[Cite as S.H.B. v. M.W.L., 2019-Ohio-3036.]

COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO 

EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA 

S.H.B., : 

 Plaintiff-Appellee, : 

 No. 107258 

 v. : 

 

M.W.L., : 

 

 Defendant-Appellant. : 

 

JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION 

 JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED

RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: July 25, 2019 

 

Civil Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas 

Domestic Relations Division 

Case No. DV-14-352429 

 

Appearances: 

Rosenthal Thurman, L.L.C., and Adam J. Thurman, for 

appellant. 

Zagrans Law Firm L.L.C., and Eric H. Zagrans, for 

appellee. 

MICHELLE J. SHEEHAN, J.: 

Respondent-appellant M.W.L. appeals from the trial court’s order 

imposing a 30-day jail sentence as a result of his failure to purge his contempt. 

Because we find the record reflects that M.W.L. has failed to purge his contempt, we 
cannot find the trial court abused its discretion in ordering the imposition of 

sentence. We therefore affirm. 

Procedural History and Substantive Facts 

On June 9, 2014, petitioner-appellee S.H.B. filed a petition for a 

domestic violence civil protection order (“CPO”) against her then-husband, 

respondent-appellant M.W.L. S.H.B. sought protection for herself and her son. A 

magistrate issued an ex parte temporary CPO in S.H.B.’s favor, effective until 

June 8, 2015. Approximately one year later, on June 4, 2015, the trial court 

magistrate held a hearing on S.H.B.’s motions to show cause and found M.W.L. in 

contempt. 

In its June 2015 contempt order, the magistrate specifically stated that 

M.W.L. admitted at trial that he placed a GPS tracking device on S.H.B.’s vehicle, 

where it remained after service upon M.W.L. of the ex parte CPO, and he did in fact 

continue to track S.H.B. on his computer after being served with the ex parte CPO. 

The magistrate found these actions constituted “following, stalking, bothering, 

harassing, and annoying the petitioner” and are prohibited by and in violation of the 

ex parte CPO. The magistrate also found that M.W.L. had several conversations with 

S.H.B. in which he orchestrated the dates, times, and location the calls would be 

placed, which the magistrate concluded demonstrated “continued control over 

[p]etitioner and her fragile mental and emotional state,” in violation of the CPO’s 

provision that M.W.L. not “initiate or have any contact with the protected persons * 

* * even with the permission of the protected person.” 
In finding M.W.L. in contempt on two separate occasions, the 

magistrate stated as follows: 

Respondent is hereby sentenced to be incarcerated for a period of 

thirty (30) days in jail on each of the two (2) findings of contempt, or 

in lieu of incarceration, to perform not less than 200 hours of 

community service for each finding of contempt, or until the contempt 

is purged, whichever occurs first. The [r]espondent’s sentence will be 

purged provided that within sixty (15) [sic] days of the issuance of a 

[j]udgment [e]ntry herein [r]espondent submits to the [c]ourt’s 

Community Service Liaison a confirmation of enrollment in the 

Batterers’ Intervention Program from the Family Guidance Center 

and, upon the completion of the ten (10) week program, proof of same, 

along with a report from a psychiatrist or licensed clinical 

psychologist, which verifies that the [r]espondent is in compliance 

with any recommendations made by the mental health professional 

after a psychological assessment of [r]espondent and review of this 

court’s June 9, 2014 ex parte [CPO], a copy of the [m]otions to show 

cause filed by the [p]etitioner and a copy of this [o]rder. 

Following the hearing, the court issued a full CPO for the protection of 

S.H.B. and her son, effective until March 26, 2020. Thereafter, both parties filed 

numerous documents with the court. S.H.B. filed several motions to show cause for 

M.W.L.’s alleged continued refusal to comply with court orders, including the June 

2015 contempt order, as well as a motion for imposition. And M.W.L., who has been 

represented by counsel at all times relevant to these proceedings, filed several 

motions, objections, and appeals to the Eighth District Court of Appeals.1

 

1 M.W.L.’s first appeal was dismissed sua sponte by this court as untimely, under 

motion No. 487912. See S.H.B. v. M.W.L., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 103268 (Aug. 15, 2015). 

His second appeal was dismissed based upon principles of res judicata. See S.H.B. v. 

M.W.L., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 104414, 2017-Ohio-464. 
On July 2, 2015, M.W.L. filed a motion for a new trial and/or motion 

for relief from judgment, arguing that the magistrate’s order wrongfully sentenced 

him to 60 days in jail or 400 hours of community service. On April 1, 2016, the trial 

court denied M.W.L.’s motion for a new trial and it granted M.W.L.’s motion for 

relief from judgment, in part, finding that “when two or more violations of a court 

order are brought out in one action for contempt, the court cannot punish the 

contemnor for each violation.” Accordingly, the trial court modified the magistrate’s 

order as follows: 

[T]he magistrate’s order of June 4, 2015 shall be corrected to apply a 

sentence of [r]espondent to be incarcerated for a period of thirty (30) 

days in jail for the two (2) findings of contempt, or in lieu of 

incarceration, to perform not less than 200 hours of community 

service for the two (2) findings of contempt, or until the contempt is 

purged, whichever occurs first instead of the sentence being applied 

to each of the findings of contempt. 

The court stated that the remainder of the magistrate’s June 2015 

contempt order shall remain “in full force and effect.” M.W.L. did not appeal the 

trial court’s modified order. 

Over two years later, on May 21, 2018, the court held a hearing on 

S.H.B.’s motion for imposition of the jail sentence, as well as her two motions to 

show cause. M.W.L., a medical physician and nonpracticing licensed attorney, 

testified. At the hearing, M.W.L. conceded that he had previously been held in 

contempt for violating the CPO on two separate occasions, he was aware of the 

court’s orders (both the June 2015 order and the April 2016 modified order), and 
the court’s orders were “clear” concerning M.W.L.’s obligations. Yet, M.W.L. denied 

that he intentionally failed to comply for years with the court’s orders. 

M.W.L. admitted that he has had the opportunity to perform 200 

hours of community service but he did not complete the 200 hours of community 

service; he had not enrolled in the Batterers’ Intervention Program; and he had not 

completed a psychological evaluation, as ordered by the court. M.W.L. testified, 

however, that he believed the court’s contempt orders provided that he had a choice 

regarding his contempt: (1) serve 30 days of incarceration; (2) perform 200 hours 

of community service; or (3) purge his sentence. And according to M.W.L., he 

“decided to do community service,” which he commenced in 2017 and 2018. M.W.L. 

testified that he had been performing community service with his synagogue, but he 

did not report his service to the court because he was unaware of any reporting 

requirement. He also testified that he had no intention to violate the court’s orders; 

he believed that by performing community service he was complying with the court’s 

orders; and he was still in the process of performing community service, nearly three 

years after the issuance of the initial contempt order. 

On May 30, 2018, the trial court found that M.W.L. had not purged his 

contempt and ordered him to be incarcerated for 30 days for his failure to comply 

with the court’s order. In its order, the court found that M.W.L. was previously 

found in contempt on June 4, 2015, and it made the following findings regarding the 

magistrate’s June 2015 contempt order and its subsequent modification by the trial 

judge: 
[The magistrate’s] order was reviewed by [the trial judge], on 

[r]espondent’s motion for new trial and/or relief from judgment. [The 

judge’s] order modified [the magistrate’s] order with regard to that 

portion of the original sentence imposing a sixty (60) day sentence, 

thirty (30) days on each contempt to that of a thirty (30) day sentence 

for the two (2) findings of contempt, or in lieu of incarceration, to 

perform not less than 200 hours of community service for the two (2) 

findings of contempt, or until the contempt is purged, whichever 

occurs first. [The judge’s] order then stated that the remainder of the 

magistrate[’s] order journalized on June 4, [2015], shall remain in full 

force and effect. 

The magistrate[’s] order states respondent is hereby sentenced to be 

incarcerated for a period of thirty (30) days in jail on each of the two 

(2) findings of contempt, or in lieu of incarceration, to perform not 

less than 200 hours of community service for each finding of 

contempt, or until the contempt is purged, whichever occurs first. 

This jail sentence was modified to thirty (30) days pursuant to [the 

judge’s] subsequent review and order. The magistrate[’s] order also 

reads [that] the [r]espondent’s sentence will be purged provided that 

within sixty [] days of the issuance of a judgment entry herein 

[r]espondent submits to the court’s community service liaison a 

confirmation of enrollment in the Batterers’ Intervention Program 

from the Family Guidance Center and, upon completion of the ten (10) 

week program of same, along with a report from a psychiatrist or 

licensed clinical psychologist, which verifies that the [r]espondent is 

in compliance with any recommendation made by the mental health 

professional after a psychologist assessment of [r]espondent and 

review of this Court’s June 9, 2014 ex parte civil protection order, a 

copy of the motions to show cause field by [p]etitioner, and a copy of 

this order. 

The magistrate’s order further states [that] in the event it is made to 

appear to the court by affidavit that [r]espondent, [M.W.L.], has failed 

to purge the contempt, a citation shall issue immediately without 

further notice, requiring the defaulting party to appear instanter to 

show cause why his sentence should not be ordered into immediate 

execution. 

The trial court further found that M.W.L. testified that he thought the 

court order was “an either or provision,” whereby he could either perform 
community service or enter the Batterers’ Intervention Program, or obtain a report 

from a psychiatrist or psychologist and follow recommendations in lieu of 

incarceration to purge his contempt. Regarding M.W.L.’s interpretation of the 

court’s prior order, the court stated that the court’s prior order was clear: “the only 

language of the order that uses the term ‘or’ is in regard to thirty (30) days 

incarceration or 200 hours of community service. There is no use of the term ‘or’ as 

the order applies to the Batterers’ Intervention Program and the 

psychiatrist/psychologist report and recommendations.” 

The court then concluded that M.W.L. failed to present any evidence 

that he had attended or completed the Batterers’ Intervention Program or had been 

examined by a psychiatrist or psychologist or received a report from the examining 

psychiatrist or psychologist. The court also determined that even if the court were 

to accept the M.W.L.’s testimony regarding his interpretation of the court’s prior 

order, specifically applying the “or” to all terms provided he performed 200 hours 

of community service, M.W.L. “has failed to complete 200 hours of community 

service or provide any documentation as to any hours of community service 

completed.” Finally, the court noted that M.W.L. has completed the appeals process 

concerning the court’s prior contempt order, no court has issued a stay during the 

appeals process, and M.W.L. “has had time to complete community service, if that 

was what he perceived the order to require of him and he has failed to do so and has 

failed to comply with any of the other provisions of the order.” Thus, as the court 
concluded, because M.W.L. had not purged his contempt, the 30-day sentence shall 

be imposed. 

M.W.L. now appeals the trial court’s imposition of his 30-day 

sentence, assigning the following errors for our review: 

I. The trial court erred and abused its discretion in its May 30, 

2018 judgment entry by not permitting Appellant to complete 

200 hours of community service in lieu of incarceration. 

II. The trial court erred and abused its discretion in its May 30, 

2018 judgment entry by sentencing Appellant to thirty (30) 

days in jail, which resulted from ambiguous, unreasonable, and 

impossible purge conditions set forth in the June 4, 2015 

judgment entry. 

Standard of Review 

We review a trial court’s decision in contempt proceedings for an 

abuse of discretion. In re A.N., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 99744, 2013-Ohio-3816, ¶ 8, 

citing State ex rel. Ventrone v. Birkel, 65 Ohio St.2d 10, 11, 417 N.E.2d 1249 (1981). 

An abuse of discretion “connotes more than an error of law or judgment, it implies 

that the court’s attitude is unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable.” Blakemore 

v. Blakemore, 5 Ohio St.3d 217, 219, 450 N.E.2d 1140 (1983). 

Law and Analysis 

In his first assignment of error, M.W.L. contends that the court abused 

its discretion by not permitting him to complete 200 hours of community service in 

lieu of incarceration. In support, he argues that the court’s contempt order provided 

him with three options: (1) 30-day incarceration; (2) 200 hours community service; 

or (3) purge the sentence. M.W.L. contends that he elected to perform community 
service, and because he began completing the community service, the court’s 

imposition of the 30-day jail sentence was error. In his second assignment of error, 

M.W.L. contends that the trial court abused its discretion in finding that he had not 

performed the 200 hours of community service, where the court’s June 2015 

contempt order did not include a deadline by which the community service must be 

performed. Because appellant’s arguments hinge upon the interpretation of the trial 

court’s June 2015 contempt order, and are related, we will address the assignments 

of error together. 

 Contempt of court has been defined as the “disobedience of an order 

of a court, conduct which brings the administration of justice into disrespect, or 

which tends to embarrass, impede or obstruct a court in the performance of its 

functions.” In re Contempt of Morris, 110 Ohio App.3d 475, 479, 674 N.E.2d 761 

(8th Dist.1996), citing Denovchek v. Bd. of Trumbull Cty. Commrs., 36 Ohio St.3d 

14, 15, 520 N.E.2d 1362 (1988). Contempt generally consists of two elements — the 

finding of contempt and the imposition of a penalty or sanctions. Coventry Group, 

Inc. v. J.L. Gottlieb Agency, Inc., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 94185, 2010-Ohio-4135, ¶ 

38. Where the sanction is intended to coerce compliance with a court’s orders, it is 

civil contempt. In re Contempt of Morris at 480. And in the matter of civil 

contempt, the “‘contemnor is said to carry the keys of his prison in his own pocket * 

* * since he will be freed if he agrees to do as ordered.’” Pugh v. Pugh, 15 Ohio St.3d 

136, 139, 472 N.E.2d 1085 (1984), quoting Brown v. Executive 200, Inc., 64 Ohio 

St.2d 250, 253-254, 416 N.E.2d 610 (1980). 
Accordingly, a sanction for civil contempt must allow the contemnor 

to purge himself of the contempt. Coventry Group, Inc. at ¶ 42, citing Tucker v. 

Tucker, 10 Ohio App.3d 251, 461 N.E.2d 1337 (10th Dist.1983). A court holds a 

purge hearing to determine whether the contemnor has satisfied the purge 

conditions. Liming v. Damos, 133 Ohio St.3d 509, 2012-Ohio-4783, 979 N.E.2d 

297, ¶ 16. If the purge conditions have not been satisfied, the court may enforce the 

sentence that has already been imposed, which is the sanction that could have been 

avoided by the contemnor’s compliance. Id. Thus, “the only issue left for the purge 

hearing is whether the contemnor complied with the purge requirements.” Id.; State 

ex rel. Robles v. Mendez, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga Nos. 100236 and 100238, 2014-Ohio1083, ¶ 10. And while S.H.B. has the initial burden of demonstrating M.W.L. was in 

contempt of a court’s order, M.W.L. bears the burden of showing that he complied 

with the purge conditions to prevent the imposition of the suspended sentence. In 

re A.N., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 99744, 2013-Ohio-3816, at ¶ 9, citing Bd. of Twp. 

Trustees v. Davisson, 3d Dist. Union No. 14-08-18, 2008-Ohio-5315, ¶ 21; see also 

Liming at ¶ 21. 

 Here, M.W.L. was previously found in civil contempt of the court’s 

protection order. In its contempt order, the court imposed a sentence and it 

provided an opportunity for M.W.L. to purge the sentence. The record shows that 
M.W.L. exhausted his appeals concerning the court’s finding of contempt.2 And 

M.W.L. now appeals the decision of the trial court following the purge hearing. “[A]t 

a purge hearing, ‘the propriety of the contempt finding or the purge conditions is not 

in question,’ and the hearing is limited to determining whether the contemnor 

complied with conditions imposed for purging contempt.” Docks Venture, L.L.C. v. 

Dashing Pacific Group, Ltd., 141 Ohio St.3d 107, 2014-Ohio-4254, 22 N.E.3d 1035, 

¶ 20, quoting Liming at ¶ 30. Thus, the sole issue in this appeal is whether M.W.L. 

satisfied the purge conditions. 

 On appeal, M.W.L. essentially claims that the trial court’s June 2015 

contempt order (as modified by the April 2016 order) permitted him to serve a 30-

day incarceration, perform 200 hours community service, or purge the sentence. 

And he argues that he elected to perform community service; therefore, the court 

abused its discretion in imposing the 30-day jail sentence. He also argues that the 

contempt order is ambiguous because there is no deadline by which he must have 

performed his community service. We find no merit to M.W.L.’s argument. 

 

2 The record demonstrates that M.W.L. filed an untimely appeal of the June 4, 2015 

contempt order on July 15, 2015, which was dismissed. See S.H.B. v. M.W.L., 8th Dist. 

Cuyahoga No. 103268 (Aug. 15, 2015). The record also shows that M.W.L. appealed the 

June 2015 contempt order for the second time. In S.H.B. v. M.W.L., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga 

No. 104414, 2017-Ohio-464, this court dismissed the appeal once again, finding that the 

court’s dismissal of the first appeal “means that the issue of whether the appeal from the 

contempt order is timely becomes res judicata.” Id. at ¶ 17. We denied M.W.L.’s motion 

for reconsideration of the dismissal under motion No. 504588, in S.H.B. v. M.W.L., 8th

Dist. Cuyahoga No. 104414 (Apr. 17, 2017). And the Supreme Court of Ohio declined to 

accept jurisdiction of this second appeal. S.H.B. v. M.W.L., 01/31/2018 Case 

Announcements, 2018-Ohio-365. 
 To the extent M.W.L. is arguing that the purge condition — or the 

contempt order outlining the contemnor’s sentence — is ambiguous, that argument 

is untimely. As discussed above, M.W.L. has exhausted his appeals concerning the 

court’s initial contempt finding, including any challenge to the purge conditions, and 

therefore, the only issue before us in this present appeal is whether M.W.L. complied 

with the conditions imposed for purging his contempt. Now is not the appropriate 

time to address the propriety of the contempt finding or challenge the purge 

conditions. See Docks Venture, L.L.C., 141 Ohio St.3d 107, 2014-Ohio-4254, 22 

N.E.3d 1035, at ¶ 20, quoting Liming, 133 Ohio St.3d 509, 2012-Ohio-4783, 979 

N.E.2d 297, at ¶ 30. 

 This analysis applies equally to M.W.L.’s allegation that the contempt 

order is ambiguous because the court failed to establish a deadline for completing 

the community service. However, even if we were to address the court’s failure to 

include a deadline, we find M.W.L.’s argument unpersuasive. 

 Where a court’s order does not include a deadline for compliance, a 

reasonable time for compliance may be inferred. Maloney v. Maloney, 12th Dist. 

Warren No. CA2015-10-098, 2016-Ohio-7837, ¶ 13 (finding the trial court’s 

determination in contempt proceedings that the wife’s actions were completed in a 

reasonable amount of time, where the separation agreement lacked temporal 

deadlines, not an abuse of discretion); Collette v. Baxter, 9th Dist. Summit 

No. 25821, 2012-Ohio-1333, ¶ 14 (finding no error in holding a party in contempt 

where the trial court failed to set a deadline for payment of attorney fees and the 
court implied a reasonable time for compliance); Willis v. Willis, 149 Ohio App.3d 

50, 2002-Ohio-3716, 775 N.E.2d 878, ¶ 67 (12th Dist.) (applying the “common 

standard of reasonable length of time” in affirming the trial court’s finding of 

contempt where the order lacked a deadline for payment of children’s medical 

expenses in a shared parenting agreement); McFarland v. McFarland, 5th Dist. 

Licking No. 01CA00021, 2001-Ohio-1843, 7-8 (stating that “in determining the 

defendant’s compliance with [an order, directing the defendant to pay certain debts, 

that does not set a repayment schedule], the common standard of reasonable length 

of time is appropriate”). 

 Here, the court’s June 2015 contempt order did not include a date by 

which M.W.L. must have completed his 200 hours of community service. We 

therefore infer a reasonable time for compliance. The record shows that the 

magistrate found M.W.L. in contempt in June 2015, and the trial court modified the 

contempt order in April 2016. M.W.L. testified at the purge hearing in May 2018 

that he had not completed the 200 hours of community service that he admittedly 

elected to perform. In applying the common standard of reasonable time, we cannot 

find the trial court’s determination that M.W.L. failed to complete 200 hours of 

community service (in the nearly three years of time from the initial contempt order, 

or the nearly two years from the modified order) to be unreasonable. Thus, the trial 

court’s order imposing the 30-day jail sentence is not an abuse of discretion. 

 Moreover, we find equally unavailing M.W.L.’s argument that the 

court abused its discretion in imposing the 30-day jail sentence because, according 
to his interpretation of the contempt order, he could choose to perform community 

service, rather than serve the 30-day jail sentence or purge the sentence. 

 This court has previously stated that “‘where the meaning of a court’s 

order is plain on its face, a party’s misunderstanding of that order and its mandate 

does not make the order ambiguous nor a defense to a contempt proceeding.’” 

Perkins v. Gorski, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 98478, 2013-Ohio-265, ¶ 11, quoting 

Gilbert at 6; Chilcote v. Gleason Const. Co., 5th Dist. Ashland No. 01COA01397, 

2002-Ohio-746, ¶ 11; see also Scarnecchia v. Rebhan, 7th Dist. Mahoning No. 05 

MA 213, 2006-Ohio-7053, ¶ 19 (finding that a contemnor cannot avoid contempt for 

violating an order that is plain on its face based on the contemnor’s subjective 

misunderstanding of the order). 

 Based upon our review, we find the court’s contempt order is clear and 

definite, unambiguous, and not subject to dual interpretations. The June 2015 

contempt order, as modified by the court’s April 2016 order, states: 

Respondent is hereby sentenced to be incarcerated for a period of 

thirty (30) days in jail for the two (2) findings of contempt, or in lieu 

of incarceration, to perform not less than 200 hours of community 

service for the two (2) findings of contempt, or until the contempt is 

purged, whichever occurs first. The [r]espondent’s sentence will be 

purged provided that within sixty [] days of the issuance of a 

[j]udgment [e]ntry herein [r]espondent submits to the [c]ourt’s 

Community Service Liaison a confirmation of enrollment in the 

Batterers’ Intervention Program from the Family Guidance Center 

and, upon the completion of the ten (10) week program, proof of same, 

along with a report from a psychiatrist or licensed clinical 

psychologist, which verifies that the [r]espondent is in compliance 

with any recommendations made by the mental health professional 

after a psychological assessment of [r]espondent and review of this 
court’s June 9, 2014 ex parte [CPO], a copy of the [m]otions to show 

cause filed by the [p]etitioner and a copy of this [o]rder. 

 As indicated above, the court’s order plainly imposed a 30-day jail 

sentence, with an option for M.W.L. to perform 200 hours of community service in 

lieu of incarceration. The court, in addition, provided M.W.L. the opportunity to 

purge his sentence, which the court must do when ordering a sanction for civil 

contempt. And the court’s order unquestionably provided that in order for M.W.L. 

to purge his sentence, he must enroll in the Batterers’ Intervention Program and 

submit to a psychological assessment by a mental health professional. The purge 

condition also included a requirement that M.W.L. provide the court with 

verification of his compliance with any recommendations made by the examining 

mental health professional. M.W.L.’s purported misinterpretation of the contempt 

order — that he could either serve 30 days in jail or perform community service or

purge his contempt — is not a defense to the court’s unambiguous order. 

 Moreover, even if we were to accept M.W.L.’s interpretation of the 

court’s order, and his testimony that he elected to perform 200 hours of community 

service, we find that M.W.L. failed to demonstrate compliance. At the purge 

hearing, M.W.L. did not provide the court with any documentation regarding the 

community service allegedly performed or the number of hours performed, nor did 

he provide evidence that he had completed the 200 hours of service. Rather, he 

made generic assertions that he has recently been performing community service 

for the Chabad synagogue. Further, he had difficulty identifying exactly when he 
performed this service, stating, “It was 2017 * * * No. No. It was 2016. 2017. * * * I 

think it was 2017 and 2018, yes.” M.W.L.’s testimony is insufficient to satisfy his 

burden of demonstrating that he complied with the conditions that would prevent 

the imposition of the suspended sentence, which in his belief was the performance 

of 200 hours of community service. 

Conclusion 

 To the extent M.W.L. is challenging the court’s order regarding purge 

conditions, including any purported ambiguity or lack of imposed deadline, that 

argument is not timely. The issue on appeal is whether M.W.L. purged his contempt. 

 The trial court’s contempt order clearly imposed a 30-day jail 

sentence or, in lieu of incarceration, 200 hours of community service. The court’s 

order also provided M.W.L. an opportunity to purge his contempt by completing the 

Batterers’ Intervention Program and submit to a psychological evaluation. M.W.L. 

conceded that he did not attend the program or submit to an examination, and 

therefore, he did not purge his contempt. And even were we to accept his 

explanation that he believed he could elect to perform community service in order 

to avoid the imposition of the 30-day jail sentence, the record reflects that M.W.L. 

failed to perform the 200 hours of community service within a reasonable time of 

the issuance of the court’s contempt order. We therefore cannot find the trial court 

abused its discretion in ordering the imposition of the sentence of 30-days 

incarceration for M.W.L.’s contempt of court. 

 M.W.L.’s first and second assignments of error are overruled. 
 Judgment affirmed. 

It is ordered that appellee recover of appellant costs herein taxed. 

The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal. 

 It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the 

common pleas court to carry this judgment into execution. 

A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 

of the Rules of Appellate Procedure 

 

___________________________ 

MICHELLE J. SHEEHAN, JUDGE 

MARY EILEEN KILBANE, A.J., and 

EILEEN A. GALLAGHER, J., CONCUR