NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

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No. 16-2117

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GRACE LAPHAN,

 Appellant

v.

WILLIAM HAINES SGT.; MICHAEL LANGDALE SGT.;

DAVID MONTELLA CHIEF; GEORGE MOORE, OFFICER;

JOHN BURGY; UPPER PROVIDENCE TOWNSHIP

______________

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania

(D.C. Civ. No. 2-14-cv-04063)

Honorable Anita B. Brody, District Judge

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Submitted under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)

February 7, 2017

BEFORE: MCKEE, COWEN, and FUENTES, Circuit Judges

(Opinion Filed: June 8, 2017)

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OPINION*

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COWEN, Circuit Judge.

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*This disposition is not an opinion of the full court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7
2

does not constitute binding precedent.

Plaintiff Grace Laphan appeals from the order of the United States District Court 

for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania granting the motion for summary judgment filed 

by Defendants Sergeant William Haines, Sergeant Michael Langdale, Chief David 

Montella, and Upper Providence Township (“Township Defendants”). We will affirm.1

I.

Laphan brought suit against Upper Providence Township and a number of police 

officers (as well as John Burgy) for alleged violations of her civil rights under federal and 

Pennsylvania law. Laphan’s claims arose out of her arrest, pursuant to an arrest warrant 

issued by Pennsylvania Magisterial District Judge Lippincott, and prosecution on state 

charges of theft by unlawful taking or disposition, receiving stolen property, and 

unauthorized use of an automobile. See Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. §§ 3921(a), 3925(a), 

3928(a). Specifically, Laphan was arrested and prosecuted for removing—and 

retaining—a 1966 Ford Mustang owned by her estranged boyfriend, Burgy, as well as a 

 1 Judge Fuentes reads Laphan’s deposition testimony, RR124-25, as presenting an 

issue of fact as to whether Laphan in fact refused to return the vehicle to Defendant 

Burgy as a form of collateral, or if she instead was merely preparing the house for sale by 

removing the vehicles and did not intend to withhold the vehicles from Defendant Burgy 

as a form of collateral in violation of the June Order. Compare RR124 (“Q. Just in terms 

of that one sentence there, it says, ‘Sergeant Haines informed Grace Laphan that she had 

no right to hold Burgy’s vehicle as collateral and she was again warned of those legal 

ramifications.’ Did that discussion occur? A. I don’t recall in those words. Q. Well, 

what’s your recollection of the words he used? A. That he didn’t know what was going 

on. He wasn’t sure. Q. Did he suggest to you at the time that you could be arrested? A. 

To me,...he told me to safeguard the vehicles, and you know, that’s what I was doing. I 

was following the court order and I was safeguarding the vehicle . . . .”) with RR124-25 

(“Q. It says ‘Grace Laphan again refused to return the vehicle upon request.’ Do you 

remember telling him at that point that you were not going to return the vehicles? A. 

Yes.”). Given this material issue of fact before the District Court on summary judgment, 

Judge Fuentes would reverse the District Court’s dismissal of this action. 
3

Ford F-350 truck (owned by a friend’s company and used for parts) from a house jointly 

owned by Laphan and Burgy. 

Township Defendants moved for summary judgment, and the District Court 

granted their motion.2

 See Laphan v. Haines, CIVIL ACTION No. 14-4063, 2016 WL 

627246 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 17, 2016). 

II.

To prevail on claims for false arrest and malicious prosecution, a plaintiff must 

show an absence of probable cause.3

 See, e.g., McKenna v. City of Philadelphia, 582 

F.3d 447, 461 (3d Cir. 2009); Dowling v. City of Philadelphia, 855 F.2d 136, 142 (3d Cir. 

1988); Kelley v. General Teamsters, Chauffeurs & Helpers, Local Union 249, 544 A.2d 

940, 941 (Pa. 1988). In a suit for damages, the existence of probable cause is generally a 

question for the jury to resolve, but a district court may conclude that probable cause 

exists as a matter of law if the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the 

plaintiff, would not reasonably support a contrary finding. See, e.g., Merkle v. Upper 

Dublin Sch. Dist., 211 F.3d 782, 788-89 (3d Cir. 2000). The District Court observed that 

“[t]he crux of the parties’ dispute over the existence of probable cause, or the lack 

 2 Laphan named another police officer (George Moore) as a defendant, but she 

agreed to dismiss her claims against this individual. After the District Court disposed of 

the Township Defendants’ summary judgment motion, a stipulation of dismissal was 

entered as to Burgy. 

3 The District Court had subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 

1343, and 1367. This Court has appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We 

exercise plenary review with respect to a grant of summary judgment. See, e.g., Kelly v. 

Borough of Carlisle, 622 F.3d 248, 253 (3d Cir. 2010). “The court shall grant summary 

judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and 

the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). 
4

thereof, is the [June 20, 2012 order entered by the Pennsylvania Court of Common Pleas 

of Delaware County in connection with litigation between Laphan and Burgy regarding 

the ownership and disposition of the house].” Laphan, 2016 WL 627246, at *4. In this 

case, Laphan claims that the District Court erred by resolving a genuine issue of material 

fact arising out of her deposition testimony and by finding that the omission of this June 

Order from the affidavit of probable cause was not material to the probable cause 

determination. See, e.g., Reedy v. Evanson, 615 F.3d 197, 213 (3d Cir. 2010) (stating 

that court must insert recklessly omitted facts and then decide if corrected affidavit would 

establish probable cause). 

Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Laphan, we determine that there 

clearly was probable cause to arrest and prosecute Laphan. We agree with the District 

Court that the June Order, at most, allowed Laphan to have the vehicles removed from 

the premises:

There is nothing in the June Order that permitted Laphan to do what she 

told Sergeant Haines she intended—i.e., to withhold the vehicles from 

Burgy until he turned over certain property and the insurance proceeds 

check. See [RR123-RR125, RR212-RR213]. While the June Order did 

instruct Burgy to endorse and turn over the insurance proceeds check to 

Laphan within ten days, it did not give her any right to use his property as 

collateral to ensure compliance.

Laphan, 2016 WL 627246, at *4 (footnote omitted). At her deposition, Laphan was 

asked the following question about Sergeant Haines’s report: 

[Q.] It says, “Complainant John Burgy contacted 7701 and requested 

police department contact Grace and have his property returned. Contacted 

Grace who stated she is safeguarding his property and would like her 

property returned along with the $35,000 check that was issued by the 
5

insurance company.” Now do you remember having that discussion with 

Sergeant Haines?

A. Yeah.

(RR123.) While Laphan contends that she did not expressly state that she was holding 

the vehicles until she received the check, the following exchange dispels any reasonable

doubt that she told the police officer that she retained the vehicles as a form of collateral:

Q. It says, “Grace Laphan informed Sergeant Haines that she was 

safeguarding the vehicle – vehicles,” excuse me, “until John Burgy returned 

her property and an insurance company check in the amount of $35,000.” 

Do you remember having that discussion with Sergeant Haines?

A. Yes.

(RR124.) According to Laphan, “[w]hile Appellant states, ‘yes’ at one point on page 63 

[of the deposition] acknowledging the statement from [the] affidavit of probable cause 

that ‘she was safeguarding the vehicles. . . . until John Burgy returned her property and an 

insurance company check,’ she does not adopt the statement as her own and merely 

acknowledges a conversation between herself and Sergeant Haines occurred about the 

topic.” (Appellant’s Brief at 22 (quoting RR124).) However, it is obvious that, when she 

said yes, she thereby agreed that the following “discussion” took place with the 

sergeant—she “informed” the police officer that she was safeguarding the vehicles until 

Burgy returned her property and gave her the check.4

 

 4 According to Laphan, the District Court improperly determined that the omission 

from the affidavit of probable cause of a conversation with an assistant district attorney 

was not material to a probable cause finding. However, she does not argue that the 

prosecutor, even if he was confused by the June Order, believed that it allowed Laphan

herself to treat the vehicles as collateral.
6

In addition, an unimpeached hold-over proceeding, although not conclusive, 

constitutes evidence of probable cause. See, e.g., Pardue v. Gray, 136 F. App’x 529, 532-

33 (3d Cir. 2005); Cosmas v. Bloomingdales Bros., Inc., 660 A.2d 83, 87 (Pa. Super. Ct. 

1995). As the District Court noted, Judge Lippincott (the judge who issued the arrest 

warrant) conducted a preliminary hearing on the charges against Laphan. Although the 

June Order was addressed at this hearing, Judge Lippincott still bound Laphan over for 

trial. Laphan was subsequently found not guilty after a bench trial before Delaware 

County Common Pleas Judge Capuzzi (who stated, inter alia, that “[i]t is beyond the 

understanding of this Court as to why, on or about July 17, 2012 an arrest warrant, which 

was approved by an ADA, was issued for the Defendant” when Laphan was actually 

acting within the scope of the June Order (RR28 n.1)). However, Laphan’s acquittal was 

not relevant to the probable cause determination because the standard for probable cause 

is significantly lower than the standard for a conviction.

5

 See, e.g., Halsey v. Pfeiffer, 

750 F.3d 273, 299 (3d Cir. 2014).

III.

For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the order of the District Court.

 5 In addition to upholding the District Court’s disposition of this matter, we also 

agree with its apt conclusion (shared by the two state judges) that, as a matter of 

prosecutorial discretion, the charges should never have been pursued in the first place. 

“Although their actions were legal, it is nevertheless regrettable that the DA’s Office 

chose to file criminal charges against Laphan rather than seeking resolution of this 

domestic dispute through more amicable means.” Laphan, 2016 WL 627246, at *7 n.11.