Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 46A04-1508-MI-1147 | May 20, 2016 Page 1 of 5

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this 

Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral 

estoppel, or the law of the case.

APPELLANT PRO SE

Olabisi Nard

Westville, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Gregory F. Zoeller

Attorney General of Indiana

Andrea E. Rahman

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

IN THE

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Olabisi Nard,

Appellant-Plaintiff,

v.

Mark Sevier,

Appellee-Defendant.

May 20, 2016

Court of Appeals Case No.

46A04-1508-MI-1147

Appeal from the LaPorte Circuit 

Court

The Honorable Thomas 

Alevizos, Judge

Trial Court Cause No.

46C01-1507-MI-1325

Riley, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 46A04-1508-MI-1147 | May 20, 2016 Page 2 of 5

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

[1] Appellant-Defendant, Olabisi Nard (Nard), appeals the trial court’s denial of his 

petition for a writ of habeas corpus.

[2] We affirm. 

ISSUE

[3] Nard raises a single issue on appeal, which we restate as: Whether the trial 

court improperly denied his habeas corpus petition.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

[4] On May 27, 2002, the State filed an Information, charging Nard with attempted 

murder. Nard was subsequently convicted and is currently serving a forty year 

sentence in Westville Correctional Facility, Indiana.

1

 In 2015, Nard filed a 

verified petition for writ of habeas corpus arguing that confinement was in 

violation of his rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment of the United 

States Constitution because he was charged by information rather than being 

indicted by a grand jury. On July 16, 2015, the trial court denied Nard’s habeas 

 

1

 See Indiana Department of Correction Offender Database, 

http://www.in.gov/apps/indcorrection/ofs/ofs?lname=Nard&fname=Olabisi&search1.x=23&search1.y=1

1 (last visited Apr. 5, 2015). 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 46A04-1508-MI-1147 | May 20, 2016 Page 3 of 5

corpus petition, holding that under Indiana Code section 35-34-1-1 the State 

may bring charges via indictment or information. 

[5] Nard now appeals. Additional facts will be provided as necessary. 

DISCUSSION AND DECISION

[6] Nard claims that the trial court erred in denying his petition for a writ of habeas 

corpus. Habeas corpus practice is a well-established but little-used remedy 

under Indiana law. Partlow v. Superintendent, Miami Corr. Facility, 756 N.E.2d 

978, 980 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001). Indiana Code section 34-25.5-1-1 provides that 

“[e]very person whose liberty is restrained, under any pretense whatever, may 

prosecute a writ of habeas corpus to inquire into the cause of the restraint, and 

shall be delivered from the restraint if the restraint is illegal.” The purpose of 

the writ of habeas corpus is to bring the person in custody before the court for 

inquiry into the cause of restraint. Partlow, 756 N.E.2d 980. One is entitled to 

habeas corpus only if one is entitled to immediate release from unlawful 

custody. Id. 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 46A04-1508-MI-1147 | May 20, 2016 Page 4 of 5

[7] On appeal, Nard argues that Indiana Code section 35-34-1-2(b)2 violates the 

Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Specifically, he argues 

that Indiana Code section 35-34-1-2(b) allows “prosecutors to discriminate 

against rich and poor citizens, wherein, the rich and political figures receive 

grand jury indictments [] yet, poor citizens receive no protections of the Fifth 

Amendments (sic).” (Appellant’s Br. p. 2). 

[8] We note that Indiana Code section 35-34-1-1 states: “[A]ll prosecutions of 

crimes shall be brought in the name of the state of Indiana. Any crime may be 

charged by indictment or information.” Indiana Code section 35-34-1-2 then 

provides, in detail, the contents, necessary requirements, and form of an 

indictment or information. Subsection (b) states that an indictment shall be 

signed by the foreman or five members of the grand jury, and the prosecuting 

attorney. In contrast, the same subsection provides that an information shall be 

signed by the prosecuting attorney or his deputy and sworn to or affirmed by 

him or any other person. 

 

2

 Throughout his appellate brief, Nard cites subsection (9)(b)(1)(2), but there is no subsection 9 in Indiana 

Code section 34-35-1-2. We assume that Nard is referring to subsection (b) under I.C. § 34-35-1-2, since that 

subsection was quoted in his appendix. 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 46A04-1508-MI-1147 | May 20, 2016 Page 5 of 5

[9] Nard maintains that prosecution by indictment protects an individual’s Fifth 

Amendment right since prosecution is done by a “neutral body,” a grand jury; 

whereas prosecution by information is done by “prosecutors [] who are not 

clearly [] neutral.” (Appellant’s Br. p. 5). 

[10] In Beverly v. State, 543 N.E.2d 1111, 1116 (Ind. 1989), our supreme court held 

that the federal constitutional provision requiring grand juries is not applicable 

to the states and the states may initiate criminal prosecutions by information. 

Therefore, the procedure by which Nard was charged has been deemed 

constitutional. The lack of review of charges by a grand jury does not show 

purposeful discrimination for purposes of establishing an equal protection 

claim. See Townsend v. State, 533 N.E.2d 1215, 1221-22 (Ind. 1989).

[11] In light of the above, the trial court correctly denied Nard’s habeas corpus 

petition since he was properly charged by information pursuant to Ind. Code § 

35-34-1-1. As such, Nard is not being held illegally. 

CONCLUSION 

[12] Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the trial court properly denied Nard’s 

habeas corpus petition.

[13] Affirmed.

[14] Najam, J. and May, J. concur