2015 IL 118049

IN THE

SUPREME COURT

OF

THE STATE OF ILLINOIS

(Docket No. 118049) 

In re M.A., a Minor (The People of the State of Illinois, Appellant 

 and Cross-Appellee, v. M.A., Appellee and Cross-Appellant). 

Opinion filed November 4, 2015.

JUSTICE THOMAS delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion. 

 Chief Justice Garman and Justice Karmeier concurred in the judgment and 

opinion. 

Justice Burke specially concurred, with opinion, joined by Justices Freeman, 

Kilbride, and Theis. 

OPINION

¶ 1 Respondent, M.A., was adjudicated delinquent of several offenses. As a result 

of her adjudication, M.A. was ordered to register under the Murderer and Violent 

Offender Against Youth Registration Act (Violent Offender Act) (730 ILCS 154/1

et seq. (West 2012)). M.A. appealed, contending that the registration provisions of 

the Violent Offender Act violated her right to substantive and procedural due 

process, as well as equal protection. 
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¶ 2 The Appellate Court, First District, rejected M.A.’s claim that the statute 

violated her right to substantive due process. 2014 IL App (1st) 132540. The 

appellate court, however, with one justice dissenting, agreed with M.A. that the 

registration provisions are unconstitutional because the provisions violate 

procedural due process and equal protection. Id. The appellate court therefore 

reversed the trial court’s order requiring M.A. to register under the Act. 

¶ 3 This appeal as of right followed. Ill. S. Ct. R. 317 (eff. July 1, 2006). We 

subsequently allowed the Juvenile Law Center, the Children and Family Justice 

Center, the Civitas ChildLaw Center, the Edwin F. Mandel Legal Aid Clinic of the 

University of Chicago Law School, the James B. Moran Center for Youth 

Advocacy, the Juvenile Justice Initiative, and the National Juvenile Defender 

Center, to file a joint amicus curiae brief on behalf of M.A. Ill. S. Ct. R. 345 (eff. 

Sept. 20, 2010). 

¶ 4 BACKGROUND

¶ 5 M.A., was charged in a juvenile petition with aggravated domestic battery (720 

ILCS 5/12-3.3 (West 2012)), aggravated battery (720 ILCS 5/12-3.05(f)(1) (West 

2012)), battery (720 ILCS 5/12-3(a)(1) (West 2012)), and domestic battery (720 

ILCS 5/12-3.2(a)(1) (West 2012)). The incident giving rise to the charges occurred 

on November 24, 2012. On that date, M.A. was 13 years old. That morning, M.A. 

and her 14-year-old brother, Muhammad, were at their aunt’s house. M.A. and 

Muhammad got into an argument over a missing shower cap. Muhammad said that 

M.A. was the last person to have the shower cap. M.A. said she was not, and swore 

on her grandfather that she did not have the shower cap. M.A.’s grandfather was 

deceased, so Muhammad became angry and said, “Don’t be putting shit on my 

granddaddy.” When M.A. responded, “You don’t tell me what to do,” Muhammad 

went over to the couch where M.A. was sitting, and told her, “Do it again.” M.A. 

told Muhammad, “Get out of my face.” Muhammad then punched M.A. in the face.

¶ 6 When the fight ended, M.A. ran to the kitchen and grabbed a knife. Muhammad

went into a bedroom and shut the door. M.A. managed to enter the bedroom and cut 

Muhammad on his face and his arm. Muhammad received 3 stitches for the cut on 

his face, and 10 stitches for the cut on his arm. 
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¶ 7 At trial, Muhammad testified that he punched M.A. two or three times on her 

arm. Muhammad said the fight lasted about a minute, then he went into a back 

bedroom. After M.A. went into the kitchen, she tried to force her way into the 

bedroom. Muhammad tried to keep M.A. out because she was yelling something 

“like I want to kill you,” and had a large kitchen knife in her hand. M.A. forced her 

way into the bedroom and began swinging the knife at Muhammad, trying to stab 

him. M.A. cut Muhammad with the knife on his face and his arm.

¶ 8 Johanne Saintsurin, M.A.’s aunt, testified that the fight started when 

Muhammad pushed M.A. on the couch, got on top of her and started punching her 

everywhere. After Muhammad stopped punching M.A., M.A. walked to the kitchen 

saying “she was going to kill him, something like that.” Muhammad went into the 

bedroom and closed the door, and M.A. came back with a knife from the kitchen. 

Saintsurin told M.A. to put the knife down. When M.A. did not put the knife down, 

Saintsurin called M.A.’s father and went to check on the younger children. 

Saintsurin then saw that Muhammad was bleeding from his arm and his nose. 

Saintsurin called 911. M.A. was still in the living room holding the knife when the 

police arrived. Saintsurin noticed several items in the living room, including a 

medicine ball and a pillow, had been cut open. 

¶ 9 M.A. testified on her own behalf that when she and Muhammad got into the 

argument, Muhammad came over to the couch where she was sitting and punched 

her multiple times. Muhammad also pulled her hair, was “hollering and cussing,” 

and was grabbing her. M.A. testified that she ran to the kitchen and grabbed a knife, 

but claimed she was trying to scare Muhammad, and was not trying to cut him. 

M.A. testified that she followed Muhammad into the bedroom. When Muhammad

opened the door a little, she “slashed” the knife in the door to scare him. M.A. 

admitted that she was talking about “killing” him.

¶ 10 On May 2, 2013, M.A. was adjudicated delinquent on all counts. The circuit

court of Cook County found Mohammad’s account of the incident more credible, 

and did not believe M.A. had made just one pass of the knife through the door. The 

circuit court sentenced M.A. to 30 months’ probation, with certain conditions. One 

of the conditions was that M.A. was required to register under the Violent Offender 

Act. M.A.’s motion to reconsider the finding of delinquency was denied. 

¶ 11 M.A. then filed an appeal, arguing that the automatic application of the Violent 

Offender Act’s registration provisions to juvenile offenders violated substantive 
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and procedural due process. M.A. also argued that the Violent Offender Act’s 

registration provisions, as applied to juvenile offenders, resulted in a denial of 

equal protection, because juvenile violent offenders were treated more harshly than 

juvenile sex offenders. M.A. did not appeal her adjudication or the sufficiency of 

the evidence to support her adjudication. 

¶ 12 The appellate court first rejected M.A.’s claim that the Violent Offender Act 

violated her right to substantive due process. 2014 IL App (1st) 132540, ¶ 48. The 

appellate court, however, agreed with M.A. that the Act denied her right to 

procedural due process. The appellate court found unconstitutional the Violent 

Offender Act’s provision mandating registration of juvenile violent offenders 

against youth as adults when they turned 17 years of age. Id. ¶ 65. The appellate 

court also held that the failure of the Violent Offender Act to provide any means by 

which a juvenile offender can petition to be taken off the registry was 

unconstitutional. Id. 

¶ 13 In addition, the appellate court found that the Violent Offender Act denied 

juvenile offenders equal protection and was unconstitutional on that basis as well. 

The appellate court held that the appropriate class for purposes of its equal 

protection analysis was juvenile offenders who, as a result of a juvenile 

adjudication, are required to register with law enforcement authorities. Id. ¶ 69. 

Looking at the class, the appellate court concluded that juvenile sex offenders are 

treated differently, and more leniently, than juveniles required to register as violent 

offenders against youth. Id. The appellate court majority found there was no 

rational basis for treating juvenile sex offenders more leniently than juvenile 

violent offenders. Id. ¶ 73. 

¶ 14 One justice dissented from the appellate court’s finding that the Violent 

Offender Act violated procedural due process and equal protection. 2014 IL App 

(1st) 132540, ¶¶ 77-108 (Pucinski, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 

Justice Pucinski would find that M.A. received all the process she was due during 

her delinquency adjudication, noting that it was the delinquency adjudication that 

triggered the Act’s mandatory registration requirements. Id. ¶ 98. Justice Pucinski 

also disagreed that juvenile sex offenders and juvenile violent offenders were 

similarly situated for purposes of equal protection. Id. ¶¶ 101-04. 
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¶ 15 ANALYSIS

¶ 16 On appeal, the State argues that the appellate court majority erred in finding 

that the Violent Offender Act violated procedural due process and equal protection. 

M.A. seeks cross-relief, arguing that the appellate court erred in finding that the Act 

did not violate substantive due process. 

¶ 17 With regard to juveniles, the Violent Offender Act states:

 “(a) As used in this Act, ‘violent offender against youth’ means any person 

who is: 

 *** 

(2) adjudicated a juvenile delinquent as the result of committing or 

attempting to commit an act which, if committed by an adult, would 

constitute any of the offenses specified in subsection (b) or (c-5) of this 

Section ***, or found guilty under Article V of the Juvenile Court Act of 

1987 of committing or attempting to commit an act which, if committed by 

an adult, would constitute any of the offenses specified in subsection (b) or 

(c-5) of this Section ***. 

 *** 

For purposes of this Section, ‘convicted’ shall have the same meaning as 

‘adjudicated’. For the purposes of this Act, a person who is defined as a violent 

offender against youth as a result of being adjudicated a juvenile delinquent 

under paragraph (2) of this subsection (a) upon attaining 17 years of age shall 

be considered as having committed the violent offense against youth on or after 

the 17th birthday of the violent offender against youth. Registration of juveniles 

upon attaining 17 years of age shall not extend the original registration of 10 

years from the date of conviction.” 730 ILCS 154/5(a)(2) (West 2012). 

¶ 18 The Violent Offender Act further provides: 

 “(b) As used in this Act, ‘violent offense against youth’ means: 

 * * * 

 (4.4) A violation or attempted violation of any of the following Sections 

or clauses of the Criminal Code of 1961 or the Criminal Code of 2012 when 
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the victim was under 18 years of age and the offense was committed on or 

after *** (2) July 26, 2010 and the defendant was under the age of 18: 

 12-3.3 (aggravated domestic battery),

 12-3.05(a)(1), 12-3.05(d)(2), 12-3.05(f)(1), 12-4(a), 12-4(b)(1), or 

12-4(b)(14) (aggravated battery)[.]” 730 ILCS 154/5(b)(4.4) (West 

2012). 

¶ 19 Because M.A. was adjudicated delinquent for the offenses of aggravated 

domestic battery and aggravated battery, M.A. fell within the definition of a violent 

offender against youth. The Violent Offender Act provides that a violent offender 

against youth has a duty to register (730 ILCS 154/10 (West 2012)). With regard to 

a juvenile, the Act provides that: 

“A person who has been adjudicated a juvenile delinquent for an act which, if 

committed by an adult, would be a violent offense against youth shall register 

as an adult violent offender against youth within 10 days after attaining 17 years 

of age.” 730 ILCS 154/10(a) (West 2012). 

With certain exceptions not relevant in this case, a person required to register under 

the Violent Offender Act is “required to register for a period of 10 years after 

conviction or adjudication if not confined to a penal institution, hospital or any 

other institution or facility.” 730 ILCS 154/40 (West 2012). 

¶ 20 The Violent Offender Act requires the Department of State Police to establish 

and maintain a statewide Murderer and Violent Offender Against Youth database 

“for the purpose of identifying violent offenders against youth and making that 

information available to the persons specified in Section 95.” 730 ILCS 154/85(a) 

(West 2012). Section 95 of the Act provides for the community notification of 

violent offenders against youth. 730 ILCS 154/95 (West 2012). However, with 

regard to juvenile offenders, the Violent Offender Act states: 

“(a) The Department of State Police and any law enforcement agency 

having jurisdiction may, in the Department’s or agency’s discretion, only 

provide the information specified in subsection (b) of Section 95, with respect 

to an adjudicated juvenile delinquent, to any person when that person’s safety 

may be compromised for some reason related to the juvenile violent offender 

against youth.
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(b) The local law enforcement agency having jurisdiction to register the 

juvenile violent offender against youth shall ascertain from the juvenile violent 

offender against youth whether the juvenile violent offender against youth is 

enrolled in school; and if so, shall provide a copy of the violent offender against 

youth registration form only to the principal or chief administrative officer of 

the school and any guidance counselor designated by him or her. The 

registration form shall be kept separately from any and all school records 

maintained on behalf of the juvenile violent offender against youth.” 730 ILCS 

154/100 (West 2012). 

¶ 21 In reviewing the Violent Offender Act’s registration provisions, we observe 

that statutes are presumed constitutional, and this court will construe a statute in a 

manner that affirms the constitutionality of the statute, if reasonably possible. 

People v. Hollins, 2012 IL 112754, ¶ 13. The party challenging the 

constitutionality of a statute has the burden of proving that the statute is 

unconstitutional. Id. The constitutionality of a statute presents a question of law, 

which is reviewed de novo. Id.

¶ 22 As noted, the appellate court majority held that the Violent Offender Act 

violated procedural due process and equal protection. Article I, section 2, of our 

state constitution guarantees its citizens equal protection and due process of law. 

Article I, section 2, provides: 

“No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process 

of law nor be denied the equal protection of the laws.” Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, 

§ 2. 

Likewise, the fourteenth amendment of the United States Constitution provides: 

“[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without 

due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal 

protection of the laws.” U.S. Const., amend. XIV, § 1. 

¶ 23 We first address the appellate court’s finding that the Violent Offender Act 

denies juvenile violent offenders equal protection. It appears from the appellate 

court’s opinion that M.A. argued that the Act violated the equal protection clause of 

both the Illinois Constitution and the federal constitution. See 2014 IL App (1st) 

132540, ¶ 67. The appellate court did not expressly state whether its finding of an 

equal protection violation was under the state constitution, the federal constitution, 
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or both. This omission does not change our review, as this court applies the same 

standard under both the Illinois Constitution and the United States Constitution 

when conducting an equal protection analysis. People v. Richardson, 2015 IL 

118255, ¶ 9. 

¶ 24 The equal protection clause guarantees that similarly situated individuals will 

be treated in a similar manner, unless the government can demonstrate an 

appropriate reason to treat those individuals differently. Id. The equal protection 

clause does not forbid the legislature from drawing proper distinctions in 

legislation among different categories of people, but the equal protection clause 

does prohibit the legislature from doing so based on criteria wholly unrelated to the 

legislation’s purpose. Id. 

¶ 25 A threshold matter in addressing an equal protection claim is determining 

whether the individual claiming an equal protection violation is similarly situated 

to the comparison group. People v. Masterson, 2011 IL 110072, ¶ 25. 

“As the Supreme Court has noted, equal protection ‘does not forbid all 

classifications’ (Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1, 10 (1992)), ‘[i]t simply keeps 

governmental decisionmakers from treating differently persons who are in all 

relevant respects alike.’ (Emphasis added.) Id. Evidence of different treatment 

of unlike groups does not support an equal protection claim. Fournier v. 

Sebelius, 718 F.3d 1110, 1124 (9th Cir. 2013).” (Emphasis in original.) In re 

Derrico G., 2014 IL 114463, ¶ 92. 

¶ 26 When a party bringing an equal protection claim fails to show that he is 

similarly situated to the comparison group, his equal protection challenge fails. 

Masterson, 2011 IL 110072, ¶ 25. Generally, in the context of equal protection 

claims, a determination of whether individuals are similarly situated requires an 

analysis of the purpose of the legislation at issue. Id.

¶ 27 In the appellate court, the State argued that M.A. could not meet the threshold 

requirement of similarly situated groups because juvenile violent offenders are not 

similarly situated to juvenile sex offenders. The appellate court acknowledged that 

the offenses with which both groups of juveniles were charged were different and 

required proof of different elements, so “in that sense, the two groups are not 

similarly situated.” 2014 IL App (1st) 132540, ¶ 69. Nonetheless, the appellate 

court held that for purposes of its equal protection analysis, “the appropriate class 

of persons is juvenile offenders who, as a result of a juvenile adjudication, are 
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required to register with law enforcement authorities.” Id. In that context, the 

appellate court concluded that juveniles required to register as sex offenders were 

treated differently, and much more leniently, than juveniles required to register as 

violent offenders against youth. Id.

¶ 28 The appellate court observed that juveniles required to register as sex offenders 

under the Sex Offender Registration Act (Registration Act) were relieved of the 

obligation to register as adults upon turning 17 years old, and were allowed an 

opportunity, after five years, to demonstrate that their obligation to register should 

be terminated. 2014 IL App (1st) 132540, ¶ 69. In contrast, juveniles required to 

register under the Violent Offender Act are required to register as adults upon 

turning 17 years old, and do not have the opportunity to seek termination of their 

registration after five years. The appellate court held that the disparity in treatment 

between these “similarly situated” groups had no rational basis, so that the Violent 

Offender Act’s registration requirement for juveniles violated equal protection. 

¶ 29 Upon review, we disagree with the appellate court’s threshold determination 

that juvenile sexual offenders are similarly situated to juvenile violent offenders. 

While juveniles adjudicated delinquent under the Registration Act and under the 

Violent Offender Act may appear to be similarly situated because both statutes 

require the juveniles to register, a determination that individuals are similarly 

situated for equal protection purposes cannot be made in the abstract. People v. 

Warren, 173 Ill. 2d 348, 363 (1996). The determination whether individuals are 

similarly situated generally can only be made by considering the purpose of the 

particular legislation. Id.

¶ 30 The Registration Act was enacted in 1986, and was originally titled the 

Habitual Child Sex Offender Registration Act (1986 Act) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 

38, ¶ 221 et seq.). The 1986 Act was passed “in response to concern over the 

proliferation of sex offenses against children.” People v. Adams, 144 Ill. 2d 381, 

386 (1991). In enacting the 1986 Act, “the legislature sought to create an additional 

method of protection for children from the increasing incidence of sexual assault 

and sexual abuse,” by requiring sex offenders to register with local law 

enforcement agencies. Id. at 387. The title of the 1986 Act was amended in 1993 to 

the Child Sex Offender Registration Act (730 ILCS 150/1 et seq. (West 1994)). The 

title was again amended in 1996 to the Registration Act (730 ILCS 150/1 et seq.

(West 1996)). 
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¶ 31 In addition to renaming the statute, the 1996 amendments to the Registration 

Act also expanded the statute to include enumerated sex offenses against adult 

victims, as well as certain sexual and nonsexual offenses against child victims (730 

ILCS 150/1 et seq. (West 1996)). Ten years later, the legislature enacted the 

Violent Offender Act. In introducing the bill which would become the Violent 

Offender Act, Representative Fritchey stated:

 “ ‘Ladies and Gentlemen, this is actually a very serious issue. Last week we 

had a number of Bills come up and I’m sure we will this week and next week 

again, with continual crackdowns on individuals that are on the sex offender 

registry. What a lot of you may not recognize is that there are a number of 

individuals that are on that registry whose crimes have nothing to do with the 

sexual offense. They may have to do with a murder if the victim was a minor. It 

may have to do with aggravated kidnapping with certain offenses along those 

lines. What this piece of legislation does is clean up, 10 years too late, the sex 

offender registry to make sure that only those individuals that’ve [sic] 

committed sex offenses remain on that registry. What is [sic] does not do is take 

these people out of the purview of law enforcement. It simply shifts them over 

into a new registry which will be called the Violent Offender Against Youth 

Registry. We would still be able to monitor them, we’d still be able to track 

them, but we will not further stigmatize individuals who have already 

committed a crime and come out and paid their time by calling them sex 

offenders when they’re actually not.’ ” (Emphases added.) 94th Ill. Gen. 

Assem., House Proceedings, Feb. 22, 2006, at 13 (statements of Representative 

Fritchey).

¶ 32 The purpose of the Violent Offender Act, then, was to remove nonsexual 

offenders from the Registration Act, as the legislature concluded that it was a 

greater stigma to be categorized as a sex offender than a violent offender. The 

legislature also recognized that the crimes of the nonsexual offenders had nothing 

to do with sexual offenses. In other words, the Violent Offender Act was enacted 

because the legislature determined that violent offenders were not similarly 

situated to sex offenders. The Registration Act and the Violent Offender Act 

address qualitatively different types of offenders and qualitatively different types of 

offenses. Consequently, although both juvenile sexual offenders and juvenile 

violent offenders are required to register under the applicable statutes, the statutes 

address separate groups of offenders in a manner unique to each group. 
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¶ 33 The appellate court majority essentially conceded as much when it admitted 

that “[c]learly, the offenses with which the two groups of juveniles are charged are 

different and require proof of different elements and in that sense, the two groups 

are not similarly situated.” 2014 IL App (1st) 132540, ¶ 69. Nonetheless, in order to 

reach the merits of M.A.’s equal protection argument, the majority simply 

concluded that, “for purposes of M.A.’s equal protection argument, we believe the 

appropriate class of persons is juvenile offenders who, as a result of a juvenile 

adjudication, are required to register with law enforcement authorities.” Id. Aside 

from this conclusory statement, the majority does not otherwise support its finding 

that the two groups of juveniles are similarly situated. Simply declaring a group 

similarly situated does not make it so absent some evidence that the individuals are 

in all respects alike.

¶ 34 M.A., a juvenile violent offender, was not similarly situated to a juvenile 

adjudicated delinquent under the Registration Act. Therefore, it is of no 

consequence that the registration provisions for juveniles adjudicated delinquent 

under the Registration Act differ from the registration provisions for juveniles 

adjudicated delinquent under the Violent Offender Act. Evidence of different 

treatment of unlike groups does not support an equal protection claim. In re 

Derrico G., 2014 IL 114463, ¶ 92. Because M.A. cannot meet the threshold 

requirement for bringing an equal protection claim, her equal protection claim 

necessarily fails. The appellate court erred in finding otherwise, and in holding that 

the Violent Offender Act was unconstitutional because it violated equal protection. 

¶ 35 Having found that the Violent Offender Act does not violate equal protection, 

we next consider the appellate court’s finding that the Violent Offender Act also 

violated procedural due process. A procedural due process claim challenges the 

constitutionality of specific procedures used to deny a person’s life, liberty or 

property. People v. Cardona, 2013 IL 114076, ¶ 15. The fundamental requirements 

of due process are notice of the proceeding and an opportunity to present any 

objections. Id. Due process is a flexible concept and “not all situations calling for 

procedural safeguards call for the same kind of procedure.” Morrissey v. Brewer, 

408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972). 

¶ 36 When a fundamental right or suspect classification based upon race or national 

origin is involved, strict scrutiny analysis applies. People v. Masterson, 2011 IL 

110072, ¶ 24. Strict scrutiny requires a showing that the statute is narrowly tailored 

to serve a compelling state interest. Id. When a fundamental right or suspect 
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classification is not involved, the rational basis standard applies. Id. The rational 

basis test requires a determination of whether the statute bears a rational 

relationship to a legitimate government purpose. Id. 

¶ 37 In addressing M.A.’s constitutional claims, the appellate court found that the 

Violent Offender Act did not violate any of M.A.’s fundamental rights. 

Accordingly, the appellate court applied the rational basis test in addressing those 

constitutional challenges. M.A. does not contest the appellate court’s finding that 

the rational basis test applies to her constitutional claims.

¶ 38 As with its equal protection analysis, the appellate court majority does not 

indicate whether the finding that the Violent Offender Act violates a juvenile’s 

right to procedural due process is under the federal constitution, the Illinois 

Constitution, or both. In her argument in support of the appellate court’s decision, 

M.A. references both the state constitution and the federal constitution. Although 

the due process clause of our state constitution may be construed independently of 

the federal due process clause (People v. Molnar, 222 Ill. 2d 495, 510 (2006)), 

M.A. does not argue, nor did the appellate court majority find, that the due process 

clause of our state constitution should be construed independently of the due 

process clause of the federal constitution. We find no compelling reason to interpret 

the Illinois due process clause to provide greater protection than its federal 

counterpart. 

¶ 39 M.A.’s challenge to the statute claimed both facial and “as applied” procedural 

due process violations. A statute is facially invalid only if there is no set of 

circumstances under which the statute would be valid. Napleton v. Village of 

Hinsdale, 229 Ill. 2d 296, 305-06 (2008). The fact that a statute could be found 

unconstitutional under some circumstances does not establish its facial invalidity. 

Id. at 306. Consequently, a facial challenge to the constitutionality of a legislative 

enactment is the most difficult challenge to mount successfully. Id. at 305. 

¶ 40 An “as applied” challenge, in contrast, challenges how a statute was applied in 

the particular context in which the plaintiff acted or proposed to act. Id. at 306. In 

an “as applied” challenge, the facts surrounding the plaintiff’s particular 

circumstances become relevant. Id. If a plaintiff prevails in an “as applied” 

challenge, enforcement of the statute is enjoined only against the plaintiff, while a 

finding that a statute is facially unconstitutional voids the statute in its entirety and 

in all applications. Id.
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¶ 41 The appellate court majority appears to have found the Violent Offender Act to 

be both facially unconstitutional and unconstitutional as applied to M.A. The 

appellate court found that “the Act, with its mandated registry for 10 years and its 

requirement that juvenile offenders automatically register as adults upon turning 

17, denies minors procedural due process.” 2014 IL App (1st) 132540, ¶ 53. The 

appellate court, however, also addressed the procedural due process violation in 

terms of M.A.’s specific circumstances. Because a finding that the statute is 

constitutional as applied to M.A. would necessarily compel a finding that the 

statute is constitutional on its face, we will first consider whether the Violent 

Offender Act is unconstitutional as applied. 

¶ 42 As noted, with regard to juvenile offenders, the Violent Offender Act provides 

that until the juvenile turns 17, dissemination of registry information is limited. See 

730 ILCS 154/100 (West 2012). However, upon turning 17, a juvenile is required 

to register as an adult, meaning that he or she is subject to community notification 

on the Violent Offender Against Youth Registry’s public website for the remainder 

of the 10 year period of registration. See 730 ILCS 154/5(a) (West 2012); 20 Ill. 

Adm. Code 1283.50(j) (2010) (“A person who has been adjudicated a juvenile 

delinquent for an act that, if committed by an adult, would be a violent offense 

against youth shall register as an adult violent offender against youth within 10 

days after attaining 17 years of age. Upon registering as an adult, the juvenile 

offender will be placed on the Illinois State Police Violent Offender Against Youth 

Registry website after an authorization letter is signed by the offender and received 

by the Illinois State Police.”). 

¶ 43 The appellate court majority found that the Violent Offender Act violated a 

juvenile’s right to due process because the statute mandates that juveniles 

automatically register as adults upon turning 17, regardless of the circumstances of 

the offense. 2014 IL App (1st) 132540, ¶ 53. Further, the statute requires juveniles 

to register as adults with the attendant inclusion of their information on the 

statewide public registry, without any individualized assessment of whether the 

juvenile poses any continuing risk to the public. Id. Moreover, adult registration 

may occur several years after the delinquency adjudication and is required without 

any opportunity for further hearing. Id. The appellate court majority held:

“While the rational basis test might support an initial registration 

requirement for all juvenile offenders classified as ‘violent offenders against 

youth’ under the Act without an individualized assessment as to whether those 
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minors, in fact, pose a danger to the public (particularly in light of the limited 

dissemination of registration information), it does not likewise justify the 

requirement that all such offenders automatically register as adults, with the 

ensuing disclosure of registration information to the public at large. This is 

particularly true given that no hearing is conducted prior to mandated adult 

registration.” Id. ¶ 54. 

¶ 44 In addressing this issue, we find the United States Supreme Court’s decision in 

Connecticut Department of Public Safety v. Doe, 538 U.S. 1, 8 (2003), to be 

controlling. There, the Court held that a party who asserts a right to a hearing under 

the due process clause must show that the facts they seek to establish in that hearing 

are relevant under the statutory scheme. At issue in that case was a due process 

challenge to the provisions of Connecticut’s sex offender registry law which 

required the Department of Public Safety to post sex offender registry information 

on the internet, and to make the registry available to the public. 

¶ 45 A convicted sex offender argued that the registration law violated his right to 

due process because he was “not a ‘ “dangerous sexual offender,” ’ and that the 

Connecticut law ‘deprives him of a liberty interest—his reputation combined with 

the alteration of his status under state law—without notice or a meaningful 

opportunity to be heard.’ ” Id. at 6 (quoting Doe v. Dep’t of Public Safety ex rel. 

Lee, 271 F.3d 38, 45-46 (2d Cir. 2001)). The District Court and the Court of 

Appeals agreed that the due process clause entitled class members “to a hearing ‘to 

determine whether or not they are particularly likely to be currently dangerous 

before being labeled as such by their inclusion in a publicly disseminated 

registry.’ ” Id. (quoting Doe v. Dep’t of Public Safety ex rel. Lee, 271 F.3d at 62. 

¶ 46 The United States Supreme Court reversed the lower courts, holding that even 

if the respondent had been deprived of a liberty interest, due process did not entitle

the respondent to a hearing to establish a fact that was not material under the 

Connecticut statute. Id. at 7. That was because the law’s requirements for 

registration turned on the fact of the offender’s conviction alone, a fact that the 

convicted offender had already had a procedurally safeguarded opportunity to 

contest. Id. No other fact was relevant to the disclosure of the registrants’ 

information, and the website contained a disclaimer explicitly stating that no 

determination had been made that any individual included in the registry was 

currently dangerous. Id. The Court held: 
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“In short, even if respondent could prove that he is not likely to be currently 

dangerous, Connecticut has decided that the registry information of all sex 

offenders—currently dangerous or not—must be publicly disclosed. Unless 

respondent can show that that substantive rule of law is defective (by 

conflicting with a provision of the Constitution), any hearing on current 

dangerousness is a bootless exercise.” (Emphases in original.) Id. at 7-8. 

¶ 47 Like the Connecticut statute, the Violent Offender Act requires violent 

offenders against youth, including juvenile offenders, to register based upon the 

fact that the offender was adjudicated delinquent or convicted of an offense 

included within the definition of a violent offender against youth, not based on the 

offender’s dangerousness. The only material fact, then, is the offender’s conviction 

or adjudication of a violent offense against youth. Moreover, the Illinois State 

Police Murderer and Violent Offender Against Youth Registry, like the registry at 

issue in Connecticut Department of Public Safety, contains a disclaimer explicitly 

stating that:

“ISP has not considered or assessed the specific risk of re-offense with regard to 

any individual prior to his or her inclusion on this Registry and has made no 

determination that any individual included in this Registry is currently 

dangerous. Individuals included on the Registry are included solely by virtue of 

their conviction record, Illinois state law and proof the offense was not sexually 

motivated. The primary purpose of providing this information is to make the 

information easily available and accessible, not to warn about any specific 

individuals.” Illinois State Police Murderer and Violent Offender Against 

Youth Registry, http://www.isp.state.il.us/cmvo (last visited Aug. 31, 2015). 

¶ 48 Given that current dangerousness is not relevant or material to the duty to 

register under the Violent Offender Act, M.A. does not have a due process right to a 

hearing to establish a fact that is not relevant or material under Illinois law. Again, 

the Act requires registration solely based upon the fact of conviction or 

adjudication, a fact that M.A. had a procedurally safeguarded opportunity to contest 

during her juvenile adjudication proceedings. M.A. did not challenge her 

adjudication as a juvenile delinquent on appeal. Like the offender in Connecticut 

Department of Public Safety, then, M.A. received all the process to which she was 

due when she was adjudicated delinquent of aggravated domestic battery and 

aggravated battery, offenses included within the definition of a violent offender 

against youth. See 730 ILCS 154/5(b)(4.4) (West 2012). 
- 16 - 

¶ 49 M.A.’s adjudication for aggravated domestic battery and aggravated battery 

were sufficient to require her to register as a violent offender against youth. The 

Violent Offender Act, therefore, does not violate procedural due process as applied 

to M.A. Because the Violent Offender Act does not violate procedural due process 

as applied to M.A., it follows that the Act also is not facially unconstitutional.

¶ 50 Finally, we turn to M.A.’s arguments in support of her request for cross-relief. 

M.A. argues that the appellate court erred in finding that the Violent Offender Act 

did not violate substantive due process. 

¶ 51 The appellate court held that the decision in In re J.W., 204 Ill. 2d 50 (2003) 

compelled the conclusion that the Violent Offender Act’s requirements passed the 

rational basis test, defeating M.A.’s substantive due process challenge. The court 

stated:

“Just as our supreme court [in In re J.W.] concluded that there is a rational 

relationship between the registration requirements for sex offenders, regardless 

of age, and the protection of the public from those offenders [citation], the same 

reasoning compels the finding that a rational relationship exists in the context 

of this case. The public requires protection from violent offenders against 

youth; this is true whether the offender is an adult or a juvenile. The degree of 

protection required may vary given, among other things, the age of the offender 

at the time the offense is committed. In recognition of this fact and consistent 

with the Juvenile Court Act’s statutory confidentiality provisions (705 ILCS 

405/1-7, 1-8 (West 2012)), the legislature has deemed it appropriate to limit 

those who have access to a juvenile offender’s information contained on the 

registry, while making the same information for adult offenders widely 

available. Given our conclusion that under the rationale of In re J.W., the Act’s 

registration requirements are rationally related to public safety, we reject 

M.A.’s substantive due process challenge.” 2014 IL App (1st) 132540, ¶ 48. 

¶ 52 In this court, M.A. argues that the Violent Offender Act violates substantive 

due process both on its face and as applied. Again, because a facial challenge to a 

statute must fail if any situation exists where the statute could be validly applied 

(People v. Davis, 2014 IL 115595, ¶ 25), we first address M.A.’ s claim that the Act 

violates substantive due process as applied to her. 

¶ 53 As a preliminary matter, we note that here too, although M.A. cited both the 

federal and the state due process clauses, the appellate court did not indicate 
- 17 - 

whether its holding was based on the state due process clause, the federal due 

process clause, or both. In this court, M.A. does not argue that the state due process 

clause provides greater protection than that provided by the federal constitution. 

Absent any argument to the contrary, we again find no compelling reason to 

construe the state due process clause independently of its federal counterpart with 

regard to M.A.’s substantive due process claim. 

¶ 54 M.A. claims that the Violent Offender Act violates substantive due process as 

applied to her because she was only 13 years and 3 months old when the offense 

took place, it was her first contact with the juvenile justice system, no one ever 

found her to be a threat to society, and the details of her offense strongly suggest 

that her offense was an act of desperation and not an accurate reflection of her 

threat to society as a whole. In addition, even if M.A. was a serious threat to 

society, by the time M.A. is required to register as an adult, 3 years and 9 months 

after the offense giving rise to her adjudication, there is no basis to conclude that 

M.A. will remain such a threat. M.A. claims that the Violent Offender Act’s stated 

goal of protecting the public is not served by automatically requiring a child such as 

M.A. to begin registering as an adult violent offender at the same time she is 

reaching the age where she will be trying to secure employment and go to college.

¶ 55 As the appellate court found, the rational basis test applies to M.A.’s 

substantive due process challenge. A statute will be upheld under the rational basis 

test as long as it bears a rational relationship to a legitimate legislative purpose and 

is neither arbitrary nor unreasonable. People v. Hollins, 2012 IL 112754, ¶ 15. In 

applying the rational basis test, a court must first ascertain the statute’s public 

purpose in order to determine whether the statute’s provisions reasonably 

implement that purpose. Id. ¶ 18. A statute will be upheld where the statute bears a 

reasonable relationship to the public interest to be served and the means adopted are 

a reasonable method of accomplishing the desired objective. In re J.W., 204 Ill. 2d 

at 67. A statute need not be the best means of accomplishing the stated objective. 

Id. at 72. Courts will not second guess the wisdom of legislative enactments or 

dictate alternative means to achieve the desired result. Id. If there is any 

conceivable set of facts that show a rational basis for the statute, the statute will be 

upheld. People v. Johnson, 225 Ill. 2d 573, 585 (2007). 

¶ 56 The purpose of the Violent Offender Act is to protect the public from violent 

offenders against youth. Requiring registration of individuals convicted or 

adjudicated of an offense constituting a violent offense against youth is a 
- 18 - 

reasonable method of accomplishing the Act’s objective to protect the public. To 

that end, the legislature has deemed it appropriate to impose a 10 year registration 

requirement on most violent offenders against youth. However, with regard to 

juvenile offenders, the legislature deemed it appropriate to limit those who have 

access to a juvenile violent offender’s information contained on the registry until 

the juvenile turns 17 years old. Limiting access to a juvenile offender’s information 

until the juvenile is 17 years old is a reasonable means of accomplishing the 

purpose the legislature sought to accomplish in enacting the statute—protecting the 

public from violent offenders against youth—while maintaining the Juvenile Court 

Act’s statutory confidentiality provisions (see 705 ILCS 405/1-7, 1-8 (West 2012)).

¶ 57 As applied to M.A., we note that in arguing that the Violent Offender Act 

violates her right to substantive due process, M.A. downplays her offenses as “an 

act of desperation,” pointing to her difficult upbringing as motivating her actions. 

However, we are not called upon to reweigh the evidence supporting M.A.’s 

adjudication or the validity of the adjudication. What is relevant for purposes of the 

instant analysis is that M.A. was ordered to register under the Act based upon her 

adjudications for aggravated battery and aggravated domestic battery. 

¶ 58 Aggravated battery is defined as:

“(a) Offense based injury. A person commits aggravated battery when, in 

committing a battery, other than by the discharge of a firearm, he or she 

knowingly does any of the following: 

(1) Causes great bodily harm or permanent disability or disfigurement.” 

720 ILCS 5/12-3.05(a)(1) (West 2012). 

This offense is a Class 3 felony when committed by an adult. See 720 ILCS 

5/12-3.05(h) (West 2012). 

¶ 59 Aggravated domestic battery is defined as:

“(a) A person who, in committing a domestic battery, knowingly causes 

great bodily harm, or permanent disability or disfigurement commits 

aggravated domestic battery.” 720 ILCS 5/12-3.3(a) (West 2012). 

Aggravated domestic battery is a Class 2 felony when committed by an adult. See 

720 ILCS 5/12-3.3(b) (West 2012). 
- 19 - 

¶ 60 Given that the charges for which M.A. is required to register would be felonies 

if M.A. committed those acts as an adult, along with the fact that those charges 

require a finding that the offender caused “great bodily harm, permanent disability, 

or disfigurement,” we agree with the appellate court that there is a rational 

relationship between M.A.’s registration and the protection of the public. 

Consequently, we find that the Violent Offender Act does not violate M.A.’s right 

to substantive due process as applied. For that reason, the Violent Offender Act also 

is not facially unconstitutional. We affirm the appellate court’s finding that the Act 

does not violate substantive due process. 

¶ 61 As a final matter, we note that the appellate court majority, M.A., and the 

amicus, spend a significant amount of time pointing out M.A.’s difficult 

upbringing, as well as the facts surrounding the incident giving rise to M.A.’s 

adjudication as a delinquent minor and subsequent thereto. The parties and the 

appellate court majority point to those facts in support of a finding that the Violent 

Offender Act’s registration requirements are unconstitutional as applied to M.A. 

¶ 62 While we do not minimize the environment in which M.A. was raised, which 

likely did play a role in her adjudication as a delinquent minor, the considerations 

raised by the parties and the appellate court majority are not relevant to our 

constitutional analysis. The facts giving rise to M.A.’s adjudication are relevant to a 

determination of guilt or innocence. M.A. has not challenged on appeal the 

sufficiency of the evidence leading to her adjudication as a delinquent minor, 

therefore, there is no need for this court to reweigh the evidence against M.A. The 

legislature deliberately chose to make an individual’s conviction or adjudication 

the basis for requiring a violent offender against youth to register under the Violent 

Offender Act. Registration under the Act is offense based, rather than offender 

based.

¶ 63 We find Justice Pucinski’s discussion on this point to be well taken. In 

dissenting in part to the majority’s finding of unconstitutionality, Justice Pucinski 

stated:

“I also do not agree with reweighing the evidence in M.A.’s case to find the 

Act unconstitutional. While I do have sympathy for M.A.’s background, the 

fact remains that the trial court heard all the testimony and observed her and 

was in the best position to determine her guilt or innocence and any mitigating 

factors. For us to reweigh the evidence before the trial judge and the trial 
- 20 - 

judge’s determination that M.A. in fact was guilty of stabbing her brother is 

improper. While the majority finds it understandable that M.A. stabbed her 

brother due to her toxic environment and abuse at the hands of her brother, there 

are many abused children who do not resort to violence. The legislature is well 

within its authority in determining that juveniles who commit violence against 

other children should register as adults when they turn 17, if they indeed 

committed the violent offense. Protecting other innocent children is a legitimate 

state interest, and requiring that juvenile violent offenders register as adults 

when they turn 17 to complete the 10-year mandated registration period is 

rationally related to that state interest.” (Emphasis in original.) 2014 IL App 

(1st) 132540, ¶ 105 (Pucinski, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 

¶ 64 The appellate court majority, M.A. and the amicus also rely heavily on 

amendments to the Registration Act in support of a finding that the Violent 

Offender Act’s registration requirements are unconstitutional. We did not address 

those amendments in our analysis because they were not relevant to that analysis. 

Given the significance placed upon those amendments by the appellate court, M.A. 

and the amicus, however, we will briefly address the amendments. 

¶ 65 At the same time that the legislature was considering House Bill 4193, which 

became the Violent Offender Act, the legislature also was considering House Bill 

2067, which would amend the Registration Act. Senator Raoul explained that 

House Bill 2067: 

“answers the invitation of the Illinois Supreme Court in the case of In re J.W., 

where in dicta, Justice McMorrow, while upholding that juvenile sex 

offenders—juveniles classified as sex offenders should—can be required to 

register as adults, indicated that the Legislature should address the situation of 

different types of offenses. And this is really targeted towards the type of the 

kind of Romeo and Juliet cases where—and—and there’s no such thing as 

consensual sex for teenagers. And so in—in cases where a sixteen-year-old and 

a fifteen-year-old engage in consensual sex, one of those two, or perhaps both 

of them, could be required to register as a sex offender once they reach the age 

of majority. What House Bill 2067 proposes to do is to remove the current state

of a law of one case fits all and—and require—and require that the court 

address cases on a case-by-case basis, so we don’t have the situation where 

teenagers engaged in consensual sex are thereafter required to register as sex 
- 21 - 

offenders.” 94th Ill. Gen. Assem., Senate Proceedings, Mar. 30, 2006, at 48 

(statements of Senator Raoul).

Of note is the fact that at the same time the legislature was passing the Violent 

Offender Act, with no provisions for a court to address registration for juveniles on 

a case-by-case basis, it was considering such a provision for juveniles required to 

register under the Registration Act. This at least suggests that the legislature 

deliberately chose not to include the proposed Registration Act amendments 

concerning juveniles in the text of the Violent Offender Act.

¶ 66 House Bill 2067 was passed by the legislature, but was vetoed by the Governor. 

Subsequently, proposed amendments to the Registration Act were raised again in 

Senate Bill 121. The amendments to the Registration Act proposed in Senate Bill 

121: eliminated the provision that a juvenile delinquent be required to register as an 

adult within 10 days of turning 17 years old; added that a minor adjudicated 

delinquent of a sex offense which would be a felony if the minor was an adult can 

petition for the termination of the term of registration after five years of 

registration; and added that a minor adjudicated delinquent of a sex offense which 

would be a misdemeanor if the minor was an adult can petition for the termination 

of the term of registration after two years of registration. Senate Bill 121 passed 

over the Governor’s veto and the amendments to the Registration Act were codified 

in section 3-5 of the statute (730 ILCS 150/3-5 (West 2008)). 

¶ 67 Recently, the court in In re S.B., 2012 IL 112204, ¶ 29, addressed the 

amendments, stating:

“In enacting the termination provisions of section 3-5, the General 

Assembly recognized that, in many instances, juveniles who engage in sexually 

inappropriate behavior do so because of immaturity rather than predatory 

inclinations. The purpose of the termination provisions of section 3-5 is to 

afford juveniles the opportunity to demonstrate this is true in an individual case, 

and to prove that they do not pose a safety risk to the community.” 

¶ 68 The appellate court, M.A. and the amicus point to the amendments to the 

Registration Act as proof that the registration provisions of the Violent Offender 

Act, which contain no similar provisions, are unconstitutional. What is overlooked 

in this claim is that a version of the Registration Act without the amendments was 

held not to violate a 12-year-old sexual offender’s right to substantive due process 

even when that 12-year-old sexual offender was required to register for life as a 
- 22 - 

result of his adjudication as a sexual predator. See In re J.W., 204 Ill. 2d 50 (2003). 

The fact that the legislature later decided to amend the Registration Act to provide 

additional protections to juvenile offenders does not thereby render the prior 

version of the Act unconstitutional. Statutes do not confer constitutional rights. 

People v. Mitchell, 189 Ill. 2d 312, 329 (2000). 

¶ 69 Moreover, we cannot assume that the considerations animating the 

amendments to the Registration Act are also present in the case of juvenile violent 

offenders. In amending the Registration Act, the legislature was concerned that the 

statute had included consensual and immature conduct, as well as more serious 

sexual offenses, in its definition of a sexual offender. The Violent Offender Act, in 

contrast, encompasses offenses targeting children that the legislature has deemed 

violent offenses. The fact that the legislature expressly defined the enumerated 

offenses to be violent offenses against children weighs against a claim that the 

statute targets behaviors similar to the consensual and immature behaviors 

motivating the amendments to the Registration Act. 

¶ 70 In any event, “the judiciary may not sit as a superlegislature to judge the 

wisdom or desirability of legislative policy determinations made in areas that 

neither affect fundamental rights nor proceed along suspect lines ***.” City of New 

Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303 (1976) (per curiam). “A statute is not invalid 

under the Constitution because it might have gone farther than it did.” Roschen v. 

Ward, 279 U.S. 337, 339 (1929). It is for the legislature, then, and not this court, to 

decide whether the Violent Offender Act’s registration provisions should be 

amended with regard to juveniles in a manner similar to the Registration Act’s

registration provisions. 

¶ 71 For all the foregoing reasons, we affirm the appellate court’s finding that the 

Violent Offender Act does not violate substantive due process. We reverse the 

appellate court’s finding that the Violent Offender Act violates equal protection 

and procedural due process. We also find that the trial court properly required 

M.A. to register under the Act, and therefore reverse the appellate court’s order 

vacating the trial court’s order.

¶ 72 Appellate court affirmed in part and reversed in part.

¶ 73 Circuit court affirmed.
- 23 - 

¶ 74 JUSTICE BURKE, specially concurring:

¶ 75 In the case at bar, M.A., a 13-year-old girl, was adjudicated delinquent of 

several offenses arising out of an altercation with her older brother. It was M.A.’s 

first referral to juvenile court. The trial court sentenced M.A. to 30 months’ 

probation with certain conditions, one of which was to register under the Illinois 

Murderer and Violent Offender Against Youth Registration Act (730 ILCS 154/1 

et seq. (West 2012)). M.A. contends that the Act’s mandatory registration 

requirements violate substantive and procedural due process and result in a denial 

of equal protection. This court rejects M.A.’s contentions and upholds the 

constitutionality of the Act as applied to juvenile violent offenders. While I am 

compelled to agree with the court’s determination as to the Act’s constitutionality, I 

write separately to express my concern that the Act fails to take into account the 

unique characteristics of juveniles and to urge the legislature to reevaluate the Act’s 

requirements as applied to juvenile offenders. 

¶ 76 The Act requires juveniles adjudicated delinquent for certain enumerated 

offenses to register as violent offenders against youth for 10 years following 

adjudication. 730 ILCS 154/5(a), 10 (West 2012). Upon registration with the local 

law enforcement agency, the agency must disclose the juvenile’s identifying 

information to the local school board, the principal and guidance counselor at the 

offender’s school, and all child care facilities, institutions of higher education, and 

libraries in the county in which she is required to register or is employed. 730 ILCS 

154/95(a-2), (a-3), 100(b) (West 2012). Any law enforcement agency also has the 

discretion to disclose the offender’s name, address, date of birth, offense, 

photograph, employment information, and any “other such information that will 

help identify the violent offender” to “any person likely to encounter a violent 

offender.” 730 ILCS 154/95(b)(3) (West 2012). Upon turning age 17, a juvenile 

violent offender is required to register as an adult, and her identifying information 

is made accessible to the public via a website. 730 ILCS 154/85(a), (b) (West 

2012). The Act does not provide an opportunity for a hearing to assess a juvenile’s 

risk of violence to the general public, nor does it provide a juvenile offender an 

opportunity to seek removal from the registry prior to the expiration of the 10-year 

registration period. 

¶ 77 In contrast to the Murderer and Violent Offender Against Youth Registration 

Act, the Sex Offender Registration Act (730 ILCS 150/1 et seq. (West 2012)), does 

not require juveniles to register as adults upon reaching age 17. Rather, juvenile 
- 24 - 

sex offenders are allowed to remain registered as juveniles for the entirety of their 

registration term. See People ex rel. Birkett v. Konetski, 233 Ill. 2d 185, 203 (2009) 

(citing Pub. Act 95-658, § 5 (eff. Oct. 11, 2007) (amending 730 ILCS 150/2(A), 

3(a))). Thus, information about a juvenile offender’s identity and offense, even 

after she reaches the age of majority, is provided only to a limited number of people 

and will never appear on the adult registry. 730 ILCS 152/121 (West 2012). 

Another procedural protection afforded to juvenile sex offenders is the right to 

petition for termination from the registry after five years for a felony or two years 

for a misdemeanor. 730 ILCS 150/3-5(c) (West 2012). Juveniles have the right to 

be represented by counsel at the hearing on a petition for termination. Following 

the hearing, the court may terminate the juvenile’s registry requirement if it finds 

by a preponderance of the evidence that the juvenile poses no risk to the

community. 730 ILCS 150/3-5(d) to (f) (West 2012). In making this determination, 

the court may consider the juvenile’s age, past offenses, risk assessment, evidence 

of rehabilitation, and mental, physical, educational and social history, as well as 

any victim impact statements. 730 ILCS 150/3-5(e) (West 2012). 

¶ 78 Significantly, the opportunity to petition for termination from the sex offender 

registry is not limited to nonviolent offenses or to juveniles who engage in sexually 

inappropriate behavior which would otherwise be consensual. Section 3-5, which 

sets forth the procedure for juvenile sex offenders to petition for early termination, 

explicitly applies to “all cases” where juveniles are adjudicated delinquent of 

qualifying offenses, even violent sexual offenses. 730 ILCS 150/3-5(a), 2(B) (West 

2012) (qualifying offenses include criminal sexual assault, aggravated criminal 

sexual assault, criminal sexual abuse, aggravated criminal sexual abuse, and 

aggravated kidnapping). 

¶ 79 I recognize that the disparate treatment of juvenile offenders under the 

registration statutes does not rise to the level of an equal protection violation 

because the two groups of juvenile offenders are not similarly situated in all 

relevant respects. Nevertheless, in my view, it is illogical to allow juveniles 

adjudicated delinquent of violent sexual offenses to petition for removal from the 

sex offender registry while disallowing the same procedure for juveniles 

adjudicated delinquent of violent offenses which do not involve a sexual 

component. No other state has separate registration laws which treat juvenile 

violent offenders more harshly than juvenile sex offenders. 
- 25 - 

¶ 80 The 2007 amendments to the Sex Offender Registration Act “significantly 

reduce[d] the impact of the minor’s registration requirement” by eliminating the 

requirement of mandatory registration on the adult registry upon turning age 17 and 

allowing a minor to petition for termination of his registration after five years. 

Konetski, 233 Ill. 2d at 203. In making these changes, the General Assembly 

recognized that juveniles who commit sexual offenses may do so “because of 

immaturity rather than predatory inclinations.” In re S.B., 2012 IL 112204, ¶ 29. 

This court has found that minors often make poor decisions based on a lack of 

experience, maturity, and judgment, all of which can change for the better as the 

minor ages and matures. See Hope Clinic for Women, Ltd. v. Flores, 2013 IL 

112673, ¶¶ 64, 86. Our history is “replete with laws and judicial recognition that 

minors, especially in their earlier years, generally are less mature and responsible 

than adults.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. ¶ 64. Minors’ “lack of maturity 

and an underdeveloped sense of responsibility” may lead to “recklessness, 

impulsivity, and heedless risk-taking.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Miller v. 

Alabama, 567 U.S. ___, ___, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2464 (2012). Moreover, children are 

more vulnerable to negative influences, particularly from their families and peers. 

Id. at ___, 132 S. Ct. at 2464. “[A] child’s character is not as well formed as an 

adult’s; his traits are less fixed and his actions less likely to be evidence of 

irretrievabl[e] deprav[ity].” Id. at ___, 132 S. Ct. at 2464. 

¶ 81 In light of the foregoing character traits of juvenile offenders, I invite the 

legislature to reexamine the Murderer and Violent Offender Against Youth 

Registration Act with the same level of scrutiny that it applied to the Sex Offender 

Registration Act when it amended that act in 2007. Ameliorating the Act’s 

requirements for juvenile offenders would better harmonize “[t]he public safety 

concerns which animate the registration and notification laws” with “our traditional 

understanding of the need to protect and rehabilitate the young citizens of this 

state.” In re J.W., 204 Ill. 2d 50, 84 (2003) (McMorrow, J., specially concurring, 

joined by Freeman, J.). 

¶ 82 JUSTICES FREEMAN, KILBRIDE, and THEIS join in this special 

concurrence.