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NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY APPELLATE PANEL

OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT

In re: ) BAP No. CC-15-1271-TaKuF

)

HOLY HILL COMMUNITY CHURCH, ) Bk. No. 2:14-bk-21070-WB

)

Debtor. )

______________________________)

)

DANA PARK, )

)

Appellant, )

)

v. ) MEMORANDUM*

)

RICHARD J. LASKI, Chapter 11 )

Trustee, )

)

Appellee. )

______________________________)

Argued and Submitted on February 19, 2016

at Pasadena, California

Filed – March 7 2016

Appeal from the United States Bankruptcy Court

for the Central District of California

Honorable Julia W. Brand, Bankruptcy Judge, Presiding

 

Appearances: Marvin Levy argued for appellant Dana Park; 

Richard D. Buckley argued for appellee Richard J.

Laski, Chapter 11 Trustee.

 

Before: TAYLOR, KURTZ, and FARIS, Bankruptcy Judges.

FILED

MAR 07 2016

SUSAN M. SPRAUL, CLERK

U.S. BKCY. APP. PANEL

OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication. 

Although it may be cited for whatever persuasive value it may

have (see Fed. R. App. P. 32.1), it has no precedential value. 

See 9th Cir. BAP Rule 8024-1(c)(2).
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INTRODUCTION

Dana Park appeals from an order disallowing her proof of

claim with prejudice. We AFFIRM. 

FACTS1

Pre-petition, the Debtor – a Presbyterian church - obtained

two loans from Hanmi Bank.2 The loans were evidenced by

promissory notes and secured by deeds of trust encumbering the

Debtor’s valuable real property in Los Angeles, California (the

“Property”). Also pre-petition, internal discord arose between

the church leadership and its membership and then between the

church leadership and its governing organization. This discord

culminated in the governing organization’s spring 2011 ouster of

the Debtor’s pastor and board of elders; various litigation in

California state court followed.

Eventually, in June 2014, the Debtor filed a chapter 11

petition; the Trustee was appointed soon after. 

While the record is unclear as to her history with the

Debtor and its disputes, Park soon participated in the

bankruptcy case. She filed a three-page proof of claim in the

1 These parties were very recently before the Panel. In

Park v. Laski (In re Holy Hill Community Church), 2016 WL 80032

(9th Cir. BAP Jan. 5, 2016) (“Holy Hill I”), Park appealed from

the bankruptcy court’s order dismissing, with prejudice, her

complaint against chapter 11 debtor Holy Hill Community Church. 

We concluded that the appeal was moot and, in the alternative,

that a merits analysis did not warrant reversal. We include

here only those facts most relevant to this appeal. 

2 We exercise our discretion to take judicial notice of

documents electronically filed in the bankruptcy case. See

Atwood v. Chase Manhattan Mortg. Co. (In re Atwood), 293 B.R.

227, 233 n.9 (9th Cir. BAP 2003).

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amount of $4.1 million dollars. The proof of claim identified

the creditor as “Dana Park, Beverly Real Estate Investments

LLC/Golden Fish LLC.” Both of the limited liability companies

(the “LLCs”) were Park-controlled entities. The proof of claim

did not attach any supporting documents.

The bases of Park’s alleged claim were two-fold. First,

she asserted an ownership interest in the Property by virtue of

a quitclaim deed (the “Beverly Deed”), which purported to

transfer the Property from the Debtor to Beverly Real Estate

Investments, LLC (“Beverly LLC”). The state court, however,

ultimately deemed the deed invalid because it was executed by

the Debtor’s pastor and board of elders after their ouster from

church leadership and management.

Second, Park alleged that she and her “companies” purchased

the Hanmi notes for $4.1 million dollars. She alleged that this

saved the Property from foreclosure and that, in exchange for

her assistance, the Debtor then executed the Beverly Deed. 

According to Park, she had no idea that there was internal

church strife or that the pastor and board of elders had been

removed from their positions at the time they executed the

Beverly Deed. 

The Trustee objected to Park’s proof of claim, arguing that

the claim lacked adequate documentation and evidentiary support. 

He asserted that there was no evidence that Park or the LLCs had

a secured claim against the Property.

In opposition, Park relied on her alleged purchase of the

Hanmi notes and the Beverly Deed. Concurrently, she filed an

amended proof of claim that changed the name of the creditors

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asserting a claim to “Dana Park dba Beverly Real Estate

Investments, LLC; JB Sunset Management.” The amended proof of

claim also attached a number of documents,3 although Park

provided no explanation of the relevancy of these documents.

The Trustee replied that the law of the case doctrine

barred Park from relying on arguments already decided against

Park by the bankruptcy court when it dismissed Park’s quiet

title action based on the Beverly Deed. The Trustee further

argued that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15 required

disallowance because Park neither obtained his consent as the

opposing party nor sought leave to amend the proof of claim from

the bankruptcy court. 

The bankruptcy court agreed with the Trustee; it sustained

the Trustee’s objection to the proof of claim, both as initially

filed and as amended. It held that Park had not shown that she

was the real party in interest entitled to assert a claim

against the Debtor based on the Hanmi notes and related trust

deeds. It also determined that Park was precluded from

relitigating her alleged interest in the Property pursuant to

the Beverly Deed. 

The bankruptcy court entered an order disallowing Park’s

3 These documents included copies of: a proof of

publication dated July 26, 2012 in a Los Angeles newspaper; an

assignment of the first Hanmi trust deed, from Hanmi to

JB Sunset Partnership; an estimated settlement statement dated

July 27, 2011, showing Beverly LLC as the buyer; an amended sale

agreement dated September 29, 2011, between Hanmi, Beverly LLC,

and J Development, LLC; an escrow closing statement dated

February 24, 2012, reflecting JB Sunset as the buyer; and emails

between a Hanmi Bank representative and Park’s brother.

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proof of claim. Park timely appealed.

JURISDICTION

The bankruptcy court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§§ 1334 and 157(b)(2)(B). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.

§ 158.

ISSUE4

Whether the bankruptcy court erred in sustaining the

Trustee’s objection to Park’s proof of claim.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The bankruptcy court’s decision on an objection to proof of

claim is a mixed question of fact and law. We review its

findings of fact for clear error and its conclusions of law de

novo. See Cont’l Ins. Co. v. Thorpe Insulation Co. (In re

Thorpe Insulation Co.), 671 F.3d 1011, 1030 (9th Cir. 2011). A 

factual finding is clearly erroneous if illogical, implausible,

or without support in inferences that may be drawn from the

facts in the record. TrafficSchool.com, Inc. v. Edriver Inc.,

653 F.3d 820, 832 (9th Cir. 2011).

DISCUSSION

Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 3001(a) establishes

that “[a] proof of claim is a written statement setting forth a

creditor’s claim.” To the extent a claim or property interest

is based on a writing, the creditor (or an agent) must attach

4 The bankruptcy court also rejected Park’s amended proof

of claim on the basis that it named a new party (JB Sunset

Partnership) and was filed after expiration of the claims bar

date. Park, however, does not specifically argue or address

this aspect of the bankruptcy court’s ruling in her opening

brief; thus, neither do we.

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that writing to the proof of claim. Fed. R. Bankr.

P. 3001(c)(1).

Here, as the Trustee acknowledged to the bankruptcy court

and at oral argument before this Panel, there is no dispute with

respect to the validity of or the Debtor’s liability on the

Hanmi notes. The Debtor scheduled the debts as undisputed

claims. We also note that, while this appeal was pending, the

Trustee obtained bankruptcy court approval of a compromise

between the Trustee and another party asserting rights under the

Hanmi notes; the settlement recitals state that the Trustee does

not dispute the validity of the liens created as a result of the

Hanmi notes and trust deeds. 

Instead, the bankruptcy court determined that Park had not

shown that she was the real party in interest entitled to assert

claims based on the Hanmi notes and the related trust deeds. 

Thus, the bankruptcy court determined that Park failed to show

that she had standing to file her proof of claim based on the

Hanmi notes. On this record, we conclude that the bankruptcy

court did not err. Consequently, Park’s several arguments in

regards to the prima facie validity of a proof of claim are

inapposite. See Veal v. Am. Home Mortg. Servicing, Inc.

(In re Veal), 450 B.R. 897, 922 (9th Cir. BAP 2011) (“[S]tanding

is a prerequisite to the evidentiary benefits set forth in

Rule 3001(f).”). 

The record shows that the proof of claim consisted only of

the three-page official bankruptcy form; Park did not attach any

other documents, even though she later alleged that her claim

was based on the Beverly Deed and her purchase of the Hanmi

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notes. The form proof of claim identified Park and the LLCs as

the creditor and included the following handwritten comment: “I

have claim [sic] to the [P]roperty on 1111 Sunset Blvd Los

Angeles, CA 90015.” 

The bankruptcy court found that on the date of petition,

another non-Park controlled entity held the liens against the

Property — not Park. It found that this was consistent with the

Debtor’s schedules, which listed the other, non-Park controlled

entity. The bankruptcy court, thus, determined that Park had

not shown that she had a right to assert a claim, either on her

own behalf or as the authorized agent of the non-Park controlled

entity. We agree. 

As stated, there was no documentary evidence that Park or

the LLCs held the Hanmi notes or had rights to enforce the

related trust deeds. The record here does not supply other

evidence supporting her right to assert claims based on the

Hanmi notes and trust deeds, either personally or through the

LLCs. Indeed, at oral argument, Park’s counsel conceded that

the claim was asserted on behalf of third parties. 

It may well be that Park orchestrated the 2011 purchase of

the Hanmi notes and contributed some of the purchase price. 

But, the record simply does not support that, from a legal

standpoint, either she or the LLCs owned the Hanmi notes or had

rights to enforce the trust deeds securing those notes. Thus,

the bankruptcy court correctly determined that Park could not

assert a claim against the estate based on her status as a

lienholder or as a party entitled to enforce the Hanmi notes.

And, to the extent Park continued to assert a claim based

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on an alleged ownership interest in the Property, the bankruptcy

court concluded that the issue had been determined by the state

court and was not subject to re-litigation. As stated in Holy

Hill I, the state court determined that the Beverly Deed was

invalid; the pastor and board of elders who executed the deed

lacked the authority to do so. Insofar as Park continues to

challenge this determination, it is now beyond dispute. Thus,

Park did not have an ownership interest in the Property that

supplied her with a claim against the estate.

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, we AFFIRM.

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