This memorandum opinion was not selected for pub lication in the New Mexico Appellate Reports. Please see Rule 12-405 NMRA for restrictions on the citation of unpublished memorandum opinions. Please also note that this electronic memorandum opinion may contain computer-generated errors or other deviations fr om the official paper version filed by the Court of Appeals and does not include the filing date. IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO 1 DARON WELCH , 2 Petitioner-Appellee/Cross-Appellant, 3

v. No. A-1-CA-35570 4 JANE CALTON FOSTER WELCH, 5 Respondent-Appellant/Cross-Appellee. 6 APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF ROOSEVELT COUNTY 7 Donna J. Mowrer, District Judge 8 Eric D. Dixon Attorney and Counselor at Law, P.A. 9 Eric D. Dixon 10 Portales, NM 11 for Appellee 12 Caren I. Friedman 13 Santa Fe, NM 14 Sandra E. Gallagher 15 Portales, NM 16 for Appellant 17 MEMORANDUM OPINION 18 BOHNHOFF, Judge. 193 {1} This appeal arises from the dissoluti on of the parties’ marriage. Respondent 1 Jane Calton Foster Welch (Wif e) challenges the district c ourt’s orders granting partial 2 summary judgment in favor of Petitioner Daron Welch (Husband) on Wife’s claims 3 of community liens against Husband’s busine sses as well as the district court’s final 4 decision and order on division of community property. In addition to contesting the 5 community lien rulings, Wife contends that the district court abused its discretion in 6 refusing to award ongoing spousal support to Wi fe and in not granting Wife all of the 7 attorney’s fees she sought. In his cross-app eal, Husband argues: (1) the district court 8 erred in awarding Wife a $20,000 reimbursement on separate debt; (2) the district 9 court erred in awarding Wife one-half of the income tax she paid following the 10 parties’ separation; and (3) the district c ourt erred in awarding Wife temporary spousal 11 support, a lump sum spousal support payment, and attorney’s fees. This is a 12 memorandum opinion and because the parties are familiar with the facts and 13 procedural posture of the case, we set fo rth only such facts and law as are necessary 14 to decide the issues raised. 15 BACKGROUND 16
{2} The parties were married on July 13, 2007. At the time of the marriage, 17 Husband held ownership interests in three businesses, WTI, Inc. (WTI), Welch 18 Trucking, Inc. (Welch Trucking), and B ubby & Son, Inc. (Bubby & Son). On October 194 15, 2013, Husband filed a petition to dissolve the marriage. Husband filed a 1 succession of motions for partial summary judgment on Wife’s community lien claim; 2 the district court ultimately granted partial summary judgment as to all three 3 businesses. The district court entered anorder dissolving the parties’ marriage on 4 March 25, 2015. The district c ourt held an evidentiary h earing on the remaining issues 5 on November 3 and December 17, 2015, and entered its final decision on March 16, 6 2016. 7 DISCUSSION 8 A. Community Lien 9
{3} Wife argues that for three reasons the di strict court erred in granting Husband’s 10 motions for partial summary judgment on her community lien claim: Husband did not 11 make a prima facie showing of entitlementto summary judgment; genuine issues of 12 material fact in any event precluded summary judgment; and the court additionally 13 erred in granting summary judgment while discovery was ongoing. 14
{4} “Summary judgment is appropriate wh ere there are no genuine issues of 15 material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Self v. United 16 Parcel Serv., Inc ., 1998-NMSC-046, ¶ 6, 126 N.M. 396, 970 P.2d 582. “The movant 17 need only make a prima facie showing th at he is entitled to summary judgment.” Roth 18 v. Thompson , 1992-NMSC-011, ¶ 17, 113 N.M . 331, 825 P.2d 1241. “Upon the 195 movant making a prima facie showing, the burden shifts to the party opposing the 1 motion to demonstrate the existence of sp ecific evidentiary facts which would require 2 trial on the merits.” Id . “Arguments by counsel are notevidence and cannot be used 3 to create a material issue of f act to defeat summary judgment.” Cain v. Champion 4 Window Co. of Albuquerque, LLC , 2007-NMCA-085, ¶ 14, 142 N.M. 209, 164 P.3d 5 90. 6
{5} “On appeal, we examine the whole record for any evidence that places a 7 genuine issue of material fact in dispute.” Rummel v. Lexington Ins. Co. , 8 1997-NMSC-041, ¶ 15, 123 N.M. 752, 945 P.2d 970. “An issue of fact is ‘genuine’ 9 if the evidence before the court consid ering a motion for summary judgment would 10 allow a hypothetical fair-minded fact[-]finder to return a verdict favorable to the non11 movant on that particular issue of fact.” Associated Home & RV Sales, Inc. v. Bank of 12 Belen , 2013-NMCA-018, ¶ 23, 294 P.3d 1276. (internal quotation marks and citation 13 omitted). “We are mindful that summary judgment is a drastic remedial tool which 14 demands the exercise of caution in its appli cation, and we review the record in the 15 light most favorable to s upport a trial on the merits.” Woodhull v. Meinel , 2009- 16 NMCA-015, ¶ 7, 145 N.M. 533, 202 P.3d 126 (internal quotation marks and citation 17 omitted). We review de novo a movant ’s entitlement to summary judgment. 186 Hernandez v. Wells Fargo Bank N.M., N.A. , 2006-NMCA-018, ¶ 5, 139 N.M. 68, 128 1 P.3d 496. 2 1. Community Lien Legal Principles and Burden of Proof 3
{6} Where the separate character of property “[is] established, it maintains that 4 character until the contrary has been made to appear by direct and positive evidence.” 5 Katson v. Katson , 1939-NMSC-021, ¶ 5, 43 N.M. 214, 89 P.2d 524. “Therefore, any 6 increase in the value of separate property is presumed to be separate property.” Bayer 7 v. Bayer , 1990-NMCA-106, ¶ 13, 110 N.M. 782, 800 P. 2d 216. Further, an “increase[] 8 in the value of separate property arising fro m an increase in market value or natural 9 growth belong[] to the owner of the separate property.” Id. ¶ 21. 10
{7} “ The presumption may be rebutted by direct and positive evidence that the 11 increase is attributable to community funds or labor.” id. ¶ 13. A lien in favor of the 12 community may be imposed on a business thatis separate property if the “evidence 13 supports a determination that community skill and labor have resu lted in an increase 14 in the value of the [business] and whether such efforts were uncompensated or 15 undercompensated.” Zemke v. Zemke , 1993-NMCA-067, ¶ 21, 116 N.M. 114, 860 16 P.2d 756 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The value of community 17 labor performed on behalf of such busine ss may be established by evidence of the 18 amount of wages paid for comparable work. See Jurado v. Jurado , 1995-NMCA-014, 197 ¶ 10, 119 N.M. 522, 892 P.2d 969. Importan tly, however, the party claiming the 1 community lien on separate property bears the burden of proving its existence and 2
amount. See Trego v. Scott , 1998-NMCA-080, ¶ 8, 125 N.M. 323, 961 P.2d 168; 3 Smith v. Smith , 1992-NMCA-080, ¶ 12, 114 N.M. 276, 837 P.2d 869. In particular, 4 if the spouse was paid a definite salary for his or her services, “in the absence of 5 definite evidence of their value, it will be presumed that the salarypaid was the value 6 of the services.” Zemke , 1993-NMCA-067, ¶ 21 (internal quotation marks and citation 7 omitted). 8 2. The Partial Summary Judgment Motions 9
{8} We note initially that the district court was sensitive to the summary judgment 10 requirement that there be no disputed issu es of material fact. Husband first sought 11 summary judgment on Wife’s community lien claims as to all three of his businesses 12 in a motion filed on June 18, 2014. In an August 20, 2014 order, the district court 13 denied the motion on the grounds that “material issues of f act exist and summary 14 judgment is not appropriate at this time.” 15
{9} Husband’s Renewed Motion . Husband filed a renewed motion for partial 16 summary judgment on August 25, 2014 (Renewed Motion). He supported the 17 Renewed Motion with his affidavit as well as the affidavit of the accountant who 18 prepared tax returns for the three businesse s. The affidavits stated that Husband 198 acquired his interests in the businesses prior to marrying Wife; the fair market value 1 of the businesses was not enhanced during the marriage by Wife’s labor; the book 2 value of Welch Trucking and WTI had decreased during the marriage; any increase 3 in the value of all three businesses was attributable to the normal growth of the 4 businesses due to market conditions; and Husband was not undercompensated for any 5 of his services to the businesses. 6
{10} In her response to Husband’s RenewedMotion, Wife generally disputed 7 whether the businesses were acquired before the marriage and disputed the value of 8 the three companies. However, she did not respond, as requi red by Rule 1-056(D) 9 NMRA, in opposition to Husband’s statement of undisputed material facts. Wife also 10 did not support her arguments with any of her own evidence regarding when she 11 contended Husband acquired hi s ownership interests in th e companies, the values of 12 the companies, or whether Husband was undercompensated for his labor on behalf of 13 the companies. Wife summarily argued th at discovery was incomplete, but did not 14 support her argument with an affidavit as contemplated by Rule 1-056(F), explaining 15 why she could not respond to Husband’s motion. 16
{11} Following an October 30, 2014, hearing, the district court granted in part and 17 denied in part Husband’s Renewed Moti on by order entered onNovember 6, 2014. 18 Citing Smith , the district court observed that to prevail on the motion, Wife had to 199 demonstrate “genuine issues of fact regarding an increase in the value of the business 1 due to the efforts of community labor .” Because Wife had not rebutted any of 2 Husband’s undisputed facts regarding Welc h Trucking and WTI, the district court 3 granted the motion as to those entities. The district court determined, however, that, 4 because Husband’s statement of undisputed facts did not address the value of Bubby 5 & Son, Husband had not met his prima faci e burden of demonstrating the absence of 6 genuine issues of fact regarding the business and denied the motion to that extent. 7
{12} Wife’s Motion to Set Aside . On December 1, 2014, Wife filed a motion to set 8 aside the district court’s November 6, 2014 ruling (Motion to Set Aside). Wife 9 asserted that due to an inability to pay th e fee of one accountant and the medical issues 10 experienced by a second accountant, Sandra Calton (Calton), she had been unable to 11 provide an accountant’s affidavit to s upport her opposition to summary judgment until 12 after the October 14, 2014 hearing. Wife al so criticized Husband for not providing a 13 fair market valuation of his three busine sses and evidence of the value of services 14 comparable to those that Hu sband had provided to the bus inesses. However, in her 15 affidavit Calton did not provideher own valuation of the businesses (either current or 16 as of the beginning of the marriage) or an opinion regarding the amount of any 17 undercompensation for Husband’s servi ces. Instead, Calton critiqued Husband’s 18 reference to the book values of Welch Trucking and WTI, his claim that the 1910 companies’ value decreased between 2007 and 2014, and his clai m that he was not 1 undercompensated. 2
{13} In a March 16, 2015 ruling, the districtcourt denied Wife’s Motion to Set 3 Aside. The court rejected Wife’s contention that she was unable to respond to 4 Husband’s Renewed Motion due to an inab ility to obtain an accountant’s affidavit, 5 noting that Wife never sought relief pursuant to Rule 1-056(F) and that Calton had 6 admitted in her deposition that she was not asked to provide an affidavit until 7 November 2014, after the hearing on the Renewed Motion. The court nevertheless 8 considered the motion on the merits. Af ter noting that Wife bore the burden of 9 establishing an increase in the values of Husband’s businesses due to community labor 10 and that such labor was undercompensated, the district court concluded that Wife 11 failed to establish a question of fact on this issue: 12 Even if the [c]ourt considered th e substance of Calton’s affidavit, 13 which it is not inclined to do, [Wife] still has not met her burden. 14 [Husband] bore the initial burden to establish that the property in 15 question, [WTI] and Welch Trucking were separate property. [Husband] 16 met that burden. The burden then shifte d to [Wife] to show that while the 17 property may be separate, any increas e in the value of the business was 18 made through community labor. . . . Any issues surrounding 19 undercompensation or unc ompensation are not ripe until an increase in 20 value of the business has been established. . . . [Wife]’s affidavit 21 of . . . Calton appears to be a critique of [Husband]’s accountant’s 22 valuation of the companies. [Wife] ’s affidavit does not establish a 23 reasonable doubt as to any genuine i ssue of fact at issue for summary 24 judgment. A critique of another accountant’s valuation is not a 25 reasonable doubt as to the facts [at] issu e. . . . Multiple accountants may 2611 value any business in a myriad of ways. [Wife] argues in the motion to 1 reconsider that book value is improper. The method of valuation is not 2 relevant yet as there has been no in crease in value established. [Wife] 3 failed to meet her burden at summaryjudgment to establish an increase 4 in the value of the businesses. 5
{14} Bubby & Son Motion . On May 5, 2015, Husband moved again for partial 6 summary judgment as to Wife’s claim of a community lien against his Bubby & Son 7 business (Bubby & Son Motion). The motion e ssentially repeated the argument and 8 analysis that Husband had presented in his earlier Renewed Motion that the business 9 had not increased in value and that any community labor was not undercompensated. 10 This time, however, Husband also provided values for the assets (for the most part, 11 three trucks) of Bubby & Son and stated thatthe assets’ values had declined since 12 2007. 13
{15} In her response to the Bubby & Son Motion, Wife criticized Husband’s 14 assertions and supporting evidence that the bus iness had lost value and that he was not 15 undercompensated. However, Wife ag ain did not offer any valuation or 16 undercompensation amounts of her own, and instead submitted the same Calton 17 affidavit that she proffered in support of her Motion to Set Aside. Significantly, Wife 18 did not invoke Rule 1-056(F) or otherwise s eek additional time or discovery in order 19 to respond to the motion. 2012 {16} In its October 5, 2015 order, the distri ct court granted the Bubby & Son Motion. 1 The court reiterated the substantive analysis it articulated in its ruling denying Wife’s 2 Motion to Set Aside. Husband had met his burden of establishing a prima facie case 3 of no community lien. Wife, however, had failed to establish a question of fact. She 4 provided no valuation for the business of her own, and in stead “Calton’s [a]ffidavit 5 merely critiques [Husband]’s valuation of [WTI] and Welch Trucking [but not Bubby 6 & Son].” In addition, Wife presented no evidence to show that Husband was 7 undercompensated. The court noted thatWife had submitted a 2010 order from 8 Husband’s previous divorce proceeding that valued Bubby & Son at $43,000 as of 9 2006, one year prior to his marriage to Wife, but ruled that the order did not establish 10 “a reasonable doubt as to an increase in th e value of the company since the marriage.” 11 3. Husband Made a Prima Facie Showing of Entitlement to Summary 12 Judgment, and Wife Failed to Meet Her Burden of Presenting Evidence 13 That Established Any Genuine Issue of Material Fact 14
{17} The district court did not err in granting Husband’s Renewed Motion. First, 15 Husband satisfied his burden of establis hing a prima facie case that his separate 16 property had not increased in value as a result of undercompensated community labor. 17 The burden of establishing a prima facie case for summary judg ment is minimal. 18 Savinsky v. Bromley Grp. , Ltd., 1987-NMCA-078, ¶ 2, 106 N.M. 175, 740 P.2d 1159. 19 Further, the owner of a business may state an opinion of the value of the business. See 2013 Lahr v. Lahr , 1970-NMSC-165, ¶ 6, 82 N.M. 223, 478 P.2d 551; see also State v. 1 Hughes , 1988-NMCA-108, ¶ 8, 108 N.M. 143, 767 P.2d 382. Husband made a prima 2 facie showing through his and the companies’ accountant’s affidavits that the three 3 businesses were Husband’s separate property, that the value of the businesses had not 4 increased during his marriage to Wife, and th at he had not been undercompensated for 5 his labor. Second, as the district court observed in ruling on Wife’s Motion to Set 6 Aside, that Wife did not properly dispute Husband’s statement of undisputed material 7 facts in accordance with the re quirements of Rule 1-056(D), see Richardson v. Glass , 8 1992-NMSC-046, ¶ 6, 114 N.M. 119, 835 P.2d 835, and more fundamentally, did not 9 submit any evidence of her own with which to establish a question of fact regarding 10 the value of the businesses or undercompe nsation of Husband’s labor. These failings 11 were sufficient grounds for granting summary judgment. 12
{18} The district court also did not err in denying Wife’s Motion to Set Aside. The 13 motion effectively was a motion to recons ider the granting of the Renewed Motion. 14 A district court does not abus e its discretion in denying a motion to reconsider if the 15 movant presents evidence or argument that could have been presented at the time the 16 original motion was decided. See Deaton v. Gutierrez , 2004-NMCA-043, ¶¶ 9-10, 135 17 N.M. 423, 89 P.3d 672. Based on Calton’s deposition testimony, the district court 18 could conclude that the evidence Wife be latedly proffered withher Motion to Set 1914 Aside—Calton’s affidavit—in fact had beenavailable prior to the hearing on the 1 Renewed Motion. 2
{19} Further, even after considering the Calton affidavit, denying Wife’s Motion to 3 Set Aside was still appropriate. Wife seems to contend, as a premise to her appeal, that 4 the district court was obliged to undertake an independent, affirmative investigation 5 into whether undercompensated labor by Husb and resulted in an increase in the value 6 of his businesses. Wife is wrong. The burden fell on Wife to present evidence 7 sufficient to create a question of fact. In ruling on the Motion to Set Aside, the court 8 properly focused on Wife’s failure to meet this burden, in particular, to present 9 evidence to establish the thre shold fact that during the marriage Husband’s businesses 10 increased in value at all, much less that the value incr eased more than would result 11 from normal market conditions. Wife could have met this burde n had Calton provided 12 her own opinion regarding an increase in the value of Husband’s businesses between 13 2007 and 2013, and that Husband was undercompensated for his work relative to 14 comparable wages. Calton did not do this , and instead confined her affidavit to 15 criticizing Husband’s valuation methodology and evidence. As the district court 16 recognized, this was insufficient to creat e a question of fact that would preclude 17 summary judgment. 1815 {20} Wife’s challenge to the district court’ s granting of Husband’s other motion, the 1 Bubby & Son Motion, can be resolved on similar grounds. Husband established a 2 prima facie case for summary judgment. Wife again failed to present evidence 3 regarding the company’s value and undercompensation for Husband’s labor. Indeed, 4 she supported her response with Calton’s original affidavit, which addressed and 5 criticized Husband’s opinions regarding th e valuation of WTI and Welch Trucking as 6 opposed to Bubby & Son. Further, the court properly determined that the order 7 entered in connection with Husband’s prev ious divorce litigation regarding the value 8 of the company in 2006 did not suffice to create a question of fact regarding any 9 increase in the value of the company between 2007 and 2014. 10 4. The District Court Did Not Err in Granting Summary Judgment While 11 Discovery Was Ongoing 12
{21} The discovery deadline, which Wife di d not attempt to ex tend, was December 13 31, 2014. Wife argues that she needed a dditional time to obtain additional discovery 14 regarding Husband’s businesses, and the di strict court erred in granting Husband’s 15 Renewed Motion in November 2014 when discovery was still ongoing. See Romero 16 v. Giant Stop-N-Go of N.M., Inc. , 2009-NMCA-059, ¶ 17, 146 N.M. 520, 212 P.3d 17 408 (noting that, “[i]t is generally inadvisable to grant summary judgment before 18 discovery has been comple ted”). We review this argument under an abuse of 1916 discretion standard. See Griffin v. Thomas , 2004-NMCA-088, ¶ 53, 136 N.M. 129, 95 1 P.3d 1044. 2
{22} We see no abuse of discretion. First, and most fundamentally, as the district 3 court itself noted, if Wife believed she n eeded additional time to obtain additional 4 discovery of financial information re garding Husband’s business, the proper 5 procedure for her to follow was set forth in Rule 1-056(F): 6 Should it appear from the affidavits of a party opposing the motion that 7 he cannot for reasons stated present by affidavit facts essential to justify 8 his position, the court may refuse th e application for judgment or may 9 order a continuance to permit affidav its to be obtained or depositions to 10 be taken or discovery to be had or may make such other order as is just. 11 Wife did not file a Ru le 1-056(F) affidavit. See Giant Stop-N-Go of N.M., Inc. , 2009- 12 NMCA-059, ¶ 18 (stating that “a party faced with a motion for summary judgment 13 may ask the district court to stay its determination so that the non-movant can conduct 14 discovery needed to rebut the motion. . . . [citing Rule 1-056(F)] If such a stay is 15 sought, the party must submit an affidavit explaining why additional time and 16 discovery are needed .” (emphasis added)); see also Williams v. R.H. Donnelley Corp. , 17 368 F.3d 123, 126 n.1 (2nd Cir. 2004) (noting that failure to file affidavit is “sufficient 18 grounds to reject a claim that the opportun ity [to conduct] discovery was inadequate” 19 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). 2017 {23} Second, even assuming for the sake of argument that Wife’s counsel’s 1 statements in her motion papers could substitu te for the required affidavit, in light of 2 Calton’s deposition testimony, the distri ct court was not persuaded by Wife’s 3 explanations why she was unable to proc ure earlier an accountant’s affidavit that 4 established a question of fact regarding th e values of Husband’s businesses or the 5 undercompensation of his labor. On appeal Wife provides no basi s for concluding that 6 the district court’s determination was in error. 7
{24} Third, under Rule 1-056(F), in any explanation why additional time and 8 discovery are needed, “vague assertions are insufficent; rather, the party must 9 specifically demonstrate how postponement of a ruling on the motion will enable him, 10 by discovery or other means, to rebut th e movant’s showing of the absence of a 11 genuine issue of fact.” Giant Stop-N-Go of N.M., Inc. , 2009-NMCA-059, ¶ 18 12 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Wife never provided any such 13 specificity. In her response to Husband’s Renewed Motion, Wife claimed that 14 Husband had provided profit and loss statements for only one year of marriage. Not 15 only did Husband dispute this claim (which dispute does not appear to have been 16 resolved), but Wife in any event did not explain how additional profit and loss 17 statements would provide information thatwould permit her to establish material 18 questions of fact regarding her community lien claim. Wife otherwise asserted only 1918 generally that “discovery wa s incomplete.” We note as we ll that Wife never stated in 1 her post-summary judgment affidavit that she needed more information (much less 2 identified specific information) before she could form and state opinions about any 3 increase in the value of Husband’s busin esses since 2007 or undercompensation of 4 Husband’s labor. In her response to Husband’s Bubby & Son Motion, Wife did not 5 assert at all that she needed additional time to conduct discoveryin order to rebut 6 Husband’s claim of entitlement to summary judgment as to her claim of a community 7 lien against that company. On the contrary , she confined her argument to the topics 8 addressed above (criticizi ng Husband’s supporting evidence and asserting that the 9 order entered in Husband’s previous divorce case created an issue of fact). For all of 10 these reasons, we find no abuse of discretion in the district court’s decision not to 11 delay proceeding with Husband’s Renewed Motion and Bubby & Son Motion. 12 B. Spousal Support 13
{25} NMSA 1978, Section 40-4-7 (1997), provide s that either party in a marriage 14 dissolution proceeding may seek spousal s upport and identifies a number of factors 15 that the court must consider in making anaward. “The actual need of the proposed 16 recipient is a focal consideration in determining whether to order spousal support.” 17 Clark v. Clark , 2014-NMCA-030, ¶ 7, 320 P.3d 991. The court in considering an 18 award of spousal support must not allow th e recipient spouse to abdicate his or her 1919 responsibility to be self-supporting and pl ace that responsibility on the other spouse. 1 See id. 2
{26} The district court had ordered Husband to pay $2,000 monthly spousal support 3 during the pendency of the divorce proceedi ng. In its March 16, 2016, final decision 4 and order, the district court terminatedthe monthly payment and ruled on Wife’s 5 request for further ongoing spousal support as follows: 6 The focal consideration in spousal s upport is need. . . . Spousal [s]upport 7 is not a penalty. . . . Section 40-4-7 . . . outlines the factors the [c]ourt 8 must consider. Both parties are re latively healthy, although [Wife] has 9 arthritis and reports that she is unable to stand for long periods of time. 10 [Wife] has her retirement income to provide for her support. [Husband] 11 has his employment and ownership of his separate property businesses 12 to provide for his support. [Husband] only has a high school education, 13 whereas [Wife] has two advanced degrees. [Wife] testified that she has 14 only applied for two jobs since the separation and does not meet current 15 licensure requirements since her re tirement in 2007. Testimony of the 16 parties established that during the term of the marriage they lived debt 17 free, took vacations without incurring debt, and lived comfortably. 18 [Wife] currently has medical/healthcoverage through her retirement, 19 while [Husband] has coverage through his business. The parties were 20 married from July 13, 2007 until March 25, 2015. The only personal 21 property awarded in this case consists of two vehicles and a bed. [Wife] 22 testified she only has one liability , a $2,000.00 loan from her sister. 23 [Wife] owns no other real estate or other significant property, outside of 24 her LPL Financial Money market. [H usband] owns his home and it sits 25 on more than one acre of land. [Hus band] and [Wife] entered into no 26 agreements in contemplation of divorce. [Husband] clearly has more 27 resources and readily [disposable] income. Conversely, this marriage 28 only lasted six years. Both parties are capable of being self-employed. 29 The Court therefore orders an additional fixed, one-time spousal support 30 payment of $5,000.00. Monthly support will cease as of January 1, 2016. 3120 The balance in Wife’s money market account was approximately $50,000. 1
{27} Wife contends that the district court “failed to follow the law and the evidence 2 when awarding [ongoing] spousal support.” Sp ecifically, she argues that on the basis 3 of her age and health condition; the parties’ relative means of support, current income, 4 and future earning capacity and prospects; th e amount, type and nature of the property 5 that was awarded to her and Husband; and her standard of living during the marriage 6 and reasonable needs, the court should have awarded ongoing spousal support, and 7 suggests a figure of $3,800.00 per month. Wi fe does not make a substantial evidence 8 challenge to any of the factual findings reflected in the district court’s spousal support 9 ruling. Rather, she effectively challenges the district court’s weighing of Section 40-4- 10 7’s factors. “Whether to order spousal s upport, how much to order, and the duration 11 of the order are within the sound discretion of the district court.” Rabie v. Ogaki , 12 1993-NMCA-096, ¶ 5, 116 N.M. 143, 860 P.2d 785. Absent an abuse of discretion, 13 we will not disturb a district court’s award of spousal support. See Talley v. Talley , 14 1993-NMCA-003, ¶ 12, 115 N.M. 89, 847 P.2d 323. “An abus e of discretion occurs 15 when a ruling is clearly contrary to the logical conclusions demanded by the facts and 16 circumstances of the case.” Clark , 2014-NMCA-030, ¶ 8 (internal quotation marks 17 and citation omitted). 1821 {28} The question for the district court was whether Wife had any “actual need” for 1 spousal support. The court considered the st atutory factors. The court noted that the 2 marriage lasted only six years; both parties were relatively healthy; Wife had 3 retirement income, a money market account with a $50,000 balance, and health 4 insurance coverage; and Wife had no debts. Wife disagrees with the manner in which 5 the district court balanced the various c onsiderations and arrived at its decision to 6 award only $5,000 as a lump sum amount, but su ch criticism does not rise to the level 7 of abuse of discretion. In re Camino Real Envtl. Ctr., Inc. , 2010-NMCA-057, ¶ 23, 8 148 N.M. 776, 242 P.3d 343(stating that “when reasons both supporting and 9 detracting from a decision exist, there is no abuse of discretion” and “merely 10 identifying the existence of evidence whic h may have tended to support a different 11 outcome does not demonstrate an abuse of discretion”). 12 C. Wife’s Attorney’s Fees 13
{29} Wife requested an attorney fee award of approximately $31,000. The district 14 court awarded her $10,000. Wife contests the award, arguing that the amount was 15 arbitrary and that she also was entitled to recover her attorney’s f ees as a sanction for 16 Husband’s “obstructive discovery tactics and defiance of court orders throughout the 17 proceedings.” 1822 {30} Section 40-4-7(A), provides that, in a divorce proceeding, “[t]he court may 1 make an order, relative to the expenses of the proceeding, as will ensure either party 2 an efficient preparation and presentation of his case.” This authorization encompasses 3 an award of attorney’s fees. As the langua ge of the statute i ndicates, “the central 4 purpose of an award of attorney fees under Section 40-4-7(A) is to remedy any 5 financial disparity between the . . . partie s so that each may make an efficient and 6 effective presentation of his or her claims.” Garcia v. Jeantette , 2004-NMCA-004, ¶ 7 19, 134 N.M. 776, 82 P.3d 947. In making an aw ard, the district court will consider, 8 among other factors, not only any disparity in the parties’ resources but also the 9 parties’ relative success on the merits. Weddington v. Weddington , 2004-NMCA-034, 10 ¶ 27, 135 N.M. 198, 86 P.3d 623. “Award of attorney fees rests in the discretion of the 11 trial court and [the appellatecourts] will not alter the fee award absent an abuse of 12 discretion.” Lenz v. Chalamidas , 1991-NMSC-099, ¶ 2, 113 N.M. 17, 821 P.2d 355. 13
{31} The district court explained its ruling on Wife’s attorney’s fee request as 14 follows: 15 Pursuant to . . . [Section] 40-4-7( A), attorney fees can be awarded 16 where there is financial disparity betw een the parties as this is the most 17 important factor. . . . This case has attimes been vexatious. Neither party 18 has clean hands in this regard. Cl early, [Husband] has more income to 19 pursue litigation. In fact, the [c]ourt has previously ordered an advance 20 of attorney fees. [Wife] attached an affidavit indicating approximately 21 $30,000.00 in attorney fees in this case. The [c]ourt hereby orders 22 [Husband p]ay [Wife] $10,000.00 for attorney fees. 2323 {32} We see no abuse of discretion in this ruli ng. First, while the district court noted 1 that Husband had more income, Wife was not destitute. More to the point, Wife was 2 not unable to secure adequate advocacy of her interests in the divorce litigation, which 3 is the underlying purpose of any attorney’s fee award. See Jeantette , 4 2004-NMCA-004, ¶ 19. That woul d have been readily appare nt to the court from the 5 fact that both parties had vigorously if not “vexatiously” litigated the case—Wife’s 6 attorney’s fee request itself reflected thather attorney had devoted approximately 400 7 hours to the case—and, as previously menti oned, Wife held as her separate property 8 a money market account with an approximately $50,000 balance th at would have been 9 available to pay her attorney’s fees. 10
{33} Second, Wife had achieved only partial success in obtai ning the relief that she 11 sought. Perhaps most significantly, the distri ct court had declinedher request for an 12 award of an ongoing, monthly $3,800 spousal support award. The court could take this 13 into account in determining the amount of an attorney’s fee award. Wife cites 14 Economy Rentals, Inc. v. Garcia , 1991-NMSC-092, ¶ 54, 112 N.M. 748, 819 P.2d 15 1306, for the proposition that the court could not arbitrarily award Wife only one-third 16 of her attorney’s fees on the basis of an “eye-ball estimate,” and instead had to enter 17 findings based on evidence. However, our Supreme Court’s concern in Economy 18 Rentals, Inc. , stemmed from the fact that the commercial litigation in that case 1924 involved multiple issues, only one of which permitted an attorney’s fee award; the 1 district court therefore had to justify its award of one-half of the requested fees by 2 showing that one-half of the attorneys’ time was devoted to advocating the one issue 3 that was the basis for the award. Economy Rentals, Inc. , 1991-NMSC-092,¶ 51-54. 4 That concern is not present here, where pursuant to Sec tion 40-4-7(A) an attorney’s 5 fee award is based on all of the work performed in the divorce case. Wife does not cite 6 any authority for the proposition that a district court must enter detailed findings 7 supporting an attorney fee award outside the special context of Economy Rentals, Inc. 8 “Where a party cites no authority to s upport an argument, we may assume no such 9 authority exists.” Curry v. Great Nw. Ins. Co. , 2014-NMCA-031, ¶ 28, 320 P.3d 482. 10
{34} Third, Wife complains that the district court did not award her attorney’s fees 11 as a sanction for Husband’s failure to make all of the monthly $2,000 interim spousal 12 support payments that the district court ha d ordered earlier in the litigation. Wife does 13 not cite any authority for the proposition that the district court was required to 14 sanction Husband, in particular, award atto rney’s fees, for his failure to make the 15 payments, and we are not otherw ise aware of any such rule. See ITT Educ. Servs., Inc. 16 v. Taxation & Revenue Dep’t , 1998-NMCA-078, ¶ 10, 125 N.M. 244, 959 P.2d 969 17 (holding that this Court will not considerpropositions that are unsupported by citation 18 to authority). Under Section 40-4-7(A), any attorney’s fee award is in any event 1925 discretionary. The district court was acting in equity, and in considering attorney’s 1 fees properly could consider that both pa rties were guilty of vexatious conduct—for 2 example, during the course of the proceedings Wife m oved to disqualify Husband’s 3 CPA from testifying, which the district court subsequently denied; Wife filed a motion 4 for sanctions against Husband which was not granted; Wife filed two motions for 5 order to show cause against Husband and th e court ruled that both were without merit. 6 We hold there was no abuse of discretion on the part of the district court in not 7 making a separate or additional award of attorney’s fees as a sanction for Husband’s 8 failure to make the interim support payments. 9 D. Husband’s Cross-Appeal 10
{35} On cross-appeal Husband argues that th e district court erred in awarding Wife 11 a $20,000 reimbursement for payments of separate debt, awarding Wife one-half of 12 the income tax she paid following the parties’ separation, and awarding spousal 13 support and attorney’s fees to Wife. To th e extent Husband argue s that there is an 14 insufficient factual basis to support the court’s findings of fact “we review the 15 evidence in the light most favorable to s upport the district court’s findings, resolving 16 all conflicts and indulging all permissible in ferences in favor of the decision below.” 17 Jones v. Schoellkopf , 2005-NMCA-124, ¶ 8, 138 N.M . 477, 122 P.3d 844. However, 18 to the extent Husband attacks the court’ s conclusions of law including those findings 1926 that function as conclusions , our review is de novo.” See Gabriele v. Gabriele , 2018- 1 NMCA-042, ¶ 18, ___ P.3d ___. Wereview a district court’s determination whether 2 an item is community or separate debt de novo. Arnold v. Arnold , 2003-NMCA-114, 3 ¶ 6, 134 N.M. 381, 77 P.3d 285. As stated, we will not alter an attorney fee or spousal 4 support award absent an abuse of discretion. Lenz , 1991-NMSC-099, ¶ 2; Weaver v. 5 Weaver , 1983-NMSC-063, ¶ 5, 100 N.M. 165, 667 P.2d 970. 6 1. The District Court Did Not Err in Awarding Wife a $20,000 7 Reimbursement on Separate Debt 8
{36} Husband does not assert a substantial evid ence challenge to the district court’s 9 factual findings that underlie its ruling on this issue. See Rule 12-318(A)(3), (4) 10 NMRA. We therefore assume that the facts material to this i ssue are undisputed as 11 found by the district court and acknowledged by the parties. Prior to the marriage and 12 in connection with the settlement of his previous divorce, Husband borrowed 13 $100,000 from his mother to pay off a lien on his separate property home. This was 14 Husband’s separate debt. Husband does not assert that the loan accrued interest. 15 During the marriage Husband made some of the $500 monthly payments on the loan 16 with funds from a joint bank account into which community income was deposited. 17 Thus, community assets were used to pay Husband’s separate debt. Wife sought 18 reimbursement for one-half of any communityassets that were used to pay his 19 separate debt. The district court generally agreed with Wife and ruled that she was 2027 entitled to a $13,750 reimbursement from Husb and for one-half of the payments that 1 Husband made to his mother from the parties’ joint account; Wife was not entitled to 2 reimbursement for payments Husband madeto his mother from a different account 3 that contained only funds thatwere his separate property. 4
{37} In addition, prior to the marriage Hu sband had purchased a tract of land 5 adjacent to his home from an aunt who appare ntly had loaned him some or all of the 6 purchase funds, and he was paying her $500 per month. Again, Husband does not 7 assert that the loan accrued interest . During the marriage Husband used the 8 aforementioned joint bank account into whic h community income had been deposited 9 to make some of the monthly payments to his aunt. Wife sought reimbursement for 10 one-half of any community assets used by Husband to pay this separate debt. The 11 district court ruled that Wife was entitle d to reimbursement of $6,250 for one-half of 12 the payments that Husband made to his aunt from the parties’ joint account but that 13 Wife was not entitled to reimbursement for payments that Husband made to his aunt 14 from a different bank account into which Husband’s separate property funds were 15 deposited. 16
{38} In McElyea v. McElyea , 1945-NMSC-035, 49 N.M. 322, 163 P.2d 635, our 17 Supreme Court held that if the community paid any part of a se parate debt, it would 18 be entitled to repayment of the amount so expended. Husband argues, however, that, 1928 because he and Wife resided in the home thatwas his separate property, Wife received 1 a benefit from the payments to his mother and aunt and for that reason he should not 2 have been required to reimburse her for one-half of the payments. Husband cites 3 Dorbin v. Dorbin , 1986-NMCA-114, ¶ 30, 105 N.M. 263, 731 P.2d 959, for the 4 proposition that, “[w]hen community [property] is spent to the benefit of separate 5 property, without the acquisition of an asse t, for example, when money is paid for 6 interest, taxes and insurance, neither Ne w Mexico statute nor case law authorizes 7 reimbursement.” (emphasis omitted). See also Martinez v. Block , 1993-NMCA-093, 8 ¶ 12, 115 N.M. 762, 858 P.2d 429 (stating that “the community has no right to be 9 reimbursed for funds spent paying mortgage in terest, taxes, or insurance premiums on 10 the asset”). However, Husband points to no evidence that any portion of the loan 11 payments that he made to his mother and aunt were used for payment of interest, taxes 12 or insurance premiums as opposed to simply reducing the principal balance on his 13 separate debts. For this reason, we conclude that the district court did not err in 14 awarding Wife one-half of the loan payments made from community assets. 15 2. The District Court Di d Not Err in Awarding WifeOne-Half of the Income 16 Tax She Paid in the Years Following the Parties’ Separation 17
{39} Husband does not assert a substantial evid ence challenge to the district court’s 18 factual findings that underlie its ruling on this issue. See Rule 12-318(A)(3), (4). We 19 therefore assume that the f acts material to th is issue are undisputed as found by the 2029 district court and acknowledged by the parties. Husband filed his 2013 and 2014 1 income tax returns (filing as “married f iling separately”) w ithout Wife’s knowledge 2 or consent, and as a result Wife also had to file separate return s for the income she 3 received from her retirement pension. Wifepaid income tax on the pension income 4 during these two years in the amount of $1,600 and $2,200, respec tively. The district 5 court determined that the tax liability wa s a community debt and that Wife was 6 entitled to reimbursement from Husband of $1,900, one-half of the sum of these 7 payments. Husband argues that the tax liabilityin fact was Wife’s separate debt and 8 she therefore had no right to reimbursement. 9
{40} In New Mexico, any “debt contracted or incurred by either or both spouses 10 during marriage which is not a separate debt” is a “community debt.” NMSA 1978, 11 Section 40-3-9(B) (1983). One type of “s eparate debt” is an “unreasonable” debt. 12 NMSA 1978, Section 40-3-9(A)(6). A district court “ maydeclare, as between the 13 parties, a debt to be unreasonable if it was incurred by a spouse while the spouse was 14 living apart and the debt did not contribute to the benefit of both spouses or their 15 dependents.” NMSA 1978, Sec tion 40-3-10.1 (1983) (empha sis added). We construe 16 this language as vesting the district court with discretion to make such a declaration. 17
{41} Pursuant to Section 40-3-9(B), Wife’s 2013 and 2014 income tax liability 18 presumptively was a community debt becau se the parties were not divorced until 1930 2015. The district court in theory might havedeclared that Wife’s income tax liability 1 incurred after October 14, 2013, when she and Husband separated, was an 2 “unreasonable” and thus separate debt. However, the district court was not required 3 to treat the post-October 14, 2013, payments as a separate debt. The district court did 4 not expressly discuss why it di d not do so, but in its ruling did note that Husband filed 5 his 2013 and 2014 income tax returns without Wife’s knowledge or consent, “thereby 6 forcing [Wife] to also to file separate.” This consideration is sufficient to support the 7 district court’s exercise of discretion in not declaring the debt to be unreasonable. In 8 any event, review of the record below doe s not reflect that Husband requested the 9 district court to treat Wife’s 2014 or any portion of the 2013 tax liability as an 10 unreasonable debt. “[O]n appeal, the party mu st specifically point out where, in the 11 record, the party invoked the court’s ruling on the issue. Absent that citation to the 12 record or any obvious preservation, we will not consider the issue.” Crutchfield v. 13 N.M. Dep’t of Taxation & Revenue , 2005-NMCA-022, ¶ 14, 137 N.M. 26, 106 P.3d 14 1273. For all of these reasons we therefore affirm the district court on this issue. 15 3. The District Court Did Not Err inAwarding Wife Temporary Spousal 16 Support, a Lump Sum Spousal Support Payment, and Attorney Fees 17
{42} “The district court [in a divorce proceeding] has wide discretion to award 18 spousal support [and attorney’s fees,] and its decision will only be set aside if it 19 constitutes an abuse of discretion.” Clark , 2014-NMCA-030, ¶ 8; Lebeck v. Lebeck , 2031 1994-NMCA-103, ¶ 27, 118 N.M. 367, 881 P.2d 727. For the same reasons that 1 underlie our denial of Wife’s challenges to the district court’s rulings on these issues, 2 we reject Husband’s arguments that the district court abus ed its discretion in awarding 3 Wife $2,000 per month spousal support through January 1, 2016 and a final $5,000 4 lump sum spousal support amount, and in awarding Wife $10,000 in attorney’s fees. 5 CONCLUSION 6
{43} We affirm the district court. 7
{44} IT IS SO ORDERED. 8

____________________________ _____ 9 HENRY M. BOHNHOFF, Judge 10

WE CONCUR: 11

___________________________________ 12 JULIE J. VARGAS, Judge 13

___________________________________ 14 DANIEL J. GALLEGOS, Judge 15