1

This report was prepared by the staff of the Federal Energy Regulatory 

Commission in consultation with staff from the North American Electric

Reliability Corporation and its Regional Entities.

This report does not necessarily reflect the views of the Commission.
2

Table of Contents

I. Executive Summary...................................................................................................... 3

II. Introduction..................................................................................................................... 7

III. Study Process and Data .............................................................................................. 7

IV. Assessment ................................................................................................................... 11

A. Overview..................................................................................................................... 11

B. Communications Resources for System Restoration absent SCADA or 

EMS................................................................................................................................ 13

C. Personnel Resources for System Restoration absent SCADA or EMS

......................................................................................................................................... 18

D. Backup Power Resources for System Restoration absent SCADA or 

EMS................................................................................................................................ 26

E. Analytical Support for System Restoration absent SCADA or EMS ... 30

F. Training for System Restoration absent SCADA or EMS........................ 35

V. Appendix 1 - Joint Study Team............................................................................. 39

VI. Appendix 2 – Request Letter for Participation.............................................. 40

VII. Appendix 3 – Glossary of Terms and Acronyms Used in Report........... 42
3

I. Executive Summary

In September 2014, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (Commission) initiated a 

joint staff review, in partnership with the North American Electric Reliability 

Corporation (NERC) and its eight Regional Entities,

1 to assess entities’ plans for 

restoration and recovery of the bulk-power system following a widespread outage or 

blackout, which culminated in the issuance of a joint Report on Restoration and Recovery 

Plans in January 2016.2

 While the Restoration and Recovery Report provided a 

comprehensive understanding of the electric utility industry’s bulk-power system 

recovery and restoration planning, it also identified certain issues that went beyond the 

scope of the review, and recommended further study of those issues. One of the areas 

identified for further study was the potential impact of the loss of Supervisory Control 

and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems on system restoration.3

Based on the recommendation in the Restoration and Recovery Plan Report, FERC, 

NERC and the Regional Entities initiated a joint study in the fall of 2016, focusing on the 

potential impact of the loss of SCADA, Energy Management System (EMS), or InterControl Center Communications Protocol (ICCP) functionality on system restoration, and 

the manner in which such impact could be mitigated.4

 The objective of the study was to 

assess applicable entities’ system restoration plan steps that may be difficult in the 

absence of SCADA, ICCP data, and/or EMS, and identify viable resources, methods or 

practices that would expedite system restoration despite the loss of such systems, 

including identifying where such methods and practices could be incorporated into 

system restoration training. 

 1 Pursuant to section 215(e)(4) of the Federal Power Act, NERC has delegated 

certain compliance and enforcement authority to eight Regional Entities.

 2 Report on the FERC-NERC-Regional Entity Joint Review of Restoration and 

Recovery Plans, January 2016, at http://www.ferc.gov/media/news-releases/2016/2016-

1/01-29-16.asp (Restoration and Recovery Report).

 

3 Events such as the recent cyber-attack against the Ukraine power grid have 

highlighted the need for this follow-up study by demonstrating the need to have alternate 

methods to monitor and control the electric grid when SCADA and other control and data 

systems are unavailable.

 

4 Appendix 3 includes a glossary of terms and acronyms used in this report.
4

In conducting this review, the joint study team gathered information from a

representative sample of eight volunteer registered entities (the participants). The joint 

study team considered several factors when identifying potential participants for the 

study, seeking entities with significant bulk-power system responsibilities, entities that 

are located in different regions, entities that have gained experience in restoration from 

extreme conditions or events, e.g., involvement in prior blackout events, hurricanes, 

severe winter weather, or tornadic conditions, and entities that regularly use SCADA, 

EMS, ICCP or other data sources in their bulk-power system operations.

Notably, this study is based on an initial assumption that a blackout event has occurred 

coincident with the loss of SCADA and/or EMS functionality. This study is not intended 

to assess the degree to which the participants’ SCADA or EMS systems are able to 

withstand or quickly recover from a widespread event to complete restoration back to 

normal operations (e.g., automatic generation control, regional market operations). 

However, as further discussed below in Section IV.A., the joint study team found that all 

participants have made significant investments in their SCADA and EMS infrastructures, 

including leveraging redundancies to increase availability and functionality.

While some participants have prepared more than others for the possibility that SCADA 

systems or EMS may be partially or totally unavailable at times during a system 

restoration event, the joint study team found that all participants would remain capable of

executing their restoration plan without SCADA/EMS availability. This is attributed to 

some participants’ planning to address loss of SCADA or EMS during system restoration,

as well as other participants’ emergency preparedness for conditions such as these 

without specifically planning for system restoration absent SCADA or EMS. The 

participants acknowledged, however, that completion of all restoration steps would be 

more time consuming and more involved under such conditions, especially those steps 

requiring a larger degree of coordination and those steps performed during later stages of 

the restoration process. 

This report provides details of the joint study team’s assessment, and makes 

recommendations for industry-wide consideration regarding practices, procedures and 

methodologies aimed to expedite system restoration during a loss of SCADA or EMS 

functionality based on the various practices and approaches studied. These 

recommendations include approaches to system monitoring without SCADA or EMS 

tools, planning to support system restoration under such conditions, and incorporating 

these measures and approaches into system restoration training. 

The joint study team considers the recommendations in this report appropriate for all 

entities responsible for system restoration. Additionally, the joint study team observed 

numerous beneficial practices employed by individual participants that may not be 
5

universally appropriate or possible. The joint study team recommends that entities 

consider incorporating those practices, or variations thereof, as appropriate. 

Recommendations

1. Planning for backup communications measures. The joint study team recommends 

that entities review and refine as necessary their backup communications measures 

and capabilities to ensure that they can be depended on to provide effective means of 

communications in the event of the loss of normal communications means during 

system restoration absent SCADA or EMS. This should include a review of their 

backup or alternative interpersonal (voice) communications systems to ensure that 

they are capable, available, and reliable for the increased use expected during system 

restoration without SCADA functionality. The joint study team also recommends 

incorporating loss of normal communications scenarios and use of backup

communications systems in entities’ system restoration training to practice their use in 

executing restoration plan steps and in monitoring of system restoration conditions 

absent SCADA. [Section IV.B.]

2. Planning for personnel support during system restoration absent SCADA. The 

joint study team recommends that entities review and refine their human resource 

operations support measures as needed to support the field and control room 

personnel necessary for system restoration absent SCADA. This includes personnel 

needed to acquire field and generation plant data, to maintain system operator 

situational awareness during blackout conditions for extended periods of time, and to 

provide logistical support for their assignments (e.g., food, shelter, transportation prearrangements). In refining such measures, entities should consider incorporating 

methods and tools that could aid personnel in gathering and managing the field data to 

provide useful information to the system operators. The joint study team also 

recommends incorporating these measures and tools into entities’ system restoration 

training, including the involvement of both field and control center support personnel 

who would gather and manage the field data. [Section IV.C.] 

3. Planning backup power supplies for an extended period of time. Due to the 

expected increase in time to accomplish system restoration absent SCADA/EMS 

functionality, the joint study team recommends that entities review and refine as 

necessary their existing provisions for backup power resources at restoration path 

substations and other locations identified as priority or critical in system restoration 

plans, to ensure they are available for an extended period of time beyond the normal 

expectation from battery backups. [Section IV.D.] 

4. Analysis tools for system restoration. Recognizing that the absence of 

SCADA/EMS functionality results in loss of State Estimator and Real-Time 
6

Contingency Analysis, the joint study team recommends that applicable entities 

review and refine as necessary other analysis tools for use (e.g., use of offline power 

system analysis tools, phasor measurement unit data) especially during the later stages 

of restoration. The joint study team also recommends incorporating these analysis 

tools into entities’ system restoration training, if not being done already, to practice 

their setup and use by support staff during system restoration. [Section IV.E]

5. Incorporating loss of SCADA or EMS scenarios in system restoration training. 

The joint study team recommends that applicable entities, as part of their system 

restoration training, practice implementation of restoration plan steps absent 

SCADA/EMS functionality or other data sources, including incorporating the insights

found. [Section IV.F]

Observed Practices for Consideration

Throughout its review, the joint study team found that the participants have many 

practices and protocols that serve to enhance their restoration and recovery planning and 

readiness in the event of loss of SCADA, EMS or ICCP systems. The joint study team 

recognizes that these practices may not be appropriate for all entities in all situations, but 

is confident that the sharing of this knowledge, thereby obtaining a wider understanding 

and incorporation of these practices, may add significant value to certain entities and to 

the industry as a whole. Examples of these beneficial practices include the following: 

• Some participants have taken into account on-site fuel shelf life for their installed 

backup generators, using long shelf life fuels, and/or are routinely maintaining the 

quality of the on-site stored fuel to ensure that extended backup power supplies are

available when needed.

• Participants transitioning to balancing area control absent EMS functionality have 

instituted backup area control error (ACE) applications. These backup

applications receive tie-line data from backup data communications sources, 

which, along with other inputs, can enable the transition back to balancing 

authority control.

Such practices, which were voluntarily implemented, or are under development by the 

review participants, serve to enhance the industry’s preparation for a major event, and 

provide training to recover more quickly and efficiently when an event occurs. The 

beneficial practices observed by the joint study team are discussed further in the relevant 

sections of this report. 
7

II. Introduction

In September 2014, the Commission initiated a joint staff review, in partnership with the 

NERC and its eight Regional Entities to assess entities’ plans for restoration and recovery 

of the bulk-power system following a widespread outage or blackout, and culminated in 

the issuance of a joint Report on Restoration and Recovery Plans in January 2016.5

 The 

Restoration and Recovery Report provided a comprehensive understanding of the electric 

utility industry’s bulk-power system recovery and restoration planning, but identified 

certain issues that went beyond the scope of the review, and recommended further study

of those issues. One of the identified areas for further study was the impact of the loss of 

SCADA systems on system restoration, since system operators rely heavily on such 

systems in performing and managing the restoration process. Events such as the 

December, 2015 cyber-attack against the Ukraine power grid have demonstrated the need 

to have alternate methods to monitor and control the electric grid when SCADA/EMS 

and other control and data systems are unavailable, and highlight the need for this study. 

The primary objective of this follow-up review is to identify steps in entities’ bulk-power 

system restoration plans that may be difficult in the absence of SCADA, ICCP data, 

and/or EMS, and identify viable resources, methods or practices to enable timely system 

restoration in the absence of SCADA/EMS functionality, which could then be 

incorporated into entities’ system restoration training.6

 

III. Study Process and Data

The joint study team adopted a collaborative model for conducting the review. Subject 

matter experts from the Commission, NERC, and the Regional Entities collectively 

provided the necessary planning and operations expertise to conduct the study.7

In order to facilitate a full and open discussion of each participant’s approach to 

restoration in the absence of SCADA/EMS functionality, the joint review team agreed 

not to disclose entity-specific information outside each review group. This report 

accordingly provides the results of the reviews without attribution to individual entities.

 5 Restoration and Recovery Report, supra note 2. 

 

6 See Appendix 2 – Request Letter for Participation.

7 Appendix 1 lists the joint study team members.
8

In making its assessment, the joint study team reviewed relevant reports, as well as 

relevant written information and documentation as provided by each participant, and 

engaged in discussions with the participants to gain additional information and insights. 

The process used for this study included three steps:

Step 1: Identify candidate entities;

Step 2: Assess entities’ restoration plan steps that may be difficult under 

various SCADA, ICCP data, and/or EMS unavailability scenarios 

and identify viable resources, methods, or practices for timely 

restoration; and 

Step 3: Form recommendations (viable resources, methods, beneficial

practices, and training).

A. Step 1: Identify Candidate Entities

The joint study team developed participant identification criteria designed to help best 

achieve the overall study goals of identifying viable resources, methods or practices that 

would enable timely system restoration absent SCADA/EMS functionality. The 

following is a list of the identification criteria used:

• Entities subject to Reliability Standards EOP-005-2 and/or EOP-006-2 that 

have a system restoration plan or coordination steps, and/or have 

documented procedures for starting blackstart resources; 

• Entities that use SCADA and/or EMS systems in their bulk-power system 

operations, including entity(ies) that use or share ICCP data;

• Entities with significant bulk-power system responsibilities, viewed as 

competent in the study focus areas, to help to maximize potential learning 

and improvement; 

• Entities located in various areas or regions, where different capabilities, 

and/or characteristics may exist; and

• Entities that have gained experience in restoration from encountering 

extreme conditions or events, e.g., involvement in prior blackout events, 

hurricanes, severe winter weather, or tornadic conditions.

The joint study team identified eight registered entities as prospective participants in 

accordance with the above criteria, and contacted each to request its participation. All 

contacted entities agreed to participate in the study, and without exception, were 
9

exemplary in their cooperation with the joint study team, sharing the detailed technical 

rationale behind implementation of their system restoration plans in the absence of 

SCADA or EMS. The joint staff team commends the participating entities for their open 

and active contributions.

A study request letter was sent to each volunteer participant, which outlined the 

information needed for the study.8

 Specifically, participants were asked to provide, or 

make available for review and discussion, documentation pertaining to the following:

• Relevant steps of system restoration plans (entity-identified);

• Operating plans and procedures for backup functionality in the event that SCADA, 

EMS or ICCP is unavailable;

• Procedures addressing monitoring and controlling voltages, real and reactive 

flows, and switching transmission elements (including aspects of system 

restoration such as control of frequency, contingency reserves, and synchronizing) 

in the event of the loss of SCADA, ICCP data, and/or EMS;

• Provisions for backup facilities if the main monitoring system is unavailable,

• Procedures to mitigate the effects of analysis tool outages;

• Any results or analysis of operator drills, exercises, simulations, or tests involving 

a loss of situational awareness tools, e.g., SCADA, ICCP, EMS, etc.; and 

• Any public or private reports or other documents that have already been produced 

in these areas that may be beneficial for the team to review, e.g., Severe Impact 

Resiliency Task Force Report. 

Where possible, the joint study team reviewed these documents prior to the start of the 

participants’ assessments, in order to aid in identifying specific areas of interest for each 

participating entity and for the study as a whole. 

B. Step 2: Assess Entities’ Restoration Plan Steps 

To aid in identifying restoration plan steps that may be difficult when SCADA, EMS, and 

ICCP systems are not available, the joint study team examined various “unavailability 

scenarios.” This approach afforded participants the opportunity to explain what 

resources, methods, or practices are used over a range of SCADA unavailability 

 8 A copy of the request letter is attached hereto as Appendix 2.
10

scenarios, and supported a more comprehensive review. Several relevant scenarios were 

assessed, including:

• SCADA or EMS system is online with limited functionality due to certain 

transmission remote terminal units (RTUs), or RTU 

concentrator/communications facilities, being out-of-service;

• SCADA or EMS system is online with limited functionality, due to 

widespread transmission RTU outages, e.g., delay in starting system 

restoration results in widespread substation RTU backup power supply 

depletions;

• SCADA or EMS system is offline or is not functional; 

• ICCP data system is offline or not functioning properly; and 

• SCADA/control system of a generator used in system restoration is 

offline/unavailable.

These scenarios were used to gain an understanding of the participants’ resources, 

methods, or practices to support system restoration absent SCADA/EMS functionality. 

The areas of focus included but were not limited to:

• Human resources for system restoration;

• Execution of system restoration steps; and

• Monitoring and control of system restoration conditions.

These areas were identified and shared with participants prior to the assessment, to enable 

the joint study team to perform an efficient, thorough, and consistent assessment for all 

participants, within the scope of review. 

C. Step 3: Form Recommendations 

Upon completion of the participant assessments (including site visits with all 

participants), the joint study team compiled its findings and recommendations in this 

report, developed with the intent of increasing the level of preparedness for potential 

problems associated with system restoration absent SCADA/EMS functionality, and 

sharing sound practices identified for undertaking restoration despite the loss of such 

functionality, including planning and training for such events.
11

IV. Assessment 

A. Overview 

During the review process, the participants provided consistent observations concerning 

the overall impact on system restoration of the loss of SCADA or EMS functionality, 

leading to some broad conclusions. The joint study team found that although all 

participants have made significant investments in their SCADA or EMS infrastructures in 

order to avoid problems associated with their loss, including instituting redundancies to 

ensure these systems are online and functional, they still prepare for the possibility that 

SCADA systems or EMS may be partially or completely unavailable, including what 

actions would be taken if it occurred during a system restoration event. 

All participants indicated that they would be capable of executing their restoration plan 

independent of SCADA or EMS availability. For example, in the absence of SCADA 

remote control capabilities, participants will dispatch local field operators to perform the 

necessary monitoring and control actions. Similarly, the participants indicated that 

blackstart generators, and the next generating units to be started, are not dependent on 

SCADA/EMS availability for start-up and utilization for system restoration, and that 

synchronization of islands and interconnections are not dependent on SCADA/EMS 

availability. 

Although participants indicated that system restoration will be possible absent SCADA or 

EMS functionality, completion of all restoration steps would overall be more time 

consuming and more involved without SCADA availability. The participants described 

several aspects of system restoration that would be more difficult and time-consuming 

due to the loss of these systems. For example, during the onset of a blackout, participants 

indicated that system restoration will demand additional use of field personnel, not only 

to help determine restoration strategy, but also to perform restoration plan steps that 

would have otherwise been completed through use of SCADA and to perform monitoring 

and reporting of grid conditions back to the control center system operators. In addition, 

the participants indicated that system restoration steps which involve additional 

communications and coordination with multiple personnel, such as load pick-up, will be 

more labor-intensive in the absence of SCADA or EMS. Overall, the participants 

expected that dependency on interpersonal communications would significantly increase 

in performing system restoration in the absence of SCADA, and that any unavailability of 

interpersonal communications would further hamper system restoration. 

With respect to the overall restoration strategy adopted, the participants indicated that 

their strategies are based on the state of bulk-power system facilities impacted by a given 

event and their availability for restoration, not on availability of operator tools such as 
12

SCADA or EMS. However, participants stated that they may modify their restoration 

strategies during later stages of restoration to preserve the reliability of the restored 

system, based on what may or may not be known about the loss of SCADA and the 

completion of associated mitigation to prevent its recurrence. For example, if a SCADA 

system(s) is still unavailable as system restoration progresses, the participants may adjust 

their restoration strategy accordingly, e.g., restore areas within the reliability coordinator 

footprint but remain operating as separate islands within the reliability area, holding off 

synchronizing to form a larger island and/or interconnecting with the rest of the 

interconnection, thereby reducing the risk of an outage to a larger restored area. 

Similarly, if a cyber event caused the unavailability of SCADA or EMS and if it is 

unclear whether the underlying problem has been addressed, participants indicated that it 

may be more reliable to operate in an islanded configuration until associated risks are 

alleviated to avoid a repeat, wide-area blackout. Also, depending on the event, there may 

be a range of facilities impacted, and all participants agree that their strategies need to be 

flexible to adjust to the situation at-hand. 

In addition, participants indicated that frequency control and monitoring during system 

restoration are not dependent on SCADA/EMS availability. Instead, participants monitor 

frequency via communication with generator operators who monitor and control 

frequency via their generating units’ power plant equipment. Given this reliance on 

generator controls, the joint study team also explored the impact of loss of isochronous 

generator digital controls on the restoration process (which may occur due to a cyber 

event). The joint study team found that participants would rely on another generator to 

perform isochronous control for the island if the primary generator was compromised. In 

addition, if the affected generator was not available at all, participants would rely on 

other islands that are part of their plan for system restoration, i.e., all plans involve the 

development of multiple restoration paths and islands. Thus, their restoration plans 

incorporate diversification or backups for loss of a generator’s control system. 

Finally, with respect to other operator tools potentially unavailable during a widespread 

outage, the joint study team also considered the loss of ICCP data and of State Estimator 

(SE) and Real-Time Contingency Analysis (RTCA) tools. The joint study team 

concluded, based on discussions with and information provided by the participants, that 

ICCP is not critical to system restoration because transmission control center operators 

who are primarily responsible for system restoration use SCADA systems and do not 

depend on ICCP,

9 and that SE and RTCA tools are neither functional in the absence of 

 9 Bulk-power system operating entities use ICCP applications to exchange real 

time operations data between entities. Although ICCP data would be used if available to 
13

SCADA/EMS nor needed during the early stages of system restoration plan execution. 

Instead, in order to ensure that the restoration plans steps will be effective and allow the 

system to remain within tolerances, participants perform periodic offline load flow 

studies of the steps and loads to be energized for primary paths, and, where feasible, for 

alternate restoration paths. 

B. Communications Resources for System Restoration absent SCADA 

or EMS 

1. Introduction

Because the absence of communications can affect SCADA functionality and because 

communications availability is important to the overall system restoration process, the 

joint study team examined participants’ primary and backup communications resources 

and how those resources are deployed for reliable communications during system 

restoration, when SCADA or EMS system functionality is compromised. 10 

All participants described scenarios where loss of field communications can result in loss 

of SCADA functionality, i.e., the system operators’ computer displays may still be 

visible, but provide no SCADA functionality. For example, SCADA functionality could 

be affected by loss of data communications from substations when communications paths 

are unavailable, or by the loss of data centers that support data communications from 

substations. Further, with loss of SCADA functionality, all participants indicated they 

would rely more heavily on interpersonal communications between control center 

operators and field personnel performing system restoration, and that if those 

communications are compromised, system restoration would be further hampered. 

Overall, the joint study team found that participants have made significant investments to 

help ensure their normal means of communications are available during blackout events 

to support the system restoration process, including taking steps to ensure expedited

restoration of vital communications and data transfer systems, e.g., through 

 

provide situational awareness to entities including reliability coordinators, transmission 

system operators do not use it to execute restoration plan steps.

10 Communications elements for backup functionality and alternate 

communications capabilities are addressed by NERC Reliability Standards EOP-008-1 -

Loss of Control Center Functionality, and COM-001-2.1 - Communications.
14

implementation of Telecommunications Service Priority.11 However, similar to their 

approach for the potential loss of SCADA, all participants also prepare for the possibility 

that their normal means of communications may be partially or totally unavailable at 

some time during a restoration event through the provision of alternate and backup forms 

of communication.

2. Observations

Participants explained that for system restoration, personnel are dispatched to field 

locations to receive switching instructions via interpersonal communications from 

transmission system operators. In the absence of SCADA or EMS, additional field 

personnel are needed to perform restoration steps, as well as to provide operators 

situational awareness via remote monitoring of restoration conditions, e.g., voltage levels. 

Thus, the absence of SCADA functionality leads to increased reliance on and usage of 

interpersonal communications and additional resources. 

The joint study team found that all participants have multiple forms of interpersonal 

communications between system operators/control centers and the following: 

• Reliability coordinators (for coordinating restoration strategy, obtaining 

authorization to start restoration, and synchronizing during later stages of 

restoration);

• Blackstart generators (for initiating system restoration plan);

• Other generation plants including nuclear power plants;

• Field personnel (for executing restoration plan steps and monitoring); and 

• Neighboring system operators (for synchronizing and coordination).

12

 11 Telecommunications Service Priority is a Department of Homeland Security 

program that authorizes national security and emergency preparedness organizations to 

receive priority treatment for vital voice and data circuits or other telecommunications 

services.

12 One participant’s approach, in deciding how to deploy multiple technologies for 

backup interpersonal communication, is to use the “best communications available” 

during the event for control center-to-field communications.
15

The joint study team found that all participants use wireless communications systems 

(such as satellite systems) for alternate interpersonal communications between system 

operators and reliability coordinators, neighboring transmission system operators, and 

black start generating plants. In addition, one participant has extensive satellite 

communications sets available for internal deployment to field personnel to serve as an 

alternate means of interpersonal communication. Some participants preprogram satellite 

communication systems with important numbers for emergency situations such as system 

restoration to increase speed of use. However, these participants also conveyed concerns 

about satellite phone functionality during emergencies, noting that available bandwidth 

for satellite phone use may be limited given the expected increased use during an 

emergency, and that satellite communications include inherent voice delays that make 

conversations more difficult as compared to interpersonal communications facilities used 

during normal conditions. 

In addition to use of satellite systems, the joint study team found that all participants with 

SCADA functionality have other wireless systems that provide alternate or backup

communications. All applicable participants use wireless interpersonal communications 

for backup interpersonal communications between control center operators and field 

personnel when land lines are unavailable. Some participants also use wireless 

interpersonal communications for communicating with blackstart and next-start 

generation plants. 

Following a sufficiency review of its wireless capability, one participant has undertaken 

an initiative focusing on possible expanded use of wireless for the entity’s enterprisewide backup interpersonal communications, with plans to increase its resiliency. Also, 

all participants noted their concern that standard cellular service capability, which can 

provide a backup means of interpersonal communications during normal grid conditions, 

may be overloaded during a large scale event and could delay restoration. Some 

participants use priority communications services to increase the reliability of their 

interpersonal communications during emergencies. 

The joint study team further found that all participants have varying forms of blast 

messaging systems. These systems are used to send alerts to internal and external 

personnel and organizations, e.g., reliability coordinator blast communications to 

transmission system operators in their reliability area, alerting specific personnel or 

subgroups of emergency conditions, via cell phone, home phone recording, and PC 

tablets, etc. Participants conveyed that these alert systems are especially important to 

convey messages during the onset of a major event such as a blackout.

All participants conveyed that it was important to have control over their communications 

resources where possible, so that in time of need or crisis, they are not dependent on 

outside resources. For most of the participants, ownership of the communications 
16

resource is important. For example, all of the applicable participants’ backup wireless 

systems for field communications are entity-owned and maintained. Other 

communication systems owned by participants include: 

• ICCP data infrastructure (to improve its reliability and functionality); and 

• A private text paging system deployed on a fixed wireless communications system 

within that participant’s service territory. 

Participants noted that external communication paths and media are unknown in some 

instances. For example, most participants indicated that their current blast 

communications system is owned and housed by external vendors. Certain participants 

have on-going initiatives to improve and have more control over their communications in 

support of system restoration during emergencies, including emergencies resulting in the 

loss of SCADA or EMS functionality: 

• One participant is considering expanding its fiber optic grid, using new vendors 

(satellite phone networks, for example) to enhance its backup interpersonal 

communications systems, and pursuing more satellite communication options.

• Another participant is undertaking an enterprise-wide backup communications 

initiative, which includes identifying all the communications systems in use and 

what they are used for, considering how each of the systems currently in place 

might be used for other purposes in order to provide backups to other entity 

emergency operations. 

• Some participants are incorporating use of backup communications devices in 

training events, i.e., going beyond testing them to make sure they work and having 

operations personnel practice using the backup systems during system restoration 

training. 

3. Conclusions

The joint study team found that robust communications facilities are especially important 

to support system restoration under a loss of SCADA scenario, due to the expected 

increase in use of interpersonal communications. The joint study team found that entities 

have backup and alternate means of communications in the event of loss of normal means 

of communication, but that they may be able to improve their response to a wide-scale 

event involving the loss of SCADA systems by conducting more thorough reviews of 

backup and alternate communications systems, to ensure they are capable, available, and 

reliable for the increased use required during such an event, assuming limited or no cell 

phone or land line service. 
17

a) Recommendation 

Planning for backup communications measures. The joint study team recommends 

that entities review and refine as necessary their backup communications measures and 

capabilities to ensure that they can be depended on to provide effective means of 

communications in the event of the loss of normal communications means during system 

restoration absent SCADA or EMS. This should include a review of their backup and

alternate interpersonal communications (voice) systems, to ensure that they are capable, 

available and reliable for the increased use expected during system restoration without 

SCADA functionality. The joint study team also recommends incorporating loss of 

normal communications scenarios and use of backup communications systems in entities’ 

system restoration training to practice their use in executing restoration plan steps and in 

monitoring of system restoration conditions absent SCADA.

b) Observed Practices for Consideration

• Identify a preferred order of use for backup interpersonal communications in the 

event of loss of normal communications, e.g., order of communications: landline 

phones -> wireless -> satellite phones.

• Have additional, i.e., extra, satellite phones for use by field personnel as a means 

of providing additional backup for interpersonal communications to the 

transmission system operator.

• In the event the normally used telecommunications network is down, have a 

portable network with independent backup communications capability(s) (e.g., 

satellite, cellular).

• Allow key system RTU points to fail over to a cellular communication medium to 

provide data back to the control room to enhance SCADA functionality even if 

normally-used communication and data transfer systems are unavailable.

13

 13 All participants have communications elements that provide for backup 

functionality in the event its primary control center functionality is lost, which may 

involve use of several communications means, e.g., redundant fiber optic, land line 

facilities, microwave, etc. 
18

C. Personnel for System Restoration absent SCADA or EMS

1. Introduction

The joint study team asked participants to provide information as to how they deploy 

personnel to perform system restoration during an outage event or other emergency, and 

what, if anything, would be different under a loss of SCADA/EMS functionality scenario. 

Areas explored included the use of field personnel, control center personnel, and other 

human resource support services to support system restoration without reliance on 

SCADA or other remote data acquisition tools. 

2. Observations

All participants conveyed that, although their underlying system restoration plans remain 

the same assuming the loss of SCADA, EMS or other associated tool functionalities,

implementation of their plans would become more human resource intensive.

14 All 

participants employ an emergency response organization, or incident command system

(ICS) for large-scale events such as a system-wide blackout.

15 This structure allows the 

participants to, among other things, manage and coordinate the support resources 

necessary for system restoration, including in those cases where increased human 

resource needs are expected due to the loss of SCADA. The participants indicated that 

ICS provides for an “all-hazards” approach, which is flexible and scalable depending on 

the severity of the system conditions.

16 

 14 Participants indicated that several important and immediate actions to determine 

restoration strategy would not change regardless of SCADA, EMS or ICCP availability, 

such as establishing communications with the reliability coordinator, neighboring 

transmission operators, and generation plants to gain understanding of local and 

surrounding system conditions. 

15 ICS is a management system designed to enable effective and efficient domestic 

incident management by integrating a combination of facilities, equipment, personnel, 

procedures, and communications operating within a common organizational structure. 

See Federal Emergency Management Administration (FEMA) “National Incident 

Management System” for more information regarding ICS, at 

https://www.fema.gov/national-incident-management-system.

16 An all-hazards approach involves implementing one measure to mitigate the 

effects of multiple event scenarios or threats. For example, additional backup power 

supplies mitigate severe weather-caused local outages, as well as system-wide blackouts.
19

a) Expected Personnel Needs and Sufficiency 

While all participants indicated that increased human resources will be needed for system 

restoration during the loss of SCADA or EMS systems, they also indicated that they have 

sufficient human resources in place for executing their system restoration plans under 

such conditions. Participants explained that system restoration, even under a loss of 

SCADA condition, may not involve dispatching field personnel to every substation on 

their system, and may not require field personnel initially dispatched to certain 

substations to remain there for the entire restoration plan implementation. All 

participants stated that they have qualified field personnel who would be dispatched to 

restoration paths, e.g., cranking paths, as designated in their system restoration plans. All 

participants would draw from field personnel across their company to provide additional 

monitoring resources at substations already restored and to provide situational awareness 

of system conditions to control center system operators. 

b) Initial Staffing and Deployment of Personnel

With respect to the initial assessment of system conditions and initial deployment of field 

personnel, the participants have a variety of processes in place to facilitate restoration in 

the event of loss of SCADA or EMS functionality. To facilitate prompt assessment of 

system conditions at the onset of a blackout absent SCADA availability, some 

participants have identified specific substations to which field personnel will be 

dispatched. These substations include intra and inter-area tie-line synchronizing 

substations, substations connected to large generation stations, and substations 

connecting several extra-high voltage transmission lines. 

One participant described a structured approach for loss of SCADA or EMS 

functionality, which could be scaled to apply to normal power grid conditions or to 

emergencies such as a blackout, to obtain information on initial system conditions, to 

conserve backup power supplies for later restoration,17 and to subsequently maintain 

situational awareness in an efficient manner. This approach involves the pre-planned 

identification of base substations (locations where qualified and skilled substation field 

personnel would be mobilized 24/7), route substations (which would be inspected on predetermined routes originating from each base substation), and non-route substations

(which would be only inspected when conditions warrant, e.g., inspecting storm damage 

at a smaller transmission substation). 

Some participants have call-out lists which pre-identify where field personnel are needed 

and their roles in the event of a blackout. These call-out lists typically identify specific 

 17 See Section IV.D - Backup Power Resources for System Restoration absent 

SCADA or EMS.
20

personnel and their capabilities, the potential areas in need of staffing, e.g., specific 

substations to be manned, and the roles and duties expected to be performed by assigned 

personnel on location. These participants explained that in the event of the loss of 

SCADA, where additional field resources are needed for monitoring, they will not only 

deploy personnel who traditionally work at the substations, but will also deploy 

additional personnel trained for substation monitoring, who are normally tasked with 

maintaining transmission lines or are involved in new project construction but do not 

traditionally perform substation monitoring. One participant indicated, based on 

feedback from recent training on system restoration absent SCADA/EMS, that it is 

incorporating periodic refresher training for these non-traditional field monitoring tasks.18 

One participant mentioned that a possible improvement in its approach to initial 

deployment would be to create a call-out list with field personnel pre-assigned to specific 

sites. Other participants indicated that call-out arrangements also demand some 

flexibility, and found that coordination and efficient deployment of personnel may be 

more difficult given that pre-assigned personnel may be unavailable due to vacation or 

illness, among other things. For example, some transmission control center operators 

have substation personnel call-out lists for each sub-region or by company district, but do 

not specify who and where personnel need to report. These participants found that 

attempting to keep a list up-to-date reflecting vacations or other absences was more 

difficult than having multiple qualified and trained personnel capable of executing the 

restoration switching instructions at the various substations.

c) Field Personnel Needed for Completion of Restoration 

Plan Steps

At the onset of a blackout, and independent of SCADA availability, all participants

implement their system restoration plans in a similar manner. First, with approval from 

the reliability coordinator on restoration strategy, transmission system operators 

commence restoration by establishing communications with blackstart generators to 

initiate start-up for each restoration path defined in the system restoration plans. One 

participant noted that in the event of a system-wide blackout condition and with a delay 

in communications to initiate start-up from the transmission control center, blackstart 

generator personnel will autonomously initiate blackstart generator start-up procedures to 

be ready for use in system restoration. Using generating plant blackstart procedures, 

plant personnel bring generating units for providing cranking path power up to speed, but 

make no connections to the grid until directed by the transmission operator.

Concurrently, transmission system operators dispatch qualified personnel to specific 

restoration path substations to retrieve and communicate vital operations information, and 

 18 See Section IV.F - Training for System Restoration absent SCADA or EMS.
21

to stand by for subsequent direction to perform specific restoration steps. 

Because restoration will be more human resource-intensive absent SCADA or EMS, 

particularly with respect to additional field personnel, all participants indicated that 

assigned field personnel live near and work at their designated substations. In addition, 

to aid readiness for prompt system restoration given a loss of SCADA scenario, one

participant indicated that its field personnel carry restoration procedures in their company 

vehicles at all times. Other participants maintain up-to-date hardcopy operating 

instructions and diagrams at restoration path substations for use in system restoration.

In the absence of SCADA, once switching activities are complete at a given substation,

some participants re-staff the substation with monitoring personnel so that the “switching 

skill set” personnel can be deployed elsewhere. In addition, all participants use 

specifically-trained staff, such as system protection personnel, to perform synchronizing 

steps at pre-identified substations to connect two islands or to establish an 

interconnection with a neighboring entity.19 Performance of these synchronizing steps 

does not depend on SCADA being available.

Load pick-up steps during system restoration involve coordination between several

entities (transmission operators, substation field personnel, and generation plant control 

room personnel), regardless of SCADA availability. Participants indicated that these 

steps will be more labor-intensive and more involved absent SCADA or EMS 

functionality to ensure the island remains stable, since transmission operator monitoring 

of the changing system conditions during load pick-up will take place manually, via 

interpersonal communications with field personnel.20

d) Field Personnel Needed for System Monitoring

All participants use additional field personnel (personnel beyond those substation 

personnel who are executing restoration steps) for monitoring and reporting facility 

conditions during the restoration process absent SCADA or EMS functionality. Field 

personnel’s monitoring responsibilities include monitoring voltage levels and assessing 

 19 Training of field personnel who perform unique tasks associated with applicable 

entities’ restoration plans is covered by NERC Reliability Standard EOP-005-2 - System 

Restoration from Blackstart Resources.

20 Irrespective of SCADA availability, under the direction of transmission 

operators, distribution entities help to identify loads which can be energized to meet cold 

load pick-up constraints, and provide field resources to sectionalize distribution feeders 

for load energization as part of the restoration process. 
22

the station backup power supply battery life.

21 Field monitoring personnel communicate 

substation conditions, voltages, equipment damage, relay targets, etc. back to the control 

center system operators. Some participants have also made arrangements for field 

monitoring personnel to use a pre-developed substation checklist or form to fill out and 

report back to the control center, both in hardcopy and electronic (PC-based) spreadsheet 

format.

Some participants use relay technicians at substations to access microprocessor based 

relays to obtain highly detailed voltage related information. These relay technicians also 

monitor relay panels for voltage readings and voltage limit exceedances, which are 

communicated back to control center operators. One participant reported that a 

computerized spreadsheet is used by operators to track voltage readings received from 

field personnel in order to ensure voltages are within limits. For some participants, limit 

exceedances at substations are alerted via annunciator panels, with lighted and audible 

alerts provided to the substation personnel, who communicate this information back to 

the control center operators. 

To monitor frequency, transmission control center personnel communicate with generator 

operators who provide updates on frequency levels. All participants reported that their 

generating plant operators monitor and control island frequency. Initially, the blackstart 

unit will control frequency while in isochronous governor control mode.

To monitor spinning and contingency reserves in individual islands during the restoration 

process absent SCADA or EMS, all participants’ transmission system operators track the 

output and capability of each online generating plant, and their associated operating 

reserves. Some participants have developed manual spreadsheet applications to input 

data to calculate and monitor island reserves, which includes generation governor 

response calculations to predict frequency change based on quantity of load pickup. 

e) Logistical Support for Emergency Staffing Needs 

In the event of a system-wide blackout, most participants stated that their field personnel 

would have difficulties in reaching their designated substation locations, due to possible 

excessive traffic conditions. To alleviate this, participants have various transportation 

arrangements in place, and they stressed the importance of having these services prearranged. For example, one participant has pre-arrangements with a transportation 

company for transporting field personnel using helicopters if roads become inaccessible. 

All participants conveyed to the joint study team that once continual (24/7) manning for 

 21 All participants indicated they will conserve substation service load where 

necessary to preserve emergency backup generator fuel supply and backup battery life.
23

identified substations is needed, their operations support team, e.g., ICS, coordinates 

providing substation personnel on shift rotation at those locations. Most indicated that 

field personnel operate on 12-hour shifts, with maximum shift timeframes of 16 hours if 

needed for emergency conditions. 

Given that system restoration is expected to take longer absent SCADA functionality, 

participants indicated that planning for extended deployment of field and other personnel 

becomes even more critical. Participants noted that substations generally have control 

building HVAC, often with one or two sleeping cots, but in general do not have food, 

water, or restroom provisions sufficient for extended occupancy.22 Most participants 

have measures in place to address these problems and to provide for extended occupancy 

at field locations, which were developed from their storm response plans and are 

implemented through their ICS. With some food provisions covered by field personnel 

who are typically on call and keep some food in their vehicles for unplanned events, ICS,

provides additional logistical support by making arrangements for food and hotel rooms 

for field personnel as needed. 

f) Control Center Personnel

For human resources needed to support transmission system operators absent 

SCADA/EMS, all participants coordinate the provision of both control center and field 

support personnel and associated resource management, through implementation of an 

ICS as described above. Participants indicated that they use all available shift supervisors 

and dispatcher/operators, including extra teams of operators called in, to support the 

control room during restoration absent SCADA or EMS. In addition, participants use 

additional control center technical support personnel to help organize and manage fieldreported system conditions. One participant has a “communicator” personnel position 

during system restoration, whose duties include assisting in organizing manuallycollected data from field personnel at substations, for provision to transmission system 

operators. Finally, additional operators are positioned at auxiliary or “storm” 

workstations in the control room, to aid in system restoration.

23

To assist the transmission operator in system restoration absent SCADA, some 

participants use control room support staff to assist in surveying generators to determine 

their availability and fuel levels, and to coordinate with field personnel regarding system 

 22 Some urban substations may have water and restroom facilities, but more 

suburban and rural substation are less likely to have such provisions.

 

23 See Section IV.E - Analytical Support for System Restoration Absent SCADA 

or EMS.
24

restoration activities. These activities include manually collecting data on voltage levels, 

station backup power supply battery life, substation conditions, equipment damage, relay 

targets, VAr output, frequency, etc.

Participants also use transmission control room personnel during restoration 

absent SCADA or EMS functionality, as follows: 

• Support personnel are used to log information on restoration progress

(assigning scribes to key positions in the control room to help system operators 

document events related to system restoration).

• Support personnel, e.g. additional shift supervisors, act as liaisons with the 

reliability coordinators/Independent System Operators to communicate 

restoration progress, so that transmission operators can continue their focus on 

restoring the system. 

• Some participants designate certain additional operations personnel as 

“pinners,” who, in the absence of SCADA, help maintain situational awareness 

by marking-up or using colored pins on hardcopy transmission diagrams to 

indicate status of transmission facilities (breaker status, transmission lines

energized, etc.).

24 

• Additional operators are used to assist the transmission system operators in 

managing the developing islands’ generator loadings, island spinning reserves, 

online capacity necessary for cold-load pick-up, etc. 

• Support engineers are called in to aid the transmission system operators in the 

analyses needed for system restoration. For example, additional operations 

engineering support and power system modeling staff work together using 

offline (not dependent on SCADA or EMS functionality) power flow tools to 

simulate restoration steps, to assist operators in their decision-making 

process.

25

• Some participants use reliability coordinator staff to assist in or perform 

engineering analyses and other support needed for system restoration.

 24 For further information regarding use of hardcopy information for situational 

awareness, see Section IV.E.2.a. - Analysis and Support Tools during Early Stages of 

System Restoration.

25 See also Section IV.E.2.a. - Analysis and Support Tools during Early Stages of 

System Restoration.
25

3. Conclusions

The team concluded that performing system restoration without the use of SCADA or 

other similar tools will demand much greater use of field and other personnel to complete 

restoration plan steps that would otherwise be completed through use of SCADA, and to 

monitor and report on equipment status. Among other things, the joint study team 

concluded that entities should plan for a lengthy system restoration period with a loss of 

SCADA functionality, including by setting up support systems for the provision of food, 

shelter, fuel, security and other services at critical field locations, while recognizing that 

facilities that may normally be relied upon for this support, e.g., area hotels, may also be 

without power.

Recognizing the challenge of how to compile all of the field information retrieved (in the 

absence of SCADA) so that it is useful information for the control center operator, the 

joint study team found that entities should consider providing field personnel with predetermined data teams, collection methods, record-keeping, and modeling methods. To 

expedite restoration, these tasks should be pre-identified as well as vetted to include not 

only those tasks normally undertaken during a blackout, but those additional tasks that 

would be performed due to the loss of SCADA/EMS. Lastly, the joint study team 

concluded that periodic refresher training would benefit personnel in non-traditional field 

roles during system restoration (such as taking substation readings), and that training for 

field personnel in general becomes more significant assuming a loss of SCADA and EMS 

functionality. 

a) Recommendation 

Planning for personnel support during system restoration absent SCADA. The joint 

study team recommends that entities review and refine their human resource operations 

support measures as needed to support the field and control room personnel necessary for 

system restoration absent SCADA. This includes personnel needed to acquire field and 

generation plant data, to maintain system operator situational awareness during blackout 

conditions for extended periods of time, and to provide logistical support for their 

assignments (e.g., food, shelter, transportation pre-arrangements). In refining such 

measures, entities should consider incorporating methods and tools that could aid 

personnel in gathering and managing the field data to provide useful information to the 

system operators. The joint study team also recommends incorporating these measures 

and tools into entities’ system restoration training, including the involvement of both 

field and control center support personnel who would gather and manage the field data.

b) Observed Practices for Consideration
26

• In addition to the dispatch of field personnel to determine system conditions, use 

distribution entity “outage management” applications/systems if available, to aid 

in initially assessing system conditions in order to determine restoration strategies. 

• Use electronic logging to allow control center support personnel to provide 

assistance in supporting, tracking, and communicating restoration progress without 

interrupting transmission operators in accessing operator log information. 

• During a system restoration emergency, have system protection personnel access 

certain substation digital devices to remotely monitor voltages and other system 

conditions for limit exceedances, which can then be communicated back to 

transmission system operators for situational awareness. 

D. Backup Power Resources for System Restoration absent SCADA or 

EMS

1. Introduction

Recognizing that system restoration absent SCADA/EMS may result in a prolonged 

restoration period, the joint study team examined what provisions participants have for 

backup power supplies for critical locations, such as key substations and control centers

essential for system restoration, to provide an emergency source of power in the event of 

a system-wide blackout. The joint study team also reviewed provisions made for a 

longer-term supply of backup power, given the magnitude and severity of events being 

considered.

26 

 26 Several current Reliability Standards include requirements that relate to the 

backup power needed to provide for bulk-power system transmission operation and 

reliability coordination, as follows:

• Requirements for the independent functionality of primary and backup control 

centers are found in EOP-008-1 - Loss of Control Center Functionality Reliability 

Standard; 

• Requirements for meeting transmission system performance through operation, 

maintenance, and testing of protection system and other automatic controls are 

found in TPL-001-4 – Transmission System Planning Performance Requirements, 

and PRC-005-1.1b - Transmission and Generation Protection System Maintenance 

and Testing; and 
27

2. Observations

a) Backup Power Supply for Control Centers, SCADA Data 

and Communications Sites, and Priority Loads

Similar to findings made in the Restoration and Recovery Report,27 the joint study team 

found that all participants provide for backup power for an extended period of time for 

transmission control centers, data centers, and SCADA/EMS and interpersonal 

communications facilities. In general, participants installed permanent backup generators 

to provide power to these critical sites. In addition, those participants who have priority 

loads such as pipe-type transmission cable facilities have installed backup generators at 

these locations. 

b) Backup Power Supply for Substations

All participants’ substations have battery backup power supplies that are typically 

designed to provide backup power for at least eight hours. Participants also indicated that 

field personnel dispatched to a substation for a large-scale event such as a blackout will 

reduce substation service load where necessary to preserve backup power supply life until 

the substation has been restored, thereby extending the availability of the backup supply 

for as long as possible.

Some participants also provide for backup power for a more extended period of time, i.e., 

beyond the period expected for battery backup, for substations that are critical to system 

restoration. For example, some participants have installed permanent backup generators 

with on-site fuel supplies sufficient to last for an extended period at all restoration path 

substations, and at substations used for synchronizing islands and interconnecting with 

 

• Requirements for operator monitoring of facilities and performing real-time

assessments to ensure prompt action to prevent or mitigate bulk-power system 

instability, uncontrolled separation, or cascading outages are found in TOP-001-3 

– Transmission Operations, IRO-002-4 Reliability Coordination – Monitoring and 

Analysis, IRO-008-2 – Reliability Coordinator Operational Analysis and Realtime Assessments, and IRO-009-2 – Reliability Coordinator Actions to Operate 

Within IROLs Reliability Standards. 

27 See Restoration and Recovery Report at 25-26 (finding that the participants in 

that study had installed local generation at control centers and other key facilities as 

backup power sources, and that they test those generators regularly to ensure operability).
28

neighboring entities. In addition, several of the participants have additional portable 

backup generators and battery charging equipment that can be transported to substations 

if needed to restore backup power to facilitate system restoration. Whatever the 

particular arrangement for backup power supply, some participants stressed the 

importance of reviewing these backup supply provisions to ensure that backup power is 

ready at any time. 

c) Backup Generator Fuel Considerations

Those participants that have installed backup generation at key locations for extended 

system restoration timeframes indicated that they also consider and try to address any 

concerns with on-site fuel shelf life, using long shelf life fuels and/or routinely

maintaining the quality of the on-site stored fuel. Some participants also indicated that 

they have fuel supply contracts with local fuel suppliers near key field locations, and that 

these contracts are designed to provide firm, top priority fuel service in an emergency 

such as a blackout. 

One participant indicated, however, that even with priority fuel service contracts or with 

an entity’s own fuel supplies/tanks for refills, it is important to verify that, in the event of 

a system-wide blackout, the delivery truck refill pumps will have backup power on-site in 

order to fill the delivery trucks in the event more fuel is needed at key locations. This 

includes verifying that fuel delivery terminals have backup power to access delivery 

trucks that may be parked within garages that need power to open the garage doors. 

 

d) Backup Power Provisions versus Length of Time for 

System Restoration

All participants estimate it may take more than one day to fully restore their system from 

a widespread blackout, depending on the extent of the event, and that the time for 

restoration will likely be further extended without SCADA/EMS availability. Most 

participants indicated that the timing for full restoration is also likely to be influenced by 

potential obstacles faced in mobilizing field personnel to substations in the event of a 

blackout condition,

28 regardless of whether SCADA is available, particularly with the 

kinds of severe events being considered as part of the study. Some participants have 

reviewed their restoration plans assuming a lengthy restoration process, and are more 

prepared with backup power provisions than others, especially for substations on 

cranking or restoration paths, to expedite restoration of service to priority loads (such as 

 28 See Section IV.C.2.e. - Logistical Support for Emergency Staffing Needs).
29

off-site power to nuclear power plants and natural gas compressor pumping stations). 

3. Conclusions

Given the possible delays in system restoration, whether due to loss of SCADA or EMS 

or other factors, most participants have taken an all-hazards approach in providing 

additional backup power supplies beyond battery backup at substations and other sites. 

All participants have provided for backup generation at transmission control centers, data 

centers, and SCADA/EMS and interpersonal communications facilities. Some

participants also provide for additional backup power at other critical locations, including 

substations on cranking or restoration paths, to help ensure system restoration is not 

delayed and power is provided to priority loads. Finally, many participants have special 

procedures in place to help ensure the availability of fuel for backup power supply during 

a system emergency, through use of long shelf life fuels, checking and replacement of 

fuels as needed, or special fuel delivery contracts. 

a) Recommendation 

Planning backup power supplies for an extended period of time. Due to the expected 

increase in time to accomplish system restoration absent SCADA/EMS functionality, the 

joint study team recommends that entities review and refine as necessary their existing 

provisions for backup power resources at restoration path substations and other locations 

identified as priority or critical in system restoration plans, to ensure they are available 

for an extended period of time beyond the normal expectation from battery backups.

b) Observed Practices for Consideration

• Install backup generators at many substations, including all cranking path 

substations on primary and alternate paths and several tie-line substations, as well 

as at pipe-type transmission cable installations. 

• Take into account on-site fuel shelf life for installed backup generators, using long 

shelf life fuels and/or routinely maintaining the quality of the on-site stored fuel to 

ensure that extended backup power supplies are available when needed. 

• Have a priority contract with a fuel delivery service for supply to backup 

generators at critical locations, obtained via state-level Department of Homeland 

Security, with top priority to secure fuel in the event of an emergency.

• Have both backup battery power supplies and backup on-site generators at 

interpersonal communications sites, including on-site fuel to support backup 
30

generation availability for an extended period of time. 

E. Analytical Support for System Restoration absent SCADA or EMS

1. Introduction

Recognizing that system restoration absent SCADA/EMS may necessitate significant 

“manual” data gathering (via field personnel) and organizing at the transmission control 

center, the joint study team examined the offline or backup support tools and analysis 

methods used by participants to monitor and analyze conditions during system 

restoration. Also, recognizing that entities periodically test or simulate their restoration 

plans, the joint study team explored how participants use these simulations and tests to 

assist with system restoration in the absence of SCADA or EMS. 

2. Observations

a) Analysis and Support Tools during Early Stages of 

System Restoration

Participants indicated that SE and RTCA computer tools, which are commonly used by 

system operators to provide situational awareness of the bulk-power system, will not be 

functional in the absence of SCADA or EMS functionality, as these tools depend on 

receiving input data from SCADA systems to function.29 

When such tools are not functional, several participants use information from prior 

simulations both to monitor restoration conditions (by comparing simulation data with 

actual data received from field personnel), and to predict expected conditions with each 

restoration step. These simulations and studies include the results from load flow studies 

of the restoration plan steps, including testing of loads to be energized, to ensure that the 

baseline restoration plan steps and switching will work and that the system will be within 

tolerance. Participants noted that they use these past studies during system restoration 

regardless of SCADA availability.

In addition, some participants use offline power flow models and cases to support

analysis during system restoration. To develop these models, participants use restoration 

plan power flow simulations (saved cases) from prior verification of the plans. In the 

absence of SCADA or EMS, the operations support engineers set up the power flow case

 29 Even if SCADA were available, SE and RTCA tools would have no value 

during the early stages of restoration for the blacked-out area, because these tools are 

designed for use in analyzing energized transmission network data. 
31

by incorporating manually-gathered field data and conditions. They then run the power 

flow case to study the next steps of restoration. Participants indicated that these 

manually-updated offline power flow models provide a means for island development 

analysis, and are especially useful if deviation from the baseline restoration plan steps is 

needed. In those situations, participants indicated that the training and tools provided to 

support engineers enables prompt analysis of the manually-collected field data, and 

effective communication of the alternate restoration steps to field personnel.

For situational awareness, including tracking of system restoration progress absent 

SCADA or EMS, all participants’ standard practice is for control center operations and 

support staff to use and mark up hard-copy one-line diagrams of the system. One 

participant has its control center operators document or mark each step of restoration as it 

is performed, recording it directly in pre-identified locations of the restoration plan 

documentation along with the associated field readings, e.g., voltage readings, MW 

readings, etc..30

Some participants also use dry-erase transmission system map boards for tracking 

restoration progress. These can be used to track which transmission and generation 

facilities are in or out of service. One participant has a paper map board of its entire 

transmission system in its control room, which can be updated to indicate system 

restoration conditions with colored magnetic indicators (lines and generators in-service, 

islands being formed, etc.).31 All participants’ operator workstations, including spare or 

“storm” workstations used during system restoration, have large work areas for control 

center dispatchers to spread out hardcopy diagrams and maps, using different-colored 

markers to keep track of the current status of breakers and of energized sections of 

transmission. These workstations have PCs, and, regardless of SCADA or EMS 

availability, are equipped with their normal and alternate interpersonal communications 

capabilities. The PCs are used, for example, to access emergency messaging 

 30 That participant’s restoration plan includes a space to record applicable values 

alongside the steps of the plan. Also, in monitoring limits at substations while generation 

and load is being restored, participants’ operators use reference tables to convert 

Amperes to Volt-Amperes and vice-versa at the various voltage levels. Substation 

metering is generally shown in Amperes, while control centers use megawatts, 

necessitating conversions.

31 One participant mentioned that a possible area for improvement is to tie all 

maps together for better visualization, which it indicated would be particularly useful 

during later stages of restoration absent SCADA or EMS.
32

applications32 or to access operations data, such as system protection information, for use 

as needed during system restoration.33 

For situations in which the SCADA system is still online but field data or field data 

communications are lost, some participants are considering use of the SCADA system 

with manually overridden data (received from field personal located at substations). This 

would allow control room system operators to visualize their system via normally-used 

wall or workstation displays. 

In addition, in order to manage generation and load for each island being developed 

absent SCADA or EMS, most participants use a pre-formatted spreadsheet tool to track 

load picked up and generation reserves for each island. Generator loading and capability 

information received from the field personnel are input into the spreadsheet. The 

spreadsheet then calculates reserves available for the next increments of load pick-up and 

for contingency loss of online generation. This monitoring ensures that generator 

reserves are allocated appropriately, including the reserve capacity needed for the 

isochronous unit to be able to effectively respond to frequency changes. The 

transmission system operator uses this tool to make sure each island has sufficient 

reserves. 

Most participants conveyed that they receive phasor measurement unit (PMU) data from 

major substations across their system, via a separate system from SCADA or EMS. The 

data is primarily used for post-event analysis of power system disturbances, and not to 

assess system status in real-time. However, in the absence of SCADA, one participant 

uses separately-received PMU data to assess precipitating event conditions. The 

participant’s reliability coordinator receives PMU data across its wide area view, and can 

assess it to determine, for example, if there are small islands remaining at the onset of a 

blackout across the reliability coordinator’s footprint, and communicate the conditions to 

the participant.34 

 32 See Section IV.B - Communications Resources for System Restoration Absent 

SCADA or EMS.

33 In addition to use of hardcopy maps, one participant’s transmission operators 

use their workstation PCs to access searchable electronic maps to use in system 

restoration.

34 See also Restoration and Recovery Report at 31. 
33

b) Analysis and Support Tools during Later Stages of

System Restoration

Participants conveyed that as restoration progresses, and as larger islands are 

synchronized and interconnections with external transmission operators are being 

established, the need for real-time on-line analysis tools increases. They indicated it 

becomes increasingly important to have SCADA, EMS as well as ICCP monitoring 

systems in-service, in order to enable the functionality of other analytical tools such as 

SE and RTCA.

Without these tools, participants have taken, or are developing, a number of other 

approaches to support the latter stages of system restoration. One participant is planning 

to develop an offline power system model, using manually-collected data from field 

personnel. The participant’s goal is to have a model that can be updated every several 

hours and is approximately reflective of current system conditions, in order to then 

perform studies such as contingency analyses.35 

One participant is currently using PMU data during normal operations to develop a 

means of state estimation, including providing associated one-line displays to system 

operators, to provide situational awareness in the absence of SCADA or EMS. Another 

participant stated that it will be able to use “near real-time” data obtained from the 

substations possessing the PMUs for system monitoring during later stages of restoration 

when these locations have been subsequently energized. 

3. Conclusions

The joint team found that during earlier stages of restoration, participants possess various 

tools and offline applications that can be used to assist in the analysis necessary to 

support system restoration steps. However, during latter stages of restoration, such as 

when interconnections with other transmission operators are established, the need for 

online tools such as SE and RTCA become more important, and manual setup and use of 

offline system analysis tools may become less feasible.

 35 The joint study team also found that those participants who have plans for using 

offline power flow analysis tools during earlier and/or later stages of restoration also have 

developed processes for organizing larger amounts of the manually-obtained data from 

field personnel to expedite its use (See Section C.2.e. - Logistical Support for Emergency 

Staffing Needs).
34

Notably, all participants indicated that they have IT response and recovery teams that will 

work to promptly restore SCADA and EMS functionality while system restoration is 

underway. 

a) Recommendation 

Analysis tools for system restoration. Recognizing that the absence of SCADA/EMS 

functionality results in loss of SE and RTCA, the joint study team recommends that 

applicable entities review and refine as necessary other analysis tools for use (e.g., use of 

offline power system analysis tools, PMU data) especially during the later stages of 

restoration. The joint study team also recommends incorporating these analysis tools into 

entities’ system restoration training, if not being done already, to practice their setup and 

use by support staff during system restoration.

b) Observed Practices for Consideration

• Develop an offline power system model, using manually-collected data from field 

personnel that can be updated every several hours and is approximately reflective 

of current system conditions, to perform studies such as contingency analyses. 

• Develop a small “tertiary” EMS application for capturing substation data, which 

will allow use of a limited amount of telemetry to aid in situational awareness of 

the transmission system. 

• Develop a system restoration database tool to assist in the event of loss of SCADA 

during system restoration, which contains generation and load data for all of the 

islands identified in restoration plans. Operations support staff can use the tool to 

track online island generation capacity, contingency reserves, and load restored, 

and can calculate cold-load pick-up limitations for the next increment of load to 

add for each island being developed. Another option is to use a spreadsheet-based 

system to track all of the following: 

 Identification of 1st and 2nd largest generation contingencies: 

 Calculation of contingency reserves needed; and 

 Recording and accounting for generators providing reserves.

The spreadsheet can be kept in laminated hard copy, to ensure access even if 

computers are not available, and can include multiple methods of contacting 

designated entities for manual dispatch.
35

• Use PMU data to develop a means of state estimation for use during later stages of 

restoration, including providing associated one-line displays to system operators,

to provide situational awareness in the absence of SCADA or EMS. 

• Institute backup ACE applications to receive tie-line data from backup data 

communications sources, which, along with other inputs, can enable the transition 

back to balancing authority control absent EMS/SCADA.

 

F. Training for System Restoration absent SCADA or EMS 

1. Introduction

Based on the joint study team’s assessment of participants’ resources and support 

measures for system restoration as discussed in Sections IV.A-E above, and recognizing 

the importance of incorporating several of those measures in training, the joint study team 

also examined the participants’ current system restoration drills and training exercises, to 

gain an understanding of their preparedness to perform system restoration under 

conditions where SCADA or EMS tools are unavailable. 

As found in the Restoration and Recovery Report most participant entities use dispatcher 

training simulators (DTS), which afford operators use of the same tools, e.g., 

SCADA/EMS simulation tools, used in normal operations, for the many steps executed 

during system restoration.36 For this analysis, however, the joint study team was 

interested in how participants may have considered or incorporated absence of SCADA 

functionality scenarios into their system restoration training. In doing so, the joint study 

team did not propose to downplay the importance of DTS in system restoration training, 

or to suggest that participants or other entities should consider practicing system 

restoration without it or otherwise consider relying solely on a tabletop exercise. Instead, 

the joint study team focused on learning of any methods participants currently use or are 

considering to practice restoration absent SCADA functionality. For example, entities 

could conduct restoration simulations without use of the remote control and monitoring 

functions in DTS. In that case, the simulation aspects of each manually-executed 

switching step could still be entered in the DTS via training support staff to verify the 

effectiveness of the operators’ manual restoration actions. 

2. Observations

A few participants have developed, and implemented as of 2016, loss-of-SCADA/EMS 

 36 Restoration and Recovery Report at 53 (finding that most participants use 

operator or dispatcher training simulators (DTS) in their system restoration drills). 
36

training and exercises, with emphasis on blackstart of the system without SCADA 

functionality and reflective of the complexities of manual switching. These participants 

identified a number of strengths and benefits from running these training simulations, 

including the following:

o Incorporation of an ICS, which provided flexibility and scalability 

depending on the severity of the simulation/scenario;

o Staff experience and knowledge from past widespread events, to betterstructure response efforts and organize additional field personnel needed;

o Ability to identify field and control center support resource priorities to 

help expedite restoration; and 

o Teamwork, which during the training scenarios, was found to be critical in 

coordination of additional human resources to support system restoration 

without SCADA. 

These participants also identified the following areas for further development following 

these simulation exercises:

o Further refinement of resources for blackstart without SCADA, e.g., human 

resource support measures; 

o Addition of field personnel security escorts to dispatched locations;

o Incorporate mutual aid and periodic training for non-traditional roles, e.g.,

use of remote training tools such as pre-recorded videos to augment 

classroom training regarding substation configuration, and obtaining 

associated readings for communication to the transmission operator, etc.; 

and 

o Enhance training by incorporating substation checklists and practicing use

of forms/templates to document meter readings; participants found that this

practice helped to improve the templates.

One participant is developing an event management framework, which includes 

evaluating many equipment outage scenarios, including loss of SCADA and 

communications systems and the associated impact on operations. That participant is 

using this framework to develop operator training drills, to commence in 2017. These 

drills will include scenario-based training drills involving both control center operations 

and field personnel. 

One participant who does not use SCADA to perform system restoration plan steps,

regularly incorporates alternate and backup interpersonal communications facilities in its
37

system restoration training. 

Another participant (an investor-owned utility with both transmission and distribution 

personnel under one umbrella organization) has placed significant focus on training 

distribution support staff on their role in system restoration from a blackout condition, 

recognizing that restoration of the system absent SCADA will result in increased use of 

field personnel for system monitoring, as well as use of distribution field personnel for 

load pick-up. That participant noted that, unlike more typical emergency storm 

distribution outage response, where the control of field personnel is more commonly with 

the distribution control centers, control over distribution support for blackstart system 

restoration will be with the transmission operators. That participant’s field personnel 

training drills emphasize this difference. In addition, that participant has been conducting 

training on its blackstart restoration plan over the past several years with field personnel, 

distribution personnel, and generation personnel. 

3. Conclusions

The joint study team found that a few participants are already actively pursuing system 

restoration training and exercises that incorporate loss of SCADA or EMS functionality. 

These participants provided notable insights on how to approach these scenarios, 

including:

• Developing loss of SCADA functionality training scenarios and associated 

measures to incorporate approaches modular and flexible enough to 

respond to any event, i.e., an all-hazards approach;

• Incorporating specific training on restoration with different levels of loss of 

SCADA or SCADA communications during the restoration process;

• Using alternative methods of interpersonal communications beyond normal 

system communication modes to familiarize staff with those methods; and

• Using additional personnel in system restoration training absent SCADA 

or EMS, including distribution entity staff, blackstart unit operators, and 

adjacent transmission operators, as well as field personnel used to perform 

non-traditional, e.g., monitoring, tasks. Such training may require 

coordination with separate entities involved in system restoration under the 

assumed conditions (e.g., distribution providers within a transmission 

operator’s footprint). 

Even though participants have trained their operators on loss of SCADA scenarios in 

their normal operations training, the joint study team found that most participants have 

not incorporated loss of SCADA scenarios in their system restoration training exercises. 
38

a) Recommendation 

Incorporating loss of SCADA or EMS scenarios in system restoration training. The 

joint study team recommends that applicable entities, as part of their system restoration 

training, practice implementation of restoration plan steps absent SCADA/EMS 

functionality or other data sources, including incorporating the above insights.

b) Observed Practices for Consideration

• Incorporate into restoration training programs practice with physical aids at the 

locations where they will be undertaking the restoration activity, e.g., training with 

substation checklists.

• Incorporate video training of specific substations, to remotely train personnel tasked 

with performing monitoring duties at those substations during system restoration, but 

who are otherwise not normally assigned to that substation. The participant has 

developed a video training library, which provides personnel with job/task aids for 

tasks that are not performed on a daily basis.
39

V. Appendix 1 - Joint Study Team

Federal Energy Regulatory Commission:

Justin Cunningham

John Denis

Julie Greenisen

David Huff

Justin Kelly

Raymond Orocco-John

David Taylor

Michelle Veloso

Florida Reliability Coordination Council, Inc.:

Hassan Hamdar

Midwest Reliability Organization:

William Kunkel

Daniel Schoenecker

North American Electric Reliability Corporation:

Robert Kenyon

Scott Mix

Katherine Street

Jim Stuart

Northeast Power Coordinating Council, Inc.:

Andrey Oks

Ralph Rufrano

ReliabilityFirst Corporation:

John Idzior

SERC Reliability Corporation:

David Greene

Texas Reliability Entity, Inc.:

Jagan Mandavilli

Western Electricity Coordinating Council:

Evan Paull 
40

VI. Appendix 2 – Request Letter for Participation

On January 29, 2016, the Commission posted to its web site the Report on the 

FERC-NERC-Regional Entity Joint Review of Restoration and Recovery Plans.

1 The 

report describes how the joint staff review team examined restoration, response, and 

recovery plans of a representative sample of nine registered entities and, from that 

review, identified beneficial practices that could be more widely deployed, 

recommendations for changes, and five areas for further study. One of the areas for 

further study is how to address the potential loss of SCADA or other data systems as part 

of a major system disturbance, as this could significantly delay system restoration. 

Commission staff, in collaboration with NERC and Regional Entity staff, is 

initiating a study of bulk-power system restoration plan steps that may be difficult in the 

absence of SCADA, ICCP data, and/or EMS.372

 As an entity with bulk-power system 

significance and representative operating characteristics that may be beneficial to this 

analysis, we are requesting [entity’s] participation in this review. Additionally, other 

registered entities with other representative characteristics are also being asked to

participate in order to achieve a more comprehensive review of restoration capabilities in 

the absence of SCADA or loss of other data sources.

The joint staff review will:

• Gather information via outreach with a select sample of bulk-power system 

entities i.e., NERC-registered entities; 

• Analyze the bulk-power system restoration plan steps that may be difficult in the 

absence of SCADA, ICCP data, and/or EMS; 

• Identify viable resources, methods or practices that would enable timely system 

restoration to occur absent SCADA/EMS functionality, which could then be 

incorporated into entities’ system restoration training; and 

• Identify beneficial practices that may be shared across the industry.

 1 See “Report on the FERC-NERC-Regional Entity Joint Review of Restoration 

and Recovery Plans” (January 2016), at http://www.ferc.gov/legal/staff-reports/2016/01-

29-16-FERC-NERC-Report.pdf (Joint Report).

2 See Joint Report at pp. iv, 17-20. 
41

Specifically, documents and information3 to be requested during the entity 

outreach, depending on applicable functions, pertain to:

• Steps of system restoration plans (entity-identified) that may be difficult in the 

absence of SCADA, ICCP data, and/or EMS; 

• Operating plans and procedures for backup functionality in the event that SCADA, 

EMS or ICCP data is unavailable;

• Procedures addressing monitoring and controlling voltages, real and reactive 

flows, and switching transmission elements (including aspects of system 

restoration such as control of frequency, contingency reserves, and synchronizing) 

in the event of the loss of SCADA, ICCP data, and/or EMS; 

• Provisions for backup facilities if the main monitoring system is unavailable; 

• Procedures to mitigate the effects of analysis tool outages; 

• Any results or analysis of operator drills, exercises, simulations, or tests involving 

a loss of situational awareness tools scenarios, e.g., SCADA, ICCP, EMS, etc.;

and 

• Any public or private reports or other documents that have already been produced 

in these areas that may be beneficial for the team to review, e.g., Severe Impact 

Resiliency Task Force Report. Pre-review of these documents at the start of the 

study can aid in identifying to the entities, specific areas of interest within scope 

for the review. 

In addition to the information specified above, entities are encouraged to provide 

any further information or documents that may be helpful in explaining their viable 

resources, methods or practices that would enable timely system restoration to occur in 

the event of the loss of SCADA, ICCP data, and/or EMS.

This collaborative assessment by the Commission, NERC and the Regional 

Entities is an important step in protecting reliability by gauging the electric utility 

industry’s level of preparation for a major event and the ability to restore the bulk-power 

system quickly and efficiently. In anticipation of [entity’s] participation, we thank you 

and will work closely with you to ensure this project is conducted as a partnership with 

minimal disruption to your organization. My staff will contact you at your earliest 

convenience regarding any questions or concerns that you may have about this joint staff 

review.

 3 As noted in the restoration and recovery report, there are system restoration 

resources and situational awareness tools that are covered by other Reliability Standards.
42

VII. Appendix 3 – Glossary of Terms and Acronyms Used in Report

Area Control Error (ACE): The instantaneous difference between a Balancing

Authority’s net actual and scheduled interchange, taking into account the effects of 

frequency bias, correction of meter error, automatic time error correction (ATEC), if 

operating in the ATEC mode. ATEC is only applicable to balancing authorities in the 

Western Interconnection.

Automatic Generation Control (AGC): Equipment that automatically adjusts

generation in a balancing authority area from a central location to maintain the balancing 

authority’s interchange schedule plus frequency bias. AGC may also accommodate 

automatic inadvertent payback and time error correction.

Balancing Authority: The responsible entity that integrates resource plans ahead of

time, maintains load-interchange-generation balance within a Balancing Authority Area,

and supports Interconnection frequency in real time.

Blackstart Resource: Generating unit(s) and associated equipment which has the ability 

to be started without support from the system or is designed to remain energized without 

connection to the remainder of the system, with the ability to energize a bus, meeting the 

transmission operator’s restoration plan needs for real and reactive power capability, 

frequency and voltage control, and that have been included in the transmission operator’s 

restoration plan.

Cranking Path: A portion of the electric system that can be isolated and then energized

to deliver electric power from a generation source to enable the startup of one or more

other generating units.

Dispatcher Training Simulator (DTS): An application which allows operators intraining to use the same tools and computer applications used in normal operations for the 

many steps executed during system restoration. The DTS also tracks the status of 

generation and dynamically updates and displays the latest simulated system conditions.

Energy Management System (EMS): A system of computer-aided tools used by bulkpower system operators to monitor, control and optimize system performance.

Generator Operator: The entity that operates generating facility(ies) and performs the

functions of supplying energy and Interconnected Operations Services. The generator

operator is responsible to have procedures for starting each blackstart resource, in

accordance with Reliability Standard EOP-005-2.

Incident Command Structure (ICS): A management system designed to enable 

effective and efficient domestic incident management by integrating a combination of 

facilities, equipment, personnel, procedures, and communications operating within a 

common organizational structure.
43

Inter-Control Center Communications Protocol (ICCP): A communications protocol 

that allows the exchange of real-time and historical power system information between 

entities, including status and control data, measured values, scheduling data, energy 

accounting data and operator messages.

Island: An electrically isolated portion of an interconnection. The frequency in an 

electrical island must be maintained by balancing generation and load in order to sustain 

operation. Islands are frequently formed after major disturbances wherein multiple 

transmission lines trip, or during restoration following a major disturbance.

Isochronous Generator Governor Control: An isochronous (or zero droop) governor 

maintains the same speed regardless of the load, and ensures that the frequency of the 

electricity generated is constant or flat. Isochronous control mode is used to control 

frequency in an island during system restoration.

Phasor Measurement Unit (PMU): Device that measures the electrical waves on an 

electricity grid, using a common time source for synchronization.

Reactive Power, Volt-Amperes reactive (VAr): The portion of electricity that 

establishes and sustains the electric and magnetic fields of alternating-current equipment. 

Reactive power must be supplied to most types of magnetic equipment, such as motors 

and transformers. It also must supply the reactive losses on transmission facilities. 

Reactive power is provided by generators, synchronous condensers, or electrostatic 

equipment such as capacitors and directly influences electric system voltage. It is usually 

expressed in kilovars (KVAr) or megavars (MVAr).

Real-Time Contingency Analysis (RTCA): A computer application which evaluates 

system conditions using real-time data to assess potential (post-contingency) operating 

conditions.

Regional Entity: An independent, regional entity with delegated authority from NERC

to propose and enforce Reliability Standards and to otherwise promote the effective and

efficient administration of bulk-power system reliability.

Registered Entity: An entity that is a user, owner, or operator of the bulk-power system

that is generally required to register with NERC.

Reliability Coordinator: The entity that is the highest level of authority who is

responsible for the reliable operation of the Bulk Electric System (BES), has the Wide 

Area view of the BES, and has the operating tools, processes and procedures, including 

the authority to prevent or mitigate emergency operating situations in both next-day 

analysis and real-time operations. The reliability coordinator has the purview that is 

broad enough to enable the calculation of Interconnection Reliability Operating

Limits, which may be based on the operating parameters of transmission systems beyond

any Transmission Operator’s vision.

Restoration: The process of returning generators and transmission system elements and

restoring load following an outage on the electric system.

State Estimator (SE): A computer application which evaluates system conditions using 

real-time data to assess existing operating conditions. 
44

Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA): A system of remote control and

telemetry used to monitor and control the transmission system.

Synchronize: The process of bringing two electrical systems together by closing a circuit 

breaker at an interface point when the voltages and frequencies are properly aligned. 

Also, when generators are brought on-line, they are said to be synchronized to the 

system.

System Operator: An individual at a control center of a balancing authority,

transmission operator, or reliability coordinator, who operates or directs the operation of

the Bulk Electric System in real‐time.

System Restoration Plan: Plan required to allow for restoring the Transmission

Operator’s System following a Disturbance in which one or more areas of the Bulk

Electric System shuts down and the use of Blackstart Resources is required to restore the 

shut down area to a state whereby the choice of the next Load to be restored is not driven 

by the need to control frequency or voltage regardless of whether the

Blackstart Resource is located within the Transmission Operator’s System.

Telecommunications Service Priority: A Department of Homeland Security program 

that authorizes national security and emergency preparedness organizations to receive 

priority treatment for vital voice and data circuits or other telecommunications services.

Transmission Operator: The entity responsible for the reliability of its “local”

transmission system, and that operates or directs the operations of the transmission

facilities. The transmission operator is required to have a restoration plan, in accordance

with EOP-005-2.