United States Court of Appeals 

For the First Circuit 

No. 16-2399 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Appellee, 

v. 

JESÚS MANUEL LAUREANO-PÉREZ, 

Defendant, Appellant. 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO 

[Hon. Francisco A. Besosa, U.S. District Judge] 

Before 

Torruella, Boudin, and Barron, 

Circuit Judges. 

 Jeannine N. Rodríguez and JNR Law Group on brief for 

appellant. 

 Rosa Emilia Rodríguez-Vélez, United States Attorney, and 

Kelly A. Zusman, Assistant United States Attorney, on brief for 

appellee. 

June 8, 2018 

 
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BOUDIN, Circuit Judge. Jesús Manuel Laureano-Pérez 

("Laureano") appeals his sentence following his guilty plea in the 

district court to a two-count indictment. One count charged 

Laureano with possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, 18 

U.S.C. § 922(g)(1); the other with unlawful possession of a machine 

gun, 18 U.S.C. § 922(o). After a hearing, the district court on 

November 2, 2016, sentenced Laureano to sixty months' imprisonment 

on each count, to be served concurrently. Along with other terms, 

the sentence directed periodic drug testing of the defendant during 

his subsequent supervised release. 

The background facts are these. On May 5, 2016, Puerto 

Rico police agents investigating drug dealing in San Juan saw 

Laureano standing by a car and, when he in turn saw their marked 

police car, he fled on foot. The police pursued him and later 

said they saw Laureano draw a firearm from a fanny pack, throw it 

over a fence, and toss the other contents of the fanny pack on the 

ground. The police recovered the firearm, high-capacity magazines 

for the weapon, and four cell phones. The authorities then 

discovered that Laureano, at the time he fled, had been serving a 

term of supervisory release following his federal conviction in 

2013 of possession of cocaine with intent to distribute. 21 

§ U.S.C. 841(a)(1). 

In due course, Laureano pled guilty to both counts 

arising out of the fanny pack incident. At the sentencing hearing, 
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the district court learned that two days prior, the judge in 

Laureano's original drug distribution case ordered him to serve 

two additional years of incarceration for violating his supervised 

release terms. 

As for the firearm charges stemming from the fanny pack 

incident, the district court determined that the guideline 

sentencing range for both counts was thirty-seven to forty-six 

months in prison, although the machine gun statute allowed for a 

sentence up to and including ten years' imprisonment. 18 U.S.C. 

§ 924(a)(2). The government requested a sentence at the top of 

the guideline range, forty-six months. Defense counsel requested 

a sentence of thirty-seven months. The district court ultimately 

varied from the guideline recommendation, imposing a sentence of 

sixty months on each count, to run concurrently. Laureano also 

received a three-year term of supervised release for each count, 

to be served concurrently. The new prison sentence would run 

consecutive with the twenty-four-month sentence on revocation that 

Laureano received the prior day, with the new sentence to be served 

first. 

On this appeal, Laureano first objects to the 

sixty-month sentences. Laureano argues that the district court 

improperly relied on community considerations and in doing so, 

failed to explain why an upward variance was warranted. 
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Just before the end of the sentencing hearing, defense 

counsel offered a portmanteau reference to the procedural and 

substantive unreasonableness of the sentence--a classic general 

objection rather than a specific one. United States v. Matos-deJesús, 856 F.3d 174, 177-178 (1st Cir. 2017); United States v. 

Soto-Soto, 855 F.3d 445, 448 n.1 (1st Cir. 2017). Our circuit 

case law is in some disorder, see United States v. Millán-Román, 

854 F.3d 75, 80–81 (1st Cir. 2017); United States v. Vargas-García, 

794 F.3d 162, 167 (1st Cir. 2015); United States v. Ruiz-Huertas, 

792 F.3d 223, 228 & n.4 (1st Cir. 2015), but whether reviewed for 

abuse of discretion or for plain error, the district court's 

position stands. 

During sentencing, the district court judge referred to 

"violent crimes and murders" occurring in "these weapons cases" 

and an uptick in the number of murders in Puerto Rico. He also 

referred to a joint firearms initiative and local law enforcement 

strategies to curtail the murder rate. 

A district court has considerable latitude to vary above 

or below the once rigidly enforced guidelines sentencing range, 

Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 47-49 (2007), but some reason 

must be given or apparent from context. Additionally, any sentence 

must concern itself primarily with the circumstances and behavior 

of the defendant. United States v. Flores-Machicote, 706 F.3d 16, 

21 (1st Cir. 2013) (a variance "'should typically be rooted either 
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in the nature and circumstances of the offense or the 

characteristics of the offender.'" (quoting United States v. 

Martin, 520 F.3d 87, 91 (1st Cir. 2008))). 

Although the district court judge considered community 

considerations, he did not ignore Laureano's individual 

circumstances, nor did he fail to justify the variance. See United 

States v. Paulino-Guzman, 807 F.3d 447, 450-451 (1st Cir. 2015). 

The judge explicitly discussed Laureano's age, education, and work 

history, before noting the seriousness of the offense, respect for 

law, and deterrence. See id. at 451. The judge then described 

Laureano's firearm offenses, including Laureano fleeing with his 

machine gun. 

Recent First Circuit decisions by successive panels have 

upheld variances on similar facts, despite a possible argument 

that this disregards the conventional rationale for variances. 

United States v. Garay-Sierra, 885 F.3d 7, 15-16 (1st Cir. 2018) 

(Thompson, J.); United States v. Fuentes-Echevarria, 856 F.3d 22, 

25-26 (1st Cir. 2017) (Howard, C.J.); United States v. Vázquez, 

854 F.3d 126, 130 (1st Cir. 2017) (Torruella, J.); Paulino-Guzman, 

807 F.3d at 450-51 (Kayatta, J.); United States v. Díaz-Arroyo, 

797 F.3d 125, 129-130 (1st Cir. 2015) (Selya, J.). Given these 

precedents, the district court did not even arguably commit error. 

Laureano's other claim on appeal is that the district 

court erred in subjecting him to a drug testing requirement. 
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Although fairly alerted by the Probation Officer's recommendation, 

counsel made no specific objection to the testing requirement when 

first raised as a possibility or when finally imposed. The 

defendant forfeited his objection and his claimed error, if it 

occurred, is not plain error. United States v. Garrasteguy, 559 

F.3d 34, 40 (1st Cir. 2009) (collecting cases). 

The Probation Officer recommended random drug testing, 

which was a supervised release condition previously imposed 

following Laureano's incarceration for the 2013 drug conviction. 

Laureano did not object to the condition and so the district court 

had no occasion to discuss it, but the court's reasoning is easily 

discerned. United States v. Quiñones-Otero, 869 F.3d 49, 51-52 

(1st Cir. 2017). As a convicted drug dealer, Laureano could have 

had ample access to drugs, and he declined to give a urine sample 

when arrested in this case. Further, given that the new offense 

occurred while Laureano was on supervised release for his prior 

drug offense, the district court clearly considered the "history 

and characteristics of the defendant," 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1), in 

its imposition of random drug screens. The condition is thus 

reasonably related to the legitimate objectives of supervised 

release. United States v. Colón de Jesús, 831 F.3d 39, 44-45 (1st 

Cir. 2016). 

Affirmed.