NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

TINA V., Appellant,

v.

DEPARTMENT OF CHILD SAFETY, L.C., B.C., Appellees.

No. 1 CA-JV 18-0148 

Appeal from the Superior Court in Yavapai County

No. P1300JD201600055

The Honorable Anna C. Young, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Law Office of Florence M. Bruemmer, PC, Anthem

By Florence M. Bruemmer

Counsel for Appellant

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Tucson

By Laura J. Huff

Counsel for Appellee Department of Child Safety

FILED 10-25-2018
TINA V. v. DCS, et al.

Decision of the Court

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MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Peter B. Swann delivered the decision of the court, in which Presiding 

Judge Kenton D. Jones and Judge David D. Weinzweig joined.

S W A N N, Judge:

¶1 This is an appeal from an order severing parental rights. We 

affirm because reasonable evidence supports the severance order.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 Tina V. (“Mother”) and David C. (“Father”) are the biological 

parents of minor children L.C. and B.C. (collectively, “Children”).1

¶3 In August 2016, after Father’s arrest for domestic violence 

against Mother (among other things) and Mother’s arrest for aggravated 

driving under the influence, the Department of Child Safety removed the 

Children from their parents’ care. The Department also found that the 

family was living in a musty and trash-strewn recreational vehicle with an 

inoperable water pump, a leaky roof, and multiple animals. Mother 

admitted to improper use of psychiatric medication as well as illegal drug 

use, and the Department discovered that she had a history of substanceabuse problems, mental-health problems, and domestic violence with 

Father.

¶4 The Department offered Mother substance-abuse treatment

and education, random urinalysis, behavioral-health treatment, counseling, 

domestic-violence education, a psychological evaluation, medication 

monitoring, parenting classes, parent-aide services and supervised visits 

with L.C., and therapeutic visits and visit coaching with B.C., who has 

special behavioral-health needs.

¶5 Mother participated in services. But her test results showed 

inconsistent and often excessive use of prescribed drugs over 16 months of 

random urinalysis. She also missed multiple tests, once tested positive for 

 

1 Father’s parental rights were severed but he is not a party to this 

appeal.
TINA V. v. DCS, et al.

Decision of the Court

3

excessive alcohol, and sometimes failed to provide urine samples in a 

manner compliant with the collection facilities’ requirements.

¶6 The Department reported in July 2017 that Mother had 

admitted not taking her psychiatric medications as prescribed. Mother then 

made similar admissions in November 2017, several months after reports

that Mother appeared heavily medicated at two visits. Mother failed to 

participate in counseling during the same period.

¶7 Mother and Father continued to live in the recreational 

vehicle, moving it between parking lots and staying in motels or with 

friends during colder weather, until the vehicle was impounded in August 

2017. Around the same time, Father was placed in housing for the seriously 

mentally ill and reported that Mother had told him he did not need to take 

his psychiatric medication. Mother soon had Father discharged to move 

out of county, in violation of his probation conditions. He was 

subsequently incarcerated, a situation for which Mother refused to 

acknowledge any responsibility. Mother also refused to acknowledge 

domestic violence in her relationship with Father.

¶8 The Department moved to sever Mother’s relationship with 

the Children in November 2017. Mother, with the support of her guardian 

ad litem, requested a “paper trial” and stipulated to the Department’s 

exhibits. The court questioned Mother and determined that her waiver of 

trial rights was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. The court then granted 

Mother’s request to be excused from the trial. Her counsel and guardian ad 

litem remained and were afforded the opportunity to cross-examine the 

Department’s sole witness, the case manager.

¶9 The case manager testified to the following. The Children 

were adoptable teenagers. L.C. had no opinion regarding the case plan, but 

expressed happiness and a desire to remain with her adoptive 

grandparental placement. And though the grandparents had previously 

been unable to maintain B.C. in their home because of his behavioral-health 

issues, they remained willing to adopt B.C. once he was ready to leave his 

therapeutic placement, which had offered to provide continuing support. 

The grandparents had remained in contact with B.C. and experienced 

increasingly positive visits with him. While upset about not knowing his 

future, B.C. said he did not want to disappoint his parents by “choos[ing] a 

side.” Evidence established that B.C. experienced increased anxiety on 

several occasions after having contact with Mother, as well as after she 

cancelled visits on short notice.
TINA V. v. DCS, et al.

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¶10 Mother’s counsel submitted a written closing argument that 

included Mother’s statements. Mother wrote that she loved the Children, 

had tried to participate in all services, did not drink, was not “messed up 

on medication,” had a stable living situation, and would be able to purchase 

a home once she received back pay.

¶11 The court severed Mother’s parental rights to the Children 

under A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(2), (B)(3), and (B)(8)(c). Mother appeals.

DISCUSSION

¶12 Mother contends that the Department failed to present 

sufficient evidence to support termination of her parental rights. To sever 

a parent-child relationship, the juvenile court must find by clear and 

convincing evidence at least one of the grounds set forth in A.R.S. § 8-

533(B), and the court must find by a preponderance of the evidence that 

severance is in the child’s best interests. Kent K. v. Bobby M., 210 Ariz. 279, 

288, ¶ 41 (2005); Michael J. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 196 Ariz. 246, 249, ¶ 12 

(2000). We accept the court’s findings of fact unless they are not supported 

by any reasonable evidence, and we will affirm the severance order unless 

it is clearly erroneous. Jesus M. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 203 Ariz. 278, 280, 

¶ 4 (App. 2002). We hold that reasonable evidence supports the juvenile 

court’s severance of Mother’s parental rights under A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(8)(c).2

¶13 Severance under § 8-533(B)(8)(c) requires proof that a child 

has been in out-of-home placement for a cumulative total period of at least 

15 months, the Department has made a diligent effort to provide 

appropriate reunification services, the parent has been unable to remedy 

the circumstances that cause the child to be in an out-of-home placement, 

and a substantial likelihood exists that the parent will not be capable of 

exercising proper and effective parental care and control in the near future. 

The circumstances that cause the child to be in an out-of-home placement 

are those “‘existing at the time of the severance’ that prevent a parent from 

being able to appropriately provide for his or her children.” Marina P. v. 

Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 214 Ariz. 326, 330, ¶ 22 (App. 2007) (citation 

omitted).

 

2 We therefore do not address whether the evidence also supported 

severance under § 8-533(B)(2) and (B)(3). See Jesus M., 203 Ariz. at 280, 

¶ 3 (“If clear and convincing evidence supports any one of the statutory 

grounds on which the juvenile court ordered severance, we need not 

address claims pertaining to the other grounds.”).
TINA V. v. DCS, et al.

Decision of the Court

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¶14 The record shows that the Children were in out-of-home 

placement for at least 15 months, during which time the Department 

offered Mother appropriate reunification services. Throughout the removal 

period, including during the period immediately preceding the severance 

trial, Mother missed urinalysis tests and provided samples that showed

inconsistent and abusive use of her prescribed psychiatric medications. 

Further, she admitted to the Department several times that she was not 

taking her medications as prescribed. Mother’s continued inability to 

manage her prescription drug use was by itself sufficient to show that she 

had been unable to remedy the circumstances that caused the Children to 

be in out-of-home placements, and that it was substantially likely she 

would be incapable of exercising proper and effective parental care and 

control in the near future.

¶15 We further hold that reasonable evidence supports the 

juvenile court’s determination that severance of Mother’s parental rights 

served the Children’s best interests. In considering a child’s best interests, 

the juvenile court must determine whether, based upon the totality of the 

evidence, the child would benefit from severance or be harmed by 

continuation of the parent-child relationship. Alma S. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 

245 Ariz. 146, 150–51, ¶ 13 (2018). Relevant factors include whether the 

child would be at risk of abuse or neglect if placed in the parent’s care, 

whether the child’s existing placement is meeting the child’s needs, 

whether the child is adoptable, and whether an adoptive placement is 

immediately available. Raymond F. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 224 Ariz. 373, 

383, ¶ 30 (App. 2010); Christina G. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 227 Ariz. 231, 

238, ¶ 27 (App. 2011); Linda V. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 211 Ariz. 76, 80,

¶ 17 (App. 2005).

¶16 Mother’s sustained misuse and abuse of her psychiatric 

medication established with substantial likelihood her continued inability 

to safely and successfully parent the Children. Further, the evidence 

established not only the Children’s adoptability, but also the existence of an 

appropriate adoptive placement, L.C.’s desire to remain with the 

placement, B.C.’s need for certainty, and Mother’s exacerbation of B.C.’s 

anxiety.
TINA V. v. DCS, et al.

Decision of the Court

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CONCLUSION

¶17 Reasonable evidence supports the juvenile court’s severance 

order. We therefore affirm.