Filed 9/20/23 Flores v. Medicali Holdings CA2/3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on 

opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 

8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for 

purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

GABRIEL FLORES,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

MEDICALI HOLDINGS, INC.,

Defendant and Appellant.

B317695

(Los Angeles County

Super. Ct. No. 19STCV31058)

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of 

Los Angeles County, Armen Tamzarian, Judge. Affirmed.

Stern & Goldberg, Alan N. Goldberg, and Peter Tran for 

Defendant and Appellant.

No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent.

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2

During discovery in this matter, defendant Medicali 

Holdings, Inc. (Medicali)1 served requests for admission on 

plaintiff Gabriel Flores seeking his admission that most of his 

wage-and-hour claims were barred by the applicable statutes of 

limitations. Flores denied the requests, and Medicali prevailed 

on this issue at trial. After trial, Medicali sought attorney fees 

under Code of Civil Procedure section 2033.420,2 which allows a 

court to award reasonable expenses, including attorney fees,

incurred by a party to prove “the truth of any matter” that 

another party has failed to admit when asked to do so. The trial 

court denied the motion, concluding that the fees Medicali sought 

to recover were incurred to defend against the untimely claims on 

the merits—not to establish that the claims were time-barred—

thus they were not recoverable under the plain language of the 

statute.

As we discuss more fully below, the trial court did not 

abuse its discretion by denying Medicali’s motion for attorney 

fees. We therefore affirm.

1 Flores named as defendants Medicali Holdings, Inc., a 

California corporation (Medicali CA); Medicali, Inc., a Nevada 

corporation (Medicali NV); and Medicali’s principal, Charles 

Weinberger. As described below, judgment was entered as to all 

three defendants, but only Medicali CA has appealed. In this 

opinion, we will refer to all the Medicali defendants 

interchangeably as “Medicali.”

2 All subsequent undesignated statutory references are to 

the Code of Civil Procedure.
3

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

I. Background.

Flores was employed by Medicali as a glassblower from 

about 2011 until September 9, 2016. Nearly three years later, on 

August 30, 2019, Flores filed the present action alleging a variety 

of wage and hour claims: failure to pay wages (first cause of 

action), failure to pay minimum wages (second cause of action), 

failure to pay overtime (third cause of action), failure to provide 

meal and rest breaks (fourth cause of action), unfair competition

(fifth cause of action), waiting time penalties (sixth cause of

action), and cancellation of contract (seventh cause of action).

The case was tried to the court in 2021. In a statement of 

decision, the trial court found that the first, second, third, fourth, 

and sixth causes of action were governed by a three-year statute 

of limitations; the fifth cause of action was governed by a fouryear statute of limitations; and the statutes were not tolled by 

Medicali’s principal’s travel outside the state. Accordingly, Flores 

could not recover under his first through fourth and sixth causes 

of action for any alleged violations that occurred before August 

30, 2016, and he could not recover under his fifth cause of action

for any violations that occurred before August 30, 2015. On the 

merits, the court found that Medicali had not violated the 

minimum wage laws, but at times had failed to pay Flores 

overtime. The court thus found Flores was entitled to recover 

$238.50 in damages for unpaid overtime and $6,065 in 

restitution.

On November 10, 2021, the court entered judgment for 

Flores.
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II. Medicali’s motion for attorney fees.

A. Medicali’s motion.

After entry of judgment, Medicali moved for attorney fees 

pursuant to section 2033.420. That section provides that if a 

party unreasonably fails to admit the truth of any matter when 

requested to do so, and if the party requesting the admission 

thereafter proves the truth of that matter, the party requesting 

the admission “may move the court for an order requiring the 

party to whom the request was directed to pay the reasonable 

expenses incurred in making that proof, including reasonable 

attorney’s fees.” (§ 2033.420, subd. (a).)

In support of its motion for attorney fees, Medicali asserted 

that in September 2019, it served requests for admission that 

asked Flores to admit the following:

(1) Requests for admission nos. 39, 40, 42, 43, 45, 46, 48, 

49, 54, and 55 asked Flores to admit that the statute of 

limitations precluded Flores from seeking damages pursuant to 

the first, second, third, fourth, and sixth causes of action for any 

period prior to August 30, 2016.

(2) Requests for admission nos. 51 and 52 asked Flores

to admit that the statute of limitations precluded Flores from 

seeking damages pursuant to the fifth cause of action for any 

period prior to August 30, 2015.

Flores denied each of these requests in November 2019. 

Following trial, however, the trial court concluded that the 

substance of Medicali’s requests for admissions were correct as a 

matter of law. Medicali thus contended that pursuant to section 

2033.420, it was entitled to recover the following:

(1) 3.0 hours of attorney time, billed at $1,500, for 

“[e]fforts to meet and confer with Plaintiff to discontinue his 
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attempts to seek damages for alleged unpaid wages outside of the 

applicable statutory periods.”

(2) 25 hours of attorney time, billed at $9,125, for 

“[p]reparation of additional discovery and the filing of two (2) 

motions to compel . . . related to Plaintiff’s . . . claim of damages 

going back to 2012, as stated in his supplemental responses to 

Special Interrogatories provided on March 27 and 30, 2020.”

(3) 5.5 hours of attorney time, billed at $2,750, for 

preparing for and taking Flores’s deposition concerning his 

claims for unpaid wages “prior to 2015.”

(4) 3.75 hours of attorney time, billed at $1,875, for 

reviewing Flores’s payroll records from 2010 to 2014, and 

preparing for and taking Flores’s deposition, about half of which 

was directed to Flores’s time-barred claims.

(5) 23.0 hours of attorney time, billed at $8,125, for 

conducting legal research and preparing a trial defense “against 

Plaintiff’s claim of alleged unpaid wages prior to the applicable 

statutory periods, including Plaintiff’s belated claim that the 

statute of limitations was tolled as to those claims.”

(6) 6.0 hours of attorney time, billed at $3,000, for

addressing Flores’s attempts at trial “to present testimony and 

introduce voluminous payroll records going as far back as 2011. 

Defendants were required to defend against such claims and 

Plaintiff’s claim that the statute of limitations was tolled.”

B. Flores’s opposition.

Flores opposed the motion for fees. He urged that his 

denial of the requests for admission was reasonable, and none of 

the fees sought were incurred to prove that his claims were 

barred by the applicable statutes of limitations. Instead, Flores

asserted, all of the fees sought were “costs for preparing [a] 
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defense if the statute was actually extended.” Flores thus 

contended that Medicali was not entitled to recover attorney fees 

pursuant to section 2033.420.

C. Order denying attorney fees.

The trial court denied the request for attorney fees. The

court found Flores’s denial of the requests for admission was 

unreasonable, but concluded Medicali failed to establish that it 

incurred attorney fees and costs to prove the facts Flores should 

have admitted. The court explained: “The matters plaintiff 

denied were that he could not recover on his first six causes of 

action for unpaid wages before August 30, 2016 . . . . [¶] Those 

matters are a simple ‘application of law to fact.’ (§ 2033.010.) 

The law is that these causes of action have a three-year statute of 

limitations. (§ 338(a); Pineda v. Bank of America, N.A. (2010) 50 

Cal.4th 1389, 1398.) There are only two necessary facts. First, 

plaintiff filed the complaint on August 30, 2019. This fact was 

not disputed and could not reasonably be disputed. Second, 

plaintiff’s employment with defendants ended on September 9, 

2016. This fact was never disputed. Plaintiff’s initial complaint 

alleges, ‘Plaintiff and Defendants separated on or around 

September 9, 2016.’ ”

“Defendant does not show it incurred the fees claimed in 

proving this simple application of law to fact. Attempting to 

convince plaintiff these matters were true does not constitute 

proving them. All the other fees described were incurred 

preparing for trial on the merits of plaintiff’s claims for unpaid 

wages before August 30, 2016. That also does not constitute 

proving the matters plaintiff should have admitted. Defendant 

incurred those fees as a backup plan so it would be prepared in 

case plaintiff was right and could recover those wages.”
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Medicali timely appealed from the order denying the 

request for attorney fees.3

DISCUSSION

Medicali contends it was entitled to recover attorney fees 

incurred to defend against Flores’s claims for wages prior to 

August 30, 2016, because had Flores not denied the requests for 

admission, “the scope of discovery and the length of Trial would 

have been narrowed and shortened.” Medicali’s claim lacks 

merit.

I. Legal standards.

A party to a civil action may propound a written request for 

the admission of “the truth of specified matters of fact, opinion 

relating to fact, or application of law to fact.” (§ 2033.010.) Any 

matter admitted in response to a request for admission is 

conclusively established against the party making the admission. 

(§ 2033.410.) A request for admission may properly be used to 

establish fact, opinion, or the application of law to fact. (Garcia v.

Hyster Co. (1994) 28 Cal.App.4th 724, 735 (Garcia).)

If a party fails to admit the truth of any matter when 

requested to do so, and if the party requesting that admission 

thereafter proves the truth of that matter, “the party requesting 

the admission may move the court for an order requiring the 

party to whom the request was directed to pay the reasonable 

expenses incurred in making that proof, including reasonable 

attorney’s fees.” (§ 2033.420, subd. (a).) The court is required to 

award the reasonable expenses incurred unless it finds that an 

3 Flores separately appealed from the judgment, and the

court consolidated Flores’s and Medicali’s appeals. On January 

5, 2023, we dismissed Flores’s appeal for failure to file an opening 

brief.
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objection to the request was sustained, the party who denied the 

request “had reasonable ground to believe [he or she] would 

prevail on the matter,” the admission sought “was of no 

substantial importance,” or “[t]here was other good reason for the 

failure to admit.” (§ 2033.420, subd. (b)(1)–(4); see also Grace v.

Mansourian (2015) 240 Cal.App.4th 523, 529 (Grace) [quoting 

statute].) The trial court’s determination of whether costs of 

proof should be awarded normally is reviewed for an abuse of 

discretion (Grace, at p. 529), but de novo review of such an order 

is warranted “ ‘ “where the determination of whether the criteria 

for an award of attorney fees and costs in this context have been 

satisfied amounts to statutory construction and a question of 

law.” ’ [Citation.]” (Serrano v. Stefan Merli Plastering Co., Inc. 

(2011) 52 Cal.4th 1018, 1026.)

The Court of Appeal considered the scope of attorney fees 

recoverable under the predecessor to section 2033.420 (see Cal. 

Law Revision Com. com., West’s Ann. Cal. Code Civ. Proc. (2023 

ed.) foll. § 2033.420) in Garcia, supra, 28 Cal.App.4th 724. There, 

plaintiff Garcia filed a complaint alleging that he was seriously 

injured at work while operating machinery designed and 

manufactured by defendant Hyster. The insurer who provided 

workers’ compensation insurance to Garcia’s employer filed a 

complaint in intervention against Hyster, alleging that it had 

been required to pay plaintiff workers’ compensation benefits as 

the result of Hyster’s negligence. (Id. at p. 728.) The complaint 

in intervention went to trial, and the trial court granted a 

nonsuit for Hyster. (Ibid.) Hyster then moved for an award of 

attorney fees “ ‘associated with the trial of this case’ ” based on 

the insurer’s denial of several requests for admission—namely, 

that Garcia’s employer was negligent, that the employer’s 
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negligence was a legal cause of Garcia’s damages, and that the 

employer’s negligence was responsible for at least 20 percent of 

Garcia’s injuries. (Id. at pp. 728–729, 733–734.) The trial court 

awarded Hyster all of the attorney fees sought, and the insurer 

appealed. (Id. at p. 734.)

The Court of Appeal reversed the award of attorney fees. It 

explained that the statute authorizes only those expenses 

“ ‘incurred in making that proof,’ i.e., proving the matters denied 

by the opposing party.” (Garcia, supra, 28 Cal.App.4th at 

pp. 736–737, italics added.) In the case before it, Hyster “likely 

devoted at least some resources to preparation of proof that it 

was not negligent in the design of its [machinery], and perhaps 

toward a showing of operator negligence; however, these issues 

were completely outside the scope of the request for admissions.” 

(Id. at p. 737.) Nonetheless, “[n]othing in the bare-bones showing 

made below, or in the lower court’s award, reflects that any 

consideration was given to the fact that Hyster Company’s trial 

preparation might extend beyond those areas covered in the 

request for admissions.” (Ibid.) Thus, the court concluded, the 

fee award was “far more than reasonable compensation under the 

circumstances,” requiring a remand “for redetermination of costs 

and fees.” (Id. at pp. 737–738.)

The Court of Appeal came to a similar conclusion in Grace, 

supra, 240 Cal.App.4th 523. There, the plaintiff was injured in a 

vehicle collision with the defendant. The plaintiff sued, alleging 

that the defendant caused the collision after running a red light. 

The plaintiff served requests for admission, asking the defendant 

to admit that he failed to stop at the red light, and that his

failure was negligent, was the actual and legal cause of the 

accident, and was a substantial factor causing the accident and 
10

plaintiff’s damages. The plaintiff also asked the defendant to 

admit that, as a result of the accident, the plaintiff was injured 

and needed medical treatment, all treatment was necessary and 

within the standard of care, and all medical bills were 

reasonable. Finally, the plaintiff asked the defendant to admit 

the plaintiff’s lost earnings as a result of the accident. The 

defendant denied each of these requests. (Id. at p. 526.)

A jury found the defendant was negligent and awarded the 

plaintiff damages for medical expenses, lost earnings, and pain 

and suffering. (Grace, supra, 240 Cal.App.4th at p. 528.) The 

plaintiff then filed a motion for attorney fees pursuant to 

section 2033.420. The trial court denied the motion, finding that 

the defendant’s denial was reasonable. (Ibid.) The Court of 

Appeal reversed, finding it was not reasonable for the defendant 

to have denied that he ran a red light, that his conduct was 

negligent, that his negligent conduct was the cause of the 

accident, and that the plaintiff was injured in the accident. (Id.

at pp. 530, 533.) The court therefore held that the plaintiff was 

entitled to recover the fees and costs associated with proving 

these facts. The court noted, however, that the plaintiff was 

required to segregate these amounts “from costs and fees 

expended to prove other issues,” including issues to which the 

defendant had stipulated. (Id. at pp. 529–530, italics added.)

Accordingly, because the defendant had stipulated to the 

plaintiff’s medical bills and lost wages—and because the court 

found it was reasonable for the defendant to have denied that the

plaintiff would require future medical care and would suffer 

future lost wages as a result of the accident—the court remanded 

for a determination of the fees the plaintiff was entitled to 

recover. (Id. at pp. 533–534.)
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II. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by 

denying Medicali’s motion for attorney fees.

As we have noted, if a party unreasonably fails to admit the 

truth of a matter, section 2033.420 permits a trial court to award 

fees and costs incurred “in making that proof”—that is, proof of 

the fact or legal conclusion that the losing party was asked to, but 

did not, admit. Consistent with this statutory language, the 

cases discussed above hold that a prevailing party is entitled 

under section 2033.420 to recover only the costs of proving the 

matters that are the subject of the requests, not the costs of 

proving “other issues.” (See also Association for Los Angeles 

Deputy Sheriffs v. Macias (2021) 63 Cal.App.5th 1007, 1031.)

Applying this standard here, we conclude that the trial 

court did not abuse its discretion by denying Medicali’s motion for 

attorney fees. The first category of fees Medicali sought related

to defense counsel’s efforts to persuade plaintiff “to discontinue 

his attempts to seek damages for alleged unpaid wages outside of 

the applicable statutory periods.” But as the trial court correctly 

noted, although counsel’s efforts, if successful, would have made 

establishing the statute of limitations defense unnecessary, those 

efforts were not themselves directed toward “proving”—that is, 

introducing evidence or making a legal argument to the court—

that significant portions of plaintiff’s claims were time-barred. 

Accordingly, under the statute’s plain language, fees associated 

with these efforts were not recoverable.

The second category of fees were for discovery, trial 

preparation, and trial related to “defending against Plaintiff’s 

claim of alleged unpaid wages prior to the applicable statutory 

periods.” Although these fees would not have been incurred had 

plaintiff admitted the claims were time-barred, that was not the 
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question before the trial court. Instead, the only relevant 

question was whether the fees were incurred to prove the matters 

plaintiff should have admitted—i.e., that his claims that accrued 

before August 30, 2016 (or August 30, 2015) were time-barred. 

Medicali’s fees associated with defending these claims on the 

merits unquestionably were not.

There is only one element of Medicali’s fee request that 

arguably had merit: fees incurred to “defend[ ] against Plaintiff’s 

claim . . . that the statute of limitations was tolled.” To the 

extent they were reasonably incurred, fees associated with 

researching and briefing plaintiff’s tolling claim could be 

recoverable under section 2033.420 as expenses incurred to prove 

a matter plaintiff should have admitted. However, Medicali did 

not separately account for any such fees as the statute requires. 

(See Grace, supra, 240 Cal.App.4th at p. 529 [in seeking fees and 

costs under section 2033.420, moving party must “segregate[ ]

[recoverable fees] from costs and fees expended to prove other 

issues”].) Under these circumstances, the trial court did not 

abuse its discretion by denying Medicali’s motion.

Medicali asserts that it should have been awarded the 

claimed fees because it “could not simply do nothing when faced 

with the Plaintiff’s denials of the Requests and assume that the 

admissions sought by the Requests (i.e., the time periods for each 

of the causes of action as limited by the applicable statutes of 

limitations) would have somehow been automatically applied at 

Trial.” Perhaps not, but section 2033.420 permits a court to 

award only those fees and costs incurred to prove facts that were 

unreasonably denied, not all fees and costs incurred as a result of

the unreasonable denial. The trial court did not err in so 

concluding.
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Medicali suggests finally that the trial court erred by 

concluding that “since the admissions sought by the Requests 

were an ‘application of law to fact,’ the Requests were somehow 

exempt from” section 2033.420. Not so. The trial court did not 

suggest that Medicali’s requests for admission were “exempt” 

from the statute; it simply concluded that Medicali had not 

demonstrated that it had incurred any recoverable fees. As we 

have discussed, that conclusion was not an abuse of discretion.
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DISPOSITION

The order denying Medicali’s motion for attorney fees is 

affirmed.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL 

REPORTS

ADAMS, J.

We concur:

EDMON, P. J.

EGERTON, J.