United States Court of Appeals

for the Fifth Circuit

No. 21-30555

Annie J. Daniel, 

Plaintiff—Appellant,

versus

Board of Supervisors for Louisiana State University 

Agricultural and Mechanical College, 

Defendant—Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Louisiana

USDC No. 3:21-CV-81

Before Stewart, Clement, and Elrod, Circuit Judges.

Per Curiam:*

Dr. Annie J. Daniel filed this employment discrimination lawsuit in 

Louisiana state court against the Board of Supervisors of Louisiana State 

University and Agricultural and Mechanical College (“LSU”). Dr. Daniel, 

who is African American, alleges that she experienced unlawful racism while 

* Pursuant to 5th Circuit Rule 47.5, the court has determined that this 

opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited 

circumstances set forth in 5th Circuit Rule 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

April 8, 2022

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

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working at LSU’s School of Veterinary Medicine (“LSU SVM”). Allegedly, 

Dr. Daniel’s superiors violated federal and Louisiana laws by subjecting her 

to racial discrimination, a hostile work environment, and retaliation. LSU 

removed the case to federal court and moved for summary judgment, which 

the district court granted. Dr. Daniel timely appealed.

For the reasons that follow, we AFFIRM the district court.

I. Facts & Procedural History

On January 1, 2014, Dr. Daniel started working for LSU SVM as a 

clinical track Associate Professor of Veterinary Medical Education and the 

Director of Veterinary Instructional Design. She was responsible for 

collecting data to ensure that LSU SVM’s curriculum was effective and for 

working with the faculty to develop sound pedagogical methods. Previously, 

Dr. Daniel had occupied similar roles at Des Moines University and Tulane 

University School of Medicine. Dr. Daniel has a Ph.D. in Education, but she 

is not trained in veterinary science and had never worked at a veterinary 

school before her appointment at LSU SVM.

Dr. Daniel’s supervisor at LSU SVM was Dr. Joseph Taboada, a white 

man who was then the Associate Dean for Student and Academic Affairs. 

Dr. Taboada was Dr. Daniel’s first point of contact at LSU SVM. He called 

Dr. Daniel once she applied and invited her to campus for a visit. Dr. Daniel 

went through a series of interviews on campus, including with Dr. Taboada.

She also presented to the faculty on diversity and inclusion. After her campus 

visit, Dr. Taboada orally extended her an employment offer, which was later 

formalized in writing.

Dr. Daniel alleges that she faced racial discrimination at LSU SVM, 

mostly at the hands of Dr. Taboada. First, she says that within a week of 

starting her job, Dr. Taboada admitted that he “didn’t know [she was] Black 

because [she] didn’t sound Black on the phone.” Dr. Daniel “just kind of 

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ignored” this comment but mentally noted that Dr. Taboada “wanted a 

[w]hite woman” and “did not want a Black woman to work with him.”

Next, Dr. Daniel alleges that Dr. Taboada made disparaging remarks 

about African Americans in her presence. Dr. Taboada generally made these 

comments during conversations with Dr. Daniel about the lack of racial 

diversity at LSU SVM. The two frequently discussed African American 

students and diversity at LSU SVM because they both believed that 

diversifying the profession was important. Within a few months of Dr. Daniel 

starting her job, Dr. Taboada told her that African Americans “don’t do 

well” at LSU SVM after she asked why so few had matriculated into the 

program. He added that “Black [parents] don’t expect their kids to go to 

college . . . [b]ecause they don’t go to college themselves.” Dr. Daniel 

responded by explaining that although her parents did not attend college, 

they pushed her to pursue higher education.

Dr. Daniel compiled a list of similar remarks that Dr. Taboada 

allegedly made throughout 2014 and 2015. Those remarks included that

(1) gifted Black students typically applied to medical school, not veterinary 

school; (2) most “Black students just cannot keep up with the pace and 

content” of veterinary school; (3) students from Southern University, the 

local historically black university, were “not academically strong enough” to 

attend LSU SVM because Southern University’s animal science program 

was “weak”; and (4) LSU SVM did not want to “burden” Black students 

“down with student loans.” Dr. Daniel considered these and other remarks 

racist.

Additionally, Dr. Daniel asserts that LSU effectively demoted her by 

relegating her to clerical work and by taking away her core duties. Allegedly, 

Dr. Taboada forced her to perform “clerical duties, inputting data, and 

providing advice—all because she is [B]lack and Dr. Taboada did not want to 

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take directives from a [B]lack woman.” During a 2017 meeting, Dr. Taboada 

suggested that Dr. Daniel could “copy and paste” faculty lecture schedules 

into a single document for the Courses and Curriculum Committee to review.

Dr. Daniel perceived this as a statement that clerical work was best suited for 

“the only Black woman in the room.” Dr. Daniel also alleges that, in 2018,

her duties were reassigned to a white woman, Dr. Heidi Banse, despite 

Dr. Banse having no training in curriculum design. According to Dr. Daniel, 

LSU “took the Instructional Design” component of her position and gave it 

to Dr. Banse. Dr. Daniel further testified that Dr. Banse and Dr. Taboada 

instituted a “Teaching Academy” for the faculty despite knowing that she 

was developing a similar program.

Dr. Daniel also alleges that LSU excluded her from training 

opportunities, declined her requests for staff support, and moved her office 

into a “closet.” On one occasion, Dr. Taboada “sent a group of people to 

learn about clinical skills” but excluded Dr. Daniel. The individuals sent to 

that event were all faculty veterinarians. Sometime during her tenure at 

LSU SVM, Dr. Daniel requested to move to an office outside of student 

affairs because she could not concentrate there. Dr. Daniel then moved to 

another office that she says was too small. Throughout her time at 

LSU SVM, Dr. Daniel requested additional staff support, but administrators 

denied her requests because the school allegedly lacked the resources to hire 

additional staff.

Dr. Daniel reported her experiences to administrators several times 

throughout her tenure at LSU SVM. In May 2017, she discussed her 

concerns about her relationship with Dr. Taboada and his alleged racist 

remarks with an LSU Human Resources official, Gaston Reinoso. In 

response, Reinoso asked Dr. Taboada about Dr. Daniel’s allegations and told 

him that, to the extent that he was making racist remarks, he “needed to stop 

immediately.” Reinoso also advised Dr. Taboada and Dr. Joel Baines, the 

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Dean of LSU SVM, that they could not retaliate against Dr. Daniel for her 

allegations. In February 2018, Dr. Daniel reported her concerns about the 

harassment and discrimination she experienced to the Senior Vice Provost at 

LSU. On June 4, 2018, Dr. Daniel complained to Reinoso that Dr. Banse and 

Dr. Taboada were taking over the Teaching Academy. On February 29, 2019, 

Dr. Daniel communicated to Dr. Baines her anxiety about working with 

Dr. Taboada. On April 12, 2019, Dr. Daniel filed an EEOC charge alleging 

discrimination, harassment, and retaliation.

LSU allegedly retaliated against Dr. Daniel for repeatedly reporting 

what she considered racial discrimination. The retaliatory actions that she 

identifies include the alleged transfer of her job duties to Dr. Banse, further

alleged racist remarks, and two negative performance evaluations. As to the 

remarks, in August 2019, Dr. Baines allegedly told Dr. Daniel that African 

American students needed to “prove themselves” to win admission to LSU 

SVM. She also says that Dr. Taboada made racist remarks throughout 2019 

and 2020, including that African Americans are “advised to go to medical 

school as opposed to veterinary school.”

Regarding the evaluations, in 2018, the LSU SVM faculty voted 

seven-to-one against reappointing Dr. Daniel, apparently because the faculty 

“d[id] not understand her role.” Even so, Dr. Daniel was reappointed and 

received a rating of “satisfactory” for the year in June 2019. Dr. Daniel 

considers that evaluation discriminatory, however, because she believes it 

falsely describes her as “inflexible,” which was “almost like” calling her an 

“angry Black woman.” On June 4, 2020, Dr. Daniel received a performance 

rating of “needs improvement” from Dr. Baines for both 2019 and 2020.

Dr. Daniel disagreed with that assessment.

In January 2020, Dr. Daniel sued LSU in Louisiana court alleging 

violations of federal and Louisiana civil rights laws. She brought 

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discrimination, harassment, and retaliation claims under Titles VI and VII of 

the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d, et seq., and 2000e, et seq., 

respectively. She also brought claims for violations of Louisiana’s antidiscrimination statute, La. R.S. § 23:301, et seq., and a reprisal claim under

Louisiana’s whistleblower statute, Id. § 23:967. LSU removed the case to 

federal court. After discovery closed, LSU moved for summary judgment. 

The district court granted LSU’s motion and entered final judgment. 

Dr. Daniel timely appealed.

II. Standard of Review

This court reviews orders granting summary judgment de novo, 

applying the same standard as the district court. Moss v. BMC Software, Inc., 

610 F.3d 917, 922 (5th Cir. 2010). Summary judgment is appropriate only 

when “the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material 

fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 56(a). “A party cannot defeat summary judgment with conclusory 

allegations, unsubstantiated assertions, or only a scintilla of evidence.” 

Lamb v. Ashford Place Apartments L.L.C., 914 F.3d 940, 946 (5th Cir. 2019) 

(quotation omitted). The court must “view[] all facts and evidence in the 

light most favorable to the non-moving party.” Moss, 610 F.3d at 922.

III. Discussion

On appeal, Dr. Daniel argues that the district court erroneously 

(1) failed to consider the totality of the circumstances when evaluating her 

hostile work environment claims; (2) held that she proved neither direct 

evidence of discrimination nor an adverse employment action for purposes 

of her discrimination claims; (3) applied the wrong standard to her retaliation 

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claim; and (4) dismissed her reprisal claim under Louisiana’s whistleblower 

statute. We address each argument in turn.1

A. Hostile Work Environment

To establish a hostile work environment claim under Title VII, the 

plaintiff must show that she (1) belongs to “a protected class”; (2) faced

“unwelcome harassment”; (3) the harassment was “based on [her] status as 

a member of a protected class”; (4) the harassment was “sufficiently severe 

or pervasive to alter the conditions of [her] employment and create an 

abusive working environment”; and (5) “the employer knew or should have 

known of the harassment in question and failed to take prompt remedial 

action.” Abbt v. City of Houston, No. 21-20085, 28 F.4th 601, 2022 WL 

764999, at *4 (5th Cir. Mar. 11, 2022) (quoting Hernandez v. Yellow Transp., 

Inc., 670 F.3d 644, 651 (5th Cir. 2012)). When assessing whether conduct

satisfies the fourth element, this court considers “the frequency of the 

discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is physically threatening or 

humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably 

interferes with an employee’s work performance.” Hernandez, 670 F.3d at

651 (quotation omitted). Moreover, “the work environment must be ‘both 

objectively and subjectively offensive.’” Id. (quoting Faragher v. City of Boca 

Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 787 (1998)).

Dr. Daniel asserts that the district court erroneously held that she 

failed to prove severe or pervasive harassment. We disagree. As an initial 

1 “Louisiana’s anti-discrimination statute . . . is ‘substantively similar’to Title VII, 

and Louisiana courts routinely look to the federal jurisprudence for guidance.” McCoy v. 

City of Shreveport, 492 F.3d 551, 556 n.4 (5th Cir. 2007) (quoting Trahan v. Rally’s 

Hamburgers, Inc., 696 So. 2d 637, 641 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1997)). Thus, “the outcome of 

[Dr. Daniel’s] statutory discrimination and retaliation claims will be the same under the 

federal and state statutes,” and “[w]e therefore analyze the issues only under the applicable 

federal precedents.” Id.

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matter, the record contains only one allegedly racist comment that an LSU 

SVM employee made about Dr. Daniel. In January 2014, Dr. Taboada 

allegedly told Dr. Daniel that he did not realize that she was Black until her

campus visit because she did not “sound Black on the phone.” Dr. Daniel 

“ignored” that comment, and there is no evidence that Dr. Taboada or 

anyone else at LSU SVM made similar statements later. The other 

statements in the record, though made in Dr. Daniel’s presence, were 

purported explanations for the lack of diversity at LSU SVM. Those 

statements thus focused on Black applicants to the school, not Dr. Daniel. 

Moreover, according to Dr. Daniel, these scattered statements were made 

over six years. This is not enough to prove a hostile work environment claim 

under this court’s precedents.

2

At bottom, Dr. Daniel failed to demonstrate harassment that was 

“sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of [her] employment 

and create an abusive working environment.” Abbt, 28 F.4th at ---, 2022 WL 

764999, at *4 (quoting Hernandez, 670 F.3d at 651). The statements that she

identifies as harassment “pale in comparison, both in severity and frequency, 

to those found in the cases” that she cites in her brief. See Turner v. Baylor 

2 See, e.g., Turner v. Baylor Richardson Med. Ctr., 476 F.3d 337, 343, 348 (5th Cir. 

2007) (rejecting harassment claim where the plaintiff’s supervisor commented about

“ghetto children,” asserted that African Americans attended “evening classes because 

they could not qualify for regular [college] admission,” and commented on the plaintiff’s

“shopping habits, car, and son’s hobby”).

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Richardson Med. Ctr., 476 F.3d 337, 348 (5th Cir. 2007). We thus conclude 

that the district court properly granted summary judgment on this claim.3

B. Racial Discrimination

Next, we assess whether the district court properly granted summary 

judgment on Dr. Daniel’s racial discrimination claim under Title VII. A 

plaintiff “may prove a claim of intentional discrimination . . . either by direct 

or circumstantial evidence.” McCoy v. City of Shreveport, 492 F.3d 551, 556 

(5th Cir. 2007). “If the plaintiff presents only circumstantial evidence, then 

she must prove discrimination inferentially using ‘[t]he three-step McDonnell 

Douglas-Burdine minuet.’” Etienne v. Spanish Lake Truck & Casino Plaza, 

L.L.C., 778 F.3d 473, 475 (5th Cir. 2015) (citation omitted). But if the plaintiff 

presents direct evidence, “the burden of proof shifts to the employer to 

establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the same decision would 

have been made regardless of the forbidden factor.” Id. (quoting Brown v. E. 

Miss. Elec. Power Ass’n, 989 F.2d 858, 861 (5th Cir. 1993)).

“Because direct evidence is rare, a plaintiff ordinarily uses 

circumstantial evidence to meet the test set out in McDonnell Douglas.” Portis 

v. First Nat’l Bank of New Albany, 34 F.3d 325, 328 (5th Cir. 1994). “Under 

that framework, the plaintiff must first establish a prima facie case of 

discrimination,” which requires her to show that she “(1) is a member of a 

protected group; (2) was qualified for the position at issue; (3) was 

discharged or suffered some adverse employment action by the employer; 

3 Dr. Daniel also asserts that the district court erroneously concluded that she 

experienced racial harassment exclusively from 2014 to 2016 and that her claim was timebarred to the extent it concerned that period. But we need not consider these issues because 

Dr. Daniel’s hostile work environment claim fails for other reasons. See Campos v. Steves & 

Sons, Inc., 10 F.4th 515, 520 (5th Cir. 2021) (“We may affirm a summary judgment on any 

ground supported by the record . . . .”).

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and (4) was . . . treated less favorably than other similarly situated employees 

outside the protected group.” McCoy, 492 F.3d at 556. If the plaintiff 

establishes a prima facie case, the burden “shifts to the employer to articulate 

a legitimate, nondiscriminatory or nonretaliatory reason for its employment 

action.” Id. at 557. If the employer meets that burden, then the plaintiff 

“bears the ultimate burden of proving that the employer’s proffered reason”

is “pretext” for unlawful discrimination. Id.

i. Direct or Circumstantial Evidence

Dr. Daniel maintains on appeal that she submitted direct evidence of 

racial discrimination. “Direct evidence is evidence which, if believed, proves 

the fact [of intentional discrimination] without inference or presumption.” 

Portis, 34 F.3d at 328–29 (quoting Brown, 989 F.2d at 861). When 

determining whether comments made at work constitute direct evidence, 

this court looks to whether the alleged comments are “(1) related to the 

plaintiff’s protected characteristic; (2) proximate in time to the challenged 

employment decision; (3) made by an individual with authority over the 

challenged employment decision; and (4) related to the challenged 

employment decision.” Etienne, 778 F.3d at 476.

The district court concluded that Dr. Daniel did not offer direct 

evidence of discrimination and that the McDonnell-Douglas framework 

therefore applied to her claims. It observed that Dr. Daniel relied on 

argumentation without evidentiary support, overstated the import of record 

evidence, and failed to demonstrate that any allegedly racist remarks “were 

related, either substantively or temporally, to the challenged employment 

decisions in this case.”

We agree with the district court. Again, the only allegedly racist 

remark that was directed at Dr. Daniel was Dr. Taboada’s comment that she 

did not “sound Black on the phone.” But that does not “prove, without 

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inference or presumption, that race was a basis in employment decisions” at 

LSU SVM, which is “our ultimate focus” at this juncture. Id. (quotation and 

alteration omitted). That is particularly so considering that Dr. Daniel’s 

telephone interview preceded a campus visit that later resulted in Dr. Daniel 

receiving an employment offer. Moreover, Dr. Daniel does not identify any 

record evidence showing that this remark, which occurred in January 2014,

was connected to the discriminatory employment decisions that allegedly

occurred years later. Indeed, the earliest employment decision that 

Dr. Daniel challenges—her alleged relegation to performing clerical duties—

occurred in 2017. Thus, this remark was not “proximate in time to [any] 

challenged employment decision.” Id. For the same reasons, even assuming

that the various statements about the lack of diversity at LSU SVM

concerned Dr. Daniel’s race, they are not direct evidence of racial 

discrimination.

ii. Adverse Employment Action

Lacking direct evidence of discrimination, this court applies the 

modified McDonnel Douglas burden shifting framework. The first step is to 

assess whether the plaintiff “establish[ed] a prima facie case of 

discrimination.” McCoy, 492 F.3d at 556. Among the elements that the 

plaintiff must show to prove a prima facie case is that she “suffered some 

adverse employment action by the employer.” Id. The district court held that 

Dr. Daniel did not suffer an adverse employment action. On appeal, 

Dr. Daniel argues that the district court erred.

For purposes of Title VII discrimination claims, “adverse 

employment actions consist of ‘ultimate employment decisions’ such as 

hiring, firing, demoting, promoting, granting leave, and compensating.” 

Thompson v. City of Waco, 764 F.3d 500, 503 (5th Cir. 2014) (citing McCoy, 

492 F.3d at 560). Generally, “the mere ‘loss of some job responsibilities’ 

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does not constitute an adverse employment action.” Id. at 504. “In certain 

instances,” however, “a change in or loss of job responsibilities . . . may be 

so significant and material that it rises to the level of an adverse employment 

action.” Id.

We consider first the alleged transfer of Dr. Daniel’s job duties and 

responsibility for the Teaching Academy to Dr. Banse. To start, although Dr. 

Daniel’s job duties shifted over time, those changes were not “so significant 

and material that [they] rise[] to the level of an adverse employment action.” 

Id. To be sure, Dr. Daniel lost primary responsibility for curriculum design, 

but that was because “[h]er efforts [had] drifted from” that role. And 

although Dr. Daniel alleges that Dr. Banse usurped her duties, their roles 

differed in that Dr. Daniel was a “pedagogical expert” whereas Dr. Banse 

was a “content expert.” Dr. Daniel further alleges that Dr. Taboada 

relegated her to performing “clerical work” when he asked her to copy and 

paste material during a meeting. However, being “asked at least once to 

perform administrative tasks outside her job description does not” prove an 

adverse employment action. Price v. Wheeler, 834 F. App’x 849, 856 (5th Cir. 

2020). Lastly, Dr. Banse did initiate the Teaching Academy. But Dr. Daniel 

had not started the project when Dr. Banse began working on it, and

administrators encouraged Dr. Daniel to collaborate with Dr. Banse, which 

she declined to do. These allegations do not establish an adverse employment 

action. Indeed, the only case that Dr. Daniel relies on to show otherwise, 

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Thompson, is inapposite because the changes there were substantially more 

significant.4

Nor do Dr. Daniel’s other allegations prove adverse employment 

actions. First, although Dr. Daniel says that the faculty voted against 

reappointing her in 2018 and that she received a poor evaluation in 2018, the 

record confirms that she was nonetheless reappointed in 2018 and that she 

received a “satisfactory” rating that year. Only the evaluation she received 

in June 2020 for the 2019 year rated her as needing “improvement.” 

However, “a low performance evaluation alone is not an adverse 

employment action.” Johnson v. McDonald, 623 F. App’x 701, 704 (5th Cir. 

2015) (citing Douglas v. DynMcDermott Petroleum Operations Co., 144 F.3d 

364, 373 n.11 (5th Cir. 1998)). Second, Dr. Daniel complains that she was 

moved into a closet. But Dr. Daniel requested to move to a different office, 

and the record lacks any evidence showing that Dr. Daniel’s new office was 

a “closet,” even if it was smaller than she preferred. Third, the only missed 

training opportunity that Dr. Daniel cites involved an opportunity in which 

all the individuals selected for the program were veterinarians, unlike 

Dr. Daniel. Finally, Dr. Daniel complains that she was denied staff support, 

but Dr. Daniel knew when she joined LSU SVM that she would receive less 

support than she previously enjoyed. Further, it is undisputed that 

Dr. Daniel received a graduate assistant in 2018. We therefore conclude that 

4

In Thompson, this court reversed the dismissal of a discrimination claim for failure 

to allege an adverse employment action. 764 F.3d at 502. The plaintiff, a Black man 

employed as a detective, alleged that his employer barred him from searching for or logging 

evidence, working undercover, giving statements in criminal cases, visiting crime scenes, 

or leading investigations. Id. Those allegations plausibly showed that the plaintiff “no 

longer occupie[d] the position of a detective” and instead “function[ed] as an assistant to 

other detectives.” Id. at 505. Accordingly, his position had become “objectively worse” 

such that “he was subject to the equivalent of a demotion.” Id. (quotation omitted).

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Dr. Daniel’s discrimination claim fails because she did not show an adverse 

employment action.

C. Retaliation

We now turn to Dr. Daniel’s claim that LSU retaliated against her for 

reporting racial discrimination and harassment in violation of Title VI

5 and 

Title VII.6 To prove a retaliation claim, a plaintiff must establish that (1) she 

“engaged in conduct protected by Title VII”; (2) she “suffered a materially 

adverse action”; and (3) “a causal connection exists between the protected 

activity and the adverse action.”Cabral v. Brennan, 853 F.3d 763, 766–67 (5th 

Cir. 2017) (quoting Jenkins v. City of San Antonio Fire Dep’t, 784 F.3d 263, 

269 (5th Cir. 2015)).

The parties dispute whether Dr. Daniel satisfied the second element. 

An employment decision constitutes a materially adverse action if 

“a reasonable employee would have found the challenged action materially 

adverse,” meaning that the action “well might have dissuaded a reasonable 

worker from making or supporting a charge of discrimination.” Id. at 767 

(quoting Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 68 (2006)).

5 We assume without deciding that Title VI encompasses a retaliation claim, 

see Sewell v. Monroe City Sch. Bd., 974 F.3d 577, 586 n.4 (5th Cir. 2020), and that the same 

elements are necessary to sustain such a claim under both Titles VI and VII, see Jones v. 

S. Univ., 834 F. App’x 919, 923 (5th Cir. 2020) (applying the Title VII retaliation standard 

to a Title VI claim) (citing Peters v. Jenney, 327 F.3d 307, 320 (4th Cir. 2003); Bhombal v. 

Irving Indep. Sch. Dist., 809 F. App’x 233, 238 (5th Cir. 2020) (per curiam)).

6 Dr. Daniel also brought a claim for reprisal under Louisiana’s whistleblower 

statute, La. R.S. § 23:967. Although Dr. Daniel argues that this statute offers broader 

protection against retaliation than does Title VII, “our precedent, and that of the Louisiana 

state courts, has consistently cited to Title VII standards in interpreting § 23:967.” Rayborn 

v. Bossier Par. Sch. Bd., 881 F.3d 409, 415 (5th Cir. 2018). Accordingly, this court has 

applied “the standards and requirements of Title VII when analyzing . . . retaliation claims 

under § 23:967.” Id. We do so again here.

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This definition is “slightly” broader than the definition that applies to an 

adverse employment action for purposes of a Title VII discrimination claim. 

Welsh v. Fort Bend Indep. Sch. Dist., 941 F.3d 818, 826 (5th Cir. 2019). Thus, 

although “Title VII’s anti-retaliation provisions do not protect employees 

from ‘petty slights, minor annoyances, and simple lack of good manners,’” a 

“retaliatory adverse employment action[] . . . need not rise to the level of [an] 

ultimate employment decision[].” Id. at 827 (quoting Burlington, 548 U.S. at 

67–68).

To prove that she suffered materially adverse action, Dr. Daniel cites 

the same allegations that she offered to show that she suffered an adverse 

employment action for purposes of her Title VII discrimination claim. We 

concluded above that those allegations failed to establish unlawful 

discrimination. Here, “[w]e similarly hold that the definition applied to 

retaliatory adverse employment actions still does not encompass any of these 

allegations.” Id. at 828. Accordingly, the district court properly dismissed 

Dr. Daniel’s retaliation claims.

IV. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the district court.

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