In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________

No. 15-3778

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

ROBERT RANJEL,

Defendant-Appellant.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.

No. 02 CR 720-1 — Samuel Der-Yeghiayan, Judge.

____________________

ARGUED NOVEMBER 1, 2016 — DECIDED SEPTEMBER 29, 2017

____________________

Before EASTERBROOK, ROVNER, and SYKES, Circuit Judges.

SYKES, Circuit Judge. In 2002 Robert Ranjel was indicted 

for participating in a Latin Kings drug-trafficking conspiracy 

operating in Aurora, Illinois. He fled to Mexico and remained there for nearly a decade. He surrendered in 2011 

and a jury later convicted him of conspiracy and related

drug crimes. The district judge imposed a sentence of

235 months in prison followed by a five-year term of supervised release.
2 No. 15-3778

Ranjel raises several claims of sentencing error. He argues that the judge (1) miscalculated the drug quantity;

(2) misapplied a guidelines enhancement for his role as a 

manager or supervisor in the conspiracy; (3) misapplied a 

guidelines enhancement for obstruction of justice; (4) erroneously considered evidence of his involvement in a gangrelated murder; and (5) failed to explicitly note that the 

guidelines recommended a three-year term of supervised 

release or explain why he opted for a five-year term.

We affirm. Ranjel waived the fifth claim of error. The others are meritless. 

I. Background

Ranjel was a member of the Latin Kings gang and was 

deeply involved in its drug-trafficking operation in Aurora, 

Illinois. In 2002 he was indicted for conspiracy to distribute

controlled substances, see 21 U.S.C. § 846, and three counts of 

distributing cocaine, see id. § 841(a)(1). When the arrest 

warrant issued, Ranjel fled to Mexico and remained there for 

almost a decade. In 2011 he turned himself in to the

U.S. Consulate in Monterrey, Mexico, and was returned to 

the United States. His case proceeded to trial the following 

year. The government’s evidence included testimony from 

federal agents, a confidential informant, and several coconspirators, as well as recordings of wiretapped phone calls 

among the coconspirators. The jury convicted Ranjel on all 

counts.

The judge ordered a presentence report (“PSR”) and specifically directed the probation office to “release the sentencing recommendation portion of the PSR” to both counsel.

The judge also ordered counsel to file any objections or 
No. 15-3778 3

corrections in writing, together with sentencing memoranda

and position statements on the recommended conditions of 

supervised release.

The PSR estimated that the drug quantity attributable to 

Ranjel as relevant conduct was approximately 2.06 kilograms of cocaine. That translated to a base offense level of 

26. As relevant here, the probation office recommended 

application of a three-level enhancement under U.S.S.G.

§ 3B1.1(b) for Ranjel’s role as a manager or supervisor in the 

conspiracy. The probation office also recommended application of a two-level enhancement for obstruction of justice 

based on Ranjel’s flight to Mexico and nearly ten years as a 

fugitive. See U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1. Finally, the PSR noted that the 

guidelines term of supervised release was three years but 

recommended that the judge impose a five-year term instead. The PSR also included specific recommendations for 

mandatory, discretionary, and special conditions of supervised release.

Ranjel’s attorney filed a sentencing memorandum raising 

several objections to the PSR, but he did not object to any of 

the recommendations regarding supervised release. Moreover, in a separate filing entitled Position on Conditions of 

Supervised Release, Ranjel’s attorney acknowledged that he 

had reviewed the PSR’s recommendations and “makes no 

objection thereto.”

At sentencing the judge ruled on counsel’s objections, ultimately accepting the PSR’s recommendations. The government then presented witnesses who testified about 

Ranjel’s involvement in a gang-related murder. Ranjel had 

been charged with the murder but was acquitted. The judge 

nonetheless credited the testimony of the government’s 
4 No. 15-3778

witnesses and took the murder into account in weighing the 

sentencing factors under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). The judge 

imposed a sentence of 235 months in prison, the top of the 

guidelines range, and a five-year term of supervised release

as recommended by the PSR. This appeal followed.

II. Discussion

Ranjel limits his appeal to sentencing issues. Most are attacks on the judge’s factual findings. That’s a steep hill to 

climb. We will not disturb a sentencing court’s factual 

findings unless they are clearly erroneous. United States v. 

Austin, 806 F.3d 425, 430 (7th Cir. 2015) (drug-quantity 

calculations reviewed for clear error); United States v. Etchin, 

614 F.3d 726, 738 (7th Cir. 2010) (credibility determinations 

warrant “especially deferential” review); United States v. 

Arceo, 535 F.3d 679, 687 (7th Cir. 2008) (obstruction-of-justice 

findings are reviewed for clear error); United States v. 

Hankton, 432 F.3d 779, 793 (7th Cir. 2005) (a finding that the 

defendant had the role of a manager or supervisor is reviewed for clear error). Under the deferential clear-error 

standard, we will reverse only if “after reviewing the entire 

record, we are left with the firm and definite conviction that 

a mistake has been made.” United States v. Marty, 450 F.3d 

687, 689–90 (7th Cir. 2006) (quotation marks omitted).

A. Drug Quantity

The judge adopted the PSR’s estimate that Ranjel’s offense conduct encompassed transactions totaling about 

2.06 kilograms of cocaine. That figure was largely based on 

the trial testimony of Juan Corral, Ranjel’s supplier, and 

frequent recorded phone calls between the two.
No. 15-3778 5

Corral described three distinct but overlapping groups of 

drug sales, each covering multiple weeks during the first 

half of 2002. The first series occurred from February 1 to 

March 31 and totaled 507 grams of cocaine. The second 

series started in the spring and continued through the end of 

June. Corral testified that during this period he sold Ranjel 

quarter-kilogram quantities of cocaine a “few times.” The 

PSR estimated that a “few times” meant at least three, for a 

total of 750 grams. Finally, Corral testified that he sometimes 

sold Ranjel additional one-eighth kilogram quantities of 

cocaine. The recorded phone calls backed up this testimony, 

capturing sales of this quantity roughly every other week 

between April 1 and June 24, for a total of not less than 

750 grams. The three subtotals sum to 2.007 kilograms (507 + 

750 + 750 = 2007 grams). In addition to these transactions, 

Ranjel also sold approximately 49 grams of cocaine to confidential informants in three separate transactions, bringing 

the combined total to 2.06 kilograms.

Ranjel challenges these calculations, arguing that the 

750-gram subtotal was double-counted. Not so. The PSR 

made clear that the identical subtotals were based on two 

separate sets of transactions with Corral, and the frequency

and amounts of these separate sales were corroborated by 

recorded phone calls. 

Ranjel argues more generally that the drug-quantity calculations were based on unreliable or imprecise evidence. In 

particular, he attacks Corral’s testimony, which he says was 

vague and marred by poor memory given the passage of 

time. Ranjel can hardly seek refuge in the passage of time, 

for which he is solely responsible. Regardless, calculating 

drug quantities is “often difficult, and district courts may 
6 No. 15-3778

make reasonable though imprecise estimates based on 

information that has indicia of reliability.” United States v. 

Bozovich, 782 F.3d 814, 818 (7th Cir. 2015); see also United 

States v. Araujo, 622 F.3d 854, 863–64 (7th Cir. 2010) (holding 

that the extrapolation of drug amounts “is permissible so 

long as it is based on reliable data regarding the size and 

frequency of the defendant’s transactions”). Corral was 

Ranjel’s main supplier, and his testimony was corroborated 

by more than 75 recorded phone calls between the two. And

on this record the 2.06-kilogram total is a conservative

estimate. The evidence showed that Ranjel used other cocaine suppliers in addition to Corral and also that he sold 

marijuana and prescription pills, neither of which was 

added to the total drug quantity. We find no error.

B. Sentencing Enhancements

Ranjel next challenges the application of the guidelines 

enhancement for his role as a manager or supervisor in the 

conspiracy. The guidelines recommend a three-level upward 

adjustment to the base offense level “[i]f the defendant was a 

manager or supervisor ... and the criminal activity involved 

five or more participants or was otherwise extensive.” 

U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(b). The judge applied this adjustment based 

on trial testimony establishing that Ranjel personally directed at least three other coconspirators to package, distribute, or sell cocaine to various buyers. Other testimony 

established that the Latin Kings drug-trafficking conspiracy 

involved far more than five people.

Ranjel argues that the judge erroneously found that he 

“managed five participants in a criminal activity.” But the 

judge made no such finding; nor was he required to. The 

enhancement applies if the defendant managed or super-
No. 15-3778 7

vised “one or more other participants” in criminal activity 

that involved five or more people. § 3B1.1 cmt. n.2. Trial

evidence established that Ranjel directed one coconspirator 

to hold drugs, another coconspirator to sell drugs, and a 

third coconspirator to deliver cocaine to various retailers, 

collect payment, and deliver the money to him. In other 

words, Ranjel “exercised some control over others involved 

in the commission of the offense,” which is enough to apply 

the § 3B1.1(b) enhancement. United States v. Pagan, 196 F.3d 

884, 892 (7th Cir. 1999) (quotation marks omitted).

Nor was it error to hold Ranjel accountable for obstruction of justice. See § 3C1.1. His flight to Mexico and nearly 

ten years as a fugitive easily qualifies as obstruction of 

justice, drawing a two-level enhancement under § 3C1.1. 

Ranjel argues that the government was not prejudiced by his 

fugitive status because federal drug agents knew where he 

was and could have extradited him if they wanted to. He

also argues that his flight to Mexico did not impose additional costs on the government or otherwise affect the government’s case in any concrete way. Actual prejudice is not 

needed. “[S]ection 3C1.1 applies to those defendants who 

attempt to obstruct or to impede the administration of justice, 

as well as to those who actually succeed in doing so.” United 

States v. Porter, 145 F.3d 897, 904 (7th Cir. 1998) (emphasis 

added).

Fleeing to another country is always “likely to burden a 

criminal investigation or prosecution significantly—likely to 

make the investigation or prosecution significantly more 

costly or less effective than it would otherwise have been.” 

United States v. Nduribe, 703 F.3d 1049, 1053 (7th Cir. 2013). 

Moreover, although proof of actual prejudice is not required, 
8 No. 15-3778

here the government established that Ranjel’s Mexican 

sojourn imposed some real costs: A cooperator who purchased cocaine from Ranjel died while Ranjel was at large;

drugs had to be retested because the crime lab kept its notes 

for only ten years; and government agents and lawenforcement witnesses retired or were no longer with their 

agencies by the time Ranjel faced trial, making them more 

difficult to locate. The judge properly applied the enhancement for obstruction of justice.

C. Ranjel’s Involvement in a Gang-Related Murder

At sentencing the government called three witnesses who 

testified to Ranjel’s involvement in a 1990 murder of a rival 

gang member. According to these witnesses, Ranjel and two 

fellow Latin Kings drove to the victim’s home, and each 

fired a gun into the house, killing the victim. Ranjel was 

tried for this murder and acquitted. Even so, an acquittal 

does not preclude the judge from considering the underlying 

conduct for sentencing purposes as long as the government 

proves the conduct by a preponderance of the evidence. 

United States v. Watts, 519 U.S. 148, 156–57 (1997). 

Ranjel does not contest the legal point. Rather, he argues 

that the government relied in part on a written proffer from 

a coconspirator, which is hearsay, and its witnesses “were 

admitted perjurers.” But hearsay is permissible at sentencing. See United States v. Grigsby, 692 F.3d 778, 787 (7th Cir. 

2012). And the judge acknowledged that “[a]ll three witnesses are convicted felons” who “told lies at times to the government officials, police officers and others.” He also recognized that the witnesses “eventually cooperated with the 

government and received reduced sentences based on those 
No. 15-3778 9

cooperations.” Nonetheless, the judge found their testimony 

credible.

A sentencing judge’s credibility determinations are entitled to exceptional deference. United States v. Johnson, 

342 F.3d 731, 735 (7th Cir. 2003). It was the judge’s job to take 

the measure of the government’s witnesses, accounting for

the various reasons to doubt their testimony. The judge did 

so here. He found the witnesses believable and considered 

this evidence in weighing the § 3553(a) sentencing factors. 

There was no error.

D. Supervised Release

Finally, Ranjel argues that the judge committed a procedural error by failing to expressly calculate and state for the 

record that the guidelines term of supervised release was 

three years. He also contends that the judge did not adequately explain his decision to impose an above-guidelines 

term of five years. The government responds that Ranjel 

waived these arguments by failing to raise them in the 

district court when he was explicitly invited to object.

Waiver is the intentional relinquishment of a known 

right. United States v. Bloch, 825 F.3d 862, 873 (7th Cir. 2016).

We have encouraged judges to provide advanced notice to 

the parties of the contemplated term and conditions of

supervised release. See United States v. Kappes, 782 F.3d 828, 

842–44 (7th Cir. 2015). Notice eliminates surprises at the 

hearing and allows the defendant to “present an informed 

response” to the proposed term and conditions. Id. at 843. 

The sentencing hearing is the “main event,” and when notice 

is given before the hearing, the parties can “prepare and 
10 No. 15-3778

identify the issues they wish to address” ahead of time.

United States v. Lewis, 823 F.3d 1075, 1083 (7th Cir. 2016).

Ranjel faced a statutory minimum three-year term of supervised release and a maximum of life. See 21 U.S.C. §§ 846, 

841(b)(1)(C). The PSR gave him ample notice that the guidelines recommended the minimum three-year term. See 

U.S.S.G. § 5D1.2. The probation office expressly recommended that the judge impose a five-year term instead, and this 

part of the PSR was released to Ranjel’s counsel. The judge 

ordered the parties to file written objections in advance of

the sentencing hearing. Ranjel did so, raising several objections. But he did not object to the calculation of the guidelines term of supervised release or the specific recommendation of an above-guidelines term of five years. And in a 

separate filing specifically responding to the proposed 

conditions of supervised release, counsel expressly acknowledged that he had reviewed the recommendations and 

“makes no objection thereto.” 

At the sentencing hearing, the judge asked Ranjel’s attorney if he had any further objections to the PSR other than 

those in his sentencing memorandum. Counsel confirmed 

that he did not. Near the end of the hearing, the judge asked 

Ranjel’s attorney if he—the judge, that is—had “considered 

all of [his] arguments.” Counsel confirmed this as well. After 

imposing sentence, the judge asked if Ranjel’s attorney 

wanted to raise any other issues. Counsel said, “no.”

In short, “[t]here were no surprises” at this sentencing 

proceeding—certainly not on any aspect of supervised 

release. Lewis, 823 F.3d at 1082. The judge gave Ranjel multiple opportunities to object to the recommended term of 

supervised release; he never did. We have no difficulty 
No. 15-3778 11

concluding that Ranjel waived any procedural or substantive 

challenge to the five-year term of supervised release.

AFFIRMED.