COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA

Present: Judges Huff, Athey and Fulton

Argued by videoconference

GREGORY BISHOP

MEMORANDUM OPINION* BY

v. Record No. 0774-21-2 JUDGE GLEN A. HUFF

APRIL 19, 2022

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF CHESTERFIELD COUNTY

David E. Johnson, Judge

James T. Maloney (James T. Maloney, PC, on brief), for appellant.

Susan Brock Wosk, Assistant Attorney General (Jason S. Miyares, 

Attorney General, on brief), for appellee.

The trial court convicted appellant of attempted forcible sodomy and aggravated sexual 

battery. He challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his convictions. Finding no error 

in the trial court’s decision, this Court affirms.

I. BACKGROUND

On appeal, this Court “consider[s] the evidence and all reasonable inferences flowing 

from that evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, the prevailing party at 

trial.” Williams v. Commonwealth, 49 Va. App. 439, 442 (2007) (en banc) (quoting Jackson v. 

Commonwealth, 267 Va. 666, 672 (2004)). Viewed through this lens, the evidence is as follows:

In September 2020, appellant was married to Jennifer Bishop (“Jennifer”), and they had an 

adult daughter, S.B., who lived on her own. On September 2, 2020, S.B. arrived at her parents’ 

home between 7:00 and 8:30 p.m. When she arrived, she and her parents watched television 

* Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opinion is not designated for publication.

UNPUBLISHED
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together in the living room. Appellant, who had to work the next day, fell asleep on the couch, but 

S.B. and Jennifer stayed up several hours talking and watching television. Over the course of the 

evening, Jennifer prepared and consumed two or three mixed drinks for herself; she stated that each 

drink contained one shot of vodka mixed with roughly seventeen ounces of water in a water bottle. 

Although Jennifer did not see S.B. drinking, she agreed that S.B. could have been, but she noted that 

S.B. appeared “coherent.”

Jennifer testified that, per his usual practice, appellant awoke at 4:00 a.m., and at 4:30 a.m., 

Jennifer retired to her bedroom. When she left, appellant and S.B. were awake, and S.B. was sitting 

in a recliner dressed in a t-shirt and pajama pants; S.B. conversed with her mother and “seemed 

perfectly fine.” Jennifer took “a Xanax” and laid in bed listening to Spotify to help her sleep, but 

after thirty to forty minutes, she turned it off. When she did, she heard her daughter “making [a] 

moaning noise.” Jennifer looked in the living room and saw S.B. “thrashing around” in the recliner, 

“moaning and hollering.”

Initially, Jennifer did not investigate further because she knew appellant was in the living 

room. But after a few minutes, S.B. continued to make “moaning” noises, prompting Jennifer to get 

out of bed. When Jennifer entered the living room, S.B. was no longer in the recliner. Instead, she 

was lying on the couch in her thong underwear with her pants off and her legs spread open. Still 

“moaning and screaming,” S.B. appeared to be “out of it.” Appellant’s face was between S.B.’s

legs, and he appeared to be performing oral sex on her.1

 When he made eye contact with his wife, 

he said nothing. From there, Jennifer retrieved her phone, ran out of the house, and called the 

police.

1 At trial, Jennifer was asked if “performing oral sex” meant that she saw appellant’s 

“face or mouth on [S.B.’s] vagina.” She answered, “One hundred percent.” On 

cross-examination, she clarified further, stating, “I don’t believe there was penetration.”
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When the police arrived, Jennifer entered the house with them. She saw her daughter’s 

pants across the room and noticed her thong underwear was “twisted” and “over to the side.” 

Officer Sykes testified that S.B. was “extremely inebriated” and unresponsive. Sykes “tapp[ed] 

[S.B.’s] shoulder” and tried to wake her for two or three minutes, but when he could not, he asked 

Jennifer for help. When Jennifer joined Sykes, S.B. simply “made noises” before her eyes rolled 

back in her head. Officer Dobson stated that when they tried to wake S.B., she could not respond 

and merely shook her head. According to Dobson, S.B. remained in this state for nearly two hours. 

When she finally spoke, she was “confused” and began talking about her car at her boyfriend’s 

house. Before the officers could collect her underwear, S.B. urinated on herself.

Sykes testified that Jennifer was “crying” and “very upset” when the police arrived at the 

house. Although he could smell alcohol on her, she did not appear to be intoxicated. Jennifer told 

Sykes that “she was in her room with her headphones on [for] . . . about 30 minutes, and she took 

her headphones off, and she heard [S.B.] making a screaming sound.” She stated that she left her 

bedroom and entered the living room, and “as soon as she walked in the room, she saw that 

[appellant]’s head was between her daughter’s legs, and he woke up and looked at her, and she 

stated to [Sykes] that it was, oh, I’ve just been cautious [sic].” Jennifer told Sykes that appellant’s 

“face was down in his daughter’s vaginal area” and S.B.’s “legs were both spread wide apart and 

her pajama pants were not on . . . anymore versus that they were on her before.” Jennifer admitted 

she “could not see” whether there was penetration or “exactly” what appellant was doing, but she 

“did not believe” there was penetration.

Sykes noted that appellant appeared “intoxicated” and “lost.” He recorded his interaction 

with appellant, who was visibly “sweating.” Dobson concurred, recalling that appellant was 

“profusely sweating,” shaking, and so pale that Dobson asked him to sit down to avoid fainting. 
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When the officers informed appellant of Jennifer’s observations, he immediately became “really 

fidgety.”

S.B.’s panties were submitted for DNA analysis, but no seminal fluid, blood, or male DNA 

material were recovered. Forensic scientist Caitlyn Ayoub agreed that, if the victim had urinated on 

the underwear, Ayoub could only obtain female DNA material from it.

S.B. recalled only a few details of the evening. She testified that around 7:00 or 8:00 p.m., 

she and her mother drank two mixed drinks in water bottles, with each of them mixing their 

respective beverages; S.B. said she added a single shot of vodka to her drinks. S.B. stated that after 

her mother went to bed, she and appellant talked, and she fell asleep briefly. Her next recollection 

was drinking shots of vodka with appellant as they watched television and played a game. S.B. 

testified that they each drank “[t]hree or four shots that [she could] remember.” She admitted that 

she became “intoxicated” and moved from the recliner to the sofa while still wearing her pajamas. 

Her next memory was being awakened by the police, but she had no recollection of speaking with 

them. Although Sykes said S.B. told him that night appellant had not “do[ne] anything sexual” to 

her, S.B. testified that she could not recall the police questioning her about any “inappropriate 

touching” by appellant.

At the conclusion of the evidence, appellant argued the Commonwealth failed to prove 

attempted forcible sodomy because it did not establish that he intended to commit a sex act. 

Regarding the aggravated sexual battery charge, he asserted that the evidence did not prove “he 

[was] trying to arouse the victim sexually, to gratify himself or her sexually.” Further, appellant 

stressed that Jennifer’s testimony was not credible.

The trial court accepted Jennifer’s testimony and found there was undisputed evidence 

showing appellant was on the sofa with his daughter with “his head . . . between her legs in the 

vaginal area” while her legs were “spread, her pants off, and her underwear skewed.” Based on 
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these circumstances, it determined that “it stretched credulity to conclude any other intent than an 

act to commit sodomy” or “to conclude that this was not a direct overt act taken toward th[e] 

commission” of sodomy. Regarding the aggravated sexual battery charge, the trial court found S.B. 

was mentally and physically helpless and that appellant sexually molested her by intentionally 

touching her “intimate parts or material directly covering such intimate parts.” Accordingly, the 

trial court convicted appellant of attempted forcible sodomy and aggravated sexual battery.

This appeal followed.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

“When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, ‘[t]he judgment of the trial court is 

presumed correct and will not be disturbed unless it is plainly wrong or without evidence to support 

it.’” McGowan v. Commonwealth, 72 Va. App. 513, 521 (2020) (alteration in original) (quoting 

Smith v. Commonwealth, 296 Va. 450, 460 (2018)). “In such cases, ‘[t]he Court does not ask itself 

whether it believes that the evidence at the trial established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.’” Id.

(alteration in original) (quoting Secret v. Commonwealth, 296 Va. 204, 228 (2018)). “Rather, the 

relevant question is whether ‘any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the 

crime beyond a reasonable doubt.’” Vasquez v. Commonwealth, 291 Va. 232, 248 (2016) (quoting 

Williams v. Commonwealth, 278 Va. 190, 193 (2009)). “If there is evidentiary support for the 

conviction, ‘the reviewing court is not permitted to substitute its own judgment, even if its opinion 

might differ from the conclusions reached by the finder of fact at the trial.’” McGowan, 72 

Va. App. at 521 (quoting Chavez v. Commonwealth, 69 Va. App. 149, 161 (2018)).

III. ANALYSIS

Appellant contends the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions because 

Jennifer’s testimony was inherently incredible. He stresses that when Jennifer observed him and 

S.B. in the living room, she had had little sleep and had consumed a combination of alcohol and 
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Xanax, “cast[ing] serious doubt on her ability to observe and accurately report” her observations. 

Further, appellant notes that Jennifer’s testimony conflicted with S.B.’s testimony regarding the 

time of S.B.’s arrival because Jennifer testified that S.B. had been away for several days before 

September 2, 2020, whereas S.B. said she had been at home “all day” on September 1, 2020. He 

also asserts that Jennifer testified that S.B. did not drink any alcoholic beverages with Jennifer, 

conflicting with S.B.’s testimony that she was drinking vodka waters with her mother. Appellant 

maintains that Jennifer gave conflicting descriptions regarding the manner and degree of his 

touching. He notes that Jennifer told the police she could not see whether appellant penetrated 

S.B.’s vagina and never told them she saw his mouth “on” S.B.’s vagina; instead, she stated only 

that she saw his head in that area. Appellant says Jennifer’s testimony was uncorroborated and that 

S.B. denied appellant had sexually abused her. He asserts that, if he had intended to sodomize S.B., 

“there is no evidence of anything stopping [him].” Finally, he contends the evidence failed to prove 

aggravated sexual battery because, even assuming he touched S.B.’s vagina, “no evidence” 

established that he did so with the intent to sexually gratify himself or S.B. This Court finds 

appellant’s argument to be without merit.

“Determining the credibility of witnesses . . . is within the exclusive province of the [fact 

finder], which has the unique opportunity to observe the demeanor of the witnesses as they 

testify.” Dalton v. Commonwealth, 64 Va. App. 512, 525 (2015) (first alteration in original)

(quoting Lea v. Commonwealth, 16 Va. App. 300, 304 (1993)). “[T]his [C]ourt will not seek to 

pass upon the credibility of the witnesses where their [testimony] is not inherently incredible.” 

Gerald v. Commonwealth, 295 Va. 469, 486 (2018) (quoting Rogers v. Commonwealth, 183 Va. 

190, 201-02 (1944)). “Evidence is not ‘incredible’ unless it is ‘so manifestly false that 

reasonable men ought not to believe it’ or ‘shown to be false by objects or things as to the 

existence and meaning of which reasonable men should not differ.’” Id. at 487 (quoting Juniper 
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v. Commonwealth, 271 Va. 362, 415 (2006)). Moreover, the fact finder “[i]s free to believe or 

disbelieve, in part or in whole, the testimony of any witness.” Bazemore v. Commonwealth, 42 

Va. App. 203, 213 (2004) (en banc).

An “attempt” is composed of (1) the intention to commit the crime and (2) the doing of 

some direct act towards its consummation that is “more than mere preparation but falls short of 

execution of the ultimate purpose.” Gray v. Commonwealth, 260 Va. 675, 681 (2000). What 

constitutes an attempt “is often intricate and difficult to determine.” Sizemore v. Commonwealth, 

218 Va. 980, 985 (1978). As a result, “no general rule can be laid down which will serve as a 

test in all cases. Each case must be determined on its own facts.” Id.

“Determining intent is ‘generally a question for the trier of fact.’” Fletcher v. 

Commonwealth, 72 Va. App. 493, 506 (2020) (quoting Haywood v. Commonwealth, 20 Va. App.

562, 565 (1995)). In determining whether a defendant is guilty of an attempted crime, “the fact 

finder is . . . allowed broad latitude in determining the specific intent of the actor.” Fortune v. 

Commonwealth, 14 Va. App. 225, 229 (1992), quoted with approval in Siquina v. Commonwealth,

28 Va. App. 694, 700 (1998). “[I]f ‘the design of a person to commit a crime is clearly shown, 

slight acts done in furtherance of this design will constitute an attempt.’” Tharrington v. 

Commonwealth, 2 Va. App. 491, 494 (1986) (quoting State v. Bell, 316 S.E.2d 611, 616 (N.C.

1984)); see also Jones v. Commonwealth, 70 Va. App. 307, 324 (2019) (“[A]n act constituting an 

attempt can be ‘slight.’”). Further, to the extent that appellant asserts that the evidence failed to 

prove the requisite intent for aggravated sexual battery,2 we will not disturb the trial court’s 

2 Code § 18.2-67.3 states in pertinent part that “[a]n accused is guilty of aggravated 

sexual battery if he . . . sexually abuses the complaining witness, and . . . [t]he act is 

accomplished through the use of the complaining witness’s mental incapacity or physical 

helplessness.” “Sexual abuse” is defined in Code § 18.2-67.10 as “an act committed with the 

intent to sexually molest, arouse, or gratify any person, where . . . [t]he accused intentionally 

touches the complaining witness’s intimate parts or material directly covering such intimate parts

. . . .”
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factual finding unless it is plainly wrong or without evidence to support it. Fletcher, 72 Va. App.

at 506.

Here, the record does not establish that Jennifer’s testimony was inherently incredible. 

Consistent with her trial testimony, she told the police she could not see whether appellant 

penetrated S.B.’s vagina; however, she was adamant that appellant’s mouth was “on” S.B.’s 

crotch. Although S.B. initially told the police her father had not touched her sexually, she was so 

incoherent that she could barely speak, permitting a rational inference that she was unaware of

what was happening to her. And notably, appellant does not dispute the trial court’s finding that 

S.B. was mentally and physically incapacitated at the time of the offenses.

Despite appellant’s claim that Jennifer’s testimony conflicted with S.B.’s regarding the 

time of S.B.’s arrival and whether they were both drinking, Jennifer expressly testified that she 

did not know if S.B. was drinking. Further, although appellant believes the combination of little 

sleep, alcohol, and Xanax rendered Jennifer’s observations unreliable, Sykes testified that she 

did not appear intoxicated when he spoke with her. Contrary to appellant’s view, a rational fact 

finder could conclude Jennifer’s behavior was consistent with having seen her husband molest 

their daughter: Jennifer immediately called the police and fled the house and was “very upset” 

and “crying” when the officers arrived.

Further, S.B. testified that she was fully dressed when she moved from the chair to the 

sofa, allowing a rational inference that appellant removed her pants. S.B.’s testimony that she 

and appellant drank several shots of vodka during the thirty to forty minutes that Jennifer was in 

bed reasonably supported the conclusion that S.B. consumed enough alcohol within a short 

period of time to incapacitate her. Finally, Jennifer heard her daughter moaning and screaming 

as she entered the living room and encountered appellant with his face on S.B.’s crotch. When 

Jennifer returned with the police, she noticed her daughter’s thong underwear was pushed to the 
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side. Although appellant’s DNA material was not recovered from the underwear, a forensic 

scientist explained that S.B.’s urine interfered with the collection of such evidence.3

“It is firmly established that ‘[c]ircumstantial evidence is competent and is entitled to as 

much weight as direct evidence provided that the circumstantial evidence is sufficiently 

convincing to exclude every reasonable hypothesis except that of guilt.’” Kelley v. 

Commonwealth, 69 Va. App. 617, 629 (2019) (alteration in original) (quoting Pijor v. 

Commonwealth, 294 Va. 502, 512 (2017)). “Circumstantial evidence is not ‘viewed in isolation’ 

because the ‘combined force of many concurrent and related circumstances, each insufficient in 

itself, may lead a reasonable [fact finder]’ to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that a 

defendant is guilty.” Rams v. Commonwealth, 70 Va. App. 12, 27 (2019) (quoting Muhammad v. 

Commonwealth, 269 Va. 451, 479 (2005)).

Viewed as a whole, the circumstances presented to the trial court were sufficient for a 

rational fact finder to conclude that appellant’s face was touching S.B.’s vaginal area and that he

intended to perform oral sex on her. The evidence also reasonably supported a finding that 

appellant touched S.B. with the intent to sexually gratify himself or S.B., who referred to her 

boyfriend repeatedly when the police and Jennifer attempted to wake her. Accordingly, the 

evidence was competent, credible, and sufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that 

appellant was guilty of attempted forcible sodomy and aggravated sexual battery.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

Affirmed.

3 In any event, it is well-established that the testimony of a sexual abuse victim need not 

be corroborated. Wilson v. Commonwealth, 46 Va. App. 73, 87-88 (2005); Garland v.

Commonwealth, 8 Va. App. 189, 191-93 (1989).