[Cite as Young v. Young, 2013-Ohio-1165.]

STATE OF OHIO ) IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 

 )ss: NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 

COUNTY OF SUMMIT ) 

CYNTHIA YOUNG 

 Appellee 

 v. 

DONALD YOUNG 

 Appellant 

C.A. No. 26541 

APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT 

ENTERED IN THE 

COURT OF COMMON PLEAS 

COUNTY OF SUMMIT, OHIO 

CASE No. 2000-03-0738 

DECISION AND JOURNAL ENTRY

Dated: March 27, 2013 

 

WHITMORE, Judge. 

{¶1} Appellant, Donald Young (“Father”), appeals from the judgment of the Summit 

County Court of Common Pleas, Domestic Relations Division. This Court dismisses the appeal 

as moot. 

I 

{¶2} Father and Appellee, Cynthia Young (“Mother”), were married in Colorado in 

1994 and, in November of that year, had a daughter, K.Y. Father and Mother divorced in 1996 

while still residing in Colorado. Subsequently, both moved to Ohio and registered their foreign 

decree in Summit County. From that point forward, Father and Mother had frequent contact 

with the court, filing various items such as child support modification requests, proposed shared 

parenting plans, and motions to modify the resulting shared parenting decrees. The court 

ultimately named Mother the primary residential parent. 
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{¶3} In 2007, Mother filed a notice of her intent to relocate to Florida with K.Y. The 

parties agreed that Mother would relocate and Father would be given companionship time. They 

further agreed that Father would be responsible for all travel costs associated with effectuating 

his companionship time and his child support obligation would terminate as a result of his paying 

the travel costs. In 2009, several things occurred. Mother began interstate proceedings to 

reinstate child support, as Father had not exercised his companionship time. Father filed a 

motion for contempt, alleging that Mother had denied him his companionship time with K.Y. 

ever since her move to Florida. The trial court ultimately reinstated Father’s child support 

obligation and denied his motion to hold Mother in contempt. Father appealed, and this Court 

affirmed the trial court’s decision. Young v. Young, 9th Dist. No. 25640, 2011-Ohio-4489. 

{¶4} Father continued to file contempt motions after the trial court’s refusal to hold 

Mother in contempt and additional motion practice ensued. In February 2011, Father filed his 

notice of intent to relocate to Nevada. Although the parties continued to litigate in Summit 

County, there is no dispute that, after Father’s relocation, Mother, Father, and K.Y. all resided 

outside of Ohio. In April 2011, Mother filed a motion to transfer the case to Florida. Father 

opposed the motion, arguing that both parties would be prejudiced by a transfer. In May 2011, 

the magistrate denied the transfer by way of order, concluding that the court “had continuing 

exclusive jurisdiction over the child custody determination.” Neither party addressed the transfer 

issue after the magistrate’s order. On June 12, 2012, however, the trial court issued a judgment 

entry sua sponte dismissing all pending motions and holding that “[a]s both the parties and 

[K.Y.] no longer reside in the state of Ohio, this Court is divested of exclusive, continuing 

jurisdiction.” 
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{¶5} Father now appeals from the trial court’s judgment and raises one assignment of 

error for our review. 

II 

Assignment of Error

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY DISIMISSING (sic) SUA SPONTE THE 

PARTIES’ ENTIRE CASE ON GROUNDS THAT IT WAS DIVESTED OF 

EXCLUSIVE CONTINUING JURISDICTION. 

{¶6} In his sole assignment of error, Father argues that the trial court erred by sua 

sponte dismissing the case on the basis that the relocation of the parties and their daughter had 

divested it of jurisdiction. 

{¶7} Chapter 3127 of the Ohio Revised Code contains the Uniform Child Custody 

Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (“UCCJEA”). Once jurisdiction has been properly invoked in 

Ohio under the UCCJEA, the Act provides that Ohio “has exclusive, continuing jurisdiction over 

[a child custody] determination until the court * * * determines that the child, the child’s parents, 

and any person acting as a parent do not presently reside in this state.” R.C. 3127.16. Finding 

that Father, Mother, and K.Y. all reside outside of Ohio, the trial court concluded that it no 

longer had jurisdiction and dismissed the proceedings. Father argues that the court 

misunderstood R.C. 3127.16. Specifically, he argues that a court is not divested of jurisdiction 

just because it no longer has exclusive jurisdiction. This Court, however, cannot address Father’s 

argument. 

{¶8} As we recently explained: 

The duty of this [C]ourt, as of every other judicial tribunal, is to decide actual 

controversies by a judgment which can be carried into effect, and not to give 

opinions upon moot questions or abstract propositions, or to declare principles or 

rules of law which cannot affect the matter in issue in the case before it. It 

necessarily follows that when, pending an appeal from the judgment of a lower 

court, and without any fault of the [appellee], an event occurs which renders it 
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impossible for this [C]ourt, if it should decide the case in favor of the [appellant], 

to grant him any effectual relief whatever, the [C]ourt will not proceed to a formal 

judgment, but will dismiss the appeal. And such a fact, when not appearing on 

the record, may be proved by extrinsic evidence. 

Capretta v. Brunswick City Council, 9th Dist. No. 11CA0094-M, 2012-Ohio-4871, ¶ 8, quoting 

Miner v. Witt, 82 Ohio St. 237, 238 (1910). The “key inquiry” in cases where the question of 

mootness arises due to the occurrence of an event is “whether the relief sought on appeal [is] 

available.” Akron Dev. Fund I, Ltd. v. Advanced Coatings Internatl., Inc., 9th Dist. No. 25375, 

2011-Ohio-3277, ¶ 25. 

{¶9} The relief Father seeks on appeal is the reinforcement of the court’s custody 

orders with regard to his companionship time. Specifically, Father requests that: 

[i]n terms of plain fairness and to correct any past injustices, this [C]ourt should 

immediately reinstate this case on the active docket and order that the minor child 

visit with [] Father so as to make up their lost time before she turns 18. 

Father did not request any other form of relief in his brief. His appeal only concerns the trial 

court’s ruling as it relates to the parties’ custodial arrangement. 

{¶10} In reviewing the record, this Court discovered that K.Y. turned 18 on November 

24, 2012. This Court then issued a show cause order to the parties, ordering them to submit 

responses addressing the issue of mootness in light of the fact that K.Y. is no longer a minor. 

Mother filed a response concluding that the appeal was moot. Father failed to respond to the 

show cause order. 

{¶11} The UCCJEA vests a qualifying court with jurisdiction to make and/or modify 

child custody determinations. R.C. 3127.15, 3127.16, and 3127.17. The Act defines a child as 

“an individual who has not attained eighteen years of age.” R.C. 3127.01(B)(2). Moreover, the 

Revised Code provides that the domestic relations court “shall allocate the parental rights and 

responsibilities for the care of the minor children of the marriage.” (Emphasis added.) R.C. 
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3109.04(A). Once K.Y. turned 18, she ceased to be a child/minor. The domestic relations court 

lacks authority to order an adult to engage in companionship time with her parent. Even if the 

court erred by dismissing the proceedings, the remedy Father seeks is no longer available due to 

K.Y.’s having turned 18. Therefore, Father’s appeal is moot. See In re Wyatt, 3d Dist. No. 5-07-

45, 2008-Ohio-2115, ¶ 9; Dahmen v. Dahmen, 11th Dist. No. 2007-T-0037, 2008-Ohio-2129, ¶ 

7-9; Matter of Miller, 5th Dist. No. 97-COA-01223, 1998 WL 429830, *1-2 (July 9, 1998). 

III 

{¶12} Father’s appeal from the Summit County Court of Common Pleas, Domestic 

Relations Division, is moot. Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed. 

Appeal dismissed. 

 Immediately upon the filing hereof, this document shall constitute the journal entry of 

judgment, and it shall be file stamped by the Clerk of the Court of Appeals at which time the 

period for review shall begin to run. App.R. 22(C). The Clerk of the Court of Appeals is 

instructed to mail a notice of entry of this judgment to the parties and to make a notation of the 

mailing in the docket, pursuant to App.R. 30. 

 Costs taxed to Appellant. 

 

 BETH WHITMORE 

 FOR THE COURT 

BELFANCE, P. J. 

HENSAL, J. 

CONCUR.
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APPEARANCES:

DAVID C. PERDUK, Attorney at Law, for Appellant. 

WILLIAM W. LOVE, II, Attorney at Law, for Appellee.