NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

LUIS ALBERTO YBOY FLORES, 

Petitioner, 

 v. 

MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney 

General, 

Respondent.

No. 20-73229 

Agency No. A044-254-657 

MEMORANDUM*

On Petition for Review of an Order of the

Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted April 15, 2022**

Pasadena, California

Before: CALLAHAN and VANDYKE, Circuit Judges, and GONZALEZ 

ROGERS,*** District Judge.

Luis Alberto Yboy Flores (“Flores”), a native and citizen of Guatemala, 

petitions for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (the “BIA”) decision to 

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision 

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

*** The Honorable Yvonne Gonzalez Rogers, United States District Judge 

for the Northern District of California, sitting by designation.

FILED

APR 20 2022

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
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uphold the denial of his application for deferral of removal under the Convention 

Against Torture (“CAT”). We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a), and we 

deny the petition.

Flores advances seven arguments in support of his petition. 

First, Flores argues that the BIA improperly discounted his qualified and 

credible expert’s testimony. Flores contends that the BIA’s discount of the 

expert’s testimony for lack of supporting citations was at odds with Dr. Boerman 

qualifying as an expert and affording his testimony full weight in the first instance. 

However, even where the Immigration Judge (“IJ”) finds an expert to be credible, 

he need not accept all his testimony and opinion as fact. See Singh v. Holder, 753 

F.3d 826, 836 (9th Cir. 2014) (distinguishing between credibility and truth); see 

also Matter of M-A-M-Z-, 28 I & N Dec. 173, 177 (BIA 2020). 

Additionally, unlike in Castillo v. Barr, 980 F.3d 1278 (9th Cir. 2020), the 

expert testimony here was contradicted—specifically, the BIA’s decision noted

that (1) the 2018 State Department Human Rights Report indicated that there were 

no reports that the government or its agents committed arbitrary or unlawful 

killings, and (2) Dr. Boerman’s own source stated that these killings could be 

political in nature or related to criminals. When presented with a record containing 

conflicting evidence, this court determines only whether the agency’s decision is 

supported by substantial evidence. See, e.g., Cole v. Holder, 659 F.3d 762, 783 
3 

(9th Cir. 2011). Under the applicable substantial evidence standard, factual

findings “are conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to 

conclude to the contrary.” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B); see Sangha v. INS, 103 F.3d 

1482, 1487 (9th Cir. 1997). 

Here, Flores’s challenge to the IJ and BIA’s assessment of “corroborative” 

evidence fails as the IJ has broad discretion to weigh evidence. See Garland v. 

Ming Dai, 141 S. Ct. 1669, 1678 (2021) (in reviewing an agency’s factual 

determination, a court of appeals must ask whether “the agency’s finding qualifies 

as one of potentially many reasonable possibilities” and cannot give “conclusive 

weight to any piece of testimony that cuts against the agency’s finding”).

Second, Flores argues that the BIA erred in finding Flores’s fear of harm 

merely speculative. Flores contests the weight assigned by the IJ and the BIA to 

the evidence in the record and asks us to reweigh that evidence to come to a 

different conclusion. To be eligible for deferral of removal under the CAT, Flores 

must establish that, if removed, he would more likely than not be tortured at the 

instigation of, or with the consent or acquiescence of, a public official. See 8 

C.F.R. §§ 1208.16(c)(2), 1208.18(a)(1); Kamalthas v. INS, 251 F.3d 1279, 1282 

(9th Cir. 2001). Under the substantial evidence standard, the court cannot reweigh 

evidence; the record must compel the conclusion that no reasonable fact finder 

could find as the agency did. Don v. Gonzales, 476 F.3d 738, 743 (9th Cir. 2007). 
4 

Flores has not satisfied this burden.

Third, Flores argues that the BIA conducted improper factfinding on appeal, 

but he fails to identify any fact found by the IJ that was ignored by the BIA, or any 

fact found by the BIA that was not found by the IJ. See Perez-Palafox v. Holder, 

744 F.3d 1138, 1145 (9th Cir. 2014). Contrary to Flores’s contention, the IJ never 

decided that Flores’s criminal record would be conveyed to Guatemalan officials, 

nor did it expressly state that Dr. Boerman provided authority for his propositions 

in a way that would contradict the BIA’s findings. Also, the BIA may take 

administrative notice of U.S. Department of State reports in the record, even where 

the IJ did not cite to those reports. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(3)(iv).

Fourth, Flores argues that the BIA erred when it disregarded material 

evidence in finding Flores does not have an individualized risk of harm based on 

tattoos that he argues will be perceived to be gang tattoos. Again, his argument 

improperly seeks to have this court reweigh the evidence, which the court cannot 

do under the substantial evidence standard. See Don, 476 F.3d at 743.

Fifth, Flores argues that the BIA erred when it ignored evidence relevant to 

the possibility of future torture. Again, we may not reweigh evidence on review 

and Flores fails to show that the evidence he presents was so compelling that no 

reasonable factfinder could conclude as the BIA did here.

Sixth, Flores argues that the BIA erred by failing to consider all grounds of 
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fear of torture and not aggregating the risks. Even if the IJ and BIA did not

identify every piece of provided evidence, they were not required to do so. See 

Lopez v. Ashcroft, 366 F.3d 799, 807 n.6 (9th Cir. 2004) (The agency “does not 

have to write an exegesis on every contention. What is required is merely that it 

consider the issues raised, and announce its decision in terms sufficient to enable a 

reviewing court to perceive that it has heard and thought and not merely reacted.”) 

(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The IJ and BIA did expressly 

consider the risk factors Flores identified, including his claim based on a fear of 

torture by gang members, the police, or vigilantes, his lack of family in Guatemala, 

and his perceived difficulty integrating into Guatemalan society and his potential 

for homelessness. Flores’s argument alleging a failure to aggregate the risks, again 

asks us to reweigh the evidence, which we are unable to do. See Don, 476 F.3d at 

743.

Finally, Flores argues that the BIA used an improperly narrow acquiescence 

standard. Although the IJ stated that “Guatemala prohibits torture and the 

government has taken steps to eradicate torture and other human-rights abuses,”

this was not the only support for the IJ’s determination. The IJ also determined 

that Flores can internally relocate, and the BIA concluded that evidence of 

corruption is not necessarily acquiescence. Moreover, evidence that a government 

is combating human rights abuses such as torture is relevant to the question of 
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whether a government is acquiescing to torture. See Del Cid Marroquin v. Lynch, 

823 F.3d 933, 937 (9th Cir. 2016) (per curiam). Flores has not shown that the BIA 

used an improperly narrow acquiescence standard. 

The petition for review is DENIED1.

1 Accordingly, we also deny the motion to stay removal (Dkt. No. 8) as moot.