Cite as: 565 U. S. ____ (2012) 1 

Per Curiam 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

DARIN RYBURN, ET AL. v. GEORGE R. HUFF, ET AL. 

ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED 

STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
 

No. 11–208. Decided January 23, 2012

 PER CURIAM. 

Petitioners Darin Ryburn and Edmundo Zepeda, along 

with two other officers from the Burbank Police Department, responded to a call from Bellarmine-Jefferson High 

School in Burbank, California. When the officers arrived 

at the school, the principal informed them that a student, Vincent Huff, was rumored to have written a letter 

threatening to “shoot up” the school. App. to Pet. for Cert. 

2. The principal reported that many parents, after hearing the rumor, had decided to keep their children at home. 

Ibid. The principal expressed concern for the safety of her 

students and requested that the officers investigate the

threat. Id., at 42, 54–55. 

In the course of conducting interviews with the principal

and two of Vincent’s classmates, the officers learned that 

Vincent had been absent from school for two days and 

that he was frequently subjected to bullying. Id., at 2. The 

officers additionally learned that one of Vincent’s classmates believed that Vincent was capable of carrying out 

the alleged threat. Id., at 44. The officers found Vincent’s 

absences from school and his history of being subjected to

bullying as cause for concern. The officers had received 

training on targeted school violence and were aware that 

these characteristics are common among perpetrators of

school shootings. Id., at 56–58, 63. 

The officers decided to continue the investigation by 

interviewing Vincent. When the officers arrived at Vincent’s house, Officer Zepeda knocked on the door and 

announced several times that the officers were with the 
 

 

 

2 RYBURN v. HUFF 

Per Curiam 

Burbank Police Department. No one answered the door or 

otherwise responded to Officer Zepeda’s knocks. Sergeant 

Ryburn then called the home telephone. The officers could 

hear the phone ringing inside the house, but no one answered. Id., at 2. 

Sergeant Ryburn next tried calling the cell phone of 

Vincent’s mother, Mrs. Huff. When Mrs. Huff answered 

the phone, Sergeant Ryburn identified himself and inquired about her location. Mrs. Huff informed Sergeant 

Ryburn that she was inside the house. Sergeant Ryburn

then inquired about Vincent’s location, and Mrs. Huff 

informed him that Vincent was inside with her. Sergeant

Ryburn told Mrs. Huff that he and the other officers were

outside and requested to speak with her, but Mrs. Huff

hung up the phone. Id., at 2–3. 

One or two minutes later, Mrs. Huff and Vincent walked 

out of the house and stood on the front steps. Officer 

Zepeda advised Vincent that he and the other officers were

there to discuss the threats. Vincent, apparently aware of 

the rumor that was circulating at his school, responded, 

“I can’t believe you’re here for that.” Id., at 3. Sergeant 

Ryburn asked Mrs. Huff if they could continue the discussion inside the house, but she refused. Ibid. In Sergeant

Ryburn’s experience as a juvenile bureau sergeant, it was

“extremely unusual” for a parent to decline an officer’s

request to interview a juvenile inside. Id., at 3, 73–74. 

Sergeant Ryburn also found it odd that Mrs. Huff never 

asked the officers the reason for their visit. Id., at 73–74. 

After Mrs. Huff declined Sergeant Ryburn’s request to

continue the discussion inside, Sergeant Ryburn asked her 

if there were any guns in the house. Mrs. Huff responded 

by “immediately turn[ing] around and r[unning] into the 

house.” Id., at 3. Sergeant Ryburn, who was “scared 

because [he] didn’t know what was in that house” and had 

“seen too many officers killed,” entered the house behind

her. Id., at 75. Vincent entered the house behind Ser-
 

Cite as: 565 U. S. ____ (2012) 3 

Per Curiam 

geant Ryburn, and Officer Zepeda entered after Vincent.

Officer Zepeda was concerned about “officer safety” and 

did not want Sergeant Ryburn to enter the house alone. 

Id., at 3. The two remaining officers, who had been standing out of earshot while Sergeant Ryburn and Officer 

Zepeda talked to Vincent and Mrs. Huff, entered the house

last, on the assumption that Mrs. Huff had given Sergeant 

Ryburn and Officer Zepeda permission to enter. Id., at 

3–4. 

Upon entering the house, the officers remained in the

living room with Mrs. Huff and Vincent. Eventually,

Vincent’s father entered the room and challenged the

officers’ authority to be there. The officers remained inside the house for a total of 5 to 10 minutes. During that

time, the officers talked to Mr. Huff and Vincent. They

did not conduct any search of Mr. Huff, Mrs. Huff, or

Vincent, or any of their property. The officers ultimately

concluded that the rumor about Vincent was false, and 

they reported their conclusion to the school. Id., at 4. 

The Huffs brought this action against the officers under

Rev. Stat. §1979, 42 U. S. C. §1983. The complaint alleges

that the officers violated the Huffs’ Fourth Amendment 

rights by entering their home without a warrant. Following a 2-day bench trial, the District Court entered judgment in favor of the officers. The District Court resolved 

conflicting testimony regarding Mrs. Huff’s response to 

Sergeant Ryburn’s inquiry about guns by finding that Mrs. 

Huff “immediately turned around and ran into the house.” 

App. to Pet. for Cert. 3. The District Court concluded that 

the officers were entitled to qualified immunity because 

Mrs. Huff’s odd behavior, combined with the information 

the officers gathered at the school, could have led reasonable officers to believe “that there could be weapons inside

the house, and that family members or the officers themselves were in danger.” Id., at 6. The District Court noted 

that “[w]ithin a very short period of time, the officers were 
 

4 RYBURN v. HUFF 

Per Curiam 

confronted with facts and circumstances giving rise to 

grave concern about the nature of the danger they were 

confronting.” Id., at 6–7. With respect to this kind of

“rapidly evolving incident,” the District Court explained,

courts should be especially reluctant “to fault the police for

not obtaining a warrant.” Id., at 7. 

A divided panel of the Ninth Circuit affirmed the District Court as to the two officers who entered the house on 

the assumption that Mrs. Huff had consented, but reversed as to petitioners. The majority upheld the District

Court’s findings of fact, but disagreed with the District

Court’s conclusion that petitioners were entitled to qualified immunity. The majority acknowledged that police

officers are allowed to enter a home without a warrant if 

they reasonably believe that immediate entry is necessary

to protect themselves or others from serious harm, even if 

the officers lack probable cause to believe that a crime has

been or is about to be committed. Id., at 24. But the 

majority determined that, in this case, “any belief that

the officers or other family members were in serious, imminent harm would have been objectively unreasonable” 

given that “[Mrs. Huff] merely asserted her right to end

her conversation with the officers and returned to her 

home.” Id., at 25. 

Judge Rawlinson dissented. She explained that “the

discrete incident that precipitated the entry in this case 

was Mrs. Huff’s response to the question regarding whether there were guns in the house.” Id., at 31. She faulted 

the majority for “recit[ing] a sanitized account of this 

event” that differed markedly from the District Court’s 

findings of fact, which the majority had conceded must be

credited. Judge Rawlinson looked to “cases that specifically address the scenario where officer safety concerns

prompted the entry” and concluded that, under the rationale articulated in those cases, “a police officer could

have reasonably believed that he was justified in making a 
 

 

Cite as: 565 U. S. ____ (2012) 5 

Per Curiam 

warrantless entry to ensure that no one inside the house

had a gun after Mrs. Huff ran into the house without 

answering the question of whether anyone had a weapon.” 

Id., at 31, 33, 37. 

Judge Rawlinson’s analysis of the qualified immunity 

issue was correct. No decision of this Court has found a 

Fourth Amendment violation on facts even roughly comparable to those present in this case. On the contrary,

some of our opinions may be read as pointing in the opposite direction. 

In Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U. S. 398, 400 (2006), we 

held that officers may enter a residence without a warrant 

when they have “an objectively reasonable basis for believing that an occupant is . . . imminently threatened with 

[serious injury].” We explained that “‘[t]he need to protect 

or preserve life or avoid serious injury is justification

for what would be otherwise illegal absent an exigency or 

emergency.’” Id., at 403 (quoting Mincey v. Arizona, 437 

U. S. 385, 392 (1978)). In addition, in Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U. S. 103, 118 (2006), the Court stated that “it 

would be silly to suggest that the police would commit a 

tort by entering [a residence] . . . to determine whether

violence . . . is about to (or soon will) occur.”

A reasonable police officer could read these decisions to 

mean that the Fourth Amendment permits an officer to enter a residence if the officer has a reasonable basis for 

concluding that there is an imminent threat of violence.

In this case, the District Court concluded that petitioners 

had such an objectively reasonable basis for reaching such

a conclusion. The District Court wrote: 

“[T]he officers testified that a number of factors led

them to be concerned for their own safety and for the

safety of other persons in the residence: the unusual 

behavior of the parents in not answering the door or

the telephone; the fact that Mrs. Huff did not inquire 
 

 

6 RYBURN v. HUFF 

Per Curiam 

about the reason for their visit or express concern that

they were investigating her son; the fact that she

hung up the telephone on the officer; the fact that 

she refused to tell them whether there were guns in 

the house; and finally, the fact that she ran back into 

the house while being questioned. That behavior, 

combined with the information obtained at the 

school—that Vincent was a student who was a victim 

of bullying, who had been absent from school for two

days, and who had threatened to ‘shoot up’ the

school—led the officers to believe that there could be 

weapons inside the house, and that family members

or the officers themselves were in danger.” App. to

Pet. for Cert. 6. 

This belief, the District Court held, was “objectively reasonable,” particularly since the situation was “rapidly 

evolving” and the officers had to make quick decisions. 

Id., at 6–7. 

The panel majority—far removed from the scene and 

with the opportunity to dissect the elements of the situation—confidently concluded that the officers really had no 

reason to fear for their safety or that of anyone else. As 

the panel majority saw things, it was irrelevant that the 

Huffs did not respond when the officers knocked on the 

door and announced their presence and when they called 

the home phone because the Huffs had no legal obligation

to respond to a knock on the door or to answer the phone. 

The majority attributed no significance to the fact that, 

when the officers finally reached Mrs. Huff on her cell 

phone, she abruptly hung up in the middle of their conversation. And, according to the majority, the officers should

not have been concerned by Mrs. Huff’s reaction when

they asked her if there were any guns in the house because Mrs. Huff “merely asserted her right to end her

conversation with the officers and returned to her home.” 
Cite as: 565 U. S. ____ (2012) 7 

Per Curiam 

Id., at 25. 

Confronted with the facts found by the District Court,

reasonable officers in the position of petitioners could have

come to the conclusion that there was an imminent threat 

to their safety and to the safety of others. The Ninth 

Circuit’s contrary conclusion was flawed for numerous 

reasons. 

First, although the panel majority purported to accept

the findings of the District Court, it changed those findings in several key respects. As Judge Rawlinson correctly

observed, “the discrete incident that precipitated the entry

in this case was Mrs. Huff’s response to the question 

regarding whether there were guns in the house.” Id., at 

31. The District Court’s finding that Mrs. Huff “immediately turned around and ran into the house” implicitly 

rejected Mrs. Huff’s contrary testimony that she walked

into the house after telling the officers that she was going 

to get her husband. Id., at 3. The panel majority upheld 

the District Court’s findings of fact and acknowledged that

it could not reverse the District Court simply because it

“may have weighed the testimony of the witnesses and

other evidence in another manner.” Id., at 15. But the 

panel majority’s determination that petitioners were not 

entitled to qualified immunity rested on an account of 

the facts that differed markedly from the District Court’s 

finding. According to the panel majority, Mrs. Huff “merely asserted her right to end her conversation with the

officers and returned to her home” after telling the officers

“that she would go get her husband.” Id., at 12, 25. 

Second, the panel majority appears to have taken the

view that conduct cannot be regarded as a matter of concern so long as it is lawful. Accordingly, the panel majority concluded that Mrs. Huff’s response to the question 

whether there were any guns in the house (immediately 

turning around and running inside) was not a reason for 

alarm because she was under no legal obligation to con-
 

 

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Per Curiam 

tinue her conversation with the police. It should go without saying, however, that there are many circumstances in 

which lawful conduct may portend imminent violence. 

Third, the panel majority’s method of analyzing the

string of events that unfolded at the Huff residence was 

entirely unrealistic. The majority looked at each separate

event in isolation and concluded that each, in itself, did 

not give cause for concern. But it is a matter of common 

sense that a combination of events each of which is mundane when viewed in isolation may paint an alarming 

picture.

Fourth, the panel majority did not heed the District

Court’s wise admonition that judges should be cautious 

about second-guessing a police officer’s assessment, made 

on the scene, of the danger presented by a particular 

situation. With the benefit of hindsight and calm deliberation, the panel majority concluded that it was unreasonable for petitioners to fear that violence was imminent.

But we have instructed that reasonableness “must be 

judged from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the

scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight” and 

that “[t]he calculus of reasonableness must embody allowance for the fact that police officers are often forced to 

make split-second judgments—in circumstances that are

tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving.” Graham v. Connor, 490 U. S. 386, 396–397 (1989). Judged from the

proper perspective of a reasonable officer forced to make a

split-second decision in response to a rapidly unfolding

chain of events that culminated with Mrs. Huff turning 

and running into the house after refusing to answer a 

question about guns, petitioners’ belief that entry was 

necessary to avoid injury to themselves or others was 

eminently reasonable.

In sum, reasonable police officers in petitioners’ position

could have come to the conclusion that the Fourth 

Amendment permitted them to enter the Huff residence if 
Cite as: 565 U. S. ____ (2012) 9 

Per Curiam 

there was an objectively reasonable basis for fearing that

violence was imminent. And a reasonable officer could 

have come to such a conclusion based on the facts as found 

by the District Court.

The petition for certiorari is granted, the judgment of

the Ninth Circuit is reversed, and the case is remanded for 

the entry of judgment in favor of petitioners. 

It is so ordered.