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AFGHAN ELECTIONS: WHAT HAPPENED AND

WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE?

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY

AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT

AND GOVERNMENT REFORM

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

NOVEMBER 19, 2009

Serial No. 111–149

Printed for the use of the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.fdsys.gov

http://www.house.gov/reform

(II)

COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND GOVERNMENT REFORM

EDOLPHUS TOWNS, New York, Chairman

PAUL E. KANJORSKI, Pennsylvania

CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York

ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland

DENNIS J. KUCINICH, Ohio

JOHN F. TIERNEY, Massachusetts

WM. LACY CLAY, Missouri

DIANE E. WATSON, California

STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts

JIM COOPER, Tennessee

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia

MIKE QUIGLEY, Illinois

MARCY KAPTUR, Ohio

ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of

Columbia

PATRICK J. KENNEDY, Rhode Island

DANNY K. DAVIS, Illinois

CHRIS VAN HOLLEN, Maryland

HENRY CUELLAR, Texas

PAUL W. HODES, New Hampshire

CHRISTOPHER S. MURPHY, Connecticut

PETER WELCH, Vermont

BILL FOSTER, Illinois

JACKIE SPEIER, California

STEVE DRIEHAUS, Ohio

JUDY CHU, California

DARRELL E. ISSA, California

DAN BURTON, Indiana

JOHN L. MICA, Florida

MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana

JOHN J. DUNCAN, JR., Tennessee

MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio

LYNN A. WESTMORELAND, Georgia

PATRICK T. MCHENRY, North Carolina

BRIAN P. BILBRAY, California

JIM JORDAN, Ohio

JEFF FLAKE, Arizona

JEFF FORTENBERRY, Nebraska

JASON CHAFFETZ, Utah

AARON SCHOCK, Illinois

BLAINE LUETKEMEYER, Missouri

ANH ‘‘JOSEPH’’ CAO, Louisiana

RON STROMAN, Staff Director

MICHAEL MCCARTHY, Deputy Staff Director

CARLA HULTBERG, Chief Clerk

LARRY BRADY, Minority Staff Director

SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS

JOHN F. TIERNEY, Massachusetts, Chairman

CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York

PATRICK J. KENNEDY, Rhode Island

CHRIS VAN HOLLEN, Maryland

PAUL W. HODES, New Hampshire

CHRISTOPHER S. MURPHY, Connecticut

PETER WELCH, Vermont

BILL FOSTER, Illinois

STEVE DRIEHAUS, Ohio

STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts

HENRY CUELLAR, Texas

MIKE QUIGLEY, Illinois

JEFF FLAKE, Arizona

DAN BURTON, Indiana

JOHN L. MICA, Florida

JOHN J. DUNCAN, JR., Tennessee

MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio

LYNN A. WESTMORELAND, Georgia

PATRICK T. MCHENRY, North Carolina

JIM JORDAN, Ohio

JEFF FORTENBERRY, Nebraska

BLAINE LUETKEMEYER, Missouri

ANDREW WRIGHT, Staff Director

(III)

C O N T E N T S

Page

Hearing held on November 19, 2009 ...................................................................... 1

Statement of:

Galbraith, Ambassador Peter W., former U.S. Diplomat and former Deputy U.N. Special Representative for Afghanistan; J. Alexander Thier,

director, Afghanistan and Pakistan Center for Post-Conflict Peace and

Stability Operations, U.S. Institute of Peace; Ashley Tellis, senior associate, South Asia Program, Carnegie Endowment for International

Peace; and Gilles Dorronsoro, visiting scholar, South Asia Program,

Carnegie Endowment for International Peace ........................................... 7

Dorronsoro, Gilles ...................................................................................... 35

Galbraith, Ambassador Peter W. ............................................................. 7

Tellis, Ashley ............................................................................................. 25

Thier, J. Alexander .................................................................................... 14

Letters, statements, etc., submitted for the record by:

Dorronsoro, Gilles, visiting scholar, South Asia Program, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, prepared statement of ......................... 38

Galbraith, Ambassador Peter W., former U.S. Diplomat and former Deputy U.N. Special Representative for Afghanistan, prepared statement

of ..................................................................................................................... 10

Tellis, Ashley, senior associate, South Asia Program, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, prepared statement of ................................ 27

Thier, J. Alexander, director, Afghanistan and Pakistan Center for PostConflict Peace and Stability Operations, U.S. Institute of Peace ............. 17

Tierney, Hon. John F., a Representative in Congress from the State

of Massachusetts, prepared statement of ................................................... 4

(1)

AFGHAN ELECTIONS: WHAT HAPPENED AND

WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE?

THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 19, 2009

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY AND FOREIGN

AFFAIRS,

COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND GOVERNMENT REFORM,

Washington, DC.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2 p.m., in room

2247, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. John Tierney (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Present: Representatives Tierney, Flake, Van Hollen, Welch,

Driehaus, and Lynch.

Also present: Representative Doggett.

Staff present: Catherine Ribeiro, communications director; Mariana Osorio, Ken Cummings, Matt and Ploszek, Robyn Russell, legislative assistants; Andy Wright, staff director; Elliot Gillerman,

clerk; Scott Lindsay, counsel; Steven Gale, fellow; Adam Fromm,

minority chief clerk and Member liaison; Christopher Hixon, minority general counsel; and Christopher Bright, minority senior professional staff member.

Mr. TIERNEY. A quorum being present, the hearing entitled, ‘‘Afghan Elections: What Happened and Where Do We Go From Here,’’

will come to order. I ask unanimous consent that only the chairman and ranking member of the subcommittee be allowed to make

opening statements. Without objection, that is so ordered.

I ask unanimous consent that the gentleman from Texas, Representative Lloyd Doggett, be allowed to participate in this hearing.

In accordance with the committee rules, he will only be allowed to

question the witnesses after all official members of the subcommittee have had their turn. Without objection, so ordered.

And I ask unanimous consent that the hearing record be kept

open for 5 business days so that all members of the subcommittee

will be allowed to submit a written statement for the record. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Good afternoon, and thank all of our witnesses for being here

today. I know the venue has been changed because the full committee continues to complete its hearing from this morning, and I am

told that we can anticipate votes on the floor within the hour. So

we are trying to get as much done as we can. We would like not

to have the hold the witnesses for that 45 minutes or so that the

votes would take, but I am not sure how that will work out.

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I just want to welcome all of you and understand that your expertise will help us as we sort of look forward to what is a complex

and puzzling issue.

Today’s hearing asks the question: What happened with the Afghan Presidential election that was held on August 20, 2009, and

what can the United States and donor community members do

about the Afghan government’s legitimacy and governance as we go

forward?

Since 2002, a key component of the U.S. strategy in Afghanistan

has been to extend the authority of the Afghan government, to encourage governmentwide reforms, to support the government’s provision of basic services like electricity and water, and to nurture

the growth of Afghan civic institutions. A weak, corrupt, and unjust

Afghan government that does not have the support of the Afghan

people can’t survive for long against the strain of a sustained

Taliban insurgency campaign. Hence, the long-term U.S. strategy

in Afghanistan is largely predicated on having a legitimate and capable government in Kabul.

Both Pakistan’s and Afghanistan’s partnership with the United

States and the international community are vital to achieving

many U.S. objectives, including disrupting, displacing, and defeating Al Qaeda. Unfortunately, despite sizable United States and

international community aid efforts, the Afghan government has

proven deficient in providing Afghan citizens with basic government services and legal protections. Further, the Afghan government has been wracked by a failure to adequately address extraordinary levels of corruption within its ranks.

Mounting United States and international frustration with incompetence and corruption in Afghanistan came to a head with the

August 20, 2009 Presidential election. The widespread and massive

voting irregularities, as reported by the United Nations and others,

have by all accounts undermined the Afghan government’s legitimacy in the eyes of its own people and those of the international

community. What should have been another milestone in the long

road toward democratic legitimacy and stronger governance was instead a missed opportunity for all Afghans, and for the international community.

Widespread government corruption is a critical hindrance to Afghan development. According to the Congressional Research Service, ‘‘[b]ecause of corruption, only about 10 percent of United States

aid is channeled through the Afghan Government.’’

In short, the ability of the Afghan government to reestablish

some semblance of democratic legitimacy and to effectively provide

basic government services is undoubtedly weighing heavily on

President Obama’s ongoing review of the U.S. strategy in the region. The failure of the Afghan election and the inability of the government to provide effective governance are not for lack of U.S.

funds. The United States spent approximately $200 million in support of the August 20th election, and, in total, all donors contributed over $300 million.

Further, since 2002, the United States has spent almost $2.7 billion for democracy, governance, rule of law, human rights, and election support in Afghanistan. As an oversight committee, we are

charged with determining whether the U.S. taxpayer funds have

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been well invested, wasted, the subject of abuse, or the victim of

fraud. It is fair to inquire how it is that such an investment could

have been made only to foster such unsatisfactory results. Moreover, we must know who is responsible, and how such a travesty

can be avoided in the future.

Shortly, we are going to hear from witnesses who can inform us

what, in their view, went wrong in the Afghan Presidential elections in order to draw and apply lessons from that difficult experience. The ultimate question, however, for today’s hearing is how do

we move forward? What can the United States and international

community do on the question of legitimacy of and performance of

the Afghan government given the long track record of failure over

the past 8 years?

[The prepared statement of Hon. John F. Tierney follows:]

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Mr. TIERNEY. With that, I cede to my colleague, Mr. Flake, for

his opening remarks.

Mr. FLAKE. I thank the chairman for calling the hearing and look

forward to it. I won’t take much time here echoing the chairman’s

statement. We spent nearly $3 billion in efforts in Afghanistan,

ranging from democracy to support ruled law, election support, and

then to see this kind of event at the last election, these kind of

irregularities, it makes us all wonder whether or not our money

has been well spent. So I am anxious to hear testimony and yield

back.

Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you.

With that, the subcommittee will now receive testimony from the

panel that is with us today.

Allow me to first introduce the entire panel, then we will go back

for their comments.

Ambassador Peter Galbraith served as the United Nations Deputy Special Representative for Afghanistan from March to September 2009. Prior to this assignment, he served as a senior diplomatic

fellow with the Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation.

From 2000 to 2001 he served as director for Political, Constitutional, and Electoral Affairs for the United Nations Transitional

Administration, East Timor. Ambassador Galbraith holds an B.A.

from Harvard College, an M.A. from Oxford University, and a J.D.

from Georgetown University.

Mr. J. Alexander Thier is the director for Afghanistan and Pakistan at the U.S. Institute for Peace. Before joining the Institute in

2005, Mr. Thier was the director of the Project on Failed States at

the Stanford University Center on Democracy, Development, and

the Rule of Law. From 2002 to 2004, he was a legal advisor to Afghanistan’s Constitutional and Judicial Reform Commissions in

Kabul. He holds a B.A. from Brown University, an M.A. from the

Fletcher School at Tufts University, and a J.D. from Stanford Law

School.

Dr. Ashley Tellis is a senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, where he specializes in international

security, defense, and Asian strategic issues. Prior to assuming this

post, Dr. Tellis served at the U.S. State Department as Senior Advisor to the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, as well

as on the staff of the National Security Council as Special Assistant to the President. Dr. Tellis holds a B.A. and an M.A. from the

University of Bombay, as well as a Ph.D. from the University of

Chicago.

Dr. Gilles Dorronsoro is a visiting scholar at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, where he specializes on security

and political developments in Afghanistan. Prior to this post, Dr.

Dorronsoro was a professor of political science at the Sorbonne and

the Institute of Politic Studies in Rennes, France. He holds a Ph.D.

from the school for Advanced Studies and Social Sciences in Paris.

I want to thank all of you witnesses for making yourselves available today and for sharing your substantial expertise. It is the policy of this committee to swear you in before you testify, so I ask

that you please stand and raise your right hands.

[Witnesses sworn.]

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Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you very much. If the record will please reflect that all of the witnesses answered in the affirmative.

I inform all of you that your full written statement will be put

into the record by unanimous consent, and also ask that you try

to keep your opening remarks as close to 5 minutes as you can. In

reading them, I can’t imagine that you could possibly put your full

written remarks in anywhere close to 5 minutes, so because you

are so familiar with the subject matter, we are going to trust that

you are able to accordion that in a little bit and give us your wisdom in 5 minutes so that we can get some questions and answers

in as well.

With that, Ambassador Galbraith, would you care to please

begin?

STATEMENTS OF AMBASSADOR PETER W. GALBRAITH,

FORMER U.S. DIPLOMAT AND FORMER DEPUTY U.N. SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE FOR AFGHANISTAN; J. ALEXANDER

THIER, DIRECTOR, AFGHANISTAN AND PAKISTAN CENTER

FOR POST-CONFLICT PEACE AND STABILITY OPERATIONS,

U.S. INSTITUTE OF PEACE; ASHLEY TELLIS, SENIOR ASSOCIATE, SOUTH ASIA PROGRAM, CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR

INTERNATIONAL PEACE; AND GILLES DORRONSORO, VISITING SCHOLAR, SOUTH ASIA PROGRAM, CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE

STATEMENT OF AMBASSADOR PETER W. GALBRAITH

Mr. GALBRAITH. Mr. Chairman, Congressman Flake, I want to

thank you for the opportunity to appear before this subcommittee

to discuss the Afghan elections and their consequences for the

United States.

Let me say that in your opening statements I think both of you

posed exactly the right question: What did the U.S. taxpayers get

for their money? And the answer is they basically got ripped off.

The $200 million from the United States, was put forward in

support of elections which Afghanistan itself could not have paid

for, and those elections were blatently fraudulent.

But that underestimates the total cost of what happened on August 20th, because it has also set back dramatically the prospects

for success in the military campaign that now engages 65,000

American service men and women, as well as 35,000 troops from

our allied countries. So this is not just about the misspending of

$200 million in American taxpayer money on elections. That, frankly, is small change as compared to what these elections have done

to prospects for success in the military operations.

We have a situation now where, today, in Kabul, President

Karzai has been inaugurated for a new term in circumstances

where a large part of the Afghan people do not see him as a legitimate leader; and that is particularly true among the Tajik population, that is, Afghanistan’s second largest ethic community, and

where the electoral fraud has undercut public support for the war

in Afghanistan. I think it is clear that is the case in the United

States; it is certainly the case in European countries that are troop

contributors. And it has, in effect, halted the momentum behind

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President Obama’s strategy on Afghanistan that started with such

promise at the beginning of this year.

I think we need to be clear as to who is responsible for the fraud.

The fraud is the responsibility of those who committed it. I don’t

know the degree of President Karzai’s personal involvement, but it

is clear that he sought to benefit from the fraud, particularly in his

effort to try to avoid a second round of the runoff, a second round

of the Presidential elections, by accepting a result that he knew

was fraudulent, and it only required intense diplomacy to get him

there.

But he also is the person who appointed all the members of the

Independent Election Commission who consulted regularly with the

chairman. It is the Independent Election Commission which—the

only thing independent about it is its name—that in every way operated as an agent of the Karzai campaign, and in every instance

of fraud—and I think this is a critical point—in every instance of

fraud, either the staff that was appointed by the Commission committed the fraud, collaborated with those who committed the fraud,

or knew about the fraud and failed to report it.

So the best that can be said about President Karzai is that he

put his own personal interest ahead of his country’s interest at a

critical time. So clearly the responsibility of the fraud is with those

who committed it.

But there is a secondary responsibility that, frankly, falls on the

United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan or, to be more

precise, on its head, the Norwegian diplomat, Kai Eide.

Let me say I worked for 4 months in UNAMA. The staff there

consists of the best people that I have ever worked with in my life;

they are professionals who care deeply about Afghanistan; some of

them have decades of experience. And the views that I represent

from the very short time that I was there do not reflect the fact

that I have learned everything about the country, but, as a leader

of the organization, I listened to the people who worked for me, and

what I present is a synthesis of what they had to say.

But $300 million was paid for the election and the United Nations, which had a mandate to support the Afghan electoral institutions, chose not to exercise oversight over how that $300 million

was spent. In short, there was a mandate that said that the U.N.

should support the Afghan institutions, particularly the Independent Election Commission. But it also said—and this was the part

that the head of the mission left out—it said support them in the

conduct of elections that are free, fair, inclusive, and transparent,

not just any old election.

Now, I have detailed in my statement, as I have in a number of

things I have written about since I was recalled—that is a polite

word for being fired—how it was that the United Nations failed to

carry out its mandate, and I would be happy to respond to that in

the question and answer period. But I would like to just—well, I

would like to touch on two points.

It is not just the U.N. Mission, but, frankly, the U.N. Headquarters, because when this issue arose, the United Nations Headquarters made no effort to investigate, they did not talk to me after

the public controversy surfaced, incidentally, which became public

through no fault of my own or the fault of the head of the Mission,

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Kai Eide, they simply took a decision that one of us had to go, and

being suitably hierarchical, they decided it should be the No. 2.

I don’t quarrel with their right to choose staff as they want, but

I do quarrel with the fact that they chose not to look at the substance of the issue. And I also quarrel with the explanation that

was given, which is that private disagreement should become a reason for removing an official, because no organization can survive or

can function well if it cannot tolerate private dissent; and it is no

excuse to say that the private dissent might some day become public, because that is almost inevitable when you have a very controversial issue.

Now, what is the implication of this? Well, frankly, for President

Obama’s counterinsurgency strategy to work, it needs a credible

local partner. United States and NATO troops can clear the

Taliban from an area, but eventually the foreign troops must be followed by Afghan troops to provide security; Afghan police to keep

order; and an Afghan government presence to provide honest administration, public services, and to assist in economic development.

It is clear that a fraud-tainted Karzai government, considered illegitimate by a large part of the country, cannot fulfill the role of

a reliable partner. Thus, we are in the situation where although

the security situation in Afghanistan has deteriorated in 2009, as

it has every year since 2004, in my view, sending additional troops

is no answer. Without a credible Afghan partner, they cannot accomplish their mission; and sending them is, therefore, a poor use

of a valuable resource. And that judgment, frankly, is one I make

without regard to whether one is supportive of the war or opposing

the war. If the troops can’t accomplish the mission they are being

given, then they shouldn’t be used for that mission.

That then leaves two other alternatives. One is simply to withdraw, or a variant of that is a pure counterterrorism strategy, and

the other option is the status quo. I am also against withdrawal because, over the last 8 years, we have accomplished a lot in Afghanistan. I think we have a moral debt to the Afghan people. And if

we withdrew, there would be certainly a rapid deterioration in the

security situation in the Pashtun parts of the country, which would

be unwelcome.

That then leaves the alternative of the status quo. It is also unsatisfactory because the situation is getting worse year by year.

But of the three options, that is, sending additional troops to circumstances where they cannot accomplish a mission, withdrawal,

and the status quo, the least unattractive is the status quo.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Galbraith follows:]

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Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you, sir.

Mr. Thier.

STATEMENT OF J. ALEXANDER THIER

Mr. THIER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee. My name is Alex Thier, and I am the director for Afghanistan and Pakistan at the U.S. Institute of Peace. Thank you

for giving me the opportunity today to present my personal views

on the way forward for the United States and Afghanistan.

We face, as you said in your opening remarks, a fundamental dilemma in Afghanistan. On one hand we have a partner who was

inaugurated for a 5-year term that we find, to put it mildly, less

than satisfactory; not a strategic partner. On the other hand, the

United States has very serious long-term national security interests not only in Afghanistan and the region, and a withdrawal, precipitous destabilization of those two countries and the region would

be a grave problem for us.

I just returned from Afghanistan and Pakistan on Saturday, and

the thing that most struck me on this trip is that we really are facing a crisis of confidence in both of those countries at the moment.

Four years of rapid decline of security in both countries—but we

will focus on Afghanistan—was capped by this election debacle that

came really at the worst possible time. There is a lack of confidence

in President Karzai, in his will to change and, indeed, in his ability

to change.

At the same time, there is a growing lack of confidence in the

United States and the international community. Questions about

whether we will be there for long make actors choose things, make

decisions based on what they think we are or are not going to do.

There is also a lack of confidence because we, together with President Karzai, hand-in-hand have stood up for the last 8 years repeatedly and promised people security, justice in the rule of law,

and economic development; and we fundamentally failed to deliver

on those things. There is also a crisis of confidence in the United

States, I think, for the same reasons.

Let me touch briefly on the elections, before moving to the second

part of the question, which I think is the more fundamental, about

how we move forward with the Karzai government.

I think that the most important thing about these elections is not

the outcome. The most important thing about this election is that

it reinforces a dynamic and a perception of impunity and corruption in Afghanistan. It is not the fact of Hamid Karzai being inaugurated today; it is the fact that the way that he came to this position was through massive fraud, was through bringing in old warlords, who we had worked for years to sideline, back into his administration, and essentially reinforcing the notion among the Afghan people that his government is corrupt and that it shelters actors who engage in impunity.

I don’t think that the United States or the United Nations, perhaps to echo some of Ambassador Galbraith’s comments, are also

without fault in this regard. We have known precisely since 2004

exactly when this election was going to take place, but we did virtually nothing to prepare for it until it was too late and the election

had to be delayed, causing a constitutional crisis in the spring.

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There was a distinct lack of principle that was pursued with these

elections, not only in terms of how the fraud was dealt with, but

also in terms of how candidates were vetted or potentially eliminated from the elections for past criminal acts.

Fundamentally, I think this election has shaken the legitimacy

and credibility of the Afghan government at the most crucial moment in the last 8 years. So the question I want to answer, then,

is what now? I think that the fundamental premise that we have

to start with is that no government that is unable to provide security to its population, which is seen as corrupt and unjust, will be

legitimate in the eyes of the population; and it is in fact this very

illegitimacy that has driven Afghans away from the government

and emboldened the insurgency.

So I want to lay out briefly five steps that I think that we need

to take urgently and firmly in order to correct some of these problems to improve our chances of changing the momentum in Afghanistan.

The first is radical prioritization. We really have to focus very intensely on what we want to accomplish in the next few years. For

too long we have been doing too many things poorly, instead of

doing a few things well. And in this sort of crisis environment, we

really need to focus, and that would be a focus on security, particularly focusing on the building up of the Afghan national security

forces; focusing on the rule of law; and focusing on economic opportunity, with a very strong emphasis on agriculture.

To come to that second point, addressing a culture of impunity

and improving governance, this really has two components. The

first is leadership. We are all waiting now to see who President

Karzai will appoint to his cabinet, who the key Governors will be.

We have dealt for the last 8 years with both a good Karzai and a

bad Karzai. The good Karzai has put some terrific ministers in

place and we have managed to have some terrific successes: the

National Solidarity Program, which has delivered aid to 22,000 Afghan villages using local Afghan governance; the National Health

Program, which has changed access to health care for Afghans from

something like 10 percent to 80 percent. There have been real successes and those have been achieved when we have had real partners in the Afghan government; not just Karzai, but the people

who run the ministries.

The bad Karzai is the one who appoints warlords, brings in people, allows his brother to run around in the south, potentially involved in the drugs trade, and so on. So what we have to do is we

have to rebalance this. We have to put a lot of pressure to ensure

that we have a multiplicity of good partners in the Afghan government, while getting rid of some of the worst actors that are undermining the credibility of that government.

The third is that we really need to decentralize our efforts. On

paper, Afghanistan is one of the most highly centralized governments on earth, and this is laid upon one of the most highly decentralized societies—economically, socially, and politically—on earth.

When you look at what has succeeded in Afghanistan, it is almost

always when we rely on local governance and local capacity in

order to build our partnerships successfully.

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The fourth is reconciliation and reintegration. We need to take

very seriously the idea that there are many people out there today,

on the battlefield, who are not implacable foes of the United States

or of the Afghan government. If you look at the spread of insecurity

across Afghanistan over the last 5 years, there are many areas that

were very pro-government just a few years ago, but now seem to

be falling into the hands of the Taliban.

Well, one of the reasons for that is not that the Taliban are so

effective, but that governance has been so weak and economic opportunity for young men has been so lacking. If we can improve

most of those things, we can help to bring, I think, many soldiers

off the battlefield. That is quite different from the question of negotiating with Mullah Omar, which I think is quite a bit more difficult and not something that is probably appropriate for this moment.

Finally, international coordination and effectiveness. Every lessons learned study, every speech that you read about post-conflict

reconstruction and stabilization always has this listed—civilian coordination, civilian coordination, civilian coordination. And yet we

continually fail to get it right. I believe that the time has come for

us to examine creating a much more empowered civilian aide coordinator on the ground in Afghanistan to match the power of our

military coordinator and the commander of the ISAF—and that is

something that we can talk about in more detail.

I just want to close with saying that I think that these steps

taken together can help to reverse the tide of insecurity and lack

of confidence that has swept Afghanistan. I spent 4 years in Afghanistan during the civil war in the 1990’s and I watched the

Taliban sweep across the country and close schools off to girls and

prevent female colleagues that I had been working with from coming into the office.

Those were very dark days. And we need to remember that as

difficult as things have gotten today in 2009, Afghanistan has come

a long, long way since those dark days just a decade ago, and I

think it is not yet time to give up hope. And I can tell you that

the Afghan people have not given up hope, nor their desire to have

us stay and build a stronger partnership with the Afghan government.

Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Thier follows:]

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Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you, sir.

Dr. Tellis.

STATEMENT OF ASHLEY TELLIS

Mr. TELLIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Mr. Ranking

Member, for inviting me this afternoon.

Let me start by saying that I share very broadly the judgments

that Ambassador Galbraith made about the facts relating to the recent elections in Afghanistan, and I endorse completely what my

colleague Alex Thier just said, in terms of the substantive things

that we need if we are to salvage the enterprise that we are currently engaged in.

I am going to summarize my comments in terms of three big

propositions.

The first proposition is that the 2009 Afghan elections were

clearly flawed. But, to my mind, they still are not an unredeemable

disaster. I think we need to look at these elections in the context

of where Afghanistan is as a country: struggling to cope with the

pressures of a very violent insurgency and the failures of both U.S.

policy and the international community’s involvement in this country. What we saw in this election was essentially Karzai behaving

as a rational politician.

Understanding that his power base in the south would not be

able to exercise their suffrage because of Taliban intimidation, he

did what a rational politician and the state of nature would do, he

cooked the books to win the elections. This is a fact.

However, there are two things that still give me reason for hope.

First, no one has been able to demonstrate that even if we had a

completely successful election, the outcome of the Presidential election would have been different from what it was. Second, we ought

not to forget that beyond the Presidential election, there were provincial council elections, and those provincial council elections,

which are very important because they represent local politics, illustrate a very important point which I think we ought to keep in

mind when we think about the future of Afghanistan: they confirmed the proposition that changes of power can take place in a

peaceful manner and responsive to local aspirations. It is something we ought not to forget.

So my first proposition is this was a disaster in many ways. It

was certainly not the perfect paragon of the democratic experience,

but there is still reason for hope.

The second proposition is that although these elections will increase our burdens—and everything that Alex Thier said I completely endorse on this question—I would argue that they do not

make the necessity for our success here any less pressing, nor do

they render the efforts we have already made in this country futile.

We have to stay committed to supporting the Afghan people in

their struggle to create a viable state. If we fail in this undertaking, I think the entire enterprise will be vitiated and it will mean

a return to those days between 1996 and 2001, with all the consequences that we had to confront.

The third proposition that I want to advance is that we will have

to do many things to help President Karzai make the critical domestic changes that are necessary for success over the long term.

26

To be sure, President Karzai will have to do many things toward

that end as well, but I do not believe he is capable of making those

difficult choices without the continued support and reassurance of

the United States.

And I want to just flag five things that we ought to do at the

level of process. I am not going to say much about the level of substance because I have written about this elsewhere and Alex has

covered this quite adequately.

Level of process. I think the first thing we have to do is simply

recognize that he is going to be president of Afghanistan for a second term. We have to deal with him. We have to deal with him because that is a fact, but we also have to deal with him because it

is fundamentally in our interest to do so. I think there are serious

issues of legitimacy, but the issues of legitimacy are actually more

abstract.

What is going to be important in the years to come is his performance, and we have to make certain that his performance is

going to deliver in two critical areas: being able to provide population security, human security, and being able to confront the

issues of corruption. It is performance in these two areas more

than any abstract problems with legitimacy that will determine

Karzai’s success as a president and the success of our efforts in Afghanistan.

The second element at the level of process, the United States,

President Obama in particular, and the administration, have to

commit clearly and resolutely to winning this war and staying involved in this country over the long term. Vacillation and wavering

really reinforces the temptations of various players in Afghanistan

to hedge their bets, to avoid supporting the coalition, and including

Mr. Karzai himself, who will simply not make the hard political

choices he has to if he is not assured that the United States will

stay engaged.

The third proposition is that we have to rebuild our personal

partnership with Mr. Karzai. There is in fact a good Karzai and a

bad Karzai, and the historical record shows that he has gone out

and done the right things when he has enjoyed a relationship with

a trusted American interlocutor. We have to go back to finding

such an interlocutor and developing such a trusted relationship.

The fourth element that I would flag is that our success in working with him, and in Afghanistan more generally, is going to require a strong civil military partnership in our embassy in Kabul.

The fifth and the last element that I would flag is the need for

a consistent whole of government effort within the United States

with respect to Afghanistan, including consistent Presidential attention.

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, for your attention.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Tellis follows:]

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Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you very much, doctor.

Dr. Dorronsoro.

STATEMENT OF GILLES DORRONSORO

Mr. DORRONSORO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

We all know, in a post-democratic Afghanistan, I think the most

important result of these elections, the turnout was officially 38

percent, but my feeling is that it was probably around 20, 25 percent. That is to say that Karzai has been probably elected by 10

or 15 percent of the population.

The second point is that in places in the south, especially, in

places where the Taliban was strong, despite the huge offensive of

the coalition in Helmand, for example, the turnout was around 5

percent, in Helmand and Kandahar. So basically nobody, no

woman, at least, nobody or very few people went to vote.

This was not only because there was intimidation from the

Taliban; this was also because people are very cynical about politics in Afghanistan right now.

I was there for the election in Mazar-e-Sharif, a place where the

security is quite good, and very few people went to the polling station.

So it is not only about Taliban, it is also about the crisis of legitimacy in Afghanistan. And I think the right comparison is with

2004, when a lot of people went to vote and the election was not

perfect, but reasonable. So the main point is that in 2004 you had

something very close to a democracy in Afghanistan. It is totally

over now.

What is worrying is we are not in the payback time. Karzai made

a lot of deals, alliances with warlords, drug dealers, local pollers to

win this election, and now he has to pay back. That is why we will

have a very, very, very large amount of corruption in the next few

months and even the next few years.

The next point is about what we have learned from the Taliban

perspective. We have learned that the Taliban are well coordinated;

they were able to launch attacks against the government in all of

Afghanistan the day of the election, and it was for them a very

good day, after all, because they showed that they were able to disrupt the election, the roads and everything.

The other problem we have with this election is the question of

the narrative. We don’t know what to say to the population in the

western countries. We cannot say that we are fighting for a democracy in Afghanistan because there is no democracy in Afghanistan.

We can speak about Al Qaeda, but Al Qaeda is not in Afghanistan;

and at least for European people, the European population, there

is no feeling of threat coming from Afghanistan. And, right now,

over 70 percent of the British population is for a quick withdrawal

from Afghanistan.

From that we have, I think, to make sure of a few things when

we are speaking about reconstruction and state building in Afghanistan, because whatever the strategy we like, we need an Afghan

state to exit Afghanistan. The first thing is the matter of time.

There is no quick fix. Actually, what we are seeing in Afghanistan

is not a process of state building, it is the reverse; the state is

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shrinking. You have less and less functioning state institutions in

Afghanistan.

So right now, in all the provinces in the south and east, there

is no functioning state; the justice is just not there. The Afghan national army is controlling absolutely nothing. So we have a major

problem. It is not that the state building is going to be quick or

not quick; it is that there is no state building working.

So what can we do about that? We need time. For example, the

Afghan national army is officially 90,000 soldiers; probably the useful amount is around 60,000. To double this number, we need at

least 5 years. The idea that we can push the Afghan army to

250,000 men in 2 or 3 years is a fantasy; it is not going to happen.

That is why you need time. And the consequence is that we need

less casualties in Afghanistan because the level of 500 casualties

for the coalition we have seen this year is just not sustainable. So

we need a strategy that allows us to build a state in the long run

with a low level of casualties.

The second point is about resources. There is actually enough resources in Afghanistan. We are giving enough money to Afghanistan. The problem is that the money is disappearing. Disappearing

because half of the money is going to foreign companies, foreign experts; and then we have this very vicious system of subcontractors

that make sure that, when you are building a school in Afghanistan, it is going to cost you double of a school in the United States,

or almost.

So the money is not going to the right place. The money should

go in places where there is enough security to check what we are

doing with the money. For example, right now we are giving a lot

of money to Helmand. It is the case since at least 2005. A lot of

money, absolutely no result. Nobody can show anything in

Helmand for all the money we gave there. So we have to reverse

the perspective. We have to give money in cities, in town, in the

north where the situation is quiet, especially not in the south, because part of this money is going to the Taliban. We are giving

much more money to the Taliban than drug trafficking.

So how to do it now. We are, since a few months, in the perspective of public humiliation of Karzai. One day The New York Times

has an article about how Karzai’s bills are being paid by the CIA;

the other day it is about—and so on and so on. I, of course, a journalist, do what they want to do, but I don’t think, as a program

of policy, that we should put public pressure like that on Karzai.

Humiliation is a terrible thing in Afghan culture. We are pushing

too far.

And the result could be counterproductive. Why? Because the

only moment where Karzai is popular in Afghanistan is when he

is criticizing the United States. Every time there is a bombing, civilians are killed, Karzai is the first one to speak. Why? Because

he understands that it is the only way to look legitimate for his

own people, especially in the south, where Karzai has lost most of

his support now.

The second thing is that we should not try to do everything ourselves; we should not try to replace the Afghan state. The main objective is to build confidence. In concrete terms, the PRTs are a

very dangerous thing in Afghanistan because they are taking the

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space of the Afghan state. Right now, if you are living near Gardez

or Khost, the real administration is the PRT, it is not the Afghan

state. Everybody knows that the Governor has no money, he has

no competence. Everybody knows that the U.S. commander is in

charge; he has money, he is doing things.

Short term it is good because you can have a road, irrigation

project, but long term it is very dangerous, because how do you

want to get out of that? I think we should be clear that we need

an exit strategy. We need to give power to Afghans, to empower Afghan authorities, and not do the reverse in the name of short-term

efficiency.

And, very quickly, the last point is about the security and the

way we should use our resources in this domain. We should be very

careful with local powers like Dostum, for example, who is back in

the game now, with militia that are being established now, and

have been established in the last few months. We have a major

problem here if they are not under the control of the Afghan national army.

These militia, as we have seen in the 1990’s, can be autonomous,

they can discredit a little bit more the Karzai regime, and at the

end it could be a [indiscernible] Afghanistan. So let’s be very careful. There is no short fix. The militia is not a good thing, except

if they are very local and very small. And we are going in the other

direction right now in Afghanistan, and I think it is probably dangerous.

Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Dorronsoro follows:]

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Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you.

I want to thank all of you for giving us such a rosy picture of

how wonderful things are, from Mr. Galbraith explaining very

clearly how Mr. Karzai at least benefited from what happened at

the elections, in the fraud elections, and taking advantage of them,

to other witnesses, including Mr. Dorronsoro just recently telling us

that he has faults for sure.

But I think, Mr. Dorronsoro, you think that we should overlook

those faults. Mr. Thier says that we have to break the cycle of impunity and corruption. Mr. Thier says that without credible and legitimate Afghan partners, we cannot succeed, no matter how significant the investment; and I think that is pretty clear.

But, Mr. Tellis, you tell us that we have to rebuild the relationship with Mr. Karzai. His flaws are legion; he is a poor manager,

he lacks attention to detail, he is terrible at policy implementation.

Other than that, how is he doing? But supposedly he has a vision

of Afghanistan as a successful and moderate state, so I guess, by

implication, there is no other Afghan over there who has a good vision but who might be at least marginally competent.

I question each of you. What is the indication that you think that

Afghanistan is going to deal with corruption, that they are going

to purge the allies that he has invited in, Dostum and others like

that, that he is going to go after those in corruption, do a serious

anti-corruption effort, when it involves, very likely, his own family

in some respects, that there is some way that we can strengthen

institutions that are intricately involved in this corruption aspect

and probably don’t stand to gain much if the corruption is cleared

up?

Let me give you one example. A recent article by Aram Roston

in The Nation claims that the Afghan Host Nation Trucking contractors have $2.16 billion in contracts to deliver critical supplies

to U.S. forces within Afghanistan, and they frequently use those

funds to pay off the Taliban and other militants for protection

along the major supply lines. The articles describes payoffs as high

as $1,500 per truck for security between Bagram Air Base and

Kandahar. Several of the six principle security companies protecting the convoys are owned by the close relatives of leading Afghan

government officials, including the cousins of President Karzai and

the son of Defense Minister Abdul Rahim Wardak.

So do any of you have any personal or experiential information

about that, or reaction to the allegations contained in the article?

Is it symptomatic of a widespread corruption in Afghanistan? How

do you think it is we are going to convince Karzai to dump off the

people that he just invited in to get elected and clean up his own

family? And how are we going to deal with changing those institutions in any reasonable fashion?

We can go left to right or we can start with hands raised, or do

anything you want to do. Mr. Thier, then Mr. Dorronsoro, then Mr.

Galbraith, then Mr. Tellis.

Mr. THIER. Thank you. When I was in Kabul, a lot of people were

talking about the brothers network. President Karzai and his two

first Vice Presidents, Fahim and Khalili. Each have a brother who

is part of the enormous contracting business that is benefiting Afghanistan. But we have to look at our own complicity in this.

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Fahim’s brother, for instance, at one point—I am not sure if it is

still the case—had the contract to supply fuel to the Bagram Air

Base, which was something around $100 million.

The case of Ahmed Wali Karzai is, of course, important because

even though there have been complaints about him for several

years being involved in all sorts of things, including the drug trade

in the south, if it is the CIA that we are asking for evidence of his

corruption that is also paying him off, then it is unlikely that we

are going to take seriously removing period; and that has certainly

been the case, unfortunately, for the last 8 years.

Questions of accountability, questions of people who committed

war crimes, these problems we have known about and we have not

taken action. So I think that we have, first of all, ourselves to be

committed to the idea that this issue, corruption and combating

corruption in the Afghan government, is more important than any

single particular client or individual, like Karzai’s brother, to the

overall mission, and we send that message clearly to President

Karzai and to other people and to the government.

The second thing we do is we use our resources. We use our intelligence resources, we use our access to understanding where the

money is going to foreign bank accounts. We can put a lot more

pressure on people within the Karzai government or people associated with the Karzai government who are engaged in corruption by

using the tools that we have developed over time and either demanding that Karzai address them or that we address them.

And the final thing is actually to put pressure on Karzai. I know

it sounds absurd, but I can tell you that for the last 8 years we

have not been the ones putting pressure on Karzai to demand accountability. And if there is a clear change of tone that is tied both

to carrots and sticks that I have outlined, then I do think that

there can be some progress. It is not going to be a silver bullet, but

we can certainly do a hell of a lot better than we have been doing.

Mr. TIERNEY. So I know this is probably not what you intended,

but what I am hearing is it is all our fault that he is corrupt.

Mr. Dorronsoro.

Mr. THIER. No.

Mr. TIERNEY. I know. I am just telling you how it sounds over

here.

Dr. Dorronsoro.

Mr. DORRONSORO. With due respect, I tend to agree with Alex on

that. I think there was no kind of huge systemic corruption in Afghanistan even in the 1990’s, in a way. It was going on, but not

that corrupt. But when you are putting billions of dollars in a society without due procedures, without any kind of control on what

is implemented or not, you have what you have seen in Kabul the

last few years, a few hundred or thousand people taking a large

part of the money, building 1 or 10 million dollar houses in Kabul;

and, trust me, all the population of Kabul knows about that because they are all in the same place.

So, yes, it is a major problem and everybody knows. It is not a

point of information, everybody knows.

Mr. TIERNEY. We all know that everybody knows because it is

happening. What makes you think that Karzai and his cohorts are

going to do anything about it?

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Mr. DORRONSORO. No, they will not, but can we do something

about it? So, first, we can try to simplify and to centralize the way

we are giving money. Very concretely, instead of giving a huge

amount of money to one company who is going to give it to subcontractors, we should give less amount of money directly to Afghan companies; and if the work is a little less good, I mean, it is

not a problem.

But we have to neutral in the way we are giving the contracts.

For example, in Kandahar, we are giving all the contracts to Wali

Karzai or his tribe the Barakzai. We should be much more neutral

in the way we are giving the money to different tribes. So that is

one thing.

Second thing, drugs are a real problem because most of [indiscernible] in the south are drug dealers. So if we launch a big antinarcotics operation in the south, it is going to be extremely difficult

militarily speaking, and we could see IEDs appearing in places

where there are no Taliban. So we should be very, very careful

about all that is about drugs. We can do things, but carefully.

And the last thing I would say is instead of paying for the security of the trucks, use the money to secure the roads. For example,

right now there is still no security between Gardez and Khost. It

is not a very long road and it is doable. So instead of paying the

Taliban, just pay some guards, some Afghan national army to do

the job. And I think—it has always been the case, you need probably $10,000 to send a truck from Garasheet to Peshawar just for

security. And then it is money again and again and again.

So let’s focus on the security of the cities and the major communication ways. That would be the first thing to do.

Mr. TIERNEY. I will come back, if we have a chance, to the others

on that. I want to let Mr. Flake have an opportunity to do questions. It just gets very frustrating from this end to think that people haven’t thought of this before. It doesn’t sound like rocket

science to most of us.

Mr. FLAKE. Well, this is extremely disconcerting in terms of

where we are.

Mr. Tellis, just one comment that you made. You said that in

order to deal effectively with Karzai, we have to have the right

interlocutor; and that assumes that we don’t have the right interlocutor now. Are you referring to Mr. Holbrooke?

Mr. TELLIS. No, not particularly. I was just thinking of a historical moment in the past, when we had someone like Zalmay

Khalilzad in Kabul, who could literally sit on Karzai’s shoulders

and appeal to the better angels of his nature. I think we need

something like that again, and it doesn’t have to be a person, it can

be an institution. But unless we have that kind of a relationship

with him, we are not going to be able to get where we are going

to.

Mr. FLAKE. Right. I mention that because there is a noted frosty

relationship between the two and maybe we need that. I don’t

know. That is what I am asking.

But just following on that theme, you mentioned that he can’t be

humiliated—that is not right in Afghan culture—but then we need

to put more pressure on him and we need to provide security and

he has to know that there is security for him to be effective.

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But it seems to me that if we provide or help provide the security, then he has less motivation to change. How do you thread that

needle with the man to encourage him? And to say nothing of the

deals that you have mentioned that he has cut with the warlords,

which may limit his flexibility? It is very difficult to see a scenario

in which we get it all right and for him to be seen as credible and

legitimate. Can that needle be threaded, Mr. Thier?

Mr. THIER. I mean, I think that our experience is quite mixed.

Of course we can’t get it all right, but we can do a lot better than

we have done previously. I was very struck, in particular, on this

trip by noticing the dependency cycle that we have created with the

Afghans. When you look at our operations in Helmand this summer, we have been building the Afghan national army for 6, 7

years now, and by all accounts done a fairly good job; created some

independent units.

But when we made our most important mission this summer into

Helmand to try and clear parts of that province from the Taliban,

there were very little Afghan national security forces in there with

us. There were a variety of reasons for it, but ultimately I think

that as our presence has grown—I mean, you look at the graph of

our presence; we had 10,000 troops in Afghanistan in 2002, 100,000

today.

In many ways, I think, because of our presence, we have a tendency to stamp out Afghan initiative and leadership. And that is not

a call for pulling our troops out, but it is a call for forcing Afghans

into more of a leadership position, because I think, ultimately,

when they are taking more of the risk and bearing more of the burden, they will ultimately perform better. And that is true on the

development side as well as on the military side.

Mr. FLAKE. Dr. Dorronsoro, you want to speak?

Let me frame this a little better, something you said. You mentioned that in 2004 that there seemed to be the closest we had to

democratic leadership or the things that we want to see in there.

Since then we have had a resurgence of the Taliban, obviously.

What is the cause and effect? Was the Taliban able to come and

get the foothold that they didn’t have in 2004 because of the corruption of the Karzai regime or was that just incidental, or did the

resurgence of the Taliban create conditions that made Karzai have

to cut deals and become corrupt?

Mr. DORRONSORO. May I just say one word about what was said

before? I think if we want to empower the Afghan army, we have

to give them things they can do; so it is defensive, it is not offensive. On what we have seen, the videos of the Afghan army when

there is an ambush somewhere in the mountain, they run. They

run fast, it is good, but they run the wrong direction.

So we have to be clear about that, and it is not going to change

for different reasons. So let’s give them the road, the stone, that

kind of thing we can do. So do we need to integrate Afghan-U.S.

troops? Maybe yes, but for defensive objectives.

So the second thing is, yes, we have a surge every year since

2002. Never worked. We have had a major problem since summer

2002, and it is a way to answer your question. Clearly, people from

the Taliban, from Quetta, where they were obviously supported by

the Pakistanis, the Taliban leadership send people inside AfghaniVerDate 11-MAY-2000 15:02 Jun 23, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00052 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\KATIES\DOCS\65547.TXT KATIE PsN: KATIE
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stan the summer 2002 to get back support from the people, to talk

to the people. So it is starting there.

So they were there, they had an organization. In 2003 they were

preaching in the mosques in the Logar province that is just south

of Kabul, and what happened in the north after was not a spontaneous thing, it was partially organized by the Taliban leadership

in Quetta. That is the first answer.

The second answer is, yes, if everything had been fine in Afghanistan, the Taliban would have lost. But if you take a few places like

Ghazni and around Daykundi, the south of Ghazni, these places,

Karzai appointed Governors who were so bad they started a local

civil war, and that helped the Taliban a lot. And it is again and

again the same thing. And in a few places in the east, special operations from the United States have been a crucial element to alienate one or two tribes. So basically you see first the Taliban, then

the local situation.

Mr. TIERNEY. Mr. Welch, you are recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. WELCH. Thank you.

You know, the big decision the President is going to make is

about the troops, and there are two models; one is to put more

troops in and hope that will be a stabilizing influence—and I take

it from the testimony that you have offered, that you question that.

But if the other alternative is taken, that is, the U.S. withdraws

militarily to urban areas, doesn’t add troops, maintains, perhaps,

the current troop count, but minimizes its military presence by

withdrawing to urban areas with the goal essentially being stopping the Taliban from taking over Kabul and cities, what are the

implications of that? What happens? I would just appreciate quick

points of view from each of you, starting with Ambassador Galbraith.

Mr. GALBRAITH. I think that is the right question. As I said in

my testimony, I don’t think we actually have any good alternatives.

And to come to the chairman’s question as to whether any things

got changed with Karzai, well, he has been in power for more than

7 years and nothing has changed. He is now there, in addition to

being ineffective, tolerant of corruption, if not corrupt, he is there

by fraud.

So there is no reason to think that there is going to be changed.

There are a number of strategies that we might try, and I don’t dispute anything that my colleagues on the panel have said, but I

think we have to face up to that reality.

The reason I am against additional troops is because I don’t

think they will be effective because there is no credible partner.

And I am against a withdrawal because we will lose what has been

achieved. So that really leaves, by default, this option that you are

discussing, which is keeping the current force level, reconfiguring

them. It is not a happy solution, but among the available choices,

I think, frankly, it is the least bad.

Mr. THIER. I am not a military strategist; I don’t know exactly

what the right number of troops are. What I do believe that I agree

fundamentally with the premise that General McChrystal has set

forth that the protection of the Afghan population, providing security to the Afghan population, which is not what we have done previously, is of paramount importance, and that improvements in

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government and improvements in the delivery of assistance will

come with security.

So I don’t know whether that means the status quo, 15,000 more

troops or 40,000 more troops, but clearly I do believe that is the

most important mission. It does need to start in key urban centers,

but even when you look at that, if you look at Kandahar, for instance, Kandahar is probably the most important place at the moment to try and stabilize.

Mr. WELCH. Is that the most important mission, because that

will provide the best protection to the liberties of the Afghan people

or the best protection to the American people against another Al

Qaeda-launched attack?

Mr. THIER. Both. I believe fundamentally that the stabilization

of Afghanistan is the best way to protect the American people, because if Afghanistan is destabilized, if the Taliban controls significant territory in Afghanistan, then they will also provide a safe

haven to Al Qaeda.

Mr. TELLIS. I think the interim objective has to be securing what

we already have, which are the population centers, and primarily

protecting the new areas where the insurgency has made an appearance in the west and the north. To do that, I think McChrystal

will need the troop requests that he has made. I just don’t see how

the arithmetic of being able to protect the central areas of Afghanistan, and the west and the north, can be done with the troops that

we have.

But whether that becomes the ultimate objective is really an

issue of some controversy; that is, do we simply focus on the central part, the north and the west, and leave the south as it is, or

do we treat those as interim objectives, wait until the Afghan national army is raised and then move out? I think that is really

going to be the next big issue.

Mr. DORRONSORO. I think we cannot win against the Taliban; we

can contain the Taliban. You cannot win against an insurgency

that has protection in Pakistan. If the Pakistan army decides to attack the Afghan Taliban, then, OK, we can discuss again, but right

now they are not doing that; they are just focusing on the Pakistani Taliban. So to win against the Taliban is not on the table;

we cannot do it, we don’t have the resources. You need 200,000,

300,000 men just to seal the border. It is out of the question.

McChrystal’s strategy, we tried it the last few months in

Helmand. It is a disaster. One hundred fifty men have died in

Helmand, and I would like to know why. What do we have to show

for that? People cannot go out Sangin, a few hundred meters outside Sangin we have been ambushed, killed by IEDs. So it has already done, you know? It is not working. And if we do McChrystal

on a larger scale next year with 400,000 men, we are losing the

war, and I mean it. We are losing the war.

So we need a low casualty strategy because it is the only, only

way to give time to ourselves and to the Afghans to build something like an Afghan state and exit. It is absolutely crucial.

Mr. WELCH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you.

Mr. TIERNEY. Mr. Van Hollen, you are recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. VAN HOLLEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

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I have some questions for Ambassador Galbraith with respect to

the role of the U.N. Mission in Afghanistan. First of all, what size

is the U.N. Mission, how big a presence does the U.N. have there?

Mr. GALBRAITH. About 4,000 people, most of them being Afghans.

Mr. VAN HOLLEN. Four thousand people under the jurisdiction.

And would you agree that it is important that the U.N. Mission be

seen in Afghanistan as working to uphold the rule of law, making

sure that there is, to the extent possible, democratic process, and

not be seen as siding with the government against other groups

within Afghanistan?

Mr. GALBRAITH. Absolutely. The United Nations has a role in Afghanistan that is different from what it has in most parts of the

world. It is the one institution that has been in Afghanistan

through the last 30 years, so it has or had a level of respect, which

also was related to the perception that it was neutral; and, unfortunately, its conduct in the elections or the conduct of the head of the

Mission has served to compromise that neutrality.

Mr. VAN HOLLEN. Right. Well, I want to get to that because I am

troubled about the message that was sent with your firing in Afghanistan, because, as I understand the facts—and correct me if I

am wrong or please elaborate—essentially you were calling the

shots as you saw them; you saw that there was fraud in the election, you brought it up internally within the U.N. Mission, you expressed your concerns privately to the appropriate people within

the Afghan government, and you were vindicated in the end.

But, as a result of telling the truth and giving the facts, you were

fired, and that would seem to me to send a very chilling message

to other people involved in this effort who are trying to do their

best to speak the truth and call the shots. Sometimes they are

right, sometimes they are wrong; but to be fired for essentially providing your opinion, it seems to me, sends a very bad message.

If you could talk about that and if you know what the consequences have been within the U.N. agency there with respect to

the fallout from your firing.

Mr. GALBRAITH. Well, obviously, I agree with what you are saying, but let me start with one basic proposition, which is that diplomatic missions are not democracies. So there is a head of mission

and that person does get to decide, but that person has to be open

to frank talk from his or her subordinates, and that is what went

on here.

I mean, there was the additional problem that he was often away

on vacation or a mission in this period, so I was in charge, and I

was proceeding basically with doing my job, which, as I saw it, was

to support the Afghan institutions and the conduct of free, fair, inclusive, and transparent elections. And the level of intervention

was hardly extreme.

I asked the chief electoral officer in Afghanistan merely to stick

with the published guidelines of the Independent Election Commission, which was to exclude obviously fraudulent ballots. I tried to

get the Independent Election Commission to remove from the rolls

polling centers that were in locations where they were never going

to open.

Later, Ban Ki-moon, the Secretary General, has said I was fired

because I wanted to disenfranchise Afghan voters. But that wasn’t

52

true; these were removing from the rolls places where nobody got

to vote. But, of course, the real disenfranchisement was when more

than a million phoney votes were cast, basically canceling out the

honest votes that were cast.

But, in the end,—and this was what was explained to me by

Alain Le Roy, who was the Under Secretary General for Peacekeeping; he said you had the misfortune that your private disagreement

became known public through no fault of your own, and that was

the reason you were removed; and I do think that sends a terrible

signal.

You asked about the impact on the mission. Well, the head of

mission, by his own admission, was a terrible manager. This whole

event, series of events have been deeply demoralizing. Many of the

American and British staff working there, and Scandinavians, have

now left. I think 7 out of the 10 people in the Political Affairs Division, which is the heart of the Mission, have left or are in the process of leaving, so it has all had a very adverse effect on morale, of

course, accompanied with what has now happened with the attack

on U.N. personnel.

Mr. VAN HOLLEN. All right.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you, Mr. Van Hollen.

Mr. Doggett, welcome to the committee.

Mr. DOGGETT. Thank you for the invitation to come over today

and thank you, Chairman Tierney, for organizing this important

hearing at such an important time in the development of our policy

in Afghanistan.

I also particularly appreciate all the witnesses. I was on the floor

in debate, or I would have been here. But I have seen your statements and I particularly appreciate, Ambassador Galbraith, your

participation and will direct my questions to you.

First, I want to say, in the strongest terms, how much I admire

the integrity that you have brought to your work in Afghanistan

and to express my appreciation that you have had the courage of

your convictions in your service there, and in your comments since

departing Afghanistan. It appears to me that we have invested tens

of millions of American tax dollars in order to ensure that we had

a Presidential election that would provide us a strong democratic

partner with whom to work in Afghanistan, and that investment

was wasted, not to mention the literally thousands of lives, American and otherwise, that were there trying to ensure the integrity

of this election. All of that put at risk and our attempt to get a full,

free, fair election failed miserably.

Mr. GALBRAITH. I agree with you entirely. Obviously, the responsibility in the first instance rests on those who committed the

fraud, the Afghans, of course. But the United Nations had a responsibility, and the head of the mission took the view that his

mandate did not go beyond providing the money; that we had no

right to be involved, no right to interfere, to tell the Independent

Election Commission that we expected them to behave in a nonpartisan and fair way. That was the nub of the disagreement.

And, of course, the fundamental problem was that the Independent Election Commission was not independent; the head, Kai Eide,

the head of the Commission, knew it wasn’t independent; nonetheVerDate 11-MAY-2000 15:02 Jun 23, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00056 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\KATIES\DOCS\65547.TXT KATIE PsN: KATIE
53

less, he chose not to act and, as a result, more than 200 million

of American taxpayer dollars were wasted, and, of course, it has

cost lives because the military mission has become much more complicated.

Mr. DOGGETT. And the amount of fraud that the Karzai folks

were involved in here, it was not just a little ballot stuffing there

or a little jimmying of the numbers here; it was massive, blatant,

and obvious fraud.

Mr. GALBRAITH. At least a third of the Karzai ballots were fraudulent, well over a million. In fact, the final results of the first

round were announced that 49 percent for Karzai, but that is because they just did a statistical sample. If there had been a full

count, it probably would 41 to 35 percent. And it is not 100 percent

clear to me that in fact Karzai would have won an honest second

round, had there been one, but then the Election Commission basically took decisions that made it impossible to have an honest second round.

Mr. DOGGETT. We are, as all of our witnesses in the committee

recognized, at the conclusion of the bloodiest month for our American military personnel in a deteriorating 8-year struggle in Afghanistan. I read with interest—and it parallels your comments

here today, Ambassador—your recent writing in The Guardian,

that ‘‘Under these circumstances’’—referring to the Karzai fraud—

‘‘sending more troops to Afghanistan to implement a

counterinsurgency strategy is a waste of precious military resources.’’ Is that still your view today?

Mr. GALBRAITH. It is. And if I may explain the difference that I

have with my colleague here, whose view is otherwise, I think I

agree with that fully. I do not believe that having additional troops

provide security will lead to improvements in government. That

was the position he was putting forward. But I think that is wrong

because the government is itself, the Karzai administration, is

hopelessly tainted with fraud and, anyhow, it has been ineffective

and corrupt for the last 7 years. So it is impossible to see how it

could get better.

Mr. DOGGETT. I gather it follows, then, the fact that President

Karzai has raised his hand and taken an oath as the victor in a

totally corrupt election, and the administration has tried to put the

best face it could on its corrupt partner, that you don’t see him

changing his colors or his conduct?

Mr. GALBRAITH. No, I don’t.

Mr. DOGGETT. And is there anything in the way of a policy

change that you see we can implement that will get us out of the

quagmire we are in there?

Mr. GALBRAITH. I can tell you I have been in a number of conflict

and post-conflict situations.

Mr. DOGGETT. Indeed.

Mr. GALBRAITH. And in every other circumstance where I have

been I have had in my mind a roadmap. Haven’t always known

that you could get on the road, but at least I have known there was

a roadmap. Here, I don’t see one. That said, I can think of a couple

of things that could help improve the situation, and probably the

most important is structural change in Afghanistan. It has a highly

54

centralized system of government for one of the most diverse countries ethnically and geographically, and it doesn’t work.

It isn’t as if the central government really runs things; it doesn’t.

It is also centralized in the sense of all powers rest in Kabul. It

is centralized also in the sense that there is a powerful president

and a weak parliament.

So Dr. Abdullah Abdullah, President Karzai’s main challenger,

proposed constitutional change that would have had power sharing

at the center, a weaker president, but with a prime minister and

cabinet chosen by parliament, so all the different ethnic groups and

factions are genuinely represented, and elected local government.

I would go further and give the elected local government some

legislative budget and tax authority. So I think that would be a

step in the right way. Then we would also be stepping away from

having Karzai as our partner; we would have other partners. Obviously, this is something we can’t impose this, but we have a lot of

clout, so it is something we can encourage. But I don’t think it is

going to provide a solution.

And the real problem in Afghanistan is that the center of gravity

of this conflict is not Kabul, it is the provinces and districts, and

the way in which most Afghans experience government in those

parts of the country is corruption, lack of services, but, above all,

abuse of power, people operating with impunity; and the government has now lost the support of the people. And even if you bring

in good government, it cannot regain it, because anybody who

would now sign up with the government would do so, at least in

the Pashtun areas, where the Taliban are, at the risk of their lives,

and that isn’t going to happen.

Mr. DOGGETT. At this point, about how much of the land area of

Afghanistan is under the control of the Karzai government in any

meaningful way?

Mr. GALBRAITH. Well, I think to some degree the answer to that

is very little, because a large part of the territory in the Pashtun

areas is where the Taliban operate freely, including in the second

largest city, Kandahar; and in the Tajik and Hazara areas it is

really the local leaders, not the Taliban, who control it.

Mr. DOGGETT. Mr. Chairman, thank you. I established over in

the Budget Committee the other day that for every new troop that

would be sent from here to Afghanistan, it is $1 million per year

per troop. We need to give very careful consideration to the testimony here, and thank you for the work of your committee.

Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you, Mr. Doggett. You have added great

contribution to the committee’s work.

We have checked also with the Appropriations Committee and

indicated what would it cost for 40,000 additional troops, because

that was the number being bandied around. General Petraeus’s

own counterinsurgency book, if you were to read it, would ask for

a lot more troops than just for this type of territory—the size, the

geography, the topography—and it would be for 14 years, on average. But just 10 years with just the 40,000 troops would be some $800

billion. So I think one thing we have to add into the equation of

our consideration here is what is the tolerance for the U.S. population, in its own economic turmoil here, to move forward if they

55

don’t see it is a prime national security interest of our country,

which brings me a couple of points as we wind up here.

One, first of all, having just also, Dr. Thier, come back on Saturday—actually, on Sunday—from Pakistan, being there last week,

one gets the feeling that both Pakistan and Afghanistan feel that

the United States has no options; that no matter what they do or

don’t do, that the United States sort of put itself in a position that

you have to keep feeding money to these folks and hope for the

best.

The Pakistanis focusing, as Dr. Dorronsoro says, on who they

think are their biggest problem and neglecting those mutual problems that we might have—the Haqqani, the Taliban, and others—

and doing it pretty blatantly, and Afghanis continuing their corruption and their impunity because they can, because there is no incentive for them to stop it, certainly, because this is how they are

all making money. So that is one problem that I think we have.

The other is the stability interest in that region doesn’t all reside

with Europe and the United States and Japan. India, Iran, Russia,

China, the other-stans, why haven’t we invited them into the game

and basically they have a lot more, in many instances, at risk here

than we do; yet we tend to sort of keep them at arm’s length and

not let them get involved. There could be an argument for handing

it over and letting them worry about it to a large extent and see

what they come up with on this, because they certainly don’t want

it to unravel.

But because of time constraints, let me just lay out one last proposition for general comments on this. Concern, apparently, underlying all this is that if some Taliban were to be allowed back into

Afghanistan, that they might accede to allowing Al Qaeda, which

numbers less than 100 in Afghanistan right now and around 500

or less in all of Pakistan, that group of people might come back in

and get a foothold in Afghanistan.

But Al Qaeda is already—five to one, at least, probably six to one

numbers—in Pakistan, not Afghanistan. There are essentially no

Al Qaeda in Afghanistan; they are in Sudan, they are in Yemen,

they are in Somalia. The Madrid and London bombings were not

planned or perpetrated out of Afghanistan; they were essentially

out of Pakistan, if anywhere. Given that, how do we reconcile the

prospect that we are keeping hundreds of thousands of troops from

the international community in a place where there are no Al

Qaeda and no troops in the many places where there are Al Qaeda?

Unless you say it is not really about Al Qaeda when it comes to

Afghanistan, it is about nation building. And if that is the point,

just when do we change our goals for what the President set out,

of wanting to destabilize and defeat Al Qaeda, and move it over to

try to build a nation in a place where that has been an unlikely

prospect for a long, long time?

Mr. Thier.

Mr. THIER. If I can just for 1 second, I just want to correct, I

think, a slight mischaracterization of my remarks by Ambassador

Galbraith. I in no way advocated for additional troops; I very explicitly said I didn’t know if the current level may be sufficient or

40,000. It is the way the troops are used and the Mission should

change.

56

Mr. TIERNEY. I think the record clearly reflects your recollection

as correct.

Mr. THIER. I think that we have a series of intertwined interests

that keep us needing to remain in Afghanistan through this difficult period. The reason Al Qaeda is in Pakistan at the moment

is because we chased them out of Afghanistan in 2001, and I have

no reason to believe, nor have I seen any evidence, that if the

Taliban were to come over back into Afghanistan and take over significant parts of the territory, that they wouldn’t bring them with

them. I think we have to look at——

Mr. TIERNEY. Well, wait a minute. Do you have any evidence

that they would?

Mr. THIER. Well, yes. I think we have significant evidence that

they are likely to welcome Al Qaeda back in based on what we experienced until 2001.

Mr. TIERNEY. If the Mullah Omar faction of Taliban were again

to take over.

Mr. THIER. Yes.

Mr. TIERNEY. Which is by no means certain.

Mr. THIER. Well, Haqqani as well. I mean, Haqqani is the one

who initially brought Mullah Omar to Afghanistan from Sudan.

I think it is really the contiguous area. They don’t recognize the

border; we do. There is no place like home, I believe, for Al Qaeda;

they are genetically linked, they have been training and recruiting

in that part of the world, on the Afghanistan-Pakistan border, for

a long time. They have a much better place to work and survive

and recruit there, I believe, than in Yemen and Somalia. So I think

it continues to pose a threat, but it is not exclusively that.

I also think that the stability of the region, the chance of the

spread of extremism—obviously, we have seen what has happened

to Pakistan over the last few years, which is quite scary. The potential spread of that into central Asia as well. There are a lot of

Uzbeks in Pakistan, as you know, in the tribal areas, and the reason that they are there is because they are trying to foment a revolution in Uzbekistan. I think that the unpredictability and potential for conflict between India and Pakistan, if we don’t deal with

the militancy crisis in Pakistan, also exists.

So I think it is problematic to try and narrow it down to one interest. I think, collectively, the United States has a lot of interests

in the stability of the region, and I agree fundamentally with the

way Ambassador Galbraith formulated it, that, as difficult as it is

to stay at the moment, leaving, I think, is a far worse option. I do

think we have the potential to improve our performance there significantly and to change the momentum, and I think that we have

the next year or two to prove that we can do that.

Mr. TIERNEY. Doctor, tell us what about India and the-stans who,

according to Dr. Thier, have an interest in this also? Where are

they?

Mr. TELLIS. Well, let me answer both those questions. I think the

reason why we have restrained ourselves from having a more active regional approach, that is, the regional players actually providing troops on the ground and doing some of the nation-building effort, is because there are very serious forms of security differences

between these players themselves; and our concern is that if you

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brought the Indians, the Iranians, and the Central Asian states

into Afghanistan in a substantial way, Afghanistan would become

a new battleground for the play of these own interests, and the

consequences of that would be each one would support their own

proxies, and the struggles between these proxies would then create

the environment that would allow for the import of various terrorist groups.

If you remember, in the years between 1991 and 2001, that is exactly what happened in Afghanistan. There was a rivalry between

the Central Asian states—India, Iran, and Pakistan—which led to

the Pakistanis attempting to protect their equities in Afghanistan

to the creation of the Taliban.

Mr. TIERNEY. Interestingly, Mr. Doggett asked the question

about what proportion of the country was really solidly held by the

Karzai government, and the answer was very little. So wouldn’t

you think, if they were so fond of home, as was said earlier, that

they would already bee back there?

Mr. TELLIS. Well, my basic sense is that if the Taliban were to

come back to power in Afghanistan—and we are only talking the

Mullah Omar Taliban right now, because I am not sure there is another Taliban; and the other Taliban really doesn’t matter from

our——

Mr. TIERNEY. Do they need to come back to power or do they just

need to have control over certain land areas? And that is already

available to them.

Mr. TELLIS. Yes. And the reason why we have not had magnification of our problems is because in those areas coalition troops are

still operating. We are still pressing Al Qaeda into the frontier. If

there was open access between the FATA and Afghanistan, in a

way that would be the case. If the Taliban had greater authority,

I think you would begin to see not only Al Qaeda, but also the

other groups like the Haqqani network and the HIG, which are of

concern to us. So I think we have to keep pressing them because

the alternatives are too dangerous.

Mr. TIERNEY. Any other Members have any questions?

[No response.]

Mr. TIERNEY. Any member of the panel wish to clarify any final

point or add some information that we ought to hear? Dr.

Dorronsoro.

Mr. DORRONSORO. Just about the reason why Al Qaeda is not in

Afghanistan. I think they don’t want to be in Afghanistan if we

keep the cities, because they cannot work from Afghanistan. They

are not interested in fighting Americans directly in Afghanistan;

what they want is cities, communication, cell phone, whatever, to

strike us in Europe and the United States. They are not interested

in the Afghan countryside. That is why the main interest for us in

Afghanistan is to keep the cities. If we keep the cities, Al Qaeda

will not be back.

Mr. GALBRAITH. If I can add. The Taliban is not going to take

over all of Afghanistan. It has no support among the Tajiks or the

Hazaras. So the worst case scenario is we are talking about a situation where they control the Pashtun areas and basically take over

Kandahar; and, frankly, at this stage, we are not that far from that

worst case scenario.

58

There is another point I would make about Pakistan, which is a

major part of this issue. There is a civilian government in Pakistan

which has a different approach from the view of the military,

which, of course, remains very powerful and which, in my view, operates in an alternate universe, seeing India as the kinder threat;

whereas, India really—if you talk to Pakistanis, military, India

comes up in a minute.

You talk in India, you can go all day and nobody mentions Pakistan. But the civilian government does want better relations with

India; it has resisted viewing Afghanistan as a place to fight a

proxy war with the Indians, it has resisted viewing it as an area

in depth. Pakistan’s interference in these recent elections was

much less than in the past, and that was the influence of President

Zardari and the Foreign Minister Qureshi.

So I think that as we look at our Pakistan policy, we do have a

strong interest in supporting the civilian government, that it

should complete its term, and that there is a gradual process that

leads to true civilian control over the military, because that, I

think, will make a difference to India; relations with India, stability in the region and in Afghanistan.

Mr. TIERNEY. Mr. Thier.

Mr. THIER. I just wanted to say one final thing, and I am sure

Ambassador Galbraith would agree with this. I think we would be

remiss in not mentioning for the record that there was one institution in this Afghan election process that stood head and shoulders

above the rest, and that was the Electoral Complaints Commission,

which was a mixed body, Afghan and international, that really,

against all odds, all political pressure, acted with great technical

expertise and, in some ways, rescued part of the legitimacy of this

election by demonstrating that even Karzai could be held to a legal

standard in the end. I think that they did an amazing job and

should be commended for it.

Mr. TIERNEY. Last shot, Ambassador Galbraith.

Mr. GALBRAITH. Thank you.

Mr. TIERNEY. What, if anything, could the United States have

done to protect its investment to the United Nations, UNAMA, that

was supposed to go to free and fair elections?

Mr. GALBRAITH. Well, let me just have a comment about the

Electoral Complaints Commission. I, of course, agree it did a very

good job, but that is now the current line by the head of the U.N.

Mission, the system worked. It didn’t work. The massive fraud discredited the elections in the eyes of the Afghan people; it plunged

the country into a 7-week crisis; the crisis ended in circumstances

where you could not have had a fair runoff. So even though, technically, this Commission did its job—incidentally, where there was

only one Afghan member because the pro-Karzai one resigned—it

didn’t really rescue the day.

Now, as to what the United Nations——

Mr. TIERNEY. What the United States could have done?

Mr. GALBRAITH. What the United States could have done, the

United States, I think, rightly left it to the United Nations because

it was responsible. I guess I have to say, although I am credited

with having been spoken out and stood up, perhaps I really didn’t

do enough, because I took seriously my role as an international

59

civil servant and I didn’t go and raise the flag as strongly as I

might during this period in the lead-up to the elections and the immediate part of it.

I was a part of a system and, as a diplomat, I stayed within that

system. But clearly all the countries ought to have done more,

ought to have ganged up, if you will, on the head of the U.N. Mission and said we had a huge investment here and we expect you

to do something to make sure the elections are free and fair.

But that said, that was a secondary shortcoming; the primary

shortcoming was with the U.N. Mission, and with the head of it,

which, by any standard of common sense, should have known that

just giving money wasn’t sufficient, that the Independent Election

Commission was partisan and there needed to be oversight for our

money.

Mr. TIERNEY. Were there red flags that the United States and

other members of the international community should have seen

along the way to know that it wasn’t heading in that direction, or

would that have taken the insight and the perspective of being

with the UNAMA group to see that?

Mr. GALBRAITH. There were some red flags, and, frankly, the administration did raise them. It is well known that Ambassador

Holbrooke had, shall we say, a difficult meeting with President

Karzai the day after the election, and the reason was he understood fully what had happened and he wanted Karzai’s commitment that he would run in a second round if that is how the ballots

turned out, and Karzai didn’t want to hear that.

So there was toughness from President Obama’s team. And I

think it is terribly important that we insist that Karzai doesn’t

choose the interlocutors with the United States. There is one U.S.

Government view, that has been the position of the administration;

that must stay the position of the administration, and they don’t

get to choose who it is that they talk to; we choose.

Mr. TIERNEY. Well, thank you, once again, all of you very, very

much. You have been very helpful and very informative.

With that, the meeting is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 3:38 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]

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