2024 UT App 45

THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

DEBRA MENDENHALL AND GARY MENDENHALL,

Appellants,

v.

SUMMERWOOD INVESTMENTS, LLC; SUMMERWOOD CONDO 

PARTNERS, LLC; SUMMERWOOD CORPORATION, INC.; HANDS ON 

CAPITAL, INC.; AND BME ENTERPRISES, LLC,

Appellees.

Opinion

No. 20210144-CA

Filed April 4, 2024

Fourth District Court, Provo Department

The Honorable Darold J. McDade

No. 090401280

Bruce M. Pritchett, Jonathan R. Rudd, and

Jeremy C. Sink, Attorneys for Appellants

Robert G. Crockett, Tanner J. Bean, Mark F. James, 

and Mitchell A. Stephens, Attorneys for Appellees

JUDGE JOHN D. LUTHY authored this Opinion, in which

JUDGES DAVID N. MORTENSEN and RYAN D. TENNEY concurred.

LUTHY, Judge:

¶1 Debra and Gary Mendenhall appeal from the district 

court’s denial of their motion to intervene in this litigation, which 

arises out of an agreement between Summerwood Condo 

Partners, LLC (Condo Partners) and business entities previously 

owned by Trevor and Linda Woolf. The Mendenhalls also appeal

from the district court’s dismissal of the underlying action. We 

conclude that the Mendenhalls’ appeal from the order denying 

their motion to intervene was untimely. We further conclude that 

the Mendenhalls lack standing to appeal from the dismissal of the 

underlying action. Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal.
Mendenhall v. Summerwood Investments

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BACKGROUND

¶2 The Mendenhalls and the Woolfs are cousins. In 2003, the 

Mendenhalls loaned money to the Woolfs to assist the Woolfs in 

financing a condominium complex. At the time, the Woolfs 

owned two holding companies, Summerwood Corporation, Inc. 

and Hands On Capital, Inc. (collectively, Hands On), which in 

turn owned Summerwood Investments, LLC (Summerwood). 

Summerwood owned the condominium complex.

¶3 In 2008, Condo Partners, an unrelated entity, entered an 

agreement to purchase Summerwood from Hands On (the 

Purchase Agreement). The sale closed that same year. At the time 

of the sale, the Woolfs still owed the Mendenhalls a substantial 

amount of money on their loan. The Purchase Agreement, 

however, included provisions under which Hands On might 

receive title to three condominium units. The Woolfs assert that 

the value of those units was roughly equal to the amount they

owed the Mendenhalls and that they, as owners of Hands On, 

intended to use those units to pay their debt to the Mendenhalls.

In the end, however, Condo Partners did not transfer title to any 

condominium units to Hands On.

¶4 The Woolfs then recorded a notice of interest against 

several condominium units, and Condo Partners and 

Summerwood (collectively, Condo Partners) responded by filing 

a Verified Petition to Nullify Wrongful Lien, thereby initiating 

this litigation. The Woolfs filed an answer. They also (as 

counterclaim petitioners), together with Hands On (as a thirdparty petitioner), asserted claims against Condo Partners for, 

among other things, an order requiring Condo Partners to convey 

to them three condominium units or the value of three 

condominium units. Additionally, the Woolfs at some point

drafted and signed a document purporting to assign from Hands 

On to the Mendenhalls “a 100% undivided interest, other rights 
Mendenhall v. Summerwood Investments

20210144-CA 3 2024 UT App 45

and titles in Three (3) of the Condominium Units described in [the 

Purchase Agreement]” (the Assignment).

¶5 After this litigation commenced, the Woolfs filed for 

bankruptcy, and eventually the bankruptcy court approved the 

sale of Hands On to BME Enterprises, LLC (BME Enterprises). 

Apparently aware that Hands On, under its new ownership, 

intended to settle and dismiss this litigation, thereby ending any 

chance for the Woolfs to obtain the three condominium units and 

thereby pay their debt to the Mendenhalls, the Mendenhalls filed

a motion to intervene, asking the court to substitute them in as the 

real parties in interest in place of the Woolfs and Hands On. In 

support of their motion, the Mendenhalls produced the 

Assignment, which (as already noted) purports to have 

transferred “a 100% undivided interest, other rights and titles in 

Three (3) of the Condominium Units described in [the Purchase 

Agreement]” from Hands On to the Mendenhalls.

¶6 Condo Partners opposed the motion, arguing that the 

Woolfs and Hands On’s claims had not been assigned to the 

Mendenhalls but, instead, had been acquired by BME Enterprises 

when it purchased the Woolfs’ interest in Hands On out of the 

bankruptcy estate. Then BME Enterprises filed its own motion to 

intervene, asking to be substituted in as the real party in interest 

in place of the Woolfs. The district court granted BME Enterprises’

motion and substituted it in as the real party in interest in place of 

the Woolfs. The court also provisionally granted the Mendenhalls’ 

motion to intervene so that they could litigate the issue of whether 

Hands On’s interest in the Purchase Agreement and claims 

arising under the Purchase Agreement had been conveyed to 

them by the Assignment.

¶7 Following discovery, Condo Partners moved for summary 

judgment on the Mendenhalls’ motion to intervene, arguing that 

the Assignment was not valid and that, even if it was, it conveyed 

to the Mendenhalls only proceeds of the Purchase Agreement—
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i.e., whatever condominium units Hands On actually received—

and, therefore, that the Mendenhalls lacked standing to intervene. 

The Mendenhalls opposed summary judgment, arguing that the 

Assignment was valid and clearly conveyed more than just 

proceeds of the Purchase Agreement. The district court denied 

Condo Partners’ motion for summary judgment, and the case 

proceeded to a bench trial on the issues related to the 

Mendenhalls’ intervention.

¶8 After the trial, the district court entered an order on 

January 15, 2021, vacating its prior provisional order of 

intervention and ultimately denying the Mendenhalls’ motion to 

intervene. Then on January 21, 2021, based on a settlement 

agreement between the parties to the underlying action—Condo 

Partners, Hands On, and BME Enterprises (collectively, the 

Appellees)—the court issued a judgment dismissing the 

underlying action with prejudice.

¶9 On February 19, 2021, the Mendenhalls filed a notice of 

appeal from both the January 15 order denying their motion to 

intervene and the January 21 judgment dismissing the underlying 

action. Following initial briefing and oral argument on appeal, 

this court asked the Mendenhalls and the Appellees for 

supplemental briefing. With their supplemental brief, the 

Appellees filed a motion to dismiss the appeal, arguing that this 

court lacks jurisdiction.1 The Mendenhalls submitted no response 

to the Appellees’ motion to dismiss.

ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶10 We first address the jurisdictional issues raised by the 

Appellees. See Living Rivers v. Executive Dir. of the Utah Dep’t of 

1. “A lack of jurisdiction can be raised by the court or either party 

at any time.” A.J. Mackay Co. v. Okland Constr. Co., 817 P.2d 323, 

325 (Utah 1991) (cleaned up).
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Env’t Quality, 2017 UT 64, ¶ 26, 417 P.3d 57 (“Before we consider 

the arguments before us on appeal, we must evaluate [the 

jurisdictional issue].”); Employers’ Reinsurance Fund v. Utah Labor 

Comm’n, 2013 UT App 139, ¶ 6, 304 P.3d 470 (per curiam) (“It is a 

court’s first duty to determine if it has jurisdiction.”). “Whether 

appellate jurisdiction exists is a question of law, which we review 

for correctness.” First Nat’l Bank of Layton v. Palmer, 2018 UT 43, 

¶ 5, 427 P.3d 1169 (cleaned up). Because we conclude that we do 

not have jurisdiction, we need not identify, and may not address,

the other issues raised on appeal. See Employers’ Reinsurance Fund, 

2013 UT App 139, ¶ 6 (“If the court concludes that it does not have 

jurisdiction, it retains only the authority to dismiss the action.” 

(cleaned up)).

ANALYSIS

¶11 The Appellees contend that to the extent the Mendenhalls 

appeal from the January 15, 2021 order denying their motion to 

intervene, the Mendenhalls’ notice of appeal is untimely and, 

thus, does not confer jurisdiction on this court. The Appellees 

further contend that to the extent the Mendenhalls appeal from 

the January 21, 2021 judgment dismissing the underlying action, 

the Mendenhalls, as non-parties, “have no standing.” We address 

each of the Appellees’ contentions in turn.

I. The Mendenhalls’ Appeal from the Denial of Their Motion to 

Intervene

¶12 The Utah Supreme Court has long held that “an order 

denying a motion to intervene is a final disposition of the claims 

asserted by the applicant for intervention and is appealable.” 

Millard County v. Utah State Tax Comm’n ex rel. Intermountain Power 

Agency, 823 P.2d 459, 461 (Utah 1991); see also Tracy v. University of 

Utah Hosp., 619 P.2d 340, 342 (Utah 1980) (“An order which denies 

an application for intervention, with prejudice, does make 

final disposition of the claims and assertions of the applicant, 
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and is therefore appealable.”); Commercial Block Realty Co. v. U.S. 

Fid. & Guar. Co., 28 P.2d 1081, 1082 (Utah 1934) (“[A] judgment 

denying the right to intervene is appealable.”). A notice of appeal 

“must be filed with the clerk of the trial court within 30 days after 

the date of entry of the judgment or order appealed from.” Utah 

R. App. P. 4(a). And “[f]ailure to file a timely notice of appeal 

deprives this court of jurisdiction over the appeal.” Pruett v. 

Anderson, 2013 UT App 33, ¶ 7, 296 P.3d 797 (per curiam), cert. 

denied, 308 P.3d 536 (Utah 2013). The case of Carrier v. Salt Lake 

County Planning Commission, 2003 UT App 30U (per curiam), 

illustrates the application of these principles in cases such as this.2

¶13 In Carrier, the district court denied a motion to intervene. 

Id. para. 2. Months later, it entered summary judgment on the 

underlying claims. Id. The applicant for intervention then filed a 

notice of appeal from the denial of its motion to intervene. Id. The 

applicant’s notice of appeal was filed “within thirty days after 

entry of the summary judgment, but more than thirty days after 

denial of his motion to intervene.” Id. Because the appeal from the 

denial of the motion to intervene was not filed within thirty days 

of the order denying intervention, this court summarily dismissed 

the appeal from the denial of the motion to intervene on the 

grounds that the appeal was untimely and, thus, that this court 

lacked jurisdiction. Id. paras. 3‒4; see also Tracy, 619 P.2d at 342 

(concluding that failure to perfect an appeal from an order 

denying intervention “goes to the jurisdiction” of the appellate 

court).

2. Although Carrier is a memorandum decision deemed not for 

official publication, this court’s memorandum decisions have 

“precedential authority” and are “automatically part of the law of 

this state, unless and until contravened by [the Utah Supreme 

Court], the legislature, or the people through the processes 

authorized for the making of new law.” Grand County v. Rogers, 

2002 UT 25, ¶ 16, 44 P.3d 734.
Mendenhall v. Summerwood Investments

20210144-CA 7 2024 UT App 45

¶14 The relevant facts here are identical to the relevant facts in

Carrier. As the district court did with the applicants for 

intervention in Carrier, the district court here denied the 

Mendenhalls’ motion to intervene. The district court entered its 

order dismissing the Mendenhalls’ motion to intervene on 

January 15, 2021. Then, like the applicants for intervention in 

Carrier, the Mendenhalls did not file their notice of appeal until 

more than thirty days after entry of the order denying their 

motion to intervene—on February 19, 2021. Accordingly, as with 

the notice of appeal in Carrier, we must conclude that the 

Mendenhalls’ notice of appeal was not timely filed as to the order 

denying intervention. See 2003 UT App 30U, paras. 3‒4. And 

because the notice of appeal was not timely in relation to the order 

denying intervention, we lack jurisdiction to consider the 

Mendenhalls’ appeal from that order and must dismiss it. See id.

II. The Mendenhalls’ Appeal from the Order Dismissing the Case

¶15 The Mendenhalls also appeal from the district court’s order 

dismissing the underlying action. But because the district court 

ultimately denied the Mendenhalls’ motion to intervene, the 

Mendenhalls were not parties to the underlying action when the 

action was dismissed. And “persons or entities that are not parties 

to a proceeding are not entitled to an appeal as of right.” Utah 

Down Syndrome Found., Inc. v. Utah Down Syndrome Ass’n, 2012 UT 

86, ¶ 9, 293 P.3d 241. Thus, when a non-party appeals, we are 

without jurisdiction and must dismiss the appeal. See Weber 

County v. Ogden Trece, 2013 UT 62, ¶ 28, 321 P.3d 1067 (“Since none 

of the so-called appellants are parties to the case, they are not 

entitled to an appeal as of right.”); Utah Down Syndrome Found., 

Inc., 2012 UT 86, ¶ 32 (dismissing the appeal because “as a 

nonparty, [the appellant] was not entitled to an appeal as of 

right”); Brigham Young Univ. v. Tremco Consultants, Inc., 2005 UT 

19, ¶ 46, 110 P.3d 678 (noting that “nonparties . . . cannot appeal 

the . . . order”), overruled on other grounds by Madsen v. JPMorgan 

Chase Bank, 2012 UT 51, 296 P.3d 671.
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20210144-CA 8 2024 UT App 45

CONCLUSION

¶16 The Mendenhalls appeal from the order denying their 

motion to intervene and from the judgment dismissing the 

underlying action. Their appeal from the order denying their 

motion to intervene was untimely because it was not filed until 

more than thirty days after the district court’s entry of that order.

Moreover, as nonparties to the underlying action, the 

Mendenhalls lack standing to appeal from the judgment 

dismissing that action. For these reasons, this court lacks 

jurisdiction, and we dismiss the Mendenhalls’ appeal.