IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA

No. 08–1635

Filed February 4, 2011

TIMOTHY L. MERRIAM, An Individual; JUSTINE MERRIAM, Both 

Individually and as Next Friend of CHRISTOPHER MERRIAM, A Minor, 

KAYLA MERRIAM, A Minor, and COLLIN MERRIAM, A Minor,

Appellants,

vs.

FARM BUREAU INSURANCE, A Corporation and/or FARM BUREAU 

INSURANCE SERVICES, A Corporation; and STEVEN C. 

STONEHOCKER, An Individual,

Appellees.

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Scott D. 

Rosenberg, Judge.

Plaintiffs appeal dismissal of their negligence claim against an 

insurance agent and the insurance companies represented by the agent. 

AFFIRMED.

Marc A. Humphrey, Urbandale, and Alan O. Olson, Des Moines, for 

appellants.

Brian L. Campbell of Whitfield & Eddy, PLC, Des Moines, for 

appellees.
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CADY, Chief Justice.

The plaintiffs, Timothy L. Merriam and Justine Merriam, 

individually and as next best friends to minors Christopher Merriam, 

Kayla Merriam, and Collin Merriam, brought this action against Steven 

Stonehocker, their insurance agent, alleging Stonehocker breached his 

duty of care to act as a reasonably prudent insurance agent when he 

failed to advise and recommend that Timothy Merriam, a self-employed 

over-the-road truck driver, procure self-employment workers’

compensation insurance. In addition, the plaintiffs contend defendants 

Farm Bureau Insurance and Farm Bureau Insurance Services 

(collectively Farm Bureau) are vicariously liable for the actions of

Stonehocker, an independent contractor with Farm Bureau. The district 

court granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment, holding the 

evidence established Stonehocker used reasonable care, diligence, and 

judgment in procuring the insurance requested by the Merriams and 

that, as a matter of law, there was no genuine issue of material fact for 

trial. On appeal, we affirm the decision of the district court.

I. Background Facts and Proceedings.

The following facts are undisputed. In 1998 or 1999, Timothy 

Merriam became an independent over-the-road truck driver for Landstar 

Ranger. As an owner operator, he was self-employed. Prior to that time, 

Merriam had always driven a truck as an employee, and any workers’ 

compensation insurance coverage was handled by his employer.

In August 2004, Steven Stonehocker began selling Farm Bureau 

insurance products as an independent contractor. Upon obtaining this 

position, Stonehocker was assigned the Merriams as clients, and it was 

his responsibility to service the account. At the time he was assigned the 

account, Farm Bureau insured the Merriams’ primary residence. 
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In early 2005, Justine Merriam contacted Stonehocker about 

insuring a second residence the Merriams were purchasing for Timothy’s 

mother. The Merriams and Stonehocker had never before met. In March 

2005, Stonehocker met with the Merriams at their residence to discuss 

their request for additional coverage. During this initial meeting, 

Stonehocker suggested the Merriams consider insuring their personal 

vehicles with Farm Bureau. Their personal vehicles were currently 

insured through a different insurance company. Stonehocker explained

Farm Bureau had a package policy that might be able to provide a better 

rate and offered to obtain a quote. At the same time, the Merriams

inquired about obtaining additional coverage on several other items. The 

Merriams indicated they were interested in obtaining insurance on their 

horses, and Stonehocker agreed to obtain a quote for them. They also 

asked Stonehocker whether their current homeowner’s policy covered 

Timothy’s guns. When he informed them that it did not, they requested 

Stonehocker obtain a quote on insuring the guns. The Merriams also 

asked Stonehocker to add their new garage and chicken coop onto their 

homeowner’s insurance policy. Finally, the Merriams inquired into 

obtaining a life insurance policy on Timothy’s mother. 

During this meeting, Stonehocker was aware that Merriam was a 

self-employed over-the-road truck driver. Justine also informed 

Stonehocker that Timothy “had a million dollar policy which applied if he 

was killed in his truck.” There was, however, no discussion of workers’ 

compensation coverage or of any insurance coverage for Timothy if he 

was injured on the job. 

Only a few weeks later, on March 29, 2005, Timothy was at his 

home in Boone, Iowa. While on duty for work, he severely injured his 

arm when, during the process of patching the driveway where he parked 
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his work truck, the dump truck he was operating malfunctioned and 

crushed his left arm.

Timothy did not have workers’ compensation coverage through

Landstar Ranger. The Merriams allege Stonehocker was negligent in 

failing to advise them that, as a self-employed over-the-road truck driver, 

Timothy had no workers’ compensation insurance unless he purchased 

the additional coverage himself. They claimed Stonehocker was in a 

position of superior knowledge pertaining to available insurance products 

and was negligent for failing to initiate a conversation with them 

regarding this issue. The Merriams allege Farm Bureau was vicariously 

liable for Stonehocker’s inaction because he works as its agent. 

II. Scope of Review.

Rulings on motions for summary judgment are reviewed for the 

correction of errors at law. Langwith v. Am. Nat’l Gen. Ins. Co., 793

N.W.2d 215, 218 (Iowa 2010). “ ‘To obtain a grant of summary judgment 

on some issue in an action, the moving party must affirmatively establish 

the existence of undisputed facts entitling that party to a particular 

result under controlling law.’ ” Baker v. City of Iowa City, 750 N.W.2d 

93, 97 (Iowa 2008) (quoting Interstate Power Co. v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 603 

N.W.2d 751, 756 (Iowa 1999)); see also Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.981(3) 

(authorizing summary judgment when “there is no genuine issue as to 

any material fact,” and “the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a 

matter of law”). In reviewing a district court’s determination that the 

defendants met their burden under this standard, “we view the evidence 

in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Langwith, 793 N.W.2d 

at 218.
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III. Prior Precedent.

The primary issue in this case is whether Stonehocker had an 

affirmative duty to inquire or advise the Merriams on Timothy’s need for 

self-employed workers’ compensation insurance coverage. We recently 

discussed the scope of the duty owed by an insurance agent to his client 

in Langwith. In Langwith, we noted the import of our decisions in two 

earlier cases 

was to limit an insurance agent’s obligation to procurement 

of the coverage requested by the client, relieving the agent of 

any duty to advise his client of the kinds and amounts of 

insurance that would protect his client’s insurable interests 

unless there was evidence of an expanded agency agreement. 

Langwith, 793 N.W.2d at 221; see also Sandbulte v. Farm Bureau Mut.

Ins. Co., 343 N.W.2d 457 (Iowa 1984); Collegiate Mfg. Co. v. McDowell’s 

Agency, Inc., 200 N.W.2d 854 (Iowa 1972). We further noted that in 

Sandbulte we narrowly circumscribed the circumstances under which an 

expanded agency agreement could arise to those situations when “ ‘the 

[insurance] agent holds himself out as an insurance specialist, 

consultant or counselor and is receiving compensation for consultation 

and advice apart from premiums paid by the insured [principal].’ ”

Langwith, 793N.W.2d at 219 (quoting Sandbulte, 343 N.W.2d at 464). 

Upon further reflection, however, we concluded “the general 

principles governing agency relationships [require] a more flexible 

method of determining [whether] the undertaking of an insurance agent 

is appropriate.” Id. We noted that, under these principles, “ ‘[a]n agent 

has a duty to act in accordance with the express and implied terms of

any contract between the agent and principal.’ ” Id. (quoting 

Restatement (Third) of Agency § 8.07, at 334 (2006)). We further held 

that “it is for the fact finder to determine, based on a consideration of all 
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the circumstances, the agreement of the parties with respect to the 

service to be rendered by the insurance agent.” Id. (citing Fowler v. Berry 

Seed Co., 248 Iowa 1158, 1165, 84 N.W.2d 412, 416 (1957)). 

Some of the circumstances that may be considered by the 

fact finder in determining the undertaking of the insurance 

agent include the nature and content of the discussions 

between the agent and the client; the prior dealings of the 

parties, if any; the knowledge and sophistication of the 

client; whether the agent holds himself out as an insurance 

specialist, consultant, or counselor; and whether the agent 

receives compensation for additional or specialized services. 

Id. (citing Fitzpatrick v. Hayes, 67 Cal Rptr. 2d 445, 452 (Ct. App. 1997)). 

Finally, we held that “[t]he client bears the burden of proving an 

agreement to render services beyond the general duty to obtain the 

coverage requested.” Id. 

IV. Application of Summary Judgment Standard. 

Viewing the record in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs, we 

now consider whether there are facts that would support a finding of an 

agreement between the parties, interpreted in light of the circumstances 

under which it was made, that obligated Stonehocker to inquire and 

advise the Merriams on Timothy’s need for self-employed workers’ 

compensation insurance protection.

A review of the summary judgment record shows that, at the time 

immediately prior to Timothy’s accident, the relationship between 

Stonehocker and the Merriams had been one of short duration. 

Stonehocker had started employment with Farm Bureau in August 2004. 

At that time, the only business the Merriams had with Farm Bureau was 

an insurance policy on their primary residence, obtained through 

another Farm Bureau agent. Their other insurance needs, including 

coverage on personal vehicles, health insurance, life insurance, and 

insurance on Timothy’s over-the-road truck were being serviced by other 
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companies. Although Stonehocker had been assigned to handle the 

Merriams’ insurance account, he did not have any contact with the 

insureds until early 2005 when Justine called him to inquire about 

coverage for a second residence. 

The main focus of their initial in-person meeting in March 2005 

was property insurance coverage. The Merriams inquired about 

additional coverage on a second residence, outbuildings, animals, and 

guns. In addition, they also asked about a life insurance policy for 

Timothy’s mother. In addressing these needs, Stonehocker testified in

his deposition that he inquired whether the Merriams would be 

interested in getting a quote on their personal vehicles to take advantage 

of a potentially better rate through Farm Bureau’s packaging of 

residential and vehicle insurance products. The Merriams consented,

and Stonehocker was subsequently able to procure additional coverage 

for the Merriams on the second residence, many of their personal 

vehicles, garage addition, animals, and outbuildings.1 

In his deposition, Stonehocker acknowledged that he knew 

Timothy was a self-employed truck driver. He testified this information 

was essential in order to provide an accurate quote. Specifically, 

Stonehocker testified: 

When you’re rating vehicles, you have to find out what the 

occupation is, because different ratings apply to where [the 

insureds] work and how far it takes to get there. And so 

that’s as far as the conversation ever went. He told me he 

was a truck driver, and I knew he didn’t commute with these 

 1Stonehocker was not asked to obtain a quote on the dump truck involved in the 

accident that severely injured Timothy, and the truck was not covered under any 

insurance policy. Due to health issues, Farm Bureau was unable to provide life 

insurance coverage for Timothy’s mother. It is unclear from the record whether the 

plaintiffs obtained insurance coverage for their guns. They were, however, able to 

obtain liability coverage on the horses.
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specific vehicles. That was the only information I was 

asking. 

Stonehocker was also advised by Justine that Timothy had coverage of a 

million dollars if he were killed in his truck.

The Merriams maintain Stonehocker’s awareness of Timothy’s selfemployment status and his life insurance policy, combined with the 

insurance agent’s unsolicited recommendation for other insurance 

coverage, supports a conclusion that Stonehocker, a licensed agent with

more knowledge than the plaintiffs, was holding himself out as an 

insurance specialist, thus enlarging his duty to make recommendations 

to the Merriams regarding workers’ compensation coverage. We do not 

agree.

The Merriams made no specific inquiry with respect to selfemployed workers’ compensation insurance and did not expressly or 

impliedly seek Stonehocker’s assistance in assessing any of their 

insurance needs other than those specifically requested. To the extent 

Stonehocker made suggestions regarding personal vehicle coverage, the 

record establishes he did so only in an effort to obtain a more favorable 

rate for the property the plaintiffs sought to insure, the residences. 

Moreover, there was no evidence of any long-standing relationship 

between the parties that would support an implied agreement to expand 

Stonehocker’s duty to include assessment of the Merriams’ other 

insurance needs. There was no evidence Stonehocker advised the 

Merriams that he was an insurance specialist, and he did not offer to 

consult with them on any additional insurance needs. Finally, aside 

from the typical commission, Stonehocker never received any additional 

compensation from the insurance products he sold the Merriams. See 

id. at 223 (finding that, in the “absence of circumstances indicating the 

insurance agent has assumed a duty beyond the procurement of the 
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coverage requested by the client, the insurance agent has no obligation 

to advise a client regarding additional coverage or risk management.”). 

The plaintiffs contend Stonehocker’s knowledge of Timothy’s selfemployed status and million dollar life insurance policy was sufficient to 

trigger a duty of inquiry on Stonehocker’s part. The fact that 

Stonehocker was a trained and licensed insurance agent with arguably 

“superior knowledge as to what insurance products someone in 

[Timothy’s] position would require to be adequately protected from injury 

or loss” cannot be the basis to find an implied agreement to expand 

Stonehocker’s duty. If that were the case, then every trained and 

licensed insurance agent would have a duty to provide an assessment of 

all of an insureds’ insurance needs, whether requested or not. As 

previously discussed, we have never held this to be the law in this state. 

Under the principles set forth in Langwith, the plaintiffs have failed to 

establish a genuine issue of material fact exists that there was an

expanded agency agreement requiring Stonehocker to advise the 

plaintiffs regarding self-employment workers’ compensation insurance 

for Timothy. Because Stonehocker is not liable to the plaintiffs, Farm 

Bureau cannot be vicariously liable. The district court’s ruling granting 

the defendants’ motion for summary judgment is affirmed.2 

AFFIRMED.

 2In their appeal, the Merriams also assert the defendants owed them a fiduciary 

duty. This issue was not ruled on by the district court, and the plaintiffs did not file a 

motion to enlarge the findings of fact or conclusions of law. Meier v. Senecaut, 641 

N.W.2d 532, 537 (Iowa 2002) (“It is a fundamental doctrine of appellate review that 

issues must ordinarily be both raised and decided by the district court before we will 

decide them on appeal.”). Therefore, it is not preserved for our review. However, even if 

properly preserved, we conclude the plaintiffs have failed to present a genuine issue of 

material fact that would support an existence of a fiduciary duty. See Kurth v. 

Van Horn, 380 N.W.2d 693, 695 (Iowa 1986) (“ ‘A fiduciary relation exists between two 

persons when one of them is under a duty to act for or to give advice for the benefit of 

another upon matters within the scope of the relation.’ ” (emphasis added) (quoting 

Restatement (Second) of Torts § 874, cmt. a, at 300 (1979))).