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STATE OF MINNESOTA

IN SUPREME COURT

A22-0630

Court of Appeals Hudson, C.J.

State of Minnesota,

Respondent,

vs. Filed: February 14, 2024

Office of Appellate Courts

Joshua Henry Baion Cummings,

Appellant.

________________________

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Leah C. Graf, Assistant Public 

Defender, Saint Paul, Minnesota, for appellant.

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, James H. Clark III, Assistant Attorney General, Saint 

Paul, Minnesota, for respondent.

________________________

S Y L L A B U S

1. The term “resources” in the criminal restitution statute, Minnesota Statutes 

section 611A.045, subdivision 1(a)(2) (2022), unambiguously means useful and valuable 

possessions.

2. The district court properly considered the defendant’s equity in his home as 

a “resource” when awarding restitution.

Affirmed.
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O P I N I O N

HUDSON, Chief Justice.

We are required here to interpret the meaning of the term “resources” in Minnesota

Statutes section 611A.045, subdivision 1(a)(2) (2022), as it pertains to criminal restitution. 

Appellant Joshua Henry Baion Cummings (Baion)1 was charged with multiple counts of 

theft based on allegations that he received $16,471.51 in wages based on his submission of

fraudulent personal care assistant records. Baion entered an Alford plea to one count of 

theft by false representation. When determining restitution at sentencing, the district court 

considered the equity in Baion’s home, which he co-owns with his spouse, as one of 

Baion’s resources. Baion appealed, arguing that the equity in a home owned with a nondefendant spouse cannot be properly considered as a resource under the restitution statute. 

In a nonprecedential opinion, the court of appeals determined that the district court did not 

err by considering Baion’s home equity as part of his resources and ability to pay 

restitution. State v. Cummings, No. A22-0630, 2023 WL 2467901, at *5 (Minn. App. 

Mar. 13, 2023). We conclude that the term “resources” unambiguously means useful and 

valuable possessions. Home equity, even when the home is co-owned with a nondefendant spouse, may be a useful and valuable possession. Accordingly, we affirm the 

court of appeals.

1 Although appellant’s name is listed in the district court record as “Joshua Henry 

Baion Cummings,” he has clarified that his proper surname is Baion. State v. Cummings, 

No. A22-0630, 2023 WL 2467901, at *1 n.1 (Minn. App. Mar. 13, 2023). Accordingly, 

we refer to appellant as Baion.
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FACTS

In October 2020, Baion was charged with four counts of theft by swindle under 

Minnesota Statutes section 609.52, subdivision 2(a)(4) (2022), and two counts of theft by 

false representation under Minnesota Statutes section 609.52, subdivision 2(a)(3) (2022). 

The State alleged that Baion had submitted false timesheets between September 2016 and 

April 2019, reporting his work as a personal care assistant for a client when, during those 

same hours, he was clocked in and working at Regions Hospital, and on one occasion, was 

traveling outside the state. In total, the State alleged that Baion received $16,471.51 in 

wages based on his submission of fraudulent personal care assistant records. 

Baion entered an Alford plea2 to one count of theft by false representation, but he 

reserved the right to challenge his ability to pay restitution. At sentencing, the State asked 

the district court to award the full amount of restitution, arguing that Baion had the ability 

to pay because he had been employed throughout the proceeding, and he owns a singlefamily home in Eagan. Baion countered that he could no longer work as a personal care 

assistant and would be terminated from his job at Regions Hospital once he was convicted 

of the offense, so his ability to pay was limited. The district court took testimony from 

Baion during the sentencing hearing. Baion testified that he is married with three minor 

children and his wife is a student who works sporadically. Baion explained that he owns a 

house with his wife in Eagan on which they owe $219,000, with monthly payments of 

2 A judge accepts an Alford plea when the defendant maintains their innocence but 

agrees that the State’s evidence is sufficient for a jury to find the defendant guilty beyond 

a reasonable doubt. State v. Theis, 742 N.W.2d 643, 649 (Minn. 2007).
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$1,500. Baion told the district court that he was not sure how much equity he and his wife 

possessed in the house. Baion also testified that he had credit card debt of approximately 

$3,000, a car loan of approximately $15,000, and student loans of approximately $40,000. 

After Baion’s testimony, his counsel inquired, “I don’t know if the State’s position 

is that he should be taking out some sort of home equity line of credit to pay 

[restitution] . . . .” The district court responded, “I think what they’re probably saying is 

there’s equity in the house” that Baion could leverage to secure a loan and to pay off the 

restitution and then “have a slightly larger monthly payment, perhaps, or extend the length 

of the mortgage.” The district court noted that calculating a defendant’s ability to pay “is 

always an inexact science” but “[i]t does appear that there’s probably money in the house 

to get an equity line.” The district court awarded restitution in the amount of $14,579.62, 

with minimum monthly payments of $50, and suggested that Baion talk to his bank about 

getting a home equity loan.3

 After commenting on Baion’s various financial obligations, 

the district court stated, “[I]f it weren’t for the equity line that I think is possible I don’t 

think that the State has demonstrated an ability to pay.” Baion did not file an objection to 

the restitution order.

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3 The district court noted that Baion could file an objection to the restitution award if 

he was not able to get a home equity loan. Baion did not file an objection.

4 Minnesota Statutes section 611A.045, subdivision 3(b) (2022), provides that “[a]n 

offender may challenge restitution, but must do so by requesting a hearing within 30 days 

of receiving written notification of the amount of restitution requested, or within 30 days 

of sentencing, whichever is later.” In State v. Gaiovnik, we recognized a narrow exception 

to this requirement, holding that a failure to object to a restitution award does not bar an 

appeal “where the only challenge is to the legal authority of the court to order restitution 

and that challenge was raised in the district court.” 794 N.W.2d 643, 648 (Minn. 2011). 
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On appeal, Baion argued that the district court erred in considering the equity in his 

home when assessing his ability to pay restitution. Cummings, 2023 WL 2467901, at *3. 

Baion asserted that the equity in his home is not an “income, resource, or obligation” under 

the plain and unambiguous meaning of Minnesota Statutes section 611A.045, 

subdivision 1(a)(2). Cummings, 2023 WL 2467901, at *3. The court of appeals reasoned 

that a “ ‘[r]esource’ is ordinarily defined as ‘[s]omething that is available for use or that 

can be used for support or help’ or in its plural form, ‘resources,’ ‘[a]n available supply, 

especially of money, that can be drawn on when needed.’ ” Id. at *4 (quoting The American 

Heritage Dictionary of the English Language 1459 (5th ed. 2018)). In applying this plain 

meaning of the word, the court of appeals concluded that home equity is a resource under 

the statute because “home equity is a source of funding owned by, and therefore available 

to, a homeowner.” Id. Accordingly, the court of appeals affirmed the district court’s 

restitution order because it reflected the district court’s “proper consideration of (1) the 

victim’s loss and (2) the defendant’s ability to pay.” Id. at *5.

This court granted Baion’s request for further review.

ANALYSIS

Minnesota Statutes section 611A.045, subdivision 1(a) provides: “The court, in 

determining whether to order restitution and the amount of the restitution, shall consider 

Baion did not object to the district court’s restitution order, he does not contend that the 

court lacks legal authority to award restitution, and he did not raise his current legal 

argument in the district court proceeding. Although Baion does not meet the requirements 

of the exception recognized in Gaiovnik, the State did not raise this deficiency below and 

waived any forfeiture argument at oral argument. See Bonga v. State, 797 N.W.2d 712, 

714 n.1 (Minn. 2011).
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the following factors: (1) the amount of economic loss sustained by the victim as a result 

of the offense; and (2) the income, resources, and obligations of the defendant.” This case 

requires us to interpret the term “resources” in section 611A.045, subdivision 1(a)(2). “We 

review issues of statutory interpretation de novo.” Hagen v. Steven Scott Mgmt., Inc.,

963 N.W.2d 164, 169 (Minn. 2021). 

“If the Legislature’s intent is clear from the statute’s plain and unambiguous 

language, then we interpret the statute according to its plain meaning without resorting to 

the canons of statutory construction.” State v. Serbus, 957 N.W.2d 84, 87 (Minn. 2021) 

(citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). “When the words of a law in their 

application to an existing situation are clear and free from all ambiguity,” Minn. Stat. 

§ 645.16 (2022), “[t]he plain language of the statute controls,” State v. Pakhnyuk, 

926 N.W.2d 914, 920 (Minn. 2019) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

To determine whether a word in a statute is ambiguous, we consider whether it can 

be “subject to more than one reasonable interpretation.” State v. Bowen, 921 N.W.2d 763, 

765 (Minn. 2019) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). If not, then the 

plain meaning of the statute’s language controls. Pakhnyuk, 926 N.W.2d at 920. In 

ascertaining the plain meaning, this court construes “words and phrases . . . according to 

rules of grammar and according to their common and approved usage.” Minn. Stat. 

§ 645.08 (2022). When the Legislature has not provided definitions of the relevant terms, 

we may consider dictionary definitions to determine a word’s common usage. See State v. 

Powers, 962 N.W.2d 853, 858 (Minn. 2021). The “relevant definition of a term depends 
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on the context in which the term is used.” State v. Alarcon, 932 N.W.2d 641, 646 (Minn. 

2019) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

I. 

The term “resources” in Minnesota Statutes section 611A.045 has no statutory 

definition. Accordingly, we may look to dictionary definitions to determine whether the 

term has a plain meaning. State v. Thonesavanh, 904 N.W.2d 432, 436 (Minn. 2017). Both 

parties propose a definition for the term “resources.” Baion proposes that because section 

611A.045 requires the court to consider the “income, resources, and obligations” of the 

defendant, “resources” refers to some measure of the defendant’s ability to financially 

compensate the victim. Minn. Stat. § 611A.045. Accordingly, Baion’s proposed definition 

of “resources” is a narrow one, specifically “an available supply that can be drawn on when 

needed.” See The American Heritage Dictionary 1495 (5th ed. 2011) (defining resources 

as “[a]n available supply, especially of money, that can be drawn on when needed”). 

The State, however, urges this court to adopt a broader definition of the term 

“resources.” In addition to acknowledging Baion’s proffered definition, the State notes 

that a “resource” can be defined as “[s]omething that is available for use or that can be used 

for support or help.” The American Heritage Dictionary 1495 (5th ed. 2018). The State 

also asserts that a “resource” may be defined as “[a] useful or valuable quality or possession 

of a country, state, organization, or person.” Black’s Law Dictionary 1568 (11th ed. 2019). 

Considering all these definitions together, the State proposes that “resources” means: 

“(1) valuable possessions, (2) things that can be used for support or help, (3) available 
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supplies of money that can be drawn on when needed, and (4) a stock or supply of materials 

or assets.” 

Typically, when parties advance different definitions in a statutory interpretation 

dispute, we evaluate and reject various definitions until we ascertain the only reasonable 

definition. Here, however, our approach differs because although the parties advocate for 

slightly different definitions, their proposed definitions are similar and do not result in 

diverging conclusions. Indeed, the parties’ proposed definitions can be easily distilled into

a single definition of “resources”: useful and valuable possessions. This definition 

accurately reflects the plain meaning of the term and is reasonable because it embodies the 

various similar definitions of the term “resources” in the context of the restitution statute. 

As the court of appeals recognized, “the statute does not distinguish among types of 

resources and places no limitations on the resources a district court may consider in 

determining a defendant's ability to pay restitution.” Cummings, 2023 WL 2467901, at *4. 

Although our definition of “resources” is broad, it is not, however, limitless. The 

context in which resources are to be considered—“in determining whether to order 

restitution and the amount of restitution,” i.e., a dollar amount—gives context to our 

definition of “resources” as useful and valuable possessions. First, a valuable possession, 

in the restitution context, refers to monetary value; sentimental value, for example, is 

irrelevant. Second, even if something has economic value, to be “useful” in the restitution 

context requires that it can be monetized. Restitution orders do not require the defendant 

to transfer the title to a home or ownership interest in a business to the victim. Instead, to 

be “useful” requires that the possession may be leveraged to provide the defendant with 
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access to money that can in turn be paid as restitution. Finally, to be a resource for 

restitution purposes, it must be a “possession” of the defendant. But this does not 

necessarily require, for purposes of considering the resource under Minnesota Statutes 

section 611A.045, subd. 1, that the defendant must have an exclusive ownership interest; a 

partial interest may be sufficient.

II.

Next, we apply the proper definition of “resources” to the facts here. Specifically, 

we consider whether Baion’s home equity is a resource for purposes of restitution.

Home equity is a homeowner’s property interest in their home that is “the difference 

between the value of the property and all encumbrances on it.” See Black’s Law 

Dictionary 681 (11th ed. 2019) (defining equity). Home equity may be leveraged to obtain 

a home equity loan, which is a “line of bank credit given to a homeowner, using as 

collateral the homeowner’s equity in the home.” Black’s Law Dictionary 1123 (11th ed. 

2019). Because home equity has economic value, and because it is useful to the extent it 

may be leveraged to obtain a loan, we conclude that home equity can be both a useful and 

a valuable possession. Therefore, in the context of the restitution statute, home equity may 

be a resource. 

That home equity may be a “resource” is not altered by the fact the defendant does 

not have exclusive ownership of the home. Even if a person shares ownership of an asset 

with others, those ownership shares may be distinctly valuable and useful to each 

individual owner. Moreover, Minnesota Statutes section 611A.045 does not restrict the 

district court to considering only resources that a defendant can access unilaterally. 
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Granted, Baion needs the consent of his spouse to access his home equity,

5 but, on the 

record before us, that home equity may still be Baion’s valuable and useful possession. It 

was thus a resource that the district court properly considered. As the district court noted, 

if Baion was unable to obtain a home equity loan and had timely objected on that basis, 

that fact may have affected the district court’s analysis of Baion’s ability to pay.

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 But 

Baion failed to show that he could not access his home equity, and the question of whether 

inaccessible home equity is a resource for restitution purposes is not now before us. 

Accordingly, the district court properly considered the fact that Baion may have equity in 

his home when ordering restitution.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the decision of the court of appeals. 

Affirmed. 

5 A home equity loan requires a conveyance. A conveyance “includes every 

instrument in writing whereby any interest in real estate is created, aliened, mortgaged, or 

assigned or by which the title thereto may be affected in law or in equity.” Minn. Stat. 

§ 507.01 (2022) (defining conveyance).

Minnesota Statutes section 507.02 (2022) prohibits a spouse, except under 

circumstances not applicable here, from unilaterally conveying the homestead. “[A] 

conveyance of the homestead by a married person without the signatures of both spouses 

is not merely voidable but is void.” Marine Credit Union v. Detlefson-Delano, 830 N.W.2d 

859, 863-64 (Minn. 2013) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).

6 “We have referred to ‘the income, resources, and obligations of the defendant’ as 

the defendant’s ‘ability to pay.’ ” State v. Wigham, 967 N.W.2d 657, 659 n.1 (Minn. 2021).