to take aboard the indomitable 

youth of America and make them Marines with the absolute conviction that as a result they will one day be better citizens. We will 

be trained and equally as prepared to route Taliban fighters in 

Marja as we are to feed beleaguered Haitians outside Port-auPrince. 

With your continued support and that of our loyal countrymen, 

we will do whatever the Nation asks us to do and do it exceedingly 

well. Thank you, sir. And I look forward to your questions. 

[The statement of General Conway follows:] 


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MARINE CORPS SUICIDES

Mr. DICKS. I just had a chance with four members of this subcommittee and two members of the Appropriations Committee to be 

in Afghanistan and Pakistan. And I was very impressed by the operation in Marja and we will have to see how the governance phase 

of this takes over and how well the Karzai government can do in 

reestablishing itself in the area. But I think the Marines did an 

outstanding job and I know we have all of the services involved in 

an operation like this. And you have another operation coming up 

in Kandahar which is a much bigger operation. But I want to compliment you on the work of the Marines and I can remember with 

Mr. Lewis being over there—right before we started in Iraq and— 

in—I guess it was 2003—when you were leading the Marines into 

Baghdad. 

So we appreciate your leadership and the great work that you 

have done and we think the Marine Corps is in outstanding shape. 

Let me ask you this: This is one sensitive issue, General Conway. 

In recent years, the number of suicides in the Marine Corps has 

continued to increase, which reflects a very disturbing trend. I 

know this is an issue that you take very seriously, can you tell us 

what you are trying to do? I know the Army takes this seriously. 

I am sure the Navy does too, but maybe doesn’t have the same 

level of problem. Mainly it is people that have been in combat 

where this issue is focused. So could you tell us what your thoughts 

are on this? 

General CONWAY. Thank you, sir, for your comments regarding 

the Marines in Marja. I will certainly make sure that that gets 

passed along. With regard to suicide, sir, it is an incredibly perplexing issue because our trend lines are all in the wrong direction. 

You are exactly right. For 2008, we had 42 suicides, which was a 

high watermark for us, and last year we had 52. So we are turned 

on to it as a very serious problem and we are actually attacking 

it, I think, through a number of ways. There are studies, but our 

view is that studies take too long. We have turned immediately to 

a program that uses our NCOs to teach other NCOs and Marines 

on what the indicators are. We have gone back to try to analyze 

those suicides that we have had. The factor that we see, I think, 

most as a corollary, is failed relationships. 

Of the 42 that we had in 2008, 35, we believe, came as a result 

of a failed relationship, a loss of a wife or potentially a girlfriend. 

I say that because they are almost exclusively male. And we believe that that 24-hour leadership, the young NCOs are the first 

that would see a behavior that would indicate that there is a problem and can start to do something about it. 

So we have trained those people. We have created videos. They 

have created scenarios, if you will, in some pretty raw language to 

get the point across. But it is well received by the troops when they 

are instructed. And that is I think probably our cornerstone effort. 

Again, there are many other approaches that we are trying to institute that we think will also help. Every Marine remembers the 

names of his three drill instructors. He will take it to the grave. 

So we are using those people from the very beginning to be talking 

about this suicide tendency that we see and that it is, in fact, not 


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very Marine like not to use your fire team, not to use your buddies 

to help you with a problem that you face. Seek others’ perspective 

and advice and help them to help you is another approach. We certainly have increased the staff and the counseling that is available 

at local bases and stations, but, sir, I would say we are hinging a 

lot on the success of our NCO effort. 

IMPROVISED EXPLOSIVE DEVICES

Mr. DICKS. I hope it works. Let me ask you—Admiral Mullen, I 

think about a week ago, as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, said that 

if somebody is involved in an Improvised Explosive Device (IED) 

explosion, that they would be taken out of combat for a period of 

time, like 24 hours to observe them so that you wouldn’t get in a 

situation where somebody might be in an IED explosion on one day 

and the then the next day another one because apparently at least 

he feels that that is a problem. What do you think of his—I know 

it only affects a very small number of people, but what do you 

think of that? 

General CONWAY. Sir, Admiral Mullen is giving voice to a program we have had in effect for probably 21⁄2 years now. We categorize people who are in an explosion, Cat 1, Cat 2, Cat 3. And 

then depending upon what category they are in, they either don’t 

go out at all, they may be able to go out within 48 hours. The level 

of treatment varies. But we are very conscious of that. In fact, the 

Commanders in Afghanistan have a program called three strikes, 

and you are in. If you endure three IED strikes, then you don’t go 

outside the wire after that because we know as a result of our studies and what the Naval doctors have given us that the brain simply 

needs rest in the wake of even a mild concussion. 

TRAUMATIC BRAIN INJURIES

Mr. DICKS. Mr. Secretary, do you want to comment on this, or 

Admiral Roughead? 

Mr. MABUS. The other thing we are trying to do on these traumatic brain injuries is do a baseline before people are deployed so 

that we will know how far they have moved off of that baseline to 

determine what category of injury they have suffered and what 

level of treatment that they need. We also do these checks when 

they come back to see if there are hidden traumatic brain injuries 

that simply haven’t been picked up. But I think that it is very safe 

to say that for the Marine Corps and for the Navy, that we are absolutely focused on this, on Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) 

for people in theater. And, in fact, I spent a good part of yesterday 

evening and last night at Bethesda. And a couple of the Marines 

I saw were there as a result of TBI and they are getting incredibly 

good care. And the earlier you can diagnose a traumatic brain injury in the field if possible, the better care and the better results 

you are going to get. 

Admiral ROUGHEAD. And I agree with the Commandant. All of us 

have been following the protocols that the Commandant described. 

But on the topic of suicide, no service is immune. I am not getting 

out in front of my headlights on this, but for the first time since 

we have been keeping records as a result of some of the efforts that 

we have been put into this in January we had zero suicides. We 


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have never had that before. In February, two less than last year. 

And so far this month, no suicides. It is a question of leadership, 

it is a question of awareness, it is a question of destigmatizing. 

So I am encouraged by what we are seeing right now and we 

really in the last 3 months, have seen a downturn which is a first 

over many, many months. So we are very encouraged with the programs that we put into place. 

Mr. DICKS. Do we try to work with the families? Because this is 

part—as you suggested, it is a relationship issue, then trying to 

work with the families—I know you all do that very, very well. But 

is that part of your strategy? 

Admiral ROUGHEAD. Yes, sir, it is the families, as the Commandant said, a common theme is relationships. You mix that with 

alcohol and you put a gun in the mix and 75 percent of the time 

that is the common trio that will produce such an unfortunate outcome. But it is the families, it is shipmates, it is an awareness of 

what is going on around you and your shipmates and that is where 

we are bringing all of our programs to bear. And as I said, I am 

encouraged by what I am seeing. 

Mr. DICKS. Mr. Frelinghuysen. 

F–35 OPERATING COSTS

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Thank you Mr. Chairman. I echo the chairman’s comments. The Marine family really looks after its Marines. 

It is a wonderful model. I got myself in hot water in another caucus. I did serve in the Army by saying that the Marines really look 

after those families. It is a wonderful model for all of our services, 

to follow. Part of our posture review, and both the chairman and 

I have mentioned it. We need more ships, we need more subs. Combat aircraft could do—focus for a minute—the Marine—you have— 

you are part of the joint strike—you are going to have your version 

of the Joint Strike Fighter, the Navy is going to have it. 

We had a hearing a couple of weeks ago, we had Admiral 

Philman, I believe, and General Scott from the Air Force. And I 

asked a question and I must say the response was a little unclear, 

the whole issue of what we call fully burdened costs associated 

with that program. There have been delays in the program, but 

there is also quite a lot of speculation and I apparently—quite a 

lot of evidence that the cost of operation into the future is considerably significant and has to be figured in to all of what you do. And 

I suppose this is sort of addressed to you, Admiral Roughead. 

Admiral ROUGHEAD. Yes, sir. There is no question that I have 

been spending a lot of time on total ownership costs not just on airplanes, but on ships. I think it is important that that be a factor 

in our procurement decisions, but I will also tell you that we are 

kind of in the fledgling state of how do we get our arms around 

of how to project these out, do we have the right costing experts 

and that is not something where we as a service have been in the 

past. But we clearly have to look at that. I would say that in the 

case of the Joint Strike Fighter, we are still in the early, early development stages of that aircraft and we are trying to work 

through what the likely total ownership costs are going to be on 

that airplane. And to date, I have not been able to completely have 

a good confident assessment of what that is. But again, we are 


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early in that process and we will continue to work on that as we 

introduce the airplane. 

STRIKE FIGHTER SHORTFALL

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. The expression that comes to mind, we are 

flying the wings off our aircraft. They are always up there, always 

under pressure. All of our assets are under pressure. There is talk 

obviously of a gap here. How do we meet that gap given what we 

see to be the delays with the Joint Strike Fighter? 

Admiral ROUGHEAD. Sir, we, in the past years, as we have been 

looking at what the strike fighter requirements are for the Navy 

have been managing that inventory very carefully by doing a lot of 

individual management of airframes and how those airframes are 

used, depending on the health of a particular airframe. We have 

also made adjustments in our squadrons. We have transitioned 

some squadrons early. We have used some of the attrition aircraft 

that were in the procurement because we have seen that—particularly in the case of the Es and Fs, we are not seeing the attrition 

rates that were assumed at the front end of that program. 

We will continue to manage the Fleet and as we get into next 

year’s budget, look at life extension programs for some of the earlier Hornets that we purchased, the As through Ds. And that will 

be part of our way of managing the inventory until we get to the 

Joint Strike Fighter, which is clearly an airplane that the United 

States Navy needs to have on its flight decks for the types of operations and environments that we are going to operate in in the future. 

General CONWAY. Sir, as I think you are aware, we haven’t 

bought a fighter bomber aircraft now in about 11 years and so we 

are very excited about the arrival of the Joint Strike Fighter. And 

I guess I have got to say in a period of some relatively somber news 

on the aircraft, we are hearing some encouraging things I think 

that will involve total life cycle costs and potentially some of the 

peripheral costs associated with the aircraft. Our informal studies 

show that heat and noise and blast are all in the general range of 

the legacy aircraft. 

So we are encouraged by that and we will further those tests certainly. We have got three aircraft at Pax River right now under developmental flight. And it is my belief and I advised the Secretary 

yesterday that we are within one or two test flights of vertical 

launch, which is a big deal for the Joint Strike Fighter STOVL 

(Short Takeoff or vertical landing) variant. So we are hanging on 

to that 2012 IOC for our aircraft again because we desperately 

need it. 

We will have a shortfall. It was 87 aircraft yesterday. It may be 

88 today because we lost one last night. The pilots got out fine. 

Anyway, we see through the mitigation procedures that CNO 

talked about and some other things that we can do that we can 

manage our way through it successfully notwithstanding the potential for a major contingency. 

Mr. DICKS. Mr. Visclosky. 


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F–35 ALTERNATE ENGINE

Mr. VISCLOSKY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Admiral, we had the 

Air Force Chief of Staff in yesterday. In one of the discussions following up on the discussion about the Joint Strike Fighter is the 

issue of the alternate engine. The Air Force indicated that they 

would be the only purchaser and that there would not be purchasers overseas or the Navy was included as far as the alternate 

engine. You are sitting here now and I would like to ask you, is 

that the Navy’s position? 

Admiral ROUGHEAD. Yes, sir, we do not desire an alternate engine. And our rationale is that we deploy in some very confined 

containers, if you will, our aircraft carriers and our large deck amphibious ships. So we want to be as compact as we can and a single 

engine is the best interest of the Navy. It is also consistent with 

every aircraft that we have in our inventory. They are all single 

engine or single manufacturer engines with our entire Naval Air 

Force. So this is consistent with how we have deployed in the past 

and it is really a function of being as efficient as we can in our deployment model, which is how we use the Navy. 

Mr. VISCLOSKY. In the not too distant past, did you have a mix 

of aircraft and a mix of engines on carriers? 

Admiral ROUGHEAD. Not to my knowledge, no, sir. 

SHIPBUILDING

Mr. VISCLOSKY. I would like to ask you about shipbuilding. I 

have the program for fiscal year 2008 and I have got the chart for 

the outyears for 2009, and I have got the chart for 2011. In 2008— 

and it is my understanding that in September, you indicated that 

313 ships is a floor, implying that it is a minimum. We were going 

to be at a 313 ship Navy in 2016. That was as of fiscal year 2008. 

In 2009, we were going to be at a 313 ship Navy in 2019. This year 

we are going to be there in 2020. This is the first year since 1992 

we will have 9 ships on order. And the chart continues to go to the 

right. Why should I have any belief that the chart that was submitted to the committee this year isn’t going to move off the chart 

in 2012? 

Admiral ROUGHEAD. Sir, I believe that the shipbuilding plan that 

we have in place in this budget submission puts us on the trajectory to that 313 floor. I would submit that this plan also is somewhat different in that if you look at the product lines that we have, 

we are now down to the two submarines per year which we set out 

do to bring those within cost. We have restarted the DDG 51 line, 

which is a ship that we know how to build that we have many in 

our inventory. 

So we can be sure of what that production is. We know how to 

build that ship. We have built tens of those ships. We already have 

62 in the inventory. We are in the process of down selecting 2 Littoral Combat Ships both of which are at sea, and both of which we 

see as operationally satisfactory and now it is to drive to one variant so that we can begin to build those in numbers at an affordable 

price. 

We are in the process of building the Joint High Speed Vessel 

which we are holding the cost on that because we are absolutely 


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ruthless in containing the requirements on that ship. We are building the amphibious ships that are in the plan. So I would submit 

that this plan is a much more stable from a design perspective 

than perhaps we have had in the past. 

Mr. VISCLOSKY. Indicating that you might see an increase of 

units in the same ship and you would have a lower cost, would you 

then imply that you would get to the 313 ship Navy without an appreciable increase in your budget request in the next out years? 

Admiral ROUGHEAD. Sir, we believe that we have properly costed 

the ships. I think that as we have worked on the plan with the acquisition executive, that we have some realistic costs and I have 

confidence in this plan. 

Mr. VISCLOSKY. If I recall, and I stand to be corrected, to be there 

in 2010 dollars, you would have to average about 20 billion a year. 

Am I correct in that assumption? In current dollars, it is about 14.7 

billion. That is where you are today? 

Mr. MABUS. Yes, to do that. 

Mr. VISCLOSKY. In those constant dollars, does that get you there 

in 2020 or in those constant dollars are we talking closer to 20 billion a year? 

Mr. MABUS. In constant dollars. If you will look at the 30-year 

plan for the first 10 years, we are at a little under 15 billion. It 

goes up in the second 10 years because of the SSBN recapitalization. 

COMMON HULL FORMS

Mr. VISCLOSKY. As far as cost containment in your discussion 

about the common hull form, why is it not a requirement to consider a common hull form and alternative analysis if you are talking about the hospital ship and combat ship program? That is 

something the Navy is looking at, but it is not a requirement to 

judge the alternative cost by looking at that common hull to keep 

your costs under control? 

Admiral ROUGHEAD. That is one of the things that I believe is 

in this plan that we put together, sir. It is a very common hull with 

a large combatant, the DDG, when we downselect to the LCS common hull. There is nothing in the plan to currently recapitalize the 

hospital ships. Our auxiliary ships, the T–AKEs, that is a constant 

plan. So our approach has been to drive toward commonality in 

hulls wherever we can, because I do believe that is the best way 

that we can minimize costs. 

Mr. VISCLOSKY. Do you think on the issue of common hull, that 

will be a common requirement as far as the alternative analysis? 

Admiral ROUGHEAD. I may be misunderstanding the question, 

sir. My objective is to, whenever possible, to look at and certain applications be done with hulls that we are already building and then 

deviate from that because I think we can save money by doing 

that. But we also have mission requirements to consider. And in 

some cases, that might not be possible. Since I have been CNO, my 

focus has been on driving to a common hull whenever we can. 

Mr. VISCLOSKY. I am reasonably certain that next year that chart 

is not going to slide to the right. 

Admiral ROUGHEAD. I have confidence in the plan that we put 

forward this time because of the consistency and the stability in 


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the designs that we have and in the way that we have properly 

costed the ships. So I have confidence in this plan, sir. 

Mr. VISCLOSKY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Admiral. 

DDG–51 MAIN REDUCTION GEAR

Mr. DICKS. Thank you. Let me just ask one quick little question 

at this point. Mr. Secretary, the committee understands there is 

currently no provider for the DDG–51 Main Reduction Gear, which 

is a central component in the construction of the ship. What are we 

going to do about it? Is there a plan to do something about this? 

Mr. MABUS. Yes, sir. There was a gap in the DDG 51 procurement as you know, and we have recently restarted that line. That 

is going to require a recapitalization not only of the main supplier, 

but also some of the subsupplier base to reach out and make sure 

that happens, but we have been working with the manufacturers, 

the two shipyards that make the DDG 51s to make sure that the 

supplier base that they rely on are there and it is one of the things 

that we looked at in this plan to make sure that we had the industrial base requirements in there to have those very specific skills 

that you need for things like you mentioned for the DDG 51. 

Mr. DICKS. Are you comfortable with the fact we are going to be 

able to get a main reduction gear? 

Mr. MABUS. Yes, sir, I am. 

Mr. DICKS. Mr. Lewis. 

MINE ROLLERS

Mr. LEWIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Secretary, Admiral, 

General, welcome. It is a pleasure to be with you. I believe this is 

for you, General. In your unfunded mandates lists, there is a $38 

million item that relates to the mine roller system. As I understand 

it, it really is designed as an asset that helps deal with IEDs. 

Could you update the committee relative to the significance of that 

system and what happens if we don’t fund the unfunded? 

General CONWAY. Sir, if we don’t fund it, we will be okay. But 

we have done some discovery learning about that system in Afghanistan since we developed the budget. We have lost 38 of the 

mine rollers over that period of time. They are very effective at 

what they do and they blow up sufficiently in front of the Marines 

that we receive very few casualties. We have a stockage on hand 

and we will certainly have them in our baseline budget next year. 

But with the loss and with the value and with the desire to create 

a robust kind of backup capability, we have put it on the unfunded 

list. 

EXPEDITIONARY FIGHTING VEHICLE

Mr. LEWIS. Thank you for that. The Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle is the replacement for the Amphibious Assault Vehicle as I understand it. It has had a troubled past with developmental and reliability problems. Can you update the committee relative to where 

we are? 

General CONWAY. Yes, sir, I can. You are right, sir, we did reliability tests strangely enough on vehicles that were past their service life expectancy a few years ago. I never understood why or how 


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we did that, but that is where we are. We now have procured seven 

new vehicles that have the mods, the product improvements on 

them that we discovered from our reliability testing. They are 

being produced by the plant out in Ohio for delivery spring through 

summer of this year. It is our belief, based on some computer testing and some encouragements, that it is going to fare pretty well. 

The agreement that we have with the Secretary of Defense and 

with this committee is that we will do the necessary field testing, 

put them against the KPs that are well established. And if successful, we will ask for a full level of procurement. If not, the Marine 

Corps will kill the program and look for alternatives. 

STRIKE FIGHTER SHORTFALL

Mr. LEWIS. Mr. Secretary, sometime ago I had a very interesting 

series of discussions with a number of leaders in the military about 

where we were going with tactical aircraft and at the time we were 

on three avenues leading down three different pathways. I don’t 

want to mention who the Commandant was who talked to me 

about the fact that we might look at those systems and see where 

our priorities are. But I am curious about what you all see as the 

challenges ahead of us. Do we have time to wait for the development of the JSF and indeed presume that between now and then 

we may well be equipped enough to not have to—or not believe 

that we are going to be challenged air to air or air to ground until 

JSF comes along. Help the committee understand just exactly 

where you think we are currently in the—— 

Mr. MABUS. I think to echo what the CNO said earlier, that up 

until this point, Navy and Marine Corps have been managing the 

tactical air assets that we have very well, doing stuff like bringing 

aircraft out of our attrition squadrons, speeding up the introduction 

of the Es and the Fs into the force. We also in this budget—and 

if you count FY 2010—are buying an additional 124 F–18s, E, Fs 

and Gs to go into our Fleet. There are ways to manage the aircraft 

that we have and the aircraft that we are going to get between now 

and 2013. 

As the CNO said, in preparing next year’s budget, one of the 

things we are going to have to look at is service life extension programs for some of our legacy aircraft. How many that will be and 

what the business case is for doing that will require the rest of this 

year to answer those questions in terms of the ramp for the JSF, 

and as we receive it and also the success of the service life assessment programs that are currently going on now. But at this point, 

we understand what the situation is. We are using the tools that 

we have and we feel that we can successfully manage this as the 

JSF comes on line. 

Mr. LEWIS. Well, thank you with that, Admiral. I am very concerned that this entire panel have the sense there is going to be 

huge pressure developing out there in terms of your budget futures. 

There is not any doubt that the call for money all across the board 

is increasing at levels that are disconcerting to those who care 

about our national strength and national security. I would hope 

that you would help us. You can’t very well do it with what is 

available before you at this point in time. But I would hope that 

there is a level of communication that has you understand that this 


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committee stands very strongly behind making sure those dollars 

flow in an effective way. But don’t kid yourself, there is going to 

be lots of pressure to put your money somewhere else. But thanks 

for being here. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. DICKS. Mr. Moran. 

EXPEDITIONARY FIGHTING VEHICLE

Mr. MORAN. Thanks very much, Mr. Chairman. Let me ask General Conway about the Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle (EFV) because some of the numbers are troubling. The GAO has informed 

us the total estimated research and development costs jumped from 

$1.5 billion to $3.6 billion and the average unit cost rose from $8 

million to $23 million. It is one of the only programs that Secretary 

Gates hasn’t gone after because he has gone after other programs 

that he felt while they were superb programs they just weren’t 

coming in on time and on budget and we had limited money. 

This budget submission shows that the Marine Corps made the 

decision in coordination with the Navy to slide procurement of the 

EFVs for one year. And since its inception, the major program review cut the number of EFVs to be purchased from over a thousand 

to just over 500, 573. And now we understand it may go to below 

500. And, of course, that has a profound impact on the unit cost. 

The total original cost estimate for the program was $7 billion it 

is now $16 billion, more than twice as much. The program spent 

$3 billion, not including the current request for an additional 250. 

It is a breach of the Nunn-McCurdy limits. Now, I am sure you are 

aware of those facts. Do you want to address them for the record? 

And particularly as the significance or the importance of the EFV 

in the combat situation we are in now? 

General CONWAY. Yes, sir. Sir, the only figure I think that you 

cited there that is new to me is the $23 million unit cost. We are 

projecting down in a range about 16. I hope it doesn’t get to 23. 

But in any event, that is the only new fact that I think you referenced. Sir, we see the program as being absolutely essential to 

our ability to do what the Nation asks us to do and that is ensure 

access in an anti-access environment. There is a lot of blue on that 

map of the arc of instability and our Nation has been fortunate the 

last couple of fights we have been in there has been a nation next 

door that allowed us to build the iron mountain, amass the forces 

across the border. 

We don’t think that is always going to be the case. In an antiaccess environment, the Navy doctrine—and I certainly support 

it—is that they won’t go closer than about 25 miles to another nation’s shoreline for the risk that is involved to ship, Sailors and 

Marines. So we have to bridge that distance and that gap. And our 

current vehicle, which is a good vehicle, a good armored personnel 

carrier as well as good amphib, only goes 5 to 6 miles in the water. 

So that makes it, I think, not viable really in that kind of environment. When we breached Nunn-McCurdy, Secretary Mabus’ predecessor, and I looked at options within industry to see if there was 

someplace else we could go for a different type of vehicle or something that could better define the requirement. 

And because it is on the leading edge of technology, an armored 

personnel carrier that goes 25 miles an hour, there was just nobody 


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else that could do it. So we continue, sir, with what we have got. 

We hope and work hard and pray that the problems have been 

fixed and that we can keep the costs tamped down. We will buy 

the minimum number of vehicles necessary to get the job done 

based upon the mission that the nation gives us and see what falls 

out of it all. 

Mr. MORAN. I understand, General. And I don’t want to be argumentative here, but I do think we ought to get this on the record. 

Secretary Gates was at least implicitly critical of the program and 

suggested in a recent news conference—well, it must have been 

last year—that the EFV had not learned that combat lessons such 

that need to be learned such as the need for a V shaped bottom. 

Do you want to address that? 

General CONWAY. Yes, sir, briefly. Sir, the Secretary made similar comments about the entirety of the amphibious fleet, but case 

studies during the QDR showed that in fact amphibious ships and 

what they offer are of tremendous value to the Department. And 

so I think that is at least in part in his decision to continue with 

where we are on the EFV and amphibs at large. So we go from 

there. We have had a blast test, I might add, very recently compared against a midgrade MRAP that showed the vehicle much 

more sustainable even with a flat bottom than I think we anticipated. So there is a bit of good news already with the development 

of these additional seven vehicles. 

Mr. MORAN. I understand further developmental work is 

being—— 

Mr. DICKS. Would you yield just for a second? 

Mr. MORAN. Yes. 

Mr. DICKS. Mr. Secretary, we would like to hear from you on 

this, too. What is your perspective here? 

Mr. MABUS. As the Commandant said, we have had some encouraging news in terms of the blast survivability, even before you put 

the applique armor on there. But as I said in my opening statement, if programs don’t perform the way they should and if they— 

the budget ramp is too steep and the performance is not up to par, 

we, the Department of the Navy, the Department of the Marine 

Corps, will not hesitate to kill it and seek an alternative. 

Mr. DICKS. You are just getting seven new vehicles, right? 

Mr. MABUS. We have—— 

Mr. DICKS. This is going to be kind of a key moment, right, to 

test these out, to see if improvements are made and then you are 

going to have a moment of truth where you decide whether you go 

forward or not? Is that—— 

General CONWAY. Absolutely, correct, Mr. Chairman. There are 

five KPs that will determine that for us that will be I think engaged over the next 18 months or so. And if it does not pass those 

KPs successfully, then we don’t have the vehicle that we need. If 

it does, if they do, then we would again argue for full procurement. 

Mr. MORAN. One knowledge point you are going to have to get through is the staff’s estimate is $23 million per unit, but we need 

to work that out because normally we defer to staff. 

Mr. DICKS. In my notes here, it is $7.1 to $16 billion, cost of the 

total program. 

Mr. MORAN. Yeah, the total program. But it is $23 million per. 


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Mr. DICKS. Okay. I got you. 

V–22 MEDEVAC VARIANT

Mr. MORAN. And the General was saying that is not accurate. So 

we will get after it, the numbers. You have got the same numbers 

I do, yeah. General, a question about the Osprey. Given that the 

Marines typically operate at long distance from medical facilities, 

do you think that a MedEvac variant of the V–22 would be a 

worthwhile effort? 

General CONWAY. Sir, I do. I think that what we are discovering 

with the capability of that airplane to really consolidate the battlefield, make great distances much closer, I would encourage consideration on part of those that have that mission for the long haul. 

We are certainly using it today to ferry patients from Helmand to 

Bagram with regard to the medical regulation procedures within 

theater and it is very effective for that. 

Mr. MORAN. Okay. Good. I will let the chairman move onto the 

next series of questions. I do want to say it is nice to see Secretary 

Mabus in that position. I didn’t have the heart to throw you any 

hardballs, so I didn’t. But nice to have all three of you here. Thank 

you. 

Mr. MABUS. I thank you on several levels, sir. 

Mr. MORAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. DICKS. Mr. Tiahrt. 

PERSONNEL TRANSPORT IN THEATER

Mr. TIAHRT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you all for your 

service to the country. It means a lot to us and we don’t say it 

enough. I want to bring to the committee’s attention, 2 of the 11 

unfunded projects in the Marine Corps budget and ask you about 

them, General. The first one is the UC–12W extended range Hawker Beechcraft King Air 350ER. And the second one is the UC–35 

extended range Cessna sovereign. Could you please tell the committee the military value and the requirements for the two programs? 

General CONWAY. Sir, those are what we call OSA aircraft. And 

frankly, if I were to categorize all of our listings on the UPL, they 

would be at the bottom of the list. That said, what we find is that 

our commanders, our staffs, our Marines who need transportation 

around theater, especially in the Pacific, find that the aircraft that 

we are using today just do not have the legs to get the numbers 

of people that we need to the locations where they need to go. 

So it is not something that I would suggest to this committee 

that you provide in lieu of those budget items that we have in the 

fiscal year 2011 budget. We will look after it next year in the baseline and it will compete and we will see if they come to pass. And 

as we asked our commanders for things that they thought ought 

to be included on that UPL, this was one that came forward from 

our Pacific Command. 

Mr. TIAHRT. I appreciate it. Mr. Chairman, that is all I have. 

Mr. DICKS. Ms. Kaptur. 


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THREAT NAVAL FORCES

Ms. KAPTUR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for your 

service to our country. And my first question has to do, Secretary 

Mabus or Admiral Roughead, that as you look at the other navies 

in the world, and you think about how we compare, I know we are 

the best, but could you talk a little bit about comparative advantage and how you really see our Navy position versus other countries’ navies and how you would rank them? 

Mr. MABUS. Well, to answer the last part of that question first, 

I would rank us number one with a bullet and I think we are unsurpassed in—— 

Ms. KAPTUR. Who is number 2? 

Mr. MABUS. I am not sure who number 2 is frankly. The CNO 

may have a better—there is a number of countries that have embarked on naval building capacity, Russia, China, India, Japan. I 

may be missing someone here, Korea, who all have varying capabilities. But the one thing that most of them have in common is 

they are building regional fleets, fleets for their home waters or 

waters within their geographical vicinity. We have a Global Fleet 

which I think we have to maintain with the capabilities that that 

Global Fleet gives us. Some of the new missions that we have been 

given include ballistic missile defense, which we believe the AEGIS 

system that we have today is the best ballistic missile defense system that America has or that the world has and that this is a capability that we believe we can shoulder as a fleet and still do the 

other jobs that we have. 

Ms. KAPTUR. Well, Mr. Secretary and Admiral Roughead, if you 

could send me an article or review of how you look at the world 

from your perspective as Navy, I would really appreciate it. And if 

you want to count the number of ships, the type of vessel, the type 

of capabilities, I am very interested in Russia, very interested in 

east Asia and just relative comparison. You must have a grid in 

your own minds that only you have based on your years of experience, but I am interested in understanding some of that myself. So 

I appreciate it very much. I have to say I am very impressed with 

your testimony and the fact that all of you gentlemen have referenced the importance of energy and U.S. security and you are 

making real efforts inside Navy, inside Marine Corps to help pull 

our country forward. 

FUEL EFFICIENCIES AND SAVINGS

In addition to what you submitted for the record, I would be very 

interested in how what you say generally is reflected in either savings in your budgets or projections for savings both on base as well 

as procurement of various fuels. Are you at a point where you can 

definitively say that based on what you have done today, you are 

actually saving dollars that you can move to other operations now 

or are you not that far along? I am looking for some measure of 

what your goals are. 

Mr. MABUS. I can. We are there in some programs. I will give 

you two quick examples. We have a noncombat fleet of vehicles of 

about 50,000. Those vehicles turn over about every 5 years. The 

fleet does. We have changed the type of vehicles we are buying. We 


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are buying more hybrid vehicles, more electric vehicles, more vehicles that use alternative fuels. The return on investment is very 

short on those. Most of that we will begin saving within a year or 

two for that program. A second thing that we can show savings on 

today is we launched our first hybrid amphibious ship as two different drives, a diesel drive for higher speeds and an electric drive 

for speeds under 10 knots or so. It was built in Mississippi and 

went around South America on its maiden voyage to its home port 

in San Diego. We saved about $2 million in fuel costs doing that. 

Over the lifetime of that ship, we expect that today’s fuel prices 

will save about $250 million in fuel for that one ship. We are prototyping an electric engine to go in our DDGs and we have asked for 

money for that prototype in this budget so that we can retrofit the 

DDGs with the same system. 

Ms. KAPTUR. All right. Any additional detail you can provide how 

you are thinking about the construct of all of that, how much you 

have saved to date, how much you expect to save. I read the overall 

goals, but as the appropriations committee, we are interested in 

dollars. So any way that would be better presented would be most 

appreciated. 

[The information follows:] 


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pwalker on DSKD5P82C1PROD with HEARINGInsert offset folio 115 here 65008A.069
91 


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Ms. KAPTUR. I am wondering if for the record you could provide 

an answer to this, the Obama administration has proposed overturning the don’t-ask, don’t-tell policy at the Department of Defense. I am wondering if you could comment on the advantages and 

disadvantages was that in those under your command if that has 

not been provided in other forms. I would just be interested. 

[The information follows:] 

The Department of the Navy is participating in the Department of Defense Comprehensive Review Group to assess the implications of a repeal of 10 U.S.C. § 654, 

should that occur, and develop an implementation plan for any new statutory mandate. 

The Comprehensive Review Working Group will identify the impacts to the force 

of a repeal of 10 U.S.C. §54 in areas that include military readiness, military effectiveness, unit cohesion, recruiting/retention, and family readiness, and recommend 

actions that should be taken in light of such impacts in a report of its findings by 

December 1, 2010. 

LEASING OF FOREIGN-BUILT SHIPS

Ms. KAPTUR. And finally, could I ask you in terms of the leasing 

of foreign-built ships, what is the Navy’s plan—first of all, how 

many foreign-built ships are you leasing? Is the trend going down 

and do you envision a time when maybe we will be able to wean 

itself away from leasing any foreign-built ships? 

Admiral ROUGHEAD. Yes, ma’am. Last year you asked about this. 

We had 14 ships on lease. Where this year we have 12 ships on 

lease and we are moving toward 10 and we are coming down. The 

challenge does however remain that when we need a particular capability and we go to lease on occasion that is the only thing that 

is out there. But we are coming down on the path that we projected 

last year when we testified. 

Ms. KAPTUR. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. DICKS. Ms. Granger. 

JOINT STRIKEFIGHTER UPDATE

Ms. GRANGER. Yes, Mr. Secretary. Sorry. In January, Secretary 

Gates announced a restructuring of the Joint Strike Fighter program. They say there are no insurmountable problems, not technical or otherwise. I would like your assessment of the measures 

that have been taken. I know that we met the last time at Lockheed Martin looking at the Joint Strike Fighter. I want to know if 

you think that those measures that have been taken are sufficient 

for success and I would like the comments also, General Conway, 

you said that was some encouraging news if you have any comments or Admiral Roughead either. 

Mr. MABUS. Yes, ma’am. The measures that have been taken at 

the Department of Defense-wide level, evening out the ramp of production, moving back for 13 months the developmental testing, putting more aircraft in the test program and reducing the number of 

aircraft early in the ramp, I believe will have the effect of getting 

this program on the way that it should be to get us the aircraft 

that we need. Also by withholding some award fees from the contractor and giving them an incentive to beat these deadlines, giving 

an incentive to beat the price that is out there I think will also be 

very helpful. As General Conway said, we already have three test 


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aircraft at Pax River of the STOVL version. They are performing 

very well. They are close to vertical takeoff flight. 

And the Marine Corps is still on its way to an IOC of late fiscal 

year 2012. And in terms of receiving aircraft, we are still looking 

to begin receiving aircraft for the Marine Corps in 2012 and for the 

Navy in 2014. Given all of that, we think that the program and 

given the need for the JSF on the decks of our carriers, our 

amphibs and with the Marines in theater, we think that the program will be—is now on track to be successful in the terms that 

have been set forth. 

General CONWAY. Ma’am, to your question, based on the restructuring we did see the loss of 28 aircraft over the 5 years of the defense plan. But I think the good news in that is that we don’t think 

that is a definite loss. We think we will get those airplanes back 

later on when we are into the full procurement cycles. The CNO 

answered the question on alternate engines. Our perspective is 

that we do not want to see the alternate engine because it could 

cost us tails. It is a competition there between the aircraft we think 

we need or an alternate engine to put in the aircraft that we would 

have and we would rather have a larger number of tails than a second engine. 

Admiral ROUGHEAD. Ma’am, I would say the focus on getting 

more airplanes into the test program is going to be extraordinarily 

helpful, and of course, in the case of the Navy is we are the third 

service in line. We are going to benefit from all of the testing that 

has been going on. Our focus is still on making our first deployment in 2016 with our first JSF squadron. So I think the adjustments that have been made will enhance the probability of success 

of that outcome. 

STEALTH AIRCRAFT

Ms. GRANGER. Thank you. This is for Admiral Roughead and 

General Conway. I know this is an open hearing, but could you discuss the recent developments in 5th generation fighter aircraft and 

advanced air defense systems in countries like Russia and China 

and how do these developments in these countries, including their 

sales in advance equipment shape the fighter force we need in 2020 

and beyond and how does the F–35 measure up to what they have? 

General CONWAY. We certainly can’t talk about the last aspect of 

that question in an open hearing, ma’am. But I will say that those 

developments I think put an emphasis point on the value of the 5th 

generation fighter, certainly to the Marine Corps. 

Admiral ROUGHEAD. And clearly, ma’am, the trend in fighters is 

towards stealth and towards the types of capabilities that are not 

unlike what we are putting into the Joint Strike Fighter. I am a 

little biased. I would say that the Joint Strike Fighter still keeps 

us in the dominant position. 

Ms. GRANGER. It is an okay bias to have. 

Admiral ROUGHEAD. I couldn’t agree more. 

LITTORAL COMBAT SHIP

Ms. GRANGER. Mr. Secretary, just one more question. You know 

that Fort Worth is extremely excited about the USS FORT 

WORTH. And I would like to know if you could tell us something 


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about what the timeline be to decide who will host the commissioning for the USS. FORT WORTH? 

Mr. MABUS. We have a little bit of time as you know. I think 

sometime in the middle of 2012 is when that commissioning would 

occur and we will work with the commissioning committee and 

with its most excellent sponsor. 

Ms. GRANGER. Thank you very much. 

Mr. MABUS. To come up with an appropriate commissioning place 

and time. 

Ms. GRANGER. Thank you very much. 

Mr. DICKS. Mr. Hinchey. 

PRESIDENTIAL HELICOPTER

Mr. HINCHEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Gentlemen, nice to be 

with you again. Thank you very much. I wanted to just talk a little 

bit about the presidential helicopter. We know it is a sad situation 

now. VH–71 is something that we tried to work on here. And to restructure the VH–71 and the purpose of that was to bring about 

something that was more effective and save money that should 

have been saved. My understanding is that now as a result of a 

loss of that particular program, there is a loss of about $4 billion 

and a substantial amount of other issues that need to be dealt 

with. 

The existing presidential helicopter system was designed back in 

the 1950s and manufactured in the 1970s. So it is really starting 

to tire out. So I am just wondering what is likely to take place? 

What do you think we are going to be doing? And what would you 

be recommending to deal with this program over the course of this 

year into next? 

Mr. MABUS. There are two specific answers to your question. One 

is that we are very early into analysis of alternatives on how to go 

with the program. The Navy working with OSD and with the 

White House in terms of needs are looking—beginning to look at 

alternatives as to what happens to the program. In terms of the 

presidential helicopters that are now flying, obviously the main 

concern is to keep those effective, flying safe, everything that you 

would expect in that helicopter. We have funds in this budget request and over the next 5 years to make sure that the current fleet 

of what presidential helicopters continues to do the job they were 

meant to do. 

Mr. HINCHEY. What does that mean, you are starting from 

scratch with a new program? 

Mr. MABUS. They are looking at all alternatives in the analysis. 

Mr. HINCHEY. No decisions have been made so far? 

Mr. MABUS. No, sir. 

Mr. HINCHEY. So this thing is still in the air, I would assume? 

Mr. MABUS. I am not sure you can put it that way. But okay. 

Mr. HINCHEY. There is still a possibility that—or is there a possibility that the VH–71 might still be bought back? That would be 

the sensible cost saving and most effective thing to do. I think one 

of the issues at hand now, for example, is that there is in the redesign of the upcoming presidential helicopter, there would be a removal of one of the important parts of the program internally within the helicopter. 


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Apparently like a rest station. Take that out of the helicopter. 

Not that people would be engaging in a lot of rest there. I don’t 

mean that. So what is likely to happen? Do you think? Do you have 

any idea? Or is the whole thing just so tentative now that nobody 

knows? 

Mr. MABUS. Well, I think it is fair to say that the whole thing 

is so early in the look at what those alternatives are that no decisions have been made on what is on the table or what is off the 

table. 

Mr. HINCHEY. Okay. I know it is an awkward situation. 

Mr. DICKS. Would the gentleman yield for just a second? What 

time frame are we talking about now since we have cancelled this 

program and Mr. Hinchey feels very strongly that was a mistake. 

What time frame are we talking about? You said the next 5 years, 

the existing helicopters, we have got funding to make sure they are 

as safe as possible which obviously we all support. But what—how 

long is this going to take if we go—once you do your analysis of 

alternatives, to get back into development? 

Mr. MABUS. Well, first I think the analysis of alternatives is 

going to take a better part of this year to look at. I think that is, 

in fact, maybe on the short side. It is going to take a while to look 

at what alternatives are available, how much they will cost, what 

they will require to produce. Before that analysis of alternatives, 

I cannot give you an answer on how long it will be. What I can tell 

you is that we have put in the budget the funds, as you just pointed out, to keep the current helicopter fleet viable, safe, effective 

until we know from that—what alternative is picked how long it 

will be before the new helicopter comes into service. 

Mr. DICKS. Mr. Hinchey. 

Mr. HINCHEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. So I guess we will 

just—well, what I would like to do is continue to work with you 

and stay close to you and just so we have an understanding of 

what the situation is going to be like and what the outcome is 

going to be. It is something that I have taken a great deal of interest in and as a result of taking a great deal of interest in it, I understand the situation very clearly. And I know that something has 

got to be done here it has to be done effectively and it has to be 

done as soon as possible. 

So I would like to continue to stay close to you and see what we 

can do about getting this problem solved. As soon as we can and 

as effectively as we can. 

Mr. MABUS. Look forward to that. 

ALTERNATIVE ENERGY

Mr. HINCHEY. I just have another question to ask about it is the 

energy situation. Our military is the largest energy consumer on 

this planet. And the situation is specifically something that really 

needs to be addressed. You know how much it needs to be addressed in terms of costs, in terms of availability, all of those 

things. So I know that there is some issue, some interest rather on 

the issue of generating alternative energy—— 

Mr. DICKS. If I could just interrupt. They have addressed this 

issue in some detail. If you want to go ahead and ask it again, go 

right ahead. 


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Mr. HINCHEY. Well, you addressed it in some detail. That means 

that the record here shows that you have a plan to deal with the 

energy issue? You are going to be focusing on alternative energy, 

solar energy particularly. And you are anticipating how soon, how 

much will become available? 

Mr. MABUS. If I could, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. DICKS. 50 percent, wasn’t that your—— 

Mr. MABUS. It is the goal of the Navy, Department of the Navy 

to, by 2020, have half its energy needs met by nonfossil fuels. That 

includes ashore and afloat. And ashore, the goal is to have at least 

half of our bases be energy neutral in terms of producing at least 

as much energy as we use. 

The final thing I will say is that today we have a very small 

solar capacity, 5 megawatts. We have now signed contracts for an 

additional 60 megawatts. When you put that together, that is 

enough to power about 41,000 homes. We are driving toward 

enough solar power, not counting other forms of alternative energy, 

in the 10-year period to power about 250,000 homes. 

Mr. HINCHEY. Well, thanks very much. 

Mr. DICKS. Mr. Rogers. 

V–22 EMPLOYMENT

Mr. ROGERS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General Conway, you 

were asked about the Osprey earlier. You are asking for another 

30 aircraft to go with the last 2 years’ similar numbers for about 

$2.5 billion annually. How is the Osprey being used overseas? 

General CONWAY. Sir, those 30 are part of a multiyear that will 

close out in another fiscal year or two. But the answer I would 

have to say is very well. We have deployed it to Iraq three times. 

We have put it aboard ship, the amphibs, to see what lessons we 

could pull down from that and now we have a squadron in Afghanistan. 

Interestingly, I just spoke to my commander in Afghanistan this 

morning on some other issues, but we discussed Osprey. He has 

fallen in love with the airplane. And the principal reason, in addition to its range and speed and carrying capacity, buildup capacity 

in some of the attacks that he has conducted there, is the ability 

to land at night in complete brownout conditions. That aircraft will 

simply lower itself to the deck. It has got lasers that identify four 

different points on the ground and pilots have complete confidence 

in a complete brownout condition at night to set it down with Marines and then take off under those same conditions. So that is 

something that no other helicopter can do today. 

Mr. ROGERS. What are you using it for there? 

General CONWAY. Sir, the full gamut of use. It is primarily—it 

is a medium assault lift helicopter. And we have used it in that 

context now in two major operations, one at Now Zad and the other 

one now in Marja. But it also transports troops and supplies 

around the battlefield. It inserts and extracts reconnaissance 

teams. 

I mentioned earlier we are using it for casualty evacuation. Not 

a primary MedEvac role, but any time that the aircraft is overflying and takes a call for a casualty, it swoops down, picks them 

up and gets them to care very rapidly. We transfer patients within 


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the theater. We use it to transfer VIP delegations. The commander 

told me he just went to Kabul and back this morning on an Osprey. 

It is a multi-use airplane that is doing everything we ask it to 

do. 

Mr. ROGERS. Given the long distance generally of Marines from 

medical facilities, it is about the only kind of vehicle you have that 

would get evacuations long distance, is it not? From the battlefield 

to the medical—— 

General CONWAY. Yes, sir. C–130s can serve that role, sir, but 

you have to take the casualties too, the C–130s, as opposed to perhaps landing in a zone very nearby and plucking them off the battlefield. 

Mr. ROGERS. I understand about a dozen Ospreys went to Haiti. 

Tell us about that. 

General CONWAY. That is correct. Sir, once again they were performing the whole gamut of drill, primarily ship to shore kind of 

movement of supplies and delivery of Marines, equipment and supplies ashore. There was also evacuation of patients out to the 

amphib ships and their dispensaries. So the traditional things that 

you would expect when you see a Marine Expeditionary Unit with 

its air combat element on board. 

Mr. ROGERS. That is the first time it has been used for humanitarian relief? 

General CONWAY. Yes, sir, I think it is. In fact I am sure it is. 

Mr. ROGERS. Have you had any accidents anywhere with the aircraft? 

General CONWAY. No, sir. We have not. Since we declared operational capacity and put it into the fight in a relatively early phase 

of its full operational capacity, it has been shot at. It hasn’t been 

hit and it has been doing again all we have asked it to do. We have 

put, by the way, guns on—I think 5 of the 12 in theater have guns 

now. So it can either do self-escort or even some zone prep, certainly self-defense. So we are expanding on the capacity of the aircraft as we go. We need a good weather radar that we do not have 

to date because it flies a long distance and it encounters different 

types of weather. 

Mr. ROGERS. So you are pleased obviously with the aircraft? 

General CONWAY. Sir, we are. I can’t say anything otherwise. 

P–3 WING REPAIR CONTRACTS

Mr. ROGERS. Let me ask you quickly also about the P–8 Poseidon 

and the P–3 Orion. We provided over $300 million to the Navy for 

wing repairs, Admiral, to the P–3 to keep them flying until you get 

the P–8s, and we have been told from DOD that several contracts 

for new wing assemblies were awarded in the August 2008 time 

frame but not yet definitized. When can we expect that? 

Admiral ROUGHEAD. Sir, we have been inducting the P–3s into 

the rewinging process and that procedure is going very, very well. 

But I will look at the specifics, at the numbers that you are talking 

about. But we are moving out smartly on that because we need 

that capability. It is in great demand and we have a good flow 

going with those P–3s right now. But I will get the particulars. 

[The information follows:] 


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Naval Air Systems Command (NAVAIR) expects the two undefinitized contract actions (UCAs) to enter formal negotiations in third quarter FY 2010 and be definitized not later than fourth quarter FY 2010. NAVAIR issued the two UCAs, one 

each to Lockheed Martin and L3 Communications, in order to expedite the manufacturing of new outer wing assemblies (OWA) and return aircraft to the Fleet as 

quickly as possible. The current definitization status does not impact Fleet availability. 

Mr. DICKS. Will the gentleman yield? The Navy is in much better 

position on these undefinitized contracts than the Air Force. The 

Air Force is way behind. But there is a 180-day rule. You are suppose to definitize these things within 180 days. That clearly is not 

happening here on the issue that was brought up. And obviously 

I think this P–8A aircraft is doing very well. In fact, I have been 

out there and seen it myself, and it is doing very well. And the P– 

3 rewinging is very important. But we are hoping that we can work 

with each of the services to try to not let this—there is a tendency 

to well, you get in and you use these undefinitized contracts and 

it kind of drifts along. And that is going to be part of our oversight 

responsibility, Mr. Secretary, to make sure we get these things definitized within the rules and within the statutory requirements. 

Mr. Rogers. 

P–8A POSEIDON

Mr. ROGERS. So where are we with the P–8A? 

Admiral ROUGHEAD. We are moving along well with the P–8A, 

sir. We have been flying the airplane. We have another airframe 

that has been stress tested. So we are moving forward with the P– 

8A. It is a good program. And we have a good profile in this budget. I don’t anticipate any issues with the P–8 and, similar to the 

chairman, I have been out to Boeing and have looked at the airplane and I am very encouraged by what I see. 

Mr. ROGERS. What is the timetable for replacing the P–3? 

Admiral ROUGHEAD. The timetable will actually have some overlap and particularly since we have rewinged some of the P–3s there 

will be some overlap. But we expect to see the P–8 in service in 

squadrons in 2012. 

Mr. ROGERS. But the P–3s will still be flying until you get the 

full complement of P–8s. 

Admiral ROUGHEAD. Yes, sir. They will continue to fly. And, of 

course, our EP–3s will continue to fly until 2024. 

Mr. ROGERS. Will you need more money for the rewinging? 

Admiral ROUGHEAD. At present time, sir, we have a good program in place for the rewinging. 

Mr. ROGERS. Now you are going to acquire, as I understand, 117 

aircraft? 

Admiral ROUGHEAD. You are referring to the P–8, sir? 

Mr. ROGERS. Yes. 

Admiral ROUGHEAD. 117, sir? 

Mr. MABUS. 117 in total, but 69 over the course of the FYDP. 

Mr. ROGERS. I am sorry? 

Mr. MABUS. 117 total in the program, but 69 over the next 5 

years. 

Mr. ROGERS. Gotcha. Well, you will consider that program as a 

multiyear procurement, will you not, upon completion of the testing? 


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Admiral ROUGHEAD. Yes, sir. Our objective is whenever we can 

obtain a multiyear that delivers the types of savings that make a 

difference. That is what we are interested in. 

Mr. ROGERS. Thank you, gentlemen, Mr. Chairman. 

DEPOT MAINTENANCE

Mr. DICKS. Admiral Roughead, you and I talked about depot 

maintenance the other day. And I am interested to know, I see 

here in the budget that in 2009 it was $7.8 billion and then 

dropped in 2010 to $6.4 billion. Now it is back up to $7.05 billion. 

And as I understand, this is supposed to be 99 percent of the ship 

maintenance in 2011? Is that your understanding? 

Admiral ROUGHEAD. Yes, sir. What we have done is we have significantly increased our operation and maintenance funding request to address the usage on the Fleet and the required maintenance that we need to get the Fleet to its extended service life, or 

estimated service life. That is why you are seeing the increase that 

you have seen in there. If you look at where we are with the unfunded maintenance that was in my unfunded program, we have 

significantly closed down on our ability to invest in what I call the 

cost to own the Navy. So we have made those increases and that 

does get us to 99 percent of what we need. 

Mr. DICKS. Just like in my area, out in the Puget Sound area, 

we have some, like Todd’s Shipyard, some private companies that 

do help do maintenance for the Navy. But it is very, very kind of 

up and down. And I just hope that the Navy will look at—we have 

our mainly public shipyards, do great work as far as I am concerned. But also there are these other companies that do provide 

help and service to the Navy and I am just worried that we try to 

protect that industrial base as best we can and by being sensitive 

to the fact that some of this work, especially on surface ships, can 

be done in private yards as well. 

Admiral ROUGHEAD. Absolutely, sir, and they do great work. And 

that is what we are trying to do here because this is our reset. We 

are not like the ground force that comes back and renews. We have 

to be able to make investments like this. We have to be able to 

maintain ships in such a way, whether it is public or private. We 

have to be able to get the ships in there, get them to the end of 

the life, and the other thing that happens when we don’t properly 

invest in the operation and maintenance accounts, the Sailors will 

pick it up and when they are home off of deployment, when they 

should be with their families and enjoying the opportunity to be 

with them, to train, to refresh, oftentimes we put the work on their 

back. 

Mr. DICKS. You have to go back on the ship to do—— 

Admiral ROUGHEAD. To do things that otherwise would be done 

by a contractor or by a public shipyard. This not only keeps the 

Fleet ready, but it also allows our Sailors to have a reasonable life 

when they are back home. 

Mr. DICKS. Mr. Lewis. 

OPERATION AND MAINTENANCE FUNDING

Mr. LEWIS. On that point, you are taking us directly to the last 

question area I had dealing with O&M. When we start massaging 


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your budgets, there is a tendency for the committee often to look 

at the pool that might be available, O&M is often that pool. So 

would you share with us a little more of the condition of your O&M 

accounts for 2010 and maybe take us to the unfunded accounts 

again for 2011? 

Admiral ROUGHEAD. Yes, sir. What we did was to bring our 

maintenance accounts up to where I believe they need to be. And 

when I was asked for my unfunded program list, there were only 

a couple of things in there. One was ship maintenance, aviation 

maintenance, and aircraft spares. In order to close that gap up. I 

mean, I could get an acceptable level of risk, but by taking the account to where it needed to be and then the underfunded just 

closed the gap. And the only thing that is in the unfunded list is 

about 9 ship availabilities and about 100 airplane depot repairs. So 

we have really closed the gap down. And as you said, sir, oftentimes that fund is used for other things. But it is so important for 

our readiness, for our training, for the life of the Fleet and actually 

the welfare of our men and women that serve at sea. 

So we believe that we have got it right this time and my commitment is that I am going to do everything I can to properly fund 

that O&M account. 

General CONWAY. Sir, if I may. Our O&M is about 22 percent of 

budget. As you can imagine, it has got to do the training and preparation and the deployment of Marines to theater. But I would like 

to speak on behalf of the Navy’s O&M because it affects us, too. 

And say for the last 2 years, we have seen a reduction in sailing 

time and, perhaps as importantly, in aircraft hours. That in many 

ways degrades our capacity to train for what we have to do. I do 

think the CNO has recognized that. He has got it right this year. 

And I certainly would like to be on record in support of his O&M 

cost. 

Mr. LEWIS. Mr. Chairman, I think it is very important that you 

help us continue on this pathway. It is one of the better developments I have heard. 

MARINE CORPS RESET

Mr. DICKS. I completely agree. Let me ask. General, you mentioned in your statement that there is a necessity to buy additional 

supplies, equipment that I think, as you said, had been promised 

but has not yet been fully fulfilled. Would you describe that situation for us? 

General CONWAY. Sir, what we have seen over the years is initially I think Congress was very aware of the requirement and is 

as concerned about it as we are. And not that there is a lack of 

concern, but there has been a slippage. We were staying within 

about 75 percent of the requirement. And now as we examine it, 

we are at about 50 percent of the requirement that we are able to 

reset or reconstitute in stride. There has been a thought process 

that when we are done in Iraq and now Afghanistan, that there 

would be monies forthcoming for a 2- or 3-year period and that 

would be when both the Marine Corps and the Army both got 

healthy. My concern is, as was evidenced earlier I think by Representative Lewis, is that the Nation has other requirements that 


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we are going to have to face pretty dramatically and that those 

monies just might not be available. So I would like to try to get—— 

Mr. DICKS. You are talking here about war reserves? 

General CONWAY. Sir, we are talking about day-to-day equipment. 

Mr. DICKS. Just regular things you need for—— 

General CONWAY. Training sets, sir, the ability to respond to a 

second contingency. Our home stations are at 60 percent equipment availability today. That is the worst we have been now in 

about a 4- or 5-year period and it concerns me. Again, as I referenced in the opening statement, our MPS stocks are up, the ships 

are at about 94 percent of supply. We consider that in some ways 

a national reserve because the Army has not been able to keep 

pace with that. But we just see the need for us to be able to recock 

and be ready to go someplace else as soon as possible, and I am 

just uneasy with the thought process of doing it all after we are 

out of Afghanistan. 

Mr. DICKS. Mr. Secretary, what do you think about that? 

Mr. MABUS. Well, as the CNO said, the Navy has to reset in 

stride, unlike the Marine Corps, unlike the Army. We have got to 

keep our O&M accounts going, and I think that this budget at 99 

percent does the things that the Navy needs to do. 

I share the Commandant’s concern about Marine reset for a couple of reasons. One is the fight in Iraq and Afghanistan has expanded the table of supply for a Marine unit. We are simply using 

more and different types of equipment than we were before, and so 

the definition of reset has not kept up with what equipment the 

Marines are actually using in theater. And so I think that first the 

definition of what reset is for the Marines should be expanded 

somewhat and, second, to the Commandant’s point, that we not 

wait until the end of Afghanistan to begin to reset the Marine 

Corps. 

Mr. DICKS. But I take it that the budget doesn’t satisfy this as 

requested, doesn’t satisfy this need? 

Mr. MABUS. The budget makes a start on this. It certainly does 

not do the whole thing, but it makes a start. 

Mr. DICKS. We are in a very difficult fiscal mess here. We have 

to keep—but I want to make sure we know—does this have an adverse effect on training? 

General CONWAY. Sir, it is starting to and that is one of the caution flags that my staff and commanders raised with us this year, 

is that our training sets and the ability to prepare the next rotation 

is starting to be adversely impacted by some selected end items 

that simply aren’t available to home base and station. 

Mr. DICKS. Because I would expect that as they deploy they have 

everything they need? 

General CONWAY. Absolutely. 

Mr. DICKS. That is one we have always protected. So that isn’t 

a problem. But it is not having the equipment for the people who 

are back at home who should be training that you are worried 

about and having the equipment in case there is another contingency? 

General CONWAY. You have got our concerns exactly, sir. 


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MRAP VEHICLES

Mr. DICKS. What about the MRAPs or the M–ATV. I understand 

that you are buying some of the original heavier MRAPs. Could you 

explain that? 

General CONWAY. Sir, we have purchased over 2,000 in the Marine Corps, Cat 1, 2 and 3 MRAPs, and mainly Cat 1s because we 

were the lighters of the variants, that is what we saw our usage 

being for the long term with that particular type of vehicle. Now, 

in Afghanistan we are finding even those vehicles are too large for 

some of the roads, some of the places where they have to go, bridge 

classifications and that type of thing. So the Department has developed a new vehicle called the M–ATV, read Afghanistan MRAP, 

that is in many ways a replacement for the up-armored HMMWV. 

It is still having its problems in Afghanistan like it had in Iraq, 

and it is a very dangerous vehicle to be riding around in. 

We have tried to minimize our buys because, as I said again in 

the opening statement, there will come a day when where we will 

want to shed some of this weight and get back to being expeditionary, and those things won’t even fit aboard the CNO’s ships in 

some cases. 

We have done some expeditionary types of things. The original 

MRAPs don’t go off road very well. So we have taken our suspension off the 7-ton trucks and put them on our Cat 1s and the troops 

absolutely love them in Afghanistan where they can go. But we are 

incorporating some of them into what will be our long-term tables 

of equipment. But I think a lot of the others will go into supply 

storage, probably in Barstow, because of the humidity factors involved. And we will use them only in the future if we get into another static environment where the IED is the weapon of choice. 

MARINE CORPS TRAINING

Mr. LEWIS. Mr. Chairman, could I follow through on that? General Conway, I am very concerned about—you probably know that 

29 Palms is in my district. 

General CONWAY. Yes, sir, I do know that well. 

Mr. LEWIS. I am very concerned and I raised this question with 

General McChrystal and got quite a response, I have not been able 

to follow up on it. So maybe you can help me follow up on it. The 

Marine Corps is about to make some decisions relative to the training territory available to them and the Congress is thinking about 

taking some action, and it concerns me that we may have decisions 

being made at a local level, at the base, that is looking short term, 

satisfying short-term training needs and ignoring the prospect of 

real needs for cross-training between the Army and the Marine 

Corps, whether in the air or on the ground or otherwise. There is 

only so much space out there and if we give it away, General, it 

will never come back. 

And so I would urge you to talk to the highest level of people in 

this training, communicate with the Army as well at the highest 

level and the Secretary to make certain that we don’t give away 

the store while we are spending time trying to satisfy somebody 

this week. 

General CONWAY. Yes, sir. Okay. Thank you for that. 


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Mr. LEWIS. We should talk further. Thank you. 

CVN–78 COST CAP

Mr. DICKS. Mr. Secretary, the committee understands that you 

recently approved an increase of approximately $1.3 billion to the 

cost cap for the CVN 78. Why was this required? 

Mr. MABUS. As you know, Mr. Chairman, the CVN 78 is the lead 

ship in the class, first ship of the Ford class carriers. Most of this 

increase was simply inflation, inflation from the time the carrier 

was begun until today and as we are looking forward in terms of 

the materiel that we are going to have to buy. Some of it was a 

smaller amount for changes primarily for safety concerns on the 

carrier. But the program itself, the total program for this carrier 

we think is moving along very well. We are still looking to field the 

carrier on time with the schedule that we have previously set forth. 

EMALS

Mr. DICKS. The committee understands that the Electromagnetic 

Aircraft Launching System, EMALS, has recently experienced a 

fairly significant incident during land-based testing causing a fair 

amount of equipment damage. What is the current status of the 

Electromagnetic Aircraft Launching System? Can you tell us about 

this incident? 

Mr. MABUS. Yes. The incident you described was about 3 months 

ago. It was an engineering incident. It has been worked through. 

We are about to restart the testing both in New Jersey, in 

Lakehurst, and in Mississippi, in Tupelo, for the four EMALS and 

we are still on schedule to put EMALS on the carrier when it is 

supposed to be integrated into the carrier. We are close to testing 

EMALS with a test sled and then an aircraft launch a little while 

later. But even with this short delay, we are still within the schedule and it is one of those reasons that you test, to see what problems pop up. This one did, but it was one that could be worked 

through. 

SURFACE COMBATANTS

Mr. DICKS. How many DDG 51s are we going to buy? Or do we 

know? 

Mr. MABUS. Over the course of the FYDP, we requested an additional eight. 

Mr. DICKS. Okay. And how about the LCS? 

Mr. MABUS. Over the course of FYDP, 17. 

Mr. DICKS. Any other questions? 

Mr. VISCLOSKY. Yes. 

Mr. DICKS. Mr. Visclosky. 

CVN–78 COST

Mr. VISCLOSKY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Getting back to the 

chairman’s question about the increase on the CVN 78, Admiral, 

we had discussed the shipbuilding program earlier. I assume that 

cost increase is built into that base looking forward and that would 

not be an additional cost? 

Admiral ROUGHEAD. Yes, sir. That is correct. 


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Mr. VISCLOSKY. Mr. Secretary, you indicated, as I understand it, 

that you don’t anticipate there would be an additional increase in 

the cost at this point? 

Mr. MABUS. Not at this point. No, sir. 

LEASING OF FOREIGN-BUILT SHIPS

Mr. VISCLOSKY. Not at this point. On the industrial base, and the 

chairman alluded to that too, if I could ask about the leasing of foreign ships, as I do every year, I would acknowledge that in 2009 

the Navy had 14 leased vessels and in 2002 they had 22. So I 

would certainly acknowledge that the number has declined. 

Mr. DICKS. I think Admiral Roughead described this for Ms. Kaptur. What are we down to, 10? 

Admiral ROUGHEAD. We are down to 12 this year and we will 

have—I am sorry, we are down to 12 this year and we will be down 

to 10, I expect, in 2014. 

Mr. VISCLOSKY. I am sorry. I must have been distracted. My preference is that we not have any foreign leased vessels. I just don’t 

think it makes any sense in this time and place talking about the 

industrial base, whether they are smaller shipyards, whether they 

are the six major yards that we have. We are not building ships 

here because we are leasing ships from somebody else. Not much 

left to protect. I mean, I am very serious. And on the 313, I hope 

you understand my intent, I want you to have 313. That is what 

you need. 

Admiral ROUGHEAD. I would like to have more than 313. 

Mr. VISCLOSKY. I know. That is how I read your remarks in September. But year after year—— 

Admiral ROUGHEAD. Yes, sir. But I think as you pointed out, we 

are on a down slope on the foreign leased ships. But there are on 

occasion when we are looking for particular capabilities, sometimes 

that is the only one that is on the market. So we end up—— 

Ms. KAPTUR. Would the gentleman yield on that one, please? 

What countries are you leasing them from, Admiral? 

Admiral ROUGHEAD. I will have to get back to you on the specific 

countries. 

Ms. KAPTUR. What are we paying them? 

Admiral ROUGHEAD. I will have to get back to you on the exact 

costs. 

[The information follows:] 

The Navy’s Military Sealift Command (MSC) does not lease ships from any foreign country. MSC charters ships from commercial entities to most efficiently respond to military requirements that are immediate, subject to change, or of uncertain duration. MSC currently has contracts to charter 21 vessels for a period of 

more than 6 months. Eleven of these ships were built outside the U.S., in Australia, 

Denmark, France, Germany, South Korea, or Turkey. The monthly cost of the leases 

for these foreign-built ships is approximately $9.5M. Foreign-built ships chartered 

by MSC for periods greater than 6 months must be converted to U.S.-flag in U.S. 

shipyards, be crewed by U.S. citizen mariners, and be in compliance with U.S. Coast 

Guard requirements. 

DDG–51 MAIN REDUCTION GEAR

Mr. VISCLOSKY. Mr. Secretary, on the DDG 51, I understand that 

there is no provider for the main reduction gear? 

Mr. DICKS. We talked about this. 


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Mr. VISCLOSKY. You did, too. I have got to pay attention. 

Mr. DICKS. But I am glad you asked the question because it 

shows you are thinking. 

Mr. VISCLOSKY. I wasn’t paying attention. I was thinking. 

Have you found a vendor? Is there a problem finding the vendor? 

Admiral ROUGHEAD. We have requests for proposals out now, sir. 

Mr. DICKS. Could you build it in a shipyard? Could you build it 

in one of our naval shipyards? 

Admiral ROUGHEAD. I would say right now probably not. 

Mr. DICKS. Probably not. 

Admiral ROUGHEAD. Because of the tooling that is required, the 

skills that are required. 

Mr. DICKS. Mr. Hinchey—— 

Mr. VISCLOSKY. One more question, but I am sure it was asked 

already. 

Mr. DICKS. No, go ahead. 

Mr. Hinchey. 

LEASING OF FOREIGN-BUILT SHIPS

Mr. HINCHEY. Well, I am just fascinated about this issue because 

I know there is an awful lot of ability to build ships here, and there 

are a lot of major companies that are interested in shipbuilding 

and this is one of the declines in the economy, in the industry in 

this country, in not building ships internally. So I am very encouraged by what you are saying as the number is dropping down, 

down to 13 now? 

Admiral ROUGHEAD. 12, sir. 

Mr. HINCHEY. Down to 12 now and you are anticipating that 

by—— 

Admiral ROUGHEAD. 2014 we will be down to 10. 

Mr. HINCHEY. Is there any tension to lease any more? 

Admiral ROUGHEAD. As I mentioned, sir, when we have a requirement for a particular type of ship and we go out on the market to look for it, on occasion sometimes the only ship that fits that 

bill is the foreign ship. 

Mr. HINCHEY. The only one that fits the bill is a foreign ship. 

Admiral ROUGHEAD. Sometimes, the only ones that fit. 

Mr. HINCHEY. What would that be? 

Admiral ROUGHEAD. Simply the design that may be required, the 

capability that is required. 

Mr. HINCHEY. Like what? What would that design be? 

Are we talking about military? 

Admiral ROUGHEAD. No, sir. We are not talking about military 

ships. These are ships that are used for commercial purposes, ships 

that I do not build or that the Navy does not build, but that these 

are ships that we go out and have some logistics need for or largely 

with our Military Sealift Command. But these are not Navy ships 

that we are talking about. All U.S. warships are U.S. made. 

And I would like to just for the record, no one builds a warship 

like the United States does. There are none that equal it. 

Mr. HINCHEY. Good. I understand that and that is very true and 

very good. 


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LPD–17

Mr. DICKS. Can I ask one quick question right at this point? Admiral Roughead, the Navy has now accepted delivery of five LPD 

17 ships. Each one of them had quality issues. How confident are 

you in the LPD 17 shipbuilders’ ability to deliver a quality ship 

that can satisfy your requirements right out of the box? 

Admiral ROUGHEAD. First of all, sir, we have had issues with 

some design, some quality control and then, particularly in the case 

of the main engines, we have had some issues there. But the contractor and the Navy technical community are working very well 

in correcting the problems that we have, and I know that the ship 

builder is also addressing these quality issues as a matter of priority. So the LPD 17 is a great ship. It has great capability. I think 

the Commandant would echo that. But we are working to correct 

these issues and make the design changes where they are required 

to get the reliability that we need for the ship. 

Mr. DICKS. Ms. Kaptur. 

MARINE CORPS SUICIDES

Ms. KAPTUR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I wanted to follow up 

very briefly in two areas. General Conway, you addressed in your 

testimony the number of suicides, and my question is did those 

occur on homeland soil here? Did they occur in theater? If so, which 

theater? What can you tell us about where those individuals had 

served, Iraq, Afghanistan? 

General CONWAY. Last year we had nine in theater, the year before that we had seven. Interestingly, there was a comment that 

they come as a result of deployment. We think that is true, but I 

would also say that the numbers of suicides that we have, the percentage that we have, of people who are deployed are almost the 

same. We have about a third of our suicides from people who have 

never deployed. And if you look at people who have deployed three 

and four times, the number is way low. So although we think there 

is a parallel here, a residual factor with increased deployments, 

there is not the pure statistics to support that. Yet I have to think 

that if failed relationships is one of the primary issues, deployments have effect on relationships. So we are trying to sort all that 

out to see exactly again what our counter means ought to be. 

Mr. DICKS. They have a very good program with their NCOs that 

are focused on trying to see if these people are having issues. 

Ms. KAPTUR. I heard that, Mr. Chairman. Thank you. And in 

Ohio we have been working with our Guard and Reserve because 

they don’t return to a home base and we have had some serious 

situations back home. And as a result of hundreds, actually thousands at this point, of soldiers being screened we have verified exactly what you are saying. We are even doing a genetic sampling 

now to look at predisposition. 

But the way in which the question is formed and their ability to 

have proper assessment has been a real problem. And I would refer 

you—not that you want to talk to anybody in the Guard or Reserve—but General Wayt, who will be retiring at the end of this 

year, who is head of our guard in Ohio, is really heavily into this 

and has some excellent data now working with several of our priVerDate Mar 15 2010 04:00 Mar 25, 2011 Jkt 065008 PO 00000 Frm 00107 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 E:\HR\OC\A008P2.XXX A008P2

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vate hospital systems. We don’t have military hospitals for the 

most part throughout Ohio. And I would just refer you to that 

which we believe should be pretty path breaking work and you 

might find it of value in what you are doing. 

General CONWAY. This is such a critical issue that the Assistant 

Commandant is my action officer on it. He is in close cohorts with 

General Chiarelli in the Army. And I think those factors are being 

brought in because the Army certainly has Guard and Reserve. But 

I will go back and confirm that with him. 

Admiral ROUGHEAD. Ms. Kaptur, one of the things that we have 

done, really focused on our reserve, we do not have a guard in the 

Navy. But on our reserve is we have put in place something that 

we call Returning Warrior Workshops that we hold around the 

country. It is not only targeted at the service member, but we bring 

the spouses in as well because oftentimes we get the indications 

that there may be an issue from the spouse. And we can also inform our spouses about things to be looking for. So we have been 

out doing that. 

We have also created 17 deployment health centers again to get 

greater awareness of the types of things that families should be 

mindful of and the early signs of a problem. 

Ms. KAPTUR. Admiral, I have to compliment, there is a small 

naval reserve unit in my district I was invited out to an event. I 

thought there would be 20 people there. It was sea cadets. I am 

telling you, that naval reserve unit was so phenomenal what they 

were doing with hundreds of young people up in our area. 

So I just wanted to mention that particular effort in the Toledo 

area which I was unaware of and I was very, very impressed with 

what they were doing. 

USMC NON-TRADITIONAL ROLES

Mr. Chairman, I just did want to ask General Conway, with 

what is going on in Afghanistan and some Marines in offensive positions and taking ground, could you discuss a little more the other 

roles that Marines are assuming inside of Afghanistan that may be 

nontraditional and how comfortable you are with that? 

General CONWAY. Yes, ma’am. Well, ma’am, we have advocated 

for a number of years, really since probably 2004 in Iraq, that this 

type of counterinsurgency warfare needs all elements of American 

power engaged. And we have had some modicum of success with 

that, with interagency, with nongovernmental organizations, with 

the assistance from other NATO nations, but not nearly to the degree that the requirement states. So what we have found is that 

our commanders, our NCOs, our staff NCOs have to do those 

things, civil affairs types of things, nation building types of things, 

agriculture, fire department, city management, all those manner of 

things that they are not really trained or qualified to do but if they 

don’t it no one else is there to do it. 

So it is all a part of the job as we see it. We welcome the help 

when it is there but where it does not exist we simply tighten up 

our pack straps and move on. 

Ms. KAPTUR. Mr. Chairman, on this point, you are living this experience. I haven’t heard in all the hearings over the last several 

years, a whole decade, I haven’t heard one creative proposal. So 


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what do we do about it for the future? How can we make it better 

in the future? You take care of it internally within the Corps? 

We need a structure, we need some way—maybe it is not the 

Corps. Maybe it is somebody else. But I see some of the young people from my area going into Afghanistan. I am thinking oh, my 

goodness, there is no language skill, there is no—they are Marines 

and they are being asked to take care of schools or go door to door 

or something like that. I have trouble with that, and I am wondering what is the mechanism, what is the school, what is the 

training, how do we provide that better in the future? 

General CONWAY. Ma’am, the CNO and I have had this conversation now with two consecutive administrations and it has been recognized at that level, and I will give some credit. I mean, people 

are adjusting their culture, they are asking for additional resources, they are looking for people who are willing to deploy overseas to some conditions that could be hazardous to their health. 

And it is moving slowly, but really too slowly, again for the requirement that we face right now and today. 

So I think people are aware and people recognize that it is something that must be accomplished. It is just the capacity is not 

where it needs to be. 

Ms. KAPTUR. Mr. Chairman, for a long time we had that group 

down there in Georgia where we train, we use our officers and we 

bring people up from Latin America. I don’t see why we don’t have 

some sort of training place within the architecture of this country 

where we can help train our people in democracy building or at 

least transition to something other than what they had. It just 

seems to me it is kind of hit and miss and that is not the best way 

to do the job, and so I just wanted to put that on the record. And 

General, if you have thoughts—— 

Mr. DICKS. Aren’t we getting a lot more than we did in Iraq, a 

lot more State Department people there, for the PRTs, and so that 

it isn’t falling as much on the military? 

General CONWAY. That is right, sir. 

Mr. DICKS. You also mentioned to me that some of your NCOs 

at the end of their career are now helping with training. I thought 

that was something that would be very legitimate and something 

that they are well prepared for. 

General CONWAY. That is something we should do, sir, and we 

are stepping up to that requirement as best we can as a bridge 

until such time as Army units who have that mission can arrive 

and take it over. 

And you are right, sir, with your earlier comment that there is 

a gradual improvement. I think we would say it is a little better 

in Afghanistan than it was in Iraq, and so there is gradual improvement. But again it is still short of satisfying the need that exists today. 

INDIVIDUAL AUGMENTEE PROGRAM

Mr. DICKS. I am a bit impressed with the individual, in lieu of, 

they changed that. What is the new phrase we use to describe what 

was the individual augmentation? 

Admiral ROUGHEAD. What we have done is we have 12,000 Sailors on the ground in the Middle East in addition to the 10,000 I 


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have at sea. And we have what we call an individual augmentee 

program where we will take someone from a command and then 

put them in a position that would normally be occupied by someone 

from the ground force or perhaps another agency. But then we 

have also injected into the process something that we call a GWOT 

support assignment, and that is a permanent change of station so 

that we can get more predictability, more stability in the lives of 

our men and women. 

We tend to use them both. We are trying to move more toward 

the permanent change of station assignment because it does give 

us more stability. And I can’t say enough about the great work that 

our young men and women in the Navy are doing. For example, of 

the 12 provincial reconstruction teams in Afghanistan, six are led 

by the Navy. I never thought I would stand on a cold mountain in 

Afghanistan talking to the PRT leader who is a former commanding officer of a nuclear submarine, and he was having the 

time of his life and he was making a difference, and he was getting 

great satisfaction from that. 

Mr. DICKS. Do you think they are trained to do that? Or do they 

have to have training? 

Admiral ROUGHEAD. What we do, sir, is we put them through 

some ground training, and then we give them some cultural awareness. We in the Navy and all the services, but for example, we are 

now providing incentives for individuals to learn languages that we 

believe are going to be important in the future. When we deploy 

our carrier strike groups, for example, we have a regional awareness program that is taught on the way over, as they go, and also 

for our amphibious groups. 

So we are getting at this. We have increased the numbers of our 

Foreign Area Officers so that they understand and are more expert 

in the regions of the world. So we are moving in this direction, and 

I can’t say enough about the great work our people are doing. 

NAVY AND MARINE CORPS END STRENGTH

Mr. DICKS. We are going to have to wind this up, but I have to 

ask one last question. We are a little concerned about Navy and 

Marine Corps end strength. As of February, you are at 330,000, 

your planned end strength is 324,000. The Marine Corps is at 

205,000, and the baseline was 202,000. 

What we are worried about is if this doesn’t change you are going 

to be $300 million over on personnel. So I assume you are well 

aware of this problem, people want to stay in, and I know that is 

a difficult problem when people who are really good and well 

trained and are needed are kind of forced out because of these limits. 

Admiral ROUGHEAD. Yes, sir, and we are watching it very, very 

carefully because last year when we saw the retention behavior 

change we knew that that was likely going to happen. 

And if I could just, our compensated end strength is really 328– 

8. 

Mr. DICKS. Even better. You are closer? 

Admiral ROUGHEAD. I am closer, yes, sir. But we are watching 

it very carefully and I predict we will be on target at the end of 

the year. 


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MARINE CORPS SPECIAL FORCES

Mr. DICKS. The Marine Corps was going to have a special forces 

unit. 

General CONWAY. Yes, sir. 

Mr. DICKS. Twenty-five hundred, as I understand it. How is that 

going? 

General CONWAY. Sir, it is going well. They are still in the developmental stages of coming to what we would call full IOC capability. But they have been very successful in Afghanistan. There 

was a standing 1–0 requirement. That has now gone to 2–0. So we 

have two companies to deploy to Afghanistan at all times. The 

Army has also asked us to take a turn at battalion headquarters. 

So we are fielding two battalion headquarters to go in and command not only our company but other Army companies of special 

operators. 

So I would say it is going pretty well. We are looking to get the 

right quality individual in there because what they do is fairly dangerous, as you can imagine. But it has added a dimension to our 

capabilities. 

Mr. DICKS. The committee is adjourned until 1:30 p.m. On Tuesday, the 16th of March, when we will hold a hearing on Central 

Command. Thank you, gentlemen, for an excellent job. 


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WEDNESDAY, MARCH 17, 2010. 

CONTINGENCY CONTRACTING 

WITNESSES 

SHAY ASSAD, DIRECTOR OF DEFENSE PROCUREMENT AND ACQUISITION POLICY, OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR 

ACQUISITION, TECHNOLOGY, AND LOGISTICS 

JEFFREY PARSONS, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, U.S. ARMY CONTRACTING 

COMMAND 

WILLIAM M. SOLIS, DIRECTOR, DEFENSE CAPABILITIES AND MANAGEMENT, GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE 

OPENING STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN DICKS

Mr. DICKS. The committee will come to order. 

Today, the Defense Appropriations Subcommittee will receive 

testimony concerning contingency contracting from three witnesses: 

Mr. Shay Assad, Director of Defense Procurement and Acquisition 

Policy, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, 

Technology, and Logistics; Mr. Jeffrey Parsons, Executive Director 

of the U.S. Army Contracting Command; and Mr. William Solis, Director, Defense Capabilities and Management Team, Government 

Accountability Office. 

Mr. Assad, Mr. Parsons and their staffs have worked diligently 

to improve contingency contracting since July 2009. 

There is now clear guidance which provides consistent ground 

rules for both the operational and support communities. Standard 

procedures have been established and articulated to ensure contracts contain the appropriate conditions for work to be performed 

in Iraq and Afghanistan. 

Mr. Assad and Mr. Parsons have published a Joint Contingency 

Contracting Handbook, which includes task checklists, training 

templates, and links to relevant regulations and Web sites. Also, 

there is now a Contingency Contracting Course from Defense Acquisition University and 10 Army training courses and leader education instructions for non-acquisition soldiers. 

Mr. Assad is also leading the DOD-wide effort to rebuild the acquisition and contracting force. 

We wish you well on that. That is something that needs to be 

done. 

The job of rebuilding the acquisition workforce is daunting. By 

2014, the acquisition workforce is expected to grow by nearly 

20,000 personnel; 10,000 due to in-sourcing, and 9,887 new hires. 

Despite the improvements in contingency contracting, challenges 

remain. One challenge is simply the magnitude of contract service 

support needed to conduct Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation 

Enduring Freedom. Of the $100 billion in operation and mainteVerDate Mar 15 2010 04:00 Mar 25, 2011 Jkt 065008 PO 00000 Frm 00113 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 E:\HR\OC\A008P2.XXX A008P2

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nance funding requested for 2001 overseas contingency operation, 

$43 billion is for contracted services. 

The largest single contract for services is the Logistic Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP) contract for logistical support, 

billeting, food and laundry services, power generation and water 

supply in Iraq and Afghanistan. In fiscal year 2010 and 2011, $7 

billion and $10 billion is budgeted for LOGCAP respectively. 

Currently, 169,000 military personnel, versus 207,000 contracted 

personnel, are in Iraq and Afghanistan. In addition, there are 

32,000 contracted personnel in other locations within CENTCOM’s 

area of responsibility, for a total of 240,000 contractors in 

CENTCOM. 

The sheer magnitude of the reliance on contractors presents difficulty in background screening, contract management and contracting oversight, and has resulted in a continuing shortage of 

contract officer representatives, the personnel who are responsible 

for developing and managing the technical aspects of the contracts. 

We look forward to your testimony and to an informative question and answer session. 

Now, before we hear your testimony, I would like to call on our 

ranking member today, Rodney Frelinghuysen, for any comments 

he would like to make. 

REMARKS OF MR. FRELINGHUYSEN

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Gentlemen, welcome, this afternoon and for the chairman’s focus 

on contingency contracting. 

We have always had wars, and now wars are described as sort 

of contingency. But all wars have been accompanied by contractors. 

They may be called by a different name. 

One thing that has sort of been clear to me is we need to focus 

on people who might be classified as bad contractors and root them 

out and do it systematically. And I assume you have many years 

collectively focused on that. 

But I am mindful that, in Iraq and Afghanistan—and you can 

correct me, perhaps, during your testimony or the Q&A—that 70 

percent of those who are contractors often are foreign nationals. 

How competent they are, I don’t know. But there is sort of a view 

here that we can run two wars simultaneously without having contractors. And I am all for lesser numbers of contractors, but we 

probably could not have been as successful as we have been to date 

in both of these contingencies without the support of contractors. 

So I put my stake down here, but I am obviously willing to be educated by all of you as to what improvements we have made in the 

contracting process. 

So thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you, gentlemen, for being here. 

Mr. DICKS. Mr. Assad, we will hear from you first. 

Mr. ASSAD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

If you would so allow, we would like to have our written comments that we submitted to the committee entered into the record. 

Mr. DICKS. Without objection, they will be placed into the record. 

Mr. ASSAD. Thank you. 


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SUMMARY STATEMENT OF MR. ASSAD

Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee, it is a pleasure 

to be today to speak to you about contingency contracting. This is 

an extremely important element of what we do within the Department of Defense to support our warfighters whose boots are on the 

ground. 

I would personally like to thank this committee for its unwavering support to our soldiers, sailors, airmen and Marines. It is greatly appreciated. I am going to be very brief because I would like to 

allow significant time for questions. 

I will tell you that there has been a remarkable improvement in 

the way we do contracting for the goods and services that we buy. 

Over the past 6 years, we will be able to discuss with you a number of steps that we have taken to ensure that we are being good 

stewards and our warfighters whose boots are on the ground are 

being good stewards of taxpayer funds. 

Having said that, there is a significant amount of improvement 

still to be had, and there are a number of areas that we will discuss with you that we see as major challenges that we are continuing to work on as diligently as we possibly can. 

Once again, Mr. Chairman, I would like to thank you for your 

support. I would like to thank this committee for its support. And 

that is going to conclude my opening statement. 

Mr. DICKS. Mr. Parsons. 

Mr. PARSONS. Yes, sir. I just echo what Mr. Assad said here already and thank you and the rest of the committee for the support 

that we have been provided. It keeps our eye on the ball when it 

comes to making improvements in contracting support and the execution. So we thank you for that. 

And I look forward to answering your questions in regards to 

specifically what we have done in the Army, and as Mr. Assad has 

said, I think we have come a long way over the last few years, 

work remains to be done and some challenges to be faced, but we 

are making significant progress. Thank you. 

[The joint statement of Mr. Assad and Mr. Parsons follows:] 


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Mr. DICKS. Mr. Solis. 

Mr. SOLIS. I also, sir, have a statement for the record. 

Mr. DICKS. Which we will place in the record, without objection. 

SUMMARY STATEMENT OF MR. SOLIS

Mr. SOLIS. Chairman Dicks, Ranking Member Frelinghuysen, 

and members of the subcommittee, I appreciate the opportunity to 

be here to discuss a number of issues regarding the oversight and 

management of contractors, contractors supporting U.S. forces and 

contingency operations. 

As you know, DOD relies greatly on contractors to support its 

current operations, and DOD officials have stated the Department 

is likely to continue to rely on contractors to support future deployments. 

My statement today will focus on two things: One, the challenges 

DOD faces in providing management and oversight of contractors 

for ongoing contingency operations; and two, the extent to which 

DOD has made progress in institutionalizing a Department-wide 

approach to managing and overseeing contract support. 

Based on our preliminary observations from ongoing work in Iraq 

and Afghanistan, DOD faces five challenges related to the managing and overseeing of contractors. These challenges are: one, providing an adequate number of personnel to conduct contract oversight and the management of contractors; secondly, training of nonacquisition personnel, such as unit commanders and contracting officer representatives (COR), on how to work effectively with contractors in operations; thirdly, ensuring that local and host country 

nationals have been properly screened and badged; fourth, compiling reliable data on the number of contractor personnel supporting U.S. forces in deployed locations; and five, identifying requirements for contractor support in ongoing operations. 

GAO has made many recommendations, starting in the mid1990s, at addressing each of these challenges. While DOD has 

taken some actions in response to our recommendations, it has 

been slow to implement others. For example, we have reported on 

the shortage of CORs who provide much of the day-to-day oversight 

of contractors during contingency operations. We have also identified challenges DOD faces in ensuring CORs are properly trained 

to execute their duties. 

In our ongoing work in Iraq and Afghanistan, we found inefficiencies in DOD’s oversight of contractors due to an inadequate 

number of personnel to carry out these duties. 

Some actions have been taken to help mitigate this problem, 

such as the Army recently directing commanders to determine 

prior to deployment the number of CORs that they will need. However, these efforts are in the early stages of implementation. 

Similarly, we found that individuals are often deployed without 

knowing that they would be assigned as CORs, thus precluding 

their ability to take the required training prior to deployment. In 

addition, we found that CORs and other oversight personnel often 

lack the technical knowledge and training needed to effectively 

oversee certain contracts. For example, in Afghanistan, officials expressed concern that there were not enough CORs trained in the 


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trades, such as electrical wiring and plumbing, to provide oversight 

over construction contracts. 

While DOD has agreed with multiple recommendations we have 

made regarding the redeployment of military commanders and 

CORs, this training has not been institutionalized throughout 

DOD. In addition, Congress has mandated that the policies include 

a requirement that operational contract support be included in 

predeployment training, but these policies have not yet been finalized. 

Until DOD has fully implemented our recommendations in each 

of these five issue areas, we will not be in a position to ensure adequate management and oversight of contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan. 

Lastly, in addition to challenges from ongoing operations, much 

remains to be done to institutionalize a DOD-wide approach to 

overseeing operational contract support. 

DOD has taken some actions, such as to establish a focal point 

for DOD’s efforts to improve contract management and oversight at 

deployed locations. In addition, the Department has issued a variety of contractor-related guidance. 

However, other guidance, such as the expeditionary contract policy and an update of the DOD instruction on contractors accompanying the force has yet to be finalized. Further, ongoing work 

has also shown that the Department continues to face challenges 

in identifying contractor requirements in its plans for future contingency operations. 

Until DOD institutionalizes operational contract support into its 

guidance, training and planning, the Department will likely continue to confront the challenges it faces today in a future contingency. That concludes my statement. I would be happy to answer 

any questions. 

[The statement of Mr. Solis follows:] 


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CONTRACT SUPPORT REQUIREMENTS

Mr. DICKS. What do you have to say about that, Mr. Assad? 

It sounds like we just did this on the wing, that there was no 

institutional framework within the Department to figure out how 

you would hire contractors when you have to deploy in a wartime 

contingency. Am I wrong? Was there any basis, existing organization, any thought given to what happens if we have to have contractors and we are in a foreign contingency? 

CONTRACTING OFFICER REPRESENTATIVES

Mr. ASSAD. When we went back into Iraq in 2004, Mr. Chairman, 

there were a lot of challenges. There were a lot of unknowns. But 

as we talk today—for example, Mr. Solis just referenced contracting officer representatives. Our fill rate now in contracting officer representatives is at 96 percent in Iraq. We believe we need 

719 of them, we have 693 CORs with their boots on the ground. 

One year ago, we had a fill rate in Afghanistan of around 46 percent. Today, our fill rate is 88 percent. Again, we think we are 

making some significant progress, but Mr. Solis is right, when we 

first got our boots on the ground—— 

Mr. DICKS. Remember, we have been in Afghanistan since October of 2001. 

Mr. ASSAD. Yes, sir. 

Mr. DICKS. And we have been in Iraq for a long period of time. 

I mean, I must tell you, when we have asked questions of people 

up here about contractors—Ms. Kaptur being one of the leaders on 

this—it was like it was some mystery; well, we don’t know how 

many people we have. It was very worrisome to me. And for a long 

time we couldn’t even get the numbers. It was like—I wouldn’t say 

a cover-up. I mean, it wasn’t even that good. I mean, there just 

didn’t seem to be anything real there. And it looks like now, 9 

years into Afghanistan, and 2003 in Iraq, we are now getting something in place. A year ago we had about half of what was necessary. 

I just hope that we learn from this so that if we have another 

contingency down the road, that we have an organization within 

the Department that can deal with the contractors and let us know 

how many people are involved and what the plan is, why you are 

doing it. Who decides it? Who decides, what should we have contractors do and what should we have the military and the civilians 

do? Who decides that? 

JOINT CONTINGENCY ACQUISITION SUPPORT OFFICER

Mr. ASSAD. What we didn’t have in place several years ago, Mr. 

Chairman, was something called the Joint Contingency Acquisition 

Support Officer, the JCASO. They are now called logistics and capability planners; they are actually resident with the combatant 

commanders to enable them to understand what is the contracting 

capability, given a specific war plan, that will be necessary? How 

will we go about contracting for it? How will we in fact be able to 

address a contingency operation? 

We didn’t have that in place several years ago. We now have it 

in place. It has been in place for about a year. We just saw in Haiti 


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where that process worked very well, where the Army was able to 

put contracting officers on the ground almost immediately to address the contracting concerns that our operational forces needed 

because they were able to do the planning involved. 

So the answer is, who is deciding what the capability is, that is 

the combatant commander’s decision to decide what his force, his 

logistics, his J–4, if you will, his chief logistics officer planning how 

much of a capability do we need, how much of that will be inherent 

to the service, and how much of that will be contracted for; we can 

do that now. 

Mr. DICKS. So you are telling me that, going forward—and Haiti 

is a good example, we were talking about this yesterday with General Petraeus, who thought that another contingency, what about 

Haiti? We were able to respond. We have the equipment. We didn’t 

kill ourselves. But I think this is important. I think it is important 

that this be part of the planning the Department does. They have 

war plans over there for every possible contingency—— 

Mr. ASSAD. Yes, sir. 

CONTRACT SUPPORT REQUIREMENTS

Mr. DICKS [continuing]. But you have to have how much of this 

are you going to do with military and civilians, and how much are 

you going to do with contractors? And you have got to be able to 

explain it to people, because if you don’t, if you can’t explain it, 

then it looks like we are trying to do things with contractors so we 

keep the numbers down so it doesn’t look like we are spending that 

much money, or whatever it is. 

I just think that this is one where we really need to keep this 

in place. So, hopefully, some day when we are out of Iraq and Afghanistan, I just hope this doesn’t wither away and be forgotten because it is something that is very important. The American people 

have a right to know how many people we are contracting to. And 

the most important thing is the Inspectors General gave us all 

kinds of reports early on about all the fraud, waste and abuse and 

everything else that accompanied these contracts, which also was 

upsetting to this committee and to the American people. 

Mr. Frelinghuysen. 

JOINT CONTINGENCY ACQUISITION SUPPORT OFFICE

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Mr. Assad, you prefaced your comments in 

the beginning by saying that this is all about what we need to do 

to support our soldiers, Marines, airmen, SeaBees in the field. And 

so, to some extent, the reason we have these contractors has a lot 

to do with, in some cases, while they may be protecting themselves, 

in some instances these contractors are used to protect them. Is 

that accurate? 

Mr. ASSAD. Yes. 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. And our Army still moves on its stomach, 

so unless you want private first classes doing KP, we have for a 

long time relied on private contractors. What is the acronym, the 

Joint Acquisition Workforce, what is that acronym that someone 

referred to? 

Mr. ASSAD. JCASO, the Joint Contingency Acquisition Support 

Officer. 


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Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. These are civilians? 

Mr. ASSAD. They are civilians. They could be military. 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. But are they associated with each one of 

your organizations? 

Mr. ASSAD. No. They are coming from the Defense Logistics 

Agency. They are under the Defense Logistics Agency, and they are 

resident with the combatant commanders. 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. All right. So those that are civilians there, 

do they volunteer, or are they told that they have to go? 

Mr. ASSAD. No, this is their job. Their job is to be logistics—— 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. This is their job. So it is not like when we 

have problems with getting people from the State Department to 

volunteer? 

Mr. ASSAD. That is correct, yes. 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. They have to go. They are obligated to go. 

Mr. ASSAD. Yes, sir. 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Who protects them? 

Mr. ASSAD. Our military. 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Are any of them protected by contractors? 

Mr. ASSAD. I don’t believe so, no. 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. So they are protected by the units in which 

they are imbedded. 

Mr. ASSAD. That is correct. 

CONTRACTING OFFICER REPRESENTATIVES

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. So the acquisition workforce that we talk 

about is 719 in total, or is that the number that have been added 

to the existing group that is there? 

Mr. ASSAD. No. The contracting officer representatives, sir, are 

actually soldiers and Marines in the field. They are part of their 

fighting units. 

And an ancillary duty that they have, that the Army and the 

Marines are now training their folks before they get their feet on 

the ground, is— 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. So it is part of their MOS; it is part of their 

military assignment. 

Mr. ASSAD. That is correct. 

SYNCHRONIZED PRE-DEPLOYMENT OPERATIONAL TRACKER (SPOT)

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. The technology that is available to assist, 

whatever happened to the so-called ‘‘synchronized pre-deployment 

and operational tracker,’’ the acronym being SPOT? 

Mr. ASSAD. The acronym being SPOT. We will have fully mechanized—in other words, everybody that is in theater will be fully 

mechanized under SPOT. 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Is that a database? 

Mr. ASSAD. Yes. It is an automated way for us to track our contractors. 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. So what exists now, and what has existed 

in the past? 

Mr. ASSAD. SPOT does exist, it is just that there are some contractors who we do not yet have in an automated way into the system so we are putting them in right now. 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. So how are they tracked? 


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Mr. ASSAD. They are tracked manually and fed into SPOT on a 

manual basis. 

COUNTING CONTRACTOR PERSONNEL

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. As we move towards 50,000 soldiers and 

Marines, et cetera, in Iraq, how many ‘‘contractors’’ do we have in 

Iraq today? 

Mr. ASSAD. Well, we have over 100,000 in Iraq today, about 

101,000 in Iraq today. 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. And what portion of those contractors are 

foreign nationals? 

Mr. ASSAD. Approximately 80 percent are foreign nationals. 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Is there a strong likelihood that we won’t 

need to depend on those as our military forces are reduced? 

Mr. ASSAD. Yes. I should correct that. Of the 100,000 in Iraq, Mr. 

Congressman, 50,000 or about are third country nationals; about 

20,000 are local. So about 70,000 contractors are not U.S. citizens 

of the 100,000 that are in Iraq. 

CONTRACTOR COMPONENT OF FORCE STRUCTURE

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. What type of work are they doing? 

Mr. ASSAD. For the most part, they are doing logistic support, 

dining facilities, laundry facilities, about 83 percent. 

One of the other things that the Secretary of Defense and the 

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff directed was that the Joint 

Staff do an extensive study on the dependency of the fighting force 

on contractors. What kinds of contractors do we have? Is that the 

right mix? 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. What is the right mix? 

Mr. ASSAD. Well, the mix will change, but about 83 percent right 

now is logistics-related functions. 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. You have been an observer of this for some 

time. 

Mr. ASSAD. About 150,000 of the 200,000 contractors in Iraq and 

Afghanistan are doing logistics functions. 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Do you think that is the right mix? 

Mr. ASSAD. Yes, I do. 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. There is a perception around the committee 

here—and you haven’t had the benefit of our exchange—that as we 

reduce our footprint in Iraq, that we are going to somehow miraculously go from 100,000 contractors down to something which is perhaps parallel to what we have with boots on the ground. 

Mr. ASSAD. Well, that could very well happen. If you are going 

to have contractors, there is no doubt that the vast majority are 

going to be in the logistics environment, and in that particular 

case, no doubt most of them in light support services. That is what 

most of them are doing. 

The other significant element of contractors is building partnerships, translators, things of that nature. That is the next largest 

size of contractors. 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Well, they are indispensable. You don’t 

want to leave our force with no way to communicate. 

Mr. ASSAD. Yes, sir. So those are the two principal, of the 

200,000 contractors, about 165,000 are either doing logistics work, 


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about 150,000, and about 14,000 or 15,000 translators doing what 

we call building partnerships. 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. That is interesting. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. DICKS. Mr. Moran. 

INHERENTLY GOVERNMENTAL FUNCTIONS

Mr. MORAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for having the hearing. 

Mr. Assad, nice to see you again. It is nice to see you other guys, 

too, but I don’t know you like I do Mr. Assad, but I will make a 

point of doing that before I leave. 

Mowing the grass is not an inherently governmental function, 

cleaning the windows, or many of the logistical functions that you 

refer to. 

On the other hand, evaluating other contractors’ bids is an inherently governmental function. Any number of auditing functions, 

budgeting functions, it seems to me that the role of lead integrator 

is a contractor function. Because for contractors to play those roles, 

there is an inherent conflict of interest, either direct or indirect. 

What we need from the Office of Management and Budget is a 

clear definition of, what is inherently governmental? We don’t have 

that definition yet, do we? 

Mr. ASSAD. No, sir. But I do know, Mr. Moran—— 

Mr. MORAN. Still working on it? 

Mr. ASSAD. Well, I have actually seen a draft of it. 

Mr. MORAN. Really? 

Mr. ASSAD. Yes. The Administrator of the Office of Federal Procurement Policy has that draft. It is in coordination. And I do believe that they are getting ready to publish that direction to all of 

us. 

INSOURCING

Mr. MORAN. That would help a lot. 

As you know, one of the problems in this transitional period, 

from over-reliance upon contracting to bringing people in house, insourcing, as they say, is that it has been done in an inconsistent 

fashion. 

Some managers get it right away, and they bring in as many 

people as they can. Others resist it and don’t. The problem is some 

of those who have been bringing people in have been going to contractors that performed well services that were needed by the government and have undermined those contractors who have spent a 

good deal of money on training and capital equipment by simply offering employees as much money as they were being paid in the 

private sector but letting them know, you really don’t have an option because we are going to hire these folks out from under this 

contract; if you want a job, you had better come in-house. That 

doesn’t seem fair either. As much as we have tried to balance between the appropriate roles for contractors versus those of government personnel, we want to do it in a fair and a rational and a sustainable way. 

Now, do you have some thoughts on how we can rectify some— 

I don’t want to call them abuses, but at least inconsistencies that 

have occurred in the last year? 


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Mr. ASSAD. Yes, Mr. Moran. First of all, I think that what we 

need to ensure is that, as we make these insourcing decisions, that 

in fact we have made a careful assessment of the inherently governmental function that we are looking to build or the skill set that 

we are looking to bring into government and that there is a purpose and reason to it. 

I agree that just insourcing for the sake of insourcing is not what 

we are trying to do within the Department. And frankly, as we 

have discussed in previous sessions, it borders on being unethical 

to try to entice people to come to work with the idea that somehow 

they are going to lose their job if they don’t decide to come into government employment. That is not the way we want to do business. 

Mr. MORAN. Are you going to try to rectify that through some 

guidance that is sent out to management? 

Mr. ASSAD. Absolutely. 

ACQUISITION WORKFORCE

Mr. MORAN. Very good. 

Now, Chairman Murtha suggested that, given the problems we 

have had with acquisition personnel, the lack of quality and quantity of acquisition personnel when we had half what we had—in the 

year 2000, for example, we wound up, after Duncan Hunter pursued his policy of having them cut by 50 percent, they were, but 

contracts had gone up by at least that, at least double, while we 

were cutting acquisition personnel in half. 

That didn’t make any sense. So we wanted to quickly grow the 

number of qualified acquisition personnel, and yet when we suggested using GSA personnel, who seemed to have transferable talents, you were the one who resisted that, Mr. Assad, I am told by 

the contractors. 

Now, is that a fair accusation? 

Mr. ASSAD. That is inaccurate. I didn’t resist it. What I simply 

said to my brothers and sisters in the other agencies that could assist us in doing contracting was they needed to come forward with 

the particular skill sets that we needed so that we could take advantage of them. And some organizations did. The Department of 

the Interior and their National Business Center has done quite a 

good job in supporting us. 

GSA has also done an outstanding job. It was just in that particular instance, GSA, frankly, came to us and said, hey, we just 

don’t have the kinds of folks that we can simply transfer over to 

do it. There were some unique skills that we needed. They were already supporting us, and the folks at GSA do a fine job supporting 

us. 

Mr. MORAN. You are using that past tense. We are going to fix 

this in terms of acquisition personnel, right? 

Mr. ASSAD. Yes, we are. 

Mr. MORAN. We are going to bring in the quantity and quality 

we need, whatever it takes. 

Mr. ASSAD. Yes. And also, we are going to take advantage of our 

sister agencies who have capabilities that we can leverage off of. 

That just makes all the sense in the world, and we are doing that. 


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COMMON ACCESS (CAC) CONTROLS

Mr. MORAN. I have one more question. 

I don’t know whether it was your fine organization, Mr. Solis, or 

the Inspector General, but this committee was given information 

that there were contractors who were issuing common access cards, 

and many of those common access cards went to people they 

shouldn’t have, and a whole lot of them were never returned. 

The problem is that, as we have people invariably who want to 

get on to military bases, for example, the easiest way is to get 

themselves a common access card. So this committee had substantial concern over the integrity of those common access cards, and 

we didn’t get any satisfying answers when we asked about this. 

There were tens of thousands of people, many of them nationals in 

the country where we were located, who had these cards, and they 

never got turned in. Do you see it as any kind of a security threat? 

And if so, how are you handling it? 

Mr. SOLIS. We haven’t looked at this issue, it must have been the 

IG. But we are aware of the issue. 

To go to my statement, I think one of the challenges—not necessarily for CAC cards, but just in general background screening 

and badging, I think, particularly when you have a lot of local nationals, third-country nationals supporting the war fight. 

Mr. MORAN. Well, I see this extraordinarily good staff has a 

question on it, and it was the DOD IG, but it could have been GAO 

as well, I know you share that concern. 

Any other thoughts on that before I finish questioning? Okay. 

Thank you. 

Thanks, Mr. Chairman. 

CONTRACTOR COMPONENT OF FORCE STRUCTURE

Mr. DICKS. Let me ask one quick question, and then I will go to 

Mr. Kingston. 

And this is for Mr. Parsons. 

When DOD talks about contractors being part of the total force, 

what does this mean to the Army? And what steps has the Department taken to implement this concept? 

Mr. PARSONS. Sir, as Mr. Assad said, in parallel with what the 

Joint Staff has been doing in looking at the extent of contractors 

being used to support operations, so has the Army. I think what 

is really important—and you spoke to this earlier—is, how do you 

do the planning for what you need in terms of contractor support? 

And then just as importantly is, what things do you put in place 

to do proper execution in the management of those contracts? That 

is really where the Army has spent a lot of time. 

We now have these Contracting Support Brigades which fall 

under my Expeditionary Contracting Command. Each one of those 

brigades supports an Army Service Component Commander, which 

would support a Geographic Combatant Commander. And their primary purpose is to work with that Army Service Component Commander in determining what their contract support requirements 

are going to be to support a given operation, whether it is a contingency operation or a full blown operation. 


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Mr. DICKS. But are we really calling contractors part of the total 

force? Is that now part of our definition? Is that correct? 

Mr. PARSONS. Sir, I don’t know if that is the Army’s official position, but I can tell you that the contractors are a large part of—— 

Mr. DICKS. It used to be the active duty Army, the National 

Guard, and the Reserves, but we hadn’t heard about the contractors being put into that definition. Now, maybe that is, you know, 

if you have 207,000 people over there, maybe it should be in that 

definition. I am not saying that that is not implausible, but I just 

was interested the first time I had seen that phrase used. 

Mr. PARSONS. Sir, I think it is recognition by the Army that the 

contractors provide essential services which enable us to execute 

our mission. So we want to treat them as part of, what do we need 

to do to execute our mission? 

COST EFFECTIVENESS OF CONTRACTOR SUPPORT

Mr. DICKS. Have we ever looked at, is it cost effective? 

Mr. PARSONS. I think it is. I think that the use of contractors is 

cost effective, especially supporting—— 

Mr. DICKS. Have we done any studies on that, any analysis on 

that? 

Mr. PARSONS. Sir, I know that several years ago, OMB had taken 

a look, especially at the LOGCAP contract, whether that approach 

was cost effective. I am not aware of any internal studies that have 

been conducted. 

Mr. DICKS. And the outcome was? 

Mr. PARSONS. As I recall, they felt that for contingency-type operations, like we have over in Iraq and Afghanistan, that there was 

cost effectiveness to using the contractors. But getting to Mr. 

Solis’s point—— 

Mr. DICKS. And we have had a shortage of troops, there is no 

question about that. So it would put more stress on the force if you 

had to have active duty forces or Guard and Reserve forces doing 

these jobs. 

Mr. Kingston. 

ROLE OF CONTRACTORS

Mr. KINGSTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I want to follow up with those questions, Mr. Parsons, because 

I think that we should recognize the important role of contractors. 

And I am willing to believe it is cost effective because I would 

think if Uncle Sam pays a military person to learn how to operate 

Strykers and rolling over Humvees and all kinds of high-tech stuff, 

that that person has hundreds of thousands of dollars worth of 

training in him compared to somebody who is serving in a food 

line. It would make sense that, if you could farm out the person 

serving the food and keep the specialist on the front line, it is a 

cost-effective way to do things. 

However, I am a little bit surprised that somebody who supports 

that position, that we don’t have more kind of a, frankly, a hell yes, 

it is cost effective, look at this, show me the math. And so as somebody who is pro-contractor, I would like to see that math. And I 

would be very surprised if it did anything but showed a strong case 

for it. 


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SECURITY IMPACTS COMMODITY PRICES

Now, having said that, I would also like to think that if I asked 

you what a gallon of gas cost in Kabul in January of 2002, you 

would be able to tell me because it was probably brought in by a 

contractor, and how much is a gallon of gas today in Kabul, because we are so many more years into the war, it would appear to 

me that we would still be using contractors to get that gas to us, 

but that the price would reflect the threat. Is that the case, and 

is somebody watching something like that? 

Mr. PARSONS. Well, sir, I can’t answer you—— 

Mr. KINGSTON. And I am just pulling gas out of the air, but I 

would say the same thing with the bread and the bologna and anything else that is being put in there for the troops. 

Mr. PARSONS. I can’t address your specific question on the fuel 

or even any given commodity, but certainly what we have seen is 

that the cost of items really is a reflection of what the environment 

is and also to the extent that we have competition going on. 

AVAILABILITY OF COMPETITION

Mr. KINGSTON. Well, because I think—originally the first premise 

was, we have a war to fight, get me a gallon of gas, and I am not 

going to bid this thing out. But 2 or 3 years down the road, you 

start saying, the war is still going on, I want to have more than 

one vendor. And it would be the same with any commodity. Again, 

I am just picking on gas. But isn’t it a French company that feeds 

a lot of the troops over there? Isn’t Gefco the company? 

Mr. ASSAD. No, sir, it is LOGCAP. It is under a particular contractor. 

Mr. KINGSTON. Is it Kellogg, Brown, and Root? 

Mr. ASSAD. Kellogg, Brown, and Root (KBR) does some of it in 

Iraq, other contractors do it in Afghanistan. 

Mr. KINGSTON. But you have a lot of vendors you can choose 

from on the—— 

Mr. ASSAD. Yes. Let me address that, Mr. Kingston, if I might. 

The amount of competition that is going on in Iraq and Afghanistan right now by the Joint Contracting Command is about 97 percent. So 97 to 98 percent of the dollars that the Joint Contracting 

Command is issuing in theater to local companies is fixed price, 

and it is done on a competitive basis. So our soldiers and Marines 

and sailors and airmen that are doing the contracting on the 

ground—and General Camille Nichols is their commander—is absolutely focused on trying to get good value for the taxpayers. So your 

point that we ought to be able to do that—— 

Mr. KINGSTON. I am not interrupting you because I disagree with 

you; I just have a lot of questions in a short period. But I think 

that is something very important to say, if you say 97 percent of 

the items or the contractors have gone through competitive bid. 

Mr. ASSAD. That is correct. That is being done by the Joint Contracting Command. 

Mr. KINGSTON. But I think we also have to understand our first 

demand of the contractors was to get it done, and then further, the 

secondary question was get it done cheaply or get it done competitively. 


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Mr. ASSAD. That is correct. 

COST EFFECTIVENESS OF CONTRACTOR SUPPORT

Mr. KINGSTON. The second question I wanted to ask is, when we 

send a civil servant over there, isn’t the multiplier on their domestic salary about double? 

Mr. ASSAD. No, I don’t think so, sir. 

Mr. KINGSTON. Well, I happen to have asked that question when 

we were in Afghanistan to one of the government agencies, and 

that is what they told me: For their employees to go over there, the 

package is about twice what they would pay here. 

Mr. ASSAD. Well, I guess if you were going to add in the per diem 

and the travel and all of that, that could be true. 

Mr. KINGSTON. The reason why, getting back to Mr. Parsons and 

this cost efficiency information, is that would be relevant, too, for 

us to know that if you have somebody who is doing a nonmilitary 

kind of function but supporting a civilian government transition, 

that if we get a Federal employee to do it, you are doubling their 

salary; whereas a contractor might be just as capable and less 

money. I happened to ask about a particular agency, I don’t want 

to pick on them at the moment, but it was twice. 

Mr. ASSAD. But I don’t think it would be cheaper to go to a contractor versus a government person. Having said that, most of the 

civilians that we have in theater, it is very limited. The reality is, 

to do contracting on the ground, we are training soldiers and Marines and airmen to do that. Those are the folks that are doing it. 

That is who we intend to do it in the future. We do have a limited, 

but very limited, number of civilians in theater assisting them, but 

the reality of life is, in a combat situation, we are going to have 

to depend upon uniformed men and women to do that work, and 

they do a marvelous job at it. 

Mr. KINGSTON. Well, one of the keys to victory right now in Afghanistan is bridging the gap between the military victory and the 

civilian transfer, and so there are going to be holes in there. That 

might not be your Department, so to speak, but that is something 

that is more and more important is, how much does it cost to send 

civilians over there? 

CONTRACT WORKFORCE COMPENSATION

Now, the other question I have is, if you are hurt and you work 

for a contractor, how is your workers’ compensation paid? Who 

pays it? 

Mr. ASSAD. Well, the workers’ compensation would be paid by the 

company that is involved. 

Mr. KINGSTON. No, it is actually not. As I understand it, they actually come under the U.S. Longshoreman law. 

Mr. ASSAD. No, Congressman, I would have to take that for the 

record, but I believe that—— 

Mr. KINGSTON. I don’t know if there is anybody who knows that, 

because I am just asking. 

Mr. ASSAD. I don’t believe it is paid by the Longshoreman’s Act. 

[The information follows.] 

The Department of Labor’s (DoL) Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs 

(OWCP) is responsible for overseeing the provisions of the Defense Base Act (DBA) 


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and the War Hazards Compensation Act (WHCA). The DBA is an extension of the 

Longshore and Harbor Workers Compensation Act. The DBA covers all workers, regardless of nationality, who are injured or die while working overseas under contract to federal agencies. Like state workers’ compensation systems, benefits under 

DBA are primarily paid by private insurance companies. DoL oversees benefit delivery by receiving and monitoring reports of injury and of benefit payments, and providing dispute resolution services. Cases where the parties are unable to resolve the 

issue in dispute are referred to a DoL administrative law judge for adjudication. 

Mr. KINGSTON. Well, I actually worked a case in my office of 

some employees who were injured, and they were Blackwater or 

some—they were really a high-stress thing, but they were paid 

under U.S. Longshoreman. And the contract with the company actually does not pay their workers’ compensation; the government 

gets involved in it. But it is sort of an orphan thing. 

One of the things that is important to me, and I really would like 

you to get back to me, is who is making sure that these folks are 

paid for their injuries? And I will give you a full case on one that 

just shows some people who are really out there and giving it their 

all, and they were injured and never paid, or paid months to years 

afterwards. 

Mr. ASSAD. Yes, sir. I can tell you that we do not, in practice, 

follow what employers do with their individual employees as it relates to injury, but I believe the actual execution is that the company is reimbursed for that workers’ compensation payment by the 

functions that you are talking about, but I believe the company is 

responsible. 

Mr. KINGSTON. In fact, Mr. Chairman, I will yield on this, but 

we actually put report language in the bill last time to get some 

people who had been injured or hurt, but it is a really illogical way 

that—a lot of boxes have to be checked before they get paid. And 

just from a human standpoint, I don’t think we are doing these 

people much—— 

CONTRACTOR COMPONENT OF FORCE STRUCTURE

Mr. DICKS. Mr. Solis, do you have any idea about this? 

Mr. SOLIS. No, I don’t. Actually I just wanted to go back to one 

issue you raised about contractors being recognized as part of the 

total force. 

It has been in the actual Joint Guidance, in that guidance since 

2000. More recently, in 2006, I think it was reemphasized that contractors are part of the total force in the 2006 QDR. So there is recognition by the Department that they are going to be part of the 

total force, along with the active military, the Reserve, the Guard, 

as well as DOD civilians. 

Mr. KINGSTON. Thank you. 

Mr. DICKS. Thank you for that explanation. 

Mr. Bishop. 

CONTRACT OVERSIGHT

Mr. BISHOP. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

And thank you, gentlemen, for being here today. 

I want to, in relation to contracting, talk a little bit about the resources that you have available and that you are actually utilizing 

to make sure that you have sufficient contract officers and sufficient auditing to deal with fraud, waste and abuse. 


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A few months ago, I was contacted, through my constituent service office, by a contractor over in Kuwait who had lost his job, 

which he felt on a pretext. He was an engineer for maintenance for 

one of the contractors that was charged with responsibility for 

making sure that the living quarters for the troops were habitable. 

This was some time after the trooper was electrocuted in the shower. He indicated that his job was to make sure that those kinds of 

things did not happen, and that he had to sign off on the repairs. 

In his particular instance, he refused to sign off on some when 

his supervisory people said he should. Long story short, he 

wouldn’t sign. It created some bad will. He was eventually let go 

because they alleged that he had claimed work time when he was 

actually off. He was called in from on his day off, had to go through 

the security check, which was documented, which could be documented by the contractors—same contractor who also had the gate 

security contract. He signed in, did everything, was registered. 

Once he got in, he did the work, came out, and signed out. When 

pay time came, he was charged with collecting the pay for not 

being present, and of course, they said that he could not document 

being present. And he said, well, you have the records when I came 

in to work. 

Long story short, he loses his job, calls us to see if we could help 

him. In the process of talking with him and his wife, they identify 

what they consider to be fraud, waste and abuse; that in the performance of that contract, they billed for two and three times the 

work that they are supposed to be doing, so that the government 

is actually being billed two or three times more than it should be. 

So my question to you is, in connection with these contractors, 

do you have a sufficient auditing force? Do you have sufficient ears 

to listen to whistle blowers? Or is the contractor—as in this particular case, the contractor was in the position to stop this individual from being able to prove that he was at work because he 

also controlled the access records to the base. So he was not in a 

position to prove that he was actually there because they would not 

give him access to those records. 

His wife, of course, was also employed by the same contractor. 

She was reluctant to speak up too much because, with a two-worker family, with one of the bread winners out of work, she doesn’t 

want to raise too much, I understand, under those circumstances, 

because they have kids. 

My question is, what about oversight? What about access for 

whistle blowers? How are you auditing? Do you have sufficient auditing capacity to make sure that when the government is billed, 

it is for work actually done? 

Mr. ASSAD. First of all, Mr. Bishop, I believe we do have a number of avenues that people can access if they believe that there has 

been some type of inappropriate behavior—overcharging, 

mischarging, whatever it might be—whether it be the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR), whether it be the 

IG, whether it be the GAO, Defense Contract Audit Agency, Defense Contract Management Agency, but we have several different 

organizations where people can get access to identify those things. 

We have spent a significant amount of time training our contracting officers to be sensitive to and in fact have put into play 


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several different scenario-based environments where they can understand potential fraud environments that they should in fact report. So if your particular constituent, frankly, if he would notify 

me, we will make sure that it gets to the appropriate authorities 

in order to be properly investigated. 

It is a challenge to keep people on the ground. DCAA has about 

30 folks resident in both Iraq and Afghanistan, 30 and 30, about 

that, and they continue to rotate their people through. Make no 

mistake about it, it is challenging to keep people there, but we are 

doing it. And DCAA is comfortable that they have got sufficient resources to properly audit the invoices and the work that is being 

done. 

Jeff, do you want to say anything about it? 

Mr. PARSONS. Yes, sir. I would just add that, in Kuwait, where 

we did have some issues with some procurement fraud, we went 

even to the extent of making posters that we put all over the installations so that not only government people, but contractors too, 

would be familiar with the procedures for notifying the proper authorities where they were concerned that there might be some 

fraudulent behavior going on, but the contractors, too. In fact, the 

CID, the Army Criminal Investigation Command, has folks over in 

Kuwait, Iraq, Afghanistan, and many of the leads that they get for 

a lot of the procurement fraud are from company employees. So we 

do encourage company employees to come forward. 

Mr. BISHOP. The staff does have, I think, the documentation on 

this particular case, but the individual was severely handicapped 

because once he lost his job, he lost access to the base. Because 

they lived actually off of the compound, he had no longer had access to it. So there was no way he could do any documentation for 

himself, let alone for the whistle blower, other than based on his 

knowledge and that of his spouse. 

So if you would like that information, I think the staff can provide you with that. 

Mr. Murtha, on his last trip to the theater, I had discussed it 

with him, and he had intended to actually look into it personally— 

he likes to visit with troops and with the individuals—but during 

that trip, because of the busy schedule, he was not able to do that. 

But the staff does have that information, and we would like to 

share it with you. And for whatever it is worth, if you could look 

into it; you have a contractor employee that lost his employment, 

had no recourse really. 

CONTRACT FRAUD, WASTE AND ABUSE

And then the other issue, which is the bigger issue for our purposes, is how do you control that fraud, waste and abuse? Over the 

years, this subcommittee has actually tried to provide more resources because it was painfully obviously that there were not 

enough. 

Mr. PARSONS. Sir, I want to tell you that the Army CID is increasing the number of agents that they have. And, again, when 

the employees will come to the agency with the merits of the issue, 

then the government has a right to go in and get some of the documentation that might be relevant. So we really do encourage them 

to come forward. 


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Mr. DICKS. Thank you. 

Ms. KILPATRICK. 

REPORT ON CONTRACTOR FRAUD

Ms. KILPATRICK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Good afternoon, gentlemen. 

One of the responsibilities of our subcommittee is obviously to 

protect the People’s purse and to provide the Defense Department, 

Pentagon, and others with all their needs so that the young men 

and women survive and live again after they finish their tours and 

that we are defended as the Constitution requires. 

Sitting on the committee for the last year or so, contracting has 

been one of the things that we have talked about a lot. In this 2010 

Defense Bill, there is language in there that a report is due by 

March 15 on fraud and has specific things that it asks for, including the total assessment by Defense contractors and all that. Has 

that report been received by our committee? 

Mr. ASSAD. Ms. Kilpatrick, I believe that that report is to be submitted by the IG. We will take it for the record and certainly get 

you an answer. 

Ms. KILPATRICK. Please. 

Mr. Chairman, do you know if we have received that report? 

Mr. DICKS. No, we haven’t received that report. 

[The information follows:] 

The Department submitted an interim report to the appropriate Committees on 

April 5, 2010. The interim report identifies some of the significant initiatives the 

Department has undertaken to address policies and safeguards against contractor 

fraud. We expect the final report addressing all the issues raised in the Joint Explanatory Statement to be furnished to the Committees around the July/August 

2010 timeframe. 

CONTRACTOR PERSONNEL

Ms. KILPATRICK. We appreciate it. Thank you, Mr. Assad, if you 

would check for us. 

Secondly, you mentioned logistics contractors, translation contractors. Another area would be deployed contractors, or are they 

included in these two? Is that a third category? I am trying to distinguish who is military, who is not, logistically; who is in the service, who is not. The numbers we have is 169,000 are military service men and women personnel. 

Mr. ASSAD. Well, for translating, building partnerships we 

call—— 

Ms. KILPATRICK. Wait, wait, wait. There are more contractors 

than there are military personnel; 207,000 are contractors. The 

169,000, I am assuming they are deployed in your three categories, 

is that right? 

Mr. ASSAD. Yes. In the logistics area, we have 150,000 civilians 

working in the logistics area, and 31,000 military, that is in logistics. 

Ms. KILPATRICK. You said that about a half hour ago. I am talking about the deployed number. 

Mr. ASSAD. That is what I mean, deployed. 

Ms. KILPATRICK. So the deployed number is not necessarily who 

are boots on the ground? 


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Mr. ASSAD. No, deployed is the military on the ground. 

Ms. KILPATRICK. And it is not 169,000; it is 150,000? 

Mr. ASSAD. Well, it is 150,000 civilians in logistics. 

Ms. KILPATRICK. I just left Iraq. 

Mr. DICKS. I think what he is saying is those are the employees 

of the contractor, the 150,000, right? 

Mr. ASSAD. That is correct. 

Mr. DICKS. So they work for the company. They are doing logistics. And we have 31,000 military working with them. 

Ms. KILPATRICK. 31,000 military means a part of the military 

service for the United States of America? 

Mr. ASSAD. Yes, ma’am. 

Ms. KILPATRICK. 31,000 of them, and 150,000 who work for contractors? 

Mr. ASSAD. In the logistics area. Like, for example—— 

Ms. KILPATRICK. No, don’t confuse me. I am just trying to understand. Thank you, though. That is why I want a report. I am a 

paper reader, kind of an airplane-rider kind of person, so I need 

something to hold on to. So I am looking for something to kind of 

distinguish so that we know. I have a little problem that there are 

only 30,000 enlisted and 150,000 contractors, because, again—— 

CONTRACTOR COMPONENT OF FORCE STRUCTURE

Mr. DICKS. Explain that. I think that is a good question. 

Mr. ASSAD. What I am trying to explain is that, is a particular 

area that we are very heavily dependent upon civilians. For example, in the area of command and control, we have six contractors 

and 3,882 military. So there are different types of environments 

that we need contractors, but dependent upon what it is, the ratio 

of military to contractors varies dramatically depending upon what 

the function is. 

Ms. KILPATRICK. I totally accept that. What I am asking is, how 

come we can’t get that in writing? I am a school teacher by profession, kindergarten. Is that classified? There is no document that exists that tell us that, which is what I am looking for. What you just 

said—and that makes all the sense in the world, Mr. Assad, in 

terms of different jobs require different military and different contractors. It is hard for us to distinguish between them. 

One thing about the 435 in this body, 60-plus of us are on Appropriations, 16 on this committee; so the other 400 doesn’t like this 

budget. They want to know, why is it so big? So they go after 

things they know nothing about. So it is our job to really explain 

it and keep the men and women safe and give them everything 

they need at the same time. So if we can’t explain this—and what 

you just said is very good and understanding, but it is not enough 

for me to go back and teach it to the people we work with because 

they don’t get it. And as the budgets are tight and getting tighter 

and you need more—and we may not be able to supply it—we better have a better grasp on it. We may need to change something. 

You may need to recommend some changes, but status quo is not 

going to be able to continue because America is suffering. 

Mr. DICKS. Will the gentlelady yield just for a second? 

Ms. KILPATRICK. Absolutely. 


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Mr. DICKS. We have a quarterly report that is done that really 

lays this out pretty effectively. I think it is on your desk. 

Ms. KILPATRICK. I am real concerned—and thank you, I appreciate all the work that you do. I hope you understand our hard task 

as well. This committee, Chairman Murtha, as well as Chairman 

Dicks, is committed to giving you what you need. At the same time, 

it has got to be responsible, effective; and fraud, waste and abuse 

have to be eliminated, like we are trying to do. But I don’t want 

us to tell you what that is. I want you to tell us what that is so 

we can act on it properly. 

Mr. ASSAD. Yes, ma’am. 

Ms. KILPATRICK. Thank you very much. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. DICKS. Ms. Kaptur. 

CONTRACTOR COMPONENT OF FORCE STRUCTURE

Ms. KAPTUR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this hearing. 

Welcome, great to have you. I wanted to have you verify the 

numbers that Congresswoman Kilpatrick—just so I understand— 

the number of contractors versus the military personnel in 

CENTCOM. The numbers I have are 240,000 contractors in 

CENTCOM, of which 207,000 of them are in Iraq and in Afghanistan. Now, what is the number of military personnel in 

CENTCOM? 

Mr. ASSAD. I can get that answer for you. I don’t have that right 

off the top of my head. 

[The information follows:] 

As of March 30, 2010 the total number of military personnel is 227,945. 

MILITARY SUPPORT

Ms. KAPTUR. That is all I have, sir. I just have 160,000 military 

in Iraq and Afghanistan. 

Mr. ASSAD. We can get that for you for the record. 

Ms. KAPTUR. Would you guess that the number of contractors are 

greater than the number of military personnel? 

Mr. ASSAD. Yes, that is true. 

Ms. KAPTUR. How long, if one looks at a perspective from 1946 

till today, and one looks at regular personnel, military personnel 

versus contractor personnel, what would each decade tell us? 

Mr. ASSAD. Well, you know, it is very interesting that you mention that, because I was actually looking at a graphic that we had 

which went from war to war, and starting with the Revolutionary 

War. And it turns out that the least contractors we used were in 

World War II, and that was obviously because that was the most 

men and women that we had in service on the ground. That was 

about seven military to one contractor. 

Ms. KAPTUR. World War II. 

Mr. ASSAD. But for the most part, they have run around one to 

one, and we can provide that information to you. 

Ms. KAPTUR. Did it start in Vietnam? 

Mr. ASSAD. No, ma’am. We have been using contractors since the 

Revolutionary War. 


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Ms. KAPTUR. No, no. But the type of ratio we see today where 

they outnumber military personnel. 

Mr. ASSAD. No, ma’am. I think you will find that there have been 

several different wars where the ratio—for example, when we were 

in Bosnia, was about one to one. But when we were in the Gulf 

War, because it was such an intense effort and so quick, the 1990stype Gulf War, it was almost 40 military to a single contractor, because we were in and out. 

Mr. DICKS. Because it was over so quickly. 

Mr. ASSAD. Yes, sir. Yes, sir. 

Mr. DICKS. The problem becomes when we stay there, then you 

have to feed people, you have to take care of them, you know. It 

is all the logistics to get them, bring their supplies in, the equipment in, and that requires a lot of people to do it. 

Ms. KAPTUR. Well, you know, Mr. Chairman—— 

COST EFFECTIVENESS OF CONTRACTOR SUPPORT

Mr. DICKS. And what we have been kind of debating before you 

got here, is it more cost-effective to use contractors than if you had 

all those people working for the government? And there is some, 

I think, some of the opinion here is that it may well be less expensive to use contractors to do some of this work, because you don’t 

have the tail of, you know, health care and pensions and everything else. 

And I am not saying that is right or wrong. I am just saying that 

the reality is this is the way they are doing it, and it is largely because we have been there a long, long time and you have to support the people. 

Ms. KAPTUR. So I think we could say it is relatively unique in 

American history? 

Mr. DICKS. Could well be, yes. 

Ms. KAPTUR. And therefore deserves particularly close inspection 

by all of us, because it is a—— 

COUNTING CONTRACTOR PERSONNEL

Mr. DICKS. Well, if the gentlewoman would yield. The thing that 

bothered me—I remembered our trip when we were there in 2007. 

We tried to ask people about—and it was just, everybody threw up 

their hands and said, we just don’t know. 

I mean, the Corps of Engineers. We had a number of meetings 

trying to get some handle on this. Now, obviously, you have got a 

handle on it now. There is no question about that. You have got 

the numbers. You can tell us all that. 

But there was a lack, for a long time, at least I felt, there was 

a lack of clear evidence, information about this. 

Now, let’s ask Mr. Solis. Do you want to comment on that? 

Mr. SOLIS. Yes. I think the numbers that we have reported, in 

looking at SPOT, are still not numbers that you could necessarily 

rely on. I think that the Census is another way of looking at it. But 

in terms of what goes in there, I wouldn’t necessarily rely exclusively on those numbers. 


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JOINT CONTINGENCY ACQUISITION SUPPORT OFFICE

But I do want to come back to one thing about this planning for 

the future, because we need to look beyond Iraq and Afghanistan— 

and we talked a little bit about the JCASO, which, again, is a great 

concept. 

But in terms of where they are in staffing, I think they want to 

have about 30 people. I think they have five, and those five are 

contractors in terms of the planners themselves. 

Also as I alluded to in my testimony, in terms of where they are 

with planning for future conflicts and what is called the Annex W, 

our review showed that there is very little planning for those contractors in the operational plans at this point in time. 

And so the question then becomes after Iraq, after Afghanistan, 

what is the contractor footprint going to look like? I think the Department needs to consider this, because as I mentioned before, 

they are recognized as part of the total force. 

CONTRACTOR COMPONENT OF FORCE STRUCTURE

Ms. KAPTUR. Well, this is where I have a little bit of a problem. 

Others may not share this point of view. That is why I asked you 

about how unique this moment is in American history. I would not 

only say it is unique, I would say it is atypical and extraordinarily 

atypical to have this type of ratio, and what the force today means 

compared to past decades. 

One of the questions I would ask is: Of the 240,000 contractors, 

how many of them are foreign nationals? We were told at one 

meeting that we have, oh, my gosh—— 

Mr. DICKS. No, we have a briefing memo here. Make sure you see 

this. It has got the numbers on it. 

Ms. KAPTUR. I don’t know where that is. 

Mr. DICKS. Maybe your staff has it. 

Mr. ASSAD. Yes. It is about 75 to 80 percent foreign nationals. 

Ms. KAPTUR. I mean, this has never happened before in our country, has it, this level of procurement of services from foreign nationals, as a part of whatever strategy we are implementing? And it 

has happened rather accidentally in a way. I don’t think the American people for the most part know it, and it is an extraordinary 

development in my opinion. So I was just given this chart now. 

Mr. DICKS. I apologize. This was not available, I guess. 

Ms. KAPTUR. Okay. Well, I thank the Chairman for this exceptional piece of information, because we can all reflect upon it. 

But I guess I just want to say that if the authorizing committees 

debated the nature of U.S. force looking like this, I guess I missed 

it during the floor debates. 

And whatever it is we are going to leave into the future in these 

places, it would seem to me it would behoove us to be much more— 

have much more foresight about what we are doing. I am very uncomfortable with this, with this turn of affairs in our country’s history. 

Mr. ASSAD. May I make a comment? Congresswoman, I have had 

a good deal of experience in the commercial sector in building significant facilities overseas, and I can tell you it is not unusual to 

have life support being provided by third-country nationals in the 


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country or local nationals in the country that you are raising it in, 

doing that kind of work. 

Ms. KAPTUR. You were working for the private sector; right, sir? 

Mr. ASSAD. Sure. But I am saying—— 

Ms. KAPTUR. Okay. What type of company were you working for? 

Mr. ASSAD. It was a defense company, but it happened to be an 

engineering construction company. 

Ms. KAPTUR. Were you building around the oil wells? What were 

you doing? 

Mr. ASSAD. No. We were actually building power plants. We were 

building oil facilities. 

Ms. KAPTUR. In what country, countries? 

Mr. ASSAD. In India, in Saudi Arabia, in several other European 

countries, in China, in Taiwan. I mean, all over the world. 

Ms. KAPTUR. But you were building it for private interests. 

Mr. ASSAD. Sure. 

Ms. KAPTUR. But in this case, we are talking about the public interest. 

Mr. ASSAD. Yeah, but my point is that if you are going to contract for life support services in a foreign country, you are absolutely going to have to depend upon the local populace or thirdcountry nationals to do that kind of work. It would be extraordinarily expensive to bring United States civilians overseas to do 

laundry services. 

Mr. DICKS. Will you yield just for a second? 

It is, I think, positive that we are hiring people from the country 

itself like Iraq or Afghanistan. 

Mr. ASSAD. Yes, sir. 

Mr. DICKS. To hire some of their people to do this work, which 

helps give them jobs, helps improve the economic circumstances for 

those people, I mean, that is one positive aspect of this. 

CONTRACTOR COMPONENT OF FORCE STRUCTURE

Ms. KAPTUR. How did we do the laundry during World War II? 

How did our guys do the laundry in World War II? 

Mr. MORAN. Our guys did it. 

Mr. ASSAD. Our guys did it. 

Mr. DICKS. Or they got the locals to do it. 

Mr. MORAN. Could I have a—I have got to leave. I just want to 

make a comment. I appreciate Ms. Kaptur’s concern. 

Mr. DICKS. I will give you additional time, Marcy. 

Mr. MORAN. But I do think that things have evolved, and we are 

trying to make the training that our soldiers get more efficient so 

that they are not doing what they would consider scut work, that 

they are doing more specialized skills. 

It is just that—I was on a codel in Iraq, and we were waiting 

in line to get into a place in the Green Zone. And there was another line where people would just flash a badge and walk right 

through, no inspection or anything. 

I said, Who’s in that line while we are waiting in this line? And 

they said, Oh, they are KBI, they run the place. 

So the point is there needs to be some balance and they need to 

understand they don’t run the place; that the government runs the 

place, and it is primarily a military operation, and they are there 


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to fill in gaps that are not being met and shouldn’t be met necessarily by our more skilled military personnel who are—they are 

volunteers now. 

In World War II they weren’t volunteers. Now they are volunteers, and they seek out a career, a specialized skill, and we put 

a lot of training in them. So I can understand the evolution. But 

Ms. Kaptur makes a good point, and I am glad she harps back on 

it: that you have got to have balance, and that they need to understand what their limited role is. That is all. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for having the hearing. 

Mr. DICKS. Again, I think the hard part on this thing was that 

we couldn’t get an answer. Mr. Murtha tried to get answers. He 

couldn’t get answers. We couldn’t. Nobody seemed to know how 

many people were involved. 

Now we have a quarterly report, but this is way into this, into 

these operations. 

Mr. MORAN. Iraq was over, and now we have got the numbers. 

Mr. DICKS. Congress had, really, Congress had really very little 

to say about this because we didn’t know the magnitude of it. 

Mr. MORAN. Yes. 

CONTRACTOR SUPPORT REQUIREMENTS

Mr. DICKS. And we couldn’t get the information for years. I am 

not blaming it on this administration, but it happened, it was part 

of the previous administration. But I am glad at least now we have 

an understanding of this, and I think Mr. Solis’ comments about 

this—is this true, only 30 or 40 people are involved in this planning for the future operation? That doesn’t sound like a very robust 

organization to me. 

Ms. KILPATRICK. Not only that, Mr. Chairman, they are contractors. 

Mr. DICKS. Five of them were contractors. 

Ms. KILPATRICK. But that means no planning done by the military. 

Mr. DICKS. Somebody has to do the work. 

Ms. KILPATRICK. Okay. 

Mr. PARSONS. Sir, if I could, and Mr. Solis is right, but I think 

if you really take a look at the contract support planning, while the 

geographic combatant commanders have got to set the tone for 

what their expectations are in a given operation, it is really at the 

service component level where a lot of this heavy lifting planning 

goes on regarding exactly what contractors are going to need. 

And that is where I think, at least from the Army side, we are 

putting in a more robust structure to work with the service component commanders to do that type of planning. Then that will feed 

up to the geographic combatant commanders who are setting the 

overall policy for what the expectations are for contractor support 

and contractor oversight in the theater. 

Mr. DICKS. Ms. Kaptur. 

CONTRACTOR COMPONENT OF FORCE STRUCTURE

Ms. KAPTUR. Yes. I would just ask, I would just ask, the Chairman has been very nice, this is more of a dialogue, and I appreciate 

it. 


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I am just wondering, are all of you gentlemen career civilian employees of the U.S. Department of Defense? How many years have 

you been with DOD? 

Mr. ASSAD. I am a career civilian. I have been with DOD for 6 

years. 

Ms. KAPTUR. Six years. 

Mr. ASSAD. Yes. 

Ms. KAPTUR. What about you, Mr. Parsons? 

Mr. PARSONS. Ma’am I spent 26 years in the Air Force on Active 

Duty and have been with the Army as a career civilian since 2003. 

Mr. DICKS. Mr. Solis is with the GAO. 

Ms. KAPTUR. Oh, Mr. Solis is with the GAO. Okay. I just—what 

America is doing today—and this is just my opinion—is so very different than what we have done in the past, and we are now into 

nation building in a way we don’t even understand. 

And DOD is being dragged into this through contracted personnel, and you can’t really say that the American people or even 

Members of Congress fully appreciate what has happened in this 

transmorphing of CENTCOM and of our Department of Defense. 

So I am always going to be like a burr under the saddle on this, 

because I am very interested in who those 100—how many was it— 

67,000, whatever it was that are subcontracted now under 

CENTCOM, 207,000—no, 240,000 under CENTCOM, and how you 

group them, is that a part of your submission and how much they 

are earning compared to how much it would cost if we were doing 

it under regular force structure. 

I am interested in that. Is there a way for you to disaggregate? 

I understand about 147,000 of them are being hired to drive trucks 

into Afghanistan, and there are police officers and all this other 

stuff. 

Can you divide up that group, these foreign nationals and what 

they are doing, into the different categories and tell us who they 

are working for so we can put names to companies to function? 

Mr. ASSAD. We can provide you a more in-depth understanding, 

if you will take it for the record. I am not sure we can get it as 

precisely as you want it, but we can certainly give you more insight 

as to how it is, what exactly these contractors are doing and who 

is employing them. 

[The information follows:] 


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UNDEFINITIZED CONTRACTS

Mr. DICKS. Okay, thank you. 

To meet urgent needs, the Defense Department can authorize 

contractors to begin work and incur costs before reaching a final 

agreement on the contract terms and conditions known as 

undefinitized contract actions or letter of contracts. 

As of October 2009 the Department of Defense has 429 contracts 

that were undefinitized. Of these, several were specifically for contingency operations, many of them exceeding the time permitted to 

definitize. 

Mr. Assad, how often are undefinitized contracts used for contingency operations? 

Mr. ASSAD. Mr. Chairman, in theater, the Joint Contracting 

Command has not issued an unpriced contractual instrument for 

well over a year. So there they are almost exclusively used within 

the CONUS operation to support in-theater use. There are 36 of 

the 409 that are associated with contingency operations almost exclusively with the Air Force. 

And, in fact, I am on my way to Wright-Patterson the week after 

next to do a detailed review and report to your committee on the 

results of that review for those particular contractors. 

Mr. DICKS. Yes. We are on a jihad up here on undefinitized contracts, okay? I mean, this is being abused. You know, they use it 

to—you know, the Air Force is the big culprit here. But we are not 

going to stand for this. 

I mean, you know, you have got major weapons systems, the C– 

17 on an undefinitized contract; global Hawk on an undefinitized 

contract. I mean, this has become a major problem. 

You know, we need you guys to take this seriously, and I am 

glad you are going out to Wright-Pat, and we have got to get this 

thing—and just letting the time frame—it is 180 days, and it goes 

on and on for years, and they never definitize the contract. 

Why is that? Is this a lack of personnel? Is this just a contempt 

for the law? 

Mr. ASSAD. Mr. Chairman, I share your frustration in the utilization of unpriced contractual instruments. They are an incredibly inefficient and expensive way for us to do business. It is not cost-effective to use unpriced contractual instruments and, frankly, most 

commands do a very good job of controlling their use. We do have 

some organizations that have, in my opinion, abused that. They 

have a purpose, and that is when we just can’t wait for a contractor’s proposal and the appropriate negotiation of it. Then I can understand the use of an unpriced instrument, but they should be 

rare. 

And we share your view and, frankly, we are on the same mission to stamp them out wherever we can. They are costly, they are 

ineffective, and they are not good uses of the taxpayers’ money. 

Mr. DICKS. Mr. Parsons, what about the Army? 

Mr. PARSONS. Sir, I share and echo Mr. Assad’s comments as 

well. Although it is a tool that is in the toolbox, and it is frequently 

used in contingency operations, the real key—and I think this is 

what you brought up—is, you know, to get those definitized, 


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though, within a reasonable time frame. You have got to be judicious in the use of them but they are a useful tool. 

Mr. DICKS. One hundred eighty days. 

Mr. ASSAD. Correct. 

Mr. DICKS. That is what, 6 months? 

Mr. ASSAD. Correct. 

Mr. DICKS. To me, you know, this is just being used as a way 

to not definitize, I guess, the contract. And I don’t think that is in 

our best interest, and you are the people in charge, and I am—we 

want—this committee wants you to get this thing turned around. 

The Air Force has promised that they are going to clean up their 

act, but they are the ones that are abusing it the most. 

Mr. Solis, do you have any comments on this? 

Mr. SOLIS. No, other than to just confirm what you just said. I 

mean, we have had a couple of reports in the past that have talked 

about these kinds of issues. And part of the other issue, I think, 

that comes up is the contracting officers are overwhelmed in terms 

of trying to get this done as well, in terms of looking at all the different contractors or contracts that are coming forward. 

So I would just say—— 

ACQUISITION WORKFORCE PLANNING

Mr. DICKS. Let me ask you about that. How are you—you are 

talking, you are in charge of getting the—hire the people that do 

this type of work, right? 

Mr. ASSAD. Yes, sir. 

Mr. DICKS. And it is like, what, 17,000, 18,000 people? 

Mr. ASSAD. I think about 20,000. 

Mr. DICKS. Twenty thousand. Now, how do you do that? We understand, we have the impression that there is a Web site that people come through and then you pick people to interview based on 

the Web site. This is a very major task. 

Mr. ASSAD. Yes, sir. 

Mr. DICKS. To hire this many people. How are you going to get 

it done and how are you going to do it? 

Mr. ASSAD. Well, the way we have set it into play is each of— 

primarily the three services, all of the Defense agencies are involved in this, have specific plans over the next 5 years. This is a 

5-year process of hiring our 20,000 acquisition workforce members. 

For example, it is about 5,600 contracting officers, 2,500 folks at 

DCMA, 800 auditors at DCAA, 250 lawyers. I mean, there are a 

number of different professions in the contract oversight arena that 

we are looking to bring in very specifically. The Army is 1,600. 

That is what they are trying to hire to increase their workforce. 

So we very specifically know by service, by the Defense agency, 

which particular skill sets we are trying to increase and what the 

plan is over the next 5 years, and we are managing that on a quarterly basis. So we bring the services in and we go through their 

plans. 

Congress has been, frankly, more than reasonable in providing 

us a number of tools to increase the ability for us to hire people. 

Make no mistake about it, Mr. Chairman, this is a challenge. 

Mr. DICKS. How many, just out of curiosity, how many people did 

you hire in 2009? 


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Mr. ASSAD. About 2,000. 

Mr. DICKS. Two thousand? 

Mr. ASSAD. Above our maintenance. In other words, growth. We 

hire about 6,000 people a year just to keep the pipeline going. 

But we have a plan, for example, about 2,200, 2,300 people this 

year, roughly, and we expect to exceed that. 

Mr. DICKS. These people then have to be trained, right? 

Mr. ASSAD. Yes, they do, and it is an extraordinary time, Mr. 

Congressman. You know, there is a perception that we are only 

going to be able to hire very young folks with very little experience 

out of school. That is not what is happening. For example, it was 

just reported to me that the intern program at Wright-Patterson, 

they bring in 48 people every third of a year. Their last class, all 

48 people had master’s degrees. That is extraordinary, and so we 

are getting—— 

ACQUISITION WORKFORCE

Mr. DICKS. Well, right now is a good time to be trying to get people, too. 

Mr. ASSAD. Yes, sir, we are getting a number of folks, manufacturing engineers and industrial engineers, coming into DCMA from 

the automobile industry. These people can transfer these skills, 

and so there is a good deal of training. Again, Congress—and we 

appreciate the committee’s support of the Defense Acquisition Development Work Fund. These are tools that we need to get the job 

done. But rest assured that we are focused on this and that the 

services are focused on it. 

Mr. DICKS. Mr. Frelinghuysen. 

FOREIGN NATIONAL CONTRACTOR WORKFORCE

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Yes, thank you, Mr. Chairman. Very briefly, Mr. Solis, you are the author of this GAO report we have in 

front of me here, and you look rather stoic on the end here, so I 

figured I might give you an opportunity to react. I understand you 

have some interesting observations about some of the Afghanis we 

are working with, we are employing; is that correct? 

Mr. SOLIS. In terms of the quality of work? 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Quality of them, things that relate to their 

backgrounds that might be of interest to the committee. 

Mr. SOLIS. Well, I think one for the challenges for the folks who 

are managing these contracts in terms of the quality of the Afghan 

contractors is that with the Afghani’s limited experience in some 

areas it does require more oversight. That is not to say that you 

shouldn’t award contracts to Afghan firms for the reasons that we 

talked about before in terms of trying to encourage and build their 

economy, but it does require more oversight for those particular 

reasons. That is part of the Afghan First program, which faces 

similar challenges as just like you the Iraq First program. 

In terms of the background screening, I think also it just adds 

more challenges when you have more of the local nationals, because one of the things that the Department still doesn’t have is 

a Department-wide policy on background screening. And so many 

times the screening is left up to the contractors. You can’t necessarily go back. Obviously, contractors can’t do FBI checks or CIA 


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checks with these folks because they are just not there in the system. So it becomes more of a challenge. 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Many of the people with the same name? 

Mr. SOLIS. That is correct. So it does present some challenges. 

One of the problems that they are having right now—— 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. I actually went through your—while everyone was talking—I didn’t see too much comment on this aspect of 

which you speak. Is this some sort of an addendum or are you 

making some recommendations in this area? 

Mr. SOLIS. Well, we have made recommendations in the past. 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Are they in here? 

Mr. SOLIS. I believe they are in here, but also I believe we have 

made some recommendations in the past to the Department to try 

to get a handle on this. 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. I mean, there are issues that relate to the 

Afghani military, which some people give high marks to—God only 

knows, I am not sure what the measurement is there. And then in 

terms of the Iraqi police, people give pretty low marks to them. But 

not only do we need to know—I am not sure it is our job to know, 

to have background checks on all of these people. 

But if they are going to be associated with us in any way, side 

by side, in combat or, for that matter, providing services in ways 

that local contractors have historically provided services, we better 

know something about them. I think we would be highly vulnerable 

if we didn’t know something about them. So there is something in 

here that relates to some specific recommendations. 

Mr. SOLIS. Either there or in our past reports, yes. 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Okay. Well, I think we need to sort of highlight them, and I if I am not familiar with them, I apologize. 

Mr. SOLIS. Yes. 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. PARSONS. Sir, if I could just add to that. I mean, the local 

commanders do put into place policies for screening and monitoring 

the local nationals that they do bring and the foreign nationals in, 

so I don’t want to leave the impression that there is nothing that 

is going on. 

But I think what Mr. Solis’ point is, is there is not an overarching policy from their perspective at the Department level. But 

rest assured at the local level, the commanders are concerned 

about force protection, and they do put processes and procedures in 

place, including watching over the local nationals as they are working. And as those local nationals prove themselves, they could reduce some of that oversight on them. 

But make no mistake. There are some procedures and policies in 

place at that commander level. 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Thank you for that clarification. Thank you 

Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. DICKS. Mr. Visclosky. 

FOREIGN NATIONAL CONTRACTOR WORKFORCE

Mr. VISCLOSKY. If I could follow up on that, the Department then 

would not have plans to have a Department-wide procedure or 

process for screening foreign national contractors? 


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Mr. ASSAD. Mr. Congressman, we are working right now on trying to determine how we bring in—right now, the way we are 

screening many of these third-country nationals is through biometrics, and we are trying to determine how we can incorporate 

those concepts into a Department-wide policy. Contractor Personnel 

authorized to accompany the U.S. Armed Forces, but we do not 

have a Department-wide policy besides Dod Instruction 3020.41 in 

terms of how to deal with contractors. 

Mr. VISCLOSKY. Do you have any idea when that process will be 

completed? 

Mr. ASSAD. I do not, Mr. Congressman, but I will take it for the 

record and get you an answer. 

[The information follows:] 

The Department currently has standardized procedures in place to vet third-country nationals in Iraq and Afghanistan. As far as specific vetting policy is concerned, 

it is the responsibility of the Geographic Combatant Commander to set the standards for vetting within his specific area of responsibility (AOR), which includes admission procedures and requirements, including country and theater clearance, 

waiver authority, immunizations, required training or equipment, and any restrictions necessary to ensure proper deployment, visibility, security, accountability, and 

redeployment of contingency contractor personnel deploying to their AOR. 

Mr. VISCLOSKY. Mr. Solis, when did GAO make that recommendation? 

Mr. SOLIS. I think we made it last year. In 2009 we were looking 

at background screening of private security contractors in Iraq, and 

we suggested that the Secretary designate a focal point because 

there is disagreement, I think, within the AT&L community and 

the Under Secretary of Defense Intelligence (USDI) community as 

to how far you should go on the background check. 

That being said, we felt that somebody ought to take a look at 

that, and I think the recommendation is still not completed as of 

yet, as Mr. Assad said. 

Mr. VISCLOSKY. Do you think you are making reasonable 

progress? 

Mr. SOLIS. We haven’t looked lately to where they are at, but obviously it is still a void. 

Mr. VISCLOSKY. Mr. Solis, you also mentioned in the report the 

Department has not fully addressed congressional direction to include operational contract support in predeployment training. 

Could I ask a question about that of the panel, and if you could 

tell me exactly what that means and then where are we? 

Mr. ASSAD. I think Mr. Parsons can talk about the 

predeployment training being done with the Army. 

Mr. PARSONS. Sir, one of the things we did recognize, and even 

with the Gansler Commission report, which really heightened the 

issue, is that we were not getting these soldiers in units that were 

going to end up performing some level of contractor management 

when they arrived in theater, some education and training on that, 

before they arrived. 

My Expeditionary Contracting Command has been charged with 

training, deploying units before they leave. So the units that are 

getting ready to go into theater to replace the units that are there 

today are now starting to get contracting officer representative 

training and also CERP training, which is the Commanders’ Emergency Response Program training, before they deploy. 


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Now, we have done 700—we have trained over 700 military since 

October that are now being deployed or will be deployed in the 

coming months over to theaters, so we should see an improvement 

in that area. Will we get 100 percent? Probably not. I mean, as 

things develop in theater and contracts come up, we may need to 

train some people on the ground. But we have made some drastic 

improvements. 

And as Mr. Solis’ report also acknowledged, the Army has put 

out an execution order that the units will identify, soldiers and 

their units, for potentially being CORs so that we can get them 

trained. So we have contacted every unit. We have either done 

some training or added scheduled training. We are in the process 

of getting that training schedule, so we are making significant 

strides on the CORs and the CERP. 

Mr. VISCLOSKY. What is your biggest problem that you need congressional help on? 

Mr. PARSONS. Well, sir, I don’t think we need any specific congressional language to do this. I think, as I mentioned earlier, 

when we started—— 

LESSONS LEARNED

Mr. VISCLOSKY. No, I am talking generally as far as your responsibilities. Is there something missing here? And I don’t mean to be 

facetious, but we have been a nation for several hundred years, we 

have had a military for several hundred years, we have been managing contracts for several hundred years. And while times change 

and conflicts change, it seems as though we are always reinventing 

this system. It would seem like we would have it down by now. I 

am curious. 

Mr. ASSAD. Mr. Visclosky, one of the things that the Secretary 

of Defense charged Dr. Carter, the Under Secretary for AT&L and 

Mr. Hale, the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) was to do 

exactly that: How are we ensuring that our lessons learned in Iraq 

are not either recreating the wheel or learning that lesson again 

in Afghanistan. 

So we meet on a monthly basis with Dr. Carter, Mr. Hale, and 

boots-on-the-ground folks, the commanding folks on the ground, to 

talk about that particular issue and, for example, not having adequate contracting officer representatives trained in CONUS before 

they put their boots on the ground in Iraq and Afghanistan; ensuring that we have the subject matter experts who can inspect properly the goods and services that we are buying; how we are making 

sure that that does not happen—the early lessons that we learned 

in Iraq, we are now ensuring aren’t happening in Afghanistan. 

That is the reason why, for example, there has been such a remarkable increase in the number of contracting officer representatives is because of the emphasis that the Secretary himself has put 

on this issue of lessons learned. 

I will tell you that Congress has given us a significant number 

of tools. We have got the flexibilities that we need to get the job 

done, and we appreciate what Congress has done for us. We just 

need to execute. 

Mr. VISCLOSKY. Yes, gentlemen, thank you. 


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Mr. DICKS. Let me ask you a question, Mr. Solis. What do these 

CORs do? 

Mr. SOLIS. They are basically the eyes and ears on the ground 

for the contracting officer in terms of the performance of the contract. They also will help in terms of the billing and a number of 

different things. But, really, they are the contracting officer’s representative right on the ground, the contracting officers. 

They are going to tell him how the contract is being performed. 

They are going to make sure that all other aspects of the contract 

in terms of quality assurance and those other things are being 

properly executed; they interact with DCMA. There are a number 

of things, because the contracting officer, or the contract, may not 

be in theater. They may be in Rock Island or they may be somewhere else. 

So the COR’s are the people representing the Army in terms of 

the execution of that contract. They can’t direct how the services 

are done. They can monitor it, but they cannot direct the services 

per se. 

Mr. DICKS. All right. Mr. Hinchey. 

INHERENTLY GOVERNMENTAL FUNCTIONS

Mr. HINCHEY. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I am sorry 

that I got here so late, but nevertheless I am happy to be here. 

Just one simple question: The fiscal year 2009 Omnibus Appropriations Act closes a loophole that allowed non-DOD agencies to 

contract out smaller functions without first conducting formal cost 

comparisons, and the same loopholes were closed for DOD in the 

fiscal year 2010, basically in the same way. These loopholes were 

closed because of concern that agencies are giving work last performed by Federal employees to contractors, without full consideration of cost and quality. It has now been more than a year since 

the provision was enacted for non-DOD agencies and almost 5 

months since the provision was enacted for DOD. 

I understand that OMB has yet to issue guidance to the agencies 

to ensure compliance with the law. Is DOD in compliance with this 

law? Do you know if they are? What, if any, guidance has DOD 

issued to ensure compliance? 

Mr. ASSAD. Mr. Congressman, the Deputy Secretary put out 

some very specific guidance on all sources and the cost-benefit 

analysis that should, in fact, be performed. That guidance is significant with regard to what I think you are referring to. 

I think what you are referring to is the guidance from OFPP to 

inherently governmental functions. I reported earlier to the committee that I know for a fact that that guidance is in draft, the 

OFPP Administrator has shared it with me, and it is presently 

being reviewed within the administration. 

So I suspect that while I can’t speak for the administration on 

this matter, I would imagine that this will be published pretty 

shortly because it was effectively done. 

Mr. HINCHEY. Yes. So you think this problem is very solvable; it 

is going to be taken care of and cleaned up very quickly? 

Mr. ASSAD. It is a challenge. I don’t think it will be done quickly, 

but certainly the guidance is there for us to execute it properly, Mr. 

Congressman. 


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ACQUISITION WORKFORCE

Mr. HINCHEY. Okay. Let me just try one other thing then, if I 

may. 

Under the Obama administration, OMB has commendably taken 

a more hands-off approach to establishing full-time employee limitation on agencies’ in-house workforce. Nevertheless, there are still 

concerns that agencies lack the necessary personal authorization to 

hire Federal employees when in-house performance is preferable 

for programmatic or financial reasons. 

Particularly in the context of in-sourcing, I think we all agree 

that personal constraints should not prevent an agency from using 

Federal employees for a particular function when in-house performance best promotes that agency’s mission or the interests of the 

taxpayer. 

Does the DOD have the flexibility necessary to use Federal employees in such instances and on not laboring under any nonstatutory in-house personal constraints? 

Mr. ASSAD. Mr. Congressman, I can speak for the acquisition 

workforce. 

Mr. HINCHEY. Could you press that again? 

Mr. ASSAD. Yes, sir. I can speak for the Acquisition Workforce. 

We are constrained in a sense that we have—we are going to try 

to hire 20,000 government folks, that is what we have set as our 

target, but there is no constraint in doing that. The Secretary has 

been very clear and very straightforward in terms of the guidance 

that he has given us. 

We have the tools, the Congress has given us the tools that we 

need to execute that. We have a plan to execute that. And I am 

comfortable that, in fact, we will be successful in doing so. 

I will take for the record, outside of the acquisition workforce, 

but I would expect that my judgment is within the Department of 

Defense. I can’t speak for the whole administration. Within the Department of Defense, I will tell you that we are not constrained to 

meet the guidance that we have been provided by the Secretary. 

Mr. HINCHEY. Okay. So the Federal employees are going to be focused on intentionally; there is going to be priority for them. Is 

that basically what you are engaged in? 

Mr. ASSAD. Well, what we are trying to do is increase the capability of the acquisition workforce, and that will be 20,000 government employees, 10,000 outright new hires and 10,000 in-sourced 

from previously contracted positions. 

Mr. HINCHEY. Okay, the in-sourced. So you know that these people are doing good jobs; you are going to maintain them? 

Mr. ASSAD. No, no, maybe there is a misunderstanding, sir. What 

we are doing is we are assessing that work that we believe should 

be inherent to the Department. We are then putting those jobs out 

for public opportunity. There is no conversion of a particular contractor who might be working there and say, Okay, tomorrow you 

are going to be a government employee. You know, that job gets 

publicly listed and it is competed. 

So, yes, we intend to do that properly and it will be government 

employees, and I am very confident that the folks we are hiring are 

capable and able to do the work. 


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Mr. HINCHEY. Yes. But if you have capable people who are employed there, there is not going to be any operation to exclude them 

in the interest of bringing in some other operation? 

Mr. ASSAD. Oh, no, not that I am aware of. Not within the acquisition workforce. 

Mr. HINCHEY. Okay. Thank you very much. 

Mr. DICKS. Let me ask you, do you have an age imbalance in the 

Army contracting workforce? An aging workforce? 

Mr. PARSONS. Sir, I wouldn’t characterize it as an age imbalance. 

I would more say it is more an experience imbalance is what we 

have today. 

As Mr. Assad said, and I will talk about my intern program, we 

have brought quite a few entry-level, brand-new people into Army 

Contracting Command that are not 20-something. They are in their 

thirties, they are in their forties; they are making, you know, a career change. 

So it is not really an age imbalance in my mind. It is more of 

an experience imbalance, and there is. I have over 40 to 45 percent 

of my workforce has less than 5 years of experience. I have another 

40 to 45 that have 20 years or more. And, in between, I don’t have 

a lot of folks. And this is, you know, a symptom, quite frankly, of 

the downsizing that we went through in the 1990s where we just 

flat-out stopped hiring people. 

We let attrition take its place and now we are in the mode of, 

hey, we have got to bring people on because there are no experienced people out there to hire. We are all competing for that contracting officer that has 8 years of contracting time. 

So it is more of an experience imbalance, from my perspective, 

than of age. No doubt that quite a few of our most experienced contracting officers are starting to retire, and I do have quite a high 

rate of that taking place. 

So it is a challenge. We have to find ways to not—when we bring 

these new people in, how do we get them trained and get them the 

experience that they need, in a rapid fashion, so that they can handle and execute the large dollars that we are faced with today. 

STANDARDIZED TRAINING

Mr. DICKS. What is the role of Defense Acquisition University in 

preparing the Army’s contracting workforce for the contracting mission of today and the future? 

Mr. PARSONS. Well, DAU’s mission is just not unique to the 

Army. They provide the training that is necessary for all of our acquisition career programs, contracting being one of them. And 

there are different certification levels within the Department of Defense. And all of our entry-level folks have about five or six courses 

that they have to take through DAU or DAU-approved accredited 

course. And so their primary role is to provide the training that 

they need to our contracting folks and our other acquisition folks. 

Mr. ASSAD. The other thing that we have done, Mr. Chairman, 

again, over the last 5 or 6 years, is that we have standardized the 

training so our marines and our soldiers and our airmen are all receiving the same training, so that when they get in a joint environment, they can execute in a joint environment. 


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You know, what we learned in the early days in Iraq, we had 

some, very frankly, very sophisticated Air Force enlisted contracting folks, and not so sophisticated in terms of the Marine 

Corps that I was leading, and the Army folks. That has turned 

around. 

You know, we are getting a lot more experience now in our Marines and our Army folks, while the Air Force has been able to 

maintain that incredibly capable enlisted contracting capability. 

Mr. PARSONS. Sir, I would emphasize that the training isn’t as 

much of a challenge as it is trying to get our folks experience, especially in our line of business. This is you learn by doing. And so 

we are making very concerted efforts and plans on how we move 

our people around to get the right type of experience in addition 

to the training that they get from DAU. 

Mr. DICKS. I would think program officers are critical; the person 

who is the program manager, I should say. 

Mr. ASSAD. One of the things—they are. And not just in government, as you know, Mr. Chairman; in industry, if you don’t have 

effective program managers, you don’t have a successful company. 

And the reality is that we are spending a lot of our resources, our 

acquisition development funds, in training program managers and 

program executive officers. 

There is significant training at DAU. In fact, I was down at DAU 

last week for 2 hours to sit with a classroom full of program managers, sharing some experience on just acquisition and program 

management challenges in the environment that we are in. 

Mr. DICKS. Ms. Kaptur—go ahead Mr. Solis. 

Mr. SOLIS. Sir, I certainly agree that the acquisition workforce 

needs to be trained, but of the actual unit commanders who are 

dealing with contractors on a day-to-day basis also need to be 

trained on how to deal with contractors, because for example, if 

they direct the contractor to do something that is out of scope, you 

have got a problem. 

So I think it is not only incumbent about the acquisition workforce and corps, but it is also the unit commanders, brigade commanders, battalion commanders on down, that really need to know 

how to deal with contractors in a contingency environment. 

Mr. PARSONS. Sir, if I could add to that, I think this gets to Mr. 

Solis’ point about institutionalizing. The Army has, in my opinion, 

really moved out in trying to institutionalize this by putting blocks 

of instruction having to do with contracting and contractor management in many, many courses in the Army, including professional 

military education, where we are getting our intermediate level at 

the captain and major level, and also at the senior level, exposed 

to contracting and contractor management and how operational 

contract support is important to the unit commanders as they execute their mission. 

So we are not where we want to be yet, but we have put a lot 

of course work in place, and we are going to continue with that. 

Mr. DICKS. Ms. Kaptur. 

SECURITY OF OUR FORCES

Ms. KAPTUR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I just wanted to put on 

the record that when we have the kinds of numbers, tens of thouVerDate Mar 15 2010 04:00 Mar 25, 2011 Jkt 065008 PO 00000 Frm 00210 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 E:\HR\OC\A008P2.XXX A008P2

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sands of people who are hired in some way to assist in these operations, though they may build links to people in the country, each 

one of them becomes a potential source of infiltration and breach. 

And I don’t think that we are good enough in deciphering who 

those might be. And what do I offer as my proof? 

We had one meeting dealing with what happened to the CIA. I 

figure the CIA is a lot smarter than you are, they got all those 

agents out there, and yet we had them all blown up at that base 

in Afghanistan. And where was the point of breach? Very interesting. And how that individual got in there, they weren’t cleared 

by a contracting agency that said you didn’t have a gun. They came 

in with a suicide vest and they pulled it just at the right time. This 

is an unbelievable form of guerilla warfare. 

And so when I look at—just so it is understood where I am headed here, I am very concerned about security of our force. 

Mr. DICKS. About what? I didn’t hear you. 

Ms. KAPTUR. I said I am very concerned about the security of our 

force and the fact that though hiring nationals in these countries 

might build bridges in some ways, each one is also a potential point 

of infiltration and breach of our security. 

And I use that most recent example with the CIA base as an example of how a truck driver and a whole set of steps happened that 

ended up having major catastrophe for people in our country—people from our country. So one of my questions—you know, we look 

at these numbers in the aggregate, and I really thank you, Mr. 

Chairman, for providing these numbers about where we are hiring—just look at the base support, 61,000 people. 

How many of them are foreign nationals? Transportation, 2,000. 

All it takes is one. And not only that, but the ones doing it can be 

informers that you won’t even know. So they study patterns, they 

get into these places. Unlike us, they have all the time in the 

world. 

We think in megabytes, they think in centuries, right? So they 

are not about to easily accommodate to our way of life. So I look 

at each one of these with great suspicion. And it could be some 

laundry person who is married to somebody who lives in this village, and the potentials for breach are enormous. So the more information you can provide us will be greatly appreciated. 

We can check their backgrounds and all the rest, but it is pretty 

obvious, we had a meeting this week—this is off the subject, but 

it is related—with representatives from the country of Lebanon, 

where it is pretty obvious what happened there in the last war 

with Israel. And what was their request of us? Their request of us 

was that fundamentalism is growing in the north, and they wanted 

help in agriculture to try to combat what was happening inside 

that country with a whole new generation of people who don’t remember 30 years ago and some of the friendships that existed back 

then. The networks that are developing at the local level, political, 

social, helping networks—— 

Mr. DICKS. I might remind the gentlewoman, we are in an open 

session here. 

Ms. KAPTUR. All right. I am glad the gentleman reminded me of 

that. 


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So we were being asked for assistance to help to enlarge upon 

the social helping networks in some of these other countries. 

It seems to me that because many of these individuals that we 

rely on live in desperate places, sure, they will take the money, but 

I don’t really think that we can guarantee the integrity for our 

forces and the security of our forces. 

So my question really is, just take the area of transportation, all 

right? Of these several hundreds and hundreds of people, what do 

we really know, just what they tell us? I mean, you don’t know the 

villages they come from. You don’t know what their contacts are. 

You don’t know why they might take a job there. 

So I just wanted to share that and express deep concern about 

what this could potentially mean down the road, because all it 

takes is a few to do great damage and they have all the time in 

the world to wait us out. 

Mr. DICKS. Any comment on that? 

Mr. ASSAD. It is a legitimate concern. It is a risk, and we are 

doing what we can do to try and screen local nationals, but it is 

a challenge. 

Mr. DICKS. But, let me ask you this. And have we had in the 

Green Zone any incidents, any people that were hired that wound 

up being a bomber? 

Mr. ASSAD. I am personally not aware of it but we will take that 

for the record, Mr. Chairman, and report back to you. 

[The information follows:] 

CENTCOM has been queried and can find no instance where hired individuals 

participated in an attack within the Green Zone. 

MRAP

Mr. DICKS. Okay. Let me ask you this. We did MRAP and the 

Stryker very, very effectively. But then you go back and look at 

Crusader, Comanche, Armed Reconnaissance Helo, the Future 

Combat System. These are all major problems for Army acquisition. Why was Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) and 

Stryker, why were they done so effectively and these others turned 

out to be major embarrassments for the United States Army? At 

least I think they are. 

Mr. ASSAD. It all goes down, I think, Mr. Chairman, there are 

several problems in every one of those programs that are unique 

to those programs. But, fundamentally, why was MRAP such a success? 

Mr. DICKS. Right. What did we do differently? 

Mr. ASSAD. Well, what we did was unequivocal support from 

Congress in terms of the funding that was required to execute it. 

We had a world-class acquisition team on that procurement. It is 

unprecedented that we could take such a major procurement from 

requirement definition to execution in the short period of time that 

we did under competition. And what it was was an extraordinary 

ability to bring several very talented people together. 

I often get asked by the Defense Science Board and a number of 

other organizations, you know, do you need more rapid acquisition 

authorities, is there something that Congress should be doing to 

make your job easier? 


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The fact of the matter is that the MRAP acquisition did not 

waive one law, we didn’t waive one procurement regulation. We, in 

fact, did three internal reviews of our peer review on MRAP, and 

yet we were incredibly successful. And it was because of the talent 

of the folks that were involved and the support of Congress in providing us the funds that we needed to execute. 

Mr. DICKS. And the contractors had to do a good job. 

Mr. ASSAD. And the contractors did an outstanding job. Yes, they 

did, sir. 

And so I would say to you that in—which is why I very much 

appreciate the support you and the rest of the committee have 

given our acquisition workforce growth activities, is that for a large 

degree, we have got the tools. We have the laws to execute it properly. We can be transparent. We just need to get an experienced, 

capable, competent workforce grown—not that we don’t have one, 

because we do a lot of things right. We do do some things wrong. 

We can do a lot better. 

And so this is more about getting experienced people, experienced program managers, talented contracting officers, and more of 

them to execute these jobs properly. 

It is not—and I can’t overstress the ability to have funds to execute—and Congress did. We can’t thank Congress enough, nor can 

our sailors, soldiers and marines whose lives have been protected 

as a result of having MRAP on the ground. 

Mr. PARSONS. Sir, I would just add, too, that I think, at least 

from my perspective, it also has to do with how proven is the technology that we are incorporating into those systems. And certainly 

on MRAP, a lot of that was already proven technology. 

I would just add that, you know, Dr. Carter has issued a memo 

to implement that Weapons Systems Acquisition Reform Act, outlining a number of things that all the departments need to consider 

in weapons system acquisition. And I think as each of the services 

implement those that we will see improvements in the acquisition 

of the systems. 

ACQUISITION REFORM

Mr. DICKS. You know, I have been here 34 years, and for 34 

years I have heard year after year, acquisition reform, acquisition 

reform, that retired generals report for the Air Force acquisition reform. 

You know, I have got to tell you, I am getting relatively cynical 

that somehow we just have a hard time procuring these large systems. And part of it is the contractors and part of it is the government. But those are four major—I mean, again, Crusader, Comanche, Armed Reconnaissance Helo and the Future Combat System. 

And the Future Combat System is very recent. 

So we are here to talk about contingency contracting, but I have 

got to tell you, I still think you have a ways to go before you convince us up here that we have turned the corner on acquisition reform. 

I wish the administration well, but it is—I think there has to be 

a lot more honesty in calculating what these things are going to 

cost, which I don’t think exists and doesn’t exist today. It is still— 

still everybody low-balls things to make it work in the budget. This 


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thing is still not where it needs to be, so I urge you to not only 

take care of these undefinitized contracts, but also to—we have got 

to have some success stories. 

And the ones that are success stories, like the Crusader, I mean 

like Comanche is basically an off-the-shelf system, modified. And 

that is a good thing to do. If you can take things off the shelf, that 

makes a lot of sense and reduces the acquisition time, et cetera. 

Mr. SOLIS. Sir, I was going to offer, too, I think Stryker was similar in that vein in that it was an off-the-shelf technology. But what 

also made it successful—and I don’t know if we will ever be able 

to do this again—we basically took a brigade off-line during the design phase of the stand-up of that brigade. 

We went out to the National Training Center and to the Joint 

Readiness Training Center and took the contractors who were 

going to support them before it was sent over to Iraq. So I think 

there was not only the technology piece, but also the fact that there 

was time and a brigade that was basically off line to test the design 

to see how it was going to work in the field. 

Mr. DICKS. Well, I hope we can learn from our successes. That 

is what I am hoping. 

Thank you. The committee stands adjourned until 10 a.m. tomorrow when the committee will reconvene for a hearing on Strategic 

Lift. 


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THURSDAY, MARCH 18, 2010. 

AIR MOBILITY PROGRAMS 

WITNESSES 

GENERAL DUNCAN J. McNABB, USAF, COMMANDER, UNITED STATES 

TRANSPORTATION COMMAND 

GENERAL RAYMOND E. JOHNS, JR., USAF, COMMANDER, AIR MOBILITY COMMAND 

MAJOR GENERAL RANDAL D. FULLHART, DIRECTOR OF GLOBAL 

REACH PROGRAMS, OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE 

AIR FORCE FOR ACQUISITION 

OPENING STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN DICKS

Mr. DICKS. This morning the Committee will hold a closed hearing concerning the Department of Air Force’s mobility programs. 

We are pleased to welcome three distinguished witnesses: General 

Duncan McNabb, Commander of the United States Transportation 

Command; General Raymond Johns, Commander of Air Mobility 

Command; and Major General Randal D. Fullhart, Director, Global 

Reach Programs, Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force 

for Acquisition. 

These gentlemen are very well qualified to discuss all aspects of 

the Air Force’s mobility programs and answer questions that the 

Committee has regarding global mobility. Generals, thank you for 

being here this morning. The Committee is very interested in hearing what you have to say about the Air Force mobility programs. 

As you are well aware, some of us on the Committee are eager to 

hear about the status of the KC–X program with the announcement that one of the expected contractors will not bid on the program. We look forward to hearing your thoughts on the way ahead 

for this vital program. The Department had planned on a summer 

award, so we are interested to hear how this development will affect the contract. 

Additionally, the Committee is looking forward to a discussion on 

the newly released Mobility Capability Requirement Study. The 

study specifically reviewed the plan for structure in 2016 to see if 

any capability gaps existed. We understand that the study validated the current force structure of 223 C–17s and 111 C–5 aircraft. However, the study also found that other fleet mixes would 

meet the requirement. We look forward to discussing the various 

scenarios that were reviewed and how each stressed our forces in 

different ways. 

Another topic of concern is the use of undefinitized contracts. I 

am glad Major General Fullhart is here because we are going to 

be talking to him about this. Within the mobility portfolio, it was 

the mobility portfolio, and specifically the C–17 program, that 

brought the issue to our attention last year and eventually led the 


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Committee to restrict the obligation of funding for the C–17 program until contracts were definitized. A program that is this far 

into its being, it is impossible for me to understand how we have 

undefinitized contracts. That is just unacceptable. 

We understand that there is a time and place for those contracts, 

such as meeting urgent wartime requirements. They are not to be 

used for routine acquisition or as a result of poor planning. General 

Fullhart, we understand that you are personally involved and look 

forward to your comments on the way ahead for Air Force contracting. 

In addition to these areas, the Committee remains concerned 

with the size and mix of our mobility fleet. The C–5M has just completed operational testing and the results will be submitted to Congress this summer. Once this report and others are submitted to 

Congress, the Air Force plans to retire 22 C–5 aircraft over the 

next 2 years, decreasing the inventory of C–5 aircraft to 89. Along 

with this decision, the Department is requesting funds to begin the 

shutdown of the C–17 production line. This line is the only production line capable of producing strategic airlift aircraft. We remain 

concerned with this decision and its potential impact on the future 

of our Nation’s industrial base for strategic airlift aircraft. 

All that said, TRANSCOM and Air Mobility Command aircraft 

continue to provide exceptional service in our ongoing efforts overseas, on providing airlift of troops to refueling aircraft. In fact, we 

were just in Ramstein and General Brady gave us a very good 

briefing. And it is extremely impressive to see all of that capability, 

logistically, both in Iraq and in Afghanistan. And I think it is one 

of our greatest strengths as a country, is being able to do these 

things with the private sector as well. And so it is indeed impressive. 

General McNabb, General Johns, and Major General Fullhart, 

thank you for all being here this morning. The Committee is very 

interested in hearing what you have to say about the Department’s 

mobility programs. We look forward to your testimony and to an 

informative question-and-answer session. Now, before we hear your 

testimony, I would like to call on our ranking member, Mr. Kingston, today for any comments you would like to make. 

REMARKS OF MR. KINGSTON

Mr. KINGSTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, And welcome to our 

distinguished guests. You cannot fight the enemy if you cannot get 

your troops and equipment to the war. We all know that, and of 

course you guys have led in that and devoted a major part of your 

career to it. And because of that, I think it is paying off in the war 

theaters. Airlift is absolutely vital to the Department and its ability 

to accomplish any mission. And it is true whether we are talking 

a C–5, C–17, C–130 or even a commercial airliner to make the effort happen. The correct mix of these is what we are going to be 

talking about today for complete but strategic and technical airlift 

quickly, efficiently, and safely. 

I am sure the recent mobility capability and requirements has 

much to say about this, and I look forward to further discussion on 

it. And, Mr. Chairman, I have a motion—— 

Mr. DICKS. Yes. 


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Mr. KINGSTON [continuing]. At the proper time. 

Mr. DICKS. This is the proper time. 

Mr. KINGSTON. I move that those portions of the hearing today 

which involve sensitive material may be held in executive session 

because of the sensitivity of the material to be discussed. 

Mr. DICKS. All those in favor of Mr. Kingston’s motion say aye. 

Those opposed? 

The ayes have it. The motion is agreed to. 

All right. Who wants to start? Who is going to start? General 

McNabb. Thank you. 

SUMMARY STATEMENT OF GENERAL MCNABB

General MCNABB. Chairman Dicks, Congressman Kingston, and 

distinguished members of the committee, it is a distinct privilege 

to be with you today. Our thoughts are with Congressman Young 

for a speedy recovery. And I understand he is on his way back and 

will be back in full business here soon. 

I want to first congratulate you, Mr. Chairman, on your appointment to lead this committee. I had the opportunity to see firsthand 

how you fought for our men and women in uniform when I was 

aide-de-camp to General Cassidy as he stood up United States 

Transportation Command and you helped him with the C–17, and 

then as Wing Commander at McChord Air Force Base in your great 

State of Washington, something that General Johns also had the 

chance of doing that and working with you as well. 

Over the years you have been a staunch proponent for our Nation’s defense and we are fortunate to have you continue to serve 

our Nation in this new leadership position. 

I am also honored to appear before you with General Johns, 

Commander of the Air Mobility Command and my commander of 

the air component to U.S. Transportation Command, who I ask to 

perform miracles every day, and who delivers. 

And it is a distinct pleasure to appear with Major General 

Fullhart from our U.S. Air Force acquisition team who I depend on 

to deliver the air mobility systems we need to win. 

Throughout 2009, the United States Transportation Command 

faced tremendous operational, logistical and geopolitical challenges, 

and we asked for and received unparalleled performance from our 

global enterprise. We are charged with synchronizing and delivering an unmatched strategic global transportation and distribution capability and producing logistic superiority for our Nation 

where and when needed by the combatant commanders we support, 

and we have done that. 

Our total force partnership of Active Duty, Reserve component, 

civilian, contractor and commercial industry colleagues answered 

every call and improved with every challenge. It is our people who 

get it done. It is 145,000 professionals working around the world 

day in and day out, producing one of this Nation’s greatest asymmetric advantages and enabling the combatant commanders to succeed anywhere in the world by providing them unmatched strategic 

lift and end-to-end global distribution. Through the superb work of 

our people and working with USCENTCOM, we are meeting the 

President’s direction to surge forces into the Operation Enduring 


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Freedom theater at the fastest possible pace on General Petraeus’ 

plan, while meeting the needs of all of our other warfighters. 

Working with our Ambassadors, the State Department, and Office of the Secretary of Defense, it was our logistic professionals 

working hand in glove with General Petraeus and his staff that 

created the Northern Distribution Network to complement the 

southern supply lines coming in from Pakistan. 

In one year’s time, through productive relationships with northern Europe, Russia, Central Asia, and the Caucasus, over 8,700 

containers of cargo have moved by commercial air, ship, truck and 

railroads, and the amount continues to climb. It is our joint assessment teams, requested by General Petraeus and General 

McChrystal, that are finding ways to increase the flow of supplies 

through existing air and surface hubs and establishing new intermodal and interair sites like Shaikh Isa Air Base in Bahrain and 

Maser-e-Sharif in Afghanistan. It is our total force air crews dramatically increasing the amount of airdrops to our warfighters in 

Afghanistan, finding innovative ways to deliver over 29 million 

pounds of supplies in 2009 to forces in remote areas, getting our 

forces what they need, while also getting convoys off dangerous 

roads and also decongesting crowded airfields. 

HAITI

Our pace was just as swift in Haiti. The earthquake created a 

chasm of isolation for the Haitian people. Our people spanned the 

divide to lift spirits and save lives. Supporting General Fraser in 

USSOUTHCOM, it was our air and seaport assessment team and 

joint port opening units on the ground at Port-au-Prince within 48 

hours after the earthquake, surveying the damage and building the 

air and sea bridges of humanitarian supplies and personnel that 

helped save a country and its people. It was our air crews, maintainers and aerial porters who flew over 2,000 sorties, moved over 

28,000 people, including 404 adoptees, and delivered almost 13,000 

tons of critical supplies and materials. 

It was our medical crews, critical care teams, and our global 

basic movement center which transported and helped save 341 

critically injured Haitians by getting them to the care they needed 

to save life or limb. 

It was our merchant mariners and our commercial and military 

partners that provided nearly 400,000 tons of life-saving cargo; 

over 2.7 million meals and over 5 million liters of water to Haitians 

in need, and we are not done yet. 

It is this logistics team working from home and abroad that gives 

our combatant commanders and our Nation the unrivaled ability to 

move. Their actions serve as an example of our Nation’s strength 

and an outward demonstration of our compassion and hope. I am 

extremely proud of and amazed by the men and women of the 

United States Transportation Command. 

Chairman Dicks, we look forward to working with you for many 

years to come. The support of this committee has been instrumental in providing the resources our team needs to win, and I 

thank you. 

Finally, I offer my condolences and the condolences of the United 

States Transportation Command to the family of Congressman 


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John Murtha and to this committee on the passing of a tremendous 

American. Chairman Murtha was one of our Nation’s greatest leaders, a steadfast champion for the men and women in uniform and 

for this Nation. He will be sorely missed. 

Chairman Dicks, I am grateful to you and the committee for inviting me to appear before you today. I ask that my written statement be submitted for the record and I look forward to your questions. 

Mr. DICKS. Without objection, all the statements will be accepted 

for the record. 

The statement of General McNabb follows: 


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Mr. DICKS. General Johns. Again, this is McChord graduation 

day here on the top. I think it is very impressive. Welcome. 

SUMMARY STATEMENT OF GENERAL JOHNS

General JOHNS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and distinguished 

committee members. I am honored to be flanked by these two wonderful officers beside me, and I would like to add my sentiments 

on the passing of Chairman Murtha. We also do hope that Congressman Young is feeling better. He has really been a great support and service to our Nation and to our service. 

The opportunity and the invitation to testify on global mobility 

issues is most appreciated. As the new commander, I am proud and 

honored to represent the nearly 135,000 Guardsmen, Reservists 

and Active Duty who comprise Air Mobility Command. Appearing 

before you today presents an incredible privilege to share and discuss important issues to our Nation. 

Forefront of that national security is our role in Operation Enduring Freedom. Through General McNabb, Air Mobility Command 

(AMC) is working diligently with United States Central Command 

(USCENTCOM) to deploy 30,000 additional troops throughout Afghanistan in accordance with the President’s direction. But the bottom line is, while challenging, I am confident that the men and 

women of AMC will close this mission within the expected timeline. 

While ramping up for the Afghanistan surge, a devastating 

earthquake struck Haiti, and Air Mobility Command mobilized in 

support of United States Southern Command and TRANSCOM. 

Mobility United States Transportation Command Airmen arrived 

at the international airport, establishing a key hub for humanitarian relief, transporting 28,000 passengers, 26 million pounds of 

life-saving cargo. And when we couldn’t get to the people, we deployed the aerial delivery capability of C–17s and C–130s which delivered 257,000 pounds of food and water to displaced Haitians. 

Moving to our modernization efforts, one simple sentence: The 

KC–X tanker aircraft is the Air Force’s number one acquisition priority. It is imperative that we begin the recapitalization of the KC– 

135. 

And lastly, a special part of our mission is the Aero Medical 

Evacuation, something we hold so dear. It is really a total force 

success. We can now transport our most critically wounded from 

the combat zone to the U.S. hospitals in 24 hours. Since October 

2001, 81,000 patients, 14,000 with battle injuries, we have been 

able to respond with world-class medical care. We have achieved 

the highest survival rates in history, and that is a total team effort. 

I am confident that Air Mobility Command will remain the cornerstone of the Department of Defense’s ability to rapidly place 

cargo and personnel anywhere in the world any time. We greatly 

appreciate the Congress’ support, this committee’s specific support 

to help recapitalize and modernize the mobility fleet. Again, Mr. 

Chairman and distinguished committee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you. 

[The statement of General Johns follows:] 


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Mr. DICKS. Well, I do think it is—besides the logistics side, the 

handling of the wounded has been one of the most impressive 

things I have seen. And many lives have been saved because of Air 

Mobility’s Command’s capability to deal with that. And we were in 

Landstuhl and saw some of the wounded there. And the fact that 

we get them back to the United States after they get to Germany 

is really remarkable too. So, well done. 

General Fullhart. And we also have to say that General Fullhart 

was at Fairchild Air Force Base. So this is an all Washington panel 

here today. 

General FULLHART. Sir, if you had not brought it up, I was going 

to, just to make sure the record was straight on that. 

Well, Mr. Chairman, I would like to begin by adding my sentiments regarding the passing of Chairman Murtha, a champion of 

our Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, his beloved Marines and, of course, 

our families. I note as the new Chairman, sir, you bring that same 

passion, and I add my congratulations to you as well. 

Mr. DICKS. Thank you. 

SUMMARY STATEMENT OF GENERAL FULLHART

General FULLHART. Chairman Dicks, Representative Kingston, 

and distinguished members of the subcommittee, I am honored to 

be here this morning to update you on the status of Air Force mobility programs. I look forward to discussing how the Air Force is 

committed to replacing our aging aircraft, supporting our 

warfighters, while being respectful of the taxpayers’ dollars. I will 

keep my remarks brief in order to provide additional time to focus 

on issues of interest to the committee. And with your permission, 

sir, I would like to submit my written testimony for the record. 

Mr. DICKS. All statements will be accepted for the record, without objection. 

General FULLHART. I am honored to be here with General 

McNabb, Commander of the United States Transportation Command and General Johns, Commander of the Air Mobility Command. They are Air Force acquisition’s primary customers for mobility aircraft. They determine the requirements and capabilities 

that are needed by the warfighter. And it is my role, working with 

our program offices, the Department of Defense, industry, and Congress to meet those needs. 

As the Director of the Global Reach Program, I oversee the acquisition of nearly 30 airlift, refueling, training, personnel recovery, 

and Special Operations Forces programs. I am extremely proud of 

the acquisition professionals serving the Global Reach Directorate 

that work with those same partners—industry, the Department of 

Defense, sister services, and Congress—to provide much needed capabilities to the warfighter. 

It is imperative that the Air Force effectively execute the acquisition process to equip our Airmen to support the combatant commanders. As you know, Mr. Chairman, with the release of the KCX request for proposal, we are now officially in the formal source 

selection phase of this procurement and we look forward to a contract award later this year. The acquisition of additional C–130J 

aircraft is on cost and on schedule. Modernization programs for our 

C–5 and legacy C–130 fleets are also performing well. We plan to 


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acquire 15 commercial off-the-shelf light mobility aircraft to support building partnership capacity programs. The C–27J is 

transitioning from a joint program to the Air Force and three aircraft have been delivered, currently located at Robins Air Force 

Base supporting initial air crew training. 

Now, while not part of the mobility portion of my portfolio, I also 

wanted to take this opportunity to thank the committee for its continued support of our efforts to both modernize and ultimately recapitalize our fleet of helicopters such as those supporting the 

warfighter in Iraq and Afghanistan and combat search and rescue 

and personnel recovery operations. 

And finally, Mr. Chairman, I acknowledge Congress’ strong interest and match that with the Department’s strong commitment to 

reduce the number of undefinitized contract actions, or 

undefinitized contract actions (UCAs), in acquisition programs. The 

Department is actively taking steps to work with industry, OSD, 

the Defense Contract Audit Agency and our program offices to definitize contracts as soon as possible and to reduce the use of 

UCAs. 

To sum up, the timely acquisition of critical mobility programs 

remains a top priority for the Air Force. We will continue to focus 

efforts on modernizing and recapitalizing our aging weapons systems and we very much appreciate Congress’ support for Air Force 

mobility programs. We thank you again for the opportunity to be 

here and I look forward to answering your questions. 

[The statement of General Fullhart follows:] 


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UNDEFINITIZED CONTRACT ACTIONS

Mr. DICKS. General Fullhart, just since we are on that point, do 

you think the Air Force has overused undefinitized contract actions? 

General FULLHART. Sir—— 

Mr. DICKS. Can you explain why this is done instead of definitizing it; and why, after 180 days goes by, we still don’t have the 

ability to definitize these contracts? 

General FULLHART. Yes, sir. And I appreciate the time. And 

without making this a dissertation, I would like to provide you and 

the other members some background, but, more importantly, what 

we are doing to resolve this. 

Mr. DICKS. This is an important issue. So you take the time you 

need to explain it. 

General FULLHART. For members, when the appropriations bills 

are passed and signed into law, the very next action that we take 

is to put a formal request for proposal on the street. And industry 

is then responsible for putting together with auditable pricing and 

contract data from their subprime contractors as well as themselves that must meet audit criteria by the Defense Contract Audit 

Agency. Their responsibility is to provide that in a timely manner 

so that audit can take place, and it provides a basis for final negotiation of that contract. 

As the Chairman has alluded to, the undefinitized contract action is a tool in a contracting officer’s tool bag and is normally used 

for things like short-notice, rapid-response type things for a 

warfighter, sometimes for advanced procurement, sometimes to ensure that we don’t have a break in production. But that is not to 

be used as a normal means of doing business. 

What we have found, Mr. Chairman, in the instances that you 

cited with Boeing and C–17—and I would also say that in my portfolio we also have the same issue with Lockheed Martin and the 

C–130—is that we were not receiving those auditable proposals in 

a timely manner. 

I tell you that I personally went to Marietta, Georgia as well as 

Long Beach, California to meet with company officials to try to understand from their perspective what was causing these problems. 

And so the things that I am going to talk to you about, I would 

not put in—nor characterize as excuses. They are the facts. But 

they need to be remedied, and leadership is what is needed. 

In many cases, over the last decade or so, if you look at most of 

the major contracts that we have, the prime contractor has increased the number of subprimes who contribute to the construction or the acquisition of a particular item. What that requires, because of the current policies in place, is that the same depth of information documentation is required from relatively small companies, in addition to those that you would expect from large companies like a Boeing or a Lockheed Martin. In many cases, they have 

been slow in providing that kind of depth of data. And in some instances they will provide a price, but they will say that price is 

only good for four months. So you can see that if we are having a 

prime who is taking as much as nine months or more to put together a proposal to turn in for audit, that in many cases when the 


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Defense Contract Audit Agency opens the folder and starts to look 

at it, they say, I can’t audit this, these have expired. 

Now, in that instance, we are faced with a couple of options. We 

can send the homework back and say you need to update the numbers, or, in some cases, because the subprimes are providing something that is a commercial item for them, they are not willing to 

give their cost and pricing data to the prime, but they are willing 

to give it to the government. And in those instances, then, it is the 

program office’s responsibility to go and fill in the blanks because 

they are willing to give us that data. They are not necessarily willing to share. 

I would also add that over the last years or so, that the Defense 

Contract Audit Agency has been taking, on average, between six 

and nine months to conduct an audit. So you can begin to add up 

the months and you can quickly see how we begin to get past 180 

days in relatively short order. And in many instances these are ongoing production lines that, for any number of good reasons, we 

prefer not to have a break. We don’t want to slow a production line, 

we don’t want to lay people off, we want to keep things going. 

Let me turn now to what I think are the solutions, because I 

think that is what you are more interested in than hearing how we 

got here. 

First and foremost, working with Mr. Shay Assad from OSD Acquisition Technology and Logistics, who I know you are familiar 

with, we are in fact reviewing, not just for the Air Force but for 

all services, the thresholds which the Truth in Negotiation Act 

(TINA) compliant data must be provided. In many cases now we 

are getting so much volume and so much detail that it slows down 

the process unnecessarily. So there are some commonsense things 

that I think will improve the process of actually developing the proposals and turning them in. 

Likewise for the Air Force, we are engaging with the Defense 

Contract Audit agency to ensure they understand the resources 

that are needed in terms of the physical number of auditors and 

also the dialogue that needs to take place both before proposals are 

begun, as well as during the proposal building process. There was 

a period of time where the Defense Contract Audit Agency would 

actually sort of—I won’t say give intermediate feedback. In other 

words, they had gathered so much information and they were able 

to look at it and say, Does this meet standards or do you need to 

get additional information? Currently their policy is, we do not 

want to see it until it is all done and then you turn it over to us. 

So there were instances in the past where we may have caught 

things sooner by that intermediate process that are now being 

caught much later and therefore adds to the time. So we are in dialogue with the Defense Contract Audit Agency to, number one, 

make sure industry understands, clearly and unambiguously, what 

is required for an auditable proposal to be completed. Second, how 

we go about ensuring that the audit process is also efficient as well 

as effective, and that we as an Air Force are also postured with 

enough contracting officers, cost officials, for those instances where 

we are going to have to go out and get the cost data because for 

various reasons the prime is not able to. 


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So what I would commit to you, Mr. Chairman, is that we are 

serious as a heart attack about this. We are working very closely 

with the staff. In fact, I think in two weeks we will be back with 

staff with the monthly update as to where we are and what we are 

doing in terms of improving the process. 

By way of statistic, I would just offer to you that since March of 

2008, the Air Force has reduced its inventory of undefinitized contract actions by 55 percent. And we have reduced, since 1 October 

of 2009, by 16 percent. But we are not going to be satisfied until 

we have eliminated all unnecessary UCAs, and we are committed 

to doing that. We very much appreciate your leadership and your 

support in our efforts to do that. Thank you for the time. 

Mr. DICKS. Obviously, this is a very complicated process. If we 

have to talk to the Defense Contract Audit Agency, we could help 

in that respect to see if we can—I understand they are under the 

control of the acquisition people. Mr. Assad works in Mr. Carter’s 

shop. 

General FULLHART. He does, sir. The actual Defense Contract 

Audit Agency falls under the Under Secretary of Defense Comptroller structure. But we are working with them and they have 

been very forthcoming and understanding of our issues. 

Mr. DICKS. These companies too ought to be—they are the ones 

that are benefiting from the contract. I mean the fact that they are 

unwilling to be more—do you think you have gotten their attention? 

General FULLHART. Sir, I will tell you that at least in my visits 

to both Boeing and Long Beach, that leadership from corporate 

came as a result of my going out there to hear firsthand what our 

concerns are. It is, in fact, in industry’s best interest not to have 

UCAs. It is in all of our best interests not to have them. But they 

have to resource their offices in such a way that they can gather 

the information in a timely manner. Their subprime contractors 

have got to be postured. If you are going to play in the big game, 

then you have got to have the staff to do it. 

Mr. DICKS. Well, I think the subcontractor issue is one of the 

most important problems we have to face. The fact that there are 

a multitude of subcontractors and the inability of the companies to 

manage them and the inability of the Department of Defense to 

manage them is why we are having, I think, all of these problems 

on these programs. There are just too many subcontractors. And 

Boeing has had problems on the 787 because of this. 

We had a classified program, very important classified program, 

that was a big problem because they couldn’t manage the subcontractors. This has become a real major problem with the Department, I think. Mr. Kingston. 

AUDITS

Mr. KINGSTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And, General 

Fullhart, I wanted to ask about that because an audit is a luxury, 

it is a necessity, it is good business practice. But it is still a luxury 

in that the purpose of an audit is to sort of ferret out irregularities, 

cost overruns, excess inventory, any sort of inefficiencies. So if you 

don’t do an audit but you are dealing with good people who do a 

good job, you should be okay theoretically, correct? 


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General FULLHART. Sir, if I might just expand briefly. What the 

purpose of the audit is in large part is cost reasonableness. What 

the Defense Contract Audit Agency’s efforts do is inform our negotiators as to whether the proposed price is in fact reasonable or 

where they think there may be inflation. And that then boosts the 

government’s position in negotiation. So that is really the benefit 

I think in terms of the audit. 

Mr. KINGSTON. So it is not just a good business practice, it is 

more really setting the market price for some of these things which 

are kind of unique to aircraft purchasing and inventory. But it still 

would appear to me if you are dealing with good businesses all up 

and down the prime and subprime level, that when you find folks 

who are out of line, that maybe we shouldn’t be doing business 

with them anymore. And the only reason why we are doing business with them is because there aren’t any other choices. 

Broad-brushing it, and I am asking, and I am wondering if you 

find that often; and that being the case, is one of our problems that 

we need more suppliers, more subprimes, more competition in the 

marketplace? Because in the private sector when you have lots and 

lots of choices, the market sets what the fair price is. But here you 

do not have lots and lots of choices because you are buying unique 

products. 

General FULLHART. I think that is the key point, Congressman. 

You are correct. Obviously you would like to have lots of competition, but there may in fact not be a market that drives you to have 

more than one or two viable alternatives. So the real benefit I 

think of the audit and being in good government practice is don’t 

sign up the taxpayer for something that is unreasonable. That is 

sort of what brings the business community back in line. Because 

if you don’t get the contract, you go out of business. So you need 

to, number one, make sure you are efficient, cost-effective, your 

quality is good, and the marketplace then will balance things out 

in the end. 

Mr. KINGSTON. Well, I am wondering, one of the interests of Congress in general and this committee is to have more competition, 

more contractors. And there are a lot of programs to help, for example, minority contractors doing business with the Air Force or 

any other Department of Defense. Are those programs developing? 

And one of them you may be familiar with, and the only reason I 

am familiar with it, Sam Nunn was involved with it. But it was 

a minority development contractor type program and it may have 

been more for supplies rather than actual service. Do you remember that one? 

General FULLHART. I don’t have a specific recollection of that one. 

What I can offer as an example, in our HH–60 modernization programs, one run out of Robins Air Force Base, they put a special 

emphasis on working with small business, minority business, 

whenever possible to help develop additional sources and to offer 

that community an opportunity to participate in government programs. 

Mr. KINGSTON. And are those showing promise? Are we getting 

some folks really up and running? 

General FULLHART. Sir, I would say on balance the answer is 

yes. And as you can appreciate in the economic climate that we are 


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in, some of those small businesses are not only doing business with 

us, but we are doing commercial business. In one case, we had one 

of our modification programs affected by the fact that one of our 

small businesses ended up going out of business. But by and large, 

we are benefiting from the expertise, especially in those niche 

areas, special capabilities. We are definitely benefiting from small 

business. 

Mr. KINGSTON. It would appear to me there would be an opportunity to merge maybe a social desire and a business desire, but 

developing these small businesses along the way to keep everybody 

honest and out there. 

COMBAT SEARCH AND RESCUE HELICOPTER

But you brought up the helicopter issue, so I wanted to ask you 

a question about that. As I understand it, you are planning to purchase 36 UH–60M helicopters across the FYDP to reconfigure the 

HH–60 Pave Hawk configuration for the CSAR role. And I was 

wondering how many rescue helicopters is the Air Force planning 

to buy? And will it be sufficient? Do we have the crews? Will we 

be able to take care of everything? You mentioned in your testimony that the CSAR rescued 4,000 people. Just talk to me a little 

bit about that if you can. 

General FULLHART. Yes, sir. I know that Congressman Hinchey 

has some interest in this as well. So maybe what I will do is give 

you a bigger answer than the question that you asked, to lay this 

out. First and foremost, we have a program of record that exists 

today for our combat search and rescue forces of 112 HH–60 aircraft. Right now today, we stand at about 96 of those that are operationally available, flyable, et cetera. Some of those are lost due to 

operational losses, et cetera. 

And so with the support of this committee, we are in the process 

now of doing operational loss replacement of those helicopters. In 

point of fact, what we have in the fiscal year 2011 budget, we are 

going to be doing four helicopters that we have already bought off 

an existing Army contract. We are going to have three to be purchased in fiscal year 2011, and three more that were in the fiscal 

year 2011, Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) as well. And 

our intent in that effort then is to replace, if you will, the HH–60slike aircraft. 

Now, the larger piece in terms of Combat Search and Rescue 

(CSAR) and the recapitalization of the CSAR fleet, we are awaiting 

and we expect within the next month or so the reports to come out 

from OSD that will inform our requirements process for the longterm total recapitalization of that fleet. It is our intent at this stage 

of the game—or our expectation is that that will be an open competition. However, what we will be focusing on there is probably 

along the lines of an existing military helicopter and them modifying it for the combat search and rescue mission. 

The third piece of this is commonly referred to as Common 

Vertical Lift Support program. That is right now 62 UH–1Ns that 

are in the Air Force inventory. They are spread amongst a lot of 

different programs. But the two that are probably most prominent 

are those that support our Intercontinental Ballistic Missile 

(ICBM) security, the overflight, the overwatch of convoy moveVerDate Mar 15 2010 04:00 Mar 25, 2011 Jkt 065008 PO 00000 Frm 00265 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 E:\HR\OC\A008P2.XXX A008P2

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ments of those missiles in our missile fields. In addition to that, 

some aircraft that are here in the Washington, D.C. area that are 

a part of the continuity of operation of government activities. 

We are in the stages now of, again, a full and open competition 

in that regard. We are focusing first and foremost on the replacement of the aircraft that we have in the missile fields, because we 

have some performance gaps there as well as some numbers gaps 

as well as range gaps in the continuity of government program that 

we have near the local area. 

So those three, if I could sort of lay that out for all of you is sort 

of where we are at with our HH–60 operational loss replacement, 

awaiting report from OSD and the Joint Staff for the recapitalization of the entire fleet, and then shortly beginning our endeavor on 

Common Vertical Lift Support program. All of these and our continued modernization of our existing fleet, again I want to stress 

my thanks to this committee for your continued strong support. 

Mr. KINGSTON. Thank you. 

Mr. DICKS. All right. Mr. Visclosky. 

CONTRACT AWARD

Mr. VISCLOSKY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Gentlemen, TRANSCOM announced an $80 million contract for passenger and 

air cargo transportation services. Are the services sought not inherently government functions? 

General MCNABB. Congressman, I didn’t understand the question. 

Mr. VISCLOSKY. On March 9, TRANSCOM announced an $80 

million contract for rotary wing aircraft, personnel, equipment, 

tools, material, maintenance and supervision to perform passenger 

and cargo air transportation services. The announcement notes 

that work will be performed in Afghanistan starting March 5, 2010 

through November 30, 2010. And the question would be: Why has 

the military sought contractors for something that appears to be an 

inherently government function? 

General MCNABB. Yes, Congressman. The big part there is like 

the rest of our lift. We depend not only on our military capability, 

but also our U.S. flag fleet, whether that is air or sea. In this case, 

the specific contracts we have gone out to are the types of helicopters that are very effective in Afghanistan, that are on the civilian market, and they fit the niches that allow us to better use our 

CH–47s and tailor them appropriately, and it basically gets us 

more lift into Afghanistan. And, obviously, you know the issue with 

rotary wing anyway in Afghanistan. It is a very tough environment. So what we want to do is make sure we are taking full advantage of every way we can get some additional helicopter lift. 

At the same time, we are doing some other things like airdrop 

to try to free up blade time so that as we service the forces in 

there, we can take full advantage of all of our assets. 

Mr. VISCLOSKY. You don’t have the capacity, or, because of the 

surge, you simply need the additional capacity until November and 

then it goes away? 

General MCNABB. We are doing this on behalf of the Army. And 

basically what we did is, they came to us and said, Could you do 

this? What we bring is the additional safety that we have with our 


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Commercial Airlift Review Board, our oversight that we have on 

commercial contracts. Originally a lot of this was being done by the 

Army directly, and they asked us to go ahead and do that for them. 

I think in the end, what we are doing is figuring out every way we 

can do to help the warfighters on the ground. 

I have been over to see General McChrystal, General Rodriguez 

and General Scaparrotti. These are niche-type missions in which 

they say this is very valuable to them. Again, it frees up CH–47s 

to do some of the larger troop movements where that is more appropriate to the war fight they are in. 

So, again, this is a niche portion that I think is good money. It 

is actually in many cases cheaper per flying hour than the CH–47. 

And I think it works out very well. We have just got to make sure 

that the safety standards are met, and I think we are doing that. 

Mr. VISCLOSKY. And in some instances, it might be more expensive. On average, would it be your assessment that we are saving 

money here? 

General MCNABB. And my assessment is we are saving money on 

this. These are almost, across the board, cheaper than a CH–47 flying hour. 

U.S. FLAGGED COMPANIES

Mr. VISCLOSKY. You mentioned they are U.S.-flagged? Are the 

companies that are under contract U.S. companies? 

General MCNABB. What we will do is first try to use U.S. flag 

if there are folks that are out there. And then in many cases they 

have a relationship with our U.S. flag fleet—— 

Mr. VISCLOSKY. And I don’t mean to quibble here, but there are 

flag vessels on the ocean that they have nothing to do with the particular country for which the flag is flown. When you say U.S.- 

flagged company, is that a U.S. corporation or not? 

General MCNABB. Let me take that for the record. I will get you 

a more specific answer on that. But in general, what we do is we 

will go out and we will do a request for proposal. We will say, here 

is the kind of services that we need, and we will have folks come 

in and we will evaluate their bids. 

[The information follows:] 

Yes. When we speak of a U.S. Flagged Company, we are referring to a ‘‘U.S. Corporation.’’ The Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) defines a U.S.-flag air carrier 

as an air carrier holding a certificate under the Federal Aviation Act of 1958. 49 

United States Code (U.S.C.) details the requirements for acquiring a certificate of 

public convenience that authorizes a carrier to provide air transportation. 49 U.S.C. 

states that in order to get a certificate of convenience you must be a U.S. Citizen. 

49 U.S.C. defines citizen as ‘‘a corporation or association organized under the laws 

of the United States . . . of which the president and at least two-thirds of the board 

of directors and other managing officers are citizens of the United States . . . and 

in which at least 75 percent of the voting interest is owned and controlled by persons that are citizens of the United States.’’ 

The U.S. flag carriers were afforded a statutory preference pursuant to the Fly 

America Act. 

Mr. VISCLOSKY. What kind of folks would come in? Like French 

airlines, Israeli airlines, U.S. airlines, Chinese airlines? 

General MCNABB. It usually is some of the smaller—if you think 

about U.S. companies that fly helicopters in the United States, 

they may come in and say we would like to bid for that. We have 

specific companies that will do that; and that is what we expect, 


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primarily it will be U.S. companies that come in and say, we meet 

your requirements and we also meet your safety standards. 

Mr. VISCLOSKY. If you could, for the record, then, General, specify which companies received those contracts and which of those 

companies—if they could be identified as to which country they are 

incorporated in? 

General MCNABB. Yes, sir. 

[The information follows:] 

The reference to an $80M contract was actually the issuance of three separate 

task orders under existing contracts to Presidential, Evergreen and Canadian Helicopters for the rotary wing airlift services required. All air carriers were approved 

by the DOD Commercial Airlift Review Board (CARB) prior to contract award to ensure safe transportation of U.S. troops and cargo. Preference was given in the source 

selection process to U.S. Flag carriers. A contract was awarded to Canadian Helicopters, a foreign flag, because there was insufficient capability offered by the U.S. 

Flag carriers to meet the requirements. Task orders were issued on March 5, 2010 

for a total of nine rotary wing aircraft. 

Evergreen Helicopters Inc., a U.S. Flag carrier, received an award to provide airlift services with two Super Puma aircrafts. The aircraft was manufactured in 

France and the total award value was $20,094,000.00. Presidential Airways, Inc., 

a U.S. Flag carrier, received an award to provide airlift services with five aircraft 

(three Bell 214STs and two S–61s). The aircraft were manufactured in the United 

States and the total award value was $39,084,531.50. Canadian Commercial Corporation subcontracted with Canadian Helicopters Inc., a foreign flag, and received 

an award to provide airlift services with two S–61 aircraft. Aircraft were manufactured in the United States and the total award value was $20,472,000.00. 

Total award value for all three contractors for an eight month base period was 

$79,650,531.50. 

U.S. BUILT AIRCRAFT

Mr. VISCLOSKY. The next question I would have is, for those companies, are they flying aircraft that were built in the United States 

of America? 

General MCNABB. No. In some cases, these are—there are Hind 

helicopters that are part of that, that are doing very well in Afghanistan. And again, there are a number of folks that we will 

first—as I said, U.S. companies will come in. If we can’t meet the 

needs of what, say, in this case the Army, we will say, okay, who 

else could meet this need? And then we can actually go back and 

talk to CENTCOM and say, is it in your interest that we go ahead 

and go outside of American companies to do this? But again, safety 

is the paramount issue here. 

INDUSTRIAL BASE

Mr. VISCLOSKY. I am very concerned about the industrial base. 

And this is a huge chicken and egg that, after 26 years in Congress, has not been resolved to my satisfaction. While there are not 

enough U.S. companies doing this or there are not enough U.S. aircraft, therefore we have to go out—as opposed to being very methodical and determined that somehow we are going to make sure 

we have some persistent need so that there is enough U.S. aircraft 

to do this in the defense of the United States of America. I mean, 

do people ever sit down and say, we are tired of contracting out foreign vessels if we are the Navy, or we are looking for U.S. Flag aircraft that maybe we don’t have enough in the inventory and maybe 

somebody ought to suggest we make those here? 


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CIVIL RESERVE AIR FLEET

General MCNABB. Congressman, I share your—the industrial 

base is a huge issue and we depend—I will tell you TRANSCOM 

absolutely depends on its U.S. Flag carriers and its U.S. Flag fleet. 

We could not get done what we get done without our civil reserve 

air fleet and our U.S. Flag fleet that does that as well. It will always go first to them if they can handle that. But I will say that 

overall, we will look to them. They are a big part of what we do 

and in many cases they are much cheaper than if we use our own 

military aircraft to do this. You can’t use them—— 

Mr. DICKS. Will the gentleman yield? How long—we have had 

CRAF in place, the Civil Reserve Air Fleet, for how many years, 

30 years? 

General MCNABB. Fifty-nine years. 

Mr. DICKS. Fifty-nine years. So this has been the way we decided 

to do it. Most of the airlift comes from U.S. airlines, right? 

General MCNABB. Absolutely. For the air side—— 

Mr. DICKS. So we are buying U.S. aircraft in most instances. 

Now, in the sealift actually, which is—80 or 90 percent of what we 

send goes by sealift. Now, in the case of Afghanistan, it is Maersk 

and the American President Line. They are the two major companies that are providing—— 

General MCNABB. And Hapag Lloyd is probably the third—it is 

a very large company as well. But Maersk and APL are the largest. 

Mr. DICKS. And this is in essence a necessity. I am with the gentleman on industrial base, and there is a provision in the law that 

on every major acquisition, they are supposed to do an analysis of 

industrial base. I had to point this out to Mr. Assad several times. 

And sometimes they forget this over at the Department of Defense. 

But we are with you on this. We think we ought to be looking at 

our industrial base more closely when we make these decisions, 

and I think sometimes that happens and sometimes it doesn’t. 

Mr. VISCLOSKY. I am very concerned because it may be a minority today, but in each of these instances, it is not just a particular 

point I raise today, people insinuate themselves into the system 

and suddenly we have four banks in the United States that have 

38 percent of the deposits. Well, that didn’t happen overnight. And 

there are a lot fewer community banks. The percentage of foreign 

vessels leased by the Navy, well, the number has gone down but 

their percentage has gone up. And I am fairly—— 

Mr. DICKS. Aren’t all our combatants, naval ships, all—— 

Mr. VISCLOSKY. Yeah, right, right. But I will move on. 

FOREIGN SHIPS

Mr. DICKS. I would like to know this because General McNabb 

has responsibility for the mobility, the sealift and everything else. 

Are we using a lot of foreign ships? 

General MCNABB. Not a lot. The number has declined. They have 

declined quite dramatically. Again, we will always use U.S. ships 

first if we can. U.S.-built and/or U.S.-flagged, and only when we 

don’t have that option will we go outside. And in some cases, there 

are some specific types of ships—we didn’t have a lot of Roll-On/ 

Roll-Off ships that were in the U.S. flag fleet. We have done much 


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better lately. But some of the leased ships and our afloat 

prepositioned ships are foreign-built. So one of the things we have 

been really working hard—they are U.S.-flagged but they are foreign-built. And what we try very hard is, wherever we can, we try 

to make sure they are U.S.-built. 

Mr. VISCLOSKY. And I don’t mean to belabor the point, Mr. 

Chairman, but we have a situation today between the nuclear industry and the steel industry. We haven’t built a nuclear plant in 

this country—and I know I am transgressing. But I just want to 

drive home the point that when these contracts—please think 

about—and the industrial base is—well, we don’t have a nuclear 

industry today. Well, all the sudden now, the steel industry and 

the suppliers don’t make those parts here. Well, okay, we are going 

to, for those first plants, buy them from someplace else. Well, okay. 

And now, well, when are the people who are making potentially 

those parts here going to get their first shot at the apple? 

General MCNABB. You bet. And, Congressman—— 

Mr. VISCLOSKY. Which has nothing to do with you, but it is just 

day after day. 

General MCNABB. You are exactly right. And what I would say 

is it is all based—their first shot will be a U.S. company always. 

So as we go down that, only when they don’t have the capability— 

on the military side, we can’t provide it—only then do we go outside of that. So I will get you a list of that. 

The helicopter issue is a tough one because of the nature of Afghanistan. And when you look at the kinds of—what could perform 

at that very high altitude, who has the very powerful engines. Because obviously, that is a very different kind of terrain. We do have 

companies that do that. Because as you know, way up in the mountains, logging, the kinds of things—so we do have companies that 

say, we really want to be part of that. Some of the companies in 

Alaska, for instance, have that. So I will get you a list of those companies. 

[The information follows:] 

Evergreen Helicopters, a Department of Defense approved carrier, is currently the 

only company providing heavy-lift capability under a TRANSCOM awarded contract. An award was made to Evergreen in March 2010 to provide two Super Puma 

aircraft in Afghanistan. 

Mr. VISCLOSKY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. DICKS. Mr. Hinchey. 

STEWART AIR NATIONAL GUARD BASE

Mr. HINCHEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I just wanted to ask 

you, first of all, a very simple question about the Stewart International base and what do you think is going on there? What do 

you think—— 

Mr. DICKS. Mr. Hinchey, would you pull the mic just a little—— 

Mr. HINCHEY. What do you think the future is going to be like 

for that particular operation there? One of the things that we have 

done recently is provide additional outside energy, solar energy operations there, and we are hoping to be able to double that sometime over the course of next year, which will meet all of the local 

energy requirements for that base. 


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But maybe you can just give us some idea about what you think 

will be happening there over the course of the next few years. 

General MCNABB. I will tell you, I will go first and then I will 

let General Johns. One, Stewart continues to be just a superb base. 

And I would just say that I have depended on it, both as I sat in 

General Johns’ chair but also when I was the Tanker Airlift Control Center commander. We were depending on C–5s, and those 

folks provided tremendous capability. We actually had all of our 

hard-broke airplanes go in there and they fixed them. The spirit of 

that Guard unit is tremendous. And every time we have ever asked 

them to step up, they are always ready not only to take care of 

whatever we ask them to do, but they also volunteer for more. And 

I think that is the nature of that and the kinds of things that you 

were talking about of leaning forward has been their legacy. They 

are known to do that, and certainly from my standpoint I appreciate that. General Johns. 

General JOHNS. Sir, thank you for the question because it brings 

me back to when I was a kid. I was raised in North Jersey, though 

I love the State of Washington. 

Mr. DICKS. Mr. Frelinghuysen should be here. 

General JOHNS. I used to watch the airplanes. And then I was 

just up there recently as the commander of AMC, one, just to 

thank the members of Stewart Air National Guard Base, to go visit 

them and show our appreciation. And I was up there as the President was coming up to the New York City visit, and I saw the 

chaos that went with a Presidential movement and how well they 

handled that and how robust they were. 

I was also taken back—and I took away and back to our core 

command that the core of expertise in our C–5s really rests in some 

of those Guard and Reserve units, Stewart Air National Guard 

Base specifically. I mean, they had some flight engineers who developed self-test equipment that we could actually determine the 

health of the C–5 landing gear, very complicated, by this test 

equipment he developed instead of sitting there swinging the gear 

and going through all of those maintenance man-hours. 

Since they have so much seasoned experience, they can provide 

solutions that my Active Duty folks—who are so young and I am 

constantly training them—don’t have the wherewithal to do, to the 

point that we are having a get-together of all the commanders from 

all over AMC, all the wing commanders. And the person that is 

going to be talking about the future of the C–5 is the Stewart Air 

National Guard Base captain who says, I have a way of doing this 

better. So to much of the chagrin of his wing commander, we said, 

I accept your offer and we are bringing him down. 

Stewart Air National Guard Base personnel are phenomenal. 

And we are very appreciative of what they do and how generous 

they are with getting us the lift to move forward. 

Mr. HINCHEY. Well, thank you. I appreciate it very much. 

Thanks. 

More time? 

Mr. DICKS. Yeah, if you want to ask another question, certainly. 

Mr. HINCHEY. If I understand it, on March 9th, TRANSCOM announced $80 million of contracts for a rotary wing aircraft and for 

a number of other things, like personnel and equipment, tools, maVerDate Mar 15 2010 04:00 Mar 25, 2011 Jkt 065008 PO 00000 Frm 00271 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 E:\HR\OC\A008P2.XXX A008P2

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terial, maintenance, supervision—all of that necessary to perform 

passenger and cargo air transportation services. 

The announcements notes that the work will be performed in Afghanistan starting about 2 weeks ago or so and run through the 

end of November of 2010. 

I am just wondering why the military sought contractors for 

something that appears to be—— 

Mr. DICKS. I think we just had this question—— 

Mr. HINCHEY. Yeah? 

Mr. DICKS [continuing]. From Mr. Visclosky. 

Mr. HINCHEY. Oh, really? 

Mr. DICKS. We just did. If you missed it, we will give him a quick 

synopsis. 

CONTRACTS

Mr. HINCHEY. Sure. Why the military is putting out these contracts when it is something that could be done internally. 

And I know that this is something that has been going on for 

some time now, particularly in that general area, particularly in 

Iraq. 

General MCNABB. And, really, the difference is the Army was 

doing that before and they asked us to pick that up. So that would 

be the first thing I would say. 

But, in general, we depend on both our military aircraft like C– 

17s and 130s; at the same time, we depend on the civil reserve air 

flight, which is the commercial airlines, to be able to move. For instance, of our passengers, 90 percent move on our civil reserve air 

fleet. And so it is U.S.-flag carriers, and it is a great relationship 

and we depend on them. 

Same thing happens at sea. And here is, on the helicopter—the 

helicopters that they are going after are typically much smaller 

than the CH–47, and they have high-altitude capability. Additionally, there are some short takeoff and landing aircraft that they are 

also looking for that, again, fills a niche. It is cheaper than our 

military aircraft. And, again, because of the threat and because of 

the situations that they are in, these airplanes will fit in that. 

One of the things that I always think about is that it is situation-dependent. There are places where we will only take military 

airplanes into. There are missions that we would only use military 

aircraft to do. But there are other types of missions that the civil 

side can do. 

And it does bring money to the economy. The U.S. carriers have 

first dibs on that; if they can cover it, then we are good to go. And 

only when a U.S. carrier can’t handle that will we go outside of 

that. And we really talk a lot with the theater commander whether 

or not they want to proceed that way. 

But right now it looks like, you know—this is one of the things 

we depend on to get the best value and still meet the mission. 

Mr. HINCHEY. Okay. Thank you. 

Mr. DICKS. All right. Ms. Kilpatrick. 

Ms. KILPATRICK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Good morning, Generals. And, to General Johns, November, a 

new assignment. Congratulations. Thank you. Appreciate you all. 


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I served on the Air Force Academy Board for 5 or 6 years. It was 

one of the highlights of my career. Outstanding, intelligent, dedicated young men and women who have given their lives. And I appreciate the service that you all give. 

AFGHANISTAN LOGISTICS

Kind of continuing on with the discussion that we are having 

now, inasmuch as Afghanistan is landlocked, heavy terrain, mountainous—our military carry up to 100 pounds up those mountains, 

getting set and all of that—the logistical challenges that we all 

face, and that you all are TRANSCOM, are we meeting them? Kind 

of going on with the last discussion, are we meeting them? Do you 

need more? Is there a plan that we would outsource more? 

We have to have what we have to have when we need it, no 

doubt about it. Are we behind? Do we need more? I want to use 

the MRAP, for example—‘‘MRAP Light,’’ which is going into— 

MRAP ATV, we call it ‘‘light.’’ I don’t know if you—do we have 

what we need? Are we able to—— 

General MCNABB. No, in fact, I would say that—and I talked to 

the chairman a little bit earlier about this. 

One of the reasons that we are being able to do, not only taking 

additional forces into Afghanistan at the President’s direction, sustaining a surge from last year about this time, which was about 

30,000 as well—so we have gone from about, you know, 40,000 

folks to 70,000, now we are going to go to 100,000, in Afghanistan. 

And our ability to sustain the fight and make sure that the folks 

have what they need on the ground and the ability to then move 

these additional forces, along with bringing forces out of Iraq— 

which is, with the success of the election, we plan to go down to 

50,000 troops in Iraq—take care of the other parts of the world like 

Haiti, like Chile, like—— 

Ms. KILPATRICK. Congratulations on your response in Haiti. That 

was awesome. Thank you. 

C–130

General MCNABB. Thank you. 

But our ability really has been because this committee has been 

so supportive in all of our parts, whether it is sea, whether it is 

air, always saying, ‘‘What else do you need?’’ It was defensive systems, you think about—you all got to fly the C–130J model. The 

J model is so much more effective in Afghanistan than either the 

E or the H. And just to give you an example, the E model could 

only carry about 6,000 pounds because of that pressure altitude. 

Again, it gets to that very high altitude in Afghanistan. 

The Dash–15 model engines can carry about 24,000; the 130J can 

carry 40,000. So each time you all have helped us and put in defensive systems that allow our crews to go in there—you know, today 

we are working on avionics upgrades, for instance the C–130 Avionics Modernization Program that allows our folks to fly safely in 

there. And that has really—— 

Ms. KILPATRICK. How are we coming on the avionics? How are 

we meeting those challenges? Are we ready? Are they there? I 

know we have money there, and I have been reading that you are 

working on it. Is it ready? 


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General MCNABB. Absolutely. And the C–17 and the 130J, for instance, have great avionics, a heads-up display. You can fly nightvision goggles with them. And it is all set up. And it has the kinds 

of safety and awareness that allows our folks to be able to work 

in that type of an environment. 

And I think the safety, you know, speaks for itself, how well we 

have done this. And all of you have flown in on our crews, whether 

it is Iraq or Afghanistan, doing those random approaches and coming in, and you just go, ‘‘Wow, how do they make it look so easy?’’ 

Ms. KILPATRICK. ‘‘Wow, how did you do that?’’ Right, right. 

General MCNABB. I get to actually fly the C–17 in my current position. And I have, you know, 5,600, 5,700 hours, mostly airdrop, 

a lot of special operations. 

Mr. DICKS. Wow. 

General MCNABB. And I will just say that, when I go down to 

Altus and fly with these young captains, they come up to me and 

they put their arm around me and say, ‘‘Come on over here, son. 

Let me tell you how we fight in this war,’’ because they know how 

to fly these assets. 

Ms. KILPATRICK. That is important, yeah. 

General MCNABB. And so the modernization portion is the same 

thing that you are doing, what do we have in our fleet that has the 

good engines, that, you know, has good service life, and can we upgrade it rather than buy new? So you all have helped us a lot on 

buying new where we must have it, modernizing what we can modernize, and then, at the same time, always looking to the future. 

My biggest hole right now that I worry the most about is the 

tankers. 

KC–X

Ms. KILPATRICK. It is the what? 

General MCNABB. The tankers. 

Ms. KILPATRICK. Uh-huh. I am going there next. 

General MCNABB. That would be the one that I sit there and I 

worry about. We are already taking risk in that area. And I know 

you all have worked very hard on the tankers. It remains my number-one acquisition priority. I see that that new tanker will do for 

the whole mobility system what the C–17 did for the airlift system—— 

Ms. KILPATRICK. Okay. So what about the KC–X? I mean, talk 

about it, in terms of—I know the chairman didn’t want to bring it 

up; he didn’t even ask me. But I have been to his district, and I 

know it is a main piece, and one of the bidders has dropped off. 

Is it still open? Is it closed? I mean, just because of what you just 

said, we need them and we need them quickly. Where are we in 

timing to close it, put it in production and all of that? I mean, you 

needed them yesterday, right? 

General MCNABB. I will let them get to the specifics of where we 

are on the contract. 

Ms. KILPATRICK. Oh, okay. 

General MCNABB. I would just say that the good news is that I 

think that everybody—what we are hearing is being offered on all 

accounts meets all of the things that I need. 


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So the Request for Proposal captured that. And, in fact, it does 

all the things that I need it to do. 

Obviously, I, as the combatant commander, and working with the 

other combatant commanders, say, ‘‘Here are the things that I need 

that new tanker to do.’’ I turn that over to the Air Mobility Command, General Johns, and he takes that and says, ‘‘Okay, to do 

those things, here is specifically what has to happen.’’ And then he 

turns that over to the Air Force acquisition world to make that all 

make sense. I am very excited about that. 

And, again, I have more on Afghanistan, if you would like to talk 

about how it all comes together, but if you want to talk—— 

Ms. KILPATRICK. Okay. One thing before, General, just for a moment. I appreciate all of that. But you said you were good except 

the tankers. 

General MCNABB. You bet. 

Ms. KILPATRICK. And we need the tankers. We, the young men 

and women who are in theater, the best that they need we want 

them to have. And this is the best committee in the Congress, I do 

believe. And you all do a good job in complimenting each other— 

and the system, I mean. 

I don’t want to put anybody at risk. I want U.S.-bought, 

trained—all of that—aircraft when we have to have it. 

General MCNABB. You bet. 

Ms. KILPATRICK. I don’t want the men and women to be short if 

they need it, if we have to go somewhere else. But I would much 

rather speed up the process to build it here, to grow it here, to 

train them here with U.S. everything. Is that the commitment of 

the Air Force? 

General MCNABB. I will let them—again, I would like to tell you 

a little bit more about Afghanistan, about how we are doing that. 

But we are on timeline for the surge. I will say, General Petraeus 

sets that timeline. You have to train those forces to have them get 

ready to go. You have to then move them, and then you have to 

be able to receive them at the other end. And all I try to do is make 

sure that transportation isn’t the issue. I always try to make sure 

that we have everything that we—— 

Ms. KILPATRICK. That is your job, yeah. 

General MCNABB [continuing]. You know, that General Petraeus 

and General McCrystal never have to worry that I am going to get 

them the stuff that they need. 

The same thing within the theater; we use a lot of airdrop now. 

We went from 2 million pounds of airdrop in 2005 to 29 million in 

2009. And the job is that, in these dispersed areas, we can get that 

stuff out there to those forces. 

PAKGLOC/NON

Ms. KILPATRICK. And most of that up-spike was Afghanistan because of its terrain. 

General MCNABB. Absolutely. That terrain is—you know, it is 

like nowhere else I have ever seen. As you said, landlocked; not 

just high mountains, but the highest mountains in the world 

around it; and very interesting neighbors, is how I would put that. 

We do bring a lot of stuff up from the Pakistan Lines of Communication on the ground. We bring about 50 percent of the supplies 


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up the PAKGLOC that is from the surface by ship into Karachi, 

and then bring it up, about 30 percent, from the Northern Distribution Network that we have opened up coming in from the north, 

mostly through Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. And then we do 20 

percent by air, which is historically a little higher than normal, but 

it is because it is landlocked. And we take everything sensitive, everything high-value, we take that in by air. 

It is the ultimate ace in the hole. If anything slows down on the 

surface, I tell them, don’t worry that you lose this, I can just replace it with another container. That needs to be on the surface. 

If it is something that you care a lot about, we will take it in by 

air, or if you need it fast. MATVs and MRAPs is a great example 

of we have taken all of that stuff in by air. 

Ms. KILPATRICK. Thank you. 

Mr. Chairman, can I do a little bit on acquisition of KC–X? 

Mr. DICKS. Yeah, well, we are going to talk about that since you 

brought it up. 

Ms. KILPATRICK. Oh, okay. I yield. 

Mr. DICKS. You know, the thing that I worry about a little bit 

here is that, you know, we have one bidder in this situation. The 

other company is now asking for additional time, and the Department is suggesting that they might grant it. But they don’t have 

a partner. I mean, the people that are out there—Raytheon, Lockheed, and L–3—I think have all said that they are not going to do 

it. 

So, at some point, it seems to me that the Department has to 

say—and I think there is a process for doing it—is there intent for 

anybody to bid? And if they haven’t got a partner—or unless they 

want to bid on their own. 

You know, at some point, I just don’t see giving them additional 

time to think about it. I mean, either they have to be serious about 

it or not. They have known for months that Northrop Grumman 

wasn’t going to bid. And if they were going to get another partner, 

they should have been doing that. 

So I know the Department’s position. We are going to go through 

the process here. Boeing hasn’t submitted its bid yet. They have to 

do that; they will. 

So do you have anything to enlighten us, General Fullhart? 

General FULLHART. Well, Mr. Chairman, as you can appreciate, 

as I said in my opening statement, we are in the formal source selection process stage at this point. So, not being part of that formal 

process, I am limited in what I can say, but let me put a few facts 

on the table. 

The first is our Chief and our Secretary, as well as Deputy Secretary Lynn and Secretary Gates have all indicated, we have a 

process in place that we think is fair and open. And we are now 

in the midst of that, with a proposal due date of 10 May, which 

has been publicly announced and is available for folks out there. 

We have a source selection evaluation team, advisory council, an 

entire team that is poised and ready, trained to receive the proposals on that date and to begin the evaluation process. 

We have mechanisms in place that are prescribed within the Defense Federal Acquisition Regulations that will allow us to ensure 

that the American taxpayer, regardless of who might put forward 


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a proposal, is going to get a fair price. And we look forward to that 

opportunity. As Congresswoman Kilpatrick indicated and as also 

General McNabb has indicated, this is an extremely important program for our Air Force. 

You alluded, sir, to my previous command assignment at Fairchild Air Force Base. I have flown those tankers. I may get this 

wrong, but I think it is the mother of the aircraft commander of 

the last KC–135 has not been born yet. So we are going to be working with these KC–135s for some time. 

We are eager to get on with this process, and we look forward 

to proposals on May 10th. And I think that would suffice for what 

I would say. 

MOBILITY CAPABILITIES AND REQUIREMENTS STUDY (MCRS)

Mr. DICKS. Yeah. Well, again, I just hope we are not going to 

grant additional time if there isn’t some credible possibility of having—they have said they want a U.S. partner to go forward with 

this. If there is no chance that they are going to submit a bid, I 

don’t see why we should extend the time—and I think it was Vice 

President Cheney who said, ‘‘so they can dither.’’ That is what it 

looks like to me, anyway. 

So, anyway, let’s talk about the metrics on the Mobility Capabilities and Requirements Study. How did you do this study? Tell us 

about this study. It is a very important one. You evaluate the perton miles. Tell us about this study. 

General MCNABB. You bet, Chairman. 

First and foremost, it was a very collaborative effort, working 

with the services, working with the combatant commands, looking 

at the strategy, anything that has a new emphasis under Quadrennial Defense Review irregular warfare; you know, long-duration 

campaigns like OIF or OEF—and really taking advantage of lessons learned. It included the fact that we have new equipment like 

MRAPs and MATVs that have become a priority. 

And I think that, from my standpoint, that part—in this case, 

TRANSCOM was co-lead with Office of the Secretary of Defense 

cost assessment and Program Evaluation, and I think it paid big 

dividends for us because we were able to make sure that that 

warfighting perspective was in there. And I really think they did 

a good job on that. 

I know they came and they briefed last week; we sent a team up 

to brief the staffs on that. And I would say that, with a few exceptions, it validated the Department’s planned mobility capabilities 

sufficiently. From my standpoint, that was great news. It validated 

a lot of the things we are doing—for instance, the new tanker. And 

I think that, in that case, it not only showed that we had a bit of 

a shortfall but we could even do better in that department. 

Airlift fleet, both strategic and theater, was sufficient. In fact, we 

have a little room, given all the upgrades and all the changes of 

how we have done the aircraft, the addition of the C–17s, the addition of the C–130Js, bringing them to the fight, the fact that they 

bring so much more capability. 

We, actually, on the inter-theater side, we need about 304 aircraft for the most stressing scenario. We are headed to have a program of record of about 334. So we will have some room to tailor 


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the strategic fleet. That is not a surprise; 300 was about what we 

needed before. And what I will be asking is that—— 

Mr. DICKS. Now, 300, that is the C–130 class aircraft, right? 

General MCNABB. No, I am sorry. 300 total C–17, C–5-type aircraft. 

Mr. DICKS. Okay. Total. Okay. 

General MCNABB. And we are headed to have about 334. And 

that is because of the restriction on retiring C–5s—— 

Mr. DICKS. How many C–130s are in that? 

General MCNABB. No C–130s in that. 

Mr. DICKS. Oh, this is just—— 

General MCNABB. This is C–17 and C–5s. This is the strategic 

lift portion. 

Mr. DICKS. Okay. 

General MCNABB. And right now, you know, we are on track—— 

Mr. DICKS. Oh, I see. You are right. You are right. Thank you. 

General MCNABB [continuing]. With your add of 223. And then 

111 C–5s, that is the 334. 

Of course, we haven’t received all those C–17s yet, but at some 

point, as we get additional C–17s, we now have the opportunity to 

retire the oldest, poorest-performing airplanes. So the big thing 

that—— 

Mr. DICKS. Are there still legal restrictions against you retiring 

the C–5s? 

General MCNABB. The restriction on that right now is 316 aircraft. Nunn-McCurdy came out with that. Now MCRS 2016 allows 

you to say, ‘‘Okay, now we have looked at everything, and here is 

where we stand.’’ 

There are some things that the Air Force has to provide. I will 

let General Johns talk about that. But it is the bed-down plan. It 

is Operational Test and Evaluation complete on the C–5 Reliability 

Enhancement and Re-engining Program, to make sure that that all 

goes well. And so, that is kind of where we are. 

But as we deliver more C–17s, as you know, the most important 

part of our weapons system is our people. It is our crews and maintainers; it is the facilities that are out there. And so, you know, we 

want to make sure that we free up maintainers and crews to man 

those new C–17s that are coming online. 

I think, on the intra-theater side, the 130 side, Mr. Congressman, we have in the neighborhood of 400 aircraft. And I would say 

that MCRS said we need about 335 C–130s to meet the highest 

stressed case. 

Mr. DICKS. A lot of them are very old, though, right? Very, very 

old. 

General MCNABB. Right. Right. 

And so our current plan of having the 130J buy and the 130 avionics modernization program—that is upgrading our C–130H2s 

and above, which is our best C–130s—between those two, we can 

meet that. 

I also worry a little bit about all the direct support that we are 

now doing—and this is as a TRANSCOM commander—that we are 

doing in support of the Army and the Special Forces and the Marines on the ground, is that they also have a time-sensitive, timecritical requirement. You heard C–27, you know that we talked 


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about 78 aircraft to be able to meet that need. That program was 

reduced to 38, and part of that was that we have additional 130s. 

So, to me, there might be 40-some-odd 130s that we will need to 

be able to supplement the C–27s to do that mission. 

So I am in the neighborhood of about 375 aircraft until—you 

know, at some point, General Johns and the whole gang will take 

another look at that. But, in my mind, we do have some room to 

retire some airplanes on that front, especially the old E models, as 

you have mentioned. 

MCRS SEALIFT

Mr. DICKS. Right. 

General MCNABB. The roll-on/roll-off: What we found on the sealift side was our roll-on/roll-off vessels, we have 92 of them, and 

they were max utilized on two of the scenarios, which makes me 

think that we—I would like to have a little more reserve in that. 

So we will be working on the sealift side to see wherever we can 

get our hands on some additional roll-on/roll-off. We have been 

doing that already, and it is already paying big dividends. But it 

is both on our organic fleet, but it is also on our U.S.-flag fleet to 

try to incentivize them to pick those up if they can do that. 

Joint High-Speed Vessel played very well. So, again, something 

that is in the program. We have 18 of those coming. But that Joint 

High-Speed Vessel, I think, will allow us some options where you 

can use one of these intermodal ports that you could take a large, 

medium-speed RO/RO ship into, one of our large ships, and then 

you could take it by air, if that is required, or you can take it by 

one of these Joint High-Speed Vessels. If you think about Haiti, 

that is where these kinds of things could really pay some big dividends. 

The last part was, they talked about the infrastructure, that it 

isn’t our structure at home, it isn’t the en route structure; it is the 

infrastructure we are going into. One of the scenarios was a long, 

sustained—you know, in a place, not unlike Afghanistan and not 

unlike Haiti, where you don’t have a lot of structure, we want to 

make sure that we have options to be able to use a number of different ways to get the stuff in. 

I think that validated that. That is what we found in Afghanistan. And that is things like using that Joint High-Speed Vessel. 

To me, some of the work we are doing on airships, Unmanned Aerial Vehicles carrying cargo, and airdrop joint. Whether it is precision airdrop or low-altitude, low-cost, it is how do we make sure 

that our folks on the ground never have to worry that we will get 

them the stuff that they need and that we can get them in there. 

And I think that that kind of validated where we are going. 

Again, you all have been absolutely superb in supporting this. And, 

today, I think our ability to go into Afghanistan, come out of Iraq, 

still take care of events like Haiti, speaks volumes to what you 

have done and the great support you have been. 

AIRDROP

Mr. DICKS. What about—you mentioned airdrop, C–17. We don’t 

do that off of the C–5, do we? Just the C–17? 


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General MCNABB. No. C–17s and C–130s primarily in Afghanistan. And I would just say that that has paid big dividends. 

And we go all the way from—we have some 130s doing some lowaltitude, low-cost, which means they are coming in at about 150 

feet at 150 knots, and it is very precise. They use disposable 

chutes. And the folks on the ground, you could do about 500 

pounds. And it has worked really slick. 

They were using some of those smaller CASA airplanes, Congressman, for that kind of thing, because it is tailored to that size 

of a load. But we now have some 130s, something General Johns 

jumped all over, of having some 130s test that, and it is working 

out great. 

Our promise, again, is to the folks on the ground. If we can do 

it by airdrop so you don’t have to put a convoy—you know, it is 

money. And so, a lot of success in there. 

The joint precision airdrop is where you put a GPS receiver on 

there. But, again, more expensive. If we don’t need it because of 

the threat, it is better to do the low-altitude, low-cost or our normal 

Contain Delivery System. 

So, with that, I will see if General Johns wants to add anything 

on that. 

General JOHNS. Sir, our mission is to get it to those who need 

it, when and how they need it. 

Regarding the airdrop, we put these Soldiers and Marines out 

into these, forward operating bases the perimeter of the country. 

Sometimes for them to traverse, to get to a main operating base is 

hazardous—the weather, the threat. So if we can put these bundles 

right where they need them, when they need them, we have met 

their needs. And, to me, that is time-critical, sensitive movement. 

For example, one night we had troops in contact, and their issue 

was the water had been contaminated. So the commander said, you 

have to get rid of your water. But, without water, they can’t sustain the fight. So they called down and said, ‘‘We need an emergency airdrop.’’ Within four hours, we had a C–17 crew, who was 

ready to go, takeoff with water to drop it within meters of the folks. 

And they said, ‘‘Well, let’s hold off now because, to go out there at 

night—let’s wait until sunrise.’’ And we are able to do that. 

And, if you think about it, another thing is that we are out in 

these villages and we have to be precise with this air delivery. If 

I miss and put a bundle through somebody’s house, they are probably going to hate America and we are going to undermine what 

the Marines and the Army have done while they are there. So, not 

only do I want to protect our Soldiers and have it close so they 

don’t have to be out and be exposed, I want to also make sure we 

support their mission, because they are trying to build trust and 

transparency to help those villages be successful and combat the 

enemy. 

So it is a whole part of building partnerships; it is us delivering 

so that they never want; and us delivering in a way that we don’t 

put them in threat. So that is kind of the focus—and so, the different means of doing it: with joint precision airdrop, with low-cost, 

low-altitude airdrop. We will do whatever it takes to make sure we 

deliver those capabilities to those Soldiers and Marines who count 

on us. 


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Mr. DICKS. Okay. That is good. 

Mr. Kingston. 

C–5 RELIABILITY ENHANCEMENT RE-ENGINEERING PROGRAM

Mr. KINGSTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I wanted to ask about this Reliability Enhancement Re-engineering Program on the C–5s. And the question is, has that been ruled 

out for the C–5? Because I understand that there has been an increase in cost and scaling back the number of airplanes that are 

going to have it. And so, I was wondering how we are going to 

apply that. And does part of this review compare the cost of a C– 

5 versus a C–17? And where is that? 

General MCNABB. And I will let General Johns jump in here, and 

General Fullhart. 

In general, when we did the Nunn-McCurdy and took a very 

hard look at the re-engining program of the C–5, what we came 

back to Congress with, the Department’s position was we would reengine the B models. Those are the airplanes that were pretty 

much built in the 1980s. But the A models would not pay for themselves, so the decision was made to forego re-engining the C–5As. 

In the end, we are on track to have 52 C–5Ms, which is the reengine. We have three that have been out there doing their initial 

test. And I would say that, from my standpoint, those airplanes are 

going to—you know, I just met with the company president, and I 

said I am still expecting to have the same kind of reliability we 

have on the C–17. So I can use it without ever worrying that I am 

going to close down a ramp. 

Everything—cost, schedule, and meeting performance parameters—seem to be on track, at least that is what I understand. 

Again, I will defer that to General Johns and General Fullhart. 

But, again, right now the plan is to only do the B’s, do not do the 

A’s. But we would do the avionics modernization program on the 

A’s. 

But when we talk about being able to retire some airplanes, it 

will be the oldest ones of those that are the poorest performers. 

And we do have an ability now to—given the MCRS, I think we 

have an opportunity to smartly tailor that fleet. 

Mr. KINGSTON. General Johns. 

General JOHNS. Sir, the C–5M is the work. What we have done 

is taken the C–5B and we have redone the cockpit, the avionics, 

to make it compatible and get rid of the old analog system and put 

a digital system in. 

In doing that, it also allows us access to the new airspace, because the new airspace is much more precise. And I can’t wallow 

through it; I have to be precisely knowing where I am, because that 

gives me access to the higher altitudes and more fuel efficiency and 

I can traverse the globe in a more responsive way for the combatant commander. 

We then take that Avionics Modernization Program (AMP) that 

avionics, and then we actually go and do about 70 other system upgrades. The major ones that we see are the engines, thrust reversers, and the environmental system. And we put those new engines 

on. 


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And what it does is it gets me the performance to get up to altitude. Because with the C–5 now, with the old engines, if I max 

gross weight, I am leveling off in the low 20s and I am driving that 

airplane very inefficiently. And if you think about all of our airliners, we are going up to the 30s and the 40s. So now, with these 

new engines, I can get up to the 30s and the 40s. I can climb at 

58 percent faster than I can with the C–5B or A. I also have a fuel 

savings of about 8 to—I will say 12 but sometimes it is 20 percent. 

But, more importantly, I can go basically from Dover Air Force 

Base to Incirlik Air Base, Turkey with about a 120,000-pound load, 

where, before, I had to put down and basically refuel somewhere 

along the way. 

So the range, the payload, the capability that the C–5M brings 

really gives me a lot of ability to deliver to the warfighter. 

Now, I came back from Ramstein Air Base on the airplane, and 

yesterday I flew the C–5M for the first time, myself, and went up 

and did a pretty good profile. And I will tell you what, I was very 

impressed with the performance. Equally important, I am impressed with the aircrew, because they have taken these airplanes—some built in the 1960s, some some built in the 1980s— 

and with this C–5M, they have this new pride and passion that, 

‘‘Sir, we are going to have better reliability, we are going to have 

better performance. Put us in the fight.’’ So all that I heard yesterday was, ‘‘Sir, we want to be part of the surge.’’ I only have three 

airplanes right now—— 

Mr. DICKS. How many of these are we going to do? 

General JOHNS. Sir, we are going to do 52 of them. We are going 

to do the B models. And we have one A and then the two C’s. And 

that is all I need to meet the warfighters’ requirements. 

And then with the other remaining C–5As, we have come to you 

and asked for support to retire 17 in fiscal year 2011, to start that 

process in a mature way so that I can always meet General 

McNabb’s requirements and I make sure I am not having too much 

risk to do that. So I am very comfortable that we can start retiring 

the older A’s at this point. 

Mr. KINGSTON. Okay. I also wanted to ask, on the C–17, the 

Globemaster Sustainment Partnership expires this year, and you 

are looking at a new partnership program or a new maintenancetype program, which would include putting in an office at Warner 

Robins, as I understand it. It may already be open, I am not sure. 

But how much money will that save? And will that do the trick 

over the life of the contract and the life of the plane? 

General JOHNS. I am going to let General Fullhart go into some 

of the numbers. But, from my perspective right now, we have Boeing, who has total responsibility for the airplane. And through a 

business case analysis, we said, well, how do we go forward, induce 

competition? And we found out that our depot is capable of performing the work for the C–17. It brings it into the depot, so we 

have the organic capability as a nation. And what the business 

case showed is we can save $9 billion to $12 billion—and General 

Fullhart will correct me on the numbers—we can begin saving that 

money by bringing it into the depot. 

Now, that is good. My position is, I can’t affect the performance 

of the airplane. I need to deliver on the aircraft to meet the 


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warfighters’ needs. So what have you done to ensure a safe transition? Well, Boeing is on contract to kind of shepherd this process 

for five years as we transition over to the depot, and then there are 

five one-year renewable contracts to continue if we need to do this 

as a teaming. 

But at the end of the day—in fact, we just met yesterday with 

General Hoffman in the Air Force Materiel Command. And I said, 

what are the leading indicators that we need to be watching month 

by month so, the minute I see something not going right, we can 

put corrective action in? Because I can’t come and disable that fleet 

during the transition. 

I am comfortable and confident we have a good plan, but I want 

to make sure we are managing it very tightly so, if we go off course 

a little bit, we can correct rapidly. 

ASSET SHARING

Mr. KINGSTON. Okay. And wanted to ask—it comes up every 

year—about managing your own inventory. You know, one of the 

things we all find out is that the National Guard is politically more 

active and more vocal than active duty. And we are glad that they 

are, and they should be. But, as you know, when you want to retire 

aircraft, because of that, they can work Congress very effectively. 

How big of a problem is that? Is it the problem that it was 5 

years ago? And do you feel like you can retire the aircraft you need 

to retire in order to have the money saved that we want you to 

save? 

General MCNABB. And, again, I will let General Johns jump in. 

My take is, on the mobility side, our ability to use the total force 

and share airplanes is really tremendous. In many cases, we find 

that we have to put a whole plan together so everybody knows all 

the moving parts. But those Guard and Reserve crews and maintainers is what is so important in all that. 

The sharing of the iron is the one that we tend to spend a lot 

of time on to make sure that we get that right. And, quite rightly, 

they worry that, ‘‘Well, we have some great folks here, and we are 

a little worried that if this mission went away, we wouldn’t get one 

back.’’ Our job is to make sure that we show how we are taking 

full advantage of all of them. And I think we have done that. 

And we have reduced—I was always thinking about the 267 C– 

141s and 180 C–130s that were replaced with the first 180 C–17s. 

And we did that in full coordination with the Guard and Reserve 

to say, ‘‘Here is how we are going to do this.’’ 

And this asset can do so much; we are going to share more of 

these assets. And something that General Johns and the Air Force 

has done is to look at better ways to share assets so that you get 

your crew ratio and maintainers, but you are sharing these very 

high-priced assets. And it has really paid some big dividends. 

So we still have some homework to do, but I think that is how 

we have done it in the past. 

So, General Johns. 

General JOHNS. Sir, our Nation was founded on the militia. Our 

Nation was founded on the National Guard. That is what it is 

today. And we wouldn’t be where we are without them. So it is a 

key part of who we are. 


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I couldn’t do my mission without the Guard and Reserve with the 

active duty. I would like to say that the active duty should be sized 

so I can meet any steady state and that I use the Guard and Reserve for that surge capability. But, you know, right now, I am living in surge, and so I am constantly going to my Guard and Reserve brethren. 

We try and maintain the active duty about a 1:2 dwell. And if 

they are gone 120 days, they are home for 240; then they are gone 

for 120 again. That crew that General McNabb talked about, that 

C–130 crew, I hugged a guy on his eleventh deployment, going 

back over to Afghanistan to do that low-altitude drop. 

So, by the same token, for my Reserve and Guardsmen, we try 

to get a dwell of 1:5 for them, because they have jobs, they have 

families. And the first thing they give up when they come work for 

me is their family vacation, where they go to their employer and 

say, ‘‘Sir, I need to go support my Air Force and my Nation again.’’ 

So I couldn’t be more appreciative. 

So one of the things I am worried about is, how do we balance? 

I want to make sure those active-duty airmen stay in and they 

don’t have to vote with their families and say, I can’t take anymore. So a 1:2 dwell is there. I have to worry about those Guardsmen and Reservists, a 1:5 dwell, because their employers are going, 

‘‘Hey, Iraq is coming down; why are you guys still busy?’’ ‘‘Well, sir, 

we are doing Afghanistan.’’ ‘‘But it is just 30,000 people.’’ ‘‘No, sir, 

we are moving a lot of equipment in there, and they need me 

through August for sure for the surge.’’ And then what is the new 

steady state? 

So I am constantly doing this. So, as you look at the airplanes 

and where we retire from, our Guardsmen live with those airplanes. My active-duty folks every four years rotate. But at Stewart 

Air National Guard Base, for example, they know them well. And 

so, if we look at adjusting things, it is very personal to them, as 

it should be. So we are very open and transparent. When we ask 

to mobilize, I sat before General McNabb with my Guard and Reserve brethren with me, saying, ‘‘This is how we are doing it, ‘‘Total 

Force.’’ We are very transparent. 

I have to respect their concerns. But, at the end of the day, I 

have to come forward with the best plan to meet 7 the warfighters’ 

needs and make sure the Guardsmen, the Reservists are sustainable in their support and their commitment and that my activeduty folks are able to stay in our Air Force. 

Mr. KINGSTON. So you don’t have the frustration that maybe the 

Air Force had 3 to 4 years ago, in terms of controlling your own 

inventory? 

General JOHNS. Sir, I wouldn’t call it frustration; I call it the 

need to communicate and to share and be open. 

And, at the end of the day, there are different perspectives. 

And, yes, our Guardsmen have more access to the Congress. 

And I respect that process, and I will continue to be open. 

And, you know, I only want the best possible solution, and that 

is the most informed input. 

Mr. KINGSTON. Thank you. 


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MISSION CAPABLE RATE

Mr. DICKS. All right. Give me the mission-capable rate for the C– 

17 and the C–5. 

General JOHNS. Yes, sir. My Mission Capable (MC) for the C–17 

is 84 percent. 

Mr. DICKS. And what about the C–5? 

General JOHNS. The C–5, I am running between 45 and 50 for 

the C–5A. I am running about 60 percent for the C–5B. 

Mr. DICKS. And we don’t know enough about the M yet. What do 

you suspect? 

General JOHNS. Yes, sir. They expect—well, the two statement 

says that two years after the initial operating capability, which is 

fiscal year 2015, they will have a 75 percent MC rate. 

Operational Test Evaluation testing is complete. There are good 

indications. Having just flown it, I am very confident and comfortable that I will deliver on that capability. And we are going to 

run the aircraft really hard during the surge, the older ones, and 

just continue to work it. 

C–17 SUSTAINMENT COSTS

Mr. DICKS. How much per year is obligated for C–17 sustainment 

in operation and maintenance and in the Transportation Working 

Capital Fund? Do you know, or can you get it for the record? 

General JOHNS. Sir, let us provide that for the record, if we may, 

precisely. 

[The information follows:] 

The Air Force Operations and Maintenance appropriation obligated the following 

amounts for C–17 contractor logistics support (CLS): 

Fiscal Year 2007: $235.6 million 

Fiscal Year 2008: $283.2 million 

Fiscal Year 2009: $330.3 million 

The Transportation Working Capital Fund obligated the following amounts for C– 

17 CLS: 

Fiscal Year 2007: $757.4 million 

Fiscal Year 2008: $803.0 million 

Fiscal Year 2009: $831.2 million 

Mr. DICKS. Okay. 

Mr. Visclosky. 

MATERIAL HANDLING EQUIPMENT

Mr. VISCLOSKY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

General McNabb, on the issue of material-handling equipment, 

the Air Force apparently a year ago had funding concerns about 

the acquisition of material-handling equipment. There were two 

different loaders that were involved. What is the status of that program? And is there still a funding issue? 

General MCNABB. Let me give you, kind of, the overview. 

We use the Tunner and the Halvorsen loaders. And, again, Congress has been very good about—the Tunner is our 60K, the 

Halvorsen is the 25K loader. They are able to do the high reach 

that allows them to offload a 747, for instance. And then we have 

the all-terrain loaders, the 10Ks. 

And, at this time, I think we have all the Tunners and 

Halvorsens that we need, and now we are getting into the depot 


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maintenance kinds of things to make sure their service life can be 

extended. 

We had a number of other types of loaders—these were the 

40,000-pound loaders—that now are, kind of, excess. Now that we 

have our full complement of Tunner and Halvorsen, we are going 

to be able to excess some of those older loaders that weren’t able 

to reach up and offload every type of airplane. 

So I think that, right now, Congressman, we are in pretty good 

shape. Again, I will see if General Johns would like to provide a 

comment on that. 

General JOHNS. I feel I can meet General McNabb’s mission 

across the globe with them—318 Tunners, 443 Halvorsens, the 

smaller one. And right now, sir, we are in the process of a refurbishment. We have begun it on the Tunner. So how do we sustain 

them? So I will say we put them in the depot, go through them, 

refurbish them, and they come back out the other end, ready to go 

again. 

So I have enough, and we have a sustainment process that allows me to continue them in good service. 

Mr. VISCLOSKY. Is there anything else we can do as far as improving ground handling facilities and other infrastructure at your 

forward bases to make it more efficient? 

General JOHNS. We have the mechanized material-handling systems. As you have been out to some of the Air Force bases— 

McChord, for example, Dover, McGuire, and Travis—where we 

have a lot of throughput, we have that big machine that will pull 

the pallets actually off the wall and get them ready to go out to 

the airplane. That is doing very well. It has really given us a lot 

of efficiency. And now we are actually putting some of those in our 

en-route. 

Sir, with all the support you have given us, I think we are on 

track to do that and to continue to be very expeditious in getting 

those aircraft loaded. So I am very comfortable right now. 

General MCNABB. Congressman, if I could mention, you have hit 

on exactly the thing that, as a TRANSCOM commander, I am always looking for, is: What are the kind of connectors, whether it 

is inter-air between a commercial to a military aircraft? We are 

doing that right now, taking 747–400s directly into airfields like 

Bagram and downloading those MATVs onto C–17s to take them 

into Bastion, you know, making sure we are taking full advantage 

of the small throughput at Bastion and using C–17s to do that. 

In some cases, it is the 747–400s—we would have to pull the turret off it to load on a 747–400. It is much cheaper to use those to 

fly it all the way to Afghanistan. But it is those kinds of things 

that allow us to turn airplanes faster and do these inter-air or 

intermodal solutions faster. We win the race in the pits, we know 

that, and that is all about velocity. So you have it exactly right. 

The Halvorsen and the Tunner loader—I will say that, when we 

first got our Tunner loader, I got those about the same times as 

the C–17s when I was the Tanker Airlift Control Center commander. I tail-number-managed both of them. Because, wherever 

they were, they were such a multiplier because they were so much 

faster. You can offload a C–17 using a Tunner loader in about 10 

minutes, 18 pallets, because it is perfectly suited to do that. 


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So we now have enough of those, and we continue to look for 

ways that we can—it is like NASCAR; you win the race in the pits. 

And you just sit back and say, if we can speed that up, we win. 

And it is velocity. 

So there are going to be some of these other ones that I think 

we are going to be able to come and—the problem is, they are kind 

of niche markets right now. And I kind of go, boy, if I had something that made that really easy to drive an MATV off a 747. Right 

now I use those K loaders to do it, and you can see what a difference it makes. 

Mr. VISCLOSKY. One other generic question: The Department of 

Defense has proposed a joint future theater lift that would be used 

by the Army and Air Force to meet both service’s missions, which 

I would compliment both services on. It was proposed this past 

year, the projected milestone A decision is in this year, milestone 

B is in 2014, and the first fielding would be 2024, which, by my 

math, is about 15 years. 

Why is it—we fought and won World War II in 4 years. Seriously. Why does it take 15 years from the time you get an idea 

until you field? I mean, that is a half a generation. 

General MCNABB. Right. Let me go first on that. 

Mr. VISCLOSKY. I am thinking of just mission change, I think of 

cost, and I think of the—— 

General MCNABB. Here is how I think about this. And then, 

again, I will let General Johns and General Fullhart jump in, as 

well. I look at this as—right now it costs about 10 times as much 

to move a pound of cargo by air than it does by surface, about 10 

times. And no surprise that about 10 percent of our stuff goes by 

air and about 90 percent goes by surface. 

If we could get to something that allowed that to be 3:1 or 2:1, 

that difference, and some of the air shipped kinds of things that 

you think about, that would enable sea-basing. And right now we 

use vertical lift because we have to use that in Afghanistan, but 

vertical lift is pretty expensive still. So what is that next key enabler that will allow us to change that cost dynamic so that we 

make this whole thing more efficient? 

There are a number of ideas that are out there: you know, tilt 

rotor, quad rotor, air ship, those kinds of things. And I think our 

big part is to get all of those in and then figure out which one is 

really kind of a game-changer and changes that equation. So that 

is how I see it. 

A lot of the other things we will be doing kind of on a constant 

improvement basis, like we were talking about the loaders, but this 

is one that I think could have us jump a whole generation. 

Mr. VISCLOSKY. How long would it take, with all of the trained 

people you have and the experience of fighting wars for 200 years 

and all of your experience in logistics and movement, to make the 

decision? And then it will still take 15 years—and not just this aircraft, but—— 

General JOHNS. Sir, on this particular one, we are looking, as the 

Army migrates to the new equipment, how quickly do they migrate 

to the new equipment? We are talking 20 to 30 tons. And then the 

question is, okay, we want to get it right into a small location. Do 


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we have to do that vertically? Extremely expensive. Is there a 

1,500–foot runway, is there a 3,000–foot runway very close by? 

So I think what we are doing right now with this analysis of alternatives, which is going through the process—and General Port 

is overseeing that—I am looking at meeting their needs on their 

timeline. I don’t believe, at this point, that the Army is going to 

be fielding this new equipment so quickly that I am behind the 

time to meet their needs. I want them never to have to worry about 

getting their equipment where they want it, when they want it. So 

I want to make sure that our timeline to deliver is there for them. 

I think we are matched right now, by virtue of their development 

of this new equipment and their fielding of it. 

And then this analysis of alternatives has to look at, what is the 

cost of putting it in vertically versus going to the nearest 1,500– 

foot runway and maybe putting it with something that has a wing? 

Or do we use the airship? 

So, again, we are looking at all that right now, I think, to deliver 

the best solution. And I hope, at this point, I am on the Army’s 

timeline to deliver it so I can meet their needs. 

And then General Fullhart is working some of the details here 

in Washington, D.C. on that. 

General FULLHART. Sir, the only thing I would add to that is in 

the relay race that is acquisitions right now, the baton is in the 

hands of the requirements generators. Because you have to understand what the concept operations are that will be used, again, as 

has already been mentioned; what equipment are we talking about; 

what environment threat, et cetera, should this be able to operate 

in. 

Once those parameters are set, then the acquisition community 

can pick up the baton and say, what is the state of the art of the 

technology? Is this something that has to be newly developed, or 

is this something that exists that, with modification, can meet the 

need? 

And so we are in the very early stages of this, but, as the analysis of alternatives takes more definition, I think we will be in a 

better position to know how long we are really talking about. 

Mr. VISCLOSKY. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. DICKS. Let me ask one here. Tell us about the presidential 

aircraft replacement, where that is. 

General MCNABB. We will let General Fullhart answer that. 

General FULLHART. Sir, we have no formal requirement at this 

stage from the Administration. But what we are doing as a Department is, I think, good stewardship of looking at the existing fleet, 

how long we have had it, what are the modifications that are going 

to be necessary to sustain it, and then at what point is it appropriate to begin the kinds of activities for a recapitalization of that 

fleet. 

In the near term, what we are doing are some, what I will call, 

risk-reduction studies. This is a generic way of saying, you know, 

where is the technology of large commercial air fleets today? What 

are the kinds of evolutionary changes that we would anticipate in 

the onboard equipment that are necessary to support the President 

in all his roles? 


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But we are nowhere near kicking off a formal acquisition program, at this stage. 

Mr. DICKS. So this is just a study, at this point? 

General FULLHART. At this point, we are gathering information 

to inform future judgments. 

Mr. DICKS. Mr. Hinchey. 

Mr. HINCHEY. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And thank you very much. This has been, of course, very interesting. 

I just want to return briefly to the C–5As. My understanding is 

that the study that has been conducted recently shows that there 

is no real need for additional C–5s and that there is not going to 

be many, if any, re-engining of the C–5s. 

General JOHNS. C–5A. 

Mr. HINCHEY. C–5As, yes, right. So I am just wondering how 

many of these C–5s are going to be retired. What do you think is 

going to be happening with them in that regard? 

General JOHNS. Sir, right now we have come and asked to retire 

17 in fiscal year 2011 and 5 more in fiscal year 2012, so a total 

of 22. And that will allow me to meet General McNabb’s 

warfighting needs. 

And then what we are also doing is we are looking at the beddown of the C–17s. We recently announced that the C–17 is going 

to Ohio, to Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, to the Reserve. And 

we are in the process of looking to bed down a C–17 unit in the 

Air National Guard, and we are going through the strategic basing 

process to do that. So that is how I am able to say, okay, we can 

retire some of those C–5s, because I am able to put C–17s in place. 

And with the Air National Guard, the manpower is never—because the manpower remains organic to the unit, so it allows the 

free-up. So we are in that process. And I think you have been in 

dialogue with the Chief and the Secretary on that. 

AIRLIFT MIX

Mr. HINCHEY. Yes. So it is basically a ratio of one retired and 

then a C–17 coming in, basically one for one, something like that? 

General JOHNS. Sir, I don’t want to tie it to that. At the end of 

the day, it is what is the right mix that I can go forward to General 

McNabb and say that I have enough strategic airlift. Because, 

again, the range on the Mobility Capabilities and Requirements 

Study-16 (MCRS) was 299 to 304 tails to achieve 32.7 million ton 

miles per day. And I want to look at that in a way that we allow 

sufficient capability, that I am never wondering about where my 

next aircraft is coming from to meet the mission. And I think we 

have that about right now. 

General MCNABB. And I think it is really to take advantage of 

those great crews and maintainers and facilities. And, again, that 

has been built for about 300 large airplanes. When you think about 

Guard and Reserve active duty, all the work that has done been, 

you know, that is about what we can handle without having additional airplanes that are sitting around the ramp. 

Mr. HINCHEY. So, as that occurs, do we know what the impact 

is going to be on the personnel that is going to be involved in this, 

the resource allocations, how they are going to be organized? 


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General MCNABB. That is strategic basing you know, they are 

going through all of those things to make sure that they have that 

all right. And that is why they take a long time on it, to make sure 

that they work with the Guard and Reserve and the bases affected 

and say, okay, are we mixing and matching right, and, at the end 

of this, are we fully utilizing the newer resources that we are giving you in the right way? 

There is a much higher crew ratio on the C–17, for instance, 

than on a C–5. So even though the manpower for a C–5 per aircraft 

is higher, I will just say the C–17, when you put the whole crew 

ratio on, the number of crews you actually need is more on a C– 

17 than a C–5 because you use them more. 

Mr. HINCHEY. Yeah. Well, thanks very much. 

Mr. DICKS. Let’s go to the—you mentioned this in your statement—the C–27J. Tell us about where we are in this. Why was 

this cut back to 38? Do you agree with Mr. Gates’s position that 

we can take care of the rest with C–130s? Tell us about this. 

General MCNABB. Again, Mr. Chairman, I will start and then see 

if General Johns wants to jump in. 

I got to be in part of that discussion. And it was, as we were 

looking at a number of different options as part of the last budget, 

here are some things that we think we could tailor a little better 

given what we have learned in Iraq and Afghanistan, but also 

given that we do have some excess capacity in the 130 fleet. 

It is that direct support mission which I think has just proved 

how important that is, is that is that marriage with the folks on 

the ground. You have seen that, you know, between McChord and 

Fort Lewis in the way that, if we start doing airdrop together, it 

just ends up being the trust grows. And we are finding that is really successful in Afghanistan and Iraq. Lots of work being done on 

that. 

From my standpoint, I think that the C–27 fills a very good 

niche. In other words, there are places where you have small types 

of packages to immediately resupply units, and it allows us to, if 

we have the C–27, be more efficient with the 130s. If we are more 

efficient with the 130s, we can be more efficient with the C–17s. 

It allows us to have a mix of options that come together. My part 

is—— 

Mr. DICKS. What kind of capacity—I mean, how much can this 

handle, cargo-wise? 

General MCNABB. It basically is about half the capacity of a C– 

130. And so, that is where it comes into. It is a two-engine. The 

front end looks very similar, in other words, the flight deck, if you 

went up on there, you would say, ‘‘Boy, this looks a lot like a 130.’’ 

But it is two engines. So it is a smaller platform, so it is a little— 

you know, as you talk about operations & maintenance over a 

lifecycle, you actually save a little money. 

But, again, I think it allows us to have a mix of options. In many 

cases, it is those CASAs that we were talking about, Congressman, 

that carry those small 500-pound loads; that you don’t need to have 

a whole 130 go out there. We could do it with a smaller airplane. 

Tails sometimes are important, but sometimes your overall capability is—the 130 and the C–27s are very complementary. So that 

would be my take on it. 


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And, General Johns, if there is anything you might add? 

General JOHNS. Sir, we are getting it for the direct support mission. We didn’t have it available when we did the experiment, the 

test. October through December, we had two C–130s go from Mansfield, and they went over to Speicher Contingency Operating Base 

in Iraq. And we basically put those aircraft under the command of 

the Combat Aviation Brigade (CAB), the aviation commander. 

I went up and visited them, both at Mansfield and at Speicher 

Contingency Operating Base, and the test was magnificent. The 

commander was able to deliver, very rapidly, parts across his 250- 

mile swath of where he was worried about helicopters. And here is 

how it went. 

General JOHNS. He had these two C–130s there he could fly on 

demand. And it worked very well for command and control. And 

that was excellent. And then in turn, he was flying his helicopters 

to make sure my C–130 stayed repaired. The C–130s would then 

take the helicopter parts all across in getting his helicopters flying 

again. And it worked very, very well. We have three C–27s right 

now. We are going to be growing to the 38. I think we can do the 

mission. 

I flew the C–27 about a month ago and I think it is really going 

to deliver the capabilities that we need. And 38 is a good number 

at this point. 

Mr. DICKS. Thirty-eight is enough. You know these need—what 

was it, 76 or—— 

General JOHNS. Seventy-eight. We will augment the rest with 

the—— 

LAIRCM

Mr. DICKS. Tell us about the large aircraft infrared countermeasures, LAIRCM, tell us a little bit about that. 

General MCNABB. It is part of the defensive system suites. 

Again, not only have we programmed a number of assets to do 

that, but actually you have helped us in the Overseas Contingency 

Operations. This is what has allowed us to operate our 130s and 

C–17s and now some of our VIP Special Air Mission airplanes by 

putting that on there. If you couple it with the tactics, techniques 

and procedures that you have seen our crews do, what you have 

is we can get people in, in what I think is a much more safe way. 

So right now, for instance, we will take our passengers into 

Manas, load them on C–17s and 130s and then bring them down. 

And you have been part of that with the random approaches, nightvision goggles, whatever it is. 

But it is those defensive systems that allow us in to operate and 

make sure that we can always, always get in. That constant work 

on that has really paid some dividends for us. And the number of 

assets that we have with LAIRCM, again coupled with the tactics, 

techniques and procedures, has really allowed us to operate in Afghanistan and Iraq the way we have and really allowed us to make 

sure we are not putting our great troops in harm’s way unnecessarily. General Johns. 

General JOHNS. Sir, new guy. It is my body armor for the aircraft 

that carry our Airmen. And with that I can sleep a little bit better 


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at night because I know I am giving everything we can to protect 

them. 

Mr. DICKS. Okay. 

General FULLHART. If I might just add to that briefly, we have 

had tremendous support from this committee for this program. The 

Fiscal Year 2011 funds that we are requesting support the C–17, 

C–5, C–130s, C–40s, C–37 and C–20s. So this continues to be a 

very important program and we appreciate your support. 

CIVIL RESERVE AIR FLEET

Mr. DICKS. Back to CRAF again. What is the current and expected capacity of the Civil Reserve Air Fleet? 

General MCNABB. Sir, right now we have—we require 120 aircraft total in our Stage III when we do our full call-up on the cargo 

side and 136 on the passenger side. We have done very well on 

both cargo and passengers. In the international long-range CRAF 

segment, we have 235 cargo airplanes committed by our U.S. carriers and 312 on the PAX side. That oversubscription, we kind of 

look at it as that is kind of our ace in the hole, if you will, that 

allows us to deal with the kinds of things like the surge, and they 

can handle it very easily because they kind of share it all. The good 

part about the Civil Reserve Air Fleet is that we do the procedures, 

we make sure the standards are the same and they can flow into 

our system. 

So when you hear 900 sorties a day coming out of Air Mobility 

Command, about 200 to 300 of those are commercial. And it is 

these folks that are flying these missions. What they do is they do 

it on a normal contracting, and this becomes our activated CRAF, 

which makes up a huge part of my wartime capability. 

Ninety percent of the folks during war will move by passenger 

airplanes, commercial passenger airplanes, and about 30% of our 

cargo. And that is what we have in the war plans. 

Mr. DICKS. All right. Well, I think this has been a very good 

hearing and thank you. 

The committee will adjourn until 4:30 p.m., March 23rd, at which 

time the committee will hold a hearing on the posture of the U.S. 

Army. Thank you very much. 


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TUESDAY, MARCH 23, 2010. 

ARMY POSTURE 

WITNESSES 

HON. JOHN M. McHUGH, SECRETARY OF THE ARMY 

GENERAL GEORGE W. CASEY, CHIEF OF STAFF, UNITED STATES ARMY 

OPENING REMARKS OF CHAIRMAN DICKS

Mr. DICKS [presiding]. The Committee will be in order. This 

afternoon the Committee will hold a hearing on the posture of the 

United States Army. We will discuss personnel matters, current operations and readiness, research and development, and procurement. We are pleased to welcome our distinguished witnesses, the 

Honorable John M. McHugh, Secretary of the Army, and General 

George W. Casey, Jr., Chief of Staff of the Army. 

Mr. Secretary, I believe this is your first appearance before the 

Defense Subcommittee as Secretary of the Army. However, you are 

no stranger to the House of Representatives having represented the 

people of New York’s 23rd and 24th districts from 1993 until assuming your present position. You served also on the Oversight 

and Government Reform Committees and the House Permanent 

Select Committee on Intelligence. You are highly respected in the 

area of military affairs and we are pleased you were able to be with 

us today to discuss the Army budget request for fiscal year 2011. 

General Casey, welcome back. You are a veteran of these budget 

hearings. We appreciate the expertise and perspective you bring to 

these proceedings, based on your many years of military service, including top level command and staff assignments in the Pentagon 

and Iraq. Mr. Secretary and General Casey, we salute you and the 

men and women, the soldiers who are the United States Army. The 

Army has carried a heavy burden and has done so with great skill, 

courage and dedication to duty. Combat tours have been extended, 

time at home has been short. Many said the Army would be broken, but the Army, I think, stands strong. The Army has answered 

every call to duty in Iraq, in Afghanistan, in Haiti and in many 

other places. But the frequent deployments there have been tough 

on soldiers and their families. 

SUICIDE

General Casey, as you noted during your recent visit to Schofield 

Barracks in January of this year, more soldiers, 27 appeared to 

have committed suicide, than were killed in combat in Iraq and Afghanistan combined. The number of suicides is high. Despite the 

best efforts of the chain of command to use every available tool to 

prevent suicide, the pace of events and the level of commitment to 


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the Army is high and it is expected to remain high in the near 

term. 

BUDGET REQUEST SUMMARY

The Army continues operations in Iraq and Afghanistan and concurrently resets soldiers, families and equipment to be ready for 

the next challenge. The President’s budget request includes $3.2 

billion for brigade combat team modernization, beginning with the 

Early Brigade Combat Team modernization effort. We will want to 

discuss these upgrades, including FCS spinouts, such as the Small 

Unmanned Aerial Vehicle and the Non Line of Sight Launch System. Based on recent combat experience, the Army has funded in 

the budget request an additional combat aviation brigade. The new 

brigade makes 12 Army combat aviation brigades and it will enter 

the force structure in fiscal year 2011. 

The Committee understands that the Army plans to add the 13th 

combat aviation brigade in 2015. The Committee will want to discuss the requirements and the personnel and equipment resources 

requested in the budget. To better balance its capabilities, the 

Army proposes to convert a heavy brigade combat team to a 

Stryker Brigade combat team by fiscal year 2013. The Committee 

will want to understand the personnel and equipment needed for 

this initiative, as well as the proposed funding. 

Additionally, the Committee will want an update on the Army’s plan for use of $150 million added by Congress in the fiscal year 

2010 Defense Appropriations Act for procurement of additional 

Strykers. Unmanned aerial vehicles are employed far more frequently in the intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance mission, as well as the attack mission. The Committee will want to 

discuss current requirements for UAVs and expanding the UAV 

mission set, as well as the resources requested for UAV acquisition 

and operation. 

PACIFIC THEATER

The readiness of U.S. Army forces in South Korea to assist in the 

defense of the country will be discussed. Training, equipment readiness and equipment modernization are topics of interest. The Committee is aware that U.S. forces on the Korean Peninsula are relocating to the south. This is a complex operation. Adding to the complexity is the tour normalization policy which implements in Korea 

3-year accompanied tour policy to replace the 1-year unaccompanied tour. 

The Army has had a patriot air defense battalion based on the 

island of Okinawa since 2006. The Committee is interested in the 

equipping, training and readiness of that battalion to assist in the 

reenforcement and defense of South Korea while maintaining 

awareness of events in and around Taiwan. Contracts for procurement and support are more frequently negotiated on a fixed price 

basis through full and open competition with the acquisition effort 

accompanied by an expanding cadre of qualified Federal acquisition 

corps professionals. The Army’s progress in hiring, training and 

certifying an expanded acquisition corps is also an area of interest. 

Other topics that are likely to be raised in the question-and-answer 

session include armed reconnaissance, helicopter, import car buyVerDate Mar 15 2010 04:00 Mar 25, 2011 Jkt 065008 PO 00000 Frm 00294 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 E:\HR\OC\A008P2.XXX A008P2

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ing, paladin, integrated management, self-propelled Howitzer and 

tactical wheeled vehicles. 

Mr. Secretary and General Casey, we have a full plate. But before we proceed with your statement, I would like to ask the distinguished ranking member, Mr. Young, for any comments. Mr. 

Young, formally chairman and who has been under the weather a 

little bit and we are glad to see him back and looking healthy. 

REMARKS OF MR. YOUNG

Mr. YOUNG. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. And believe 

me, it is good to be back. And I do want to extend a very warm 

welcome to Secretary McHugh and General Casey, two outstanding 

leaders leading a tremendous Army. We have asked a lot of our 

Army and they deserve our consideration for whatever their needs 

might be. It is up to us to make sure that the necessary—what is 

necessary for adequate training is made available, for the weapons 

to do the job and the transportation to get there and whatever it 

takes to protect our forces while they are there during the fight. 

And I know the leadership of both of these fine gentlemen, agree 

with that and we have talked many times about what it is we have 

to do to make sure that happens. So, Mr. Secretary, General, thank 

you very much for being here today and thank you for the good job 

you do leading our Army. We look forward to your testimony. 

Mr. DICKS [presiding]. You may proceed as you wish and we will 

put your entire statement in the record without objection. 

SUMMARY STATEMENT OF SECRETARY MCHUGH

Mr. MCHUGH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. First of all, I appreciate, Mr. Chairman, yours and the distinguished ranking member’s kind comments. Given the considerations on time, I want to 

make a few brief opening comments. But with your forbearance, I 

would especially like to add my words of condolences and sadness 

over the loss of former chairman Jack Murtha. For all of us in this 

room, I had the honor and the opportunity of serving with him for 

all of my 17 years. He was a great friend of men and women in 

uniform, certainly the Army, but a great friend on a personal level. 

And I had an opportunity go with many of you and, of course, the 

chief to his services both in Pennsylvania and here. And he will be 

sorely missed. 

Having said that, Mr. Chairman, again, if I may be so bold, I 

think the decision to nominate you to his Chair was absolutely a 

magnificent one. In your case too, you and I worked together on 

any number of issues. And I know that you will pick up this mantle 

ably and fill some pretty considerable footsteps. So my congratulations. 

Mr. DICKS. We appreciate your comments about Chairman Murtha and we feel exactly the way you do. And we appreciate your 

leadership and the ability to work with you on these issues. 

Mr. MCHUGH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me just briefly say 

with respect to the reason we are here today. This will not be a 

shock to any, but I think it is important to know. After nearly 9 

years of warfare, your Army is tired. It is stressed, it is feeling the 

effects of multiple deployments. Too many times in the theater and 


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too little time back at home to recoup and to recover. We are making progress and trying to do the best in the way ahead to address 

some of those challenges. But they do continue. Having said that, 

I think you should be aware that in spite of those challenges, this 

Army remains resilient, it remains determined, and it is extraordinarily effective. 

As I know, Mr. Chairman, you and others have recently returned 

from theater. And largely to the resources that this subcommittee 

and ultimately Committee in the House has helped provide, this 

Army has more experience, more education, more training and 

more lethal capabilities than ever before. But it is an unbalanced 

force. And in order to take steps to correct that, we have to continue the progress that has been made and we think this budget 

takes us and keeps us in the right direction to restore balance, to 

take care of soldiers and their families. Of course our equally important citizen cadre to make sure we are providing for our wounded warriors to affect the policies of reset and modernization that 

are so critical in helping us to face successfully the enemies today 

and the enemies yet unknown of tomorrow. 

If you look at all of the vital programs associated with those ini- tiative soldier health and family programs are fully funded: $42 

million for the comprehensive soldier fitness, a program that my 

predecessor and General Casey were instrumental in putting into 

place; $9.6 billion in MILCON to create across 114 individual 

projects; better access and better quality to health care; $28 million 

for the SHARP program; and $55 million for suicide prevention, for 

more clinics to more behavior health specialists, and more of those 

things that this Army and its family needs, I think this budget 

takes us, as I said, in the right direction. Similarly in wounded warrior programs, here too, $900 million to 

continue to operate the 29 WTUs and—based in our facilities, 

camps, posts and stations and nine community-based facilities; $1.2 

billion in MILCON to create nine community-based complexes providing a triad of care, making sure that every wounded warrior has 

someone that he or she can talk to about the way ahead in their 

medical care. And including, of course, as I mentioned, modernization, that I know we will get a chance to talk about more. 

This budget is a good budget in increasingly challenging times. 

And while no budget I would argue is ever perfect, we think from 

the Army perspective it reaches the appropriate balance and we 

look forward to working with this Committee, the subcommittee 

and its challenges ahead to ensure that as all of us wish so very 

much to see happen our great Army, soldiers, civilians and their 

families are provided for in these very challenging times. 

So with that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back and look forward to 

your questions. 

Mr. DICKS. Well, thank you very much. We just—a number of us 

on the Committee just got back from a trip to Afghanistan and 

Pakistan. And I guess I would ask General Casey if you would give 

us kind of an update on how you think things are going in Afghanistan, the so-called surge in Afghanistan. 

General CASEY. Sure. I will do that. I would like to just—— 

Mr. DICKS. If you want to make a statement too. 

General CASEY. I do. 


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Mr. DICKS. Go head. I am sorry. 

General CASEY. That is okay. I will just add that to the end of 

it. 

Mr. DICKS. Add that to the end. Thank you. 

[The statement of Secretary McHugh follows:] 


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SUMMARY STATEMENT OF GENERAL CASEY

General CASEY. Like the Secretary, I will give you my full statement for the record. I would just like to highlight a few things. I 

would like to give you an update on where we are in getting back 

in balance. And then I would like to talk to you about three priorities for us in this budget that I hope are also priorities for the 

Committee and those three are sustaining our soldiers and our 

families, reset and modernization. And one of the most significant 

things about this budget is, as you will see in there now, the transition of our brigade combat team modernization away from future 

combat systems program into a new program and I will talk about 

that briefly. 

First of all, the update. I have been saying since 2007, to the 

Committee, that the Army was out of balance, that we were so 

weighed down by our current commitments that we couldn’t do the 

things that we knew we needed to do to sustain our soldiers and 

families for the long haul and to prepare to do other things. And 

we, with the help of the Committee, put ourselves on a plan back 

in 2007 to get back in balance by 2011. It is hard to believe that 

was 3 years ago. And I want to report to you on the progress that 

we made there. 

GROWING THE ARMY

And I want to tell you that this 2011 budget provides the resources that with the Iraq drawdown that provides us the time to 

put us back in balance here as we suggested we could do in 2011. 

And let me just talk to you about six key areas and give you an 

update about what that means. First of all, growth, you recall in 

2010, President Bush directed us to increase the size of the Army 

by 74,000. Originally, that growth was to be completed by 2012. 

With the help of the Committee and the Secretary of Defense, we 

moved that to 2010. And we actually finished that growth last 

summer. That was a huge assistance here that enabled us to meet 

the increased demand in Afghanistan without having to increase 

time on the ground to 15 months and without having to reinstitute 

stop loss. 

So the growth has been a very big help to us. Now, you will know 

that even as we finished that growth, it was clear to us that we 

were still having difficulty manning units because we had about 

10,000 soldiers already deployed on transition teams or manning 

headquarters. We had another 10,000 soldiers in warrior transition 

units or manning warrior transition units and we had another 

10,000 that were temporarily non-deployable. 

So Secretary Gates authorized us to increase the size of the 

Army by another 22,000. And we are in the process of it growing 

to 15,000 of that 22,000 this year. And we will make a decision in 

the coming months whether or not we actually need the full 22,000. 

So our growth has been a big success story and a big help. 

TIME AT HOME

Second, dwell, the time that the soldiers spend at home. I am increasingly convinced that the most important thing we can do to 

get ourselves back in balance is to increase the time the soldiers 


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spend at home. And it is not just so they can spend more time with 

their families. That is important. But it is so they can recover 

themselves. We just completed a study that told us what we intuitively have known, that it takes 2 to 3 years to recover from a 1- 

year combat deployment. That is the reality of it. And we have 

been for 5 years, we have been about 1 year out, 1 year back. So 

what that says is the soldiers aren’t fully recovering and the effects 

are cumulative. 

With the growth that I talked about, we are able to meet—almost meet our dwell goals that we set in 2007: 1 year out, 2 years 

back for the active force; 1 year out, 4 years back for the Guard 

and Reserve. Even with the Afghan plus-up, our portion of that 

plus-up is about 22,000. We get 70 percent of the active force there 

and we get 80 percent of the Guard and Reserve there in 2011. 

MODULARITY

Third, modularity. Some of you will remember in 2004, we began 

the conversion of our division based Army to modular brigades that 

were much more tailorable to meet differing circumstances. That 

involved the conversion of all 300 brigades, 300-plus brigades in 

the Army. We are 90 percent done with that. And that—and the 

brigades are making—are demonstrating their effectiveness in Iraq 

and Afghanistan every day. The other element of our organizational transformation is rebalancing. We have moved about 150,000 

soldiers away from Cold War skills into skills more relevant for 

today. 

TRANSFORMATION

For example we stood down about 200 tank companies, artillery 

batteries, air defense batteries and we stood up a corresponding 

number of civil affairs, psychological operations, special forces, 

military police. Taken together, modularity and rebalancing, it is 

the largest organizational transformation of the Army since World 

War II, and we have done it while we have been sending 150,000 

soldiers over and back. We couldn’t have done that without the 

help and support of the Committee. The fifth element of this is we 

are putting the whole Army on a rotational model, much like the 

Navy and the Marine Corps have been on for years. We have to do 

that so we can continue to meet these demands and do it at a 

tempo that is sustainable for the All-Volunteer Force. We will be 

well on our way to doing that by 2011. 

And lastly, restationing. 2011—and this budget contains about $1 billion to finish up the 2005 BRAC. And that affects and has 

affected about 380,000 soldiers, families and civilians all across the 

Army. And that was a lot of additional activity, but the plus side 

for us was that the facilities on our installations have—and the 

quality of those facilities have gone up substantially. 

So bottom-line, after 3 years working with you to get back in balance, we made great progress. We are not out of the woods yet, but 

I can see us where we need to get in 2011 and this budget provides 

the resources to do it. I would like to conclude then just with the 

few words on those three priorities that I mentioned. First of all, 

sustaining our people. Our soldiers and families are the heart and 

soul of the organization. And we set out 3 years ago to double the 


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amount of resources we are putting towards soldiers and family 

programs. We have sustained that in this budget. This budget contains money for housing, barracks, child care, youth facilities, war 

transition units and survivor outreach services. We are very, very 

keen to continue the efforts that we made early on. 

RESET

Second, reset. There is almost $11 billion in this budget to reset 

equipment coming out of Iraq and Afghanistan. People may miss 

the fact that we are maintaining high operational ready rates in 

Iraq and Afghanistan and have over the last 81⁄2 years is in large 

part due to the investment in the reset. And reset is critical, not 

only to sustaining ourselves in Iraq and Afghanistan but to the 

long-term health of the force. And finally, modernization. As I mentioned, this budget marks the transition from the future combat 

systems program to a brigade combat team modernization strategy 

for the entire Army. We believe that we have crafted an achievable 

and affordable modernization strategy to modernize our brigade 

combat teams it has got 4 key elements and I can talk about it in 

more depth as we go along. 

MODERNIZATION

First, we intend to incrementally modernize the network so that 

we can take advantage of advancements in information technology 

and upgrade the systems as we go forward. Second, we intend to 

incrementally modernize the brigades by fielding capability packages. And some of you will remember what we called spinouts, the 

intelligence and surveillance devices that we were developing to go 

with the vehicles of the future combat system. We intend to field 

those in different packages again so we can take advantages of 

technology. Third, we are incorporating MRAPs into the force, both 

for our infantry brigade combat teams and to the explosive ordnance disposal units that require these vehicles on a regular basis. 

And lastly, we are building a new ground combat vehicle. And 

this will be an infantry fighting vehicle it will be the first vehicle 

designed from the ground up to operate in an IED environment. 

And this budget contains the money to begin that process. So those 

are the three priorities that I wanted to share with you. And I will 

close, Mr. Chairman, with my expression of the pride that the Secretary and I feel in the Army and I know that you share. And I 

will tell you that we do stand strong. Thank you very much. 

[The joint statement of Secretary McHugh and General Casey 

follows:] 


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ROTATION CYCLE

Mr. DICKS. Well, thank you very much. And both of those were 

excellent statements and I am glad that you feel that we are moving in the right direction in terms of the numbers of people. Give 

us a little explanation of this rotational system in terms of how 

this would—how this would impact the Army. I know you mentioned that the Navy and the Marine Corps do it. But explain how 

that whole thing works. 

General CASEY. I will. And then I forgot to give you the update 

on Afghanistan and I will tack that on to the end. Remind me if 

I forget. 

Mr. DICKS. Okay. Good. 

General CASEY. If you think about—I said 1 year out, 2 years 

back. That means you need three-fourths pool, one to be deployed, 

one to be training to deploy and one to be recovering. If you take 

the Army and you divide it up into three-fourths pools and then 

you add the Guard and Reserve who will flow through those force 

pools at differing years because they are at 1 year out, 4 years 

back, we can organize ourselves so that every—and each one of 

those 3 pools, you have a core headquarter, a 3-star headquarters, 

5 division headquarters, 20 brigade combat teams, 3 or 4 of those 

are Guard, and about 90,000 enabling forces, helicopters, engineers, military police, intelligence, half of those are Guard and Reserve. 

And so that would be the output. And we would prepare ourselves to deliver that output annually. And they could be used for 

Iraq and Afghanistan. They could be used by combat commanders 

for security assistance or whatever they need. That doesn’t quite 

meet the current demand in theater. We are over—that total force 

package is about 160,000. And we have got about 24 brigade combat teams deployed right today. But the idea of this, it is a rotational readiness model. So as you come out of the reset, you gradually build readiness as you move towards the available pool where 

you deploy. 

But the purpose of that is so that we can deliver that capability, 

trained and ready to go to war at a tempo that is sustainable for 

the all volunteer force. And what we have been doing in the past 

is you come back, you take your leave and you get your training 

and you go back again. And we have been doing it in 12 to 15 

months. And that is just not sustainable. So that is the purpose. 

We are going to be at this for a while. We believe that organizational model will allow us to do that. Did you want to add anything 

to that? 

Mr. MCHUGH. I did, but you have to talk about Afghanistan. 

AFGHANISTAN UPDATE

General CASEY. Afghanistan. The flow of the forces in is proceeding apace. I just had an update today from the Army commander who is responsible for bringing those forces in. The equipment for the first force package is there and the troops are flowing 

in, and I expect that they will get there at or at least maybe even 

in advance of their date. What we are seeing, what I am seeing is 

a gradual—the gradual impact that these forces are having over 


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time and a gradual shift in the momentum of the operations there, 

which is exactly what General McChrystal hoped to see. 

You mentioned earlier the battle of Marja. I think that is important from two perspectives: One, because it was an area that was 

important to the enemy and they couldn’t hold it. And that is significant. And I asked General McChrystal on a video teleconference 

what that told him about the enemy and he said it told me that 

they weren’t quite as strong as I thought they were. And I think 

that—so that is significant. 

We still have a long way to go there. We still have some shortages and trainers that I know General Caldwell and General 

McChrystal are working on. And we have to grow the security 

forces as much as we did in Iraq so they can ultimately take over. 

But I think they are going in the right direction. 

ROTATION CYCLE

Mr. MCHUGH. Mr. Chairman, if I may, with respect to the cyclical training, the ARFOR GEN as we call it, and the Chief very, 

very accurately described the advantages of how it generates force 

structure. The other thing does, is that at the same time, a challenge and ultimate benefit, it provides us the opportunity bring all 

the other things that the Army does into that rotation. Right now 

you have troops coming home at various times, they need to go to 

their schooling. They have got joint service requirements that may 

or may not be available. 

We can tune this new enterprise model that the Chief and others 

have been working on so that it too works on that same cyclical 

program so that when folks come back their dwell time is really 

dwell time and they can attend the schools that are necessary for 

them to advance in their career line. 

So we see it as a larger business model. And also as a way to 

make the career in the Army more attractive to soldiers who are 

interested in furthering their education of course, and gaining rank 

and staying in for the long haul. 

Mr. DICKS. Mr. Young. 

AFGHANISTAN—TRANSPORTATION

Mr. YOUNG. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. With the terrain in Afghanistan being really rough, very few roads and highways that we would consider movable and with some of the units 

actually using mules to carry supplies and equipment, et cetera, 

where are we on the issue of ground transportation for our troops? 

MRAPs, Strykers, Humvees? 

Mr. MCHUGH. I will take MRAPs. Obviously the Chief has a 

great vignette. He can tell you about his son, but I will leave that 

to him if he cares to. But this is an incredibly important addition 

to the force structure as you said, Congressman Young, particularly 

in Afghanistan where the training challenges are far different in 

most ways, far more difficult than they were in Iraq. 

MINE RESISTANT AMBUSH PROTECTED—ALL TERRAIN VEHICLE

Right now we have just over 1,500 of the new MRAPs in Afghanistan. We have got about 160 that are on route to Afghanistan. 


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Most of them by ship, about 30 or so are being conveyed by air. 

We have some who have actually arrived at the port of Karachi 

that are be outfitted tested and will be fielded soon. We have approximately another 130 or so that are at the port in Charleston 

ready to be shipped. So we are at about the saturation rate, about 

to the extent as to what they can take into theater, what they can 

set up and deploy reasonably. 

But this is going to be key both to—in terms of carrying the fight 

to the Taliban and to the anti-Afghan forces. But also as you noted, 

it does provide us an opportunity for greater options on ground 

transportation which in a country of very few roads has been an 

enormous problem. Both logistically and also in terms of IEDs and 

predictability on ground routes. 

MRAPs 

Mr. YOUNG. Let me follow up on the MRAP issue. Are all of the 

MRAPs in country now, are they all the same model or are we into 

some of the smaller MRAPs that we developed later? 

Mr. MCHUGH. We have several variants, but all M–ATVs that 

are coming off the line are going to Afghanistan for the moment. 

But it is absolutely true. And not all the requirements are the 

same. A lot of missions and some don’t require the flexibility, don’t 

require the all terrain capabilities of the M–ATV. So I think that 

mix will continue for a while, but clearly the M–ATV is the platform for the moment. 

STRYKER

Mr. YOUNG. What about Stryker? How important is Stryker in 

the overall ground transportation area? 

General CASEY. It is important for us as an Army to have a 

versatile mix of capabilities, transportation capabilities. So it is beyond just Afghanistan. And as we were organizing ourselves, we 

want to have heavy brigades that are ready. So you have tanks and 

Bradleys, light brigades augmented with MRAPs and then Stryker 

brigades so you can mix those forces together to give you what you 

need. 

I think it is probably common knowledge to the Committee here 

that the Strykers that we put into Afghanistan had some challenges. They got put into a tough area and they saw some IEDs 

that had a huge explosive weight and frankly some of those would 

have blown over a tank. And so we have studied that and one of 

the proposals that has come out is a V shaped hull for the 

Strykers. 

And frankly that appears promising. We have lots of testing that 

we need to do on that. But right now the Stryker from a survivability perspective is closer to the Humvee than it is to the MRAP. 

So if this hull kit works out, or this hull works out and it moves 

it closer to the MRAP, that is going to significantly enhance what 

the Stryker can do for us. Folks love the mobility of the Stryker 

and they like the organization of the brigade. So it is an important 

asset to us not just in Afghanistan but Army-wide. 

Mr. YOUNG. General, I have seen that model of that new V 

shaped hull and it does appear that it would be a major improvement as far as the protecting of the vehicle and the personnel inVerDate Mar 15 2010 04:00 Mar 25, 2011 Jkt 065008 PO 00000 Frm 00376 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 E:\HR\OC\A008P2.XXX A008P2

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side. Keep us advised on how you are proceeding with that. One 

more question on ground transportation, on HMMWVs. Does 

HMMWV play as important a role in Afghanistan as it did in Iraq? 

HMMWV

General CASEY. No. And especially as the MRAPs had become 

available. And so up-armored HMMWVs, Strykers, MRAPs and MATVs are probably—that is how the preference would be in a descending order. No, it is not. And I was talking earlier to the chairman. We are working through an overall vehicle strategy. What we 

need in terms of HMMWV, what we need in terms of MRAPs, all 

terrain vehicles, Strykers and trucks frankly. And we have been 

working on that for about 10 months and I expect to see that here 

in the coming months. 

Mr. YOUNG. Aren’t we scheduled to have—go ahead. 

Mr. MCHUGH. I was just going to say, in fact, the Army just did 

a prohibitive review, an assessment of where we were on HMMWV 

acquisition. We had met our requirement. In fact we have exceeded 

it. We just executed termination to that contract, not an immediate 

termination, but a drawn down that will exercise the option of the 

contract. We will procure several thousand more, 2,662, in fact, in 

the coming months and then some other-than-Army sales of about 

8,895. 

And after that, we expect the Humvee to still be a part of our 

vehicle fleet. But it will be much adjusted in its activity based on 

what we have experienced in Afghanistan. 

Mr. YOUNG. Mr. Secretary, I understood that to be the case. But 

I also understand that there are quite a number of foreign sales 

scheduled for the Humvee. But the charts that I have looked at 

seem to show me that the line will shut down, because of the 

Army’s decision, and will be shut down before the construction of 

the new vehicles for foreign sales could be produced. Where do we 

stand there? 

Mr. MCHUGH. The Army has—we have taken an approach to try 

to stretch out the activity on the line as far as practicable. As I 

said, we have not only met our requirement, we have exceeded it. 

We have about 8,000 HMMWVs that are currently on the lot waiting for the Army to accept. We exercise the option, as I mentioned 

earlier, in the existing contract procuring another 2,262. Afterwards as you noted correctly, Mr. Young, we have other-than-Army 

sales, FMS, Marine Corps, other branches of the services that will 

purchase nearly 9,000. Depending on what the production rate is, 

whether it is 50 or 30, wherever they are able to make that out, 

we expect the line can stay open until the end of at least 2013. 

Thereafter, we have a major recap program that we are submitting I hope soon or reprogramming request from the available monies that the current manufacturer, AM General in the State of Indiana, would certainly be welcome to compete in which would keep 

that line running even further. We try to be as sensitive as we can 

to the manufacturing base which we are concerned about, but there 

are only so far we can go and limits we have to respect. 

Mr. YOUNG. I certainly understand that and that was my question for General Casey, was the HMMWV still going to be an imVerDate Mar 15 2010 04:00 Mar 25, 2011 Jkt 065008 PO 00000 Frm 00377 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 E:\HR\OC\A008P2.XXX A008P2

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portant part of our inventory. Okay. Mr. Chairman, thank you very 

much. I appreciate your remarks. 

Mr. DICKS. Mr. Visclosky. 

Mr. VISCLOSKY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Secretary, congratulations. I appreciate the responsibilities you have and wish you 

well. General, thank you very much for being here. If I could follow 

on with Mr. Young’s line of questioning, Congress did provide $1.3 

billion for the HMMWV program for the 2010 budget. Do you or 

could you tell us today what the Army’s obligation plan for those 

funds are? 

Mr. MCHUGH. As I briefly mentioned to Congressman Young, we 

are developing a reprogramming requests for the unexpended monies available in the HMMWV procurement program. That is working its way towards the DOD comptroller, Bob Hale. I don’t want 

to prejudge how he will dispose of that one way or another. But it 

is certainly the Army’s view that we can use those funds particularly in the recap program. But again as I mentioned, Mr. Young, 

is a critical opportunity for AM General, the current manufacturer 

or certain of the depots which I know some members on this subcommittee have some interest to participate in those. So we have 

purposes for the money, much of it, most of it is redirected back 

in a HMMWV recap. 

Mr. VISCLOSKY. Do you have a time frame as to when we will get 

the reprogramming request? 

Mr. MCHUGH. I don’t, Congressman. As I said, it is really predicated upon Mr. Hale’s shop processing. 

Mr. VISCLOSKY. And when you talk about the recapitalization 

program, what do you mean specifically? What am I looking at program-wise? 

Mr. MCHUGH. You have HMMWV sets come back from theater, 

HMMWV sets that are being utilized in CONUS that reach their 

operational life. And it costs about $184,000 to purchase a new 

HMMWV. In recap, it essentially creates a new vehicle by taking 

the old platform in most cases, stripping it right down to the frame 

and rebuilding. And that costs between 90 and $100,000. So it is 

a cost saving measure, but it also maintains the operational fleet 

at the requirement numbers so we are not buying platforms that, 

as I said, under current requirements we don’t need. 

Mr. VISCLOSKY. General, it is my understanding the Army, and 

I think you had alluded to it, is looking to a mix of light tactical 

vehicles. And you had mentioned that—I think said 10 months the 

Army had been working on that and you are some months away. 

Would that include HUMMWVs, armored HUMMWVs, joint light 

tactical vehicles, MRAPs? Is that—you are looking at the whole 

universe? 

General CASEY. I am sure you are asking yourselves the same 

thing I asked myself 10 months ago, what are we doing with all 

these vehicles. And as I think about it, the HUMMWV is basically 

a utility vehicle that can do a range of different things. So that is 

kind of the first tier of systems. And the basic HUMMWVs can be 

used for training at home. And they can be used for a range of missions outside of Iraq and Afghanistan. Up-armored HUMMWVs is 

the next tier. They can be used in an IED environment. And then 


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beyond that, you have the MRAPs. And I mentioned that we have 

worked to incorporate the MRAPs into our organizations. 

This is something we didn’t have before. But the MRAP wouldn’t 

be a replacement for the HMMWV. It just wouldn’t. It is a specialty type of vehicle for a special environment. So we have got to 

figure that out. The next year beyond that is a Stryker. That serves 

a slightly different function than the MRAP. 

So we are working our way through how we are going to use, 

frankly, the investment we have made in the MRAPs and how that 

is going to fit in with the other vehicles we already have. 

Mr. VISCLOSKY. When do you think a final decision will be made? 

General CASEY. I have been quite impatient about this myself 

and I do expect to see it in the next couple of months. 

GUARD AND RESERVE

Mr. VISCLOSKY. If I could, one more question, Mr. Chairman. You 

had mentioned before as far as the operation tempo kind of 2 to 

1 for active, 4 to 1 for Reserve and Guard. A more philosophical 

question, my sense with the guard 20 years ago is if I signed up 

for a guard unit, I was in a reserve, I would not anticipate barring 

any emergency, that I would, if you would, go active. 20 years 

later, my sense in some of the people I have talked to in the Guard 

or Reserve is they know, if you would, what they are signing up 

for now and feel as though they are part of the regular or uniform 

services. Is that a distinction that is closing that gap or is it still 

recognized with the 1 to 4 and the 1 to 2? 

General CASEY. The Guardsmen and Reservists I talk to and the 

leadership of the Guard and Reserve would take the latter position, 

that they know what they are signing up for. I mean, half of the 

Guard and Reserve are combat veterans today. That is fundamentally different than it was when I came in the Army. And what I 

hear from them is give us some predictability, get us to 1 to 4 or 

1 to 5 even. And we can sustain this. Now, I think it is a conversation that we all need to have as we go down the road and as demands come down in Iraq. Because we have 70 to 80,000 Guardsmen and Reservists mobilized on a given day and have had for 

sometime. And I am not sure how long folks are willing to—can accept that. But that is a few years from now, but I think it is a conversation that we probably need to have. 

Mr. VISCLOSKY. General, thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

FUTURE COMBAT SYSTEMS

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Secretary, 

congratulations. A great choice. General Casey, over the years, 

whenever I saw—your subordinates saw me, they were always 

pushing for the Future Combat Systems and you have done such 

a good job, I really can’t get it out of my mind. I know it has been 

cancelled and now, it is morphed into—and I want you to talk a 

little bit more about what it is morphing into here. We did spend 

billions of dollars, and I think those dollars were well spent. I 

would like to know from you what we are retrieving from what we 

have already invested. And I am sure you can do that and then 

when you talk about the versatile mix that is on the battlefield 

today, of course most of that is legacy. I am concerned about the 


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future. One of the things that you drilled into me was that what 

we have now in some ways is 30 or 40 years old and we need to 

prepare for the future. Now, I understand we are spending $2.6 billion on a ground combat vehicle. We are slated to spend in this 

budget $3.2 billion on brigade combat team modernization program. What are we going to get with that money? And are we 

going to run into some of the same problems on the Future Combat 

Systems even with this new focus here? I am all for you. I was the 

last guy as far as I am concerned, the last guy standing that would 

have gone from the Future Combat Systems. 

General CASEY. I appreciated the company. Thank you. 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. It worries me sick here what has happened 

here. 

NETWORK

General CASEY. Thank you very much. And that is a great question. And I probably wasn’t clear enough in my opening statement. 

If you think about what we are doing with the Future Combat Systems, the major components were the network, the vehicles, because it was a family of vehicles that we are building, and the spinouts, the intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance systems that 

were linked by the network. What has gone forward is everything 

but the family of vehicles. The network, which to me is the most 

important element because as we look to try to build—— 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. This is a connectivity of all of these elements. 

General CASEY. Absolutely. As I was going to say, as—the network is what gives us the ability to operate in any environment. 

And not to be overly simplistic, in any environment a soldier goes 

into, they need to know where they are, they need to know where 

their buddies are, they need to know where the enemy is and when 

they shoot at them they need to hit them. That is what the network enables. So that survived. And it frankly has pulled the rest 

of the Army network operations forward. 

SPINOUTS

So we are in a much better position from a network perspective 

because of the Future Combat Systems. The second thing that is 

out there are the spinout, those intelligence surveillance, reconnaissance systems that are there. And we are getting them to a position to take them forward. Now, we just did a limited user test 

and found some warts on them and we are working to fix those 

warts. And I can tell the Committee we won’t take anything forward that isn’t ready. But those also survived. The vehicles, family 

of vehicles did not and the Secretary of Defense, as you will recall, 

told us to go back to the drawing board, take a blank sheet of 

paper and start over. So we did. And we have better incorporated 

the lessons of the current fight in that. 

GROUND COMBAT VEHICLES

But we also are aware that the state of the art is on vehicle technology because we pushed it there with the future combat systems. 

So the $15 billion is so that we invested in that program over time 


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was basically a great test bid to give us the insights that we need 

to move this program forward and to give us a modernization capability for the Army we need for the second decade and the 21st century. 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. So what we are doing on the new generation of ground combat vehicles is being accelerated here? How is 

that moving along? 

General CASEY. I wouldn’t say accelerated. 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. I know the answer. And that is why I—this 

struggle here, it is unbelievable here. 

General CASEY. I tell you, both the Secretary of Defense and I 

pushed very hard to get this vehicle done in 5 years. 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. All I can hear is the voice of the late chairman saying by the time we lower our troop strength in Iraq, which 

we are doing, and let us say the public will somewhat is not as 

strong as it used to be, we are going to find our Army underfunded 

because we are going to come up with our other national priorities 

and it worries me that what we are morphing into here is absolutely essential for the future safety of our soldiers and their ability 

to be effective on the battlefield. 

General CASEY. I couldn’t agree more with you, Congressman. 

Mr. DICKS. Would you yield? 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Yes, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. DICKS. Tell me what this new ground combat vehicle is going 

to—the Army’s record in procurement isn’t exactly stellar, General. 

General CASEY. It is not. 

Mr. DICKS. And if I were you, why wouldn’t you just go out and 

tell industry you have got 6 months, like you did with the MRAP 

and the M-ATV and come back and give us something? Why not 

do it that way or take these existing programs that we already 

have and use them? What are you going to get in going through 

a big development program for a new ground combat vehicle? 

General CASEY. Chairman, we ask ourselves the same question. 

That was the first place we looked. And we said is there something 

out there that we could take and would meet our needs. And the 

answer was no. We are talking about an infantry fighting vehicle 

to replace the Bradley fighting vehicle, a vehicle that was designed 

in the early 1970s. 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. If I can reclaim my time, inherent in the 

vehicle is the design that we have been using on MRAP. Is that 

one of the reasons that this thing is progressing like a snail? 

General CASEY. No. The reason the thing is progressing like a 

snail is the acquisition process. And that is something, the weapons 

system acquisition reform act is out there. We are trying to do 

this—we are very conscience of our track record here, chairman. 

And we are trying to make this a model of development. But the 

process is slow. As I started to say, the SECDEF and I—— 

Mr. DICKS. It wasn’t when we did the MRAP and the M–ATV. 

General CASEY. It was an off-the-shelf vehicle. An MRAP is not 

an infantry fighting vehicle. It is a troop carrier. You wouldn’t go 

into battle against tanks and infantry fighting vehicles in an 

MRAP. You would lose your rear end. 

Mr. MCHUGH. If I could just add, we are trying to take lessons 

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opment of the next generation troop vehicle, as the General said. 

What we are ideally striving for is something that gives you the 

survivability of the MRAP, gives you the lethality and the fighting 

power of the Bradley and gives you the maneuverability that we 

all enjoy in the Stryker. 

That sounds easy to say. But you also integrate the new network 

capabilities that the Chief has been talking about. And a 5-year 

program is a reasonable one, but I think we are all very mindful. 

I got the call from then-Secretary—he still is—Secretary of Defense 

with respect to the termination of FCS when I was still on the 

Armed Services Committee and it was not the happiest phone call 

I ever had. 

So there is history there. But I think in support of the Weapons 

System Reform Act and with the backing of the full power and research capabilities of OSD that we have a reasonable way forward. 

But there is risk. And we are mindful of that and we are trying 

to go forward this a deliberative way that produces a good product 

but understand as well we don’t want to continue to develop until 

we outpace ourselves and requirements are no longer relevant to 

the fight of the moment. 

General CASEY. The last thing is the vehicles designed to replace 

the Bradley, it has limits on size, weight and power. Just won’t 

carry more. Can’t carry the network. That is kind of where we are. 

So we need to take it to the next level. 

Mr. DICKS. I was on the Committee when we did the M–1, the 

Bradley and the Apache. General ‘‘Shy’’ Myers was sitting in your 

place. That was the historic moment for the Army acquisition. Everything has been downhill since. Mr. Moran. 

Mr. MORAN. Well, we are certainly on pace to be able to win the 

last war, that being Iraq and Afghanistan. First let me preface by 

saying I am glad that you are both in the positions that you are 

in and we have great confidence in you. But even the Stryker double V-hulled vehicles that Mr. Young was talking about, I mean, we 

are going to be out of that—at least we are going to start the withdrawal from Afghanistan next year. We have already started a substantial withdrawal from Iraq. 

HELICOPTER LOSSES

And so maybe they will be on line by the time the war is over. 

And that is the frustration—I am sure you share it. But there are 

a number of questions I wanted to ask. But I was struck by one 

particular question. Actually, I am continually struck by the excellence of the staff. I have got to tell you that. But one question. 

They asked about—in the last—in a 7-year period, 327 helicopters 

were lost, 469 fatalities, but only 20 percent of them were attributable to hostile action. Have we addressed that? I mean, that is 

pretty stunning. But we are now getting reports from Iraq and Afghanistan. We have, I won’t go over the numbers, but they add up 

to—go ahead. I don’t want to interrupt you because there are other 

questions I want to ask. 

General CASEY. If I could, back to your first comment about winning the last war. The vehicle we are designing is designed for the 

next war, not for this war. It has to be able to operate in all environments and that is the versatility. So it is not—— 


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Mr. MORAN. The problem is we don’t know where that next war 

is going to be. 

General CASEY. Pardon me? 

Mr. MORAN. The problem is we don’t know where it is going to 

be or what shape it is going to take. So invariably, we prepare ourselves to win the last war because that is the best criteria that we 

have to go on. But I don’t want to get into an argumentive situation. 

General CASEY. I would never argue with you, Congressman. 

Back to the—we have had a concerted effort on aviation safety over 

the last decade and since really 2000, the trends have been in a 

positive direction, but we have been at war. And in the last year, 

we have had 26 class A accidents, which are major accidents. The 

vast majority of those, better than 70 percent are human error. The 

other normal causes of failure are materiel failure and environmental failure and then those are 10 to 15 percent each. 

Mr. MORAN. It is troubling. 80 percent are nonhostile action. In 

the first Iraq war, a majority of American soldiers’ deaths were by 

friendly fire, which I was surprised at. In Iraq, I am told that it 

is now in the high 30. So it has gotten better. In Afghanistan it 

is much less. But has a study been done? Are we dealing with that? 

Because I really was struck by the numbers in the first Iraq war. 

I guess it is understandable that the Iraqi troops were retreating. 

So we killed an awful lot of our own people. It still seems to be a 

problem, is it not? 

FRIENDLY FIRE

General CASEY. You are talking about friendly fire. 

Mr. MORAN. Friendly fire, yes. 

General CASEY. Friendly fire deaths in Iraq and Afghanistan 

have been relatively infrequent. Most of them have come from indirect fire, from helicopters or close air support, but relatively infrequent. 

The ground indirect fire that we saw in Desert Storm, we don’t 

see too many of those incidents. I mean, I can’t give you the exact 

numbers, but I can tell you, looking at this now, from 2004 when 

I was in Iraq to today, given the scope of the operations going on, 

relatively few, I would say. 

Mr. MORAN. I just finished reading this book called Where Men 

Win Glory, and it was disturbing, and that is one of the reasons 

why it was so disturbing, but it was well written. 

IMPROVISED EXPLOSIVE DEVICES (IEDs)

Let me ask a little bit about the IEDs and the evolution of IEDs. 

I understand that, increasingly, they are carried by humans, even 

women, suicide bombers. There is a product that was developed 

called the CounterBomber, and I am told the Marine Corps and the 

Air Force use it effectively. It identifies suicide bombers from a 

standoff distance with low-power radar and video. But the Army 

apparently bought 12 systems this year, and 11 of them are still 

in the warehouse. Is there any reason for that case? Only one has 

been deployed, whereas the Marine Corps and the Air Force are 

using them extensively. 


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General CASEY. I don’t know that that is correct. I know JIEDDO 

purchased 12 for us. The last time I looked at this, we were in the 

process of figuring out the fielding plan for the theater. So I know 

we will get them into the fight as quickly as we can. 

We have had systems to screen people since I was in Iraq. This 

is a new version of a system that we have had for a while. 

Mr. MORAN. Well, okay. We might check up on that. It is curious 

that only one has been deployed—— 

Mr. MCHUGH. I do know we had discussed that before, and you 

correctly cite the utilization in our two sister services. We have not 

field tested those. The 12 sets that you speak about is intended to 

allow us to field test with—assuming it goes well—with more acquisitions in the future. I was not aware only there were 11 in the 

warehouse. We will certainly check on that and try to get a status 

report on that for you. 

UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES

Mr. MORAN. I will yield back my time after I asked this, but we 

are using UAVs, of course, more and more frequently, but the Air 

Force has chosen to use different personnel than the Army. The Air 

Force, for example, uses rated officer aviators. The Army trains enlisted personnel to find UAVs. Have you found any difference in 

their performance, the effectiveness of the UAVs? 

General CASEY. No. We are, frankly, satisfied with our enlisted 

soldiers in the way that they manipulate and fly the UAVs. One 

of the benefits they have is that is what they do. They stay in that 

career field their whole career. They don’t come in and out of the 

flight jobs like what happens with the Air Force. So we have been 

very satisfied with that. And they are FAA certified, so we are very 

pleased with it. 

LIMITED USER TESTS (LUTs) 

Mr. MORAN. Well, in that area the Army intends to use these 

Class I UAVs, which I am sure you are familiar with, John, but 

the Committee is aware that in the user test last fall of the Class 

I UAV, it was rated as not reliable with the mean time between 

systems aborts at 11⁄2 hours, when they were hoping for 23 hours. 

That is quite a disparity. And they can be seen and heard from 

about 2 kilometers. The data links are not secure. 

So it really raises the question how much procurement funding 

is in the budget for those if they have failed tests so badly. I mean, 

should we go back to the drawing board on those? 

Mr. MCHUGH. If I could start, Congressman, and then I will turn 

it over to the Chief. Those were limited user tests, as you said; and 

the objective of those tests are to determine exactly what your comments focused upon, that is, the shortcomings and the need where 

we have to go further into research and development to outfit it to 

the stated requirements. After those tests, the Army got together 

with Dr. Ash Carter, who is the acquisition executive for OSD, and 

determined a reasonable way forward to continue testing. 

The Chief mentioned—I believe it was in his opening statement—we understand the challenges in these LUTs, these limited 

user tests, and we intend to use those findings to take us into the 

next step. But if that fails to come along, then we will not field any 


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of the systems. But it is really the way in which you work on a program, develop it, and hopefully successfully field, but we, as the 

test results showed, have a ways to go. 

Mr. MORAN. Thank you Secretary, General. Thank you. 

Mr. DICKS. Mr. Kingston. 

Mr. KINGSTON. Thank you Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Secretary and General Casey, I reiterate what Mr. Moran 

said and some of the other members of the Committee. We are glad 

that both of you are in your positions, and we are very proud of 

the great jobs you are doing. 

FORT STEWART

Mr. Secretary, as you know, I have to be a broken record with 

you a little bit on behalf of Mr. Barrow and Mr. Isakson and Mr. 

Chambliss in terms of Fort Stewart. One of the things that this 

Committee actually did last year was require the Secretary of Defense to come up with a report about what to do to mitigate the 

impact of the combat brigades not coming to Fort Stewart, and I 

was wondering who in the Army is handling your section of that 

report and when it might be ready. That is question one. 

And then the other question, in the ongoing discussion you and 

I have been having, is the BCTs in Europe, bringing them home, 

when is that going to happen? Would that be cost-efficient to do 

that, and what is going on there? 

Mr. MCHUGH. Well, I would not say you are a broken record. I 

would say you are appropriately consistent and insistent in the interest of your constituents and that great base. So no apologies are 

necessary. 

Starting at the end of your questions first, as you and I have 

talked as well, we had expected the rebasing decision to be made, 

but through the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) there was a 

decision to supplant that, to replace it with—waiting until the completion of the European strategic study that is going on and also 

our own analysis. We would expect both of those looks to be completed sometime in the summer, and we are still programmed, subject to whatever the findings of those studies are, to bring those 

two BCTs home, but we will certainly know the way forward by the 

end of the summer of the fall program. 

The other question with respect to the DOD study, I can’t tell 

you when we expect that. I can tell you the Army staffed that at 

the levels you might assume both from the personnel side as well 

as the community assistance side. But because of the nature of the 

request, it really is an OSD and a DOD challenge and they are 

staffing that in the main. 

Mr. DICKS. Can you yield to me for a second? 

Mr. KINGSTON. Yes. 

Mr. DICKS. I saw the local people—I don’t know if it was on 60 

Minutes or what it was on—but it sounded as if the Army went 

down there and said, we really need you people to lean forward, to 

get out there and do things and build houses and do stuff. And 

then this happens, and a lot of these people are going to be completely ruined financially because of this. They took the Army at 

their word. 


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This is very unusual. I have been around here a long time. I 

don’t remember the Army going out there and asking people to do 

things like this before, but I will tell you it made an impression on 

me that this wasn’t fair. 

Mr. KINGSTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and—— 

Mr. DICKS. I will give you a chance. I am sorry, Mr. Secretary. 

Mr. MCHUGH. Well, I am not going to sit here and disagree, Mr. 

Chairman. And the Army did do that when I represented Fort 

Drum—— 

Mr. DICKS. Who was the General that went down there and told 

these people—— 

Mr. MCHUGH. I am sorry. I don’t know. But it is not really a 

matter of one individual—— 

Mr. MORAN. General Casey. 

Mr. KINGSTON. It was General Cody. 

Mr. MCHUGH. It is really not a matter of one individual. It is a 

matter of reality versus need, and that, for example—and Congressman Kingston and I and Senators Chambliss and Isakson 

have talked about this—when Fort Drum, in Watertown, New 

York, where I had honor of representing, was scheduled to receive 

troops, the Army did the same thing, came forward and—— 

Mr. DICKS. General Cucolo. That is who we think it is. 

Mr. MCHUGH. Tony Cucolo. He is in Iraq fighting for his country, 

God love him. 

But, again, it is not a matter of a single person. You have troops 

coming, and there are certain infrastructure needs. 

The challenge, as you noted and as Congressman Kingston 

knows so well, when a decision comes from another source not to 

do those troop movements, you have a lot of people who are placed 

in jeopardy. I had a chance to meet with many of those community 

leaders through a meeting that Congressman Kingston and Senators Isakson and Chambliss set up, and I understand their jeopardy. 

I can’t make a promise as to what we will do, because there are 

too many things in flux, but I can promise you I am fully cognizant 

of the challenges there. The Office of Economic Adjustment has put 

about $40 million into the community, but, as I know Congressman 

Kingston will be quick to note correctly as well, that supports only 

the public side of the equation. A lot of private investors came forward for housing and such, and we are mindful of that, and certainly every decision we make with respect to future basing we will 

keep that in mind. 

Mr. KINGSTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for your personal attention on that. 

The first announcement was December 19, 2007, by General 

Cody and then General Cucolo and Colonel Book. 

And, of course, all of us in elected office reflect on what the 

BRAC committee has said, but just to show you in 2008, when real 

estate was dead flat all around the world and including in Georgia, 

this one city issued 634 building permits for new houses in anticipation of the troops. So it has been very tough. And the Secretary 

has been very sympathetic and very open, and we really appreciate 

it. And I just want to urge you, as these troops might be coming 


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back from Europe or wherever new missions are, and so let me 

thank you for that. 

POPPY CROP—AFGHANISTAN

Mr. KINGSTON. And, General Casey, I wanted to ask you a question. 

When we were in Afghanistan, it was a very productive trip. We 

were very impressed with what General McChrystal and Caldwell 

and Minister Atmar and all these folks are doing. But the one gap 

in the shape, clear, hold, build, and transfer is poppies. There did 

not seem to be a really good answer about what to do with the 

poppy crop. If you destroy it, you lose the goodwill of the people. 

If you buy them out, you are going to have the problem next year. 

And I am bothered that after 8 years we still don’t know what to 

do with the poppies. 

General CASEY. If I could just say one word on the Generals, I 

mean, the names General Cody and General Cucolo have been 

kicked around here, but we had every intention of putting in those 

brigades in there. So no one should leave here thinking that those 

guys were down there doing something untoward. 

Mr. KINGSTON. Yes, sir. I am glad you brought that up. These 

guys have been absolutely great with the community, and they 

were reflecting—they were only giving a message from BRAC. 

General CASEY. Thank you for that. 

Anyway, poppies, I agree. It is a huge policy issue. It is something that has been wrestled with at the highest levels of this government and NATO governments for a while. The chairman and I 

were talking about this before the session. 

I personally believe the drug issue is something that has to be 

addressed; and I use an example of visiting Colombia in 2008, talking to my counterpart. He took me out to where the FARC used 

to control, and he said it wasn’t until we decided to eliminate the 

drug problem that we ultimately became successful. And I said, oh, 

is that because of the money that it puts into the insurgency and 

the terrorists? And he said, part of it, but it is the corrupting influence that it has on the whole society. And then that is what we 

ultimately are going to have to get after. 

Mr. KINGSTON. But there is no three-point plan at this point, 

from what I am gathering. 

General CASEY. I don’t know what the specifics of the plan is. 

COUNTERBOMBERS

Mr. KINGSTON. I know I am way over time, but I wanted to, before Mr. Moran leaves, mention on those CounterBombers that you 

have a program that is the entry control point in a box, and those 

are not included in that yet. So if it is a good device, it seems like 

it would be consistent to have those in there. And I just wanted 

to mention that while Mr. Moran was here. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. DICKS. Ms. Kaptur. 

DEFENSE CONTRACTORS

Ms. KAPTUR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 


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Secretary McHugh, welcome, and General Casey, thank you so 

much for your service to our country and all those under your command. 

In your testimony, General Casey, you state that the campaigns 

in Iraq and Afghanistan continue to create demands that have our 

Army operating beyond sustainable capacity. I am wondering, I ask 

myself the question many times, how these conflicts are different 

than those we faced in the past; and the number of contractors in 

theater both in Iraq and Afghanistan simply astound me. Do you 

have the ability, as the Army General, to provide me with a roadmap of how we can insource many of the services now being provided by contractors and how much it would save us in terms of 

dollars and better support to our troops in theater? 

General CASEY. Probably not holistically. I can look at it from an 

Army perspective. 

But if you think about how we got here and you go back to the 

mid ’90s when we were talking about reducing the size of the Army 

from 780,000 down to 480,000 and at that time the decision was 

made to rely on contractors for what was perceived to be shortterm deployments, I don’t think anybody involved ever thought 

that we would be doing this for 81⁄2 years. And so there is a force 

structure dimension to this and especially for the contractors in 

theater. As you know, there are over 200,000 contractors right now 

in Iraq and Afghanistan. 

Ms. KAPTUR. It is unbelievable. 

And, of course, some of those who support that type of effort say, 

well, it is a jobs program for the people over there, so they support 

us. It is a way of building support. Well, I don’t know. That is certainly unusual in American history, the way I look at it; and I am 

very interested in, you know, putting those dollars to use for our 

own soldiers. 

It is very hard. The chairman has done a great job of trying to 

help us negotiate through this slush, but you try to get information 

and figure out what is going on. Maybe if there is a way you could 

give us a sense of the broad architecture of that and what aspects 

might be able to be insourced back into the Army and then look 

at certain categories and tell us how much more it is costing us to 

do this than if the Army did it. So you wouldn’t have to do it all, 

but you could hone in on some certain areas where we could begin 

to bring it back under the umbrella of the U.S. Army. 

I have to tell you I am very concerned, based on some things we 

have learned from other witnesses, about the integrity and security 

of our own military because of background checks on some of these 

individuals being hired by the very unusual form of warfare in 

which we are involved and some of the great damage that has been 

exacted toward our troops and other U.S. Personnel in theater. So 

I am very concerned about this contractor issue and how we can 

insource. Any enlightenment you could provide us would be greatly 

appreciated. 

General CASEY. When you say ‘‘insource’’, Congresswoman, do 

you mean how we could have the military take over these tasks? 

Ms. KAPTUR. Yes. And the amount of money—— 

Mr. DICKS. I think she also means it could be some civilians as 

well, civilian employees of the Department of Defense. 


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General CASEY. And I think you know that some of that is going 

on back here. 

Ms. KAPTUR. Yes. 

Mr. DICKS. Will the gentlewoman yield for a second? 

Ms. KAPTUR. I would be happy to yield. 

Mr. DICKS. We tried early on and even when Mr. Murtha was the 

chairman—we had a hard time initially in Iraq about getting information. Almost every witness would come in here and say we just 

don’t know. So it looked like it was a cover-up, that they didn’t 

want us to know. 

Now, I am not saying—and then that has changed because now 

we get a quarterly report that lays out the number of contractors 

and what is happening. So we have a better understanding how 

many of them are host nation, how many are other foreigners but 

not host nation, and how many of them are U.S. citizens. So we 

have a better picture. 

But I think what we all would like—at least I would like to know 

is just a little bit more of a description of why—and I understand 

going from 780,000 to 450,000; and, as I remember, that was done 

in the late ’80s, early ’90s. I think Colin Powell, Chairman of the 

Joint Chiefs, and Dick Cheney, Secretary of Defense, were the ones 

that recommended this build-down; and it was pretty much agreed 

to in Congress. After the end of the Cold War, we thought we 

would go to a smaller level. 

But I guess what I would like to hear you talk about a little bit 

is why did we decide to use contractors rather than government 

workers, et cetera? Why did we pick contractors to do this? 

Maybe it is because they could do the things that you needed to 

have done. I think food places and the tents and everything and 

the equipment early on in Desert Storm—actually, at the start of 

the Iraq War, both of them, you had a lot of contractors. But can 

you give us a little better feeling about why contractors? 

Mr. MCHUGH. I think the Chief has said the overall imperative 

was end strength. And I was one of those who wasn’t particularly 

happy with the end strength draw-down, but that is water under 

the bridge. 

What the Army had was the decision, do you send Army personnel into the war or do you send them into the kitchen, into the 

mess hall? There are a lot of what I think most people would agree 

are less than warfighter-level activities, from laundry services to 

food services, et cetera, that contractors could well provide. 

I don’t want to suggest for a moment that there isn’t reform 

needed. As the Chief said, we have currently in Iraq right now 

some 205,000 contractors of all stripes. 

Ms. KAPTUR. Iraq or Afghanistan, Mr. Secretary? 

Mr. MCHUGH. Iraq. 

Ms. KAPTUR. We still have over 200,000 in Iraq? 

General CASEY. Iraq and Afghanistan. 

Mr. DICKS. I think it is both, isn’t it? 

Mr. MCHUGH. I don’t think so. 

I am now corrected and told it is 205 in both. But in Iraq we are 

coming down about 5 percent a month, but that has to be flexible 

because of the uncertainty surrounding the election. 


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So I do think there are things we can do; and, as the Chief mentioned, we are in fact here in the States acting pretty aggressively 

to reduce our reliance on contractors to insource core activities. 

Just this past year, we have insourced about 900 core activities. 

We think that saved the Army about $41 million, and by the end 

of 2015 we have an objective of insourcing over 3,000 new positions. 

But your main concern is in the theaters of war; and, as I said, 

the overriding imperative was then and I would suggest respectfully remains now that of end strength and how many troops we 

have available to do the warfighting versus other activities. 

Ms. KAPTUR. Well, I just think, General Casey, if you could provide us with any insights on that; and I am particularly interested 

on costs, if you pick out different functions, if you look across at 

who those contractors are and how much they are being paid. 

I had an experience when the chairman took us over into—we 

were flying over into Iraq, and we had a young fellow who was flying us over there, and he happened to be from Ohio. I said, how 

are you doing? 

And he said, I will be real happy when I don’t have to haul those 

fat old guys back there in and out of theater. And he said, do you 

know how much they are being paid versus how much we are being 

paid? 

I said, that is a very important comment to me, sir. 

You know, it is down into the ranks. So I am interested in what 

we are paying people and the impact that that has across Army. 

So, anyway, point made; and we will ask some additional questions for the record. 

IRAN-NUCLEAR THREAT

I wanted to ask you, General, in your career as a military man— 

you may not be able to answer this question for me—but when you 

think about the Middle East and Iran and containing the nuclear 

threat of Iran, what kinds of perspectives instruct your thinking as 

to how that quest of trying to contain her is different than what 

we faced with the Soviet Union when we and NATO for years 

worked together to contain any kind of nuclear adventurism on the 

part of the Soviets? Have you given any thought to that? 

General CASEY. Not necessarily to Iran and the Soviets, but as 

I look at Iran, I look at the world’s largest state sponsor of terror, 

and the thought of them having a nuclear weapon makes me very 

uncomfortable. But this, as you all know, is a huge policy issue 

that the administration is wrestling with very hard. 

Ms. KAPTUR. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. DICKS. Thank you for that answer. 

Mr. Rogers. 

PAIN PILL ABUSE

Mr. ROGERS. Thank you Mr. Chairman. 

Welcome to both of you. Mr. Secretary, we are especially proud 

of you. Local boy makes good. And, General, it is always good to 

see you and your staff. 

Last week, USA Today ran an article entitled Abuse of Pain Pills 

by Troops Concerns Pentagon. And it went on to say that you are 


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trying to curb the volume of narcotics given to troops as the number of prescriptions for painkillers and instances of drug abuse continue to soar. The Pentagon data indicates that military doctors 

wrote almost 3.8 million prescriptions for pain relief for service 

members last year, which is four times the amount in 2001. The 

Pentagon survey in the last year, in ’08, showed that one in four 

soldiers admitted abusing prescribed drugs, mostly pain relievers, 

in the 12 months prior to the survey; 15 percent had abused drugs 

in the 30 days before the survey. 

I bring this up because my district has had a similar problem 

with prescription pain abuse. The State of Kentucky led the way 

and formed a prescription drug monitoring agency that pharmacists and doctors and hospitals feed information into that one 

computer so that other doctors can check to see if there has been 

a double filling of that prescription somewhere. 

One, tell us about the problem as you see it, if there is a problem. And, two, what do you think we do about it? And, three, would 

there be a way for the Army to establish a prescription drug monitoring program so that you could track spikes in abuse of drugs by 

an individual or by a group? 

Mr. MCHUGH. It is a problem, and I think the article pretty fairly describes the challenges that the Army faces. But at least on the 

first level it really is not much different than what you can find 

in many instances in the civilian community, that is, a particular 

patient going to multiple doctors receiving multiple prescriptions, 

sometimes deliberately, other times because the tracking models 

are not there and they just find themselves over time taking five 

or six different pills, many of which are directed toward pain, and 

all of a sudden you have an abuser and then an addict. 

The Army has tried to do a better job, and we are really facing 

two particular sets of challenges. First is in theater, where, on the 

one hand, that forum shopping for a physician, if you will, is a little bit less likely to occur, given the concentration of troops and the 

medical professionals that are available. But, on the other hand, 

obviously, the tracking systems are not as reliable as they are here 

in CONUS. 

The major concern we have focused upon is within the Warrior 

Transition Units. That is, as you know, Mr. Rogers, where the most 

profoundly wounded arrive and where the need for pain management is most keenly felt; and we have established a program 

whereby all prescriptions within the WTUs go to a single point 

source so that we have that opportunity to make sure that multiple 

prescriptions designed to do the same thing are not finding themselves into a particular patient. 

I am not prepared to say it is up and working 100 percent, but 

I think we definitely are in the right direction. And, of course, we 

need to couple that with behavioral health and with our substance 

abuse programs to make follow-up care and assistance available 

when those cases do arise beyond our control. 

I mentioned in the budget we have funds to increase those folks 

out under the substance abuse program to make sure we are taking care of those who have found themselves in trouble but doing 

a better job of keeping them from getting in trouble in the first 

place. 


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Mr. ROGERS. That article said Assistant Army Secretary Thomas 

Lamont said a multi-service task force is examining how the Army 

gives pain relief pills to its soldiers. Eventually, it will outline how 

to limit prescription medication use and ensure that Army hospitals all use the same procedure for dispensing medicine. 

He said, and I quote, ‘‘We found every Army medical center was 

dealing with pain in altogether different ways, all individual, but 

not an Army-wide program at all. There was no consistency.’’ 

Is that a valid observation? 

Mr. MCHUGH. I would never disagree with the Army’s Assistant 

Secretary for M&RA. Tom Lamont is a very capable guy. So just 

intuitively I would say yes, but based on knowledge, yes. 

General CASEY. I believe that is the finding of the Pain Management Task Force that the Surgeon General set up last year. It has 

been going on about 10 months, and we are about to get a report. 

But I am sure that is exactly the kind of thing that the Pain Management Task Force found. 

Mr. ROGERS. Well, it is a sad subject to bring up, but I think it 

is important that we talk about it. 

General CASEY. I think you are exactly right, and it is part of the 

cumulative effects of 81⁄2 years of war. It is not a pretty thing, but 

it is something we just have to get on the table and deal with. 

Mr. ROGERS. I was going to ask you that. Is this a product of the 

lack of dwell time and the long service that military—— 

General CASEY. We have had over 25,000 wounded just in the 

Army, and those wounds require some pain medication so that the 

soldiers can deal with them and then surgeries. You talk to some 

of these soldiers, they have had two and three surgeries to fix their 

wounds, and there are pain pills. So that is part of it. 

Mr. ROGERS. I mean, has the 8 years of continuous service 

brought pressure on members of the military to the point that they 

are seeking some relief through prescription drug abuse? 

General CASEY. I think that all our indications are that the request for treatment for drug and alcohol abuse are going up. So the 

short answer is yes. 

Mr. MCHUGH. We have a substance abuse problem. That is why 

we have such a robust program that we are attempting to grow to 

put those treatment specialists out, the closest possible locations to 

the troops. Because pain management and mismanagement is a 

huge component of this. 

But, Mr. Rogers, I think you are absolutely correct. We have to 

assume that substance abuse by multiple causes but certainly the 

pressures of rapid and frequent deployments has to be amongst 

them. 

Mr. ROGERS. Well, you are not exempt from the general population. The general population has the same problem, and you are 

reflecting everyone else, I guess. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. DICKS. Thank you. 

Mr. Hinchey. 

ENERGY SECURITY

Mr. HINCHEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 


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Secretary McHugh, thank you; and, General Casey, thank you 

very much. It is great to see the things you have written and the 

statements you have made and the questions that you have answered. 

I just want wanted to ask an opening question about energy, because in the context of your statement you make some significant—— 

Mr. DICKS. Will the gentleman pull your mike just a little closer? 

Mr. HINCHEY [continuing]. Significant statements about the energy situation. You say that energy security is a key component of 

Army installations, weapons systems, and operations. The Army 

has developed a comprehensive energy security strategy. 

Can you tell us more about that? What is being done? How much 

money are you seeking to budget in the upcoming fiscal year to 

meet the goals? What additional funds have been allocated for by 

the Army for the installations to meet energy savings and energy 

security requirements? And, also, the work that has been done at 

headquarters with the creation of a Senior Energy Executive and 

Senior Energy Council and who the Army has designated at the installation level to have overall responsibility for the energy and 

meeting the requirements in the Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007 and then the executive order of 13514? 

Mr. MCHUGH. I will do my best; and I am sure you will help me 

along the way, Mr. Hinchey. It is good to see you, sir. 

We view this challenge as important on a number of different 

levels. First of all, obviously, it is something that is environmentally responsible to do. The Army feels a great obligation, given 

our dispersed nature and reliance on a good neighbor policy, to try 

to be responsible stewards of the environment; and given the fact 

that we are spending tens upon tens of billions of dollars here in 

the United States and elsewhere on products that could potentially 

have severe consequences on the environment, we are trying to do 

a much better job. 

But the other aspect of it is, frankly, we view it as a question 

of national security. Independence and energy independence particularly within our bases is important. If there is an energy disruption in the general community based on some natural or other 

caused disaster, we want to make sure to the extent we can that 

military facilities are able to continue to operate and provide national security services. 

You asked about the program and its various components, and 

you listed some things; and my quick answer would be, all of the 

above. 

The Army is going to be the largest fielder of alternative fuel vehicles in the Federal Government. We have a very aggressive acquisition program for hybrid vehicles. I think the Postal Service 

would probably say they are number one, but we might dispute 

that. We are going forward very aggressively. 

I just returned a few weeks ago from a tour to Fort Bliss, Fort 

Irwin, the National Training Center. Fort Drum has aggressive 

programs. Virtually every base has both an environmental conservation program, trying to preserve the energy they use from the 

grid, but also pretty aggressive alternative environmental programs. 


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A solar project at Fort Drum. Some might say that they would 

think it would be a snow program, but it is solar development at 

Fort Drum. 

We have very aggressive alternative energy programs at Fort 

Irwin out in the California desert. 

So we are relying upon the leadership of each base to identify 

where the options and opportunities are for them; and we are supporting those where they can bring it in, put it before the Senior 

Executive Council that you spoke about that is staffed through 

ASAALT, through acquisition logistics technology, virtually all the 

components of the Army, to make sure we are directing resources 

where the greatest benefit lies. So we are excited about it. I have 

no doubt we can do better, but we are leaning forward pretty aggressively. 

General CASEY. I couldn’t top that. 

SUICIDES

Mr. HINCHEY. So it is an issue that has to be serious and something that has to really be done to improve the circumstances. I am 

sure that you are engaging it in a way that will hopefully bring 

that about; and it sounds so, based upon what you said in the context of your statements and your response now. 

There are a number of issues that we are dealing with here with 

regard to the circumstances of suicides. The number has gone up 

dramatically over the course of the last several years. In fact, if you 

look back on the history of it, each year it goes up higher and higher. 

Pardon me. 

General CASEY. It has gone up about 18 to 20 a year since 2004. 

Mr. HINCHEY. Yes. And over the course of the last several years 

it has continued to go up significantly higher. And I am just wondering if there is anything that is being done to attempt to deal 

with this situation, if there is any understanding of what the motivations are, what is causing it, and if there is anything we can do 

to be helpful that could deal with this situation more effectively. 

General CASEY. Thank you very much for that offer. 

I will tell you we have been working on this for a while. Last 

year, we really launched a full court press on it. In fact, it was 

2008 that we started this. And it is, frankly, frustrating that with 

the level of effort that we put out there that we haven’t stemmed 

the tide. As I mentioned, it is about 18 to 20 a year increasing; and 

that is just not acceptable. We have a broad wholistic campaign effort to work this, and we put about $55 million toward the effort. 

You ask about insights. The insights you get from this are the 

same things that you hear all the time. It is relationships, usually 

failed relationships with a little drug and alcohol abuse mixed in, 

and there are sometimes job problems or financial problems attached to them. And those are the things that seem to lead people 

to take their lives. 

COMPREHENSIVE SOLDIER FITNESS

One of the things we are finding, though, is that the young men 

and women we are getting from our society don’t have the coping 

skills to deal with the challenges that we are asking them to deal 


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with. One of the ways that we have tried to get at this—and it is 

a long-term fix, not a short-term fix—it is a program called Comprehensive Soldier Fitness, and it is a program that is designed to 

build resilience and enhance performance. We want to bring mental fitness up to the same level that we give to physical fitness. 

We started this program in October. We already have over 

380,000 soldiers and family members who have taken an online 

survey to tell them where their strengths and weaknesses are on 

the five key areas of fitness. We have trained over 800 master resilience trainers. These are sergeants and a couple family members 

who are trained to go back to their units and teach soldiers some 

of the skills they need to build the resilience. 

So this has a lot of promise, and it is something—as I said, 

380,000 soldiers have already benefited from it, but it is a culture 

change for us, and I believe it is essential to sustain us over the 

long haul, because we are going to be at this for a while. 

Mr. MCHUGH. I was just going to add, we had 160 suicides last 

year in the Army; and, as you noted, that is the highest ever. I 

share the Chief’s frustration. I give him credit for assigning the 

Vice Chief of Staff of the Army to focus very carefully on this issue, 

and he has done a great job. 

One of the most exciting things we have done is enter into a 5- 

year longitudinal study with the Institute of Mental Health, bringing some of the most preeminent experts in mental health, behavioral health specialists, and suicide prevention specialists into this 

team that is beginning to analyze and trying to find themes and 

causes. 

We just had our first quarterly report. I got the brief on that a 

few weeks ago; and it is beginning to form the data in ways that 

they feel over time can help not just the military, the Army, but 

in fact can help unlock many of the mysteries of suicide that exist 

in the general population as well. 

I think the good news about that is—5 years is a long time, and 

none of us want to wait that long to have results and to take programs on. They will report every quarter, and each time they find 

a major or significant development that they feel there is a prescribed response to, either a different program or some other kinds 

of intervention, they will recommend those; and, of course, we will 

act on those as quickly as we possibly can. 

SUICIDES

The other thing we are trying to do is take care as close as possible to the individual soldier particularly in theater. We have got 

a need for about 4,300 behavioral health providers in theater; and 

we are at about 86 percent of that, about 3,700. This is a hard 

cadre to grow, because it is also a shortage classification of providers in the civilian sector as well. But we are growing that to 

make sure that in the units in Afghanistan particularly, but, also, 

of course, in Iraq, we can keep an eye on the soldiers and hopefully 

encouraging the buddy system, your battle buddy, to watch out for 

each other. We can intervene and try to short circuit a few of these 

tragic acts. We are deeply troubled and concerned by it. 

Mr. VISCLOSKY. Will the gentleman yield for a moment? 

Mr. DICKS. Yes. Go ahead. 


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Mr. VISCLOSKY. Is there any distinction as a ratio between men 

and women in uniform services taking their lives? 

Mr. MCHUGH. The percentage? 

Mr. VISCLOSKY. No. I am just wondering in the universe. Because 

you have about 200 in ’08. As a ratio, is there a disproportionate 

number of men in uniform taking their lives versus women or vice 

versa? Is there something going on there? 

Mr. MCHUGH. The rates among men are higher. Some of those 

reasons are obvious. We obviously have more men deployed. That 

would not affect the rate but the likelihood. Because you would expect that males that are somewhat more exposed to the stressors. 

But I can’t speak to the relationship, that ratio in the military 

versus the civilian community. I am sure they have looked at that 

data, but I don’t have it before me. I am not even sure—— 

Mr. DICKS. If you would yield to me, I would like to ask a question. How many of these suicides occurred while in theater, the 26 

this year, and how many occurred in home installations? Is there 

any—— 

Mr. MCHUGH. We have 160 total confirmed. I believe you just 

gave the figure in theater, 26. 

Mr. HINCHEY. One of the numbers here says that 78 reported 

suicides among Reserve component soldiers not on active duty, and 

that was on top of the 160 last year. 

Mr. MCHUGH. That is correct. 

One of the reasons this is so mystifying, about a third of the confirmed suicides—and I think it is important we distinguish between the two—but a third of the confirmed suicides are committed 

by troops that had never deployed. So we don’t want to be so single-minded that we ignore other possibilities. 

Obviously, intuitively it would seem to me the stressors of combat, of multiple rotations, et cetera, et cetera, is someplace we want 

to focus; and we will. But when you have got a third of the force 

that by definition have been not been exposed to those stressors, 

we want to make sure we are looking at the picture holistically. 

And that again I think is one of the real exciting parts of what we 

call the 5-year longitudinal study. 

Mr. DICKS. So we don’t know of the 26 how many were deployed 

and how many were at home station? 

Mr. MCHUGH. I am sure we know. 

Mr. DICKS. I have been very impressed with General Chiarelli’s 

and everybody’s concern about this. 

I guess the question we would ask again and reiterate, is there 

something else we could do—does the Army have all of the resources that it needs to deal with this issue or is there some area 

where, if we added some money, it might make a difference? 

Mr. MCHUGH. Well, I am very hesitant to say we don’t want any 

more money for anything, but I think we have for the moment plotted an appropriate way to address this and to assess it. That may 

change in the near future, and I think I still have the phone numbers—— 

POSTTRAUMATIC STRESS DISORDER AND TRAUMATIC BRAIN INJURY

Mr. DICKS. I know Mr. Murtha and Mr. Young added money before for posttraumatic stress disorder and traumatic brain injury. 


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One thing I noticed that Chairman Mullen did was to ask that 

if somebody had been involved in an IED explosion that they be 

taken out of their combat assignment for a period of time in order 

to make sure that they have fully recovered. General Casey, what 

do you—I am sure you knew all about that, but—— 

General CASEY. Right. And we are actively working protocols 

that say, if you are exposed to an IED and it blasts within a certain distance, then you break for 24, 48, 72 hours, depending on 

the severity of the blast. 

We are testing that protocol now with some units. I was just 

down at the Joint Readiness Training Center, and they were actually exercising those protocols in training so that when they got to 

theater they would do them. 

As you know, when the brain is injured, it just needs some rest. 

So sitting a soldier out for a period time after exposure starts that 

rest process, and it pays dividends for us in the long haul. So it 

is something you will see implemented across the theater here over 

the next 6 to 12 months. 

Mr. MCHUGH. The interesting thing we are dealing with is that 

more than 70 percent of all TBI incidences are rated as mild. Probably in your football days and my hockey days it would be getting 

your bell rung. But, as the Chief indicated, we understand now, regardless of severity, the earlier you can get to that individual, pull 

him or her from the stress of the battlefield, provide rest and recuperation, be the injury severe or mild, the better the chances for 

full recovery from that incident itself. 

SUICIDES

Mr. DICKS. Do you have any information about is there a greater 

number of suicides on any particular bases? Have you looked at 

that? 

Mr. MCHUGH. We have had clusters that we have looked at very 

carefully. Not just suicides but acts of violence, spousal abuse, et 

cetera. So far, the studies we have seen have indicated a confluence 

of unrelated events, so it is hard to draw conclusions from that. 

But, clearly, there have been clusters of both suicides and acts of 

violence that continue to capture our attention. 

Mr. DICKS. Well, obviously, that would be something that you 

would want to focus on if you have certain bases, and it could be 

based on how many times people from those bases have deployed, 

which is also—but, as I said earlier, I think that the Army is taking this very seriously and trying to do everything it can. 

There is still one idea out there—I think they are trying this in 

Hawaii—where people could go online—this is a very online generation—and be able to get—and I think this could be done either 

in country or when one of these units come back, especially the 

Guard and Reserve units when they dismantle and go back to their 

homes, about going online to see if they can get some help. I think 

that is a concept still worth evaluating. 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Will the gentleman yield? 

Mr. DICKS. I yield. 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. The VA has in a number of parts of the 

country a very successful online communication where a veteran 


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who has come back can literally get online with a live body on the 

other end of the phone. It is a pretty damn good model. 

I know we talked about seamlessness here and all that, but, in 

reality, it might be something worth looking into. 

General CASEY. We have actually done it with a battalion, and 

we are doing it with a brigade now, and the results have been, as 

you suggest, very positive. 

Mr. DICKS. Was that in Hawaii? 

General CASEY. It was in Hawaii. It was out on the west coast. 

It was Hawaii. I think it was Lewis and Alaska. 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. The family readiness groups that I work 

with, I am shocked by some of the situations that some of our National Guard people leave back home. Little wonder. There is so 

much problem and despair and foreclosures and all sorts of stuff. 

It is a good group to be in communication with. I am sure you are. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

ADJOURNMENT

Mr. DICKS. All right. We are going to end this. Thank you very 

much for an excellent hearing. 

The next hearing is 9:30 tomorrow morning with Secretary 

Gates, and it is in 2359. 

[CLERK’S NOTE.—Questions submitted by Mr. Tiahrt and the answers thereto follow:] 

MEADS’ COST OVERRUNS

Question. As I’m sure you are aware, the Army’s Medium Extended Air Defense 

System (MEADS) is years behind schedule and substantially over-budget. In fact, 

according to recent reports, an internal Army memo has estimated that over ‘‘$2.5 

billion additional funding is required in FY2012–2017 to comply with the expected 

MEADS cost growth’’ of the program and to ensure that it meets U.S. operational 

requirements. What are your thoughts on looking at alternatives that would combine the best parts of MEADS with the existing and enhanced Patriot missile system? 

Answer. The Army is continuing to program and plan for Medium Extended Air 

Defense System (MEADS) as a replacement for Patriot. The Department has opened 

discussions on how best to achieve a truly integrated coalition air and missile defense capability, using the Army Integrated Air and Missile Defense Battle Command System as the centerpiece. Components from Patriot, as well as the more capable and more mobile radars and launchers being developed in MEADS, when 

ready, could be integrated in the Air and Missile Defense System-of-Systems. 

Question. How do you plan to deal with the MEADS cost increases without jeopardizing other key existing and developing Army programs, including efforts to sustain and modernize the existing Patriot system? 

Answer. The Army is reviewing Patriot and Medium Extended Air Defense System cost requirements and priorities as part of the resourcing process for FY12–17. 

MEADS PROGRAM AND TRANSATLANTIC COOPERATION

Question. As you know, the United States has partnered with Germany and Italy 

to develop MEADS. The program’s cost overruns and schedule slip have resulted in 

concern from both our allies; however, ‘‘transatlantic cooperation’’ is frequently cited 

as a justification for continuing with MEADS. Meanwhile, 12 other nations use the 

Patriot missile system (including six NATO countries which either currently has or 

plan to acquire Patriot). Given the significant investment in Patriot by the United 

States and our allies around the world, should we consider a Patriot-based alternative to MEADS? 

Answer. The Army’s Medium Extended Air Defense System (MEADS) provides 

some capabilities not available within even an upgraded Patriot system, including 

360-degree surveillance and fire control radar capability. MEADS will be interoperable with Patriot systems already fielded to the U.S. and allies. 


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UPCOMING CDR TEST FOR MEADS 

Question. Despite the fact that MEADS is years behind schedule and more than 

a billion dollars over budget, the program entered the system-level CDR phase in 

August 2009, and a critical milestone is forthcoming in August 2010. Given the 

MEADS program’s troubled history, does it make sense to await the results of this 

upcoming milestone before committing another $440 million in FY2011? 

Answer. The U.S. is committed to its obligations under the Medium Extended Air 

Defense System Design and Development Memorandum of Understanding. The commitment of these funds is an OSD decision. 

Question. Please describe the criteria that will be used to determine whether 

MEADS satisfies the requirements of the upcoming milestone. 

Answer. The MEADS Critical Design Review will assess the maturity of the contractor’s design, software development, integration and testing status. Objective criteria include the percentage of drawings completed, interface definition status, subsystem testing results and the level of integration accomplished. 

Question. Do these criteria include affordability, risk, and performance? 

Answer: Yes, affordability, risk and performance of the MEADS will be principal 

elements of the Department’s System Program Review of the MEADS program. 

[CLERK’S NOTE.—End of questions submitted by Mr. Tiahrt. 

Questions submitted by Mr. Moran and the answers thereto follow:] 

COUNTER BOMBER SYSTEMS

Question. Both the Marine Corps and Air Force are using the ‘‘Counter Bomber’’ 

system in Afghanistan. With 12 Counter-Bomber systems already produced for the 

Army through JIEDDO, how does the Army plan to deploy these systems in Afghanistan? 

Answer. United States Central Command identified eleven locations for installation, with one Counter Bomber system already delivered. A Brigade Combat Team 

has been identified to train on the twelfth Counter Bomber system prior to deployment, and this system will remain a pre-deployment ‘‘operational spare’’ training device. The Counter Bomber is intended to be part of the Entry Control Point systemof-systems that relies on methods from human observation and assessment to highly 

technical sensing devices. It combines video tracking and radar interrogation to 

screen individuals for person-borne improvised explosive devices. The Army continues to coordinate with JIEDDO to speed the delivery and installation of the remaining Counter Bomber systems, and is planning to ship one system every three 

weeks. 

Question. In view of the testing the Army has already conducted on CounterBomber at White Sands, will the Army fund and field additional Counter-Bomber 

units to Afghanistan, and, if so, when will it be completed? 

Answer. Army Test and Evaluation Command (ATEC) tested the upgraded 

Counter Bomber at White Sands, NM, in November 2009 (ATEC Capabilities and 

Limitations Report, dated Jan 2010). The results of the test provided the Army with 

significant operational data to justify a Forward Operational Assessment (FOA) for 

the 3rd Generation Counter Bomber system, in the United States Central Command 

(USCENTCOM) area of operation (i.e. Afghanistan). The FOA will determine the capabilities of the new 3rd Generation Counter Bomber, as a subset of Entry Control 

Point security, against Person-Borne Improvised Explosive Devices (PBIED). An 

operational assessment in Afghanistan will enable the Army to: 1) prove the capability is applicable in Afghanistan; 2) measure the effectiveness of the system; and 

3) enable a quantitative comparison with current Counter-Improvised Explosive Device systems also being employed for PBIED detection. The FOA is scheduled for 

completion by July 2010; and it will enable the. Army to determine if there is a justification for funding and fielding additional systems to Afghanistan. 

Question. With regards to the ‘‘Entry Control Point in a Box’’ program, does the 

Army have any plans to include Counter-Bomber detection equipment in the program? 

Answer. The Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization (JIEDDO) 

has funded 12 Counter Bomber Detection systems for the Army to use in Operation 

Enduring Freedom. Currently, the Air Force is the lead agency for testing and evaluating this capability. If the Counter Bomber detection capability is successfully 

validated to meet a capability gap for deployed forces, it could transition to the 

Army for consideration as a program of record or as part of the ‘‘Entry Control Point 

in a Box’’ program. JIEDDO will continue to fund until a transfer is coordinated. 


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Question. What actions will the Army now take to ensure that all inspection 

checkpoints in Afghanistan provide our forces with effective standoff protection from 

human carried IEDs? 

Answer. The Army and the Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization (JIEDDO) continue to field capabilities and explore emerging technologies that 

enable detection of human-borne improvised explosive devices (IEDs). Personnel 

scanners and non-intrusive inspection systems provide forces in Afghanistan the capability to detect explosives, IED precursors, and other hazardous materials at 

checkpoints. In addition, recent advances in intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities give deployed forces unprecedented situational awareness and the 

ability to detect, screen or defeat potential threats with more speed and less risk 

to the force. Moreover, the Army continues to integrate lessons learned from over 

eight years of combat in pre-deployment training and other counter-IED training 

events. The Army is also assessing standoff protection initiatives such as the 

Counter Bomber (personnel security against Person-Borne Improvised Explosive Devices). Once evolving Counter-IED technologies are proven, and the theater commander requests them, the Army will procure and field them as quickly as possible. 

Additionally, JIEDDO has partnered with the Department of Homeland Security to 

continue to develop solutions for the personnel-borne improvised explosive devices 

threat while also cooperating in technology demonstrations and evaluations. 

[CLERK’S NOTE.—End of questions submitted by Mr. Moran. 

Questions submitted by Mr. Dicks and the answers thereto follow:] 

TACTICAL WHEELED VEHICLES

Question. The Army depends on its fleet of light, medium, and heavy trucks to 

move soldiers, supplies, and equipment. Prior to the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, trucks were rarely armored. The few wheeled vehicles that were armored were 

engineer route clearance vehicles and a small number of military police vehicles. As 

various insurgent forces began using improvised explosive devices to attack 

unarmored trucks, the Army began to add armor packages on light, medium, and 

heavy trucks. The Army’s inventory of light tactical wheeled vehicles has numbered 

approximately 150,000, including uparmored HMMWVs in the combat theaters, 

unarmored HMMWVs at home stations, and a small number of uparmored 

HMMWVs positioned for pre-deployment training. The Committee is informed that 

the Army may evolve to a mix of unarmored HMMWVs, armored HMMWVs, Joint 

Light Tactical Vehicles, small Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicles, 

and MRAP—All Terrain Vehicles. General Casey, please describe the Army’s plan 

and time line for migrating to a mix of light tactical wheeled vehicles in units across 

the components of the Army. 

Answer. The Army currently has a mix of light tactical vehicles (LTV) within each 

component. Today, the Active Component’s LTV fleet consists of 21 percent armored, 

the National Guard’s LTV fleet consists of 34 percent armored and the Reserve’s 

LTV fleet consists of 14 percent armored. With current programmed funding 

through FY15 and redistribution of retrograde assets, these statistics will be 46 percent, 40 percent and 18 percent respectively. Within the next twenty four months, 

the Army intends to rebalance its fleet among the components to better reflect the 

appropriate balance of armor capable vehicles based on missions. Additionally, the 

Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV) currently in development phase, is the planned 

replacement for the High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV). The 

Army will begin fielding the JLTV in 2015 with approximately 2,000 vehicles produced per year. Therefore, the Army must maintain the HMMWV fleet through approximately FY30. Finally, the Army has established plans to place over 15,000 

Mine Resistant Ambush Protected Vehicles (MRAPs) and MRAP-All Terrain Vehicles in the force. 

Question. Please explain the Army’s decision to include no funding for the purchase of HMMWVs in the fiscal year 2011 request. 

Answer. As a result of analysis conducted over the course of the last few months, 

the Army has decided to accelerate its already established plans to stop High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV) procurement. This decision is based 

on the fact that the Army has reached its acquisition objective for HMMWVs. The 

Army’s current FY10 HMMWV requirement is 152,727 with 156,375 on hand. Although the average fleet age is approximately 15 years, our cost benefit analysis 

tells us we should recapitalize older models rather than buy new ones. 

Question. General Casey, please describe the Army’s plan for a competitive, ‘‘Open 

Market’’ effort to recap HMMWVs. 


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(a) What is the estimated cost of a recapped HMMWV versus the cost of a new 

vehicle? 

Answer. At this time, the Army has not made any decisions on a competitive Uparmored High Mobility Multi-purpose Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV) recapitalization 

(RECAP) program. A Request for Proposal (RFP) and a supporting Business/Technical case analysis are being developed based on responses to a Request for Information/Market Survey. The Army’s goal is to use competition to provide the best value 

for the government. Competition provides the Army access to a full range of industry (depot, private, or public private teaming) capabilities, processes and potential 

technical advances. 

(a) Planning is still ongoing for a competitive RECAP program and validated cost 

estimates are not available to compare the exact cost between competitive recapitalization and that of a new HMMWV. However, the unarmored and estimated Up Armored HMMWV recapitalization costs are approximately 31% and 66% of the cost 

of new production, respectively. 

Question. What would be the logic of recapitalizing a 15 to 20 year old HMMWV 

if the cost is about 90% of the cost of a new HMMWV? 

Answer. The Army would not recapitalize a High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled 

Vehicle (HMWWV) at a cost of 90 percent of the replacement vehicle. The recapitalization cost for an unarmored HMWWV is $55,000 and the estimated cost for an 

up armored HMMWV (UAH) is $105,000 to $130,000, which is variant dependent. 

The unarmored and estimated UAH recapitalization costs are approximately 31% 

and 66% of the cost of new production, respectively. 

Question. Congress provided a total of $1.3 billion for Army procurement of 

HMMWVs in the fiscal year 2010 Defense Appropriations Act. What is the Army’s 

obligation plan for those funds? 

Answer. The Army has obligated $431 million of the $1.3 billion FY10 funding to 

procure 2,122 High Mobility Multi-purpose Wheeled Vehicles (HMMWV). Of the remaining funds, the Army is planning to reprogram approximately $560 million for 

the existing HMMWV Recap and the remaining funds to support other Army priorities. 

Question. Does the Army intend to reprogram fiscal year 2010 funds that were 

appropriated for the purchase of HMMWVs? 

Answer. The Army is planning to put approximately 2,100 HMMWVs on contract 

using FY10 Base and OCO funding. The FY10 base budget will buy 1,400 HMMWVs 

to support systems that use the HMMWV as their prime mover. The FY10 OCO 

funding buys 700 HMMWVs for U.S. Army Special Operations Command. The Army 

plans to seek approval from the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Congress 

to reprogram the remaining FY10 OCO procurement funding to recapitalize 

HMMWVs returning from theater and for other Army priorities. 

Question. The Committee understands that the only units fully equipped with 

light, medium, and heavy armored trucks are in Iraq and Afghanistan. Should units 

in other potential hot spots, such as Korea, be equipped with armored trucks? 

Answer. Yes. We do intend to put armored and armor-capable vehicles in other 

theaters through the investment and modernization process. In fact, there are 

armor capable vehicles in Korea in the Army Prepositioned Stocks. In the Army’s 

approved Tactical Wheeled Vehicle Investment Strategy, the modernization path is 

to acquire all armor capable (or armor installed) vehicles, and as the fleet is modernized, all theaters will have increasing numbers of armor capable vehicles. 

TWO NEW COMBAT AVIATION BRIGADES

Question. Budget briefing materials for the fiscal year 2011 budget request include the formation of two additional Army combat aviation brigades, the 12th and 

13th such brigades. The 12th Combat Aviation Brigade (CAB) will form in fiscal 

year 2011. The 13th CAB will form in 2014. What are the operational requirements 

that call for additional Combat Aviation Brigades? 

Answer. Army Aviation is in great demand for overseas contingency operations 

and is among the most frequently deployed Army asset. The addition of active component CABs to the force structure allows the Army to meet demands for combat 

while relieving stress on Army Aviation Soldiers and Families. Army Aviation units 

have dwell times of 1.1 to 1.3 years for each year deployed, while the Army goal 

for active units is 2 years of dwell time for each year deployed. Aviation Study II 

is an on-going study directed by the CSA, which analyzes the Army’s current aviation force structure and ARFORGEN sourcing requirements. One of the initial study 

determinations was a need for an additional CAB to get closer to the Army’s BOG/ 

Dwell goals. 


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Question. What criteria will you use to determine where the Army will station the 

new brigades? 

Answer. The Army will determine where to station our two new Combat Aviation 

Brigades (CABs) based on the requirement to train the CAB for combat operations, 

opportunities for the CAB to conduct air-ground integration training with brigade 

combat teams (BCTs), and the suitability of potential locations for aviation unit stationing, to include all Soldier and Family requirements. The Army developed a stationing analysis model called the Military Value Analysis, to assist with analyzing 

potential locations for unit stationing. The Army used this model to determine the 

best location to station the twelfth active component CAB. This recommendation 

will be considered by Army senior leadership before a final stationing decision is announced. The Army will use the same model and criteria for determining the best 

location for stationing the thirteenth active component CAB. Any decision will be 

analyzed for compliance with the National Environmental Protection Act through an 

Environmental Impact Statement. 

Question. How do the two additional Combat Aviation Brigades fit into the Army’s 

plan to rebalance the force? 

Answer. Because the Army is consolidating one CAB from existing aviation force 

structure (twelfth active component CAB), the Army will only add one CAB headquarters and one additional full CAB. The activation of these CABs will have negligible adverse effects on operational readiness, modernization and reset efforts for 

the Army. The rebalancing effort for the twelfth CAB will consolidate existing assets 

under a CAB headquarters, which will better enable the Army to source this unit 

and greatly improve ARFORGEN requirements. The Army will also be able to leverage existing personnel force structure from the active component, as well as already 

programmed increases to the training base to sufficiently field the thirteenth CAB. 

This rebalancing of the force by the activation of an entire CAB will add approximately 4 months of dwell time to Army Aviation and will allow some units to reach 

the required BOG/Dwell goal of 1:2. All units will reach, at a minimum, a BOG/ 

Dwell of 1:1.5. 

Question. What additional aircraft must be procured in order to field each of the 

new Combat Aviation Brigades? 

Answer. One of the two combat aviation brigades (CAB) is being reorganized from 

within the Army’s existing aviation force structure and will not require additional 

procurements. The second CAB is being built incrementally as manning and equipment become available. The FY11 procurement includes 4 CH–47F helicopters, 16 

UH–60M and 2 HH–60M Medical Evacuation helicopters. Beyond FY11, the Army 

will need to procure 48 AH–64D helicopters, an additional 8 CH–47F helicopters, 

27 UH–60M and 13 HH–60M Medical Evacuation helicopters. 

Question. What is the dwell time between combat tours for the current 11 Combat 

Aviation Brigades? 

Answer. Active component Army Aviation units have dwell times of 1.1 to 1.3 

years for each year deployed (with eleven CABs), while the Army goal for active 

units is 2 years of dwell time for each year deployed (a BOG/Dwell of 1:2). As an 

example, the 10th CAB from Fort Drum, New York will deploy with 365 days dwell 

since their last deployment. 

Question. What is the target dwell time? 

Answer. Army Aviation active component units have dwell times of 1.1 to 1.3 

years for each year deployed (with eleven CABs), while the Army goal for active 

units is 2 years of dwell time for each year deployed (a BOG/Dwell of 1:2). 

FUTURE COMBAT SYSTEMS (FCS) AND BRIGADE MODERNIZATION PROGRAM

Question. In June 2009, the Defense Acquisition Executive cancelled the manned 

Ground Vehicle parts of Future Combat Systems (FCS). In the wake of that cancellation, the Army initiated a new Brigade Modernization Program which will field 

the components of FCS that are ready for duty in units. These items are the NonLine of Sight Launch System, tactical and urban unattended sensors, a small unmanned air vehicle, a small unmanned ground vehicle, an unmanned utility vehicle, 

and a communications network integration kit. How will the new Ground Combat 

Vehicle improve on the Bradley Fighting Vehicle? 

Answer. While the Bradley Fighting Vehicle (BFV) has limited capacity for enhancing its mobility, survivability and power generation, we expect the Ground 

Combat Vehicle to have a range of capabilities that the BFV does not provide. These 

include: protected mobility (maneuvering off-road to avoid improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and greater on-road protection against IEDs); tailored for full spectrum 

operations with modular, scalable armor kits; ability to carry a full infantry squad; 

under-belly protection that equals or surpasses the MRAP; off-road mobility of the 


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BFV; better side protection than the BFV; precision lethality overmatch against adversary systems while limiting collateral damage; integration into the network to 

maintain situational awareness; and adequate growth potential to ensure the ability 

to integrate upgrades and new technologies. 

Question. When will the Ground Combat Vehicle program begin to field new vehicles to units? 

Answer. The Army anticipates that the Ground Combat Vehicle (GCV) will begin 

fielding its Infantry Fighting Vehicle variant in FY17, with the first brigade 

equipped in FY19. 

Question. Is a Bradley upgrade program a viable option? 

Answer. The upgraded Bradley Fighting Vehicle is one of the alternatives being 

analyzed in the Ground Combat Vehicle Analysis of Alternatives (AoA), which is assessing the effectiveness of potential alternatives against current and future threats. 

The Army will complete its Ground Combat Vehicle AoA in July 2010. 

M4 CARBINE

Question. The M4 Carbine is a shortened version of the Vietnam era M–16 Rifle. 

The compact M4 is preferred by soldiers for fighting in urban areas. The Army has 

fielded nearly 400,000 M4s, and has made 62 product improvements since the initial 

M4 fielding. The fiscal year 2011 request proposes $20.2 million for 11,494 M4 Carbines. General Casey, the Army is currently conducting a competition for a new individual soldier’s weapon. What are the shortcomings that the Army is seeking to 

address in the new weapon? 

Answer. The Individual Carbine Capabilities Development Document is pending 

approval by the Army Requirements Oversight Council and will then be forwarded 

to the Joint Requirements Oversight Council. If the requirement is ultimately approved, industry will be allowed to compete and increase performance in the following areas: accuracy, reliability, operational availability, probability of incapacitation, probability of hit and hit quality, barrel life, signature management, rate of 

fire, trigger pull, ambidextrous operation, ammunition, magazines, and 

adjustability. 

Question. From time to time anecdotes pop up that suggest the M4 Carbine was 

not as reliable as it should have been during combat. After the July 13, 2008 battle 

of Wanat in Afghanistan, reports in the media cited internal military documents in 

which soldiers reported their M4s jamming. General Casey do you believe there is 

merit to these reports? 

Answer. We take all of these reports seriously. All incidents that reflect potential 

systemic problems are investigated. The Army determined that the M4s involved in 

the Battle of Wanat operated within Army specifications. The M4 has consistently 

been rated very high by the Soldiers, non-commissioned officers and officers who 

have used the weapon in combat. The Army has made over 62 material changes to 

the M4 since it was introduced into the force in the early 1990’s. The latest change 

resulted in an improved magazine that reduces the number of jams created by the 

failure of the round to properly feed from the magazine into the chamber. Last Fall 

we began issuing these magazines to units in Afghanistan and will eventually replace all of the magazines across the force. 

Question. A frequent response to criticism of the M4 Carbine is that if the weapon 

is properly cleaned and lubricated, it will meet all reliability and durability standards. However, during an extended fight in the dust and dirt of Afghanistan, the 

weapon will not be clean and any lubricants will likely become fouled with dirt. 

Would a better standard be a weapon that continues to function when not clean and 

lubricated? 

Answer. Such a standard would be ideal, but is not available in the current industrial base. Moreover, we do not foresee it as a future possibility based on market 

research. 

The Army has tested many versions of lubrication, both wet and dry, against the 

Department of Defense’s Cleaning, Lubricant and Preservative (CLP) standard. The 

products that met all the CLP specifications are available to our units today. All 

conventional weapons have metal on metal contact when the weapon goes through 

its functioning cycle. The ignition of the powder to send the round down range is 

essentially an explosion that creates heat and residue. The Army has verified 

through testing and review by our combat Soldiers that a heavy coating of lubrication is the best means to ensure that weapons continue to operate in the harshest 

of conditions. The reliability and durability standards continue to be raised as technology produces better lubricants. The Army is also improving reliability by issuing 

an improved magazine for the M16 and M4 that significantly reduces feeding jams, 


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and by ensuring the Individual Carbine Requirement contains reliability objectives 

that are higher in all conditions. 

Question. Do Army Special Forces and Rangers carry the M4 or some other rifle 

or carbine? 

Answer. Yes. Both the U.S. Army Special Forces and Rangers are issued the 

M4A1, which is a variant of the M4 Carbine. 

STRYKER VEHICLES

Question. The Quadrennial Defense Review notes that the Army will convert one 

Heavy Brigade Combat Team to a Stryker Brigade Combat Team by 2013. Several 

more may be converted as resources are available. Funding for Stryker vehicles in 

fiscal year 2010 is $513 million, including a congressional increase of $150 million 

to procure 93 vehicles plus survivability enhancements. The fiscal year 2011 request 

proposes $300 million to procure 83 vehicles. The budget request adds a new line 

for Stryker modification with proposed funding of $146 million for survivability enhancements. The Overseas Contingency Operations request includes $445 million 

for Stryker survivability kits. General Casey, please discuss the number of Strykers 

and the variant mix that will be purchased with the fiscal year 2010 and 2011 procurement funding. What are the key survivability enhancements? 

Answer. The Army plans to procure 17 Stryker Reconnaissance Vehicles (RV) and 

76 Stryker Infantry Carrier Vehicles (ICV) in FY10. We also plan to purchase 29 

RVs and 54 ICVs in FY11. However, pending a successful test of the Double-V Hull 

concept, the Army may decide to reprioritize FY10 and FY11 funding to procure 

Double-V Hull Strykers for use in Afghanistan. Key survivability enhancements include: slat armor, Stryker Reactive Armor Tiles, Common Ballistic Shield, Drivers 

Enhancement Kit, Tire Fire Suppression Kit, Hull Protection Kit, Mine Roller 

Adapter Kit and Blast Mitigation Kit. 

Question. What is the plan to add a ‘‘V’’ or ‘‘Double V’’ hull to the Stryker? 

(a) What is the projected increase in survivability based on the improved hull design? 

(b) Will Stryker blast protection be as good as an MRAP? 

Answer. The Army has requested and received approval from OSD to build and 

test a limited number of prototype Stryker vehicles with an integrated Double-V 

Hull design. As these test vehicles become available, which is expected in early 1st 

Quarter FY11, the Director, Operational Test and Evaluation will conduct robust, 

independent testing concentrating on Soldier survivability. At the conclusion of this 

testing, which is expected to take approximately 60 to 90 days, the Army Acquisition Executive will chair a Configuration Steering Board (CSB). The CSB will review the test data and determine whether to recommend additional procurement of 

Strykers with Double V Hulls. The Defense Acquisition Executive has informed the 

Army that if further procurement is requested, he would consider authorizing, with 

Congressional approval, production and limited fielding of up to 450 modified 

Stryker vehicles to support urgent operational needs in Afghanistan. 

(a) The projected increase in protection against Improvised Explosive Devices 

(TED) is expected to double the protection level available on Stryker vehicles currently operating in Afghanistan. This increased protection is expected to greatly increase survivability. 

(b) Although initial testing of the Double-V Hull design has been promising, only 

independent testing of the design integrated onto the Stryker vehicle hull will determine how well its blast protection compares to the MRAP. 

Question. General Casey, what is your concept of the proper number of Brigade 

Combat Teams, and what is the proper mix of Infantry, medium weight or Stryker, 

and Heavy Brigade combat teams? 

Answer. Our goal is to build a versatile mix of tailorable and networked organizations, operating on a rotational cycle, to provide a sustained flow of trained and 

ready forces for full spectrum operations. Additionally our goal is to hedge against 

unexpected contingencies at a sustainable tempo for our All-Volunteer Force. 

Army analysis balances the array of ongoing force requirements in support of 

OEF and OIF, extant war plans, contingency plans and future contingency requirements as reflected in Office of the Secretary of Defense’s planning scenarios. The 

45 Active Component (AC) and 28 Reserve Component (RC) Brigade Combat Teams 

(BCTs) meet the needs for sustained operations and potential surges. The 7 

STRYKER BCTs (6 AC/1 RC), 26 Heavy BCTs (19 AC/7 RC) and 40 Infantry BCTs 

(20 AC/20 RC) all possess great versatility which enables full spectrum operations. 

The ongoing force mix analysis has indicated the need to increase the number of 

Stryker BCTs available to Combatant Commanders. Accordingly, we are converting 

one AC Heavy BCT to an AC STRYKER BCT beginning in FY11. 


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Question. Have units in the field gradually changed the role of the Stryker vehicle 

from a troop carrier to a mounted fighter vehicle, a role for which the Stryker was 

not designed? 

Answer. No. By design, variants within the Stryker Family of Vehicles are considered carriers (except MGS and ATGM), which enable rapid transport of the Stryker 

Brigade Combat Team (SBCT) formation on the battlefield. Several of the variants 

have direct fire weapons, however their primary purpose remains to provide direct 

support to the 108 infantry squads and the 12 reconnaissance platoons in the execution of combat tasks. While the Anti-Tank Guided Missile (ATGM) and the Mobile 

Gun System (MGS) have long range direct fire weapons capable of destroying enemy 

armored vehicles, both variants are designed to support infantry combat operations, 

and are not used as fighting vehicles for standalone long range engagements. In 

fact, the Soldiers and Leaders within the SBCT refer to the Stryker as ‘‘trucks’’, acknowledging that they are not considered fighting vehicles like the Bradley or 

Abrams. 

The intent of providing more accurate and capable weapon systems on the various 

Strykers is to increase the overall force protection level of the formation by enabling 

SBCT Soldiers to be more lethal, capable, and effective on the battlefield through 

more rapid identification and reduction of threats. The use of Strykers in combat 

reflects Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures developed during home station training 

and live fire qualification exercises. The capstone qualification event in an SBCT is 

a combined exercise that incorporates vehicles, weapons systems, and dismounted 

squads, as opposed to vehicle-focused gunnery in heavy formations. 

U.S. ARMY FORCES IN KOREA

Question. U.S. Army forces in Korea include Headquarters Eighth U.S. Army, 

Headquarters 2nd Infantry Division, 2nd Heavy Brigade Combat Team, 210th Fires 

Brigade, 2nd Combat Aviation Brigade, 501st Military Intelligence Brigade, 1st Signal Brigade; and other medical, and support organizations. U.S. Forces are in the 

process or relocating to the southern part of the Korean Peninsula. The 2nd Infantry Division has one heavy brigade combat team in Korea. That brigade has M1A1 

Tanks, and M2A2 Operation Desert Storm series Bradley Fighting Vehicles. However, the Army has newer and more capable versions of the Abrams Tank and the 

Bradley Fighting Vehicle. Why not provide the most capable equipment to the U.S. 

Army forces in Korea? 

Answer. The Army provides all combat formations with the best available equipment in accordance with the unit’s assigned mission priorities. We are scheduled to 

upgrade the M1A1 tanks and Bradley Fighting Vehicles in Korea in the second 

quarter, FY11. The Army will continue modernizing these vehicles, in concert with 

the fleet investment plan. The Heavy Brigade Combat Team (HBCT) on the Korean 

peninsula is scheduled to receive the Ml Abrams Integrated Management Situational Awareness variant and M2 Bradley Operation Desert Storm variant in the 

second quarter, FY11. 

Based on potential force mix changes pursuant to the Quadrennial Defense Review and equipment availability as other HBCTs undertake missions in Iraq and 

Afghanistan, the Army is assessing the feasibility of providing the newest M1 

Abrams System Enhancement Program and M2A3 Bradley to the HBCT forwardstationed in Korea. 

Question. Does providing newer, more capable equipment to key areas other than 

Iraq and Afghanistan come under your effort to rebalance resources? 

Answer. Yes. The Army has units that do not rotate through an Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) cycle, but are forward stationed, or otherwise considered high 

priority. These include theater committed forces, Army Service Component Command Headquarters, Army Special Operations Forces and other units. The Army 

provides all combat formations with the best available equipment within its resources. We have provided modernized enablers to U.S. forces in Europe and are 

scheduled to upgrade tanks and Bradleys in Korea in the second quarter FY11. The 

Army will continue to modernize units in accordance with mission priorities. 

Question. Tactical wheeled vehicles operating in Iraq and Afghanistan were initially unarmored, but force protection efforts in response to enemy tactics have resulted in wheeled vehicle fleets that have fully armored passenger cabs and many 

have remotely operated weapons stations. Should U.S. Army units in Korea be 

equipped in a similar fashion? 

Answer. Yes. Through the investment and modernization process, we plan to put 

armor capable vehicles in Korea. We have already placed some armored vehicles in 

Army Pre-positioned Set 4, located in that theater. The Army’s Tactical Wheel Vehicle Investment Strategy includes acquiring all armor capable (or armor installed) veVerDate Mar 15 2010 04:00 Mar 25, 2011 Jkt 065008 PO 00000 Frm 00405 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 E:\HR\OC\A008P2.XXX A008P2

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hicles. As the total fleet is modernized, the vehicles in Korea will become increasingly armor capable. 

Question. When will the brigade combat team in Korea receive Brigade Modernization spin outs from the FCS program? 

Answer. The Army has not yet determined when the brigade combat team (BCT) 

in Korea will receive Brigade Modernization spin outs from the FCS program. While 

the Army will field these technologies in Capability Packages to all BCTs by FY25, 

the unit fielding schedule is determined by multiple factors including deployment 

and procurement schedules. The first unit identified to receive the Increment 1 Capability Package is the 3rd BCT, 1st Armored Division, based at Ft. Bliss, Texas 

in FY11. 

NON-COMBAT/NON-HOSTILE LOSSES

Question. The Summary Briefing on the ‘‘Study on Rotorcraft Safety’’, dated December 9, 2009, reported that between October 2001 and December 2008, the Department of Defense experienced 327 rotorcraft losses, with 469 fatalities. Combat 

hostile action accounted for 20 percent of the losses. Combat non-hostile mishaps 

accounted for 40 percent, and non-combat mishaps accounted for the remainder. 

Fully 80 percent of losses were not attributable to hostile action. Significant among 

the various categories of losses were: Controlled Flight into Terrain, Brownout, and 

Object Strike. Army monthly updates to the Committee on helicopter losses in Iraq 

and Afghanistan since February 2003 indicate 176 helicopters lost as of February 

2010. How many of the losses occurred in circumstances other than combat or hostile action, such as brownout, flying into obstacles, or flying into the ground? 

Answer. Since FY02, the Army has lost 151 Rotary Wing Aircraft to non- combat, 

non-hostile accidents. The losses included 52 AH–64, 34 UH–60, 20 CH–47 and 45 

OH–58D aircraft. Over the same period of time, the US Army lost 45 aircraft to hostile action. 

The biggest contributing factor to non-combat, non-hostile accidents is human 

error (typically over 70%). Major human error causes are aircrew coordination failures (56%), overconfidence/complacency (28%) and inadequate mission planning, 

such as power management and failure to update weather. Most accidents involve 

flights assessed as low risk with 52% of accidents occurring during the day and 43% 

happening during training. 

The Army Aviation Center of Excellence and the Program Executive Office—Aviation are working diligently on training and materiel initiatives to reduce non-combat 

aircraft losses. Some of the more comprehensive initiatives include: leaders forming 

aviation task forces early and training as a team throughout the reset/train cycle 

of ARFORGEN; increasing opportunities for high altitude/environmental training at 

High-Altitude Army Aviation Training Site and other high altitude training areas; 

refining Aircrew Coordination Training—Enhanced and continuing to stress initial 

and refresher training for all aircrews; fielding modernized aircraft such as the UH– 

60M, CH–47F, UH–72; and installing modernized training devices and simulators. 

The Army continues to enhance home station training and institutional training by 

incorporating lessons learned, leveraging outside training assets during reset/train 

cycle and improving programs of instruction in our institutional training courses 

and Officer/NCO educational courses. 

Question. Currently what tools or instruments are available to Army helicopter 

crews to counter the effects of brownout, the blinding dust kicked up by the rotor 

wash as a helicopter operates near the ground? 

Answer. Army Aviation is addressing brownout conditions by several methods to 

include: adjusting operational Tactics, Techniques and Procedures to reduce entering into Degraded Visual Environment (DVE) conditions; conducting limited visibility training at home station and in theater prior to accepting mission responsibility; and improving aircraft system display symbology, flight handling qualities, 

and sensor systems. For example, through the Common Avionics Architecture System and Manned-unmanned Common Architecture Program cockpit systems, the 

UH–60M, AH–64D, and CH–47F are being fielded with advanced display symbology 

to provide an easily understood representation of the aircraft’s orientation relative 

to the ground in DVE conditions, such as brownout. Additionally, the UH–60M and 

CH–47F have advanced flight control systems, which improve handling qualities of 

the aircraft, helping to effectively deal with this situation. The AH–64D flight control system has automatic hover hold, which when coupled with the radar altimeter 

provides the aircrew the capability to deal with brownout situations. 

Army Aviation Program Managers continue to investigate pilotage sensor systems 

being developed by industry and the government that further improve the aircrew’s 


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situational awareness of terrain, obstacles and weather conditions in a DVE/brownout situation. 

In particular, the Army Science and Technology program has technology efforts 

under development to support helicopter pilots conducting landing and take-off operations during DVE conditions. These efforts are investigating several sensor-based 

solutions, from a single nose mounted system to one that would employ a number 

of multispectral sensors distributed around a UH–60/CH–47, providing imagery to 

both pilots and crew members on the aircraft cockpit display panel or via an optical 

head tracked display. Head tracked display sensors will allow multiple pilots and 

crew members to collaborate to view imagery all around the aircraft. This will provide the ability to track aircraft position relative to the ground and other objects, 

provide the ability to see through dust and will enhance crew coordination in degraded visual environments. In addition, Army Aviation S&T has further developed 

advanced display symbology under the Brown-Out Symbology System. 

Question. Are other vision aides which use a series of icons or a cartoon to provide 

the pilot with surrogate ground references reliable enough for testing and possibly 

fielding? 

Answer. Army Aviation has upgraded aircraft situational displays as part of the 

Common Avionics Architecture System and Manned-unmanned Common Architecture Program cockpit systems, currently fielded on much of the rotorcraft fleet. 

These display systems incorporate improved symbology to provide intuitive awareness of the aircraft orientation during all phases of flight. In addition, Army Aviation S&T has further developed advanced display symbology under the Brown-Out 

Symbology System, which can enhance situational understanding by providing an 

indication of the landing location, aircraft attitudes and sink rates, as well as improved icons indicating height above the ground. These symbols are of primary importance to an aircrew in a brownout situation and have been shown to allow safe 

and repeatable landings during flight test under brownout conditions. The focus of 

the S&T symbology development is to address the human/machine interface and 

balance the need to provide significantly more relevant data to the aircrew during 

time critical and high workload conditions without saturating their ability to properly interpret these display cues. 3–D audio and tactile stimulation have also been 

investigated to augment visual display cues. 

Question. What additional warning devices are needed to assist air crews to avoid 

obstacles, including flying into the ground? 

Answer. The Army flies in a hazardous operational environment every day. Since 

2003 we have flown nearly three million helicopter hours and most of those in a 

low level environment. Continuous investment in aircraft modernization, improved 

aircrew training and increased aviator combat experience has decreased our overall 

accident and combat losses. Since 2002 Army Aviation has achieved a downward 

trend in accidents that result in fatalities and loss of aircraft. This downward trend 

is not necessarily a result of improved aircraft capability but reflects a transition 

from an austere to a more mature operational environment, as well as the considerable experience gained by aircrews in both combat theaters. 

The introduction of moving map displays in our helicopter fleet has significantly 

increased the situational awareness of our aircrews. We need to give our pilots a 

warning for terrain and obstacles in their flight path. We have conducted an analysis of our ability to operate at low altitudes worldwide and have determined that 

we do in fact have a capability gap when conducting helicopter operations. To address this gap, the Army is pursuing a fully integrated material solution that will 

allow pilots to safely accomplish their mission in a degraded visual environment. 

Question. What is the status and funding of the Advanced Distributed Aperture 

System? 

Answer. The Advanced Distributed Aperture System (ADAS) Program is on schedule to complete flight tests from November 2010 to January 2011. The program is 

also on cost with $360K remaining from the $48.3M funded. Flights taking place 

in 1st Quarter, FY11 will be paid for via carryover FY10 funds. 

OH–58D KIOWA WARRIOR

Question. The Army has been flying the 01–1–58 series scout helicopter since the 

end of the Vietnam War. The current OH–58D Kiowa Warrior carries light weapons 

and a mast mounted sensor pod. The Kiowa Warriors have performed well in Iraq 

and Afghanistan wars, with much of the credit due to the skill and dedication of 

the aircrews and the ground maintenance teams. The Army has lost 50 OH–58Ds 

in the current actions. The Committee is aware that the Army has lost 50 Kiowa 

Warrior aircraft in the Iraq and Afghanistan wars. Please provide a general overview of how the aircraft were lost. 


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Answer. Since FY02, the Army has experienced a total of 51 OH–58D Kiowa Warrior operational losses. Of these aircraft, 14, or 27%, were lost as a result of hostile 

fire. The remaining losses resulted from a variety of reasons to include human and 

environmental factors and materiel failure. The largest contributing factor to Kiowa 

Warrior losses during non-combat, non-hostile accidents is human error, approximately 65%. The next largest contributing factor is materiel failure, less than 15%. 

Question. The OH–58D is not in production. The Committee understands that a 

few of the remaining unarmed OH–58A and C model aircraft are being converted 

to D models. How many will be converted, at what unit cost, and what is the time 

line to field the aircraft? 

Answer. Currently the Army is short 34 OH–58D Kiowa Warrior helicopters with 

an additional two aircraft awaiting attrition, for a total of 36 aircraft below the required quantity of 368. The Army plans to convert 36 aircraft from OH–58A to the 

D model configuration at a cost of approximately $9.5M each. Overseas Contingency 

Operations funding was requested in FY10 (6 aircraft) and FY11 (15 aircraft) and 

we plan to request funding in FY12 (15 aircraft). The first rebuilt OH–58D aircraft 

will be fielded by the third quarter, FY12. 

Question. How does the Army manage the aerial reconnaissance mission, given 

the shortage of Kiowa Warriors? 

Answer. The Army is meeting its entire aerial reconnaissance mission in Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom despite aircraft shortages. 

The priority of support remains with deployed units to resource which are being 

resourced to 100% authorized quantity (30 aircraft each). Using the Army’s Force 

Generation (ARFORGEN) model, garrison units in dwell are managed according to 

priority of deployment. The Army’s desired goal is to fill units in dwell at 80% of 

their authorized quantity by their redeployment plus 180 days (R+180). Currently 

this is not possible. However, units continue to perform superbly in combat despite 

these training shortages. Units in pre-deployment training are averaging 18 aircraft 

or 60% of the authorized requirement. 

Question. Where in the Army’s active and reserve units are the shortages located? 

Answer. In the active component, all Continental United States units including 

Alaska and Hawaii are short aircraft when not deployed. Current shortages are at 

Fort Campbell, Kentucky; Fort Bragg, North Carolina; Fort Lewis, Washington; Fort 

Drum, New York and Fort Wainwright, Alaska. The only reserve unit equipped with 

OH–58D helicopters is the Tennessee Army National Guard (1–230th Cavalry 

Squadron) with 24 of 30 authorized aircraft on hand. These shortages are in line 

with the Army Force Generation Model. 

Question. Can the AH–64 serve adequately as an Armed Reconnaissance Helicopter? 

Answer. Although it has been used in that role, the AH–64 would not adequately 

satisfy the Army’s armed reconnaissance mission. This is due to its size, noise signature, radar and infra-red cross sections and its maneuverability at low altitudes. 

The current OH–58D aircraft is better suited for reconnaissance missions when 

compared to the Apache helicopter, and is an excellent platform for the counter-insurgency mission. 

To meet all of the Army’s armed reconnaissance requirements the Apache would 

require additional procurement at approximately 3 to 4 times the cost of a light, 

manned, armed reconnaissance capability. In addition, the total fleet operating and 

sustainment cost would correspondingly increase. 

ARMED RECONNAISSANCE HELICOPTER

Question. The Army cancelled the RAH–66 Comanche in 2004. The Comanche was 

to have been a replacement with significant capability upgrades to the OH–58D 

Kiowa Warrior. However, the Comanche program was 20 years in development and 

had spent $7 billion without fielding an aircraft. A follow-on Armed Reconnaissance 

Helicopter (ARH) program was terminated in October 2008. That effort was to be 

based on a commercially produced Bell 407 but cost growth and schedule problems 

doomed the program. The ARH is currently undergoing an Analysis of Alternatives. 

What is the status of the Analysis of Alternatives, and what is the way ahead? 

Answer. The Army is exploring all options to leverage existing and potential developmental solutions in manned, unmanned and manned-unmanned teaming solutions. In July 2009, the Defense Acquisition Executive directed the Army to conduct 

an Analysis of Alternatives (AoA) to meet Armed Aerial Scout capabilities and determine a replacement for the OH–58D Kiowa Warrior. The AoA will take a holistic 

look to determine the appropriate materiel solution(s) to address the still valid requirements and any capability gaps identified in the Initial Capabilities Document. 

The AoA will be conducted in two non-sequential phases with the first phase to be 


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completed in April 2010 and the final analysis (phase II) to be completed in December 2010 (followed by the final report published in April 2011). 

Question. Does the Army need a new ARH? 

Answer. The Army has an enduring requirement for a light, manned, armed reconnaissance rotary wing aircraft. The armed reconnaissance capability remains a 

key element in the Army’s airborne attack, reconnaissance, surveillance, targeting 

and acquisition force structure modernization effort. This force structure includes 

heavy attack helicopters, unmanned aerial systems and light reconnaissance helicopters complementing one another and working synergistically on the battlefield. 

The Armed Aerial Scout will conduct armed aerial reconnaissance providing combat 

information to enable joint/combined air-ground maneuver execution of mobile 

strike, close combat and vertical maneuver operations across the full-spectrum of 

military operations. 

The Armed Aerial Scout capability will meet the still valid requirements and capability gaps identified in the Initial Capabilities Document, specifically the need 

to operate in a high/hot environment like Afghanistan. Additionally, the Armed Aerial Scout will have the Joint Interoperability Level 2 capability to control unmanned 

aircraft systems. 

Question. Could the Lakota light helicopter serve as the base aircraft for the 

ARH? 

Answer. The Lakota Light helicopter (UH–72A) could possibly serve as the next 

Armed Aerial Scout; however, as the aircraft is currently produced it operates under 

a Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) certified qualification as a non-combat aircraft and does not possess a full military qualification. The aircraft would need significant modifications and qualification testing in order to meet minimum qualification for combat operations, including live fire testing, installation of ballistic tolerant fuel tanks, aircraft survivability equipment and other crew protective measures. 

Question. Could an AH–64 Apache serve in the ARH role? What are the cost and 

tactical implications of using Apaches as armed reconnaissance helicopters? 

Answer. The Apache has been used in the armed reconnaissance mission however, 

it does not adequately satisfy the Army’s armed reconnaissance needs. This is due 

to its size, noise signature, radar and infra-red cross sections and its maneuverability at low altitudes. To permanently include the Apache in a reconnaissance role 

would require additional procurement of Apaches at approximately 3 to 4 times the 

cost of a light, manned, armed reconnaissance capability. 

AH–64 APACHE

Question. The AH–64 Apache has been a reliable and lethal attack helicopter in 

Iraq and Afghanistan. The air cover provided by Apache attack helicopters serves 

to deter enemy attacks, and the Apache is a fast and powerful direct fire tactical 

responder for units in contact. However, the Army has suffered 52 operational losses 

of Apaches in pre-deployment training and in combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Nine have been shot down in combat. All losses have been funded for 

replacement. The Army has been in the process of converting early model AH–64A 

aircraft to the AH–64D configuration. The Committee understands that the ‘‘A’’ 

models are found in Army National Guard units, and that units equipped with ‘‘A’’ 

models are not considered deployable for the current fights. What is the status of 

getting all the older ‘‘A’’ model Apaches converted to ‘‘D’’ model? 

Answer. The Army is committed to converting the remaining Army Reserve AH– 

64A Battalion and the remaining four Army National Guard AH–64A Battalions to 

AH–64D Longbows. The Apache A to D conversion is on schedule and funded. The 

program has converted 592 aircraft and is scheduled to complete the remaining 125 

aircraft by the end of FY14. 

Question. How many Army National Guard Apache Battalions are not deployable 

due to having AH–64A? 

Answer. There are currently four non-deployable AH–64A model Armed Reconnaissance Battalions in the Army National Guard. 

Question. What is the time line to finish the ‘‘A’’ to ‘‘D’’ conversion? 

Answer. The AH–64A model to ‘‘D’’ model conversion is projected to be completed 

by second quarter FY14. 

Question. Is the ‘‘A’’ to ‘‘D’’ conversion fully funded? 

Answer. Yes. 

Question. A total of 52 Apaches have been lost in combat operations in Iraq and 

Afghanistan; nine of which were shot down. How were the other 43 lost? 

Answer. The 43 losses resulted from a variety of reasons to include human error, 

environmental factors and materiel failure. The largest contributing factor to these 


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accidents is human error (typically over 70%). These reasons include aircrew coordination, overconfidence/complacency and inadequate mission planning. 

Question. What materiel or training solutions are available to assist aircrews to 

avoid both hostile and non-hostile losses? 

Answer. AH–64 Apache material solutions include: ballistic crew protection from 

some small arms; Aircraft Survivability Equipment such as the Common Missile 

Warning System; the Modernized Target Acquisition and Designation Sight, which 

improves situational awareness for both hostile and non-hostile situations; and 

crashworthy fuel cells. Program Manager Apache is also fielding High Performance 

Shock Struts designed to absorb higher loads and collapse at a slower rate during 

a crash sequence. 

The Apache Aircrew Training Plan has been expanded to include more robust 

Combat Maneuvering Flight events resulting in better crew reaction to hostile fire. 

In addition, the Army sends its instructors to the High Altitude Training Center in 

Gypsum, Colorado, and encourages all units to send their aircrews to this school 

prior to deployment. The High Altitude Training Center helps air crews better understand the effects of flying in extreme environmental conditions, similar to what 

they may experience in Afghanistan and Iraq. 

STANDARD ISSUE COUNTER SNIPER

Question. Explanatory language accompanying the fiscal year 2010 Department of 

Defense Appropriations Act directed the Secretary of the Army to provide a report, 

within 60 days of enactment of the Act, on the acquisition objective and basis of 

issue plan for both vehicular and soldier wearable sniper detection equipment, as 

previously directed in the Joint Explanatory Statement accompanying the Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2009. In Afghanistan, snipers remain a serious and very 

capable threat to U.S. forces. As U.S. forces have advanced into areas that have 

been Taliban strongholds, exposure to snipers has increased and U.S. Soldiers continue to be shot and killed by snipers. The Army has provided counter sniper equipment to units in response to operational needs statements from units that are deployed or preparing to deploy. Should counter sniper equipment be standard issue 

for units deploying to Iraq and Afghanistan? 

Answer. No. The Army continues to procure and field counter sniper capabilities 

to forces in both Iraq and Afghanistan in accordance with validated operational 

needs. Capabilities fielded to warfighters become Theater Provided Equipment to 

maintain equipment that is commensurate with force strength in theater. Currently, 

counter sniper capabilities are not standard issue to all deploying units. However, 

units arriving in theater will fall in on assets of the unit they are replacing. This 

enables the theater commander to maneuver assets based on changing threat conditions and maximize the effects on the ground. The Army has also established gunshot detection as an enduring capability through the Capabilities Development for 

Rapid Transition process. 

Question. Does the Army have a plan to make soldier worn and vehicle mounted 

counter sniper devices standard in the equipment tables for Army units? 

Answer. The Army is pursuing several efforts to provide an enduring counter 

sniper capability through its deliberate planning processes. Whether these are Soldier mounted, ground vehicle mounted or other types of configurations is part of the 

materiel solution set. Counter sniper capabilities will be distributed throughout the 

Army based on analysis conducted by U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command. 

A vehicle mounted gunshot detection Capability Production Document (CPD) was 

validated in February 2009. This CPD calls for 13,658 vehicle mounted systems to 

be installed on tactical wheeled vehicles. The Army continues to analyze the efficacy 

of a Soldier worn gunshot detection system. CPD staffing for an individual gunshot 

detection system is expected to be completed and validated this calendar year. 

Question. The fiscal year (FY) 2009 Supplemental Appropriations Act provided 

$50 million for counter sniper acoustic sensors. What is the status of obligating 

those funds and issuing the devices for use in the field? 

Answer. Of the total $50M provided, the U.S. Army Rapid Equipping Force (REF) 

obligated $15M on two different contracts to purchase the Soldier Wearable Acoustic 

Targeting System (SWATS). First, in September 2009, the REF procured and deployed 235 systems to theater. Next, in March 2010, the REF procured 2,054 systems; the deployment of these systems is currently underway and should be completed in May 2010. Project Manager Soldier Sensors and Lasers (PM SSL) will 

competitively award the remaining $35M. On January 20, 2010, PM SSL issued an 

Individual Gunfire Detection (IGD) solicitation. This solicitation requested vendors, 

with mature technology capable of satisfying the IGD threshold technical criteria 

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ducting the competitive Operational Test of three IGD systems that meet the 

threshold criteria listed in the solicitation. The testing is expected to conclude in 

May 2010 with subsequent contract award in fourth quarter FY 2010. The initial 

fielding will be three to four months after contract award. 

Question. What is your assessment of the mission performance of the Soldier worn 

and vehicle mounted counter sniper devices? 

Answer. Counter Sniper devices are used in theater in three different ways: worn 

by the Soldier, mounted to vehicles and mounted to guard towers at Forward Operating Bases and Combat Outposts. Classified feedback on vehicle mounted counter 

sniper devices from commanders downrange indicates they are effective in saving 

Soldier lives. The Soldier Wearable Acoustic Targeting Sensor (SWATS) is successful in detecting and localizing the direction and distance of small arms fire. Soldiers 

believe SWATS systems are beneficial and have recommended several system improvements that are being actively worked. High demand for these systems exists 

in theater due to the success of this emerging capability. 

Question. What has been the feedback from soldiers in the field who have used 

counter-sniper devices? 

Answer. The Soldier Wearable Acoustic Targeting Sensor (SWATS) is successful 

in detecting and localizing the direction and distance of small arms fire. Soldiers 

believe SWATS is beneficial, but recommended system improvements regarding calibration, elevation solution, ergonomics and power. These improvements are being 

actively worked by Program Executive Office (PEO) Soldier. High demand for these 

devices attests to its popularity with Soldiers. Classified feedback from Soldiers 

downrange on vehicle mounted devices has been positive. This is an established program within PEO Intelligence, Electronic Warfare and Sensors. 

PREPOSITIONED STOCKS

Question. Five modular Brigade Combat Team (BCT) equipment sets are the centerpieces of the Army Prepositioned Stocks (APS) program. These sets enable the 

rapid deployment of CONUS-based soldiers in support of future contingency operations. The Army’s APS strategy is to have three Heavy BCTs stored on land, and 

two additional Infantry BCTs to be aboard ships. However, Army operational requirements (first the Iraq Surge and now the Afghanistan surge) have resulted in 

only one full APS on hand (APS–4 in Northeast Asia). It has been reported that during OIF and OEF, Army issued War Reserve Secondary Items (WRSI) stocks that 

it had prepositioned both afloat and ashore, and that it is now in the process of a 

holistic review of the WRSI program. What is the current level and condition of 

WRSI stocks? What are the plans to reconstitute such stocks and what is the estimated cost to reconstitute? 

Answer. The Army made great progress in reconstituting WRSI stocks to meet our 

APS Strategy 2015. With $1.5B in Overseas Contingency Operations funding in Fiscal Years 2008 and 2009, and $102M in base program funding, the Army has procured ∼80% of the initial supplies and critical sustainment (up to 60 days of supply) 

needed to reconstitute these stocks. The remaining 20%, or about $400M in shortfall, involves initial supplies for two APS–5 Southwest Asia sustainment brigades 

and for new equipment such as the Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicles entering the APS inventory in the coming years. 

To reconstitute WRSI, the Army plans to harvest materiel from the Iraq drawdown to offset the need for additional funding. Depending on how much is able to 

be obtained thru this means, the Army will submit an FY12 OCO Army Working 

Capital Fund funding request for any required supplies and sustainment. 

Question. What is the readiness status of APS–5 and APS–3? 

Answer. Detailed readiness levels are classified but projected levels of fill for 

APS–3 and APS–5 unit equipment sets are as follows: 

(1) APS–3 Afloat Army Strategic Flotilla (ASF) IV Theater Opening/Port Opening 

Package (TO/PO) uploaded on the USNS Watson is currently enroute to the Pacific 

area of operations after completing a cargo maintenance cycle at Charleston, SC. 

The TO/PO Package has a 97% Equipment On Hand (EOH) level of fill. 

(2) APS–3 Afloat Infantry Brigade Combat Team (IBCT) with motorized augmentation set will be uploaded on two Large Medium Speed Roll-on Roll-off (LMSR) 

ships in September and November 2010. It has a projected 80% EOH level of fill. 

The Army plans to increase this level of fill prior to upload through available equipment from reset/repaired OIF retrograded equipment, depot and new production. 

(3) APS–5 Southwest Asia (SWA) Heavy Brigade Combat Team (HBCT) with motorized augmentation set located in Kuwait, which was originally planned to be fully 

operational on 31 Mar 2010, is delayed to Mar 2011 due to the recent issue of medium and heavy tactical wheeled vehicles, Material Handling Equipment, and 


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SINCGARS radios in support of the Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) Expansion. 

The HBCT currently has an 87% EOH level of fill which includes all combat vehicles. The motorized augmentation set has 83% EOH. The Army plans to fill equipment shortages over the next year from reset/repaired Operation Iraqi Freedom 

(OIF) retrograded equipment, depot and new production. 

(4) Temporary SWA Infantry Brigade Combat Team (IBCT) with motorized augmentation set located in Kuwait has a 94% EOH level of fill. The motorized augmentation set has 99% EOH. Some Medium & Heavy Tactical Wheeled Vehicles, 

Tractors, Vans and Container Handlers have been issued to fill OEF Expansion requirements. The set will become the APS–3 Army Strategic Flotilla II IBCT when 

no longer required ashore in the CENTCOM AOR. 

Question. What underlying requirements does the Army use to build and rebuild 

its APS? 

(a) Do these requirements vary by APS? 

(b) Do these requirements reflect recent changes in the Army’s overall manning/ 

deployment strategy? 

Answer. APS position and composition are primarily driven by the Combatant 

Commander’s requirements. As Combatant Commander plans evolve, APS composition and disposition is reviewed and adjusted if necessary. 

(a) The Army is continuously and holistically reassessing the APS strategy to ensure it meets Combatant Commander requirements based on the Guidance for the 

Employment of the Forces and Joint Services Capabilities Plan. The APS afloat assets are used to support multiple Combatant Commanders requirements and not 

tied to a single scenario. The mixture of mission and enabler capabilities provide 

Combatant Commanders with operational flexibility. APS ground based sets support 

rapid deployment and early entry forces in high threat environments. 

(b) APS has been heavily used in Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom and requires Overseas Contingency Operations funding for reconstitution. The 

Army has utilized the equipment and rebuilt the APS sets several times. Most recently, equipment from APS supported the surge in Iraq and the plus-up in Afghanistan. 

Question. What impact has the Army Prepositioned Stock Strategy 2015 (established in 2007) had on stock levels? What are the funding requirements within the 

fiscal year 2011 budget to implement this strategy? 

Answer. Execution of Army Prepositioned Stocks (APS) Strategy 2015 has had 

minimal impact on existing APS stock levels. The strategy increased previous force 

structure by adding an Infantry Battalion set in Southwest Asia and motorized augmentation set to selected APS–3 and 5 sets. Other than that, the changes were not 

significant enough to have a major impact on stockage levels. More significant has 

been the lessons learned from OEF/OIF in stockage determination for secondary 

items, and stock positioning, (taking advantage of the establishment of forward DLA 

depots around the world). Finally, the drawdown in Iraq affords us an opportunity 

to take advantage of stocks purchased to support the war, which we can now use 

to help fill out secondary item stockage levels. 

The FY11 budget request (Base OCO) to implement APS Strategy 2015 totals approximately $2B. This includes Other Procurement Army funding of ∼$1.5B and Operations and Maintenance Army funding of ∼$545M. This funding will allow us to 

reconstitute that portion of the APS sets established by the 2015 APS Strategy and 

provide for Care of Supplies in Storage for APS–3 and APS–5; funds five uploaded 

APS–3 Large Medium Speed Roll-On Roll-Off (LMSR) and container ships; and returns three LMSR ships from reduced operating to full operating status. 

Question. A significant number of Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicles, currently being used in OIF and OEF, will be repaired (reset) and made part 

of prepositioned equipment upon the conclusion of hostilities in Iraq and/or Afghanistan. What is the current plan for the disposition of MRAP vehicles upon conclusion 

of the war(s)? 

Answer. The Army has developed a pre-decisional allocation plan for MRAPs as 

they return from theater. This plan was briefed to Army senior leaders and is undergoing revision based on guidance to conduct a detailed cost benefit analysis. The 

results will be presented to Army senior leaders the end of March 2010. 

The exact numbers are yet to be determined, but some MRAPs and M–ATVs will 

be placed in the force structure allocated to Task Organized sets and into units to 

fill existing capability gaps. Additionally, other MRAPs will become part of a robust 

training fleet allowing Soldiers to maintain proficiency on the system. 

Question. If MRAP vehicles are to be placed into war reserve/prepositioned stocks 

and equipment, in what numbers and where? 

Answer. The Army developed an allocation plan for MRAPs. MRAPs currently 

used in Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom will be repaired 


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(reset) and made part of the prepositioned stocks program when no longer required 

in Iraq or Afghanistan. 

The allocation plan projects tasked organized MRAP sets (Infantry Brigade Combat Teams, Heavy Brigade Combat Teams, Stryker Brigade Combat Teams and 

enablers) will be placed into the prepositioned stocks program. The Army is analyzing positioning options to support Combatant Commanders. The remaining 

MRAP sets will be located in the Continental United States (CONUS) at the Army 

Strategic Logistics Activity and Sierra Army Depot. 

Questions. What will be the disposition of non-standard items of equipment upon 

conclusion of the wars? 

(a) What, if any, is expected to be declared excess to the needs of the Service? 

(b) What, if any, will be retained by the Service(s) and how will it be utilized? 

Answer. Non-Standard Equipment (NS–E) has been divided into two categories: 

Retained and Not-to-be-Retained. 

Retained NS–E: HQDA has identified selected NS–E items that are to be retained 

and stored as part of Pre-positioned Stocks in Southwest Asia or returned to Sierra 

Army Depot for potential future contingency use, once the NS–E is no longer required in Iraq or Afghanistan. Retained NS–E accounts for approximately 95% of 

the dollar value of all NS–E in Iraq. 

Not-to-be-Retained NS–E: A listing of NS–E items, excess to theater requirements 

and not being retained for future use, is provided to the National Association of 

State Agencies for Surplus Property (NASASP) for vetting with the state and local 

governments. If no U.S requirement exists, then Not-to-be-Retained NS–E items are 

available for potential transfer to coalition partners (Iraq, Afghanistan or Pakistan). 

Examples include: office and exercise equipment; non-tactical vehicles; air conditioners; commercial generators; televisions and commercial tentage. 

(a) The listing of NS–E items has been provided to the NASASP for vetting with 

State and local governments, includes ∼133K individual items valued at ∼$400M. 

Examples of potential equipment include: exercise equipment; computers and monitors; office furniture; air conditioners; select non-tactical vehicles (utility trucks, 

water trucks, fuel trucks, cargo vans); commercial tentage; television monitors and 

screens; public address systems; and experimental items deemed unsuited for future 

use. It is important to note that some NS–E does not meet U.S. specifications and 

therefore would require modification (in some cases costing more than the item is 

worth). Most of the equipment has been in theater for a number of years and is now 

beyond its expected useful life. 

(b) HQDA has identified selected NS–E items that will be retained and stored either OCONUS or CONUS in Army Pre-positioned Stocks or at a supply depot such 

as Sierra Army Depot. This equipment will be used in future contingencies, or in 

the case of commercial equipment, will be issued to installations to fulfill current 

requirements. The current retained NS–E list consists of over 183K individual items 

valued at ∼$8.1B. Equipment examples include: Mine Resistant Ambush Protected 

(MRAP) vehicles; convoy protection devices (Rhino); entry control point X-Ray and 

surveillance equipment; optical surveillance and targeting systems (Ghost); container handling equipment and cranes; specialized night vision devices; optical 

sights and rangefinders; and commercial construction equipment/forklifts that comply with U.S. specifications. 

BALANCED TRAINING FOCUS

Question. The Secretary of Defense has stated publically that the United States 

should not seek to eliminate national security risks through larger defense budgets 

that attempt to do everything and buy everything. He has said that the Department 

of Defense must set priorities and consider tradeoffs and opportunity costs. Such a 

rebalancing is necessary so that the Army can successfully conduct counter insurgency operations in addition to preparing for other potential future contingencies. 

However, the fiscal year 2011 defense budget request for operation and maintenance 

does not seem to reflect priorities or tradeoffs. Mr. Secretary, please describe the 

balance that the Army has, or has not been able to achieve between training for 

counter-insurgency operations and future potential full spectrum training. 

Answer. The Army is in the third year of a four-year effort to restore balance. We 

are making steady progress toward achieving our goals for deployment frequency. 

Our interim goal for Active Component (AC) forces in FY12 is a 1:2 ratio of time 

deployed to time at home station. Our interim goal for Reserve Component (RC) 

forces in FY12 is a 1:4 ratio of time mobilized to time not mobilized. Our force planning assessments indicate about 70% of AC forces and about 80% of RC forces will 

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ment frequency will conduct Full Spectrum Operations training on multiple assigned mission environments. 

Another measure of Army balance between training for counter-insurgency operations and training for future Full Spectrum Operations is the scenario used for 

training during the Combat Training Center rotations. At some point, not all units 

produced by the Army’s force generation process will be required to deploy. Non-deploying units will not be required to execute a mission rehearsal exercise at the 

Army’s maneuver Combat Training Centers (CTCs), rather they will execute a training rotation designed for Full Spectrum Operations in a generic contemporary operational environment. In FY11 the Army plans to conduct 2–3 such maneuver rotations. 

Question. Please discuss dwell time and the operation and maintenance-budget as 

factors that limit full spectrum training and equipment readiness. 

Answer. The Army is in the third year of a four-year effort to restore balance. We 

are making solid progress toward achieving in our interim goals for deployment frequency. Our interim goal in FY12 for Active Component forces is a 1:2 ratio of time 

deployed to time at home station. Our interim goal for Reserve Component forces 

is a 1:4 ratio of time mobilized to time not mobilized. Our force planning assessments indicate about 70% of AC forces and about 80% of RC forces will be able to 

achieve these goals before FY12. Units achieving goals for deployment frequency 

will be able to conduct Full Spectrum Operations training. 

Regardless of available training time before the next deployment, units prepare 

to conduct Full Spectrum Operations (some mix of offense, defense, and stability operations) for a contemporary operational environment (in complex conditions and 

against regular and irregular forces, including criminal elements). With limited 

training time, however, deploying forces focus primarily on their next assigned mission environment. Units achieving goals for deployment frequency will conduct Full 

Spectrum Operations training on multiple mission environments. 

Between Army base and Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) funding, the 

Army has sufficiently resourced units deploying to theater. However, the Army has 

relied on OCO funding to fully prepare deploying forces for operations in Iraq and 

Afghanistan. As the demand for forces diminishes, Army base funding must support 

the preparation of forces for other operational environments. In the future, Army 

units will simultaneously conduct some mix of offense, defense, and stability operations against a variety of threats (conventional, irregular, criminal, etc.) under 

complex conditions. 

UNDEFINITIZED CONTRACT ACTIONS

Question. To meet urgent needs, the Department of Defense can authorize contractors to begin work and incur costs before reaching a final agreement on the contract terms and conditions—known as undefinitized contract actions (UCAs), or letter contracts. As of October 2009, the Department of Defense had 429 contracts that 

were undefinitized. This type of contracting is not in the best interests of the taxpayer since the contractors lack incentives to control costs while the contract is 

being definitized. How are undefinitized contracts different from normal contracts? 

Answer. With a normal contract, the terms, specifications and price are agreed 

upon or negotiated by both parties (definitized) prior to performance. With an 

undefinitized contract, the terms, specifications, or price have not been agreed upon. 

Rather the contract action provides for agreement within 180 days after the UCA 

is issued. This may be extended to 180 days after the contractor submits a qualifying proposal, or the date on which the amount of funds obligated under the contractual action is equal to more than 50 percent of the negotiated ceiling price for 

the contract action. 

Question. Mr. Secretary, do you think the Army overuses undefinitized contract 

actions (UCAs)? 

Answer. No, we only use UCAs when the negotiation of a definitive contract action is not possible in sufficient time to meet the Government’s requirements or the 

Government’s interest demands that the contractor be given a binding commitment 

so that contract performance can begin immediately. 

Question. In your experience, does the benefit of starting work sooner outweigh 

the loss of control experienced in a UCA? 

Answer. Yes, starting the work sooner allows the Government to obtain crucial 

supplies or services quicker. The UCA requires more oversight and includes measures to minimize the loss of control. 

Question. As of September 2009, the Army had 30 overdue definitizations, which 

is about 34 percent of all the Army’s UCAs. What is the Army doing to rein in overdue undefinitized contract actions? 


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Answer. In order to rein in overdue undefinitized contract actions, the Office of 

the Secretary of Defense has set in place two reporting requirements, a Consolidated UCA Management Plan and a Consolidated UCA Management Report, identifying UCAs with a value exceeding $5 million. These reports are due on October 

31 and April 30 of each year. We use these to monitor progress toward 

definitization. 

Question. Does a shortage of contracting officers within the Army impact the 

Army’s ability to definitize contracts? 

Answer. Yes, the shortage of contracting personnel impacts almost every facet of 

contracting. We are working to rebuild the workforce so that we can better meet 

mission requirements and return to past levels of efficiency and effectiveness. Hiring new contracting personnel is half the battle; bringing them to a level of capability to credibly perform in a complex spectrum of contracting situations takes approximately five years. 

Question. What actions are you taking to reduce the Army’s reliance on 

undefinitized contract actions? 

Answer. The Army has taken the following actions in reducing reliance on 

undefinitized contract actions (UCA): 

• Increased emphasis in using advance acquisition planning to minimize the need 

for UCAs. 

• Mandatory UCA Management Report submission for each UCA exceeding $5 

million. 

• Semi-annual UCA Management Reports addressing each UCA with an estimated value exceeding $5 million. 

• Record copies of weighted guidelines for each definitized UCA with a value of 

$100 million or more. 

• Contracting Activity Department Chief required approval of all UCAs under $5 

million. 

However, it’s important to keep in mind that in truly urgent situations, UCAs 

provide a necessary tool to address critical warfighter needs. 

EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE DISPOSAL TRAINING

Question. The movie ‘‘Hurt Locker’’ won an Oscar for Best Motion Picture. This 

movie depicts the life of an Army Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) team serving 

in Iraq. All individuals trained to be EOD technicians are trained at the Navy’s Explosive Ordnance Disposal School at Eglin Air Force Base in Florida. The Navy 

manages the school, and all the Services provide instructors. Since 1999, the school 

has grown from an annual student requirement of 634 to over 1,700 students in 

2009. While the school is a great asset to our nation, there are some areas of concern. Last year, some services did not fully utilize their authorizations. The Army 

only provided 692 students even though they were authorized 1,004. Additionally, 

the failure or dropout rate was 40 percent for the Army. 

What is the Army’s plan to fill all authorized seats? 

Answer. In FY09, the Army filled 708 of 1075 Phase II (Naval EOD) school allocated seats for a 66% fill rate. Our analysis showed that the lower fill rate for FY09 

was caused by a combination of shortfalls in recruitment (September 2008 through 

December 2009) and 30% attrition rates (789 grads of 1128 student seat fills) from 

the Phase I (Army EOD) prep course. The recruitment shortfall was caused by adding a significant number of training seats (573 above the original program of 502) 

to the Army Program for Individual Training at mid-year 2008 to meet urgent force 

structure demands. High attrition rates at the Phase I (Army EOD) prep course 

were due primarily to academics. By the end of FY09, seat fill rates improved to 

89%. Reductions in attrition are being addressed by a U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command special focus team. 

In FY10, there is no particular issue at this time limiting the Army’s ability to 

fill seats at the Phase II (Navy EOD) Basic Course. The fill rate is at 97% and projected to remain close to that for the rest of the year. Although the fill rates have 

improved, the next step is to reduce course attrition. 

Question. What is the Army doing to increase the graduation rate? 

Answer. Headquarters, Department of the Army G–3/5/7 in coordination with the 

U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command has assembled a special focus team to 

develop a strategy to address: (1) learning improvements (2) physical training improvements (3) integration of Army Center for Enhanced Performance instruction, 

and (4) modifying the Army’s EOD nine-week preparatory course to better prepare 

students for the EOD Basic Course at the Navy School Explosive Ordnance Disposal. 


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Question. The Marine Corps sends senior enlisted or officers to the course. Should 

the Army consider this plan? 

Answer. In-service recruits (who tend to be mostly Non-Commissioned Officers) 

have a better academic and administrative record for graduation. The Army is institutionalizing a ‘‘proof of concept’’ in-service recruitment program for the EOD 

School. An Army team will conduct an on-site visit to Eglin Air Force Base 5–9 

April 2010 to discuss the implementation of these changes. The team will be led by 

Lieutenant General Mark Hertling, Deputy Commanding General for Initial Military Training, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command and included representatives from the Army’s Recruiting Command; Headquarters, Department of the 

Army, Deputy Chief of Staff G–3/5/7; and the Ordnance Munitions and Electronic 

Maintenance School. The Army is also vetting a mitigation strategy with the dual 

goals of keeping school throughput high by filling available seats and lowering overall attrition of qualified candidates. 

ARMY SUICIDES

Question. The number of soldier suicides has increased annually since 2004. In 

2009 alone, there were 160 reported active duty Army suicides. In addition, there 

were 78 reported suicides among reserve component soldiers not on active duty. 

While the official statistics for 2009 are still awaiting confirmation, it is clearly evident that this reflects a disturbing upward trend. For comparison, in 2008 there 

were 140 active duty suicides and 57 reserve component suicides. In 2007, there 

were 115 active duty suicides, and in 2006 there were 102 active duty suicides. 

The new figure of 160 reported active duty Army suicides is the highest since 

record keeping began in 1980. In response to the rise in suicides, in December 2009, 

the Army mandated that all personnel receive suicide prevention and awareness 

training/counseling before departure and upon return from in-theater leave. 

However, so far this year the Army has reported 26 suicides among active duty 

soldiers and 20 suicides among reserve component soldiers not on active duty. The 

official numbers are yet to be verified. General Casey, are there certain bases that 

experience a greater number of suicides than others? If so, which bases? 

(a) Are these bases seeing a higher average deployment rate compared to the 

Army overall? 

(b) Do you think that repeated lengthy combat tours combined with limited dwell 

time at home station are major factors contributing to the increase in the rate of 

suicides? 

Answer. As of 1 March 2010 the three installations with the highest number of 

suicides (pending and/or confirmed) are: Fort Hood (6 home station), Fort Lewis (3 

home station, 1 deployed), and Fort Carson (3 home station, 1 deployed). For 2009 

the three highest were: Fort Campbell (20 home station, 1 deployed), Fort Stewart 

(10 home station, 1 deployed), and Fort Hood (8 home station, 3 deployed). 

All of these bases host large concentrations of rotational forces including combat 

and support units, as well as and large total populations overall. These bases in particular have high concentrations of brigade combat teams and associated enablers 

that have in fact been affected by a high operational tempo. They also host large 

concentrations of junior enlisted combat arms Soldiers, which presently are our 

most vulnerable population. 

In comparison however, we also have other bases with similar population demographics that did not experience the extremes in suicide rates for 2009 such as Fort 

Bragg (5 home station, 1 deployed). These bases also host large numbers of rotational units and experienced similar OPTEMPO, yet have lower total incidences of 

suicide. 

It is difficult to directly and unequivocally prove the effect of OPTEMPO on suicide in the ranks. Even without scientific investigation, however, OPTEMPO clearly 

influences some of the leading correlated factors such as relationship difficulties, 

substance abuse, medical and behavioral health challenges and total stress on the 

force. We have partnered with the National Institute for Mental Health to conduct 

a 5-year Army STARRS research initiative. This study will attempt to provide a 

more concrete basis to show what if any causal relationship exists between the different variables leading to suicide, including deployment history and OPTEMPO. 

Question. What resources are included in the fiscal year 2011 budget request to 

deal with this dilemma and how will they be used? Does the Army need any additional funding to help prevent suicides? 

Answer. The Army has reprioritized within our current programs to ensure resources are available to support suicide prevention. In FY11, the Army is providing 

$42.9M for suicide prevention programs. These programs include training and education for Soldiers, leaders and healthcare providers. The Army will expand its 


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Strong Bonds program to support family communication, invest in data management programs to better identify risk trends and increase the transparency of information. We will also add program managers and psychological directors to assist 

garrison commanders and regional commanders in developing and executing a comprehensive health promotion, risk reduction and suicide prevention programs. 

In addition, the Army has requested $42.5M in FY11 to build resilience in Soldiers. The Army’s Comprehensive Soldier Fitness program is designed to equip and 

train our Soldiers, Family members and Army Civilians to maximize their potential 

and face the physical and psychological challenges of sustained operations. Lastly, 

the Army is planning on spending $1.7B in FY11 to support other family programs. 

Question. Of the 26 reported active duty suicides so far this year, how many of 

these suicides occurred while in theater and how many occurred at home installations? How many of those soldiers served in Iraq and Afghanistan and how many 

served multiple tours? 

Answer. As of 28 February 2010 there were 26 reported suicides. Of the 26, 6 occurred in theater: 3 in Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), and 3 in Operation 

Iraqi Freedom (OIF). The remaining 20 suicides occurred at home installations. Of 

the 26 total, 19 Soldiers (73%) had deployed at least once to either OEF or OIF. 

Of the 19 who had deployed, only 1 Soldier had multiple deployments. For reference, 

approximately 70% of the total Active Component Army has deployed at least one 

time. 

Question. Please explain what Mental Health (MH); and Army Suicide Prevention 

Program (ASPP) services are available to Soldiers before deploying, while in Theater, and upon return from Theater? 

Answer. The Army requires all Soldiers to fill out the Pre-Deployment Health Assessment 30 days before deploying. This process includes questions regarding the 

Soldier’s behavioral health status. Soldiers can be referred to behavioral health for 

additional screening or treatment when warranted. Additionally, unit suicide prevention and awareness training is conducted prior to and upon return from rest & 

recuperation leave (R&R). 

During deployment, many units have organic or attached behavioral health teams 

available for outreach, training and treatment. These teams typically consist of a 

behavioral health provider (psychologist or social worker) and an enlisted behavioral 

health technician. Recently, the Army began pilot projects to expand tele-behavioral 

health capability within theater. These projects extend professional behavioral 

health assessment and counseling services into smaller operating bases so Soldiers 

do not have to be evacuated for routine behavioral health counseling and treatment. 

Prior to leaving Theater, all personnel submit a Post Deployment Health Assessment and are screened for referral (as necessary) upon their return to home station 

or de-mobilization. Soldiers are further required to submit a Post Deployment 

Health-Reassessment within 180 days of their return from Theater for follow-up and 

identification of issues. The Army has also begun a pilot tele-behavioral health 

screening test to ensure all returning Soldiers receive ‘‘person to person’’ screening 

upon returning home. 

Question. The Army and National Institute of Mental Health signed an agreement 

in October 2008 to conduct long-term research to identify factors impacting the mental and behavioral health of Soldiers and to share intervention and mitigation strategies that will help decrease suicides. During this study, which is expected to last 

five years, what aspects of soldier life will be examined? What recommendations 

from the study have you received at this point, and what is the Army doing to implement? 

Answer. The Army Study to Assess Risk and Resilience in Service Members 

(Army STARRS or the Study) is a five-year study that is being conducted via a cooperative agreement grant award from the National Institute of Mental Health. The 

grant was awarded in July, 2009, to a consortium consisting of the Uniformed Services University of the Health Sciences, Columbia University, the University of 

Michigan and Harvard University. As a cooperative agreement, the research is 

being carried out by the grantees as well as NIMH scientists; Army scientists are 

also participating in scientific coordination and review. 

The purpose of Army STARRS is to identify, as rapidly as scientifically possible, 

modifiable risk and protective factors associated with suicidal behavior and psychological health. This will help inform the Army’s ongoing efforts to prevent suicide 

and improve Soldiers’ overall psychological health and functioning. To do this, investigators will conduct an epidemiologic study of mental health, psychological resilience, suicide risk, suicide-related behaviors and suicide deaths in the Army. The 

Study will evaluate representative samples of Soldiers across all phases of Army 

service, both retrospectively and prospectively. 


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Army STARRS is designed to focus comprehensively on all aspects of Soldier life 

that may be associated with suicide risk and psychological health. To do this, the 

Study will use three types of information: administrative data from Army and Department of Defense (DoD) sources, including personnel and health records; interview data collected from Soldiers directly; and biological data from Soldiers, (e.g., 

via saliva and/or blood specimens, for genetic and neurobiological analyses). The 

Study will examine a number of areas, such as exposure to adverse events, attitudes, social support, leadership and unit climate, training and knowledge, employment and economic status, family history and health/health care use. 

It should be noted that while suicidal behavior occurs at a specific point in time, 

the Study views risk and resilience as developing over time. Therefore, it will examine Soldiers’ characteristics and experiences over time. This will provide significant 

longitudinal information relating Soldiers’ characteristics and experiences to subsequent psychological health, suicidal behavior and other relevant outcomes. Over the 

5-year course of the Study, data from approximately 400,000 Soldiers will be collected, making Army STARRS the largest study of mental health and suicide ever 

undertaken, whether in military or civilian populations. 

From a scientific perspective, it is too early for there to be substantive findings 

Army STARRS began receiving historical information from Army sources in January 

2010, following a detailed process of identifying relevant data sources, entering into 

a Data Use Agreement with the Army and demonstrating compliance with the 

Army’s Information Assurance protocol. Parallel Data Use Agreements with applicable DoD data sources are in process. The Study is scheduled to begin new data collection from current Soldiers and new recruits over the next six months. 

Army STARRS will report progress and findings to the Army on a quarterly basis, 

as well as on an ad hoc basis as new findings arise. In the coming year, the Study 

is scheduled to deliver initial findings on risk and protective factors for suicide and 

related outcomes, based on analyses of historical data; as well as detailed new information on the characteristics, exposures and experiences of current Soldiers and 

new recruits, with particular focus on known risk factors for suicide. In subsequent 

years, the Study will follow Soldiers over time, identify those who have particular 

negative (or positive) outcomes, and deliver practical, actionable information on risk 

and protective factors for suicide. 

In the interim and at the request of the Army, NIMH has provided a report on 

civilian ‘‘best practices’’ regarding suicide prevention and behavioral health care. 

NIMH and the Army are also working together to identify where relevant interventions could be implemented. 

TEMPORARY END-STRENGTH INCREASE

Question. The Army is requesting funding to support a temporary increase of 

22,000 active Army soldiers for fiscal year 2010 and fiscal year 2011, increasing the 

active duty Army end-strength from a base of 547,400 to 569,400. The fiscal year 

2011 budget request assumes this growth will be 15,000 in fiscal year 2010 and 

7,000 in fiscal year 2011. The Army is on track to meets its accession goal of 15,000 

this year, and a decision will soon be made as to whether the additional 7,000 troops 

are necessary. End strength is due to start ramping down in March 2012 and be 

completed in September 2013. Of the 22,000, about 1,000 will be reenacted retired 

officers and 21,000 will be new recruits. 

The Army has limited means to make quick changes to end-strength. Its four ‘‘levers’’ to affect end-strength are changing the number of recruits, reenlistments, promotions, or moves. When will the Army reach its goal of 15,000 additional new soldiers in 2010? 

Answer. The Army expects to reach its additional 15,000 goal not later than September 2010 and potentially as early as June 2010. 

Question. At what point will a decision be made as to whether the additional 

7,000 troops are necessary? 

Answer. Within the next several months, a determination will be made regarding 

the additional 7,000 Soldiers. 

Question. What is the affect of the temporary end-strength increase on soldier 

dwell time? 

Answer. Despite the short term impact of the recent surge of troops to Afghanistan, we continue to make progress toward our goal of keeping the ratio of Boots 

on Ground (BOG) time to Dwell time at 1:2 for the active force and 1:4 for the reserve component. 

Eventually increased dwell time will be achieved by lowering the demand on our 

forces. This will ease the constant pressures on our forces as we move into the rotational cycle of the Army Forces Generation (ARFORGEN) model. 


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The Army Senior Leadership remains committed to meet these deployment goals 

while eliminating Stop Loss, and without any increase in tour length for our Soldiers. 

Question. What is the proposed plan to reduce the total end-strength back to 

547,400 in the next few years? 

Answer. Regardless of whether the temporary end-strength increase is 15,000 or 

22,000 Soldiers, the plan is a draw-down over an 18 month period with the goal of 

being at the ‘‘pre-increase’’ end-strength level of 547,400 Soldiers by the end of 

FY13. 

Question. Given normal retirement and reenlistment rates, how many active 

Army personnel can it expect to retire or separate in fiscal year 2013 under normal 

circumstances? 

(a) Will this be enough to handle the temporary end-strength ramp down or will 

additional measures be needed? 

(b) Is the Army changing its assumptions regarding estimated retirement and reenlistment rates due to poor economic conditions? 

Answer. The Army expects approximately 73,000 personnel to retire or separate 

in FY13. 

(a) In the absence of yet to be approved modifications to personnel management 

policies and/or modifications to the FY13 accession mission, our forecasted losses 

will not be sufficient to meet the temporary end-strength ramp down. However, 

analysis and recommendations regarding force shaping strategies to draw-down 

from either 15K or 22K Soldiers have been developed. After a CSA decision on 

whether to continue the final 7K growth during FY11, the Army will develop an implementation plan to execute the appropriate force shaping strategies. 

(b) We forecast retirement and other loss rates by applying time series techniques 

to historical data to derive loss rates by type, grade, months of service, gender, term 

and projection month. These rates are subsequently applied at this level of detail 

within the Active Army Strength Forecaster (A2SF) suite of models to forecast 

losses. This technique has been accurate to within 0.5%. By using time series analysis, we are assuming that emerging trends can be derived from historical behavior. 

We do not currently use econometric modeling. 

Question. How does the Army decide which of the staff reduction ‘‘levers’’ to pull 

if it needs to reduce staff? 

(a) When will it start making those decisions? 

Answer. The Army reduces its force based on requirements. The size of the requirement, along with the timeline, determines which reduction levers or methods 

will be implemented. These methods can include natural attrition in conjunction 

with a reduction in recruiting and retention missions, voluntary incentives, involuntary actions or a combination. A determination will be made regarding which reduction levers should be implemented at the same time the Army decides whether the 

additional 7,000 Soldiers are required. 

Question. How might the steep ramp down due to the temporary end-strength affect morale? 

Answer. We are expecting that the ramp down will have little or no effect on the 

total force. However, there is expected to be a morale impact at the individual level; 

this type of individual impact happens when the Army determines that an individual’s continued service in the Army is not in the Army’s best interest. The Army 

has support programs to assist these individuals as they transition from military 

life to civilian life. 

ENLISTMENT AND RETENTION BONUSES

Question. The military services offer a variety of enlistment and reenlistment bonuses to attract new recruits into military specialties that are considered ‘‘hard to 

fill,’’ as well as to encourage experienced military members in ‘‘shortage jobs’’ to stay 

in past their first enlistment period. The Army has more enlistment incentives than 

any of the other military services. Programs include Enlistment, Overseas Extension, and Reenlistment bonuses. Bonus levels are in constant flux. What was the 

total funding for Army recruiting and retention bonuses for fiscal year 2010 and 

what is the total budget for fiscal year 2011? 

Answer. The total funding for Army recruiting and retention bonuses was just 

under $1.7B for FY10 and just over $1.7B for FY11. The table below displays the 

FY10 enacted and the FY11 request for the Active and Reserve Components by Enlistment Bonus, which includes new and anniversary payments, and Reenlistment 

Bonus, which includes Selective Reenlistment Bonus (SRB) and Critical Skills Retention Bonus (CSRB). 


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SM FY 2010 FY 2011 

Enlistment Bonus—AC ............................................................................................................................ $445 $465 

Reenlistment Bonus—AC ........................................................................................................................ $434 $457 

Total—AC ....................................................................................................................................... $879 $922 

Enlistment Bonus—USAR ....................................................................................................................... $250 $177 

Reenlistment Bonus—USAR .................................................................................................................... $65 $116 

Total—AR ....................................................................................................................................... $315 $293 

Enlistment Bonus—NGB ......................................................................................................................... $244 $251 

Reenlistment Bonus—NGB ..................................................................................................................... $239 $239 

Total—NG ....................................................................................................................................... $483 $490 

Total ....................................................................................................................................... $1,677 $1,705 

Question. What is the range of individual bonuses for recruiting? 

(a) For retention? Please indicate why there are differences. 

Answer. Recruiting bonuses for critical skills range from as low as $1,000 to as 

high as $20,000. Currently, only 34 of the Army’s 160 skills have a cash bonus incentive. Recruiting new Soldiers in a particular skill will determine the type of 

bonus they receive. Skills such as Explosive Ordnance Disposal and Signal Intelligence are difficult to recruit given the danger element or the difficulty in qualifying for the skill. 

Retention bonuses for critical skills range from $40,000 to as high as $150,000. 

Currently, only 15 of the Army’s nearly 200 skills have a critical skills retention 

bonus (CSRB) incentive. CSRB is extremely effective and is the primary resource 

tool used to retain skills identified as critical to combat readiness. The 15 critical 

skills are defined as such because they may require long training periods, are low 

density, high demand and a challenge to recruit. 

Question. Have you found any imbalances or inequities in your recruiting and retention bonus structure that have been improved for fiscal year 2011? 

Answer. The Army continually monitors bonuses to recruit the proper mix of critical skills and to maintain an even flow of recruits to the training base. Since the 

Army recruits new Soldiers in the entry skill level, but retains them in higher skill 

levels, applicable bonuses may differ. The Army has maintained balance and 

equitability consistent with mission requirements. Quarterly, the Army reviews skill 

level retention strength by grade to determine appropriate bonus amounts and 

makes adjustments as needed. 

Question. At a time when the Army is having unprecedented success at retaining 

its soldiers, has the Army reviewed its recruiting and retention bonus program? 

Answer. Yes, the Active Army conducts quarterly incentives review boards to determine if bonuses are needed and if existing incentives programs should be reduced, eliminated or adjusted. The Army has reduced all bonuses since 2008 and 

will continue to do so as long as recruiting and retention objectives are attained in 

the proper mix of critical skills. Bonuses for many skills have been fully eliminated, 

allowing the Army to target only the most critical skills. 

Question. Is there any concern that enlistment and re-enlistment bonuses are now 

viewed by soldiers as an entitlement instead of a bonus? 

Answer. Such concerns existed during the peak bonus periods from 2007 through 

2008. Since then, the Army has reduced bonuses dramatically and the perception 

of bonuses as an entitlement has greatly diminished. As bonus levels stabilize and 

are targeted to only the most critical skills, the expectation that a bonus as an entitlement is fading away. 

SURGE IN AFGHANISTAN

Question. Last December, the Administration announced that it will send an additional 30,000 personnel to Afghanistan. Of the 30,000 service members being sent 

to Afghanistan, how many are Army soldiers? 

Answer. The Army will support the additional force requirements with approximately 21,000 soldiers. 

Question. Of the soldiers being sent, how many will be on their 1st deployment 

and how many will be on their 2nd or more tour? 

Answer. About 50% of the soldiers we send down range are on their first deployment. The remaining 50% have deployed at least once. This is consistent with other 

units that the Army is deploying today in Iraq and Afghanistan. 


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Question. Are soldiers deploying to Afghanistan training with the same equipment 

they will use when deployed? 

(a) If not, what compromises are necessary in your training programs? 

(b) Please provide some specific examples. 

Answer. Soldiers deploying to Afghanistan have an opportunity to train on almost 

all equipment they will use when deployed. However, there are some training equipment shortfalls which includes: Blue Force Tracker, Tactical Satellite and Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicles. 

Blue Force Tracker: Units normally train on how to use the Blue Force Tracker 

prior to deploying to Afghanistan. However, a limited number of Blue Force Trackers causes us to conduct this training in a classroom environment, without practical 

exercises. This problem is mitigated by the vast combat experience of the force. 

Tactical Satellite: This capability exists in Pre-Deployment Training Equipment 

sets at the battalion level but not at the company level as deployed in theater. We 

are working through Army G8 to get these terminals in Pre-Deployment Training 

Equipment sets at the company level in order to meet the requirement of units deployed in theater. 

Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP): The Army has 477 of 755 Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicles required for pre-deployment training and by 

1 June will have 120 of 306 MRAP All Terrain Vehicles (MATV) required for predeployment training. The Army has positioned these assets at key locations such as 

Combat Training Centers and Mobilization Stations to ensure all deploying Soldiers 

get the necessary training. We augment this hands-on training with well developed 

Training simulators. 

[CLERK’S NOTE.—End of questions submitted by Mr. Dicks.] 


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W I T N E S S E S 

Page 

Assad, Shay .............................................................................................................. 113 

Casey, General G. W ............................................................................................... 293 

Conway, General J. T .............................................................................................. 1 

Fullhart, Major General R. D ................................................................................. 215 

Johns, General R. E., Jr .......................................................................................... 215 

Mabus, Secretary Ray ............................................................................................. 1 

McHugh, J. M .......................................................................................................... 293 

McNabb, General D. J ............................................................................................. 215 

Parsons, Jeffrey ....................................................................................................... 113 

Roughead, Admiral Gary ........................................................................................ 1 

Solis, W. M ............................................................................................................... 113 

Æ 


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