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THE FUTURE OF JAPAN

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON ASIA AND THE PACIFIC

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

MAY 24, 2011

Serial No. 112–31

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/

(II)

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida, Chairman 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey 

DAN BURTON, Indiana 

ELTON GALLEGLY, California 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

DONALD A. MANZULLO, Illinois 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

RON PAUL, Texas 

MIKE PENCE, Indiana 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

CONNIE MACK, Florida 

JEFF FORTENBERRY, Nebraska 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

TED POE, Texas 

GUS M. BILIRAKIS, Florida 

JEAN SCHMIDT, Ohio 

BILL JOHNSON, Ohio 

DAVID RIVERA, Florida 

MIKE KELLY, Pennsylvania 

TIM GRIFFIN, Arkansas 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina 

ANN MARIE BUERKLE, New York 

RENEE ELLMERS, North Carolina 

VACANT 

HOWARD L. BERMAN, California 

GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York 

ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American 

Samoa 

DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida 

DENNIS CARDOZA, California 

BEN CHANDLER, Kentucky 

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York 

ALLYSON SCHWARTZ, Pennsylvania 

CHRISTOPHER S. MURPHY, Connecticut 

FREDERICA WILSON, Florida 

KAREN BASS, California 

WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts 

DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island 

YLEEM D.S. POBLETE, Staff Director 

RICHARD J. KESSLER, Democratic Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON ASIA AND THE PACIFIC

DONALD A. MANZULLO, Illinois, Chairman 

RON PAUL, Texas 

BILL JOHNSON, Ohio 

DAN BURTON, Indiana 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

MIKE KELLY, Pennsylvania 

JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina 

ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American 

Samoa 

FREDERICA WILSON, Florida 

GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

DENNIS CARDOZA, California 

(III)

C O N T E N T S 

Page

WITNESSES 

Battalion Chief Robert J. Zoldos II, Program Manager, U.S.A.–1/VA–TF1, 

Urban Search & Rescue, Fairfax County Fire and Rescue Department ......... 2

Mr. Randall Schriver, Partner, Armitage International ...................................... 7

Michael J. Green, Ph.D., Senior Adviser and Japan Chair, Center for Strategic and International Studies .......................................................................... 14

Mr. L. Gordon Flake, Executive Director, The Maureen and Mike Mansfield 

Foundation ............................................................................................................ 22

LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING 

Battalion Chief Robert J. Zoldos II: Prepared statement ..................................... 5

Mr. Randall Schriver: Prepared statement ........................................................... 10

Michael J. Green, Ph.D.: Prepared statement ....................................................... 16

Mr. L. Gordon Flake: Prepared statement ............................................................ 25

APPENDIX 

Hearing notice .......................................................................................................... 42

Hearing minutes ...................................................................................................... 43

The Honorable Donald A. Manzullo, a Representative in Congress from the 

State of Illinois, and chairman, Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific: 

Prepared statement .............................................................................................. 44

The Honorable Eni F.H. Faleomavaega, a Representative in Congress from 

American Samoa: 

Prepared statement .............................................................................................. 46

Material submitted for the record ...................................................................... 48

(1)

THE FUTURE OF JAPAN 

TUESDAY, MAY 24, 2011

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON ASIA AND THE PACIFIC, 

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, 

Washington, DC. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2 p.m., in room 

2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Donald A. Manzullo 

(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. 

Mr. MANZULLO. The Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific will 

come to order. Our first witness is Battalion Chief Robert Zoldos, 

representing Fairfax County, Virginia, Fire and Rescue. Chief 

Zoldos is in his 17th year with the Fairfax County Fire and Rescue 

Department. He currently holds the position of chief of the Urban 

Search and Rescue Team. Prior to his appointment to his current 

position, he served as the chief of the Technical Rescue Operations 

Team, the department’s local and regional response element. With 

him is Ms. Massey and Atticus. 

Chief Zoldos deployed with the Virginia Task Force One, VATF–

1, 11 times in 7 different capacities. His previous deployments include international rescue missions in Kenya, Turkey, Taiwan, 

Iran, Haiti, and most recently to Japan as a task force leader. Domestically, the chief served as rescue squad officer with VATF–1 at 

the Pentagon after the September 11, 2001, attack. 

He is accompanied today by two members of his team, Jennifer 

Massey and Atticus Finch, a 5-year-old German shepherd. Ms. 

Massey and Atticus are integral to Virginia Task Force One and 

were deployed to Japan as part of the search and rescue team. Ms. 

Massey has been with VATF–1 since 1999, and she serves as president of the board of directors of the American Rescue Dog Association and as treasurer of the board of directors of the Virginia 

Search and Rescue Dog Association. 

Our next witness is Randy Schriver, one of five founding partners of Armitage International, a consulting firm specializing in 

international business and development strategies. He is chief executive officer and president of the Project 2049 Institute, a not-forprofit dedicated to the study of security trendlines in Asia. He is 

also senior associate of the Center for Strategic and International 

Studies. Immediately prior to his return to the private sector, he 

served as the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian 

and Pacific Affairs, responsible for the PRC, Taiwan, Mongolia, 

Hong Kong, Australia, New Zealand, and the Pacific Islands. Prior 

to joining the Asia Bureau, he served for 2 years as chief of staff 

and the senior policy adviser to Deputy Secretary of State Richard 

2

Armitage. He joined the Department of State in March 2001 upon 

the swearing in of Deputy Secretary Armitage. 

Our next witness is Michael Green, a senior adviser and Japan 

chair at CSIS, as well as an associate professor of international relations at Georgetown University. He previously served as Special 

Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs and Senior 

Director for Asian Affairs at the National Security Council from 

January 2004 to December 2005 after joining the NSC in 2001 as 

Director of Asian Affairs with responsibility for Japan, Korea, Australia, and New Zealand. His current research and writing is focused on Asia regional architecture, Japanese politics, U.S. foreign 

policy history, the Korean Peninsula, Tibet, Burma and U.S.-India 

relations. 

The next witness is L. Gordon Flake, who joined the Mansfield 

Foundation in February 1999. He was previously a senior fellow 

and associate director of the Program on Conflict Resolution at the 

Atlantic Council of the U.S. and, prior to that, director of research 

and academic affairs at the Korea Economic Institute of America. 

He has traveled to North Korea numerous times. He is a member 

of the London-based International Institute for Strategic Studies 

and he serves on the Board of the U.S. Committee of the Council 

for Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific. 

Your complete written testimonies will be made a part of the 

record. I will try to keep everybody within the 5-minute clock. We 

will just do the best we can. 

Mr. Zoldos, the floor is yours. 

STATEMENT OF BATTALION CHIEF ROBERT J. ZOLDOS II, 

PROGRAM MANAGER, U.S.A.–1/VA–TF1, URBAN SEARCH & 

RESCUE, FAIRFAX COUNTY FIRE AND RESCUE DEPARTMENT 

Chief ZOLDOS. Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, 

thank you for inviting me today to testify at this important hearing. I will focus my testimony today on the rescue efforts and the 

level of devastation in the aftermath of the tragic earthquake and 

tsunami. 

First I would like to extend my deepest condolences to those who 

lost loved ones, homes and livelihoods in the affected areas. 

On March 11 at 1446 hours in Japan, a magnitude 9.0 earthquake, the fifth largest in the world since 1900, occurred on the 

east coast off Honshu at a depth of approximately 15 miles. According to the U.S. Geological Survey, the epicenter of the earthquake 

was located 80 miles east of Sendai, the capital of the Miyagi Prefecture, and 231 miles northeast of Tokyo. 

The earthquake generated a large tsunami that struck the 

Fukushima Prefecture, resulting in additional fatalities and damage. At the time, media reports indicated that the earthquake and 

the tsunami resulted in at least 300 deaths and injuries. 

The United States Agency for International Development maintains agreements with two FEMA-certified urban search and rescue domestic teams, Los Angeles County in California and the Fairfax County team in Virginia. The teams maintain 24/7 readiness to 

deploy to international disasters when requested by the affected 

country and the U.S. chief of mission. 

3

Within 3 hours of the earthquake, the U.S. Agency for International Development’s Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance gave 

an alert to the two teams to begin preparing for a possible USAR 

deployment in Japan. This alert allows us to begin bringing in our 

team’s command and general staff as well as to prepare our equipment for deployment. 

USAID requested two USAR teams, one from each department. 

The two teams were composed of a total of 148 personnel trained 

in search, rescue, and medical services; and 12 live rescue search 

canines, like Atticus here—he is usually a little more active than 

this—who is here today with his handler Jennifer Massey. Working 

under the direction of experienced handlers like Jennifer, our live 

search canines are able to locate live victims deep within the rubble. 

Along with personnel and canines, we also bring with us a great 

deal of search and rescue equipment for operating in any type of 

construction or building. Each team has the capacity for physical, 

canine, and electronic searches, or what the average person refers 

to as looking, sniffing and listening. 

We also bring a vast emergency medical capacity, which allows 

for the treatment of injured team members as well as victims we 

find during operations. Other highly trained specialists on our 

teams are able to assess damage, determine needs, provide feedback to local officials, and conduct hazardous material surveys and 

evaluations of affected areas. The teams that deployed to Japan 

also had a water rescue capability, which was anticipated to be in 

demand due to the presence of the heavily flooded areas. 

USAID deployed two heavy teams to Japan, one from Fairfax 

and one from Los Angeles. This means that these teams had the 

highest classification possible under the U.N.-sponsored International Search and Rescue Advisory Group, or INSARAG, and 

designates the ability to search in any type of building, including 

reinforced concrete. 

The two U.S. teams arrived in Misawa, Japan, on March 13. We 

landed on a U.S. military airbase there. The military greeted, 

housed and fed us. Our 60-ton equipment cache was transported on 

trucks operated by U.S. airmen, all of whom had experienced the 

quake and were very happy to see a rescue team. 

After initial inbrief by local officials, we were immediately dispatched to Ofunato, one of the most affected areas in the Iwate 

Prefecture in northeastern Japan. The Japanese Ministry of Defense transported a large portion of our equipment from Misawa 

Air Force Base to where we set up our base of operations at the 

Setamai school in Sumita. We had had readiness meetings with 

local authorities to establish operational assignments, search criteria, and incident objectives. And at first light on March 15, the 

teams headed out to begin search and rescue operations alongside 

the Japanese and international search and rescue teams. 

Our two U.S. teams searched with teams from the United Kingdom, China, and many of our brothers from the Osaka and Ofunato 

fire departments. House by house and building by building, we 

scoured the debris-ravaged remains of Ofunato looking for victims. 

There were heavy losses in this once thriving community. Large 

boats and ships were scattered throughout the area, with many 

4

resting between building. Vehicles were all over rooftops, but the 

majority of the buildings in low-lying areas were simply gone. Some 

people lost everything, family, friends, their homes and businesses, 

and yet we were greeted with an outpouring of kindness that none 

of us will ever forget. 

After searching in Ofunato, we were unable to locate any survivors. Local officials asked that we move on in our search to 

Kamaishi, north of Ofunato. Much like in our previous search, the 

wall of water generated by the enormous quake destroyed the area 

surrounding the bay. Houses and buildings were unrecognizable. 

As a rescuer combing through the rubble, we were always 

searching for voids. Even the smallest void space can provide 

enough room for someone to possibly survive. Both of our teams deployed in the aftermath of the January 2010 earthquake in Haiti, 

and the U.S. teams were able to make an unprecedented 47 live 

rescues. Some of these rescues were in void spaces so small and so 

precarious that I still can’t fathom how some of them survived. 

But in Japan, we were searching in areas where the tsunami had 

utterly washed over and through nearly every possible void space. 

So if one might had survived the earthquake in a void, then they 

had to beat the odds a second time when the tsunami struck. Compound this with the fact that the weather was often below freezing. 

We knew the likelihood of finding someone was very, very slim. 

And yet the U.S. teams and our partners never gave up the search 

and our hope as we searched every inch of our assigned locations. 

We demobilized and returned home on March 20 after searching 

all locations assigned to us by the Japanese Government. It was 

difficult to accept that we were unable to find any survivors, but 

we were honored to have been deployed to help the Japanese in 

their time of need. Everywhere we went in Japan, we were warmly 

greeted by a resilient population that extended their arms to embrace our rescue teams even in the face of this utter tragedy. 

On behalf of the Urban Search and Rescue Teams in Los Angeles 

and Fairfax County, I would like to thank the Government of 

Japan for inviting us and the United States Government for deploying us to assist in the aftermath of this tragic disaster. I would 

also like to thank the Board of Supervisors for both Fairfax and 

Los Angeles Counties for their unwavering support of our international search and rescue efforts. 

I will be happy to take any questions you may have, sir. 

Mr. MANZULLO. Thank you very much. 

[The prepared statement of Chief Zoldos follows:]

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Mr. MANZULLO. Mr. Schriver. 

STATEMENT OF MR. RANDALL SCHRIVER, PARTNER, 

ARMITAGE INTERNATIONAL 

Mr. SCHRIVER. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much for the invitation to address this committee. I am quite honored, and I am 

honored to be seated with my fellow panelists Mr. Zoldos on the 

front lines and my good friends Mike and Gordon. 

Let me add to the expressions of condolence that have also been 

made. The tragedy is 2 months past, but there are still people suffering in very dire circumstances, so it is important that we keep 

people in our thoughts and prayers. 

Let me just make two points up front. From time to time, we 

hear people question whether or not Japan will recover and reconstitute. I think we should dispense with that notion. Japan will recover. It is a great country, a great society, a great nation, and has 

a history, as the Ambassador said, of coming back from previous 

tragedy. The real question, the salient issue, is the pace and what 

trajectory. Will Japan slide into a middle power status given these 

not only recent events, but some of the other challenges they faced, 

or will they truly have the wherewithal to emerge to a regional and 

global status to where they have been for the past several decades? 

The second point I want to make up front, we should be very, 

very clear that it is in our interests in the United States for Japan 

to follow that second path, to the path of recovery to regional and 

global leadership. It is important to us not only because of our alliance and our affinity with our friends in Japan, but our regional 

strategy, in many ways our global strategy, is dependent on a 


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strong alliance, what we are doing on the Korean Peninsula, our 

obligations in the Taiwan Strait, our mutual support for freedom 

of navigation and so forth. We need Japan to recover, and as a 

friend and ally, we need to be seeking out ways that we can help 

them make that fast recovery and return to a position of prominence. 

Japan, of course, has many of the immediate challenges that 

were already mentioned: The recovery of the immediate affected 

areas, relocation of population, dealing with the energy situation, 

and I would add to the comments already made about how impressed everyone is with how the Japanese citizens have responded, their strength in the face of this crisis, their benevolence 

to fellow citizens and to hosting our people. 

Let me also say in the immediate response, a congratulations 

and support is also noted for the Obama administration and how 

well they have done, and particularly our military services who responded alongside brothers in arms and rescue workers. So this 

was a joint effort extremely well done, and we should acknowledge 

that. 

The medium term, of course, and the longer term, there are some 

uncertainties. I think Japan’s essential choice about turning inward or seeking to still retain positions of regional and global influence, these are real questions, and the discrete policy decisions that 

will be made in the present and in the near term will impact that. 

Again, our aspirations are for a strong Japan. We can’t have and 

should not be complacent about Japan looking inward. But I would 

also add there are a few voices who have talked about a reorientation opportunity for Japan, some high-profile op-eds maybe, about 

looking at reorienting away from the alliance and maybe toward 

China. 

I just want to say that while China will surely be part of the recovery and will surely be part of Japan’s trajectory out of this crisis, this would not be a very wise move, in my opinion. China is 

not the same kind of partner that the United States will be now 

and looking forward; at best, an unreliable partner. We only need 

to look at the events of 2010 to see China’s more assertive sovereignty claims; vis-a`-vis Japan, their cutting off of rare earth materials when Japan was in need; and in general, an attitude of supporting the adversaries of Japan, like North Korea. So I hope it is 

not an inward turn, but I also hope it is not a reorientation away 

from the alliance. I very much believe in the future of this alliance. 

I also just want to say, although most of us are consumed about 

talking about Japan’s challenges and the uncertainties in Japan 

and decisions that they have to make, there are some uncertainties 

about the United States that we have to be realistic about. And if 

you are sitting in Tokyo or anywhere else in the region, there are 

questions about our own wherewithal. 

Japan looks at us, I am sure, and sees we are involved in a third 

war in the Middle East now. And will our attention be once again 

diverted away from Asia? They follow our budget debates and understand that there may be defense cuts coming. What would that 

mean for the alliance? What would that mean for the region? They 

wonder about our support for trade liberalization, a long hallmark 

of U.S. leadership in Asia. Now we are hardly in the game, as othVerDate 0ct 09 2002 16:00 Jul 07, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00012 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\AP\052411\66531 HFA PsN: SHIRL
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ers are pursuing it in a robust manner. And they look at things 

like our own engagement of China, and they see something like the 

strategic and economic dialogue and the number of Cabinet secretaries and the President himself, their level of involvement with 

that. We have nothing like that with respect to our best ally in the 

region with Japan. So they look at these things, and they wonder 

about us. So I think as we think about how to help Japan, we also 

need to think about our own policies and our own positioning. 

So, again, I think it is absolutely vital that we invest in the future of this alliance for reasons that I have articulated and others 

have articulated. It does require the time and attention of our 

seniormost leaders. It does require, I think, for us to be a leader 

on trade, not a reluctant participant. And I think we should have 

high aspirations and expectations for this alliance, not give Japan 

a pass or in any way be implicit in an inward look on their part. 

Thank you. 

Mr. MANZULLO. Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Schriver follows:]

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Mr. MANZULLO. Mr. Green. 

STATEMENT OF MICHAEL J. GREEN, PH.D., SENIOR ADVISER 

AND JAPAN CHAIR, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES 

Mr. GREEN. Mr. Chairman, thank you for inviting me. Thank you 

for focusing on our ally in its time of need and support. 

The triple disaster of March 11 has been the greatest crisis 

Japan has faced since the war. More than 24,000 dead and missing. More than 400,000 displaced. More than 70,000 who have lost 

their jobs. I lived for a time as a student not far from the area 

where our colleagues from Fairfax were deployed in the Iwate Prefecture, and it has been personally heartbreaking for me to see this 

beautiful coast eliminated by the power of nature. 

For all the reasons my friend Randy Schriver said, Japan is our 

indispensable linchpin not only in the Pacific, but globally; the second largest contributor to the World Bank, the IMF, the United 

Nations. I worked for 5 years on the National Security Council 

staff. We could not do anything we do in the Pacific and beyond 

if we didn’t have Japan as our ally. Americans know that. 

In the first month, $250 million was raised by private U.S. citizens. Thousands of Americans have gone to help. 20,000 from the 

U.S. military. For our part, at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, we have established a task force called the Partnership for Recovery with Japan’s Business Federation Keidanren. 

The task force is chaired by the CEO of Boeing Jim McNerney, and 

we have about 25 prominent Americans at that level from civil society think tanks and the corporate sector, and we are working 

with our colleagues in Japan to come up with ideas and areas 

where the U.S. can help as Japan charts its recovery and moves 

on a trajectory to a strong economic position and strong role in the 

world. And we would be very happy to brief you, and the members 

of the committee, and your staffs as we move forward and get some 

concrete ideas out on the table. We will be traveling to Japan in 

June. 

I have seen some of the opportunities and challenges Japan will 

face coming out of this. I would like to focus on what I would say 

are three strengths and three problems, three challenges. The 

three strengths are things that people who knew Japan understood. But I think for much of the world, the Japanese public’s response to this crisis has really spotlighted some resilience that 

much of our media had forgotten about. 


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First is the esteem and respect with which Japan is viewed 

around the world. Public opinion polls taken globally have always 

ranked Japan in the top three countries or four countries, often 

first, in terms of respect worldwide. Well over 100 countries have 

responded, rich countries like the United States or Britain or Australia, but countries like Afghanistan, where people from Kandahar 

who have benefited from Japanese aid have sent money, sent rugs 

and blankets to help. It is played back in the Japanese media, and 

people appreciate this in Japan. It has, I think, given a new sense 

of how important Japan is to the world, to the Japanese themselves. 

Secondly, Randy touched on this, it really is important, the performance of the Japanese Self-Defense Forces and the U.S. military 

with them in a supporting role was exemplary. Operation 

Tomodachi, which means ‘‘friend,’’ is the largest joint and combined 

operation we have ever done with Japan. And our friends and adversaries alike will take note of the fact that in 3 days we rebuilt 

Sendai airport, which had been absolutely devastated. That is no 

insignificant interoperability incapacity. It reassures our friends; 

and as I said, our adversaries will take note of how close we are. 

Third, the Japanese youth, which has been dismissed in recent 

writings as sort of lost and without a goal, has been incredible in 

this crisis. Over 300,000 people have volunteered from within 

Japan to go north. Companies and schools are giving volunteer vacations. I teach at Georgetown, and just about every Japanese student I have ever had or intern I have ever had has dropped what 

they are doing and has gone north really speaks well to the next 

generation of Japanese leadership. 

Three challenges. The economic one is quite clear. As the Ambassador said and Randy said, Japan will recover. The fiscal situation 

is stressful. They will manage that. There will be some hollowing 

out in Tohoku as companies diversify their risk from production. 

Twenty to thirty percent of production may not come back to that 

region, but that is an opportunity to rebuild a new kind of economic model in that part of Japan. 

Secondly, energy. The rolling blackouts are over. Energy supply 

is adequate. But in the long run, Japan had planned on moving 

from 30 percent of energy supply from nuclear to 50 percent. That 

is going to be hard. Japanese public support nuclear, but they are 

going to have to look at this. I think if Japan investigates and reports on this experience, it will be well positioned to lead the world 

in defining new safety requirements for peaceful nuclear energy. 

Finally, politically this has stressed the Japanese Government. 

There are a lot of ideas, a lot of plans. There is no centralized planning process yet. It will come. It is a challenge. I think the opportunity is that we have seen in this crisis some new political stars 

start to rise and some real energy in all the major parties. 

We will stand with Japan, all of us. This committee has set the 

example. Ultimately Japanese leaders will make the decisions, 

make the calls, but the fact the United States is there with them 

to offer support, ideas, and assistance will matter enormously. So 

I thank you for calling this hearing and for your support as well. 

Mr. MANZULLO. Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Green follows:]

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Mr. MANZULLO. Mr. Flake? 

STATEMENT OF MR. L. GORDON FLAKE, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, THE MAUREEN AND MIKE MANSFIELD FOUNDATION 

Mr. FLAKE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I, too, am honored to join 

my fellow panelists in addressing this important topic at this time. 

With your lead, I will just summarize a few of the key points 

from my written testimony. But first and foremost, I want to very 

much associate myself with the comments of my fellow panelists. 

I very much agree with them, and in my written comments you 

will see that there are similar veins in terms of our relative optimism about the recovery of Japan and the potential of this tragic 

event to in a positive way affect the trajectory of Japan as a nation 

and as an ally of the United States. 

As I understand, the underlying assumption of the panel and the 

reason we are holding it today is that the events of March 11, as 

tragic as they were, have the potential to alter Japan’s trajectory, 

and there is some concern that it may cause Japan to kind of pull 

inward. With an already difficult fiscal situation in Japan, with a 

tremendous cost incurred by this tragedy, there is concern that 

Japan will no longer be willing or able to engage with us in the 

region as we have done in the past. And I think that is a very important issue for us to address, given the importance of Japan as 

our ally in Asia and how much we rely on things that we do jointly. 

I think if you look at my written testimony and the comments 

made earlier, I am generally optimistic that that won’t be the case. 

But rather than speak about the issue more broadly, I think it is 

useful to look at one very specific and important example in the region itself. So I, in my written remarks and today, will choose to 

focus really on Japan-South Korea relations as two of our most important allies in the region. 

So as a way to sort of use a litmus test to kind of test the assumption that Japan might be retrenching—and I think, again, 

looking at the case of Korea gives you perhaps exactly the opposite 

answer—that the events of March 11, as horrific as they may be, 

actually in the short and long run will likely have a positive influence on relationships between our two most important allies that 

at times in the past have been troubled, and this is a rare and important opportunity for us to improve those relations and for Japan 

and Korea to work together as they go forward. 

I would note that many of the issues that we were asked to address in this panel are also directly relevant to that core relationship in Northeast Asia: The question of denuclearization, particularly in North Korea; the question of human rights, again, with 

North Korea being first and foremost; free trade. Obviously we are 

at the cusp, hopefully, of passing the Korea-U.S. Free Trade Agreement, the KORUS. It is something that would have a tremendous 

impact on U.S-Japan trade relations and, of course, on KoreaJapan trade relations going forward. The broader question of the 

role of China in the region. All of these things really are tied up 

in that relationship between these two core allies that we have in 

Japan and Korea. 

I would note that prior to the events of March 11, the KoreaJapan relations were on a historic upswing. Political changes in 

23

both Japan and Korea really resulted in a remarkable improvement in the political relationship, which had been difficult because 

of historical legacy and other issues, territorial disputes, et cetera. 

But there was remarkably close coordination with Washington on 

North Korea; on North Korea policy; on joint responses to actions 

by North Korea; on actions and inactions by China in the region, 

everything from China’s ignoring the sinking of the Cheonan or the 

Yeonpyeong shelling to China’s actions in the Senkaku Islands or 

their statements on the South China Sea. These all serve to push 

Korea and Japan as allies of the United States ever closer together. 

And you had some real positive developments on the security 

front with some historic developments in South Korea and Japan 

military-to-military relationships, with South Korea and defense officials attending and observing U.S.-Japan naval exercises and vice 

versa. 

So again, we are on the uptick. So the question really would be 

for this panel today, how did the events of this past March affect 

that trajectory? 

It is important to note that Korea was the first country to have 

a search and rescue team on the ground in Japan. It was partly 

due to proximity, but it is a remarkable statement of how things 

have changed in that relationship. Some 76 percent of the Korean 

public polled shortly thereafter were highly supportive of that deployment and of gathering aid to send to Japan, again which tells 

you how dramatically things have shifted in that relationship in a 

positive direction, and that included some very high-profile entertainers and others. They are emblematic of the changes in that relationship as you go forward. 

I would note, if you look at, again, some of the fundamental questions that the committee has raised, there really is, as a result of 

the events of March 11, no change in policy coordination toward 

North Korea. That will continue unabated. Just this past weekend 

there was a very successful Japan-South Korea-China summit 

meeting in Japan where, as the Ambassador mentioned, they went 

jointly to the disaster area where they began to push for a free 

trade agreement. 

The Ambassador also mentioned Japan’s commitment to consider 

TPP. I would urge that if the United States is successful at passing 

the Korea-U.S. Free Trade Agreement, it would be a tremendous 

driver for cooperation between Japan and Korea in the region on 

free trade and other issues that we have a great interest in here 

in the United States as well. 

Also issues such as human rights, of course, are not resourcedriven. So at least in the Korea-Japan relationship, the premise 

that somehow Japan deprived of resources is going to turn inward, 

I think, is probably going to be the exact opposite. The Ambassador 

gave a very telling statistic that, despite this historic and devastating earthquake, tsunami, and nuclear crisis, they are only 

planning to cut their foreign aid 7 percent. And in these days of 

budget cutting in Washington, DC, 7 percent seems like an awfully 

small number to me in that regard as you go forward. Again, it is 

emblematic of Japan’s commitment to the region as we go forward. 

I would just say that the United States can do nothing better 

than to continue to support these trends that I have just outlined 

24

in the trilateral relationship between the United States and its two 

important allies in Asia. 

Thank you very much. 

Mr. MANZULLO. Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Flake follows:]

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Mr. MANZULLO. The congressional district that I represent has 

over 2,000 factories. It is one of the most densely populated manufacturing areas in the country, with quite a bit of Japanese foreign 

direct investment. Mitsubishi, known for automobiles and rockets, 

actually owns the only American production facility of rice crackers, which are made in Rockford, Illinois. Nippon Sharyo broke 

ground to build a massive $40 million facility to build cars for the 

Chicago Metro. Rocknel Fasteners. We could go on and on with the 

extent of the massive investments by the Japanese into the United 

States. 

I am concerned over the issue of the United States, quite frankly, 

focusing a lot on China and not focusing enough on our friend for 

years and years. Mr. Schriver, you had mentioned the fact that 

China had cut off the supply of rare earth minerals at a time when 

here in this country we have a tremendous shortage in the permanent magnets, neodymium iron boron and samarium cobalt. China 

has a 97 percent share of manufacturing those items, and, of 

course, they are used in electronics and guidance systems and in 

batteries for hybrid and battery-driven automobiles. 

My question is: Are we just sitting on the sidelines watching 

things happen, watching China continue to dominate or try to 

dominate the manufacturing sector, and neglecting our bilateral relationship with Japan? It is kind of a tough question, but you guys 

didn’t think I would throw a softball, did you? Does anybody want 

to take a stab at that? Mr. Schriver? 

Mr. SCHRIVER. Well, I guess I introduced the topic partially. I 

think there are a number of ways to measure support and sort of 

take the temperature of a relationship. Certainly when it comes to 

the time and attention of our seniormost leaders, it looks like sort 

of a sinocentric approach to the region, that strategic and economic 

dialogue which we are now in our third round of that. At one point 

last year during our visit to Beijing in conjunction with that dialogue, over half the U.S. Cabinet was in China. And I think in 

terms of measuring the relationship in that regard, we just aren’t 

doing that same kind of investment with our closest allies. 

So I think people watch that. And you could say, well, that is 

process, and it is symbolic. It is not substance. But I think in some 

cases, the symbolic gestures do affect substance, and certainly affect impressions and perceptions. So I think more time and attention to our best ally, first among equals for sure in Asia, warrant 

it. 

Mr. MANZULLO. But how do you do that? 

Mr. SCHRIVER. Well, we have been unable to schedule a two-plustwo meeting, which is the Foreign Minister/Defense Minister meeting. Why has it taken so long to do that and have that kind of 

meeting at a time when I think it would be very welcome? We need 

to be creative about putting the U.S.-Japan alliance in a leadership 

role when it comes to regional and global problem solving, not relying on China, some people have gone so far as to suggest a G–2 

with China. So it is an investment in sort of the bureaucratic infrastructure, but it is really outlook, and it is really aspirations for the 

alliance, and I think our aspirations for the alliance could be higher. 

Mr. MANZULLO. Mr. Flake. 

32

Mr. FLAKE. Well, I would very much agree with Mr. Schriver 

that there needs to be more attention paid to Japan. I would caution against trying to measure relative importance just by the 

amount of time spent on an issue. I think the amount of time we 

spent on China is more representative of the difficulties that we 

face in that relationship in that regard. 

And I would point out that tragic events like that of March 11th 

really do tend to bring home the level of importance and the level 

of closeness in the relationship. And so in this case alliances matter. The notion that we could have that level of close coordination 

on relief efforts, as both the Ambassador and Dr. Green highlighted 

in terms of this Operation Tomodachi, with a country where we 

didn’t have 40 years of close—50 years of close alliance, coordination, and cooperation, it is kind of fanciful in that regard. And I 

do think that events that we have seen right now have tended to 

focus the attention of the United States on the importance of that 

ally. 

So the amount of bureaucratic and other attention paid to Japan 

in the month immediately following the tsunami, earthquake and 

nuclear crisis, I think, was unprecedented in terms of the teams 

that went out there. Obviously the key right now is to sustain that. 

Mr. GREEN. If I may, when George Shultz was Secretary of State, 

he said that our security in the Pacific and across the Atlantic depends on our allies. But the diplomacy of alliances is like tending 

a garden; you have got to get up every morning, you have to pull 

the weeds.It is labor-intensive; it is not always dramatic or not always in the press. When have you difficult big relationships like we 

have with China, that all gets in the press. And so there is a natural tendency for senior officials to want to get the headlines, to 

go for the big win in relations with China. But in the long run our 

ability to manage China’s rising power will depend on how much 

gardening we do in the alliances. 

And there are issues. Randy mentioned scheduling the two-plustwo, the senior meetings; defense making a decision on its next 

fighter, and we are going to have to work through the bureaucratic 

process of helping them hopefully decide on an American aircraft, 

for example. There is just a lot of this kind of gardening. 

Frankly, to the extent that Congress is engaged in this dialog, 

it is keeping the spotlight on it with the administration, that helps 

a lot, because, as I said, the gardening part is not always going to 

get the headlines, but in the long run that is what really counts. 

And you can see the results in Operation Tomodachi and the way 

our militaries operated together, this huge joint and combined operation. We can do that about almost no one else in the same way. 

So it is not as if people haven’t put in the work, but with fewer 

time on the calendar, this alliance management is going to need a 

renewed energy from the administration, State Department, Pentagon, but across the board. 

Mr. MANZULLO. Thank you. 

Mr. Johnson. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate the opportunity and thank the panel for being with us today. 

What long-term effects—and any of you can respond to this—

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petitiveness of Japanese companies, particularly in the auto and 

electronic sector? And how does the disaster impact the U.S. manufacturing sector and jobs? Because we get quite a few raw materials from Japan, particularly in the steel industry, that are needed 

here. So what long-term impacts do you see there? 

Mr. GREEN. The Japanese manufacturing sector, the production 

chains were interrupted. My wife and I tried to buy a car recently, 

and we were told, at Japanese auto dealerships, Mitsubishi, Toyota, and so forth, there is a 3- to 6-month waiting list. It wasn’t 

just final manufactured and sold cars. Korea has terrific wireless 

and cell phone technology, but you open up any Samsung or Lucky 

Goldstar cellphone, and the critical semiconductors inside are Japanese. 

I was recently in Seoul and talked to the president of a major 

chaebol, a major conglomerate, and he said very candidly when 

they were interrupted—Korean production was interrupted because 

they couldn’t get these critical components from Japan—they 

looked seriously at creating that capacity themselves in Korea and 

concluded it was 5- to 10-year enormously expensive effort. And 

they didn’t try because they figured Japan would be back on track 

within a matter of months. 

So I think Japan will retain that competitive edge in these critical subcomponents. But what I am hearing from Japanese executives I have talked to is they are going to diversify a bit. The number I keep hearing is 20 percent, 30 percent of the production, and 

manufacturing that was in northern Japan is going to be moved. 

Some of that may come to the U.S., some of it will go to India, 

some of it will go to China. But the business community is becoming wary of China. Because the Chinese side overplayed its hand 

when it took this mercantilist step of cutting off rare earth exports 

because of a diplomatic flap, that sent a message to the whole 

world and the marketplace. So the Japanese are going to look at 

India and Vietnam, and they will diversify and hedge their risk. 

In the long run I think that means the economy will be back on 

track. There may be more jobs for us. We can count on Japan as 

a supplier. It creates possibly a different economic model in northern Japan, possibly an opportunity. They are going to have to rebuild, they can create a new IT, a different kind of economic model 

there. 

So there will be changes, but I think competitiveness is going to 

be restored and maintained. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Kind of a corollary to that, the Japanese Government recently announced that it would have to postpone its decision on whether to participate in the negotiations of the Trans-Pacific Partnership, or TPP. How would the lack of Japan’s participation affect the effectiveness of the TPP negotiations? And is Japan’s 

participation necessary, in your view, for the success of the TPP? 

Mr. GREEN. If my colleagues don’t mind, the reality—my first job 

in government was in USTR, so I know how they think. The reality 

is that negotiating with Japan is tough, the third largest economy, 

the second largest OECD advanced industrial economy. TPP right 

now in countries like New Zealand, Singapore are easier to negotiate with. 

34

So I think negotiating with Japan will be tough. And there are 

some who are, I think, in the U.S. Government and other governments in TPP on the fence about whether they want to get into 

that big scrum in the Japanese Government because they are good 

negotiators. 

Strategically, however, in the longer term, if we don’t get Japan 

in TPP, it doesn’t accomplish what we should really want, which 

is building a trans-Pacific trade architecture. It ensures that as 

Asia integrates, we are in, and that we have access and opportunities. So sooner or later it is, I think, undeniably in U.S. interests 

for Japan to be in. 

Mr. JOHNSON. So basically if I understand what you are saying 

correctly, TPP, its effectiveness in ultimately achieving what we 

were trying to achieve with TPP, it is essential that——

Mr. GREEN. Eventually, that is right. 

Mr. JOHNSON. If Japan is not going to be a part of it, we are not 

going to get out of it what we are looking for. 

Mr. GREEN. That is right. If it is going to really define trade 

rules across the Pacific, eventually we have got to have Japan. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. 

Mr. MANZULLO. Mr. Kelly, who knows a little bit about automobiles. 

Mr. KELLY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I am an automobile dealer, and we can help you with that car 

you can’t find. We do have some Korean models that probably will 

fit in there real well. 

Chief, I want to congratulate you on the efforts as I think that 

the United States has always been the first responder. No matter 

where the disaster takes place in the world, no matter what the 

issue may be, we always seem to be the first one there with the 

most help. Any lessons learned? 

Chief ZOLDOS. A couple major lessons learned. That was the first 

time our team had actually been collocated with two other major 

teams. The Fairfax Team, USA Team 1; and USA Team 2, the Los 

Angeles team; and the United Kingdom’s ISAR team were all put 

at one location and really operate as a triple team, if you will. That 

combined with the fact that the Japanese LEMA, local emergency 

management, was very well defined and had the situation very well 

detailed as far as operational assignments. Those two together 

really mapped out our day far more than we are normally used to. 

Our last mission was to Haiti, and obviously that was much more 

of an open rescue environment. 

I think one of the takeaways is that when we are working in that 

sort of—those restrictions and how well the day is laid out, we really look farther down the road, because our first operational assignment was 1 square kilometer for the entire day. Obviously we can 

knock that out with 74 people in just a matter of hours. 

So it is getting the understanding of what our team’s capabilities 

are out there. Our team is an international classified; there are 

only 21 teams like that. And with that goes a fact sheet, goes some 

understanding of what our team can do. I think the more teams operate with the Japanese, with the Chinese and other teams that 

are out there, that understanding of our capabilities will allow for 

more seamless operation. 

35

Mr. KELLY. And I know for about 50 years we have had a great 

alliance with Japan. I know there has been some fear on the Japanese side that somehow they may get abandoned by the United 

States. Certainly our response and our commitment smoothed over 

some of those fears. Were you able to detect that at all while were 

you there? 

Chief ZOLDOS. Well, the one interesting part was, and we have 

said this many times, firefighters are firefighters worldwide. And 

we were welcomed as part of the team, and really it was seamless. 

Our briefings were at 8 p.m. Every night, and the Osaka Fire Department ran that operational area. They brought their people up, 

and they were the commanding general staff. And we were at the 

table just like everyone else was. So there was sort of a comfort 

level between fire rescue professionals there. 

Mr. KELLY. From an economic standpoint, I am a very big backer 

of the KORUS agreement. I am not sure that our approach to it 

makes sense. I think we approach everything that we do as having 

some type of a political push on one side or the other. By having 

hearings like this, and Mr. Blake, Mr. Green and Mr. Schriver 

have been able to address that. 

The upside of a free trade agreement with Korea right now is so 

critical to the United States and our economic recovery. I just wonder a little bit, because you made, I think, a very good statement 

saying that we are the custodians or we are the stewards of what 

we have right now, which we really don’t own anything; it is just 

put in our care and custody until the time we actually have control. 

The idea is to make it better for that next generation coming after 

us. 

I am really worried right now that we have again back-burnered 

a trade agreement that is absolutely—it is not an option, this is essential. We are talking a $10–$12 billion upside for the United 

States, and we made it political to see who is going to blink first 

as to whether we pass that or not. 

If you could—because these are the type of hearings that shed 

some light for the American people as to what is actually going 

on—just if you could, give a little bit of a walkthrough for us of 

what the upside of that KORUS agreement would be, not in addition to Panama and Colombia, but I do know firsthand with Korea 

and how it would stabilize that part of the world for us. I mean, 

we have got two very good allies that we have to rely on in an area 

that is really under great duress right now by an aggressive Chinese President. So if you could give just us a little upside of that. 

Mr. FLAKE. Let me start off with that and say first and foremost 

I agree with you completely. If you were looking at further upsides 

in the Korea-U.S Free Trade Agreement above and beyond the jobs, 

which again, obviously, on a domestic level is most important, but 

on a broader strategic level there really is a competition in some 

level going on between the United States and China in this region. 

One of the subtexts of this hearing is what is going to happen if 

Japan is no longer engaged? Does that not cede the ground to 

China? 

If we fail to ratify a free trade agreement of this magnitude with 

one of our closest allies in the region, what does that say about 

American economic leadership in the region when all the other 

36

countries are watching this deal? The notion that we could go forward with the Trans-Pacific Partnership, the TPP, if we fail to get 

KORUS is fanciful, right? 

On the flip side of that, if we do ratify KORUS and move forward 

on that front, it puts tremendous pressure on Japan—actually in 

some ways not pressure, it actually opens the field for Japan to 

move forward in working with us on TPP. Obviously Korea’s free 

trade agreement is what we call a gold standard, a high-level, highquality free trade agreement, and Koreans would almost automatically be in the TPP in that process. And the notion that Japan then 

could sit on the sidelines again kind of misses the broader kind of 

strategic realities in the region. 

So I think from our own national interests, from our leadership 

in the region, from these competing models of free trade and economic development in the region between us and China, and from 

the relationship with our two allies on a strategic level, I can’t 

think of anything we could do better at this point. I agree with you 

wholeheartedly. 

Mr. GREEN. We are all friends of long standing; Gordon worked 

for the Obama campaign, Randy and I worked for the McCain campaign, but you would be very hard pressed, in fact I think you 

could not find an expert on Asia who spends time in the region and 

thinks about it, Independent, Republican or Democrat, who is opposed to the KORUS FTA. It is critical to our future in the region. 

As you mentioned, 10-plus billion dollars in new economic activity. 

But in Asia there are, depending on how you count, well over 100 

FTAs now signed or being negotiated. We are in about three or four 

of them. If we don’t ratify this free trade agreement, we are not 

going have the credibility to get into any trade negotiations in Asia 

in the future. 

What does that mean? I mean, not only are we going to miss opportunities to reduce barriers to trade in terms of tariffs, these are 

the free trade agreements and the arrangements that are going to 

write the rules for everything from services, to labor protection, to 

environment, to what kind of access and contract—I mean, everything. It is much more than just the tariffs involved. It is about 

rulemaking in the most dynamic economic region in the world. 

So, you know, our friends, all of us experience this. Our friends 

in Asia are sort of perplexed why we are not moving expeditiously 

to pass this. I know the reason, not as well as you all do, but free 

trade agreements are hard. But in terms of our position in Asia, 

it frankly is a no-brainer to most people who follow the region. 

Mr. SCHRIVER. I will just add to that very briefly, because I agree 

100 percent with my colleagues. A lot of us, even on the other side 

of the aisle, worked on the Republicans when the Obama administration came in and said we are back in Asia. We were grateful to 

see that and grateful to see the time and attention. But you cannot 

be back in Asia without a trade agenda, you cannot be back in Asia 

if you are not part of the discussion and the dialogue about trade 

and commerce, because that is the lifeblood of this region, and we 

are not in the game right now. KORUS is important for the economic and the trade benefits, but it is of strategic value for us and 

for the alliance. 

37

You know, there is an expression about warfare: It is too important to be left to the generals and the military. This trade policy 

right now needs to transcend trade officials, it needs to transcend 

politics. We need leadership, and we need to get it done, and we 

need to do TPP as well. Otherwise we are not back, and we are not 

in the game. 

Mr. KELLY. I sure hope we move in that direction, because we 

all know this. The strength of the alliance is the strength of each 

member, and the strength of each member is on the strength of the 

alliance. So we have got to work together, and we have got to move 

forward. This is not a political; this is an American solution to 

American needs. So thank you very much for coming here today. 

Mr. MANZULLO. This last February I was in Christchurch, New 

Zealand, along with seven other Members of Congress, and we left 

2 hours and 21 minutes before the massive earthquake. 

I think, frankly, there is no foreign trade policy of the Obama administration. Let me just throw this out to you, what we found to 

be extraordinarily disturbing. New Zealand is a very interesting 

country. It is a small country. We got into some very earnest discussions with the Speaker of the House Mr. Smith and others in 

the government over the fact that New Zealand was almost willing 

to close their eyes to infringement on software by China in exchange for more trade with China. 

That really was the purpose of my congressional delegation, because we also had a similar problem with Australia, but not as extreme as what we are experiencing with New Zealand. Our mission 

there was to try to impress upon the people in both those countries 

the absolute importance of protecting intellectual property. 

There was a study that just came down, I believe, from either a 

think tank or a government agency—that said that the Chinese 

were responsible just in the past year for $40 billion of lost profits 

as a result of violating intellectual property. That is extraordinarily 

disturbing because it continues unabated. 

We held a hearing with the people from Fellowes, Inc. They 

make paper shredders out of Congressman Roskam’s district. They 

just lost $190 million worth of property in China in a total takeover 

by one of their supposed partners. No one complains about that. 

The trade missions continue, and people want to form these partnerships. China is going in the opposite direction on openness, on 

enhancing economic freedom, on the manner in which people are 

treated and human rights, and, as far as I am concerned, in terms 

of their business dealings. 

I know this hearing is about Japan, but it goes to show here we 

have Japan, which is a democracy. It is a light in that part of the 

world where there are very few democracies, and I think that we 

should be doing everything we can to help Japan as opposed to letting China continue unabated with a ruthless dictatorship, because 

somewhere down the line we are not going to be able to have light 

and darkness in the same room with people who have that sense 

of core values. 

That was more of a statement than a question, but if any of you 

want to comment on that, I would be open to that. 

Mr. SCHRIVER. Congressman, we appreciated your trip to New 

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gation. I did not quite get out in time before the earthquake, but 

your mission——

Mr. MANZULLO. We almost thought we would see Atticus and the 

team down there. 

Mr. SCHRIVER. Your mission was very well received there, because I think, right to your point, people want an alternative. 

Of course China’s going to be extremely important to the region, 

and we can’t begrudge China for their strategy to not only engage 

in these trade relationships for their economic benefit, but they are 

seeking political gain, and trying to improve their lie—in the golf 

sense—and improve their lie in the region. We can’t begrudge them 

for that, but we have to be giving an alternative to our friends and 

allies, and that is what I am afraid we are not doing right now. 

I think Japan, just to return to that topic, you know, in an odd 

way it might be a good thing that they can’t join the TPP discussions at this juncture because I think it probably would have made 

the goal of having a framework agreement by APEC and November 

11th a little bit beyond our reach. It is still a tough road to get to 

Hawaii in November and have that framework agreement. But if 

we get it, and we get KORUS, then Japan well have that tough 

choice are we in or are we out, and I think they will be in, and 

that will be to everyone’s benefit. 

But we have to exert leadership and we have to give the alternatives; otherwise how could we blame these smaller countries 

when they look at the market——

Mr. MANZULLO. Well, perhaps it would be not only good in diplomacy, but in terms of enhancing trade for us to encourage Japan 

to continue in these talks. This TPP is not going to come to a final 

agreement this year. It is not going to happen. But I think perhaps 

one of the things we should do is continue to work with the Ambassador and our other colleagues in Japan to have them be part of 

those talks so they are not on the outside and nothing is strange 

to them whenever we come to any type of an agreement. 

Mr. GREEN. I think that is right, Mr. Chairman. We do have to 

be a bit sensitive that we don’t appear to the Japanese press to be 

thrusting them at them against their will. There is plenty of support in Japan for this. I think it will be generated from within. We 

should do what we can to encourage and facilitate Japan’s participation. 

This connects, I think, to your first point about how we maintain 

strong relations with our allies and don’t all rush to China. 

Randy and I both have small kids, and when you watch them 

play soccer, the coach tells them, you are the fullback, you are the 

goalie; and then the ball goes on the field, and they all run to the 

ball. And frequently our Asia policy looks like that. The ball is 

China now, and everyone is running there. But if we invest more 

time in encouraging progress on TPP, and passing the free trade 

agreement, and talking to Japan about the future of their participation in TPP, we will be in a much better position. 

On intellectual property rights, Randy and I butted our heads 

against that issue in government for 5 years. If we have a regionwide consensus through trade agreements we are leading on about 

the need to protect intellectual property rights—because Australia 

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culture. They are not going to fight that fight for us. I think your 

trip helped. 

But Japan and Korea, they do have real concerns about intellectual property rights; not software, but manufacturing process technology. So if we have got a broad consensus in the region about the 

rules for protecting intellectual property rights, that is worth much 

more than 10 of these strategic and economic dialogues where half 

the Cabinet cajoles the Chinese for a day. If the rules are being 

written in a way the Chinese, are we in or out, I think they will 

come in, they will start coming around, in part because I think the 

Chinese leadership knows that if they don’t have a better system 

for protecting intellectual property rights, they are not going move 

up the development chain themselves. They are not going develop 

the next generation of companies and technology if you can just rip 

off software and technology the way you can in China now. 

So it is not as if the system in China is going to be 100 percent 

against this. If they see the rules are being written a certain way 

across Asia, I think that will put us in a much better position. 

Mr. FLAKE. I could very briefly say that I very much appreciate 

you raising this issue in the context of the U.S.-Japan relationship, 

because really there is a competition for what the standards and 

the norms of the region and the globe are going to be. In that regard Japan’s full recovery and their active participation in setting 

those is very much in our interest. 

When you look at questions like intellectual property rights, the 

rule of law, the basic questions and value of standards and norms, 

this is an area where Japan’s recovery is our recovery in that regard, because it is by working together with our allies where we 

have these shared values, standards and norms that I think we 

have much more influence not just in the region, but in the globe 

at large. So it puts it very much in the context of what we are talking about. 

Mr. MANZULLO. We want to thank you all for coming. Atticus, did 

he take a snooze over there? He is just taking it easy over there. 

He is named after Atticus Finch in ‘‘To Kill a Mockingbird.’’ He 

stood up. We want to thank you all for coming. I have never really 

talked to a dog like this in a hearing before. But we want to thank 

you all for coming. 

I think it was extraordinary that the Ambassador came here 

today and bared his soul. You could tell the pain of the disaster is 

written all over his face because he is an extraordinarily sensitive 

individual. I have had the opportunity to get to know him very, 

very well. He is such a man of honor, and for him to speak here 

today and then talk about the needs of his country was magnanimous on his part, and also on the part of the Japanese Government 

that fully participated, wanting to get out the message that Japan 

is on its way back. 

Chief, we want to thank you for the work that you do, and the 

reason that we had you come here is to really lay the scene as to 

the extent of the damage, and the waste, and the heaviness that 

is on your heart and your fellow workers’ that went over there, and 

the obvious disappointment that you couldn’t find anybody alive. I 

think that statement more than anything pointed out the nature 

and the extent of the devastation. So, we want to thank you. We 

40

want to thank each of the panelists for taking the time to spend 

with us this afternoon. 

This subcommittee is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 4 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 

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66531e-2.eps
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66531f-1.eps
47


66531f-2.eps
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MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD BY THE HONORABLE ENI F.H. 

FALEOMAVAEGA, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM AMERICAN SAMOA


66531g-1.eps
49


66531g-2.eps
50


66531g-3.eps
51


66531g-4.eps
52


66531g-5.eps
53


66531h.eps
54

Æ


66531i.eps