## I N THE



## U NITED 

## S TATES 

## C OURT OF 

## A PPEALS

FOR THE 

## S EVENTH 

## C IRCUIT



### ________________________

No. 12

‐ 1692

N ASIRUDDIN 

### K HAN



### ,

Petitioner

‐ Appellee

,

v.

T ARFA 

### F ATIMA



### , Respondent

‐ Appellant

.

__________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.

No. 12 C 1270— Harry D. Leinenweber

, Judge

.

__________________________

Argued April 30, 2012—Decided May 4, 2012 *



### __________________________

Before B AUER



### , P OSNER



### , and H AMILTON



### , Circuit Judges

.

P OSNER



### , Circuit Judge

. The International Child Abduction

Remedies Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 11601 et seq

., which implements the

Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child

Abduction, T.I.A.S. No. 11,670, 1343 U.N.T.S. 89 (Oct. 25, 1980),

entitles a person whose child has been removed from his cus

‐

* This opinion and the dissent are being released in typescript. A print copy

will follow.

### No. 12

‐ 1692 2

tody (sole or joint) to the United States (usually by the other

parent) to petition in federal or state court for the return of the

child. 42 U.S.C. §§ 11603(a), (b). The petitioner in this case is the

father, and the respondent, his wife, is the mother. She removed

the child from their joint custody and is thus the “abductor.”

The child is a girl not yet 4 years old, who in consideration of

her privacy is referred to in the briefs and record only as ZFK.

The father, an optometrist in Edmonton, Alberta (Canada),

wants to take the child back to Edmonton. He has filed for di

‐

vorce in Canada on the ground of the mother’s “physical or

mental cruelty” to him, and seeks sole custody of the children.

The mother, a U.S. citizen living in Illinois, wants to keep the

children with her in the United States. The district court or

‐

dered ZFK returned to Canada with her father, and the mother

appeals. The child was taken from her mother on March 9 of

this year by U.S. Marshals, pursuant to an ex parte order by the

district judge upon the claim of the father’s lawyer that the wife

is a flight risk because India, which the family was visiting

when the mother flew to the United States with ZFK, is not a

signatory of the Hague Convention, and so she might decide to

fly back to India, taking the child with her. (Both parties are of

Indian ethnicity.) Until our order of May 1, discussed below,

was executed, the child was living with her father in a hotel in

Chicago. The order (which was carried out on May 3) directed

that she be returned to her mother’s custody pending the final

disposition of the appeal.

“The [Hague] Convention was created to discourage abduc

‐

tions by parents who either lost, or would lose, a custody con

‐

test.... The Convention drafters adopted a ‘remedy of re

‐

turn’...to discourage abductions, reconnect children with their

primary caretakers, and locate each custody contest in the fo

‐

rum where most of the relevant evidence existed. [But] while

the remedy of return works well if the abductor is a non

‐

custodial parent, it is inappropriate when the abductor is a pri

‐

### No. 12

‐ 1692 3

mary caretaker who is seeking to protect herself and the chil

‐

dren from the other parent’s violence.” Merle H. Weiner, “Nav

‐ igating the Road Between Uniformity and Progress: The Need

for Purposive Analysis of the Hague Convention on the Civil

Aspects of International Child Abduction,” 33 Colum. Human

Rts. L. Rev. 275, 278–79 (2002) (citations omitted), quoted in Van

De Sande v. Van De Sande

, 431 F.3d 567, 568 (7th Cir. 2005). See

also Karen Brown Williams, “Fleeing Domestic Violence: A

Proposal to Change the Inadequacies of the Hague Convention

on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction in Do

‐

mestic Violence Cases,” 4 John Marshall L.J. 39, 42–45 (2011);

Noah L. Browne, Note, “Relevance and Fairness: Protecting the

Rights of Domestic

‐ Violence Victims and Left

‐ Behind Fathers

Under the Hague Convention on International Child Abduc

‐

tion,” 60 Duke L.J. 1193, 1202–05 (2011); Roxanne Hoegger,

“What If She Leaves? Domestic Violence Cases Under the

Hague Convention and the Insufficiency of the Undertakings

Remedy,” 18 Berkeley Women’s L.J. 181, 187–88 (2003); Merle H.

Weiner, “International Child Abduction and the Escape from

Domestic Violence,” 69 Fordham L. Rev. 593, 634 (2000). As these

articles explain, domestic violence is a common inciter to “ab

‐

duction”—the abused spouse flees and takes her children with

her. Accusations of domestic violence figure in the present case,

as we are about to see.

Article 13(b) of the Convention provides a defense to the re

‐

turn of the “abducted” child if “there is a grave risk that [the

child’s] return would expose the child to physical or psycho

‐ logical harm or otherwise place the child in an intolerable situa

‐

tion.” The respondent (the abductor) must prove this defense

by clear and convincing evidence, 42 U.S.C. § 11603(e)(2)(A),

and Hague Convention proceedings must be conducted with

dispatch. Art. 11; March v. Levine

, 249 F.3d 462, 474 (6th Cir.

2001). (The articles that we cited explain that the framers of the

Convention believed that abductors would mainly be abusive

### No. 12

‐ 1692 4

fathers rather than abused mothers. This may explain the

heightened burden of proof that Congress imposed in the stat

‐

ute implementing the Convention.) The dispatch in this case

may have been excessive—the procedural adequacy of the pro

‐ ceedings in the district court is the principal issue presented by

this appeal. The only other issue is whether the father aban

‐

doned his custodial rights during the family’s trip to India; we

think it clear he did not.

The parties became husband and wife in an arranged mar

‐ riage two years before the birth of ZFK, their first child. During

the family’s visit to India that we mentioned the wife com

‐ plained to the Indian police of domestic abuse. The police inves

‐ tigated, charged the husband, and took away his passport; and

it was in April of last year, while he was thus marooned in In

‐

dia that the wife (pregnant at the time with a second child), flew

to the United States with ZFK. Eventually the husband’s pass

‐

port was returned and he flew back to Canada and some

months later, in February of this year, filed the petition for the

return of the child. That child was born in the United States af

‐

ter the mother had brought ZFK here and is therefore a U.S.

citizen. The father does not argue that the mother abducted that

child, who continues to live with her mother.

On March 7 the father obtained an ex parte order from the

district court requiring the mother to yield custody of ZFK to

him pending resolution of his petition, and on the thirteenth the

judge scheduled an evidentiary hearing for March 22. It was

held that day, with the judge as trier of fact since it was an equi

‐

table proceeding. He issued a final order of return the next day

and also ordered the wife to hand over ZFK’s passport to her

husband so that he could take the child back to Canada. But the

judge conditioned the orders on the husband’s agreeing to pay

a retainer (though not necessarily any additional fees) for an at

‐

torney who would be hired by the wife to handle the divorce

and custody proceeding that her husband has begun in Canada.

### No. 12

‐ 1692 5

On the wife’s motion we stayed both the order of return,

and the order that she turn over the child’s passport to her hus

‐

band, pending the decision of her appeal. And on May 1, after

hearing oral argument in the appeal the day before, we ordered

the child returned to the mother pending our decision, but that

both the mother’s passport and the child’s passport be held by

the U.S. Marshals Service until further notice.

The wife’s testimony, if believed, reveals that her husband

has a violent, ungovernable temper, had physically abused her

on many occasions, some in the presence of ZFK (and in front of

the child he had told his wife he would take out her eyeballs—

though the child, not quite 3 years old at the time, may not have

known what “eyeballs” are), had been rough on occasion with

the child—indeed terrified the child—and that the child’s mood

had brightened greatly when she was living apart from her fa

‐

ther. But if the husband’s testimony is believed, he was, if not a

model husband, not an abuser of his wife or the child. His law

‐

yer conducted a vigorous cross

‐ examination of the wife, based

in part on discrepancies between her testimony at the eviden

‐ tiary hearing and a deposition she had given a few days earlier.

She stood her ground, making few concessions to the cross

‐ examining attorney.

Rule 52(a)(1) of the civil rules requires the judge to “find the

facts specially and state [his] conclusions of law separately”

when he is the trier of fact. He is not excused from this duty in a

proceeding under the Hague Convention. And the duty is not

waived—indeed it is at its most exacting—when as in this case

plaintiff and defendant testify inconsistently and it is impossi

‐

ble to demonstrate by objective evidence which one is telling

the truth, or more of the truth. The trier of fact must decide

whom to believe (and how much to believe) on the basis of the

coherence and plausibility of the contestants’ testimony, cor

‐

roboration or contradiction by other witnesses, and other clues

to falsity and veracity.

### No. 12

‐ 1692 6

The process of factfinding in such a situation is inexact and

the findings that result are doubtless often mistaken. But the

judge can’t just throw up his hands, as happened in this case,

because he can’t figure out what is true and what is false in the

testimony. There is no uncertainty exception to the duty im

‐ posed by Rule 52. As we said in another case, “One cannot but

sympathize with the inability of the district judge in this case to

say more than he did in justification of the damages that he as

‐

sessed for loss of consortium. But the figures were plucked out

of the air, and that procedure cannot be squared with the duty

of reasoned, articulate adjudication imposed by Rule 52(a).” Ar

‐ pin v. United States

, 521 F.3d 769, 776 (7th Cir. 2008).

And if there were such an exception, it would not be avail

‐

able when the evidentiary hearing had lasted only a day, as in

this case. The judge could have adjourned the hearing for a few

days to enable additional evidence to be obtained and pre

‐

sented; in particular he could have had ZFK examined by a

child psychologist. The wife’s lawyer—his initial proposal of an

expert witness having been turned down because the witness

hadn’t had time to examine the child (remember that the hear

‐ ing was held only two weeks after the respondent learned

about the suit)—offered to submit an evaluation based on an

examination of the child by the end of the week. The judge re

‐

fused. His final order, issued as we said the day after the hear

‐ ing, is two pages long and contains no findings of fact relating

to the Article 13(b) defense—just a conclusion that the wife had

failed to meet her burden of proof. That was not a finding of

fact, but a conclusion of law. Rule 52(a)(1) requires both: that

the facts be found “specially” and the conclusions of law stated

separately. It is needless to add that there is no rule exempting

the judge from the duty of finding the facts in cases in which

the plaintiff has a higher burden of proof than the usual civil

burden of the preponderance of the evidence.

### No. 12

‐ 1692 7

But at the end of the evidentiary hearing the judge had had

a discussion with the lawyers, and from that we can piece to

‐ gether his thinking and extract a single, solitary factfinding.

The judge began by saying, directly after the parties’ wit

‐

nesses had testified (there were no closing arguments), that

“neither—none of the parties to the suit are residents of Illi

‐

nois.” Not true; the wife is currently a resident of Illinois. The

judge said that “if I send it [the issue of custody of the child]

back to Canada, the Canadian courts presumably will look and

take evidence and so forth and hear essentially the same evi

‐

dence, I guess, I’m hearing today and make a decision to award

custody to the mother or to the father.... [Under the Hague

Convention] the child is to be returned except where there’s

grave risk of harm to the child. And, now, there’s—presumably,

there’s always some risk. All I know is what I heard here today.

And I’m—there’s been a he said/she said hearing today. And

it’s very difficult for me to say categorically one side is telling

the truth and one side is not telling the truth.” The judge men

‐

tioned a bruise that the mother had received on her arm in In

‐

dia and that had been photographed at the police station and

was a basis for her complaint to the police. The judge said that

if the father had inflicted the bruise—which he declined to de

‐

cide one way or the other—that was a bad thing to have done

but it hadn’t created a “grave risk,” a key term in Article 13(b).

But the issue was not creating a grave risk to the mother, but a

grave risk (of psychological harm) to the child. If the mother’s

testimony about the father’s ungovernable temper and brutal

treatment of her was believed, it would suport an inference of a

grave risk of psychological harm to the child if she continued

living with him.

Very little of the wife’s testimony was so much as men

‐

tioned by the judge, even though the wife had testified that

she’d been beaten with a pillow (which may sound like a pillow

fight, but it was a sofa pillow that he beat her with in no

### No. 12

‐ 1692 8

friendly fashion and she testified that it hurt), knocked down by

him in front of ZFK, hit in the chest by a heavy wallet that he

had hurled at her, choked by him twice (and she said she

thought she would die) when she was pregnant with her sec

‐

ond child, threatened as we said with having her eyeballs

yanked out, and dragged bodily from the backyard into a room

in the house.

Supervised Visitation Services of Chicago, funded by the

City, supervises visits by noncustodial parents to their children.

It supervised ZFK’s visits to her mother after the marshals had

transferred the child to the father’s custody on March 9. One of

the supervisors testified that when the visit was over and she

(the supervisor) told the child that she was taking her back to

her father, the child became hysterical. The supervisor testified

that the child had seemed “in major distress”—“bigger than”

(normal) “separation anxiety.” In cross

‐ examination she said “I

do feel it wasn’t just a matter of her being upset about leaving

her mother. There was definitely a factor there of not wanting

to go back to her dad.” She was also worried by the child’s hav

‐ ing saidwithout apparent reason when returned to her father “I

am a bad girl.”

Another supervisor testified that during another supervised

visit the child “said ‘hurt’.... [S]he pointed to her arm, and then

said something about Dad.... [S]he said: ‘I’m scared.’ And I

asked her to clarify who she was scared of, and she said ‘Dad.’

Or ‘Daddy.’ Something like that.... It was not very clear to me

what exactly she was trying to say and what exactly was going

on.” About this witness the judge said “she was very,

very...was certainly very, very speculative as to—and couldn’t

say specifically whether anything particular happened.”

The mother’s testimony was corroborated by her sister and

her sister’s husband. The judge did not mention the testimony

of those witnesses, the testimony of the supervisor from Super

‐

vised Visitation Services (the one who testified about the child’s

### No. 12

‐ 1692 9

having said she “hurt”), or any testimony of the mother except

about the bruise on her arm and he made no finding about

whether the father had inflicted it, instead as we noted dismiss

‐ ing it as not evidence of a “grave risk”—to the mother. His fo

‐

cus on the bruise to the exclusion of any mention of the

mother’s testimony that her husband had choked her hard

enough to make her afraid she would die, or indeed of any of

her other testimony, is perplexing.

It is possible that the judge ignored the mother’s testimony

because so much of it was about physical and psychological

abuse of her by her husband (and her husband’s parents, who

lived with them), rather than of the child. But much of that

abuse occurred in the child’s presence; and repeated physical

and psychological abuse of a child’s mother by the child’s fa

‐

ther, in the presence of the child (especially a very young child,

as in this case), is likely to create a risk of psychological harm to

the child. Whether it is a grave risk, and thus triggers the Article

13(b) defense, is a separate question, but one that cannot be ad

‐

dressed, let alone answered, without recognizing the potential

for such a risk in the father’s behavior toward the mother in the

child’s presence. All this the judge ignored.

Throwing up his hands at what he may have thought an in

‐ comprehensible quarrel between foreigners, the judge remarked

that even if the child wouldn’t be safe living with her father,

“Why can’t Canada any more than Illinois protect—offer her

protection?” The mother’s lawyer pointed out that other wit

‐

nesses besides the mother had testified and that there was tes

‐ timony of “multiple instances” of abuse, to which the judge re

‐ plied: “Then she ultimately should prevail.... Canada should

make the decision on who gets custody of the child because the

child is a Canadian citizen and domiciled in Canada.” The law

‐

yer as we said asked for a few days to obtain a psychologist’s

evaluation of the child and the judge refused.

### No. 12

‐ 1692 10

It seems that the judge, building on his mistaken belief that

none of the parties was an Illinois resident, overlooked our

warning in Van De Sande v. Van De Sande

, supra

, 431 F.3d at 570–

71, not to treat the Hague Convention as a venue statute de

‐ signed “to deter parents from engaging in international forum

shopping in custody cases” (quoting Baxter v. Baxter

, 423 F.3d

363, 367 (3d Cir. 2005)). The Convention says nothing about the

adequacy of the laws of the country to which the return of the

child is sought—and for good reason, for even perfectly ade

‐

quate laws do not ensure a child’s safety. Because of the privacy

of the family and parental control of children, most abuse of

children by a parent goes undetected. Pennsylvania v. Ritchie

,

480 U.S. 39, 60 (1987); Coy v. Iowa

, 487 U.S. 1012, 1022 (1988)

(concurring opinion); Van De Sande v. Van De Sande

, supra

, 431

F.3d at 570–71; Valentine v. Konteh

, 395 F.3d 626, 640 (6th Cir.

2005) (opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part). ZFK is

not yet 4. She is hardly in a position to complain to the

Mounties about her father.

If the judge’s order is affirmed, the child’s mother, who ap

‐

pears not to be employed or to have any significant financial

resources, will have to hunt up a Canadian lawyer and con

‐

vince the lawyer to represent her without any assurance of be

‐ ing fully compensated. If able to hire a lawyer she may be able

to obtain interim custody of the child from a Canadian court,

along with a support order, but what will she do until she ob

‐

tains that relief? Move back in with the father? Let the child live

with him while she returns to the United States while the cus

‐ tody proceeding unfolds? Suppose she eventually wins custody

of the child, as is not unlikely since no one accuses her of having

abused the child or being an unfit mother. Then ZFK who (until

our order of May 1 was executed) had been separated from her

mother only since March might not be reunited with her for an

indefinite period. Unless a trier of fact determines that the

mother is a thorough liar, we are concerned that continuing the

### No. 12

‐ 1692 11

child in her father’s custody may inflict inflict psychological

harm on her.

But that is an aside. We are not the factfinders. The essential

point is that the evidentiary hearing was inadequate. Rule 52(a)

was violated; there were no findings of fact on the key issues.

Decisions are frequently reversed for such omissions. See, e.g.,

Freeland v. Enodis Corp.

, 540 F.3d 721, 739 (7th Cir. 2008); Arpin v.

United States

, supra

, 521 F.3d at 776–77; Supermercados Econo, Inc.

v. Integrand Assurance Co.

, 375 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2004); Rosco, Inc. v.

Mirror Lite Co.

, 304 F.3d 1373, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2002); Zivkovic v.

Southern California Edison Co.

, 302 F.3d 1080, 1090–91 (9th Cir.

2002). The failure to allow psychological evidence was another

error.

The errors were not harmless. The district court’s order is

therefore vacated and the case remanded for a proper hearing.

Circuit Rule 36 shall apply on remand. We urge that the pro

‐ ceedings on remand be conducted expeditiously and we sug

‐

gest that the judge to whom the case is assigned appoint a child

psychologist to interview ZFK. See Fed. R. Evid. 706. Our May 1

order shall remain in effect until further notice.

The rulings in this opinion are procedural. We do not pre

‐ judge the merits of the Article 13(b) defense. And we remind

that the burden of proving the defense is stiff. But whether the

burden has been carried cannot be determined in the absence of

Rule 52 factfindings.

V ACATED AND 

### R EMANDED



### , WITH 

### D IRECTIONS



### .H A M IL T O N

, Cir cuit Jud ge

, d i s s e nt in g: I r e spe ctf ully diss e nt

fr om th e de cis ion to r e ve r se an d r e man d th is case to th e dist r ict

cour t. My coll e ague s an d I agr e e th at th e ch ild ’ s c o un tr y of

ha bit ual r e side nc e is Can ada an d th at th e moth e r ’s r e moval of

th e ch ild fr om In d i a t o th e Un ite d State s viol ate d th e fat he r ’s

r ig h t s as a par e nt

. The dispute d issue is th e moth e r ’s “gr ave

r is k ” d e f e ns e to wh at is oth e r wi se a r ock- soli d H ague

Con ve nt ion case for r e tur n of th e ch ild to Can ada. I woul d

aff ir m th e dist r ict cour t’s fi nd in g th at th e moth e r did not pr ove

th e “gr ave r isk” de fe ns e by cle ar an d con vin cin g e vide nc e an d

woul d aff ir m th e or de r r e tur ni ng th e ch ild to Can ada. I woul d

all ow t h a t na tion ’s cour ts to addr e ss th is ch ild ’s be st in te r e st

an d t o d e cid e on custody

, suppor t, vis itat ion

, an d all r e late d

matte r s w ith out fur th e r de lay.

As I e xplain in de tail be low

, th e te mptati on we fac e wi th th is

case is one th at wa s an tic ipate d by th e dipl omats an d fam ily

law e xpe r ts wh o dr aft e d th e H ague C o n v e nt ion an d by th e

Un ite d State s Con gr e ss th at e na cte d th e impl e m e nt in g

le gi s l atio n. The te mptati on is to de cid e th e me r its of th e

unde r lyi ng custody dispute

, an d to do so bas e d on th e be st

in t e r e s t o f th e ch ild

. Tha t sound s at fi r st lik e a huma ne an d

se ns ibl e wa y to de cid e th e ca s e

. B ut for case s in volv in g

abduc tion s, th e Con ve nt ion an d th e le gisl atio n we r e dr aft e d as

tigh tly as possib le to disc oura ge cour ts fr om de cid in g th e be st

in t e r e s t o f th e ch ild

. The Con ve nt ion an d th e le gisl atio n ar e

de sign e d t o d e cid e ve nue

, an d to de cid e it qui ckl y, to de te r

for um sh oppin g in custody dispute s by wa y of in te r na tion al

ch ild abduc tion s. The r igh t ve nue is or din ar ily th e coun tr y of

th e ch ild ’s ha bit ual r e side nc e

. Al th ough th e r e is an impor tan t

e xce ption wh e r e a r e tur n to th at coun tr y woul d pose a “gr ave

r isk” to th e ch ild

, th at e xce ption wa s dr aft e d car e full y to ke e p

it na r r ow, pr e cis e ly so a s to pr e ve nt cour ts de cid in g H ague2 N o

. 1 2

- 1 6 9 2

Con ve nt ion p e t iti ons fr om r e ach in g too far in to th e me r its of

th e custod y q ue stion

.

My coll e ague s’ de cis ion to r e ve r se is bas e d on th e nob le st of

motiv e s, to pr ote ct a vuln e r a b l e ch ild fr om a pote nt ial th r e at

an d to tr y to act in he r be st in te r e st. De spite my coll e ague s’

disc lai me r s th at th e r e ve r sal is onl y a pr oce dura l de cis ion

,

th ough, th e r e ve r sal doe s wh at H ague Con ve nt ion cour ts ar e

not suppose d to do. The r e v e r sal is also cle ar ly bas e d on th e

vie w tha t th e dist r ict judge wh o saw an d h e ar d th e wi tn e sse s

wa s simpl y wr ong in hi s e va l uation of th e par tie s’ cr e dib ili ty

– a n e v aluat ion we can make onl y by r e adin g an d r e -r e adin g

tr an scr ipts.

I do not kn ow wh e th e r th e dist r ict judge wa s r igh t or wr ong

in hi s fac tual e val uation of cr e dib ili ty. I wi ll ch e e r f ul ly

con ce de th at, bas e d on all we kn ow about th is tr ouble d fam ily

,

a fam ily cour t judge (w he th e r in Can ada or th e Un ite d State s)

wh o con side r s th e be st in te r e st of th e ch ild is lik e ly to aw ar d

custody to he r moth e r

, at le ast on an in te r im ba sis wh ile th e

divor ce goe s for wa r d. The law could not be an y cle ar e r

,

how e ve r

, th at th at is not th e que stion for th e d i str ict cour t or

for us to de cid e

. Our job an d th e dist r ict cour t’s job is to de cid e

onl y th e na r r ow que stion s pr e se nt e d by th e H ague Con ve nt ion

pe titi on.

For th e dist r ict cour t, this wa s a dif fi cult case

. Base d on th e

dist r ict cour t’s fi nd in g s

, our job on appe al in th is case sh ould

be much e asie r

. We sh ould r e spe ct th e dist r ict cour t’s fi nd in gs

an d all ow th e fam ily cour ts in th e Can adia n pr ovin ce of

Al be r ta to do th e ir job

, wh ich is th e mor e d i f f i c ul t one of

de cid in g all th e issue s of ch ild custody

, suppor t, an d vis itat ion

in th e divor ce case

. By in s t e a d b r oade ni ng th e issue s in th isN o

. 1 2

- 1 6 9 2 3

case

, as th e maj or ity doe s, we te nd to un d e r m i n e a cr iti cal

pr ovis ion of th e H ague Con ve nt ion an d i nv ite oth e r par e nt s

wh o ha ve abduc te d th e ir ch ild r e n to do t h e same in futur e

case s. To e xplain my r e ason s in mor e de tail

, I addr e ss fi r st th e

“gr ave r isk” e xce ption as it e volv e d in th e H ague Con ve nt ion

,

wh ose pr oce e din g s sh ow th at our obli gati on unde r

in te r na tion al law is to r e sist th e lur e of de cid in g custody bas e d

on a br oad in qui r y in to th e be st i n t e r e st of th e ch ild

. I tur n

th e n to th e maj or ity’ s spe cif ic cr iti cis ms of th e dist r ict cour t’s

ha nd lin g of th is c ase

.

I. The Na rro w Except io n fo r “Gr ave Ris k”

A clos e look at th e pr o c e e din gs th at le d to th e H ague

Con ve nt io n s h o w s th at its fr ame r s an d r atif ie r s for e saw th e

path my coll e ague s take in th is case

, wa r ne d agai ns t it, a nd

dr aft e d lan guage as c l e ar ly as th e y could to pr e ve nt cour ts

fr om br oade ni ng a H ague Con ve nt ion case in to a compl e te an d

pr olon ge d custo dy ba ttle

.

The bas ic pr e mise of th e H ague Con ve nt ion is to pr ote ct th e

be st in te r e sts of all ch ild r e n by r e movi ng th e in ce n tiv e to

abduc t ch ild r e n in volv e d in custody dispute s an d to r e tur n an

abduc te d ch ild to he r coun tr y of ha bit ual r e side nc e

, pr omptly

,

an d wi th out atte mptin g to de te r min e me r its of th e unde r lyi ng

cus tody dispute

. 42 U. S.C. § 1160 1(a )( 4); Blo ndi n v. Du bo is

,

189 F.3d 240, 245 (2d Cir

. 1999 ); Fri edr ich v

. F r i e d r i ch

, 983 F.2d

1396

, 1400 (6t h Cir

. 1993 ); Fab ri v. Pri ti ki n-Fa br i

, 221 F. Supp. 2d

859, 863 (N.D. Ill

. 2001 ). The ce nt r al pr ovis ion of th e

Con ve nt ion , A r tic le 12, pr ovide s w ha t is kn own as t he r e tur n

r e m e d y : “ Wh e r e a ch ild ha s be e n wr ong full y r e move d or

r e tain e d in ter ms of Ar tic le 3 .

. . th e auth or ity con ce r ne d sha ll4 N o

. 1 2

- 1 6 9 2

ord er the ret urn of the chil d fo rt hwit h .” Se e Abb ot t v. Abb ot t

, 130 S.

Ct. 19 83, 1 989 (20 10)

.

In dr aft in g th e Con ve nt ion

, it wa s r e cogn ize d, of cour se

, th at

th e r e could b e e xce ption al cir cumsta nc e s in wh ich th e r e tur n

r e me dy sh ould be de ni e d, in cludi ng case s wh e r e r e tur n woul d

e nd an ge r th e ch ild

. The dr af t e r s con side r e d a numb e r of

dif fe r e nt for mulati ons for th is e xce ption

. The ir de bate s sh ow

th at th e y r e cogn ize d th at if t h e e xc e ption we r e too br oad, or

we r e in te r pr e te d too br oadly

, it c o ul d e ff e cti ve ly unde r min e

th e e nt ir e Con ve nt ion

.

T he dr aft e r s fi r st con side r e d “subs tan tial r isk” an d oth e r

,

e ve n le ss de man din g for mulati ons in th e En gli sh te xts of th e

pr oposal s, such as e xce ption s for th e be st in te r e sts of th e ch ild

or for th e for um na tion ’s publi c polic y. Thos e le ss de man din g

stan dar ds we r e all r e je cte d in fav or o f t h e “gr ave r isk”

la ng uage in Ar tic le 13( b)

. The y we r e r e je cte d pr e cis e ly be cause

th e y would cre ate too gre at a r isk th at th e cour ts woul d del ve

in to th e me r its of th e ultim ate custody de te r min atio n. Se e

, e.g.

,

1980 Con fe r e nc e de La H aye de d r o i t in te r na tion al pr ive

,

En lé ve me n t d 'e nf an ts, in 3 Ac te s e t Docume nt s de la

Q ua t o r zié me se ssion (“A cte s”)

, pp. 168, 182- 83, 203- 04, 362

(19 82)

. 1

The se con ce r ns ar e cle ar in par tic ipati ng na tion s’ comme nt s

on th e e ar lie r

, le ss de man din g stan dar ds. Ge r man y, for

S u c h n e g o t i a t i n g r e c o r d s c a n b e h e l p f u l i n i n t e r p r e t i n g 1

d i s p u t e d t e r m s i n i n t e r n a t i o n a l t r e a t i e s

. E

. g

. , S a l e v

. H a i t i a n C e n t e r s

C o u n c i l

, I n c

. , 5 0 9 U

. S

. 1 5 5

, 1 8 4

- 8 7 ( 1 9 9 3 )

.N o

. 1 2

- 1 6 9 2 5

e xample

, pr ovide d a wa r ni ng th at pr e dic ts our ha nd lin g of th is

case :

The wi de r an d vague r th e pr ovis ion is wor de d, th e gr e ate r

th e mar gin for th e ‘ab ductor ’ succe ssf ully to r e sist th e r e tur n

of th e ch ild

. In th e in te r e st of an e ff e cti v e ‘ fun cti oni ng ’,

th e r e for e

, th e e xce ption s sh ould be r e str ict e d a s clos e ly as

possib le an d onl y t h e situat ion s r e all y wor th y of an

e xce ption sh ould b e pr ovide d for

.

Thi s is also in acc or dan ce wi th th e purpos e o f th e

Con ve nt ion to r e tur n th e ch ild as qui ckl y as pos s i b l e

. The

wi de scope of disc r e tion now le ft to th e compe te nt auth or iti e s

un d e r [th e “subs tan tial r isk” e xce ption ] may r e sult in a

con side r abl e d e lay of th e r e tur n. Expe rt opi nio ns ma y be call ed

fo r as wel l as seco nd opi nio ns by ot her exp ert s which will ta ke mu ch

ti me

, inv est iga ti ons o

f fa ct ma y be ma de by which ma tt ers could

eas il y b e de la yed

.

Ac te s p. 216 (e mph asis adde d). Of par tic ular in te r e st to our

Con gr e ss or to Un ite d State s cour ts, pe r ha ps, ar e th e comme nt s

o f th e Un ite d State s de le gati on, wh ich sh ar ply cr iti ciz e d th e

e ar ly “ substa nt ial r isk” pr oposal :

The Un ite d State s i s s e r iously con ce r ne d about th e far

r e ach in g in r oads [th e ar tic le th at late r be came A r t i c le 13]

make s in to th e ‘pr ompt r e tur n’ pr in cipl e

. The ve r y obj e cts of

th e Con ve nt ion may b e de fe ate d if th is art icl e is adopte d in

its pr e se nt for m. As th e Swi ss De le gate

, Mr Be ach le r

, state d

in 1976

, t h e s t a tus quo ant e must be r e -e stab lis he d be for e

th e r e is an y oth e r disc ussion

. O n l y aft e r th e r e tur n of th e

ch ild to the coun tr y of or igi n may th e me r its be con side r e d.6 N o

. 1 2

- 1 6 9 2

[Th is ar ti cle ] r e tain s lit tle of th e ‘r e stor atio n of custody ’

con ce pt or of ‘pr ompt r e tur n’ wi th out e xamin atio n of th e

me r its. It s br oad excep ti ons wil l te nd to tur n vir tua ll y eve ry ret urn

pro ceedi ng i n t o a n adv ers ary conte st on the me ri ts of the custo dy

que st io n. No ab ducto r’ s la wyer woul d fa il to rai se one or mo re of the

excep ti ons

.

Ac te s p. 2 42 ( e mph asis adde d; ci tati on omitt e d).

The C o n ve nt ion adopte d th e str ict e r “gr ave r isk” stan dar d

to pr e ve nt or at le ast disc oura ge such e ff or ts to br oade n th e

scope of c ourt pr oce e din gs se e kin g r e tur n of a ch ild

. The

dr aft e r s we r e fam ili ar wi th th e pr acti ce o f cour ts r e lyi ng on

such br oad stan dar ds to r e sist de man ds th at abduc te d ch ild r e n

be r e tur ne d to th e ir coun tr ie s of ha bit ual r e side nc e

. Ac te s pp.

182- 83. The Con ve nt i on wa s de sign e d to e nd th at pr acti ce

.

The Explan ator y Re por t for th e fi na l te xt of th e Con ve nt ion

e xplain e d:

[I] t must not be for gotte n th at it is by in vo k i n g ‘ th e be st

in te r e sts of th e ch ild ’ th at in te r na l j ur i s dic tion s ha ve in th e

past ofte n fi na lly aw ar de d th e custody i n que stion to th e

pe r son wh o wr ong full y r e move d or r e tain e d th e ch ild

. It can

ha ppe n th at such a de cis ion is th e mo s t j us t, but we can not

[i gn or e ] th e fac t th at r e cour se by in te r na l auth or iti e s to such

a not ion in volv e s th e r i sk of th e ir e xpre ssin g par tic ular

cultur al, soc i a l e tc. atti tude s wh ich th e mse lve s de r ive fr om

a give n na tion al commun ity an d th us bas ic a l l y imposi ng

th e ir own subj e cti ve val ue judgm e nt s upon th e na tion al

commun ity fr om whi ch th e ch il d has r e ce nt ly be e n sn atch e d.N o

. 1 2

- 1 6 9 2 7

Ac te s p. 431. On th e e xce ption for gr ave r isk, th e Explan ator y

R e p o r t w a r n e d m o r e s p e c i f i c a l l y a g a i n s t e x p a n s i v e

in te r pr e tati on:

To con clude our con side r atio n of th e pr oble ms wi th wh ich

th is pa r agr aph de als, it w ould se e m ne ce ssar y to unde r lin e

th e fac t th at th e th r e e t ype s of e xce ption to th e r ule

con ce r ni ng th e r e tur n of th e ch ild must be appli e d onl y so

far as th e y go an d no fur th e r

. Thi s impl ie s abov e all th at the y

are to be int erp ret ed in a res tr ict ive fa shi on if the Conve nti on is not

to be co m e a d e a d le tt er. In fac t, th e Con ve nt ion as a wh ole

r e sts upon t h e unan imous r e je cti on of th is phe nom e non of

ill e gal ch ild r e moval s and upon th e con vic tion th at the be st

wa y to comb at th e m a t a n in te r na tion al le ve l is to r e fuse to

gr an t th e m le gal r e cogn iti on. The pr act i c a l appli cati on of

th is pr in cipl e r e qui r e s th at th e sign ator y State s be con vin ce d

th at th e y be lon g, de spite th e ir dif fe r e nc e s, to th e same le gal

commun ity wi th i n w h ich th e auth or iti e s of e ach State

ackn owl e dge th at th e auth or iti e s o f one of th e m – th ose of

th e ch ild ’s ha bit ua l r e side nc e – ar e in pr in cipl e be st plac e d

to de cid e upon que stion s of custody an d acc e ss. As a r e sult,

sys te ma ti c inv oc at io n of th e sai d excep ti ons

, sub st it uti ng the fo rum

chose n by the ab ducto r fo r tha t of the chil d’s res ide nce, woul d le ad

to the coll aps e of the whol e st ructu re of t h e C o n vent io n by

de pr ivi ng it of th e spir it of mutual con fi de nc e wh ich is its

in spir atio n.

Ac te s pp. 4 34- 35 ( e mph asis adde d).

Turn in g fr om th e H a gue Con ve nt ion itse lf to its

impl e menta ti o n by th e Uni ted S ta tes

, th e Con gr e ss e mph asiz e d

th e s e same poin ts, r e cogn izi ng th e te mptati on to tur n H ague

Con ve nt ion pr oce e din gs in t o f ull- blow n custody fi gh ts.8 N o

. 1 2

- 1 6 9 2

Con gr e ss foun d th at ch ild r e n wh o ha ve be e n wr ong full y

r e move d or re tain e d “are to be pr omptly r e tur ne d u nl e ss one

of th e na r r ow e xce ption s se t for th in th e Con ve nt ion appli e s.”

42 U.S.C. § 11601( a)( 4). Con gr e ss dec lar e d: “Th e Con ve nt ion

an d th i s c ha pte r e mpow e r cour ts in th e Un ite d State s to

de te r min e onl y r igh ts unde r th e Con ve nt ion an d not th e me r its

of an y unde r lyi ng ch ild custody c l aims .” 42 U. S.C.

§ 1160 1(b )( 4). The State De par tme nt advi se d Con gr e ss th at th e

e xce ption s we r e “dr aw n ve r y na r r o w ly le st th e ir appli cati on

unde r min e th e e xpre ss purpos e s of th e Con ve nt ion – to e ff e ct

th e pr ompt r e tur n of abduc te d ch ild r e n, ” an d th at Con ve nt ion

de le gate s be lie ve d th at “cour ts woul d un d e r s tan d an d fulf ill

th e obj e cti ve s of th e Con ve nt ion by na r r owl y inte r pr e tin g the

e xce ption s an d all owi ng th e ir use on ly in cle ar ly me r itor ious

case s, an d onl y wh e n th e pe r son opposin g r e tur n ha d me t th e

bur de n of pr oof.” H ague I n t e r na tion al Ch ild Ab ducti on

Con ve nt i o n ; Te xt an d Le gal An alys is, 51 Fe d. Re g. 10,4 94,

10,5 09 (M ar ch 26, 1986 ). Mor e spe cif ica lly on th e “gr ave r isk”

e xce ption , th e State De par tme nt e xplain e d:

Thi s pr ovis ion wa s not in te nd e d to be use d by de fe nd an ts as

a ve hi cle to lit igat e (or r e lit ig a t e ) th e ch ild ’s be st in te r e sts.

Onl y evi de nc e dir e ctl y esta bli sh in g the e xiste nc e of a gr ave

r isk th at woul d e xpose th e ch ild to phy sic al or e m o tion al

ha r m or oth e r wi se plac e th e ch ild in an in tole r abl e situat ion

is ma t e r i a l to th e cour t’s de te r min atio n. The pe r son

opposin g th e ch ild ’s r e tur n must s h o w th at th e r isk to th e

ch ild is g r ave , n ot me r e ly se r ious.N o

. 1 2

- 1 6 9 2 9

Id . at 1 0,51 0. 2

One cr iti cal pr ovis ion of th e impl e me nt in g le gisl atio n in th e

Un i t e d State s de alt wi th bur de ns of pr oof. In impl e me nt in g

th e “gr ave r isk” e xce ption

, Con gr e ss impose d on a r e spon de nt

(th e moth e r in ou r c a s e ) th e bur de n of pr ovin g th e e xce ption

“by cle ar an d con vin cin g e vide nc e .” 42 U. S.C. § 1160 3(e )( 2)( A)

(r e fe r r in g to Ar tic le 13( b) of th e Con ve nt ion ). Tha t de man din g

stan dar d of proof wa s prope r ly the foc us for th e dist r ict cour t

an d sh ould be our foc us as we ll. The c h o i c e t o impose th at

hi gh bur de n of pr oof w as de sign e d to make a dif fe r e nc e , an d

sh ould make a diff e r e nc e , in c ase s e xactl y li ke th is on e wh e r e

it i s dif fi cult to mak e a r e lia ble fa ctual de te r min atio n.

Re ason abl e pe ople may de bate wh e th e r th e “ g r ave r isk”

stan dar d is suff ici e nt ly se ns iti ve to le giti mate cla ims of abuse

,

wi th out be in g ove r -se ns iti ve to fal se or e xa g ge r ate d cla ims.

Some of th e advoc ate s’ an d sch olar s’ law jour na l ar tic le s cit e d

by th e maj or ity ar gue th at th e “g r ave r isk” stan dar d is too

dif fi cult for vic tims of dome stic v i o l e nc e to sati sfy

. Se e

, e.g.

,

Kar e n Br own Wi lli ams, Fle ei ng Do me st ic Vi ol ence: A Pro pos al to

Chang e the Ina deq uacie s of t h e H a gue Conve nti on on the Civi l

Asp ects of Int ern at io nal Chil d Abdu cti on in Do me st ic Vi ol ence

Case s

, 4 J. Mar sh all L.J. 39 (20 11) ; Roxann e H oe gge r

, Wh at if She

Lea ves ? Do me st ic Vi ol ence Case s Un der the Ha gue Conve nti on and

the Ins uff

ici ency of the Un der ta ki ngs Rem edy

, 18 Be r ke le y

Wome n’ s L.J. 181 (2 0 0 3 ) ; Me r le H

. We in e r

, Int ern at io nal Chil d

Abdu cti on and the Escap e fr om Do me st ic Vi ol ence

, 69 For dh am L.

T h e e x e c u t i v e b r a n c h ’ s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f a t r e a t y i s e n t i t l e d t o 2

“ g r e a t w e i g h t

. ” A b b o t t

, 1 3 0 S

. C t

. a t 1 9 9 3

, q u o t i n g S u m i t o m o S h o j i

A m e r i c a

, I n c

. v

. A v a g l i a n o

, 4 5 7 U

. S

. 1 7 6

, 1 8 5 ( 1 9 8 2 )

.1 0 N o

. 1 2

- 1 6 9 2

Re v. 59 3 ( 2000 ). As th e maj or ity poin ts out, t he pr opor tion of

in te r na tion al ch ild abduc tion c ase s wh e r e th e abduc tor is

he r se lf fl e e in g a viol e nt or psych ologi cal ly abusi ve situat ion

ha s gr own much hi gh e r th an wa s an tic ipat e d by th e

Con ve n t i o n or by Con gr e ss. The de man din g “gr ave r isk”

stan dar d, r e q ui r in g pr oof by cle ar an d con vin cin g e vide nc e

,

cr e ate s th e possib i l i t y t ha t an abusi ve par e nt could use th e

Con ve nt ion

, wh ich wa s e na ct e d to pr ote ct ch ild r e n, to ha ve

cour ts or de r th ose ch ild r e n bac k in to h ar m’s wa y.

The Con ve nt ion dr aft e r s we r e aw ar e of th is possib ili ty. The

“gr ave r isk” e xce ption wa s a compr omise de sign e d to addr e ss

th e pr oble m na r r owl y, wi th out in vit in g abduc tin g par e nt s an d

th e ir law ye r s to br oade n lit igat ion o ve r th e r e tur n r e me dy to

in clude a full custody batt le

. The dr aft e r s r e cogn ize d th at

all owi ng such br oade r lit igat ion woul d unde r min e th e abi lit y

of th e C o nv e nt ion to pr ote ct th ose oth e r ch ild r e n wh o ar e

abduc te d by th e ir abuse r s or by par e nt s wh o se e k to use th e m

as le ve r age

. Our job

, of cour se

, is to apply th e Con ve nt ion an d

th e le gisl a t i o n th e mse lve s, not th e sch olar ly cr iti cis ms an d

p r o posal s for impr ove me nt s in th e m. Se e also Me r le H

.

We in e r

, Na vig at ing the Road Bet ween Un if orm it y and Pro g r e s s :

The Ne ed fo r Purp osi ve Anal ysi s o f t h e Ha gue Conve nti on on the

Civi l Aspe cts of Int ern at io nal Ch i l d A bd ucti on

, 33 Colum. H um.

Rts. L. Re v. 275, 279-8 0 (2002 ) ( not in g conce r n about e ff e cts of

judi cia l man ipulat ion of Con ve nt ion in case s in volv in g cla ims

of dom e stic vio le nc e ).

Be for e movi ng to th e spe cif ics of our case

, an d th e maj or ity’ s

cr iti cis ms of th e dist r ict cour t’s ha nd lin g of th is case

, one

sh o u ld not for ge t th e H ague Con ve nt ion ’s e mph asis o n p ro mp t

de cis ion s. Ar tic le 11 pr ovide s: “Th e judi cia l or admi ni str ativ e

auth or iti e s o f Con tr acti ng State s sh all act e xpe diti ously inN o

. 1 2

- 1 6 9 2 1 1

pr oce e din gs for th e r e tur n of ch ild r e n. ” Wh at is e xpe diti ous?

Ar tic le 11 pr ovide s fur th e r th at if th e e nt ir e pe titi on is not

de cid e d wi th in six we e ks fr om th e star t of th e pr oce e din gs, th e

in te r e ste d par tie s an d coun tr ie s ha ve a r igh t to an e xplan atio n

f o r th e de lay. Tha t’s a mil d san cti on, but it ce r tain ly give s us

a tar ge t. In th is case we ar e alr e ady we ll pas t t h a t p o i nt

, an d

th e r e ve r sal he r e poin ts tow ar d mo r e we e ks or mon th s of

lit igat ion in th e dist r ict cour t.

Tha t ne e d for a pr omp t d e c isi on on th e r e me dy of r e tur n

give s dist r ict cour ts a goo d d e a l of fl e xibi lit y in de cid in g th e

pr oce dure s th e y wi ll use to de cid e th e se pe titi ons

. In

No ri nder v. Fuent es

, 6 5 7 F.3d 526 (7t h Cir

. 2011 ), for e xample

,

we aff ir me d th e r e me dy of r e tur n aft e r e xpe dite d pr oce e din gs

wi th lim ite d an d e xpe dite d disc ove r y. We s a i d : “Th e

C o n ve nt ion an d its impl e me nt in g Ac t ar e ch ock full of th e

lan guage of urge nc y an d in no unc e r tain te r ms con te mpla te

e xpe dite d proce dure s to guar an te e th at chi ldr e n ar e r e tur ne d

qui ckl y to th e cor r e ct jur isdi cti on. ” Id. at 533. I n e s s e nc e

, a

dist r ict judge fac i ng a H ague Con ve nt ion pe titi on sh ould

or din ar ily use th e e xpe dite d pr oce dure s th at apply to motion s

for te mpor ar y r e str ain in g or de r s an d pr e lim in ar y in jun cti ons

.

Our appe lla te r e vie w of th e pr oce dura l ch oice s sh ould r e spe ct

t he time pr e ssur e s an d all ow for some fl e xibi lit y, some

disc r e tion , an d e ve n some impe r fe cti ons

.

II. The Di st ri ct Cou rt ’s D ecis io n

The dist r ict cour t fac e d th e fol low in g situat ion

. The fat he r

e asil y prove d his pri ma f aci e cas e of e nt itl e me nt to the r e tur n

r e me dy. The ch ild ’s ha bit ual r e side nc e ha s be e n Can ada, an d

th e moth e r r e move d th e ch ild fr om th e fat he r ’s cus t o d y i n

viol atio n of hi s r igh ts as a f ath e r (un de r Can adia n law ) wh e n1 2 N o

. 1 2

- 1 6 9 2

sh e took th e ch ild duri ng th e fam ily tr ip to In dia an d fl e w to

he r par e nt s’ hom e in th e Un ite d State s. The he ar in g tr an scr ipt

sh ows th at th e judge kn e w he wa s suppose d to act qui ckl y an d

th at h is j ob was most em pha tic all y not to de cid e th e me r its of

th e unde r lyi ng custody dispute be tw e e n th e par e nt s. The onl y

se r ious issue w a s w he th e r th e moth e r pr ove d by cle ar an d

con vin cin g e vide nc e th a t r e tur ni ng th e ch ild to he r fat he r in

Ca na da woul d pose a gr ave r isk to he r phy sic all y or

psych ologi cal ly. On th at issue

, th e dist r i c t j ud ge he ar d

te stim ony for a day. At th e e nd of th e he ar in g, he state d hi s

or al fi nd in g th at th e moth e r ha d not pr ove d he r de f e ns e by

cle ar an d con vin cin g e vide nc e

. The ne xt day he issue d a sh or t

wr itte n or de r r e pe atin g th at f in din g.

The maj or ity ide nt if ie s th r e e dist in ct e r r or s by th e dist r ict

cour t: (a) fai l i n g to make suff ici e nt ly spe cif ic fi nd in gs; (b )

ove r looki ng a wa r ni ng in one of our case s not to r e ly on polic e

an d law s of th e coun tr y of ha bit ual r e side nc e to pr ote ct a ch ild ;

an d (c ) r e fusi ng to de lay a r ul in g to give th e moth e r ’s e xpe r t

time to con duct a psych olog i c al e val uation of th e ch ild

. As I

r e ad th is r e cor d, th e dist r i c t j udge did not commi t such

r e ve r sib le e r r or s. 3

I b e l i e v e t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t m a d e a n e r r o r a t t h e o u t s e t o f t h e 3

c a s e

, b u t o n e t h a t i s n o w m o o t

. T h e f a t h e r f i l e d w i t h h i s p e t i t i o n

u n d e r t h e H a g u e C o n v e n t i o n a r e q u e s t t h a t h e b e g i v e n i m m e d i a t e

c u s t o d y o f t h e c h i l d b e f o r e t h e m o t h e r c o u l d b e h e a r d

, o s t e n s i b l y o n

t h e g r o u n d t h a t s h e p o s e d a f l i g h t r i s k a n d m i g h t t a k e t h e c h i l d b a c k

t o I n d i a

, w h i c h i s n o t a p a r t y t o t h e H a g u e C o n v e n t i o n

. T h e s h o w i n g

o f f l i g h t r i s k w a s t h i n

, b u t e v e n i f t h e r e w a s a f l i g h t r i s k

, t h e m u c h l e s s

d r a s t i c s t e p o f s e i z i n g t h e m o t h e r ’ s a n d c h i l d ’ s p a s s p o r t s s h o u l d h a v e

b e e n s u f f i c i e n t t o p r e s e r v e t h e s t a t u s q u o u n t i l t h e m o t h e r c o u l d h a v e

b e e n h e a r d o n t h e i n t e r i m c u s t o d y i s s u e

.N o

. 1 2

- 1 6 9 2 1 3

A. Suff ici ency o f Fi ndi ngs

The maj or ity’ s stron ge st argume nt is th at th e fi nd in gs we r e

not spe cif ic e nough an d that the judge sh ould ha ve e xplain e d

in mor e de tail hi s v i e w of th e fac ts an d th e te stim ony of th e

wi tn e sse s. If all we ha d we r e th e tw o-pag e wr itte n or de r

, I

woul d agr e e th at mor e wa s ne e d e d

. But we also ha ve mor e

de tail e d or al e xplan atio ns th at e m e r g e d at th e e nd of th e

he ar in g as th e judge an noun ce d hi s de cis ion

, t h e m oth e r ’s

law ye r ar gue d th at th e de cis ion wa s mi s t a k e n

, an d th e judge

e xplain e d h is r e ason in g fur th e r . In my vie w, th e tr an scr ipt i s

suff ici e nt to unde r stan d th e judge ’s th in kin g. It sh ows th at th e

judge unde r stood th e e vide nc e

, unde r stood th e law

, an d did

not cle ar ly e r r by fi nd in g th at th e moth e r ha d no t p r o v e d by

cle ar an d con vin cin g e vide nc e th at r e tur n woul d pose a gr ave

r isk t o th e ch ild

.

Fe de r al Rule of Civi l Pr oce dure 52( a) all o w s f o r or al

fi nd in gs. I t r e qui r e s fi nd in gs on as man y of th e subsi diar y

fac ts as ar e ne ce ssar y to disc lose to th e r e vie wi n g c o ur t th e

ste ps by wh ich th e tr ial cour t r e ach e d its ultim ate con clusi on

on e ach fac tual issue

. Or tl of f v. Un it ed Sta te s

, 335 F.3d 652, 661

(7 t h Cir

. 2003 ), abr ogate d on oth e r gr ounds

, Ali v. Fede ral

Bure au o f P ri son s

, 552 U. S. 214 (20 08)

, as state d in Par rot t v.

Un it ed Sta te s

, 536 F.3d 629, 635 (7t h Cir

. 2008 ). The suff ici e nc y

of fin din gs must be e val uate d in con te xt, ke e pin g in min d the

substa nt ive issue s and th e bur de n of pr oof. Se e Ame ri can Red

Cros s v. Com mu nit y Blo od Cent er of the Oz ark s

, 257 F.3d 859, 863

(8t h Cir

. 2001 ) (or a l f in din gs at e nd of one -da y he ar in g we r e

suff ici e nt give n th e lim ite d pr oce e din gs)

. F in din gs ar e to be

lib e r all y con str ue d in suppor t of a judgm e nt

, e ve n if th ose

fi nd in gs are not as de tail e d as we migh t desi r e

. Zack v. C.I.R.

,1 4 N o

. 1 2

- 1 6 9 2

291 F.3d 407, 412 (6t h Cir

. 2 0 0 2 ) (af fi r min g judgm e nt ); Grov er

Hi ll Grai n Co. v. Baug hm an- Os te r, Inc

., 728 F.2d 784, 793 (6t h Cir

.

1 9 84) (r e ve r sin g judgm e nt wh e r e fi nd in gs did not give cle a r

unde r stan din g of bas is for dist r ict cour t’s de cis ion ); Tra vel e rs

Ins . Co. v. Du nn

, 228 F.2d 629, 631- 32 (5t h Cir

. 1956 ) (af fi r min g

judgm e nt wh e r e dist r ict cour t state d or al fi nd in g th at appe lle e

ha d “te stif ie d tr uly”)

. Gi v e n th e urge nc y of th e matte r th e

dist r ict judge ha d to de cid e

, we sh ould r e ad hi s fi nd in gs mor e

ch ar itab ly th an my coll e ague s do so lon g as we can fol low th e

path of hi s r e ason in g. Tha t path i s e asy to fol low he r e

. The

moth e r ha d to pr ove he r de fe ns e by cle ar an d c o n v i nc in g

e vide nc e

. The con fl ict s in th e e vide nc e about th e fat he r ’s

tr e atme nt of th e moth e r ove r th e ye ar s of t he ir mar r iage , an d

th e cr e dib ili ty issue s rais e d with both of th e m, me an t th at he r

e vide nc e wa s n ot cl e ar an d con vin cin g.

The judge be gan t o summar ize hi s vie w of th e case at page

214 of th e tr an scr ipt. H e said th at if he we r e sitt in g in Can ada

as a fam ily cour t judge

, he woul d pr oba bly aw ar d custody to

th e moth e r

. Tr. 215. H e con tin ue d: “But as I unde r stan d th e

law

, an d I’m r e adin g fr om Judge Pos ne r ’s opin ion [i n Va n De

Sand e v. Va n De Sand e

, 431 F.3d 567 (7t h C i r

. 2 0 05) ], th at th e

e xce p t i o n is th e ch ild is to be r e tur ne d e xce pt wh e r e th e r e ’s

gr ave r is k of ha r m to th e ch ild .” So far

, so good. H e

c o nt in ue d: “A nd

, now

, th e r e ’s

– pr e sumab ly, th e r e ’s alw ays

some r isk. Al l I kn ow is wh at I he ar d today. An d I’m

– th e r e ’s

be e n a h e said /she said he ar in g today. An d it’ s ve r y dif fi cult

for me to say cate gor ica lly one side is te lli ng th e tr uth an d one

side is not te lli ng th e tr uth. An d th e bur d e n i s

– th e r e ’s

e xtra or din ar y bur de n on th e par t

– to e stab lis h th at de fe ns e of

gr ave r isk of ha r m.” Tr. 215- 16. Ag ain

, no e r r or ye t, and not e

th e cr iti cal r e fe r e nc e to th e bur de n of pr oof t he moth e r fa ce d.N o

. 1 2

- 1 6 9 2 1 5

Did the judge say e nough about the onl y ne utr al wit ne sse s,

th e tw o vis itat ion supe r vis or s? The m oth e r sough t to sh ow

wi th th e ir te stim ony th at th e ch ild ha d be e n tr aumati ze d by

he r fat he r ’s be ha vior an d th at sh e ha d spon tan e ously cr ie d out

th at he ha d h ur t he r

. The supe r vis or s’ te stim ony sh ows th at

th e ch ild is now much mor e comf or tabl e wi th he r moth e r th an

wi th he r fat he r

. T r

. 101- 04, 143. Tha t is not ne ce ssar ily

sur pr isi ng aft e r th e ch ild ’s lon g a b s e n ce fr om th e fat he r aft e r

th e abduc tion an d th e sudde n ch an ge of cus t ody or de r e d by

t h e dist r ict cour t, as at le ast one supe r vis or

, Ms. S o t o

,

r e cogn ize d. Tr. 102- 04. The judge r e ason abl y de scr ibe d Ms.

Ke lly ’s te stim ony about possib le phy sic al abuse as spe culat ive

,

Tr. 216, an d he not e d fur th e r : “But th e r e ’s be e n no e vide nc e

wh atsoe ve r th at an yth in g phy sic all y w a s e ve r don e to th is

ch ild

, possib ly e xce pt sq ue e zin g an ar m

, a n d th at wa s

dispute d. Bu t e ve n assumi ng th at th e r e wa s sq ue e zin g of an

ar m, th at’ s far sh o r t of wh at I woul d con side r e stab lis hi ng

gr ave r isk of ha r m.” Tr. 219. Tha t is a r e ason abl e vie w of th e

e vide nc e

, wh ich wa s not ne ar ly as cle ar or str ong as th e moth e r

ar gue s, an d it is a r e ason abl e appli cati on of th e le gal stan dar d

to th at e vide nc e

. The judge did not spe cif ica lly a d d r e s s th e

te stim ony of Ms. Soto, wh o supe r vis e d a vis it tw o days be for e

th e he ar in g. Ms. Soto te st i f i e d th at th e ch ild wa s ve r y ha ppy

to se e he r moth e r

, did not wa nt to go hom e wi th he r fat he r

,

an d be came hy ste r ica l wh e n told it wa s time to me e t he r fat he r

.

Tr. 98. Ms. Soto te stif ie d th at th e ch ild ’s be ha vior we nt be yon d

se par atio n an xie ty an d sh e se e me d tr aumati ze d. On c r o s se xamin atio n, how e ve r

, sh e ackn owl e dge d that she woul d not

e xpe ct smooth tr an siti ons fr om o n e p a r e nt to an oth e r wi th a

young ch ild wh o ha s be e n se par ate d fr om one par e nt for 11

mon th s, an d wh e n give n th e oppor tuni t y

, s he did not asse r t

th at sh e th ought th e ch ild h ad b e e n abuse d by he r fa th e r

. Tr

.1 6 N o

. 1 2

- 1 6 9 2

103- 04. Ms. Soto’s te stim ony wa s so in con clusi ve th at I se e no

e r r or in fa ili ng to add r e ss i t spe cif ica lly

.

The maj o r i t y se e ms most con ce r ne d wi th th e lac k of a

fi nd in g that e ith e r th e moth e r an d he r fam ily we r e te lli ng th e

tr uth or th e fat he r wa s te lli ng th e tr uth, cr iti ciz in g th e judge for

in voki ng an “unc e r tain ty e xce pt i o n ” to th e fi nd in gs

r e qui r e me nt of Rule 52( a )

. “If th e moth e r ’s te stim ony about

th e fa th e r ’s ungov e r na ble te mpe r an d br utal t r e atme nt of h e r

wa s be lie ve d, it woul d suppor t an in fe r e nc e of a gr ave r isk of

psych ologi cal ha r m to th e ch ild if sh e con tin ue d liv in g wi th

hi m.” Sl ip op. a t 7.

Not all cour ts woul d ne ce ssar ily agr e e wi th th at vie w of th e

moth e r ’s te stim ony he r e

. Se e

, e.g.

, Gaudi n v. Rem is

, 415 F.3d

1028

, 1035 (9t h Cir

. 2005 ) (“ t h e q ue stion is wh e th e r th e ch ild

woul d suff e r ‘se r ious abuse ,’ th at is ‘a gr e a t de al mor e th an

min imal ’”) (c ita tion s omitt e d); id. at 1037 (gr ave -r isk in qui r y

sh ould foc us on sh or t-t e r m r isk pe nd in g oppor tuni ty for hom e

coun tr y’s cour ts to addr e ss in te r im custody issue s). At le ast for

purpos e s of ar gume n t

, th ough, I wi ll acc e pt th e maj or ity’ s

latt e r poin t about possib le psych ologi cal ha r m to th e ch il d fr om

sh or t-t e r m custody wi th th e fat he r p e n d i n g a de cis ion by a

Can adi a n cour t on in te r im custody

. The pr oble m is th at th e

maj or ity’ s cr it ici sm lose s sigh t of th e cr iti cal poin t he r e : th e

bur de n to pr ove “gr ave r isk ” t o th e ch ild by cle ar an d

con vin cin g e vide nc e

. 42 U. S.C. § 1160 3(e )( 2 ) (A ). Wi th th at

stan dar d of pr oof, th e judge simpl y wa s not r e q ui r e d t o fi nd

th at th e moth e r ’s te stim ony wa s e ith e r tr ue or fal se

, acc ura te or

mist ake n. Face d wi th con fl i cti ng e vide nc e fr om both th e

moth e r an d th e fat he r

, e ach of wh ose te stim ony wa s we ake ne d

by in con sist e nc ie s an d th e con fl ict in g te stim ony of th e oth e r

,

it’ s h ar d to ar gue wi th th e fi nd in g th at th e moth e r ’s e vide nc eN o

. 1 2

- 1 6 9 2 1 7

wa s not “cl e ar an d con vin cin g.” We migh t wi sh th at th e judge

ha d made a c r isp c all of b all or str ike

, tr ue or fal se

, but th at is

not a r e ali stic vie w of th e appli cab le stan dar d as appli e d to th is

con fl ict in g e vide nc e

. The dist r ict judge wa s not cr e atin g a ne w

“unc e r tain ty e xce ption ” to Rule 52( a), as th e maj or ity sugge sts.

H e wa s simpl y applyi ng th e cle ar an d con vin cin g bur de n of

pr oof t o e vide nc e th at h e foun d n e ith e r cl e ar n or con vin cin g.

By imposi ng th e r e qui r e m e n t o f cle ar an d con vin cin g

e vide nc e

, Con gr e ss wa s cr e atin g a logi cal spac e for e xactl y th is

sor t of fi nd in g: th e moth e r m i gh t be te lli ng th e tr uth, or so a

judge migh t fin d by a pre pond e r an ce of the e vide nc e

, but he r

e vide nc e is stil l not so pe r suasi ve as to be cle ar an d con vin cin g.

We migh t not lik e th at r e sult. Like some of th e advoc ate s an d

sch olar s cit e d by th e maj or ity, we m igh t th in k th at th e

C o n v e nt ion an d th e Con gr e ss sh ould ha ve made it e asie r t o

pr ove th e de fe ns e

. But unde r th e con tr olli ng bur de n of pr oof,

th e de fe ns e to th e r e tur n r e me dy wa s not pr ove n. The dist r ict

judge cle ar ly unde r stood th e bur de n of pr oof an d appli e d it to

r e je ct th e de fe ns e

. I do not se e a r e ve r sib le e r r or th e r e

. A mor e

de tail e d or al or wr itte n r e vie w of th e con fl ict s in th e e vide nc e

e xplain in g in mor e de tail wh y the moth e r ’s e vide nc e wa s n ot

cle ar an d con vin cin g woul d not ha ve he lpe d th e dist r ict judge

or us. 4

T h e m a j o r i t y a l s o c r i t i c i z e s t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t f o r m i s t a k e n l y

4

f i n d i n g t h a t n o n e o f t h e p a r t i e s w a s a r e s i d e n t o f I l l i n o i s

. T h e m o t h e r

i s a U n i t e d S t a t e s c i t i z e n a n d h a s b e e n r e s i d i n g i n I l l i n o i s s i n c e M a y

2 0 1 1

, b u t s h e i s

, o r a t l e a s t w a s

, a l s o a p e r m a n e n t r e s i d e n t o f C a n a d a

,

w h i c h t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t p r o p e r l y f o u n d w a s t h e h a b i t u a l r e s i d e n c e o f

t h e c h i l d

. I n l i g h t o f t h e H a g u e C o n v e n t i o n ’ s s t a n d a r d s b a s e d o n

h a b i t u a l r e s i d e n c e

, w h i c h t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t a p p l i e d c o r r e c t l y

, t h e r e

w a s n o p r e j u d i c i a l e r r o r h e r e

.1 8 N o

. 1 2

- 1 6 9 2

B. Ov erl ook ing a W

arn ing ?

The maj or ity n e xt sugge sts t ha t th e dist r ict judge may h ave

made a le gal e r r or

, th at he may ha ve “ove r looke d our wa r ni ng

in Va n De Sand e v. Va n De Sand e

, supr a

, 431 F.3d at 570- 71

, not

to tr e at th e H ague Con ve nt ion as a ve nue statute de sign e d ‘to

de te r par e nt s from e ng agin g in in te r na tion al for um sh oppin g

in custody case s. ” Slip op. at 9, quoti ng Baxt er v. Baxt er

,

423 F.3d 363, 367 (3d Cir

. 2005 ). The H a g ue C o n v e nt ion is

in de e d a ve nue statute

. It is de s i g n e d t o de te r e xactl y such

f or um-sh oppin g an d to pr e ve nt lit igat ion of custody in th e

coun tr y ch ose n by th e abduc tin g par e nt

, as th e Thi r d Cir cuit

e xplain e d in Baxt er

. A ccor d, e.g.

, Engl and v. Eng la nd , 234 F.3d

268, 271 (5t h Cir

. 2000 ); Lops v. Lops

, 140 F.3d 927, 936 (11 th Cir

.

1998 ). The quote d pa s sage in Va n De Sand e addr e sse d a

dif fe r e nt issue

, an ar gume nt th at a cour t could de ci d e “gr ave

r isk” an d ve nue by a s k i n g onl y if th e coun tr y of ha bit ual

r e side nc e h ad suf fi cie nt law s an d poli ce to pr ote ct t he ch ild

.

It is unc l e a r f r om th e Va n De Sand e opin ion wh e th e r th e

fat he r actua lly made th at ar gume nt in th a t case (th e tar ge t of

th e disc ussion wa s dic tum in an oth e r cir cuit’ s opin ion ), but in

an y e ve nt th e dist r ict judge did not m a k e t h e suppose d e r r or

he r e

. The judge wa s th or oughl y fam ili ar wi t h Va n De Sand e.

H e r e fe r r e d to it re pe ate dly dur in g th e he ar in g. The maj or ity

sugge sts th e judge made th is mist ake wh e n he aske d: “Wh y

c a n ’ t Can ada an y mor e th an Ill in ois pr ote ct

– off e r he r

pr ote cti on? ” Tr. 218. In con te xt, it is cle ar th at th e judge wa s

r e fe r r in g to th e moth e r

, no t to th e ch ild

. (Th e judge ’s

pr e ce din g que stion wa s “Wh y can ’t sh e move t o C an ada? ”,

r e fe r r in g obvi ously to th e moth e r .) The que stion wa s r aise d as

par t of t h e j ud ge ’s pr ope r e ff or t to sati sfy hi mse lf th at aN o

. 1 2

- 1 6 9 2 1 9

Can adia n fam ily cour t could qui ckl y take ste ps to de al wi th

in te r im q ue stion s such as custody

, suppor t, in cludi ng payi ng

ne e de d le gal fe e s. Se e Tr. 212- 13, 218, 220- 22. The r e is no 5

d o ub t th at th e moth e r he r e woul d fac e substa nt ial obsta cle s

lit igat in g in th e coun tr y of ha bit ual r e side nc e

, aw ay fr om h e r

par e nt s. She woul d n e e d to f in d a plac e to liv e an d a law ye r

,

an d sh e pr obab ly wo ul d n e e d an aw ar d of in te r im suppor t.

But th ose obsta cle s ar e sur mount abl e an d in an y e ve nt ar e not

le giti mate gr ounds for de nyin g th e Ha gue Con ve nt ion ’s r e tur n

r e me dy.

C. Ref usi ng Fur the r D el ay fo r M ore Evi dence

A t th e be gin ni ng of th e he ar in g, th e judge gr an te d t h e

fat he r ’s mo t i o n to e xclude te stim ony fr om th e moth e r ’s

psych ologi cal e xp e r t, Dr

. H atch e r

. Be cause Dr

. H atch e r ha d

not in te r vie we d th e moth e r or th e ch ild or an yon e e lse

in volv e d in th e case

, th e dist r ict cour t foun d th at th e pr off e r e d

e xpe r t opin ion s woul d not be he lpf ul. Tr. 7-8

. Ne ar th e e nd of

th e he ar in g, aft e r th e judge ha d said th at gr ave r i s k ha d not

be e n sh own

, th e m o t h e r ’ s law ye r aske d for an oth e r we e k for

Dr

. H atch e r to con duct a psych ologi cal e val uation of th e ch ild

an d s ub mit a r e por t to th e cour t. Tr. 221. The maj or ity fi nd s

th at th e dist r ict judge e r r e d by not all owi ng such a de lay. The

judge pr o vide d a sound r e ason for not doin g so. Af te r

J u d g e O ’ S c a n n l a i n e x p l a i n e d f o r t h e N i n t h C i r c u i t i n 5

G a u d i n v

. R e m e s

, “ b e c a u s e t h e H a g u e C o n v e n t i o n p r o v i d e s o n l y a

p r o v i s i o n a l

, s h o r t

- t e r m r e m e d y i n o r d e r t o p e r m i t l o n g

- t e r m c u s t o d y

p r o c e e d i n g s t o t a k e p l a c e i n t h e h o m e j u r i s d i c t i o n

, t h e g r a v e

- r i s k

i n q u i r y s h o u l d b e c o n c e r n e d o n l y w i t h t h e d e g r e e o f h a r m t h a t c o u l d

o c c u r i n t h e i m m e d i a t e f u t u r e

, ” p a r t i c u l a r l y i n c o n t e x t o f c o n c e r n

a b o u t p s y c h o l o g i c a l h a r m

. 4 1 5 F

. 3 d a t 1 0 3 7

.2 0 N o

. 1 2

- 1 6 9 2

disc ussion bac k an d for th

, th e cour t e xplain e d: “Base d up o n

wh at I kn ow of e xpe r ts, th e n th e y come up wi th an e xpe r t, an d

th e n you’r e r igh t bac k wh e r e we star te d fr om. One wi l l say

th at th e r e is, an d th e ot h e r wi ll say th e r e isn ’t. ” Tr. 224. The

judge wa s cle ar ly i n dic atin g th at wa iti ng for such an

e val uation woul d le ad, a t a m in imum, to se ve r al m or e we e ks

of de lay to all ow for th e moth e r to ar r an ge for th at e val uation

,

for th e fat he r to ar r an ge for a simi lar e val uation

, for e xch an ge s

of e xpe r t r e por ts, an d for a n o t h e r e vide nt iar y he ar in g be for e

th e dist r ict cour t. In oth e r w o r d s

, th e judge r e cogn ize d, he

woul d be he ar in g a full -b low n cu st o dy fi gh t, wh ich simpl y wa s

not hi s job unde r th e H ague Con ve nt ion

. H e wa s cor r e ct, an d

he ce r tain ly di d n ot ab use h is di scr e tion

.

The fi nd in g of e r r or on th is poin t is th e most tr oubli ng aspe ct

of th e maj or ity’ s de cis ion

, in te r ms of th e ove r all e ff e cti ve ne ss

of the H ague Con ve nt ion

. The Con ve nt ion is unde r min e d by

e xpand in g th e “gr ave r isk” e xce ption in to a th or ough in qui r y

in to th e me r its of th e custody issue

. By fi nd in g th at th e r e fusal

to de lay th e de cis ion for such addit ion al e xpe r t te stim ony wa s

an abuse of disc r e tion (th ough th e maj or ity doe s n o t use th at

phr ase ), th e e xpans i o n of vir tuall y an y “gr ave r isk” de fe ns e

in to a f ull- blow n custody h e ar in g be come s n e ar ly i ne vit abl e

.

As e xplain e d abov e in Pa r t I, th at wa s th e pr e dic tion of th e

Un ite d State s de le gati on to th e H a gue Con ve nt ion wh e n th e

e xce ption wa s dr aft e d mor e br oadly

. Both th e Con ve nt ion an d

Con gr e ss r e je cte d th at br oade r appr oach

. T h e y in sist e d th at

t h e e xc e ption be ke pt na r r ow an d th at de cis ion s be ma d e

qui ckl y. Un de r th e maj or ity’ s appr oach

, how e ve r

, th ose goals

may be miss e d an y time one par e nt compl ain s th at th e oth e r

ha s abuse d he r or hi m in an y wa y th at could ha ve aff e cte d th e

ch ild psych ologi cal ly. The ide a th at a de cis ion could be madeN o

. 1 2

- 1 6 9 2 2 1

wi th in th e tar ge t pe r iod of six we e ks wi l l b e c o m e a dist an t

me mor y.

If th e maj or ity’ s appr oach pr e vai ls, th ose con se que nc e s may

we ll e ch o to th e de tr ime nt of Un ite d State s par e nt s wh ose

ch ild r e n ar e abduc te d to oth e r coun tr ie s. An impor tan t point

for th e Con gr e ss in i m p l e m e nt in g th e Con ve nt ion wa s th at a

for e ign cour t must compl y wi th its obli gati on to r e tur n a ch ild

to th e U ni te d State s “with out con ducti ng an y pr oce e din gs on

th e me r its of th e unde r lyi ng custody cla ims. ” 134 Con g. Re c.

S3839 -02 (da ily e d. Apr

. 12

, 1 9 8 8 ) (st ate me nt of Se n. Dixon ).

Man y oth e r me mbe r s of Con gr e ss r e coun te d pr oble ms th e ir

con stit ue nt s ha d e nc ounte r e d be cause th e ir ch ild r e n ha d be e n

abduc te d to oth e r coun tr ie s th at r e fuse d to r e tur n th e ch ild r e n

wi th out full con side r atio n of custody issue s unde r for e ign law

.

Se e We in e r

, 69 For dh am L. Re v. at 603- 0 4 (c olle cti ng

e xample s). If th e Un ite d State s cour ts do not r e spe ct th e lim its

of H ague Con ve nt ion pr oce e din gs, it wi ll be dif fi cult to ar gue

in for e ign cour ts or th r ough di p loma tic ch an ne ls th at oth e r

na tion s’ cour ts sh ould r e spe ct t he m.

I do not me an t o e xa gge r ate pr e dic tion s of doom he r e

.

Pe r ha ps th e maj or ity’ s r e ason in g on th is poin t can be con fi ne d

to th e comb in atio n of the all e gati ons , corr obor atin g e vide nc e

,

pr oce dure s, an d fi nd in gs in th is case

. The maj or ity doe s not

sugge st th at th e r e fusal o f m o r e time for psych ologi cal

e val uation wa s alon e a suff ici e nt bas is to r e ve r se

. Ye t th e r isk

to t he Con ve nt ion an d to th e oth e r ch ild r e n an d par e nt s it is

suppose d to pr ote ct is non e th e le ss se r ious. For th e se r e ason s,

I woul d aff ir m th e judgm e nt of th e dist r ict cour t an d all ow th e

Can adia n cour ts to do th e ir d i f f i c ult job in de ali ng wi th th is

ch ild an d h e r fa mil y.