137 FERC ¶ 61,066 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 

FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION 

18 CFR Part 35 

(Docket No. RM11-17-000) 

Enhancement of Electricity Market Surveillance and Analysis through Ongoing 

Electronic Delivery of Data from Regional Transmission Organizations and Independent 

System Operators 

(October 20, 2011) 

AGENCY: Federal Energy Regulatory Commission. 

ACTION: Notice of Proposed Rulemaking. 

SUMMARY: The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (Commission) proposes to 

revise its regulations to require each regional transmission organization (RTO) and 

independent system operator (ISO) to electronically deliver to the Commission, on an 

ongoing basis, data related to the markets that it administers. Ongoing electronic delivery 

of data relating to physical and virtual offers and bids, market awards, resource outputs, 

marginal cost estimates, shift factors, financial transmission rights, internal bilateral 

contracts, and interchange pricing will facilitate the Commission’s development and 

evaluation of its policies and regulations and will enhance Commission efforts to detect 

anti-competitive or manipulative behavior, or ineffective market rules, thereby helping to 

ensure just and reasonable rates. 

DATES: Comments on the proposed rule are due [insert date 60 days after publication in 

the FEDERAL REGISTER]. 

ADDRESSES: Comments, identified by docket number, may be filed in the following 

ways: 
Docket No. RM11-17-000 ii

 Electronic Filing through http://www.ferc.gov. Documents created electronically 

using word processing software should be filed in native applications or print-toPDF format and not in a scanned format. 

 Mail/Hand Delivery: Those unable to file electronically may mail or hand-deliver 

comments to: Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, Secretary of the 

Commission, 888 First Street, NE, Washington, DC 20426. 

Instructions: For detailed instructions on submitting comments and additional 

information on the rulemaking process, see the Comment Procedures Section of this 

document. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: 

William Sauer (Technical Information) 

Office of Enforcement 

Federal Energy Regulatory Commission 

888 First Street, NE 

Washington, DC 20426 

(202) 502-6639, william.sauer@ferc.gov 

Christopher Daignault (Legal Information) 

Office of the General Counsel 

Federal Energy Regulatory Commission 

888 First Street, NE 

Washington, DC 20426 

(202) 502-8286, christopher.daignault@ferc.gov 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 
137 FERC ¶ 61,066 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 

FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION 

Enhancement of Electricity Market Surveillance Docket No. RM11-17-000 

and Analysis through Ongoing Electronic 

Delivery of Data from Regional Transmission 

Organizations and Independent System Operators 

NOTICE OF PROPOSED RULEMAKING 

(October 20, 2011) 

1. In this Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NOPR), the Federal Energy 

Regulatory Commission (Commission) proposes, pursuant to sections 301(b) and 

307(a) of the Federal Power Act (FPA),1

 to amend its regulations to require each 

regional transmission organization (RTO) and independent system operator (ISO) to 

electronically deliver to the Commission, on an ongoing basis, data related to the 

markets that it administers. Ongoing electronic delivery of data relating to physical 

and virtual offers and bids, market awards, resource outputs, marginal cost estimates, 

shift factors, financial transmission rights (FTR), internal bilateral contracts, and 

interchange pricing will facilitate the Commission’s development and evaluation of 

its policies and regulations and will enhance Commission efforts to detect anticompetitive or manipulative behavior, or ineffective market rules, thereby helping to 

ensure just and reasonable rates. 

 1

 16 U.S.C. 825(b), 825f(a). 
Docket No. RM11-17-000 - 2 -

I. Background

2. Wholesale electricity markets have witnessed tremendous change in recent 

years. In the decades after the 1935 enactment of the FPA, the industry was 

characterized by self-sufficient, vertically integrated utilities. Most utilities built their 

own generation, transmission, and distribution facilities and sold electricity to their 

own wholesale and retail customers. During this time, the Commission regulated 

jurisdictional entities’ rates through traditional cost-based ratemaking. Cost-based 

rate regulation ensures that rates are just and reasonable by administratively 

determining an entity’s cost of providing service. Changes in national policy and 

other forces led to increased coordination and competition in the late 1960s and 

1970s,2

 and the enactment of the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act (PURPA).3 

The 1980s and early 1990s experienced an increased adoption of market-based 

ratemaking and wholesale power sales competition to promote efficiency and to 

lower wholesale power prices.4

 

 (continued...) 

2

 Counted among such forces are the Northeast blackout of 1965 and the 

responses to perceived transmission system insufficiencies, as well as the subsequent 

oil crisis of 1973. For a discussion of developments following the 1965 blackout, see 

William F. Fox, Jr., Federal Regulation of Energy 749, 755 (1983 & Supp. 1993), 

and Stephen Breyer and Paul W. MacAvoy, The Federal Power Commission and the 

Coordination Problem in the Electrical Power Industry, 46 S. Cal. L. Rev. 661, 661 

(1973). 

3

 Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-617, 92 Stat. 

3117 (1978) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 16 U.S.C.); see, e.g., 

16 U.S.C. 824a-3, 824i, 824j.

4 See, e.g., Louisville Gas & Elec. Co., 62 FERC ¶ 61,016, at 61,143 & n.16, 

61,149 (1993) (accepting non-traditional, market-based rates as consistent with 
Docket No. RM11-17-000 - 3 -

3. National policy fostered further market evolution by encouraging increased 

competition among generators through the Energy Policy Act of 1992 (EPAct 1992).5

 

Specifically, EPAct 1992 eased regulatory restrictions so that independent and 

affiliate generators could more easily enter, and compete in, wholesale electricity 

markets. EPAct 1992 also expanded the Commission’s authority to address undue 

discrimination in transmission access in order to promote wholesale competition. In 

subsequent orders, the Commission found that the availability of transmission service 

enhances competition in power markets, by increasing power supply options of 

buyers and power sales options of sellers, and leads to lower rates for consumers.6

 

By the mid-1990s, the Commission had determined that additional measures were 

 

primary regulatory goal of ensuring lowest reasonable cost energy to consumers, 

provided service is reliable and the seller demonstrates a lack of market power); Pac. 

Gas & Elec. Co., 38 FERC ¶ 61,242, at 61,790 (1987) (accepting proposed 

competitive rates because “competition ... encourages utilities to make efficient 

decisions with a minimum of regulatory intervention [and, u]ltimately, consumers 

should benefit from lower prices as competition improves efficiency.”), modifying on 

other ground, 47 FERC ¶ 61,121 (1989), modified, 50 FERC ¶ 61,339 (1990), 

modified sub nom. W. Sys. Power Pool, 55 FERC ¶ 61,099, at 61,319 (addressing 

applicant’s failure to eliminate anticompetitive effects by mitigating market power), 

granting stay, 55 FERC ¶ 61,154, reh’g granted in part, 55 FERC ¶ 61,495 (1991), 

modified, 59 FERC ¶ 61,249 (1992); Pub. Serv. Co. of New Mexico, 25 FERC 

¶ 61,469, at 62,038 (1983) (averring that “competition penalizes a seller that is 

inefficient or has an unreasonable pricing strategy[; consequently,] consumers ... 

benefit because the improvements in efficiency lead to lower prices.”); see also 

Heartland Energy Servs., Inc., 68 FERC ¶ 61,223 (1994) (reviewing early 

Commission decisions granting market-based rate authority). 

5

 Pub. L. No. 102-486, 106 Stat. 2776 (1992). 

6 Fla. Mun. Power Agency v. Fla. Power & Light Co., 65 FERC ¶ 61,125, at 

61,615, reh’g dismissed, 65 FERC ¶ 61,372 (1993), final order, 67 FERC ¶ 61,167 

(1994), order on reh’g, 74 FERC ¶ 61,006 (1996). 
Docket No. RM11-17-000 - 4 -

needed to address undue discrimination in transmission access and issued Order Nos. 

8887

 and 889,8 which required “open access” transmission service. In doing so, the 

Commission explained that its action “remove[s] impediments to competition in the 

wholesale power marketplace and ... bring[s] more efficient, lower cost power to the 

Nation’s electricity customers.”9

 The Commission subsequently issued Order 

No. 890,10 to further remedy undue discrimination and thereby remove barriers to 

competition. 

4. In addition to addressing undue discrimination in transmission access, Order 

No. 888 encouraged the formation of ISOs. The Commission posited that “ISOs have 

great potential to assist us and the industry to help provide regional efficiencies, to 

facilitate economically efficient pricing, and, especially in the context of power pools, 

 7 Promoting Wholesale Competition Through Open Access NonDiscriminatory Transmission Services by Public Utilities; Recovery of Stranded 

Costs by Public Utilities and Transmitting Utilities, Order No. 888, FERC Stats. 

& Regs. ¶ 31,036 (1996), order on reh’g, Order No. 888-A, FERC Stats. & Regs. 

¶ 31,048, order on reh’g, Order No. 888-B, 81 FERC ¶ 61,248 (1997), order on 

reh’g, Order No. 888-C, 82 FERC ¶ 61,046 (1998), aff’d in relevant part sub nom. 

Transmission Access Policy Study Group v. FERC, 225 F.3d 667 (D.C. Cir. 2000), 

aff’d sub nom. New York v. FERC, 535 U.S. 1 (2002). 

8 Open Access Same-Time Information System and Standards of Conduct, 

Order No. 889, FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 31,035 (1996), order on reh’g, Order No. 889-

A, FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 31,049, reh’g denied, Order No. 889-B, 81 FERC ¶ 61,253 

(1997). 

9

 Order No. 888, FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 31,036 at 31,634. 

10 Preventing Undue Discrimination and Preference in Transmission Service, 

Order No. 890, FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 31,241, order on reh’g, Order No. 890-A, 

FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 31,261 (2007), order on reh’g, Order No. 890-B, 123 FERC 

¶ 61,299 (2008), order on reh’g, Order No. 890-C, 126 FERC ¶ 61,228 (2009), order 

on clarification, Order No. 890-D, 129 FERC ¶ 61,126 (2009).
Docket No. RM11-17-000 - 5 -

to remedy undue discrimination and mitigate market power.”11 To facilitate ISO 

formation and foster independent operation of the transmission grid, the Commission 

suggested that utilities should voluntarily transfer operating control of their 

transmission facilities to an ISO. Four years later, in Order No. 2000,12 the 

Commission encouraged the voluntary formation of RTOs to administer the 

transmission grid on a regional basis. To date, the Commission has approved six 

RTOs and ISOs: PJM Interconnection, L.L.C. (PJM); New York Independent 

System Operator, Inc. (NYISO); Midwest Independent Transmission System 

Operator, Inc. (Midwest ISO); ISO New England Inc. (ISO-NE); California 

Independent System Operator Corporation (CAISO); and Southwest Power Pool, Inc. 

(SPP). Together, these six RTOs and ISOs serve more than half of the United States’ 

wholesale electricity demand.13

5. The wholesale electricity markets operated by Commission-approved 

RTOs/ISOs have evolved since their inception and will likely continue to do so as 

advances in technology usher in additional competing resources, computational 

 11 Order No. 888, FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 31,036 at 31,652; see also id. at 

31,730-32. 

12 Regional Transmission Organizations, Order No. 2000, 65 FR 809 (Jan. 6, 

2000), FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 31,089 (1999), order on reh’g, Order No. 2000-A, 

FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 31,092 (2000), aff’d sub nom. Pub. Util. Dist. No. 1 of 

Snohomish County, Washington v. FERC, 272 F.3d 607 (D.C. Cir. 2001).

13 See ISO/RTO Council, Progress of Organized Wholesale Electriciy Markets 

in North America 1 (2007), http://www.isorto.org/atf/cf/%7B5B4E85C6-7EAC40A0-8DC3-003829518EBD%7D/IRC_State_of_the_Markets_Report_103007.pdf. 
Docket No. RM11-17-000 - 6 -

efficiencies, new products, and new types of market participants. Today, for 

example, market participants include independent generating resources, storage 

devices, demand response and energy efficiency providers, marketers and traders, 

vertically integrated utilities, power marketing administrations, municipalities and 

cooperatives, among others. 

6. Substantial changes also have occurred with respect to the manner in which 

electricity is bought and sold. For example, when the IntercontinentalExchange 

(ICE) was established in 2000, the vast majority of electricity sales transacted on ICE 

contained requirements for physical delivery. Electricity bought or sold without 

requirements for physical delivery is commonly referred to as a financial electricity 

product. Beginning in 2004, the volume of financial electricity products bought and 

sold on ICE eclipsed that of electricity bought and sold on ICE with physical delivery 

requirements. The financial electricity product volumes on ICE also surpassed 

electricity volumes reported to the Commission through Electric Quarterly Reports 

(EQR) in several markets.14 Given that financial electricity products commonly settle 

using published prices from Commission-jurisdictional markets, changes in the prices 

of physical electricity products impact the values of both physical and financial 

electricity products. 

 14 See Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, 2008 State of the Markets 

Report (2009), available at http://www.ferc.gov/market-oversight/st-mkt-ovr/2008-

som-final.pdf. We also note that financial electricity products may be transacted 

(1) through exchanges besides ICE (e.g., NYMEX and Nodal Exchange), (2) by voice 

brokers, (3) bilaterally, or (4) by using other means. 
Docket No. RM11-17-000 - 7 -

7. Recognizing the importance of information relating to market trading and 

market oversight, the Commission issued Order No. 200115 and Order No. 697,16 

establishing reporting requirements for entities selling under market-based rates. As 

one keen observer stated, in this regard, “[i]nformation is the key to a viable 

electricity market and to preventing market manipulation.”17 In addition, the Energy 

Policy Act of 2005 (EPAct 2005)18 gave the Commission expanded authority to 

 15 Revised Public Utility Filing Requirements, Order No. 2001, FERC Stats. 

& Regs. ¶ 31,127, reh’g denied, Order No. 2001-A, 100 FERC ¶ 61,074, reh’g 

denied, Order No. 2001-B, 100 FERC ¶ 61,342, order directing filing, Order No. 

2001-C, 101 FERC ¶ 61,314 (2002), order directing filing, Order No. 2001-D, 

102 FERC ¶ 61,334, order refining filing requirements, Order No. 2001-E, 

105 FERC ¶ 61,352 (2003), order on clarification, Order No. 2001-F, 106 FERC 

¶ 61,060 (2004), order revising filing requirements, Order No. 2001-G, 120 FERC 

¶ 61,270, order on reh’g and clarification, Order No. 2001-H, 121 FERC ¶ 61,289 

(2007), order revising filing requirements, Order No. 2001-I, FERC Stats. & Regs. 

¶ 31,282 (2008). 

16 Market-Based Rates for Wholesale Sales of Electric Energy, Capacity and 

Ancillary Services by Public Utilities, Order No. 697, FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 31,252, 

clarified, 121 FERC ¶ 61,260 (2007), order on reh’g, Order No. 697-A, FERC Stats. 

& Regs. ¶ 31,268, clarified, 124 FERC ¶ 61,055, order on reh’g, Order No. 697-B, 

FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 31,285 (2008), order on reh’g, Order No. 697-C, FERC Stats. 

& Regs. ¶ 31,291 (2009), order on reh’g, Order No. 697-D, FERC Stats. & Regs. 

¶ 31,305 (2010), aff’d sub nom. Montana Consumer Counsel v. FERC, No. 08-71827, 

2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 20724 (9th Cir. Oct. 13, 2011). In its decision upholding 

Order No. 697, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals noted that monitoring must be 

accompanied by enforcement because “[w]ithout enforcement, there is little reason to 

believe that sellers will police themselves.” Montana Consumer Counsel, 2011 U.S. 

App. LEXIS 20724 at *19 n.5.

17 Charles H. Koch, Jr., Collaborative Governance: Lessons for Europe from 

U.S. Electricity Restructuring, 61 Admin. L. Rev. 71, 97 (2009). 

18 Pub. L. No. 109-58, 119 Stat. 594 (2005). 
Docket No. RM11-17-000 - 8 -

address market manipulation,19 including the ability to assess civil fines and seek 

criminal penalties.20

8. Independent market monitoring by RTO/ISO market monitoring units (MMU) 

is an important means to evaluate market developments and to identify and deter 

market abuses and manipulation. In Order No. 2000, the Commission identified 

market monitoring as a basic function of an RTO.21 The Commission refined its 

approach to MMUs in a 2005 policy statement and in Order No. 719.22 In the 2005 

Policy Statement, the Commission outlined tasks for MMUs to perform in order to 

enhance the competitive structure of RTO/ISO markets.23 Subsequently, in Order 

 19 See, e.g., 16 U.S.C. 824v. 

20 See 16 U.S.C. 825o (criminal penalties); 16 U.S.C. 825o-1 (civil fines). 

21 Prior to this first generic consideration of MMUs in Order No. 2000, the 

Commission addressed market monitoring in connection with individual RTO/ISO 

proposals. See Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 77 FERC ¶ 61,265 (1996), order on reh’g, 81 

FERC ¶ 61,122 (1997), order on clarification, 83 FERC ¶ 61,033 (1998) (requiring 

the ISO to file a detailed monitoring plan and listing minimum elements for such a 

plan); Pennsylvania-New Jersey-Maryland Interconnection, 81 FERC ¶ 61,257 

(1997) (requiring PJM Interconnection, L.L.C. to develop a market monitoring 

program to evaluate market power and market design flaws). 

22 Market Monitoring Units in Regional Transmission Organizations and 

Independent System Operators, 111 FERC ¶ 61,267 (2005) (2005 Policy Statement); 

Wholesale Competition in Regions with Organized Electric Markets, Order No. 719, 

FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 31,281 (2008), order on reh’g, Order No. 719-A, FERC Stats. 

& Regs. ¶ 31,292 (2009), order on reh’g, Order No. 719-B, 129 FERC ¶ 61,252 

(2009). 

23 2005 Policy Statement, 111 FERC ¶ 61,267 at P 2. 
Docket No. RM11-17-000 - 9 -

No. 719, the Commission further clarified requirements for MMU functions, 

independence, and information sharing.24 

9. The Commission has acknowledged that MMUs perform a vital and necessary 

function in market oversight25 but that they do not supplant the Commission’s 

authority.26 Rather, MMUs are designed to provide the Commission with an 

additional means of detecting market power abuses, market design flaws, and 

opportunities for improvements in market efficiency.27

II. Discussion

10. In this NOPR, the Commission proposes to revise its regulations to require 

each RTO and ISO to electronically deliver to the Commission, on an ongoing, nonpublic basis, data related to the markets that it administers; namely, data relating to 

physical and virtual offers and bids, market awards, resource outputs, marginal cost 

estimates, shift factors, FTRs, internal bilateral contracts, and interchange pricing. To 

facilitate such ongoing, electronic delivery, the Commission proposes that each RTO 

and ISO use automated electronic procedures to provide this data. 

 24 Specifically, MMU functions consist of evaluating existing and proposed 

market rules, tariff provisions, and market design elements and recommending 

changes, if applicable; reviewing and reporting on the performance of wholesale 

markets; and identifying and notifying the Commission of behavior that may require 

investigation. See Order No. 719, FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 31,281 at P 354. 

25 See, e.g., Order No. 719, FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 31,281 at P 314. 

26 Order No. 2000, FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 31,089 at 31,156-57. 

27 Id. 
Docket No. RM11-17-000 - 10 -

11. The Commission is statutorily obligated to ensure that sales of electricity in 

wholesale markets are made at just and reasonable rates,28 and to address market 

manipulation in connection with the purchase or sale of electricity subject to the 

Commission’s jurisdiction.29 Toward that end, section 301(b) of the FPA provides 

that the Commission shall at all times have access to and the right to inspect and 

examine all accounts and records of public utilities.30 In this NOPR, and pursuant to 

its authority under section 301(b), the Commission proposes to seek ongoing 

electronic delivery of data including accounts and records of the RTOs/ISOs, which 

are public utilities. 

12. Moreover, the Commission also has authority pursuant to section 307(a) of the 

FPA to investigate any facts, conditions, practices, or matters it may deem necessary 

or proper to determine whether any person, electric utility, transmitting utility, or 

other entity may have violated or might violate the FPA or the Commission’s 

regulations, or to aid in the enforcement of the FPA or the Commission regulations, 

or to obtain information about wholesale power sales or the transmission of power in 

interstate commerce.31

13. As markets continue to evolve with increased levels of sophistication, the 

Commission must continue to evaluate the type of data necessary to ensure just and 

 28 See 16 U.S.C. 824d, 824e. 

29 See 16 U.S.C. 824v. 

30 16 U.S.C. 825(b). 

31 16 U.S.C. 825f(a). 
Docket No. RM11-17-000 - 11 -

reasonable rates. The Commission’s market monitoring and surveillance capabilities 

and associated data requirements must keep pace with market developments and 

evolve along with the markets. Further, the Commission’s evaluation of the market 

rules, regulations, and policies should be informed by the data collection proposed 

herein. Electronic delivery of the types of data proposed herein will help to bring the 

Commission’s access to RTO/ISO data in sync with the types and levels of activity in 

those markets and help to ensure that rates are just and reasonable. 

14. Most of the data discussed in this NOPR are already collected and stored by 

the RTOs/ISOs in order to administer their markets. To the extent that an RTO/ISO 

does not already collect specific data, the Commission is not proposing to require 

either the collection of such data from market participants or its electronic delivery to 

the Commission. The Commission also proposes that key identifiers and other 

descriptive details necessary to understand the data be included in the data 

electronically delivered to the Commission. Finally, the Commission proposes that 

each RTO/ISO electronically deliver the data to the Commission using a common 

transfer method and format (i.e., Secure File Transfer Protocol and XML), which are 

described below. The Commission is not proposing that each RTO/ISO aggregate or 

materially modify the data prior to electronic delivery to the Commission.32

 

 (continued...) 

32 The Commission is currently considering providing an XML Schema 

Definition (XSD) that describes the structure of the XML document to be 

electronically delivered to the Commission. XSD defines those elements, attributes, 

data types, and any default or fixed values in the XML. Depending on how the 

requested data is stored by each RTO/ISO, some data transformation may be required 

to prepare XML that is consistent with the XSD. For example, one RTO/ISO might 
Docket No. RM11-17-000 - 12 -

15. This NOPR proposes to require an automated data delivery process, in part, to 

minimize any burden on RTOs/ISOs. The Commission currently can request this 

data from individual RTOs and ISOs on an ad hoc basis. Such recurrent, periodic 

data requests may require more Commission and RTO/ISO resources than the 

proposed electronic delivery of this data using an automated process. 

16. Although the six RTOs/ISOs have developed different wholesale electricity 

market designs, there are many similarities in the data that they use to administer 

these markets. Generally speaking, market participants with their own supply 

resources or with supply resources under contract submit energy supply offers 

indicating the price at which they are willing to supply various quantities of energy. 

Load-serving entities submit demand bids indicating the price at which they are 

willing to buy various quantities of energy. The supply offers pass through market 

power screens. These screens are used to determine whether the resources can affect 

the market price and whether the offers should be mitigated. If an energy supply 

offer triggers the application of mitigation, it is replaced with a mitigated energy 

supply offer. Generally, mitigated energy supply offers are calculated using 

 

store dates in MM-DD-YYYY format while the rest use YYYY-MM-DD format. As 

such, an XSD might specify that dates in the XML be electronically delivered to the 

Commission in YYYY-MM-DD format. 
Docket No. RM11-17-000 - 13 -

estimated marginal cost data, which approximate generators’ costs under different 

conditions.33

17. Similar to the process for submitting energy offers and bids, market 

participants with their own supply resources or with supply resources under contract 

also submit offers to provide ancillary services and capacity services.34 These offers 

typically indicate a price at which a market participant is willing to provide the 

service and, like the energy supply offers discussed above, are subject to mitigation 

when appropriate. 

18. Entities with or without physical assets or load obligations may also submit 

“virtual” supply offers and demand bids in the RTO/ISO day-ahead markets. These 

virtual offers and bids contribute to price formation in RTO/ISO markets. Further, 

entities located outside of the RTO/ISO footprint may submit supply offers and 

demand bids in the form of interchange offers and bids. 

19. The RTOs/ISOs match the above-described inputs through an intricate process 

designed to use the lowest-cost resources to meet demand.35 This process yields 

pricing signals through locational marginal pricing (LMP) that determine which 

 33 The estimated marginal cost data the Commission proposes to receive 

through this NOPR do not include individual generators’ actual costs, revenues, or 

profits. 

34 We note that currently CAISO and SPP do not administer a centralized 

capacity market. 

35 We note that other inputs, including generation capabilities and other system 

costs, inter alia, are used by RTOs/ISOs to arrive at the lowest-cost solution. 
Docket No. RM11-17-000 - 14 -

supply offers and demand bids are selected (and which would also inform long-term 

planning, e.g., decisions on whether to enter and exit markets). Supply offers that are 

selected are required to provide a specific amount of service. For example, resources 

that are selected in the day-ahead energy market will be given an energy market 

award that specifies the amount of energy a particular resource is financially 

obligated to supply. These market awards are determined by each resource’s supply 

offer and the corresponding day-ahead LMP. Finally, the RTO/ISO provides 

dispatch instructions for resources in real time. Real-time compensation is 

determined by the dispatch instructions, metered output, and the corresponding LMP. 

20. LMP is comprised of three components: the system-wide price of energy, 

transmission line losses, and the congestion charge. The congestion charge 

component of LMP is calculated using shift factors when modeled flows are above 

the intended physical capability of given transmission facilities. A shift factor 

reflects the positive or negative percentage effect that a one-megawatt change in 

generation output or demand will have on an identified constraint. These shift factors 

are used to create a dispatch strategy that is consistent with physical and other 

reliability constraints. In other words, shift factors allow RTOs/ISOs to manage 

transmission constraints through congestion charge price signals that relate to a 

generator’s or load’s influence on a specific constraint. 

21. Prices in the RTO/ISO day-ahead markets and real-time balancing markets can 

be volatile depending on market conditions. Products designed to hedge RTO/ISO 

price volatility have provided valuable tools for RTO/ISO market participants to 
Docket No. RM11-17-000 - 15 -

secure predictable revenue streams or reduce price risk associated with generation 

costs. These price hedging tools have evolved concurrently with changes in 

wholesale electricity markets. 

22. In the RTO/ISO markets, market participants can limit price risk using several 

tools, notably, virtual offers and bids, FTRs, and internal bilateral contracts. Virtual 

offers and bids (collectively, virtuals) allow market participants the opportunity, 

among other things, to transfer price risk between day-ahead and real-time markets 

within an RTO/ISO. When virtuals are scheduled in the day-ahead market, the 

financial commitment is established at published day-ahead prices, and virtuals are 

automatically liquidated with the opposite buy/sell position, in most cases at real-time 

prices. Virtuals are not backed by physical assets. If a load-serving entity determines 

that it might need to purchase supply from real-time markets,36 the load-serving 

entity could use virtuals to “lock-in” a day-ahead price. 

 

23. FTRs provide market participants with a mechanism to hedge transmission 

costs under LMP-based market designs. In general, load-serving entities in 

RTOs/ISOs are allocated either FTRs or transmission rights convertible into FTRs. 

This allocation is often based on usage during an historical period. Allocated FTRs 

are limited to load-serving entities and to those who funded construction of specific 

transmission facilities. Other FTRs are auctioned, and such FTRs generally can be 

purchased by creditworthy entities. Moreover, FTRs can be resold outside of the 

36 A load-serving entity might determine such a need to purchase supply, for 

example, because of potential weather-related events or generator malfunction. 
Docket No. RM11-17-000 - 16 -

RTO/ISO auction and allocation procedures. Transactions occurring outside of the 

RTO/ISO allocation and auction procedures are commonly referred to as secondary 

market transactions. 

24. Finally, internal bilateral contracts allow market participants to hedge energy 

costs under LMP-based market designs. In RTOs/ISOs, market participants can enter 

into bilateral agreements and use the RTO/ISO to perform settlement functions. 

These internal bilateral contracts typically rely on a bilaterally negotiated price rather 

than the potentially more volatile RTO/ISO LMP-based energy price, and they allow 

market participants the opportunity to transfer risks relating to energy costs among 

market participants. Thus, a load-serving entity may enter into an internal bilateral 

contract with a supplier to settle its energy costs at a predetermined rate rather than at 

the applicable LMP. If the market participant reports this internal bilateral contract to 

the RTO/ISO, the RTO/ISO would then account for this agreement in its settlement 

process. 

25. RTO/ISO price-hedging products have been created outside of the RTO/ISO 

markets as well. Electricity futures were first traded on NYMEX in March 1996.37 

Electricity futures, which are traded on organized exchanges, and electricity forwards, 

which are traded outside of organized exchanges, are transactions that typically 

specify a quantity of physical electricity to be delivered at a specific time and place in 

 37 S.J. Deng and S.S. Oren, Electricity derivatives and risk management, 

31 Energy 940, 943 (2006), available at http://www.sciencedirect.com. 
Docket No. RM11-17-000 - 17 -

the future at an agreed-upon price.38 A generation owner can sell output from its 

facility at a pre-determined price by entering into futures or forward transactions even 

as the RTO/ISO price varies. 

26. In recent years, other products for hedging RTO/ISO prices have developed, 

such as electricity swaps. Swaps are similar to electricity futures and forwards, but 

swaps are financial transactions that do not require physical delivery. Electricity 

swaps can be bought or sold at a given “fixed” price and subsequently settle at a 

“floating” published daily electricity price; this is typically referred to as a “fixed-forfloating” swap. Swaps can act as a hedge when used alongside physical electricity 

sales, by guaranteeing the generation owner an agreed upon price, notwithstanding 

fluctuation in the published electricity price. Specifically, if the published daily 

electricity price is higher than the agreed upon price, the generation owner pays the 

difference to the counter-party to the swap but still receives the agreed upon price.39 

This effectively guarantees a predictable revenue stream to the generation owner. 

RTO/ISO posted prices are one of the commonly referenced settlement values used in 

electricity swaps. 

 38 See id. at 942-43. 

39 For example, Generator sells to the RTO/ISO at a market-based rate, which 

varies according to the market. As a hedge, Generator sells a financial swap to 

Counter-party at $30/MWh. If the published electricity price that Generator receives 

on day one is $20/MWh, Counter-party pays Generator the difference, i.e., $10 ($30 

minus $20). Thus, Generator receives the agreed upon price of $30/MWh. 

Conversely, if the published electricity price that Generator receives on day two is 

$45/MWh, Generator owes Counter-party the difference, i.e., $15 ($45 minus $30). 

Thus, Generator again receives the agreed upon price of $30/MWh. 
Docket No. RM11-17-000 - 18 -

27. To the extent that any market participant is willing to manipulate the market, 

that market participant would have an incentive to manipulate RTO/ISO prices that 

are used to settle values for electricity products, including financial products such as 

electricity swaps. The likelihood of an attempt at market manipulation can be 

reduced if the perceived cost of manipulation exceeds the perceived benefit. For 

example, a market participant may wish to drive up an RTO/ISO price because that 

market participant also holds an electricity swap that benefits from a higher RTO/ISO 

price. In that vein, the market participant may offer supply into the RTO/ISO market 

at levels above its own marginal costs, driving up an RTO/ISO price by requiring a 

higher-priced unit to be selected. That market participant would receive less revenue 

from the RTO/ISO due to the lost sales opportunity from its own higher-priced offer 

not being selected. However, in this example, the market participant may be able to 

more than offset the reduction in revenue through the benefit of its electricity swap 

associated with the higher RTO/ISO price. 

28. Given the history of electricity markets it regulates, the Commission expects 

that such markets will continue to evolve, that new physical and financial products 

will be formed, and that increasingly complex manipulative or other anti-competitive 

strategies may be created. 

A. Market Monitoring and Surveillance

29. To keep pace with market developments, the Commission is proposing to 

establish ongoing, electronic delivery of data from each RTO and ISO to enhance its 

market monitoring and surveillance efforts. By seeking electronic delivery of the 
Docket No. RM11-17-000 - 19 -

data outlined in this NOPR, the Commission does not seek to displace or modify any 

of the existing market monitoring functions performed by MMUs. Nor do we intend 

our proposal to be perceived as an implicit criticism of the MMUs’ performance. 

Instead, this data will help the Commission detect anti-competitive or manipulative 

behavior, or ineffective market rules, and thus help ensure just and reasonable rates. 

30. Among other objectives, the Commission will use the data it proposes to 

receive as part of automated screens and other analyses designed to detect attempts to 

manipulate RTO/ISO pricing for the purpose of benefiting products that settle using 

RTO/ISO pricing and to detect abuses involving interchange transactions. Supply 

offer, demand bid, virtual, and FTR data will assist the Commission in understanding 

how market participants are positioning themselves in RTO/ISO markets. For 

example, market participants attempting to move RTO/ISO settlement pricing might 

offer supply into the RTO/ISO market at uncompetitive prices. Likewise, market 

participants could target specific LMP prices using virtual offers and bids. Because 

congestion impacts are often spread across many price nodes (and result in many 

different LMPs) through shift factors, these virtual offers and bids need not be placed 

at the specific price node for which a market participant might be attempting to move 

the LMP. Estimated marginal cost and shift factor data will enhance the 

Commission’s ability to identify such behavior that may be designed to impact 

RTO/ISO pricing. Moreover, interchange pricing data will assist the Commission’s 

efforts to identify anomalous or uneconomic electricity interchange schedules; 
Docket No. RM11-17-000 - 20 -

electricity schedules between markets that are not consistent with pricing signals 

could be a source of market inefficiency or raise other anti-competitive concerns. 

31. Securing data concerning the markets that the RTOs/ISOs administer is part of 

the Commission’s broader effort to enhance its market monitoring and surveillance 

capabilities. Specifically, in a recently issued NOPR on Commission access to 

electronic tag (e-Tag) data,40 the Commission proposed to make e-Tag data available 

to the Commission to assist in monitoring the market and preventing manipulation, 

among other things. In yet another NOPR, the Commission proposed to require 

additional contract and transaction data from those who file EQRs and to extend the 

EQR filing requirements to wholesale market participants which fall outside the 

Commission’s FPA section 205 jurisdiction.41 The Commission stated that these 

proposals would strengthen the Commission’s ability to identify potential exercises of 

market power or manipulation. We believe that the same is true here. 

32. Utilizing the data the Commission proposes to receive in this NOPR and the 

two NOPRs addressed above could greatly enhance the Commission’s market 

monitoring and surveillance capabilities. The data will permit the Commission to 

improve its screening of market participants for illicit behavior, making such conduct 

more difficult to mask. In addition, the data the Commission proposes to collect in 

 40 Availability of E-Tag Information to Commission Staff, Notice of Proposed 

Rulemaking, FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 32,675 (2011). 

41 Electricity Market Transparency Provisions of Section 220 of The Federal 

Power Act, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 32,676 (2011). 
Docket No. RM11-17-000 - 21 -

these NOPRs could provide a better picture of legitimate market activity and lessen 

the possibility that market monitoring and surveillance screens will result in error. 

B. Commission Policies and Regulations

33. In overseeing wholesale electricity markets, the Commission evaluates, in 

response to submissions or on its own motion, existing market designs and the 

effectiveness of market rules. The Commission proposes to use RTO/ISO market 

data to more effectively carry out these functions. Electronic delivery of this data 

will enable the Commission to better identify ineffective market rules and better 

inform Commission policies and decision-making, and thus help prevent anticompetitive behavior and ensure just and reasonable rates. 

34. We believe that electronic delivery of RTO/ISO market data will provide the 

Commission with empirical information that will augment ongoing industry outreach 

in determining the effectiveness of the Commission-approved market rules and the 

efficiency of existing market designs in producing just and reasonable rates. 

Electronic delivery of the market data sought would allow the Commission to 

perform better ongoing analysis as markets evolve and new resources begin 

participating in these markets. For example, the market data sought should enable the 

Commission to assess both the scheduling practices of renewable resources and how 

renewable energy schedules compare with actual real-time performance. Because of 

its unique position, the Commission will be able to perform such analysis across the 

RTO/ISO markets. This cross-market analysis will enhance the Commission’s 

ongoing efforts to assess the performance of different market designs and rules. 
Docket No. RM11-17-000 - 22 -

35. In seeking electronic delivery of this data, the Commission emphasizes that it 

does not seek to displace existing MMU efforts to evaluate market rules and market 

designs nor is it proposing to modify any of the market monitoring functions 

performed by MMUs. Rather, the Commission is seeking to augment the 

assessments currently being performed by MMUs, thus strengthening the 

Commission’s regulatory capabilities through the ongoing electronic delivery of 

RTO/ISO market data. 

C. Requested Data

36. As part of this rulemaking, the Commission proposes to require ongoing 

electronic delivery of, the data (e.g., the information to be included in the datasets) 

described below. The Commission invites comment on these data requirements: 

1. Supply offers and demand bids for energy and ancillary services -

The Commission is proposing that RTOs/ISOs provide their data on 

supply offers and demand bids submitted to RTO/ISO markets. This 

dataset would include all offers and bids for energy and ancillary 

services. This dataset would also include offers and bids submitted for 

interchange transactions, as well as those submitted without economic 

consideration, i.e., self schedules. 

2. Virtual offers and bids - The Commission is proposing that 

RTOs/ISOs provide their data on virtual supply offers and virtual 

demand bids submitted to RTO/ISO markets. 
Docket No. RM11-17-000 - 23 -

3. Energy/ancillary service awards - The Commission is proposing that 

RTOs/ISOs provide their data on market awards for energy and 

ancillary services. This dataset would include the quantity and price of 

all market awards for energy and ancillary services. The dataset would 

also identify resources that are self-scheduled. 

4. Capacity market offers, designations, and prices - For RTOs/ISOs 

with centralized capacity markets, the Commission is proposing to 

require RTOs/ISOs to provide their data on capacity offers as well as 

capacity market outcomes or designations. This dataset would identify 

capacity resources, the amount of procured capacity, and the applicable 

capacity market price. 

5. Resource output - The Commission is proposing that RTOs/ISOs 

provide their data on resource output data used in market settlements. 

This dataset would include details used in market settlements, including 

RTO/ISO dispatch instructions (i.e., the output that a dispatched 

resource is expected to produce in real-time) for energy or ancillary 

services, or whether resources are operating at self-scheduled output 

levels, and measured output levels. 

6. Marginal cost estimates - The Commission is proposing that 

RTOs/ISOs provide their data on marginal cost estimates; such 

estimates are typically generated for the potential replacement of supply 

offers in market power mitigation procedures. This dataset would 
Docket No. RM11-17-000 - 24 -

include all marginal cost estimates that have been developed, and not 

just those estimates that were used to generate mitigated supply offers. 

The Commission is seeking just the resulting marginal cost estimates 

themselves, however, and is not proposing that RTOs/ISOs provide the 

inputs that allow for calculation of those estimates. Further, the 

Commission is not seeking other operating information regarding 

individual generators’ actual costs, revenues, or profits. 

7. Day-ahead shift factors - The Commission is proposing that 

RTOs/ISOs provide their data on shift factors calculated for use in the 

day-ahead market. This would include generation shift factors, which 

are factors to be applied to a generator’s expected change in output to 

determine the amount of flow contribution that that change in output 

will impose on an identified transmission facility or flowgate, and load 

shift factors, which are factors to be applied to a load’s expected change 

in demand to determine the amount of flow contribution that that 

change in demand will impose on an identified transmission facility or 

flowgate. This dataset would not be limited to binding constraints, but 

should also include all shift factors calculated to address non-binding 

constraints. 

8. FTR data - The Commission is proposing that RTOs/ISOs provide 

their data on FTR transactions that may not be publicly posted in all 

RTO/ISO markets. Specifically, the Commission is proposing that 
Docket No. RM11-17-000 - 25 -

RTOs/ISOs provide data detailing how all FTRs and allocated rights 

were acquired, either through RTO/ISO allocation or auction 

procedures; data detailing whether the acquired allocation positions 

were converted from positions that collect auction revenue into 

positions that collect congestion revenue; and data detailing secondary 

market transactions to the extent that they are available to the 

RTO/ISO. 

9. Internal Bilateral Contracts - The Commission is proposing that 

RTOs/ISOs provide their data on the settlement of internal bilateral 

contracts for energy. 

10. Pricing data for interchange transactions - The Commission is 

proposing that RTOs/ISOs provide their data on pricing information for 

scheduled interchanges. Scheduled interchanges include any 

transaction between two or more Balancing Authority Areas. To 

enhance the Commission’s market monitoring and surveillance efforts, 

the Commission is proposing that eTag IDs be included, when 

applicable, in addition to other interchange pricing details and 

transaction identification. 

37. The data that the Commission is proposing to receive electronically in this 

NOPR are limited to physical and virtual offers and bids, market awards, resource 

outputs, marginal cost estimates, shift factors, FTRs, internal bilateral contracts, and 

interchange pricing. These datasets would include descriptive information such as 
Docket No. RM11-17-000 - 26 -

market participant names, unique identifiers, pricing points, and other information 

that the Commission considers necessary and appropriate to understand and analyze 

the data described in this NOPR. Markets are not static, however, and, as markets 

continue to evolve, the Commission may initiate a new rulemaking process in the 

future to reassess the data necessary for its market monitoring and surveillance efforts 

and for its policy and decision-making needs. 

38. The Commission proposes that RTOs/ISOs be required to electronically 

deliver the data discussed in this NOPR to the Commission within seven days after 

each RTO/ISO creates the datasets in a market run or otherwise. For example, dayahead offers and bids, market awards, resource outputs, day-ahead shift factors, 

internal bilateral contracts, and day-ahead interchange pricing data would be required 

to be electronically delivered within seven days after the completion of each dayahead market run. Real-time offers and bids and real-time interchange pricing data 

would be required to be electronically delivered within seven days after the 

completion of each real-time market run. For data that are updated less frequently, 

including capacity market results, estimated marginal costs, and FTR data, each 

RTO/ISO would be expected to electronically deliver that data within seven days 

after it is created or updated by the RTO/ISO. For the initial delivery of data under 

this proposal, however, the Commission proposes that each RTO/ISO would be 

required to electronically deliver all such data forty-five days after the effective date 

of any final rule in this proceeding. Finally, if the RTO/ISO makes later corrections 

to the data (after they have been delivered to the Commission), the RTO/ISO would 
Docket No. RM11-17-000 - 27 -

be expected to electronically deliver the corrected data to the Commission within 

seven days after the correction has been made. The Commission invites comments 

with respect to the timeframe in which the data described in this NOPR should be 

electronically delivered to the Commission. 

39. The Commission proposes to locate the requirement to electronically deliver 

this data on an ongoing basis within section 35.28(g) of our regulations. Further, the 

Commission proposes to direct each RTO/ISO to submit a compliance filing 

amending its open access transmission tariff to reflect this requirement within fortyfive days after the effective date of any final rule in this proceeding. 

D. Data Formatting and Web-Based Delivery

40. In order to facilitate the Commission’s efforts described above, the 

Commission is proposing to require each RTO and ISO to use consistent formatting 

and delivery methods to electronically deliver the data described in this NOPR to the 

Commission. Consistent formatting and delivery methods will enable the 

Commission to develop routine data procedures to link RTO/ISO and other market 

data, thus enabling automated analytic techniques. 

41. In regard to data formatting, the Commission is proposing to require that any 

data outlined in this NOPR be in an XML format that is consistent for all RTOs/ISOs 

when electronically delivered to the Commission. As stated above, the Commission 
Docket No. RM11-17-000 - 28 -

is not proposing that each RTO/ISO materially modify the data prior to electronic 

delivery to the Commission.42

42. In Order No. 714,43 the Commission adopted XML format for entities to use 

when making tariff related filings, based upon industry agreement.44 XML is also 

commonly used by RTOs/ISOs to deliver data to market participants through Open 

Access Same-Time Information Systems (OASIS) and other purposes. Data not 

formatted in XML may also be extracted directly from a database into an XMLformatted file using automated procedures. However, the Commission also 

recognizes that XML, which was adopted by the industry as the most effective format 

to use when electronically filing tariffs, may not be the preferred format to use when 

electronically delivering RTO/ISO data. Accordingly, we seek comment on this 

issue. 

43. In regard to the data delivery method, the Commission is proposing that each 

RTO and ISO use a secure data delivery method to provide data to the Commission 

due to the commercially-sensitive nature of the market data described in this NOPR. 

Specifically, the Commission is proposing that any RTO/ISO market data be 

electronically delivered using the Secure File Transfer Protocol (SFTP). Delivery by 

SFTP is similar to delivery by File Transfer Protocol or “FTP,” a widely-used file-

 42 See supra P 14. 

43 Electronic Tariff Filings, Order No. 714, 73 FR 57515, FERC Stats. & Regs. 

¶ 31,276 (2008). 

44 Order No. 714, FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 31,276 at P 30. 
Docket No. RM11-17-000 - 29 -

sharing protocol; except that all communications transmitted using SFTP are 

encrypted. Access to the server where the data is electronically delivered will only be 

granted to each applicable RTO and ISO and to the Commission. 

44. Accordingly, and as part of our consideration of the range of possible formats 

and delivery methods that RTOs/ISOs may use to electronically deliver data to the 

Commission, the Commission invites comments with respect to efficient and secure 

ways to provide the Commission with RTO/ISO data. The Commission also invites 

comment on the time and resources that may be needed by RTOs/ISOs for the initial 

implementation and ongoing compliance with the proposed requirements of this rule. 

Finally, the Commission invites comment on whether a phased implementation 

approach should be undertaken, and, if so, what a potential phased approach should 

entail. 

E. Non-Public Data

45. Much of the information that the Commission expects to receive in this 

proposal is, by its nature, commercially-sensitive. 45 Disclosure of such information 

 45 In the past, the Commission has granted requests for privileged or 

confidential treatment of similar non-public data. See, e.g., N.Y. Indep. Sys. 

Operator, Inc., 131 FERC ¶ 61,169, at P 15 (2010) (granting such treatment for data 

relating to specific generator or other equipment details, transmission system 

information, bidding strategies, generator reference levels, generator costs, guarantee 

payments, and the associated relevant time periods); see also So. Cal. Edison Co., 

135 FERC ¶ 61,201, at P 20; Hydrogen Energy Cal. LLC, 135 FERC ¶ 61,068, at P 

25 (2011); N.Y. Indep. Sys. Operator, Inc., 130 FERC ¶ 61,029, at P 3 (2010). 
Docket No. RM11-17-000 - 30 -

could result in competitive harm to market participants and the market as a whole.46 

Accordingly, the Commission proposes that the data sought in this proceeding is to be 

kept non-public and not be made publicly available,47 except as may be directed by 

the Commission, or a court with appropriate jurisdiction.48

46. To the extent the data collected pursuant to this rulemaking are used, for 

example, to support proposed market rule changes, the analysis relied upon by the 

Commission will be publicly available except that confidential market information 

and other protected or confidential information will remain non-public. Also, the 

 46 Section 301(b) of the FPA, 16 U.S.C. 825(b), provides that no member, 

officer, or employee of the Commission may divulge any fact or information that may 

come to his knowledge during the course of examination of books or other accounts, 

except as may be directed by the Commission or by a court. 

47 We note that, notwithstanding that the Commission may have data available 

to it, complainants still must bear the burden of making a prima facie case; 

complainants must do more than make unsubstantiated allegations. Interstate Power 

& Light Co. v. ITC Midwest, LLC, 135 FERC ¶ 61,162, at P 18 (2011); see also 

UNITIL Power Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Co. of N.H., 62 FERC P 61,055, at 61,287 (1993) 

(“The question we must answer at this stage of the proceeding is whether UNITIL has 

presented sufficient evidence of PSNH’s costs so that we may assess whether a trialtype, evidentiary hearing is warranted.”); Houlton Water Co. v. Me. Pub. Serv. Co., 

55 FERC P 61,037, at 61,110 (1991) (“Maine Public correctly states that a customer 

seeking a section 206 investigation of existing rates must provide some basis to 

question the reasonableness of the overall rate level, taking into account changes in 

all cost components and not just [the item being challenged].”).

48 We note that the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) allows persons to file 

requests to obtain data from the Commission. However, commercially-sensitive data, 

like that described in this NOPR, is covered by exemption 4 of FOIA, which protects 

“trade secrets and commercial or financial information obtained from a person [that 

is] privileged or confidential.” 5 U.S.C. 552(b)(4) (2006), amended by OPEN 

Government Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-175, 121 Stat. 2524 (2007); accord 

18 CFR 388.107(d). 
Docket No. RM11-17-000 - 31 -

Commission may direct its staff to publicly issue a staff report outside of a 

rulemaking proceeding with similar protections for confidential or otherwise 

protected information. 

III. Information Collection Statement

47. The collections of information contained in this proposed rule have been 

submitted to the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) for review under section 

3507(d) of the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995, 44 U.S.C. 3507(d). The 

Commission solicits comments on the Commission’s need for this information, 

whether the information will have practical utility, the accuracy of the provided 

burden estimates, ways to enhance the quality, utility, and clarity of the information 

to be collected, and any suggested methods for minimizing respondents’ burden, 

including the use of automated information techniques. Respondents subject to the 

filing requirements of this rule will not be penalized for failing to respond to these 

collections of information unless the collections of information display a valid OMB 

Control number. 

48. The proposed rule does not require market participants other than the 

RTOs/ISOs to report information to the Commission. 

49. The Commission’s estimated reporting burden related to the proposed rule in 

Docket RM11-17-000 follow. 
Docket No. RM11-17-000 - 32 -

Burden hrs. 

per 

respondent

Cost per 

respondent

Burden hrs. 

per 

respondent

Cost per 

respondent

Burden hrs. 

for all 

respondents

Cost for all 

respondents

Compliance filing 6 7 $1,750 14 $3,500

Web-Based Delivery 6 1040 $100,864 40 $3,879 2320 $225,003

Grand Total, Average 

Annual Estimates 6 2334 $228,503

Average Annual Burden 

(implementation cost 

Data Collection, averaged over 3 yrs.)

Proposed FERC-921

No. of 

respondents

Implementing Burden Annual Recurring 

Operating Burden

50. The Commission recognizes that there will be an initial implementation 

burden associated with providing the Commission with RTO/ISO data. This includes 

submitting a compliance filing to the Commission, which the Commission estimates 

as a burden of 7 hours per RTO/ISO, and implementing a process to automatically 

upload data to an SFTP site for Commission use (including development, testing and 

production). The Commission estimates a burden of 1040 hours per RTO/ISO for the 

development, testing and production of an automated process to provide the 

Commission with the data described in this NOPR. In this regard, though, RTO/ISO 

markets have already developed capabilities necessary to handle RTO/ISO data in an 

automated manner. For instance, through their Open Access Same-time Information 

Systems (OASIS), RTOs/ISOs already make certain market data publically available 

in XML format using automated procedures. Likewise, some RTOs/ISOs have 

developed procedures similar to those proposed in this NOPR to deliver data to their 

MMUs. 

51. For the recurring effort involved in electronically delivering RTO/ISO data to 

the Commission, the Commission anticipates that the additional burden associated 

with this rule will be minimal. Any recurring burden would be associated with 
Docket No. RM11-17-000 - 33 -

addressing updates to RTO/ISO data as the data that they process changes and due to 

occasional errors in the data handling or data upload process. 

Information Collection Costs: The Commission has estimated the cost of compliance 

per RTO/ISO to be $102,614 in the initial year of implementation and $3,879 in 

subsequent years. The Commission expects that the compliance filing will be 

completed by RTO/ISO legal staff and has estimated an hourly rate at $250/hour. 

The Commission estimates that a variety of staff, including legal, database 

administrators and IT and information security specialists, will be required to 

electronically deliver to the Commission the RTO/ISO data described in this NOPR. 

The Commission estimated the average hourly cost for this task to be $96.98/hour 

(including legal staff at $250/hour, information systems manager at $105.35/hour, 

database administrator at $55.61/hour, and information security analyst at 

$57.67/hour).49 

Title: proposed FERC-92150

Action: Proposed Collection. 

 49 Hourly average wage is an average and was calculated using Bureau of 

Labor Statistics (BLS), Occupational Employment Statistics data for May 2010 (at 

http://www.bls.gov/oes/) for the database administrator and information security 

analysts. The average hourly figure for legal staff and information systems manager 

is a composite from BLS and other resources. The following weightings were 

applied to estimate the average hourly cost: legal staff (1/6), information systems 

manager (1/6), database administrator (1/3), and information security analyst (1/3). 

50 OATT compliance filings (like the one-time compliance filing here) are 

normally included under FERC-516 (OMB Control No. 1902-0096). However, the 

reporting requirements (including the compliance filing) contained in this proposed 

rule in Docket No. RM11-17 will be covered by a proposed FERC-921. 
Docket No. RM11-17-000 - 34 -

OMB Control No.: To be determined. 

Respondents for this Rulemaking: RTOs and ISOs. 

Frequency of Information: Initial implementation, compliance filing, and automated 

daily updates. 

52. Necessity of Information: As wholesale electricity markets continue to 

develop and evolve, new opportunities arise for anti-competitive or manipulative 

behavior. The Commission’s market monitoring and surveillance capabilities and 

associated data requirements must keep pace with market developments and evolve 

along with the markets. The data discussed in this NOPR will allow the Commission 

to more effectively identify and address such behavior; to identify ineffective market 

rules; to better inform Commission policies and regulations; and thus to help ensure 

just and reasonable rates. 

53. Internal Review: The Commission has made a preliminary determination that 

the proposed revisions are necessary to keep pace with ever-changing possibilities for 

anti-competitive or manipulative behavior and to better inform Commission policies 

and regulations, and thus to ensure that rates are just and reasonable. The 

Commission has assured itself, by means of its internal review, that there is specific, 

objective support for the burden estimate associated with the information 

requirements. 

54. Interested persons may obtain information on the reporting requirements by 

contacting the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, Office of the Executive 
Docket No. RM11-17-000 - 35 -

Director, 888 First Street, NE, Washington, DC 20426 [Attention: Ellen Brown, email: DataClearance@ferc.gov, phone: (202) 502-8663, fax: (202) 273-0873]. 

55. Comments concerning the information collections proposed in this NOPR and 

the associated burden estimates, should be sent to the Commission in this docket and 

may also be sent to the Office of Management and Budget, Office of Information and 

Regulatory Affairs, Washington, DC 20503 [Attention: Desk Officer for the Federal 

Energy Regulatory Commission]. For security reasons, comments should be sent by 

e-mail to OMB at the following e-mail address: oira_submission@omb.eop.gov. 

Please reference FERC-921 and the docket number of this proposed rulemaking 

(Docket No. RM11-17-000) in your submission. 

IV. Environmental Analysis

56. The Commission is required to prepare an Environmental Assessment or an 

Environmental Impact Statement for any action that may have a significant adverse 

effect on the human environment.51 The Commission has categorically excluded 

certain actions from these requirements as not having a significant effect on the 

human environment.52 The actions proposed here fall within a categorical exclusion 

in the Commission’s regulations, i.e., they involve information gathering, analysis, 

 51 Regulations Implementing the National Environmental Policy Act, Order 

No. 486, 52 FR 47,897 (Dec. 17, 1987), FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 30,783 (1987). 

52 18 CFR 380.4. 
Docket No. RM11-17-000 - 36 -

and dissemination.53 Therefore, environmental analysis is unnecessary and has not 

been performed.

V. Regulatory Flexibility Act Certification

57. The Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980 (RFA)54 generally requires a 

description and analysis of final rules that will have significant economic impact on a 

substantial number of small entities. The RFA mandates consideration of regulatory 

alternatives that accomplish the stated objectives of a rule and that minimize any 

significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities. The Small 

Business Administration’s (SBA) Office of Size Standards is responsible for the 

definition of a small business.55 The SBA has established a size standard for utilities, 

stating that a firm is small if, including its affiliates, it is primarily engaged in the 

transmission, generation and/or distribution of electric energy for sale and its total 

electric output for the preceding twelve months did not exceed four million megawatt 

hours.56 RTOs and ISOs are not small entities, and they are the only entities 

impacted directly by this proposed rule. 

 

58. CAISO is a nonprofit organization with over 54,000 megawatts of capacity 

and over 25,000 circuit miles of transmission lines. 

53 See 18 CFR 380.4(a)(5). 

54 5 U.S.C. 601-612. 

55 13 CFR 121.101. 

56 13 CFR 121.201 (Sector 22, Utilities). 
Docket No. RM11-17-000 - 37 -

59. NYISO is a nonprofit organization that oversees wholesale electricity markets 

serving 19.2 million customers. NYISO manages a nearly 11,000-mile network of 

high-voltage transmission lines. 

60. PJM is comprised of more than 700 members including power generators, 

transmission owners, electricity distributers, power marketers, and large industrial 

customers and serves 13 states and the District of Columbia. 

61. SPP is comprised of 63 members serving 6.2 million households in nine states 

and has 48,930 miles of transmission lines. 

62. Midwest ISO is a nonprofit organization with over 145,000 megawatts of 

installed generation. Midwest ISO has over 57,600 miles of transmission lines and 

serves 13 states and one Canadian province. 

63. ISO-NE is a regional transmission organization serving six states in New 

England. The system is comprised of more than 8,000 miles of high-voltage 

transmission lines and over 300 generators. 

64. The Commission believes this proposed rule will not have a significant 

economic impact on a substantial number of small entities, and therefore no 

regulatory flexibility analysis is required. 

VI. Comment Procedures

65. The Commission invites interested persons to submit comments on the matters 

and issues proposed in this notice to be adopted, including any related matters or 

alternative proposals that commenters may wish to discuss. Comments are due 

[insert date 60 days from publication in the FEDERAL REGISTER]. Comments 
Docket No. RM11-17-000 - 38 -

must refer to Docket No. RM11-17-000, and must include the commenter’s name, the 

organization they represent, if applicable, and their address. 

66. The Commission encourages comments to be filed electronically via the 

eFiling link on the Commission's web site at http://www.ferc.gov. The Commission 

accepts most standard word processing formats. Documents created electronically 

using word processing software should be filed in native applications or print-to-PDF 

format and not in a scanned format. Commenters filing electronically do not need to 

make a paper filing. 

67. Commenters that are not able to file comments electronically must send an 

original copy of their comments to: Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, 

Secretary of the Commission, 888 First Street NE, Washington, DC 20426. 

68. All comments will be placed in the Commission’s public files and may be 

viewed, printed, or downloaded remotely as described in the Document Availability 

section below. Commenters on this proposal are not required to serve copies of their 

comments on other commenters. 

VII. Document Availability

69. In addition to publishing the full text of this document in the Federal Register, 

the Commission provides all interested persons an opportunity to view and/or print 

the contents of this document via the Internet through the Commission's Home Page 

(http://www.ferc.gov) and in the Commission’s Public Reference Room during 

normal business hours (8:30 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. Eastern time) at 888 First Street, NE, 

Room 2A, Washington, DC 20426. 
Docket No. RM11-17-000 - 39 -

70. From the Commission’s Home Page on the Internet, this information is 

available on eLibrary. The full text of this document is available on eLibrary both in 

PDF and Microsoft Word format for viewing, printing, and/or downloading. To 

access this document in eLibrary, type the docket number excluding the last three 

digits of this document in the docket number field. 

71. User assistance is available for eLibrary and the Commission's website during 

normal business hours from the Commission’s Online Support at 202-502-6652 (toll 

free at 1-866-208-3676) or e-mail at ferconlinesupport@ferc.gov, or the Public 

Reference Room at 202-502-8371, TTY 202-502-8659. E-mail the Public Reference 

Room at public.referenceroom@ferc.gov. 

List of subjects in 18 CFR Part 35

Electric power rates, Electric utilities, Reporting and recordkeeping requirements. 

By direction of the Commission. Commissioner Spitzer is not participating. 

Nathaniel J. Davis, Sr., 

Deputy Secretary. 
Docket No. RM11-17-000 - 40 -

In consideration of the foregoing, the Commission proposes to revise Chapter 

I, Title 18 of the Code of Federal Regulations to read as follows: 

PART 35 – FILING OF RATE SCHEDULES AND TARIFFS 

1. The authority for part 35 continues to read as follows: 

Authority: 16 U.S.C. 791a–825r, 2601–2645; 31 U.S.C. 9701; 42 U.S.C. 7101–

7352. 

2. In § 35.28, paragraphs (g)(4) through (g)(6) are redesignated as paragraphs (g)(5) 

through (g)(7) and a new paragraph (g)(4) is added to read as follows: 

 

§ 35.28. Non-discriminatory open access transmission tariff.

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(g) Tariffs and operations of Commission-approved independent system operators 

and regional transmission organizations. 

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(4) Electronic delivery of data. Each Commission-approved regional 

transmission organization and independent system operator must electronically 

deliver to the Commission, on an ongoing basis and in a form and manner 

acceptable to the Commission, data related to the markets that the regional 

transmission organization or independent system operator administers. 

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