# FILED

March 23, 1998 Cecil Crowson, Jr. Appellate C ourt Clerk IN THE COURT OF CRIMI NAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT KNOXVILLE JANUARY 1997 SESSION

STATE OF TENNESSEE, ) ) Appellee, ) No. 03C01-9602-CC-00075

) ) Sullivan County v. ) ) Honorable R. Jerry Beck, Judge ) DAVID GLEN HAYNES, ) (Sentencing) ) Appellant. )
For the Appellant : For the Appellee : Stephen M. Wallace Charles W. Burson District Public Defender Attorney General of Tennessee and and Gale K. Flanary Janis L. Turner Assistant District P ublic Defender Counsel for the State P.O. Box 839 450 James Robertson Parkwa y Blountville, TN 37617 Nashville, TN 37243-0493 H. Greeley Wells, Jr. District Attorney General and Phyllis H. Mill er Assistant District A

ttorney General P.O. Box 526 Blountville, TN 37617

OPINION FILED:____________________

AFFIRMED Joseph M. Tipton Judge1 The trans cript o f the g uilty plea hear ing is n ot co ntain ed in th e rec ord o n app eal.

2 On July 13, 1995, the defendant also ent ered guil ty pl eas to the char ges of rape, a Cl ass B felony, and incest, a Class C felony , invol ving the defendant’s d aughter. The def endant recei ved concurrent, Range I sentences of eight y ears and three y

ears, respect ively . Upon recommendation by t he state, the trial c ourt gran ted intens ive proba tion.

3 App aren tly, no o ne at the s ente ncin g hea ring b ut the defe nda nt wa s aw are o f the a ssa ult charge. 2 O P I N I O N

The defendant, David Glen Hayne s, appeals as of right from an or der of the Sullivan County C riminal Court rever sing its earlier g rant of intensive probation. On July 13, 1995, the defendant was convicted of aggrav

ated burglary and agg ravated assault, Class C felonies, in the Sullivan County Criminal Court upon his entry of guilty pleas. 1 The defendant was sentenced as a Rang e I, standard offender to concurrent sentences of five years. The t rial court ordered that t he defendant serve his sentences consecutively to the sentences imposed in an unrelated case. 2 The trial court initially granted intensive prob

ation, but it reconsidered a nd reversed its decis ion after granting the state’s petition for a rehea ring based upon the defendant’s commi ssion of an assault upon h is girlfriend that was not revealed at t he sentencing h earing. 3 The defendant contends that the trial cour t erroneously granted

the state’s petition to rehe ar and erroneously denied prob ation. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Initially, we note that the briefs submitted by both parties in this case are lacking relative to the central issue in thi s appeal. See T.R.A.P. 27(a)(7), (b) and (h); Tenn. Ct. Crim. App. R. 10. The de fendant’s brief raises the iss ue whether the trial court erred by grant ing the state’s petition to rehear and by denying probation. In the argument portion of his brief, t he defendant essentially summari zes the facts and then states th at “the co urt erred in recons idering th e matter , had corr ectly grant ed inten sive probation earlier, and err ed in reversing it

s decision . . . .” The onl y authority cited by the defendant relates to the appropri ateness of denying alternati ve sentencing. The defendant cites no authority i n support of his argument that the trial court erred by3

granting t he state ’s petitio n to rehea r and reco nsiderin g its decis ion to gran t intensi ve probation. Nor does the state respond to the issue about whethe r the trial court could grant the petition to rehear and modify the manner of servic e of the sentence imposed to a harsher manner. Rather, the state viewed the i ssue as one relating only to whether the trial court appropri ately denied alternativ e sentencing. Although it does note that this court has affirmed a probation revocation fo r the commission of an offense committed after the entry of judg ment, but before the probationary term begins, see State v. Stone , 880 S.W.2d 746, 748 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994), it does not explain how the Stone circumstances relate to t he present case.

We hold that the defendant has waived any cl aims regarding the procedural correctness o f the trial court’s action s. The argument portion of an appealing party’s br

ief must set forth the contentions w ith respect to the issues presented on appeal with ci tations to the authorities. T.R.A.P. 27(a)(7) and (h)

. Pursuant to Rule 10(b), Tenn. C t. Crim. App. R., issues that are not supported by argument or citation to autho rities will be tr eated as waived by t his court. Given the shortcomings of the defendant in prepar ing his brief, the issues presented by the defendant must be treated as waiv ed.

In any event, we note that the trial court afforded the defendant the procedural protections pr ovided under T.C.A. § 40-35- 311 for probation revocations

. Moreover, evidence presented at the hearing on the state’s petition to rehear establis hed by a pre pondera nce of th e evidenc e that th e defen dant viola ted the la w, conduct unknown to the trial court at the sentencing. Under similar circumstances, this court has approved a probati on revocation even thoug h the offense was committed before the original sentenci ng. See State v. Stubblefield , 953 S.W.2d 223, 223-25 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1997).4 Therefore, we see nothing in the record that would w arrant us concluding that the order of confinement was i llegal or unauthoriz ed. In consideration of the foregoing and the record as a whole, the judgment of the tr ial court is affirmed.

Joseph M. Tipton, Judge

CONCUR:

Gary R. Wade, Judge

William M. Barker, Judge