[Cite as Ohmer v. Renn-Ohmer, 2013-Ohio-330.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 

TWELFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO 

BUTLER COUNTY 

RICHARD J. OHMER, : 

 Plaintiff-Appellant, : CASE NO. CA2012-02-020 

 

 : O P I N I O N

 - vs - 2/4/2013 

 : 

HOLLIE A. RENN-OHMER, : 

 Defendant-Appellee. : 

APPEAL FROM BUTLER COUNTY COURT OF COMMON PLEAS 

DOMESTIC RELATIONS DIVISION 

Case No. DR2010-12-1500 

M. Lynn Lampe, Adam C. Gelding, 1248 Nilles Road, Suite 7, Fairfield, Ohio 45014, for 

plaintiff-appellant 

Richard B. Uhle, Jr., 285 Main Street, Batavia, Ohio 45103, for defendant-appellee 

 RINGLAND, J. 

{¶ 1} Plaintiff-appellant, Richard Ohmer ("Father"), appeals from a decision in the 

Butler County Court of Common Pleas, Domestic Relations Division, granting a divorce 

between Father and defendant-appellee, Hollie Renn-Ohmer ("Mother"). This decision also 

granted Mother sole custody of the parties' two minor children, awarded child and spousal 

support in favor of Mother, and divided the parties' property. For the reasons outlined below, 
Butler CA2012-02-020

 - 2 - 

we reverse the decision of the trial court and remand the matter for further proceedings. 

{¶ 2} The parties were married on June 11, 2005, and have two children born issue 

of their marriage, Alexa, whose date of birth is July 13, 2006, and Rylan, whose date of birth 

is May 4, 2008. Father is a staff physician at an urgent care facility and additionally works at 

a managed care organization where he reviews medical worker compensation cases. Mother 

has a gerontology degree and previously worked as a firefighter and paramedic. Mother 

worked until some point during her pregnancy with the parties' first child. Sometime in 2010, 

the parties were in the process of negotiating to file dissolution paperwork. However, 

negotiations broke down after Father noticed Mother had been taking trips without him and 

wearing new clothes and jewelry. Additionally, Father restrained Mother and forced her to 

kiss him, further hindering the relationship. 

{¶ 3} On December 22, 2010, Father filed for divorce. At this time, it appears Mother 

was in Virginia visiting her paramour, Joseph Hill, whom she met online sometime in October. 

The parties' two children were with her at some point during the Virginia trip. After Mother 

returned to Ohio, she was served with the divorce complaint on December 27, 2010. The 

next day, she left the marital residence with the children. On December 29, 2010, Mother 

notified Father via email that she had moved out with the children. Mother offered to bring 

the children to the marital residence on January 3, 2011, to spend the day with Father. 

{¶ 4} On January 3, 2011, Father filed motions for contempt, an emergency hearing, 

and ex parte orders. Father alleged that Mother left the marital residence with the parties' 

two minor children and a few household items. Father also alleged that he did not know 

where Mother had taken the children or where they were living. Father averred in his affidavit 

that Mother sent him an email on December 29, 2010, stating that she had moved out with 

the children. However, he did not reveal to the trial court that Mother offered to return the 

children on January 3, 2011. The trial court granted Father's motion, and designated Father 
Butler CA2012-02-020

 - 3 - 

legal custodian and residential parent of the parties' two minor children. The order also 

stated Mother's parenting time was to be supervised until further order of the court. 

{¶ 5} Following the ex-parte order limiting Mother's parenting time to supervised 

visits, Mother did not see her children until January 27, 2011. On January 12, 2011, Mother 

emailed Father and asked if her friend could pick up the children so she could visit with them. 

Father was apparently uncomfortable with the situation, and did not allow Mother's friend to 

pick up the children. Mother admittedly left for Virginia soon after she made the request. 

The trial court found: "Dr. Ohmer then refused Ms. Renn-Ohmer any parenting time with the 

children until 1/27/11, in spite of the fact that Dr. Ohmer was working 14 hour days and was 

unavailable to exercise parenting time." 

{¶ 6} After Mother returned from Virginia, the parties reached an agreement 

regarding temporary orders. The parties agreed on a parenting schedule, child support, and 

spousal support. With some modifications, the parenting schedule generally reflected Mother 

as the residential parent and Father as the nonresidential parent. 

{¶ 7} A final divorce hearing was held in front of a judge on September 1 and 13, 

2011. Father filed a proposed shared parenting plan, which Mother opposed. The trial court 

found that Father's shared parenting plan was not in the children's best interest and 

designated Mother the residential parent and legal custodian of the children. The trial court 

stated: "The Court has reviewed the factors, but relies most heavily on the fact that Ms. 

Renn-Ohmer has been the primary caregiver, that the parties are unable to work together in 

the best interest of the children, Dr. Ohmer's denial of parenting time from January 3 to 

January 27, 2011 and his continued justification for his behavior at trial." 

{¶ 8} The trial court also awarded Mother spousal support, ordered Father to pay 

child support, and divided the parties' property. A final divorce decree was filed on January 

13, 2012. It is from this decree that Father timely appeals, asserting five assignments of 
Butler CA2012-02-020

 - 4 - 

error for review. 

{¶ 9} Because Father's first, second, and third assignments of error are related, we 

will address them together. 

{¶ 10} Assignment of Error No. 1: 

{¶ 11} THE TRIAL COURT ERRED TO THE PREJUDICE OF APPELLANT BY 

DENYING APPELLANT'S MOTIONS TO ADMIT NEW EVIDENCE AFTER THE FINAL 

HEARING BUT PRIOR TO THE TRIAL COURT'S DECISION, AS THE EVIDENCE WAS 

RELEVANT TO THE CUSTODY DETERMINATION. 

{¶ 12} Assignment of Error No. 2: 

{¶ 13} THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN DESIGNATING 

APPELLEE AS THE SOLE RESIDENTIAL PARENT AND LEGAL CUSTODIAN, AS THE 

TRIAL COURT'S DECISION WAS AGAINST THE MANIFEST WEIGHT OF THE 

EVIDENCE. 

{¶ 14} Assignment of Error No. 3: 

{¶ 15} THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN DESIGNATING 

APPELLEE AS THE SOLE RESIDENTIAL PARENT AND LEGAL CUSTODIAN, AS THE 

TRIAL COURT MOST HEAVILY RELIED UPON APPELLANT'S "DENIAL OF PARENTING 

TIME," HOWEVER, THE EVIDENCE DID NOT SUPPORT THIS FINDING. 

{¶ 16} Father argues in his first assignment of error that the trial court abused its 

discretion by not considering newly-discovered evidence which impacts the best interest of 

the children. Specifically, Father argues that evidence he sought to introduce would show 

that Mother failed to inform him of Alexa's significant behavioral issues at school which 

required counseling. In addition, Father asserts that Mother failed to inform him of an injury 

Rylan had sustained until after Rylan had been released from the emergency room. Father 

argues in his second and third assignments of error that the trial court abused its discretion in 
Butler CA2012-02-020

 - 5 - 

designating Mother the sole residential parent and legal custodian of the children. 

Specifically, Father argues that the trial court's decision was against the manifest weight of 

the evidence because Mother violated virtually every temporary court order during the 

pendency of the divorce. Father asserts that Mother violated temporary orders by: taking the 

children to Virginia without telling Father, moving the children into a new residence during the 

pendency of the divorce without telling Father, enrolling the children into different schools 

without telling Father when she did not have custody of the children, not informing the 

schools of Father's contact information, and leaving the children with a third party when she 

went to Virginia to visit her paramour. Furthermore, Father argues that the evidence did not 

support the finding that Father denied Mother parenting time. Father asserts that Mother 

only contacted Father one time regarding visitation in January. Father alleges that 

supervised visitation did not occur because Father did not approve of the supervisor, and 

immediately after Father's disapproval of the supervisor, Mother left Ohio to visit her 

paramour in Virginia for the remainder of the month. 

{¶ 17} First, we will address the issue related to new evidence. "The admission or 

exclusion of relevant evidence rests within the sound discretion of the trial court." State v. 

Sage, 31 Ohio St.3d 173 (1987), paragraph two of the syllabus. An appellate court will not 

disturb evidentiary rulings absent an abuse of discretion that produced a material prejudice to 

the aggrieved party. State v. Maurer, 15 Ohio St.3d 239, 265 (1984). An abuse of discretion 

is more than an error of judgment; it means that the trial court was unreasonable, arbitrary, or 

unconscionable in its ruling. Blakemore v. Blakemore, 5 Ohio St.3d 217, 219 (1983). 

{¶ 18} In In re Sullivan, 12th Dist. No. CA2002-03-061, 2003-Ohio-195, we found that 

the trial court did not abuse its discretion by considering new evidence in a permanent 

custody proceeding when the Children Services Board filed a "Motion to Reopen Permanent 

Custody Proceedings" based on the discovery of new evidence. In Sullivan, the motion was 
Butler CA2012-02-020

 - 6 - 

supported by an affidavit signed by a Children Services Board caseworker. Id. at ¶ 5. The 

new evidence included information that the father in the case had previously concealed 

information from the court, specifically regarding another child. Id. Furthermore, in Anderton 

v. Hatfield, 10th Dist. No. 07AP-198, 2007-Ohio-7139, the Tenth Appellate District found that 

the trial court did not abuse its discretion in hearing new evidence from a guardian ad litem 

despite a long time lapse between the close of the parties' case and the motion when 

grandmother may have suffered two heart attacks, one party had been evicted, and there 

was a question as to where a child was attending school. Such evidence could have a 

significant impact on the evaluation of the child's best interest. Id. at ¶ 22. 

{¶ 19} Subsequent to Father filing his motion to admit new evidence, there was 

evidence that Alexa visited the Mayerson Clinic, alluding to sexual abuse. However, because 

this evidence was not initially before the trial court, we cannot consider it at this time. 

Nevertheless, there was new evidence contained in Father's affidavit that the trial court 

should have considered. New evidence contained in the affidavit included Alexa's behavioral 

incidents at school and the fact that Alexa required counseling. In the affidavit, Father states 

that Alexa had 161 behavioral episodes at school between September 1 and October 28, 

2011. This evidence was not available for the hearings because Alexa was just beginning 

kindergarten at the time. The root of Alexa's behavioral issues that may be discovered 

through counseling could be vital to determining the children's best interest. Consequently, 

we find that the trial court abused its discretion by not considering the new evidence. 

{¶ 20} Because the trial court did not consider all relevant evidence in making the 

custody determination, we find that the trial court necessarily abused its discretion by 

designating Mother the sole residential parent and legal custodian of the parties' two minor 

children. On remand, the trial court should consider this new evidence to determine the best 

interest of the children, which may or may not change its evaluation of the weight of the 
Butler CA2012-02-020

 - 7 - 

evidence. Father's first, second, and third assignments of error are all sustained. 

{¶ 21} We do note, however, that Mother seems to be exhibiting a pattern of lack of 

communication with Father. Father's motion to admit new evidence reflected a lack of 

communication by Mother. Father averred that Mother enrolled Alexa in counseling at 

Catholic Charities of Southwest Ohio without consulting him. Father also averred that Mother 

did not notify him of an injury Rylan sustained until after he had been released from the 

hospital. Furthermore, Mother had conferences with teachers on September 15, 2011 and 

October 31, 2011, of which Father claims he received no notice. However, this is not new 

evidence. There was ample evidence presented that Mother failed to consult with Father 

about important decisions regarding the children, including where to send the children to 

school, enrolling in dance lessons, and choice of pediatrician. Furthermore, Father's denial 

of parenting time could be traced to a lack of communication. While not new evidence, we 

are concerned that the affidavit attached the "Motion to Admit Evidence" indicates that the 

lack of communication by Mother may be a continued pattern. 

{¶ 22} Assignment of Error No. 4: 

{¶ 23} THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN FINDING AN AWARD OF 

SPOUSAL SUPPORT TO BE APPROPRIATE * * *. 

{¶ 24} Father argues that the trial court abused its discretion in awarding Mother 

spousal support for several reasons. First, Father argues that the trial court abused its 

discretion in awarding Mother spousal support when Mother and her paramour are 

cohabitating. Second, Father asserts that the trial court abused its discretion by not 

considering Mother's need for support. Finally, Father contends that the trial court abused its 

discretion in awarding Mother spousal support when, combined with the trial court's child 

support order and allocation of debt, Father has negative monthly income. 

{¶ 25} The trial court considered the appropriate factors to award spousal support as 
Butler CA2012-02-020

 - 8 - 

enumerated by R.C. 3105.18(C)(1), and also considered the fact that Mother and her 

paramour commingled finances. The trial court then awarded Mother $2,250 per month in 

spousal support. Additionally, the trial court stated that "[t]he spousal support shall terminate 

upon the death of either party, remarriage of Ms. Renn-Ohmer or cohabitation of Ms. RennOhmer in a partner like relationship as defined by Ohio law." With this statement, the trial 

court impliedly found that the relationship between Mother and her paramour did not 

constitute cohabitation as defined by Ohio law. 

{¶ 26} Father argues that the trial court erred in making this determination because the 

relationship between Mother and her paramour actually constitutes cohabitation as defined 

by Ohio law. Father asserts that Mother and her paramour are cohabitating because Mother 

lives in a house owned by her paramour, they are showing the children "how a husband and 

wife or man and woman are supposed to behave," and their funds are commingled. In 

contrast, Mother contends that her relationship with her paramour does not constitute 

cohabitation because there was no evidence offered to show that they are actually living 

together. We agree with Father. 

{¶ 27} It is well-established that a trial court has broad discretion in determining 

whether an award of spousal support is proper based on the facts and circumstances of each 

case. Beamer v. Beamer, 12th Dist. No. CA2009-08-107, 2010-Ohio-3143, ¶ 23, citing 

Kunkle v. Kunkle, 51 Ohio St.3d 64, 67 (1990). In turn, "absent an abuse of discretion, a 

spousal support award will not be disturbed on appeal." Hutchinson v. Hutchinson, 12th Dist. 

No. CA2009-03-018, 2010-Ohio-597, ¶ 16. An abuse of discretion is more than error of law 

or judgment; it requires a finding that the trial court's attitude was unreasonable, arbitrary or 

unconscionable. Blakemore v. Blakemore, 5 Ohio St.3d at 219. A finding of "cohabitation 

during the pendency of the divorce should logically be a factor to bar an original award of 

support." Keith v. Keith, 12th Dist. No. CA2010-12-335, 2011-Ohio-6532, ¶ 9. However, it is 
Butler CA2012-02-020

 - 9 - 

important to note that while cohabitation is a factor to be considered in awarding spousal 

support, it does not serve as an outright bar of spousal support. Id. at 12. 

{¶ 28} It is a question of fact determined by the trial court on a case-by-case basis as 

to whether a particular relationship or living arrangement constitutes cohabitation. Marley v. 

Marley, 12th Dist. No. CA97-03-072, 1997 WL 632866, *2 (Oct. 13, 1997); Guggenbiller v. 

Guggenbiller, 9th Dist. No.10CA009871, 2011-Ohio-3622, ¶ 8. Consequently, an appellate 

court will not overturn a trial court's finding in regard to cohabitation as long as it is supported 

by some competent, credible evidence. Moore v. Moore, 12th Dist. No. CA95-05-013, 1996 

WL 42329, *2 (Feb. 5, 1996); Austin v. Austin, 170 Ohio App.3d 132, 2007-Ohio-676, ¶ 6 

(9th Dist.). In determining whether competent and credible evidence exists, "[a] reviewing 

court should be guided by a presumption that the findings of a trial court are correct, since 

the trial judge is best able to view the witnesses and observe their demeanor, gestures, and 

voice inflections, and use those observations in weighing the credibility of the testimony." 

Keith at ¶ 12, quoting Bey v. Bey, 3rd Dist. No. 10-08-12, 2009-Ohio-300, ¶ 15. 

{¶ 29} Cohabitation contemplates a relationship that approximates, or is the functional 

equivalent of, a marriage. Keeley v. Keeley, 12th Dist. Nos. CA99-07-075, CA99-080-080, 

2000 WL 431362, * 1 (Apr. 17, 2000), citing Piscione v. Piscione, 85 Ohio App.3d 273, 275 

(9th Dist.1992). There are three principal factors for courts to consider when determining 

whether cohabitation exits, which are: (1) actually living together (2) of a sustained duration 

(3) with shared expenses with respect to financing and day-to-day expenses. Keith at ¶ 11. 

In turn, cohabitation "requires not only a relationship, sexual or otherwise, of a permanent, 

continuing nature, but also some sort of monetary support between the spouse and the 

paramour so as to be the functional equivalent of a marriage." Cravens v. Cravens, 12th 

Dist. No. CA2008-02-033, 2009-Ohio-1733, ¶ 10. 

{¶ 30} In this case, there was evidence presented that Mother and her paramour 
Butler CA2012-02-020

 - 10 - 

purchased a home together. Mother provided a partial down payment consisting of closing 

costs, and her paramour is responsible for the actual mortgage. Mother testified that the 

mortgage of $1,800 per month was too high for her to pay, so she entered into a rental 

agreement with her paramour to pay him $1,560.76 per month. Mother testified that she and 

her paramour were "setting * * * a good example for [the children] of how a husband and wife 

or man and woman are supposed to behave." When asked whether the relationship was 

"more than casual," Mother responded "well, of course it is. He is carrying a mortgage for 

me." Mother and her paramour opened a joint bank account in February 2011, so that the 

paramour could transfer money to Mother faster in order to ensure she paid her bills on time. 

Mother testified that her paramour did not intend to live with her because he is in the United 

States Navy and stationed in Virginia. Nevertheless, Mother testified that her paramour has 

stayed the night with her with the children present when he was in Ohio. Furthermore, he is 

planning to move to Ohio when he retires from the Navy next year. Consequently, there is 

evidence that Mother and her paramour live together when he is in Ohio in the house they 

purchased together, their relationship is lasting in duration, and they share living expenses. 

In light of this evidence, and the fact that Mother's paramour is in the United States Navy and 

stationed in Virginia necessarily limits the amount of time he spends in Ohio, we find that 

there is no competent credible evidence to support the trial court's finding that Mother and 

her paramour are not cohabitating. 

{¶ 31} As stated above, the mere fact that Mother and her paramour are cohabitating 

does not bar an award of spousal support. However, the trial court included a clause in the 

order that spousal support was to terminate upon Mother's cohabitation "in a partner like 

relationship as defined by Ohio law." With this clause, we find that the award of spousal 

support was an abuse of discretion as Mother and her paramour are cohabitating as defined 

by Ohio law. Father's fourth assignment of error is sustained. 
Butler CA2012-02-020

 - 11 - 

{¶ 32} Assignment of Error No. 5: 

{¶ 33} THE TRIAL COURT'S FAILURE TO INCLUDE THE SECOND MORTGAGE AS 

MARITAL DEBT AND THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDING THAT [MOTHER'S] PREMARITAL 

TAX DEBT WAS 100% MARITAL WAS AGAINST THE MANIFEST WEIGHT OF THE 

EVIDENCE. 

{¶ 34} Father argues the trial court erroneously found that a second mortgage on the 

marital residence did not exist, and thus erred in failing to include it as marital debt. 

Furthermore, Father argues the trial court erroneously found Mother's 2005 tax liability to be 

from 2007, and thus erroneously included it in the marital debt. We agree. 

{¶ 35} Prior to making any division of property, the trial court must determine what 

property is marital and what property is separate. R.C. 3105.171(B); Brown v. Brown, 12th 

Dist. No. CA2008-08-021, 2009-Ohio-2204, ¶ 11. To do this, the trial court must know what 

constitutes "during the marriage." "During the marriage" typically means the period of time 

between the date of the marriage through the date of the final divorce hearing. R.C. 

3105.171(A)(2)(a). However, if a trial court determines that the use of one or both of these 

dates would be inequitable, the trial court may choose dates that would be equitable in 

determining marital property. R.C. 3105.171(A)(2)(b). Furthermore, when a trial court makes 

a distributive award of property, the trial court "shall specify the dates it used in determining 

the meaning of 'during the marriage.'" R.C. 3105.171(G). Property acquired during the 

marriage is presumed to be marital. R.C. 3105.171; Vergitz v. Vergitz, 7th Dist. No. 05 JE 

52, 2007-Ohio-1395, ¶ 12. Likewise, any property that was acquired by one spouse prior to 

the date of the marriage is presumed to be separate. R.C. 3105.171. Although the statute 

does not mention debt as an element of marital and separate property, the rules concerning 

marital assets have been consistently applied to marital and separate debt. Marrero v. 

Marrero, 9th Dist. No. 02CA008057, 2002-Ohio-4862, ¶ 43; Vergitz at ¶ 12. 
Butler CA2012-02-020

 - 12 - 

{¶ 36} A trial court's classification of debt as marital or separate is reviewed under the 

manifest weight of the evidence standard. Williams v. Williams, 12th Dist. No. CA2006-09-

103, 2007-Ohio-2996, ¶ 38. Manifest weight "concerns the inclination of the greater amount 

of credible evidence, offered in a trial, to support one side of the issue rather than the other." 

Baird v. Crop Prod. Servs., Inc., 12th Dist. Nos. CA2011-03-003, CA2011-04-005, 2012-

Ohio-4022, ¶ 17, citing Eastley v. Volkman, 132 Ohio St.3d 328, 2012-Ohio-2179, ¶ 12. 

Furthermore, "[t]he appellate court must be guided by a presumption that the trial court's 

factual findings are correct since the trial judge 'is best able to view the witnesses and 

observe their demeanor, gestures and voice inflections, and use these observations in 

weighing the credibility of the proffered testimony.'" Holland v. Garner, 12th Dist. No. 

CA2009-09-226, 2010-Ohio-2963, ¶ 8, quoting McGuire v. Sprinkle, 12th Dist. No. CA2006-

06-069, 2007-Ohio-2705, ¶ 19. However, "the court of appeals shall give due regard to the 

opportunity of the [trial court] to judge the credibility of the witnesses, and shall accept the 

findings of fact of the [trial court] unless they are clearly erroneous." (Emphasis added.) 

Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 97, 116 S.Ct. 2035 (1996). 

{¶ 37} In this case, the trial court found that while Father testified regarding a second 

mortgage with a balance of $57,000, he provided no documentation regarding this loan. The 

trial court specifically found that the only debt owed to Wells Fargo was a VISA account that 

required a monthly payment of $230. At a hearing, Father responded in the affirmative to a 

leading question that the second mortgage was with Wells Fargo. However, Father 

subsequently testified regarding a VISA balance owed to Wells Fargo regarding a loan to 

replace windows. Concerning a second mortgage, Father testified that he owed a second 

mortgage with a balance of $56,000 or $57,000 with a monthly payment of $668 per month. 

Exhibit 10, a Chase bank statement, shows that a payment was made to Citimortgage for 

$687.71 on July 26, 2011. This mortgage payment is in addition to the mortgage payment to 
Butler CA2012-02-020

 - 13 - 

ASC for $1,092.08 made on July 18, 2011. This is also in addition to a $270 payment made 

to Wells Fargo on July 8, 2011 as reflected in Exhibit 13. Consequently, there is clearly 

evidence of a second mortgage. We find the trial court erred in not including the second 

mortgage in the property division. 

{¶ 38} The trial court also found Father and Mother to be jointly and severally liable for 

the marital tax debts from both "2007 & 2009." On the property division worksheet, the trial 

court specifically found that the amount owed on the 2007 tax debt was $45,570.64. The trial 

court allocated half of this amount to Father. Despite the trial court finding that this tax debt 

was from 2007, Mother testified that this tax debt was from 2005. Furthermore, Mother 

identified Exhibit J as a "tax bill for myself." Exhibit J indicates that this tax liability was 

incurred during the tax period of December 31, 2005. Consequently, the trial court's 

classification of the 2005 tax debt as a 2007 marital debt was against the manifest weight of 

the evidence. 

{¶ 39} There is some discrepancy as to what constitutes "during the marriage." The 

parties were married on June 11, 2005. The trial court specified the valuation date of 

February 23, 2011, but it did not explicitly use the parties' date of marriage as the beginning 

of the marriage. The trial court found the residence to be marital property, despite the 

property being titled solely in Father's name and purchased prior to June 11, 2005. The trial 

court found the residence constitutes marital property because the parties acknowledged 

they were cohabitating in the residence since its purchase in 2004. Essentially, the trial court 

found that utilizing the actual date of marriage to classify the residence as separate or marital 

property was inequitable. Consequently, on remand, in addition to including the second 

mortgage in the property division, the trial court must clarify the dates it used to constitute 

"during the marriage," and whether utilizing the actual marriage date is inequitable. The trial 

court must then apportion the 2005 tax debt as marital or separate debt accordingly. Father's 
Butler CA2012-02-020

 - 14 - 

fifth assignment of error is sustained. 

{¶ 40} Judgment reversed and cause remanded. 

S. POWELL, P.J., and PIPER, J., concur.