NOTICE: NOT FOR PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION DOES NOT CREATE

LEGAL PRECEDENT AND MAY NOT BE CITED EXCEPT AS AUTHORIZED.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

CHARLOTTE G., Appellant,

v.

DEPARTMENT OF CHILD SAFETY, B.G., W.G., Appellees.

No. 1 CA-JV 14-0102

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County

No. JD21348

The Honorable Susanna C. Pineda, Judge

The Honorable Roland J. Steinle, III, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

John L. Popliek, P.C., Scottsdale

By John L. Popilek

Counsel for Appellant

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Phoenix

By JoAnn Falgout

Counsel for Appellee Department of Child Safety
CHARLOTTE G. v. DCS, et al. 

Decision of the Court

2

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Lawrence F. Winthrop delivered the decision of the Court, in which 

Presiding Judge Patricia K. Norris and Judge John C. Gemmill joined.

W I N T H R O P, Judge:

¶1 Charlotte G. (“Mother”) appeals the juvenile court’s order 

terminating her parental rights to B.G. and W.G. (collectively, “the 

children”). The children are members of the Gila River Indian Community

(“Tribe”).

1 On appeal, Mother does not contest that the statutory grounds 

for severance were proven, that there was a substantial likelihood that she 

would not be capable in the near future of exercising proper and effective 

parental care and control, and that severance of the relationship was in the 

best interests of the children. Mother contends, however, that the juvenile

court erred in terminating her parental rights because the State failed to 

prove additional elements necessary to terminate a parent-child 

relationship under the Indian Child Welfare Act (“ICWA”). For the 

following reasons, we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 Mother is the biological parent of B.G. and W.G. The natural 

father of the children is deceased. In June 2011, the children found Mother 

extremely intoxicated and unresponsive and called 911. The Arizona 

Department of Economic Security (“ADES”) was notified and Mother 

subsequently agreed to participate in substance abuse classes through 

Native American Connections.

2 Mother did not participate in these 

services. ADES filed a dependency petition in January 2012 alleging 

Mother neglected the children due to her substance abuse. The children 

 

1 Mother is a member of the Navajo Nation. Prior to his death, Father 

was a member of the Gila River Indian Tribe. 

2 In May 2014, Child Protective Services (“CPS”) was replaced by the 

Department of Child Safety (“DCS”), an entity outside of ADES. In its 

answering brief, DCS refers to the parties as they existed at the time of the 

proceedings, and so do we.
CHARLOTTE G. v. DCS, et al. 

Decision of the Court

3

were removed from Mother’s custody and initially placed with maternal 

grandmother. The juvenile court found the children dependent as to 

Mother in May 2012 and approved a case plan for family reunification.

ADES offered Mother several services including substance abuse testing 

and treatment, parenting classes, parenting aide services, and a 

psychological evaluation. In September 2012, the children were placed in 

paternal grandmother’s custody.3

¶3 From December 2012 to October 2013, during four separate 

report and review hearings, the juvenile court found ADES was making 

active efforts to reunify the family. At the same time, however, the juvenile 

court noted that Mother was failing to cooperate with TASC and TERROS 

and repeatedly found that returning custody of the children to Mother 

without modification of Mother’s behaviors was likely to result in serious 

emotional and physical danger to the children. Nevertheless, the juvenile 

court in March of 2013 granted Mother a six-month extension to participate 

and comply with the continuing active efforts by ADES for reunification of 

the family.4

¶4 In October 2013, the juvenile court changed the case plan to 

severance and adoption. ADES filed a motion for termination of the parentchild relationship, alleging two specific grounds. First, ADES asserted 

Mother was unable to discharge her parental responsibilities because of a 

history of controlled substances and/or alcohol abuse and there were 

reasonable grounds to believe the condition will continue for a prolonged 

indeterminate period. See Ariz. Rev. Stat. (“A.R.S.”) § 8-533(B)(3).5 Next, 

ADES alleged the children had been in an out-of-home placement for a 

cumulative total period of fifteen months or longer, pursuant to a court 

order. See id. at § 8-533(B)(8)(c). ADES also alleged the best interests of the 

children would be served by terminating the parent-child relationship. See

id. at § 8-533(B).

 

3 Paternal grandmother meets the placement preferences under 

ICWA.

4 From December 2012 to October 2013, Mother completed 

approximately 28% of her required TASC urinalysis testing.

5 We cite the current version of the statutes if no revisions material to 

our decision have occurred since the relevant dates.
CHARLOTTE G. v. DCS, et al. 

Decision of the Court

4

¶5 The juvenile court conducted a termination hearing in March 

2014, during which Mother, two caseworkers from CPS, and one 

caseworker from the Tribe testified. Mother testified she began drinking at 

age 14, stating that the current period of sobriety stemming from her then 

current inpatient treatment was the longest period she had been sober aside 

from her pregnancies. Mother also admitted to using methamphetamine in 

2010, but maternal grandmother’s early intervention led Mother to enter an 

inpatient program. Mother explained she relapsed with alcohol in June 

2011, which prompted ADES’ involvement and attempts to engage Mother 

in services. Mother testified that over the course of approximately two 

years, she successfully completed two inpatient programs, but failed to 

engage in either aftercare program, and subsequently relapsed each time. 

In early 2013, TERROS assisted Mother in finding another inpatient 

treatment facility, but she failed to attend four separate scheduled intakes

at such facility. At the time of the hearing, Mother was receiving inpatient 

treatment at a tribal community-based treatment facility.

¶6 The tribal caseworker testified that, because Mother was now

in a tribal community-based treatment program, the Tribe was, pending 

completion of that treatment and successful completion of some after-care 

program, no longer in favor of severance and adoption. The tribal

caseworker agreed, however, that returning custody of the children to 

Mother at this time would likely result in serious emotional or physical 

damage to the children. In addition, the tribal caseworker agreed that 

ADES had previously made active efforts “[at] giving Mo[ther] the help that 

she needed, specifically inpatient treatment.” The tribal caseworker stated 

she assisted Mother in entering Mother’s then current inpatient program 

located on the reservation because the tribal caseworker had “close 

connections” with this facility. According to the tribal caseworker, CPS did 

not assist her in this placement effort.

¶7 A CPS supervisor for the ICWA unit testified that ADES 

offered Mother several services, including substance abuse treatment with 

TERROS, urinalysis testing with TASC, and inpatient referrals for 

substance abuse treatment facilities. The CPS ICWA supervisor further 

testified regarding Mother’s failure to engage in offered services, including

Mother’s failure to participate in TERROS referrals and her “sporadic” 

testing at TASC. The CPS ICWA supervisor testified that ADES made 

active efforts under ICWA and that returning custody of the children to

Mother would likely result in serious emotional or physical damage to the 

children.
CHARLOTTE G. v. DCS, et al. 

Decision of the Court

5

¶8 The CPS case manager assigned to Mother’s case beginning 

in June 2013 testified that Mother was unable to discharge her parental 

responsibilities due to her chronic abuse of drugs and alcohol and this 

condition was likely to continue for an indeterminate period of time. Based 

on Mother’s failure to maintain sobriety or participate in ADES’ offered 

programs, the CPS case manager opined that Mother had failed to remedy 

the circumstances causing out-of-home placement and was not capable of 

exercising care and control of the children. The juvenile court terminated 

Mother’s parental rights on April 10, 2014.6 Mother timely appealed. We 

have appellate jurisdiction pursuant to the Arizona Constitution, Article 6, 

Section 9; A.R.S. § 8-235(A); and Rule 103(A) of the Arizona Rules of 

Procedure for the Juvenile Court.

ANALYSIS

¶9 On appeal, Mother raises several issues regarding ADES’

alleged failure to prove the necessary elements to terminate a parent-child 

relationship under ICWA. Specifically, Mother argues (1) the juvenile court 

erred in holding the State had by clear and convincing evidence proved it 

made active efforts to maintain and restore the Indian family unit; (2) the 

juvenile court erred in holding that the State proved beyond a reasonable 

doubt that continued custody of the children by the parent or Indian 

custodian is likely to result in serious emotional or physical damage to the 

children; (3) the State did not prove the likely serious emotional or physical 

damage to the children though the testimony of a “qualified expert;” (4) the 

juvenile court erred as a matter of law in relying upon pronouncements by 

the children’s paternal grandmother (the current placement) that she would 

accept only “severance and adoption” and not guardianship as a remedy in 

this matter. This court will not substitute our opinion for that of the juvenile 

court unless the juvenile court’s findings are clearly erroneous. Pima Cnty.

Dependency Action No. 93511, 154 Ariz. 543, 545, 744 P.2d 455, 457 (App. 

1987) (citation omitted).

I. The juvenile court did not err in finding ADES proved it made active 

efforts to maintain and restore the family unit.

¶10 Mother contends ADES failed to make “active efforts” for 

reunification. We disagree. On appeal, Mother argues “active efforts,” as 

 

6 The juvenile court found by clear and convincing evidence that

Mother was unable to discharge her parental responsibilities under A.R.S. 

§ 8-533(B)(3). This was the sole basis for terminating Mother’s parental 

rights.
CHARLOTTE G. v. DCS, et al. 

Decision of the Court

6

required by ICWA, require more than “reasonable efforts.” Mother 

supports this contention by citing other jurisdictions that have found 

“active efforts” to be a higher standard than “reasonable efforts.” Mother 

further asserts that ADES “did little more than make its ‘usual’ substance 

abuse referrals (i.e., TERROS), and did little to nothing to find a competent 

inpatient treatment program for Mother.” Despite Mother’s contentions, 

the juvenile court specifically found on several occasions that ADES had 

made active efforts as required under ICWA, “including providing Mother 

detoxification programs, in-patient programs, and repeatedly offering 

aftercare substance abuse programs.” On this record, we see no reason to 

further parse the meaning of “active efforts” when the juvenile court 

specifically found that ADES had met this standard in the present case.

¶11 The record demonstrates the juvenile court had ample 

evidence to substantiate its finding, including testimony from the CPS

ICWA supervisor, the CPS caseworker, and Mother regarding Mother’s 

failure to meaningfully participate in services and to maintain sobriety.

¶12 Mother alleges ADES failed to engage in active efforts when 

it failed to find her appropriate inpatient treatment, leaving it to the tribal 

caseworker to find the latest inpatient program for Mother. In this regard, 

the tribal caseworker testified that getting Mother admitted to the inpatient 

program on the reservation was due to the caseworker’s “close 

connections” to that inpatient unit. The tribal caseworker’s assistance in 

finding another inpatient program for Mother does not diminish ADES’ 

active efforts to engage Mother in services, including ADES’ scheduling of

four separate intakes to another inpatient facility, all of which Mother failed 

to attend. See Yvonne L. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 227 Ariz. 415, 423, ¶ 34, 

258 P.3d 233, 241 (App. 2011) (stating “neither ICWA nor Arizona law 

mandates that ADES provide every imaginable service or program 

designed to prevent the breakup of the Indian family before the court may 

find that ‘active efforts’ took place”). Accordingly, the juvenile court did 

not abuse its discretion when it found ADES had made active efforts at 

reunification as required under ICWA.

II. The juvenile court did not err in finding ADES proved beyond a 

reasonable doubt, through the testimony of a “qualified expert,” that 

continued custody of the children by Mother is likely to result in serious 

emotional or physical damage to the children.

¶13 Mother first argues ADES failed to provide sufficient 

foundation for the testimony of any expert; therefore, the opinion testimony 

of the various caseworkers, as described above, must be disregarded.
CHARLOTTE G. v. DCS, et al. 

Decision of the Court

7

During the termination hearing, however, Mother did not object to any 

opinion testimony given by CPS’ two caseworkers or the Tribe’s 

caseworker. Accordingly, Mother has waived this issue on appeal. See

Estate of Reinen v. N. Arizona Orthopedics, Ltd., 198 Ariz. 283, 286, ¶ 9, 9 P.3d 

314, 317 (2000) (stating “[a]n objection to proffered testimony must be made 

either prior to or at the time it is given, and failure to do so constitutes a 

waiver”). To the extent Mother argues the tribal caseworker and CPS 

caseworkers do not qualify as experts, we find that all three caseworkers 

qualify as expert witnesses as required under ICWA.

¶14 An individual may qualify as an expert witness regardless of 

whether that individual has expertise with Indian children. Rachelle S. v. 

Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 191 Ariz. 518, 520, ¶ 11, 958 P.2d 459, 461 (App. 

1998). In an effort to assist state courts in interpreting ICWA, the United 

States Department of the Interior Bureau of Indian Affairs issued a set of

guidelines. Guidelines for State Courts; Indian Child Custody Proceedings

(“Guidelines”), 44 Fed. Reg. 67,584 (Dep’t of Interior Nov. 26, 1979).7

Arizona courts have previously relied on these Guidelines when 

interpreting sections of ICWA. Rachelle S., 191 Ariz. at 520, ¶ 12, 958 P.2d 

at 461. Section D.4 entitled “Qualified Expert Witnesses” states in relevant 

part:

(b) Persons with the following 

characteristics are most likely to meet the 

requirements for a qualified expert witness for 

purposes of Indian child custody proceedings:

(i) A member of the Indian child’s 

tribe who is recognized by the tribal community 

as knowledgeable in tribal customs as they 

pertain to family organization and childrearing 

practices.

(ii) A lay expert witness having 

substantial experience in the delivery of child 

and family services to Indians, and extensive 

knowledge of prevailing social and cultural 

standards and childrearing practices within the 

Indian child’s tribe.

(iii) A professional person having 

substantial education and experience in the area 

of his or her specialty.

Guidelines, 44 Fed. Reg. 67,584.

 

7 The Guidelines have not been revised.
CHARLOTTE G. v. DCS, et al. 

Decision of the Court

8

¶15 In the present case, the CPS ICWA caseworker had substantial 

education and experience to qualify as an expert witness under the 

Guidelines, including 20 years’ experience with ADES, two of those as the 

ICWA unit supervisor, and a bachelor’s and master’s degree. Next, the CPS 

case manager had 18 months experience at CPS, managed over 20 ICWA 

cases, and had offered similar opinion testimony at three prior severance 

trials for ICWA cases. We find this experience, coupled with his bachelor’s 

degree and then current enrollment in a master’s degree program, qualified 

the CPS case manager as an expert witness. Last, the tribal caseworker 

qualified as an expert witness due to her membership in the children’s tribe, 

the Gila River Indian Community.8 The Tribe’s caseworker’s testimony 

fairly indicates that she is a member of the Tribe. Accordingly, even had 

Mother preserved an objection as to foundation, the juvenile court did not 

err when it considered the testimony of the CPS caseworker, the CPS ICWA 

supervisor, and the Tribe’s caseworker, as each of these individuals 

constitutes a “qualified expert” under ICWA.9

¶16 Mother next contends the juvenile court’s “single finding” 

that Mother’s custody of the children would result in serious emotional or 

physical harm not only misstates the testimony of Tribe’s caseworker, but 

also fails to establish proof of such potential harm beyond a reasonable 

doubt. Here, Mother’s assertion is unfounded, as nothing in the record 

demonstrates the juvenile court only considered the testimony of the Tribe’s 

caseworker. In addition, the juvenile court made several relevant findings 

that substantiate its ruling. First, the juvenile court stated “[t]he tribe 

opined that to return the children to Mother would cause a substantial risk 

of emotional or physical harm because Mother has a history of relapse.” 

Next, the juvenile court expressly found “beyond a reasonable doubt that 

return of the children to Mother would likely [] cause both physical and 

emotional harm to the children.”10 Nothing in the record indicates that the 

juvenile court improperly or solely relied on the Tribe’s caseworker’s 

 

8 Mother did not contend at trial and does not argue on appeal that 

the Tribe’s caseworker is not a member of the Tribe.

9 All three caseworkers testified that returning custody of the children 

to Mother at the time of the hearing would place them at risk of serious 

emotional or physical harm.

10 The juvenile court reasoned that Mother is a lifetime alcoholic who 

fails to maintain sobriety, despite numerous opportunities to do so. In 

addition, the juvenile court reiterated that Mother cannot provide the basic 

needs of the children, including food, clothing, and housing.
CHARLOTTE G. v. DCS, et al. 

Decision of the Court

9

testimony. Mother’s reliance on selected portions of this caseworker’s

testimony misstates the overall context of her testimony, as she ultimately 

agreed that Mother is not currently able to safely parent the children. It is 

clear from this record that the juvenile court acted well within its discretion 

in finding that the children would likely be harmed if returned to Mother’s 

custody.

III. The juvenile court did not rely upon pronouncements made by the 

children’s paternal grandmother when it terminated Mother’s parental 

rights.

¶17 Mother contends the juvenile court relied on statements made 

by the children’s paternal grandmother that she would not be willing to 

serve as the children’s guardian and would agree to further participate only 

if the case plan was for adoption. In support of her argument, Mother cites 

the juvenile court’s factual statement in its minute entry ruling that 

“[p]aternal grandmother does not wish to be the guardian of the children; 

however, she is willing to adopt the children.” Despite Mother’s assertion, 

we find nothing in the record that demonstrates the juvenile court relied on 

grandmother’s statements in deciding to terminate Mother’s parental 

rights; instead, the only relevant finding made with regard to placement 

states: “[t]he children are doing well in their current placement with 

Paternal Grandmother. They are flourishing in their current environment. 

The placement is also ICWA compliant.” We find no error as this is an 

appropriate finding for the juvenile court to make during termination 

proceedings.

CONCLUSION

¶18 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm.