153 FERC ¶ 61,220

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION

18 CFR Part 35

[Docket No. RM15-2-000; Order No. 819]

Third-Party Provision of Primary Frequency Response Service

(Issued November 20, 2015)

AGENCY: Federal Energy Regulatory Commission.

ACTION: Final rule.

SUMMARY: The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (Commission) is revising its 

regulations to foster competition in the sale of primary frequency response service. 

Specifically, the Commission amends its regulations governing market-based rates for 

public utilities pursuant to the Federal Power Act (FPA) to permit the sale of primary 

frequency response service at market-based rates by sellers with market-based rate 

authority for sales of energy and capacity. 

EFFECTIVE DATE: This Final Rule will become effective [Insert date 90 days after 

publication in the FEDERAL REGISTER].
Docket No. RM15-2-000 - 2 -

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

Rahim Amerkhail (General Information)

Office of Energy Policy and Innovation

Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, 

888 First Street, NE

Washington, DC 20426

(202) 502-8266

Gregory Basheda (Market Power Screening Information)

Office of Energy Market Regulation

Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, 

888 First Street, NE

Washington, DC 20426

(202) 502-6479

Lina Naik (Legal Information)

Office of the General Counsel

Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, 

888 First Street, NE

Washington, DC 20426

(202) 502-8882

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
153 FERC ¶ 61,220

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION

Before Commissioners: Norman C. Bay, Chairman;

 Cheryl A. LaFleur, Tony Clark,

and Colette D. Honorable.

Third-Party Provision of Primary Frequency 

 Response Service

Docket No. RM15-2-000

ORDER NO. 819

FINAL RULE

(Issued November 20, 2015)

1. The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (Commission) is revising its 

regulations to foster competition in the sale of primary frequency response service.1

 

Specifically, the Commission amends its regulations to revise Subpart H to Part 35 of 

Title 18 of the Code of Federal Regulations governing market-based rates for public 

utilities pursuant to sections 205 and 206 of the Federal Power Act (FPA)2 to permit the 

sale of primary frequency response service at market-based rates by sellers with marketbased rate authority for sales of energy and capacity.

 1 As described in more detail below, this Final Rule defines primary frequency 

response service as a resource standing by to provide autonomous, pre-programmed 

changes in output to rapidly arrest large changes in frequency until dispatched resources 

can take over. 

2 16 U.S.C. 824d, 824e (2012).
Docket No. RM15-2-000 - 2 -

This proceeding derives from Order No. 784,3 2. in which the Commission revised 

Part 35 of its regulations to reflect reforms to its Avista policy4 governing the sale of 

certain ancillary services at market-based rates to public utility transmission providers. 

Specifically, Order No. 784 found that when appropriate intra-hour transmission 

scheduling practices are in place, the Avista restrictions need not apply to the sale of 

Energy Imbalance, Generator Imbalance, Operating Reserve-Spinning and Operating 

Reserve-Supplemental services, because with those scheduling practices in place the 

existing market power screens for sales of energy and capacity can also be applied to sales 

of those ancillary services.5

 

3. However, because of the unique technical and geographic requirements associated 

with Reactive Supply and Voltage Control (under OATT Schedule 2) and Regulation and 

 3 Third-Party Provision of Ancillary Services; Accounting and Financial Reporting 

for New Electric Storage Technologies, Order No. 784, 78 Fed. Reg. 46,178 (July 30, 

2013), FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 31,349 (2013).

4 Avista Corp., 87 FERC ¶ 61,223, order on reh’g, 89 FERC ¶ 61,136 (1999) 

(Avista). Outside the markets operated by regional transmission organizations and 

independent system operators, Avista authorizes suppliers who cannot show a lack of 

market power with respect to certain ancillary services to nevertheless sell such services, 

subject to certain restrictions. As relevant to this Final Rule, these restrictions prohibit

sales to a public utility that is purchasing ancillary services to satisfy its own Open Access 

Transmission Tariff (OATT) requirements to offer ancillary services to its own customers, 

or sales to a traditional, franchised public utility affiliated with the third-party seller, or 

where the underlying transmission service is on the transmission system of the affiliated 

public utility.

5 Order No. 784, FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 31,349 at P 4, PP 57-58.
Docket No. RM15-2-000 - 3 -

Frequency Response (under OATT Schedule 3),6 the Commission only allowed marketbased rate sales of Schedule 2 and Schedule 3 services to a public utility that is purchasing 

ancillary services to satisfy its OATT requirements if either: a) the sale is made pursuant 

to a competitive solicitation that meets certain specified requirements; or b) the sale is 

made at or below the buying public utility transmission provider’s own Schedule 2 or 3 

rate, as applicable. The Commission further stated its intention to gather more information 

regarding the technical, economic and market issues concerning the provision of these 

services in a separate proceeding. 

4. Commission staff held a workshop on April 22, 2014 in this proceeding and then 

issued a notice of proposed rulemaking that distinguished between regulation service and 

primary frequency response service, and proposed to allow sales of primary frequency 

response service at market-based rates by entities granted market-based rate authority for 

sales of energy and capacity.7

 In response to the NOPR, 19 sets of comments were 

submitted. 

 6 Id. PP 59-61. Although the title of Schedule 3 addresses both frequency response

and regulation, the two services are distinct from each other. Frequency response is a 

resource standing by to provide autonomous, pre-programmed changes in output to rapidly 

arrest large changes in frequency until dispatched resources can take over while regulation 

service is centrally dispatched through automatic generation control (AGC) and is not 

focused exclusively on frequency control.

7 Third-Party Provision of Primary Frequency Response Service, Notice of 

Proposed Rulemaking (NOPR), 80 Fed. Reg. 10,426 (Feb. 26, 2015), FERC Stats. & 

Regs. ¶ 32,705 (2015).
Docket No. RM15-2-000 - 4 -

I. Background

The Commission in Order No. 8888 5. delineated two categories of ancillary services: 

those that the transmission provider is required to provide to all of its basic transmission 

customers9 and those that the transmission provider is only required to offer to provide to 

transmission customers serving load in the transmission provider’s control area.10 With 

respect to the second category, the Commission reasoned that the transmission provider is 

not always uniquely qualified to provide the services, and customers may be able to more 

cost-effectively self-supply them or procure them from other entities. The Commission 

contemplated that third parties (i.e., parties other than a transmission provider supplying 

ancillary services pursuant to its OATT obligation) could provide these ancillary services 

on other than a cost-of-service basis if such pricing was supported, on a case-by-case 

 8 See Promoting Wholesale Competition Through Open Access Non-Discriminatory 

Transmission Services by Public Utilities; Recovery of Stranded Costs by Public Utilities 

and Transmitting Utilities, Order No. 888, FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 31,036 (1996), order on 

reh’g, Order No. 888-A, FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 31,048, order on reh’g, Order No. 888-B, 

81 FERC ¶ 61,248 (1997), order on reh’g, Order No. 888-C, 82 FERC ¶ 61,046 (1998), 

aff’d in relevant part sub nom. Transmission Access Policy Study Group v. FERC, 

225 F.3d 667 (D.C. Cir. 2000), aff’d sub nom. New York v. FERC, 535 U.S. 1 (2002).

9 The first category consists of Scheduling, System Control and Dispatch service 

and Reactive Supply and Voltage Control from Generation Sources service.

10 The second category consists of Regulation and Frequency Response service, 

Energy Imbalance service, Operating Reserve-Spinning service, and Operating ReserveSupplemental service. Order No. 890 later added an additional ancillary service to this 

category: Generator Imbalance service. See Preventing Undue Discrimination and 

Preference in Transmission Service, Order No. 890, FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 31,241, at 

P 85, order on reh’g, Order No. 890-A, FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 31,261 (2007), order on 

reh’g, Order No. 890-B, 123 FERC ¶ 61,299 (2008), order on reh’g, Order No. 890-C, 

126 FERC ¶ 61,228 (2009), order on clarification, Order No. 890-D, 129 FERC ¶ 61,126 

(2009).
Docket No. RM15-2-000 - 5 -

basis, by analyses that demonstrated that the seller lacks market power in the relevant 

product market.11 

Subsequently, in Avista,

12 6. the Commission adopted a policy allowing third-party 

ancillary service providers that could not perform a market power study to sell certain 

ancillary services at market-based rates with certain restrictions.13

7. As noted earlier, the instant proceeding derives from Order No. 784 in which the 

Commission found that when appropriate intra-hour transmission scheduling practices are 

in place, the Avista restrictions need not apply to the sale of Energy Imbalance, Generator 

Imbalance, Operating Reserve-Spinning and Operating Reserve-Supplemental services, 

because with those practices in place, the results of the existing market power screens for 

sales of energy and capacity can also be applied to sales of these ancillary services.14 

 11 Order No. 888, FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 31,036 at 31,720-21.

12 See supra n.4.

13 These ancillary services included: Regulation and Frequency Response, Energy 

Imbalance, Operating Reserve-Spinning, and Operating Reserve-Supplemental. The 

Commission did not extend this Avista policy to Reactive Supply and Voltage Control 

from Generation Sources service, which means that third parties wishing to sell this 

ancillary service at market-based rates would be required to present specific evidence of a 

lack of market power in the provision of this specific product before the Commission 

would authorize sales of this service at market-based rates. The Commission also did not 

extend the Avista policy to Scheduling, System Control and Dispatch service. Because 

only balancing area operators can provide this ancillary service, it does not lend itself to 

competitive supply. Order No. 784, FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 31,349 at n.17.

14 Because energy and generator imbalance services merely require the 

ability to respond to dispatch within the hour, the Commission found that any 

sub-hourly transmission scheduling interval would be sufficient. Order No. 784-A, 

146 FERC ¶ 61,114 at P 12 (2012). As the operating reserve services require more rapid 

response within the hour (spinning reserves must be available immediately and 

(continued...)
Docket No. RM15-2-000 - 6 -

8. However, the Commission also found in Order No. 784 that the record developed to 

that point did not support expanding these market-based rate authorizations to include 

sales of Reactive Supply and Voltage Control (under OATT Schedule 2) (Schedule 2 

service) and Regulation and Frequency Response (under OATT Schedule 3) services

(Schedule 3 service).

15 Instead, the Commission allowed market-based rate sales of 

Schedule 2 and Schedule 3 services to a public utility that is purchasing ancillary services 

to satisfy its OATT requirements, provided the sale is made pursuant to a competitive 

solicitation that meets certain specified requirements16 or the sale is made at or below the 

buying public utility transmission provider’s own Schedule 2 or 3 rate, as applicable.17 

The Commission further stated its intention to gather more information regarding the 

technical, economic and market issues concerning the provision of these services in a 

separate proceeding that considers, among other things, the ease and cost-effectiveness of 

relevant equipment upgrades, the need for and availability of appropriate special 

 

supplemental reserves must be available within a short period of time), the Commission 

required potential sellers of operating reserve services to satisfactorily explain, in their 

market-based rate applications, how the particular intra-hour transmission scheduling 

practices or other protocols in their regions permit resources in one balancing authority 

area to respond to contingencies in a neighboring balancing authority area within these 

tight time frames. Order No. 784-A, 146 FERC ¶ 61,114 at PP 13-15.

15 Order No. 784, FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 31,349 at PP 59-61.

16 Id. PP 99-101.

17 Id. PP 82-85.
Docket No. RM15-2-000 - 7 -

arrangements such as dynamic scheduling or pseudo-tie arrangements, and other technical 

requirements related to the provision of Schedule 2 and Schedule 3 services.18

9. Pursuant to that directive, Commission staff held a workshop on April 22, 2014 to 

obtain input from interested persons regarding the technical, economic and market issues 

concerning the provision of Schedule 2 and Schedule 3 services.19 Among other things, 

the workshop explored issues surrounding the sale of these services at market-based rates. 

Comments submitted in response to the workshop that discussed the characteristics 

associated with a primary frequency response product indicated that market-based rate 

sales of such a product are feasible.20

10. Separately, the Commission on January 16, 2014 issued a Final Rule approving 

reliability standard BAL-003-121 under which a balancing authority22 must maintain a 

 18 Id. P 61.

19 See Third-Party Provision of Reactive Supply and Voltage Control and 

Regulation and Frequency Response Services, Final Agenda, Docket No. AD14-7-000 

(Apr. 22, 2014).

20 For example, most commenters echo Edison Electric Institute’s (EEI) arguments 

that virtually all generators can provide primary frequency response, and because it is 

provided at the interconnection level, balancing authority areas have more flexibility on 

the location of the resource than they would for other products. See, e.g., Edison Electric 

Institute Post-Workshop Comments, Docket No. AD14-7-000, at 7-8 (filed June 3, 2014).

21 Reliability standards proposed by the North American Electric Reliability 

Corporation (NERC) are subject to the Commission’s jurisdiction under section 215 of the 

Federal Power Act. 16 U.S.C. 824o(d). The Commission has authority to approve or 

reject such standards, and to enforce those that are approved.

22 The NERC Glossary defines a balancing authority as “(t)he responsible entity 

that integrates resource plans ahead of time, maintains load-interchange-generation 

balance within a Balancing Authority Area, and supports Interconnection frequency in real 

(continued...)
Docket No. RM15-2-000 - 8 -

minimum frequency response obligation.23 While most balancing authorities should be 

able to meet the new reliability standard using their own resources,24

some may 

nevertheless be interested in purchasing primary frequency response service from others if 

doing so would be economically beneficial. 

11. Based upon information received at the workshop and in the subsequently-filed 

11 written comments, the Commission issued a NOPR that differentiated between 

regulation service and primary frequency response service, analyzed the technical 

characteristics of primary frequency response service to show why the existing market 

power screens for sales of energy and capacity could be used to show lack of market 

power for sales of primary frequency response as well, and therefore proposed to allow 

sales of primary frequency response service at market-based rates by entities granted 

market-based rate authority for sales of energy and capacity.25 The NOPR sought 

comment on all aspects of this proposal.26

 

time.” See 

http://www.nerc.com/pa/Stand/Glossary%20of%20Terms/Glossary_of_Terms.pdf.

23 See Frequency Response and Frequency Bias Setting Reliability Standard, Order 

No. 794, 146 FERC ¶ 61,024 (2014).

24 Id. PP 62-63.

25 NOPR, FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 32,705 (2015). With respect to the remainder of 

the issues discussed in the workshop and associated written comments, the Commission 

did not see sufficient evidence to pursue generic reforms through this rulemaking 

proceeding. Id. P 10. 

26 Id. P 30.
Docket No. RM15-2-000 - 9 -

12. Most of the 19 sets of comments submitted in response to the NOPR are supportive 

of the proposal, with some commenters seeking clarification of various issues. 

Meanwhile, the limited set of adverse comments fall into two broad categories: 

1) comments seeking to contest the technical arguments regarding market power relied 

upon by the NOPR; and 2) comments that do not relate to market power screening but 

rather relate to various aspects of the implementation of actual primary frequency response 

transactions.

13. For the reasons described more fully below, the Commission finds that it is 

appropriate to finalize the NOPR proposal to permit voluntary sales of primary frequency 

response service at market-based rates for entities granted market-based rate authority for

sales of energy and capacity. We also address various requests for clarification, as 

discussed more fully below. We emphasize that this Final Rule does not place any limits 

on the types of transactions available to procure primary frequency response service; they 

may be cost-based or market-based, bundled with other services or unbundled as discussed 

further below, and inside or outside of organized markets. This Final Rule focuses solely 

on how jurisdictional entities can qualify for market-based rates for primary frequency 

response service in the context of voluntary bilateral sales. 

II. Discussion

14. In the NOPR in this proceeding, the Commission proposed to define primary 

frequency response service as the “autonomous, automatic, and rapid action of a generator, 

or other resource, to change its output (within seconds) to rapidly dampen large changes in 
Docket No. RM15-2-000 - 10 -

frequency.”27 Elsewhere in the NOPR, the Commission discussed the idea that individual 

autonomous responses to large changes in frequency will be of short duration, sustained 

only until dispatched regulation or operating reserve resources begin responding.28 As 

there are aspects of both statements that are important to properly defining this product, in 

this Final Rule the Commission will refine and clarify the NOPR’s definition to state that

primary frequency response service is defined as a resource standing by to provide 

autonomous, pre-programmed changes in output to rapidly arrest large changes in 

frequency until dispatched resources can take over. 

A. Technical Issues Related to the Application of Existing Market Power 

Screens to Primary Frequency Response Service

1. Geographic Market and the Impact of Resource Distance

15. The Commission analyzes horizontal market power for market-based sales of 

energy and capacity29 using two indicative screens, the wholesale market share screen and 

the pivotal supplier screen, to identify sellers that raise no horizontal market power 

concerns and can otherwise be considered for market-based rate authority.30 The 

 27 Id. P 12.

28 Id. P 24.

29 See 18 CFR 35.37(b) (2015).

30 See Market-Based Rates for Wholesale Sales of Electric Energy, Capacity and 

Ancillary Services by Public Utilities, Order No. 697, FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 31,252 at 

PP 13, 62, clarified, 121 FERC ¶ 61,260 (2007), order on reh’g, Order No. 697-A, FERC 

Stats. & Regs. ¶ 31,268, clarified, 124 FERC ¶ 61,055, order on reh’g, Order No. 697-B, 

FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 31,285 (2008), order on reh’g, Order No. 697-C, FERC Stats. & 

Regs. ¶ 31,291 (2009), order on reh’g, Order No. 697-D, FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 31,305 

(continued...)
Docket No. RM15-2-000 - 11 -

wholesale market share screen measures whether a seller has a dominant position in the 

relevant geographic market in terms of the number of megawatts of uncommitted capacity 

owned or controlled by the seller, as compared to the uncommitted capacity of the entire 

market.31 A seller whose share of the relevant market is less than 20 percent during all 

seasons passes the wholesale market share screen.32 The pivotal supplier screen evaluates

the seller’s potential to exercise horizontal market power based on the seller’s 

uncommitted capacity at the time of annual peak demand in the relevant market.33 A seller 

satisfies the pivotal supplier screen if its uncommitted capacity is less than the net 

uncommitted supply in the relevant market.34 

16. Passing both the wholesale market share screen and the pivotal supplier screen 

creates a rebuttable presumption that the seller does not possess horizontal market power; 

failing either screen creates a rebuttable presumption that the seller possesses horizontal 

market power.35 A seller that fails one of the screens may present evidence, such as a 

 

(2010), aff’d sub nom. Mont. Consumer Counsel v. FERC, 659 F.3d 910 (9th Cir. 2011), 

cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 26 (2012). See also 18 CFR 35.37(b), (c)(1) (2015).

31 Order No. 697, FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 31,252 at P 43. 

32 Id. PP 43-44, 80, 89. 

33 18 CFR 35.37(c)(1) (2015). 

34 Order No. 697, FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 31,252 at P 42. 

35 18 CFR 35.37(c)(1) (2015). 
Docket No. RM15-2-000 - 12 -

delivered price test, to rebut the presumption of horizontal market power.36 In the 

alternative, a seller may accept the presumption of horizontal market power and adopt 

some form of cost-based mitigation.37

17. Three of the key components of the analysis of horizontal market power are the 

definition of products, the determination of appropriate geographic scope of the relevant 

market for each product, and the identification of the uncommitted generation supply 

within the relevant geographic market. In Order No. 697, the Commission adopted a 

default relevant geographic market for sales of energy and capacity.

38 Specifically, the 

Commission generally uses a seller’s balancing authority area plus directly interconnected 

(first-tier) balancing authority areas, or uses the Regional Transmission Organization 

(RTO) or Independent System Operator (ISO) market if applicable, as the default relevant 

geographic market. However, where the Commission has made a specific finding that 

there is a submarket within an RTO/ISO, that submarket becomes the default relevant 

 36 18 CFR 35.37(c)(2) (2015). For purposes of rebutting the presumption of 

horizontal market power, sellers may use the results of the delivered price test to perform 

pivotal supplier and market share analyses and market concentration analyses using the 

Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI). The HHI is a widely accepted measure of market 

concentration, calculated by squaring the market share of each firm competing in the 

market and summing the results. The Commission has stated that a showing of an HHI 

less than 2,500 in the relevant market for all season/load periods for sellers that have also 

shown that they are not pivotal and do not possess a market share of 20 percent or greater 

in any of the season/load periods would constitute a showing of a lack of horizontal

market power, absent compelling contrary evidence from intervenors. Order No. 697, 

FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 31,252 at P 111.

37 18 CFR 35.37(c)(3) (2015). 

38 Order No. 697, FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 31,252 at P 15.
Docket No. RM15-2-000 - 13 -

geographic market for sellers located within the submarket for purposes of the marketbased rate analysis. The Commission also provided guidance as to the factors the 

Commission will consider in evaluating whether, in a particular case, to adopt an 

alternative larger or smaller geographic market instead of relying on the default 

geographic market.39

18. The Commission stated in the NOPR that, because primary frequency response 

service can be effectively supplied by any resource throughout an interconnection and 

have the same ability to dampen harmful changes in interconnection-wide frequency, the 

geographic market for market power analysis of a primary frequency response product 

could be the entire interconnection within which the buyer resides, and in any event would 

be no smaller than the geographic market represented in the existing market power 

screens;40 i.e., the home balancing authority area of the seller plus first-tier balancing 

authority areas or the RTO/ISO market if applicable. The Commission therefore proposed 

to apply the existing market power screens used for energy and capacity sales, without 

modification as to geographic market, to sales of primary frequency response service.

 39 A necessary condition that must be satisfied to justify an alternative market is a 

demonstration regarding whether there are frequently binding transmission constraints 

during historical peak seasons examined in the screens and at other competitively 

significant times that prevent competing supply from reaching customers within the 

proposed alternative geographic market. Id. P 268.

40 NOPR, FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 32,705 at P 23.
Docket No. RM15-2-000 - 14 -

Most commenters either express specific support for this finding,41 19. or are silent on 

the issue.42 However, American Public Power Association, the National Rural Electric 

Cooperative Association, and the Transmission Access Policy Study Group (together, 

TAPS), PJM Interconnection, L.L.C. (PJM), and Midcontinent Independent System 

Operator, Inc. (MISO) raise limited, technical concerns regarding this finding. 

20. TAPS argues that while remote generators may be capable of responding, there is 

reason to be concerned that frequency response from a distant generator would be less 

effective than frequency response from a nearby generator, and that this alleged impact of 

distance would upset the Commission’s proposal to rely on the existing market-based rate 

screens used for energy and capacity sales to ensure that sellers of primary frequency 

response service lack market power when making sales to public utility transmission 

providers.43

21. PJM similarly asserts, without elaboration, that questions remain as to whether 

there is sufficient substitutability of units across the Eastern Interconnection so as to 

support the conclusion that market power issues are of limited concern in the provision of 

primary frequency response. PJM also asserts that the kind of communications 

 41 See, e.g., American Wind Energy Association (AWEA) at 6; Calpine Corporation 

(Calpine) at 5; EEI at 2; Electricity Consumers Resources Council (ELCON) at 3.

42 See Dominion Resources Services, Inc. (Dominion) at 2; Duke Energy 

Corporation (Duke) at 3; Electric Power Supply Association (EPSA) at 3; Energy Storage 

Association (ESA) at 1; Idaho Power Company (Idaho Power) at 2; Public Interest 

Organizations at 2.

43 TAPS at 5-6.
Docket No. RM15-2-000 - 15 -

infrastructure, protocols, and compensation policies necessary to permit PJM to obtain 

primary frequency response from resources outside of its market do not yet exist.44

22. MISO argues that, while the NOPR is correct that any resource anywhere in an 

interconnection can help stabilize the frequency of that interconnection following a load or 

resource loss, there may be negative reliability impacts caused by flows to very remote 

locations, particularly if there are weak or transmission-limited interfaces.45

Commission Determination

23. We adopt the NOPR proposal to apply the existing market power screens used for 

energy and capacity sales, without modification as to geographic market, to sales of 

primary frequency response service. With respect to TAPS’s arguments, the Commission 

finds that the delay in sensing a change in frequency associated with resource distance 

does not undermine the NOPR’s proposal to rely upon the default geographic market 

reflected in the existing market power screens for sales of energy and capacity; i.e., the 

home balancing authority area of the seller plus first-tier balancing authority areas or the 

RTO/ISO market if applicable. While TAPS is correct that a resource located far across 

an interconnection from the site of a contingency event should sense the resulting change 

in frequency later than would a closer resource, studies of this issue46 indicate that this 

 44 PJM at 4.

45 MISO at 5.

46 See, e.g., http://fnetpublic.utk.edu/eventsamples/20110823175058_E.jpg. See 

also, John Undrill, Power and Frequency Control as it Relates to Wind-Powered 

Generation (2010), available at http://www.ferc.gov/CalendarFiles/20110120114503-

Power-and-Frequency-Control.pdf.
Docket No. RM15-2-000 - 16 -

delay would be within the NOPR’s product definition that requires primary frequency 

response resources to change their output within seconds in response to a large change in 

frequency.47 

24. With respect to PJM’s assertion that questions remain as to the substitutability of 

units across the Eastern Interconnection, PJM has not explained what those questions may 

be, and in any event the NOPR does not propose to test market power based on an 

interconnection-wide geographic market. 

25. With respect to PJM’s argument that the kind of communications infrastructure, 

protocols, and compensation policies necessary to permit PJM to obtain primary frequency 

response from resources outside of its market do not yet exist, the Commission partially 

agrees and partially disagrees as described below, but even where we partially agree, this 

would not impact the NOPR proposal regarding market power screening.

26. With respect to communications protocols, the Commission agrees that in order to 

effectuate actual voluntary primary frequency response transactions, it may be necessary 

to further develop or refine existing communications protocols, as more detailed data may 

be needed for purposes of verifying primary frequency response activity than for other 

activities. However, this refinement should not pose such a fundamental barrier to sales of 

primary frequency response service from one balancing authority area to another that it 

calls into question the default geographic market of the existing market power screens. 

This is because, as will be discussed further below, there are existing information sharing 

 47 NOPR, FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 32,705 at P 12.
Docket No. RM15-2-000 - 17 -

systems and protocols that should be able to accommodate the more detailed information 

associated with primary frequency response transactions without requiring an 

unreasonable amount of effort from affected parties. Hence, for market power screening 

purposes, resources in first-tier balancing authority areas should remain viable competitors 

to supply primary frequency response to the home balancing authority area.

27. With respect to compensation policies, the Commission disagrees with PJM that 

compensation policies necessary to support this Final Rule do not yet exist. As will be 

further discussed below, this Final Rule does not require development of organized 

markets for primary frequency response service, but rather is focused on voluntary 

bilateral sales of primary frequency response at market-based rates. In bilateral markets, 

compensation would be negotiated between the buyer and the seller pursuant to the seller’s 

market-based rate authority. As such, bilateral transactions will be strictly voluntary and 

the buyer will presumably only agree to them if it sees an economic reason to do so. 

Therefore, no further compensation policies are necessary in connection with this Final 

Rule.

28. Finally, MISO argues that there may be negative reliability impacts caused by flows 

to very remote locations, particularly if there are weak or transmission-limited interfaces. 

The Commission agrees but sees this as a practical consideration relevant to particular 

bilateral transactions rather than a universal issue that invalidates the use of existing 

market power screens to show lack of market power for sales of primary frequency 

response service. Accordingly, this argument does not invalidate the NOPR proposal 

regarding market power screening for sellers of primary frequency response service.
Docket No. RM15-2-000 - 18 -

2. Need for Transmission Reservation and Scheduling

29. With respect to potential barriers related to transmission scheduling or reservation, 

the Commission stated in the NOPR that primary frequency response service should not 

require any transmission reservation or scheduling, because by definition individual 

frequency responses would not be sustained for long enough periods to trigger a need for 

transmission service or schedule changes. Rather, such individual primary frequency 

responses should be rapidly replaced by resources centrally dispatched by the relevant 

balancing authority.48

30. Most commenters either specifically agree that transmission scheduling and 

reservation should not be necessary in connection with the temporary, autonomous 

changes in output associated with primary frequency response service,49 or remain silent 

on the issue. However, EEI asserts that transmission reservation or scheduling may be 

needed in some cases. According to EEI, the duration of primary frequency response 

products could range from a minute or two to supplement a response for only large events, 

to an unbounded number of minutes for as long as frequency remains beyond a given 

frequency deadband. In the case of longer durations, according to EEI, transmission 

providers may have to assess the potential transmission impact of third-party resources 

 48 NOPR, FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 32,705 at P 24.

49 See, e.g., AWEA at 6; ELCON at 3; MISO at 1.
Docket No. RM15-2-000 - 19 -

providing primary frequency response through their service territory for extended periods 

of time.50 Duke makes similar arguments.51

31. Similarly, TAPS argues that the Commission did not adequately examine in the 

NOPR the implications of remote provision of primary frequency response on 

transmission availability and co-optimization of energy and ancillary services. TAPS 

argues the Commission should provide additional analysis of how remote supply of 

frequency response service will affect transmission reserve margin and available transfer 

capability, how the associated costs are borne, and whether this will have adverse 

consequences for market efficiency, particularly in RTOs.52

Commission Determination

32. The Commission continues to believe that transmission reservation and scheduling 

will not create a barrier to sales of frequency response within an interconnection. While 

the Commission concedes that in some cases transmission capacity may need to be 

reserved to support a sale of primary frequency,53 we continue to believe that in the vast 

majority of cases the sale of primary frequency response service should not require any 

 50 EEI at 8.

51 Duke at 7-8.

52 TAPS at 9-11.

53 The Commission expects that sales of primary frequency response from resources 

in transmission constrained areas would constitute the most likely scenario where a 

reservation of transmission capacity might be needed to support the sale. Naturally, the 

added cost of such transmission purchases would likely be considered by the potential 

purchaser in deciding whether or not to enter into such purchase.
Docket No. RM15-2-000 - 20 -

transmission reservation or scheduling because, by definition, individual frequency 

responses would not be sustained for long enough periods to trigger a need for 

transmission service or schedule changes. With respect to EEI’s arguments, the 

Commission disagrees that primary frequency response, as defined in this Final Rule, 

could last for an unbounded number of minutes. By the definition of primary frequency 

response provided in this Final Rule, individual primary frequency responses shall be 

short, lasting only until dispatched resources can take over. Thus, even if a deviation from 

target frequency lasts longer than the typical short responses envisioned by our primary 

frequency response product definition, this does not necessarily mean that a particular 

resource that continues to respond to that deviation is doing so through extended periods 

of primary frequency response service as EEI suggests. 

33. Rather, after the initial autonomous response, any continuing response would be 

deemed to occur as a result of dispatch instructions from the relevant balancing authority, 

which would most likely constitute either use of regulation or operating reserves. 

Accordingly, while a transmission reservation may sometimes be needed to support a sale 

of primary frequency response, there should never be a need to actually schedule 

transmission or change a transmission schedule in connection with primary frequency 

response service. Hence, transmission scheduling should pose no barrier to sales of 

primary frequency response service, and in the open access transmission environment 

created by Order No. 888, reservation by itself does not present any undue barrier to 

participation. Indeed, all other ancillary service transactions, at least in bilateral markets, 

are expected to include needed transmission reservation.
Docket No. RM15-2-000 - 21 -

34. With respect to TAPS’s argument, the Commission agrees that transmission 

providers may in some cases need to set aside additional transmission capacity to support

particular sales of primary frequency response from remote resources. However, the 

possibility that particular transactions involving remote resources may require additional 

transmission capacity to be set aside does not undermine the NOPR proposal to grant 

market-based rate authority for voluntary sales of primary frequency response to entities 

that pass the existing market power screens for sales of energy and capacity. These 

screens already limit consideration of imports from first-tier balancing authority areas 

based on simultaneous transmission import limits as a way to test market power under 

realistic conditions based on a reasonable simulation of historical conditions.

54 No further 

consideration of transmission impacts is necessary to test for seller market power. 

Analysis of (1) how remote supply of primary frequency response service in particular 

transactions might affect transmission reserve margin and available transfer capability;

(2) how the associated costs would be borne; or (3) whether this might have adverse 

consequences for market efficiency are concerns that are not relevant to the Commission’s 

market power assessment. Rather, these are concerns that may impact a balancing 

authority’s decision as to whether to enter into any given primary frequency response 

transaction, or that may become relevant if any RTO or ISO voluntarily chooses to 

develop an organized market for primary frequency response - something that is not 

required by this Final Rule. 

 54 Order No. 697, FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 31,252 at P 354.
Docket No. RM15-2-000 - 22 -

35. With respect to TAPS’s arguments regarding potential distortion of co-optimized 

RTO/ISO energy and ancillary service markets, this Final Rule merely clarifies the 

appropriate method for ex ante market power screening for potential sellers of primary 

frequency response service. It does not require any entity, including RTOs and ISOs, to 

purchase primary frequency response. Nor does it require RTOs and ISOs to develop 

organized markets for primary frequency response. The Commission finds it reasonable to 

assume that if an RTO or ISO ever decides to purchase primary frequency response 

service, it will only do so if the RTO or ISO can address its and its stakeholders’ concerns 

as to the impact on its co-optimized markets. Furthermore, if such purchases require any 

tariff modifications, the RTO or ISO would also need to submit a filing to the Commission 

for its review addressing such issues. Accordingly, in the context of this Final Rule

focusing on market power screens, these concerns are premature and beyond the scope.

B. Requests for Clarification

1. Purchases Required or Optional

36. A variety of entities request clarification that this Final Rule does not require 

purchases of primary frequency response or the development of organized markets for 

primary frequency response.55 At the other end of the spectrum, Calpine argues that RTOs 

and ISOs should be given a deadline to develop tariff changes that would enable them to 

implement primary frequency response compensation mechanisms.56 

 55 EEI at 1-2; California Independent System Operator Corporation (CAISO) at 2; 

MISO at 1; PJM at 2, 5.

56 Calpine at 9.
Docket No. RM15-2-000 - 23 -

37. The Commission grants the requests to clarify that this Final Rule does not require 

any entity to purchase primary frequency response from third parties or to develop an

organized market for primary frequency response. This Final Rule is limited to issues 

associated with market power screening for voluntary bilateral sellers of primary 

frequency response service. In light of this clarification, we deny Calpine’s request for 

RTOs and ISOs to be given a deadline to develop tariff changes that would enable them to 

implement primary frequency response compensation mechanisms.

2. Interaction with Regulation Service

38. EEI and Duke both request that sellers be able to retain the reference to “Regulation 

and Frequency Response Service” in their current market-based rate tariffs, and that the 

Final Rule make clear that providing market-based rate authorization for primary 

frequency response service is not intended to limit the options that buyers have in 

procuring these ancillary services.57 

39. The Commission does not intend to limit the options that buyers have in procuring 

these ancillary services but will nevertheless affirm the NOPR proposal to require a 

separate listing of regulation service and primary frequency response service in marketbased rate tariffs. However, to address EEI’s and Duke’s concerns, the Commission 

clarifies that, even though we require that regulation service and primary frequency 

response service be separately listed in sellers’ market-based rate tariffs, this does not 

mean that buyers and sellers cannot agree to combined transactions involving both 

 57 EEI at 4; Duke at 3-7.
Docket No. RM15-2-000 - 24 -

regulation service and primary frequency response service with appropriate restrictions. 

Those restrictions involve the need for the market-based regulation service component to 

be limited to the buyer’s OATT rate for regulation or the outcome of a competitive 

solicitation as described in Order No. 784.58 No such restrictions would apply to the 

primary frequency response service component of such combined transactions.

40. Duke also expresses concern as to what impact splitting the services in the “Third 

Party Provider” section of the market-based rate tariff would have on transmission 

providers and any transmission customers self-providing service under Schedule 3 of the 

OATT.59 

41. The Commission clarifies that OATT Schedule 3 serves a different purpose from 

the market-based rate tariff (cost-based sales from the OATT provider versus marketbased sales from third parties), and so OATT Schedule 3 does not need modification as a 

result of this Final Rule. However, to the extent that a particular OATT provider 

purchases primary frequency response from a third party in order to help serve its OATT 

customers, it may propose in a section 205 filing to include such costs in its OATT 

Schedule 3 rates.

 58 Order No. 784, FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 31,349 at PP 82 and 99-101.

59 Duke at 6, 8.
Docket No. RM15-2-000 - 25 -

3. Information Sharing and Measurement and Verification

42. A variety of entities emphasize the importance of adequate information sharing and 

measurement and verification if primary frequency response service is to be traded.60 In 

this regard, SmartSenseCom, Inc. (SmartSenseCom) also argues that in order to support 

the broadest base of available resources to provide primary frequency response services, 

potential providers should have flexibility in their ability to select any monitoring device 

that meets or exceeds applicable industry standards for accuracy as a means to measure 

frequency and trigger the primary frequency response at a given set point.61

43. The Commission agrees that these matters are important, and expects that potential 

buyers will ensure that the resources from which they purchase are capable of providing 

the service in a useful manner, consistent with relevant NERC requirements and guidelines 

as discussed earlier. This would require that, among other things, the parties agree to 

appropriate information sharing and measurement and verification. At this stage, and 

given the voluntary nature of any primary frequency response transactions that may result 

from this Final Rule, the Commission sees no need to be more prescriptive regarding 

specific methods of information sharing and measurement and verification.

44. In a related matter, TAPS asserts that the NOPR’s statement that telemetry sharing 

should not pose any significant barrier to the use of remote resources for the purposes of 

market-based rates requires further evaluation. TAPS argues that transmitting the 

 60 CAISO at 2-3; EEI at 5; MISO at 1-4; Duke at 7-8; Dominion at 3; Idaho Power 

at 2.

61 SmartSenseCom at 9-10.
Docket No. RM15-2-000 - 26 -

telemetry data from one balancing authority area to just one other balancing authority area 

effectively doubles (or more) the number of points at which the data can be intercepted or 

attacked. Thus, TAPS argues that the Commission should provide additional analysis to 

evaluate whether these potential technical barriers will impede the ability of remote 

generators to compete to make market-based rate sales of primary frequency response 

across balancing authorities and to multiple balancing authorities.62

45. As mentioned earlier, the Commission finds that balancing authorities already share 

with their neighbors the same type of operational information contemplated here, both on a 

day-to-day basis, and occasionally through special arrangements like pseudo-ties or 

dynamic schedules, though they may not do so with as much detail as would be required 

for primary frequency response. In sharing such information, they use secure protocols 

such as Inter-Control Center Communications Protocol.63 There appears to be nothing 

unique about information related to primary frequency response transactions, which would 

largely involve the real-time operational state of the resources in question as a way of 

verifying both their readiness to respond and actual responses to relevant frequency 

deviations, that could not be accommodated by this existing secure protocol widely used 

by the electric utility industry. As a result, the Commission continues to believe that the 

information sharing required to facilitate sales of primary frequency response service will 

 62 TAPS at 6-9.

63 See International Electroctechnical Commission, Telecontrol equipment and 

systems - Part 6-802: Telecontrol protocols compatible with ISO standards and ITU-T 

recommendations - TASE.2 Object models (Sept. 2005), available at

https://webstore.iec.ch/publication/18156.
Docket No. RM15-2-000 - 27 -

not create a barrier to such sales and thus we find in this Final Rule that the market power 

screens used for energy and capacity are valid for primary frequency response service.

4. Definition of Primary Frequency Response Service

46. Parties request various clarifications regarding the definition of primary frequency 

response service. Calpine and EPSA assert that the product definition for primary 

frequency response service should include both inertial response from conventional 

“spinning mass” generators and primary frequency response from discretionary turbinegovernor settings.64 Similarly, Union of Concerned Scientists argues for the inclusion of 

synchronous and/or synthetic inertia as a market product that can be used to provide 

primary frequency response, and requests that the Commission clarify whether the creation 

of markets for inertia is within the scope of changes that were envisioned by the 

Commission when it issued this NOPR.65

47. The Commission emphasizes that this Final Rule addresses market-based rate 

authority for sales of services that fit the definition of primary frequency response 

services, i.e., resources standing by to provide autonomous, pre-programmed changes in 

output to rapidly arrest large changes in frequency until dispatched resources can take 

over. True inertia, while also serving an important function, does not fit this definition 

because it does not arrest large changes in frequency, but rather acts to oppose all changes 

in frequency. The term “synthetic inertia” is more complicated to address because it is not 

 64 Calpine at 7, n.16; EPSA at 5.

65 Union of Concerned Scientists at 8.
Docket No. RM15-2-000 - 28 -

clear from the record whether there is actual industry consensus on what the term means. 

However, if it is assumed to mean a resource standing by to provide autonomous, preprogrammed changes in output to rapidly arrest large changes in frequency until 

dispatched resources can take over, then the Commission would simply consider it a form 

of primary frequency response subject to this Final Rule. In contrast, if the “synthetic 

inertia” response either cannot be sustained until dispatched resources take over, or is 

merely aimed at slowing all changes in frequency instead of arresting large changes, then 

“synthetic inertia” would not be a form of primary frequency response, and sales of it 

would not be encompassed by this Final Rule.

48. Several commenters assert that the product definition must differentiate based on 

response time in addition to magnitude of response.66 Consistent with this idea, 

SmartSenseCom asks the Commission to amend section 35.28 of its regulations by adding 

a new paragraph that states the following: 

Primary frequency response in ancillary service markets. Each Commission 

approved independent system operator or regional transmission organization that 

has a tariff that provides for the compensation for primary frequency response 

service must provide such compensation based upon the actual service provided, 

include a capacity payment that takes into account the speed of primary frequency 

response-providing resources and a payment for performance that reflects the 

quantity of primary frequency response provided by a resource in response to a 

frequency deviation.67

 66 Calpine at 7; AWEA at 4; Grid Storage Consulting at 2-4; Public Interest 

Organizations at 4; SmartSenseCom at 8.

67 SmartSenseCom at Ex. A.
Docket No. RM15-2-000 - 29 -

49. The Commission finds that the Final Rule’s product definition, summarized at the 

beginning of the discussion section above, already sufficiently incorporates the importance 

of speed. The Commission finds that no further differentiation based on response time or 

magnitude is necessary in connection with this Final Rule, which deals only in the 

appropriate ex ante market power screening of potential sellers of primary frequency 

response service. For this reason, and because this Final Rule does not require 

development of organized markets for primary frequency response, the Commission also 

denies as unnecessary the requested addition to the Commission’s regulations related to 

organized RTO and ISO markets for primary frequency response.

50. Grid Storage Consulting, LLC (Grid Storage Consulting) and Public Interest 

Organizations argue that the product definition for this service should require response that 

is immediate, bi-directional, proportional to the frequency deviation, continuous in the 

sense of not being prematurely interrupted by competing controls or physical limitations, 

and certain.68 The Commission clarifies that potential voluntary buyers and sellers of

primary frequency response service are free to negotiate any refinements to the basic 

product definition in this Final Rule that they see fit, so long as such refinements remain 

consistent with the basic definition. Obviously, any market-based rate authority granted as 

a result of this Final Rule would only apply to products that are consistent with the 

definition of primary frequency response service described at the beginning of the 

discussion section above.

 68 Grid Storage Consulting at 4-7; Public Interest Organizations at 4.
Docket No. RM15-2-000 - 30 -

51. SmartSenseCom urges the Commission to define primary frequency response 

directly within the Commission’s regulations.69 The Commission denies this request as 

unnecessary. The Commission’s regulations do not include definitions of every particular 

product subject to its jurisdiction; it is sufficient for such product definitions to be 

described in relevant Commission orders such as this one.

5. Miscellaneous Requests for Clarification

52. EEI encourages the Commission to make clear in the Final Rule that a potential 

third-party provider would not be disqualified from competing on the basis that it is 

interconnected to an affiliated transmission provider. According to EEI, not addressing 

the affiliate restriction provisions of the Avista policy could unnecessarily limit the pool of 

third-party generators that would be eligible to compete to provide market-based primary 

frequency response service.70

53. EEI’s concern relates to the component of the Avista restrictions highlighted below: 

(2) to address affiliate abuse concerns, the approach [permitting market-based rate 

sales of ancillary services without a corresponding market power analysis] will not 

apply to sales to a traditional, franchised public utility affiliated with the third-party 

supplier, or to sales where the underlying transmission service is on the system of 

the public utility affiliated with the third-party supplier.[

71] 

54. As the Commission noted in the Avista passage quoted above, this second Avista

restriction was meant to address affiliate abuse. However, EEI’s concern that potential 

 69 SmartSenseCom at 3.

70 EEI at 7.

71 Avista Corp., 87 FERC ¶ 61,223 at n.12 (1999) (emphasis added).
Docket No. RM15-2-000 - 31 -

third-party providers should not be disqualified from competing on the basis that they are 

interconnected to an affiliated transmission provider appears to be based on an overly

broad interpretation of the language highlighted above; i.e., one that would prevent sales 

that only tangentially involve the affiliated public utility transmission provider’s system. 

While the Commission understands this concern, we do not believe it is justified because

the highlighted language targets a much narrower set of circumstances. 

In particular, in Ameren Marketing,

72 55. the Commission approved a case-by-case 

request for market-based rates for ancillary services sales by a third-party seller to 

transmission customers located on the transmission system of the seller’s public utility 

transmission provider affiliate where the seller offered several safeguards to protect 

against the potential for affiliate abuse.

73 Ameren Marketing demonstrates the narrow 

scope of the Commission’s concern related to this Avista restriction; namely, third-party 

sales to customers located on the transmission systems of affiliates. Only in these

situations does the second Avista restriction apply, and in these situations, we remain 

willing to consider requests for market-based rate authority for sales of primary frequency 

response service on a case-by-case basis. In response to EEI’s concern, the Commission 

 72 Ameren Energy Marketing Co., 95 FERC ¶ 61,448, at 62,626 (2001) (Ameren 

Marketing).

73 With respect to all three Avista restrictions, the Commission expressed its 

willingness to consider requests for market-based rate authority under the conditions 

associated with the restrictions on a case-by-case basis. Avista Corp., 87 FERC ¶ 61,223 

at n.12.
Docket No. RM15-2-000 - 32 -

clarifies that where the customer is not located on the transmission system of the thirdparty seller’s affiliate, this aspect of the Avista restrictions does not apply.

56. EEI also recommends that the Commission clarify in the Final Rule that the 

location of primary frequency response purchases be deemed to be where the customer is 

located within an interconnection, rather than where the underlying generation resides. 

According to EEI, this would address a potential ambiguity in how the NOPR proposal is 

described in paragraph 28 of the NOPR, where the Commission stated that “. . . sellers 

passing existing market-based rate screens in a given geographic market should be granted 

a rebuttable presumption that they lack market power for sales of primary frequency 

response in that market.”74 EEI states that if a generator has passed the Commission’s 

existing market power screens (or if the screens are not required to be submitted based on 

the location of the generation) for the geographic market in which the buyer is located, 

then the generator should benefit from the rebuttable presumption that it lacks market 

power with respect to sales of primary frequency response service throughout the entire 

interconnection.75

57. EEI appears to be concerned that the language in paragraph 28 might be interpreted 

to mean that market-based rate sales of primary frequency response are only authorized in 

specific geographic markets. As will be explained next, this would be similar to how 

market-based rate sales of operating reserves are handled pursuant to Order No. 784, but

 74 EEI at 7 (citing NOPR, FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 32,705 at P 28).

75 Id. at 7-8.
Docket No. RM15-2-000 - 33 -

different from how authority for market-based rate sales of energy and capacity is granted. 

With respect to energy and capacity, the Commission’s normal practice is to test for 

market power in the seller’s home balancing authority area, and, if the seller is verticallyintegrated, first-tier balancing authority areas, because this is where the seller’s market 

power likely would be greatest. However, the market-based rate authority granted based 

on passage of these market power screens permits sales anywhere that the seller is capable 

of transacting. In Order No. 784, the Commission had to depart from this standard 

practice with respect to market-based rate sales of operating reserves because of the 

special transmission scheduling practices associated with those services. Order No. 784 

required sellers of operating reserves to first demonstrate that the scheduling practices in 

the regions within which they wish to sell could support sales of operating reserves from 

one balancing authority area to another, and market-based rate authority for sales of 

operating reserves would only be granted for regions where such showing was made 

successfully by the seller.76 Because primary frequency response is autonomous and 

individual responses are of short duration, no special scheduling practices would be 

required. Hence, the Commission finds that market-based rate authority for sales of 

primary frequency response should be granted on the same basis as sales of energy and 

capacity; i.e., while market power is tested at the resource’s location, authority is granted 

for sales anywhere the seller is capable of transacting. The Commission, therefore,

clarifies the description in paragraph 28 of the NOPR accordingly.

 76 Order No. 784, FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 31,349 at P 58.
Docket No. RM15-2-000 - 34 -

58. AWEA, ESA, Union of Concerned Scientists, and Grid Storage Consulting argue 

that there may be some resources that have been authorized to sell ancillary services at 

market-based rates but not energy and capacity, or that are otherwise eligible to participate 

in Commission-authorized and supervised markets. They recommend that any such 

resources be permitted to sell primary frequency response service at market-based rates as 

well.77 In a similar vein, Public Interest Organizations ask the Commission to consider 

whether there is any class or potential class of emerging resources that sell only ancillary 

services and not energy or capacity, and if so, whether such resources should be exempted 

from existing market power screens in exchange for some more appropriate market power 

analysis.78 

59. In response to these comments, the Commission clarifies that for resources capable 

of injecting electric energy onto the interstate transmission grid,79 authority to sell at 

market-based rates, even exclusively in organized RTO or ISO markets, is only granted to 

entities that either pass the existing market power screens for sales of energy and capacity

or where any market power concerns have been adequately mitigated. Thus, even if such 

 77 AWEA at 4; ESA at 4-5; Union of Concerned Scientists at 3; Grid Storage 

Consulting at 10.

78 Public Interest Organizations at 5-6.

79 Pursuant to section 201(a) of the FPA, the Commission is charged with 

regulating the transmission of electric energy in interstate commerce and the sale of 

electric energy at wholesale in interstate commerce. 16 U.S.C. § 824(a) (2012). Section 

201(b) provides that the Commission shall have jurisdiction over facilities for wholesale 

sales of electric energy in interstate commerce or for transmission of electric energy in 

interstate commerce. Id. § 824(b). In section 201(e), a public utility is defined as a person 

who owns or operates facilities subject to the jurisdiction of the Commission. Id. § 824(e).
Docket No. RM15-2-000 - 35 -

sellers only sell ancillary services today, their authorization to do so was granted based in 

part upon either passage of the existing market power screens for sales of energy and 

capacity or where there was a demonstration that any market power concerns have been 

adequately mitigated.

80 The only current exception to this rule involves demand response 

resources. If a third-party seller exclusively uses demand response resources to participate 

in RTO/ISO markets, it does not need to seek market-based rate authority or place any 

tariff on file with the Commission, because demand response resources do not inject 

electric energy onto the interstate transmission grid. However, if it ever markets services 

from other types of resources that result in it injecting electric energy onto the grid, then it 

would need market-based rate authority and a tariff on file.81 Accordingly, all sellers with 

market-based rate authority using resources that can inject electric energy onto the 

interstate transmission grid, even if they only sell ancillary services today, are already 

eligible to make use of the rebuttable presumption related to primary frequency response 

in this Final Rule. Similarly, sellers exclusively using demand response resources are 

already exempted from the need to submit market power analyses to gain authorization for 

their sales, and Public Interest Organizations have provided no reason why any new class 

of resources should be exempted.

 80 In the event that sellers fail the existing market power screens for the RTO/ISO 

markets, the Commission allows such sellers to seek to obtain or retain market-based rate 

authority by relying on Commission-approved RTO/ISO monitoring and mitigation. See 

Refinements to Policies and Procedures for Market-Based Rates for Wholesale Sales of 

Electric Energy, Capacity and Ancillary Services by Public Utilities, Order No. 816, 80 

FR 67056, (Oct. 30, 2015), 153 FERC ¶ 61,065, at P 28 (2015). 

81 EnergyConnect, Inc., 130 FERC ¶ 61,031, at PP 26-33 (2010). 
Docket No. RM15-2-000 - 36 -

60. Union of Concerned Scientists, ESA, and Public Interest Organizations all ask that 

the Commission clarify that the current Final Rule applies for all resources that can 

provide primary frequency response.82 Steel Producers Alliance makes similar arguments, 

emphasizing that resources other than generators are able to provide primary frequency 

response service and should be permitted to compete to provide the service.83 The 

Commission clarifies that this Final Rule applies to jurisdictional market-based rate sellers 

of primary frequency response service, irrespective of what specific equipment they may 

choose to use to make such sales.

61. MISO asserts that certain technical statements within the NOPR require limited 

clarification. First, while MISO agrees with the NOPR that 60 Hertz (Hz) is the target 

frequency in North America, MISO notes that scheduled frequency may be offset at times 

to correct time error.84 Second, in response to the NOPR’s description of how each 

balancing authority’s automatic generation control system will issue dispatch instructions 

to regulation resources to try to return the systems frequency to 60 Hz, MISO argues that 

typically the contingent balancing authority uses a combination of automatic generation 

control and contingency reserves for this purpose.85 The Commission agrees with these 

 82 Union of Concerned Scientists at 5; ESA at 2-4; Public Interest Organizations 

at 2-3.

83 Steel Producers Alliance at 2-3.

84 MISO at 5.

85 Id. at 6.
Docket No. RM15-2-000 - 37 -

clarifications, but finds that they do not alter any fundamental underpinning of the NOPR 

proposal.

62. Union of Concerned Scientists seeks clarification that procurement of, and payment 

for, primary frequency response service would be allowed if the sale of primary frequency 

response service under market-based rates were allowed. It suggests that the Commission 

state that markets for primary frequency response service are allowed, subject to petition 

by appropriate utilities and approval by the Commission.86 Union of Concerned Scientists 

also asks that market eligibility and participation as a seller should not be constrained by 

disproportionate administrative burdens.87 The Commission agrees that market-based rate 

sales by entities that have been granted authorization for such sales are allowed; that is, of 

course, the object of a market-based rate application. With respect to the authority for 

potential buyers to purchase primary frequency response service, this Final Rule only 

involves market power screening of potential sellers. As with most products in voluntary 

bilateral markets, potential buyers do not need the Commission’s permission. Similarly, 

the Commission clarifies that RTOs and ISOs remain free to develop organized markets 

for primary frequency response if they so choose, though nothing in this Final Rule 

requires them to do so, and if they choose to do so, only then will the Commission review 

such issues as eligibility requirements for participation.

 86 Union of Concerned Scientists at 4.

87 Id. at 3.
Docket No. RM15-2-000 - 38 -

6. Requests Outside the Scope of this Proceeding

63. AWEA and Public Interest Organizations both request that the Commission permit 

sales of regulation service at market-based rates by entities with authority for marketbased rate sales of energy and capacity.88 AWEA further requests that the Commission: 

a) explore the role that dynamic transfer capability, or lack thereof, plays in protecting 

against exertion of market power;89 b) consider relaxing interconnection standards for 

resources that only sell ancillary services;90 and c) consider whether entities in bilateral 

market areas should be required to develop platforms for the sale of primary frequency 

response, even if on a limited basis such as through open seasons.91

64. Monitoring Analytics, LLC (Monitoring Analytics) notes that, while the NOPR is 

mainly concerned with the market power screens typically used in connection with 

authorizations to charge market-based rates, in organized markets like PJM’s, such rates 

are granted in significant part based on the market power mitigation rules of the RTO or 

ISO. Accordingly, Monitoring Analytics recommends that if PJM develops a market for 

primary frequency response service, the rules for such market should incorporate the 

 88 AWEA at 1, 7-9; Public Interest Organizations at 5.

89 AWEA at 3.

90 Id. at 4.

91 Id. at 5.
Docket No. RM15-2-000 - 39 -

three pivotal supplier test that is already used for market power mitigation in PJM’s other 

markets.92

65. ESA argues that fast responding energy storage resources should be allowed to 

supply both primary frequency response and regulation services simultaneously. In this 

regard, ESA asserts that the Commission should not inadvertently create a system where 

all providers of primary frequency response must provide such service for at least 5-10 

minutes until the slowest regulation resources can be brought online.93 ESA requests that 

the Commission ensure that ancillary service market designs and procurement mechanisms 

are reasonably consistent across regions and reflect non-market compensated benefits in 

the determination of operational needs for particular capabilities, such as fast response.94

66. Grid Storage Consulting argues that balancing authorities should not be able to 

mandate that primary frequency response be provided as part of other market products,95

and that in some circumstances it may be appropriate to permit the costs of dedicated 

primary frequency response resources to be recovered in transmission rate base.96

67. If an RTO seeks to create an organized market for primary frequency response, then 

Dominion recommends that the Commission require a market design similar to those used 

 92 Monitoring Analytics at 7.

93 ESA at 5.

94 Id. at 6.

95 Grid Storage Consulting at 8-9.

96 Id. at 10-11.
Docket No. RM15-2-000 - 40 -

currently to procure other ancillary services such as regulation and operating reserves. 

Alternatively, Dominion also supports allowing RTOs to procure primary frequency 

response at cost-based rates, in a manner similar to how reactive power is procured.

Dominion also argues that generators should either be exempt from charges such as 

operating reserve and balancing energy when deviating from their schedules in order to 

provide primary frequency response service or their compensation should include credits 

to offset such charges.97

68. SmartSenseCom asserts that there is a difference in value between resources 

capable of delivering a rapid response to changing frequency and slower-responding units. 

Accordingly, SmartSenseCom asks the Commission to require public utility transmission 

providers to take into account the speed and accuracy of primary frequency response 

resources when determining reserve requirements for primary frequency response, as the 

Commission did for regulation service in Order No. 784. SmartSenseCom claims this “is 

particularly necessary in this instance in light of the language set forth in Order No. 784 

and in the instant NOPR that distinguishes [primary frequency response] from regulation 

and the different requirements that will now exist for each service.”98

69. The Commission finds all of these issues to be beyond the scope of this Final Rule. 

This Final Rule deals only with market-based pricing for voluntary bilateral primary 

frequency response sellers. While some of the issues raised above might be relevant in 

 97 Dominion at 3.

98 SmartSenseCom at 8.
Docket No. RM15-2-000 - 41 -

other proceedings,99 none of the issues raised above is relevant to the topic of marketbased rates in voluntary bilateral markets. Accordingly, there is no need to address these 

issues here.

III. Compliance and Implementation

70. In Order No. 697, the Commission provided standard tariff provisions that sellers 

must include in their market-based rate tariffs to the extent they are applicable based on 

the services provided by the seller,100 including a provision for sales of ancillary services 

as a third-party provider.101 The Commission hereby revises the “Third Party Provider” 

ancillary services provision to change the reference to “Regulation and Frequency 

Response Service” to “Regulation Service” and to add a reference to “Primary Frequency 

Response Service.” The new language is as follows:

Third-party ancillary services: Seller offers [include all of the 

following that the seller is offering: Regulation Service, Reactive 

Supply and Voltage Control Service, Energy and Generator 

Imbalance Service, Operating Reserve-Spinning, Operating ReserveSupplemental, and Primary Frequency Response Service]. Sales will 

not include the following: (1) sales to an RTO or an ISO, i.e., where 

that entity has no ability to self-supply ancillary services but instead 

depends on third parties; and (2) sales to a traditional, franchised 

public utility affiliated with the third-party supplier, or sales where 

 99 For example, if an RTO or ISO eventually proposes to develop an organized 

market for primary frequency response service, or if the Commission at some point in the 

future decides to require such development, then several of the issues raised above might 

become relevant at that stage.

100 Order No. 697, FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 31,252 at Appendix C.

101 In Order No. 784, the Commission revised the standard third party provider 

provision to reflect the changes adopted in Order No. 784. Order No. 784, FERC Stats. 

& Regs. ¶ 31,349 at P 200.
Docket No. RM15-2-000 - 42 -

the underlying transmission service is on the system of the public 

utility affiliated with the third-party supplier. Sales of Operating 

Reserve-Spinning and Operating Reserve-Supplemental will not 

include sales to a public utility that is purchasing ancillary services to 

satisfy its own open access transmission tariff requirements to offer 

ancillary services to its own customers, except where the Commission 

has granted authorization. Sales of Regulation Service and Reactive 

Supply and Voltage Control Service will not include sales to a public 

utility that is purchasing ancillary services to satisfy its own open 

access transmission tariff requirements to offer ancillary services to 

its own customers, except at rates not to exceed the buying public 

utility transmission provider’s OATT rate for the same service or 

where the Commission has granted authorization.

71. The Commission finds that a seller that already has market-based rate authority as 

of the effective date of this Final Rule is authorized as of that date to make sales of 

primary frequency response service at market-based rates. Such a seller will be required to 

revise the third-party provider ancillary services provision of its market-based rate tariff to 

reflect that it wishes to make sales of primary frequency response service at market-based 

rates. However, while this authorization is effective for sellers with existing market-based 

rate authority as of the effective date of this Final Rule, in order to reduce their 

administrative burden, the Commission permits such sellers to wait to file this tariff 

revision until the next time they make a market-based rate filing with the Commission,

such as a notice of change in status filing or a triennial update.

72. As noted in the NOPR, consistent with the existing requirements of Order 

No. 2001, any entity selling primary frequency response service will need to report such 

sales in the Electric Quarterly Report,102 and the Commission will update its Electric 

 102 See Revised Public Utility Filing Requirements, Order No. 2001, FERC Stats. & 

Regs. ¶ 31,127, reh’g denied, Order No. 2001-A, 100 FERC ¶ 61,074, reh’g denied, Order 

(continued...)
Docket No. RM15-2-000 - 43 -

Quarterly Report system to include a specific product name option for primary frequency 

response service.103

IV. Information Collection Statement

The Paperwork Reduction Act (PRA)104 73. requires each federal agency to seek and 

obtain Office of Management and Budget (OMB) approval before undertaking a collection 

of information directed to ten or more persons or contained in a rule of general 

applicability. OMB regulations require approval of certain information collection 

requirements imposed by agency rules.105 Upon approval of a collection(s) of information, 

OMB will assign an OMB control number and an expiration date. Respondents subject to 

the filing requirements of an agency rule will not be penalized for failing to respond to the 

collection of information unless the collection of information displays a valid OMB 

control number.

74. The Commission will submit the revised information collection requirements to 

OMB for its review and approval. The Commission solicits public comments on its need 

 

No. 2001-B, 100 FERC ¶ 61,342, order directing filing, Order No. 2001-C, 101 FERC 

¶ 61,314 (2002), order directing filing, Order No. 2001-D, 102 FERC ¶ 61,334, order 

refining filing requirements, Order No. 2001-E, 105 FERC ¶ 61,352 (2003), order on 

clarification, Order No. 2001-F, 106 FERC ¶ 61,060 (2004), order revising filing 

requirements, Order No. 2001-G, 120 FERC ¶ 61,270, order on reh’g and clarification, 

Order No. 2001-H, 121 FERC ¶ 61,289 (2007), order revising filing requirements, Order 

No. 2001-I, FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 31,282 (2008). 

103 NOPR, FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 32,705 at P 29.

104 44 U.S.C. 3501-3520 (2012).

105 See 5 CFR 1320 (2015).
Docket No. RM15-2-000 - 44 -

for this information, whether the information will have practical utility, the accuracy of 

burden and cost estimates, ways to enhance the quality, utility, and clarity of the 

information to be collected or retained, and any suggested methods for minimizing 

respondents’ burden, including the use of automated information techniques.

75. Burden Estimate and Information Collection Costs: While, to the Commission’s 

knowledge, no entity currently sells primary frequency response service on an unbundled 

basis,106 there is no reason why primary frequency response service could not be sold 

today under cost-based rates. Such cost-based sales, if they occurred, would face all of the 

burdens associated with cost-of-service regulation, including a variety of requirements 

from which market-based rate sellers frequently seek and are granted waiver.107 

Furthermore, just like market-based rate sellers, cost-based rate sellers must report all 

transactions in the Electric Quarterly Report. Accordingly, the Commission views this 

Final Rule as providing potential market-based rate sellers of primary frequency response 

 106 It is likely that some customers purchase primary frequency response service 

along with other services on a bundled basis, such as through full requirements contracts, 

but this Final Rule is focused on unbundled sales of primary frequency response service.

107 Such burdens would include, for example, the need to maintain Open Access 

Transmission Tariffs and Open Access Same-Time Information Systems related to any 

jurisdictional transmission facilities owned by the entity, the need to adhere to the 

Commission’s standards of conduct, the need to adhere to the detailed cost-of-service 

related requirements of subparts B and C of Part 35 of the Commission’s regulations, the 

need to adhere to the accounting and reporting requirements of Parts 41, 101, and 141 of 

the Commission’s regulations, and the need to seek separate authorizations for issuances 

of securities and assumptions of liabilities under FPA section 204 and Part 34 of the 

Commission’s regulations.
Docket No. RM15-2-000 - 45 -

service with the opportunity to avoid cost-of-service regulation for such sales and the 

associated substantial reporting burdens.

76. Below, we discuss the expected increases in burden as a result of this Final Rule. 

The Commission expects the additional burden to be greatly outweighed by the reduction 

in burden from avoiding cost-of-service regulation. The additional estimated annual 

public reporting burdens and costs for the requirements in this Final Rule are as follows.

Changes in Final Rule in RM15-2108

Number of 

Respondents

(a)

Annual 

Number of 

Responses per 

Respondent

(b)

Total 

Number of 

Responses

(a)X(b)=(c)

Average 

Burden & 

Cost Per 

Response 

(d)

Total Annual 

Burden 

Hours & 

Total Annual 

Cost

(c)X(d)=(e)

Cost per 

Response

(e)/(c)

FERC-516 (Electric Rate Schedules and Tariff Filings) (one time, phased in)

 108 For purposes of burden estimation, the NOPR assumed that industry staff 

members are similarly situated to FERC, in terms of hourly cost per full time employee, 

and no commenter disputes this assumption. Therefore, the estimated average hourly cost 

(salary plus benefits) is $72.00. 
Docket No. RM15-2-000 - 46 -

1,585109 0.163110 259

6 hrs.; 

$432

1,554 hrs.; 

$111,888 $432

FERC-920 (Electric Quarterly Report) (one-time, phased in)

1,585 0.163 111 259

2 hrs.; 

$144

518 hrs.; 

$37,296 $144

 109 The 1,585 respondent universe includes existing sellers (1,999 total marketbased rate sellers - 697 Category 1 sellers + 70 Category 1 sellers = 1,372 sellers estimated 

to sell primary frequency response services) plus 213 new market-based rate applicants (as 

estimated in Docket No. RM14-14). (We estimate that ten percent (or 70, as indicated 

above) of the Category 1 sellers may choose to sell primary frequency response services.) 

110 We expect respondents to enter the primary frequency response market 

gradually. For each of the next three years, we expect all 213 new market-based rate 

applicants per year (or 639 total during Years 1-3), to include the primary frequency 

response language in their tariffs. 

Additionally, during the three-year period, we expect a total of ten percent of the 

existing 1,372 respondents (or 137 respondents), to decide to sell primary frequency 

response services and to make the corresponding FERC-516 rate filing. The 

corresponding annual estimate is 46 of the existing respondents (an average of 3.4% 

annually). Therefore, the annual estimate, including both new respondents and existing 

respondents, is an average of 259 (213 + 46) respondents and responses per year.

111 As respondents decide to sell primary frequency response services, they would 

report the new offering in their Electric Quarterly Report (FERC-920), and would continue 

to report in subsequent EQRs. When a filer adds the new service, we estimate the onetime burden to be two hours. We expect any additional burden associated with reporting 

the new service in the EQR to be negligible after the first implementation as it would 

become part of the respondent’s normal reporting practice in the EQR and would only 

involve selecting the ‘primary frequency response’ option from a list of product names. 

On average, we expect filers of the new primary frequency response service to phase in:

• Year 1, 259 respondents or 16.3 percent of EQR filers.

• Year 2, 259 respondents or 16.3 percent of EQR filers.

• Year 3, 259 respondents or 16.3 percent of EQR filers.
Docket No. RM15-2-000 - 47 -

Titles: FERC-516 (Electric Rate Schedules and Tariff Filings) and FERC-920 (Electric 

Quarterly Report (EQR)).

Action: Revision of Currently Approved Collection of Information.

OMB Control Nos.: 1902-0096 (FERC-516) and 1902-0255 (FERC-920).

Respondents: Public utilities.

Frequency of responses: One-time, phased in (for both FERC-516 and FERC-920).

Necessity of the Information: Regarding FERC-516, section 205(c) of the Federal Power 

Act requires public utilities to file with the Commission schedules showing all rates and 

charges for any transmission or sale subject to the Commission’s jurisdiction. 

Accordingly, entities wishing to sell primary frequency response service at market-based 

rates must amend their market-based rate tariffs to include the language included in this 

Final Rule. Regarding FERC-920, the Commission is revising the EQR to ensure that 

public utilities that may sell primary frequency response service at market-based rates 

report those sales in the EQR, consistent with their filing obligations under section 205(c). 

Internal Review: The Commission has reviewed the requirements associated with the 

proposed revisions to the information collections and determined they are necessary to 

ensure that rates remain just, reasonable, and not unduly discriminatory.

77. These requirements conform to the Commission’s need for efficient information 

collection, communication, and management within the energy industry. The Commission 

has assured itself, through internal review, that there is specific, objective support for the 

burden estimates associated with the information collection requirements.
Docket No. RM15-2-000 - 48 -

78. Interested persons may obtain information on the reporting requirements by 

contacting the following: Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, 888 First Street, NE, 

Washington, DC 20426 [Attention: Ellen Brown, Office of the Executive Director], 

e-mail: DataClearance@ferc.gov, Phone (202) 502-8663, fax: (202) 273-0873.

Comments on the collections of information and associated burden estimates in the Final

Rule should be sent to the Commission in this docket and may also be sent to the Office of 

Information and Regulatory Affairs, Office of Management and Budget, Washington, DC 

20503 [Attention: Desk Officer for the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission]. For 

security reasons, comments to OMB should be submitted by e-mail to: 

oira_submission@omb.eop.gov. Please refer to OMB Control No. 1902-0096 

(FERC-516) and OMB Control No. 1902-0255 (FERC-920).

V. Environmental Analysis

79. The Commission is required to prepare an Environmental Assessment or an 

Environmental Impact Statement for any action that may have a significant adverse effect

on the human environment.112 The Commission concludes that neither an Environmental 

Assessment nor an Environmental Impact Statement is required for this Final Rule under 

section 380.4(a)(15) of the Commission’s regulations, which provides a categorical 

exemption for approval of actions under sections 205 and 206 of the FPA relating to the 

filing of schedules containing all rates and charges for the transmission or sale subject to 

 112 Regulations Implementing the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, Order 

No. 486, 52 FR 47,897 (Dec. 17, 1987), FERC Stats. & Regs., Regulations Preambles 

1986-1990 ¶ 30,783 (1987).
Docket No. RM15-2-000 - 49 -

the Commission’s jurisdiction, plus the classification, practices, contracts, and regulations 

that affect rates, charges, classifications, and services.113

VI. Regulatory Flexibility Act

The Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980 (RFA)114 80. generally requires a description 

and analysis of proposed and final rules that will have significant economic impact on a 

substantial number of small entities.

81. The Small Business Administration’s (SBA) Office of Size Standards develops the 

numerical definition of a small business.115 The SBA revised its size standard for electric 

utilities (effective January 22, 2014) from a standard based on megawatt hours to a 

standard based on the number of employees, including affiliates.116 Under SBA’s current 

size standards, the entities with market-based rates which are affected by this Final Rule

likely come under the following categories117 with the indicated thresholds (in terms of 

number of employees118): 

• Hydroelectric Power Generation, 500 employees.

 113 18 CFR 380.4(a)(15) (2015).

114 5 U.S.C. 601-612 (2012).

115 13 CFR 121.101 (2015). 

116 SBA Final Rule on “Small Business Size Standards: Utilities,” 78 FR 77,343 

(Dec. 23, 2013).

117 13 CFR 121.201, Sector 22, Utilities.

118 SBA’s regulations at 13 CFR 121.201 state that “[t]he number of employees ...

indicates the maximum allowed for a concern and its affiliates to be considered small.”
Docket No. RM15-2-000 - 50 -

• Fossil Fuel Electric Power Generation, 750 employees.

• Nuclear Electric Power Generation, 750 employees.

• Solar Electric Power Generation, 250 employees.

• Wind Electric Power Generation, 250 employees.

• Geothermal Electric Power Generation, 250 employees.

• Biomass Electric Power Generation, 250 employees.

• Other Electric Power Generation, 250 employees.

82. The categories for the applicable entities have a size threshold ranging from 

250 employees to 750 employees. For the analysis in this Final Rule, we are using the 

threshold of 750 employees for all categories. We anticipate that a maximum of 

82 percent of the entities potentially affected by this Final Rule are small. In addition, we 

expect that not all of those entities will be able to or will choose to offer primary frequency 

response service. 

83. Based on the estimates above in the Information Collection section, we expect a 

one-time cost of $576 (including the burden cost related to filing both the tariff and the 

EQR) for each entity that decides to offer primary frequency response service. 

84. The Commission does not consider the estimated cost per small entity to impose a 

significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities. Accordingly, the 

Commission certifies that this Final Rule will not have a significant economic impact on a 

substantial number of small entities.
Docket No. RM15-2-000 - 51 -

VII. Document Availability

85. In addition to publishing the full text of this document in the Federal Register, the 

Commission provides all interested persons an opportunity to view and/or print the 

contents of this document via the Internet through the Commission's Home Page 

(http://www.ferc.gov) and in the Commission's Public Reference Room during normal 

business hours (8:30 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. Eastern time) at 888 First Street, NE, Room 2A, 

Washington, DC 20426.

86. From the Commission's Home Page on the Internet, this information is available on 

eLibrary. The full text of this document is available on eLibrary in PDF and Microsoft 

Word format for viewing, printing, and/or downloading. To access this document in 

eLibrary, type the docket number excluding the last three digits of this document in the 

docket number field.

87. User assistance is available for eLibrary and the Commission’s website during 

normal business hours from the Commission’s Online Support at 202-502-6652 

(toll free at 1-866-208-3676) or email at ferconlinesupport@ferc.gov, or the Public 

Reference Room at (202) 502-8371, TTY (202) 502-8659. E-mail the Public Reference 

Room at public.referenceroom@ferc.gov.

VIII. Effective Date and Congressional Notification

88. The Final Rule is effective [INSERT DATE 90 days from publication in 

FEDERAL REGISTER]. The Commission has determined, with the concurrence of the 

Administrator of the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs of OMB, that this Final 

Rule is not a “major rule” as defined in section 351 of the Small Business Regulatory 
Docket No. RM15-2-000 - 52 -

Enforcement Fairness Act of 1996. This Final Rule is being submitted to the Senate, 

House, Government Accountability Office, and Small Business Administration.

List of subjects in 18 CFR Part 35 

Electric power rates; Electric utilities; Reporting and recordkeeping requirements.

By the Commission.

( S E A L )

Nathaniel J. Davis, Sr.,

Deputy Secretary.
Docket No. RM15-2-000 - 53 -

In consideration of the foregoing, the Commission amends Part 35, 

Chapter I, Title 18, Code of Federal Regulations, as follows.

PART 35 – FILING OF RATE SCHEDULES AND TARIFFS

1. The authority citation for Part 35 continues to read as follows:

Authority: 16 U.S.C. § 791a-825r, 2601-2645; 31 U.S.C. § 9701; 42 U.S.C. 

§ 7101-7352.

2. Revise § 35.37 (c)(1) to read as follows:

§ 35.37 Market power analysis required.

* * * * *

(c)(1) There will be a rebuttable presumption that a Seller lacks horizontal market 

power with respect to sales of energy, capacity, energy imbalance service, generation 

imbalance service, and primary frequency response service if it passes two indicative 

market power screens: a pivotal supplier analysis based on annual peak demand of the 

relevant market, and a market share analysis applied on a seasonal basis. There will be a 

rebuttable presumption that a Seller lacks horizontal market power with respect to sales of 

operating reserve-spinning and operating reserve-supplemental services if the Seller passes 

these two indicative market power screens and demonstrates in its market-based rate 

application how the scheduling practices in its region support the delivery of operating 

reserve resources from one balancing authority area to another. There will be a rebuttable 

presumption that a Seller possesses horizontal market power with respect to sales of 

energy, capacity, energy imbalance service, generation imbalance service, operating 
Docket No. RM15-2-000 - 54 -

reserve-spinning service, operating reserve-supplemental service, and primary frequency 

response service if it fails either screen.

* * * * *