No. 237, November 2008 Strategic Forum 1

charges of double standards. The third challenge is how to build cooperation between 

the Gulf states and Iraq. Strengthening borders 

and redeveloping economic and security 

linkages can be an important down payment 

on better relations, but lingering suspicions 

will be hard to overcome.

Iraq’s interest in purchasing Americanmade aircraft (F–16s, according to press 

accounts) and recent use of the Iraqi army to 

reestablish control of public spaces inside 

the country have already raised concern 

among Iraq’s Kurds and in Kuwait. Ambitious 

collective defense arrangements will also 

remain problematic, though the United States 

could encourage international partners to 

address issues, including illegal immigration, 

environmental pollution, and water scarcity, 

that require transnational solutions. Given 

these challenges, the Gulf states may well 

seek expanded security guarantees from 

the United States even as they remain wary 

of more visible, formal ties. In this regard, 

whatever happens in Iraq will resonate 

throughout the Gulf.

What Drives Iran? 

For the United States, any consideration 

of Persian Gulf security must begin with Iran: 

its ambitions, perceptions, and behavior. For 

many in the West, Winston Churchill’s famous 

quip about the Soviet Union—being a riddle 

wrapped in a mystery inside an enigma—could 

apply equally well to Iran given its complex, 

Persian Gulf security challenges will 

increasingly pose difficult choices for the 

next administration. Iran’s quest for regional 

preeminence, driven by the impulses of 

exceptionalism and self-sufficiency that are 

deeply engrained in the country’s political psyche, will not slacken any time soon. 

Seeing such preeminence as its historic 

prerogative, Tehran still aspires to acquire a 

military posture, including nuclear capability, 

commensurate with that vision.

Iran’s neighbors, inevitably, are caught 

in the middle. A fragile Iraq will seek a 

middle ground between Iran and the United 

States because it needs the support of both 

to preserve its independence and territorial 

integrity. The Arab Gulf states, meanwhile, 

will try to restore a balance of power in the 

region—their traditional preference—while 

they seek new commitments to their security 

from the United States and new customers in 

Asia, in particular China and India.

The United States faces three challenges 

in the Gulf. The toughest challenge by far is 

whether to engage Iran and, if so, how. The 

risks of doing so are not trivial, but there is 

also common ground to be claimed, especially 

on achieving a stable Iraq. The second delicate 

issue is what posture to take on reform within 

the Gulf states. Internal pressures for reform 

are growing, yet a heavy-handed approach 

can trigger local cynicism of U.S. motives and 

 Strategic Forum No. 237

November 2008

Institute for National Strategic Studies

National Defense University

http://www.ndu.edu/inss

Key Points

Challenges to Persian Gulf

Security: How Should

the United States Respond?

by Judith S. Yaphe

opaque, and often turbulent politics. And yet 

the key to understanding Iran is to figure out 

what it sees when it looks in the mirror. What 

are the fundamental influences that shape 

Iran’s view of its role in the world?

The first, clearly, is Iranian nationalism. 

It is a means of unifying society while assuring 

territorial integrity and political power. The 

second is Islam, which is the country’s source 

of faith and ethical code. The third is Persia

as the basis of its historical identity and 

cultural pride. Taken together, these factors 

and the aspirations they embody—to secure 

Iran’s territorial and political integrity while 

gaining acceptance of the regime’s legitimacy 

and the country’s status in international 

relationships more generally—are deeply 

rooted in Iranian society. But there is also a 

fourth, latter-day imperative that wields great 

influence over Iranian attitudes: the quest for 

strategic self-sufficiency.

Everywhere they look, Iran’s leaders see 

their country encircled by real and potential 

enemies—by Iraq, which used chemical 

weapons and missiles against Iran in their 

8-year war; by the Gulf Arab states, which 

financed the Iraq War, host the U.S. military 

presence, and are seen as repressing their 

Shia communities; by Pakistan, which is 

occasionally involved in hostile skirmishes 

with Iran on their common border and 

has encouraged anti-Iranian activity in 

Afghanistan; and by Central Asia, once proSoviet, now a source of economic opportunity, 
2 Strategic Forum No. 237, November 2008

sectarian risk, and host to U.S. military 

forces. Above all, the United States, a virtual 

neighbor since the occupation of Iraq in April 

2003, and Israel are viewed as enemies: both 

threaten Iran’s nuclear achievements and 

deplore its efforts to derail any peace process 

between Israel and the Palestinians or Israel 

and Syria. Washington, in particular, is 

seen as keen to keep the Persian Gulf as its 

militarized zone, maintain pro-U.S. regimes 

in Baghdad and Kabul, and marginalize Iran.

Iran’s leaders—whether moderate Persian 

nationalists or conservative Islamists—

view the world with a mix of confidence and 

trepidation. Regardless of where they stand 

on the political spectrum, they most likely 

share a common view of the threats to the 

homeland and the measures necessary to 

protect Iranian interests. This consensus also 

includes a strong, underlying sense that they 

may well have to fight alone, again—just 

as they did from 1980 to 1988—and that 

Iran must be able absolutely to defend itself 

without assistance. Thus, Tehran aspires to 

independence and self-sufficiency in both 

strategic and operational terms. It believes 

that it must build its own military industries, 

reconstitute a modern military force, and have 

minimal reliance upon foreign suppliers. It 

also seeks to acquire nuclear technology and, 

eventually, the wherewithal to produce nuclear 

weapons, probably as a cost-effective way to 

compensate for military weakness and relative 

strategic isolation.1

The predicament that all this poses for 

Iran’s neighbors and the larger international 

community is not only how military selfsufficiency is defined by Tehran, but also 

how this self-sufficiency impulse plays 

into an already strong sense of Iranian 

exceptionalism—specifically, that the country 

is endowed with the natural right and historic 

destiny to dominate the greater Middle East as 

well as to lead the world’s Muslims.

Iran’s ambitions to be the preeminent 

power in its neighborhood are longstanding. 

The quest for regional hegemony began under 

Dr. Judith S. Yaphe is a Distinguished Research Fellow in the Institute for National Strategic Studies at the 

National Defense University. Comments may be addressed to Dr. Yaphe at yaphej@ndu.edu.

the shahs and has been continued by the 

clerics of the Islamic Republic. Iranian foreign 

policy has always been designed to protect a 

nation and an empire that were long coveted 

by more powerful neighbors—Ottoman 

Turkey and tsarist Russia—and divided into 

spheres of influence by the great powers of the 

20th century—the Soviet Union, Great Britain, 

and the United States. Viewed through this 

historical prism, these ambitions have little 

to do with exporting its Islamic revolution or 

expanding its borders, although occasional 

reminders to the Gulf Arabs of the Shia and 

Persian-origin communities within their 

borders prompt those Sunni Arab–led states to 

recall their vulnerability.

Iran assumes it is by right the preeminent power in the Persian Gulf and the 

greater Middle East region. It has the largest 

population, largest land mass, largest military, 

and oldest culture and civilization. It believes 

it is the economic engine of the region and 

the most innovative in application of science 

and technology. In the Iranian worldview, 

that “region” is more than the Gulf or Central 

Asia. It extends from Afghanistan through the 

Gulf, Iraq, Turkey, and the greater Middle East 

(especially anything affecting Syria, Lebanon, 

Palestinians, and Israel). As the preeminent 

power, Tehran expects to be consulted on all 

issues affecting the region, in much the same 

sense that Syrian President Hafiz al-Assad 

interpreted his and Syria’s role. Iran believes 

that all the roads to a U.S. exit strategy from 

Iraq, to a peace settlement in the Arab-Israeli 

context, and to stability in the Gulf run 

through Tehran. Without Iran, according

to this view, the country’s leaders believe, 

there can be no peace, no resolution of 

conflict, and no “justice.”

Iran wants to expand its influence and 

authority in the region, but it is not interested 

in territorial expansion. Rather, it seeks to 

build its clout through a policy of aggressive 

outreach short of war—by building and backing support networks throughout the region; 

providing political support and economic 

assistance to key actors; bolstering trade and 

commercial ties with neighboring countries; 

and signing security and defense agreements. 

In implementing its policies, Iran operates on 

two intertwined principles that underwrite its 

ability to build networks of surrogates, intimidate opponents and critics, influence governments, and make foreign policy: the first of 

these is plausible deniability, and the second 

is deliberate ambiguity.

Networks of Influence

The struggle of many Shia communities in 

Iraq, Lebanon, and the Gulf to achieve equal 

political status and end economic discrimination began in the 1970s, when Shia clerics in the seminaries of Najaf, Iraq, began to 

preach a doctrine of political activism. Known 

as velayat-e faqih, the doctrine was advanced 

primarily by Iranian cleric Ayatollah Ruhollah 

Khomeini, then in exile in Najaf, and prominent 

Iraqi cleric Ayatollah Muhammad Baqr alSadr, a founder of the clandestine Dawa Party. 

This Shia “awakening” received additional 

boosts from the Iranian revolution and the 

creation in 1979 of an Islamic republic based 

on clerical rule and the 1982 Israeli invasion 

of Lebanon, which brought the Israel Defense 

Forces to the outskirts of Beirut and contributed to the birth of Hizballah as a military 

and charitable organization.

By 1982, Iran’s revolutionary government 

was supporting humanitarian efforts, including building clinics, schools, hospitals, and 

mosques; reconstructing villages destroyed 

by the Israelis; and paying benefits to famiIran assumes it is

by right the preeminent 

power in the Persian Gulf 

and the greater Middle 

East region
No. 237, November 2008 Strategic Forum 3

lies of martyrs killed in fighting with Israel 

or in the Lebanese civil war. Iran also began 

to provide military training and equipment 

to the darker side of Hizballah—to the terrorist networks controlled by Imad Mughniyah 

and others against U.S. and other Western targets. Elements of the newly created Iranian 

Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) trained in 

Lebanon and with Hizballah units.

Key questions for the analytical community in the 1980s resonate today. How 

much control does Iran exert over surrogates 

such as Hizballah and Hamas? Are Hizballah’s 

leaders, such as Hassan Nasrallah, totally 

subservient to the wishes of Iran’s supreme 

leader and the doctrine of velayat-e faqih? 

Would Hamas do more than pray for Iran 

if the latter were threatened with imminent 

attack? Or do they act independently of Iran, 

as Lebanese and Palestinian nationalists 

willing to work within the systems of 

government so long as they can shape them? 

The answer probably remains the same 

today as it was in the 1980s: the surrogates 

have great personal loyalty and devotion to 

the ideals of the Islamic revolution and to 

its clerical leaders, but tend to pursue selfinterest, with or without Iran’s approval. Iran 

may not be consulted on all operations, or if 

it is, may not approve, but it would not openly 

oppose Hizballah or Hamas actions or risk a 

breach with its most successful surrogates.

Despite a prohibition by the late Ayatollah 

Khomeini against relations with the Saudis, 

today’s Iranian government values its 

expanding ties to Saudi Arabia and the other 

Gulf Arab regimes. Even the United Arab 

Emirates maintains links to Iran, despite their 

seemingly intractable dispute over ownership 

of three small islands in the Gulf, the Tunbs 

and Abu Musa. Iran’s outreach extends to Shia 

communities in Iraq (approximately 55–60 

percent of the population), Saudi Arabia 

(10–15 percent of the population concentrated 

primarily in the oil-rich Eastern Province), 

Kuwait (approximately 20 percent), and 

Bahrain (about 75 percent). Iran’s approach 

to neighboring Arab states and their Shia 

communities has changed over the years. 

Initially, it consisted of efforts to organize 

antiregime movements through mosques and 

prayer houses led by local Shia clerics or Iranbased activists. Since Khomeini died in 1989, 

Iranian efforts have focused on diplomatic 

efforts to restore relations with its Gulf 

neighbors, primarily Saudi Arabia.

Iraq as Risk and 

Opportunity

Iraq and Iran have endured long years of 

war interspersed by uneasy periods of truce, 

the most recent conflict being the 8 years 

from 1980 to 1988 that saw nearly a million 

casualties on both sides and untold damage 

to property and economic infrastructure. 

Ayatollah Khomeini assumed Iraq’s Shia 

would join the Shia Islamic Republic to defeat 

the secular, Sunni Arab–dominated regime 

in Baghdad; Saddam Hussein assumed the 

Arabs of Iran’s Khuzistan Province would join 

Arab Iraq to defeat the mullahs. Both were 

wrong. Iraq’s Shia Arabs fought to defend the 

state of Iraq from defeat by Persians and were 

rewarded for their loyalty by Saddam; after the 

aborted 1991 rebellion, they were slaughtered 

by Saddam for their disloyalty. Iran’s Arabs 

remained loyal to the republic.2

The collapse of Saddam’s regime in April 

2003 gave Iran an unanticipated opportunity. 

Its primary regional enemy was gone. Iraqi 

Shia militants who had spent two decades in 

Iranian exile could now return and demand a 

role in the post-Saddam government. Iran had 

created the major exile group—the Supreme 

Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq 

(SCIRI, called the Islamic Supreme Council of 

Iraq [ISCI] since May 2007)—as an umbrella 

organization for Iraqi exiles; it was led by 

members of a prominent pro-Iranian clerical 

family, Ayatollah Muhammad Baqr al-Hakim, 

and his brother, Abd al-Aziz al-Hakim.3

Iranian pilgrims could now visit the Shia 

shrines in the cities of Najaf and Karbala 

while traders, businessmen, diplomats, 

investors, security personnel, and intelligence 

operatives could easily cross the unguarded 

900-mile border. Iran called for transparent 

elections and democratic institutions in the 

new Iraq, correctly assuming that the majority 

Shia population would win any election and, 

for the first time in history, govern Iraq. Iran 

was—and is—eager for an Iran-friendly 

government in Iraq. Iran’s vision of a perfect 

Iraqi state is one strong enough to maintain 

Iraq’s unity and territorial integrity but too 

weak to challenge Iran or the other neighbors. 

Iran would prefer an Islamic state under 

shariah law similar to its own theocratic 

facade, but if forced to choose between a 

precarious Islamic state and a stable unitary 

state would almost certainly choose the latter.

With opportunity, however, comes risk. 

Iran is pouring money into Iraq in the form 

of business investment and community 

reconstruction. It is refurbishing the mosques 

and shrines of Najaf and Karbala, building 

community infrastructure, and providing 

various forms of support (money, advisors, 

training, and intelligence) to many of the 

political factions and government ministries, 

especially the Interior Ministry, according 

to accounts told by Iraqis and reported 

in the press. In early 2008, President 

Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, on the first visit 

made by an Iranian leader to Iraq, offered 

Iraq development assistance, including 

joint projects for oil, pipeline and refinery 

construction, and a billion-dollar loan. 

Iraq turned down the loan offer but signed 

economic and trade agreements and issued 

tenders for construction of a pipeline to 

Iran. Iraqi Arabs and Kurds report that Iran 

has funded practically every Shia candidate 

standing for election to the National Assembly, 

and some Iraqis claim the IRGC has links 

to Sunni Islamist factions in the center 

and north of Iraq.4

 It expects, in return, a 

compliant government in Baghdad willing 

to accede to its vision of the new Iraq. By 

Iran’s vision of a perfect 

Iraqi state is one strong 

enough to maintain Iraq’s 

unity and territorial 

integrity but too weak

to challenge Iran or the 

other neighbors
4 Strategic Forum No. 237, November 2008

Avoiding Risk,

Seeking Opportunity

Living in the shadow of their larger 

neighbors to the north, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, 

Bahrain, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, 

and Oman have preferred to have outsiders 

define their security policies and needs (or, 

more aptly, allowed them to do so) since the 

1960s. New to acting as states rather than 

tribes, not yet wealthy from oil, and accustomed to letting tradition determine the governance and institutions of civil society, the 

smaller Arab states of the Persian Gulf initially 

followed their colonial protector, Great Britain, 

to shelter themselves from the Arab and 

Persian nationalist storms that periodically 

swept through the neighborhood. The exception was Saudi Arabia, which enjoyed better 

relations with the United States than with the 

United Kingdom. When the British decided 

they could no longer afford to protect the Gulf 

Arabs and withdrew in 1971, the smaller 

and more fragile Gulf states turned to the 

United States to assume the British mantle.7

Concerned about possible Soviet encroachments in the Gulf, President Richard Nixon 

created the Twin Pillars policy, which designated Iran and Saudi Arabia as proxies for 

U.S. military presence in the region.8

 This was 

followed by the Carter Doctrine on U.S. military 

engagement in the Gulf and the expansion of 

American force presence and operations during 

the Iran-Iraq war.

Through the 1970s and 1980s, the Arab 

states of the Gulf faced the hegemonic ambitions of Iran, first under the secular and 

intensely nationalistic regime of the shah and 

then under the revolutionary Islamic Republic 

of Iran, also nationalistic and determined 

to export its revolution across the Gulf. In 

between Iranian challenges came Iraqi feints 

contrast, the oil-rich Gulf states—once the 

source of more than $80 billion in loans to 

help Iraq defeat Iran—now oppose debt relief 

or additional assistance to Iraq.

Iran’s influence in Iraq is probably at 

its highest point now. According to interviews 

with Iraqis, a growing number of Shia, as well 

as Sunnis and Kurds, are uneasy with the extent 

of authority and influence Iran and the IRGC 

wield in Iraq.5

 They raise several important 

questions: How extensive is Iranian influence 

in Iraqi ministries (especially defense, interior, 

and intelligence)? Have Iranians been involved 

in targeting Iraqi intellectuals, academicians, 

or military officers for assassination? Are the 

Iranians communicating with or assisting al 

Qaeda operatives in Iraq through the IRGC? 

Are the Iranian religious scholars in the 

seminaries of Qom trying to displace those 

of Najaf from the intellectual and spiritual 

leadership of Shia Islam? Whether Iran 

is engaged in all, some, or none of these 

activities, the appearance of their involvement 

and the Iraqis’ unease is reminiscent of the 

Islamic Republic’s assistance to Hizballah

in Lebanon in the 1980s.

Iraq’s government must balance 

American complaints that Iran is supporting 

anti-U.S. acts of terrorism in Iraq with 

Iranian demands that the United States 

leave Iraq and the Gulf. Support from both 

Washington and Tehran is critical to the 

survival of any government in Baghdad. 

Thus far, the Nuri al-Maliki government has 

managed to bring Americans and Iranians 

together for several meetings in Baghdad, and 

Tehran appears to have reined in Muqtada 

al-Sadr by insisting he abide by his ceasefire 

and draw down his militia. But Muqtada is 

not an Iranian loyalist. That role is reserved 

for ISCI, which has proven itself to be a much 

more witting tool and ally of Iran. Prime 

Minister Maliki and other prominent Iraqi 

Arabs and Kurds certainly discuss security 

issues with the Iranians. The Iranians, in 

turn, have made clear to Iraqi leaders their 

opposition to any Iraqi-American security pact 

that would permit an extended U.S. military 

presence in Iraq or allow the U.S. forces to 

monitor or attack it from Iraqi bases.6

at territorial acquisition as well as attempts 

to gain influence in decisionmaking on Gulf 

and wider Arab political, economic, and strategic affairs. In 1981, as the Iraq-Iran war 

continued and Iran broadened its efforts to 

export its revolution, the six states formed the 

Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC).9

 It was not 

intended to be a political or security organization similar to the European Union or the 

North Atlantic Treaty Organization; instead, 

its members focused on common economic 

interests, such as forming a common customs 

union and trade zone and cooperating in 

local police and security matters.

Changing Perceptions

Are security perceptions in the Gulf 

states changing? The answer, clearly, is yes. 

Gulf Arab security policies have traditionally 

been based on risk avoidance, collective reaction, and reliance on nonregional powers to 

ensure their security and survival. The strategy was to avoid provoking either of the dominant and powerful governments in Baghdad 

or Tehran, pay for protection, use arms sales 

as an extension of foreign policy, and above 

all, maintain a balance of power in the Gulf. 

Iraq’s invasion and occupation of Kuwait in 

1990 should have exposed the weakness in 

this form of strategic thinking, but the Gulf 

governments preferred to maintain the kind 

of balance of power they once felt comfortable under—a balance maintained by cordial 

relations with regional powers and backed up 

by a more distant U.S. presence.

Several developments in the past few 

years have begun to produce a significant 

shift in the strategic thinking of the Gulf 

states. The first—the spread of terrorist 

attacks by groups using religion to justify their 

actions—accelerated following the al Qaeda 

attacks on the United States on September 11. 

Al Qaeda and other Sunni extremist elements 

accuse the Al Sa’ud and other ruling Gulf 

Arab families of being un-Islamic and puppets of the United States and have conducted 

a series of terrorist operations on Saudi and 

American targets in Saudi Arabia. Youths from 

many Arab states have been recruited for operations in Iraq, and press reports indicate Gulf 

nationals have been caught in Iraq and on 

support from both 

Washington and Tehran

is critical to the survival 

of any government

in Baghdad
No. 237, November 2008 Strategic Forum 5

their return to the Arabian Peninsula states. 

Consequently, the Gulf states are more sensitive to homegrown terrorism than ever before.

The second major development is the rise 

of political and sectarian movements demanding political reform. All of the Gulf states are 

witnessing the growing political influence of 

ultraconservative religious, ethnic, and tribal 

factions. These factions demand a greater 

role in decisionmaking, constitutional limitations on ruling family power, adherence to a 

stricter interpretation of Islamic law, and an 

end to corruption in government. In Kuwait, 

for example, elections for the national assembly in May 2008 saw Islamists and tribal conservatives significantly increase the number 

of seats held in the assembly to nearly half. 

These conservative elements are now challenging the ruling Al Sabah family for the 

right to appoint cabinet ministers and for limitations on the power of the amir.

The toppling of Saddam’s regime and 

the election of a non-Sunni government in 

Baghdad has had a major impact on the 

Gulf Arab states. They see risk whether Iraq 

fails or succeeds. A failed Iraq means more 

cross-border terrorists entering or returning 

to the Gulf intent on overthrowing the 

traditional ruling elites. It also raises the risk 

of sectarian or ethnic unrest in countries 

where significant minority populations have 

long been discriminated against by Sunni, 

Wahhabi prejudices and Arab nationalist 

sentiment. If Iraq succeeds in stabilizing 

under a democratic-leaning, elective form of 

governance, especially one with a weak central 

government and strong semi-independent 

provincial authorities, then the Gulf states 

worry about the export of “advanced” political 

ideas, which they say their countries do not 

need or are not prepared to adopt. Either 

strategically or tactically, they no longer see 

Iraq as the eastern flank of the Arab world 

and protector of the Sunni world against the 

Persian Shia crescent; rather, they now see 

Iraq as potentially providing strategic depth 

for a hegemonic-minded Iran.

The Gulf Arab states have only recently 

begun to express unease with a nuclearempowered Iran. Loath to provoke Iran by 

denying its right to nuclear energy capability, the Gulf Arabs now speak openly of their 

concerns about Iran developing nuclear weapons, given Tehran’s insistence upon full-cycle 

control of uranium enrichment and the possibility of as many as 20 more nuclear powerplants strung out along the northern shore of 

the Gulf. They deny Iran would use a nuclear 

weapon against them, but their fears of weaponization appear at this point to be second to fear of environmental damage from 

a Chernobyl-style accident or natural disaster (such as an earthquake at a nuclear plant 

built on or near a fault) and Iran’s lack of 

responsibility or preparation for consequence 

management in the event of a nuclear accident.

Finally, the Gulf Arabs worry that the 

United States would launch war against Iran 

or negotiate security issues with Iran without consulting Gulf friends and allies. Should 

the United States launch military operations 

against Iran, it would be the fourth Gulf war 

in one generation. Gulf rulers would like the 

United States to consult them before taking 

any initiatives—hostile or friendly—toward 

Iran. Privately, many admit that they would 

feel compelled to support the United States but 

are uncertain about its willingness to honor 

its commitments to their stability and security 

(meaning their survival).

Gulf State Options?

The GCC states are consumers and not 

producers of security. They publicly urge 

the United States to get out of Iraq but only 

after establishing a secure and stable government there. For them, Iraq is the litmus test. 

If the United States does not stay the course 

in Iraq, then how strong will American commitments be to the Gulf governments? Their 

response to these new risks has been to reconsider their strategic options. The most important shift has been to seek stronger commitments to their security not only from the U.S. 

and European governments but also from new 

friends and customers in Asia (China, India, 

and Japan) who may be willing to extend 

security guarantees in exchange for assured 

access to oil, investment, and arms sales. The 

extent of their discussions with European and 

Asian governments is unclear, but France, 

Germany, and Spain have been talking with 

individual members of the GCC about security issues (France agreed in January 2008 to 

deploy a 500-man contingent to the United 

Arab Emirates). China, India, and Japan are 

increasingly dependent on Gulf oil and gas, 

but none seems interested in contributing to 

Gulf security or protecting sealanes and

access to oil and gas.

In response to Iran’s nuclear aspirations and threat, the Gulf Arab states have 

announced their interest in acquiring nuclear 

energy facilities similar to Iran’s civilian nuclear energy program. Together, the 

GCC states control nearly half the world’s 

known oil reserves, but mostly in response 

to Iran’s nuclear programs, several Gulf 

states have expressed interest in nuclear 

energy for domestic energy consumption. The 

International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) 

sent a team of experts to Riyadh in 2007 

to discuss building nuclear energy plants. 

Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and the United Arab 

Emirates seem especially interested, but all 

declare that any nuclear energy facilities built 

would be placed under IAEA and Nuclear 

Nonproliferation Treaty safeguards.10

Underlying these options is the desire

of the Gulf Arab governments to avoid

provoking Iran. They would prefer to keep

the diplomatic door open and maintain

correct relations with their large and powerful neighbor. In keeping this option, the 

GCC allowed Iranian President Ahmadinejad 

to speak to its annual summit in December 

2007. Saudi Arabia then welcomed him when 

he made his first hajj, the annual pilgrimage 

to Mecca and Medina required of all Muslims. 

This was the first appearance by an Iranian at 

a GCC meeting and the first hajj visit by a sitting Iranian president.11

the Gulf Cooperation 

Council states publicly 

urge the United States

to get out of Iraq but

only after establishing

a secure and stable 

government there
6 Strategic Forum No. 237, November 2008

Ahmadinejad’s economic and security

policies, but the regime appears to be coping 

effectively with potential critics and opponents 

by playing the nationalist card and threatening retaliation.12

Seek Progress on Common 

Interests Before Tackling the Larger 

and More Complicated Issues. Iraq 

and our friends in the Gulf will continue to 

move cautiously in developing ties to Iran. 

Those ties, for now and the foreseeable future, 

will probably remain limited to cooperation 

on trade, commerce, police matters, and 

intelligence-sharing on drugs and narcotics 

trafficking. They are not likely to conclude 

any significant security pact whose terms 

would include a demand for the withdrawal 

of U.S. military forces from the region. Gulf 

governments may prefer to avoid antagonizing 

their larger and more dangerous neighbors, 

but they also realize that U.S. commitment to 

their security and presence, however invisible 

they may pretend it is, allows them the 

freedom to negotiate with former enemy Iran 

and, at some point in the future, Iraq.

Push Hard on American-style 

Political Reform or Replace Talk of 

Democracy with That of Common 

Interests and Mutual Dependency.

Even without U.S. pressure, the GCC states and 

Iraq will face daunting domestic challenges 

over the next decade, including rising 

demands for an end to authoritarian rule 

(meaning monarchies, ruling families, single 

parties, or tribes), and greater restrictions on 

or opportunities for women. There may be 

problems of overdevelopment and a risk to the 

fragile Gulf ecosystem from increased tanker 

traffic, lack of potable water, or a nuclear 

accident or oil fire. The region also faces a 

challenge to keep small, rich populations 

happy and expatriate labor unorganized 

and isolated (more than 85 percent of the 

population of Qatar and the United Arab 

Emirates is foreign labor, for example). The 

United States will need to choose its issues 

carefully, especially since a strong public 

stance on domestic political reform often 

triggers local cynicism that the United 

States does not live by its ideals and that its 

security is heavily reliant upon dysfunctional 

governments or unpopular regimes.

Looming Choices for 

Regional Strategy

For the next U.S. administration, much 

is at stake in the Persian Gulf. Since the 

1980s, the United States has enjoyed virtually 

unchallenged preeminence in maintaining 

Gulf security. Oil was relatively cheap in 

price and plentiful in supply, and Asia was 

not a major competitor for the world’s energy 

resources. But all that is changing. The 

number of outside powers with access to and 

influence in the region is clearly growing; 

Iran’s ambitions have not ebbed; Iraq’s future 

stability and external orientation remain very 

much an open question; and the Gulf Arab 

states face internal pressures for reform. In 

fashioning its options, the United States

faces a number of tough choices, including 

the following.

Engage or Isolate Iran’s 

Government. American administrations since the 1979 Islamic revolution have 

believed that the Iranian regime’s most 

important goal was recognition of its legitimacy and that talking to Iranian leaders 

would be tantamount to recognition and a 

reward for bad behavior. The tactic may have 

been effective in the 1980s, when Iran was at 

war with Iraq and intent upon exporting its 

extreme version of Islamic revolution to Iraq, 

Lebanon, and the Gulf. But denial of recognition may no longer be a trump card for the 

United States. Neither President Ahmadinejad 

nor Supreme Leader Khamenei appears intimidated by our refusal to recognize the Islamic 

Republic. More important to Ahmadinejad 

and most Iranians is recognition and acceptance of Iran’s claims to be the dominant 

power in the Gulf region and a participant 

to be consulted in matters dealing with the 

greater Middle East, including Israeli-Arab 

and Lebanese issues. The challenge for any 

U.S. engagement policy would be to avoid giving Tehran the impression that Washington 

is acceding to its preeminence as opposed to 

seeking common ground on issues such as 

Iraq’s survival as a unified state and avoidance of the Sunni-Shia/Arab-Kurd “clash of 

civilizations” that some scholars and political leaders in the region predict. Whether or 

not engagement is pursued, harsh American 

rhetoric needs to be toned down, since it has 

only served to enhance the Iranian president’s stature among Iranians and has made 

it easier for Tehran to deflect attention from 

those aspects of its behavior that its neighbors 

regard as threatening.

Maintain or End Sanctions That 

Preclude Economic Investment in 

Iran. The sanctions placed on Iran by the 

United States in 1979 remain in force today. 

They have slowed but not stopped Iran in 

rebuilding its military infrastructure or 

acquiring the technology and training

necessary to build a nuclear capacity, and 

they have hindered foreign investment in 

Iran. The United Nations (UN) this year 

approved what its members describe as tough 

sanctions, including shutting down Iranian 

banks operating abroad. Sanctions, however, 

have not pressured Iran to modify its behavior 

regarding support for extremist groups, opposition to the peace process, or suspending uranium enrichment. Inept leadership and poor 

economic planning have probably done more 

harm to Iran than U.S.-imposed sanctions. 

Iran’s political well-being depends on wise 

economic decisions, including raising salaries 

and living standards for the Iranian people, 

creating jobs, and investing in Iran’s petrochemical industries. Acquiescence to a pipeline project to carry Central Asian gas and oil, 

for example, would be an important signal of 

U.S. awareness of Iran’s economic needs but 

would probably annoy Turkey and Russia. It 

could also defuse potential Iranian dependence on Chinese investment in the energy 

sector of its economy. European sanctions 

may bring a greater popular outcry against 

the challenge for any U.S. 

engagement policy would 

be to avoid giving Tehran 

the impression that 

Washington is acceding 

to its preeminence as 

opposed to seeking 

common ground
No. 237, November 2008 Strategic Forum 7

Promote Cooperative Relations 

between Iraq and Its Gulf Neighbors.

Conventional wisdom suggests that for 

the next 10 to 15 years, Iraqis will need to 

concentrate on reinventing themselves, their 

identity, and their political institutions and 

economic infrastructure. For that process, they 

will need cooperation from their neighbors 

in stabilizing trade and development plans 

and maintaining secure borders. Iraq’s new 

government, however, may have a different 

agenda. In the short term, Iraq’s government 

is already looking at ways to consolidate its 

authority over the entire country and bring 

disputed areas under central control. In the 

long term, Iraq could decide to claim its 

“rightful” place as leader of the Gulf and 

resume efforts to acquire weapons of mass 

destruction. If it does, Kuwait had better look 

to its borders and the GCC to its alliances. 

The Gulf states do not agree on cancelling 

Iraq’s debts from the Iraq-Iran war; Kuwait 

in particular opposes forgiving even part of 

Iraq’s debt or ending reparations payments 

due it under the UN Security Council 

resolutions of 1991. Probably the most serious 

block to cooperative relations between Iraq 

and its neighbors and the most serious test 

for U.S. policies will lie in Baghdad’s quest 

for advanced weapons systems, including 

advanced American F–16 aircraft.13

Pursue Effective Deterrence 

and Collective Defense Options at 

the Same Time. While continued arms 

sales to the Gulf are no panacea for countering a nuclear-armed Iran, two other frequently mentioned alternatives have their own 

drawbacks. The first is a regional nuclearfree zone, but neither Israel nor Iran seems 

the least bit interested. The second is to turn 

the GCC into a regional defense and security 

organization that would include Iraq, Yemen, 

and, eventually, Iran. Unfortunately, the GCC 

would be hard pressed to become the Persian 

Gulf’s or Middle East’s equivalent of the 

Organization for Security and Co-operation in 

Europe or the European Union. Pan-regional 

solutions will not work; they are too broad in 

scope and too vague in purpose. Alternatively, 

the United States, in conjunction with our 

European partners and Asian states dependent on the region’s energy resources, could 

cooperate in supporting the establishment of a 

subregional security organization as a venue 

for threat reduction talks and confidencebuilding measures and encourage Iran, Iraq, 

Yemen, and the Gulf states to join it. Similarly, 

the United States should engage Europe, nonGulf Arabs (Egypt), and Asian powers with 

influence in the region to address security 

issues that are not specifically military. Most 

states in this region share transnational problems—terrorism, religious and nationalist 

extremism, organized crime, arms smuggling, 

illegal immigration, environmental pollution, 

drug and human trafficking, disease, poverty, 

lack of water resources, and desertification—

and need transnational solutions.

Offer the GCC Expanded Security 

Guarantees and a Smaller Military 

Presence. In the face of a nuclear-capable 

Iran or a rearmed Iraq, the Gulf Arabs are 

likely to seek expanded U.S. guarantees of 

enhanced protection and promises to defend 

them if a confrontation is imminent. This 

could include advanced missile defense 

systems or inclusion under the American 

nuclear umbrella. They are not likely, 

however, to support an American policy of 

preemptive strikes to lessen their Iran problem 

or to welcome the presence of a substantial 

U.S. military force on “bases” or with access 

to base facilities. They will not join Iran in a 

security arrangement that would preclude a 

U.S. presence in the Gulf, reflecting in part 

their understanding that that presence allows 

them to improve relations with Tehran now 

and Baghdad some day. At the same time, 

the Gulf regimes are wary of closer ties to 

the United States, fearing popular protest to 

the costs of the presence of the United States 

and the dependence on it for protection their 

governments should be able to provide.

Looking Ahead

The U.S. military is likely to be in the 

Gulf for some time. The desire to reduce its 

footprint and the vulnerability of forward 

deployed forces needs to be balanced against 

the diplomatic and deterrent value of a visible 

presence in the Gulf. If friends and enemies 

no longer see U.S. forces and operations, they 

may conclude that the Gulf governments are 

once again vulnerable to intimidation or outright threat and that Washington is less likely 

to defend its interests and honor its security 

commitments in the region.

In approaching decisions on the 

American future forward presence posture 

for the Gulf, several political realities need 

to be taken into account. While rumors 

about Iranian and Iraqi strategic intentions 

and preferences for regional dominance are 

rife, Iraq and Iran are not perceived by the 

GCC states as immediate threats to regional 

security, and most believe the United States 

the United States should 

engage Europe, non-Gulf 

Arabs, and Asian powers 

with influence in the 

region to address security 

issues that are not 

specifically military

The Strategic Forum series presents original research by members 

of NDU as well as other scholars and specialists in national security 

affairs from this country and abroad. The opinions, conclusions, 

and recommendations expressed or implied within are those of 

the contributors and do not necessarily reflect the views of 

the Department of Defense or any other agency of the Federal 

Government. For information on NDU Press visit the Web site at 

http://www.ndu.edu/inss/nduhp. INSS also produces Joint Force 

Quarterly for the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; the journal 

can be accessed at www.ndupress.edu.

The Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS) is a policy 

research and strategic gaming organization within the National 

Defense University (NDU) serving the Department of Defense, 

its components, and interagency partners. The institute provides 

senior decisionmakers with timely, objective analysis and gaming 

events and supports NDU educational programs in the areas of 

international security affairs and defense studies. Through an 

active outreach program, including conferences and publications, 

INSS seeks to promote understanding of emerging strategic 

challenges and policy options.

 

INSTITUTE FOR NATIONAL STRATEGIC STUDIES

Patrick M. Cronin

James A. Schear Director David H. Gurney

Director of Research Director, NDU Press
8 Strategic Forum No. 237, November 2008

needs to shape strategies to engage Iraq and 

Iran positively. U.S. preferences for balancing 

security in the Gulf invariably carry weight 

in the region, but Washington probably has 

less influence than it once had in dictating 

behaviors and alliances. It is only realistic 

to expect that these states will pursue the 

strategies that best suit their needs of the 

moment. Iran, too, thinks in terms of survival 

and will try to shape the regional security 

environment to ensure it.

It would be a mistake for U.S. policymakers to assume Gulf security issues 

can be kept isolated from other regional 

concerns. Palestine is still important, even 

if the motives of some Arab governments 

may be less altruistic regarding the fate of 

the Palestinians. Justice for the Palestinians 

and control of the sites sacred in Islam, 

especially the Haram al-Sharif in the Old 

City of Jerusalem (site of the Temple Mount, 

where the Dome of the Rock and al-Aqsa 

mosques sit) are issues that resonate with the 

Arab and Muslim street. No Arab ruler can 

ignore these issues or pretend that domestic 

security is more important. The fact or 

perception of Israeli intransigence as well as 

divisions within the Palestinian Authority and 

U.S. reluctance to take the lead in finding 

a solution all shape Iranian and Gulf Arab 

public attitudes and damage U.S influence 

in the region to a significant degree. Finally, 

political change in Iran may come smoothly 

or violently, but it will not alter a defense 

strategy based upon the goal of acquiring a 

nuclear capability and is unlikely to lead to 

major reversals in Tehran’s foreign

and security policies.

Notes

1 For further discussion of Iranian ambitions and 

regional reactions, see Judith S. Yaphe and Charles D. 

Lutes, Reassessing the Implications of a Nuclear-Armed 

Iran, McNair Paper 69 (Washington, DC: National Defense 

University Press, 2005).

2 For Saddam’s rewards and punishment of Iraq’s Shia, 

see Faleh A. Jaber, The Shi’ite Movement in Iraq (London: Saqi 

Books, 2005), and Ayatollahs, Sufis, and Ideologues: State, 

Religion, and Social Movements (London: Saqi Books, 2002).

3 Muhammad Baqr al-Hakim was the spiritual leader of 

the movement; he was assassinated in August 2004 outside the 

Imam Ali Mosque in Najaf. Abd al-Aziz was in charge of the 

Supreme Council of the Islamic Revolution in Iran’s (SCIRI’s) 

militia, the Badr Brigade, and fought with Iranian forces 

against Iraq in their 8-year war. He currently heads the

organization. Apparently at the suggestion of the Iranians, 

SCIRI changed its name to the Supreme Islamic Council

in Iraq (SICI or ISCI) last year.

4 Personal interviews, 2005–2008.

5 Interviews, 2006–2008.

6 Maliki made his second visit as prime minister in 

June 2008. President Jalal Talabani, Foreign Minister Hoshyar 

Zebari, and Kurdish officials have also visited or consulted 

with Iranian officials, including senior Iranian Revolutionary 

Guard Corps representatives. See Andrew E. Kramer, “Iraqi 

Premier is Expected to Discuss Allegations and Aid in Iran 

Visit,” The New York Times, June 3, 2008, A12.

7 For a short history of the U.S. military engagement in 

the Persian Gulf, see Richard Sokolsky, ed., The United States 

and the Persian Gulf: Reshaping Security Strategy for the 

Post-Containment Era (Washington, DC: National Defense 

University Press, 2003).

8 The United States first entered the Gulf with a small 

naval presence—the U.S. 5th Fleet—in 1947 in Bahrain and 

an Air Force presence in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, from the 

1940s through the early 1960s. 9 In 2001, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) extended 

a special status to Yemen but is reluctant to extend full membership to Yemen, Iraq, or Iran.

10 Other nations that have said they plan to construct 

civilian nuclear reactors or have sought technical assistance 

and advice from the International Atomic Energy Agency 

(IAEA), the Vienna-based United Nations nuclear watchdog 

agency, in the last year include Egypt, Jordan, Syria, Turkey, 

and Yemen, as well as several North African nations. See Bob 

Drogin and Borzou Daragahi, “Arabs make plans for nuclear 

power,” Los Angeles Times, May 26, 2007.

11 Iranian sources claim the GCC invited Ahmadinejad 

to speak, but Gulf officials say the Iranian invited himself 

to Doha for the annual summit. He reportedly spoke about a 

12-point plan for regional security, but no further information 

has been made available. The Arab press has begun speculating that Ahmadinejad will be invited to this winter’s meeting.

12 For the latest IAEA report on Iran’s enrichment activities, see “Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement 

and relevant provisions of Security Council resolutions 1737 

(2006), 1747 (2007) and 1803 (2008) in the Islamic Republic 

of Iran,” GOV/2008/38, September 15, 2008. The Board of 

Governors announced that it had reached an impasse with 

Iran over its refusal to account for previous military research, 

noted that Iran had made “substantial gains” in its enrichment efforts, and concluded that Iran’s resolve to build its 

nuclear infrastructure in defiance of international standards 

had hardened. See also Joby Warrick and Thomas Erdbrink, 

“U.N. Agency at ‘Dead End’ as Iran Rejects Queries on Nuclear 

Research,” The Washington Post, September 16, 2008, A17.

13 Arab press reports in September 2008 reported

that Kuwait and Iraq’s Kurds had both objected to the Iraqi 

armed forces receiving aircraft that could be used once

again to attack them.