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SECURE VISAS ACT 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON 

IMMIGRATION POLICY AND ENFORCEMENT 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

ON

H.R. 1741 

MAY 11, 2011 

Serial No. 112–39 

Printed for the use of the Committee on the Judiciary 

( 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://judiciary.house.gov 

(II) 

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY 

LAMAR SMITH, Texas, Chairman 

F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER, JR., 

Wisconsin 

HOWARD COBLE, North Carolina 

ELTON GALLEGLY, California 

BOB GOODLATTE, Virginia 

DANIEL E. LUNGREN, California 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

DARRELL E. ISSA, California 

MIKE PENCE, Indiana 

J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia 

STEVE KING, Iowa 

TRENT FRANKS, Arizona 

LOUIE GOHMERT, Texas 

JIM JORDAN, Ohio 

TED POE, Texas 

JASON CHAFFETZ, Utah 

TIM GRIFFIN, Arkansas 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

TREY GOWDY, South Carolina 

DENNIS ROSS, Florida 

SANDY ADAMS, Florida 

BEN QUAYLE, Arizona 

[Vacant] 

JOHN CONYERS, JR., Michigan 

HOWARD L. BERMAN, California 

JERROLD NADLER, New York 

ROBERT C. ‘‘BOBBY’’ SCOTT, Virginia 

MELVIN L. WATT, North Carolina 

ZOE LOFGREN, California 

SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas 

MAXINE WATERS, California 

STEVE COHEN, Tennessee 

HENRY C. ‘‘HANK’’ JOHNSON, JR., 

Georgia 

PEDRO R. PIERLUISI, Puerto Rico 

MIKE QUIGLEY, Illinois 

JUDY CHU, California 

TED DEUTCH, Florida 

LINDA T. SA ́ NCHEZ, California 

[Vacant] 

SEAN MCLAUGHLIN, Majority Chief of Staff and General Counsel 

PERRY APELBAUM, Minority Staff Director and Chief Counsel 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON IMMIGRATION POLICY AND ENFORCEMENT

ELTON GALLEGLY, California, Chairman 

STEVE KING, Iowa, Vice-Chairman 

DANIEL E. LUNGREN, California 

LOUIE GOHMERT, Texas 

TED POE, Texas 

TREY GOWDY, South Carolina 

DENNIS ROSS, Florida 

ZOE LOFGREN, California 

SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas 

MAXINE WATERS, California 

PEDRO R. PIERLUISI, Puerto Rico 

GEORGE FISHMAN, Chief Counsel 

DAVID SHAHOULIAN, Minority Counsel 

(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

MAY 11, 2011 

Page 

THE BILL 

H.R. 1741, the ‘‘Secure Visas Act’’ .......................................................................... 4 

OPENING STATEMENTS 

The Honorable Elton Gallegly, a Representative in Congress from the State 

of California, and Chairman, Subcommittee on Immigration Policy and 

Enforcement .......................................................................................................... 1 

The Honorable Zoe Lofgren, a Representative in Congress from the State 

of California, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Immigration Policy 

and Enforcement .................................................................................................. 11 

The Honorable Lamar Smith, a Representative in Congress from the State 

of Texas, and Chairman, Committee on the Judiciary ..................................... 15 

WITNESSES 

Gary L. Cote, Acting Deputy Assistant Director, Office of International Affairs, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, U.S. Department of 

Homeland Security 

Oral Testimony ..................................................................................................... 18 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 20 

David T. Donahue, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Visa Services, Bureau 

of Consular Affairs, U.S. Department of State 

Oral Testimony ..................................................................................................... 27 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 29 

Janice L. Kephart, Director of National Security Policy, Center for Immigration Studies 

Oral Testimony ..................................................................................................... 38 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 40 

Edward Alden, Bernard L. Schwartz Senior Fellow, Council on Foreign Relations 

Oral Testimony ..................................................................................................... 50 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 52 

LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING 

Material submitted by the Honorable Zoe Lofgren, a Representative in Congress from the State of California, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee 

on Immigration Policy and Enforcement ........................................................... 12 

Material submitted by the Honorable Sheila Jackson Lee, a Representative 

in Congress from the State of Texas, and Member, Subcommittee on Immigration Policy and Enforcement .......................................................................... 67 

APPENDIX 

MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING RECORD

Prepared Statement of the National Immigration Forum ................................... 70 

(1) 

SECURE VISAS ACT 

WEDNESDAY, MAY 11, 2011 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

SUBCOMMITTEE ON IMMIGRATION

POLICY AND ENFORCEMENT, 

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, 

Washington, DC. 

The Subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 3:25 p.m., in room 

2141, Rayburn Office Building, the Honorable Elton Gallegly 

(Chairman of the Subcommittee) presiding. 

Present: Representatives Gallegly, Smith, Ross, Lofgren, and 

Jackson Lee. 

Staff present: (Majority) Dimple Shah, Counsel; Marian White, 

Clerk; and Tom Jawetz, Minority Counsel. 

Mr. GALLEGLY. I apologize for the confusion around here. We 

normally like to have our trains run on time, but as you know, the 

bells just went off and we have a series of eight votes? Seven or 

eight votes. And in the interest of time, I am going to go over and 

start my voting, and then as soon as the voting series is over, we 

will reconvene and we will get on with this very important hearing. 

I appreciate your being here. I appreciate your patience, but 

some things are above my pay grade. Thank you very much. 

[Recess.] 

Mr. GALLEGLY. I call the Immigration Subcommittee hearing to 

order. 

First of all, I want to apologize to our witnesses for the delay. 

As I said before we left, there was a series of votes and some things 

are beyond our control. And I appreciate your patience and I appreciate your being here today. 

The Departments of State and Homeland Security both have responsibility when it comes to admitting foreign visitors to the 

United States. The Department of State Consular Affairs is responsible for issuing visas, while Immigration and Customs Enforcement in DHS operates the Visa Security Program in designated, 

high-risk consular posts overseas. 

Following the tragic events of September 11th, 2001, there was 

a great deal of discussion in Congress with respect to moving the 

visa issuance responsibilities from the State Department to DHS, 

the objective to treat visa issuance as a law enforcement and national security function, rather than a foreign relations tool. Rather 

than transferring these functions to DHS in their entirety, the 

Homeland Security Act of 2002 split the visa functions. DHS now 

writes the regulations regarding visa issuance and assigns staff to 

2 

consular posts abroad as part of the Visa Security Program to conduct investigations on visa applications. However, the State Department still has the responsibility to ultimately issue the visas. 

Unfortunately, the Visa Security Program has not expanded 

nearly as quickly as expected. The Government Accountability Office reports that ICE has not implemented its 5-year expansion 

plan or even covered all high-risk posts. Therefore, Chairman 

Smith has introduced legislation, The Secure Visas Act, that requires DHS to maintain Visa Security Units, known as VSUs, at 

the 19 consular posts that already have them and expand these 

units to the posts that ICE has designated as ‘‘highest-risk.’’ Some 

of these ‘‘highest-risk’’ countries include Yemen, Saudi Arabia, 

Syria, Morocco, Lebanon, and Algeria. VSU’s are critical for national security. At VSU-staffed consular posts, 100 percent of applicants receive additional screening. At non-VSU posts, fewer than 2 

percent of the applicants get extra screening. 

The actions of Omar Farouk Abdulmutallab, who attempted to 

blow up Northwest Airlines flight 253 and kill over 200 innocent 

people on December 25, 2009, refocused attention on the responsibilities of the Departments of State and Homeland Security with 

respect to visa revocation. 

Abdulmutallab was traveling on a valid visa issued to him in 

June of 2008. The State Department acknowledged that his father 

came into the U.S. embassy in Abuja, Nigeria on November 19, 

2009 and told officials with the State Department and the CIA that 

his son had vanished and expressed concern that he had ‘‘fallen 

under the influence of religious extremists in Yemen.’’ According to 

the news reports, the father’s visit with the U.S. authorities was 

arranged by Nigerian intelligence officials, who his father had contacted after receiving a call from his son that made him fear that 

his son might be planning a suicide mission in Yemen. 

Despite the father’s visit and the warning he conveyed, the State 

Department made no effort to revoke the visa. The case of 

Abdulmutallab demonstrates that clearly something went drastically wrong. 

In addition to expanding the Visa Security Program, Chairman 

Smith’s bill provides law enforcement with the tools it needs to revoke visas by clarifying that the Secretary of DHS has the explicit 

power to refuse or revoke a visa when the Secretary determines 

that such refusal for revocation is necessary or advisable in the security interests of the United States. 

Under current law, the DHS Secretary can ask the State Department to revoke a visa. The DHS Secretary, however, only exercised 

his revocation once in 2005. The State Department is the entity 

that normally revokes visas. 

Furthermore, this bill makes clear the revocation of a visa is not 

subject to judicial review. H.R. 1741 simply applies the same review standards to visa revocations that is currently applied to visa 

denials. Ultimately, this bill provides DHS with the necessary tools 

to prevent potential terrorists or other criminals from entering our 

country and doing our citizens great harm. 

At this point, I would yield to the gentlelady from California, the 

Ranking Member of the Subcommittee, Ms. Lofgren. 

The bill, H.R. 1741, follows:] 

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Ms. LOFGREN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. This hearing touches 

on many important issues and I am looking forward to hearing the 

testimony of each of the witnesses. 

Although I apologized to each of them individually, I share in 

your apologies for the late start. It was unavoidable. As we were 

casting those votes, I was thinking of you sitting here in the room. 

Our embassies and consulates abroad really represent our face to 

the world and serve many critical functions, and the visa adjudication process is really important to advancing America’s interests in 

legitimate travel, trade promotion, and educational exchanges, as 

well as business. It also plays an important role in keeping us safe 

by identifying people who would do us harm before they ever arrive 

at ports of entry, and meeting all of these goals is important to ensuring our security. 

Now, as the Chairman has said, when Congress created the Department of Homeland Security, there was what I call a robust discussion about how involved the new agency should be in setting 

visa policy and handling the day-to-day business of adjudicating 

visa applications overseas. And the current act gives DHS authority over visa issuance, regulations, and authorizes the Secretary to 

refuse visas based on current law by working through the consular 

officers. And it also created the Visa Security Program. 

Recognizing the State Department’s expertise in foreign policy 

matters, the act retained the core functions of consular officers, and 

one of the most important functions they perform is adjudicating 

the very large number of visa applications that are received every 

day. Under the current system, consular officers collect biographic 

and biometric information, run the names, fingerprints, digital photographs through a variety of security and background checks, and 

ultimately the consular officer makes a decision regarding visa eligibility. When a case triggers national security or other concerns, 

it is forwarded to Washington, D.C. for a security advisory opinion. 

Even without red flags, broad categories of cases are routinely submitted for SAO’s to undergo additional checks by intelligence and 

law enforcement agencies, and then any hits are manually reviewed by an analyst. 

According to the State Department, this process took place 

300,000 times last year. Unfortunately, the number of false 

positives that were encountered is very high. About 98 percent of 

the time a case was referred for an SAO, the analyst concludes that 

the law enforcement or security-related information in the system 

had nothing to do with the person who was applying for the visa. 

Because surnames in many parts of the world are similar or identical, mistakes are regularly made. 

Now, the Homeland Security Act, mentioned by the Chairman, 

tried to lay out a framework that would be workable but left the 

agencies to fill out the details. We had an opportunity to check 

with General Colin Powell, hoping we might actually get him to be 

a witness here at this hearing, but he was not available this week. 

But he talked about really the personal negotiations that went on 

between him as Secretary of State and Homeland Security Secretary Tom Ridge, and they really reached a conclusion that I think 

in many ways has worked, maybe needs some improvement, but 

the shared responsibilities mean that each agency now plays a sigVerDate Aug 31 2005 13:31 Jul 15, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00014 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 H:\WORK\IMMIG\051111\66315.000 HJUD1 PsN: DOUGA
11 

nificant role in determining who comes to the U.S., with State principally in charge of the visa process, but DHS and Customs and 

Border Protection as final gatekeepers determining who is permitted to board planes headed for the country, who is permitted to 

walk through the ports of entry. 

Now, I am interested in hearing the witnesses’ views on how this 

is working, whether we can adequately meet our goals while facilitating legitimate trade and travel and make this work in a very 

seamless and smooth way. 

At the outset, I will say on the bill that the Chairman of the full 

Committee has introduced that I have a concern about the judicial 

review provision. It is already the case that visa revocations or denials made abroad are insulated from judicial review, and I for one 

would not change that. But this bill would eliminate judicial review 

for persons who are in this country and are placed in removal proceedings. That means that people who have resided lawfully in the 

United States for many years, who could have U.S. citizen spouses 

and children, could face the prospect of being permanently separated from their families without the opportunity for judicial review. 

The Supreme Court has long recognized that the writ of habeas 

corpus guaranteed by the Suspension Clause of the Constitution 

provides a means by which to test the legality of executive detention. The Great Writ has also been used throughout our history to 

challenge the legality of deportation and exclusion proceedings. 

And this has been recognized by the Congress in the Intelligence 

Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 and again in the 

REAL ID Act in 2005. And I think the bill as written would fail 

were it to be changed on constitutional grounds, and I thought it 

important to raise that at an early stage of the proceedings. 

And I would also, Mr. Chairman, ask unanimous consent to submit for the record a letter from the ACLU regarding this point, as 

well as a statement from Senator Menendez. 

Mr. GALLEGLY. Without objection. 

[The information referred to follows:] 

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Ms. LOFGREN. I yield back. 

Mr. GALLEGLY. I thank the gentlelady. At this time, I will recognize the Chairman of the full Committee and the sponsor of the 

pending legislation, my good friend from Texas, Mr. Smith. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

In response to what the Ranking Member just said, I trust that 

that means she supports 95 or 96 percent of the bill, and I take 

that as a good sign. We can talk about the judicial review—— 


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Ms. LOFGREN. If the gentleman would yield, I would not want to 

give that misimpression, but I thank the gentleman for his comment. 

Mr. SMITH. I was going by the number of words you might have 

disagreed with. 

But in any case, the broader point is that visa revocation is a discretionary decision. Numerous circuit courts have concluded that 

visa revocations are in fact a purely discretionary power held by 

the Secretary of DHS and therefore are not subject to any constitutionally mandated judicial review. So we might argue about the 

pros and cons. I just don’t want to leave the impression that somehow it is constitutionally mandated. 

Mr. Chairman, in any case, in light of Osama bin Laden’s death, 

some believe the ‘‘war on terror’’ has ended, and that the threat 

posed by al Qaeda and other terrorist groups has diminished. This 

is far from the truth. In the words of bin Laden himself, ‘‘I can be 

eliminated, but not my mission.’’ 

The 19 hijackers involved in the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks applied for 23 visas and obtained 22 out of 23 visas. These 

terrorists began the process of obtaining visas almost two and a 

half years before the attack. At the time, consular officers were unaware of the potential indicators of a security threat posed by these 

hijackers. 

Recent events underscore the need to strengthen and improve 

visa security. We know terrorists use loopholes in our immigration 

system to enter the United States. 

After receiving a B2 tourist visa, Omar Farouk Abdulmutallab 

attempted to blow up a plane on its way to Detroit on Christmas 

Day 2009. Thankfully, his attempt was thwarted and hundreds of 

innocent lives were spared. 

Although he failed in his attempt to murder innocent people, 

Abdulmutallab should never have been allowed to board the plane 

to Detroit. Despite warnings from Abdulmutallab’s father about the 

son’s possible Muslim radicalization, the U.S. visa issued to him in 

2008 was neither identified nor revoked. 

More recently, Khalid Aldawsari, a 20-year-old who entered the 

United States from Saudi Arabia on a student visa, was arrested 

on February 24, 2011 on terrorism charges, including attempted 

use of weapons of mass destruction. While Aldawsari was screened 

by the Visa Security Units, he had never come to the attention of 

law enforcement before because he was a ‘‘lone wolf’’ actor and he 

never demonstrated any harmful or criminal tendencies. 

Authorities only learned of Aldawsari February 1, 2011, when a 

shipping company and a chemical supplier called authorities to report a suspicious attempt to purchase a large quantity of Phenol, 

a chemical that can be used to make explosives. 

The Homeland Security Act of 2002 authorized the placement of 

Department of Homeland Security Visa Security Units at ‘‘highestrisk’’ U.S. consular posts. This was an effort to address lapses in 

the current system, increase scrutiny of visa issuance, and prevent 

terrorists from gaining access to the United States. Visa security 

units ensure that thorough background checks are conducted on all 

visa applicants, not just a select few. 

17 

The intent of the Visa Security Units is to ensure that national 

security, and not meeting the demands of foreign nationals for 

visas, is the number one goal of our visa issuing process. Unfortunately, since 2002, neither the State Department nor DHS has put 

a high enough priority on the establishment of Visa Security Units. 

Visa security units exist only in 19 consulates located in 14 countries. Meanwhile, there are close to 50 countries that have been 

designated as ‘‘highest-risk.’’ 

Last week, I introduced legislation to make the visa process more 

secure. H.R. 1741, the ‘‘Secure Visas Act,’’ requires placement of 

Visa Security Units at all U.S. consular posts in highest-risk countries such as Algeria, Lebanon, and Syria. 

H.R. 1741 also grants the Department of Homeland Security Secretary the authority to revoke a visa in cases like that of the 

Christmas Day Bomber and to delegate that authority to appropriate agency officials. These are common-sense steps that ensure 

no one who seeks to harm our country is able to enter and stay in 

the United States. 

In addition to making it harder for terrorists to enter the U.S., 

The Secure Visas Act allows U.S. officials to remove suspected terrorists and others with revoked visas who are already in the U.S. 

Under current law, an alien terrorist in the U.S. whose visa has 

been revoked can remain in the U.S. to fight their deportation in 

Federal court and force the Government to release classified information. Giving litigation rights to terrorists makes no sense. The 

Secure Visas Act closes this loophole and allows the terrorist to be 

removed from American soil without threatening the disclosure of 

intelligence sources and methods. 

Many national security officials warn of future attacks. We don’t 

need national security officials to simply predict attacks. We need 

them to prevent attacks. That means we must prevent terrorists 

from entering this country before they act, and this legislation allows us to do just that. 

Visa security is critical to national security. Terrorists will continue to enter the U.S. legally if we do not improve and secure our 

visa process. 

The September 11th hijackers, the Christmas Day Bomber, and 

the Texas university student terrorist serve as proof that the war 

on terror continues and that radical jihadists are as committed as 

ever to killing Americans. America must be equally committed to 

stopping them. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I will yield back. 

Mr. GALLEGLY. I thank the gentleman. 

Without objection, other Members’ opening statements will be 

made a part of the record of the hearing. 

We have a very distinguished panel of witnesses today. Each of 

the witnesses’ written statements will be entered into the record in 

its entirety. I would ask that each witness summarize his or her 

testimony in 5 minutes or less. To help you stay within the time, 

there is a little light system down there with a yellow light that 

would let you know you have 1 minute remaining, and then the red 

light would signal that the 5 minutes has expired. I really appreciate your cooperation on this so we can get through and have everyone have their opportunity to ask questions of the witnesses. 

18 

Our witnesses today starts with Gary Cote. He serves as the Acting Deputy Assistant Director for the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement Office of International Affairs. He is the former 

director of the Visa Security Unit within the Office of International 

Affairs where he was responsible for managing the ICE headquarters Visa Security Unit and all foreign ICE Visa Security 

Units. Throughout his 37 years in law enforcement, he has held 

various high-level positions. 

Our second witness is Mr. David Donahue. He serves as the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Visa Services at the Bureau of Consular 

affairs, U.S. Department of State. Prior to this position, he was the 

Director of Office Policy coordination and Public Affairs in the Bureau of Consular Affairs. Mr. Donahue joined the Foreign Service 

in 1983 and has held numerous positions stationed throughout the 

world. Mr. Donahue graduated from St. Meinrad College in Indiana. 

Ms. Janice Kephart is the Director of National Security Policy at 

the Center for Immigration Studies. She previously served as counsel to the 9/11 Commission. Ms. Kephart received her bachelor’s 

from Duke University and J.D. from Villanova Law School. 

And our fourth witness today is Mr. Edward Alden. Mr. Alden 

is the Bernard L. Schwartz Senior Fellow at the Council on Foreign 

Relations. Prior to joining the council, Mr. Alden was the Washington bureau chief for the Financial Times and also served as the 

project director for the independent task force on U.S. immigration 

policy. Mr. Alden holds a master’s degree in international relations 

from the University of California at Berkeley. 

Mr. Cote, we will start with you. Welcome. 

TESTIMONY OF GARY L. COTE, ACTING DEPUTY ASSISTANT DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, U.S. IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, U.S. DEPARTMENT 

OF HOMELAND SECURITY 

Mr. COTE. Thank you, Chairman Gallegly, Chairman Smith, 

Ranking Member Lofgren, and distinguished Members of the Subcommittee. 

On behalf of Secretary Napolitano and Assistant Secretary Morton, thank you for the opportunity to discuss ICE’s international efforts to protect the Nation. Today I will discuss the important role 

that the Visa Security Program, along with the State Department, 

plays in protecting the homeland by helping to identify individuals 

who present a risk before they can travel to the United States. The 

Visa Security Program places DHS law enforcement officers in U.S. 

embassies abroad to work with the State Department consular officers and diplomatic security agents to secure the visa adjudication 

process. 

As you know, section 428 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 

authorized the Secretary of Homeland Security to administer and 

enforce the Immigration and Nationality Act and other laws relating to visas, refuse and revoke visas for individual applicants in accordance with the law, assign DHS officers to diplomatic posts to 

perform visa security activities, initiate investigations of visa security-related matters, and provide advice and training to consular officers. In short, the Homeland Security Act directed DHS to assist 

19 

in the identification of visa applicants who may attempt to enter 

the United States for illegitimate purposes, including illegal immigration, criminal- and terrorist-related activities. 

The visa adjudication process is often the first opportunity to assess whether a potential visitor or immigrant presents a threat to 

the United States. The U.S. Government has long recognized the 

importance of this function to national security. DHS regards the 

visa process as an important part of its broader security strategy, 

and the Visa Security Program is one of several programs focused 

on minimizing global risks. 

DHS does not participate in all visa adjudications. Rather, DHS 

becomes a part of the process following initial screening of an applicant in countries where a Visa Security Unit is present. The 

Visa Security Program efforts complement the consular officer’s initial screening. This is accomplished by conducting targeted, indepth law enforcement-focused reviews of individual visa applications and applicants prior to issuance, as well as recommending refusal or revocation of applications where warranted. 

ICE now has Visa Security Units at 19 high-risk visa adjudication posts in 15 countries. In fiscal year 2010, ICE opened offices 

in four additional locations. Also in fiscal year 2010, ICE agents 

screened 815,000 visa applicants at these 19 posts and, in collaboration with their State Department colleagues, determined that 

104,000 required further review. Following the review of these 

104,000 applications, ICE recommended the refusal of more than 

1,300 applicants. In every instance, the State Department followed 

the Visa Security Unit recommendation and refused to issue a visa. 

Visa Security Program recommendations have also resulted in 

State Department visa revocations. 

Effective border security requires broad information sharing and 

cooperation among U.S. agencies. In January, ICE signed a memorandum of understanding outlining roles, responsibilities, and collaboration between DHS and the State Department’s Bureau of 

Consular Affairs and the Diplomatic Security Service. The MOU 

governs the day-to-day operations of the Visa Security Units at 

U.S. embassies and consulates abroad. 

To facilitate information sharing and reduce duplication of efforts, ICE and the State Department support collaborative training 

and orientation prior to overseas deployments. Once they are deployed to overseas posts, ICE and State Department personnel 

work closely together in working groups coordinating meetings, 

trainings, briefings, and engage in regular and timely information 

sharing. 

Under the direction of the Homeland Security Council, beginning 

in May 2008, ICE and the State Department collaborated on the 

development of the Visa Security Program’s site selection methodology and came to an agreement on current site selection criteria 

which is based on risk. The process for selecting a particular site 

for a unit begins with the ICE site selection evaluation, which includes a quantitative analysis of threats posed by applicants at a 

particular consular office, as well as a site visit assessment. The 

site assessment and proposal are then entered into the formal nomination process and, prior to deployment of personnel, must be reviewed and approved by the chief of mission at a particular post 

20 

in a manner consistent with the National Security Directive-38 and 

its implementing guidelines. 

I see that my time has expired. Thank you for your opportunity 

for me to testify today, and I would be willing to answer any questions that you may have. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Cote follows:] 


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Mr. GALLEGLY. Thank you very much, Mr. Cote. 

Mr. Donahue? 


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TESTIMONY OF DAVID T. DONAHUE, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR VISA SERVICES, BUREAU OF CONSULAR AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE 

Mr. DONAHUE. I am honored by this opportunity to testify today 

on this important topic of close and fruitful cooperation with our 

ICE colleagues in our joint efforts to protect our borders. 

The State Department strongly supports the mission and future 

of the Visa Security Program, the VSP. We embrace a layered approach to security screening and believe the VSP supports the critical role that State Department consular officers play in securing 

our borders. The VSP maximizes the utility of the visa application 

and interview processes to detect and combat terrorism, criminality, and other threats to the United States and the traveling 

public. 

We share visa application information widely with the interagency group responsible for national security. Robust sharing of 

data between agencies is part of the layered approach to security 

adopted after 9/11. A complex layered approach to screening, beginning with biometric and biographic checks against law enforcement 

databases, interviews by consular officers, multiple steps by ICE 

and U.S. Customs and Border Protection, and matching of biometrics collected abroad at the port of entry to confirm the identity 

and intentions of those wishing to enter the United States ensure 

the security of the visa process. These measures are constantly reviewed and enhanced as needed. ICE VSP officers assigned to Visa 

Security Units abroad provide timely and valuable on-site vetting 

of visa applications and other law enforcement support to our consular officers. 

Here in Washington, we work with our VSP colleagues on issues 

affecting program operations and on longer-term issues related to 

the expansion of the program to select overseas posts. VSP officers 

in Washington review our visa databases and advise posts of 

emerging information about visa holders. In addition, we cooperate 

on the resolution of issues that are raised as the VSP is expanded 

to more posts. In January 2011, we concluded the memorandum of 

understanding governing VSU-State Department interactions with 

visa sections, procedures for resolving the very few disputed visa 

cases that emerge from the VSU review process, and collaboration 

between ICE-VSU officers and diplomatic security agents assigned 

as regional security officers or assistant regional security officers 

for investigations at our consular sections. 

The recently released GAO report on VSP operations noted that 

visa officers and ICE-VSP officers sometimes consider the same set 

of facts and reach different conclusions. In fact, we work together 

to resolve those few cases. In the end, there must be full agreement 

on any decision since the traveler cannot travel without a visa and 

DHS will not permit boarding of someone who is a security threat 

for a flight to the United States. 

Let me address the expansion of the VSP which I know is of keen 

interest to the Members of this Subcommittee. The Department 

works collaboratively with DHS pursuant to the October 2004 

MOU on the administrative aspects of assigning personnel overseas 

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ceived NSDD-38 requests from ICE for the establishment of VSU’s 

in four countries and for increases to VSU staff in two more countries. Those requests have all been approved by the respective chief 

of missions and the new VSU’s are either deployed or in the latter 

stages of deployment. 

As an established part of the process, senior officials from the 

State Department Bureau of Consular Affairs and Diplomatic Security accompany ICE officials on the site assessments preceding 

NSDD-38 submission. The assessment teams consult with officials 

at post to determine the feasibility and timing of establishing an 

office and brief the chief of mission on the role of the VSU. In June 

2010, a joint State-ICE team conducted assessments of three posts. 

Before closing, I would like to highlight the consular officers’ essential role in enforcing U.S. immigration law and protecting our 

borders. Our 246 consular sections in 167 countries are staffed by 

more than 1,500 officers, nearly 4,000 locally engaged staff, and 

100 full-time diplomatic security agents assigned as ARSO-I’s devoted to fraud prevention efforts. 

Officers devoted to visa adjudication are highly qualified, welltrained, and very motivated professionals committed to a career of 

serving the United States overseas. They have foreign language 

skills necessary to stay abreast of the local trends and conduct 

interviews. 1,067 of our consular officer positions require fluency in 

1 of 65 languages. 

Consular officers are fully prepared for this critical responsibility. Our officers understand foreign cultures and political, legal, 

and economic developments in countries where they are posted. 

This unique cadre of employees gives the Department a special expertise in matters directly relevant to the full range of visa ineligibilities. The Department’s commitment to training and continuing education to equip consular officers with particular expertise in identifying individuals who pose a threat, possess fraudulent 

documents, are imposters or otherwise attempting to enter into the 

United States. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Madam Ranking Member. I am 

pleased to take any questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Donahue follows:] 

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Mr. GALLEGLY. Thank you, Mr. Donahue. 

Ms. Kephart? 


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38 

TESTIMONY OF JANICE L. KEPHART, DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL 

SECURITY POLICY, CENTER FOR IMMIGRATION STUDIES 

Ms. KEPHART. Thank you, Chairman Gallegly and Ranking Member Lofgren, for the opportunity to testify today on the importance 

of assuring that security is embedded throughout the visa process. 

Let me start today with my conclusion. Extending appropriate 

visa adjudication authorities judiciously where necessary helps 

build a stronger and more flexible border framework that can 

adapt to changes in terrorist travel methods as we move forward. 

The 9/11 Commission’s recommendations emphasize that terrorists are best stopped when ‘‘they move through defined channels.’’ 

Remember that of 23 hijacker applications, 22 were approved. 

The first and best opportunity to stop terrorist travel is in the 

visa adjudication process where triggers for further investigation 

can mimic what should have been triggers in the 9/11 investigation, such as recently obtained new passports, suspicious or fraudulent travel stamps, indicators of extremism, or incomplete applications or fraudulent applications. 

However, we know that new terrorist travel methods evolve constantly, and it is actually DHS and ICE that have the best access 

to the information and expertise to expose those methods because 

only ICE holds the open-case information and sensitive data we 

need to identify terrorists. 

In addition—and this is really important to our discussion 

today—a foreign national’s affiliation with terrorism may develop 

after or because of an already-existing U.S. visa. Osama bin Laden 

and colleague Sheikh Mohammad specifically sought out individuals with existing U.S. visas. Thus, in my view visas need periodic 

review, especially prior to U.S.-bound travel. Revocation investigations need to be as robust as those conducted by VSU’s prior to visa 

issuance. In fact, as we know already, visa revocations can be the 

linchpin to deny entry or support removal of those already in the 

United States. 

With the death of bin Laden and an increase in retaliatory statements by al Qaeda, we may now experience even more splintering 

of al Qaeda into factions or ‘‘lone wolf’’ type terrorists. Our consular 

posts will be under more pressure than ever to get adjudications 

right, most particularly in visa-issuing countries where there is 

currently no formal policy on pre-travel vetting. Today visa waiver 

travelers coming for business or pleasure are vetted through ESTA, 

a DHS travel authorization program which operates as a virtual 

mini-visa for nationals of visa-waiver countries. 

But visa-issuing countries have no such standardized pre-travel 

vetting. This is a significant gap, even if the State Department is 

trying to fill it in right now. There is no formalization of that. In 

these instances, revocations could occur without the threat posed 

by airline travel of a terrorist such as the Christmas Day Bomber. 

From the lens of a former 9/11 Commission staffer, my view is 

that extending visa revocation authority to DHS and expanding 

VSU’s worldwide is common sense from a legal, policy, and bureaucratic viewpoint. VSP security-related reviews in high-risk areas of 

the world and throughout the visa process are essential. From a 

policy perspective, security has to trump infrastructure, political, or 

diplomatic considerations that are not always in line with security 

39 

decisions. From a legal perspective, it is DHS that is responsible 

for both homeland and border security at heart. Thus, what VSU’s 

add to security of visa processing at consulates overseas is invaluable because it is what they do. 

The State Department has its top mission as diplomacy and is 

an absolutely and necessary function, and the work they do is extremely important. But State’s chief of missions really should not 

have a say in determining whether VSU presence should be at a 

consular post or not. 

Moreover expanding VSP authority to security-related revocations is feasible. The VSU’s combine intelligence operation and law 

enforcement to intercept terrorists and constrain terrorist mobility, 

as we have already heard today. 

Our national security depends in part on the robustness of our 

border security to keep out foreign nationals with nefarious intentions. Counterterrorism efforts outside of our physical borders and 

throughout the entire visa process in both issuance and revocation 

has to be as secure as possible. The entity really with the mission, 

expertise, and bureaucratic functioning on national security-related 

immigration cases is DHS. In addition, DHS already has that visa 

authority by law. An extension of that authority simply to include 

revocations seems to make common sense. You know, legislation 

supporting this end should certainly be considered and a priority. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Kephart follows:] 

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Mr. GALLEGLY. Thank you, Ms. Kephart. 

Mr. Alden? 


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TESTIMONY OF EDWARD ALDEN, BERNARD L. SCHWARTZ 

SENIOR FELLOW, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS 

Mr. ALDEN. Good afternoon, Chairman Gallegly and Ranking 

Member Lofgren, and distinguished Members of the Subcommittee. 

I have researched extensively the issues of national security and 

immigration, both for my book, ‘‘The Closing of the American Border: Terrorism, Immigration and Security Since 9/11,’’ and as 

project director for the council’s independent task force on U.S. immigration policy. 

The goal of visa security is to use the visa system as a screening 

tool to keep out those suspected of having terrorist or criminal 

links or otherwise posing a security threat to the United States. 

Successful screening requires pulling together all of the information available to the Government and checking the identities of 

visa applicants against that information. The question of which 

agency is in charge or where the individuals doing the screening 

are located is less important than having an effective system in 

place. 

I have four points. 

First, the security review system should be both comprehensive 

and efficient, allowing for accurate determinations in a timely manner. Security done well will improve not detract from travel facilitation because it permits scarce consular and intelligence resources 

to be focused on those who may pose a threat while allowing the 

vast majority of lawful travelers to receive visas promptly. 

Second, screening tools have improved immensely over the past 

decade. In the aftermath of 9/11, there were few good options. The 

United States had little choice but to scrutinize certain visa applicants on the basis of general profile characteristics—nationality, 

age, gender, et cetera—that were only loosely connected to the actual risk posed by an individual. That is no longer the case. For 

the past couple of years, the Government has been pilot-testing a 

new system in which all visa applicants will be checked quickly 

and accurately against the information available in the Government’s terrorism, border, criminal, and visa databases. In particular, it is my understanding that this process helps to resolve 

many of the false name matches that plague the current procedures while also identifying security risks that are missed under 

the current system. 

Third, it is time, therefore, to streamline some of the redundant 

and inefficient security review programs put in place after 9/11 

when better options did not exist. The security advisory opinion 

system in which detailed background checks are done each year on 

several hundred thousand visa applicants should become more targeted and focused. 

Fourth, unnecessary visa delays, some—certainly not all—as a 

result of cumbersome security screening hurt the U.S. economy. 

The tourist industry, which is our largest single export, has missed 

out on a decade of strong growth in world travel. Visas are currently required for some 35 percent of visitors and that number 

will rise to more than half by 2002 because of growing travel from 

Brazil, India, and China. In a report on visa delays to be released 

tomorrow that I strongly recommend to your attention, the U.S. 

Travel Association estimates that simply regaining our pre-9/11 

51 

share of world travel would add $859 billion to U.S. GDP and create 1.3 million jobs. The Commerce Department has said that visa 

delays discourage foreign investment and keep business travelers, 

many who are coming here on buying missions, away from the 

United States. The result is jobs lost at a time when unemployment is near double-digit levels. 

Finally, unnecessary visa delays damage the United States’ reputation for fairness. I have come to know many of the innocent individuals caught up in lengthy delays because of poorly designed 

visa security measures. They are scientists and engineers and business people, most of whom have lived in the United States for 

years who faced long delays simply because they went home for a 

visit and triggered the background check when they tried to get 

their visas stamped to return. 

One of them, Jay Sarkar, is a microchip designer who helped create Intel’s latest generation of chips. He earned a Ph.D. at the University of Texas and almost gave up on this country after facing a 

4-month security review in 2008. Today, thankfully, he works for 

Qualcomm in San Francisco and was awarded one of the small 

number of green cards given to outstanding researchers. 

Another I wrote about recently, Lakshmi Ganti, an electrical engineer with an M.B.A. from Babson College, faced an 18-month security review in trying to return to his job in Boston. Not surprisingly, he lost that job. 5 months ago, he got a new job offer in the 

United States but was again faced with a security review. I am 

pleased to report that shortly after I filed my testimony on Monday, he called to tell me that his visa had finally been approved 

and that he will be able to return to the United States. 

It is time to move past worn-out notions that delays in visa processing are necessary for security. They are not. Delays are simply 

costs with no benefits. It is possible for the U.S. Government to do 

better on both security and facilitation, and Congress and the Administration should work together to make this happen as quickly 

as possible. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Alden follows:] 

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Mr. GALLEGLY. Thank you very much, Mr. Alden. 

Mr. Alden, in your written testimony, you state unnecessary visa 

delays do great damage to the United States’ reputation. That is 

page 3, first sentence. Correct? Are you saying that the opinions of 

foreign countries should take precedence over the safety of Americans? 

Mr. ALDEN. No. Actually what I am worried about is the opinions 

of people who have come to the United States, have worked in the 

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want to be part of this country and its economy. So it is not the 

opinions of foreign governments. I think that is irrelevant. It is the 

impression we leave with skilled would-be immigrants who are 

thinking do I want to come to the United States or do I want to 

stay home in India or in China or do I want to go to Europe? If 

I am a talented individual, where do I want to work? That is where 

we hurt our reputation. I am not worried about what foreign governments think. I am worried about what individuals who can contribute—— 

Mr. GALLEGLY. From foreign countries. 

Mr. ALDEN. From foreign countries. But many of them have contributed greatly to our economy and continue—— 

Mr. GALLEGLY. But isn’t the word ‘‘unnecessary’’ a little subjective? 

Mr. ALDEN. I don’t think so because my understanding is that we 

have the capability, due to improvement in information management, to do more effective security screening with fewer delays. I 

think our goal should be both security and facilitation. It is not an 

either/or question. 

Mr. GALLEGLY. Mr. Donahue, has the State Department headquarters established specific reasons which has communicated to 

all the embassies and consulates for which a request for establishment of a VSU at the visa-issuing post overseas may have been refused? 

Mr. DONAHUE. Thank you for the question, Mr. Chairman. 

We have not established any specific guidelines. We certainly 

support and we work very hard working with our VSU or ICE colleagues to establish new offices in all the places that we have jointly agreed they should be. The NSDD-38 requires that an Ambassador or a chief of mission at a post makes a determination about 

all people that come. And these chief of missions, whether they are 

State Department or they are a member of another agency—come 

from another agency or they come from the military, they come 

from the Hill, they come from the private sector—and they are 

tasked with the responsibility to ensure that every member of their 

mission is secure and is doing the most effective job for the U.S. 

Government. They have to make that decision. 

That being said, we work very closely with ICE in their presentations for their NSDD-38, but everyone going out to the post, no 

matter what the agency is, including State Department officials— 

there must be an approval from the chief of mission for that person 

to come out to post. 

Mr. GALLEGLY. Would you ever see a situation where State 

would ever deny a request that would enhance national security? 

Mr. DONAHUE. I cannot imagine what that would be, sir. 

Mr. GALLEGLY. Ms. Kephart, in your opinion, should aliens 

whose visas are revoked on terror or national security grounds be 

allowed to access the Federal courts to appeal their revocation? 

Ms. KEPHART. You know, when you are dealing with national security cases, you are dealing with national security information. 

The issue is a longstanding one. This is the same issue that the 

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curity information there. I don’t think it is ever a good idea to put, 

number one, State’s authority to issue a visa at stake. It is a discretionary issue. The courts have decided this again and again in 

the circuits, and it is not up for judicial review according to four 

of our circuits. 

Furthermore, you are dealing with national security information, 

as I said, and putting that system into chaos is not a good idea 

from a national security perspective at all. 

Mr. GALLEGLY. Thank you. 

I see my time has expired, but can I just add one additional 

question at the end? Do you think that part of this process, should 

they ever get into the courts, that it could force the Government 

to release classified information that might be very important and 

in our national security? 

Ms. KEPHART. Right. I didn’t state it clearly enough, but when 

I was referring to national security information, I was referring to 

classified information. Yes, sir. 

Mr. GALLEGLY. Okay, that is fine. Thank you very much, Ms. 

Kephart. 

Ms. Lofgren? 

Ms. LOFGREN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I think we might actually have more agreement than I thought 

when the hearing began because, as I understand it, when someone 

comes and applies for a nonimmigrant visa, the State Department 

is going to run it through your CLASS database, but you are only 

going to run it through the TECS database, if you have got a 

Homeland Security person there stationed abroad. Is that correct? 

Mr. DONAHUE. It is partially correct. Many of the TECS files are 

transferred over to the CLASS database, and so we check a lot of 

the records against records that are in TECS. But I think you need 

to see it in the larger process because, first of all, under the current 

process, after the visa issued, that record is then reviewed in a recurrent vetting process, something that was recommended by Ms. 

Kephart. We have a recurrent vetting process that looks at all of 

the visas that are extant and checks to see is there any other data 

in—— 

Ms. LOFGREN. Well, I think that is a good idea. 

Mr. DONAHUE [continuing]. Any sources. And I receive every day 

numerous requests to revoke, and we do revoke. In fact—— 

Ms. LOFGREN. Well, in your testimony, you indicated you have 

never—I mean, when Homeland says don’t do this, you never once 

have failed to follow that. 

Mr. DONAHUE. That is right. 

Ms. LOFGREN. So that is a piece of good news. 

Here’s a question. The GAO report—one thing that kind of jumps 

out is that the ICE agents are not necessarily receiving language 

or country-specific training, and that might not matter in some 

countries, but I think it would be very material in some other countries. 

And so when I go abroad and I visit with consular officers and 

I look at how this goes, one of the questions I have always had is 

couldn’t we break down the bureaucratic barriers. I think we ought 

to run every applicant through the TECS system. You know, you 

got a DHS person sitting next to a State Department person. They 

62 

are all on the same team. I mean, why don’t we have the State Department just run the names through, and then if there is value 

added to the law enforcement people, they have got unique training 

for that. But if the database is in the U.S., if you don’t have a DHS 

agent with the language skills so they can’t actually do the interview, I am wondering what is the value of having a person without 

the language skills stationed in a place, for example, in Yemen. 

Mr. COTE. Congresswoman, we do actually have language-capable VSU personnel overseas, and during our recruiting process, we 

do recruit for the language capabilities. 

Ms. LOFGREN. So in every case, we wouldn’t send an officer over 

unless they spoke the language of the country they are being stationed in? 

Mr. COTE. Not at every post, but there have been some instances 

where the post has required language training, and we have sent 

people to language training—— 

Ms. LOFGREN. I wonder if you could just, you know, after the 

hearing, give me a list of the agents and the language capabilities 

and where they have been sent and the instances where we have 

a match and the exceptions to that. That would very interesting to 

me. 

Mr. COTE. We will provide that. 

Ms. LOFGREN. Mr. Alden, you have had an opportunity, I think, 

to take a look at the legislation that has been discussed. Do you 

have any views on whether the bill accomplishes what you think 

needs to be done in terms of security as well as efficiency? 

Mr. ALDEN. I think to echo some of the comments that you have 

made, I think the real issue is what the VSP agents are doing in 

the embassies where they are located. And the GAO report highlighted the need to get a better handle on that. If all we are talking 

about is running names against additional databases, this can be 

done from the United States. It can be done at a fraction of the 

cost. 

Ms. LOFGREN. It would be a lot cheaper. 

Mr. ALDEN. A lot cheaper than putting people in the embassies. 

So the question is are we talking about the development of more 

of an elite corps so individuals with real language training, local 

law enforcement contacts, much like the FBI attaches or the CIA 

station personnel that we have abroad? If we are talking about the 

development of that sort of capability, then I can see it adding a 

lot in terms of what Ms. Kephart talked about in trying to identify 

indicators of terrorist travel. 

What I don’t see—and I am happy to be corrected—is that DHS 

has a plan for developing that type of capacity. It seems to be more 

just getting an ICE agent in place. 

Ms. LOFGREN. Well, I think we are going to get a report on that 

subsequent to this. 

Mr. ALDEN. And I think it is important to try to clarify that. 

Ms. LOFGREN. It just seems to me that we ought to break down 

the barriers between the two Departments to have access to the 

database. That is just to me a simple thing. And once we do that, 

assuming that we have got our technology in place—you know, if 

there is a problem with somebody, it would be nice to know it before we issue a visa and not issue the visa. That is a lot better than 

63 

revoking. Obviously, if you find out later and you need to revoke, 

you do, but the earlier you catch it, the better of you are going to 

be, it seems to me. That is a suggestion I would make, and I think 

to some extent this is a system that has worked as envisioned and 

maybe could be expanded with some interagency collaboration. 

And I see my time is up, Mr. Chairman. So I will yield back. 

Mr. GALLEGLY. I thank the gentlelady. 

The gentleman from Florida, Mr. Ross? 

Mr. ROSS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr.—it is Cote? I appreciate that. 

Let me ask you about the security process, I mean, the screening 

process. Do you have an opinion as to whether the screening process—I mean, we have got the 2004 intel requirements that they 

have in-person interviews. Do you think that the best place to do 

the screening is in the United States or at the consular office? 

Mr. COTE. I think that the best approach is to have a layered approach, and the layered approach starts with initial screening with 

databases and information sharing between the agencies that are 

involved in the national security process. 

Mr. ROSS. Go ahead. I would assume, though, that you would 

think that we should have an in-person interview at least in the 

consular office. 

Mr. COTE. Absolutely. We believe that there is no finer capability 

of not having law enforcement-trained person, boots on the ground 

so to speak, there to be able to look at documents, do interviews, 

collaborate with our State Department colleagues and other law enforcement agencies at post, along with bringing the law enforcement expertise to that process. 

Mr. ROSS. And if we had had that in place prior to September 

11th in 2001, we probably would have prevented a major catastrophe. 

Mr. COTE. I think it would have certainly enhanced the process, 

yes. 

Mr. ROSS. Now, I know the GAO has issued a report, and according to the report, over one-quarter or about 5 of 19 posts of the 

VSP are located at embassies and consulates that are ranked outside of the top 50 risk posts identified by DHS and State. Do you 

know what decision-making process was followed to place the VSP 

agents at these locations instead of high-risk locations? 

Mr. COTE. Well, we have to start out by looking at how they are 

ranked, and out of the over 200 visa issuing posts, they are ranked 

as far as risk is concerned. I can tell you that all the VSU’s are 

within the top 100, and I think as far as getting the expansion of 

the program out there at least initially, we wanted to get to any 

one of those posts that we could get to as quickly as possible to secure the posts and work with our colleagues there. So the highestrisk posts are still our goal. 

Mr. ROSS. And in furtherance of that goal, what is being done, 

can you say, to enhance that strategic plan? 

Mr. COTE. Our 5-year strategic deployment plan is still in place. 

It is consistent with what we plan to do going forward and having 

the opportunity and the resources to do that, we will. It is one of 

our top priorities. 

64 

Mr. ROSS. Thank you. I also note that the report indicated that 

since the establishment of the program in 2003, the VSP tracking 

system did not collect accurate comprehensive data on VSP performance measures such as the time spent by VSP agents on visa 

security activities or investigations, training provided to consular 

officers, and assistance and liaison activities provided by VSP 

agents. In fact, the GAO recommended that the Department of 

Homeland Security ensure that the VSP tracking system collects 

reliable data on all performance measures to accurately evaluate 

and report on VSP performances. 

Do you think that the Department of Homeland Security needs 

to improve the tracking of the VSP activities and performance? 

Mr. COTE. We concurred with the majority of that. Since the report, we have put into place a new tracking system that has those 

measures put into it, and we are tracking all the recommendations 

that the GAO report had. 

Mr. ROSS. You are. Good. 

Mr. COTE. We are. 

Mr. ROSS. Ms. Kephart, do you think that the Visa Security Program should be expanded? 

Ms. KEPHART. Yes, absolutely. The additional positive that the 

VSP provides—and the DHS OIG report from 2008 makes this very 

clear—is that it adds a layer of on-site investigative expertise that 

would not otherwise exist. So you can have not only an analysis of 

individual cases, but you can have an analysis of ongoing methods 

that are developing in terrorist travel. You cannot have that necessarily by simply a technology check. I agree with Ranking Member Lofgren that you need to make TECS available across the 

board, but that technology access is only the base for an investigation. You need to have folks on board to actually conduct those investigations, and the DHS OIG report has a very good example— 

anecdotal—of terrorist affiliations amongst three people that were 

only discovered because VSP was on site. 

Mr. ROSS. Thank you. 

I see my time is up and I yield back. 

Mr. GALLEGLY. I thank the gentleman. 

The gentlelady from Texas, Ms. Jackson Lee? 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Could I ask Mr. Donahue to move the time clock? Because I cannot see it. Just a little bit over. There we are. Thank you very 

much. And the Chairman knows I always want to comply with the 

time clock. 

Let me thank both the Ranking Member for raising some of the 

questions that she raised. 

But I would out of personal privilege like to acknowledge the 

Ambassador from Kenya who had the privilege of studying at the 

University of Texas Medical Center some 30 years ago, which I 

think indicates the kind of people that do come to the United 

States. But he now serves as the Ambassador to the United States 

from Kenya, and I would like to acknowledge him this afternoon 

and thank him for his presence here. 

Let me just ask Mr. Cote. 

Mr. COTE. It is Cote, Congresswoman. 

65 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. It is Cote, okay. I was tempted to say it but 

did not see an accent. 

But in any event, is it just your assessment in the position that 

you had that most of the people seeking to come into the United 

States, if you look globally of coming for a productive purpose, 

when you look at visas across the board in your work? 

Mr. COTE. I would that would be correct. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Mr. Donahue, what has been your assessment? I am not sure how long you have been in your position, but 

in dealing with visas, what have you seen is the landscape? 

Mr. DONAHUE. I would agree with that assessment. I have been 

doing it for 28 years and the vast majority of people applying for 

visas are coming for positive reasons. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. And, of course, most will say it only takes one 

and we understand that. We have gone over and over again as to 

what happened with 9/11. We know that many of the individuals 

were there with visas and some of them—I think the term that we 

have heard—had ‘‘clean skin,’’ had no records, so that even as they 

were issued overseas, there was no derogatory information that 

might have generated their presence at least on some. 

Maybe Mr. Cote has something he was trying to respond to? 

Mr. COTE. No, Congresswoman. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. How in the instance of the 9/11 when some 

might have had clean skin—I know there are different 

terminologies—would the enhanced Visa Security Program under 

the legislation that we are presently sort of having a hearing for— 

where would that have helped? 

Mr. COTE. You are asking me? 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Yes, sir. 

Mr. COTE. It is not absolutely certain, but I think with the enhanced screening process and the 100 percent vetting that we do 

from where they applied for the visas, I think there is a possibility 

that it could have been uncovered. Bringing law enforcement and 

the intelligence community information that we do now to that 

process, I think there would be a good possibility that it could have 

been uncovered prior to issuance. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. But what you are saying is there is also that 

kind of cooperation to a certain extent right now. 

Mr. COTE. Cooperation with the State Department? 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Yes. 

Mr. COTE. Yes. We do cooperate. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. And with intelligence. I mean, you look broadly at the applicant. 

Mr. COTE. At the visa security posts that we are at, we look in 

depth at all those applications that we believe could be a national 

security risk. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. And I know, Mr. Donahue, there is an intent 

by this bill to expand those VSU units. What do you think? Is there 

any great enhancement on what you are doing and these units in 

terms of the cost and other issues that we have to be concerned 

about? 

Mr. DONAHUE. Well, first of all, I would like to say that since 9/ 

11, we have really changed the way—— 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. You have. 

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Mr. DONAHUE [continuing]. We do things and especially in the 

last year, that instead of having static databases, we are looking 

for that person who previously we didn’t know. And that is where 

we certainly appreciate the support that we receive from ICE and 

from the other intelligence and law enforcement communities to 

help us find that person, that unknown character. We can build 

databases of bad people all—— 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. And I don’t mean to cut you off, but I need 

to let this other point—I do want to bring to the attention of the 

Committee that a gentleman from—a Saudi student attempted a 

terrorist terror plot. He was caught because of a combined effort 

but was not caught earlier. And I don’t know if this VSU unit 

would have helped him because he had no derogatory elements to 

his background. 

So I think the question I want to raise is that we need a system 

of cooperation. The question is, are the VSU units the best, and is 

it good to remove the judicial review? Because I think overall the 

grand number of people that come into the United States want to 

do good. I want to weed out the ones who do not. 

And I would just like to finish on this point. Do you have any 

comment about removing the judicial review aspect to an individual whose visa has been denied? 

Mr. GALLEGLY. Would you like to try to respond to that very 

quickly? 

Mr. DONAHUE. We have just received this bill recently. We have 

not sent it through the interagency process. We would be glad to 

take it for the record. 

Ms. LOFGREN. Would the gentlelady yield? 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. I would be happy to yield, if the gentleman 

would yield me an additional minute. 

Mr. GALLEGLY. An additional 30 seconds. 

Ms. LOFGREN. I just want to make clear for the general public 

we know that right now revocation of visas outside the United 

States is not subject to judicial review, and I don’t think anybody 

is suggesting that that be changed. 

Mr. DONAHUE. And we thank you for that. 

Ms. LOFGREN. The question is what happens constitutionally to 

someone who is in the U.S. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Correct. 

Ms. LOFGREN. I thank the gentlelady for yielding. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. My point was the judicial review component 

to the legislation. 

Ms. LOFGREN. I knew that but I just wanted to make sure the 

public understood. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. And if you can comment on that. 

And I would finally say that terrorism is something we have to 

be concerned about, but we need to balance the visa system to ensure that we still have a welcoming door for those who want to 

come and help and do well in the United States as this country has 

been based upon. 

I yield back. 

Mr. GALLEGLY. The time of the gentlelady has expired. 

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I would ask unanimous consent to enter into the record a letter 

of support on H.R. 1741, the ‘‘Secure Visas Act,’’ from ACT! for 

America. 

Hearing no objection, that will be the order. 

[The information referred to follows:] 


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Mr. GALLEGLY. I want to thank our witnesses particularly for 

your patience in waiting almost 2 hours for us to get started. I 

know your time is valuable, and we all respect that. And I really 

appreciate that, plus the excellent testimony you gave today. We 

are all grateful for that. 

Without objection, all Members will have 5 legislative days to 

submit to the Chair additional written questions for the witnesses, 

which we will forward and ask the witnesses to respond as promptly as possible so their answers can be made a part of the record 

of the hearing. 

Without objection, all Members will have 5 legislative days to 

submit any additional materials for inclusion in the record. 

And with that, again I thank the witnesses for not only your patience but your excellent testimony, and with that, the hearing 

stands adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 4:30 p.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.] 

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A P P E N D I X 

MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING RECORD

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