1

SYLLABUS

(This syllabus is not part of the opinion of the Court. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for the 

convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Supreme Court. Please note that, in the 

interest of brevity, portions of any opinion may not have been summarized.)

State v. Joseph M. Jaffe (A-12-13) (072259)

Argued February 3, 2014 -- Decided December 15, 2014

SOLOMON, J., writing for a unanimous Court.

In this appeal, where the defendant was sentenced almost one year after entering a guilty plea, the Court 

considers whether the sentencing court should have considered relevant post-offense conduct in weighing the 

applicable aggravating and mitigating factors. 

Defendant and two others were charged with various drug offenses. Defendant entered into a negotiated 

plea agreement in which he agreed to plead guilty to third-degree conspiracy to possess cocaine with the intent to 

distribute, and to cooperate with the State’s prosecution of his co-defendants. In exchange, the State agreed to 

recommend a three-year prison term and to allow defendant the right to argue for probation or a custodial sentence 

to be served in county jail. Defendant pled guilty on August 16, 2011, but sentencing was delayed until his codefendants’ cases were resolved. As a result, defendant was not sentenced until August 3, 2012.

At the sentencing hearing, defense counsel asserted that because nearly a year had passed since defendant’s 

conviction, the pre-sentence investigation and report were stale. He argued that leniency was warranted because, in 

the time between defendant’s plea and sentencing, defendant had not reoffended, was gainfully employed, and had 

been acting as the “de facto” father to his girlfriend’s five-year-old child. Defendant testified that he had been sober 

since the date of his arrest, had been attending Narcotics Anonymous with a sponsor, had joined “a mixed issue 

support group” with his church, had “recently started working with at-risk teenagers,” and was engaged to be 

married. Counsel argued that, based upon defendant’s post-conviction rehabilitative efforts and circumstances, the 

court should find certain mitigating factors: Defendant’s conduct was the result of circumstances unlikely to recur;

his character and attitude demonstrated that he was unlikely to commit another offense; he was likely to respond 

affirmatively to probationary treatment; and imprisonment would result in excessive hardship to himself and his 

dependents. Counsel also argued the court should find as a mitigating factor defendant’s cooperation with the 

prosecution of his co-defendants.

The trial court concluded that applicable law did not allow him to consider “post[-]offense conduct,” and

declined to weigh such evidence in assessing mitigating factors. The court found only mitigating factor twelve 

applied, based upon defendant’s cooperation with the State, and determined that the following aggravating factors 

applied: the risk that defendant will reoffend; defendant’s likely involvement in organized criminal activity; the 

extent and seriousness of defendant’s prior criminal record; and the need to deter defendant and others. Having 

determined that the aggravating factors substantially outweighed the sole mitigating factor, and having noted that the 

State’s recommendation was at “the lowest end of the third degree range,” the court sentenced defendant in 

accordance with the plea agreement to a three-year term of imprisonment without a period of parole ineligibility.

Defendant appealed his sentence to the Appellate Division, arguing before an excessive-sentencing panel 

that a non-custodial sentence was warranted in light of defendant’s post-offense rehabilitative efforts. The panel 

rejected counsel’s arguments and affirmed defendant’s sentence in a summary order. 

The Court granted defendant’s petition for certification. 215 N.J. 488 (2013).

HELD: Because a sentencing analysis is a fact-sensitive inquiry, which must be based on consideration of all the 

competent and credible evidence raised by the parties at sentencing, the trial court must consider evidence of a 

defendant’s post-offense conduct. This matter is remanded for resentencing to ensure consideration of all of the 

facts relevant to the applicable aggravating and mitigating factors.
2

1. Prior to the Code of Criminal Justice, criminal sentences were beyond the scope of appellate review. Under prior 

law, sentencing courts exercised a wide discretion in gathering evidence concerning the defendant’s life and 

characteristics. To promote uniformity in sentencing, the Legislature replaced the unfettered discretion of prior law 

with a structured discretion designed to foster less arbitrary and more equal sentences. The Code does not, however, 

require the trial court to ignore a defendant’s individual characteristics and circumstances. This Court has 

recognized that “the Legislature codified to a certain extent the traditional emphasis on individualized sentencing,” 

resulting in a “tension between an individualized sentencing approach on the one hand, and the reforms aimed at 

sentencing uniformity on the other.” State v. Randolph, 210 N.J. 330, 346 (2012). (pp. 8-9) 

2. In State v. Randolph, the Court observed that “the discretion the sentencing court wielded pre-Code survives to a 

more limited extent through the court’s analysis of the aggravating and mitigating factors set forth in N.J.S.A.

2C:44-1.” 210 N.J. 330, 348 (2012). The Court also recognized in Randolph that sentencing courts are required to

give due consideration to a presentence report, prepared after a defendant’s conviction, which includes 

individualized information pertaining to a defendant’s criminal, psychiatric, employment, personal, and family 

history. Id. at 346 (citing N.J.S.A. 2C:44-6(a), (b)). Thus, while the judge “must sentence in accordance with the 

applicable statutes,” the sentencing statute “‘still allow[s] for evaluation of a range of information unconstrained by 

evidential considerations.’” Id. at 348 (citing State v. Natale, 184 N.J. 458, 483-84 (2005)). In this matter, the 

relevant mitigating factors are illustrative of the requirement that the sentencing court consider defendant’s 

individual qualities and circumstances. (pp. 9-11) 

3. Having reaffirmed that each defendant is entitled to an individualized consideration during sentencing, the Court 

addresses whether that assessment requires the trial court to consider a defendant’s post-offense conduct at the initial 

sentencing phase. The Court notes that in Randolph, it held that, upon remand for resentencing, a trial court must 

engage in a de novo review of the aggravating and mitigating factors applicable to the defendant at the time of his 

resentencing. 210 N.J. at 333. In reaching that conclusion, the Court relied, in part, on Pepper v. United States, in 

which the United States Supreme Court overturned the Eighth Circuit’s ruling prohibiting consideration of a 

defendant’s post-sentencing rehabilitative efforts, explaining that “possession of the fullest information possible 

concerning the defendant’s life and characteristics” is “[h]ighly relevant -- if not essential -- to [the] selection of an 

appropriate sentence.” 131 S. Ct. 1229, 1240 (2011) (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks and additional 

citation omitted). (pp. 11-13)

4. Against that backdrop, this Court holds that the trial court should view a defendant as he or she stands before the 

court on the day of sentencing, and that evidence of post-offense conduct, rehabilitative or otherwise, must be 

considered in assessing the applicability of, and weight to be given to, aggravating and mitigating factors. The 

Court notes that the sentencing statute preserves the concept of individualized assessment “through the application 

of some aggravating and mitigating factors that . . . invite consideration by the sentencing court of the individual 

defendant’s unique character and qualities,” and reaffirms its prior holding that a defendant in a resentencing hearing 

“is entitled to the same full review and explanation of the finding and weighing of the aggravating and mitigating 

factors” as during sentencing. Randolph, 210 N.J. at 349. The Court determines that such review must include 

evidence relating to a defendant’s post-offense conduct, and applies to the trial court’s assessment of aggravating 

and mitigating factors at a defendant’s initial sentencing hearing. (pp. 14-15) 

5. The Court recognizes that the trial judge in this matter indicated that he did not accept defendant’s claims that he 

had changed his life. However, in light of the judge’s statement that he could not consider defendant’s post-offense 

conduct, the Court concludes that it cannot infer that defendant’s putative rehabilitation evidence was fully 

considered when he was sentenced. The Court, therefore, vacates defendant’s sentence and remands to the trial 

court for a de novo assessment of the applicable aggravating and mitigating factors, accounting for defendant’s postoffense conduct. The resentencing court must consider defendant’s post-offense conduct up to the date of his 

resentencing. (pp. 15-16) 

The judgment of the Appellate Division is REVERSED, and the matter is REMANDED to the trial court 

for resentencing consistent with this opinion.

CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER; JUSTICES LaVECCHIA, ALBIN, PATTERSON, and FERNANDEZVINA; and JUDGE CUFF (temporarily assigned) join in JUSTICE SOLOMON’s opinion.
1

SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY

A-12 September Term 2013

072259

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

JOSEPH M. JAFFE,

Defendant-Appellant.

Argued September 8, 2014 – Decided December 15, 2014

On certification to the Superior Court, 

Appellate Division.

Matthew W. Reisig argued the cause for 

appellant (Reisig & Associates, attorneys; 

Mr. Reisig and Jeffrey M. Zajac, on the 

briefs).

Reema Sethi Kareer, Assistant Prosecutor/

Special Deputy Attorney General, argued the 

cause for respondent (Fredric M. Knapp, 

Morris County Prosecutor, attorney).

Jeffrey S. Mandel argued the cause for 

amicus curiae Association of Criminal 

Defense Lawyers of New Jersey (Cutolo 

Mandel, attorneys).

JUSTICE SOLOMON delivered the opinion of the Court.

Defendant Joseph M. Jaffe received a three-year state 

prison sentence almost a year after pleading guilty to an 

accusation charging him with third-degree conspiracy to possess 

cocaine with the intent to distribute. At sentencing, defense 
2

counsel asked the court to consider defendant’s rehabilitative 

efforts since he was arrested and charged. The trial court 

declined to weigh such evidence in assessing mitigating factors, 

concluding that applicable law did not allow him to consider 

“post[-]offense conduct.” In light of our recent holding in 

State v. Randolph, 210 N.J. 330 (2012), that a defendant should 

be assessed as he stands before the court on the day of 

sentencing, we conclude that the sentencing court must consider 

a defendant’s relevant post-offense conduct in weighing 

aggravating and mitigating factors. 

A judge’s sentencing analysis is a fact-sensitive inquiry, 

which must be based on consideration of all the competent and 

credible evidence raised by the parties at sentencing. Because 

we decide here that the trial court must consider at sentencing 

evidence of a defendant’s post-offense conduct, we are compelled 

to remand for resentencing to ensure consideration of all of the 

facts relevant to the applicable aggravating and mitigating 

factors. 

I.

The following facts were established during defendant’s

plea colloquy. Pursuant to an investigation into a local drug 

distribution operation conducted by detectives of the Morris 

County Prosecutor’s Office, defendant and two others were 

charged with various drug offenses. Defendant entered into a 
3

negotiated plea agreement in which he agreed to plead guilty to 

third-degree conspiracy to possess cocaine with the intent to

distribute, in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:5-2 and N.J.S.A. 2C:35-

5(a)(1), and to cooperate with the State’s prosecution of his 

co-defendants. In exchange, the State agreed to recommend a 

three-year prison term and to allow defendant the right to argue 

for probation or a custodial sentence to be served in county 

jail.

Defendant pled guilty on August 16, 2011. He admitted to 

acting as an intermediary between his co-defendants to ensure

that payment for the cocaine reached the appropriate party.

However, sentencing was delayed until his co-defendants’ cases 

were resolved. As a result, defendant was not sentenced until 

August 3, 2012, almost one year after the entry of his guilty 

plea. 

At the sentencing hearing, defense counsel asserted that

because nearly a year had passed since defendant’s conviction,

the pre-sentence investigation and report were stale. He argued

that leniency was warranted because, in the time between 

defendant’s plea and sentencing, defendant had not reoffended, 

was gainfully employed, and had been acting as the “de facto” 

father to his girlfriend’s five-year-old child. Counsel also 

submitted a letter written by the mother of defendant’s child, 

claiming that defendant was “a great father.” Defendant 
4

testified that he was using drugs at the time he committed the 

offense, but had been sober since the date of his arrest, had 

been attending Narcotics Anonymous with a sponsor, had joined “a 

mixed issue support group” with his church, had “recently 

started working with at-risk teenagers,” and was engaged to be 

married.

Counsel argued that, based upon defendant’s post-conviction 

rehabilitative efforts and circumstances, the court should find

defendant’s conduct was the result of circumstances unlikely to 

recur, N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(b)(8), his character and attitude 

demonstrated that he was unlikely to commit another offense,

N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(b)(9), he was likely to respond affirmatively 

to probationary treatment, N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(b)(10), and 

imprisonment would result in excessive hardship to himself and 

his dependents, N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(b)(11). Emphasizing 

defendant’s role in the conspiracy was “minor,” counsel also 

argued the court should find as a mitigating factor defendant’s 

cooperation with the prosecution of his co-defendants, N.J.S.A.

2C:44-1(b)(12).

The court agreed that defendant’s pre-sentence report was 

“somewhat stale.” However, the court expressly refused to 

consider defendant’s post-offense conduct, explaining that

[w]e have an interesting method of sentencing 

in the State of New Jersey, one that does not 

encompass, frankly, post-offense conduct, 
5

unlike the federal system, which actually 

takes that into consideration. It may be one 

of the reasons why when someone is arrested on 

federal charges, they find their way to the 

local soup kitchen to stand in line to help 

out. I don’t mean to diminish that, but it is 

a factor under the federal sentencing 

guidelines, a factor we do not have.

The court then disagreed with defense counsel’s assertion that 

defendant had “changed his life,” stating: “It sounds like he’s 

certainly turned the corner and made a u-turn, but then again, 

that was the way it appeared in 1998 as well.”

Having refused to consider defendant’s post-offense 

conduct, the court found only mitigating factor twelve applied. 

Based upon defendant’s seven previous arrests and three prior 

indictable convictions, the court found the following 

aggravating factors applied: the risk that defendant will 

reoffend, N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a)(3); the extent and seriousness of 

defendant’s prior criminal record, N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a)(6); and 

the need to deter defendant and others, N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a)(9). 

Noting the nature of the present offense, the court also found 

as an aggravating factor that defendant likely was involved in 

organized criminal activity, N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a)(5).

Having determined that the aggravating factors 

substantially outweighed the sole mitigating factor, and having 

noted that the State’s recommendation was at “the lowest end of 

the third degree range,” the court sentenced defendant in 
6

accordance with the plea agreement to a three-year term of 

imprisonment without a period of parole ineligibility, less 121 

days of jail credit.

Defendant appealed his sentence. Before an excessivesentencing panel of the Appellate Division, defense counsel 

argued that a non-custodial sentence was warranted in light of 

defendant’s post-offense rehabilitative efforts. The panel 

rejected counsel’s arguments and affirmed defendant’s sentence 

in a summary order. 

We granted defendant’s petition for certification. 215 

N.J. 488 (2013).

II.

The issue raised by the parties in this appeal requires us 

to consider the scope of our holding in State v. Randolph, 

supra. In that case, we stated that, “when ‘reconsideration’ of 

sentence or ‘resentencing’ is ordered after appeal, the trial 

court should view defendant as he stands before the court on 

that day[.]” 210 N.J. at 354. While defendant acknowledges 

that Randolph was decided in the context of a resentencing 

hearing following an ambiguously worded remand order, he asserts 

that our reasoning in Randolph applies equally at the initial 

sentencing stage -- particularly where, as here, a significant 

amount of time has passed between the entry of the guilty plea

and sentencing.
7

The State counters that Randolph was a decision addressing 

the scope of appellate practice rather than “a substantive 

decision regarding the applicability of any particular 

mitigating factors to a particular sentence being imposed in the 

first instance.” Nevertheless, the State characterizes 

defendant’s argument that the sentencing court should consider 

evidence of post-offense rehabilitative conduct as an 

“unremarkable proposition.” The State argues instead that the 

judge’s statements, viewed in context, indicate that the judge 

considered and rejected defendant’s claims that he had reformed. 

The State specifically notes the judge’s statement that, “while 

it’s good to hear [defendant] appears to have turned his life 

around, is helping young people, is helping himself by attending 

NA meetings, the Court cannot turn a blind eye to his criminal 

conduct.” The State maintains this acknowledgment demonstrates 

that the judge considered defendant’s putative rehabilitative 

evidence, implicitly found it incredible, and rejected the 

contention that this evidence warranted a finding of any 

additional mitigating factors.

Amicus curiae Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers of 

New Jersey (ACDL) argues that, by expressly refusing to consider 

defendant’s post-offense rehabilitative efforts, the trial judge 

disregarded evidence of mitigating factors, and in doing so, 

failed to consider all the facts necessary for the comprehensive 
8

sentencing analysis to which defendant was entitled. Citing

Randolph, supra, and State v. Natale, 184 N.J. 458 (2005), the 

ACDL contends that this Court has encouraged sentencing judges 

to consider as much information as possible regarding the 

characteristics of a defendant’s life and circumstances at 

sentencing, and that consideration of defendant’s post-offense 

conduct falls within the sentencing framework established by the 

Legislature. 

III.

A.

We begin with a review of the requirements and purpose of 

our sentencing guidelines. 

Prior to the enactment of the New Jersey Code of Criminal 

Justice, it was “axiomatic that criminal sentences were beyond 

the scope of appellate review.” Roth, supra, 95 N.J. at 341. 

Under prior law, sentencing courts “‘exercise[d] a wide 

discretion’” in gathering evidence “‘concerning the defendant’s 

life and characteristics.’” Natale, supra, 184 N.J. at 472 

(citations and internal quotation marks omitted). The goal was 

to “‘provide the sentencing judge with the composite picture of 

the “whole man.”’” Ibid. 

To promote uniformity in sentencing, the Legislature

“replace[d] ‘the unfettered discretion of prior law with a 

structured discretion designed to foster less arbitrary and more 
9

equal sentences.’” State v. Bridges, 131 N.J. 402, 420 (1993)

(quoting State v. Hartye, 105 N.J. 411, 418 (1987)). In doing 

so, the Legislature “establishe[d] a general framework to guide 

judicial discretion” in order to promote uniformity in 

sentencing. Natale, supra, 184 N.J. at 485 (alteration in 

original) (quoting State v. Hodge, 95 N.J. 369, 374-75 (1984))

(internal quotation marks omitted). 

The Code does not, however, require the trial court to 

ignore a defendant’s individual characteristics and 

circumstances. To the contrary, the Legislature listed as

“general purposes” of the sentencing statute the furtherance of 

“the correction and rehabilitation of offenders,” N.J.S.A. 2C:1-

2(b)(2), and “differentiat[ion] among offenders with a view to a 

just individualization in their treatment,” N.J.S.A. 2C:1-

2(b)(6). Thus, “the Legislature codified to a certain extent 

the traditional emphasis on individualized sentencing,” 

resulting in a “tension between an individualized sentencing 

approach on the one hand, and the reforms aimed at sentencing 

uniformity on the other.” Randolph, supra, 210 N.J. at 346. 

We observed previously that “the discretion the sentencing 

court wielded pre-Code survives to a more limited extent through 

the court’s analysis of the aggravating and mitigating factors 

set forth in N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1.” Id. at 348 (citing Natale, 
10

supra, 184 N.J. at 486).1 In addition to the sentencing 

statute’s general purpose provision, we noted the Legislature 

requires the sentencing court to give “‘due consideration’” to a

presentence report, prepared after a defendant’s conviction,

which “includes individualized information pertaining to a 

defendant’s criminal, psychiatric, employment, personal, and 

family history.” Id. at 346 (citing N.J.S.A. 2C:44-6(a), (b)). 

Noting these observations and our determination in Natale that 

“the judge has discretion but must sentence in accordance with 

the applicable statutes,” we concluded that the sentencing 

statute still “allow[s] for evaluation of a range of information 

unconstrained by evidential considerations.” Id. at 348 (citing 

Natale, supra, 184 N.J. at 483-84).

The mitigating factors relevant here are illustrative of 

the requirement that the sentencing court consider defendant’s 

individual qualities and circumstances. Defendant maintains 

before this Court that his post-offense rehabilitative conduct 

warrants a finding that his criminal behavior was the result of 

 

1 Although N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(b) states that the court “may 

properly consider” the listed mitigating factors, we have held 

that, “where mitigating factors are amply based in the record 

before the sentencing judge, they must be found.” State v. 

Dalziel, 182 N.J. 494, 504-05 (2005). Accordingly, where the 

evidence supports a finding of a mitigating factor, that 

evidence must be part of the court’s “deliberative process.” 

Id. at 505; see also State v. Hess, 207 N.J. 123, 155 n.8 (2011)

(noting same). 
11

circumstances unlikely to recur, N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(b)(8), that 

his character and attitude show he is unlikely to commit another 

offense, N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(b)(9), that he is likely to respond 

affirmatively to probationary treatment, N.J.S.A. 2C:44-

1(b)(10), and that imprisonment would result in excessive

hardship to himself and his dependents, N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(b)(11).

“[T]he finding, weighing, and balancing of [these] mitigating 

factors” requires the court to assess the character of the 

offender, as well as “the severity” of the proposed sentence in 

relation to “the crime that the defendant committed.” Randolph, 

supra, 210 N.J. at 345, 349.

Having determined that each “[d]efendant is entitled to 

[an] individualized consideration during sentencing,” id. at 

349, see N.J.S.A. 2C:1-2(b)(2), (6), we turn to the question of 

whether that assessment requires the trial court to consider a 

defendant’s post-offense conduct at the initial sentencing 

phase.

B.

In Randolph, we held that, upon remand for resentencing, a 

trial court must engage in a de novo review of the aggravating 

and mitigating factors applicable to the defendant at the time 

of his resentencing. Id. at 333. On appeal from his initial

resentencing, Randolph argued that remand was necessary to 

reweigh the aggravating and mitigating factors to determine if 
12

the imposition of three consecutive maximum terms was warranted. 

Id. at 336-37. The Appellate Division agreed, ordering “remand 

for reconsideration and justification for the sentence of three 

consecutive maximum terms.” Id. at 337.

At his second resentencing hearing, Randolph argued that,

in the period between his initial sentencing and his second 

resentencing hearing, he had joined a Narcotics Anonymous

program, obtained his General Equivalency Diploma, and attended 

behavior modification and parenting classes. Id. at 337-38. 

The second resentencing court, narrowly interpreting the remand 

order to require only a statement of the specific factual 

findings underlying the imposition of consecutive sentences, 

refused to consider Randolph’s post-sentencing rehabilitative 

evidence. Id. at 338. We granted certification to consider

whether the resentencing court properly declined to consider 

Randolph’s putative rehabilitative evidence based on his conduct 

in the period between his initial sentencing and second 

resentencing hearing, which occurred over seven years later. 

Id. at 333, 335, 337. 

Finding the Appellate Division’s remand order ambiguous, we 

held that “defendant was entitled to present the 

[rehabilitative] evidence and to have it considered[.]” Id. at 

333. We determined that, at resentencing, “the trial court was 

called on to conduct nothing less than a resentencing, which 
13

necessarily involves the reevaluation and reweighing of 

aggravating and mitigating factors.” Ibid. 

We acknowledged that, unlike the federal sentencing 

statute, 18 U.S.C.A. § 3661, our sentencing statute contains no 

de-limiting provision regarding information to be considered by 

the sentencing court in relation to a defendant’s background, 

character, and conduct. Id. at 346. However, we have found --

and reaffirm here -- that the sentencing statute and our case 

law “left open for consideration . . . a wider array of 

information” for the trial court to consider “once the decision 

to impose incarceration had been made and the focus shifted to 

the weighing of aggravating and mitigating factors[.]” Id. at 

346-48 (citing Hodge, supra, 95 N.J. at 377). 

In reaching our decision in Randolph, we relied, in part, 

on Pepper v. United States, ___ U.S. ___, 131 S. Ct. 1229, 179 

L. Ed. 2d 196 (2011). There, the United States Supreme Court 

overturned the Eighth Circuit’s ruling prohibiting consideration 

of a defendant’s post-sentencing rehabilitative efforts. Id. at 

__, 131 S. Ct. at 1243, 179 L. Ed. 2d at 215. The Court 

observed that “‘possession of the fullest information possible 

concerning the defendant's life and characteristics’” is 

“‘[h]ighly relevant -- if not essential -- to [the] selection of 

an appropriate sentence.’” Id. at ___, 131 S. Ct. at 1240, 179 

L. Ed. 2d at 212 (alteration in original) (quoting Williams v. 
14

New York, 337 U.S. 241, 247, 69 S. Ct. 1079, 1083, 93 L. Ed.

1337, 1342 (1949)). In reaching our decision here, we reaffirm 

our acceptance of the “principle that ‘the punishment should fit 

the offender and not merely the crime.’” Randolph, supra, 210 

N.J. at 342 (quoting Pepper, supra, __ U.S. at __, 131 S. Ct. at 

1240, 179 L. Ed. 2d at 212 (internal quotation marks omitted)). 

As noted above, the sentencing statute preserves the 

concept of individualized assessment “through the application of 

some aggravating and mitigating factors that . . . invite 

consideration by the sentencing court of the individual 

defendant’s unique character and qualities.” Id. at 349. We 

acknowledged in Randolph the principles relied upon in cases 

interpreting the federal sentencing statute, and held that a 

defendant in a resentencing hearing “is entitled to the same 

full review and explanation of the finding and weighing of the 

aggravating and mitigating factors” as during sentencing. Ibid. 

This review must include evidence relating to a defendant’s 

post-offense conduct. In the court’s performance of that 

function, the defendant is entitled to have his post-offense 

rehabilitative evidence considered. Id. at 333. We see no 

reason why these principles should not be applied to the court’s 

assessment of aggravating and mitigating factors at a 

defendant’s initial sentencing hearing. 
15

In conclusion, the trial court should view a defendant as 

he or she stands before the court on the day of sentencing. 

This means evidence of post-offense conduct, rehabilitative or 

otherwise, must be considered in assessing the applicability of,

and weight to be given to, aggravating and mitigating factors. 

We recognize the trial judge here indicated that he did not 

accept defendant’s claims that he had changed his life. “On 

appeal, a trial judge’s sentencing determinations are entitled 

to substantial deference.” State v. Pagan, 378 N.J. Super. 549, 

558 (App. Div. 2005); see also State v. Lawless, 214 N.J. 594, 

606 (2013) (noting that reviewing court may “not substitute its 

judgment for the judgment of the sentencing court”). However, 

in light of the judge’s statement that he could not consider 

defendant’s post-offense conduct, we cannot infer that 

defendant’s putative rehabilitation evidence was fully 

considered when he was sentenced.2 

Given the ambiguity in the record, the interests of justice 

oblige us to vacate defendant’s sentence and remand to the trial 

court for a de novo assessment of the applicable aggravating and 

mitigating factors, accounting for defendant’s post-offense 

 

2 Although the State was under no obligation to provide an 

updated presentencing report, we note that “[t]he fact that no 

revised presentence report was prepared documenting any alleged 

post-incarceration rehabilitation further supports a conclusion 

that the issue of rehabilitation was not fully considered.” 

United States v. Diaz, 639 F.3d 616, 623 (3d Cir. 2011). 
16

conduct. In accordance with Randolph, the resentencing court 

must consider defendant’s post-offense conduct up to the date of 

his resentencing. We express no view, however, on the merits of 

this evidence or the weight that it should be given. Those are 

matters for consideration by the sentencing court, in the 

exercise of its discretion. 

IV.

The judgment of the Appellate Division is reversed, and the 

matter is remanded for resentencing consistent with this 

opinion.

CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER; JUSTICES LaVECCHIA, ALBIN, PATTERSON, 

and FERNANDEZ-VINA; and JUDGE CUFF (temporarily assigned) join 

in JUSTICE SOLOMON’s opinion.
1

SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY

NO. A-12 SEPTEMBER TERM 2013

ON CERTIFICATION TO Appellate Division, Superior Court

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

JOSEPH M. JAFFE,

Defendant-Appellant.

DECIDED December 15, 2014

Chief Justice Rabner PRESIDING

OPINION BY Justice Solomon

CONCURRING/DISSENTING OPINIONS BY

DISSENTING OPINION BY 

CHECKLIST REVERSE AND 

REMAND

CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER X

JUSTICE LaVECCHIA X

JUSTICE ALBIN X

JUSTICE PATTERSON X

JUSTICE FERNANDEZ-VINA X

JUSTICE SOLOMON X

JUDGE CUFF (t/a) X

TOTALS 7