[Cite as Youngstown v. Newton, 2023-Ohio-4250.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO 

SEVENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

MAHONING COUNTY

CITY OF YOUNGSTOWN,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

GERARD A. NEWTON,

Defendant-Appellant.

OPINION AND JUDGMENT ENTRY

Case No. 23 MA 0006

Civil Appeal from the

Youngstown Municipal Court, Mahoning County, Ohio

Case No. 15 CVF 4044

BEFORE:

Mark A. Hanni, Carol Ann Robb, David A. D’Apolito, Judges.

JUDGMENT:

Affirmed.

Atty. Samuel F. Jordan, Millstone & Kannensohn, for Plaintiff-Appellee and

Gerard A. Newton, Pro se, Defendant-Appellant.

Dated: November 21, 2023
– 2 –

Case No. 23 MA 0006

HANNI, J.

{¶1} Defendant-Appellant, Gerard A. Newton (Appellant), appeals from a 

Youngstown Municipal Court judgment denying his motion to vacate a default judgment 

and contempt orders. For the following reasons, two of the orders appealed from are not 

final and appealable and all assignments of error are otherwise without merit. 

{¶2} On December 4, 2015, the City of Youngstown (Appellee) filed a complaint 

against Appellant alleging that he owed $150 for grass cutting and weed removal services 

that occurred at his described property in Youngstown, Ohio on July 28, 2015. The 

complaint stated that grass cutting and weed removal services were rendered under the 

Ohio Revised Code and City of Youngstown ordinances for the abatement of nuisances 

under R.C. 1749.01 through 1749.05. The summons mailed with the complaint informed 

Appellant that he had to answer the complaint within 28 days. It warned that if Appellant 

failed to appear or defend against the complaint, he could face judgment by default. The 

complaint was served by certified U.S. Mail.

{¶3} The complaint was subsequently returned to sender as unclaimed and 

unable to forward. Consequently, it was mailed by ordinary U.S. Mail with a certificate of 

mailing to the same address on March 1, 2016. It was not returned. 

{¶4} On June 27, 2017, counsel for Appellee filed an application for default 

judgment in Youngstown Municipal Court. Counsel indicated that Appellant failed to 

appear and answer. Counsel also filed an affidavit attesting that: Appellant owed a 

balance of $150 with interest; no payments were made on the account; and research did 

not show that Appellant was on active military service, incompetent, or a minor. 

{¶5} On July 10, 2017, the court granted default judgment in favor of Appellee 

and ordered Appellant to pay $150 with interest from July 28, 2015, and court costs. 

{¶6} Despite the July 10, 2017 default judgment, a September 29, 2017 text 

docket entry from Youngstown Municipal Court stated that the case had been pending 

since December 4, 2015, with no activity since March 1, 2016. The entry stated that it 

served as notice that the case would be dismissed for lack of prosecution unless good 

cause was shown before October 11, 2017. 

{¶7} The next docket entry is dated March 24, 2022. It indicates that Appellee

filed a debtor’s exam. A second March 24, 2022 docket entry indicates that a hearing 
– 3 –

Case No. 23 MA 0006

was scheduled for a debtor’s exam on March 31, 2022. It also states “RESULT: 

DEFENDANT FAILED TO APPEAR.” Further, Appellee’s motion for supplementary 

proceedings to schedule a debtor’s exam is time-stamped April 1, 2022. The court 

granted the motion and scheduled the debtor’s exam for May 31, 2022. The order 

cautioned that failure to appear was punishable by a contempt order. 

{¶8} Records show that Appellant signed for certified mail delivery of the court 

order on April 2, 2022. The docket indicates that certified mail was issued on April 1, 

2022 and accomplished on April 2, 2022. 

{¶9} On May 31, 2022, the magistrate issued an order indicating that service was 

perfected on Appellant and he failed to appear for the debtor’s exam. The court continued 

the case for Appellee to file a motion to show cause. Appellee filed the motion to show 

cause on July 12, 2022. 

{¶10} On July 14, 2022, the court issued an order to show cause for Appellant to 

appear before the court on August 23, 2022 to show why he should not be punished for 

contempt of court. Records show that Appellant’s wife signed for the certified mail 

delivery of the order on July 15, 2022. 

{¶11} On August 23, 2022, the magistrate held a hearing on Appellee’s motion to 

show cause. The magistrate found that service was perfected on Appellant and he failed 

to appear for the hearing. 

{¶12} On September 26, 2022, the court issued a contempt order for Appellant’s 

failure to appear at the August 23, 2022 hearing. The court found Appellant in contempt 

and granted him 30 days to purge the contempt by appearing before the court with all 

relevant financial information. The order is dated September 23, 2022 and time-stamped 

September 26, 2022. 

{¶13} On October 28, 2022, Appellant filed a motion to vacate the default 

judgment and contempt order. He alleged that the judgment and order were void because 

he received no pre-abatement or collection letter from the City of Youngstown and the 

City’s ordinance imposing abatement without written notice conflicted with Ohio Revised 

Code 731.51, which required notice. Accompanying the motion was Appellant’s sworn 

affidavit stating that he never received a pre-abatement letter, collection letter, or other 

demand for payment of $150.
– 4 –

Case No. 23 MA 0006

{¶14} On December 6, 2022, the court denied the motion to vacate, finding that it 

was untimely filed. The court signed the journal entry on December 6, 2022 and it was 

time-stamped on December 6, 2022. The entry was docketed December 8, 2022. 

{¶15} On January 9, 2023, Appellant filed the instant appeal. He asserts four 

assignments of error. 

APPEAL OF NUMEROUS COURT ORDERS

{¶16} In his notice of appeal, Appellant attempts to appeal four separate municipal 

court orders. Those are: (1) the court’s December 6, 2022 order denying Appellant’s 

motion to vacate the default judgment against him; (2) the court’s July 10, 2017 default 

judgment order; (3) the court’s July 14, 2022 order to show cause; and (4) the court’s 

September 26, 2022 contempt order.

{¶17} For the following reasons, we find that the municipal court’s July 14, 2022 

and September 26, 2022 orders are not final appealable orders. We further find that 

Appellant’s assignments of error lack merit. 

LACK OF FINAL APPEALABLE ORDERS

{¶18} An appellate court has authority to review only final orders and the court 

lacks jurisdiction over any order that is not final. Stewart v. Solutions Community 

Counseling and Recovery Ctrs., Inc., 168 Ohio St.3d 96, 2022-Ohio-2522, 195 N.E.3d 

1035, ¶ 4, citing Supportive Solutions, L.L.C. v. Electronic Classroom of Tomorrow, 137 

Ohio St.3d 23, 2013-Ohio-2410, 997 N.E.2d 490, ¶ 10.

{¶19} The Ohio Supreme Court has held that, “[a] court order finding a party in 

contempt and imposing a sentence conditioned on the failure to purge is a final, 

appealable order on the issue whether the party is in contempt of court.” Docks Venture, 

L.L.C. v. Dashing Pacific Group, Ltd., 141 Ohio St.3d 107, 2014-Ohio-4254, 22 N.E.3d 

1035, ¶ 23. Thus, the court order of contempt must include both a finding of contempt 

and a sentence that activates if the party does not purge the contempt. 

{¶20} In the instant case, neither the July 14, 2022 nor the September 26, 2022 

orders imposed a sentence conditioned on Appellant’s failure to purge the contempt. The 

July 14, 2022 order to show cause directed Appellant to appear before the court on 
– 5 –

Case No. 23 MA 0006

August 23, 2022 to explain why he should not be found in contempt and sanctioned for 

his disobedience of a prior court order. Since the order lacked a contempt finding and a 

sanction, it is not a final appealable order and we lack jurisdiction to review it. The same 

applies to the court’s September 26, 2022 order of contempt. While the court found 

Appellant in contempt for his failure to appear at the show cause hearing, the court did 

not impose a sanction. Rather, the court granted Appellant 30 days in which to purge the 

contempt. Without a corresponding sanction, this also does not constitute a final 

appealable order. 

{¶21} Accordingly, we lack jurisdiction to consider Appellant’s appeal of the July 

14, 2022 and September 26, 2022 judgment entries because they are not final appealable 

orders. 

MERITS OF ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR

{¶22} We take the four assignments of error out of order for ease of analysis. In 

his second and third assignments of error, Appellant asserts:

2. The Court Disregarded its Responsibilities Under Rule 12 (H)(3) 

When It Failed To Address its Subject Matter Jurisdiction (Including 

Standing To Sue Under Section 1749.04(b))[sic] When Presented With 

A Credible Demonstration Of Jurisdictional Deficiency By The 

Defendant And Vacate Its Default Judgment And Ancillary Contempt 

Proceedings, Where The City Failed To Answer The Defendant’s 

Motion And Fulfill Its Obligation To Establish The Court’s Subject 

Matter Jurisdiction And The City’s Standing To Sue Under Its Own 

Legislation. 

3. The Court Erroneously Failed To Require The City To Undertake 

Its Burden To Establish The Court’s Subject Matter Jurisdiction And 

The City’s Standing To Sue Under Section 1749.04(b) And Instead Sua 

Sponte Erroneously Pre-Empted The City’s Duty To Answer The 

Jurisdictional Challenge By Offering A Defense Of Untimely Filing 

which The City Chose Not [to] Assert And Relying Upon A Void 
– 6 –

Case No. 23 MA 0006

Judgment To Establish A deadline For Seeking Relief From The Void 

Judgment. 

{¶23} Appellant asserts that Appellee disregarded its burden under Civ. R. 

12(H)(3) to establish the subject matter jurisdiction of the municipal court. He further 

asserts that the municipal court erred by offering Appellee the defense of untimely filing

of his motion to vacate the default judgment instead of requiring Appellee to establish the 

court’s subject matter jurisdiction. 

{¶24} Appellee does not specifically address these assertions. Rather, Appellee 

acknowledges that a party may raise the subject matter jurisdiction of a court at any time. 

Appellee asserts that the municipal court possessed subject matter jurisdiction.

{¶25} Civ. R. 12(H) is entitled “Waiver of Defenses and Objections” and Civ. R. 

12(H)(3) states that, “[w]henever it appears by suggestion of the parties or otherwise that 

the court lacks jurisdiction on the subject matter, the court shall dismiss the action.” 

Subject matter jurisdiction can never be waived and can be challenged at any time. Pratts 

v. Hurley, 102 Ohio St.3d 81, 2004-Ohio-1980, 806 N.E.2d 992, ¶ 11. The subject-matter 

jurisdiction of a court is its “power to hear and decide cases.” Fifth Third Bank, N.A. v. 

Maple Leaf Expansion, Inc., 188 Ohio App.3d 27, 2010-Ohio-1537, ¶ 15 (7th Dist.), citing 

Pratts, 102 Ohio St.3d 81, 2004-Ohio-1980, 934 N.E.2d 366, ¶ 11. 

{¶26} Municipal courts are statutorily created under R.C.1901.01, and the subject

matter jurisdiction of those courts is set forth by R.C. 1901.18. Cheap Escape Co., Inc. 

v. Haddox, L.L.C., 120 Ohio St.3d 493, 900 N.E.2d 601, 2008-Ohio-6323, ¶ 7. Municipal 

courts have subject matter jurisdiction of those matters identified in R.C. 1901.18 that are 

within its territories. Id. R.C. 1901.17 establishes the $15,000 monetary limit of the 

municipal court’s jurisdiction. R.C. 1901.02(A) provides that the municipal courts 

established under R.C. 1901.01 “have jurisdiction within the corporate limits of their 

respective municipal corporations.” 

{¶27} The Ohio Supreme Court holds that “[w]hen a court has the constitutional 

or statutory power to adjudicate a particular class or type of case, that court has subjectmatter jurisdiction.” Ostanek v. Ostanek, 166 Ohio St.3d 1, 2021-Ohio-2319, 181 N.E.3d 

1162, ¶ 36, citing Corder v. Ohio Edison Co., 162 Ohio St.3d 639, 2020-Ohio-5220, 166 

N.E.3d 1180, ¶ 14. The Court recognizes that “there is a distinction between a court that 
– 7 –

Case No. 23 MA 0006

lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over a case and a court that improperly exercises that 

subject-matter jurisdiction once conferred upon it.” Pratts, supra, at ¶ 10. 

{¶28} The instant case concerns a complaint in contract against Appellant to pay 

$150 in fees expended by the City in hiring a service to mow grass on Appellant’s property

located in Youngstown, Ohio, that exceeded the height allowed in the City ordinance. 

The municipal court has subject matter jurisdiction over such matters. The case involved 

the violation of a City Ordinance concerning property located in the City of Youngstown 

and an attempt to collect $150 for abatement of the nuisance on the property owned by 

Appellant in the City of Youngstown. 

{¶29} For these reasons, Appellant’s assignments of error numbers 2 and 3 lack 

merit.

{¶30} In his first assignment of error, Appellant asserts:

1. Enforcement Of The City’s Chapter 1749 Abatement Legislation 

Violated The Provisions Of Title VII Section 731.51 et seq. And Was 

Invalid Under The Requirement Under Section 3, Article XVII Of The 

Ohio Constitution That Municipal Police Power Enactments Not Be In 

Conflict With Applicable State Statutes.

{¶31} Appellant asserts that the City failed to provide him notice before it 

summarily abated the weeds and grasses on his property. He contends that this violated 

his constitutional procedural due process rights and conflicts with R.C. 731.51, which 

requires written notice to a property owner to cut noxious weeds within 5 days of service 

of the notice. Appellant challenges Youngstown City Ordinance Section 1749, et seq., 

which concern public nuisances. He maintains that the amendments to this section made 

on April 1, 2015 (through Ordinance 15-90) violate and conflict with procedural due 

process and Ohio Rev. Code 731.51, because Council removed the notice provisions that 

were previously found in Section 1749. 

{¶32} Appellant explains that these prior sections required the City to provide the 

property owner with a warning and citation before entering his property, abating the 

nuisance, and charging a removal fee. Appellant also challenges the absence of a 

hearing before the City abated and the City’s failure to issue him a collection letter before 
– 8 –

Case No. 23 MA 0006

suing him. He concludes that these violations establish that the municipal court lacked 

subject matter jurisdiction to grant default judgment and find him in contempt. 

{¶33} Appellee responds that Appellant waived the issue of the validity of the civil 

complaint on appeal because he failed to raise it before the municipal court. Appellee 

further asserts that municipal courts have subject matter jurisdiction over actions not 

exceeding $15,000 that have a territorial connection. R.C. 1901.17; R.C. 1901.18. 

Appellee also contends that the municipal court did not abuse its discretion by denying 

Appellant’s motion to vacate because the motion was untimely filed.

{¶34} We note that the record before us lacks documentation of any notice issued 

to Appellant informing him of a nuisance violation, a citation to cut or remove the offending 

grasses, or a collection letter preceding a civil suit. The civil complaint in the municipal 

court appears to be the first filing in the record before this Court. 

{¶35} Section 3, Article XVIII of the Ohio Constitution is entitled “Municipal powers 

of self-government” and provides that “[s]ubject to the requirements of Section 1 of Article 

V of this constitution, municipalities shall have authority to exercise all powers of local 

self-government and to adopt and enforce within their limits such local police, sanitary 

and other similar regulations, as are not in conflict with general laws.” 

{¶36} The City ordinances at issue govern its procedures upon finding and abating 

noxious weeds and grasses over eight inches on parcels of land within the City. 

Youngstown City Ordinance 1749.01 describes the weeds and grasses over eight inches 

and declares them “unlawful as a public nuisance and detrimental to the health, safety 

and welfare of the general public.” 

{¶37} Youngstown City Ordinance 1749.02 prohibits a property owner from 

allowing noxious weeds and grasses over eight inches in height to stand and further 

provides:

(b) The City may issue a citation to the owner or tenant to cut or remove the 

grass, weeds, and/or plants specified under Section 1749.01. The City, in 

its sole discretion, may issue or post a warning notice to the owner or tenant 

prior to issuing a citation. Posted notices shall be in at least twelve-point 

type and prominently posted on or near the property.
– 9 –

Case No. 23 MA 0006

(c) A violation of this Section is a nuisance per se pursuant to Section 

1749.01, and as such the City may enter said lot of land to abate the 

nuisance without issuing or posting notice in order to protect the health, 

safety and welfare of the general public.

{¶38} Youngstown City Ordinance 1749.03 allows the City to remove the grasses 

and weeds and continue to maintain the property until the growing season ends and to 

“recover the total cost for all services.” Youngstown City Ordinance 1749.04(a) provides 

that the removal costs are the obligation of the property owner and sets the cost at a 

minimum of $150.

{¶39} Youngstown City Ordinance 1749.04(b) provides that:

(b) The City of Youngstown may collect the costs or charges for such 

removal or abatement from the property owners. At any time after such 

costs are incurred, subject to limitations as provided by law, the City of 

Youngstown or a duly retained agent or attorney at law shall send a letter 

attempting to collect such costs to the property owner at the property 

owner's last known address, via regular U.S. mail. If the property owner 

fails to pay within 30 days of the date of the letter, then the City of 

Youngstown or a duly retained agent or attorney at law may collect the cost 

or charges from the property owners by any of the following methods:

(1) The City of Youngstown may certify the total costs, together with a 

proper description of the lands, to the County Auditor who shall place the 

costs upon the tax list and duplicate. The costs are a lien upon such lands 

from and after the date the costs were incurred. The costs shall be collected 

as other taxes and returned to the City of Youngstown. 

* * * 

Such certification shall not, however, preclude other methods of recovery of 

such cost as may be authorized generally by law; and/or
– 10 –

Case No. 23 MA 0006

(2) The City of Youngstown or a duly retained agent or attorney at law may 

commence a civil action to recover the total costs from the owner.

{¶40} Appellant contends that he received no notice of a nuisance violation, 

citation, letter of abatement, or collection letter for abatement fees. He asserts that 

Youngstown Ordinance 1749.02 conflicts with R.C. 731.51 because the ordinance allows 

the City discretion to issue notice, while the statute mandates notice. 

{¶41} R.C. 731.51(A) is entitled “Notice to cut noxious weeds or remove litter,” 

and provides that: 

(A) Upon written information that noxious weeds are growing on lands in a 

municipal corporation, and are about to spread or mature seeds, the 

legislative authority shall cause a written notice to be served upon the 

owner, lessee, agent, or tenant having charge of such land, notifying him 

that noxious weeds are growing on such lands and that they must be cut 

and destroyed within five days after the service of such notice. 

{¶42} R.C. 731.53 provides that the legislative authority of a municipal corporation 

shall remove the noxious weeds and bill the property owner if the property owner fails to 

comply with the notice sent under R.C. 731.51. 

{¶43} It is true that the language in Youngstown City Ordinance 1749.02(b) is 

discretionary as it states that the City “may issue a citation” and the City has “sole 

discretion” to issue or post a warning notice before issuing a citation. Further, 

Youngstown City Ordinance 1749.02(c) provides that the City may abate the nuisance 

without providing notice because such a violation is a nuisance per se and abatement 

can be made “to protect the health, safety and welfare of the general public.” 

{¶44} However, even accepting this discretionary language, it appears that 

Appellee violated its own ordinance. Since no documentation preceding the complaint is 

present in the record before us, it appears that the City violated Youngstown Ordinance 

1749.04(b) by failing to send Appellant a letter notifying him that the City was seeking to 

collect its costs for abating the grass. The language in this section is mandatory, stating 

that before filing a civil suit or assessing the removal fee to the auditor, the City agent or 

an attorney “shall” send the property owner a letter by mail informing him that the City is 
– 11 –

Case No. 23 MA 0006

seeking to collect the costs of abatement on the property. Youngstown City Ordinance 

1749.04(b). It continues that, “[i]f the property owner fails to pay within 30 days of the 

date of the letter,” then the City may collect the fees from the property owner either by 

certification to the auditor or by filing a civil suit to recover the fees. Id. 

{¶45} Although Appellee may have violated its ordinance, we find that Appellant 

has waived this issue on appeal. “A failure to preserve an issue in the trial court waives 

the issue for purposes of appeal.” Mauldin v. Youngstown Water Dept., 7th Dist. 

Mahoning No. 19 MA 0010, 2019-Ohio-5065, 150 N.E.3d 433, citing Wynn v. 

Waynesburg Rd LLC, 7th Dist. Carroll No. 17 CA 0921, 2018-Ohio-3858, ¶ 11; and 

Stanton v. Marc's Store, 7th Dist. Mahoning No. 15 MA 49, 2015-Ohio-5551, ¶ 35, citing 

Schade v. Carnegie Body Co., 70 Ohio St.2d 207, 210, 436 N.E.2d 1001 (1982) (“the 

fundamental rule is that an appellate court will not consider any error which could have 

been brought to the trial court's attention”). The Ohio Supreme Court has held that, “[t]he 

failure to challenge the constitutionality of a statute in the trial court forfeits all but plain 

error on appeal, and the burden of demonstrating plain error is on the party asserting it.” 

State v. Quarterman, 140 Ohio St.3d 464, 2014-Ohio-4034, 19 N.E.3d 900, ¶ 2 (2014).

{¶46} Appellant had plenty of opportunities to raise the issue of notice before the 

trial court well before he filed his motion to vacate the default judgment. He failed to 

answer, respond, or defend in this action for over 5 years after the default judgment was 

issued against him. He could have raised this issue with a motion to dismiss the complaint 

or defended against it after filing an answer. Appellant does not complain about a failure 

to receive a copy of the complaint. Since Appellant failed to respond or answer, or 

otherwise indicate his intention to defend against the complaint, he was not entitled to 

notice of the application for default judgment. See Civ. R. 55(A). Moreover, the record 

shows that Appellant was served with notice of a debtor’s examination, the order to show 

cause, the show cause hearing date, and the order in contempt when he failed to appear. 

{¶47} For these reasons, Appellant’s first assignment of error lacks merit. 

{¶48} In his fourth assignment of error, Appellant asserts:

4. In Any Case, Defendant’s Vacation Motion Was Timely Filed, 

Since his Motion Was Filed On October 23, 2022, Well Within The 

Thirty-Day[sic] from September 26, 2022 deadline.
– 12 –

Case No. 23 MA 0006

{¶49} Appellant asserts that he timely filed his motion to vacate the default 

judgment and contempt orders. He contends that the trial court incorrectly used the date 

of the court’s signature on the September 23, 2022 journal entry, rather than the date that 

the order was entered upon the judgment journal, which was September 26, 2022. He 

claims that he was also entitled to three additional days to answer under Civ. R. 6(D) for 

mail service, which would allow him to file by October 26, 2022. He notes that he filed 

his motion on October 23, 2022.

{¶50} Appellee counters that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying 

Appellant’s untimely motion to vacate. Appellee notes that Civ. R. 60(B) allows for the 

filing of a motion to vacate “within a reasonable time.” Appellee contends that the motion 

to vacate was not filed within a reasonable time because the default was issued on July 

10, 2017 and Appellant filed the motion to vacate on October 23, 2022. 

{¶51} In his motion to vacate the default judgment, however, Appellant asserted 

the motion was not based upon Civ. R. 60(B). Rather, he stated that it was based upon 

the inherent authority of the court to vacate void judgments. (See Mot. to Vacate at page 

3). He submits that the “reasonable time” requirement of Civ. R. 60(B) therefore does not 

apply to his motion. 

{¶52} Appellant is correct that trial courts have inherent authority to vacate a void 

judgment and a party who asserts a lack of jurisdiction based on a lack of service does 

not need to meet Civ. R. 60(B) requirements. Patton v. Diemer, 35 Ohio St.3d 68, 518 

N.E.2d 941 (1988), paragraph four of the syllabus (“The authority to vacate a void 

judgment is an inherent power of the court and is not derivative of Civ.R. 60(B)[.]”). 

{¶53} However, just as with a Civ. R. 60(B) motion, we review a trial court’s 

decision on a motion to vacate a default judgment under an abuse of discretion standard. 

See During v. Quoico, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 11AP-735, 2012-Ohio-2990, 973 N.E.2d 

838, ¶ 16. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Appellant’s motion to 

vacate the default judgment based upon untimeliness. 

{¶54} In its application for default judgment on June 27, 2017, Appellee included 

a document dated March 1, 2016 and signed by the postmaster, which showed regular 

mail with certificates of mailing, and included service to Appellant’s address with a 

tracking number. The court granted the application for default judgment, finding that 
– 13 –

Case No. 23 MA 0006

Appellant was duly served with process in accordance with Civ. R. 4 and Appellant failed 

to plead, appear, or otherwise respond to the complaint. The court granted Appellee 

judgment in the amount of $150 plus interest on July 10, 2017. 

{¶55} Nearly five years later, the municipal court ordered a debtor’s exam to occur 

on May 31, 2022 and Appellant failed to appear. A record dated April 4, 2022 from the 

U.S. Post Office indicated that Appellant signed for the debtor’s exam order as it was sent 

by certified mail. On July 14, 2022, the municipal court issued an order to show cause 

for Appellant to appear on August 23, 2022 to explain why he should not be found in 

contempt of court for his prior failures to obey the court’s orders. The record shows that 

the court order was mailed to Appellant on the same date and on July 15, 2022, certified 

mail delivery was signed. 

{¶56} Yet again, Appellant failed to appear. Consequently, the municipal court 

issued a contempt order on September 26, 2022 indicating Appellant’s latest failure to 

appear. The court ordered that Appellant appear with his financial information within 30 

days to purge his contempt. 

{¶57} On October 28, 2022, Appellant filed his motion to vacate the default 

judgment order and order of contempt, challenging the court’s subject matter jurisdiction 

and the constitutionality of the Youngstown City Ordinances. 

{¶58} This record shows that service of the complaint was perfected on Appellant, 

as well as nearly every other order in this case. 

{¶59} As discussed, infra, the municipal court possessed subject matter 

jurisdiction over the case. Further, the City did not lack standing to sue. And even if it 

had, the Ohio Supreme Court has held that “a particular party's standing, or lack thereof, 

does not affect the subject-matter jurisdiction of the court in which the party is attempting 

to obtain relief.” Bank of Am. v. Kuchta, 141 Ohio St. 3d 75, 2014-Ohio-4275, 21 N.E.3d 

1040, ¶ 23, citing State ex rel. Tubbs Jones v. Suster, 84 Ohio St.3d 70, 77, 701 N.E.2d 

1002 (1998). 

{¶60} If Appellant wished to challenge the complaint due to lack of notice of an 

abatement letter, he should have answered or responded. If he wished to challenge the 

default proceedings, the debtor’s exam, and the contempt orders, he should have 

answered, responded, appeared, or otherwise defended against these filings. He should 
– 14 –

Case No. 23 MA 0006

not have waited over five years to challenge the court order granting default judgment. In 

light of Appellant’s repeated inaction and lack of compliance in the municipal court, we 

find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying his motion to vacate the 

default judgment or other orders against him. 

{¶61} For these reasons, Appellant’s fourth assignment of error lacks merit. 

{¶62} Based on the above, all of Appellant’s assignments of error lack merit.

Robb, J., concurs.

D’Apolito, P.J., concurs.
[Cite as Youngstown v. Newton, 2023-Ohio-4250.]

For the reasons stated in the Opinion rendered herein, Appellant’s assignments of 

error are overruled and the judgment of the Youngstown Municipal Court, Mahoning 

County, Ohio is affirmed. Costs to be taxed against the Appellant.

A certified copy of this opinion and judgment entry shall constitute the mandate in 

this case pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. It is ordered that a 

certified copy be sent by the clerk to the trial court to carry this judgment into execution.

JUDGE MARK A. HANNI

JUDGE CAROL ANN ROBB

JUDGE DAVID A. D’APOLITO

NOTICE TO COUNSEL

This document constitutes a final judgment entry.