166 FERC ¶ 61,137

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION

18 CFR Part 37

[Docket No. RM17-8-001; Order No. 845-A]

Reform of Generator Interconnection Procedures and Agreements

(Issued February 21, 2019)

AGENCY: Federal Energy Regulatory Commission.

ACTION: Order on rehearing and clarification.

SUMMARY: The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission is granting in part and

denying in part the requests for rehearing and clarification of its determinations in Order

No. 845, which amended the Commission’s pro forma Large Generator Interconnection

Procedures and pro forma Large Generator Interconnection Agreement to improve

certainty, promote more informed interconnection decisions, and enhance interconnection

processes.

EFFECTIVE DATE: This order on rehearing and clarification will become effective

[75 DAYS AFTER PUBLICATION IN THE FEDERAL REGISTER].

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

Tony Dobbins (Technical Information)

Office of Energy Policy and Innovation

Federal Energy Regulatory Commission

888 First Street, NE

Washington, DC 20426

(202) 502-6630

tony.dobbins@ferc.gov
Docket No. RM17

-8-001- 2 -

Kathleen Ratcliff (Technical Information)

Office of Energy Market Regulation

Federal Energy Regulatory Commission

888 First Street, NE

Washington, DC 20426

(202) 502-8018

kathleen.ratcliff@ferc.gov

Adam Pan (Legal Information)

Office of the General Counsel

Federal Energy Regulatory Commission

888 First Street, NE

Washington, DC 20426

(202) 502-6023

adam.pan@ferc.gov

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
166 FERC ¶ 61,137

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION

Before Commissioners: Neil Chatterjee, Chairman;

 Cheryl A. LaFleur and Richard Glick.

 

Reform of Generator Interconnection Procedures and

Agreements

Docket No. RM17-8-001

ORDER NO. 845-A

ORDER ON REHEARING AND CLARIFICATION

(Issued February 21, 2019)

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Paragraph Numbers

I. Introduction and Background.......................................................................................... 1.

II. Discussion...................................................................................................................... 6.

A. Interconnection Customer’s Option to Build ............................................................ 6.

1. Ameren Decision.................................................................................................... 7.

2. Justification for the Option to Build Requirements............................................. 22.

3. FPA Section 203 Blanket Authorization for Transfer of Facilities from 

Interconnection Customer to Transmission Provider.............................................. 34.

4. Requirements Related to Reliability, CIP Standards, Liability, Security, and 

Posting of Standards and Specifications.................................................................. 38.

5. Affected Systems................................................................................................. 59.

6. Cluster Studies..................................................................................................... 62.

7. Stand Alone Network Upgrades.......................................................................... 65.

8. Cost Estimates ..................................................................................................... 69.

9. Oversight Costs.................................................................................................... 72.

B. Identification and Definition of Contingent Facilities ............................................ 76.

1. Requests for Rehearing and Clarification............................................................ 77.

2. Determination ...................................................................................................... 78.

C. Transparency Regarding Study Models and Assumptions ..................................... 79.

1. Protection of Network Model Information.......................................................... 80.

2. Requirement to Post Network Model Information.............................................. 86.
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D. Congestion and Curtailment Information................................................................ 89.

1. Request for Rehearing ......................................................................................... 90.

2. Determination ...................................................................................................... 92.

E. Definition of Generating Facility in the Pro Forma LGIP and Pro Forma LGIA 93.

1. Requests for Rehearing and Clarification............................................................ 94.

2. Determination ...................................................................................................... 95.

F. Interconnection Study Deadlines............................................................................. 97.

1. Adoption of Order No. 845 Interconnection Study Metric Reporting 

Requirements........................................................................................................... 99.

2. Interconnection Study Data Posting Requirements........................................... 104.

G. Requesting Interconnection Service below Generating Facility Capacity ........... 108.

1. Requests for Rehearing and Clarification.......................................................... 111.

2. Determination .................................................................................................... 114.

H. Utilization of Surplus Interconnection Service..................................................... 119.

1. Original Interconnection Customer’s Ability to Utilize or Transfer Surplus 

Interconnection Service ......................................................................................... 122.

2. Effect of Expedited Surplus Interconnection Service Process on the Queue and on 

Transmission Planning........................................................................................... 130.

3. Impact of Differences in Electrical Characteristics between the Surplus and 

Original Interconnection Customers...................................................................... 136.

4. Independent Entity Variations........................................................................... 139.

5. Additional Requests for Clarification Regarding Surplus Interconnection 

Service ................................................................................................................... 142.

I. Material Modification Definition and Incorporation of Advanced Technology.... 148.

1. Requests for Rehearing and Clarification.......................................................... 149.

2. Determination .................................................................................................... 152.

J. Process Concerns.................................................................................................... 156.

1. Compliance and Effective Dates ....................................................................... 156.

K. Interconnection Request Withdrawals .................................................................. 167.

1. Requests for Rehearing and Clarification.......................................................... 168.

2. Determination .................................................................................................... 169.

L. Wholesale Distribution Tariffs.............................................................................. 170.

1. Requests for Rehearing and Clarification.......................................................... 170.

2. Determination .................................................................................................... 172.

III. Information Collection Statement ............................................................................ 173.

IV. Regulatory Flexibility Act Certification .................................................................. 177.

V. Document Availability .............................................................................................. 178.

VI. Effective Date........................................................................................................... 181.

Appendix A: List of Short Names of Entities that Filed Requests for Rehearing or 

Clarification....................................................................................................................... __
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Appendix B: Compilation of Final Rule Changes to the Pro Forma LGIP Made by Order 

No. 845 and Order No 845-A............................................................................................ __

Appendix C: Compilation of Final Rule Changes to the Pro Forma LGIA Made by 

Order No. 845 and Order No. 845-A................................................................................. __

I. Introduction and Background

1. On April 19, 2018, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (Commission) 

issued Order No. 845.

1

 Order No. 845 revised the Commission’s pro forma Large 

Generator Interconnection Procedures (LGIP) and pro forma Large Generator 

Interconnection Agreement (LGIA) to improve certainty for interconnection customers, 

promote more informed interconnection decisions, and enhance the interconnection 

process.2

 The Commission expected these reforms to provide interconnection customers 

with better information and more options for obtaining interconnection service and that, 

as a result, there would likely be fewer interconnection requests overall and fewer 

interconnection requests that do not reach commercial operation. The Commission 

also anticipated that, as a result of these reforms, transmission providers would

 1 Reform of Generator Interconnection Procedures and Agreements, Order 

No. 845, 163 FERC ¶ 61,043 (2018). 

2 Id. P 2. The pro forma LGIP and pro forma LGIA establish the terms and 

conditions under which public utilities that own, control, or operate facilities for 

transmitting energy in interstate commerce must provide interconnection service to 

large generating facilities. Id. P 6. A large generating facility is “a Generating Facility 

having a Generating Facility Capacity of more than 20 [megawatts (MW)].” See, e.g., 

pro forma LGIA Art. 1 (Definitions).
Docket No. RM17-8-001 - 4 -

be able to focus on those interconnection requests that are most likely to reach 

commercial operation.3

2. In Order No. 845, the Commission adopted ten different reforms in three general 

categories. First, in order to improve certainty for interconnection customers, Order 

No. 845: (1) removed the limitation that interconnection customers may only exercise 

the option to build a transmission provider’s interconnection facilities4 and stand alone 

network upgrades5 in instances when the transmission provider cannot meet the dates 

proposed by the interconnection customer; and (2) required that transmission providers 

 3 Order No. 845, 163 FERC ¶ 61,043 at P 2.

4 According to the pro forma LGIA: 

Transmission Provider's Interconnection Facilities shall mean all facilities 

and equipment owned, controlled or operated by the Transmission Provider 

from the Point of Change of Ownership to the Point of Interconnection as 

identified in Appendix A to the Standard Large Generator Interconnection 

Agreement, including any modifications, additions or upgrades to such 

facilities and equipment. Transmission Provider's Interconnection Facilities 

are sole use facilities and shall not include Distribution Upgrades, Stand 

Alone Network Upgrades or Network Upgrades. 

Pro forma LGIA Art. 1 (Definitions).

5 Stand alone network upgrades: 

shall mean Network Upgrades that an Interconnection Customer may 

construct without affecting day-to-day operations of the Transmission 

System during their construction. Both the Transmission Provider and the 

Interconnection Customer must agree as to what constitutes Stand Alone 

Network Upgrades and identify them in Appendix A to the Standard Large 

Generator Interconnection Agreement. 

Id.
Docket No. RM17-8-001 - 5 -

establish interconnection dispute resolution procedures that allow a disputing party to 

unilaterally seek non-binding dispute resolution. Second, to promote more informed 

interconnection decisions, Order No. 845: (1) required transmission providers to outline 

and make public a method for determining contingent facilities; (2) required transmission 

providers to list the specific study processes and assumptions for forming the network 

models used for interconnection studies; (3) revised the definition of “Generating 

Facility” to explicitly include electric storage resources; and (4) established reporting 

requirements for aggregate interconnection study performance. Third, Order No. 845 

aimed to enhance the interconnection process by: (1) allowing an interconnection 

customer to request a level of interconnection service that is lower than its generating 

facility capacity; (2) requiring transmission providers to allow for provisional 

interconnection agreements that provide for limited operation of a generating facility 

prior to completion of the full interconnection process; (3) requiring transmission 

providers to create a process for interconnection customers to use surplus interconnection 

service at existing points of interconnection; and (4) requiring transmission providers to 

set forth a procedure to allow transmission providers to assess and, if necessary, study an 

interconnection customer’s technology changes without affecting the interconnection 

customer’s queued position. In Order No. 845, the Commission made “no changes to the 

variations allowed by Order No. 2003” and further explained that “on compliance, 
Docket No. RM17-8-001 - 6 -

transmission providers may argue that they qualify for . . . variations from the 

requirements of [Order No. 845].”6

3. The Commission received twelve requests for rehearing and/or clarification of 

Order No. 845.7

 The rehearing and clarification requests raise issues related to all but 

one of the reforms adopted therein.8 Generation Developers also request rehearing of the 

Commission’s decision not to adopt a reform pertaining to congestion and curtailment 

information as the Commission proposed in the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking 

(NOPR).

9

 Some requests for rehearing and clarification also raised general or process 

 6

 Order No. 845, 163 FERC ¶ 61,043 at P 43 (citing Standardization of Generator 

Interconnection Agreements and Procedures, Order No. 2003, 104 FERC ¶ 61,103, at 

P 826 (2003), order on reh’g, Order No. 2003-A, 106 FERC ¶ 61,220 (2004), order on 

reh’g, Order No. 2003-B, 109 FERC ¶ 61,287 (2004), order on reh’g, Order No. 2003-C, 

111 FERC ¶ 61,401 (2005), aff'd sub nom. Nat’l Ass’n of Regulatory Util. Comm’rs v. 

FERC, 475 F.3d 1277 (D.C. Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 1230 (2008)).

7 Appendix A provides the short names of the entities that filed requests for 

rehearing or clarification.

8 No entity requested clarification or rehearing regarding the dispute resolution 

reform adopted in Order No. 845. 

9 Reform of Generator Interconnection Procedures and Agreements, 157 FERC 

¶ 61,212 (2016).
Docket No. RM17-8-001 - 7 -

concerns.10 For the reasons discussed below, we grant in part and deny in part the

requests for rehearing and clarification.11 

4. In particular, we grant rehearing with regard to the option to build reform to: 

(1) require that transmission providers explain why they do not consider a specific 

network upgrade to be a stand alone network upgrade; and (2) allow transmission 

providers to recover oversight costs related to the interconnection customer’s option to 

build. We also grant rehearing with regard to the surplus interconnection service reform 

to explain that the Commission does not intend to limit the ability of RTOs/ISOs to argue 

that an independent entity variation from the Commission’s surplus interconnection 

service requirements is appropriate. We also grant rehearing in part and find that, with 

regard to the reform for requesting interconnection service below generating facility 

 10 ISO New England Inc. (ISO-NE) filed an answer to AWEA’s request for 

clarification. Rule 713(d) of the Commission's Rules of Practice and Procedure, 

18 C.F.R. § 385.713(d) (2018), prohibits answers to requests for rehearing. Although 

AWEA has styled its pleading as a request for clarification, we consider it to be a request 

for rehearing and, on that basis, reject ISO-NE’s answer. As a result, we also dismiss 

AWEA’s answer to ISO-NE’s answer, as well as Ameren and MISO TOs’ answer to 

AWEA’s answer.

11 In Appendices B and C of this order, we provide all the revisions to, and 

additions of, provisions in the pro forma LGIP and the pro forma LGIA that the 

Commission made in Order No. 845 and this order on rehearing and clarification, Order 

No. 845-A. The underline and strikethrough in these appendices respectively reflect 

additions to, and deletions from, the pro forma LGIP and the pro forma LGIA made in 

Order Nos. 845 and Order No. 845-A. Additionally, these Appendices reflect several 

non-substantive corrections in these appendices to address stylistic inconsistencies in 

some of the new and revised pro forma LGIP and pro forma LGIA provisions. For 

example, in pro forma section 3.8, we have replaced the term “GIA” with “Large 

Generator Interconnection Agreement” and have capitalized some terms that are defined 

in the pro forma LGIP and/or the pro forma LGIA.
Docket No. RM17-8-001 - 8 -

capacity, an interconnection customer may propose control technologies at any time in 

the interconnection process that it is permitted to request interconnection service below 

generating facility capacity. 

5. Additionally, we grant clarification with regard to the option to build by finding 

that: (1) the Order No. 845 option to build provisions apply to all public utility 

transmission providers, including those that reimburse the interconnection customer for 

network upgrades; and (2) the option to build does not apply to stand alone network 

upgrades on affected systems. We also grant clarification with regard to transparency 

regarding study models and assumptions to find that: (1) transmission providers may use 

the Commission’s critical energy/electric infrastructure information (CEII) regulations as 

a model for evaluating entities that request network model information and assumptions;

and (2) the phrase “current system conditions” does not require transmission providers to 

maintain network models that reflect current real-time operating conditions of the 

transmission provider’s system. With regard to the interconnection study deadlines 

reform, we grant clarification that the date for measuring study performance metrics and 

the reporting requirements do not require transmission providers to post 2017 

interconnection study metrics. With regard to requesting interconnection service below 

generating facility capacity, we grant clarification that a transmission provider must 

provide a detailed explanation of its determination to perform additional studies at the 

full generating facility capacity for an interconnection customer that has requested 

service below its full generating facility capacity. Finally, in this order, we deny all other 

requests for rehearing and clarification. 
Docket No. RM17-8-001 - 9 -

II. Discussion

A. Interconnection Customer’s Option to Build

6. In Order No. 845, the Commission adopted a reform revising articles 5.1, 5.1.3, 

and 5.1.4 of the pro forma LGIA to allow interconnection customers to unilaterally select 

the option to build for stand alone network upgrades and transmission provider’s 

interconnection facilities regardless of whether the transmission provider can complete 

construction of such facilities by the interconnection customer’s proposed in-service date, 

initial synchronization date, or commercial operation date.

12 Prior to Order No. 845, this 

option to build was available to an interconnection customer only if the transmission 

provider did not agree to the interconnection customer’s preferred construction timeline. 

The Commission stated that the revisions adopted in Order No. 845 would “benefit the 

interconnection process by providing interconnection customers more control and 

certainty during the design and construction phases of the interconnection process.”13

1. Ameren Decision

7. On January 26, 2018, less than three months prior to Order No. 845’s issuance, 

the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit (D.C. Circuit) 

decided Ameren Services Co. v. FERC,

14 a decision that vacated and remanded prior 

Commission decisions affecting the Midcontinent Independent System Operator, Inc. 

 12 Order No. 845, 163 FERC ¶ 61,043 at PP 73-74. 

13 Id. P 85.

14 880 F.3d 571 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (Ameren).
Docket No. RM17-8-001 - 10 -

(MISO).

15 Several requests for rehearing of Order No. 845 refer to the Ameren decision. 

To explain the context of these arguments, we provide some background regarding the 

Order No. 2003 interconnection pricing policy16 and network upgrade cost responsibility 

in MISO. We also provide a short summary of Ameren.

8. In Order No. 2003, the Commission drew a distinction between interconnection 

facilities, which are “found between the Interconnection Customer’s Generating Facility 

and the Transmission Provider’s Transmission System,”17 and network upgrades, which 

“include only facilities at or beyond the point where the Interconnection Customer’s 

Generating Facility interconnects to the Transmission Provider’s Transmission 

System.”18 Under Order No. 2003, this classification determines which party has 

ultimate cost responsibility. Interconnection facilities “[are] paid for solely by the 

 15 In Ameren, the D.C. Circuit referred to the NOPR in this proceeding but only 

as it pertained to the Commission’s original proposal to require agreement between a 

transmission owner and an interconnection customer before the transmission owner could 

elect to initially fund network upgrades. See Order No. 845, 163 FERC ¶ 61,043 at P 122 

(citing Ameren, 880 F.3d at 585). The Commission opted to not move forward with that 

particular proposal in “light of the [Ameren] decision.” Id.

16 We use this term, consistent with its use in Order No. 2003, to refer to Order 

No. 2003’s policy of distinguishing interconnection facilities and network upgrades 

for the purpose of assigning ultimate cost responsibility. See, e.g., Order No. 2003, 

104 FERC ¶ 61,103 at PP 675-76. 

17 Id. P 21.

18 Id.
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Interconnection Customer” and network upgrades “[are] funded initially by the 

Interconnection Customer (unless the Transmission Provider elects to fund them).”19 

9. While the Order No. 2003 interconnection pricing policy requires interconnection 

customers to initially fund network upgrades (unless the transmission provider elects to 

fund them), Order No. 2003 established a crediting policy to reimburse interconnection 

customers for these costs.

20 In particular, if the network upgrades necessary for an 

interconnection are “funded initially by the Interconnection Customer,” the 

interconnection customer “would then be entitled to a cash equivalent refund . . . equal to 

the total amount paid for the Network Upgrades.”21 Under this policy, the transmission 

provider must pay the total amount that the interconnection customer paid for network 

upgrades as “credits against the Interconnection Customer’s payments for transmission 

services.”22 Order No. 2003-B states that “the period for reimbursement may not be 

longer than the period that would be required if the Interconnection Customer paid for 

 19 Id. P 22 (emphasis added).

20 In Order No. 2003, the Commission refers to this policy of reimbursing 

interconnection customers for the cost of network upgrades as its “crediting policy.” See, 

e.g., id. P 683. In this order, we refer to this mechanism as the Order No. 2003 crediting 

policy.

21 Id. P 22.

22 Id.
Docket No. RM17-8-001 - 12 -

transmission service directly and received credits on a dollar-for-dollar basis, or 20 years 

[from the generating facility’s commercial operation date], whichever is less.”23 

10. MISO sought, and the Commission granted, an independent entity variation for 

MISO to depart from the Order No. 2003 crediting policy.24 Instead, MISO directly 

assigns to interconnection customers 90 percent of the costs for network upgrades rated 

345 kV and above (with the remaining 10 percent recovered on a system-wide basis) and 

100 percent of the costs for network upgrades rated below 345 kV.25 

11. In addition, under the interconnection pricing policy that MISO proposed and the 

Commission accepted, MISO’s tariff provides MISO transmission owners two options 

for recovering network upgrade capital costs from interconnection customers. Under the 

first option, which we refer to in this order as MISO’s interconnection customer initial 

funding option, the interconnection customer would fund the network upgrades prior to 

construction, and the MISO transmission owner would not refund the non-reimbursable 

portion of this capital (the 90 or 100 percent) to the interconnection customer, and would 

neither include the capital in its rate base nor charge the interconnection customer a 

return on this capital.26 Under the second option, the MISO transmission owner would 

 23 Order No. 2003-B, 109 FERC ¶ 61,287 at PP 3 & 36.

24 Midwest Indep. Transmission Sys. Operator, Inc., 129 FERC ¶ 61,060, at P 59 

(2009), order denying reh’g, 154 FERC ¶ 61,073 (2016). 

25 Id. P 8. 

26 See Midcontinent Indep. Sys. Operator, Inc., 151 FERC ¶ 61,220, at P 5 (2015). 
Docket No. RM17-8-001 - 13 -

pay for the construction of the network upgrades and then recover the interconnection 

customer’s portion of the cost burden over time through periodic network upgrade 

charges27 that include a return on the capital investment.28 In this order, we refer to this 

option as MISO’s transmission owner initial funding option.

12. On June 18, 2015, in response to a complaint relating to these network upgrade 

initial funding options, the Commission instituted a proceeding under FPA section 206 to 

examine MISO’s pro forma GIA, the pro forma Facilities Construction Agreement, and 

pro forma Multi-Party Facilities Construction Agreement.

29 To support this decision, 

the Commission stated that allowing MISO transmission owners to unilaterally “select 

transmission owner [initial] funding may be unjust, unreasonable, unduly

discriminatory”30 and “may increase costs of interconnection service . . . with no 

corresponding increase in service.”31 

 27 As noted by the D.C. Circuit, this network upgrade charge “paid from the 

incoming generator . . . includes both a return of capital . . . and a return on capital” and 

is, according to the D.C. Circuit, “thus economically equivalent to inclusion in the rate 

base, with the exception that they are charged specifically to the incoming generator 

rather than to all of the transmission owner’s customers.” Ameren, 880 F.3d at 576 

(emphasis in original).

28 See Midcontinent Indep. Sys. Operator, Inc., 151 FERC ¶ 61,220 at P 8. 

29 Id. P 2.

30 Id. P 53.

31 Id. P 48.
Docket No. RM17-8-001 - 14 -

13. On December 29, 2015, the Commission denied rehearing on the June 2015 order. 

In particular, it stated that “because there is the possibility for an increase in costs 

presented by a transmission owner’s unilateral election [of transmission owner initial 

funding] as compared with [interconnection customer initial funding], and yet there is 

no increase in interconnection service provided, such unilateral election is unjust and 

unreasonable.”32 For this reason, it directed MISO to revise its tariff “to remove the 

ability of a transmission owner to unilaterally elect to initially fund network upgrades.”33 

In response to a request for rehearing on that order, the Commission again denied 

rehearing, finding that the December 29, 2015 order did not deprive MISO transmission 

owners of the opportunity to earn a return “to which they are entitled” because pursuant 

to the interconnection customer initial funding option, “the [MISO] transmission owner 

makes no investment of which, or on which, it is entitled to a return.”34

14. The petitioners in Ameren challenged these three decisions regarding MISO’s 

options for transmission owners to recover network upgrade capital costs from 

 32 Otter Tail Power Co. v. Midcontinent Indep. Sys. Operator, Inc., 153 FERC 

¶ 61,352, at P 32 (2015).

33 Id. P 65.

34 Otter Tail Power Co. v. Midcontinent Indep. Sys. Operator, Inc., 156 FERC 

¶ 61,099, at P 12 (2016). The Commission also stated that its “task is to allow a public 

utility the opportunity to offer its investors a return commensurate with the risk 

associated with their investment, as represented by the utility’s business and financial 

risks” and that, under the interconnection owner initial funding option, “the transmission 

owner does not bear that risk.” Id. P 13. 
Docket No. RM17-8-001 - 15 -

interconnection customers.

35 The D.C. Circuit vacated and remanded the orders, finding 

that the Commission had not adequately responded to MISO transmission owner 

concerns that MISO’s interconnection customer initial funding option “compels 

[transmission owners] to construct, own, and operate facilities without compensatory 

network upgrade charges—thus forcing them to accept additional risk without 

corresponding return as essentially non-profit managers of [network] upgrade 

facilities.”36 Regarding these risks, the D.C. Circuit stated that MISO transmission 

owners would have to “assume certain costs that are never compensated” such as 

“liability for insurance deductibles and all sorts of litigation, including environmental and 

reliability claims.”37 Moreover, the D.C. Circuit stated that the MISO orders at issue 

suggest that the Commission does not believe that MISO transmission owners are entitled 

“to earn a return on capital” for network upgrades funded through MISO’s 

interconnection customer initial funding despite transmission owners’ assumption of such 

costs.38 For these reasons, the D.C. Circuit stated that the Commission “must explain 

 35 Ameren, 880 F.3d at 573.

36 Id.

37 Id. at 580.

38 Id. at 581.
Docket No. RM17-8-001 - 16 -

how investors could be expected to underwrite the prospect of potentially large non-profit 

appendages with no compensatory incremental return.”39 

a. Requests for Rehearing and Clarification 

15. MISO TOs, Ameren, and EEI argue that Order No. 845’s option to build revisions

are contrary to (1) the regulatory compact (under which utilities construct facilities, have 

an obligation to serve, and receive a level of earnings in return) and (2) the D.C. Circuit

decision in Ameren.

40 EEI argues that Order No. 845 fails to consider that transmission 

owners should receive compensation for the risk of owning and operating facilities. 

Additionally, MISO TOs, EEI, and Ameren argue that the Commission should grant 

rehearing and return to the pre-Order No. 845 option to build provisions.41

16. MISO TOs argue that the revised option to build “could impact the transmission 

provider’s ability to construct, fund, and earn a return on stand alone network upgrades 

and transmission provider interconnection facilities” because the “the transmission 

provider could not place them into its rate base or otherwise earn a return on those 

upgrades and facilities.”42 In support of their concerns, MISO TOs further state that 

 39 Id.

40 MISO TOs Rehearing Request at 11-12 (citing Ameren, 880 F.3d at 581); 

Ameren Rehearing Request at 3-5; EEI Rehearing Request at 3-4.

41 MISO TOs Rehearing Request at 14; Ameren Rehearing Request at 14; 

EEI Rehearing Request at 6.

42 MISO TOs Rehearing Request at 12-13.
Docket No. RM17-8-001 - 17 -

“compulsory generator-funded upgrades and facilities raise serious statutory and 

constitutional concerns” similar to those addressed in Ameren, where the D.C. Circuit

determined that, “the Commission failed to explain why transmission owners should 

be forced to add ‘non-profit appendages’ to their transmission system[s].”43 

17. If the Commission does not grant rehearing, MISO TOs and Ameren ask the 

Commission to clarify that the transmission owner may pay interconnection customers

for construction costs incurred for the option to build facilities when the interconnection 

customer transfers them pursuant to article 5.2(9) of the pro forma LGIA and then charge 

the customer a return pursuant to a Facility Service Agreement.44 They argue that, 

without this clarification, the option to build would be contrary to the transmission 

owner's right to earn a return on facilities that are part of its transmission system.45

b. Determination

18. We deny MISO TOs’, EEI’s, and Ameren’s requests for rehearing. We find that 

the concerns identified in Ameren pertain solely to unique features of MISO’s tariff and 

precedent that applies in MISO. As such, the Ameren decision does not implicate the 

Commission’s revisions to the pro forma LGIP and the pro forma LGIA as outlined in 

Order No. 845. Specifically, the D.C. Circuit recognized in Ameren that, under MISO’s 

transmission owner initial funding option, a MISO transmission owner can levy a 

 43 Id. at 13 (citing Ameren, 880 F.3d at 584).

44 Id. at 14-15; Ameren Rehearing Request at 12-13.

45 Ameren Rehearing Request at 13.
Docket No. RM17-8-001 - 18 -

network upgrade charge on interconnection customers after the transmission owner 

initially finances a network upgrade. The D.C. Circuit recognized that this network 

charge, which is memorialized in a Facilities Services Agreement, is “paid [by] the 

incoming generator” and “includes both a return of capital . . . and a return on capital” 

and “is thus economically equivalent to inclusion in the rate base.”46 We note that the 

network upgrade charge and Facilities Services Agreement are unique features of 

MISO’s policy for recovering the cost of network upgrades, and the D.C. Circuit’s 

primary concern was with the Commission’s requirement that there be mutual agreement 

between the MISO transmission owner and the interconnection customer before the 

MISO transmission owner can elect MISO’s transmission owner initial funding option. 

The D.C. Circuit found that, if the MISO transmission owner must obtain the 

interconnection customer’s agreement to initially fund network upgrades, then the

interconnection customer could effectively prevent the MISO transmission owner from 

assessing a network upgrade charge and receiving a return on its investment.47

19. Order No. 845 creates no such concerns. In reaching this conclusion, we first 

note that the Commission adopted the option to build in Order No. 2003 as part of the 

pro forma LGIA and that it did so in conjunction with the establishment of the Order 

 46 Ameren, 880 F.3d at 576.

47 Id. at 580-81 (stating, among other things, that “FERC must explain how 

investors could be expected to underwrite the prospect of potentially large non-profits 

appendages with no incremental return” and that “the answer FERC offered—to cajole 

consent from the generators[ ]

—is a non sequitur”).
Docket No. RM17-8-001 - 19 -

No. 2003 crediting policy. Viewing the option to build in this context, we find that Order 

No. 845 does not deprive transmission providers of the ability to earn a return of, and on,

network upgrades, including stand alone network upgrades constructed pursuant to the 

option to build as outlined in the pro forma LGIA. On the contrary, Order No. 2003 

established the Order No. 2003 crediting policy, a mechanism that explicitly allows 

transmission providers to earn a return of, and on, the costs of network upgrades. To this 

end, under the Commission’s policy as outlined in Order No. 2003, a transmission 

provider has the ability to earn a return of capital expenditure for network upgrades to the 

extent that it has reimbursed an interconnection customer with transmission credits.48 

Additionally, when the transmission provider includes in its rate base the cost of a 

network upgrade, the transmission provider earns a return on the costs of this facility.

20. In contrast to the option to build set forth in the pro forma LGIA, the concerns the 

D.C. Circuit identified in Ameren are present only in MISO because MISO’s 

interconnection pricing policy is a unique variation from the Order No. 2003 crediting

policy under which MISO directly assigns 90 or 100 percent of the network upgrade cost 

responsibility to interconnection customers. Commission precedent makes clear that, for 

variations from the Commission’s pro forma provisions, it is the transmission provider 

 48 Order No. 2003-A, 106 FERC ¶ 61,220 at P 657 (finding that a transmission 

provider “cannot include the cost of the [interconnection customer-funded] Network 

Upgrades in its transmission rates until it has provided credits to the Interconnection 

Customer, and as long as any part of the Network Upgrades remains the responsibility of 

the Interconnection Customer, that part of the cost cannot be recovered in transmission 

rates”). This is true for all network upgrades, including stand alone network upgrades.
Docket No. RM17-8-001 - 20 -

that has the burden to demonstrate that it qualifies for the variation.

49 Thus, we find that 

the Commission’s Order No. 845 option to build revisions, which do not alter the Order 

No. 2003 crediting policy, do not conflict with the Ameren decision because they do not

deprive transmission owners of the ability to earn a return on, and of, stand alone network 

upgrade costs.

50

21. Finally, we deny MISO’s and Ameren’s requests for clarification that the 

transmission owner may pay the interconnection customer for its option to build 

construction costs when the interconnection customer transfers the facilities to the 

transmission owner, and then charge the interconnection customer a return pursuant to a 

Facilities Services Agreement.51 We deny these requests because they are essentially 

requests for the Commission to allow MISO to deviate from the requirements outlined 

in Order No. 845 based on MISO’s interconnection pricing policy, which is itself a 

deviation from Order No 2003. If MISO wishes to make such a request, it should do so 

 49 See S. Cal. Edison Co., 141 FERC ¶ 61,100, at P 23 (2012) (“A transmission 

provider seeking a case-specific deviation from a pro forma interconnection agreement 

bears the burden of justifying and explaining what makes the interconnection unique and 

what operational concerns or other reasons necessitate the variations.”); see also PJM 

Interconnection, L.L.C., 111 FERC ¶ 61,098, at P 9 (2005).

50 Only the transmission provider’s interconnection facilities and stand alone 

network upgrades, as opposed to all network upgrades, are relevant in the option to build 

discussion.

51 MISO TOs Rehearing Request at 14-15; Ameren Rehearing Request at 12-13.
Docket No. RM17-8-001 - 21 -

when it submits its Order No. 845 compliance filing, and the Commission will consider it 

then.52 

2. Justification for the Option to Build Requirements

22. In Order No. 845, the Commission stated that the revisions it adopted to the 

option to build “will benefit the interconnection process by providing interconnection 

customers more control and certainty during the design and construction phases of the 

interconnection process.”53 The Commission also found that “limiting exercise of the 

option to build to circumstances where the transmission provider cannot meet the 

interconnection customer’s requested dates is not just and reasonable.”54 In support of 

this conclusion, the Commission stated that this limitation “restrict[ed] an interconnection 

customer’s ability to efficiently build the transmission provider’s interconnection 

facilities and stand alone network upgrades in a cost-effective manner, which could result 

in higher costs for interconnection customers.”55 Furthermore, the Commission stated 

that “in circumstances where an interconnection customer cannot exercise the option to 

 52 We note that, in response to a similar request from MISO about how the 

requirements of Order No. 845 apply to MISO’s specific interconnection process, the 

Commission stated that it will evaluate each transmission provider’s tariff provisions 

at the time that it submits its compliance filing. Order No. 845, 163 FERC ¶ 61,043 at 

P 204.

53 Id. P 85.

54 Id.

55 Id.
Docket No. RM17-8-001 - 22 -

build, it may pay more and/or wait longer for the construction of the transmission 

provider’s interconnection facilities and stand alone network upgrades.”56

a. Requests for Rehearing and Clarification 

23. Multiple entities argue that the Order No. 845 revisions to the option to build fail 

to satisfy the legal requirements of Federal Power Act (FPA) section 206.57 Ameren and 

MISO TOs argue that the Commission failed to make a showing of undue discrimination 

or harm arising from the current pro forma LGIA or the option to build provisions under 

MISO’s tariff.58 MISO TOs further argue that this lack of undue discrimination is 

especially “true in [regional transmission operators or independent system operators 

(RTOs/ISOs)] where the interconnection process is administered by an independent 

entity.”59 

24. Additionally, MISO TOs state that interconnection customers in non-RTOs/ISOs 

generally receive transmission credits to reimburse them for any network upgrades they 

fund upfront60 and that, in a RTO/ISO, an interconnection customer receives transmission 

rights or other rights in connection with the upgrades they fund.61 MISO TOs argue that 

 56 Id. P 86.

57 16 U.S.C. 824e (2012).

58 Ameren Rehearing Request at 7; MISO TOs Rehearing Request at 7.

59 MISO TOs Rehearing Request at 7-8.

60 Id. at 9.

61 Id.
Docket No. RM17-8-001 - 23 -

these factors provide “a level of cost protection to interconnection customers, and may 

leave them ultimately indifferent as to costs.”62 SoCal Edison argues that, without 

oversight for costs incurred, interconnection customers have no incentive to prevent overspending to accelerate construction.

63

25. Ameren and EEI argue that the Commission failed to demonstrate that the existing 

option to build provisions are not just and reasonable.64 EEI contends that simply 

because an interconnection customer may build more cheaply and quickly does not mean 

that charges associated with facilities built by the transmission provider are unjust and 

unreasonable.65 

26. EEI further argues that the prior option to build provisions “ensure that the 

Transmission Provider would be responsive to the Interconnection Customer’s requested 

dates and provided an option . . . if the Transmission Provider was not responsive.”66 

EEI goes on to argue that Order No. 845 is unjust and unreasonable because, as more 

 62 Id.

63 SoCal Edison Request for Clarification at 3. Under the California Independent 

System Operator Corporation (CAISO) tariff, there is a limit on refunds of $60,000/MW 

for the cost of Reliability Network Upgrades, but below that threshold, SoCal Edison 

does not see any cost containment incentive or mechanism to review costs. CAISO 

Tariff, Appendix DD, Section 14.3.2.1(1); see also Southern Rehearing Request at 7.

64 Ameren Rehearing Request at 7; EEI Rehearing Request at 3.

65 EEI Rehearing Request at 5 & 7.

66 Id. at 7.
Docket No. RM17-8-001 - 24 -

interconnection customers exercise the option the build, the transmission provider’s 

ability to make decisions about its own assets or the location of the assets will 

“progressively decline.”67 

27. EEI, MISO TOs, and Ameren also assert that Order No. 845 only cites one 

example where cost and time savings have occurred.68 MISO TOs contend that the 

Commission failed to explain why this example justifies the “across-the-board 

determination that all existing option to build provisions are not just and reasonable.”69 

Southern argues that “merely suggesting that changes can occur” does not provide 

“substantial evidence” of the need for the new Order No. 845 option to build 

requirements.70 

28. SoCal Edison seeks clarification regarding the Order No. 845 option to build 

revisions.

71 Specifically, it argues that the Commission fails to address the cost risk to 

 67 Id.

68 MISO TOs Rehearing Request at 9 (citing Order No. 845, 163 FERC ¶ 61,043 

at P 86); Ameren Rehearing Request at 8.

69 MISO TOs Rehearing Request at 9.

70 Southern Rehearing Request at 7 (citing Nat. Fuel Gas Supply Corp. v. Fed. 

Energy Reg. Comm’n, 468 F.3d 831, 839 (D.C. Cir. 2006); Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Assoc. of

the U.S. v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983) (Motor Vehicle Mfrs.); 

Allentown Mack Sales & Serv., Inc. v. Nat. Labor Relations Bd., 522 U.S. 359, 374

(1998)). 

71 SoCal Edison Request for Clarification at 2.
Docket No. RM17-8-001 - 25 -

California ratepayers under the CAISO tariff, which requires that transmission customers, 

not third party builders or interconnection customers, ultimately bear network upgrade

costs.72 SoCal Edison states that, under the CAISO tariff, the transmission provider 

would reimburse the interconnection customer over five years for the amount the 

interconnection customer spent on the stand alone network upgrades.73 SoCal Edison 

states, however, that the LGIA does not include a mechanism for ratepayers to challenge 

the justness and reasonableness of the construction costs that the interconnection 

customer incurred.74 For these reasons, SoCal Edison requests that the Commission 

clarify whether it intended these new rules to apply in instances when the interconnecting 

customer does not ultimately bear the costs of its construction for network upgrades.75 

Further, SoCal Edison requests that the Commission clarify that it would not prohibit the 

transmission provider from simply putting the interconnection customer’s costs into rates 

per the CAISO tariff.76

b. Determination 

29. We deny Ameren’s, MISO TOs’, SoCal Edison’s, EEI’s, and Southern’s rehearing 

requests. First, in response to Ameren’s and MISO TOs’ claims that the Commission 

 72 Id. at 3.

73 Id. (citing CAISO Tariff, Appendix U, Section 3.4.3).

74 Id.

75 Id. at 4.

76 Id.
Docket No. RM17-8-001 - 26 -

failed to make a showing of undue discrimination, we note that the Commission did not 

argue that the Order No. 845 option to build provisions are necessary to address undue 

discrimination in the pre-Order No. 845 option to build process. Rather, the Commission 

justified changes to the option to build by stating that the pre-Order No. 845 option to 

build provisions are not just and reasonable because they restrict “an interconnection 

customer’s ability to efficiently build the transmission provider’s interconnection 

facilities and stand alone network upgrades in a cost-effective manner, which could result 

in higher costs for interconnection customers.”77 In addition, the Commission found that 

the pre-Order No. 845 option to build provisions could prevent interconnection customers 

from reducing construction times.

78 

30. We also disagree with MISO TOs’ and SoCal Edison’s assertions that 

interconnection customers that receive transmission credits, transmission rights, or other 

rights in connection with network upgrades have no economic incentive to reduce 

network upgrade costs. Although under Order No. 2003 interconnection customers that 

fund the costs of network upgrades receive network upgrade cost reimbursement through 

crediting of all their network upgrade costs, interconnection customers still are generally 

responsible for financing all of their construction costs up front and compete with other 

developers to meet the substantial requirements to obtain such financing. The need to 

 77 Order No. 845, 163 FERC ¶ 61,043 at P 85.

78 See id. P 86 (finding that where “an interconnection customer cannot exercise 

the option to build, it may . . . wait longer for the construction of transmission provider’s 

interconnection facilities and stand alone network upgrades”).
Docket No. RM17-8-001 - 27 -

obtain financing up front and the fact that interconnection customers can wait for 

years for full reimbursement of their network upgrade costs create an incentive for 

interconnection customers to keep overall project costs low. Additionally, 

interconnection customers have emphasized to the Commission that certainty and the 

ability to control risks are necessary to successfully develop generation.79 The option 

to build revisions increase certainty and the ability to control risks by providing 

interconnection customers with greater control over their up-front construction costs and 

schedule. 

31. These facts support the Commission’s conclusion that interconnection customers 

have incentives to reduce network upgrade costs. In addition, we believe that a

transmission provider’s incentives to reduce network upgrade costs may not be as 

significant as an interconnection customer’s incentives to reduce such costs. In support 

of this conclusion, we note that, under the Order No. 2003 crediting policy, where a 

transmission provider reimburses the interconnection customer for the network upgrade 

costs, it does so over time through credits rather than funding the costs up front. 

Moreover, unlike an interconnection customer, a transmission owner is allowed to 

recover the cost of a transmission credit in its rate base as it reimburses the 

 79 See, e.g., 2015 AWEA Petition at 4 (“[t]he key reforms requested in the [AWEA 

petition] relate to the certainty of . . .the interconnection process” and include reforms 

for “creating more certainty on network upgrade costs”) & 8 (“typically the part of the 

project development process with the greatest uncertainty and risk of delay for developers 

and the area in which developers often have the fewest opportunities to manage and 

control . . . risks”) (emphasis added).
Docket No. RM17-8-001 - 28 -

interconnection customer. By doing so, the transmission provider, unlike the 

interconnection customer, will be able to earn a return on its cost for providing the 

transmission credit. Furthermore, although an interconnection customer receives a 

transmission credit reimbursement for any stand alone network upgrades it pays for 

upfront, interconnection customers do not receive any form of reimbursement for the 

costs of the transmission provider’s interconnection facilities. Thus, an interconnection 

customer has an even greater incentive to reduce costs for the transmission provider’s 

interconnection facilities. 

32. In response to Ameren’s and EEI’s contention that the Commission provided 

insufficient evidence for concluding that the pre-Order No. 845 option to build was unjust 

and unreasonable, we note the Commission’s reliance upon the reasonable economic 

proposition that interconnection customers would have a significant economic incentive 

to build the transmission provider’s interconnection facilities and stand alone network 

upgrades in a cost-effective manner.80 We reiterate the finding that “in circumstances 

where an interconnection customer cannot exercise the option to build, it may pay more 

and/or wait longer for the construction of the transmission provider’s interconnection 

 80 See S.C. Pub. Serv. Auth. v. FERC, 762 F.3d 41, 65 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (stating 

that to meet the FPA section 206 requirements, the Commission must support its 

findings by “substantial evidence,” not “empirical evidence” and that its findings need 

only be based upon “reasonable economic propositions”); see also Pub. Serv. Co. of 

Colo., 163 FERC ¶ 61,204, at P 31 (2018) (finding that applying this standard requires 

“evidence that ‘a reasonable mind might accept” as “adequate to support a conclusion” 

and that the Commission’s findings may be based on “reasonable economic propositions” 

and “predictive judgments grounded in basic economic principles”). 
Docket No. RM17-8-001 - 29 -

facilities and stand alone network upgrades.”81 Additionally, we continue to find that the 

pre-Order No. 845 option to build provisions were unjust and unreasonable for creating a 

hurdle that could prevent interconnection customers from reducing their costs and 

shortening their construction timelines. For these reasons, we disagree with EEI’s, MISO 

TOs’, and Ameren’s claims that the Commission relied solely on a single example of 

time and cost savings. 

33. Finally, we grant SoCal Edison’s request and clarify that the Order No. 845 option 

to build provisions apply to all public utility transmission providers, including those that

reimburse the interconnection customer for network upgrades. In Order No. 845, the 

Commission’s option to build revisions only eliminated the limitation that prevents

interconnection customers from exercising the option to build transmission provider’s 

interconnection facilities and stand alone network upgrades unless the transmission 

provider informs the interconnection customer that it cannot meet dates proposed by the 

interconnection customer.

82 Order No. 845 made no other modifications relating to the 

treatment of stand alone network upgrades; nor did it alter the Order No. 2003 crediting 

policy, which provides a mechanism for an interconnection customer to receive 

transmission credits in reimbursement for the total amount that the interconnection

customer pays for network upgrades, including stand alone network upgrades. Thus, as 

 81 Order No. 845, 163 FERC ¶ 61,043 at P 86.

82 Id. P 3.
Docket No. RM17-8-001 - 30 -

noted above, pursuant to the Order No. 2003 crediting policy, the transmission provider 

can recover the costs of such credits in their transmission rate base after it provides the 

credits to the interconnection customer.83 Moreover, as noted above, the Commission 

relied on the reasonable economic proposition that interconnection customers have a

greater economic incentive than transmission providers to reduce the cost of stand alone 

network upgrades. 

3. FPA Section 203 Blanket Authorization for Transfer of Facilities 

from Interconnection Customer to Transmission Provider

34. Article 5.2(9) of the pro forma LGIA, which Order No. 845 did not modify, states 

that “[u]nless Parties otherwise agree, Interconnection Customer shall transfer ownership 

of Transmission Provider’s Interconnection Facilities and Stand Alone Network 

Upgrades to Transmission Provider.” Eversource Energy Service Company (Eversource) 

submitted comments in response to the NOPR asking the Commission to grant a blanket 

authorization under FPA section 20384 for the transfer of transmission provider’s 

interconnection facilities and/or stand alone network upgrades constructed pursuant to the 

option to build.85 Eversource argued, among other things, that where electricity flows 

over transmission facilities in interstate commerce, such “facilities are considered to be 

[Commission-jurisdictional], even if not otherwise in service” and that the regulatory 

 83 See Order No. 2003-A, 106 FERC ¶ 61,220 at P 657.

84 16 U.S.C. 824b.

85 Eversource 2017 Comments at 17-19 (citing 18 CFR 33.1).
Docket No. RM17-8-001 - 31 -

approval required by FPA section 203 is “an additional undertaking . . . that would not 

occur but for the interconnection customer’s construction of the transmission owner’s 

transmission facilities.”86 In Order No. 845, the Commission did not address this request 

for a blanket authorization.

a. Requests for Rehearing and Clarification 

35. EEI and MISO TOs ask the Commission to grant the request originally made 

in Eversource’s NOPR comments for a FPA section 203 blanket authorization for 

facilities built pursuant to the option to build if the Commission decides to retain the 

Order No. 845 revisions to the option to build.

87 In support, EEI states that the 

Commission provided no reasoning for not granting such a blanket authorization and that 

the required transfer, coupled with a “likely increase” in the need for such transfers, 

weighs in favor of “decreasing the regulatory burden” on transmission providers and 

interconnection customers.88 EEI argues that, like other FPA section 203 blanket 

authorizations, such transactions would not raise concerns under the Commission’s 

traditional analysis.89 EEI further argues that failure to create such a blanket 

authorization would require transmission owners to either accept ownership prior to 

 86 Id. at 18.

87 EEI Rehearing Request at 8; MISO TOs Rehearing Request at 15.

88 EEI Rehearing Request at 8 & n.23.

89 Id. at 8.
Docket No. RM17-8-001 - 32 -

energization or face the task of making an FPA section 203 filing prior to transfer.90 

EEI argues that such issues could delay the transfer of these facilities and cause other 

complications in the operability of assets where generating assets have obligations to 

come online on a certain timetable. EEI argues that a blanket authorization would 

increase the likelihood of timely transfer after the facilities are tested and determined to 

be safe to operate as part of the transmission system.91 Finally, EEI argues that granting 

such a blanket authorization is consistent with the goal of reducing the regulatory burden 

of FPA sections 203 and 205.

36. MISO TOs argue that FPA section 203 approval is “sometimes a significant 

undertaking” and that the Commission should therefore grant this request for blanket 

authorization.92 MISO TOs argue that Eversource raised this issue in comments on the 

NOPR and that failure to respond to this argument would demonstrate that Order No. 845 

is arbitrary and capricious.

b. Determination

37. We deny MISO TOs’ and EEI’s requests for rehearing. The Commission has 

established, in its regulations, a number of blanket authorizations that apply to 

transactions for which specific approval under FPA section 203 would otherwise be 

 90 Id. at 9.

91 Id.

92 MISO TOs Rehearing Request at 16.
Docket No. RM17-8-001 - 33 -

necessary. A transaction covered by a blanket authorization is “pre-approved” pursuant 

to the regulation itself rather than requiring an application and specific finding under 

FPA section 203 that the transaction is consistent with the public interest. Blanket 

authorizations “under section 203 cannot be granted lightly, particularly generic 

authorizations.”93 Because a blanket authorization is “an ex ante determination as to the 

appropriateness of a category of transactions under section 203 and a counterparty is not 

yet identified, a blanket authorization can be granted only when the Commission can be 

assured that the statutory standards will be met, including ensuring that the interests of 

captive customers are safeguarded and that public utility assets are protected under all 

circumstances.”94 The limited hypothetical facts MISO TOs and EEI provide in their 

rehearing requests regarding facilities constructed pursuant to the option to build do not 

provide the assurance that such transactions will meet these statutory standards. Thus, 

we deny rehearing. 

4. Requirements Related to Reliability, CIP Standards, Liability, 

Security, and Posting of Standards and Specifications

38. Order No. 845 made no revisions to article 5.2 of the pro forma LGIA, which 

lays out the general conditions for exercising the option to build. Article 5.2 (1) of the 

pro forma LGIA provides that the interconnection customer “shall engineer, procure 

equipment, and construct Transmission Provider’s Interconnection Facilities and Stand 

 93 FPA Section 203 Supplemental Policy Statement, 120 FERC ¶ 61,060, at P 33.

(2007), order on clarification and reconsideration, 122 FERC ¶ 61,157 (2008).

94 Id.
Docket No. RM17-8-001 - 34 -

Alone Network Upgrades (or portions thereof) using Good Utility Practice and 

using standards and specifications provided in advance by Transmission Provider.” 

Article 5.2(2) of the pro forma LGIA requires that the interconnection customer’s 

“engineering, procurement and construction . . . comply with all requirements of law 

to which Transmission Provider would be subject.” 

39. Article 5.2(7) of the pro forma LGIA requires that the interconnection customer 

“indemnify Transmission Provider for claims arising from Interconnection Customer’s 

construction . . . under the procedures applicable to Article 18.1 Indemnity.” In response 

to Edison Electric Institute’s, National Grid’s, and Xcel Energy Services, Inc.’s 

comments on the NOPR taking issue with article 5.2(7) in light of the changes made in 

Order No. 845, the Commission reiterated the language in this provision and stated that 

this provision is “sufficiently broad to address EEI’s, Xcel’s, and National Grid’s 

concerns.”95

a. Requests for Rehearing and Clarification 

40. EEI and MISO TOs argue that the Commission’s Order No. 845 revisions to the

option to build do not address how the changes will impact transmission providers’ 

ability to maintain system reliability.96 MISO TOs state that the Commission's revisions 

to the option to build may substantially increase the number of instances when the option 

 95 Order No. 845, 163 FERC ¶ 61,043 at P 94.

96 EEI Rehearing Request at 3; MISO TOs Rehearing Request at 17.
Docket No. RM17-8-001 - 35 -

to build is elected in, for example, RTOs/ISOs with large generation interconnection 

queues such as MISO.97

41. APS argues that the option to build, as revised by Order No. 845, conflicts with 

the Critical Infrastructure Protection Reliability Standards (CIP standards). In 

explanation, APS states that the existing CIP standards require that transmission 

providers meet specific security and access requirements, which increase as the impact 

classification increases (from low to high). APS argues that the assets to which 

interconnection customers would interconnect would be subject to at least one CIP 

standard and that, while a transmission provider would have “continued responsibility to 

meet [its] compliance and security obligations . . . under the . . . [r]eliability [s]tandards,” 

an interconnection customer “may not be similarly obligated.”98 APS draws this 

conclusion because, it argues, although the pro forma LGIA requires interconnection 

customers to comply with “applicable Reliability Standards for procurement, 

engineering, and construction” under the option to build, it addresses neither the

reliability standards related to security nor transmission provider obligations related to 

the existing transmission assets within which the interconnection customer would build.99 

APS contends that requiring transmission providers to manage CIP standard compliance 

 97 MISO TOs Rehearing Request at 17-18.

98 APS Rehearing Request at 8-9.

99 Id. at 9 (citing pro forma LGIA Art. 5.1).
Docket No. RM17-8-001 - 36 -

for interconnection customers would already be “extremely challenging” and “[was] 

rendered impossible” by the Commission’s rejection of requests to require transmission 

provider approval for the interconnection customers’ subcontractors.100 If the 

Commission does not grant rehearing, APS asks the Commission to limit option to 

build construction activities so that they do not include “those facilities to which 

the [CIP standards] are applicable, e.g., outside the substation perimeter.”101

42. APS also states that the current pro forma LGIA liability and indemnification 

provisions are insufficient to protect transmission providers that may violate their 

regulatory requirements as a result of the expanded option to build. In particular, APS

states that pro forma LGIA articles 5.1 and 18.1 do not explicitly address the need for 

interconnection customers to cooperate with, and adhere to, transmission provider 

processes to facilitate compliance with North American Electric Reliability Corporation 

(NERC) reliability standards.

102 APS also contends that article 18.2 specifically excludes 

either party from liability that results from “any losses, damages, costs or expenses for 

any special, indirect, incidental, consequential, or punitive damages.”103 APS contends, 

 100 Id. (citing Order No. 845, 163 FERC ¶ 61,043 at P 110).

101 Id. at 10.

102 Id. at 11.

103 Id. at 11. Pro forma LGIA Article 18.2 states that: 

Other than the Liquidated Damages heretofore described, in no event shall 

either Party be liable under any provision of this LGIA for any losses, 

damages, costs or expenses for any special, indirect, incidental, 
Docket No. RM17-8-001 - 37 -

however, that such damages are the types from which transmission providers need to

protect themselves to ensure that the appropriate party will be responsible for penalties, 

required mitigation efforts, and other costs. In light of its interpretation of article 18.2,

APS questions who would be liable for “direct facility damage” and “increased costs for 

the service of load and/or wholesale customers” if “during the course of construction, a 

significant error is made by the Interconnection Customer or its contractor, which . . . 

results in the loss or destruction of a portion of the Transmission Provider’s facilities or 

equipment.”104 For all these reasons, APS asserts that the Commission should withdraw 

the option to build reform unless it proposes additional revisions that reduce the 

administrative burden on transmission providers.105

43. EEI also asserts that the Commission erred in deciding that interconnection 

customers exercising the option to build no longer need to post security. EEI argues that 

the Commission’s determination that “there would be no need for the interconnection 

customer to provide security . . . for facilities the transmission provider will not 

 

consequential, or punitive damages, including but not limited to loss of 

profit or revenue, loss of the use of equipment, cost of capital, cost of 

temporary equipment or services, whether based in whole or in part in 

contract, in tort, including negligence, strict liability, or any other theory of 

liability; provided, however, that damages for which a Party may be liable 

to the other Party under another agreement will not be considered to be 

special, indirect, incidental, or consequential damages hereunder. 

104 Id. at 12.

105 Id. at 12.
Docket No. RM17-8-001 - 38 -

construct” fails to consider scenarios where the interconnection customer is unable to 

complete the project and the transmission provider must do so.106 For these reasons, EEI 

argues that interconnection customers should have to post security for the project at the 

transmission provider’s cost estimate.107

44. Generation Developers request rehearing of the Commission’s decision not to 

require that transmission providers post the “standards and specifications” required by

article 5.2 of the pro forma LGIA for the transmission provider’s interconnection 

facilities and stand alone network upgrades on their websites.

108 They reason that 

interconnection customers cannot decide whether to exercise the option to build without

this information and that requiring the posting of this information will fulfill the 

requirement to provide such information “in advance.”109 Generation Developers also 

argue that transmission providers already have these standards and specifications “[s]o 

far as Generation Developers are aware.”110 In addition, Generation Developers argue 

that granting this request would enhance transparency and certainty.

 106 EEI Rehearing Request at 12-13.

107 Id. at 13.

108 Generation Developers Rehearing Request at 3.

109 Id. at 4.

110 Id.
Docket No. RM17-8-001 - 39 -

45. MISO TOs argue that “[w]ith the potential increase in elections of the option to 

build, coordination and balkanization are real concerns.”111 Even with the safeguards 

provided by article 5.2(1) of the pro forma LGIA, MISO TOs argue that transmission 

providers will have the burdensome and costly responsibilities of developing sufficiently 

detailed standards and the responsibility of monitoring and policing the interconnection 

customer' equipment procurement and construction activities. MISO TOs further state 

that Order No. 845 does not address the need for coordination among multiple 

interconnection customers, contractors, or other third parties.112

b. Determination

46. We deny rehearing as to the arguments from EEI and MISO TOs that the 

Commission did not adequately address concerns about reliability related to the expanded 

option to build. In response to similar arguments made in comments to the NOPR, in 

Order No. 845, the Commission found that concerns that the option to build will 

compromise system reliability are misplaced because they ignore the safeguards for 

reliability already in place for the existing option to build.113 In particular, the 

Commission stated that such “vague reliability concerns about the option to build are 

misplaced and that articles 5.2.1, 5.2.3, 5.2.5, and 5.2.6 of the pro forma LGIA are 

 111 MISO TOs Rehearing Request at 19.

112 Id. at 20.

113 Order No. 845, 163 FERC ¶ 61,043 at P 91.
Docket No. RM17-8-001 - 40 -

sufficient to guarantee the reliability of the facilities in question.”114 We again find 

that the safeguards embodied in article 5.2 of the pro forma LGIA are adequate. 

47. We deny APS’s request for rehearing regarding the potential for violations of CIP 

standards. Pro forma LGIA article 5.2(1) requires that interconnection customers 

“engineer, procure equipment, and construct” interconnection facilities and network 

upgrades using good utility practice and using standards and specifications provided in 

advance by the transmission provider. We clarify that such standards and specifications 

under pro forma LGIA article 5.2(1) would apply to any necessary contractor access to 

existing facilities while the interconnection customer exercises the option to build. In 

addition, Order No. 845 acknowledges that the transmission owner has the option of 

maintaining a list of contractors available to interconnection customers for the option 

to build.115 Accordingly, APS can, if it elects, maintain and make available a list of 

contractors for the interconnection customer to use for the option to build, thus ensuring 

that contractors used by the interconnection customer can access existing facilities in 

accordance with the relevant CIP standards. Furthermore, article 5.2(5) gives 

transmission providers “unrestricted access to Transmission Provider’s Interconnection 

Facilities and Stand Alone Network Upgrades.” We read these provisions in combination 

to give transmission providers the security and access necessary to ensure that 

interconnection customers exercise the option to build in accordance with applicable CIP 

 114 Id. (citing Order No. 2003-A, 106 FERC ¶ 61,220 at P 232).

115 Id. P 110.
Docket No. RM17-8-001 - 41 -

standards. Therefore, there is no additional need to give transmission providers the 

ability to approve subcontractors or to further limit the transmission provider’s

interconnection facilities and stand alone network upgrades for which the interconnection 

customer may exercise the option to build.

47. We also deny APS’s request for rehearing regarding its liability and indemnity 

concerns, which appears to reflect a misunderstanding of the relationship between the 

pro forma LGIA’s indemnification and consequential damages provisions. In Order 

No. 2003 and its progeny, the Commission explained its reasoning for adopting these 

provisions and how they relate to one another. To improve clarity, we further explain

this reasoning below.

48. In Order No. 2003, the Commission observed that indemnification is defined as 

“compensating another for a loss suffered due a third party’s act of Default.”116 The 

Commission also stated that “interconnection presents a greater risk of liability than 

exists for the provision of transmission service.”117 For this reason, article 18.1 

(Indemnity)118 requires that “the interconnecting generator and the transmission provider 

 116 Order No. 2003, 104 FERC ¶ 61,103 at P 630 (citing Black’s Law 

Dictionary 772 (7th ed. 1999)).

117 Id. P 636.

118 Pro forma LGIA Art. 18.1 reads: 

Indemnity. The Parties shall at all times indemnify, defend, and hold the 

other Party harmless from, any and all damages, losses, claims, including 

claims and actions relating to injury to or death of any person or damage 
Docket No. RM17-8-001 - 42 -

each indemnifies the other from all damages to third parties arising under the LGIA.”119 

Article 18.1 “provide[s] protection for acts of ordinary negligence, but not for acts of 

gross negligence or intentional wrongdoing.”120 

49. Additionally, as noted in Order No. 845,121 Order No. 2003 created safeguards in 

pro forma LGIA article 5.2 to protect transmission providers when an interconnection 

customer exercises the option to build. One such safeguard, in pro forma LGIA article 

5.2(7), is a requirement that the interconnection customer indemnify the transmission 

provider for specific aspects related to the option to build.122 This provision “applies to 

 

to property, demand, suits, recoveries, costs and expenses, court costs, 

attorney fees, and all other obligations by or to third parties, arising out of 

or resulting from the other Party's action or inactions of its obligations 

under this LGIA on behalf of the Indemnifying Party, except in cases of 

gross negligence or intentional wrongdoing by the indemnified Party.

119 Ne. Utils. Serv. Co., 111 FERC ¶ 61,333, at P 28 (2005) (emphasis supplied).

120 Order No. 2003, 104 FERC ¶ 61,103 at P 636.

121 Order No. 845, 163 FERC ¶ 61,043 at PP 40 & 91.

122 Pro forma LGIA Art. 5.2 (7) provides that: “Interconnection Customer shall 

indemnify Transmission Provider for claims arising from Interconnection Customer's 

construction of Transmission Provider's Interconnection Facilities and Stand Alone 

Network Upgrades under the terms and procedures applicable to Article 18.1 Indemnity.” 

While the Commission modified the pro forma LGIA in Order No. 845 to allow 

interconnection customers to exercise the option to build regardless of whether the 

transmission provider can meet the interconnection customer’s proposed in-service date, 

initial synchronization date, or commercial operation date, it made no other changes to 

the requirements that the interconnection customer must abide by, include the indemnity 

provision pro forma LGIA article 5.2 (7). See id. P 91 (“[i]n this Final Rule, we make no 

changes to the requirements in article 5.2”).
Docket No. RM17-8-001 - 43 -

all work, regardless of the side of the Point of Interconnection on which the work 

occurs.”123 However, this provision (in contrast to the general language of pro forma 

article 18.1) “protect[s] the Transmission Provider from liability arising out of the 

Interconnection Customer’s exercising its right to build.”124 That is, while both article 

18.1 and article 5.2(7) pertain to indemnification for third party claims, article 5.2(7) 

only indemnifies the transmission provider for third party claims arising from the 

interconnection customer’s construction under the option to build. 

50. Order No. 2003 also adopted a no consequential damages provision in pro forma 

LGIA article 18.2 (Consequential Damages).125 This provision “protects either Party 

from liability for any special, indirect, incidental, consequential, or punitive damages, 

including profit or revenue.”126 The interconnection customer and transmission provider, 

however, “remain liable for . . . any damages for which a Party may be liable to the other 

Party under another agreement.”127 

51. In a request for rehearing of Order No. 2003, Central Maine Power Company, 

New York State Electric & Gas Corporation, and Rochester Gas and Electric Corporation 

 123 Order No. 2003, 104 FERC ¶ 61,103 at P 638.

124 Order No. 2003, 104 FERC ¶ 61,103 at P 357 (emphasis supplied).

125 Supra n. 104.

126 Order. No. 2003, 104 FERC ¶ 61,103 at P 906.

127 Id.
Docket No. RM17-8-001 - 44 -

sought clarity on the relationship between article 18.2 and the pro forma LGIA’s 

indemnification provisions. They argued that, because article 18.2 “does not exclude 

consequential damages which arise as part of [an indemnification] claim,” the 

Commission should “ensure the full implementation” of the pro forma LGIA indemnity 

protections by amending article 18.2 “to exclude consequential damages that arise in 

conjunction with indemnification.”128 

52. The Commission rejected this request in Order No. 2003-A and stated that “[t]he 

indemnification of one Party by another must be comprehensive and must include any 

liability the indemnified Party faces as a result of the indemnifying Party’s misdeeds.”129 

It continued, stating that “[w]hile Article 18.2 prevents one Party from seeking 

consequential damages against another Party, the purpose of the indemnification 

provisions is different; it protects the Party not at fault from liability to third parties 

(those who are not Parties to the interconnection agreement).”130 The Commission stated 

that “[r]equiring the indemnifying Party to reimburse the indemnified Party only for, say 

compensatory damages and not for punitive damages that may be assessed against the 

indemnified Party would weaken the LGIA’s protections and shield the indemnifying 

 128 Central Maine Aug. 25, 2003 Rehearing Request at 4-5 (Docket 

No. RM02-1-001).

129 Order No. 2003-A, 106 FERC ¶ 61,220 at P 455.

130 Id.
Docket No. RM17-8-001 - 45 -

Party from full liability.”131 Thus, the limitations in article 18.2 (Consequential 

Damages) apply only to claims by one LGIA party against the other directly, and are not 

applicable to third party claims under article 18.1 and article 5.2(7) for indemnification 

for claims.

53. Thus, article 5.2(7) in combination with the pro forma LGIA indemnification 

provisions provide sufficient protection from third party claims against transmission 

providers for claims arising from the interconnection customer’s construction under the 

option to build. Additionally, because pro forma LGIA articles 5.2(7) and 18.1132

address an interconnection customer’s liability to the transmission provider only when 

there is a third-party claim against the transmission provider, these articles do not 

preclude a transmission provider from making a direct claim against an interconnection 

customer. In particular, given the extensive safeguards in pro forma LGIA article 5.2, 

the transmission provider may argue that the interconnection customer has breached the 

interconnection agreement if the interconnection customer fails to abide by any 

requirement that results in the transmission provider accruing damages, e.g., through 

harm to the transmission system.

133 

 131 Id.

132 We note, however, that, when indemnification is not pursuant to the option 

to build indemnification in pro forma LGIA article 5.2(7), article 18.1 requires that 

the interconnection customer and the transmission provider indemnify each other. 

See Ne. Utils. Serv. Co., 111 FERC ¶ 61,333 at P 28.

133 If, however, harm to the transmission provider’s transmission system results 
Docket No. RM17-8-001 - 46 -

54. Regarding the Commission’s statement in Order No. 845 that pro forma LGIA 

article 5.2(7) is “sufficiently broad to address”134 the concerns expressed in NOPR 

comments, we reiterate that the Commission made no changes to pro forma article 5.2, 

including the indemnity provision related to the option to build in article 5.2(7).135 

Additionally, the Commission did not interpret pro forma LGIA article 5.2(7) to expand 

the terms of the indemnity provisions to include indemnification by the interconnection 

customer for activities other than the interconnection customer’s option to build 

construction. The Commission did not expand the applicability of this provision for 

multiple reasons. First, pro forma LGIA article 5.2(7) related to the option to build 

indemnifies the transmission provider for “claims arising from Interconnection 

Customer's construction,” and this language already provides indemnification for the 

transmission provider for a significant number of third party claims arising from the 

interconnection customer’s option to build construction. Second, as noted above, even if 

the indemnity provisions do not apply, the transmission provider may pursue a claim for 

breach if the interconnection customer’s conduct pursuant to the option to build breaches 

the interconnection agreement. Third, pro forma LGIA article 5.2 gives the transmission 

 

in the transmission provider’s liability to a third party, such as an industrial customer, 

and such harm to the transmission provider’s transmission system arises from the 

interconnection customer’s construction pursuant to the option to build, the transmission 

provider could invoke the indemnity provisions of the pro forma LGIA. 

134 Order No. 845, 163 FERC ¶ 61,043 at P 94.

135 See, e.g., id. P 91.
Docket No. RM17-8-001 - 47 -

provider “significant oversight authority” over the option to build, which, if exercised 

properly, gives the transmission provider a significant role in ensuring that the 

interconnection customer’s exercise of the option to build does not expose the 

transmission provider to liability.136 For example, the transmission provider has the 

ability to “set[] the specifications governing construction (Article 5.2.1), approve[] the 

Interconnection [Customer’s] construction plans (Article 5.2.3), . . . an unlimited right 

of inspection (Article 5.2.3), and . . . the right to require the Interconnection Customer to 

remedy any deficiencies (Article 5.2.6).”137

55. We also deny rehearing as to EEI’s contention that the Commission erred by 

removing the requirement for the interconnection customer to provide security if the 

interconnection customer fails to complete any option to build facilities. If such a 

situation arises and the interconnection customer still wants to move forward with the 

interconnection request, this situation would re-trigger article 11.5 of the pro forma LGIA

for “the applicable portion of Transmission Provider’s Interconnection Facilities [and] 

Network Upgrades,” and the interconnection customer would then have to provide 

security no later than 30 days prior to the transmission provider recommencing 

“procurement, installation, or construction of a discrete portion of a Transmission 

 136 Id. P 110.

137 Order No. 2003-A, 106 FERC ¶ 61,220 at P 232.
Docket No. RM17-8-001 - 48 -

Provider’s Interconnection Facilities [or] . . . Network Upgrades.”138 Thus, there is no 

need to require other revisions to the pro forma LGIA to account for EEI’s suggested 

eventuality. In addition, the occurrence of such a scenario may indicate that the 

interconnection request is no longer viable, in which case, the transmission provider’s 

interconnection facility or stand alone network upgrade would no longer be necessary. 

56. We also deny Generation Developers’ request for rehearing of the decision not to

require transmission providers to post on their websites the “standards and specifications” 

for exercising the option to build. Despite Generation Developers’ assertions, there is 

nothing in the record to suggest that the engineering, procurement, and construction 

standards and specifications applicable to the transmission provider’s interconnection 

facilities and stand alone network upgrades required for a particular interconnection 

request would be available prior to the submission of a specific interconnection request. 

In fact, it might be difficult or impossible to provide such information on a website 

before an interconnection customer submits its interconnection request and the required 

technical data. Regardless, pursuant to article 5.2(1) of the pro forma LGIA, if an 

interconnection customer has informed the transmission provider of its decision to 

exercise the option to build, the transmission provider must provide such standards and 

specifications “in advance” of the interconnection customer “engineer[ing], procur[ing] 

 138 Pro forma LGIA Art. 11.5.
Docket No. RM17-8-001 - 49 -

equipment, and construct[ing] Transmission Provider’s Interconnection Facilities and 

Stand Alone Network Upgrades.”139

57. In response to MISO TOs, we find that article 5.2(1) of the pro forma LGIA

equips the transmission provider with the ability to develop “standards and 

specifications” to avoid concerns about transmission system “balkanization.” We

also note that, as discussed more fully below, the Commission is granting rehearing 

to allow transmission providers to recover oversight costs as negotiated between the 

interconnection customer and the transmission provider and memorialized in the LGIA.

58. As to MISO TOs’ concerns regarding the lack of guidance about coordination, 

we note that each interconnection request and each transmission system is unique. The 

transmission provider and interconnection customer will have an opportunity to work 

through the relevant details regarding coordination during the negotiation phase of the 

LGIA. Therefore, we decline to provide detailed instructions to account for a multitude 

of dissimilar scenarios when transmission providers and interconnection customers are 

capable of coordinating the option to build process for multiple interconnection requests.

5. Affected Systems

59. The pro forma LGIP and pro forma LGIA define affected systems as “electric 

system[s] other than the Transmission Provider’s Transmission System that may be 

affected by the proposed interconnection.”140 The interconnection system impact study 

 139 Pro forma LGIA Art. 5.2(1).

140 Pro forma LGIP Section 1 (Definitions); Pro forma LGIA Art. 1 (Definitions). 
Docket No. RM17-8-001 - 50 -

“evaluates the impact of the proposed interconnection on the safety and reliability of 

the Transmission Provider’s Transmission System, and, if applicable, an Affected 

System.”141 Impacts on affected systems may require the construction of network 

upgrades to address the impacts caused by a particular interconnection request. 

a. Requests for Rehearing and Clarification 

60. MISO TOs state that the Commission did not address whether the option to build 

extends to upgrades on affected systems. They also state that the burden created by the 

option to build revisions will be higher if affected systems must allow interconnection 

customers that do not interconnect with them directly to construct on their systems.

142

b. Determination

61. We grant MISO TOs’ request for clarification and clarify that the option to build 

does not apply to stand alone network upgrades on affected systems. To make our intent

clear, we revise the definition of stand alone network upgrade to read (with additions 

in italics):

Stand Alone Network Upgrades shall mean Network Upgrades that are not 

part of an Affected System that an Interconnection Customer may construct 

without affecting day-to-day operations of the Transmission System during 

their construction. Both the Transmission Provider and the Interconnection 

Customer must agree as to what constitutes Stand Alone Network Upgrades 

and identify them in Appendix A to the Standard Large Generator 

Interconnection Agreement.143

 141 Pro forma LGIP Section 1 (Definitions); Pro forma LGIA Art. 1 (Definitions).

142 MISO TOs Rehearing Request at 21.

143 This revision is the first of two changes to the definition of a stand

alone network upgrade in the pro forma LGIP and pro forma LGIA. The
Docket No. RM17-8-001 - 51 -

6. Cluster Studies

62. Clustering is “the process whereby a group of Interconnection Requests is studied 

together, instead of serially, for the purpose of conducting the Interconnection System 

Impact Study.”144 Transmission providers may “allocate the cost of . . . common 

upgrades for clustered Interconnection Requests without regard to Queue Position.”145 

Transmission providers have the discretion to decide whether to study interconnection 

requests serially or in clusters.146

a. Requests for Rehearing and Clarification 

63. APS argues that the expanded option to build provisions are incompatible for 

transmission providers that conduct cluster studies.

147 Specifically, regarding a cluster 

study that identifies stand alone network upgrades for which multiple interconnection 

customers are responsible, APS questions which interconnection customer may exercise

the option to build. Further, if multiple interconnection customers want to build a stand 

alone network upgrade, APS asks who decides which interconnection customer has 

priority to exercise the option to build.

148

 

additional revision is described in the option to build subsection on stand alone network 

upgrades (II.A.7).

144 Pro forma LGIA Art. 1 (Definitions).

145 Pro forma LGIP Section 4.1

146 Pro forma LGIP Section 4.2.

147 APS Rehearing Request at 13.

148 Id.
Docket No. RM17-8-001 - 52 -

b. Determination

64. We deny APS’s rehearing request on this issue. We disagree that the Order 

No. 845 option to build revisions are incompatible with a cluster study approach. 

APS has not pointed to any specific provisions in the pro forma LGIA that would 

preclude customers in a cluster study from exercising the option to build. Moreover, 

APS has not provided any evidence to indicate that stand alone network upgrades being 

required by more than one interconnection customer in a cluster will be a common

enough occurrence to require pro forma LGIA revisions tailored to such a scenario. 

Additionally, the scenario APS envisions is not tied to the changes adopted in this 

proceeding because, to the extent that such a circumstance occurs, multiple 

interconnection customers could have sought to exercise the option to build for the same 

stand alone network upgrade under the pre-Order No. 845 option to build. However, if a 

transmission provider that studies interconnection requests in clusters believes this is a 

concern, it should, on compliance, propose revisions to address how it will process 

requests by multiple interconnection customers to exercise the option to build for the 

same stand alone network upgrade. 

7. Stand Alone Network Upgrades 

65. Stand alone network upgrades are “Network Upgrades that an Interconnection 

Customer may construct without affecting day-to-day operations of the Transmission 
Docket No. RM17-8-001 - 53 -

System during their construction.”149 Both the transmission provider and the 

interconnection customer “must agree as to what constitutes Stand Alone Network 

Upgrades and identify them in Appendix A” to the LGIA.150

66. In Order No. 845, the Commission denied Generation Developers’ request for a 

requirement that transmission providers explain why they do not think a network upgrade 

is a stand alone network upgrade. The Commission stated that “it would be difficult for a 

transmission provider” to make this determination “until it is presented with the results of 

a system impact study.”151

a. Requests for Rehearing and Clarification 

67. Generation Developers claim that the Commission erred by not requiring 

that transmission providers explain their reasoning when they disagree with an 

interconnection customer about whether a network upgrade is stand alone.152 They 

reason that not requiring such an explanation undermines the interconnection customer’s 

ability to exercise the option to build and increases process opacity.

153 They also 

disagree with the Commission that providing such an explanation would be difficult 

before the transmission provider has the system impact study results, as these results 

 149 Pro forma LGIP Section 1 (Definitions); Pro forma LGIA Art. 1 (Definitions).

150 Pro forma LGIP Section 1 (Definitions); Pro forma LGIA Art. 1 (Definitions).

151 Order No. 845, 163 FERC ¶ 61,043 at P 112.

152 Generation Developers Rehearing Request at 5-6.

153 Id. at 6.
Docket No. RM17-8-001 - 54 -

will be available prior to the LGIA stage of the interconnection process, when the 

interconnection customer can first express its desire to exercise the option to build.154 

Furthermore, Generation Developers argue that, if there is a disagreement, dispute 

resolution or a complaint filed pursuant to FPA section 206 are not viable options

because these options involve costly delays.155 

b. Determination

68. We grant rehearing and find that the Commission erred by not requiring a 

transmission provider to explain why it does not consider a particular network upgrade to 

be a stand alone network upgrade. We recognize that, because of the mutual agreement 

requirement in the definition of stand alone network upgrade, disagreements may arise 

regarding whether a network upgrade is a stand alone network upgrade.

156 The 

Commission, in Order No. 2003, was aware that transmission providers had reliability 

concerns related to the option to build when the Commission defined stand alone network 

upgrades to include the mutual agreement requirement.

157 Even though the transmission 

 154 Id. at 8.

155 Id. at 6-7.

156 See Duke Energy Florida, LLC, 163 FERC ¶ 61,174 (2018) (setting for hearing 

an LGIA that was filed unexecuted because of disagreement as to whether a network 

upgrade was stand alone). 

157 See Order No. 2003, 104 FERC ¶ 61,103 at PP 341, 356-57 (noting that the 

transmission provider must retain “adequate control of the engineering and construction 

of . . . Stand Alone Network Upgrades because of its obligation to protect the safety of 

the public and maintain the reliability of the Transmission System”).
Docket No. RM17-8-001 - 55 -

provider has the ability to disagree when an interconnection customer believes a 

network upgrade is a stand alone network upgrade, the transmission provider may not 

unreasonably withhold its agreement because such an outcome would be unjust and 

unreasonable. That is, the transmission provider must explain why the upgrade in 

question is not one that an interconnection customer may construct without affecting

the transmission system’s day-to-day operations during construction. Therefore, we

require that, when there is a disagreement, a transmission provider must provide the 

interconnection customer a written explanation within fifteen days of its determination

that outlines the technical reasons why it does not consider a network upgrade to be a 

stand alone network upgrade. We consider this time period reasonable because it begins 

at the time of the transmission provider’s determination outlining its technical reasons. 

To effectuate this revised requirement, we revise the definition of stand alone network 

upgrades in the pro forma LGIP and the pro forma LGIA to include the following new 

sentence at the end of the definition (with additions in italics): 

Stand Alone Network Upgrades shall mean Network Upgrades that are not 

part of an Affected System that an Interconnection Customer may construct 

without affecting day-to-day operations of the Transmission System during 

their construction. Both the Transmission Provider and the Interconnection 

Customer must agree as to what constitutes Stand Alone Network Upgrades 

and identify them in Appendix A to the Standard Large Generator 

Interconnection Agreement. If the Transmission Provider and 

Interconnection Customer disagree about whether a particular Network 

Upgrade is a Stand Alone Network Upgrade, the Transmission Provider 

must provide the Interconnection Customer a written technical explanation
Docket No. RM17-8-001 - 56 -

outlining why the Transmission Provider does not consider the Network 

Upgrade to be a Stand Alone Network Upgrade within 15 days of its 

determination.158

8. Cost Estimates

69. Section 8.3 of the pro forma LGIP provides that transmission providers shall: 

use Reasonable Efforts to . . . issue a draft Interconnection Facilities Study 

report to Interconnection Customer within . . . ninety . . . Calendar Days, 

with no more than a +/- 20 percent cost estimate contained in the report; or 

one hundred eighty . . . Calendar Days if the Interconnection Customer 

requests a +/- 10 percent cost estimate. 

a. Requests for Rehearing and Clarification 

70. Southern asks the Commission to grant rehearing with regard to Order No. 845’s 

option to build changes, but, if it does not, it asks the Commission to clarify that the 

requirement in section 8.3 of the pro forma LGIP would apply to interconnection 

customers that construct stand alone network upgrades.159 Specifically, it points to the 

requirement that transmission providers must provide an estimated cost that is “plus or 

minus 10 or 20 percent, depending on the length of the study” to provide some certainty 

regarding cost exposure to the interconnection customer.160 Southern argues that 

interconnection customers exercising the option to build must do the same to provide 

cost certainty to transmission providers and their native load customers. In particular, 

 158 As noted above in the affected systems section (II.A.5), this is the second of 

two clarifying revisions that we are making to the definition of stand alone network 

upgrades in the pro forma LGIP and pro forma LGIA.

159 Southern Rehearing Request at 9.

160 Id.
Docket No. RM17-8-001 - 57 -

Southern argues that the interconnection customer should either be bound by the estimate 

in the transmission provider’s interconnection facilities study report or “should be 

required to provide an estimate that complies with the plus or minus 10/20 percent cost 

estimate.”161

b. Determination

71. We deny rehearing on this issue. Section 8.3 of the pro forma LGIP only requires 

the transmission provider to make reasonable efforts during the interconnection study 

process to estimate costs to construct network upgrades, and the pro forma LGIP does not

impose any consequences on transmission providers that exceed the estimate or accuracy 

margin.

162 Southern’s request would therefore require the Commission to hold the 

interconnection customer to a higher standard than it holds the transmission provider. 

We decline to do so.

9. Oversight Costs

72. In Order No. 845, in response to arguments that “interconnection customers 

should assume all additional costs that result from exercise of the option to build,” the 

Commission stated that it was making “no changes with regard to cost assignment for 

 161 Id.

162 See Duke Energy Fla., LLC, 165 FERC ¶ 61,230, at P 22 (2018) (“[t]he 

Commission’s precedent is clear that the costs in an LGIA are simply estimates and that 

interconnection customers are responsible for paying the actual costs of interconnection 

facilities and network upgrades”).
Docket No. RM17-8-001 - 58 -

transmission provider’s interconnection facilities and stand alone network upgrades.”163 

Additionally, in response to concerns that transmission providers “will have to expend 

significant resources to perform oversight functions” for the option to build, the 

Commission stated that “the Final Rule does not alter the role that the transmission 

provider would play in overseeing the option to build process.”164

a. Requests for Rehearing and Clarification 

73. Southern argues that, as a result of Order No. 845, transmission providers will 

increasingly incur costs to provide additional coordination, oversight, and approval of 

stand alone network upgrade “design, equipment specifications, contractors, construction, 

and commissioning.”165 EEI asks the Commission to clarify whether transmission 

providers can recover such costs associated with overseeing an interconnection 

customer’s construction when the option to build is exercised.166 Specifically, it asks 

the Commission to allow transmission providers to recover the costs for “providing the 

coordination, oversight, and approval required for the Interconnection Customer’s 

construction.”167 As background, EEI states that, in Order No. 2003-A, the Commission 

stated that it would “not require the Transmission Provider [to] be reimbursed for 

 163 Order No. 845, 163 FERC ¶ 61,043 at P 95.

164 Id. P 103.

165 Southern Rehearing Request at 8.

166 EEI Rehearing Request at 13; see also SoCal Edison Rehearing Request at 4.

167 EEI Rehearing Request at 10.
Docket No. RM17-8-001 - 59 -

construction oversight cost,” as the interconnection customer may only exercise the 

option to build “as a last resort” and that the transmission provider “can avoid the 

expense[s]” of oversight by meeting the milestones and avoiding the pre-Order No. 845 

option to build trigger.168 EEI argues that, since this reasoning no longer holds true, the 

Commission should amend article 5.2 of the pro forma LGIA to add the following 

provision: “(12) Transmission Provider shall recover all reasonable costs associated with 

the review, approval, testing, inspection and transfer of the Interconnection Facilities and 

Stand Alone Network Upgrades constructed by the Interconnection Customer in 

accordance with this Article 5.2.”169

74. In response to the NOPR, SoCal Edison raised concerns regarding the additional 

costs and oversight that will result from the exercise of the option to build and sought 

Commission confirmation that the interconnection customer should bear those costs.

170 

SoCal Edison argues on rehearing that, despite the Commission’s reliance on its 

requirement that the interconnection customers and their contractors must use good utility 

practice, the interconnection customers may have little incentive to rigorously adhere to 

the transmission provider’s standards and specifications.171 

 168 Id. at 11-12 (citing Order No. 2003-A, 106 FERC ¶ 61,220 at PP 218-19).

169 Id. at 13.

170 SoCal Edison Request for Clarification at 4 (referencing SoCal Edison 

April 13, 2017 Comments at 4-5).

171 Id. (citing Order No. 845, 163 FERC ¶ 61,043 at P 111).
Docket No. RM17-8-001 - 60 -

b. Determination

75. With regard to oversight costs related to the option to build exercised by 

interconnection customers for the transmission provider’s interconnection facilities and

stand alone network upgrades, we grant rehearing. We agree with EEI that the rationale 

that the Commission provided in Order No. 2003 for disallowing collection of oversight 

costs (namely, that a transmission provider can avoid such costs by agreeing to meet the 

interconnect customer’s schedule)172 no longer applies as a result of Order No. 845. For 

this reason, we revise article 5.2 of the pro forma LGIA to include a placeholder for 

transmission providers to recover the costs of executing the responsibilities enumerated 

for transmission providers in that same article. We expect the transmission provider and 

interconnection customer to negotiate this amount and clearly state it in the LGIA. The 

Commission will add the following language at the end of article 5.2 of the pro forma 

LGIA (with new additions in italics):

(12) If Interconnection Customer exercises the Option to Build pursuant 

to Article 5.1.3, Interconnection Customer shall pay Transmission Provider 

the agreed upon amount of [$ PLACEHOLDER] for Transmission Provider 

to execute the responsibilities enumerated to Transmission Provider 

under Article 5.2. Transmission Provider shall invoice Interconnection 

Customer for this total amount to be divided on a monthly basis pursuant 

to Article 12.

 172 Order No. 2003-A, 106 FERC ¶ 61,220 at P 218.
Docket No. RM17-8-001 - 61 -

B. Identification and Definition of Contingent Facilities

76. In Order No. 845, the Commission added new section 3.8 to the pro forma LGIP, 

which requires that transmission providers publish a method for identifying contingent 

facilities173 and that they provide a list of potential contingent facilities to interconnection 

customers at the close of the system impact study phase. Order No. 845 further requires 

that transmission providers provide, upon the interconnection customer’s request, the 

estimated network upgrade costs and estimated in-service completion date associated 

with each identified contingent facility if the transmission provider determines that this

information is readily available and not commercially sensitive.

1. Requests for Rehearing and Clarification 

77. Generation Developers seek rehearing of the Commission’s decision not to exempt 

interconnection customers from financial responsibility for late-identified contingent 

facilities.174 Specifically, Generation Developers state that the Commission did not 

explain why it is just and reasonable for the interconnection customer to bear unexpected 

costs in the circumstance where a transmission provider identifies additional contingent 

facilities after the close of the system impact study phase. Generation Developers add 

 173 Contingent facilities “shall mean those unbuilt interconnection facilities and 

network upgrades upon which the interconnection request’s costs, timing, and study 

findings are dependent, and if delayed or not built, could cause the need for restudies

of the interconnection request or a reassessment of the interconnection facilities and/or 

network upgrades and/or costs and timing.” Order No. 845, 163 FERC ¶ 61,043 at P 218.

174 Id. P 201.
Docket No. RM17-8-001 - 62 -

that Order No. 845 provides no incentive for the transmission provider to accurately 

identify contingent facilities because it shifts all of the consequences of a failure to timely 

identify all contingent facilities onto the interconnection customer.175 Generation 

Developers ask the Commission to state that the interconnection customer will not be 

financially responsible if the transmission provider only identifies a new contingent 

facility after the close of the system impact study phase.176 

2. Determination 

78. We deny Generation Developers’ rehearing request. To provide increased 

transparency to interconnection customers regarding the interconnection process, Order 

No. 845 requires that transmission providers outline a method to identify contingent 

facilities by the close of the system impact study phase. Thus, the interconnection 

customer will have notice of any contingent facilities identified by the transmission 

provider by the close of the system impact study phase. This requirement to identify 

contingent facilities does not change cost responsibilities. In denying this request, we 

note that it would be inconsistent with the cost causation principle to exempt an 

interconnection customer from interconnection facility and network upgrade costs that

 175 Generation Developers Rehearing Request at 11.

176 Id. at 10.
Docket No. RM17-8-001 - 63 -

would not be necessary but for that interconnection request.177 The principle of cost

causation generally requires that costs “are to be allocated to those [that] cause the costs 

to be incurred and reap the resulting benefits.”178 The Commission did not revisit this 

principle in Order No. 845, and we decline to do so at this time.

C. Transparency Regarding Study Models and Assumptions 

79. In Order No. 845, the Commission revised section 2.3 of the pro forma LGIP to 

require transmission providers to maintain network models and underlying assumptions 

on either an Open Access Same-Time Information System (OASIS) site or a passwordprotected website. These revisions allow transmission providers to require 

interconnection customers, OASIS site users, and password-protected website users to 

sign a confidentiality agreement before the release of commercially sensitive information 

or CEII. The revisions also require that the network model information and underlying 

assumptions “reasonably represent those used during the most recent interconnection 

study and be representative of current system conditions.”179

 177 See Order No. 2003, 104 FERC ¶ 61,103 at P 694 (“it is appropriate for the 

Interconnection Customer to pay the initial full cost for Interconnection Facilities and 

Network Upgrades that would not be needed but for the interconnection”).

178 S.C. Pub. Serv. Auth. v. FERC, 762 F.3d at 87 (quoting Nat’l Assoc. of 

Regulatory Util. Comm’rs v. FERC, 475 F.3d at 1285). 

179 Order No. 845, 163 FERC ¶ 61,043 at P 236.
Docket No. RM17-8-001 - 64 -

1. Protection of Network Model Information

a. Requests for Rehearing and Clarification

80. Non-Profit Utility Trade Associations request that the Commission clarify that its 

intention is to permit transmission providers “to protect data that would qualify for CEII 

treatment if [they] were submitted” to the Commission.180 They note that, under the 

Commission’s regulations, an entity may submit information to the Commission and

request that it be treated as CEII, but this information will not formally be designated as 

CEII until there is a request to access the information and the Commission has granted 

CEII status. Non-Profit Utility Trade Associations state that revised section 2.3 of the

pro forma LGIA implicates a large amount of modeling and assumption information that 

meets the substantive definition of CEII but that the Commission has not designated such 

information as CEII. Non-Profit Utility Trade Associations contend that this technicality 

limits a transmission provider’s ability to protect sensitive data, and they ask the 

Commission to clarify that information “may be protected under [pro forma] LGIP 

section 2.3 if the Transmission Provider determined that it would meet the substantive 

criteria for CEII had it been submitted to the Commission for that determination.”181 

According to Non-Profit Utility Trade Associations, when there are questions regarding 

 180 Non-Profit Utility Trade Associations Rehearing Request at 5.

181 Id. at 6.
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the transmission provider’s judgment, the Commission’s complaint procedures should be 

adequate to provide resolution.182

81. Non-Profit Utility Trade Associations also allege that the language of revised

section 2.3 of the pro forma LGIP is broad enough to allow any entity to obtain network 

models and underlying assumptions for any reason. Non-Profit Utility Trade 

Associations further allege that offering a confidentiality agreement to all OASIS site 

users without further limitation could include unknown entities that pose a security risk. 

For this reason, Non-Profit Utility Trade Associations ask the Commission to clarify that 

the Commission intended to permit transmission providers to apply reasonable standards 

to requests from entities to enter into such confidentiality agreements. Non-Profit Utility 

Trade Associations suggest that the Commission’s CEII regulations could provide a 

useful framework for standards because they require that requesters provide a name,

contact information, and a statement of need. If the request is made on behalf of an 

organization, the requester must state that it is authorized to make the request on behalf of 

the organization and that all individuals in the organization will be bound by executed 

non-disclosure agreements.183

82. Non-Profit Utility Trade Associations expect that transmission providers would 

limit their review to ascertaining that the entity is a recognized industry participant or 

 182 Id. at 4-6.

183 Id. at 6-7.
Docket No. RM17-8-001 - 66 -

has a legitimate commercial, academic, or governmental interest in accessing the data. 

Further, Non-Profit Utility Trade Associations contend that the potential for anticompetitive behavior in this review seems limited and manageable through the 

Commission’s complaint procedures or enforcement hotline.184

83. If the Commission does not grant these clarifications, Non-Profit Utility Trade 

Associations request rehearing of Order No. 845’s revisions to section 2.3 of the pro 

forma LGIP, asserting that the Commission erred in requiring transmission providers to 

post network models and underlying assumptions without permitting the transmission 

providers to adequately protect information that may be used to threaten critical 

infrastructure.185

b. Determination

84. Order No. 845 did not revise the Commission’s existing CEII requirements.

186 

As Non-Profit Utility Trade Associations note, information is not CEII unless the 

Commission has designated it as CEII through its CEII designation process. 

Accordingly, we deny Non-Profit Utility Trade Associations’ request for clarification 

that transmission providers may designate as CEII information that they believe should 

 184 Id. at 7.

185 Id. at 7-8.

186 Under the Commission’s CEII regulations, 18 CFR 388.113, an entity 

may submit information to the Commission requesting that it be treated as CEII.

18 CFR 388.113 (2018).
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be treated as such. We also reiterate that neither the Commission’s CEII regulations187

nor Order No. 845 precludes a transmission provider from taking necessary steps to 

protect information within its custody or control to ensure the safety and security of the 

electric grid.188

85. We grant Non-Profit Utility Trade Associations’ request for clarification that 

transmission providers may apply reasonable standards to requests to enter into 

confidentiality agreements before information is released. Specifically, we grant 

clarification to the extent that Non-Profit Utility Trade Associations would like to use the 

Commission’s CEII regulations as a model for evaluating entities that request network 

model information and assumptions (prior to signing a non-disclosure agreement), they 

may do so.

189 

2. Requirement to Post Network Model Information

a. Requests for Clarification

86. APS asks the Commission to clarify that the requirement that network models and 

underlying assumptions “reasonably represent those used during the most recent 

interconnection study and be representative of current system conditions” in revised

 187 Section 388.113 of the Commission’s regulations does not govern the 

transmission provider’s handling, sharing, and disseminating of information that the 

transmission provider submitted for CEII designation, including how it disseminates 

that information on its OASIS site or password-protected website. Id.

188 Order No. 845, 163 FERC ¶ 61,043 at P 241.

189 See 18 CFR 388.113(g)(5)(i).
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section 2.3 of the pro forma LGIP does not require transmission providers to modify the 

network models and underlying assumptions utilized for evaluating interconnection 

requests so that they are representative of “current system conditions.”190 APS also asks 

the Commission to clarify that such language simply requires that the posted network 

models and underlying assumptions reasonably represent those anticipated future system 

conditions that the transmission provider utilizes to evaluate interconnection requests.191

87. APS notes that there are often significant differences between “current system 

conditions” and those conditions utilized in the base cases and models to evaluate

interconnection requests. More specifically, APS states that current system conditions 

would not include those facilities, equipment, configurations, relay settings, etc., unless 

they are built and operating. Conversely, APS states that “models and base case data 

utilized to evaluate Interconnection Request[s] incorporate planned, future facilities, 

equipment, configurations, relay settings, etc.”192 For this reason, APS argues that the 

network models and underlying assumptions utilized to evaluate interconnection 

requests will, and should, always differ from those models and assumption utilized to 

“approximate or evaluate ‘current system conditions,’ which do not, and should not,

 190 APS Rehearing Request at 17.

191 Id.

192 Id.
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incorporate, or rely upon, planned, future facilities, equipment, configurations, [and] 

relay settings.”193

b. Determination

88. We grant APS’ request for clarification. In Order No. 845, the Commission did 

not require that transmission providers modify the network models and the underlying 

assumptions used in interconnection studies. Rather, the purpose of the revisions to 

section 2.3 of the pro forma LGIP is to make transparent the base case data, network 

models, and underlying assumptions that transmission providers use to conduct 

interconnection studies. Therefore, we clarify that the phrase “current system conditions” 

does not require transmission providers to maintain network models that reflect current 

real-time operating conditions of the transmission provider’s system. Instead, the 

network model information should reflect the system conditions currently used in 

interconnection studies.

D. Congestion and Curtailment Information 

89. In the NOPR, the Commission proposed to require that transmission providers 

post congestion and curtailment information in one location on their OASIS sites so that 

interconnection customers could more easily access information that may aid in their 

decision making.194 In Order No. 845, however, the Commission declined to adopt this 

proposal after considering the comments on the NOPR. The Commission stated that it 

 193 Id.

194 Order No. 845, 163 FERC ¶ 61,043 at P 247. 
Docket No. RM17-8-001 - 70 -

found “persuasive those comments that assert that, in some instances, generating 

information on the causes of congestion or on unit-specific or constraint-specific 

curtailment information is technically infeasible or would require significant additional 

effort.”195 The Commission also noted that many transmission providers already

publish congestion and curtailment data and that other pertinent information is 

otherwise available.196

1. Request for Rehearing

90. Generation Developers seek rehearing of the Commission’s decision not to require 

the posting of congestion and curtailment information. They assert that transmission 

providers should want to post this information to improve siting decisions, but few 

transmission providers do so, and, even when they do, there is a lack of uniformity. 

Generation Developers add that non-disclosure agreements would address any 

confidentiality concerns.197

91. Generation Developers also assert that the Commission did not explain why it 

concluded that posting the information is “technically infeasible” when the transmission 

provider already knows this information.198 Generation Developers argue that the need 

 195 Id. P 270.

196 Id. P 271.

197 Generation Developers Rehearing Request at 15-16.

198 Id. at 16.
Docket No. RM17-8-001 - 71 -

for additional effort on the part of the transmission provider should not outweigh the need 

for making this information available. Finally, Generation Developers state that posting 

the information furthers the Commission’s goal for improving transparency, and failure 

to do so increases uncertainties in the interconnection process.199

2. Determination 

92. We deny Generation Developers’ request for rehearing. First, we reiterate that 

many transmission providers already publish some congestion and curtailment data such 

as locational marginal price data and dispatch reports.200 Furthermore, we again note that 

a significant amount of publicly available information for the Eastern Interconnection is 

contained in the NERC Transmission Loading Relief (TLR) Logs, including the duration, 

direction, and MW of curtailments.

201 We also note that multiple commenters made a 

credible argument that imposing the proposed requirements would not provide 

information that would be useful for interconnection customers.202 We disagree with 

Generation Developers that the Commission did not explain why providing such 

information is technically infeasible. As noted in Order No. 845, PJM Interconnection 

L.L.C. (PJM), for example, explained that it lacked the software capability to determine 

 199 Id.

200 Order No. 845, 163 FERC ¶ 61,043 at P 271.

201 Id.

202 See id. P 264.
Docket No. RM17-8-001 - 72 -

congestion causes.

203 The Commission decided not to proceed with its proposal in light 

of the limited usefulness, difficulty, and technical infeasibility of complying with the 

proposed requirements. For these reasons, we continue to believe that it was not 

appropriate to proceed with the proposed requirement. Additionally, we note that, in a 

rulemaking proceeding, the agency is “accorded considerable deference in evaluating 

information presented and reaching decisions based upon its expertise,” and “the agency's 

decision to refrain from amending the elaborate, established regulatory scheme cannot be 

disturbed absent a strong showing that such action was unreasonable.”204 

E. Definition of Generating Facility in the Pro Forma LGIP and Pro 

Forma LGIA 

93. In Order No. 845, the Commission revised the definition of “Generating Facility” 

to include electric storage resources and to allow electric storage resources to 

interconnect pursuant to large generator interconnection processes. Specifically, the 

Commission revised the definition of a generating facility in the pro forma LGIP and pro 

forma LGIA as follows (with additions in italics): “Generating Facility shall mean 

Interconnection Customer’s device for the production and/or storage for later injection

 203 Id. PP 258, 270.

204 Professional Drivers Council v. Bureau of Motor Safety, 706 F.2d 1216, 1220-

21 (D.C. Cir. 1983); see also New York v. FERC, 535 U.S. 1, at 28 (2002) (finding the 

Commission's choice not to assert jurisdiction represents a statutorily permissible policy 

choice).
Docket No. RM17-8-001 - 73 -

of electricity identified in the Interconnection Request, but shall not include the 

interconnection customer’s Interconnection Facilities.”205

1. Requests for Rehearing and Clarification 

94. APS requests that the Commission revise the definition of “Generating Facility” to 

recognize the load characteristics of electric storage resources.206 APS’s concern is that 

the definition adopted by Order No. 845 could narrow the scope of studies that a 

transmission provider will perform, create ambiguity regarding the upgrades necessary to 

accommodate the load characteristics of electric storage resources, and create 

inconsistencies with the definition of “electric storage resource” in Order No. 841.207

APS also states that neither the pro forma LGIP nor the pro forma LGIA allow the 

transmission provider to study the load characteristics of electric storage resources and 

are not specific as to how the transmission provider should recover the costs for those 

studies or how the transmission provider should classify the upgrades needed to 

accommodate the load characteristics of electric storage resources for cost allocation

purposes.

208 

 205 Order No. 845, 163 FERC ¶ 61,043 at P 273.

206 APS Rehearing Request at 18. 

207 Id. (citing Electric Storage Participation in Markets Operated by Regional 

Transmission Organizations and Independent System Operators, Order No. 841,

162 FERC ¶ 61,127 (2018)). Order No. 841 defines an electric storage resource as 

“a resource capable of receiving electric energy from the grid and storing it for later 

injection of electric energy back to the grid.” Order No. 841, 162 FERC ¶ 61,127 at n.1.

208 APS Rehearing Request at 19.
Docket No. RM17-8-001 - 74 -

2. Determination

95. We deny APS’ rehearing request. We reiterate that the definition change in Order 

No. 845 allows electric storage resources that wish to interconnect pursuant to the pro 

forma LGIP and pro forma LGIA to do so, and the revised definition is consistent with 

Order No. 792’s revisions to the definition of “small generating facility” in the pro forma 

Small Generator Interconnection Procedures (SGIP) and pro forma Small Generator 

Interconnection Agreement (SGIA).

209 While Order No. 845 revised the definition of 

generating facility, it did not define “electric storage resource.” 

96. Moreover, we find it is not necessary to impose requirements regarding the scope 

of studies needed to account for the load characteristics of electric storage resources and 

the upgrades required to accommodate those load characteristics here. In Order No. 845,

the Commission did not take a position regarding, or impose requirements pertaining to, 

the load characteristics of electric storage resources. Instead, the Commission observed 

that transmission providers have the flexibility to address the load characteristics of 

electric storage resources and that electric storage resources have already interconnected 

pursuant to Commission-jurisdictional LGIPs and LGIAs.

210 The Commission also 

stated that, if a transmission provider finds that the terms of its pro forma LGIA are 

insufficient to accommodate a particular resource, “the LGIP permits a transmission 

 209 Order No. 845, 163 FERC ¶ 61,043 at P 273.

210 Id. P 285.
Docket No. RM17-8-001 - 75 -

provider to enter into non-conforming LGIAs when necessary.”211 Because the 

requirement in Order No. 845 is to allow electric storage resources to interconnect under 

the pro forma LGIP and pro forma LGIA, APS’s request and discussion of the load 

characteristics of electric storage resources are beyond the scope of Order No. 845.

F. Interconnection Study Deadlines

97. In Order No. 845, the Commission modified the pro forma LGIP to institute 

quarterly reporting requirements for transmission providers to report interconnection 

study performance data on their OASIS sites or public websites. The Commission also 

adopted requirements for transmission providers to file informational reports with the 

Commission if a transmission provider exceeds its interconnection study deadlines for 

more than 25 percent of any study type for two consecutive calendar quarters (Filed 

Report Requirement).

98. In adopting these reporting requirements, the Commission found that the reporting 

requirements provide increased transparency and information to interconnection 

customers and do not unduly burden transmission providers.212 It also found that the 

increased transparency resulting from these new requirements should provide for 

“improved queue management and better informed interconnection customer planning –

 211 Id.

212 Id. P 307.
Docket No. RM17-8-001 - 76 -

results that may be important enough to support some corresponding burden on 

transmission providers.”213

1. Adoption of Order No. 845 Interconnection Study Metric 

Reporting Requirements

a. Requests for Rehearing and Clarification

99. Southern requests rehearing, arguing that the Commission failed to account for 

events outside of a transmission provider’s control and that the Filed Report Requirement 

could subject transmission providers to additional reporting requirements and penalties 

for circumstances beyond their control.214 Southern contends that “this failure to make a 

rational connection between the facts and the requirement[s] adopted” is arbitrary and

capricious and in violation of the law.215 Southern contends that the Commission has 

adopted skewed metrics that inappropriately suggest that delays are the fault of the 

transmission provider without regard to possible interconnection customer action. 

Southern contends that this approach could lead to a determination that a transmission 

provider is not using reasonable efforts and result in a possible penalty.216

100. Southern also seeks rehearing on the start date for measuring interconnection 

study performance metrics. It asserts that the date that a transmission provider receives 

an executed study agreement from the interconnection customer is not the appropriate 

 213 Id.

214 Southern Rehearing Request at 3, 10-11.

215 Id. at 10-11.

216 Id.
Docket No. RM17-8-001 - 77 -

start date. In support of this argument, it points out that the transmission provider may 

not receive additional items required for an interconnection request, such as study 

deposits and technical data, for some time after the execution of the study agreement. 

Southern states that, if the Commission does not adopt “a revised start date that 

commences with the receipt of the study deposit and provision of complete and valid 

data, then . . . [it] should clarify that an Interconnection Customer is required to provide 

the study deposit and complete and valid technical data before the Transmission Provider

is required to begin the study.”217

b. Determination

101. We deny Southern’s rehearing request that the Commission reconsider the

requirement for transmission providers to quarterly post interconnection study metrics. 

The purpose of the study reporting requirements is to improve interconnection customer 

planning, transmission provider queue management, and Commission oversight. As 

noted in Order No. 845, we believe that the increased transparency provided through the 

reported study information could “allow interconnection customers to assess whether a 

transmission provider is using ‘reasonable efforts’ to process interconnection studies” and 

allow them “to develop informed expectations about how long the interconnection study 

portion of the process actually takes” within a particular transmission system.218 The 

 217 Id. at 12.

218 Order No. 845, 163 FERC ¶ 61,043 at P 306 (quoting Pro forma LGIP 

Section 1 (Definition)). 
Docket No. RM17-8-001 - 78 -

Commission has acknowledged that interconnection study delays may not be the result of 

the transmission provider’s actions, and, in recognition of this possibility, it declined to 

implement automatic penalties for study delays.

219 While we understand that Southern 

has concerns that posting data on transmission providers’ consistency with tariff study 

timeframes may result in parties attempting to place blame on transmission providers, we 

note that the reported metric data in itself does not determine drivers for possible study 

data variance. The reported metrics are simply a transparency tool into the results, but 

not the drivers, of study completion. The posted study metrics indicate the proportion of 

interconnection studies a transmission provider is able to complete in the time frames 

established in its LGIP. We note that transmission providers are able to provide the 

rationale for and details regarding interconnection study delays to relevant 

interconnection customers under the provisions of sections 6.3, 7.4, and 8.3 in the pro 

forma LGIP and to other stakeholders as part of the information in the reports submitted

under the Filed Report Requirement. 

102. As the Commission noted in Order No. 845, the detailed information provided to 

the Commission through the Filed Report Requirement should be particularly beneficial 

in identifying process deficiencies and the causes of delays in regions that persistently 

experience significant delays.220 This requirement also creates some consistency in the 

process for interconnection customers to obtain certain interconnection study information 

 219 Id. P 309.

220 Id. PP 308, 310.
Docket No. RM17-8-001 - 79 -

from transmission providers, and they will create a record that will allow the Commission 

to better assess the reasons for interconnection study delays. 

103. We also deny Southern’s request for rehearing regarding the start date for 

measuring interconnection study performance metrics, which Order No. 845 specifies as 

beginning with the execution of the relevant interconnection study agreement. Pursuant 

to the study performance metrics established in Order No. 845, the Commission uses the 

period between the execution of an interconnection study agreement and the date that the 

transmission provider provides the completed interconnection study to the 

interconnection customer as a time period for comparison221 against the study time frame 

specified for that interconnection study in the pro forma LGIP, as established in Order 

No. 2003.222 For purposes of consistency, the Commission chose to use the execution of 

an interconnection study agreement as the starting point for this comparison period 

because the pro forma LGIP uses the execution of an interconnection study agreement as 

the starting point for determining the time frame for completing an interconnection 

study.223 In response to Southern’s expressed concern, we note, however, that, as 

 221 See Pro Forma LGIP, Sections 3.5.2.1(D), 3.5.2.2(D), & 3.5.2.3(D).

222 See Pro Forma LGIP, Section 6.3, 7.4, & 8.3.

223 See, e.g., Pro Forma LGIP, Section 6.3: “The Transmission Provider shall use 

Reasonable Efforts to complete the Interconnection Feasibility Study no later than fortyfive (45) Calendar Days after the Transmission Provider receives the fully executed 

Interconnection Feasibility Study Agreement.” See also Pro Forma LGIP, Sections 7.4 

& 8.3.
Docket No. RM17-8-001 - 80 -

established in Order No. 2003, an executed interconnection study agreement is submitted 

concurrently with a study deposit and the provision of technical data called for in the 

interconnection study agreement.224 As such, the timing for these components and their 

relationship with submission of an executed interconnection agreement has already been 

established and was not changed by Order No. 845. 

2. Interconnection Study Data Posting Requirements

a. Requests for Rehearing and Clarification

104. EEI requests clarification on two issues related to reporting interconnection study 

metrics. First, EEI requests clarification that the interconnection study metric reporting 

requirement begins with data for 2018, because Order No. 845 became effective on July 

23, 2018.225 EEI notes that Order No. 845 adopts the NOPR language requiring the 

posting of quarterly metrics beginning with 2017. In response, EEI expresses concern 

that the study data required may not be available retroactively to the beginning of 

calendar year 2017 in the detail required by Order No. 845. 

 224 See, e.g., Pro Forma LGIP, Section 6.1: “The Interconnection Customer shall 

execute and deliver to the Transmission Provider the Interconnection Feasibility Study 

Agreement along with a $10,000 deposit no later than thirty (30) Calendar Days after its 

receipt. On or before the return of the executed Interconnection Feasibility Study 

Agreement to the Transmission Provider, the Interconnection Customer shall provide the 

technical data called for in Appendix 1, Attachment A.” See also Pro Forma LGIP, 

Sections 7.2 & 8.1.

225 EEI Rehearing Request at 18.
Docket No. RM17-8-001 - 81 -

105. Second, EEI seeks clarification on the timing for filing reports if a transmission 

provider triggers the Filed Report Requirement.226 Specifically, EEI asks how to comply 

with the Filed Report Requirement to submit a report “within 45 days of the end of the

calendar quarter” if posted data from 2017 indicate that the Filed Report Requirement 

was triggered even though Order No. 845 “did not go into effect until Q2 2018.”227

106. To clarify that the events that would trigger the Filed Report Requirement begin 

after Order No. 845 became effective, EEI recommends that the Commission revise 

section 3.5.3 of the pro forma LGIP as follows (with proposed deletions in brackets from 

and proposed additions in italics):

3.5.3 Transmission Provider is required to post on OASIS or its website 

the measures in paragraph 3.5.2.1(A) through paragraph 3.5.2.4(F) for 

each calendar quarter within 30 days of the end of the calendar quarter. 

Transmission Provider will keep the quarterly measures posted on OASIS 

or its website for three calendar years with the first required [reporting year 

to be 2017] quarterly report to be for the first calendar quarter after the 

effective date of Order No. 845. If Transmission Provider retains this 

information on its website, a link to the information must be provided on 

Transmission Provider’s OASIS site.228

b. Determination

107. We grant EEI’s request for clarification and confirm that the date for measuring 

study performance metrics and the reporting requirements do not require transmission 

providers to post 2017 interconnection study metrics. EEI requested that the posting 

 226 Id.

227 Id. at 19.

228 Id.
Docket No. RM17-8-001 - 82 -

requirement begin in the 2018 calendar quarter after Order No. 845 becomes effective.

229

However, in light of the Commission’s granting of a compliance extension to a date 90 

days after issuance of this order,

230 we likewise extend the commencement of the

retention and posting requirements. The reporting requirement shall commence in 

the first calendar quarter of 2020. This applies to both the study metrics reporting

requirement and the Filed Report Requirement. To effectuate this clarification, we revise

section 3.5.3 of the pro forma LGIP as follows (with deletions from and additions to the 

language from Order No. 845 in brackets and in italics, respectively): 

Transmission Provider is required to post on OASIS or its website the 

measures in paragraph 3.5.2.1(A) through paragraph 3.5.2.4(F) for each 

calendar quarter within 30 days of the end of the calendar quarter. 

Transmission Provider will keep the quarterly measures posted on OASIS 

or its website for three calendar years with the first required [reporting 

year to be 2017] report to be in the first quarter of 2020. If Transmission 

Provider retains this information on its website, a link to the information 

must be provided on Transmission Provider’s OASIS site.

G. Requesting Interconnection Service below Generating Facility 

Capacity 

108. In Order No. 845, the Commission modified the pro forma LGIP to allow 

interconnection customers to request interconnection service that is lower than the

 229 As noted below in Section J.1. Compliance and Effective Dates, EEI requested 

an extension of the Order No. 845 Compliance deadline. 

230 Notice of Extension of Compliance Date, Docket No. RM17-8-000 (Oct. 3, 

2018).
Docket No. RM17-8-001 - 83 -

proposed generating facility capacity,

231 recognizing the need for proper control 

technologies and flexibility for transmission providers to propose penalties to ensure 

that the generating facility does not inject energy above the requested level of service.232 

The Commission also clarified that interconnection customers may either request 

interconnection service below generating facility capacity in their interconnection 

requests, or reduce their levels of requested interconnection service by up to 60 percent

and 15 percent, respectively, at two subsequent points in the interconnection process:

(1) prior to returning an executed system impact study agreement; and (2) prior to 

returning an executed facilities study agreement.233

109. With respect to the need to enforce limits on energy injection through monitoring 

and control technologies, and the related issue of penalties for over-generation, the 

Commission largely relied on existing provisions of the pro forma LGIA to address these 

needs. These include any provisions related to system protection facilities and any 

provisions that allow a transmission provider to curtail service or terminate an LGIA in 

response to an interconnection customer exceeding its energy injection limit.

234

 231 The term generating facility capacity means “the net capacity of the Generating 

Facility and the aggregate net capacity of the Generating Facility where it includes 

multiple energy production devices.” Pro forma LGIA Art. 1. 

232 Order No. 845, 163 FERC ¶ 61,043 at P 367. 

233 Id. PP 405-06. 

234 Id. PP 369-72, 396, 416-17. 
Docket No. RM17-8-001 - 84 -

110. The Commission also required transmission providers to study interconnection 

requests at the level of interconnection service requested by the interconnection customer 

for purposes of identifying interconnection facilities and network upgrades. Furthermore, 

the Commission stated that transmission providers may, if determined necessary to 

ensure safety and reliability, perform studies at the full generating facility capacity. The 

Commission clarified that, in such circumstances, the transmission provider must provide 

a detailed written explanation for such a determination to the interconnection 

customer.235 The Commission also required that, if the transmission provider determines 

that additional network upgrades are necessary based on these studies, it must specify 

which additional network upgrade costs are based on which studies and provide a 

detailed explanation of why the additional network upgrades are necessary.

1. Requests for Rehearing and Clarification

111. APS argues that the indemnification and liability provisions of the pro forma 

LGIA would not protect transmission providers where the action or inaction of an 

interconnection customer resulted in damage to or loss of use of the transmission 

provider’s equipment or facilities or where such damage resulted in increased costs or 

loss of revenue for transmission providers. APS asks the Commission to clarify that 

transmission providers may propose stronger indemnification provisions in their LGIPs 

or LGIAs for interconnection service that is less than a generating facility’s generating 

facility capacity. According to APS, operational controls can fail, and without explicit 

 235 Id. PP 383-84. 
Docket No. RM17-8-001 - 85 -

provisions addressing interconnection customer liability, the reform inequitably allocates 

consequential risk (which is directly attributable to a generating facility’s operation) to

transmission providers. For these reasons, APS requests clarification that transmission 

providers may propose LGIP/LGIA provisions to protect themselves from these risks or 

costs. APS also asks the Commission to explicitly define the interconnection customer’s 

responsibilities for security, liability, indemnification, and overall reliability if an 

interconnection customer is interconnecting at a capacity lower than the full generating 

facility capacity.

236

112. AWEA requests clarification regarding the timing of when a transmission provider 

must inform the interconnection customer of its election to perform additional studies at 

the full generating facility capacity. Specifically, AWEA argues that the transmission 

provider should inform the interconnection customer before performing these additional 

studies so that the interconnection customer can provide additional information or 

otherwise alleviate transmission provider concerns without the loss of time and money it 

may otherwise spend on additional studies. AWEA notes that the interconnection 

customer may bear the cost of additional studies and may seek to pursue dispute 

resolution if there is no agreement on the adequacy of control technologies or the 

need for additional study at the full generating facility capacity.237

 236 APS Rehearing Request at 15-16. 

237 AWEA Request for Clarification at 6-7. 
Docket No. RM17-8-001 - 86 -

113. AWEA also asks the Commission to clarify that there should be flexibility for 

the interconnection customer to wait until a facilities study is complete before the 

interconnection customer has to specify any required control technologies. It argues 

that this clarification is necessary to reconcile ambiguity in Order No. 845 concerning 

whether it is the interconnection customer’s or transmission provider’s responsibility to

propose control technologies for a generating facility seeking service below generating 

facility capacity. In particular, AWEA is unable to reconcile two statements made by the

Commission: (1) “any control technologies proposed by the interconnection customer to 

restrict the generating facility’s output to the requested interconnection service levels 

must be identified in the project description at the beginning of the study process,” and 

(2) the Commission sees “no reason to preclude a customer from relying on the 

transmission provider to identify protection and control technologies in the first 

instance.”238

2. Determination

114. We deny APS’s request for clarification because existing provisions in the 

pro forma LGIA are sufficient to address APS’s concerns. More specifically, we find 

that article 18.1 of the pro forma LGIA in combination with articles 9.3 (Transmission 

Provider Obligations) and 9.4 of the pro forma LGIA (Interconnection Customer 

Operations), are adequate to address APS’s concerns. Article 18.1 indemnifies a party 

from “any and all damages, losses, claims . . ., demand, suits, recoveries, costs and 

 238 Id. at 7 (quoting Order No. 845, 163 FERC ¶ 61,043 at P 396). 
Docket No. RM17-8-001 - 87 -

expenses, court costs, attorney fees, and all other obligations by or to third parties, arising 

out of or resulting from the other Party’s action or inactions of its obligations under this

LGIA”239 and covers “the amount of such Indemnified Person’s actual loss, net of any 

insurance or other recovery.”240 Pro forma LGIA article 9.4 requires the interconnection 

customer “to operate, maintain and control the Large Generating Facility . . . in a safe and 

reliable manner . . . in accordance with this LGIA” and “all applicable requirements of 

the Control Area of which it is part, as such requirements are set forth in Appendix C, 

Interconnection Details, of this LGIA.” The phrase “action or inactions of its obligations 

under this LGIA” in article 18.1 would include failure by the interconnection customer to 

abide by article 9.4 and Appendix C to the LGIA. Therefore, if the interconnection 

customer requests interconnection service below generating capacity, it commits to 

operate consistent with such a request under section 3.1 of the pro forma LGIP, which 

states that “[t]he necessary control technologies and protection systems ... for exceeding 

the level of Interconnection Service established in the executed, or requested to be filed 

unexecuted, LGIA shall be established in Appendix C of that executed, or requested to 

be filed unexecuted, LGIA.”241 Moreover, Appendix C of the LGIA, which contains 

interconnection details specific to the interconnection request, must memorialize the 

 239 Pro forma LGIA Art. 18.1.

240 Id. Art. 18.1.2 (emphasis added).

241 See Pro Forma LGIP Section 3.1.
Docket No. RM17-8-001 - 88 -

interconnection customer’s commitment to operate consistent with its request for 

interconnection service below generating facility capacity. We note that the Commission 

has previously required the inclusion of such operating requirements in Appendix C.242 

115. It is the transmission provider’s responsibility to ensure that Appendix C of the 

LGIA includes these operational requirements. More specifically, under pro forma LGIA 

article 9.3 (Transmission Provider Obligations), the transmission provider “has the 

responsibility for establishing the Interconnection Customer’s operating instructions and 

operating protocols and procedures” and because “these instructions, protocols, and 

procedures . . . include reliability requirements, article 9.3 . . . gives the Transmission 

Provider responsibility for modifications to Appendix C.”243

116. Accordingly, we find the existing indemnification provision in pro forma LGIA

article 18.1 would cover an action or inaction by the interconnection customer related to 

overgeneration because the interconnection customer would have failed to operate its

generating facility consistent with its LGIA obligations. Because of this finding, we 

revise the last sentence of section 3.1 of the pro forma LGIP to now read “[t]he necessary 

 242 See, e.g., Essential Reliability Services and the Evolving Bulk-Power System—

Primary Frequency Response, Order No. 842, 162 FERC ¶ 61,128, at P 180 (2018) 

(requiring interconnection customer and transmission providers to establish in Appendix 

C of an LGIA the operating range for an interconnecting electric storage resource that 

considers the system needs for primary frequency response and the physical limitations of 

the electric storage resource).

243 Bonneville Power Admin., 112 FERC ¶ 61,195, at P 20 (2005), order on reh’g, 

113 FERC ¶ 61,005 (2005).
Docket No. RM17-8-001 - 89 -

control technologies and protection systems shall be established in Appendix C of the 

executed, or requested to be filed unexecuted, LGIA.”244 In Order No. 845, the 

Commission declined to generically adopt into the pro forma LGIP any additional 

financial penalties for exceeding the limitations for interconnection service established in 

the interconnection agreements. However, the Commission did allow a transmission 

provider to propose and justify a need for additional penalties in a section 205 filing. 

We note that, if a transmission provider were to propose additional penalties, then 

information on the additional penalties should also be included in Appendix C of the 

LGIA. On a different but related note, it is worth pointing out that an interconnection 

customer’s failure to abide by the operating requirements contained in Appendix C may 

constitute a breach of the LGIA and may trigger the default and termination provisions 

in articles 17.1.1 and 17.1.2 of the pro forma LGIA, respectively. 

117. In response to AWEA’s request to require a transmission provider to inform the 

interconnection customer before performing additional studies at the full generating 

facility capacity, we grant clarification and clarify that a transmission provider must

provide a detailed explanation of its determination to perform additional studies at the

full generating facility capacity to an interconnection customer prior to performing 

the additional studies. This explanation will allow the interconnection customer to 

understand the transmission provider’s reasoning for determining that additional studies

are necessary before the studies are conducted. We also reiterate Order No. 845’s 

 244 Pro Forma LGIP Section 3.1.
Docket No. RM17-8-001 - 90 -

requirement that, if after the additional studies are complete, the transmission provider 

determines that additional network upgrades are necessary, then the transmission 

provider must: (1) specify which additional network upgrade costs are based on which 

studies; and (2) provide a detailed explanation of why the additional network upgrades 

are necessary.

245 Accordingly, we revise the paragraph at the end of section 3.1 in the 

pro forma LGIP to include the following sentence (with new additions from Order 

No. 845 in italics):

These requests for Interconnection Service shall be studied at the level 

of Interconnection Service requested for purposes of Interconnection 

Facilities, Network Upgrades, and associated costs, but may be subject to 

other studies at the full Generating Facility Capacity to ensure safety and 

reliability of the system, with the study costs borne by the Interconnection 

Customer. If after the additional studies are complete, Transmission 

Provider determines that additional Network Upgrades are necessary, then 

Transmission Provider must: (1) specify which additional Network 

Upgrade costs are based on which studies; and (2) provide a detailed 

explanation of why the additional Network Upgrades are necessary. 

118. We deny AWEA’s request for clarification to allow an interconnection customer 

the flexibility to propose control technologies to the transmission provider after the 

completion of the facilities study because allowing such flexibility could cause delays 

in the processing of the transmission provider’s queue. However, we reiterate that 

the interconnection customer may propose control technologies when it submits its 

interconnection request at the beginning of the interconnection process, or, if it chooses 

not to, then it may rely on the transmission provider to identify the necessary control 

 245 Order No. 845, 163 FERC ¶ 61,043 P 384.
Docket No. RM17-8-001 - 91 -

technologies. Additionally, Order No. 845 stated that an interconnection customer may 

request to reduce its interconnection service by up to 60 percent before it returns an 

executed system impact study agreement to the transmission provider and by up to an 

additional 15 percent prior to the return of an executed facilities study agreement.246 

Because Order No. 845 permits the interconnection customer to reduce its 

interconnection service below generating facility capacity at these two other points in 

the generator interconnection process, 247 we grant rehearing in part to find that an 

interconnection customer may propose control technologies at both of these points as 

well. We note that this clarification still preserves the transmission provider’s ability to 

ensure system protection under the existing pro form LGIA.248 

H. Utilization of Surplus Interconnection Service 

119. In Order No. 845, the Commission adopted pro forma LGIP and pro forma LGIA 

provisions to enable a new interconnection customer to utilize the unused portion of an 

existing interconnection customer’s interconnection service within specific parameters. 

The intent was to reduce costs for interconnection customers and improve wholesale 

market competition by increasing the utilization of existing interconnection facilities and 

network upgrades rather than requiring new ones. These reforms were also intended to

 246 Id. P 396.

247 Id. P 406; see also pro forma LGIP Sections 4.4.1 & 4.4.2.

248 Order No. 845, 163 FERC ¶ 61,043 at P 372; see also pro forma LGIA 

Section 9.7.4.1.
Docket No. RM17-8-001 - 92 -

improve capabilities at existing generation facilities, to prevent stranded costs, and to 

improve access to the transmission system.249

120. As relevant to the requests for rehearing and clarification, in Order No. 845, the 

Commission modified the pro forma LGIP and pro forma LGIA to: (1) add a definition 

for “Surplus Interconnection Service” to section 1 of the pro forma LGIP and to article 1 

of the pro forma LGIA;

250 and (2) add a new section 3.3 to the pro forma LGIP that 

requires the transmission provider to establish a process for the use of surplus 

interconnection service.

251

121. Also relevant to the requests for rehearing, Order No. 845 required “transmission 

providers to provide an expedited process for interconnection customers to utilize or 

transfer surplus interconnection service at a particular point of interconnection. This 

process would be expedited in the sense that it would take place outside of the 

 249 See Order No. 845, 163 FERC ¶ 61,043 at P 467.

250 Id. (“Surplus Interconnection Service shall mean any unneeded portion of 

Interconnection Service established in a Large Generator Interconnection Agreement, 

such that if Surplus Interconnection Service is utilized the total amount of 

Interconnection Service at the Point of Interconnection would remain the same.”).

251 Id. (“Utilization of Surplus Interconnection Service – Transmission Provider 

must provide a process that allows an Interconnection Customer to utilize or transfer 

Surplus Interconnection Service at an existing Point of Interconnection. The original 

Interconnection Customer or one of its affiliates shall have priority to utilize Surplus 

Interconnection Service. If the existing Interconnection Customer or one of its affiliates 

does not exercise its priority, then that service may be made available to other potential 

interconnection customers.”).
Docket No. RM17-8-001 - 93 -

interconnection queue.”252 It also clarified that the use or transfer of surplus 

interconnection service does not entail queue jumping.253 Finally, Order No. 845 

permitted a limited, continuation of surplus interconnection service for up to one year 

following the retirement and permanent cessation of commercial operations of the 

original interconnection customer’s generating facility.254 Below, we address the issues 

raised in requests for rehearing or clarification.

1. Original Interconnection Customer’s Ability to Utilize or 

Transfer Surplus Interconnection Service

a. Requests for Rehearing and Clarification

122. Non-Profit Utility Trade Associations state that the Commission’s surplus 

interconnection service decision builds on the premise that transmission providers, when 

considering interconnection applications, must study the implications of generation 

output at full capacity, and assume that each interconnection customer is fully using its 

interconnection service when studying new requests. Non-Profit Utility Trade 

Associations note that, on that basis, the Commission then built a “right” under the tariff 

for interconnection customers to market surplus interconnection capacity.255

 252 Id. P 486.

253 Id. PP 487.

254 Id. PP 505-06.

255 Non-Profit Utility Trade Associations Rehearing Request at 9.
Docket No. RM17-8-001 - 94 -

123. However, Non-Profit Utility Trade Associations allege that Order No. 845 fails 

to account for the “dynamic nature of the transmission planning and operating 

environment.”256 In particular, they argue that the Commission explicitly recognized that 

transmission planners build certain assumptions into their models when it stipulated that 

studies for the use of surplus interconnection capacity will focus on available reactive 

power studies, short circuit fault duty analyses, stability analyses, and any other 

appropriate studies.257 Non-Profit Utility Trade Associations argue that, for planning 

models, assuming that interconnection customers may at any time market capacity that 

has long been idle alters the planning environment and will likely require additional 

investment.258 

124. According to Non-Profit Utility Trade Associations, while “the interconnection 

capacity needed by any interconnection customer may be effectively free . . . when 

initially secured,” it may later become valuable when a subsequent interconnection 

customer submits an interconnection request. Non-Profit Utility Trade Associations

argue, however, that permitting an interconnection customer an ongoing opportunity to 

remarket interconnection service permits the value of the associated capacity to be set at 

the cost of system expansion, regardless of the cost to the interconnection customer. 

According to Non-Profit Utility Trade Associations, such a result would be an unearned 

 256 Id. at 9.

257 Id. at 9-10 (citing Order No. 845, 163 FERC ¶ 61,043 at P 461).

258 Id.
Docket No. RM17-8-001 - 95 -

windfall for the initial interconnection customer, and holds the potential for it to assess 

monopoly rent meaningfully in excess of its cost. Non-Profit Utility Trade Associations

further contend that, if the original interconnection customer does not release “its 

capacity,” a transmission provider would have “to build out the grid for an ensuing 

customer,” with the resulting cost to be borne ultimately by the system as a whole as 

costs are rolled into system-wide rates under the Commission’s generic interconnection 

pricing policy.259

125. Furthermore, Non-Profit Utility Trade Associations argue that, under Order 

No. 2003, all system customers are ultimately responsible for network upgrade costs 

associated with interconnection applications on a rolled-in cost basis.260 Non-Profit 

Utility Trade Associations assert that this fact “undermines any equitable claim that 

interconnection customers may have to the financial benefit of transmission capacity 

associated with network upgrades for which they have provided initial funding.”261 For 

this reason, Non-Profit Utility Trade Associations argue that the Commission should 

withdraw the surplus interconnection service provisions because they will drive up 

system-wide costs, permit interconnection process gaming, and will not increase system 

efficiency.262 Non-Profit Utility Trade Associations concede that, after an 

interconnection is complete, some surplus capacity may exist. For this reason, Non-

 259 Id. at 9-11.

260 Id. at 10-11 (citing Order No. 2003, 104 FERC ¶ 61,103 at PP 130-33).

261 Id. at 11.

262 Id. at 11-12.
Docket No. RM17-8-001 - 96 -

Profit Utility Trade Associations do not oppose modifications to permit the transfer of 

surplus capacity for a period of five years after the interconnection’s energization.

b. Determination

126. We deny Non-Profit Utility Trade Associations’ request for rehearing. First, we 

disagree with Non-Profit Utility Trade Associations that the establishment of surplus 

interconnection service fails to account for the “dynamic nature of the transmission 

planning and operating environment.”263 While transmission planners may make 

reasonable assumptions as to future transmission system use to plan for transmission 

system maintenance, the transmission provider has no right to assume in all 

circumstances that unused interconnection service will remain unused indefinitely. In 

fact, Order No. 845 explained that, “even if a generating facility only operates a few days 

a year, or routinely operates at a level below its maximum capacity, the remaining, 

unused interconnection service is assumed to be unavailable to other prospective 

interconnection customers.”264 As long as the original interconnection customer remains 

in compliance with its LGIA, it retains the right to make full use of its contracted for 

interconnection service, and, so long as any necessary transmission service has been 

obtained, it may inject at the full level contracted for under its LGIA.

265 

 263 Id. at 9.

264 Order No. 845, 163 FERC ¶ 61,043 at P 468.

265 See id PP 468-72.
Docket No. RM17-8-001 - 97 -

127. As to the remainder of Non-Profit Utility Trade Associations’ arguments, while

we agree that, where transmission providers follow the Commission’s Order No. 2003 

crediting policy, transmission customers ultimately pay for interconnection-related

network upgrades,266 this fact does not undermine the rationale for surplus 

interconnection service. The amount of interconnection service that was granted to the

original interconnection customer remains the same throughout the term of its LGIA,

whether or not that original interconnection customer ultimately receives credits for the 

cost of any network upgrades that may have been needed to accommodate its original 

interconnection request. Accordingly, the amount of surplus interconnection service that 

can be offered by the original interconnection customer likewise does not depend on 

whether the original interconnection customer receives or received credits for the cost of 

any network upgrades that may have been needed to accommodate its original 

interconnection request. 

 266 Specifically, under the pro forma LGIA of Order No. 2003, an interconnection 

customer only provides up-front financing of network upgrades that enable 

interconnection service. After the interconnection customer enters commercial operation, 

the transmission provider reimburses the interconnection customer through transmission 

service credits and rolls the cost of the network upgrades into its transmission rates over 

time. Order No. 2003, 104 FERC ¶ 61,103 at PP 693-96. See also LGIA Art. 11.4.1 

(“Interconnection Customer shall be entitled to a cash refund, equal to the total amount 

paid to Transmission Provider and Affected System Operator, if any, for the Network 

Upgrades, including any tax gross-up or other tax-related payments, and not refunded to 

Interconnection Customer pursuant to Article 5.17.8 or otherwise, to be paid to 

Interconnection Customer on a dollar-for-dollar basis for the non-usage sensitive portion 

of transmission charges, as payments are made under the Transmission Provider's Tariff 

and Affected System's Tariff for transmission services with respect to the Large 

Generating Facility”).
Docket No. RM17-8-001 - 98 -

128. In addition, we continue to find that these surplus interconnection service 

requirements serve to “enhance access to the transmission system at [a specific] point of 

interconnection” and are necessarily “limited in nature,” as stated in Order No. 845.267 

These requirements are consistent with the fact that, once an original interconnection 

customer commences operation, nothing in its LGIA prohibits it from operating at the full 

amount of interconnection service established in its LGIA,

268 taking into account any 

curtailment for temporary reliability reasons, even if it has not historically done so.269 In 

other words, rather than encouraging the withholding of interconnection capacity as 

asserted by Non-Profit Utility Trade Associations, the surplus interconnection service

requirements make it easier for the original interconnection customer to utilize or transfer 

surplus interconnection service at a particular point of interconnection. 

129. Similarly, we disagree with Non-Profit Utility Trade Associations’ argument that 

“[p]ermitting an original interconnection customer an ongoing opportunity to remarket 

interconnection service” may allow it “to assess monopoly rent meaningfully in excess of 

its cost.”270 As noted in Order No. 845, new interconnection customers retain the “ability 

 267 Order No. 845, 163 FERC ¶ 61,043 at PP 480-81.

268 For purposes of this argument, we assume that any necessary transmission 

service has been obtained to allow such operation of the generation facility at the full 

amount of interconnection service established in its LGIA.

269 Id. P 480.

270 Non-Profit Utility Trade Associations Rehearing Request at 9.
Docket No. RM17-8-001 - 99 -

to submit an interconnection request for any requested point of interconnection directly 

with the transmission provider, rather than seeking surplus interconnection service with 

respect to an original interconnection customer’s point of interconnection.”271 

Furthermore, as also explained in Order No. 845, surplus interconnection service is, by 

definition, more limited in nature than new interconnection service provided by the 

transmission provider because: (1) the total output of the original interconnection 

customer plus the surplus interconnection service customer behind the same point of 

interconnection will be limited to the maximum total amount of interconnection service 

granted to the original interconnection customer; (2) the original interconnection 

customer will be able to stipulate the amount of surplus interconnection service that is 

available, to designate when that service is available, and to describe any other conditions 

under which surplus interconnection service at the point of interconnection may be used; 

and (3) it will only be available at the preexisting point of interconnection of the original 

interconnection customer.

272 Thus, surplus interconnection service is an inherently more 

limited service than non-surplus interconnection service. For these reasons, the original 

interconnection customer cannot assess monopoly rents through the sale of surplus 

interconnection service because a potential purchaser of surplus interconnection service 

can always opt instead for non-surplus interconnection service from the transmission 

 271 See, e.g., Order No. 845, 163 FERC ¶ 61,043 at P 482; see also id. PP 490 & 

507.

272 See, e.g., id. P 481.
Docket No. RM17-8-001 - 100 -

provider. That said, we note that making surplus interconnection service available when 

it was not available before provides a new option for interconnection customers that are 

willing to accept the limitations associated with surplus interconnection service. 

2. Effect of Expedited Surplus Interconnection Service Process on 

the Queue and on Transmission Planning

a. Requests for Rehearing and Clarification

130. Some rehearing requests argue that the Commission has not adequately addressed 

the impact that the expedited surplus interconnection service process may have on the

non-surplus interconnection queue. APS argues that the studies associated with surplus 

interconnection service must compete for the same transmission provider resources, 

including personnel, as other interconnection studies. Further, APS states that “where 

interim facilities are necessary . . . it is not clear how and when such facilities would 

become ‘contingent facilities’ in the normal interconnection study process.”273 APS adds 

that, where studies from a request for surplus interconnection service identify additional 

impacts, those impacts could affect interconnection customers that are already in the 

queue.274 As a result, APS asks the Commission to clarify that transmission providers 

may incorporate into their pro forma LGIAs and LGIPs provisions that are necessary to 

ensure that these issues, when they arise, can be resolved.

 273 APS Rehearing Request at 14.

274 Id. at 13-15. APS raises the same issues with respect to provisional 

interconnection service.
Docket No. RM17-8-001 - 101 -

131. Similarly, EEI and Southern argue that the Commission’s rationale for the surplus 

interconnection service provisions fails to consider the impact to the transmission 

planning process if more than two customers seek to use the same interconnection 

service. They argue that, while the transmission provider can study the original 

interconnection customer and the surplus interconnection customer for a safe and reliable 

interconnection, transmission providers may find it increasingly difficult to reliably study 

subsequent interconnection requests and plan for future transmission system 

expansion.275 

132. EEI also argues that, in all transmission planning studies, when considering safety 

and reliability evaluations such as breaker duty, grounding, or stability, the transmission 

provider considers all other transmission system components at full load even though 

most of these components do not operate at full capacity all the time. It argues that this 

methodology allows transmission providers to efficiently plan the transmission system to 

operate safely and reliably under stressed conditions and that the Commission should 

account for this planning consideration when implementing Order No. 845.276 Finally, 

EEI seeks guidance to address these implementation and operational issues and requests a 

technical conference or workshop to address these issues.277

 275 EEI Rehearing Request at 15; Southern Rehearing Request at 15.

276 EEI Rehearing Request at 15.

277 Id. at 15-16.
Docket No. RM17-8-001 - 102 -

b. Determination

133. We deny the requests by EEI, Southern, and APS for clarification and technical 

conference with respect to the potential impact on the queue of the expedited surplus 

interconnection service process, both with respect to interconnection requests and to 

transmission planning. While the Commission agrees with APS that, for a given 

transmission provider, the same personnel that would be responsible for processing the 

non-surplus interconnection queue would likely also be responsible for administering the 

surplus interconnection service process, this fact does not justify granting the requests for 

clarification. As noted in Order No. 845, transmission providers routinely conduct 

similar studies outside of the interconnection process without causing significant delays 

to other interconnection customers.278 None of the rehearing requests provided evidence 

refuting this assertion. We find it reasonable to assume that transmission providers will

be able to similarly study surplus interconnection service requests without creating 

significant delays in the non-surplus interconnection process. 

134. Additionally, we are not persuaded by the argument that transmission providers 

may find it increasingly difficult to reliably study later interconnection requests and plan 

for future transmission system expansion due to the need to assess multiple scenarios for

surplus interconnection service at the same point of interconnection. This issue exists 

irrespective of whether surplus interconnection service is an available option, as there are 

 278 Order No. 845, 163 FERC ¶ 61,043 at P 488 (citing, e.g., MISO FERC Electric 

Tariff, Attachment X (76.0.0), Section 11.5).
Docket No. RM17-8-001 - 103 -

always uncertainties and complexities surrounding transmission system modeling. These 

uncertainties require making assumptions as to future conditions that, by their very 

nature, cannot be predicted in the present with 100 percent accuracy.279 Considering all 

of the limitations associated with surplus interconnection service described elsewhere in 

this section, particularly the fact that it cannot be granted if it would require new network 

upgrades, we see no evidence that the mere existence of surplus interconnection service 

would fundamentally or significantly increase the difficulty of making assumptions as to 

future conditions in connection with transmission system modeling.

135. APS requests clarification as to how and when interim facilities would become 

“contingent facilities” in the normal interconnection study process. APS also requests

clarification concerning additional impacts identified in surplus interconnection service 

studies affecting the determination of what upgrades are necessary for interconnection 

customers that are already in the queue. As discussed in more detail in the next section 

below, surplus interconnection service cannot be granted if doing so would require new 

network upgrades. Accordingly, surplus interconnection service should have no 

additional impacts affecting the determination of what upgrades are necessary for 

interconnection customers that are already in the queue. Similarly, because surplus 

 279 For example, it will always be difficult for a given transmission provider to 

know with certainty how much unaffiliated generation will retire in the future and how 

much new unaffiliated generation may ultimately be built to replace it, and making 

reasonable assumptions in order to address these and other uncertainties is a necessary 

and intrinsic part of transmission system modeling.
Docket No. RM17-8-001 - 104 -

interconnection service will not be granted if it requires new network upgrades, there 

should be no interim facilities that need to be considered contingent facilities in the 

normal interconnection study process. Accordingly, we find no basis to grant 

clarification.280

3. Impact of Differences in Electrical Characteristics between the 

Surplus and Original Interconnection Customers

a. Requests for Rehearing and Clarification

136. EEI states that where two generators with different electrical characteristics (e.g., 

short circuit contribution, fault current, harmonic profile) share a point of 

interconnection, if the transmission provider receives a third interconnection request on 

the same transmission line, the transmission provider will have to either (1) choose one of 

the two original generators to include for the third generator’s interconnection evaluation 

or (2) perform multiple evaluations to consider all potential generator operation 

scenarios. Under the first scenario, according to EEI, it is possible that the study could 

miss potential upgrades that could be necessary, and under the second scenario, the 

transmission provider’s study and the transmission planning process become more 

 280 Similarly, APS raised this issue in regards to provisional interconnection

service, and we deny clarification with respect to provisional interconnection on the same 

basis. Furthermore, provisional interconnection is only available when available studies 

or additional studies as necessary indicate that there is a level of interconnection that can 

occur without any additional interconnection facilities and/or network upgrades. See id.

P 441.
Docket No. RM17-8-001 - 105 -

complex. As a result, EEI requests that the Commission convene a technical conference 

or staff-led workshop to address these issues prior to requiring implementation.281

137. For similar reasons, Southern asks the Commission to clarify that transmission 

providers are only obligated to provide surplus interconnection service up to the amount 

that can be provided without building new network upgrades.282 

b. Determination

138. We clarify that, by definition, surplus interconnection service is only available up 

to the level that can be accommodated without requiring the construction of new network 

upgrades. We agree that a surplus interconnection service customer may have

significantly different electrical characteristics (e.g., short circuit contribution, fault 

current, harmonic profile) than the original interconnection customer, and that those 

differences may sometimes result in the need to take actions up to and potentially 

including the construction of new network upgrades to maintain the reliable operation of 

the system in order to accommodate the new surplus interconnection request. This could 

be true even if the total injections of energy from the original and surplus interconnection 

customers are limited to the level of interconnection service contracted for by the original 

interconnection customer. Thus, in recognition of the Commission’s stated objective of 

increasing efficiency in the interconnection process through this reform, we clarify that 

surplus interconnection service is only available up to the amount that can be

 281 EEI Rehearing Request at 14-15.

282 Southern Rehearing Request at 16.
Docket No. RM17-8-001 - 106 -

accommodated without requiring new network upgrades.

283 This clarification should

address concerns regarding the potential impact of differences in electrical 

characteristics, and therefore, no additional technical conference or staff-led workshop is

necessary.

4. Independent Entity Variations

a. Requests for Rehearing and Clarification

139. NYISO asks the Commission to clarify that Order No. 845 does not limit the 

manner in which RTOs/ISOs demonstrate independent entity variations with respect to 

surplus interconnection service. Specifically, NYISO cites paragraph 477 of Order No. 

845, which appears to create highly prescriptive surplus interconnection service 

requirements with regard to RTO’s/ISO’s interconnection procedures. However, NYISO 

argues that the assumptions concerning the need for, and benefits of, surplus 

interconnection service are not applicable to NYISO, whose rules are “fundamentally 

different” from other transmission providers’ rules.

284

 283 We note that surplus interconnection service will likely require new directly 

assignable interconnection facilities to connect the surplus interconnection service 

customer to the original interconnection customer’s interconnection facilities. However, 

interconnection facilities are always the sole cost responsibility of the relevant 

interconnection customer, so requiring more of those for a surplus interconnection 

request will not impact others in the interconnection queue. 

284 NYISO Request for Rehearing at 6-19. NYISO provides examples of these 

regional rules that it asserts are incompatible with the surplus interconnection service 

requirements.
Docket No. RM17-8-001 - 107 -

b. Determination

140. We grant NYISO’s request for rehearing because the Commission did not intend 

to limit the manner in which RTOs/ISOs may seek independent entity variations with 

respect to surplus interconnection service. Order No. 845 states that:

for a process to be consistent with or superior to, or an independent entity 

variation from, the Final Rule’s surplus interconnection service 

requirements, the transmission provider must demonstrate, at a minimum, 

that its tariff: (1) includes a definition of surplus interconnection service 

consistent with the Final Rule; (2) provides an expedited interconnection 

process outside of the interconnection queue for surplus interconnection 

service, consistent with the Final Rule; (3) allows affiliates of the original 

interconnection customers to use surplus interconnection service for 

another interconnecting generating facility consistent with the Final Rule; 

(4) allows for the transfer of surplus interconnection service that the 

original interconnection customer or one of its affiliates does not intend to 

use; and (5) specifies what reliability-related studies and approvals are 

necessary to provide surplus interconnection service and to ensure the 

reliable use of surplus interconnection service.285

141. Upon further consideration, we find that it was not appropriate to limit the 

flexibility of independent entities to request independent entity variations. This passage 

from the preamble of Order No. 845 should have been limited to discussing whether a 

process is “consistent with or superior to” Order No. 845 requirements and should not 

have referred to independent entity variations. Therefore, we modify this portion of the 

preamble of Order No. 845 to eliminate the phrase “or an independent entity variation 

from.” As NYISO correctly notes, requesting an independent entity variation provides 

more flexibility than requesting a variation that is “consistent with or superior to” a final 

 285 Order No. 845, 163 FERC ¶ 61,043 at P 477 (emphasis added).
Docket No. RM17-8-001 - 108 -

rule’s requirements.

286 Nevertheless, we will not otherwise address any specific 

independent entity variation arguments in NYISO’s request for clarification at this time. 

Such arguments are more appropriate in a proceeding on a particular transmission 

provider’s Order No. 845 compliance filing.

5. Additional Requests for Clarification Regarding Surplus 

Interconnection Service 

a. Requests for Rehearing and Clarification

142. Some of the rehearing requests argue more narrowly that the surplus 

interconnection service requirements are inconsistent with particular Commissionapproved provisions in transmission providers’ own tariffs. In this regard, Southern 

argues that no LGIA to which Southern is a party obligates it to maintain an 

interconnection customer’s capability to be designated as a network resource after the 

original generating facility’s commercial operation date. It explains that any preservation 

of capacity would instead “be done under an appropriate transmission delivery service 

arrangement.”287 Therefore, Southern asks for clarification that the statement “that if the 

original LGIA is for [Network Resource Interconnection Service (NRIS)], the surplus 

interconnection customer could be either [Energy Resource Interconnection Service 

(ERIS)] or NRIS” does not apply to Southern.288

 286 Order No. 2003, 104 FERC ¶ 61,103 at P 26.

287 Southern Rehearing Request at 16 (citing to a portion of Attachment J-1 to 

Southern’s tariff).

288 Id. at 17.
Docket No. RM17-8-001 - 109 -

143. AWEA requests clarification on two issues regarding the implementation of the 

surplus interconnection service requirements. First, AWEA seeks clarification that the 

Commission intends to accommodate a “Multi-Phase model,” which according to AWEA 

differs from the MISO Net Zero Interconnection Service Model. AWEA describes the 

Multi-Phase Model as a situation where a developer that planned to build a plant with a 

higher generating facility capacity enters a contract for a lower capacity during its 

development process. It argues that this situation could “leave[] excess capacity in the 

interconnection service that is not immediately used,” and the developer “may wish to 

build an additional generating plant at that same site,” or “may wish to sell the excess 

capacity to another party.”289 AWEA contends that this Multi-Phase model would fit 

under the Commission’s definition of surplus interconnection capacity.290 AWEA also 

states that some RTOs/ISOs have procedures that allow the initial party to reassign or 

transfer surplus interconnection capacity to another party consistent with this Multi-Phase 

model.291 AWEA therefore requests clarifications that the situations “similar to that of 

the Multi-Phase model described above, in addition to the Net Zero model, are . . . an 

intended use of surplus interconnection capacity, and that transmission providers should 

also provide a process by which the Multi-Phase model can allow the efficient use of 

 289 AWEA Request for Clarification at 3.

290 Id.

291 Id. at 4.
Docket No. RM17-8-001 - 110 -

existing interconnection capacity.”292 It argues that both approaches to the use of surplus 

capacity could be accomplished through the same process or in two different 

processes.293

144. Second, regarding retirement of the original generator associated with a surplus 

interconnection service agreement, AWEA requests that the Commission clarify that,

during the one-year grace period prior to the retirement of the original generator, a new 

generator can apply for repowering or replacement at the point of interconnection, with 

the agreement of the original interconnection customer, under the RTO/ISO’s existing 

rules. Further, AWEA requests that the Commission clarify that, if the retirement and 

replacement process is successful, the surplus interconnection customer could continue to 

operate after that one-year grace period.294 AWEA also asks the Commission to clarify 

that the rules and processes that exist for replacement or repowering are also available to 

surplus interconnection service customers.295

b. Determination

145. We deny the requests for clarification by Southern and AWEA, as discussed 

further below. We deny Southern’s request for clarification regarding whether the 

statement “that if the original LGIA is for NRIS, the surplus interconnection customer 

could be either ERIS or NRIS” applies to Southern. Southern argues that, under its tariff, 

 292 Id.

293 Id.

294 Id. at 5.

295 Id.
Docket No. RM17-8-001 - 111 -

it is not obligated under any LGIA to maintain an interconnection customer’s capability 

to be designated as a network resource after the original generating facility’s commercial 

operation date because of a certain provision it added to its tariff. However, Southern 

fails to acknowledge the concerns the Commission identified when Southern first 

proposed this provision. Specifically, the Commission stated that “[a]lthough Southern 

states on rehearing that it was ‘not trying to nullify, avoid, or evade the requirements of 

Order Nos. 2003 and 2003-A in adopting Attachment J-1,’ we continue to find that, 

without the conditions discussed below, revised Attachment J-1 has not been shown to be 

consistent with or superior to the pro forma LGIA and LGIP.”296 Among the referenced 

conditions was that Southern must add language stating that “other provisions of these 

sections notwithstanding, [the relevant analyses and studies] will be conducted in a 

manner that preserves the NRIS status of existing generators.”297 Accordingly, we deny 

Southern’s request for clarification on this issue. Where a particular original 

interconnection customer’s interconnection service is NRIS, if a surplus interconnection 

customer seeks to interconnect at the same point of interconnection, then it may seek 

either ERIS or NRIS.

146. We find that AWEA’s description of the Multi-Phase model is inconsistent with 

the surplus interconnection service described in Order No. 845. In Order No. 845, the 

 296 See Southern Company Services, Inc., 109 FERC ¶ 61,014, at P 18 (2004). 

297 See id. P 19.
Docket No. RM17-8-001 - 112 -

Commission described the use of surplus interconnection service as appropriate when 

interconnection customers do not use the full generating facility capacity of their 

interconnection service due to the nature of their operations.298 The Commission also 

agreed with CAISO’s argument that “where the original interconnection customer . . . 

reduces the generating facility capacity of its facility from what was originally proposed 

for interconnection, it would not retain rights indefinitely to any excess interconnection 

capacity thus created.”299 Furthermore, in finding that there are no significant concerns 

regarding the potential for hoarding interconnection service, we relied on the fact that, 

currently, an original interconnection customer can only secure interconnection service 

based on the generating facility capacity of the generating facility that it constructs and 

continues to operate.300 In light of these findings, because AWEA’s proposed “MultiPhase” model is based on the idea that the original interconnection customer would 

intentionally secure an amount of interconnection service in excess of the size of the 

generating facility that it constructs and continues to operate, we find that this concept 

would not be consistent with surplus interconnection service as defined in Order No. 845.

147. We also deny clarification with respect to AWEA’s requests related to repowering 

or replacement. To the extent that a particular transmission provider has 

repowering/replacement provisions in its tariff, nothing in Order No. 845 would alter

 298 Order No. 845, 163 FERC ¶ 61,043 at P 480.

299 Id. P 493.

300 Id. P 490.
Docket No. RM17-8-001 - 113 -

those provisions.301 Furthermore, if a particular repowering/replacement process is 

successful, any continued operation from that point forward would then be under a new 

interconnection agreement associated with the outcome of the successful 

repowering/replacement process.

I. Material Modification Definition and Incorporation of Advanced 

Technology

148. In the pro forma LGIP, section 4.4 states that an interconnection customer that has 

requested a modification in writing to a transmission provider “shall retain its Queue 

Position if the modifications are in accordance with [pro forma] Sections 4.4.1, 4.4.2 or 

4.4.5, or are determined not to be Material Modifications pursuant to 4.4.3.”302 In Order 

No. 845, the Commission modified section 4.4.2(c) of the pro forma LGIP to allow an 

interconnection customer to incorporate certain technological changes to its

interconnection request without risking the loss of its queue positon. In addition, the 

Commission modified section 4.4.4 of the pro forma LGIP to require transmission 

providers to include a technological change procedure that includes the requisite 

information and process that the transmission provider will follow to assess whether an

 301 Similarly, to the extent that a particular transmission provider lacks such 

provisions, nothing in Order No. 845 creates a new obligation for the transmission 

provider to add them.

302 Pro forma LGIP Section 4.4 (Modifications). Material modification “shall 

mean those modifications that have a material impact on the cost or timing of any 

Interconnection Request with a later queue priority date.” Pro forma LGIP Section 1 

(Definitions); pro forma LGIA Art. 1 (Definitions).
Docket No. RM17-8-001 - 114 -

interconnection customer’s proposed technological change is a material modification. 

Further, Order No. 845 required that transmission providers develop a definition of 

permissible technological advancement that would define a category of technological 

changes that will not result in the loss of queue position pursuant to the pro forma

material modification provision.

303

1. Requests for Rehearing and Clarification 

149. EEI requests that the Commission clarify that it is not changing the definition of 

material modification established in Order No. 2003. It argues that the material 

modification procedure focuses on the entire interconnection queue, while the process for 

determining if a technological change is a material modification would only focus on 

electrical performance, even though improved or increased electrical performance “can 

and will have an impact on lower-queued resources.”304 EEI states that this issue is a

concern because transmission providers must focus on grid reliability, and not all 

technological changes will have the same impact on the grid.305 

 303 Order No. 845, 163 FERC ¶ 61,043 at P 518.

304 EEI Rehearing Request at 17; see also Southern Rehearing Request at 13.

305 EEI Rehearing Request at 17. To illustrate its point, EEI argues that two 

different interconnection customers in different areas of the electric system may propose 

to incorporate the same technology changes. However, it contends that one technological 

change may not affect other interconnection customers in the queue (if, for example, no 

other interconnection requests are related to the same line or substation bus), while the 

other interconnection customer may impact the cost and timing for others in the queue (if, 

for example, other interconnection requests are related to the same line or substation bus). 

Thus, the latter would be considered a material modification, while the former would not. 

As another example, Southern offers that an interconnection customer may “replace [its] 
Docket No. RM17-8-001 - 115 -

150. EEI also asks whether the Commission created a new standard for evaluating what 

constitutes a material modification.

306 EEI requests that the Commission clarify that the 

intent is not to change the definition of material modification as defined in Order No. 

2003, which is related to one interconnection customer’s impact on another customer in 

the queue.307

151. Southern argues that, because the NOPR did not indicate that the Commission was 

proposing to revise the definition of material modification, this failure would contravene 

the notice and comment requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act.308

2. Determination

152. In response to Southern and EEI, Order No. 845 did not change the existing 

material modification definition, which determines whether an interconnection 

customer’s proposed change will cause it to lose its queue position based on whether it 

has a material impact on the cost or timing of any interconnection request with a later 

 

inverters to decrease a generating facility’s short circuit contribution . . . which could be 

considered ‘greater or equal electrical performance’” but that this change could result in a 

breaker upgrade originally identified for this interconnection request to be triggered 

instead by a later-queued interconnection request. Thus, Southern reasons, this change 

would be a material modification. Southern Rehearing Request at 13-14.

306 Id. at 17.

307 Id.

308 Southern Rehearing Request at 14 (citing 5 U.S.C. 553 (2012); Chocolate Mfrs. 

Ass’n of U.S. v. Block, 744 F.2d 1098, 1104 (1985)).
Docket No. RM17-8-001 - 116 -

queue priority date.

309 Order No. 845’s requirement that transmission providers develop 

a definition of permissible technological advancement does not alter the definition of a 

material modification in the pro forma LGIP or conflict with the existing construct. 

Rather, Order No. 845 requires transmission providers to develop a definition of 

permissible technological advancements that the interconnection process will

accommodate without triggering the loss of queue position pursuant to the material 

modification provision of the pro forma LGIP.310 For purposes of clarity, we explain 

further how this revision will fit in with the existing provisions. Permissible

technological advancements, as determined by the transmission provider, will be added to 

the existing list of modifications in section 4.4.2 of the pro forma LGIP that do not 

require a material modification assessment and thus do not result in the loss of an 

interconnection customer’s queue position.

311 While the Commission included the 

correct pro forma LGIP language in section 4.4.2 of Appendix B, in the text, the 

Commission neglected to include the word “permissible.” Therefore, we clarify that 

section 4.4.2 of the pro forma LGIP should include the following language as subpart (c) 

(with emphasis supplied in italics):

a Permissible Technological Advancement for the Large Generating 

Facility after the submission of the interconnection request. Section 4.4.4 

 309 Sections 4.4.1, 4.4.2, and 4.4.5 of the pro forma LGIP enumerate modifications 

that an interconnection customer may make without losing its queue position. 

310 Order No. 845, 163 FERC ¶ 61,043 at P 530.

311 See id. App. B at Section 4.4.2. 
Docket No. RM17-8-001 - 117 -

specifies a separate technological change procedure including the requisite 

information and process that will be followed to assess whether the 

Interconnection Customer’s proposed technological advancement under 

Section 4.4.2(c) is a Material Modification. Section 1 contains a definition 

of Permissible Technological Advancement.

153. It is noteworthy that existing interconnection customer modifications permitted 

under section 4.4.2 of the pro forma LGIP may affect lower-queued customers but do not 

result in loss of queue position.312 Thus, this requirement is similar to the existing

exemptions laid out in section 4.4.2 of the pro forma LGIP, which allow for the 

identification in the tariff of specific changes to an interconnection request that do not 

result in the interconnection customer losing its queue position. 

154. We deny rehearing regarding Southern’s assertion that the Commission did not 

provide notice of its proposal to revise the definition of material modification. The 

NOPR did not propose, and Order No. 845 did not adopt, any revisions to the definition 

to material modification. 

155. In response to EEI’s and Southern’s arguments that the requirements for a new 

technological change procedure and definition of permissible technological advancement 

are inconsistent with the definition of material modification, we clarify that the 

requirement that transmission providers develop a definition for permissible 

technological advancement is distinct from the other Order No. 845 requirement that 

 312 For example, the modifications listed in section 4.4.2 of the pro forma LGIP 

include a 15 percent decrease of electrical output (MW) that could have a material impact 

on the cost of a lower-queued interconnection request. Pro forma LGIP Section 4.4 

(Modifications).
Docket No. RM17-8-001 - 118 -

transmission providers develop a technological change procedure for determining 

whether or not a proposed technological change is a material modification. In particular, 

we note that a transmission provider’s technological change procedure must specify the 

conditions under which a study will or will not be necessary to determine whether a 

proposed technological change is a material modification.313 When studies are necessary, 

the interconnection customer’s technological change request must demonstrate that the 

proposed incorporation of the technological change would result in electrical 

performance that is equal to or better than the electrical performance expected prior to the 

technological change and would not cause any reliability concerns (i.e., materially 

impact the transmission system with regard to short circuit capability limits, steady-state 

thermal and voltage limits, or dynamic system stability and response).314 If the 

interconnection customer cannot demonstrate in its technological change request that the

proposed technological change would result in equal or better electrical performance, the 

change will be assessed pursuant to the existing material modification pro forma LGIP 

provisions. We clarify that information regarding electrical performance submitted by 

the interconnection customer is an input into the technological change study and that this 

factor alone is not determinative of whether a proposed technological change is a material 

modification. We also clarify that the determination of whether a proposed technological 

 313 Order No. 845, 163 FERC ¶ 61,043 at P 519.

314 Id. P 520.
Docket No. RM17-8-001 - 119 -

change (that the transmission provider does not otherwise include in its definition of 

permissible technological advancements) is a material modification should include an 

analysis of whether the proposed technological change materially impacts the timing and 

costs of lower-queued interconnection customers.315 Accordingly, the final decision as to 

whether or not a proposed technological change is a material modification will remain 

with the transmission provider. Consistent with Order No. 845, the transmission provider 

must make such a determination no more than 30 days after an interconnection customer 

submits a formal technological change request.316

J. Process Concerns 

1. Compliance and Effective Dates 

156. Order No. 845 was issued in the Federal Register on May 9, 2018, and its effective 

date was seventy-five days after that, or July 23, 2018. In Order No. 845, the 

Commission stated that all public utility transmission providers were to submit 

compliance filings to adopt the requirements of Order No. 845 “as revisions to the LGIP 

and LGIA in their [Open Access Transmission Tariffs (OATT)] no later than 90 days 

after the issuance of” Order No. 845 in the Federal Register.317 

 315 Order No. 2003, 104 FERC ¶ 61,103 at P 166.

316 Order No. 845, 163 FERC ¶ 61,043 at P 535.

317 Id. P 555.
Docket No. RM17-8-001 - 120 -

a. Motions for Extension of Time

157. The ISO/RTO Council318 and Southern filed motions to extend the compliance 

date of Order No. 845. The ISO/RTO Council requested that the Commission extend the 

compliance deadline by seventy days to October 16, 2018.319 The New England Power 

Pool Participants Committee filed comments in support of this motion. Southern 

requested that the Commission extend the compliance period to a total of 180 days so that 

the compliance filing deadline would be November 5, 2018.320 On June 1, 2018, the 

Office of the Secretary issued a notice extending the compliance deadline to November 5, 

2018.321

158. On September 24, 2018, EEI submitted a motion requesting an extension of the 

compliance deadline for Order No. 845 up to and including ninety (90) days after the 

Commission’s issuance of an order addressing the pending requests for rehearing of 

Order No. 845. On September 26, 2018, AWEA filed an answer in opposition to EEI’s 

 318 The ISO/RTO Council is comprised of the Alberta Electric System Operator 

(AESO), CAISO, the Electric Reliability Council of Texas, Inc. (ERCOT), the 

Independent Electricity System Operator (IESO), ISO-NE, MISO, NYISO, PJM, and 

Southwest Power Pool, Inc. AESO, ERCOT, and IESO are not Commissionjurisdictional public utilities and did not join in this motion. 

319 ISO/RTO Council May 17, 2018 Motion to Extend the Time Period to Comply

at 1.

320 Southern May 22, 2018 Motion to Extend the Period of Time to Comply at 1.

321 Notice of Extension of Compliance Date, Docket No. RM17-8-000 (June 1, 

2018).
Docket No. RM17-8-001 - 121 -

motion. On October 3, 2018, the Office of the Secretary issued a notice granting EEI’s 

motion and requiring that transmission providers submit the compliance filings directed 

in Order No. 845 within ninety days of the Commission’s issuance of this order.322

b. Requests for Rehearing and Clarification 

159. Duke and EEI request rehearing of the Commission’s decision to establish an 

effective date seventy-five days after publication in the Federal Register and a 

compliance deadline ninety days after publication. Duke argues that Order No. 845 

“represents the most significant change to the generator interconnection process . . . since 

Order No. 2003” and that the Commission should therefore grant rehearing and establish 

an effective date and compliance deadline of November 5, 2018, 180 days after 

publication in the Federal Register.

323

160. Duke and EEI also argue that the Commission erred by failing to justify the 

variation in the compliance and effective date, arguing that this failure to align the dates 

is arbitrary and capricious because it departs from the NOPR proposal and past 

precedent.324 EEI argues that having an effective date in advance of the compliance date 

 322 Notice of Extension of Compliance Date, Docket No. RM17-8-000 (Oct. 3, 

2018). On October 15, 2018, AWEA requested rehearing of this notice, which the 

Commission dismissed in a November 13, 2018 order. Reform of Generator 

Interconnection Procedures and Agreements, 165 FERC ¶ 61,090 (2018).

323 Duke Rehearing Request at 8-9; see also EEI Rehearing Request at 21. EEI

also states that it does not object to the ISO/RTO Council’s request for an additional 70 

days for the compliance period.

324 Duke Rehearing Request at 10; EEI Rehearing Request at 21.
Docket No. RM17-8-001 - 122 -

creates regulatory uncertainty as to the provisions that are in effect.325 Duke states that 

the NOPR proposed to require each public utility to submit a compliance filing “within 

90 days of the effective date of the final rule” but that it was silent with regard to a 

proposed effective date.326

c. Determination 

161. We deny rehearing regarding the compliance deadline for Order No. 845. Duke 

and EEI’s arguments as to the original compliance filing set forth in Order No. 845 are 

moot in light of the October 3, 2018 notice, which extended the compliance deadline until 

ninety days after the issuance of this order. We also deny Duke’s and EEI’s requests for 

rehearing regarding the effective date. In response to the arguments that the compliance 

date and effective date should align, we note that there is no such statutory or regulatory

requirement and that the Commission has previously required effective dates that do not 

coincide with compliance deadlines.327 Further, we remind Duke and EEI that the 

effective date is the effective date of Order No. 845 itself.

 325 EEI Rehearing Request at 21.

326 Duke Rehearing Request at 9.

327 See, e.g., Order No. 841, 162 FERC ¶ 61,127 at P 344 (effective date within 90 

days of publication in the Federal Register and compliance deadline within 270 days of 

publication in the Federal Register); see also Standards of Conduct for Transmission 

Providers, 125 FERC ¶ 61,291, at P 2 (2008) (stating that Order No. 717 would become 

effective 30 days after publication in the Federal Register and that transmission providers 

must be in full compliance no later than 60 days from publication in the Federal 

Register).
Docket No. RM17-8-001 - 123 -

162. Nonetheless, in light of the confusion created by the multiple motions and 

rehearing requests that pertain to the compliance deadline and effective dates, we provide 

guidance regarding the compliance process and the effective dates of the LGIP/LGIA and 

forma LGIP/LGIA revisions required by Order No. 845 and Order No. 845-A. The 

effective date of Order No. 845 was July 23, 2018 (75 days after its publication in the 

Federal Register). The effective date of this order (Order No. 845-A) will be 75 days 

after the publication of this order in the Federal Register. Each public utility transmission 

provider must submit a single compliance filing within 90 days of the issuance of this 

order that includes revisions to its pro forma LGIP and pro forma LGIA necessary to 

comply with Order Nos. 845 and 845-A. Order No. 845 was silent regarding the 

effective date of the required tariff revisions, so we address such effective dates here. In 

doing so, we find that it is appropriate to follow the approach taken with regard to Order 

No. 2003 and its progeny as closely as possible. We describe that approach and the 

approach we are taking with regard to Order No. 845 and Order No. 845-A below.

163. The Commission issued Order No. 2003 on July 24, 2003. In response to requests 

to do so, the Commission extended the Order No. 2003 compliance deadline for 

RTOs/ISOs and non-RTO/ISO transmission providers to January 20, 2004.328 On 

January 8, 2004, the Office of the Secretary issued a notice clarifying the compliance 

procedures in the Order No. 2003 proceeding. The notice stated that all non-RTO/ISO 

 328 Notice Clarifying Compliance Procedures, Docket Nos. RM02-1-000 & RM02-

1-001, at P 1 (Jan. 8, 2004).
Docket No. RM17-8-001 - 124 -

transmission providers’ tariffs were “deemed to include [the pro forma LGIP and the pro 

forma LGIA] on” the date of the compliance deadline and “directed [the non-RTO/ISO

transmission providers] to make ministerial filings reflecting those revisions to their 

OATT[s] in their next filings with the Commission.”329 For RTOs/ISOs, the Commission 

stated that “[u]ntil the Commission acts on [their] compliance filings, the [RTOs’/ISOs’] 

existing Commission-approved interconnection standards and procedures will remain in 

effect.”330 

164. In Order No. 2003-A, the Commission deemed the non-RTO/ISO transmission 

providers’ OATTs to “be revised to adopt [the revised] pro forma LGIA and LGIP on 

[Order No. 2003-A’s] effective date” and directed all such transmission providers to 

make ministerial filings reflecting such revisions “upon their next filing(s) with the 

Commission.”331 For RTOs/ISOs, the Commission required each RTO/ISO to file “on or 

before the effective date of [the] Order on Rehearing either (1) a notice that it intends to 

adopt the [revised] pro forma LGIP and LGIA, or (2) new standard interconnection 

procedures and agreements developed according to Order No. 2003’s ‘independent entity 

variation’ standard.”332 The Commission stated that, in “either event, the [RTOs’/ISOs’] 

 329 Id. P 2.

330 Id. P 3.

331 Order No. 2003-A, 106 FERC ¶ 61,220 at P 43.

332 Id. P 49.
Docket No. RM17-8-001 - 125 -

currently effective OATT will remain in effect pending any necessary Commission 

action.”333 

165. For Order No. 2003-B, however, the Commission, in recognition that “it has taken 

longer than anticipated for all [non-RTO/ISO transmission providers] to make the 

necessary changes,” adopted a “different procedure.”334 The Commission once again 

deemed each non-RTO/ISO transmission provider’s tariff “to be amended to adopt the 

revisions . . .contained [in Order No. 2003-B] on the effective date of [that] order,” but 

the Commission required each non-RTO/ISO transmission providers to file an 

amendment to include such revisions within 60 days of Order No. 2003-B’s issuance.335 

The Commission also required each RTO/ISO to submit revised tariff sheets with 60 days 

of Order No. 2003-B’s issuance.336 For Order No. 2003-C, the Commission deemed each 

non-RTO/ISO transmission provider’s tariff “to be amended to adopt the [Order No. 

2003-C revisions] 30 days after the issuance of [that] order” and required each nonRTO/ISO transmission provider to “amend its OATT to include the [new] clarifications . 

. . within 60 days after issuance of” Order No. 2003-C.337

 333 Id. P 51.

334 Order No. 2003-B, 109 FERC ¶ 61,287 at P 139.

335 Id. P 4.

336 Id. P 139.

337 Order No. 2003-C, 111 FERC ¶ 61,401 at P 3.
Docket No. RM17-8-001 - 126 -

166. Because the Commission is only requiring a single compliance filing from 

transmission providers to comply with the combined requirements of Order Nos. 845 and 

Order No. 845-A, the effective date for each compliance filing’s proposed tariff revisions 

should be the same date. Consistent with the distinction made by Order No. 2003 and its 

progeny regarding the compliance requirements for non-RTO/ISO transmission providers 

and RTOs/ISOs, we will deem the tariff provisions to be effective for non-RTO/ISO

transmission providers on the effective date of this order (seventy-five days from 

publication in the Federal Register) or the compliance deadline (ninety days from the 

issuance of this order), whichever is later, and we require each non-RTO/ISO 

transmission provider to file an amendment to their tariffs to include such provisions by 

the compliance deadline (ninety days from the issuance of this order). For each 

RTO/ISO, the effective date of the proposed revisions shall be the date established in the 

Commission’s order accepting that RTO’s/ISO’s compliance filing, which will be no 

earlier than the issuance date of such an order.

K. Interconnection Request Withdrawals

167. In Order No. 845, the Commission recognized that, in addition to significant 

interconnection queue backlogs and long timelines, in some regions, there is a “recurring 

problem of late-stage interconnection request withdrawals that lead to interconnection 

restudies and consequent delays for lower-queued interconnection customers.”338 The 

 338 Order No. 845, 163 FERC ¶ 61,043 at P 24.
Docket No. RM17-8-001 - 127 -

Commission stated, however, that the reforms adopted in Order No. 845 “will benefit 

both interconnection customers and transmission providers.”339

1. Requests for Rehearing and Clarification

168. Southern contends that Order No. 845 fails to address delays and inefficiencies 

caused by “speculative” interconnection requests.340 It argues that, currently, a 

speculative interconnection customer can “sit in the queue for years” and withdraw “at 

the last moment.”341 Southern asserts that this is a cause for concern because, since 2014, 

interconnection customers have suspended or terminated (at their request) half the 

interconnection agreements executed under Southern’s OATT. Southern asserts, 

however, that, while the Commission acknowledges this concern, Order No. 845 “fails to 

address solutions on the customer side.”342 Southern further objects to Order No. 845’s 

imposition of requirements on transmission providers to provide additional information 

and flexibility, because such revisions “do little to nothing to address” the problem of 

speculative generation.343 Southern states further that Order No. 845 therefore “fails to 

make a rational connection with the underlying problem caused not by transmission 

providers, but by speculative interconnection customers” and that is therefore “arbitrary 

 339 Id. P 2.

340 Southern Rehearing Request at 3-6.

341 Id. at 3-4.

342 Id. at 5.

343 Id.
Docket No. RM17-8-001 - 128 -

and capricious.”344 Similarly, MISO TOs argue that, with regard to the option the build, 

the Commission failed to “meaningfully respond” to assertions that the main reason for 

increased costs, delays, and cost uncertainty are late-stage withdrawals and that this 

omission renders the Commission’s findings “arbitrary, capricious, and inconsistent with 

reasoned decision-making.”345

2. Determination 

169. We deny Southern’s and MISO TOs requests for rehearing on this issue. 

Regarding the issue of speculative projects, we note that the Commission designed some

of the Order No. 845 reforms to provide more and better information so that 

interconnection customers will be more likely to submit interconnection requests that 

achieve commercial operation. For instance, the purpose of the reform on transparency 

regarding study models and assumptions is to reduce the likelihood that interconnection 

customers will submit multiple interconnection requests to figure out which request has 

the most suitable point of interconnection. Thus, this reform will likely result in more 

accurate and informed decision-making by the interconnection customer, which will, in 

turn, reduce the likelihood of late-stage withdrawals.346 For this reason, we continue to 

find that, on balance, the reforms adopted by Order No. 845 will improve the 

 344 Id. at 5-6. 

345 MISO TOs Rehearing Request at 11 (citing Motor Vehicle Mfrs., 463 U.S. 

at 41, 43; Ameren, 880 F.3d at 581; PSEG Energy & Trade LLC v. FERC, 665 F.3d 203, 

208, 210 (2011)).

346 See Order No. 845, 163 FERC ¶ 61,043 at P 239.
Docket No. RM17-8-001 - 129 -

interconnection process for both interconnection customers and transmission providers. 

We also disagree with Southern’s argument that the Commission’s exercise of its 

discretion in developing Order No. 845’s requirements was arbitrary and capricious. As 

the Commission has noted on other occasions, it has “broad discretion to choose how best 

to marshal its limited resources and personnel to carry out its delegated responsibilities” 

and therefore, the Commission is not required to expand this rulemaking proceeding to 

impose additional requirements upon interconnection customers.347 

L. Wholesale Distribution Tariffs

1. Requests for Rehearing and Clarification

170. California Utilities request that the Commission clarify, as it did for the SGIA and 

SGIP, that the new requirements in Order No. 845 do not apply to wholesale distribution 

access tariffs (WDAT).348 California Utilities comment that the Commission did not 

directly address these issues as raised in comments by PG&E and SoCal Edison filed in 

response to the NOPR.

349 In support of their request, California Utilities comment that,

under their respective WDATs, they process a very small number of requests to 

 347 See, e.g., Wholesale Competition in Regions with Organized Electric 

Markets, Order No. 719-A, 128 FERC ¶ 61,059, at P 118 (2009) (responding to a 

rehearing request arguing that the Commission “shirk[ed] its duty under the FPA in 

confining the scope of [the] proceeding to four specific areas of reform”) (citing Chevron

U.S.A. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 842-45 (1984)), order on reh’g, Order 

No. 719-B, 129 FERC ¶ 61,252 (2009).

348 California Utilities Request for Clarification at 2.

349 Id.
Docket No. RM17-8-001 - 130 -

interconnect wholesale generation projects to distribution facilities, which are radial in 

nature and not part of the CAISO-controlled grid.350 

171. California Utilities state that the interconnection of wholesale generation to the 

distribution system may trigger the need for upgrades to the distribution system 

considered to be distribution facilities for purposes of the WDATs.351 California Utilities 

note that the interconnection of wholesale generation to the distribution grid could also 

trigger an upstream need for reliability network upgrades on the CAISO-controlled grid 

but contend that there could not be stand alone network upgrades as defined under Order 

No. 845 for generation connected to the distribution system.352 Therefore, the California 

Utilities argue, these limited projects should not subject the WDATs to these 

requirements, such as OASIS site postings, which do not exist for the California Utilities’ 

distribution systems.353 California Utilities maintain that the administrative burden and 

costs of complying outweigh any benefits. Moreover, many of the proposed new 

requirements concern transmission information that is available on CAISO’s website.354 

 350 Id.

351 Id.

352 Id.

353 Id.

354 Id.
Docket No. RM17-8-001 - 131 -

Alternatively, California Utilities suggest that any potential reforms to the WDATs 

should be considered together in a separate rulemaking.355

2. Determination 

172. We clarify that the requirements of Order No. 845 will not apply to WDATs at 

this time. We find that the distinct engineering and jurisdictional implications of an 

interconnection with a distribution system should be further evaluated before requiring

California Utilities or other entities with a WDAT to apply the requirements of Order 

No. 845 to their WDATs.

III. Information Collection Statement

173. The Paperwork Reduction Act (PRA) provides that an agency may not conduct or 

sponsor the collection of information unless the agency has published an estimate of the 

burden that shall result from the information collection in advance of adopting or revising 

such collection. The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) requires that OMB 

approve certain information collection and data retention requirements imposed by 

agency rules.356 However, this order on rehearing contains no additional reporting 

requirements, and is, therefore, not subject to OMB approval. Moreover, the 

Commission submitted to OMB the information collection requirements arising from 

Order No. 845, and OMB approved those requirements. In this order, the Commission is 

making no substantive changes to those requirements, but has provided clarifications that 

 355 Id. at 4.

356 5 CFR 1320.11(b) (2018).
Docket No. RM17-8-001 - 132 -

requires no additional information. Therefore, the Commission does not find it necessary 

to make a formal submission to OMB for review and approval under section 3507(d) of 

the PRA. This order will be submitted to OMB for informational purposes only.

174. Interested persons may obtain information on the reporting requirements by 

contacting the following: Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, 888 First Street, NE, 

Washington, DC 20426 [Attention: Ellen Brown, Office of the Executive Director], 

email: DataClearance@ferc.gov, phone: (202) 502-8663, fax: (202) 273-0873.

175. Comments concerning the collection of information and the associated burden 

estimate(s) in Order No. 845 should be sent to the Commission in this docket and may 

also be sent to the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, Office of Management 

and Budget, 725 17th Street, NW, Washington, DC 20503 [Attention: Desk Officer for 

the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission]. 

176. Due to security concerns, comments should be sent electronically to the following 

email address: oira_submission@omb.eop.gov. Comments submitted to OMB should 

refer to Docket No. RM17-8-001.

IV. Regulatory Flexibility Act Certification

177. The Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980 (RFA) 357 generally requires a description 

and analysis of rules that will have significant economic impact on a substantial number 

of small entities. The RFA does not mandate any particular outcome in a rulemaking. It 

only requires consideration of regulatory alternatives that accomplish the stated 

 357 5 U.S.C. 601-12 (2012).
Docket No. RM17-8-001 - 133 -

objectives of a rule and that minimize any significant economic impact on a substantial 

number of small entities. The Commission has determined that Order No. 845 will not 

have a significant impact on a substantial number of small entities; therefore these 

requirements under the RFA do not apply.358

V. Document Availability

178. In addition to publishing the full text of this document in the Federal Register, the 

Commission provides all interested persons an opportunity to view and/or print the 

contents of this document via the Internet through the Commission’s Home Page 

(http://www.ferc.gov) and in the Commission’s Public Reference Room during normal 

business hours (8:30 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. Eastern time) at 888 First Street, NE, Room 2A, 

Washington, DC 20426.

179. From the Commission’s Home Page on the Internet, this information is available 

on eLibrary. The full text of this document is available on eLibrary in PDF and 

Microsoft Word format for viewing, printing, and/or downloading. To access this 

document in eLibrary, type the docket number of this document, excluding the last three 

digits, in the docket number field.

180. User assistance is available for eLibrary and the Commission’s website during 

normal business hours from the Commission’s Online Support at (202) 502-6652 (toll 

free at 1-866-208-3676) or email at ferconlinesupport@ferc.gov, or the Public Reference 

 358 See Order No. 845, 163 FERC ¶ 61,043 at PP 564-65.
Docket No. RM17-8-001 - 134 -

Room at (202) 502-8371, TTY (202) 502-8659. E-mail the Public Reference Room at 

public.referenceroom@ferc.gov.

VI. Effective Date

181. These regulations are effective [INSERT DATE 75 DAYS AFTER DATE OF 

PUBLICATION IN THE FEDERAL REGISTER].

By the Commission. Commissioner McNamee is not participating.

( S E A L )

Nathaniel J. Davis, Sr.,

Deputy Secretary.
Docket No. RM17-8-001 - 135 -

Note: Appendix A will not be published in the Federal Register. 

Appendix A: List of Short Names of Entities that Filed Requests for 

Rehearing or Clarification

Short Name or Acronym Filer

Ameren Ameren Services Company

APS Arizona Public Service Company

AWEA American Wind Energy Association

California Utilities Pacific Gas and Electric Company, 

Southern California Edison Company, 

and San Diego Gas and Electric 

Company (jointly)

Duke Duke Energy Corporation

EEI Edison Electric Institute;

Generation Developers E.ON Climate & Renewables North 

America, LLC, EDF Renewables, Inc., 

EDP Renewables North America LLC, 

and Enel Green Power North America, 

Inc. (jointly)

MISO TOs MISO Transmission Owners359

 359 The MISO transmission owners that participated in MISO TOs’ Rehearing 

Request consist of: Ameren Services Company, as agent for Ameren Missouri, Ameren 

Illinois, and Ameren Transmission Company of Illinois; American Transmission 

Company LLC; Big Rivers Electric Corporation; Central Minnesota Municipal Power 

Agency; City Water, Light & Power (Springfield, IL); Cleco Power LLC; Cooperative 

Energy; Dairyland Power Cooperative; Duke Energy Business Services, LLC for Duke 

Energy Indiana, LLC; East Texas Electric Cooperative; Entergy Arkansas, Inc.; Entergy 

Louisiana, LLC; Entergy Mississippi, Inc.; Entergy New Orleans, LLC; Entergy Texas, 

Inc.; Great River Energy; Hoosier Energy Rural Electric Cooperative, Inc.; Indiana 

Municipal Power Agency; Indianapolis Power & Light Company; ITC Transmission; 

ITC Midwest LLC; Michigan Electric Transmission Company, LLC; MidAmerican 

Energy Company; Minnesota Power (and its subsidiary Superior Water, L&P); Missouri 

River Energy Services; Montana-Dakota Utilities Co.; Northern Indiana Public Service 
Docket No. RM17-8-001 - 136 -

NYISO New York Independent System 

Operator, Inc. 

Non-Profit Utility Trade Associations American Public Power Association, 

Large Public Power Council, and 

National Rural Electric Cooperative 

Association (jointly)

PG&E Pacific Gas and Electric Company

SoCal Edison Southern California Edison Company

Southern Southern Company Services, Inc.

 

Company LLC; Northern States Power Company, a Minnesota corporation, and Northern 

States Power Company, a Wisconsin corporation, subsidiaries of Xcel Energy Inc.; 

Northwestern Wisconsin Electric Company; Otter Tail Power Company; Prairie Power 

Inc.; Southern Illinois Power Cooperative; Vectren Energy Delivery of Indiana; Southern 

Minnesota Municipal Power Agency; Wabash Valley Power Association, Inc.; and 

Wolverine Power Supply Cooperative, Inc.
Docket No. RM17-8-001 - 137 -

Note: Appendix B will not be published in the Federal Register. Square brackets

indicate that the text should be filled in as appropriate by the transmission provider.

Appendix B: Compilation of Final Rule Changes to the Pro Forma LGIP

Made by Order No. 845 and Order No 845-A

The Commission modifies the following sections of the pro forma LGIP as indicated

below:

Section 1. Definitions

Contingent Facilities shall mean those unbuilt Interconnection Facilities 

and Network Upgrades upon which the Interconnection Request’s costs, timing, 

and study findings are dependent, and if delayed or not built, could cause a need 

for Re-Studies of the Interconnection Request or a reassessment of the 

Interconnection Facilities and/or Network Upgrades and/or costs and timing.

Generating Facility shall mean Interconnection Customer’s device for the 

production and/or storage for later injection of electricity identified in the 

Interconnection Request, but shall not include the Interconnection Customer’s 

Interconnection Facilities.

Permissible Technological Advancement [Insert definition here].

Provisional Interconnection Service shall mean Interconnection Service 

provided by Transmission Provider associated with interconnecting the 

Interconnection Customer’s Generating Facility to Transmission Provider’s 

Transmission System and enabling that Transmission System to receive electric 

energy and capacity from the Generating Facility at the Point of Interconnection, 

pursuant to the terms of the Provisional Large Generator Interconnection 

Agreement and, if applicable, the Tariff.

Provisional Large Generator Interconnection Agreement shall mean the 

interconnection agreement for Provisional Interconnection Service established 

between Transmission Provider and/or the Transmission Owner and the 
Docket No. RM17-8-001 - 138 -

Interconnection Customer. This agreement shall take the form of the Large 

Generator Interconnection Agreement, modified for provisional purposes.

Stand Alone Network Upgrades shall mean Network Upgrades that are 

not part of an Affected System that an Interconnection Customer may construct 

without affecting day-to-day operations of the Transmission System during their 

construction. Both the Transmission Provider and the Interconnection Customer 

must agree as to what constitutes Stand Alone Network Upgrades and identify 

them in Appendix A to the Standard Large Generator Interconnection Agreement. 

If the Transmission Provider and Interconnection Customer disagree about 

whether a particular Network Upgrade is a Stand Alone Network Upgrade, the 

Transmission Provider must provide the Interconnection Customer a written 

technical explanation outlining why the Transmission Provider does not consider 

the Network Upgrade to be a Stand Alone Network Upgrade within 15 days of its 

determination.

Surplus Interconnection Service shall mean any unneeded portion of 

Interconnection Service established in a Large Generator Interconnection 

Agreement, such that if Surplus Interconnection Service is utilized, the total 

amount of Interconnection Service at the Point of Interconnection would remain 

the same.

2.3 Base Case Data.

Base Case Data. Transmission Provider shall maintain provide base power 

flow, short circuit and stability databases, including all underlying 

assumptions, and contingency list on either its OASIS site or a passwordprotected website, upon request subject to confidentiality provisions in 

LGIP Section 13.1. In addition, Transmission Provider shall maintain 

network models and underlying assumptions on either its OASIS site or a 

password-protected website. Such network models and underlying 

assumptions should reasonably represent those used during the most recent 

interconnection study and be representative of current system conditions. If 
Docket No. RM17-8-001 - 139 -

Transmission Provider posts this information on a password-protected 

website, a link to the information must be provided on Transmission 

Provider’s OASIS site. Transmission Provider is permitted to require that 

Interconnection Customers, OASIS site users and password-protected 

website users sign a confidentiality agreement before the release of 

commercially sensitive information or Critical Energy Infrastructure 

Information in the Base Case data. Such databases and lists, hereinafter 

referred to as Base Cases, shall include all (1) generation projects and (2ii) 

transmission projects, including merchant transmission projects that are 

proposed for the Transmission System for which a transmission expansion 

plan has been submitted and approved by the applicable authority.

3.1 General 

An Interconnection Customer shall submit to Transmission Provider an 

Interconnection Request in the form of Appendix 1 to this LGIP and a 

refundable deposit of $10,000. Transmission Provider shall apply the 

deposit toward the cost of an Interconnection Feasibility Study.

Interconnection Customer shall submit a separate Interconnection Request 

for each site and may submit multiple Interconnection Requests for a single 

site. Interconnection Customer must submit a deposit with each 

Interconnection Request even when more than one request is submitted for 

a single site. An Interconnection Request to evaluate one site at two 

different voltage levels shall be treated as two Interconnection Requests. 

At Interconnection Customer's option, Transmission Provider and 

Interconnection Customer will identify alternative Point(s) of 

Interconnection and configurations at the Scoping Meeting to evaluate in 

this process and attempt to eliminate alternatives in a reasonable fashion 

given resources and information available. Interconnection Customer will 

select the definitive Point(s) of Interconnection to be studied no later than 

the execution of the Interconnection Feasibility Study Agreement. 

Transmission Provider shall have a process in place to consider requests for 

Interconnection Service below the Generating Facility Capacity. These requests 

for Interconnection Service shall be studied at the level of Interconnection Service 
Docket No. RM17-8-001 - 140 -

requested for purposes of Interconnection Facilities and Network Upgrades, but 

may be subject to other studies at the full Generating Facility Capacity to ensure 

safety and reliability of the system, with the study costs borne by the 

Interconnection Customer. If after the additional studies are complete, 

Transmission Provider determines that additional Network Upgrades are 

necessary, then Transmission Provider must: (1) specify which additional Network 

Upgrade costs are based on which studies; and (2) provide a detailed explanation 

of why the additional Network Upgrades are necessary. Any Interconnection 

Facility and/or Network Upgrade costs required for safety and reliability also will 

be borne by the Interconnection Customer. Interconnection Customers may be 

subject to additional control technologies as well as testing and validation of those 

technologies consistent with Article 6 of the LGIA. The necessary control 

technologies and protection systems shall be established in Appendix C of the

executed, or requested to be filed unexecuted, LGIA.

3.3 Utilization of Surplus Interconnection Service. 

Transmission Provider must provide a process that allows an 

Interconnection Customer to utilize or transfer Surplus Interconnection 

Service at an existing Point of Interconnection. The original 

Interconnection Customer or one of its affiliates shall have priority to 

utilize Surplus Interconnection Service. If the existing Interconnection 

Customer or one of its affiliates does not exercise its priority, then that 

service may be made available to other potential Interconnection 

Customers.

3.3.1 Surplus Interconnection Service Requests.

Surplus Interconnection Service requests may be made by the existing

Interconnection Customer whose Generating Facility is already 

interconnected or one of its affiliates. Surplus Interconnection Service 

requests also may be made by another Interconnection Customer. 

Transmission Provider shall provide a process for evaluating 

Interconnection Requests for Surplus Interconnection Service. Studies for 

Surplus Interconnection Service shall consist of reactive power, short 

circuit/fault duty, stability analyses, and any other appropriate studies. 

Steady-state (thermal/voltage) analyses may be performed as necessary to 

ensure that all required reliability conditions are studied. If the Surplus 

Interconnection Service was not studied under off-peak conditions, offpeak steady state analyses shall be performed to the required level 
Docket No. RM17-8-001 - 141 -

necessary to demonstrate reliable operation of the Surplus Interconnection 

Service. If the original System Impact Study is not available for the 

Surplus Interconnection Service, both off-peak and peak analysis may need 

to be performed for the existing Generating Facility associated with the 

request for Surplus Interconnection Service. The reactive power, short 

circuit/fault duty, stability, and steady-state analyses for Surplus 

Interconnection Service will identify any additional Interconnection 

Facilities and/or Network Upgrades necessary.

3.34 Valid Interconnection Request.

3.34.1 Initiating an Interconnection Request.

3.34.2 Acknowledgement of Interconnection Request.

3.43.5.1 OASIS Posting. 

3.5.2 Transmission Provider will maintain on its OASIS or its website summary 

statistics related to processing Interconnection Studies pursuant to 

Interconnection Requests, updated quarterly. If Transmission Provider 

posts this information on its website, a link to the information must be 

provided on Transmission Provider’s OASIS site. For each calendar 

quarter, Transmission Providers must calculate and post the information 

detailed in sections 3.5.2.1 through 3.5.2.4. 

3.5.2.1 Interconnection Feasibility Studies processing time. 

(A) Number of Interconnection Requests that had Interconnection 

Feasibility Studies completed within Transmission Provider’s coordinated 

region during the reporting quarter, 

(B) Number of Interconnection Requests that had Interconnection 

Feasibility Studies completed within Transmission Provider’s coordinated 

region during the reporting quarter that were completed more than [timeline 

as listed in Transmission Provider’s LGIP] after receipt by Transmission 

Provider of the Interconnection Customer’s executed Interconnection 

Feasibility Study Agreement, 
Docket No. RM17-8-001 - 142 -

(C) At the end of the reporting quarter, the number of active valid 

Interconnection Requests with ongoing incomplete Interconnection 

Feasibility Studies where such Interconnection Requests had executed 

Interconnection Feasibility Study Agreements received by Transmission 

Provider more than [timeline as listed in Transmission Provider’s LGIP] 

before the reporting quarter end, 

(D) Mean time (in days), Interconnection Feasibility Studies completed 

within Transmission Provider’s coordinated region during the reporting 

quarter, from the date when Transmission Provider received the executed 

Interconnection Feasibility Study Agreement to the date when 

Transmission Provider provided the completed Interconnection Feasibility 

Study to the Interconnection Customer, 

(E) Percentage of Interconnection Feasibility Studies exceeding [timeline as 

listed in Transmission Provider’s LGIP] to complete this reporting quarter, 

calculated as the sum of 3.5.2.1(B) plus 3.5.2.1(C) divided by the sum of 

3.5.2.1(A) plus 3.5.2.1(C)). 

3.5.2.2 Interconnection System Impact Studies Processing Time. 

(A) Number of Interconnection Requests that had Interconnection System 

Impact Studies completed within Transmission Provider’s coordinated 

region during the reporting quarter, 

(B) Number of Interconnection Requests that had Interconnection System 

Impact Studies completed within Transmission Provider’s coordinated 

region during the reporting quarter that were completed more than [timeline 

as listed in Transmission Provider’s LGIP] after receipt by Transmission 

Provider of the Interconnection Customer’s executed Interconnection 

System Impact Study Agreement, 
Docket No. RM17-8-001 - 143 -

(C) At the end of the reporting quarter, the number of active valid 

Interconnection Requests with ongoing incomplete System Impact Studies 

where such Interconnection Requests had executed Interconnection System 

Impact Study Agreements received by Transmission Provider more than 

[timeline as listed in Transmission Provider’s LGIP] before the reporting 

quarter end, 

(D) Mean time (in days), Interconnection System Impact Studies completed 

within Transmission Provider’s coordinated region during the reporting 

quarter, from the date when Transmission Provider received the executed 

Interconnection System Impact Study Agreement to the date when 

Transmission Provider provided the completed Interconnection System 

Impact Study to the Interconnection Customer, 

(E) Percentage of Interconnection System Impact Studies exceeding 

[timeline as listed in Transmission Provider’s LGIP] to complete this 

reporting quarter, calculated as the sum of 3.5.2.2(B) plus 3.5.2.2(C) 

divided by the sum of 3.5.2.2(A) plus 3.5.2.2(C)).

3.5.2.3 Interconnection Facilities Studies Processing Time. 

(A) Number of Interconnection Requests that had Interconnection Facilities 

Studies that are completed within Transmission Provider’s coordinated 

region during the reporting quarter, 

(B) Number of Interconnection Requests that had Interconnection Facilities 

Studies that are completed within Transmission Provider’s coordinated 

region during the reporting quarter that were completed more than [timeline 

as listed in Transmission Provider’s LGIP] after receipt by Transmission 

Provider of the Interconnection Customer’s executed Interconnection 

Facilities Study Agreement, 
Docket No. RM17-8-001 - 144 -

(C) At the end of the reporting quarter, the number of active valid 

Interconnection Service requests with ongoing incomplete Interconnection 

Facilities Studies where such Interconnection Requests had executed 

Interconnection Facilities Studies Agreement received by Transmission 

Provider more than [timeline as listed in Transmission Provider’s LGIP] 

before the reporting quarter end, 

(D) Mean time (in days), for Interconnection Facilities Studies completed 

within Transmission Provider’s coordinated region during the reporting 

quarter, calculated from the date when Transmission Provider received the 

executed Interconnection Facilities Study Agreement to the date when 

Transmission Provider provided the completed Interconnection Facilities 

Study to the Interconnection Customer, 

(E) Percentage of delayed Interconnection Facilities Studies this reporting 

quarter, calculated as the sum of 3.5.2.3(B) plus 3.5.2.3(C) divided by the 

sum of 3.5.2.3(A) plus 3.5.2.3(C)). 

3.5.2.4 Interconnection Service Requests Withdrawn from Interconnection 

Queue.

(A) Number of Interconnection Requests withdrawn from Transmission 

Provider’s interconnection queue during the reporting quarter, 

(B) Number of Interconnection Requests withdrawn from Transmission 

Provider’s interconnection queue during the reporting quarter before 

completion of any interconnection studies or execution of any 

interconnection study agreements, 

(C) Number of Interconnection Requests withdrawn from Transmission 

Provider’s interconnection queue during the reporting quarter before 

completion of an Interconnection System Impact Study, 
Docket No. RM17-8-001 - 145 -

(D) Number of Interconnection Requests withdrawn from Transmission 

Provider’s interconnection queue during the reporting quarter before 

completion of an Interconnection Facilities Study, 

(E) Number of Interconnection Requests withdrawn from Transmission 

Provider’s interconnection queue after execution of a generator 

interconnection agreement or Interconnection Customer requests the filing 

of an unexecuted, new interconnection agreement, 

(F) Mean time (in days), for all withdrawn Interconnection Requests, from 

the date when the request was determined to be valid to when Transmission 

Provider received the request to withdraw from the queue.

3.5.3 Transmission Provider is required to post on OASIS or its website the 

measures in paragraph 3.5.2.1(A) through paragraph 3.5.2.4(F) for each 

calendar quarter within 30 days of the end of the calendar quarter. 

Transmission Provider will keep the quarterly measures posted on OASIS 

or its website for three calendar years with the first required report to be in 

the first quarter of 2020. If Transmission Provider retains this information 

on its website, a link to the information must be provided on Transmission 

Provider’s OASIS site. 

3.5.4 In the event that any of the values calculated in paragraphs 3.5.2.1(E), 

3.5.2.2(E) or 3.5.2.3(E) exceeds 25 percent for two consecutive calendar 

quarters, Transmission Provider will have to comply with the measures 

below for the next four consecutive calendar quarters and must continue 

reporting this information until Transmission Provider reports four 

consecutive calendar quarters without the values calculated in 3.5.2.1(E), 

3.5.2.2(E) or 3.5.2.3(E) exceeding 25 percent for two consecutive calendar 

quarters: 

(i) Transmission Provider must submit a report to the Commission 

describing the reason for each study or group of clustered studies pursuant 
Docket No. RM17-8-001 - 146 -

to an Interconnection Request that exceeded its deadline (i.e., 45, 90 or 180 

days) for completion (excluding any allowance for Reasonable Efforts). 

Transmission Provider must describe the reasons for each study delay and 

any steps taken to remedy these specific issues and, if applicable, prevent 

such delays in the future. The report must be filed at the Commission 

within 45 days of the end of the calendar quarter. 

(ii) Transmission Provider shall aggregate the total number of employeehours and third party consultant hours expended towards interconnection 

studies within its coordinated region that quarter and post on OASIS or its 

website. If Transmission Provider posts this information on its website, a 

link to the information must be provided on Transmission Provider’s 

OASIS site. This information is to be posted within 30 days of the end of 

the calendar quarter.

3.56 Coordination with Affected Systems.

3.67 Withdrawal.

3.8 Identification of Contingent Facilities. Transmission Provider shall post 

in this section a method for identifying the Contingent Facilities to be 

provided to Interconnection Customer at the conclusion of the System 

Impact Study and included in Interconnection Customer’s Large Generator 

Interconnection Agreement. The method shall be sufficiently transparent to 

determine why a specific Contingent Facility was identified and how it 

relates to the Interconnection Request. Transmission Provider shall also 

provide, upon request of the Interconnection Customer, the estimated 

Interconnection Facility and/or Network Upgrade costs and estimated inservice completion time of each identified Contingent Facility when this 

information is readily available and not commercially sensitive.

4.4.1 Prior to the return of the executed Interconnection System Impact Study 

Agreement to Transmission Provider, modifications permitted under this 

Section shall include specifically: (a) a decrease of up to 60 percent of 

electrical output (MW) of the proposed project, through either (1) a 
Docket No. RM17-8-001 - 147 -

decrease in plant size or (2) a decrease in Interconnection Service level 

(consistent with the process described in Section 3.1) accomplished by 

applying Transmission Provider-approved injection-limiting equipment; (b) 

modifying the technical parameters associated with the Large Generating 

Facility technology or the Large Generating Facility step-up transformer 

impedance characteristics; and (c) modifying the interconnection 

configuration. For plant increases, the incremental increase in plant output 

will go to the end of the queue for the purposes of cost allocation and study 

analysis.

4.4.2 Prior to the return of the executed Interconnection Facilities Study 

Agreement to the Transmission Provider, the modifications permitted under 

this Section shall include specifically: (a) additional 15 percent decrease of 

electrical output of the proposed project through either (1) a decrease in 

plant size (MW) or (2) a decrease in Interconnection Service level 

(consistent with the process described in Section 3.1) accomplished by 

applying Transmission Provider-approved injection-limiting equipment;, 

and (b) Large Generating Facility technical parameters associated with 

modifications to Large Generating Facility technology and transformer 

impedances; provided, however, the incremental costs associated with those 

modifications are the responsibility of the requesting Interconnection 

Customer; and (c) a Permissible Technological Advancement for the Large 

Generating Facility after the submission of the Interconnection Request. 

Section 4.4.4 specifies a separate technological change procedure including 

the requisite information and process that will be followed to assess 

whether the Interconnection Customer’s proposed technological 

advancement under Section 4.4.2(c) is a Material Modification. Section 1 

contains a definition of Permissible Technological Advancement.

4.4.4 Technological Change Procedure.

[Insert technological change procedure here].

6.3 Interconnection Feasibility Study Procedures. 
Docket No. RM17-8-001 - 148 -

Transmission Provider shall utilize existing studies to the extent practicable 

when it performs the study. Transmission Provider shall use Reasonable 

Efforts to complete the Interconnection Feasibility Study no later than 

forty-five (45) Calendar Days after Transmission Provider receives the 

fully executed Interconnection Feasibility Study Agreement. At the request 

of Interconnection Customer or at any time Transmission Provider 

determines that it will not meet the required time frame for completing the 

Interconnection Feasibility Study, Transmission Provider shall notify 

Interconnection Customer as to the schedule status of the Interconnection 

Feasibility Study. If Transmission Provider is unable to complete the 

Interconnection Feasibility Study within that time period, it shall notify 

Interconnection Customer and provide an estimated completion date with 

an explanation of the reasons why additional time is required. Upon 

request, Transmission Provider shall provide Interconnection Customer 

supporting documentation, workpapers and relevant power flow, short 

circuit and stability databases for the Interconnection Feasibility Study, 

subject to confidentiality arrangements consistent with Section 13.1. 

Transmission Provider shall study the Interconnection Request at the level 

of service requested by the Interconnection Customer, unless otherwise 

required to study the full Generating Facility Capacity due to safety or 

reliability concerns.

7.3 Scope of Interconnection System Impact Study. 

The Interconnection System Impact Study shall evaluate the impact of the 

proposed interconnection on the reliability of the Transmission System. The 

Interconnection System Impact Study will consider the Base Case as well 

as all generating facilities (and with respect to (iii) below, any identified 

Network Upgrades associated with such higher queued interconnection) 

that, on the date the Interconnection System Impact Study is commenced: 

(i) are directly interconnected to the Transmission System; (ii) are 

interconnected to Affected Systems and may have an impact on the 

Interconnection Request; (iii) have a pending higher queued 

Interconnection Request to interconnect to the Transmission System; and 

(iv) have no Queue Position but have executed an LGIA or requested that 

an unexecuted LGIA be filed with FERC. 
Docket No. RM17-8-001 - 149 -

The Interconnection System Impact Study will consist of a short circuit 

analysis, a stability analysis, and a power flow analysis. The 

Interconnection System Impact Study will state the assumptions upon 

which it is based; state the results of the analyses; and provide the 

requirements or potential impediments to providing the requested 

interconnection service, including a preliminary indication of the cost and 

length of time that would be necessary to correct any problems identified in 

those analyses and implement the interconnection. For purposes of 

determining necessary Interconnection Facilities and Network Upgrades, 

the System Impact Study shall consider the level of Interconnection Service 

requested by the Interconnection Customer, unless otherwise required to 

study the full Generating Facility Capacity due to safety or reliability 

concerns. The Interconnection System Impact Study will provide a list of 

facilities that are required as a result of the Interconnection Request and a 

non-binding good faith estimate of cost responsibility and a non-binding 

good faith estimated time to construct.

8.2 Scope of Interconnection Facilities Study. 

The Interconnection Facilities Study shall specify and estimate the cost of 

the equipment, engineering, procurement and construction work needed to 

implement the conclusions of the Interconnection System Impact Study in 

accordance with Good Utility Practice to physically and electrically connect 

the Interconnection Facility to the Transmission System. The 

Interconnection Facilities Study shall also identify the electrical switching 

configuration of the connection equipment, including, without limitation: 

the transformer, switchgear, meters, and other station equipment; the nature 

and estimated cost of any Transmission Provider's Interconnection 

Facilities and Network Upgrades necessary to accomplish the 

interconnection; and an estimate of the time required to complete the 

construction and installation of such facilities. The Facilities Study will also 

identify any potential control equipment for requests for Interconnection 

Service that are lower than the Generating Facility Capacity.

13.5.5 Non-binding dispute resolution procedures. If a Party has submitted a 

Notice of Dispute pursuant to section 13.5.1, and the Parties are unable to 
Docket No. RM17-8-001 - 150 -

resolve the claim or dispute through unassisted or assisted negotiations 

within the thirty (30) Calendar Days provided in that section, and the 

Parties cannot reach mutual agreement to pursue the section 13.5 arbitration 

process, a Party may request that Transmission Provider engage in Nonbinding Dispute Resolution pursuant to this section by providing written 

notice to Transmission Provider (“Request for Non-binding Dispute 

Resolution”). Conversely, either Party may file a Request for Non-binding 

Dispute Resolution pursuant to this section without first seeking mutual 

agreement to pursue the section 13.5 arbitration process. The process in 

section 13.5.5 shall serve as an alternative to, and not a replacement of, the 

section 13.5 arbitration process. Pursuant to this process, a Transmission 

Provider must within 30 days of receipt of the Request for Non-binding 

Dispute Resolution appoint a neutral decision-maker that is an independent 

subcontractor that shall not have any current or past substantial business or 

financial relationships with either Party. Unless otherwise agreed by the 

Parties, the decision-maker shall render a decision within sixty (60) 

Calendar Days of appointment and shall notify the Parties in writing of 

such decision and reasons therefore. This decision-maker shall be 

authorized only to interpret and apply the provisions of the LGIP and LGIA 

and shall have no power to modify or change any provision of the LGIP 

and LGIA in any manner. The result reached in this process is not binding, 

but, unless otherwise agreed, the Parties may cite the record and decision in 

the non-binding dispute resolution process in future dispute resolution 

processes, including in a section 13.5 arbitration, or in a Federal Power Act 

section 206 complaint. Each Party shall be responsible for its own costs 

incurred during the process and the cost of the decision-maker shall be 

divided equally among each Party to the dispute.

Appendix 1 to LGIP 

5. 

h. Requested capacity (in MW) of Interconnection Service (if 

lower than the Generating Facility Capacity).
Docket No. RM17-8-001 - 151 -

NOTE: Appendix C will not be published in the Federal Register. Square brackets 

indicate that the text should be filled in as appropriate by the transmission provider.

Appendix C: Compilation of Final Rule Changes to the Pro Forma LGIA

Made by Order No. 845 and Order No. 845-A

The Commission modifies the following sections of the pro forma LGIA as indicated 

below:

Article 1. Definitions.

Generating Facility shall mean Interconnection Customer’s device for the 

production and/or storage for later injection of electricity identified in the Interconnection 

Request, but shall not include the Interconnection Customer’s Interconnection Facilities.

Provisional Interconnection Service shall mean Interconnection Service 

provided by Transmission Provider associated with interconnecting the 

Interconnection Customer’s Generating Facility to Transmission Provider’s 

Transmission System and enabling that Transmission System to receive electric 

energy and capacity from the Generating Facility at the Point of Interconnection, 

pursuant to the terms of the Provisional Large Generator Interconnection 

Agreement and, if applicable, the Tariff.

Provisional Large Generator Interconnection Agreement shall mean the 

interconnection agreement for Provisional Interconnection Service established 

between Transmission Provider and/or the Transmission Owner and the 

Interconnection Customer. This agreement shall take the form of the Large 

Generator Interconnection Agreement, modified for provisional purposes.

Stand Alone Network Upgrades shall mean Network Upgrades that are 

not part of an Affected System that an Interconnection Customer may construct 

without affecting day-to-day operations of the Transmission System during their 

construction. Both the Transmission Provider and the Interconnection Customer 

must agree as to what constitutes Stand Alone Network Upgrades and identify 

them in Appendix A to the Standard Large Generator Interconnection Agreement. 

If the Transmission Provider and Interconnection Customer disagree about 

whether a particular Network Upgrade is a Stand Alone Network Upgrade, the 

Transmission Provider must provide the Interconnection Customer a written 

technical explanation outlining why the Transmission Provider does not consider 
Docket No. RM17-8-001 - 152 -

the Network Upgrade to be a Stand Alone Network Upgrade within 15 days of its 

determination.

Surplus Interconnection Service shall mean any unneeded portion of 

Interconnection Service established in a Large Generator Interconnection 

Agreement, such that if Surplus Interconnection Service is utilized the total 

amount of Interconnection Service at the Point of Interconnection would remain 

the same.

5.1 Options. Unless otherwise mutually agreed to between the Parties, 

Interconnection Customer shall select the In-Service Date, Initial Synchronization 

Date, and Commercial Operation Date; and either the Standard Option or 

Alternate Option set forth below for completion of Transmission Provider's 

Interconnection Facilities and Network Upgrades, as set forth in Appendix A, 

Interconnection Facilities and Network Upgrades, and such dates and selected 

option shall be set forth in Appendix B, Milestones. At the same time, 

Interconnection Customer shall indicate whether it elects to exercise the Option to 

Build set forth in Article 5.1.3 below. If the dates designated by Interconnection 

Customer are not acceptable to Transmission Provider, Transmission Provider 

shall so notify Interconnection Customer within thirty (30) Calendar Days. Upon 

receipt of the notification that Interconnection Customer’s designated dates are not 

acceptable to Transmission Provider, the Interconnection Customer shall notify 

Transmission Provider within thirty (30) Calendar Days whether it elects to 

exercise the Option to Build if it has not already elected to exercise the Option to 

Build.

5.1.3 Option to Build. If the dates designated by Interconnection Customer are not 

acceptable to Transmission Provider, Transmission Provider shall so notify 

Interconnection Customer within thirty (30) Calendar Days and unless the Parties 

agree otherwise, Interconnection Customer shall have the option to assume 

responsibility for the design, procurement and construction of Transmission 

Provider's Interconnection Facilities and Stand Alone Network Upgrades on the 

dates specified in Article 5.1.2. Transmission Provider and Interconnection 

Customer must agree as to what constitutes Stand Alone Network Upgrades and 

identify such Stand Alone Network Upgrades in Appendix A. Except for Stand 

Alone Network Upgrades, Interconnection Customer shall have no right to 

construct Network Upgrades under this option.

5.1.4 Negotiated Option. If Interconnection Customer elects not to exercise its option 
Docket No. RM17-8-001 - 153 -

under Article 5.1.3, Option to Build, Interconnection Customer shall so notify 

Transmission Provider within thirty (30) Calendar Days, and If the dates 

designated by Interconnection Customer are not acceptable to Transmission 

Provider, the Parties shall in good faith attempt to negotiate terms and conditions 

(including revision of the specified dates and liquidated damages, the provision of 

incentives, or the procurement and construction of a portion of Transmission 

Provider's Interconnection Facilities and Stand Alone Network Upgrades by 

Interconnection Customer all facilities other than Transmission Provider’s 

Interconnection Facilities and Stand Alone Network Upgrades if the 

Interconnection Customer elects to exercise the Option to Build under Article 

5.1.3) pursuant to which Transmission Provider is responsible for the design, 

procurement and construction of Transmission Provider’s Interconnection 

Facilities and Network Upgrades. If the Parties are unable to reach agreement on 

such terms and conditions, then, pursuant to Article 5.1.1 (Standard Option),

Transmission Provider shall assume responsibility for the design, procurement and 

construction of Transmission Provider's Interconnection Facilities and Network 

Upgrades all facilities other than Transmission Provider’s Interconnection 

Facilities and Stand Alone Network Upgrades if the Interconnection Customer 

elects to exercise the Option to Build pursuant to article 5.1.1, Standard Option. 

5.2 General Conditions Applicable to Option to Build.

(12) If Interconnection Customer exercises the Option to Build pursuant to 

Article 5.1.3, Interconnection Customer shall pay Transmission Provider

the agreed upon amount of [$ PLACEHOLDER] for Transmission Provider 

to execute the responsibilities enumerated to Transmission Provider under 

Article 5.2. Transmission Provider shall invoice Interconnection Customer 

for this total amount to be divided on a monthly basis pursuant to Article 

12.

5.9 Limited Operation Other Interconnection Options.

5.9.1 Limited Operation.

5.9.2 Provisional Interconnection Service. Upon the request of Interconnection 

Customer, and prior to completion of requisite Interconnection Facilities, 

Network Upgrades, Distribution Upgrades, or System Protection Facilities 

Transmission Provider may execute a Provisional Large Generator 

Interconnection Agreement or Interconnection Customer may request the 

filing of an unexecuted Provisional Large Generator Interconnection 
Docket No. RM17-8-001 - 154 -

Agreement with the Interconnection Customer for limited Interconnection 

Service at the discretion of Transmission Provider based upon an evaluation 

that will consider the results of available studies. Transmission Provider 

shall determine, through available studies or additional studies as 

necessary, whether stability, short circuit, thermal, and/or voltage issues 

would arise if Interconnection Customer interconnects without 

modifications to the Generating Facility or Transmission System. 

Transmission Provider shall determine whether any Interconnection 

Facilities, Network Upgrades, Distribution Upgrades, or System Protection 

Facilities that are necessary to meet the requirements of NERC, or any 

applicable Regional Entity for the interconnection of a new, modified 

and/or expanded Generating Facility are in place prior to the 

commencement of Interconnection Service from the Generating Facility. 

Where available studies indicate that such, Interconnection Facilities, 

Network Upgrades, Distribution Upgrades, and/or System Protection 

Facilities that are required for the interconnection of a new, modified and/or 

expanded Generating Facility are not currently in place, Transmission 

Provider will perform a study, at the Interconnection Customer’s expense, 

to confirm the facilities that are required for Provisional Interconnection 

Service. The maximum permissible output of the Generating Facility in the 

Provisional Large Generator Interconnection Agreement shall be studied 

and updated [on a frequency determined by Transmission Provider and at 

the Interconnection Customer’s expense]. Interconnection Customer 

assumes all risk and liabilities with respect to changes between the 

Provisional Large Generator Interconnection Agreement and the Large 

Generator Interconnection Agreement, including changes in output limits 

and Interconnection Facilities, Network Upgrades, Distribution Upgrades, 

and/or System Protection Facilities cost responsibilities.