1 In her complaint, Plaintiff names “Trustees of the

University of Pennsylvania,” “University of Pennsylvania,” and

“University of Pennsylvania Department of Public Safety” as

Defendants. In its answer, The Trustees of the University of

Pennsylvania states that it is a Pennsylvania non-profit

corporation and that it is unaware of any separate entities named

“University of Pennsylvania” or “University of Pennsylvania

Department of Public Safety.” As Plaintiff apparently does not

dispute this, I will refer only to the one Defendant.

 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

JENNIFER PAGE : CIVIL ACTION

:

:

v. : 

: NO. 03-6815

THE TRUSTEES OF THE UNIVERSITY :

OF PENNSYLVANIA :

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

Fullam, Sr. J. December 20, 2005

Defendant1 has moved for summary judgment in this employment

discrimination case. Because Plaintiff has not met her burden of

establishing that any reasonable person in her circumstances

would have resigned, I will grant the motion.

For purposes of the summary judgment motion, I have

construed the disputed facts in the light most favorable to

Plaintiff. However, to the extent Plaintiff alleges facts in her

affidavit filed after oral argument that contradict statements

given in her depositions, the affidavit will not be considered.

 Ms. Page was employed for several years as a police

officer for the University of Pennsylvania. In 2002, Plaintiff

went on maternity leave. Upon her return in November of that

Case 2:03-cv-06815-JF Document 30 Filed 12/20/05 Page 1 of 5
2

year, Plaintiff submitted a memorandum requesting “out of

service” (personal) time to express breast milk and was granted

two such breaks during her shift. Plaintiff asserts that despite

this permission, her supervisors refused to allow her to request

a courtesy transport from her foot patrol to headquarters. She

protested and was assigned to a patrol closer to headquarters,

but she alleges that her supervisor called for her on the radio

and that she was interrupted in the locker room where she went to

express milk. Plaintiff contends this conduct violated the

Pregnancy Discrimination Act.

Plaintiff also has alleged race discrimination, asserting

that her supervisor required her (but not white officers) to wear

her cap while traveling from a patrol car to a building, allowed

white officers to spend more time buying coffee at a convenience

store, and checked on Plaintiff’s whereabouts during lunch and

personal breaks. Plaintiff was also criticized for the manner in

which she prepared time sheets, was briefly relieved of her

firearm, and was assigned insignificant tasks (such as counting

bicycles and arranging for other officers’ shoes to be shined and

the captain’s official vehicle to be washed). At the time she

was assigned these tasks, Plaintiff was on limited duty,

apparently because of a back injury unrelated to her pregnancy. 

Defendant has shown that other officers on limited duty performed

similar tasks, although no other officer was required to have

Case 2:03-cv-06815-JF Document 30 Filed 12/20/05 Page 2 of 5
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another officer’s shoes shined. Plaintiff also alleges that

although she filed a complaint on December 16, 2002, she was not

interviewed until January 6, 2002. Plaintiff resigned

approximately two months after her return from maternity leave,

on or about January 14, 2003. 

In this case, as Plaintiff acknowledges, there is no direct

evidence of discrimination. There is insufficient indirect

evidence from which a reasonable jury could conclude that

Plaintiff’s supervisors or fellow officers discriminated against

her because of her race or gender or for a pregnancy-related

condition. On this last point, it is noteworthy that Plaintiff

does not allege discrimination during her pregnancy. Even if

Plaintiff could establish discrimination, she cannot establish a

constructive discharge. Although Plaintiff alleges that some of

the conduct complained of occurred before her maternity leave,

her focus is on the short period between November 5, 2002, and

January 14, 2003, after her return to work. The offending

behavior charged by Plaintiff during that time did not constitute

“working conditions so intolerable that a reasonable person would

have felt compelled to resign.” Pennsylvania State Police v.

Suders, 542 U.S. 129, —- (2004). Also, Plaintiff barely gave

Defendant an opportunity to respond. The three-week delay

between the complaint and the interview is not excessive given

that it coincided with the end-of-year holidays; a reasonable

Case 2:03-cv-06815-JF Document 30 Filed 12/20/05 Page 3 of 5
4

person would not assume that her complaint had been disregarded. 

The investigation was not completed because Plaintiff resigned

less than a month after making her complaint. Finally, Plaintiff

cannot show a causal link between her workers compensation claim

and the alleged retaliation.

An appropriate order follows.

Case 2:03-cv-06815-JF Document 30 Filed 12/20/05 Page 4 of 5
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

JENNIFER PAGE : CIVIL ACTION

:

:

v. : 

: NO. 03-6815

THE TRUSTEES OF THE UNIVERSITY :

OF PENNSYLVANIA :

ORDER

AND NOW, this 20th day of December, 2005, upon consideration

of Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment, and the response

thereto, and after oral argument,

IT IS hereby ORDERED that:

1. The Motion is GRANTED. Summary Judgment is entered IN

FAVOR OF Defendants, THE TRUSTEES OF THE UNIVERSITY OF

PENNSYLVANIA, UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA, and

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY

and AGAINST Plaintiff, JENNIFER PAGE. 

2. All other motions are DISMISSED AS MOOT.

3. The Clerk is directed to mark the case CLOSED.

BY THE COURT:

/s/ John P. Fullam 

 Fullam, Sr. J. 

Case 2:03-cv-06815-JF Document 30 Filed 12/20/05 Page 5 of 5