IV

106TH CONGRESS

1ST SESSION H. CON. RES. 97

Urging the prohibition on military assistance and arms transfers to the

Government of Indonesia until the President certifies that the Government of Indonesia is no longer arming, financing, or supporting paramilitary units in East Timor and has taken certain other actions relating

to East Timor, and for other purposes.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

MAY 5, 1999

Mr. KENNEDY of Rhode Island (for himself, Mrs. LOWEY, Mr. LANTOS, Ms.

MCKINNEY, Mr. EVANS, and Mr. HALL of Ohio) submitted the following

concurrent resolution; which was referred to the Committee on International Relations

CONCURRENT RESOLUTION

Urging the prohibition on military assistance and arms transfers to the Government of Indonesia until the President

certifies that the Government of Indonesia is no longer

arming, financing, or supporting paramilitary units in

East Timor and has taken certain other actions relating

to East Timor, and for other purposes.

1 Resolved by the House of Representatives (the Senate

2 concurring),

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

4 This concurrent resolution may be cited as the ‘‘East

5 Timor Paramilitary Accountability Resolution’’.
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1 SEC. 2. FINDINGS.

2 The Congress finds the following:

3 (1)(A) Paramilitary violence in East Timor has

4 escalated significantly beginning in November 1998.

5 (B) Since then, some 10,000 civilians have fled

6 from the countryside to seek refuge in churches,

7 schools and private homes.

8 (C) Incidents of rape, beatings, torture and dis9 appearance have been reported frequently.

10 (2) Indonesia invaded East Timor on December

11 7, 1975, and has illegally occupied that nation for

12 more than 23 years.

13 (3) The Indonesian occupation has claimed the

14 lives of over 200,000 East Timorese—fully a third

15 of the population—in massacres, by torture, and

16 through forced starvation.

17 (4) The Indonesian military (ABRI) and elite

18 units like the Kopassus special forces have carried

19 out a systematic reign of terror in East Timor, num20 bering over 21,000 troops according to ABRI docu21 ments from September 1998.

22 (5) East Timorese Bishop Carlos Ximenes Belo

23 and diplomat Jose Ramos-Horta were jointly award24 ed the Nobel Peace Prize in 1996 for their acts of

25 courage on behalf of their people.
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1 (6)(A) On May 21, 1998, 33 years after he

2 seized power in a bloody coup, Indonesian dictator

3 Suharto was forced to resign in the wake of mass

4 pro-democracy protests and a severe economic crisis.

5 (B) His handpicked successor, B.J. Habibie, as6 sumed the presidency.

7 (7) In June 1998, Indonesian President

8 Habibie, in a striking change of policy, introduced a

9 plan for autonomy for East Timor, but excluded

10 East Timorese control over the military, foreign pol11 icy and currency, and a referendum on self-deter12 mination.

13 (8)(A) In July 1998, the United States Senate

14 unanimously adopted a resolution supporting East

15 Timor’s right to a referendum on self-determination.

16 (B) In October 1998, the United States Con17 gress went on record as supporting self-determina18 tion for East Timor in a provision included in the

19 Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency Supplemental

20 Appropriations Act, 1999.

21 (9) On January 27, 1999, Indonesian President

22 Habibie offered that Indonesia would consider Indo23 nesian withdrawal from East Timor as a ‘‘second

24 option’’ for East Timor if the majority of its people

25 were to reject his autonomy plan.
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1 (10) In February 1999, jailed East Timorese

2 resistance leader Xanana Gusmao was moved from

3 prison to house arrest.

4 (11)(A) Also in February 1999, Secretary of

5 State Madeleine Albright met with Gusmao, as well

6 as Indonesian officials, during a visit to Jakarta.

7 (B) Afterward she praised Gusmao’s character,

8 and expressed United States support for several of

9 the steps necessary for a peaceful transition in East

10 Timor including an international monitoring pres11 ence and the disarming of Indonesian-backed para12 military units as soon as possible.

13 (12)(A) The United Nations, under Secretary

14 General Kofi Annan, has sponsored a series of talks

15 between Portugal and Indonesia on East Timor’s po16 litical status.

17 (B) In February 1999 these talks yielded a ten18 tative agreement to hold a United Nations-sponsored

19 ballot in East Timor to determine East Timor’s re20 jection or acceptance of an Indonesian autonomy

21 plan.

22 (13)(A) On April 6, 1999, over 25 internally

23 displaced persons were attacked and killed by ma24 chete-wielding members of the paramilitary unit Besi
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1 Merah Putih, while members of the Indonesian mili2 tary (ABRI) assisted.

3 (B) The number injured is still unknown, but

4 the Indonesian Government has apparently ob5 structed attempts to deliver international humani6 tarian assistance.

7 (14) The United States Congress has placed

8 high hopes in the beginnings of a democratic process

9 in Indonesia, especially the June 7, 1998, elections,

10 and has issued support and funding to assist in that

11 process.

12 (15) If parliamentary elections, widely perceived

13 as completely illegitimate in East Timor, are allowed

14 to proceed in the occupied territory, and if para15 military units are not disbanded, violence in East

16 Timor is likely to further destabilize the overall envi17 ronment in Indonesia and diminish the likelihood of

18 genuine democratic reform.

19 (16) Despite the April 21, 1999, signing of an

20 agreement on a ceasefire by East Timorese resist21 ance representatives, paramilitary leaders, and the

22 Indonesian military (ABRI) commander in East

23 Timor, paramilitary violence has not lessened.
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1 (17) Another brutal attack was waged against

2 civilians in the area of Suai on April 22, 1999, and

3 more than 8 individuals were killed.

4 (18) On April 23, 1999, United Nations talks

5 yielded a tentative agreement that is expected to be

6 signed on May 5, 1999, in New York.

7 (19) Any such agreement must be followed with

8 a free and fair vote, United Nations and other inter9 national monitors, and the disarming and disbanding

10 of the paramilitary units.

11 SEC. 3. DECLARATION OF POLICY.

12 The Congress declares that the United States will no

13 longer accept, condone, finance, or supply the Indonesian

14 military occupiers, nor their proxies, the paramilitary civil15 ian militia units, in East Timor.

16 SEC. 4. SENSE OF THE CONGRESS RELATING TO VIOLA17 TIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN EAST TIMOR.

18 It is the sense of the Congress that the Secretary of

19 State and the Secretary of Defense should take an active

20 and visible role in urging the Government of Indonesia and

21 the Indonesian military—

22 (1) to permit an international investigation of

23 the massacre at Liquica; and
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1 (2) to bring to justice those individuals respon2 sible for gross violations of internationally recog3 nized human rights in East Timor.

4 SEC. 5. SENSE OF THE CONGRESS RELATING TO PROHIBI5 TION ON UNITED STATES MILITARY ASSIST6 ANCE AND ARMS TRANSFERS TO THE GOV7 ERNMENT OF INDONESIA.

8 (a) PROHIBITION.—It is the sense of the Congress

9 that United States military assistance and arms transfers

10 should not be provided to the Government of Indonesia

11 unless the President certifies to the Congress that the

12 Government of Indonesia—

13 (1) is no longer arming, financing, or sup14 porting paramilitary units in East Timor, and ceases

15 its own military attacks on civilians, separate from

16 and together with these paramilitary units;

17 (2) has assisted in the successful disarming and

18 disbanding of the paramilitary units in East Timor;

19 (3) allows free and open access to East Timor

20 to a continuing United Nations presence, inter21 national human rights and relief and development

22 organizations, and the press; and

23 (4) has reduced substantially the Indonesian

24 military (ABRI) troop presence in East Timor, as
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1 the beginning of a United Nations-monitored with2 drawal;

3 (b) UNITED STATES MILITARY ASSISTANCE AND

4 ARMS TRANSFERS.—In this section, the term ‘‘United

5 States military assistance and arms transfers’’ means—

6 (1) assistance under chapter 2 of part II of the

7 Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (relating to military

8 assistance), including the transfer of excess defense

9 articles under section 516 of that Act;

10 (2) assistance under chapter 5 of part II of the

11 Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (relating to inter12 national military education and training or

13 ‘‘IMET’’), including military education and training

14 for civilian personnel under section 541 of such Act

15 (commonly referred to as ‘‘Expanded IMET’’); or

16 (3) assistance under the ‘‘Foreign Military Fi17 nancing’’ Program under section 23 of the Arms Ex18 port Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2763) and the transfer

19 of defense articles, defense services, design and con20 struction services, or any other defense-related train21 ing under that Act (22 U.S.C. 2751 et seq.).

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