United States Court of Appeals

For the Eighth Circuit

___________________________

No. 18-1683

___________________________

United States of America

lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellee

v.

Elvia Adilene Ibarra-Sanchez

lllllllllllllllllllllDefendant - Appellant

____________

Appeal from United States District Court 

for the District of Minnesota - St. Paul

____________

Submitted: March 11, 2019

Filed: May 6, 2019

[Unpublished]

____________

Before SHEPHERD, ARNOLD, and ERICKSON, Circuit Judges.

____________

PER CURIAM.

In November 2016, Elvia Ibarra-Sanchez was indicted on one count of

conspiring to distribute methamphetamine and two counts of aiding and abetting the

distribution of methamphetamine. See 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(C), 846; 18

U.S.C. § 2. At trial, her primary defense was that she did not knowingly commit the
crimes. The jury found her guilty on all counts, and the district court sentenced her

1

to two years in prison and three years of supervised release. She appeals, arguing the

district court plainly erred in allowing an expert to present so-called drug-courier

testimony and that the district court abused its discretion by giving the jury a willfulblindness instruction. We affirm.

The indictment against Ibarra-Sanchez included charges that she conspired

with her boyfriend turned fiancé, Jeovani Huerta-Gonzalez. He pleaded guilty and

testified on Ibarra-Sanchez's behalf at her trial. Both testified that he shielded her

from his illicit drug trafficking, to the point that, according to Huerta-Gonzalez,

Ibarra-Sanchez "didn't know anything about what I was doing." Ibarra-Sanchez

admits that she was with Huerta-Gonzalez on three occasions when he distributed

methamphetamine, but she maintains she still did not realize he was distributing

drugs. The government, on the other hand, presented testimony from an unindicted

coconspirator who said, among other things, that Ibarra-Sanchez had witnessed drug

transactions, that she had instructed Huerta-Gonzalez where to find drugs in his

apartment on one occasion, and that she had handled some of the drug-transaction

proceeds.

The government also called a police officer to give expert testimony about the

modus operandi of drug traffickers. He testified that drug dealers often use girlfriends

in various ways to help them distribute. He also said that, while girlfriends are not

necessarily made aware of all the details of a conspiracy, "they are absolutely going

to be informed about what's going on." He acknowledged that "one time may be a

coincidence," but, he continued, "if somebody's role is to be present or somebody is

present and they're actively working on behalf of that organization, then they would

have knowledge about what's going on."

The Honorable Ann D. Montgomery, United States District Judge for the

1

District of Minnesota.

-2-
Ibarra-Sanchez maintains on appeal that the district court erred in allowing this

expert testimony because, she contends, it constitutes impermissible drug-courier

testimony. Because defense counsel did not object to thistestimony before the district

court, we review for plain error. See United States v. Sorensen, 893 F.3d 1060, 1064

(8th Cir. 2018). What is called drug courier evidence is generally inadmissible at trial

because it involves nothing more than testimony about investigative techniques that

police officers use to identify potential drug couriers. See United States v. Holmes,

751 F.3d 846, 851 (8th Cir. 2014). A court, however, may allow officers to give

expert testimony concerning the modus operandi of drug dealerssince most jurors are

unfamiliar with the trade. United States v. Schwarck, 719 F.3d 921, 923 (8th Cir.

2013).

In some cases the line between these two legal principles is admittedly

somewhat hazy. But we have specifically held that "[e]xpert testimony to the effect

that drug traffickers do not typically use couriers who are unaware they are

transporting drugs is permissible where one theory ofthe defense isthat the defendant

was unaware of the presence of the drugs." United States v. Urbina, 431 F.3d 305,

311 (8th Cir. 2005). That's precisely the situation here; the apparent object of the

officer'stestimony wasto establish that Ibarra-Sanchez was aware of, and assisted in,

Huerta-Gonzalez's drug trafficking. We therefore detect no error, much less a plain

one.

We review the district court's decision to give a willful-blindness instruction

over defense counsel's objection for an abuse of discretion. United States v. Atkins,

881 F.3d 621, 627 (8th Cir. 2018). We have described willful blindness as "a limited

exception" to a requirement that the defendant have actual knowledge of a crime's

commission, applying "only if the defendant was aware of facts that put himon notice

that criminal activity was probably afoot and deliberately failed to make further

inquiries, intending to remain ignorant." United States v. Hansen, 791 F.3d 863, 868

(8th Cir. 2015).

-3-
We don't think the district court abused its discretion in giving a willfulblindness instruction on this record. We have explained that such an "instruction is

particularly appropriate when the defendant denies any knowledge of a criminal

scheme despite strong evidence to the contrary." United States v. Woodard, 315 F.3d

1000, 1004 (8th Cir. 2003). Indeed, Ibarra-Sanchez admits being near HuertaGonzalez during three drug transactions but disclaims any knowledge of them, so,

under Woodard, the instruction was appropriate. Ibarra-Sanchez also points to her

testimony thatshe questioned Huerta-Gonzalez about warning signs of illicit activity

and merely accepted his explanations. She argues that, by questioning HuertaGonzalez, she did not bury her head in the sand. But the jury was not obligated to

believe she questioned him, and even if it did, it could still reasonably find that her

mere questioning was insufficient to show she did not intend to remain ignorant.

We disagree with Ibarra-Sanchez that the instruction lowered the government's

burden of proof to the point thatshe could be convicted for mere negligence. We have

rejected this very argument where, as here, the willful-blindness instruction also

informed the jury that it could not find knowledge if the defendant were "merely

negligent, careless, or mistaken." See United States v. Haire, 806 F.3d 991, 998 (8th

Cir. 2015).

Affirmed.

______________________________

-4-