United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

WILTON R. STEPHENS, JR., CAROL M. 

STEPHENS,

Plaintiffs-Appellants

v.

UNITED STATES,

Defendant-Appellee

______________________ 

2016-2720

______________________ 

Appeal from the United States Court of Federal 

Claims in No. 1:15-cv-00153-TCW, Judge Thomas C. 

Wheeler. 

______________________ 

Decided: March 9, 2018

______________________ 

 CRAIG S. LAIR, Rose Law Firm, Little Rock, AR, argued for plaintiffs-appellants. Also represented by BYRON 

JANSEN WALKER. 

 ANTHONY T. SHEEHAN, Tax Division, United States 

Department of Justice, Washington, DC, argued for 

defendant-appellee. Also represented by DAVID A.

HUBBERT, JONATHAN S. COHEN. 

______________________ 

Before NEWMAN, WALLACH, and CHEN, Circuit Judges.
2 STEPHENS v. UNITED STATES

CHEN, Circuit Judge. 

Appellants Wilton R. Stephens, Jr., and Carol M. Stephens (collectively, the “Stephenses”) sued the United 

States (Government) in the U.S. Court of Federal Claims

(“Claims Court”), seeking a refund of federal income taxes 

and interest. The Government filed a motion to dismiss 

for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to Rule

12(b)(1) of the Rules of the Court of Federal Claims, 

arguing that the Stephenses failed to file a timely tax 

refund claim with the Internal Revenue Service (IRS). 

The Claims Court denied the Government’s motion to 

dismiss. See Stephens v. United States, 127 Fed. Cl. 660, 

660 (2016). The Government filed a motion for reconsideration, which the Claims Court also denied. App’x 3.1 

After the Government requested that the Claims Court

certify the case for interlocutory appeal, the Claims Court

sua sponte “t[ook] another look at the applicable case law 

and statutory provisions” and granted the Government’s 

motion to dismiss. Stephens, 127 Fed. Cl. at 660–61. We 

affirm.

BACKGROUND

The Stephenses filed joint federal income tax returns

for tax years 1995, 1996, and 1997. During these tax 

years, Mr. Stephens was a shareholder of SF Holding 

Corporation (“SF”), a subchapter S corporation.2 See 

generally I.R.C. §§ 1361 et seq. S corporations generally 

do not pay federal income taxes. See I.R.C. § 1363(a). 

Instead, they pass their tax items through to their shareholders, who report those items on individual tax returns. 

See I.R.C. § 1366. The Stephenses reported passthrough 

income arising out of investments in SF. At least some of 

 

1 “App’x” refers to the appendix filed by Appellants.

2 SF was formerly named “Stephens Group, Inc.” 

App’x 10.
STEPHENS v. UNITED STATES 3

this income was classified as “passive activity” income on 

the Stephenses’ tax returns.3 In addition, the Stephenses 

reported passive activity losses (which may be deducted 

from passive activity income) and passive activity credits 

(which may be claimed against taxes allocable to passive 

activities). See I.R.C. § 469(d).

The IRS audited SF’s returns and the Stephenses’ individual returns for 1995 and 1996. Those tax years were 

subject to the audit provisions of the Tax Equity and 

Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982 (TEFRA), Pub. L. No. 97-

248, 96 Stat. 324 (codified in scattered sections of Title 26 

of the U.S. Code). Under TEFRA, the IRS had to complete its audit of SF’s returns before it could apply any 

corporate-level adjustments to the passthrough items on 

the Stephenses’ individual returns and finalize its audit of 

the individual returns. Because of amendments to the 

Tax Code, the Stephenses’ 1997 return was not subject to 

TEFRA and was audited separately from the 1995 and 

1996 returns.

In April 2003, the IRS sent a notice proposing to disallow certain of the Stephenses’ passive activity loss deductions and passive activity credits for 1995 and 1996. As 

detailed in a subsequent notice of deficiency, the IRS 

concluded that Mr. Stephens had materially participated 

in some of SF’s activities. This material participation 

meant that income arising from such activities would be 

considered nonpassive rather than passive, as originally 

reported by the Stephenses. The passive activity deductions and credits could not be used to offset tax liability 

arising from nonpassive income. See I.R.C. § 469(d).

 

3 A “passive activity” is defined in the Tax Code as 

any activity that “involves the conduct of any trade or 

business” in which “the taxpayer does not materially 

participate.” I.R.C. § 469(c)(1).
4 STEPHENS v. UNITED STATES

On December 3, 2007, the corporate audit of SF concluded with a closing agreement that covered only corporate-level adjustments. Completion of the SF audit 

permitted the IRS to finalize its audit of the Stephenses’ 

1995 and 1996 returns. On March 24, 2008, the IRS 

again proposed the disallowance of the Stephenses’ 1995 

and 1996 passive activity loss deductions and credits in 

the same amounts proposed in April 2003. On January 

21, 2009, the IRS sent the Stephenses a notice of deficiency for 1995 and 1996, again in the same amounts proposed in April 2003 and March 2008. The Stephenses did 

not contest the notice of deficiency and paid the amount 

specified by the IRS on January 6, 2010. The limitations 

period for 1995 and 1996 expired two years later on 

January 6, 2012. The Stephenses never filed a formal 

refund claim for 1995 or 1996.

The Stephenses allege that they believed they could 

carry over their now-disallowed passive activity losses 

from 1995 and 1996 to 1997 to reduce their income taxes 

by an amount approximately equal to the increase in their 

1995 and 1996 taxes. On July 25, 2006, the Stephenses 

entered into an agreement with the IRS to extend the 

deadline for filing a refund claim for 1997 until June 30, 

2008. On October 8, 2009, over a year after the June 30, 

2008 deadline, the Stephenses mailed an amended tax 

return for 1997 to the IRS. The amended return sought to 

carry over the 1995 and 1996 passive activity losses to 

1997.

In November 2011, the Stephenses sent a letter regarding their amended return for 1997 in which they 

invoked the mitigation provisions of the Tax Code. See 

I.R.C. §§ 1311–1314 (mitigation provisions). These provisions, in specified circumstances, “permit a taxpayer who 

has been required to pay inconsistent taxes to seek a 

refund of a tax the recovery of which is otherwise barred 

by [I.R.C.] §§ 7422(a) and 6511(a).” United States v. 

Dalm, 494 U.S. 596, 610 (1990). I.R.C. § 7422(a) states
STEPHENS v. UNITED STATES 5

that no suit for the recovery of any tax alleged to have 

been erroneously collected may be brought until a “claim 

for refund or credit has been duly filed” with the IRS. 

I.R.C. § 6511(a) specifies the limitations period for filing a 

refund claim.4 There is no dispute that the limitations 

period in which the Stephenses could have filed a timely 

refund claim for 1997 had long expired, on June 30, 2008. 

See Open. Br. 14 (“The period for filing a claim for refund 

for 1997 expired on June 30, 2008.”).

On March 15, 2012, the IRS sent a notice proposing to 

disallow the Stephenses’ refund claim for 1997 because it 

was untimely and because the mitigation provisions did 

not save the claim. On April 12, 2012, the Stephenses

filed an administrative appeal of the proposed disallowance, in which they invoked, inter alia, equitable recoupment in addition to mitigation in an effort to save their 

untimely refund claim. “Equitable recoupment is a judicially created doctrine . . . used as a defense allowing 

redress against a timely claim that results in the double 

inclusion or double exclusion of items, when the correction 

 

4 Section 6511(a) states:

Claim for credit or refund of an overpayment of 

any tax imposed by this title in respect of which 

tax the taxpayer is required to file a return shall 

be filed by the taxpayer within 3 years from the 

time the return was filed or 2 years from the time 

the tax was paid, whichever of such periods 

expires the later, or if no return was filed by the 

taxpayer, within 2 years from the time the tax 

was paid. Claim for credit or refund of an 

overpayment of any tax imposed by this title 

which is required to be paid by means of a stamp 

shall be filed by the taxpayer within 3 years from 

the time the tax was paid.
6 STEPHENS v. UNITED STATES

of such items would be barred by the statute of limitations.” 2 Mertens Law of Fed. Income Taxation § 14:3

(2018) (hereinafter, “Mertens”) (citing Bull v. United 

States, 295 U.S. 247 (1935)). The IRS rejected the Stephenses’ administrative appeal because their refund 

claim was untimely and neither mitigation nor equitable 

recoupment applied.

The Stephenses filed suit in the Claims Court. In 

their complaint, the Stephenses contended that the

amended 1997 return that they filed in October 2009 

(which would have been an untimely filing for that year) 

was actually an informal refund claim for tax years 1995 

and 1996. It is undisputed that the limitations period for 

filing a refund claim for 1995 or 1996 did not expire until 

after the Stephenses filed their amended 1997 return in 

October 2009. The Stephenses asserted two grounds for 

relief set out in separate counts in the complaint: 

(1) statutory mitigation and (2) equitable recoupment.

The Government moved to dismiss for lack of subject 

matter jurisdiction, arguing, inter alia, that the Stephenses had not filed a timely refund claim for 1997 and 

had not filed any refund claim for 1995 or 1996 (refuting 

the Stephenses’ claim that their amended 1997 return 

qualified as an informal claim for the earlier two years). 

The Claims Court initially denied the Government’s 

motion, treating the timely filing of a refund claim as 

merely “an element of the [Stephenses’] cause of action” 

rather than a jurisdictional prerequisite. The Government filed a motion for reconsideration, which the Claims 

Court initially denied. The Government moved to certify 

the case for interlocutory appeal. On August 2, 2016, the 

Claims Court sua sponte reconsidered its prior rulings 

and granted the Government’s motion to dismiss, concluding that a timely refund claim was indeed a “prerequisite 

for a refund suit.” Stephens, 127 Fed. Cl. at 661 (citing 

United States v. Clintwood Elkhorn Min. Co., 553 U.S. 1, 

5 (2008)).
STEPHENS v. UNITED STATES 7

The Stephenses appeal.

We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1295(a)(3). 

STANDARDS OF REVIEW

We review the Claims Court’s legal conclusion that it 

lacked subject matter jurisdiction de novo. See Coast 

Prof’l, Inc. v. United States, 828 F.3d 1349, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 

2016). “In deciding a motion to dismiss for lack of subject 

matter jurisdiction, the court accepts as true all uncontroverted factual allegations in the complaint, and construes 

them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Estes 

Exp. Lines v. United States, 739 F.3d 689, 692 (Fed. Cir. 

2014). When, as here, a motion challenges the truth of 

jurisdictional facts, “[w]e review determinations of the 

Court of Federal Claims regarding jurisdictional facts for 

clear error.” Ferreiro v. United States, 350 F.3d 1318, 

1324 (Fed. Cir. 2003).

DISCUSSION

“The party seeking to invoke [the Claims Court]’s jurisdiction must establish that jurisdiction exists by a 

preponderance of the evidence.” Hymas v. United States, 

810 F.3d 1312, 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (citation omitted). 

The United States may only be sued if it expressly consents to suit by waiving sovereign immunity. Dalm, 494 

U.S. at 608; see also Starr Int’l Co., Inc. v. United States, 

856 F.3d 953, 976 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (citations omitted). 

The Tucker Act waives sovereign immunity for lawsuits 

seeking tax refunds, but only when the jurisdictional 

requirements in the Tax Code for bringing such suits are 

met. Clintwood Elkhorn Mining, 553 U.S. at 4–5, 8–9. 

One of these requirements is specified in I.R.C. § 7422(a):

No suit or proceeding shall be maintained in any 

court for the recovery of any internal revenue tax 

alleged to have been erroneously or illegally 

assessed or collected . . . until a claim for refund 
8 STEPHENS v. UNITED STATES

or credit has been duly filed with the Secretary, 

according to the provisions of law in that regard, 

and the regulations of the Secretary established in 

pursuance thereof.

See Clintwood Elkhorn Mining, 553 U.S. at 4–5. By 

regulation, taxpayers are required to “set forth in detail 

each ground upon which a credit or refund is claimed and 

facts sufficient to apprise the Commissioner of the exact 

basis thereof.” Treas. Reg. § 301.6402-2(b)(1) (2016). This 

requirement “is designed both to prevent surprise and to 

give adequate notice to the [IRS] of the nature of the 

claim and the specific facts upon which it is predicated, 

thereby permitting an administrative investigation and 

determination.” Computervision Corp. v. United States, 

445 F.3d 1355, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (internal quotation 

marks omitted).

The only potential refund claim identified by the Stephenses is their October 2009 filing of an amended return 

for 1997. See Oral Arg. at 0:30–1:32, 

http://oralarguments.cafc.uscourts.gov/default.aspx?fl=20

16-2720.mp3. The Stephenses argue that their amended 

1997 return should be understood as a timely informal 

refund claim for tax years 1995 and 1996. Id. The Government counters that the amended 1997 return was not

an informal refund claim because it did not adequately 

apprise the IRS that the Stephenses sought a refund for 

1995 or 1996. We agree with the Government.

The Stephenses did not challenge the amount of their 

1995 and 1996 taxes in their October 2009 filing with the 

IRS. To the contrary, the Stephenses stated that the 

“agreed upon adjustments” for 1995 and 1996 “created” 

the carryovers that they sought to apply to their 1997

taxes. App’x 19 (emphasis added). In Computervision, we 

explained that an informal refund claim must adequately 

apprise the IRS of the particular year or years for which a 

refund is sought. 445 F.3d at 1365. Nowhere in the 
STEPHENS v. UNITED STATES 9

Stephenses’ amended 1997 return or the cover letter 

accompanying it did the Stephenses adequately apprise 

the IRS that they were seeking a refund for 1995 or 1996. 

Because the Stephenses’ October 2009 filing was not an 

informal refund claim for 1995 or 1996, and because this 

was the only basis on which the Stephenses argued that 

they filed a timely refund claim under § 7422(a), the 

Stephenses’ suit is barred by the statute of limitations. 

However, the Stephenses argue that, even if their suit 

is legally barred by §§ 6511(a) and 7422(a), their mitigation and equitable recoupment claims remain viable in 

view of the “equitable purpose” of mitigation and the need 

to apply principles of equity to “avoid a windfall to the 

Government.” See Reply Br. 10–13. For the reasons 

discussed, infra, we disagree.

I. Mitigation

In general, mitigation allows a taxpayer or the IRS to 

“correct errors otherwise barred by the statute of limitations” when all requirements in the mitigation provisions

are met. Mertens § 14:7; see TLI, Inc. v. United States, 

100 F.3d 424, 427 (5th Cir. 1996) (“[I]n narrowly defined 

circumstances, the strictures established by the statutes 

of repose are loosened by the Tax Code’s mitigation provisions.”). “The primary purpose of the mitigation provisions is to prevent the inconsistent treatment of items 

that result in a windfall to either the taxpayer or the 

Service.” Mertens § 14:7 (citing Costello v. Comm’r of 

Internal Revenue, 111 T.C.M. (CCH) 1148 (2016)). However, “Congress did not intend by [the mitigation provisions] to provide relief for inequities in all situations in 

which just claims are precluded by statutes of limitations.” Olin Mathieson Chem. Corp. v. United States, 265 

F.2d 293, 296 (7th Cir. 1959). To obtain relief under the 

mitigation provisions, taxpayers “must demonstrate that 

[they] meet[] the specific requirements” of the provisions. 

Id.
10 STEPHENS v. UNITED STATES

The Fourth Circuit summarized the requirements

that must be met for the mitigation provisions to apply:

Mitigation is permitted when three elements are 

present: [(1)] there must be “a determination” of 

tax liability as defined in [I.R.C.] § 1313(a)(1)–(4); 

[(2)] the determination must fall within one of the 

circumstances of adjustment described in [I.R.C.] 

§ 1312(1)–(7); and [(3)] depending on which 

circumstance of adjustment is found, either an 

inconsistent position must be maintained by the

party against whom mitigation will operate, 

[I.R.C.] § 1311(b)(1), or the correction of the error 

must not have been barred at the time the party 

for whom mitigation will operate first maintained 

its position, [I.R.C.] § 1311(b)(2).

Longiotti v. United States, 819 F.2d 65, 68 (4th Cir. 

1987).5 

Regarding the first element, I.R.C. § 1313(a) defines 

only four types of “determination[s]” of tax liability that 

may trigger application of the mitigation provisions: (1) a 

final decision by a court of competent jurisdiction; (2) a 

closing agreement under I.R.C. § 7121; (3) a final administrative ruling on a refund claim (unless suit is timely 

instituted on the claim); and (4) a mitigation agreement 

 

5 The Fourth Circuit’s three-part framework is consistent with our prior analysis of the mitigation provisions, see, e.g., Evans Tr. v. United States, 199 Ct. Cl. 98, 

101–05 (1972), and with Fifth and Seventh Circuit case 

law discussing the mitigation provisions, see TLI, 100 

F.3d at 427–29; Fruit of the Loom, Inc. v. Comm’r, 72 F.3d 

1338, 1341–42 (7th Cir. 1996). Moreover, both parties 

present their arguments under Longiotti’s three-element 

framework. We agree that this framework accurately 

summarizes the requirements in §§ 1311–1314.
STEPHENS v. UNITED STATES 11

between the IRS and the taxpayers. The Stephenses 

allege two determinations that fall under § 1313. First, 

the Stephenses argue that the closing agreement entered 

into between SF and the IRS at the conclusion of the 

IRS’s audit of SF was a determination under § 1313(a)(2). 

Second, the Stephenses assert that the IRS’s March 15, 

2012 letter denying the Stephenses’ claim related to the 

amended 1997 return was a determination under 

§ 1313(a)(3). The Government argues that neither of 

these qualifies as a determination under the statutes. 

We agree with the Government.

As noted by the Government, there has been no closing agreement for the Stephenses’ individual income 

taxes, which are the subject of the instant lawsuit. See 

Resp. Br. 46. The closing agreement between SF and the 

IRS explicitly stated that the agreement did not determine whether business activity of SF was or was not 

passive activity under I.R.C. § 469 for purposes of any 

shareholder’s individual taxes. S. App’x 52 ¶ 5.6 The SF 

closing agreement therefore does not qualify as a “closing 

agreement” for the Stephenses’ taxes under § 1313(a)(2).

The IRS’s March 15, 2012 letter denying the Stephenses’ claim related to their amended 1997 return is 

likewise not a “final determination” because such a determination could only come at the end of the instant 

litigation, which was initiated to challenge the IRS’s 

decision. Section 1313(a)(3)(B) excepts from its coverage 

any claim for refund that was denied where “suit is instituted” on that claim, and the claim could only become a 

determination under § 1313(a)(1) at the conclusion of the 

instant litigation. See Treas. Reg. § 1.1313(a)-1 (“A determination may take the form of a decision by the Tax 

Court of the United States or a judgment, decree, or other 

 

6 “S. App’x” refers to the appendix filed by the Government. 
12 STEPHENS v. UNITED STATES

order by any court of competent jurisdiction, which has 

become final.” (emphasis added)). The Stephenses’ mitigation claim fails because they have not identified any

determination of tax liability that falls under § 1313(a). 

Additionally, the mitigation claim fails because the 

Stephenses have not shown applicability of any of the 

seven “circumstances of adjustment described in [I.R.C.] 

§ 1312(1)–(7)” under Longiotti’s second requirement. 819 

F.2d at 68. The Stephenses contend that circumstance

four (codified as § 1312(4)) applies in this case, because 

the complaint alleges that “passive loss deductions were 

denied for tax years 1995 and 1996, and the carryforward 

of these losses were again denied for 1997.” Open. Br. 17. 

Section 1312(4) authorizes an adjustment where “[t]he 

determination disallows a deduction or credit which 

should have been allowed to, but was not allowed to, the 

taxpayer for another taxable year.” I.R.C. § 1312(4). 

However, § 1312(4) is subject to an important exception 

set out in § 1311(b)(2)(B):

In the case of a determination described in 

[§] 1312(4) (relating to disallowance of certain 

deductions and credits), adjustment shall be made 

under this part only if credit or refund of the 

overpayment attributable to the deduction or 

credit . . . was not barred, by any law or rule of 

law, at the time the taxpayer first maintained 

before the Secretary or before the Tax Court, in 

writing, that he was entitled to such deduction or 

credit for the taxable year to which the 

determination relates.

Section 1311(b)(2)(B) excludes the Stephenses’ refund 

claim from coverage by the mitigation provisions, regardless of whether their claim is for 1997 or for 1995 and 

1996. First, as explained, supra, the Stephenses’ amended 1997 return was untimely filed—and, therefore, barred 

by the statute of limitations—for tax year 1997. Second, 
STEPHENS v. UNITED STATES 13

the Stephenses’ argument that their amended 1997 

return was an informal claim for 1995 and 1996—

presented for the first time in their complaint filed in 

2015—was untimely “maintained” under § 1311(b)(2)(B). 

The IRS defined what it means to “maintain” a claim for a 

deduction or credit under this subsection of the statute in

Treas. Reg. § 1.1311(b)-2(b): 

The taxpayer will be considered to have first 

maintained in writing before the Commissioner or 

the Tax Court that he was entitled to such 

deduction or credit when he first formally asserts 

his right to such deduction or credit as, for 

example, in a return, in a claim for refund, or in a 

petition (or an amended petition) before the Tax 

Court.

The Stephenses first claimed a refund under their current 

theory—that their 1997 amended return was an informal 

claim for 1995 and 1996—when they filed their complaint 

in this suit in 2015, well after the limitations period for 

1995 and 1996 expired in 2012. Even assuming that the 

Stephenses’ complaint qualifies as a valid way to “maintain” entitlement to deductions or credits under this rule, 

an issue we need not decide, the Stephenses’ complaint 

was filed more than three years after they were first 

“barred” from asserting any claim for refund for 1995 or 

1996 under the statute of limitations. Prior to filing their 

complaint in 2015, the Stephenses never challenged the 

changes to their 1995 or 1996 tax liability imposed by the 

IRS. Therefore, the Stephenses’ mitigation claim fails for 

the additional reason that § 1312(4) does not apply as a 

circumstance of adjustment under Longiotti’s second 

requirement. 

II. Equitable Recoupment

Finally, the Stephenses argue that they have pleaded 

sufficient facts to support a claim for equitable recoupment. Under the doctrine of equitable recoupment, “a 
14 STEPHENS v. UNITED STATES

party litigating a tax claim in a timely proceeding may, in 

that proceeding, seek recoupment of a related, and inconsistent, but now time-barred tax claim relating to the 

same transaction.” Dalm, 494 U.S. at 608. In Dalm, the 

Supreme Court stated that, “[t]o date, we have not allowed equitable recoupment to be the sole basis for jurisdiction.” Id. Instead, the Supreme Court explained that 

the doctrine has been applied only where “there was no 

question but that the courts in which the refund actions 

were brought had jurisdiction.” Id. Taxpayers may assert 

equitable recoupment only “in a timely proceeding.” As 

already discussed, supra, the Stephenses’ claims are

untimely.

To allow the Stephenses’ equitable recoupment to 

survive the Government’s motion to dismiss would be to 

overlook the Supreme Court’s instruction that the Government “is immune from suit, save as it consents to be 

sued” and that “the terms of its consent to be sued in any 

court define that court’s jurisdiction to entertain the suit.” 

Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). “A statute of 

limitations requiring that a suit against the Government 

be brought within a certain time period is one of those 

terms.” Id. When a plaintiff’s refund claim is barred by 

the statute of limitations and does not qualify under the 

mitigation provisions, allowing the plaintiff to “maintain 

a suit for refund on the basis of equitable recoupment . . . would be doing little more than overriding 

Congress’ judgment as to when equity requires that there 

be an exception to the limitations bar.” Id. at 610. In 

view of Dalm and the principle that “waivers of sovereign 

immunity by Congress ‘cannot be implied but must be 

unequivocally expressed,’” the Stephenses’ equitable

recoupment claim cannot serve as an independent basis 

for jurisdiction in this case. Id. at 608 (quoting United 

States v. King, 395 U.S. 1, 4 (1969)).
STEPHENS v. UNITED STATES 15

CONCLUSION

We have considered the Stephenses’ remaining arguments and find them unpersuasive.7 Accordingly, the 

Claims Court’s order granting the Government’s motion 

to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction is

AFFIRMED

 

7 At oral argument, counsel for the Stephenses argued that they had “no notice that they were impacted” by 

the 1995 and 1996 adjustments resulting from the SF 

audit until January 2009. Oral Arg. at 28:03–28:11. As 

noted, supra, the IRS proposed disallowances in April 

2003 and again in March 2008 in the exact amounts that 

were eventually assessed and paid by the Stephenses. 

The Stephenses were given enough notice to file a timely 

general refund claim for 1997 before the limitations 

period expired in June 2008. See generally Computervision, 445 F.3d at 1368–69 (describing general refund 

claim doctrine). The Stephenses could have later perfected the general refund claim once the IRS sent an official

notice of deficiency specifying the precise amount owed. 

The Stephenses did none of the above.