135 Nev., Advance Opinion 496 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA 

No. 77622 

FILED 

DEC 2 6 2019 

HIGH DESERT STATE PRISON; THE 

STATE OF NEVADA; AND OFFENDER 

MANAGEMENT DIVISION, 

Appellants, 

VS. 

LUIS RICHARD SANCHEZ, 

Respondent. 

Appeal from a district court order granting in part a 

postconviction petition for a writ of habeas corpus challenging the 

computation of time served. Eighth Judicial District Court, Clark County; 

Linda Marie Bell, Judge. 

Affirmed. 

Aaron D. Ford, Attorney General, and Natasha M. Gebrael, Deputy 

Attorney General, Carson City, 

for Appellants. 

Luis Richard Sanchez, Indian Springs, 

in Pro Se. 

BEFORE HARDESTY, STIGLICH and SILVER, JJ. 

OPINION 

By the Court, HARDESTY, J.: 

NRS 209.4465(7)(b) permits the award of good time credit 

deductions from an offender's minimum sentence towards the parole 

- t5212.90 

ETH A. BROWN 

UPREM - CO 

By 

CLERK 
eligibility date for crimes committed on or after July 17, 1997. In 2007, the 

Legislature amended NRS 209.4465 to preclude the application of these 

statutory good time credits to an offender's parole eligibility when convicted 

of certain crimes, including felony sex offenses and category A or B felonies. 

As a result, offenders convicted of the crimes enumerated in NRS 

209.4465(8) may have credits applied to their parole eligibility date if they 

committed the crimes prior to the amendment's effective date of July 1, 

2007, while those offenders captured by the addition of subsection 8 may 

not. 

This appeal requires us to determine which version of NRS 

209.4465 applies when the offender's criminal conduct began prior to the 

effective date of the 2007 amendment and continued through its enactment. 

Respondent Luis Sanchez was convicted of two counts of attempted 

lewdness with a child under 14—a crime captured by the addition of 

subsection 8 to NRS 209.4465—and was alleged to have committed the 

offenses between 2006 and 2013. The district court applied the 2003 version 

of NRS 209.4465, but the State contends this was error because the 

attempted lewdness counts were charged as continuing offenses through 

2013. We hold that NRS 209.4465(8) (2007) applies when the charged 

offense is continuous in nature. However, because attempted lewdness with 

a child under 14 is not a continuing offense, we conclude the district court 

properly applied the pre-2007 version of the statute, and we affirm. 

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 

The State charged Sanchez with two counts of attempted 

lewdness with a child under 14 in violation of NRS 201.230 and NRS 

193.330. The information provided that Sanchez committed these offenses 

on or between May 8, 2006, and January 31, 2013, but did not otherwise 

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distinguish any specific dates within this range. Sanchez pleaded guilty to 

the charged offenses, and the district court entered a judgment of conviction 

and sentenced him to two consecutive terms of 5 to 15 years for his 

convictions. 

Thereafter, Sanchez filed a postconviction petition for a writ of 

habeas corpus, arguing that the Nevada Department of Corrections 

miscalculated his parole eligibility by failing to properly apply good time 

credit to his minimum term of imprisonment. The district court agreed and 

granted Sanchez's petition in part.' Specifically, the district court found 

that NRS 209.4465(7)(b) (2003), pursuant to Williams v. State, 133 Nev. 

594, 402 P.3d 1260 (2017), afforded Sanchez a good time credit deduction 

from his parole eligibility date. The State appeals. 

DISCUSSION 

The State argues on appeal that the district court erred by 

applying the pre-2007 version of NRS 209.4465 because Sanchez's crime—

attempted lewdness with a child under 14—constituted a continuing 

offense. As such, the State maintains that the district court should have 

applied the version of the statute in effect when the crime ended in 2013. 

NRS 209.4465(8) (2007), the State continues, precludes the application of 

good time credit against Sanchez's minimum sentence because the crime 

Sanchez was convicted of constitutes a category B felony. 

We review questions of statutory construction de novo. Jackson 

v. State, 128 Nev. 598, 603, 291 P.3d 1274, 1277 (2012). NRS 209.4465(7)(b) 

1The district court denied several other claims relating to credits. In 

his answering brief, Sanchez challenges the district court's determination 

concerning his work and merit credits calculations. Because Sanchez did 

not pursue an appeal from the district court's order, we lack jurisdiction to 

address Sanchez's argument here. NRS 34.575(1). 

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mandates that credits earned pursuant to the statute, by an offender who 

committed a crime on or after July 17, 1997, must "[a]pply to eligibility for 

parole unless the offender was sentenced pursuant to a statute which 

specifies a minimum sentence that must be served before a person becomes 

eligible for parole." In 2007, the Legislature amended NRS 209.4465 to add 

subsection 8, which excludes offenders who committed certain offenses from 

having statutory credits applied to their minimum terms. 2007 Nev. Stat., 

ch. 525, § 5, at 3177. Relevant to this appeal, NRS 209.4465(8)(b) and (d) 

prohibit offenders convicted of "[a] sexual offense that is punishable as a 

felony" or "[a] category A or B felony," respectively, from receiving the 

benefit of such credits. 

Logically, where an offender committed a crime that began 

prior to the 2007 amendment to NRS 209.4465 and ended after the statute's 

enactment, the nature of the convicted offense controls which version of the 

statute applies. If the nature of the convicted offense is not continuous, 

NRS 209.4465 (2003) applies. But if the convicted offense is continuous in 

nature, NRS 209.4465 (2007) applies. 

Attempted lewdness with a child under the age of 14 constitutes 

both a category B felony and a sexual offense punishable as a felony. See 

NRS 201.230 (2005); NRS 193.330(a)(1) (1997). As such, Sanchez would be 

prohibited from applying good time credits to his parole eligibility date 

under the 2007 version of NRS 209.4465. Therefore, we must determine 

whether attempted lewdness with a child under 14 constitutes a continuing 

offense. We conclude that it does not. 

We "consider an offense to be a continuing offense only when 

'the explicit language of the substantive criminal statute compels such a 

conclusion, or the nature of the crime involved is such that [the Legislature] 

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must assuredly have intended that it be treated as a continuing one.'" 

Rimer v. State, 131 Nev. 307, 319, 351 P.3d 697, 706 (2015) (alteration in 

original) (quoting Toussie v. United States, 397 U.S. 112, 115 (1970)). We 

determined in Rimer v. State that, considering the cumulative effect of 

child-abuse-and-neglect violations, the Legislature must have intended to 

treat such violations as a continuing offense. Id. at 319-20, 351 P.3d at 707. 

We are =persuaded, however, by the State's arguments to extend this logic 

to the case at bar. 

First, Sanchez was convicted under NRS 201.230 and NRS 

193.330, and nothing in the language of these criminal statutes compels us 

to conclude that the Legislature intended attempted lewdness with a child 

under the age of 14 to be treated as a continuing offense. Second, an 

"attempe by definition is "[a]n act done with the intent to commit a crime, 

and tending but failing to accomplish it," not a pattern of behavior. NRS 

193.330(1) (1997). Just because an act of sexual abuse may constitute child 

abuse—a continuing offense, see NRS 200.508(4)(a)—it does not follow that 

attempted lewdness with a child under the age of 14 should be treated as a 

continuing offense. Finally, we recognize that while the State was not 

required to allege an exact date of the offense committed here, the inclusion 

of a date range does not mean that the offense was a continuing offense. See 

Wilson v. State, 121 Nev. 345, 368-69, 114 P.3d 285, 301 (2005) 

(acknowledging that the State may allege "a time frame for an offense 

instead of a specific date, provided that the dates listed are sufficient to 

place the defendant on notice of the charges"). 

Because we conclude that attempted lewdness with a child 

under the age of 14 is not a continuing offense, we further conclude that the 

district court properly relied on the 2003 version of NRS 209.4465 and 

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Stiglich 

J. 

applied Sanchez's earned credits to his parole eligibility. Accordingly, we 

affirm the district courf s order granting in part Sanchez's petition for a writ 

of habeas corpus. 

J. 

Hardesty 

We concur: 

Silver 

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