1 Cite as: 565 U. S. ____ (2012)

Per Curiam



## SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

DARIN RYBURN, ET AL

. v. GEORGE R. HUFF, ET AL

.

ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED

STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

No. 11–208. Decided January 23, 2012

P ER C URIAM

. Petitioners Darin Ryburn and Edmundo Zepeda, along with two other officers from the Burbank Police Depart

ment, responded to a call from Bellarmine-Jefferson High School in Burbank, California. When the officers arrived at the school, the principal informed them that a stu

dent, Vincent Huff, was rumo red to have written a letter threatening to “shoot up” the school. App. to Pet. for Cert.

2. The principal reported that many parents, after hear

ing the rumor, had decided to keep their children at home.
Ibid . The principal expressed concern for the safety of her students and requested that the officers investigate the
threat. Id., at 42, 54–55. In the course of conducting interviews with the principal and two of Vincent’s classmates, the officers learned that Vincent had been absent from school for two days and that he was frequently subjected to bullying. Id., at 2. The officers additionally learned that one of Vincent’s class

mates believed that Vincent was capable of carrying out the alleged threat. Id., at 44

. The officers found Vincent’s absences from school and his history of being subjected to bullying as cause for concern. The officers had received training on targeted school violence and were aware that these characteristics are common among perpetrators of school shootings. Id., at 56–58, 63.
The officers decided to co ntinue the investigation by interviewing Vincent. When the officers arrived at Vin

cent’s house, Officer Zepeda knocked on the door and
announced several times that the officers were with the2 RYBURN v. HUFF

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Burbank Police Department. No one answered the door or otherwise responded to Officer Zepeda’s knocks. Sergeant Ryburn then called the home telephone. The officers could hear the phone ringing inside the house, but no one an

swered. Id., at 2. Sergeant Ryburn next tried calling the cell phone of Vincent’s mother, Mrs. Huff. When Mrs. Huff answered the phone, Sergeant Ryburn identified himself and in

quired about her location. Mrs. Huff informed Sergeant Ryburn that she was inside the house. Sergeant Ryburn then inquired about Vincent’s location, and Mrs. Huff informed him that Vincent was inside with her. Sergeant Ryburn told Mrs. Huff that he and the other officers were outside and requested to speak with her, but Mrs. Huff hung up the phone. Id., at 2–3. One or two minutes later, Mrs. Huff and Vincent walked out of the house and stood on the front steps. Officer Zepeda advised Vincent that he and the other officers were there to discuss the threats. Vincent, apparently aware of the rumor that was circulating at his school, responded, “I can’t believe you’re here for that.” Id., at 3. Sergeant Ryburn asked Mrs. Huff if they could continue the discus

sion inside the house, but she refused. Ibid. In Sergeant Ryburn’s experience as a juvenile bureau sergeant, it was “extremely unusual” for a pare nt to decline an officer’s request to interview a juvenile inside. Id., at 3, 73–74. Sergeant Ryburn also found it odd that Mrs. Huff never
asked the officers the re ason for their visit. Id., at 73–74. After Mrs. Huff declined Sergeant Ryburn’s request to
continue the discussion inside , Sergeant Ryburn asked her if there were any guns in the house. Mrs. Huff responded by “immediately turn[ing] around and r[unning] into the
house.” Id. , at 3. Sergeant Ryburn, who was “scared because [he] didn’t know what was in that house” and had “seen too many officers killed,” entered the house behind

her. Id., at 75. Vincent entered the house behind Ser

-3 Cite as: 565 U. S. ____ (2012)

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geant Ryburn, and Officer Zepeda entered after Vincent. Officer Zepeda was concerned about “officer safety” and did not want Sergeant Ryburn to enter the house alone. Id., at 3. The two remaining officers, who had been stand

ing out of earshot while Sergeant Ryburn and Officer Zepeda talked to Vincent and Mrs. Huff, entered the house last, on the assumption that Mrs. Huff had given Sergeant Ryburn and Officer Zepeda permission to enter. Id., at

3–4. Upon entering the house, the officers remained in the living room with Mrs. Huff and Vincent. Eventually, Vincent’s father entered the room and challenged the officers’ authority to be there. The officers remained in

side the house for a total of 5 to 10 minutes. During that time, the officers talked to Mr. Huff and Vincent. They did not conduct any search of Mr. Huff, Mrs. Huff, or Vincent, or any of their property. The officers ultimately concluded that the rumor about Vincent was false, and they reported their conclusion to the school. Id., at 4. The Huffs brought this action against the officers under Rev. Stat. §1979, 42 U. S. C. §1983. The complaint alleges
that the officers violated the Huffs’ Fourth Amendment rights by entering their home without a warrant. Follow

ing a 2-day bench trial, the District Court entered judg

ment in favor of the officers. The District Court resolved conflicting testimony regardin g Mrs. Huff’s response to Sergeant Ryburn’s inquiry about guns by finding that Mrs. Huff “immediately turned around and ran into the house.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 3. Th e District Court concluded that the officers were entitled to qualified immunity because Mrs. Huff’s odd behavior, combined with the information the officers gathered at the school, could have led reason

able officers to believe “that there could be weapons inside the house, and that family members or the officers them

selves were in danger.” Id., at 6. The District Court noted that “[w]ithin a very short peri od of time, the officers were4 RYBURN v. HUFF

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confronted with facts and ci rcumstances giving rise to grave concern about the nature of the danger they were confronting.” Id., at 6–7. With respect to this kind of “rapidly evolving incident,” the District Court explained, courts should be especially reluctant “to fault the police for not obtaining a warrant.” Id., at 7. A divided panel of the Ninth Circuit affirmed the Dis

trict Court as to the two office rs who entered the house on the assumption that Mrs. Huff had consented, but re

versed as to petitioners. The majority upheld the District Court’s findings of fact, but disagreed with the District Court’s conclusion that petitioners were entitled to quali

fied immunity. The majority acknowledged that police
officers are allowed to enter a home without a warrant if they reasonably believe that immediate entry is necessary to protect themselves or others from serious harm, even if the officers lack probable cause to believe that a crime has
been or is about to be committed. Id., at 24. But the majority determined that, in this case, “any belief that the officers or other family members were in serious, im

minent harm would have been objectively unreasonable” given that “[Mrs. Huff] mere ly asserted her right to end
her conversation with the o fficers and returned to her
home.” Id., at 25. Judge Rawlinson dissented. She explained that “the discrete incident that precipitated the entry in this case was Mrs. Huff’s response to the question regarding wheth

er there were guns in the house.” Id., at 31. She faulted the majority for “recit[ing] a sanitized account of this event” that differed markedly from the District Court’s findings of fact, which the majority had conceded must be credited. Judge Rawlinson looked to “cases that specifi

cally address the scenario where officer safety concerns prompted the entry” and concluded that, under the ra

tionale articulated in those ca ses, “a police officer could have reasonably believed that he was justified in making a5 Cite as: 565 U. S. ____ (2012)

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warrantless entry to ensure that no one inside the house had a gun after Mrs. Huff ran into the house without answering the question of whether anyone had a weapon.” Id., at 31, 33, 37. Judge Rawlinson’s analysis of the qualified immunity
issue was correct. No decision of this Court has found a Fourth Amendment violation on facts even roughly com

parable to those present in this case. On the contrary, some of our opinions may be read as pointing in the oppo

site direction.

In Brigham City v. Stuart , 547 U. S. 398, 400 (2006), we held that officers may enter a residence without a warrant when they have “an objectively reasonable basis for believ

ing that an occupant is . . . imminently threatened with [serious injury].” We explained that “ ‘[t]he need to protect or preserve life or avoid seri ous injury is justification for what would be otherwise illegal absent an exigency or emergency.’ ” Id., at 403 (quoting Mincey v. Arizona , 437
U. S. 385, 392 (1978)). In addition, in Georgia v. Ran

dolph , 547 U. S. 103, 118 (2006), the Court stated that “it would be silly to suggest that the police would commit a tort by entering [a residence] . . . to determine whether
violence . . . is about to (or soon will) occur.” A reasonable police officer could read these decisions tomean that the Fourth Amendment permits an officer to enter a residence if the officer has a reasonable basis for concluding that there is an i mminent threat of violence. In this case, the District Cour t concluded that petitioners had such an objectively reasonable basis for reaching such
a conclusion. The District Court wrote:

“[T]he officers testified t hat a number of factors led them to be concerned for their own safety and for the safety of other persons in the residence: the unusual behavior of the parents in not answering the door or the telephone; the fact that Mrs. Huff did not inquire6 RYBURN v. HUFF

Per Curiam

about the reason for their visit or express concern that they were investigating her son; the fact that she hung up the telephone on the officer; the fact that she refused to tell them whether there were guns in the house; and finally, the fact that she ran back into the house while being questioned. That behavior,
combined with the information obtained at the
school—that Vincent was a student who was a victim of bullying, who had been absent from school for two days, and who had threatened to ‘shoot up’ the
school—led the officers to believe that there could be weapons inside the house, and that family members or the officers themselves were in danger.” App. to
Pet. for Cert. 6.

This belief, the District Cou rt held, was “objectively rea

sonable,” particularly since the situation was “rapidly evolving” and the officers had to make quick decisions. Id., at 6–7. The panel majority—far removed from the scene and with the opportunity to dissect the elements of the situa

tion—confidently concluded that the officers really had no reason to fear for their safety or that of anyone else. As the panel majority saw things, it was irrelevant that the Huffs did not respond when the officers knocked on the door and announced their presence and when they called the home phone because the Huffs had no legal obligation to respond to a knock on the door or to answer the phone. The majority attributed no significance to the fact that, when the officers finally reached Mrs. Huff on her cell phone, she abruptly hung up in the middle of their conver

sation. And, according to the majority, the officers should not have been concerned by Mrs. Huff’s reaction when they asked her if there were any guns in the house be

cause Mrs. Huff “merely asserted her right to end her
conversation with the officers and returned to her home.”7 Cite as: 565 U. S. ____ (2012)

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Id., at 25. Confronted with the facts found by the District Court, reasonable officers in the positi on of petitioners could have
come to the conclusion that there was an imminent threat to their safety and to the safety of others. The Ninth Circuit’s contrary conclusion was flawed for numerous

reasons. First, although the panel ma jority purported to accept the findings of the District Court, it changed those find

ings in several key respects. As Judge Rawlinson correctly observed, “the discrete incident that precipitated the entry in this case was Mrs. Huff’s response to the question regarding whether there were guns in the house.” Id., at

31. The District Court’s finding that Mrs. Huff “immedi

ately turned around and ran into the house” implicitly rejected Mrs. Huff’s contrary testimony that she walked into the house after telling the officers that she was going to get her husband. Id., at 3. The panel majority upheld the District Court’s findings of fact and acknowledged that
it could not reverse the Dis trict Court simply because it “may have weighed the testimony of the witnesses and
other evidence in another manner.” Id., at 15. But the panel majority’s determinatio n that petitioners were not entitled to qualified immunity rested on an account of the facts that differed markedly from the District Court’s finding. According to the panel majority, Mrs. Huff “mere

ly asserted her right to end her conversation with the
officers and returned to her home” after telling the officers “that she would go get her husband.” Id., at 12, 25. Second, the panel majority appears to have taken the view that conduct cannot be regarded as a matter of con

cern so long as it is lawful. Accordingly, the panel ma

jority concluded that Mrs. Hu ff’s response to the question whether there were any guns in the house (immediately turning around and running inside) was not a reason for alarm because she was under no legal obligation to con

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tinue her conversation with the police. It should go with

out saying, however, that there are many circumstances in which lawful conduct may po rtend imminent violence. Third, the panel majority’s method of analyzing the string of events that unfolded at the Huff residence was entirely unrealistic. The majority looked at each separate event in isolation and concluded that each, in itself, did not give cause for concern. But it is a matter of common
sense that a combination of events each of which is mun

dane when viewed in isolation may paint an alarming picture. Fourth, the panel majority did not heed the District Court’s wise admonition that judges should be cautious about second-guessing a police officer’s assessment, made on the scene, of the danger presented by a particular situation. With the benefit of hindsight and calm deliber

ation, the panel majority co ncluded that it was unreason

able for petitioners to fear that violence was imminent.
But we have instructed that reasonableness “must be judged from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight” and that “[t]he calculus of reasonableness must embody allow

ance for the fact that police officers are often forced to make split-second judgments—in circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving.” Graham v. Con

nor , 490 U. S. 386, 396–397 (1989). Judged from the proper perspective of a reasonable officer forced to make a split-second decision in response to a rapidly unfolding chain of events that culminated with Mrs. Huff turning and running into the house after refusing to answer a question about guns, petitioners’ belief that entry was necessary to avoid injury to themselves or others was eminently reasonable. In sum, reasonable police officers in petitioners’ position

could have come to the conclusion that the Fourth Amendment permitted them to enter the Huff residence if9 Cite as: 565 U. S. ____ (2012)

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there was an objectively reasonable basis for fearing that
violence was imminent. And a reasonable officer could
have come to such a conclusion based on the facts as found by the District Court. The petition for certiorari is granted, the judgment of the Ninth Circuit is reversed, and the case is remanded for the entry of judgment in favor of petitioners.

It is so ordered.