Supreme Court

Robert Houllahan :

v. : No. 2021-32-Appeal.

 (PC20-2010)

Louis E. Gelineau et al. :

Peter Cummings :

v. : No. 2021-33-Appeal.

 (PC19-10530)

Louis E. Gelineau et al. :

Philip Edwardo :

v. : No. 2021-41-Appeal.

 (PC19-9894)

Roman Catholic Bishop of 

Providence et al.

:

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision 

before publication in the Rhode Island Reporter. Readers 

are requested to notify the Opinion Analyst, Supreme 

Court of Rhode Island, 250 Benefit Street, Providence, 

Rhode Island 02903, at Telephone (401) 222-3258 or 

Email: opinionanalyst@courts.ri.gov, of any 

typographical or other formal errors in order that 

corrections may be made before the opinion is published. 
- 1 -

 Supreme Court

Robert Houllahan :

v. : No. 2021-32-Appeal.

 (PC20-2010)

Louis E. Gelineau et al. :

Peter Cummings :

v. : No. 2021-33-Appeal.

 (PC19-10530)

Louis E. Gelineau et al. :

Philip Edwardo :

v. : No. 2021-41-Appeal.

 (PC19-9894)

Roman Catholic Bishop of 

Providence et al.

:

Present: Suttell, C.J., Goldberg, Robinson, and Long, JJ.

O P I N I O N

Justice Goldberg, for the Court. This Court is confronted with another 

amendment of the General Laws, which, it is alleged, breathes new life into 

previously time-barred lawsuits against Bishop Louis E. Gelineau, Bishop Thomas 
- 2 -

Tobin, the Roman Catholic Bishop of Providence, a Corporation Sole, and several 

additional corporate defendants.

These consolidated cases came before the Supreme Court on February 1, 

2023, on appeal by plaintiffs, Robert Houllahan, Peter Cummings, and Philip 

Edwardo (Houllahan, Cummings, Edwardo, or collectively, plaintiffs) challenging 

the dismissal of all claims in favor of defendants, Louis E. Gelineau; the Roman 

Catholic Bishop of Providence, a Corporation Sole (RCB); Thomas Tobin; St. 

Joseph’s Church Providence Rhode Island; Bishop McVinney Regional School, 

Alias, Successor to Catholic Association for Regional Education; St. Anthony 

Church Corporation North Providence; John/Jane Doe 1-250; and XYZ

Corporations 1-250 (defendants) in accordance with Rule 12(b)(6) of the Superior 

Court Rules of Civil Procedure. 

On appeal, plaintiffs allege that the trial court erred in ruling that G.L. 1956 

§ 9-1-51 (the act), as amended, created a class of criminal actors beyond the scope 

of actual perpetrators as set forth in the act. The plaintiffs also urge this Court to 

abrogate its prior holding in the leading case of Kelly v. Marcantonio, 678 A.2d 873 

(R.I. 1996), and its progeny, that serves to bar recovery against those whose conduct, 

plaintiffs submit, rises to the level of criminality. The plaintiffs also contend that

the trial court erred in overlooking a single claim by plaintiff Edwardo that is based 
- 3 -

on New York law. For the reasons set forth in this opinion, we affirm the decision

of the Superior Court in all respects. 

Facts and Travel

The plaintiffs in the cases at bar filed separate Superior Court actions alleging

that they were sexually molested as minors by priestsin the Roman Catholic Diocese 

of Providence (Diocese). We address each plaintiff’s allegationsin turn.1

Robert Houllahan was born in the late 1960s to a devout Roman Catholic 

family. He became acquainted with Normand Demers, offending priest, in his 

capacity as a diocesan priest at St. Joseph’s Church. Demers engaged in a 

relationship with Houllahan, which included religious instruction and training, 

spiritual guidance, and socialization. The plaintiff alleges that, at some point in 

1976, he was molested by Demers and another man in Demers’s private quarters 

above the parish rectory. While in the rectory, Houllahan took note of several 

children from Central America, some of whom were living in the rectory at the time. 

For over twenty years, Houllahan was unable to speak of his abuse at the hands of 

Demers.

Houllahan asserted that in the late 1970s, church officials were aware that 

Demers was bringing boys to the United Statesfrom Central America for the purpose 

1 We pause to note that this Court concurs with the trial justice’s observations that 

the accusations made by plaintiffs against each offending priest were hideous and

appalling and shock the conscience of the Court. 
- 4 -

of sexual molestation. Demers eventually was arrested in 1989, in Haiti, after the 

director of an orphanage, with which Demers and the hierarchal defendants in this 

case were associated, learned that hewas molesting boys at the facility. The plaintiff 

alleges that Bishop Gelineau, through his Auxiliary Bishop, Kenneth Angell, 

promised the orphanage director that Demers would be investigated, prosecuted, and 

punished in Rhode Island if the director would cooperate in helping to have the 

charges against him dismissed. According to plaintiff, shortly after Demers’s return 

to Rhode Island, these defendantsreturned him to service in a parish, describing the 

original reports as unsubstantiated.

Peter Cummings was born in 1966 to a Roman Catholic family who regularly 

received sacraments through parishes within the Diocese. As a practicing Roman 

Catholic, Cummings developed great admiration, trust, reverence, and obedience to 

Roman Catholic priests, including Reverend John Petrocelli. The plaintiff became 

acquainted with Petrocelli while a student at Bishop McVinney Regional Elementary 

School, which he attended from ages nine until thirteen. Petrocelli used his position 

with the school to initiate and maintain a relationship with Cummings, encouraging

him to participate in different activities, including swimming at a local pool. It was 

after one of these swimming sessions that Petrocelli first sexually assaulted 

Cummings, taking him in his grasp and indicating that it was very important that he 

be allowed to show Cummings how to dry his genitals. Although Petrocelli released 
- 5 -

Cummings when he said no and resisted, he proceeded to fondle himself under a 

towel while Cummings continued to dry himself. This behavior continued 

frequently while Cummings attended grade school.

Over a decade later, in 1992, Cummings was hospitalized after suffering a 

severe psychological episode. He finally was able to speak about the abuse that he 

suffered at the hands of Petrocelli when he was a child. Cummings contacted the 

Diocese to alert it of Petrocelli’s abuse and was subsequently visited by Auxiliary 

Bishop Angell. Although Bishop Angell offered to assist Cummings with his 

treatment, Cummings alleged that Angellfailed to acknowledge Petrocelli’s history 

of misconduct, including a complaint recorded months earlier about Petrocelli 

swimming with young boys.

Philip Edwardo also was born to a devout Roman Catholic family in 1966. 

Commencing in either 1977 or 1978, Philip Magaldi, pastor of St. Anthony Church,

initiated and maintained a relationship with Edwardo as his mentor and confidant

through Edwardo’s work as an altar boy. Edwardo was a student at St. Thomas 

Catholic Regional Elementary School, and Magaldi arranged to have Edwardo 

available to serve Mass at several funerals each month while he was in school.

In 1979 or 1980, Magaldi learned that Edwardo’s mother had developed a 

serious drinking problem, and that Edwardo’s home life was difficult. Magaldi 

encouraged Edwardo to spend his spare time at St. Anthony’s rectory and church 
- 6 -

while also assisting with different tasks around the church. As Edwardo grew close 

to the employees of the church, including Magaldi, he eventually was compensated 

for his work, and Magaldi informed Edwardo’s father that Edwardo couldstay at the 

rectory any time he wished. 

On occasion, Edwardo slept at the rectoryat Magaldi’s urging, using a spare 

bedroom on the second floor. On one occasion in the spring of 1980, Magaldi took 

Edwardo to lunch in Warwick and then to a spa to use a swimming pool. When

Edwardo complained that he did not feel well, Magaldi used this as an excuse to 

perform a “medical procedure” on Edwardo, but in actuality used the opportunity to 

sexually assault him. Edwardo did not resist until he became dizzy and vomited.

Later that summer,Magaldi began regularly supplying Edwardo with alcohol.

During one incident, after several drinks, Magaldi contrived a medical problem and 

induced Edwardo to assist him, which again ended in sexual assault. Over the 

ensuing months, Magaldi became very physical with Edwardo, grabbing his buttocks 

and genitals whenever the chance arose. When Edwardo attempted to ask Magaldi 

to stop, Magaldi threatened to tell his father that he had been consuming alcohol. 

This threat, along with Magaldi’s continued attention and gift giving, led to several 

years of Magaldi’s abuse.

Edwardo estimates that he was sexually abused between 100 and 300 times 

from 1978, when he was twelve years old, until 1983, when he was seventeen years 
- 7 -

old. Edwardo and Magaldi went on several out-of-state trips throughout this period, 

including a two-day trip to New Hampshire, and a trip to New York City, where he 

was supplied with alcohol by Magaldi and molested in his hotel room after he 

attempted to go to sleep for the night. During this later trip, Magaldi mentioned to 

Edwardo that Bishop Gelineau was informed about the trip because it was related to 

his priestly duties.

Edwardo also alleges that he was physically beaten by another priest, at the 

behest of Magaldi, for withdrawing from their interactions. Once Edwardo was 

finally able to tell Magaldi to cease his abuse, Magaldi contacted Edwardo’s father 

and fabricated a story about Edwardo stealing money from the church. According 

to Edwardo, he chose to allow his father to believe Magaldi’s allegations rather than 

disclose the abuse that had occurred. 

Edwardo alleges that he was unable to speak of Magaldi’s abuse until 

approximately 2007, when he contacted the Bishop’s office to alert them of the 

abuse; Edwardo was then referred to Robert McCarthy2in the Diocese’s Office of 

Compliance. According to Edwardo, he spoke with McCarthy several times and 

2 Robert McCarthy was the Diocese’s first education and complaint coordinator for 

sexual concerns. He was tasked with investigating and recommending appropriate 

resolutions for complaints of sexual misconduct involving anyone associated with 

the Diocese. He is not a defendant in this case.
- 8 -

provided a detailed statement outlining the years of abuse that he suffered at the 

hands of Magaldi.3 

Bishop Gelineau was the Roman Catholic Bishop of Providence from 1972 

until 1997. In this role, Bishop Gelineau was vested with legislative, executive, and 

judicial power regarding the governance of the Diocese. Bishop Gelineau was 

responsible for the “training, hiring, assignment, monitoring, and/or supervision of 

diocesan candidates accepted for admission to the priesthood, seminarians, deacons 

and priests generally”—including the offending priests. The RCB is the primary 

corporate entity through which Bishop Gelineau and the Diocese conducted their

business.

The plaintiffs alleged that the offenses committed by the offending priests

were undertaken during the course and within the scope of their employment as 

priests incardinated in the Diocese, under the authority of Bishop Gelineau and RCB. 

The plaintiffs alleged these defendants knew that these priests were pedophiles 

and/or ephebophiles

4 who made sexual advances toward minor boys under the 

pretext of their priestly duties. Among their several allegations, plaintiffs contended

3 During this time, Edwardo learned that Magaldi had been transferred to a Diocese 

in Texas, where he was accused of engaging in the same behavior with another child.

4 Ephebophilia is defined as “[a] paraphilia in which adult sexual gratification is 

derived from fantasies or acts involving a postpubescent adolescent, often of the 

same gender.” The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language 597 (5th

ed. 2011).
- 9 -

that defendants knew of, but failed to warn plaintiffs or their parents of, practices 

commonly used by child predators, including swimming trips and outings as an 

opportunity to abuse children, and that such practices were ongoing by these priests.

The plaintiffs also alleged that defendants understood that the activities undertaken 

by the offending priests, including outreach to foreign orphaned boys and local 

young male prostitutes, were for illicit sexual activity, but, in order to protect the 

priests, declined to warn plaintiffs. 

In their complaints, plaintiffs identified a bevy of other priests, incardinated 

in the Diocese, who admitted to childhood sexual assault offenses, were convicted 

of childhood sexual assault, or were under police investigation for childhood sexual 

assault; the misdeeds of these priests are not before us. The plaintiffs alleged that 

defendants ignored, concealed, and/or pretended to be unaware that priests were 

sexually abusing children in order to protect the reputation of the Roman Catholic 

Church rather than secure the safety and well-being of children. The plaintiffs

alleged that defendants engaged in a pattern of conduct that included falsely assuring 

others that the issue of offending conduct would be addressed; ignoring or failing to 

properly investigate complaints; suppressing the results of investigations;

reassigning offending priests to new parishes; falsely holding out offending priests

as competent, moral, and harmless; falsely representing that they would actively 

assist in the criminal investigation and prosecution of priests accused of childhood 
- 10 -

sexual abuse; and failing to warn parishioners. According to plaintiffs, this conduct

not only protected the Bishop and the Diocese, it enabled and aided and abetted the 

offending prieststo further offend.

Motions to dismiss were filed in each case contending that all claims were 

barred by the applicable statute of limitationsset forth in G.L. 1956 § 9-1-14(b) that 

was in effect when the abuse occurred. In accordance with § 9-1-14(b), actions for 

personal injury arising from the claims asserted were subject to a three-year statute 

of limitations. Specifically, defendants asserted that because they were not 

perpetrators under the amended statute, § 9-1-51, which provides for a 

thirty-five-year retroactive statute of limitationsfor actual perpetrators, thesecauses 

of actions were time-barred pursuant to § 9-1-14(b). 

A joint hearing on the motions to dismiss was held on September 30, 2020. 

Significantly, upon inquiry by the trial justice, counsel for plaintiffs acknowledged

that plaintiffs were opposing the motions to dismiss based solely on the 

interpretation of the term “perpetrator” set forth in § 9-1-51. Counsel for plaintiffs 

also acknowledged that plaintiffs discovered their causes of action more than three 

years before these actions were commenced.

The defendants argued that the thirty-five-year retroactive statute of 

limitationsset forth in § 9-1-51(a)(1), and enacted by the General Assembly in 2019, 

applied only to individuals accused of actually engaging in sexual abuse, referred to 
- 11 -

as perpetratorsin the act. The defendants contended that, pursuant to § 9-1-51(a)(2), 

a non-perpetrator is one who may have caused or contributed to the wrongful sexual 

activity by another person. The defendants averred that plaintiffs’ complaints must 

be dismissed because defendants are non-perpetrators, and the retroactive 

application of the thirty-five-year statute of limitations in the 2019 amendment to 

§ 9-1-51 is applicable only to perpetrator defendants.

The plaintiffs relied heavily on this Court’s decision in Kelly, in which we 

recognized that one who aided and assisted the childhood sexual abuse “to the degree 

that he or she would be subject to prosecution under chapter 37 of title 11[,]” would 

be considered a perpetrator defendant. Kelly, 678 A.2d at 876 (emphasis added). The 

plaintiffs contended that although some concealment or aiding and abetting claims 

may amount to negligence and not perpetrator conduct under Kelly, the defendants’ 

actions could nonetheless rise to the level of criminal aiding and abetting, and thus

constitute perpetrator conduct. Hence, according to plaintiffs, because defendants’ 

actions rose to the level of criminality, they were perpetrators under § 9-1-51 and 

subject to the retroactive application of the thirty-five-year statute of limitations.

The trial justice issued a written decision on October 16, 2020, granting 

defendants’ motions to dismiss all claims in all cases. The trial justice declared that 

§ 9-1-51 “unambiguously distinguishes between ‘perpetrator’ and 

‘non-perpetrator[,]’ [and a]ll wrongful conduct committed by a defendant which 
- 12 -

caused or contributed to childhood sexual abuse by another person is 

‘non-perpetrator’ conduct regardless of whether the conduct would subject the 

defendant to criminal prosecution under the Rhode Island penal code.” The trial 

justice further determined that, even if the statute was ambiguous, it was clear that 

the General Assembly intended to limit the term perpetrator to the actual abuser. 

The trial justice concluded that the only conduct that met the definition of 

perpetrator was conduct by the actual abuser, which in the cases before her, were the 

offending priests. Because defendants were non-perpetrators, the thirty-five-year 

statute of limitations was not applicable, and the actions were dismissed as 

time-barred. Orders of dismissal, pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), were entered in each 

case. The plaintiffs timely appealed.

Standard of Review

“The sole function of a motion to dismiss is to test the sufficiency of the 

complaint.” Benson v. McKee, 273 A.3d 121, 127 (R.I. 2022) (quoting Gannon v. 

City of Pawtucket, 200 A.3d 1074, 1077 (R.I. 2019)). “When we review the grant 

of a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), we apply the same standard as the 

hearing justice.” Id. (quoting Chase v. Nationwide Mutual Fire Insurance Company, 

160 A.3d 970, 973 (R.I. 2017)). “A motion to dismiss may be granted only when it 

is established beyond a reasonable doubt that a party would not be entitled to relief 

from the defendant under any set of conceivable facts that could be proven in support 
- 13 -

of its claim.” Id. (quoting Chase, 160 A.3d at 973). This Court “ha[s] permitted a 

statute-of-limitations defense to be raised by a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) 

—providing the alleged timing defect appears on the face of the complaint.” Martin 

v. Howard, 784 A.2d 291, 297 (R.I. 2001).

“Under this standard, this Court confines its review to the four corners of the 

complaint, assume[s] that the allegations set forth are true, and resolve[s] any doubts 

in favor of the [complainant].” Benson, 273 A.3d at 127 (internal quotation marks 

omitted). “There is, however, a narrow exception for documents the authenticity of 

which are not disputed by the parties; for official public records; for documents 

central to plaintiffs’ claim; or for documents sufficiently referred to in the 

complaint.” Id. (quotingChase, 160 A.3d at 973).

Analysis

Statutory Construction

The plaintiffs contend that the trial justice erredin dismissing their complaints 

as time-barred after determining that defendants fell within the classification of 

non-perpetrator, even if their conduct, as plaintiffs contend, would be subject to 

criminal prosecution. “This Court reviews ‘questions ofstatutoryinterpretation de 

novo.’” Epic Enterprises LLC v. Bard Group, LLC, 186 A.3d 587, 589 (R.I. 2018) 

(quoting State v. Hazard, 68 A.3d 479, 485 (R.I. 2013)). “In matters of statutory 

interpretation our ultimate goal is to give effect to the purpose of the act as intended 
- 14 -

by the Legislature.” Id. at 589-90 (quoting Webster v. Perotta, 774 A.2d 68, 75 (R.I. 

2001)). “It is well settled that when the language of a statute is clear and 

unambiguous, this Court must interpret the statute literally and must give the words 

of the statute their plain and ordinary meanings.” Id. at 590 (quoting Alessi v. Bowen 

Court Condominium, 44 A.3d 736, 740 (R.I. 2012)). When determining the intent 

of the Legislature, “we consider the entire statute as a whole * * *.” Sorenson v. 

Colibri Corp., 650 A.2d 125, 128 (R.I. 1994).

In accordance with § 9-1-51(a)(1)(i) and (ii), all claims against a perpetrator 

defendant for injuries suffered as a result of sexual abuse must be brought within 

thirty-five years of the alleged act, or within seven years from the time the victim 

discovered, or reasonably should have discovered, that the injury was caused by the 

act. See § 9-1-51(a)(1). The 2019 amendment allowed a new thirty-five-year statute

of limitations for claims pertaining to a perpetrator defendant to be applied 

retroactively, that is, “any claim or cause of action based on conduct of sexual abuse

may be commenced within the time period enumerated in subsections (a)(1)(i) and 

(a)(1)(ii) regardless if the claim was time-barred under previous version of the 

general laws.” Section 9-1-51(a)(3), as amended by P.L. 2019, ch. 82, § 1; P.L. 2019, 

ch. 83, § 1 (emphasis added).
- 15 -

Conversely, claims against non-perpetrator defendants that were time-barred

under previous versions of the General Laws were not revived under the 2019 

amendment to § 9-1-51. The relevant language is as follows:

“(2) All claims or causes of action brought against a 

non-perpetrator defendant by any person alleging 

negligent supervision of a person that sexually abused a 

minor, or that the non-perpetrator defendant’s conduct 

caused or contributed to the childhood sexual abuse by 

another person to include, but not be limited to, wrongful 

conduct, neglect or default in supervision, hiring, 

employment, training, monitoring, or failure to report 

and/or the concealment of sexual abuse of a child shall be 

commenced within the later to expire of:

“(i) Thirty-five (35) years of the act or acts alleged 

to have caused an injury or condition to the minor; 

or

“(ii) Seven (7) years from the time the victim 

discovered or reasonably should have discovered 

that the injury or condition was caused by the act.”

Section 9-1-51(a)(2), as amended by P.L. 2019, ch. 

82, § 1; P.L. 2019, ch. 83, § 1 (emphasis added).

As defined by the statute, the term sexual abuse is limited to “any act committed by

the defendant against a complainant who was less than eighteen (18) years of age at 

the time of the act and which act would have been a criminal violation of chapter 37 

of title 11.” Section 9-1-51(e) (emphasis added).

According to plaintiffs, because neither § 9-1-51(a)(1) or (2) provides an 

explicit definition of a perpetrator or a non-perpetrator defendant, the language of 

the statute must be viewed as ambiguous. Specifically, plaintiffs assert that the use 
- 16 -

of the language “all claims” in both sections means that any tort claim could be 

asserted against both a perpetrator and non-perpetrator defendant, except for failure 

to report or professional negligence, thus rendering the distinction between the two 

classes meaningless. The plaintiffs allege that the trial justice erred in dismissing 

their complaints by unambiguously categorizing defendants as non-perpetrator

defendants, even though, plaintiffs contend, they could be found criminally

responsible for the sexual abuse committed by the offending priests. The plaintiffs 

further argue that defendants are criminally responsible as perpetrators of the crimes 

committed against plaintiffs, based on their own conduct. We disagree. Although 

this Court recognizes and appreciates the pain and horrorsuffered by these plaintiffs

as innocent children, when the General Assembly amended § 9-1-51, the members

deliberately drew a clear dichotomy between perpetrator and non-perpetrator 

defendants for retroactive application of the statute of limitations; its legislative 

history gives rise to this conclusion.

It is well settled that when this Court examines the meaning of a statute,

“individual sections must be considered in the context of the entire statutory scheme, 

not as if each section were independent of all other sections.” Sorenson, 650 A.2d at 

128. Although § 9-1-51 does not define perpetrator, the statute sets forth a 

nonexhaustive list of conduct pertaining to non-perpetrator defendants, which 

comprise the very allegations made against these defendants. Non-perpetrator 
- 17 -

defendants are defendants accused of “negligent supervision of a person that 

sexually abused a minor, or * * * [whose] conduct caused or contributed to the 

childhood sexual abuse by another person * * *.” Section 9-1-51(a)(2) (emphasis 

added). These acts include, but are not limited to, “wrongful conduct, neglect or 

default in supervision, hiring, employment, training, monitoring, or failure to report 

and/or the concealment of sexual abuse of a child * * *.” Id. 

This Court has previously addressed the distinction between perpetrator and 

non-perpetrator defendants regarding claims for childhood sexual abuse, most 

notably in Kelly v. Marcantonio, 678 A.2d 873 (R.I. 1996). In Kelly, we were 

confronted with the question of “whether claims for injuries resulting from the 

sexual abuse of a minor [were] governed by G.L.1956 § 9-1-51, as amended by 

P.L.1993, ch. 274, § 1 or G.L.1956 § 9-1-14(b) when those claims [were] asserted 

against someone other than the alleged abuser.” Kelly, 678 A.2d at 875. Our decision 

in Kelly rested on the definition of sexual abuse, which has remained unchanged.Id. 

at 876. Childhood sexual abuse is conduct that falls within the provisions of chapter 

37 of title 11 of the General Laws, entitled “Sexual Assault.”

In Kelly, this Court stated that when “read[ing] the definition [of sexual abuse]

contained in § 9-1-51(e) together with the main body of that statute, the rule that 

emerges is that all actions brought pursuant to § 9-1-51 must be based on the 

intentional conduct of ‘the’ defendant-perpetrator.” Kelly, 678 A.2d at 876. 
- 18 -

We acknowledged that “[a]lthough [§ 9-1-51] did not explicitly limit the 

statute’s application only to perpetrator-defendants, the language used by the 

General Assembly permits no other interpretation.” Kelly, 678 A.2d at 876. Thus, 

perpetrators are limited to those accused of committing child sexual abuse. See id.

Significantly, in Kelly, this Court unequivocally declared that “the only intended 

target of the legislation is the person who at the time of the abuse would have been 

subject to criminal prosecution pursuant to chapter 37 of title 11 of our General 

Laws.” Id. at 876 (emphasis added). That remains the law today.

In Ryan v. Roman Catholic Bishop of Providence, 941 A.2d 174 (R.I. 2008), 

the plaintiffs’ complaint against many of these same defendants, which included 

charges of criminal conduct, alleged, in part, concealing a felony; conspiracy; aiding 

and abetting; intentional harm and misconduct; fraudulent concealment; and 

intentional infliction of emotional distress.Ryan, 941 A.2d at 178 n.8.5 Those claims 

failed. Id. at 188. The alleged conduct of the hierarchal defendants did not classify

them as perpetrator defendants. Id. at 178.

Simply put, under § 9-1-51(a)(2), a non-perpetrator defendant is one who did 

not engage in childhood sexual abuse as a principal or an aider and abettor, but one

whose wrongful conduct “caused or contributed to the childhood sexual abuse by 

another person * * *.” Section 9-1-51(a)(2) (emphasis added). In the cases at bar,

5 Many of these same claims are asserted by plaintiffs in the cases at bar.
- 19 -

plaintiffs do not suggest that defendants engaged in the sexual abuse perpetrated by 

the offending priests.

6

 The allegations made against these defendants, as in Kelly

and its progeny, are appalling, but the claims asserted fall squarely within 

non-perpetrator conduct; there are no allegations of actual childhood sexual abuse

against these defendants, or of conduct that “actually aids and assists in the 

commission of the criminal act to the degree that he or she would be subject to 

prosecution under chapter 37 of title 11 as a principal.”Kelly, 678 A.2d at 876. We 

therefore conclude that the trial justice properly found defendants to be 

non-perpetrator defendants as designated by § 9-1-51. 

Although plaintiffs argue that defendants can be classified as perpetrators and

rely on Kelly as support for this novel assertion, we reject these contentions.

According to plaintiffs, defendants could be found to have criminal liability for an 

6 When drafting their complaints, plaintiffs mounted an “everything but thekitchen 

sink” pleadings approach, including more than thirty cumulative counts, spanning

over four hundred pages of pleadings. The claims included allegations of (1)

intentional misconduct (deliberately reassigning the offending priests, failing to 

remove or suspend, or otherwise stop them from pursuing sexual assaults on 

children); (2) intentional misconduct (breaching their duty of care and disregarding 

the rights and safety of plaintiffs by failing to warn or protect them from the 

offending priests under their supervision);(3) negligence in the hiring, supervision,

and retention of the offending priests; (4) respondeat superior; (5) negligence for 

premises liability; (6) conspiracy to commit acts and violate plaintiffs’ rights; (7)

fraudulent concealment/misrepresentation; (8) breach of fiduciary duty; (9) 

negligent infliction of emotional distress; (10) breach of duty in loco parentis; and 

(11) invasion of privacy.
- 20 -

offense, whether or not they were physically present when the crime was committed,

as either a coconspirator or an “accessory” to the offense. This simply is not the law. 

The plaintiffs seize on the language in Kelly that states that an employer can

be considered a perpetrator if they “actually aid[] and assist[] in the commission of 

the criminal act to the degree that he or she would be subject to prosecution under 

chapter 37 of title 11 as a principal,” Kelly, 678 A.2d at 876, and argue that 

defendants should be classified as perpetrators for “aiding and abetting” the 

offending priests. The plaintiffs are incorrect. To be subject to prosecution under 

chapter 37 of title 11, an offender must have actually committed the crime or be 

guilty as an aider and abettor.

“Every person who shall aid, assist, abet, counsel, hire, 

command, or procure another to commit any crime or 

offense, shall be proceeded against as principal or as an 

accessory before the fact, according to the nature of the 

offense committed, and upon conviction shall suffer the 

like punishment as the principal offender is subject to by 

this title.” General Laws 1956 § 11-1-3. 

To find that a party aided and abetted a principal, “the circumstances must 

establish that a defendant ‘shared in the criminal intent of the principal and there 

must be a community of unlawful purpose at the time the act is committed * * *

[and] assumes some participation in the criminal act in furtherance of the common 

design * * *.’” State v. Gazerro, 420 A.2d 816, 828 (R.I. 1980) (emphasis added)

(quoting Johnson v. United States, 195 F.2d 673, 675 (8th Cir. 1952)).
- 21 -

In order for defendants to be found to be aiders and abettors, the evidence 

must establish that defendants knowingly, willfully, and intentionally sought,

through their conduct, to accomplish the sexual abuse of these children by these 

priests. See United States v. O’Campo, 973 F.2d 1015, 1022 (1st Cir. 1992)

(defendant’s criminal liability for aiding and abetting was affirmed because he 

“knowingly, willfully, and intentionally” assumed his role “to insure that the 

distributive transaction of cocaine for money was fully consummated”). Assuming 

the facts as alleged as true, there is nothing in the record before us that would lead 

us to reach this conclusion. None of plaintiffs’ numerous allegations accuse 

defendants of participating in the sexual abuse of these victims, nor assisting these 

priests in accomplishing their goal of sexually molesting plaintiffs. It is clear that 

the motivation of these defendants, although deplorable in its own right, was for 

purely selfish, self-preservation purposes. We therefore conclude that defendants 

cannot be found culpable as aiders and abettors.

7

Other Criminal Allegations

We turn briefly to plaintiffs’ remaining arguments. The plaintiffs contend that 

one could negligently fail to report child abuse, which could have the unintended 

7 We pause to note that included in the allegations by plaintiff Edwardo was that he 

was physically beaten by another priest for withdrawing from his interactions with 

Magaldi. This other priest would certainly qualify as an aider and abettor as he 

sought to assist Magaldi in achieving his goal of his continued sexual assault of 

Edwardo.
- 22 -

effect of concealing it, but would not rise to the level of perpetrator, while,

conversely, one could undertake affirmative intentional conduct that could

categorize them as a perpetrator. We deem this argument unavailing. Section

9-1-51(a)(2) dictates that the acts that defendants are accused of committing is

non-perpetrator conduct. As set forth in § 9-1-51(a)(2), wrongful conduct including 

supervision, monitoring, concealment, and failure to report child sexual abuse is

non-perpetrator conduct, even though it may violate Rhode Island’s penal code. The 

General Assembly, with full knowledge that failure to report child sexual abuse is a 

criminal act under the General Laws, designated this conduct as non-perpetrator. 

Therefore, even if defendants’ actions constituted a violation of a criminal statute, 

these defendants are non-perpetrators and the claims are time-barred.

Legislative History

This Court rejects plaintiffs’ contention that § 9-1-51 is ambiguous. And 

indeed, were we to find ambiguity in § 9-1-51, its legislative history would prove 

fatal to plaintiffs’ argument. When interpreting a statute, “we apply the meaning 

most consistent with the intended policies and purposes of the Legislature” when the 

meaning is unclear. Roe v. Gelineau, 794 A.2d 476, 484 (R.I. 2002). On January 23, 

2019, House Bill No. 5171, the amendment to § 9-1-51 under review, was introduced 
- 23 -

in the General Assembly.8 This act, as originally drafted, would have extended the 

statute of limitations for victims of childhood sexual abuse from seven years to 

thirty-five years, while also extending the statute of limitations for conduct which 

caused or contributed to childhood sexual abuse by others to thirty-five years. It 

would have allowed claims against perpetrator and non-perpetrator defendants that 

were previously time-barred to be brought within three years of the effective date of 

the legislation. This proposed version of the statue was amended, and the provision 

allowing for previously time-barred claims to be brought forward against 

non-perpetrator defendants was removed. 

The statute that is currently before us, enacted by the General Assembly, and 

signed by the governor, markedly differs from the version first introduced. 

Specifically, the amendment drew a clear distinction for claims against hierarchy 

defendants as prospective only, which is the heart of this controversy. The act as 

passed was limited to perpetrator defendants and allows for claims against 

perpetrators within the newly extended statutes of limitations, regardless of whether

the claim had previously been time-barred. See § 9-1-51(a)(3). But the Legislature

did not allow complaints against non-perpetrator defendantsto be resurrected. The 

evolution of this legislation, from introduction to passage, convinces us that the 

8 An identical companion bill, Senate Bill No. 315, was introduced in the General 

Assembly on February13, 2019.
- 24 -

General Assembly deliberately and purposefully intendedthe revival of time-barred 

claims against perpetrator defendants only. This is the law as it exists today. 

The Discovery Rule

The plaintiffs next contend that this Court should abandon its holding in Kelly

and allow claims to go forward in cases in which defendants’ actions rise to the level 

of criminality, even if they are time-barred. The plaintiffs argue that “this Court

should abandon that portion of Kelly * * * that is construed to carve out a per se rule 

prohibiting delayed discovery, a fact-based claim, from proceeding in child sexual 

abuse cases.” (Emphasis omitted.) The plaintiffs urge this Court to adopt a discovery 

rule similar to our holding in Anthony v. Abbott Laboratories, 490 A.2d 43 (R.I. 

1985), where we held that in actions involving drug-product liability, “the running 

of the statute of limitations would begin when the person discovers, or with 

reasonable diligence should have discovered, the wrongful conduct of the 

manufacturer.”Anthony, 490 A.2d at 46.

In weighing this Court’s holding in Anthony against claims of childhood 

sexual abuse in Kelly, we acknowledged that while “enforcement of claims 

against perpetrator-defendants could be justified because those defendants would be 

the persons directly responsible for any alleged repressed memories, neither that 

policy reason, nor any other policy concerns, are strong enough to support judicial 

application of the discovery rule to actions against nonperpetrator-defendants.” 
- 25 -

Kelly, 678 A.2d at 878. Our holding in Kelly has been reinforced by the recent 

legislative history underlying the current version of § 9-1-51. It would be most 

inappropriate for this Court to accomplish by judicial decree that which the General 

Assembly refused to enact by statute. We therefore decline plaintiffs’ appeal to 

abandon “this well-settled precedent.” Brochu v. Santis, 939 A.2d 449, 454 (R.I. 

2008).

Equitable Estoppel

The plaintiffs next argue that the doctrine of equitable estoppel requires that 

claims against defendants be allowed to proceed by virtue of defendants’ intentional 

misconduct. “A defendant may be estopped from pleading the statute of limitations 

on the ground that representations were made for the purpose of inducing the 

plaintiff to rely thereon when the plaintiff did in fact so rely on the representations 

to his [or her] injury.” Wolf v. S. H. Wintman Co., 92 R.I. 470, 473, 169 A.2d 903, 

905 (1961). “Pursuant to the provisions of § 9-1-20, if a potential defendant 

fraudulently conceals a cause of action from a potential plaintiff, the statute of 

limitations is tolled until such time asthe plaintiff discovers the existence of a cause 

of action.” Ryan, 941 A.2d at 182. “In order to demonstrate that there has been 

fraudulent concealment on the part of a defendant, a plaintiff must show: (1) that 

the defendant made an actual misrepresentation of fact; and (2) that, in making such 

misrepresentation, the defendant fraudulently concealed the existence of plaintiff’s 
- 26 -

causes of action.” Id. (citing Kelly v. Marcantonio, 187 F.3d 192, 200 (1st Cir. 

1999)) (applying Rhode Island law). We have previously addressed this assertion. 

In Ryan, we held that “the plaintiff must demonstrate that the defendant made 

an ‘express representation or [engaged in] other affirmative conduct amounting in 

fact to such a representation which could reasonably deceive another and induce 

him [or her] to rely thereon tohis [or her] disadvantage.’” Ryan, 941 A.2d at 182-83

(quoting Caianiello v. Shatkin, 78 R.I. 471, 476-77, 82 A.2d 826, 829 (1951)).

“Mere silence or inaction on the part of the defendant does not constitute actual 

misrepresentation in this context.” Id. at 182. “The key consideration is whether or 

not the defendant fraudulently misrepresented material facts, thereby misleading 

the plaintiff into believing that no cause of action existed.” Id. at 183.

The plaintiffs in this case assert numerous accusations against defendants,

but there are no claims of actual misrepresentations of facts; nor were plaintiffs

convinced to believe thatsexual assault did not occur; or that the offending priests

were not the persons who committed the sexual assault. Additionally, the 

complaintsfail to establish that these defendants made actual misrepresentations to 

plaintiffs regarding potential civil claims. The plaintiffs have acknowledged that 

they were aware of the sexual abuse perpetrated upon them by the offending priests

decades ago. We therefore conclude that the statute of limitations is not tolled under 
- 27 -

theories of equitable estoppel or fraudulent concealment but is counted among the 

sins of silence committed by these defendants.

New York Claim

The plaintiffs allege that the trial justice erred in not addressing Edwardo’s

claim that defendants’ actions resulted in his sexual abuse by the offending priest in 

the state of New York, in violation of that state’s laws.

9 This Court has stated that a 

party waives its alleged error of law if it “fail[s] to raise and develop it in its briefs,” 

even if the issue was properly preserved in the trial court. McGarry v. Pielech, 108 

A.3d 998, 1005 (R.I. 2015). 

In their initial brief before this Court, plaintiffs declared,in a single sentence,

that the trial justice erred by not addressing the merits of the New York claim when 

granting the motionsto dismiss. The plaintiffs again asserted this contention in their 

reply brief, arguing that the issues were properly preserved and should be remanded 

to the Superior Court with instruction to address them on the merits as they were not 

previously addressed by the trial court.

In Count XII of his amended complaint, Edwardo alleged that defendants’

intentional or negligent acts or omissions resulted in a violation of the New York 

Child Victim’s Act. However, in Superior Court, plaintiffs’ objection to defendants’

9 New York C.P.L.R. § 214-g, which went into effect on February 14, 2019, revived 

previously time-barred claims of sexual abuse by persons who were under eighteen.
- 28 -

motions to dismiss consisted of a one-sentence footnote, and plaintiffs’

memorandum merely asserted that there was no question that liability as to 

non-perpetrators has been revived under New York law. 

“Generally, we deem an issue waived ‘when a party [s]imply stat[es] an issue 

for appellate review, without a meaningful discussion thereof * * *.’” A. Salvati 

Masonry Inc. v. Andreozzi, 151 A.3d 745, 750 (R.I. 2017) (quoting In re Jake G., 

126 A.3d 450, 458 (R.I. 2015)). In the cases at bar, plaintiffs provided scant

argument in their briefs as to why the New York claim should survive a motion to 

dismiss.

Furthermore, at the hearing on the motionsto dismiss, the trial justice inquired 

whether plaintiffs were only proceeding on the interpretation of the word perpetrator 

in the amended statute. The plaintiffs’ counsel affirmatively answered that the issue 

before the court was the interpretation of the word perpetrator in the amended statute. 

The plaintiffs’ counsel did not raise the issue of the New York claim at any point 

during the hearingor at any time thereinafter.

This Court “ha[s] cautioned that a general objection is not sufficient to 

preserve an issue for appellate review; rather, assignments of error must be set forth 

with sufficient particularity to call the trial justice’s attention to the basis of the 

objection.” Union Station Associates v. Rossi, 862 A.2d 185, 192 (R.I. 2004). The 

failure of a specific objection, coupled with a failure to raise an issue during hearings 
- 29 -

will render an issue waived, unless the case “falls within the narrow exception to the 

‘raise or waive rule’ * * *.” Id. Three factors must be satisfied in order for the 

exception to apply:

“First, the error complained of must consist of more than 

harmless error. Second, the record must be sufficient to 

permit a determination of the issue. * * * Third, counsel’s 

failure to raise the issue at trial must be due to the fact that 

the issue is based upon a novel rule of law which counsel 

could not reasonably have known at the time of trial.”

Shoucair v. Brown University, 917 A.2d 418, 428 (R.I. 

2007) (quoting Harvey Realty v. Killingly Manor 

Condominium Association, 787 A.2d 465, 467 (R.I. 

2001)).

In the cases at bar, plaintiffs failed to meaningfully develop their contention

that the New York claim should survive the motion and failed to address the issue at 

the hearing or by way of postjudgment motions. The plaintiffs are asking the Court 

to find error in a matter not fairly brought to the attention of the trial justice. There 

is nothing in the record before us that would provide plaintiffs with an exception to 

our long held “raise or waive rule.” We therefore conclude that that issue was not 

properly preserved for review by this Court and decline to address it here.

Constitutional Claims

The trial justice declined to address defendants’ contention that § 9-1-51(a)(3)

violates article 1, section 2 of the Rhode Island Constitution for deprivation of 

due-process protections because she found that the statute unambiguously 

distinguished between perpetrator and non-perpetrator, and that plaintiffs’ claims 
- 30 -

were not revived. The defendants ask us to opine nonetheless on issues of 

constitutional significance.

We have long held that “[n]either this Court nor the Superior Court should 

decide constitutional issues unless it is absolutely necessary to do so.” In re Brown, 

903 A.2d 147, 151 (R.I. 2006). “When * * * fac[ing] a fork in the road, with one 

turn that will require [this Court] to slog through the thicket of a constitutional issue 

and the other offering a journey through more hospitable terrain, we routinely elect 

to take the path of least resistance.” State v. Beaudoin, 137 A.3d 717, 726 (R.I. 2016).

In the cases at bar, because the trial justice granted the motionsto dismiss the 

plaintiffs’ claims as time-barred, it was unnecessary to address the constitutional

issues raised by the defendants. “[T]his Court ‘will not decide a constitutional 

question raised on the record when it is clear that the case before it can be decided’

on other grounds such that the determination of the constitutional question is not 

‘indispensably necessary for the disposition of the case.’” Amico’s Incorporated v. 

Mattos, 789 A.2d 899, 909 (R.I. 2002) (quoting State v. Pascale, 86 R.I. 182, 185, 

134 A.2d 149, 151 (1957)). We therefore decline to address the defendants’ 

contention that the revival of these claims against the defendants is prohibited by the 

Rhode Island Constitution. 
- 31 -

Conclusion

For the reasons set forth in this opinion, we affirm the decision of the Superior 

Court. The papers in this case may be returned to the Superior Court.

Justice Lynch Prata did not participate.
SU-CMS-02A (revised November 2022)

STATE OF RHODE ISLAND

SUPREME COURT – CLERK’S OFFICE

Licht Judicial Complex

250 Benefit Street

Providence, RI 02903

OPINION COVER SHEET

Title of Case

Robert Houllahan v. Louis E. Gelineau et al.

Peter Cummings v. Louis E. Gelineau et al. 

Philip Edwardo v. Roman Catholic Bishop of 

Providence et al. 

Case Number

No. 2021-32-Appeal. (PC 20-2010)

No. 2021-33-Appeal. (PC 19-10530)

No. 2021-41-Appeal. (PC 19-9894)

Date Opinion Filed June 30, 2023

Justices Suttell, C.J., Goldberg, Robinson, and Long, JJ.

Written By Associate Justice Maureen McKenna Goldberg

Source of Appeal Providence County Superior Court 

Judicial Officer from Lower Court Associate Justice Netti C. Vogel

Attorney(s) on Appeal

For Plaintiffs:

Timothy J. Conlon, Esq.

For Defendants:

Howard Merten, Esq.