J-S37019-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

STEFFEN SHAUN ROOKSTOOL 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 3099 EDA 2022

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered August 31, 2022

In the Court of Common Pleas of Lehigh County 

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-39-CR-0000741-2020

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., MURRAY, J., and SULLIVAN, J.

MEMORANDUM BY SULLIVAN, J.: FILED JAUNARY 5, 2024

Steffen Shaun Rookstool (“Rookstool”) appeals from the judgment of 

sentence imposed after the trial court denied his severance motion and a jury 

convicted him of theft by unlawful taking and persons not to possess firearms.

1

 

We affirm.

The facts recited by the trial court are as follows:

The victim, [J.R.]

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resided with her two teenage daughters

and [Rookstool] . . .. [Rookstool] was her boyfriend, and they had 

been in a relationship for approximately two (2) years. At some 

point, [Rookstool] moved into her residence. [J.R.] had 

purchased her first firearm, a Glock 42, .380 caliber, in 2019. She 

had purchased the firearm for protection for herself and her 

daughters, and kept it in a safe during the day and under her 

mattress at night. [Rookstool] was aware of the safe, but he was 

not provided with the combination to open the safe.

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1 See 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 3921(a), 6105(a)(1).

2 We elect not to state the victim’s full name.
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In February of 2020, [J.R.] noticed that her firearm was 

missing from under her mattress. When asked, [Rookstool] 

denied knowledge of the whereabouts of the firearm. She 

periodically asked him about the firearm, but [Rookstool] played 

dumb. He suggested that she misplaced the firearm. Eventually, 

on February 14, 2020, during a car ride, [Rookstool] admitted that 

he had taken the firearm and had given it to a “buddy” for drugs. 

[J.R.] told him to get it back, and [Rookstool] responded[,] “[I]t's 

not that easy.” When [Rookstool] did not call his “buddy” to 

retrieve the firearm, [J.R.] called the police, and the state police 

responded to her residence. They interviewed [Rookstool] outside 

the presence of [J.R.].

One of the troopers who responded was Trooper Peter 

Hamati-Attieh. Upon his arrival, he spoke with [J.R.] about the 

stolen firearm. He then spoke to [Rookstool], who initially denied 

knowledge of what happened to the firearm. During the course of 

the interview, [Rookstool] changed his story and told the troopers 

that he did steal the firearm on February 6, 2020, and gave the 

firearm “to a friend.” He then elaborated, explaining that he 

“traded it in. I went and got drugs with it.” He told the troopers 

he traded it "to a guy named Corey." [Rookstool] did not provide 

Corey's last name, but provided a location and description where 

Corey resided.

[Rookstool’s] statements led to the residence of Corey 

Beitler at 2156 North Cedar Crest Boulevard in South Whitehall, 

where a search warrant was executed. Located inside the 

residence, in a speaker box on the floor, was the missing firearm. 

A loaded magazine was found inside [of] the firearm.

Trial Court Opinion, 2/8/23, at 2-3 (footnote and record citations omitted).

On May 25, 2022, Rookstool’s trial counsel made an oral motion for 

severance of the charges of theft by unlawful taking and persons not to 

possess firearms, and the trial court denied the motion.

A jury convicted Rookstool of the above-listed offenses, and the trial 

court later imposed an aggregate standard range sentence of thirty to eightyfour months of imprisonment. Trial counsel filed post-sentence motions, 
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which the trial court denied after a hearing. Rookstool filed a timely notice 

of appeal and he and the trial court complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.

Rookstool raises the following issue for our review:

Whether the lower court acted properly in denying [Rookstool’s] 

request for severance of the two charges, theft by unlawful taking 

and possession of a firearm prohibited and allowed the 

Commonwealth to use one trial to convict [Rookstool] for the two 

separate charges[?]

Rookstool’s Brief at 7 (unnecessary capitalization removed).

Rookstool’s issue addresses the court’s denial of his severance motion

and the potential prejudice from a joint trial for multiple offenses.

A motion for severance is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial 

court and its decision will not be disturbed absent a manifest abuse of 

discretion. Commonwealth v. Melendez-Rodriguez, 856 A.2d 1278 1282 

(Pa. Super. 2004) (en banc). An abuse of discretion is not merely an error in 

judgment but occurs where a court overrides or misapplies the law, an 

exercise of judgement that is manifestly unreasonable, or the result of 

partiality, prejudice, bias or ill-will. See Commonwealth v. Faison, 297 

A.3d 810, 821 (Pa. Super. 2023).

Pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 563, two or more 

offenses may be joined in the same information if:

(1) the evidence of each of the offenses would be admissible in a 

separate trial for the other and is capable of separation by the jury 

so that there is no danger of confusion; or

(2) the offenses charged are based on the same act or transaction.
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Pa.R.Crim.P. 563(A).

A person commits theft by unlawful taking where he unlawfully takes 

movable property of another with the intent to deprive him thereof. See 18 

Pa.C.S.A. § 3921. A person commits persons not to possess firearms where, 

having committed a prior enumerated offense, he possesses, controls, or sells 

a firearm. See 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6105(a). 

To determine whether each of the offenses would be admissible at a trial 

for the other, this Court looks to Pa.R.E. 404(b). That rule precludes the 

admission of other crimes evidence to show that a person had a propensity to 

commit crime, see Pa.R.E. 404(b)(1), but permits the admission of other 

crimes for other proper purposes. See Commonwealth v. Lark, 543 A.2d 

491, 497 (Pa. 1988); Commonwealth v. Cascardo, 981 A.2d 245, 250 (Pa. 

Super. 2009). One proper purpose our Courts recognize for the admission of 

other crimes evidence is to explain the context or complete story of the events 

surrounding the subject at issue by demonstrating the chain of events that 

formed the history and natural development of the charge or charges being 

considered. See Lark, 543 A.2d at 497; Cascardo, 981 A.2d at 250 (also 

stating the importance that the events occur close in time and place to the 

other crime). 

Other crimes evidence is admissible only if its probative value exceeds 

its potential for prejudice, i.e., that jurors might convict the defendant 

because he has a bad character or a propensity to commit crimes. See 
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Commonwealth v. Dillon, 925 A.2d 131, 136-37 (Pa. 2007). Accordingly, 

this Court assesses whether the other crimes evidence is offered for a proper 

purpose, the evidence of each would be admissible in a separate trial for the 

other, the evidence is capable of separation by the jury so there is no danger 

of confusion, see Pa.R.Crim.P. 563(A)(1), and its probative value exceeds its 

potential for prejudice, see Dillon, 925 A.2d at 136. See also Pa.R.Crim.P. 

583 (stating that a court may sever an offense if it appears a party may be 

prejudiced by offenses being tried together); Commonwealth v. 

Shackleford, 275 93 A.3d 692, 701 (Pa. Super. 2023) (citation omitted) 

(stating the prejudice contemplated by Rule 583 is present “if the evidence 

tended to convict the appellant only by showing his propensity to commit 

crimes or because the jury was incapable of separating the evidence or could 

not avoid cumulating the evidence”). 

Rookstool asserts that the proof of his commission of the firearms 

charge did not require evidence of how he acquired the gun and evidence that 

he stole the gun could have caused the jury “to accumulate [sic] that evidence 

and find him guilty of the firearms offense as a result of that accumulation.” 

Rookstool’s Brief at 11-13.

The trial court found that the jury would have had no difficulty 

separating the evidence, and Rookstool “forged his own linkage of events and 

he deserve[d] to be tried jointly on them.” See Trial Court Opinion, 2/8/23, 

at 5, quoting Lark, 543 A.2d at 500.
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We hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying 

Rookstool’s severance motion. Rookstool’s theft of J.R.’s gun and his 

possession of that gun are so closely intertwined in time and place that they 

form the history of the case and the natural development of the facts. See

Lark, 543 A.2d at 497; Cascardo, 981 A.2d at 250. The offenses of theft 

and prohibited gun possession and the facts establishing Rookstool’s 

commission of those offenses are simple, and that simplicity defeats any 

reasonable concern the jury would have been incapable of separating the 

evidence or would have improperly cumulated the evidence as Rookstool 

asserts. On this record, there is no reasonable basis to conclude that the jury 

convicted Rookstool of the firearms offense solely because it heard evidence 

that he stole J.R.’s gun. Rookstool does not show prejudice requiring 

severance. No relief is merited. 

Judgment of sentence affirmed. 

Date: 1/5/2024