SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-3876-18T4

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

ROY DOVE, a/k/a MICHAEL

FLEMING, MIKE FLEMMING,

and KENT HUNT,

Defendant-Respondent.

Submitted August 28, 2019 – Decided

Before Judges Alvarez and Gooden Brown.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law 

Division, Essex County, Indictment No. 97-05-2358.

Theodore N. Stephens II, Acting Essex County 

Prosecutor, attorney for appellant (Frank J. Ducoat, 

Special Deputy Attorney General/Acting Assistant 

Prosecutor, of counsel and on the brief).

Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for 

respondent (Diane E. Carl, First Assistant Deputy 

Public Defender, of counsel and on the brief).

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the 

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

September 4, 2019
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PER CURIAM

By way of interlocutory appeal, the State challenges a Law Division order 

granting defendant Roy Dove's motion to correct an illegal sentence. We 

reverse.

Defendant was convicted by a jury of the following: first-degree 

aggravated manslaughter, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-4; first-degree felony murder, 

N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(a)(3); first-degree armed robbery, N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1; fourthdegree unlawful possession of a knife, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(d); and third-degree 

possession of a knife for an unlawful purpose, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4(d). On May 

29, 1998, Dove was sentenced to an aggregate term of life in prison without 

parole, and a separate eighteen months for the unlawful possession of a knife. 

Although the convictions and sentence were affirmed, the matter was remanded 

for the entry of an amended judgment merging all the offenses.

1

 State v. Dove, 

No. A-6522-98 (App. Div. Oct. 2, 2000). The Supreme Court denied 

certification. State v. Dove, 167 N.J. 88 (2001). 

Defendant's two post-conviction relief (PCR) applications, both based on 

the grounds of ineffective assistance of counsel, were denied by way of 

 

1

 It is unclear whether a subsequent amended judgment was ever entered. None 

was included in either party's appendix. The only judgment of conviction

provided is dated May 29, 1998. 
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unpublished opinions. State v. Dove, No. A-0567-04 (App. Div. Jan. 30, 2006); 

State v. Dove, No. A-4030-08 (App. Div. May 4, 2010). Defendant only 

petitioned for certification as to the first PCR, which was denied. State v. Dove, 

186 N.J. 604 (2006). Defendant's petition for federal habeas corpus relief was 

also denied. Dove v. Ricci, No. 06-04940-FSH (D.N.J. Aug. 23, 2007). 

When he sentenced defendant in 1998, the judge said:

[U]nfortunately, as I have indicated . . . a jury 

has found you guilty of all of these charges. The State 

has made a motion for an extended term as a repeat 

offender, and pursuant to the statute they've confirmed 

their right to do so, and I must agree by virtue of the 

evidence submitted to me that they are correct, and I 

shall sentence you accordingly.

The jury, despite your disagreement, required a 

total time of less than four and one-half hours to 

determine your guilt on these very serious matters.

I have considered your presentence report very 

carefully. You're 36 years of age. You've been 

convicted as the State has indicated, of two serious 

crimes before. There's the necessity to deter you and 

others.

Defendant now alleges by way of motion that the judge's failure to 

articulate additional reasons made the sentence illegal and requires correction. 

Although appearing to agree with the State that even if defendant was 

resentenced, life without parole was mandated pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.1, 
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the Law Division judge nonetheless granted the application. The only reason 

she gave for the decision is that it would give defendant an opportunity to proffer

the rehabilitative efforts he made since his incarceration some twenty years 

prior.

Defendant does not question his eligibility for mandatory life without 

parole pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.1(a). He had been convicted of two firstdegree armed robberies, N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1, when at least twenty-one years old

before his 1998 sentence. Thus, defendant was then also eligible for sentencing 

as a persistent offender pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:44-3(a). 

The controlling case is State v. Acevedo, 205 N.J. 40 (2011). In that per 

curiam decision, the Court posed the question: "whether the imposition of 

consecutive sentences without a statement of reasons gives rise to [a basis for]

relief on a petition for [PCR]." Id. at 42. The Court held that the sentence was 

not "illegal," within the scope of the rules related to PCR, and was "therefore 

not subject to modification on PCR." Ibid. The Court reviewed years of relevant 

precedent, reaffirming the well-established principle that the failure to state 

reasons for an otherwise legal sentence is not grounds for post-conviction relief. 

Id. at 45-47. 
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Just as in Acevedo, this defendant contends that the sentence is illegal 

because of the judge's failure to enumerate the relevant aggravating and 

mitigating factors, or otherwise expand on his reasons. That does not suffice to 

make the sentence illegal. Applying Acevedo's straightforward mandate, we 

must respectfully disagree with the Law Division judge.

Reversed.