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U.S. STRATEGY TOWARD PAKISTAN 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

MAY 12, 2009 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations 

( 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.access.gpo.gov/congress/senate 

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts, Chairman

CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut 

RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin 

BARBARA BOXER, California 

ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey 

BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland 

ROBERT P. CASEY, JR., Pennsylvania 

JIM WEBB, Virginia 

JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire 

EDWARD E. KAUFMAN, Delaware 

KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York 

RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana 

Republican Leader designee 

BOB CORKER, Tennessee 

JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia 

JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho 

JIM DEMINT, South Carolina 

JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming 

ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi 

DAVID MCKean, Staff Director

KENNETH A. MYERS, JR., Republican Staff Director

(II)

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

Holbrooke, Hon. Richard, Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan, Department of State, Washington, DC ..................................................... 6 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 8 

Responses to questions submitted for the record by: 

Senator John F. Kerry .............................................................................. 35 

Senator Richard G. Lugar ........................................................................ 41 

Senator Robert P. Casey, Jr. .................................................................... 49 

Senator Jim DeMint .................................................................................. 51 

Kerry, Hon. John F., U.S. Senator from Massachusetts, opening statement ..... 1 

Lugar, Hon. Richard G., U.S. Senator from Indiana, opening statement ........... 4 

(III)

(1) 

U.S. STRATEGY TOWARD PAKISTAN 

TUESDAY, MAY 12, 2009 

U.S. SENATE, COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, Washington, DC. 

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:20 a.m., in room 

SD–419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. John F. Kerry 

(chairman of the committee) presiding. 

Present: Senators Kerry, Dodd, Feingold, Menendez, Casey, 

Webb, Shaheen, Kaufman, Gillibrand, Lugar, Corker, Isakson, 

Risch, DeMint, and Wicker. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN F. KERRY, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM MASSACHUSETTS 

The CHAIRMAN. Good morning. This hearing will come to order. 

We were going to have the business meeting as rapidly as possible at the beginning, but until we have requisite 10 Senators, we 

are not able to do that. So, what we’ll do is start the hearing component, and as soon as we have 10 Senators here, we’ll do the business-meeting component and then move on. 

And, Ambassador Holbrooke, thank you for your willingness to 

indulge us and allow us to do that. 

With its nuclear arsenal, its terrorist safe havens, Taliban sanctuaries, and a growing insurgency, Pakistan has emerged as one of 

the most difficult foreign policy challenges that we face. We’re fortunate to have with us today to share his views one of America’s 

most accomplished diplomats, Ambassador Richard Holbrooke, who 

will share with us the results of the now-two trilateral meetings 

that have taken place, as well as his own travels to the region and 

efforts to revitalize America policy in the region. 

Last Thursday, this committee hosted Pakistani President Asif 

Zardari along with Afghan President Karzai for a working lunch. 

And the trilateral meetings that were held in Washington last 

week I think provided the basis of increased cooperation of some 

progress. 

For most of the past 8 years, just getting Pakistani and Afghan 

officials in the same room required, frankly, a herculean effort. 

Committee members during this luncheon asked some very tough 

questions. It was a very frank exchange; I must say, a unique 

exchange, in my experience at luncheons with two Presidents of 

countries with different interests, and they were both very gracious 

in taking those questions and in providing the committee and the 

guests who were there an important opportunity to be able to 

2 

really examine American policy and to hear the leaders of those 

countries express their views. 

We’re not looking for perfection, but we do have a need to make 

progress and to redefine some aspects of the policy, and we need 

to work together—Congress, the administration, the Pakistanis, 

the Afghans. And the stakes are really much too high for anything 

less than our maximum cooperative effort. 

Pakistan today, frankly, has the potential either to be crippled 

by the Taliban or to serve as a bulwark against everything that the 

Taliban represents. For many of us in Congress and the administration, recent events have only reaffirmed our belief that we need 

a bold new strategy. The Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act, 

which I’ve introduced with Senator Lugar, is the centerpiece of a 

new approach designed to redefine, not only America’s policy 

toward Pakistan, but also our relations with the Pakistani people. 

I’m pleased that the President has asked Congress to pass it. 

Ultimately, it will be the Pakistani people, not Americans, who 

will determine their nation’s future. The good news is that, for all 

of its current troubles, Pakistan remains a nation whose 170 million citizens are overwhelmingly moderate, whose own soldiers and 

police have died fighting terrorism and insurgency, a country that 

has committed itself to a very difficult democratic transition, even 

at a moment of enormous strain. 

I look forward to hearing Ambassador Holbrooke’s thoughts on 

how we can empower those Pakistanis fighting to steer the world’s 

second largest Muslim country on to a path of moderation, stability, and regional cooperation. 

Since President Obama called on Congress to pass a Pakistan aid 

bill, the dangers of inaction have risen almost by the day. The government has struck an ill-advised deal that effectively surrendered 

the Swat Valley to the Taliban. Predictably, this emboldened the 

Taliban to extend their reach ever closer to the country’s heartland. 

In recent days, we’ve seen encouraging signs that Pakistan’s Army 

is finally taking the fight to the enemy, but much remains to be 

done. 

Even as we help Pakistan’s Government to respond to an acute 

crisis, we also need to mend a broken relationship with the Pakistani people. For decades, America sought Pakistani cooperation 

through military aid, while paying scant attention to the wishes 

and needs of the population itself. This arrangement is rapidly disintegrating. Today, an alarming number of Pakistanis actually 

view America as a greater threat than al-Qaeda. 

Until this changes, there is, frankly, little chance of ending tolerance for terrorist groups or for persuading any Pakistani Government to devote the political capital necessary to deny such groups 

sanctuary and covert material support. 

I’ve seen, firsthand, how American aid can, in fact, have a transformative effect. After the 2005 Kashmir earthquake, America 

spent nearly $1 billion on relief efforts. I can personally attest that 

the sight of American service men and women saving the lives of 

Pakistani citizens in places like Mansehra and Muzaffarabad was 

invaluable in changing perceptions of America. Now we have to 

recreate this success on a broader scale. 

3 

The Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act is an important 

first step. On the economic side, it triples nonmilitary aid to $1.5 

billion annually for 5 years and urges an additional 5 years of 

funding. These funds will build schools, roads, clinics; in other 

words, undertake those kinds of projects on a regular basis to 

achieve the kind of connection with the Pakistani people that we 

did in the course of the earthquake relief. 

Of course our aid to Pakistan aims to achieve more than just 

good deeds. It will empower the civilian government to show that 

it can deliver its citizens a better life, but at the center of any 

strategy—and I’m sure Ambassador Holbrooke will underscore 

this—at the center of any strategy is the effort by the Government 

of Pakistan itself to build its own relationship with its own people. 

To do this right, we believe that we have to make a long-term 

commitment. Most Pakistani’s feel that America has used and 

abandoned their country in the past; most notably, after the jihad 

against the Soviets in Afghanistan. It is this history and this fear 

that causes Pakistan and many Pakistanis to hedge their bets. If 

we ever expect Pakistan to break decisively with the Taliban and 

other extremist groups, then they need to know that we’re not 

merely momentary friends. 

On the security side—and they also need to know, I might add, 

unlike the last 8 years, that we are not principally focused on a 

relationship with the leader of the country, as opposed to the people of the country—on the security side, the bill places reasonable 

conditions on military aid. It asks the administration to certify that 

Pakistan’s Army and spy services have been partners in the struggle against al-Qaeda, the Taliban, and their affiliates, and also 

partners in the effort to solidify democratic governance and the 

rules of law in Pakistan. 

As important as the economic and military components of our aid 

to Pakistan are, it is also important how they fit together. An 

unequivocal commitment to the Pakistan people will enable us to 

calibrate our military assistance more effectively. For too long, the 

Pakistani military has felt that we were simply bluffing when we 

threatened to cut funding for a particular weapon system or an 

expensive piece of hardware. And up to now, they have been right. 

But, if our economic aid is significantly larger—i.e., tripled, as Senator Lugar and I have proposed—we will finally be able to make 

these choices on the basis of both our national interests rather 

than the institutional interests of the Pakistani security forces. 

Even as we take bold steps, we should realize that our aid package to Pakistan is not a silver bullet. This bill aims to increase our 

leverage significantly, but we need to be realistic about what we 

can accomplish. Americans can influence events in Pakistan, but 

we cannot, and should not, decide them. Ultimately, the true decisionmakers are the people of Pakistan and the leaders of Pakistan, 

and that’s the way it will be, going forward. 

Ask a resident, not even an elderly one, of Lahore or Karachi or 

Peshawar, what these places used to be like, and you will hear reveries of a time that now seems a world away. We need to help 

Pakistan once again become a nation of stability, security, and 

prosperity, enjoying peace at home and abroad, a nation, in short, 

4 

that older Pakistanis remember from their childhoods. It’s this nation that most Pakistanis desperately want to reclaim. 

I’m eager to hear Ambassador Holbrooke’s thoughts on how we 

encourage the Pakistan people to choose a peaceful, stable future 

and offer them the best that we can offer, which is a helping hand 

in the effort to get there. 

With Senator Lugar’s indulgence, I’d now ask that we open the 

business meeting portion of the morning. 

[Recess.] 

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Lugar. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD G. LUGAR, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM INDIANA 

Senator LUGAR. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I join 

you in welcoming Ambassador Holbrooke. We’re grateful that he’s 

come today to share his insights on Pakistan and the Kerry-Lugar 

legislation. 

The Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act of 2009 sustains 

the objectives outlined in the bill I introduced last year with thenSenator Biden. Senator Kerry and I have listened carefully to those 

conducting a strategic review of United States policy in South Asia, 

and we’ve tried to ensure consistency with the President’s goals. 

This hearing gives members an opportunity to review the situation in Pakistan, as well as United States policy options and the 

resources that may be required to achieve them. 

The United States has an intense strategic interest in Pakistan 

and the surrounding region. The U.S. National Intelligence Estimate last year painted a bleak picture of the converging crises in 

Pakistan. A growing al-Qaeda sanctuary and expanding Taliban 

insurgency, political brinksmanship, a failing economy, are intensifying turmoil and violence in that country, and these circumstances are a threat to Pakistan, the region, and the United States. 

Our legislation is intended to take advantage of the opportunity 

for revitalizing our relationship through greater diplomatic engagement, as well as a commitment to economic and political development. It calls for significant increases in United States and international economic support alongside relevant military assistance 

linked to Pakistani performance against terrorism. We seek strong 

cooperation with the Pakistan Government, the continued improvement in Indo-Pak relations, the secure management of Pakistan’s 

nuclear program, and the development of Afghanistan as a free and 

stable country governed by the rule of law. 

While our bill envisions sustained economic and political cooperation with Pakistan, it is not a blank check. The bill subjects our 

security assistance to a certification that the Pakistani Government is meeting—or, is using the money for its intended purpose; 

namely, to combat the Taliban and al-Qaeda. 

The bill also calls for tangible progress in governance, including 

an independent judiciary, greater accountability by the central government, respect for human rights, and civilian control over the 

military and intelligence agencies. 

Our bill also contains provisions to help ensure that development 

funds are spent effectively and efficiently. It stipulates that the 

administration must provide Congress with a comprehensive assistVerDate Nov 24 2008 13:10 Nov 03, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00008 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 H:\DOCS\PAKISTAN BETTY
5 

ance strategy before additional assistance is made available. And 

once money begins to flow, the administration must report, every 

6 months, on how the money is spent and what impact it’s having. 

In addition, the bill provides that, before the administration spends more than half of the $1.5 billion authorized in any fiscal 

year, it must certify that the assistance provided to that date is 

making substantial progress toward the principal objectives contained in the administration’s strategy report. 

We also have asked the Government Accountability Office to 

review, annually, the administration’s progress on stated goals, and 

we authorize $20 million each year for audits and programs, 

reviews by the inspector general of the State Department, USAID, 

and other relevant agencies, in addition. The United States should 

make clear to the people of Pakistan that our interests are focused, 

not on supporting a particular leader or party, but on democracy, 

pluralism, stability, the fight against violence and extremism. 

These are values supported by a large majority of the Pakistani 

people. 

As I noted when we introduced the Kerry-Lugar bill last week, 

any United States policy related to Pakistan will require the cooperation and active support of both the executive and legislative 

branches of our Government. Senator Kerry and I are trying to 

play a constructive role in facilitating a consensus position between 

branches that will undergird the rational approach to the region 

with the best chances of success. With this in mind, it is vital the 

administration’s message on Pakistan be clear and consistent. The 

administration also must continue to actively consult with Congress on elements of strategy, not simply lobby us for funds. 

The administration has conducted some bipartisan outreach on 

this topic already, and I encourage the President to build on this 

so we have a truly bipartisan consensus as we grapple with the 

spectrum of security challenges the region presents. 

I look forward to working with President Obama’s administration 

and congressional colleagues on a policy toward Pakistan that 

builds our relationship with that nation and protects vital United 

States. interests. 

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Lugar, and thank 

you for your partnership in this effort to try to weave together a 

solid policy. 

Ambassador Holbrooke, thank you very much for joining us 

today, and, I think, more particularly, thank you for taking on this 

difficult task. It’s complicated, and we’re very appreciative that 

you’re bringing your talents to bear here. 

If you could perhaps summarize testimony, and then we can 

maximize the amount of time Senators will have to ask questions, 

and we’d appreciate it. Your full testimony will be placed in the 

record as if read in full. 

Let me just mention one thing, to all my colleagues. On the issue 

that I know is of concern to everybody on nuclear weapons, that is 

the one topic we’re going to have to take up in a classified session. 

So, those questions, if I could ask you to hold them, we will schedule a classified session with appropriate folks in order to talk about 

that. 

6 

Ambassador. 

STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD HOLBROOKE, SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE FOR AFGHANISTAN AND PAKISTAN, DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, DC 

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

It is an enormous personal honor and privilege to testify before 

you for the first time as chairman of this committee. You are the 

seventh chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee I’ve 

had the privilege of testifying before since I was first confirmed in 

this very room by Senator John Sparkman in 1977. 

Your leadership and that of Senator Lugar is absolutely critical 

in the highly important issue we’re here to discuss today. 

I would like to submit my statement for the record and make a 

few brief comments. 

And I do want to start with the lunch you referred to at the 

beginning. I’ve been to a lot of lunches up here for foreign leaders 

over the last 30 years, but I’ve never seen one like that. That was 

really a lunch that moved policy. Neither man had ever done that 

before. By pulling the two men together—President Zardari and 

President Karzai—in a serious forum in which they were required 

to answer tough, tough questions, tougher, in many ways, than 

those asked at the other end of Pennsylvania Avenue in the State 

Department, you encouraged them in the very goal of the trilateral 

summit, which is to work with each other. 

It is axiomatic that success in Afghanistan, however you define 

it, is not possible if Pakistan’s western areas remain a sanctuary 

for rest, recuperation, recruitment, and then attacking Afghanistan 

again. And cooperation between Islamabad and Kabul is notoriously bad. That goes back into history. And it’s an enormously complicated problem. And, by holding that lunch and simultaneously 

make them talk to each other in front of 27 Senators, and also to 

hear your views, was, in my experience on the Hill, unprecedented 

and unique. And I thank you and Senator Lugar and your colleagues for it. 

That lunch was the last event of a very effective week, and I 

wanted to give you a sense, beyond my written statement, of what 

we were trying to do and where we think we are. 

This was not just a photo-op, it was not just one meeting between two Presidents. As you saw in the room, you had ministers 

in that room from both countries. Most notably, three of the 

matched pairs—the Ministers of Agriculture, the Ministers of Interior, and the Ministers of Finance—had never met each other. So, 

we were playing the kind of leadership role that I think is what 

the United States, both branches, should do. 

As a result of those meetings—we’ve agreed to hold four sets of 

meetings like this a year, and this was the second, but the first at 

the chief-of-state level—as a result of those meetings, we have set 

up working groups and task forces on a whole range of issues, 

stretching from water resource management, an issue of enormous 

political sensitivity, of course, to negotiating the trade transit 

agreement between Afghanistan and Pakistan—a team of ours is 

on its way to Islamabad right now to push those negotiations—to 

perhaps most the difficult of all issues, intelligence cooperation. 

7 

You saw, firsthand, in the room, when you called on General 

Pasha, the head of ISA—ISI—the immense complexity in that area. 

So, we think that this trilateral process will improve our chances 

of achieving our objectives. 

But, I would not want to mislead you. What happens in Washington is only as good as its reactivation on the ground in the field. 

We can sit here and pledge and shake hands and sign agreements, 

but it only matters if it happens on the ground. 

The situation in Pakistan is extremely difficult. And I was 

pleased to see, Mr. Chairman, that you began by saying, and I 

quote your words because I hope to use them repeatedly, ‘‘We’re 

not looking for perfection.’’ You’re not going to find any in our policies in this part of the world. This is one tough issue. 

For those of us—and I see at least two people on this podium 

who served in another war in a distant land, in another—long 

ago—this is as tough as anything I’ve ever seen before, anything 

I’ve ever worked on. 

We are in Afghanistan and Pakistan because of 9/11, because 

al-Qaeda and its allies are camped out in western Pakistan and 

have pledged and promised and predicted and threatened to do it 

again to us and other countries. These are the men who killed 

Benazir, who did Mumbai, who attacked the cricket team in 

Lahore, who attacked the United States. They are—the epicenter 

of this area is in western Pakistan. 

If it were not for that fact, Mr. Chairman, we would not be sitting here today asking—supporting your very visionary proposal to 

triple aid, nonmilitary aid, and we would not be having this kind 

of colloquy. Pakistan would still be a huge issue, for many other 

reasons, including the nuclear weapons. Pakistan would also be an 

immensely important country because of its size and its role in the 

Muslim world. But, the reason we consider it one of, if not the, 

highest strategic priority of this administration is because they 

directly threaten us. 

People ask me if this is another Vietnam, and I would say, quite 

frankly to you, that structurally there are many similarities, 

including the sanctuaries, including the problems of governance, 

including problems of corruption, including problems of inefficiencies and inadequacies in strategy, including sometimes our own 

strategies. That’s part of the job I was given by the President and 

Secretary of State, is to work on the civilian side of that problem. 

But, I want to underscore the core difference between Vietnam 

and Afghanistan-Pakistan. And it is 9/11. There was no threat from 

the Vietcong and the North Vietnamese Army to the homeland of 

the United States. They had no interest, no intentions, and no 

capabilities. Our enemies now include people that do—and that’s 

why we’re here today—in this historically troubled area. 

The bill you have presented corrects a longstanding imbalance in 

our economic assistance. It was too heavily weighted to the wrong 

issues, the wrong areas, and too heavily military. But, I know there 

are military components to this that you wish to discuss. 

With that, Mr. Chairman, I will stop and be honored to respond 

to your questions and say, once again, because there are more 

friends of mine on this committee than any other in the Congress, 

how pleased I am to appear before you. 

8 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Ambassador Holbrooke follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD C. HOLBROOKE, SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE

FOR AFGHANISTAN AND PAKISTAN, DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, DC 

Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Lugar, and distinguished members of the committee: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It is a great honor to appear before your committee again. 

When I last testified before you, it was as a private citizen offering personal views 

on Afghanistan and Pakistan. Today, I appear before you as the Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan. I deeply appreciate the President’s and Secretary 

Clinton’s confidence in appointing me to this position. 

A stable, secure, democratic Pakistan is vital to U.S. national security interests. 

We must support and strengthen the democratic Government of Pakistan in order 

to eliminate once and for all the extremist threat from al-Qaeda and affiliated terrorist groups. 

Yet relations between the United States and Pakistan have been inconsistent over 

the years. In Pakistan, many believe that we are not a reliable long-term partner 

and that we will abandon them after achieving our counterterrorism objectives. 

Many in the United States question the dedication of some elements of the Pakistani Government to ending safe haven for terrorists on Pakistani soil. But our engagement has to be aimed at putting our relationship on a better long-term footing. 

To assure a strong partnership in the fight against extremists, constancy and consistency must be the hallmarks of our engagement with Pakistan. This engagement 

must be conducted in a way that respects and enhances democratic civilian authority while also engaging the Pakistani people in our commitment to help them pursue a prosperous economy, a stronger democracy, and a vibrant civil society. 

ADMINISTRATION STRATEGY

In March, President Obama announced the new U.S. strategy for Afghanistan and 

Pakistan which reflected unprecedented input from both governments. The President’s core strategic goal is to disrupt, dismantle, and eventually defeat al-Qaeda 

and to eliminate the safe havens in Afghanistan and Pakistan. The President’s 

strategy makes clear the importance of Pakistan’s future and stability to the United 

States and the rest of the world, and the need for increased security, governance, 

and development assistance to Pakistan. 

TRILATERAL ENGAGEMENT

Last week in Washington, we completed the second round United States-Afghanistan-Pakistan trilateral engagement, this time at the summit level. Through this 

trilateral mechanism, we have advanced unprecedented cooperation between 

Afghanistan and Pakistan. All parties involved reaffirmed their shared commitment 

to combat the spread of terrorism and extremism and underscored the priority 

placed on this. United States Cabinet members also met with their Pakistani and 

Afghan counterparts in a broad-based interagency approach to explore new areas of 

cooperation on foreign policy, economic policy, agriculture, police and prison reform, 

and intelligence. In five high-level breakout consultation sessions, officials from the 

State Department, FBI, Department of Agriculture, USAID, Defense Department, 

National Security Council, intelligence community, Treasury, Commerce, and USTR 

met with their Afghan and Pakistani counterparts. Through these substantive discussions, the following practical and concrete initiatives were delivered. 

• Afghanistan and Pakistan signed a memorandum of understanding committing 

their countries to achieving a transit trade agreement by the end of this year. 

• Afghanistan and Pakistan agreed to continue the cross-border Jirga process to 

be held after the Afghan elections. 

• Afghanistan and Pakistan committed to opening two Border Coordination Centers in 2009, one in Afghanistan and the other in Pakistan. 

• The United States, Afghanistan, and Pakistan plan to increase cooperation on 

agricultural development and research, as well as launching a Regional Infrastructure and Trade Development initiative to accelerate needed infrastructure 

development. 

• Afghanistan and Pakistan plan to pursue, with U.S. support, a Joint Action 

Plan outlining areas of common concern on issues of law enforcement, border 

security and management, and rule of law. 

• The next Trilateral Consultations is planned to take place this fall. 

9 

INTERNATIONAL ENGAGEMENT

A critical objective of the administration’s new strategy is to forge an international consensus to support Pakistan. We will involve the international community to actively assist in addressing security, governance, and development goals in 

Pakistan. 

We have already made progress. 

• At the April 3–4 NATO Summit, allied leaders agreed to build a broader political and practical relationship between NATO and Pakistan. 

• On April 17, the World Bank and the Japanese Government cochaired a successful Pakistan Donors’ Conference in Tokyo where the international community pledged more than $5 billion in new support, well above the $4 billion 

requirement identified by the International Monetary Fund. 

• We are also urging allies to work closely with us both bilaterally and through 

the Friends of Democratic Pakistan to coordinate development assistance. The 

Friends held a successful ministerial meeting in parallel with the Tokyo Donors 

Conference, at which Pakistan’s international partners affirmed their political 

support for the democratically elected government. 

STRENGTHENING PAKISTANI CIVILIAN AND GOVERNMENT CAPACITY

A key aspect to the new strategy is to put more attention and resources toward 

Pakistan’s economic and governance challenges. By increasing economic and educational opportunities, expanding the reach of quality health care, reinforcing 

human rights—particularly women’s rights—and empowering civil society, life for 

millions of average Pakistanis will improve. Toward this end, the President has 

voiced his support for the congressional efforts to increase nonmilitary assistance to 

Pakistan to $1.5 billion per year for 5 years. Introduction of bills in both Houses 

demonstrates Congress’s support of our long-term commitment to helping the Pakistani people. 

It is vital that we devote some of these resources to target the economic and social 

roots of extremism in western Pakistan with more economic aid. There have often 

been rebellions in that area historically, but this is the first time they have been 

tied to an international terror movement. Our assistance should support Pakistani 

efforts to ‘‘hold and build’’ in western Pakistan as part of its counterinsurgency 

efforts so extremists do not return to fill the vacuum once military operations have 

ended. 

We must also do our part to enhance bilateral and regional trade possibilities by 

implementing Reconstruction Opportunity Zones (ROZs) and encouraging foreign investment in vital sectors, such as energy. The administration supports congressional 

passage of ROZ legislation as a key way to boost private investment and sustainable 

economic development in targeted areas of Afghanistan and border areas of Pakistan. I ask for your support in expediting this crucial legislation. 

BUILDING COUNTERINSURGENCY CAPACITY

Successfully shutting down the Pakistani safe haven for extremists will require 

consistent and intensive strategic engagement with Pakistan’s civilian and military 

leadership. It is vital to strengthen our efforts to both develop and enable Pakistani 

security forces—both the military and law enforcement—so they are capable of carrying out sustained counterinsurgency operations. The Pakistani Army has traditionally been arrayed in a conventional deployment in the east, against India. We 

must work with Pakistan so that it has the resources and training to recalibrate 

from its current conventional threat posture to one that addresses the insurgent 

threat on its Western frontier. 

STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS

We are developing a strategic communications plan to counter the terror information campaign, based in part on a strategy that proved successful in Iraq. This is 

an area that has been woefully under-resourced. The strategic communications 

plan—including electronic media, telecom, and radio—will include options on how 

best to counter the propaganda that is key to the insurgency’s terror campaign. 

SUPPORTING LEGISLATION FOR ASSISTANCE TO PAKISTAN

Security assistance for Pakistan has to show results. In the President’s words, 

‘‘We must focus our military assistance on the tools, training and support that Pakistan needs to root out the terrorists’’ but ‘‘we will not, and cannot provide a blank 

10 

check.’’ Pakistan must demonstrate its commitment to rooting out al-Qaeda and the 

violent extremists within its borders. 

The administration intends to implement measures of performance in its economic, social, and military assistance to Pakistan. We must ensure, however, that 

such tools do not impede the effectiveness of our assistance or play to the ‘‘trust deficit’’ that plagues our bilateral relationship and promotes distrust among the Pakistani people. Any legislation should engender the greatest level of cooperation by 

winning the trust of our civilian and military partners in Pakistan. 

The administration is committed to working closely with the members of this committee, and Congress, to ensure that together we are able to provide the resources 

necessary to carry out our new strategy in Pakistan. 

All of our efforts in Pakistan are geared toward creating the vibrant, modern, and 

democratic state that Pakistanis desire and U.S. policy envisions as a partner in 

advancing stability and development in a key region of the world. 

Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today. 

The CHAIRMAN. Well, thank you very much, Ambassador 

Holbrooke. Again, we’re delighted to have you here, and delighted 

you’re tackling this, complicated as it is. And I agree with you that 

it’s tough. 

Why don’t we try to sort of establish a baseline, here, with respect to what we’re dealing with. A lot of the news stories lately 

have been implying Pakistan is on the brink of becoming a failed 

state, or in some of the news reporting you get a sense that there 

may be an imminent takeover, so forth, by the Taliban. My personal view is that both of those judgments are overblown, that it 

is not about to be a failed state and they’re not about to take over 

the whole country. Nevertheless, they have made very significant 

gains, and if the situation remains the way it has been for these 

last years, they will continue to. 

That said, would you share with us your view about, sort of, 

What are we looking at here, in terms of the governance capacity 

within Pakistan and the state of the insurgency itself? Or, 

insurgencies, because there are criminal efforts, there are various 

indigenous-focused insurgencies, and then, of course, Lashkar-eTaiba, which took its effort to Mumbai. Perhaps you could just sort 

of lay the baseline for the committee, if you would. 

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. First of all, Mr. Chairman, I agree 

with you, Pakistan is not a failed state. But, from its birth, Pakistan has been under pressure from—based on the ethnic diversity 

of its nation and because, although everybody’s Muslim, they have 

very strong identities with their—Pashtun, Punjabi, Sindh, and so 

on. And so, I share your view. 

Your question addresses the current situation on the ground 

politically? Is that what you’d like me to address? 

The CHAIRMAN. Politically and the insurgency—— 

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. OK. 

The CHAIRMAN [continuing]. Militarily. 

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. Politically, I think the facts are pretty 

well known. We have a democratically elected government, after a 

decade of military rule which was excessively supported, in my 

view, by the United States. We need, in my view, to strengthen the 

democracy in Pakistan. That should be our core objective. 

Another military coup, another military takeover, another military intervention would be very much against the interests of the 

United States, and, above all, the people of Pakistan. And every 

public opinion poll shows overwhelming desire for democracy to 

succeed, but when you drill down to the next level, you come up 

11 

with an anomaly, which is a sharp division between the two leading political forces, the PPP of President Zardari, ruling party, and 

the party of Nawaz Sharif and his brother, the chief minister in the 

Punjab. They had formed a government together, as we all know, 

in the period that led to the removal of Musharraf, and then they 

split apart. 

I am very pleased to bring to your attention again a fact which 

got relatively little attention in the United States until recently, 

and that was that, last week, the week before last, in the Punjab, 

the two parties formed a coalition government. Punjab’s 60 percent 

of the population. I think that’s a big step forward toward the kind 

of national unity that’s wanted. 

I would also draw your attention to the extremely important 

statements of Prime Minister Gilani, who, in the last few days, 

made a major speech calling for an all-parties conference on 

national security, and other leading political figures from other 

parties have also endorsed that. 

So, before we throw up our hands and assume that Pakistan is, 

‘‘falling apart,’’ let’s recognize that, with a lot of encouragement 

from their friends, including this committee and other people who 

were at the lunch last week, you can see the signs that Pakistan’s 

political effort is knitting together somewhat, compared to where it 

was a few weeks ago. 

On the insurgency issues, we all know that your characterization 

of the Swat deal is one that I also made publicly, so I’m completely 

on the same wavelength as you. The Pakistani people supported 

that deal very strongly; something like 74 percent of the population, in a poll taken by the IRI, the International Republican 

Institute, and published this morning—I don’t have the exact figure, but I think that poll is well worth putting into your record— 

something like 74 percent of the IRI respondents supported that 

poll when it was taken. But, the Taliban, as you predicted, as 

many of your colleagues predicted, as we predicted—the Taliban 

violated it, used it as an excuse to keep moving east, and that created a kind of a near panic, among some people, that led to the current attention. Of course, your bill—and it should be long noted— 

long preceded that crisis and was not as a result of it. 

So, the Pakistani Army began their military operations just in 

the last few days. The military operations—I’m not in a position 

this morning, Mr. Chairman, to report to you on how they’re going, 

because the only information I have is fragmentary; it’s more journalist than intelligence. I don’t really—frankly, I don’t really trust 

what I hear, from a situation like that, until the dust of battle is 

settled. But, one thing is clear, 900,000 refugees have been registered with the U.N. in that area, and we have a major, major refugee crisis. The executive branch is meeting steadily on this. I 

think there’s a meeting going on right now about this, downtown. 

So far, the United States has provided over $57 million for this crisis, from emergency funds. I would welcome any suggestions or 

advice you have on this, because, since our national security interests are so at stake and we look like we’re heading for about 1 million to 1,300,000 refugees, we should not ignore that. 

The CHAIRMAN. Let me ask you, if I can—last question—What 

makes you—well, let me go back. 

12 

When Pakistan was created, the Pakistanis themselves, and the 

British, agreed to create this area called the Federally Tribal 

Administered Areas, and they did it in acknowledgment of the complications of the Pashtun and tribal presence there. Sir Mortimer 

Durand drew a line right smack through the Pashtun, sort of, 

dividing them, partly in Afghanistan, partly in Pakistan. And, in 

effect, the Pakistanis acknowledged, by omission and commission 

over the years, what they chose not to do, that they were sort of 

happy to leave it be tribally administered and not essentially integrated into Pakistan. 

I remember meeting with President Musharraf a few years ago 

and pressing him on the issue of why they didn’t go in and begin 

to deal with the extremism and, you know, the insurgencies then. 

And he talked about the complications and how difficult it was, and 

so on, and sort of underscored to me the reticence on behalf of some 

folks to deal with that. 

Obviously, Alexander the Great, the British, and the Soviets all 

found enormous difficulty in trying to tame that part of the world. 

Now we are sort of at this crucible, if you will, where we’re trying 

to get them to do the very thing that they’ve never been willing to 

do and no one’s been able to do. 

Share with us your thoughts about that. What is needed to be 

achieved, here, in order to protect the United States and our interests? And how do we keep our interests from being extended 

beyond what they really are or what is achievable? 

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. Well, you know, Mr. Chairman, when 

I asked people what books I should read about Pakistan, a lot of 

them suggested Rudyard Kipling’s ‘‘Kim,’’ which is set in what is 

now called the FATA. The British set this area up as their western 

buffer against the wilds of Afghanistan. Your historical description 

is exactly correct. It was—we are—as in so many other parts of the 

world—think of Yugoslavia and Sudan—we’ve inherited boundaries—the world has inherited boundaries which leave a perpetual 

dissatisfaction. The international boundary is disputed. 

Many of us believe that one thing that should be done is to take 

the Federally Administered Tribal Areas and incorporate them into 

the full political life of Pakistan. President Zardari has said he’d 

like to do that. Nawaz Sharif says he would favor it. I would hope 

the Pakistani Government would consider moving on this. It’s been 

out there for many years. 

This arrangement you describe began under the British at the 

end of the 19th century, and, while it’s very romantic for readers 

of Flashman novels, it’s not a good way to run that area. 

And it has—but, you see, until 9/11, that—the tribal system kind 

of ran itself. Then the United States drove the Taliban east, they 

nested in this area. The United States and the government in 

Islamabad ignored what was happening. And, as they nested, they 

festered. And they realized that, not only did they have a nice sanctuary to counterattack Afghanistan, they had a nice place from 

which to recruit and focus on the east, as well. 

Your bill provides more funds in one bill than the United States 

has spent in that area since 9/11. That is one of the reasons we 

are so enthusiastic about it. It’s long overdue. And I cannot offer 

13 

you solutions today, Mr. Chairman, but I can offer you a significant 

redirection in American emphasis and focus. 

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Lugar. 

Senator LUGAR. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Ambassador Holbrooke, I want to discuss the legislation with you 

for a moment, because it encompasses 5 years. Obviously, today we 

are talking about the crisis of today and the next few weeks, and 

5 years seems like a long time away, through the entire administration, through several different elections of Congress. This is 

why, in the bill, we tried to set up, first of all, the thought that 

the administration should have a plan for the 5 years. Now, as the American people take a look at $7.5 billion over 5 

years for Pakistan, and given the description we’ve already heard 

today of the military activity and the chaotic difficulties of refugees 

and so forth, there is not a very distinct image of what anyone does 

with the $1.5 billion in any particular year, quite apart from over 

5 years. There’s the thought that somehow, for the first time, 

schools and health and civil governments and reform of this sort 

might be our objective, as opposed to an in-and-out business with 

the military. But, that almost begs the question of who in the 

administration sets up some parameters of how the money will 

flow, who administers it, and how the interface occurs between our 

United States administrators and those in Pakistan. Further, how 

the Pakistani administration will, we hope, take hold of the proper 

administration to bring about Pakistani objectives? 

And I just add, as a final thought to that question, that we’ve 

asked for a 6-month review—that is a report each 6 months during 

this 5 years—for a total of 10 reports—reviewing the progress 

made as it relates to the original administration plan provided for 

in our legislation—asking as to how effective were the expenditures 

in meeting what we thought were our goals. That will require some 

doing, likewise, by various persons who come along and who hopefully understand the whole ethos of the situation. 

So, describe the formation of the plan and how quickly that can 

occur, given the time limits, as you pointed out, and the need. And 

then, it would help if you could provide some description of what 

sort of personnel are available, in a country as large as Pakistan, 

to begin to implement the plan. 

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. Well, thank you, Senator Lugar. 

First of all, this—the money—if you’re asking exactly how the 

money will be allocated, I would like to submit in writing to you 

a more precise outline of the—of how we would propose to allocate 

it. 

I think it’s a very important question; I don’t want to do it off 

the top of my head. And we’re still—— 

Senator LUGAR. And, furthermore, there’s flexibility given by the 

bill—— 

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. Yes. 

Senator LUGAR [continuing]. Depending upon the exigencies of 

the time. 

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. But, second, in regard to the tribal 

areas, the previous commitment from the executive branch was 

$750 million over 5 years. As a private citizen, I was briefed on this 

in Islamabad, and I, quite honestly, said, and I wrote at the time 

14 

in the Washington Post, that I thought it was a pathetic amount 

of money, given the importance of this area. That discussion took 

place about 14 months ago. 

You are now offering us a very significant increase. According to 

the notes handed to me, in FY08 there was $187 million provided 

to FATA. In 2009, the number will increase to $600 million. 

Now, what are we going to do with it? You mentioned development. Roads are important. Microcredit. I met, yesterday, with the 

people from FINCA, a wonderful NGO that specializes in microcredit and has a terrific program in Afghanistan. They have nothing in Pakistan. We’re going to allocate some of the money, if you 

approve it, to FINCA, but ask them to start working out of Peshawar, because women’s microcredit addresses so many different 

needs at once—health, education, livelihoods, the agricultural program I mentioned earlier, law enforcement. 

Quite honestly, although the money sounds like a lot, it isn’t; it 

isn’t, in my view, as much as the problem needs. Some people 

worry about capacity, but the Pakistanis have a well-developed 

NGO system, they have a government out there, they need 

resources. The country is extremely poor. Over half the people live 

on less than $2 a day. And, by the way, every time I go to Islamabad, people say to me, ‘‘Fine to give money to FATA, but that’s 

only 4 or 5 million people out of 175 million in the country’’—18 

million people in Karachi alone, the world’s largest Muslim city, 

and they have 4 hours of electricity a day, which is one of the reasons the water resource management program and the dam—the 

program for the Joint Afghanistan/Pakistan Dam, which was just 

signed in front of Bob Zoellick last week during the summit—are 

so important. The needs there are enormous, and the history of 

United States relations with Pakistan has emphasized the wrong 

kinds of assistance. 

So, with your permission, I will submit a more precise answer. 

[The information was supplied in the written responses to questions submitted by Senator Lugar. See page 41 in the ‘‘Additional 

Material Submitted for the Record’’ section.] 

Senator LUGAR. That would be helpful. And, likewise, would you 

provide some idea of this plan that the bill calls for. In other words, 

the answers you’re going to give will be very helpful, in terms of 

your on-the-spot view, but I think what we’re going to be looking 

at regularly is this plan, because we’re going to be coming back to 

it every 6 months for how much of it’s being fulfilled. 

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. We would welcome, Senator Lugar, a 

continual dialogue, not just every 6 months, but whenever you 

want. I would be delighted to travel with you and any of your colleagues to the region so that we can start with the same experiential base. 

But, let me make a point about the military side of things. It has 

been pointed out by a lot of observers that the army is overwhelming Punjabi and this is a Pashtun area. When Admiral 

Mullen and I met with people from the Waziristan area, on our last 

trip to Afghanistan—Pakistan—and I wish to emphasize that those 

people met with us at the risk of their lives. It was really dangerous to come into Islamabad. When we met with them, they told 

15 

us that Punjabi military coming into a Pashtun area are as alien 

as it would be if they were NATO troops. And we take that point. 

So, where do we come out on the security side? There is this ancient group called the Frontier Corps; again, Kiplingesque, Kiplingera stuff, very colorful group. We believe that they can be strengthened into a serious counterinsurgency force. 

Mr. Chairman, I’m just responding on a point I know is of particular interest to you. The upgrading of the Frontier Corps. 

Senator LUGAR. Right. 

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. A lot of the money we’re asking you for 

is going to go to seriously upgrading their weaponry. Maybe we 

think the time for Enfield rifles is over. They still use them. And, 

by the way, they still work. We’re going to try to give them better 

counterinsurgency training. And we think their size can be increased. We have a very, very small American contingent out there, 

doing advice only. And we want to give them some means. 

One last point, Mr. Chairman, and this is the one I feel most 

strongly about. Concurrent with the insurgency is an information 

war. We are losing that war. The Taliban have unrestricted, unchallenged access to the radio, which is the main means of communication in an area where literacy is around 10 percent for men 

and less than 5 percent for women. And radio is broadcast from the 

backs of pickup trucks and motorcycles, it’s from mosques. It’s lowwattage FM radio stations. They broadcast the names of people 

they’re going to behead, just like Rwanda. And for reasons that are 

hard to explain, we have no counter-programming efforts that existed when we took office. We have a—we don’t have jamming, we 

don’t try to override, we don’t do counter-programming. 

Senator Kerry and I, in particular, have talked about this, and 

I want to state, in front of the full committee, that Senator Kerry 

wrote into his bill a special section on this issue. That’s very helpful to us in our internal dialogue, which is going on as we speak. 

President Obama has personally expressed a desire to deal with 

this. And we shall do so. 

And I want to bring to your attention that this particular issue— 

we cannot win the war; however you define ‘‘win,’’ we can’t succeed, 

however you define ‘‘success’’—if we cede the airwaves to people 

whose—who are—who present themselves as false messengers of 

the prophet, which is what they do. And we need to combat it. And 

I thank you for bringing—for highlighting that issue in the bill that 

you and the chairman have put forward. 

Senator LUGAR. Well, thank you. I appreciate, as always, your 

testimony. But, as I say, please get back to us with the plan, 

because that will be important, not only for us, but, likewise, for 

our colleagues and for those in the public who are going to be following this for some time. 

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. I will, Senator Lugar. And I certainly 

will be responsive, as I’ve tried to be to you ever since we first 

started working together in the 1970s. But, I would like to underscore that we are—that we did a strategic review, but that was an 

overview. We are now drilling down to the deepest levels. 

General Petraeus and I have now operationalized most of the 

Afghanistan part. He and I are now turning to Pakistan. As you 

know, there’s been a very important command change in AfghaniVerDate Nov 24 2008 13:10 Nov 03, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00019 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 H:\DOCS\PAKISTAN BETTY
16 

stan yesterday. That doesn’t apply directly to Pakistan, but anything that happens in one country affects the other. 

We are in the—we have upgraded our Embassy in Afghanistan 

enormously in the last few weeks, not only with Carl Eikenberry 

as our new Ambassador, but with Ambassador Frank Ricciardone 

as the deputy ambassador, Ambassador Tony Wayne, from Argentina, former Assistant Secretary of State for Economics, going to be 

the field—the boss of the field operations. We now have to do the 

same thing in Islamabad. Ambassador Patterson and I have talked 

about it, and we welcome your support on that, as well. 

Senator LUGAR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Lugar. 

Let me just say quickly, as I turn to Senator Feingold, that the 

Frontier Corps has been doing some interesting and surprisingly 

capable things, and I think there is promise there. And second, 

that small unit that you’ve talked about, there is just some exceptional people who have a terrific sense of what reality is on the 

ground, and we need to listen to them closely as we go forward 

Senator Feingold. 

Senator FEINGOLD. I thank the chairman very much for holding 

this hearing. 

And, Ambassador Holbrooke, thank you for coming before the 

committee. As you know, I was just delighted when the President 

and the Secretary of State had the wisdom to select you to be the 

special envoy on this issue. And I give the chairman enormous 

credit for that lunch the other day. It was one of the most unique 

things in the mere 17 years that I’ve been watching these things. 

And I saw fingerprints of Dick Holbrooke all over that very unique 

event that I thought was just excellent. 

Now, it has been nearly 8 years since al-Qaeda attacked the 

United States. And, while I’m very pleased that President Obama 

has unequivocally recognized the need to refocus the government’s 

attention and resources on this threat, I do remain concerned that 

the plan for Afghanistan and Pakistan has the potential to escalate, rather than diminish, the threat. 

Since 2001, as you pointed out, Pakistan has received billions of 

dollars from the United States in assistance packages and reimbursements for security-related counterterrorism initiatives, and 

yet, al-Qaeda has actually reconstituted itself along the border 

region, primarily because the last administration focused its 

attention on Iraq and relied on a partner in Pakistan who lacked 

popular support and whose commitment to fighting extremism was 

questionable. Fortunately, President Obama wants to reverse the 

previous administration’s failed policies. 

Good intentions are not enough, however. As the President and 

the Secretary of State have made clear, security in Afghanistan 

and Pakistan, and even for us here at home, are inextricably 

linked. Adding 21,000 new troops in Afghanistan, I fear, could further destabilize Pakistan without providing substantial, lasting 

security improvements in Afghanistan. Your very words here this 

morning, Mr. Ambassador, were, ‘‘We pushed them to the east.’’ 

The question here is, Are we going to continue to push more people 

to the east who may be more able to do us harm in Pakistan than 

they’re able to do us harm in Afghanistan? 

17 

So, obviously, as you know better than anyone, to succeed, we 

must ensure that we have an equal partner in the Pakistani Government. If we’re serious about fighting al-Qaeda and preventing 

another generation of bin Ladens from emerging, we must also ensure that any expanded support for development, rule of law, 

human rights, and anticorruption is met with equal dedication by 

the Pakistani Government. 

And along these lines, Mr. Ambassador, I’m interested to hear 

from you today about how we can help ensure a coordinated and 

effective response to the rising numbers of displaced people that 

have resulted from the recent military offensive in the western part 

of Pakistan, which, of course, we all know we’re not talking here 

about the FATA; we’re talking about Pakistan proper, we’re talking 

about internally displaced people. And, as you know from our previous conversations, less than a year ago I had the opportunity to 

see the good effects of American aid in both the North West Frontier Province and in Pakistani Kashmir after the earthquake. 

Now, we can’t have a foreign policy based on waiting for natural 

disasters. However, when one does occur—we’ve seen, both in the 

tsunami incident in Indonesia, in that region, and also here in 

Pakistan—that that is something we can do, and do quickly, that 

can make a difference. So, I urge you to consult with people in the 

administration to help make that happen. 

I’m also pleased that Senators Kerry and Lugar have reintroduced and updated legislation to strengthen Pakistan’s civilian government. That is overdue. And I’m also pleased to see that the legislation will require the Secretary of State to be forthcoming on 

what progress is occurring as a part of our oversight. After all, this 

does, obviously, involve taxpayer dollars. 

Now, back to the issue, Ambassador, of what you just said, that 

everything that happens in Afghanistan affects Pakistan. Well, 

that gets at the core of some of my concerns. 

Is the proposed policy sufficiently considering the—what I like to 

call the ‘‘balloon effect’’ of ‘‘whatever happens in Afghanistan affects Pakistan,’’ or vice versa? You’ve said that the impact of our 

troops in Afghanistan will mean the Taliban will, ‘‘go east into 

Pakistan toward the Baluchistan area—an issue that has to be addressed.’’ So, I’m curious, Do you believe the Pakistani Government 

is doing everything it can to capture Taliban leaders, particularly 

in Baluchistan? And are we sure that when we put 21,000 more 

troops in Afghanistan, and get up to a level of 70,000 troops—are 

we sure that that isn’t making the situation in Pakistan potentially 

worse? Or is it actually making it better? Could it—is it possible 

that it’s going to be having the kind of negative effect that you’ve 

actually alluded to in your remarks? 

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. Thank you, Senator Feingold. 

On your first point—— 

The CHAIRMAN. Is your mike on? 

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. Thank you, Senator Feingold. On your 

first point, you are absolutely correct that an additional amount of 

American troops, and particularly if they’re successful, in Helmand 

and Kandahar, could end up creating a pressure in Pakistan which 

would add to the instability. I raised that issue as soon as the troop 

18 

discussions began at the White House, and I was not alone in raising it. 

The United States military command, under GEN David 

Petraeus, who I think is a great American military leader, is well 

aware of it. They have been conducting, and are conducting as we 

speak, very intense discussions with the Pakistani Army to work 

with them so that they will be prepared this time, as they were not 

prepared in 2002 for what happened. 

On your key question, Is Pakistan doing everything it can to capture Taliban leaders, al-Qaeda, and so on?—you heard, as I did, 

General Pasha’s reply, in closed session, to that question, in the 

lunch we discussed earlier. I don’t know the answer to that, 

because I don’t know what it is they’re not doing that they could 

be doing. They have captured over—and killed and eliminated over 

the years a good number of the leaders of the Taliban and 

al-Qaeda. But, others have been under no—under less pressure. 

There is a history here, which General Pasha spoke very frankly 

about at our lunch, when he said, quite bluntly to the Senators assembled and those of us who were privileged to be there, that we 

have to remember that this had originally been a joint PakistaniAmerican intelligence operation in the 1980s, and when the United 

States walked out on Afghanistan in 1989, which history will 

record as a very serious error, the Pakistanis were left with a situation which required them, from their own point of view, to continue some of these relationships. It made sense in 1989, it made 

no sense after 9/11, from our point of view, but many people think 

the Pakistanis are still ambivalent about it. And many people in 

the region—indeed, the bulk of the people in the region, as all of 

you know—believe the United States will abandon them again, 

because of the history. 

One of the things that this administration has tried to do is say, 

‘‘We’re not going to walk out, this time.’’ But, words have to be 

measured against history, and the history has left them skeptical. 

And we need to show the region, which is, again, why this legislation has become so important—I mean, I want to be very frank 

with you, the phrase ‘‘Kerry-Lugar’’ has a talismanic quality in the 

Pakistani press now. It’s not just the amount of money, it’s the fact 

that it is now read as a symbol of our intentions to stick around 

and be serious about it. And, of course, the troop commitment in 

Afghanistan speaks for itself. 

Senator FEINGOLD. Mr. Ambassador, my time is out. I just want 

to make sure I get an answer to the larger question. Are you sure 

that the troop buildup in Afghanistan will not be counterproductive, vis-a-vis Pakistan? 

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. No, I am only sure that we are aware 

of the problem, that we are working intensely with the Pakistani 

Army, that they are aware of it, that the lesson of 2001–02 is— 

been absorbed. But, everyone who’s observed the situation from the 

outside has come to the same conclusion, Senator Feingold, and 

that is that there are not enough forces in the west. And this offensive will drive pressure into Baluchistan, where the fighting now 

is to the north and the Federally Administered Tribal Areas. We 

hope that the Pakistanis will move more troops into the west, improve the training of the Frontier Corps. We’re ready to assist with 

19 

all of this. It is imperative that it be done. It is an extraordinarily 

complicated equation. 

Why, then, would I still support the troop buildup in Afghanistan, which I strongly support? For the simplest of reasons. You 

could not leave the American, the NATO, and the ISAF forces in 

the deployment structure which was inherited on January 20. We 

did not have enough forces, ourselves, to do our own job, so the recommendation of General Petraeus and General McKiernan for an 

additional 17,000 troops and 4,000 trainers was, in my view, absolutely critical. 

But, yes, we’re aware of the consequence. And I would say, quite 

candidly, that wasn’t true 7 years ago. 

The CHAIRMAN. An honest answer. Thank you. 

Senator Corker. 

Senator CORKER. Mr. Chairman, thank you. 

And, Ambassador, thank you for your testimony. And I, too, want 

to thank you for the lunch meeting that took place last week. I will 

tell you that what struck me about it was, it was the last event 

with two leaders that were here, and I think it’s very intelligent 

that you all are having these trilateral meetings. I thank you for 

that. 

What struck me, though, was, after having these ministerial 

breakouts and having days of meetings—and I’m going to ask some 

questions about Afghanistan, since it—your term ‘‘AfPak’’ is one 

that’s been part of the vernacular here in Washington now—I was 

struck by the fact that the President of Afghanistan could not, in 

a coherent way, relay what our mission in Afghanistan ought to be. 

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. And may interrupt to say—— 

Senator CORKER. And then—— 

Ambassador HOLBROOKE [continuing]. To say—— 

Senator CORKER. Well, not—— 

Ambassador HOLBROOKE [continuing]. Interrupt to say that—— 

Senator CORKER. Well, let me finish. 

Ambassador HOLBROOKE [continuing]. The President was—— 

Senator CORKER. Let me finish. 

Ambassador HOLBROOKE [continuing]. Struck by your response. 

Senator CORKER. Well, his nonresponse—— 

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. He was very—— 

Senator CORKER [continuing]. His nonresponse was pretty stunning to, I think, most people in the meeting. And when I pushed 

back in—at his eloquent, long-winded nonresponse, he then said, 

‘‘This is your mission,’’ OK? And I was also struck—I was glad to 

see the good relations between him and President Zardari. That 

was good to see. 

But, I guess what I’d like to ask you one more time, because I’ve 

said before, your explanation of our mission there has sort of rung 

hollow—and you’re a very knowledgeable person, you’re our person 

as it relates to foreign relations there—What is our mission in 

Afghanistan, in your words? 

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. Well, first let me just clarify my interjection. You made a big impact on President Zardari. I don’t dispute your characterization of the exchange, but it was one of the 

most memorable moments of last week, and he got your message, 

which was that you, as a senior member of this committee, were 

20 

not satisfied with his answer. And I think it had exactly the desired effect. 

Will it produce the desired outcome? That’s another issue. This 

dealing with the Pakistani Government, with its complexities— 

after all, the Prime Minister has a lot of power, too—is difficult. 

Now, on the question of our mission; our mission was clearly 

stated by the President in his speech at the end of March. It is to 

defeat, dismantle, and disable al-Qaeda and the enemies of the 

United States who directly threaten us. 

Now, since those—since the al-Qaeda is overwhelmingly in Pakistan, not Afghanistan, the question legitimately arises, Well, why 

are we fighting in Afghanistan, when the enemy is in Pakistan? 

And we spent a lot of time discussing this. And the answer is, the 

Taliban and al-Qaeda are so interrelated that Taliban—you might 

envisage it as the cordon which surrounds the hard core. Taliban 

does the local jihad, al-Qaeda does the global jihad, and they interact. And we believe strongly—and I believe all observers would 

agree—that the enemies of the United States—Taliban, al-Qaeda, 

Baitullah Mehsud, and others—who also are enemies of the Pakistan democracy—are people we must deal with. 

I stress again, Senator, the enemies of Pakistan are the same as 

the enemies of the United States. Some of them are in Afghanistan, 

some of them are in Pakistan. We must help them win. 

Senator CORKER. OK. 

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. And by ‘‘win,’’ I mean stabilize the 

Government in Pakistan and give the Afghans the capacity to 

defend themselves. 

Senator CORKER. So—I have shown support for our efforts in 

Afghanistan and our efforts, certainly, in Iraq. You all have just 

gone through a strategic review. We are asked to vote on a supplemental next week. I have to tell you that there is a lot of moving 

parts, from my perspective, and I do not think that we have coherently laid out to this body what our strategy is, overall. I mean, 

Senator Feingold had some questions. There are issues that I think 

that need to be discussed. 

And before I move on to this bill, I would just say that I really 

think that it’s a mistake to bring the supplemental up next week. 

We’ve talked to the Army; they’re not going to be out of funds until 

July 1. We just talked with them within the last hour. And I think, 

for Members of this body, on both sides of the aisle, to have the 

questions that we all have, especially after meeting with the leaders of these two countries last week, I think it is a mistake, and 

I think we are potentially embarking on a monumental mistake, 

whether we end up doing the right things or not, by this body not 

discussing this in the way that it should and being fully bought 

into something that I think is going to be a part of our country’s 

efforts for years to come, especially since we are, in fact, doubling 

down, if you will, in Afghanistan. 

And so, to me, this is something that we should discuss much 

more fully, should not rush out a supplemental today. 

So, let me just—and especially—I’d love to talk about just the little things, like corruption. I mean, your administration has alluded 

to the fact that, in the poppy-crop areas, that you feel the government is actually taking more of the illegal moneys than the Taliban 

21 

is, that we’re supporting an illegal government action there, that 

that is of greater concern than the poppy crop actually going to the 

Taliban. OK? 

In Pakistan, you know, I hate to be pejorative here, but, I mean, 

the Leader was formerly called ‘‘Mr. Ten Percent.’’ I know that that 

may be unfair. But, I do think we need to understand how these 

moneys are going to be circulated through these countries in such 

a way that they don’t end up in a bank account in Switzerland. I 

think those are important things to talk about. 

But, let me just say, this bill—to come down to this piece of legislation, since I have 29 seconds left—— 

The CHAIRMAN. Senator, this is important enough—happy to give 

you a little extra time, if colleagues—you know, this is an important discussion. We’re here to have the discussion, so now is the 

time to get at it. 

Senator CORKER. Well, I appreciate the phone call that we had 

yesterday, but I really believe that this administration is making 

a large mistake asking for this supplemental today, when our engagement there is going to be multiyeared. You all have just come 

in—I’m not criticizing you; you’re a man of extreme knowledge— 

but, we have not hashed out what’s happening, and we are going 

to be engaged there for many, many, many years. Many men and 

women will lose their lives. We’re doubling down—and we haven’t 

debated this yet. OK? So, I’m going to stop there. 

But, on this legislation, just to get to the menial issues of the 

day, I appreciate the leadership of our two Senators in offering 

this. I do find it similar to what I’m saying about the supplemental. 

We are asking you to tell us what you’re going to do with this 

money after we pass the bill. I just find that to be really odd. It 

seems to me that the administration would come tell us what it is 

they want to achieve in Pakistan, and tell us what the benchmarks 

are; we would look at the intelligence community’s efforts, which 

I know that is occurring, and we would look at what we ought to 

be doing in regard to that, after you have laid out to us what those 

benchmarks are. For us to pass a large amount of funding, and yet, 

then ask, later, for you to tell us what you’re going to with it, to 

me, seems backward. And I would love a response to that. 

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. Senator, I agree it’s complicated, and I 

agree it’s tough, and I think every Senator on all sides of this issue 

has made that point, no more eloquently than our chairman, here, 

and Senator Lugar. 

But, I do not feel that it’s quite fair to say that we haven’t outlined what we do with it. I responded to Senator Lugar’s question 

by listing health, education, livelihoods, women’s microcredit, 

capacity-building, the Frontier Corps. We have changed the focus. 

None of this happened in the past. And, on your points about corruption and counternarcotics, I’m on the record as agreeing fully 

with what you just said. 

So, why, then, do I, respectfully—and I mean the ‘‘respectfully’’ 

sincerely—why, then, do I disagree with you on the issue of delaying? First of all, we’re not asking for money and then we’ll decide 

how to spend it. We’re asking for emergency money at this 

moment. But, I need to underscore the following point, particularly 

given the very high visibility of this bill in Pakistan. 

22 

Senator CORKER. We’re mixing messages. The supplemental and 

this bill are two separate issues, right? 

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. I understand the difference. 

Senator CORKER. OK. 

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. I understand the—I’ve testified before 

the supplemental people, too. But, the—and this is an anomaly of 

the way the press covers it, but the words ‘‘Kerry-Lugar’’ have become a symbol of American support for Pakistan in the emergency, 

not something called ‘‘the supplemental,’’ which contains a lot of 

other things. I understand that the supplemental is necessary for 

the money. I’m just telling you facts on the ground. 

But, the point I want to underscore, Senator, with great respect, 

is simple. The only beneficiary of a delay in this bill is the enemies 

of our Nation, the people who are trying to have the next 9/11, 

because they will use it, on that radio that I was talking about earlier, to mislead people as to our true commitments in the area. So, 

while I agree with you about the supplemental—— 

Senator CORKER. That we should put it off? 

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. Sir? 

Senator CORKER. That we should put the supplemental off and 

at least—— 

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. No, sir. 

Senator CORKER [continuing]. Us—— 

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. No, sir. I’m in favor—I’ve supported 

the supplemental, as well. But, that—but, we’re here to testify in 

behalf of your bill, as I—that’s why I’m here. And I—— 

Senator CORKER. Well, the supplemental’s coming up next week. 

I know my time is up. 

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. But, you’re talking—— 

Senator CORKER [continuing]. The—— 

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. You asking me about—— 

Senator CORKER. The supplemental’s what—— 

Ambassador HOLBROOKE [continuing]. Delaying the supplemental? 

Senator CORKER. Yes. I mean, this bill is a—— 

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. Oh. 

Senator CORKER [continuing]. Is a—the Army does not need 

those funds until—— 

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. Yes—— 

Senator CORKER [continuing]. July 1. 

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. The—— 

Senator CORKER. And we have not, in any—you’ve had a strategic review. We had two leaders come up here that had no earthly 

idea what our mission is in their countries. OK? And the fact is 

that I don’t think we, as a body, have talked about Afghanistan in 

the proper way yet. 

The CHAIRMAN. Well, let me—can I intervene here, just if I can, 

because I want to—I want to give you some leeway, but I also— 

we have colleagues who are waiting. But, I want to try to—let me 

cover a couple of things quickly. 

First of all, Senator, I think it is entirely appropriate, particularly given the change of command that has just taken place, in 

our Secretary of Defense’s own judgment that there needs to be a 

transition, it’s very appropriate to be asking some questions about 

23 

Afghanistan and the supplemental. I think a lot of us have some 

questions. 

But, let’s separate that out for a moment from this, and also separate out the—I want to speak to this question of the two Presidents’ definitions. You and I heard that answer differently. I heard 

President Karzai very clear say that, ‘‘If your definition of the mission was what the prior administration said it was’’—i.e., the building of a government, democracy, you know, putting in place X, Y, 

Z, schools, et cetera—he tipped his hat to that administration and 

basically absolved us of that responsibility for that, saying, ‘‘You’ve 

accomplished it. You gave us a national government, you gave us 

a process. We have an election coming up. We’ve built X number 

of schools. We have X number of women going to school,’’ as he 

described it. I forget the percentage. He was very clear about that 

part of it. But, he said, what is unfinished—he was very clear— 

‘‘Your mission is to fight al-Qaeda and to prevent them from 

retaking over the—you know, the areas of Afghanistan where they 

can then launch strikes against the rest of the world.’’ That’s what 

he said. Now, that is, you know, basically what President Obama 

and others have defined it. 

Now, I still think we need to flesh out the how of some of that, 

personally. And we’re doing that, here. I mean, the fact is that, 

when I was in Peshawar just a few weeks ago, and the Frontier 

Corps was telling me how they went into Bajaur, cleared it out, but 

it had been 7 weeks and nothing, absolutely nothing, had come in 

underneath it. That’s the purpose of this bill. I mean, the whole 

purpose of this is to empower the civic, both in FATA and nationwide, that provides an alternative to what the Taliban are offering. 

What’s interesting is, the Taliban, unlike Hezbollah or Hamas, 

who have mastered providing services and directly engaging in the, 

sort of, day-to-day life of citizens, Taliban don’t do much in the way 

of service apart from meting out their rough version of justice; they 

just scare people and kill people and intimidate them. And so, 

they’ve actually left open an enormous opportunity, which is what 

the urgency of this bill is, is to be able to come in and empower 

some governance that actually makes a difference in the lives of 

people. That’s the only way that we have a prayer, here. We, they, 

whoever—however you link it. 

And so, I’d say to the Senator, we’re happy to spend a lot of time 

on this, and we’re going to spend some time on Afghanistan, 

because it’s a tricky, long-term deal. And we need to do that. But, 

I do not think it’s fair to say that President Karzai didn’t define 

the mission in—as he sees it, in Afghanistan. And I said, afterward, that he, in effect, has given us a very much more limited, 

narrower mission than we’ve had for the previous 7 years. 

Senator Menendez. 

Senator MENENDEZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Ambassador, thank you for your long-term service to our country, 

and this present assignment, as well. 

You know, I have supported, both in the House and the Senate, 

these efforts with Pakistan, but I have real concerns. I have to be 

honest with you. It’s those concerns that led Senator Harkin and 

myself to ask for a Government Accountability report that came 

out that’s called ‘‘Securing, Stabilizing, and Developing Pakistan’s 

24 

Border Area with Afghanistan.’’ And basically, that report said 

that, after 6 years of efforts by the United States and Pakistani 

Governments, and over $12 billion in military and development 

assistance, al-Qaeda had, ‘‘regenerated its ability to attack the 

United States, continues to maintain a safe haven in the FATA region.’’ It noted that an integrated, comprehensive plan, including 

all elements of national power—diplomatic, military, intelligence, 

development, economic, and law enforcement—had not yet been 

developed for the FATA, despite that fact that it was called for in 

the 2003 national strategy for combating terrorism, the 9/11 Commission report, and the implementing legislation of the 9/11 Commission. 

So, the question is, one: Do we not need a comprehensive strategy, as the Government Accountability Office called for? And second, What is it? And third, Do we not, after—you know, the Pakistanis have, in my mind, a series of one step forward, two steps 

backward. The Pakistanis rush their troops to the Indian border 

when their own sovereignty is being besieged by the elements within their country. They make a deal in the Swat region, which I believe is in their interest, not ours. You have our Director of the CIA 

going in what was supposed to be a private, secret meeting, having 

a videotape released of him. You wonder whether the Pakistanis 

are on the same page as us, or they’re only there when, in fact, 

pressure is exerted, in their own national interests, as well as ours. 

So, do we need a comprehensive plan? What is it? What is our 

strategy—our comprehensive strategy? And should we not have 

benchmarks to make sure that we don’t continue in the one-stepforward two-steps-back? 

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. Thank you, Senator. 

I believe we do have a comprehensive strategy. 

Senator MENENDEZ. What is it? 

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. And we have—the President laid it out 

in his speech, in the end of March. We laid it out to our allies. 

We’ve briefed the Hill repeatedly and in detail. 

Senator MENENDEZ. Well, what is it? Give me the elements of it. 

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. The key elements are, No. 1, to defeat 

the people who pose a direct threat to our homeland—al-Qaeda and 

its supporters; to stabilize the Government of Afghanistan and give 

it the ability to be self-sufficient in defense of its—in its own security so that eventually the American combat troops and the NATO 

combat troops can leave; to—— 

Senator MENENDEZ. I’m talking about Pakistan, though, for the 

moment. 

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. Well, these two are completely related, 

Senator. 

Senator MENENDEZ. But, when you’re asking money—— 

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. And in—— 

Senator MENENDEZ [continuing]. When you’re asking money for 

Pakistan, specific, I’d like to understand what our strategy is in the 

context of Pakistan. 

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. I need to stress again, as I have for 

years as a private citizen and in the government, that the ignoring 

of Pakistan, the complete ignoring of Pakistan, in terms of these 

25 

issues over the last few years, significantly contributed to the current crisis in Afghanistan, as well as Pakistan. 

As for Pakistan itself, how can we ignore that area of western 

Pakistan which contains the people sworn to destroy America? So, 

we need to strengthen and help stabilize this government. 

It begins with strengthening democracy. After a 10-year military 

rule which was very bad for our strategic interests and, I believe, 

for Pakistani people, particularly the latter part of it. 

There are many parts—the previous Senator spoke about the 

many moving parts here; there are many moving parts, and I’d be 

happy to go back over them again at any time you wish. But, I 

want to underscore that to strengthen Pakistani democracy will 

take resources, which is why we strongly support this bill. 

We need to—before you came in, we had extended colloquy on 

the Frontier Corps. Well, the Frontier Corps are from the local 

areas of the west, whereas the regular army are mainly Punjabis. 

It’s been pointed out repeatedly that Punjabis are regarded as an 

alien force in the western areas. So, we want to strengthen the 

Frontier Corps. 

We want to build roads, help them build roads, clinics, education, 

jobs. There’s another bill in the Congress on the opportunity zones, 

sponsored in the Senate by Senator Cantwell, which is a very important job-creation bill, which I hope will also get passed. 

Our role here—we can’t run Pakistan; it’s the second largest 

Muslim country in the world, it’s a vast and complicated country. 

But, we can do more to help the civilian development and economic 

issues and help them strengthen democracy. 

Senator MENENDEZ. Let me say that I don’t believe that—$12 billion later, that we are ignoring or have been ignoring Pakistan. If, 

$12 billion later, you were telling a United States taxpayer that we 

have been ignoring Pakistan, they would probably bristle at the 

idea. The reality is, is that when I talk about strategy—and I appreciate the development efforts that you just talked about; I support those—but, I’m talking about a strategy that brings in the 

military element, that brings in the diplomatic element, that brings 

in the economic element, that brings in the intelligence element, 

that brings in the law enforcement element, that brings in the ruleof-law element. And I don’t get the sense that we have that. 

Now, as someone who has continuously voted for this, I’m reticent to continuously vote without knowing that there is a strategic 

plan. I don’t have the sense of that. And so, I’d like—you know, I 

look at what the GAO report said about our ability to validate 

funds that have gone there in the past. I don’t know that we have 

a better structure today to validate the funds; we don’t even know 

where significant parts of this money went to. That’s $12 billion 

later. You’re asking us to vote for a whole new set of money without knowing whether there are going to be benchmarks, without 

knowing whether we have a better system of accountability. I personally can’t continue down that road, as much as I think this is 

critical. 

So, there’s going to have to be some give-and-take here if you 

want the support of some of us, who have been supportive along 

the way, but are just not here for a blank check. I said that in the 

26 

previous administration; and, as much as I respect this one, I 

believe the same standards have to be applied. 

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. Well, Senator, I am deeply troubled by 

what you said, because that—— 

Senator MENENDEZ. I’m deeply—— 

Ambassador HOLBROOKE [continuing]. The GAO—— 

Senator MENENDEZ [continuing]. Troubled by where we’re at. 

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. Well—— 

Senator MENENDEZ. I’m deeply troubled by where we’re at—— 

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. Senator—— 

Senator MENENDEZ [continuing]. And I get no sense of reassurance, from what I hear so far. 

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. Well, I’m sorry you don’t get a sense of 

reassurance, but let me say that that GAO report arrived on my 

desk as I arrived at my job, and let me share with you a fact. The 

people who were in the Department wanted to write a point-bypoint rebuttal to it, and I put a complete hold on that and said, 

‘‘On the contrary, that’s going to be one of our guides for our policy.’’ And if you feel that you should penalize this administration 

for the mismanagement that you’ve described accurately in the 

GAO report, I can’t do anything about it. But if—— 

Senator MENENDEZ. No, I don’t want to penalize—Mr. Ambassador, I don’t want to penalize this administration for anything 

that, in the past, happened. But, I do believe that the past is prologue, unless we change it. 

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. Well, we are changing. 

Senator MENENDEZ. And so, what I’m looking for is a sense—a 

certainty of a strategy that will take this money and put it to good 

use between both the Kerry-Lugar bill and the supplemental and 

future moneys, as well as a sense of accountability and benchmarks, so that we don’t continue the history that we’ve seen here. 

And so, I don’t want to belabor the point. I would be happy to talk 

to you at length in my office at some point, if you want my support, 

because right now it is not there, based upon what I—— 

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. I would be honored to come to your 

office and talk to you about it. We do have benchmarks. The Congress has asked for them. They’re being worked out in detail now, 

in conjunction with the staffs in both houses, under the direction 

of Admiral Blair, the Director of National Intelligence. We are 

going to respond to any requests you have for benchmarks and 

metrics. We agree with everything you’ve just said. 

Having said that, I believe very strongly that the Pakistani people and their new democratic government deserve to have our support. You talked about the waste of the $12 billion. I wrote about 

that, as a private citizen. I thought it was a waste, a lot of it, because it went to conventional military support. And I’m not going 

to detract what I said as a private citizen, but I’m here today, Senator, to underscore to you that we have a different strategy. We’ve 

laid it out in public, we’ve laid it out in private. I would be happy 

to come up to the Hill with General Petraeus, if you wish, and we’ll 

come up and have more private meetings. I’ve met with—I would 

say I’ve met with half the Senators in this body personally since 

I started this job, in only 3 months, and—probably more than anyVerDate Nov 24 2008 13:10 Nov 03, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00030 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 H:\DOCS\PAKISTAN BETTY
27 

one else except Secretary Clinton—and I am committed to working 

with you. 

But, we do have a strategy, and it is still being refined at the 

tactical and operational level. We discussed a lot of this earlier this 

morning here. And if there’s any specific issue you want to cover, 

I’d be delighted to do so. 

But, we cannot walk away from Pakistan now without damaging 

our own most vital national security interests. 

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Menendez, if I can just—first of all, your 

questions refer to the Coalition Support Funds rather than programs run through State. These questions are very well put and 

important, and—we have a record here of not having had that 

accountability. And again, we’re not trying to go backward, but we 

did find out where the money went in the last years, because we 

thought it was going in one place, and, in fact, regrettably, it went 

to the general treasury of Pakistan. That’s where it was spent. So, 

we gave significant billions of dollars to Pakistan for one purpose, 

and it was spent for another. 

Now, with that knowledge, we drafted this legislation, and this 

legislation is very specific in saying that the President has to submit to us, as well as to the Appropriations Committee, the amounts 

of funds that are going to specific projects and programs, a description of the specific projects for which the money is going to go, a 

list of the criteria used to measure the effectiveness of those 

projects, systemic qualitative basis for assessing whether the outcomes are achieved, a timeline for each project and program, a 

description of the role played by the Pakistani national, regional, 

and local officials in identifying and implementing each of those 

programs, and all of the amounts of money that are going through 

it. So, those are some of the benchmarks and requirements that 

we’ve set out here specifically in response to what’s promoting your 

concerns, and the administration has worked with us very closely 

in laying those out. 

So, we, I think, are going to have a direct track on each and 

every dollar here, which is the intent and purpose of this—— 

Senator MENENDEZ. Mr. Chairman, if I may, very briefly, 

because I know my colleagues—— 

The CHAIRMAN. Go ahead. 

Senator MENENDEZ. I just—I appreciate what you’re trying to do 

in the bill. And what I want to see is, even giving those metrics, 

which I applaud, how does that fit into the strategy, which I’m still 

not quite sure is—— 

The CHAIRMAN. That’s fair. And I think that Ambassador 

Holbrooke has said he’s spent time—and we’ll have another hearing, if we need to, in the next days in order to make sure that we 

thoroughly answer all these things. 

Ambassador Holbrooke. 

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. May I add one more point before the 

Senator leaves, and that is that the Congress created, I think, a 

year or two ago, the special inspector general for Afghan Reconstruction, SIGAR, which is now headed by a retired major general 

named General Fields, Cyrus Fields. We have been working very 

closely with them. Their responsibility, of course, is solely to the 

Congress, and we understand that and respect it. But, I want to 

28 

say that I believe they have tremendous potential, Mr. Chairman, 

to help in the fight against corruption if you would consider—and 

I’m speaking way out of previously thought-through guidelines 

here, but I wanted to bring it to your attention—the Afghan Government and the—has specifically asked SIGAR to help it in the 

anticorruption efforts. And I think this would be very valuable. It 

may require some consultations or legislative adjustment. 

And I also think that, as we expand our efforts in Pakistan, you 

may wish to consider whether they have an oversight role. There 

are something like six different inspectors general and oversight 

committees in the executive branch and reporting to the Hill. You 

mentioned one of the most important: GAO. But, there are also the 

SIGAR group, there’s the inspector general of the State Department, there’s the inspector general of AID, and there are several 

other oversight committees. SIGAR is the one that seems to be 

most actively on the ground, because of the authority you gave 

them. And I wanted that to—I wanted you to reflect in the record 

how much we value them, while respecting their independence. 

And to the extent you wish to expand their mandate or expand 

their resources, we would strongly support that. 

The CHAIRMAN. Well, that’s something we should talk about in 

the next days. 

And, Senator Menendez, we might add, there’s a GAO report required here within 1 year of the strategy report being submitted 

to us. So, within 1 year of that, we have an independent assessment of everything that the strategy report laid out. So, we’re 

working at it, and we’ll work closely with everybody here to do it. 

Senator Risch. 

Senator RISCH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Ambassador Holbrooke, thank you for coming today. And let me 

say, you can put me in the same column as Senator Corker and 

Senator Menendez, as being less than enthusiastic at this point. 

I’m really concerned about Afghanistan. It seems to me, in Iraq, 

we’re winding down, there’s going to be problems there as we leave; 

we’re going to have to deal with those as we leave. 

Pakistan, you know, you’ve got the government—the people 

themselves fighting for control of their government. We’ve chosen 

sides. I think it’s going to be somewhat easier to make decisions 

there as to how we support the side that we’ve chosen. 

The Afghanistan problem—I was there last month. I’ve met with 

the President. I was at the same lunch. And, Mr. Chairman, I can 

tell you, I think you were a lot more articulate than the President 

was about describing the progress there. 

I’ve got to tell you, I was—I have been stunned by the lack of 

progress in Afghanistan. When you go there and you look at what’s 

happening, and you look at what has happened, it is just breathtaking the amount of money, the American lives we’ve spent there, 

and you have a government that has control maybe to the outskirts 

of the capital. You’ve got a population that has, really, no sense of 

nationalism. You’ve got an economy that’s based on a product that 

is illegal in virtually every country in the world. And the corruption, everybody admits that nothing happens without bribery and 

corruption there. It is terribly depressing. 

29 

And this—to me, until somebody gets a handle on stopping the 

poppy production, all of this stuff is—goes by the by. To me, trying 

to say, ‘‘Well, we don’t want any corruption in the country’’ is kind 

of like telling the Mafia, ‘‘Well, OK, you’re in charge of prostitution, 

gambling, and drugs, but we don’t want any corruption with you.’’ 

You stand on the abyss and look into that black hole, and that’s 

about all you see, is a black hole. You just don’t see a bottom. 

Now, I just heard you articulate what our objectives are there, 

and that is to decimate the bad guys. You just don’t have the country itself having the willpower, the political willpower, to join us in 

that. In fact, I heard the President say—and he didn’t say it 

directly, but if you read between the lines—that, yes, we stood up 

their government; yes, we’ve stood up their military; yes, we’ve 

stood up their police, ‘‘But you guys—America—need to continue 

this fight with the Taliban and al-Qaeda.’’ You know, I wanted to 

jump at that point and say, ‘‘Well, what are you going to do about 

this?’’ because that enthusiasm—I just don’t see it. 

And I’ve got to tell you, the Afghanistan thing is very, very 

depressing. And I’d like to—with the money we’re putting in there, 

we need to have—we need to have something much, much more 

concrete than what we have. I’d like to see an end game, but I 

don’t know who’s smart enough to develop an end game for us in 

that country. It’s very depressing. 

Thank you, Mr. Ambassador. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Risch. 

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. That’s pretty close to the view I had 

when we entered the government. I don’t mean to be facetious 

about it, but your description is—I would quibble with some of the 

details. There are areas of progress, real areas of progress. But, the 

overall situation has deteriorated since 2004—there’s no question 

about it—in Afghanistan. And that, in turn, has increased the pressure in Pakistan, and vice versa. We all understand that, Senator. 

That’s why we’re here. We’re trying to turn around the situation, 

which was clearly in decline when the administrations changed. 

And I’m very grateful to the support—for the support and advice 

of this committee, and of the Senate in general, because we have 

a common enemy and a common threat and a common mission 

here. 

And I really don’t agree with the previous Senator that we don’t 

have a strategy, but I do agree with you that the situation is 

extraordinarily serious, and that’s why we sent additional troops, 

that’s why we’re asking for additional funds, and that’s why we 

want to work with you to fashion a bipartisan policy that can be 

sustained in our national security interests. And I welcome comments like yours, although I think we could quibble on some of the 

details of what you said. 

Senator RISCH. Well, Ambassador, one of the difficulties I have 

is, you like to see a political will amongst the people, or a—some 

willpower, some ‘‘We can get this done.’’ And the difficulty I’m having is, I’m just wondering whether we have enough troops and 

whether we have enough money to convince the general populace 

in that country that they need to change the way they’ve been living for centuries. And that—you just don’t hear it. 

30 

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. Here’s an interesting statistic from this 

morning’s International Republican Institute, IRI, poll. In June 

2008, 9 percent of the Pakistani people wanted to cooperate with 

the United States against terrorism. In March, the number had 

gone up to 37 percent. I would wager a great deal that today that 

number is even higher, because there’s a huge backlash going on 

against the Taliban. 

Similarly, on the question of democracy, in today’s IRI poll, 77 

percent of the Pakistani people are prodemocracy, but 81 percent 

think the country’s headed in the wrong direction. So, there’s a 

clear indicator of what has to be done. Seventy-four percent think 

religious extremism is a very serious problem for Pakistan, but the 

government is not very popular. 

So, I think the ingredients of a strategy are there, but the military—the Pakistan military has to take back the west. And that’s 

where we are today as we hold this important hearing. 

The CHAIRMAN. Let me—I’m sorry, go ahead, Senator Risch. 

Senator RISCH. No, thank you, Ambassador Holbrooke. Thank 

you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. I was just going to suggest, Ambassador 

Holbrooke, I think the administration has a tremendous opportunity staring it in the face, with these tens of thousands of people 

being displaced as a consequence of Taliban excess. There is an 

opportunity, actually, to provide services, much as we did with the 

earthquake relief, which had a profound impact on the perception 

of America. And I would urge us to take advantage of that in the 

next days, because that can help to rapidly change opinion and, in 

fact, provide you with an opportunity we haven’t had in Swat, 

North West Frontier Province, et cetera. If we did that, and did it 

well, it could change the game for the government, too, I think. So, 

I would urge that. 

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. I am—I could not agree more. I’m glad 

you said it in public. Many of us have been saying it for the last 

few days, in private. We are looking for how to act on that. And 

we will—— 

The CHAIRMAN. Well, I’d bump it—— 

Ambassador HOLBROOKE [continuing]. Carry your—— 

The CHAIRMAN [continuing]. Into part of the—— 

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. We will—— 

The CHAIRMAN [continuing]. Supplemental or do something. But, 

I think the administration’s got to come up here and seize this 

opportunity—— 

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. We—— 

The CHAIRMAN [continuing]. The strategy that’s been written for 

it. 

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. I share your view, and I will relay your 

views immediately to the executive, my colleagues. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Senator Casey. 

Senator CASEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Ambassador, thank you for appearing today. 

The CHAIRMAN. Can I just interrupt you for 1 second? 

Senator CASEY. Yes. 

31 

The CHAIRMAN. I have President Carter coming in, because he’s 

coming to testify to us this afternoon. I need to go to meet with 

him. But, if, Senator Kaufman, you could close out again? You’re 

getting good at that. I appreciate it. 

Thank you very much, and I appreciate it. 

And, Ambassador, if we could follow up, perhaps afterward, we 

can detail how we approach some of the issues that have been 

raised here today. 

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for giving 

us this opportunity to lay out our strategy. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thanks so much for coming today. Very important. Appreciate it. 

Senator Casey. 

Senator CASEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Ambassador, we’re honored by your presence here. I didn’t 

realize the first time that you appeared here was 1977. Through 

the work you did in the 1970s, the 1980s, the Dayton Accords, and 

the conversation we have had, you have a great sense of the gravity of the challenge, the gravity, in terms of our national security 

ahead of us. 

So, these are difficult issues, but I was struck by a line from your 

written testimony, when discussing the overarching priorities of 

the Kerry-Lugar bill. And I think this one sentence sums up why, 

not only it’s a good piece of legislation that I and others have cosponsored, but that we need to move quickly to get it passed. And 

I’m quoting, ‘‘By increasing economic and educational opportunities, expanding the reach of quality health care, reinforcing human 

rights, particularly women’s rights, and empowering civil society, 

life for millions of average Pakistanis will improve.’’ 

Just by way of a statement, a good summation of why we need 

to pass the legislation. 

And then, finally, one other statement, and then I want to get 

to at least one major question. I was struck by a statement in yesterday’s New York Times story about al-Qaeda and the threat 

posed in Pakistan, by Bruce Riedel—a man you have worked so 

closely with—who led the administration’s review of the policy. I 

was struck by the intensity or the gravity of this statement. Bruce 

Reidel said, ‘‘They’’—meaning al-Qaeda—‘‘They smell blood and 

they are intoxicated by the idea of a jihadist takeover in Pakistan.’’ 

When I read a statement by Bruce Reidel, and the threat posed 

in Pakistan by al-Qaeda, and juxtapose that information with the 

supplemental request for not only the $497 million in emergency 

funds that Department of State has asked for, but also with the 

$400 million requested for the Pakistan counterinsurgency capabilities fund asked for Secretary Gates and General Petraeus, Secretary Gates noting that these funds are needed to be in place by 

Memorial Day to ensure that we don’t run out of funding for counterinsurgency prior to September 30—when I juxtapose those two, 

I have to say, we need to not only pass the supplemental, but act 

with a sense of urgency and dispatch. This is needed right now. 

I also believe we should attach the same sense of urgency to the 

Kerry-Lugar legislation. I say that by way of—just by way of a 

statement. But—I don’t know if you want to add to that. And I 

want to get to a fundamental question. 

32 

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. Hard to add to answer that. I agree 

with it completely. Thank you for that statement. 

Senator CASEY. With regard to what a lot of us know, and it’s 

not written about as much, but it underlies all these discussions 

when we talk about just Pakistan for a moment, but it obviously 

affects the strategy for—in both countries—and that is India. We 

know that there is an obsession there with regard to the Pakistani 

military. I think most Americans can understand or appreciate 

some of that obsession. Every country has its focus. We had a 

threat, over many generations, posed by the Soviet Union. We 

understand that. 

But, it’s becoming an increasingly difficult problem to solve, 

because if the Pakistani Government and their military forces are 

focused only, or largely, on India, it’s going to be very difficult to 

make it work, militarily. 

I ask you this, and I say this as someone who was in all three 

countries last May, and, at one point, sitting with the national security adviser of India, I said in reference of Iran, ‘‘Look, I know 

that India has a lot of ties to Iran, and I know that you have 

some—you have strong relationships. But, you’ve got to help us 

with this nuclear threat posed by Iran.’’ We’ve asked a lot of countries, and countries have asked us, to set aside, or to move to one 

side temporarily, a rivalry or a concern. 

I ask you this—and I know it’s a long lead-up—I ask you this 

with regard to India. Are there steps that India can take, in the 

context of this whole discussion, to help lower the temperature or 

create an environment where Pakistan can ease up a little bit, as 

they have already? I know; they’ve moved some of their military 

forces from the border, but are there efforts that India can undertake, not just on its own, but by our urging, that would help, here? 

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. Senator, I appreciate the question. It’s 

of the highest importance. With great respect, since we’re in the 

final days and hours of an election in India, where 700 million people are voting, and since any comment I would make might be misunderstood in that context, I would rather just simply restrict myself to saying that my job is Afghanistan and Pakistan, but at all 

steps in the process, we keep the Indians fully informed. They are 

not only an interested party, they are arguably the interested 

party, although many other countries, including most notably 

China and Iran, have borders with Afghanistan and also have 

interests. 

But, India’s interests are very high. India is the great regional 

power. And I have great personal respect and affection for India. 

And I keep Indian—India—they have a new ambassador, who just 

arrived; I met with her as soon as she was in Washington. And we 

will keep India fully informed. And the issues you raise are of great 

concern to us, but I’d—if you’ll permit me, I’d like to stop at that 

point. 

Senator CASEY. Ambassador Holbrooke, thank you very much. 

Senator KAUFMAN [presiding]. Mr. Ambassador, I’ve made it a 

policy, since I’ve been here, not to have long statements, but to just 

ask questions, but I think I’ve got to break that policy. Every policy 

should be broken. I think your patience, to listen to my colleagues 

this morning, has been exemplary. I mean, just absolutely exemVerDate Nov 24 2008 13:10 Nov 03, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00036 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 H:\DOCS\PAKISTAN BETTY
33 

plary. I think, to sit here and criticize what’s gone on, the last 8 

years, as if you were responsible for it, and how much time you and 

the President spent articulating what the plan is in Afghanistan 

and what the plan is in Pakistan, shows patience of Job, frankly, 

to do it. I think it’s quite clear what’s going on, and that’s what 

I’d like to confirm some of this. 

No. 1, we had—in Afghanistan, I don’t know how we could have 

a more specific plan in what it is that we’re going to be doing, in 

terms of—I agree with the comments about—there could be problems with the Taliban and al-Qaeda moving over to Pakistan, but 

we have to go into Helmand and Kandahar provinces in order do 

it, and we have a plan to do it. So, I think the plan that you and 

David Petraeus—and when Ambassador Eikenberry gets there—I 

think we’ve got the right people on the ground, new people on the 

ground, to do that job. 

Pakistan, I think people are not reading the newspaper the last 

month. I really think that—and I—you know, I just don’t think 

they’ve read what’s happened in the Pakistan—I was in Pakistan, 

and it was quite clear to me that there was a sea change going on 

over there. Essentially, in the past we’ve gone to them and said, 

‘‘Would you please help us in the FATA areas? Would you please 

help us, because it’s in our interest?’’ I think what’s happened in 

the Swat Valley is, they now understand it’s in their interest to do 

this, they now are the ones challenged. That is a world-class difference. And to talk about Pakistan without realizing or discussing 

the fact that there’s been a change of will in the government, I 

think, just doesn’t deal with the reality of the situation on the 

ground. 

So, the first thing I want to say is, my discussions with President 

Zardari and Prime Minister Gilani, I came in with a much altered 

understanding of what their problem is and what their will was to 

actually deal with that problem. Is that a fair summation? 

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. Yes, it is. And I appreciate your comments about patience. 

I’ve testified a lot, and I’m perfectly comfortable receiving the 

views of the people elected by the population to represent them. 

But, what is frustrating, frankly, is to be held accountable for a 

GAO report which I happen to agree with. That is—that’s a little 

bit difficult, because we’re using that GAO report as one of our 

guides, and because I stopped a kind of an automatic pilot. They— 

when I came into office, that was the first issue that came to me, 

Senator Kaufman, ‘‘Hey, we’ve got—we have this terrible GAO report. We’ve got to rebut it, point by point.’’ I said, ‘‘Why? Why 

should we rebut it? Why don’t we learn from it?’’ And that happened on the second day I was in the job. So, I want to put that 

on the record, because we want to work with you. 

And I want to reiterate my strong view that SIGAR, a very littleknown creation of the Congress, either last year or 2007, I don’t 

remember when, is a great potential tool for us to work together 

in an organization which is essentially the legislative branch’s 

presence in Afghanistan. And if you expand its geographic scope or 

you expand its mandate to help the Afghans fight corruption, you 

will be helping our nation and—while keeping the separation of 

powers. I want to respect that, because every time I see General 

34 

Fields, he says, ‘‘I don’t work for you.’’ And I said, ‘‘I know, but we 

all are Americans.’’ He’s a retired major general. He’s a very patriotic man. But, I hope you will look carefully at SIGAR. 

Senator KAUFMAN. The other question is, when I went to Pakistan, 3 weeks ago, I was concerned about their will, that basically, 

you know, they had the troops up along the Indian border, FATA 

had never been an area they were concerned about, it doesn’t really 

affect them, their lives, it hasn’t affected them for hundreds and 

hundreds of years. The people in the FATA have further been difficult to control. So, I went with kind of a will problem. After the— 

what occurred in the Swat Valley, I became concerned about a 

capability problem. 

What do you think the capability of the Pakistan military to actually deal with the Taliban is and what the Taliban is doing now? 

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. We don’t think they have enough forces 

in the west. We’ve said so publicly. We’re glad that they’re starting 

to focus on that issue, but it’s not enough, it’s not fast enough. 

Second, their training has been excessively for a conventional 

war against the east, and not enough for counterinsurgency. 

Third, the ethnic issue I addressed earlier is a concern. 

Fourth, we think the Frontier Corps deserves much more attention, and I think your chairman made it clear he shares that view. 

So, we have a lot of work to do here. 

But, I do want to address one point that was stated earlier by 

one of your colleagues. I don’t think we’re looking at a takeover of 

Pakistan by religious extremists from the Pashtun belt. The 

Pashtun are a minority in Pakistan, and the overwhelming majority of people do not want that to happen. It would be much more 

dangerous if the militancy became embedded among the Punjabis. 

Senator KAUFMAN. I traveled up to the FATA and met with the— 

and saw what—the training for the Frontier Corps. How—if we 

appropriate this money, how soon do you think we can actually 

have an effect on the Frontier Corps, expanding the Frontier Corps 

and increasing their training? 

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. Immediately, because it would be our 

highest priority to get that money through the pipeline and into 

the hands of the Americans and the Pakistanis on the front lines 

in Peshawar and west of Peshawar. 

Senator KAUFMAN. Finally, I served on the Broadcasting Board 

of Governors for 13 years, and, the answer to your question about 

strategic broadcasting, I can’t pass by saying—without saying we— 

we have a 71-percent listenership in Iraq to Broadcasting Board of 

Governor broadcasts. We have a 56-percent listenership in Afghanistan, and we have about 10 percent in Pakistan. The biggest single 

problem is getting the government, which I now think is ready to 

do it, and you could help, allowing us to be on the air on the services—the distribution of what our programming is. 

So, I was in the FATA. I know about—we’re putting FM stations 

in there. The big problem you’re going to find, which we found out 

in Kosovo, we found out in Serbia, is finding programming that will 

really affect the people. We threw away a considerable amount of 

money in Iraq trying to do what I hear the Defense Department’s 

trying to do now in Pakistan. You might want to go back and see 

35 

how that worked. And, as I say, we’ve ended up now with a 76- 

percent broadcasting. 

So, I say—I would look to the Broadcasting Board of Governors 

as a way to—what they’re doing, and see how we can expand the 

programming and the distribution in Pakistan. 

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. Thank you for that. I did not know you 

served on the BBG—— 

Senator KAUFMAN. Yes. 

Ambassador HOLBROOKE [continuing]. And I’m very pleased to 

hear it. I believe that a meeting is going on right now at the White 

House about this subject. The BBG was in the list of items I sent 

down there to be discussed. What I’d like to do is—if you would 

agree, Senator, would be to send our team up here to the Hill to 

talk to you about how you think we could get this going. It’s very 

important. And it also involves Voice of America. 

Senator KAUFMAN. Yes. 

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. But, in the end, the primary vehicle 

should not be American radio, it should be local radio. But, Americans should support it. 

Senator KAUFMAN. Yes. The problem you’re going to find with 

local radio is getting the programming. 

Anyway, thank you very much for your comments. 

And, with that, I will adjourn the hearing today. 

[Whereupon, at 12:14 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.] 

ADDITIONAL MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

RESPONSES OF AMBASSADOR HOLBROOKE TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED

BY SENATOR JOHN KERRY

OPERATIONAL EXPENSES

Question. Is the amount of funding authorized in S. 962 for operational and auditing expenses ($10 million per year and $20 million per year, respectively) adequate 

to the expanded scope of the mission? If additional resources are required—particularly in the area of operating expenses—please provide a detailed explanation of 

how the additional funds will be used. [Note: If any adjustment from the figures 

contained in the bill is deemed necessary by the administration, it is very important 

that this explanation be as complete and transparent as possible.] 

Answer. The best way to ensure that the Department of State and Mission Pakistan will have the operational and auditing resources for administering and implementing Foreign Assistance programs would be for Congress to enact the Pakistan 

FY 2010 request of $76.2 million for State operating expenses and the request of 

$30.8 million for USAID operating expenses for Pakistan. We hope that Congress 

will also move expeditiously to approve the FY 2009 supplemental including the 

requested amounts for State and USAID Operating Expenses, as well as $806.2 million requested by State for secure and upgraded facilities, all of which will enhance 

the capacity of our diplomatic and development efforts in Pakistan. 

That said, the authorization to use up to $30 million of Foreign Assistance annually to cover unexpected or incremental operating and auditing costs associated with 

S. 962 would seem sufficient. 

Separately, I reiterate our support for the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR). SIGAR is Congress’s representative on the ground and 

we would like to see SIGAR deployed in every province in Afghanistan to assist with 

oversight of our assistance programs. We value SIGAR and respect its independence. To the extent that Congress is willing to expand its mandate and responsibilities, I have made clear we would very strongly support that. 

36 

LINKING MILITARY AND NONMILITARY AID

Question. Do you believe (as advocated by President Obama in his championing 

of the Kerry-Lugar bill, and his cosponsorship of S. 3263 in 2008) that military aid 

should be de-linked from development aid—with development aid as a long-term 

commitment to the Pakistani people, and military aid carefully calibrated to the requirements and the will of the Pakistani military? Or do you believe that military 

and nonmilitary aid should be authorized in the same piece of legislation? 

Answer. Our development and security assistance programs are two pieces of the 

same strategic goal—to help Pakistan become a secure, stable democratic partner. 

Both types of assistance are crucial to support the people of Pakistan and defeat 

al-Qaeda and the Taliban. Our development assistance and our military assistance 

must be integrated and complementary. 

I agree that development aid should be a long-term commitment to the Pakistani 

people. Development programs to enhance Pakistan’s capacity to provide improved 

health, education, and other basic services to the Pakistani people will require 

patience and commitment to have an impact. Our military assistance to Pakistan 

demonstrates our long-term commitment to helping Pakistan confront the threat of 

terrorism and extremism. Both are necessary tools but should not be limited by 

being inappropriately tied together. 

The question of whether authorization for development and military aid should 

be in the same piece of legislation is for Congress to determine. 

What we seek is the flexibility to be able to apply the appropriate resources at 

the appropriate time depending on specific needs or unique opportunities. 

LEVELS OF MILITARY ASSISTANCE

Question. Do you believe that the level of military assistance channeled through 

the State Department should be locked in place now for the next 5 years, or (as 

advocated by President Obama in his championing of the Kerry-Lugar bill, and cosponsorship of S. 3263) that it should be authorized on an annual basis, depending 

on the actions, needs, and commitment of the Pakistani military? 

Answer. The President expressed support for the Kerry-Lugar bill as originally 

proposed. Both Afghanistan and Pakistan perceive the United States as having previously abandoned them during their times of need and so it is important that our 

military assistance to Pakistan demonstrate our long-term commitment to helping 

Pakistan confront the threat of terrorism and extremism, and also include mechanisms to maximize effectiveness. 

The situation on the ground in Pakistan is quite fluid, with the needs of the Pakistani military evolving with its response to the threat posed by insurgents. Locking 

in specific levels of authorized military assistance would limit our flexibility in 

response to the situation on the ground. A strategic commitment to provide ongoing 

assistance is, however, important. 

Question. Do you believe that the Pakistani military will be more cooperative with 

U.S. efforts or less cooperative if they know that they will receive exactly the same 

military aid authorization every year for the next half-decade, regardless of their 

actions? 

Answer. Again, year-to-year authorization levels are appropriate to the fluid 

nature of the security situation in Pakistan. However, a strategic commitment to 

provide ongoing assistance is important. That said, better cooperation with Pakistan 

is not contingent exclusively on funding levels, but also depends on building relationships and breaking down misconceptions. These efforts help overcome the trust 

deficit and help Pakistan follow through on the changes needed to confront our common threat. 

LIMITATIONS ON MILITARY ASSISTANCE

Question. Do you consider the limitations on military assistance contained in section 6 of S. 962 (and the waivers provided) to be a reasonable compromise between 

setting no conditions on security aid and setting overly restrictive limitations on 

such assistance? 

Answer. We agree with Congress that an increase in security assistance for Pakistan should take into account Pakistan’s progress in preventing al-Qaeda and other 

terrorist groups from operating in Pakistan and using Pakistan as a safe haven to 

launch attacks. We are committed to providing Pakistan with the assistance it 

37 

needs to wage the counterinsurgency campaign, as long as its concerted efforts 

toward these goals continue. 

While we are committed to accountability and partnering with the Congress in 

our efforts to ensure that assistance is used effectively and is making progress, we 

appreciate ensuring that flexibility be preserved to provide economic assistance, as 

needed, on a continuous basis, and also appreciate efforts to facilitate the accountability as well as flexibility with regard to furnishing military assistance. 

Question. What do you think would be the impact of conditioning military aid on 

issues of great political sensitivity in Pakistan, such as F–16 transfers and the fate 

of A.Q. Khan? What would be the impact of providing the President with only a 

highly restrictive level of waiver (‘‘vital to the national security’’)? 

Answer. Our security assistance to Pakistan, which has included support for Pakistan’s F–16 program, is a tangible symbol of the United States-Pakistan relationship. Pakistan cannot regain control of its border region absent a robust counterterrorism and counterinsurgency capability, which includes the use of a targeted close 

air support capability. Upgraded F–16s, in conjunction with appropriate training, 

provide Pakistan with this capability. Thus, overly restrictive conditionality on military aid to Pakistan could compromise our efforts to assist the Government of Pakistan as it seeks to dismantle terrorist networks in Pakistan. The highly restrictive 

waiver of ‘‘vital to the national security’’ would limit the President’s authority and 

flexibility. 

However, we are not considering the use of additional foreign military financing 

(FMF) for the Pakistan F–16 program at this time. To date, the Government of 

Pakistan is current on its F–16 payments for the new aircraft and for related weapons systems. 

Regarding A.Q. Khan, we believe that conditionality of military aid would not be 

an effective or appropriate means of influencing the fate of A.Q. Khan. We appreciate Pakistan’s efforts in shutting down the proliferation network led by A.Q. Khan 

as well as the cooperation Pakistan has provided the United States and the IAEA 

to investigate the Khan network. Key people involved with the network have been 

put out of business or are facing prosecution. We believe diplomatic means are a 

more effective tool in this case. 

EFFECTIVENESS OF U.S. AID: ENSURING WE DO NOT REPEAT MISTAKES OF AFGHANISTAN

Secretary Clinton has been forthright about the unacceptable levels of waste and 

mismanagement in United States aid to Afghanistan over the past 7 years. Critics 

charge that USAID’s contracting system relies too much on private contractors, 

there is a tendency for measuring outputs instead of outcomes, security restrictions 

distance U.S. aid practitioners from the locals they hope to support, and development projects often do not fit into a larger, comprehensive strategy. For both 

Afghanistan and Pakistan, concerns have been raised about the absorptive capacity 

and security challenges—particularly (in Pakistan) in the Federally Administered 

Tribal Areas, and parts of Baluchistan and NWFP. 

Question. Given the Secretary’s concerns, how will the administration assure us 

that a tripling of nonmilitary aid to Pakistan will be well spent and directly used 

to serve the interests of the Pakistani people? 

Answer. I have committed to reviewing every USAID contract and program in 

Afghanistan and Pakistan to ensure that our reinvigorated assistance is aligned 

with the President’s new strategy and that assistance is reaching the Afghan and 

Pakistani people, instead of foreign contractors. USAID is revisiting its operational 

models and hiring additional staff in Afghanistan and Pakistan to implement much 

larger development assistance programs. Specifically, USAID is expected to increase 

staffing in Pakistan, as well as support staff in Washington, to allow more rapid 

and effective implementation of assistance, by permitting USAID to effectively manage greater numbers and larger development assistance programs. The State 

Department will also boost support staff, primarily in Washington, in order to increase its reporting and coordination capacity for Pakistan. 

USAID has designed a monitoring and evaluation (M&E) system specifically for 

the nonpermissive environment in the frontier region, which can be applied to other 

parts of the country. USAID’s M&E system uses overlapping, multitiered checks and 

balances which reinforce the Government of Pakistan’s (GOP) own M&E efforts. The 

system utilizes a range of actors including local program staff, GOP interlocutors 

at the FATA Secretariat, community members, and independent monitors to follow 

the process from project development through implementation to provide overlapping layers of oversight. Oversight feedback is provided back to U.S. personnel and 

38 

implementing partners from a variety of sources allowing them to identify and 

verify where there might be issues. 

Question. How will the administration use the funds for nonmilitary assistance to 

Pakistan—as laid out in the Kerry-Lugar bill (S. 962)? Please be as specific as possible. 

Answer. Nonmilitary assistance funds will go to a wide array of projects. These 

include: Law enforcement reform, training, and equipment provision; law enforcement aviation support; judicial reform; antimoney laundering efforts; counternarcotics alternative development projects; interdiction; and drug demand reduction 

programs. In terms of governance and human rights projects, we will: Educate the 

public about and develop Election Commission of Pakistan adjudication procedures; 

build the capacity of the independent media; increase voting and civic participation 

among women; consult residents of the FATA on their political future; train journalists in the FATA, NWFP and Balochistan; and combat gender-based violence. 

USAID assistance will focus on: Rehabilitation of water and irrigation systems, 

bridges, roads, markets, health clinics and schools; improving rural electrification/ 

power distribution; strengthening health and education services; improving community infrastructure; providing job skills training; and generating employment. 

For areas where poverty, disease, and unemployment are creating breeding 

grounds for radicalism, we will improve the Pakistani Government’s ability to provide basic services, fair and efficient governance to its citizens, and economic opportunities for young people—all of which increase satisfaction with civilian government and decrease the appeal of extremist groups. 

We will target agricultural interventions at both unstable and vulnerable areas. 

Programs will help small producers organize into groups which will be integrated 

into commercial value chains generating substantial income gains. We will make 

women’s participation a priority in all agricultural activities. Our priority goals in 

basic education are to dramatically increase access to schools, significantly raise 

chronically low enrollment rates, especially for girls, and improve educational quality. We will dramatically strengthen primary health care services, concentrating on 

priority geographic areas. A focus will be placed on maternal and child health, and 

prevention and treatment of major infectious diseases, including tuberculosis, 

malaria, and HIV/AIDS. 

DISPLACED CIVILIANS

The latest wave of violence in the Swat Valley is expected to displace up to 

800,000 people—which would put the total number of IDPs in the North West Frontier Province at 1.3 million people. As you noted at the hearing, the U.S. Government may have an opportunity to demonstrate our commitment to the Pakistani 

people by stepping up our humanitarian efforts: Such as the humanitarian aid following the Kashmir earthquake of 2005 was seen as a vital sign of friendship and 

support. 

Question. What is the U.S. humanitarian response in terms of financial and 

human resources? What additional resources do you envision bringing to the table 

in the near future—and would the funding authorized by S. 962 facilitate such 

efforts? 

Answer. We are closely following developments in conflicts around the world. 

Based on current assessments, our budget request includes the funding needs we 

anticipate for FY 2010. The United States is building the Government of Pakistan’s 

capacity to respond immediately to the growing crisis by providing direct assistance, 

supporting the local economy through indirect purchases and helping the Pakistani 

Government publicize its ability to protect its own citizens. As Secretary Clinton has 

frequently noted, we are continuously reassessing the need for additional assistance 

and will help lead diplomatic efforts to encourage greater international assistance 

for Pakistanis displaced during the crisis. 

We have already mobilized several agencies and bureaus to respond to this crisis. 

USAID has deployed a six-person Disaster Assistance Response Team to Pakistan 

to lead our efforts on the ground. In FY 2008 and to date in FY 2009, the Office 

of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) has provided nearly $60 million in 

humanitarian assistance to conflict-affected populations in Pakistan. USAID/OFDA 

is supporting health, nutrition, humanitarian coordination and information management, economy and market systems, risk reduction, shelter and settlements, and 

water, sanitation, and hygiene interventions, as well as the provision of relief supplies and logistical support. To date in FY 2009, USAID’s Office of Food for Peace 

has provided 39,670 MT of Public Law 480 Title II emergency food assistance, valued at more than $36 million, to World Food Programme (WFP) emergency operVerDate Nov 24 2008 13:10 Nov 03, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00042 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 H:\DOCS\PAKISTAN BETTY
39 

ations. USAID has also provided 20 generators and 20 transformer sets for pumping 

water and providing lighting. The Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration (PRM) has contributed $14.6 million to address the crisis, in addition to over $50 million in regional humanitarian assistance, with additional contributions to follow. State/PRM contributions 

to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and the International Committee of the Red Cross support camp management, protection, shelter, water and 

sanitation, and health interventions conducted by these two organizations. In 

response to State’s request for assistance, DOD approved $10 million in aid and dispatched three C–17 flights to deliver 50 tents and 120,000 halal meals to Islamabad. 

U.S. Central Command purchased 2 water trucks, 50 environmental control units 

for tents, and 25 generators. To bolster the U.N.’s capabilities to coordinate the aid 

effort, Ambassador Rice is urging senior U.N. officials to deploy a permanent 

humanitarian coordinator. The State Department has also spearheaded a campaign 

for donations from the international community. 

Due to the ongoing military operations we do not have a full damage assessment 

and rebuilding estimate. We are continuing to monitor the situation and are in constant consultations with the Pakistani Government and donor countries. The displaced population could reach 3 million or more should the Pakistan military proceed with operations in Waziristan, as they have stated they will do in the coming 

weeks. Our response to this humanitarian crisis will require significant resources. 

Question. What is the administration doing to ensure that the Government of 

Pakistan is taking every precaution to minimize civilian casualties and displacement? 

Answer. The Department of State and the Department of Defense have strongly 

urged the Pakistan military to avoid civilian causalities. We are developing a longer 

term assistance package to help facilitate the ‘‘build’’ and ‘‘hold’’ phases. Pakistani 

political and military officials have repeatedly assured us that holding areas and 

facilitating reconstruction so that people displaced during this crisis can return 

home is a top priority. 

Relatedly, the Pakistani Government has attempted to mitigate civilian casualties 

by encouraging the population in affected areas to evacuate their homes prior to 

commencement of operations. Also, the Pakistan military has taken the lead to provide relief support with the appointment of Lt. Gen. Nadeem Ahmad and his use 

of 1st Corps as the command element for humanitarian operations. 

Question. In recent months, we have seen a growing number militant attacks on 

law enforcement targets, including the April 5 bombing in Chakwal, the seizure of 

the police academy on the outskirts of Lahore, and the ambush on the Sri Lankan 

cricket team and its police escort in Lahore. The primary victims of these attacks 

were Pakistan’s undermanned and underequipped police, a militant strategy that 

appears designed to expose state institutions as weak. I am particularly concerned 

about the Pakistani police and have allocated up to $100 million in the Kerry-Lugar 

bill (S. 962) for police reform, equipping, and training. 

• What type of strategy would the administration pursue to help the Pakistani 

Government enact serious and comprehensive reform of the police and law 

enforcement agencies? How much money and time will it take? 

Answer. Supporting civilian law enforcement and security organizations is critical 

to our comprehensive strategy to support Pakistan’s counterinsurgency efforts; this 

is particularly the case as conflict has spread from tribal areas to settled areas of 

the North West Frontier Province (NWFP) and cities across Pakistan. We must 

assist in ensuring that the police have the tools to detect, investigate, and arrest 

insurgents and build their abilities to deter and, where necessary, confront and 

defeat these elements. The Department of State’s Bureau for International Narcotics 

and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) FY 2010 budget request reflects our growing 

support for the important role of civilian law enforcement, representing more than 

five times the FY 2009 INCLE request. 

Moving forward, we have several ongoing law enforcement assistance programs 

that we seek to expand. The first is INL’s Law Enforcement Reform program, which 

was established in 2002 and has trained over 8,000 law enforcement officers nationwide in a variety of law enforcement competencies, including management, investigations, human rights, and tactical training in improvised explosive device recognition, post-blast investigation, and civil disturbance management. This year, new 

courses will be added in crime and intelligence analysis, police command and control, and police communications management. 

If approved, INL’s FY 2009 supplemental and FY 2010 funding requests will 

advance efforts to build more capable police and SWAT-like capabilities in the most 

40 

vulnerable areas, starting with the NWFP Police Elite Force and continuing in 

Balochistan. This training and equipping effort aims to prepare these forces to prevent and respond to the types of contingencies they face on a routine basis, including suicide bombings, improvised explosive device detonations, kidnappings, and targeted killings. 

To serve as a force multiplier, INL seeks to increase its helicopter fleet to help 

civilian security elements under Ministry of Interior (MOI) authority, including provincial police and the Frontier Corps, to conduct surveillance, reconnaissance, resupply, and transport of law enforcement personnel to remote areas quickly and safely. 

Additional air assets will allow MOI personnel to more efficiently launch operations 

that support the ‘‘hold’’ mission of law enforcement in areas along the border with 

Afghanistan. The operational tempo of INL’s air assets in 2008 and early 2009 was 

the highest in the history of the INL aviation program in Pakistan and will continue 

to increase as law enforcement capabilities improve. 

While improving the capabilities and equipment of law enforcement personnel is 

of critical importance, public trust in the police must also be addressed. We are currently consulting with the Government of Pakistan on proposals for pilot projects 

that can improve the delivery of policing services and improve public perception of 

civilian law enforcement. The administration has requested $155.2 million in FY 

2010 INCLE in order to address these challenges. 

COALITION SUPPORT FUNDS (CSF)

Question. Congress has appropriated billions of dollars in CSF to reimburse Pakistan and other countries for their operational and logistical support of U.S.-led 

counterterrorism operations. Much of this money appears to have gone for purposes 

other than those intended by Congress, and this committee has yet to receive a full 

and current information on the CSF program. 

• Do you consider existing oversight and accountability procedures for Coalition 

Support Funds to be adequate? 

• Will you insure that this committee is, in future, given full access (in classified 

or unclassified form) to all documents necessary to understand and evaluate the 

effectiveness of the CSF program in Pakistan? 

• In rough terms, what percentage of CSF payments over the past 7 years have 

reimbursed costs incurred in the battle against al-Qaeda and the Taliban, as 

opposed to other missions of the Pakistani military or redirection to the general 

budget? 

Answer. Coalition Support Funds are administered by the Department of Defense 

(DOD). DOD would be in a better position to provide specific details regarding CSF 

procedures. 

IMPROVING PAKISTAN’S COUNTERINSURGENCY CAPABILITIES

The administration has requested $400 million for PCCF in the FY09 supplemental to build the capacity of Pakistan’s security forces to combat insurgents in 

Pakistan. The traditional State Department-guided security assistance framework 

has built up protections to prevent the supply of U.S. arms and training to military 

forces that have engaged in human rights violations, to help ensure that the system 

is not abused by bribery or other procurement irregularities, and to prevent the 

diversion of equipment to unauthorized recipients. Many of the purchases envisioned for the PCCF seem compatible with that traditional security assistance 

framework. 

Question. What are the specific constraints imposed by the traditional security 

assistance framework that would hinder the work you think is needed in Pakistan? 

Answer. The Pakistan Counterinsurgency Capability Fund (PCCF) was not 

requested because of specific constraints on the security assistance framework, but 

rather to address the exceptional situation in Pakistan where there is an urgent 

need to allow the Combatant Commander to accelerate, enhance, and resource Pakistan’s counterinsurgency operations and capabilities. 

Question. If PCCF is routed through the Department of Defense (either for 1 year, 

or longer), what steps will you take to ensure that the safeguards of the traditional 

security assistance framework are used to prevent predictable problems from arising 

in the PCCF? 

Answer. State and DOD have a strong, longstanding relationship as DOD is the 

executive agent for State’s security assistance programs. The implementation of 

PCCF will build upon this framework. PCCF requires Secretary of State concurVerDate Nov 24 2008 13:10 Nov 03, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00044 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 H:\DOCS\PAKISTAN BETTY
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rence and both State and DOD are committed to working closely together to ensure 

that this concurrence is exercised in a meaningful and substantive way. 

COMMUNICATIONS STRATEGY

You noted the need for a communications strategy, particularly in FATA and 

parts of Baluchistan and NWFP. 

Question. Do you feel that there is a role for the Broadcasting Board of Governors’ 

services, such as VOA and RFE/RL in Pakistan? If so, what is that role, and how 

are you cooperating with the BBG to incorporate their broadcasting services into 

your overall strategy in Pakistan? Do you feel that BBG is sufficiently resourced to 

accomplish the mission? 

Answer. Winning the information war is critical to the success of our overall 

effort. To that end, I am working closely with General Petraeus, Ambassador Eikenberry, and my interagency team here in Washington to overhaul our strategic communications efforts and form a fully integrated, civilian-military effort that will 

broadcast our message. 

BBG’s services have an important role to play in Pakistan. Along the AfghanistanPakistan border, where the scope of government and commercial radio broadcasts 

is extremely limited, and where extremist groups actively utilize the airwaves to 

propagate their message, developing credible, accurate, moderate broadcast alternatives is essential. The BBG and the State Department have cooperated in organizing a series of strategic communications research seminars on Afghanistan and 

Pakistan, and the BBG participates in interagency strategic communication planning sessions. 

Question. Please provide as much detail as you wish on the communications strategy you envision, particularly in the areas of provision of cell phone coverage, radio 

broadcasting (equipment vs. content), and possible distinctions between activities 

traditionally conducted by the State Department (public diplomacy) vs. those conducted by the military or intelligence agencies (jamming of hostile broadcasts). 

Answer. We must undertake a major new integrated civilian-military program on 

strategic communications in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Three simultaneous projects 

are essential: We must redefine our message; we must connect to the people on the 

ground through cell phones, radio, and other means; and we must identify and support key communicators who are able, through local narratives, to counter the militants’ fear-mongering, propaganda and information domination. Additional personnel and structures in Kabul and Islamabad/Peshawar are essential. 

Mobile phones are a vital tool for counterinsurgency and a mobile-equipped population is one that can be more effectively engaged and empowered to circumvent and 

challenge the militants. In FATA, we must push for greater cell phone penetration 

throughout the different agencies. 

Radio is a particularly effective means of reaching tribal populations because it 

is the most pervasive media. We propose to: (1) Expand radio production capacity 

through a training and on-the-job mentoring program for local radio staff members; 

(2) support locally developed, cross-border radio programming; (3) help to develop 

community-based radio stations; (4) establish public-private partnerships; and (5) 

develop programming that fosters interaction and participation. 

Broad interagency participation will be key to developing and implementing our 

communications strategy. In April, we cohosted with DOD an interagency meeting 

attended by over 50 representatives from State, DOD, USAID, and the intelligence 

community, to discuss current strategic communication activities within Afghanistan and Pakistan, and the urgent need for a comprehensive and coordinated Strategic Communications plan for the region. It is also vital that we bring in experts 

and engage the private sector. We are actively engaged with a variety of partners. 

We are currently in the process of identifying resources for these various elements 

in support of our strategy and will remain in close consultation with the Congress 

on this effort. 

RESPONSES OF AMBASSADOR RICHARD HOLBROOKE TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED

BY SENATOR RICHARD LUGAR

LEGISLATION—S. 962, THE ENHANCED PARTNERSHIP WITH PAKISTAN ACT OF 2009

Question. You stressed on several occasions during your testimony the administration’s strong support for the Kerry-Lugar legislation, S. 962. 

42 

• How does S. 962 specifically support or encumber U.S. policy initiatives and 

goals in Pakistan and in the region? 

Answer. This legislation’s authorization of $1.5 billion in foreign assistance to 

Pakistan, every year for 5 fiscal years, underscores our long-term commitment to 

Pakistan and its people. Many Pakistanis believe that the United States is not a 

reliable long-term partner and will abandon Pakistan after achieving our counterterrorism objectives. Our engagement has to be aimed at building a long-term strategic partnership and must be conducted in a way that respects and enhances the 

Pakistani people’s pursuit of a prosperous economy, a stronger democracy, and a 

vibrant civil society. If enacted, S. 962 would be a critical demonstration of our 

commitment. 

The Kerry-Lugar legislation’s emphasis on economic and governance challenges 

reinforces a key aspect to the President’s new strategy on Afghanistan and Pakistan. By increasing economic and educational opportunities, expanding the reach of 

quality health care, reinforcing human rights—particularly women’s rights—and 

empowering civil society, we will increase the opportunities for millions of Pakistanis to improve their lives. 

The administration shares Congress’s concern that security assistance for Pakistan must show results. As the President has noted, ‘‘We must focus our military 

assistance on the tools, training, and support that Pakistan needs to root out the 

terrorists’’ but ‘‘we will not, and cannot, provide a blank check.’’ Pakistan must demonstrate its commitment to rooting out al-Qaeda and the violent extremists within 

its borders. 

We are committed to accountability and partnering with the Congress in our 

efforts to ensure that assistance is used effectively and is making progress. At the 

same time, we appreciate ensuring that flexibility be preserved to provide economic 

assistance, as needed, on a continuous basis, and also appreciate efforts to facilitate 

the accountability as well as flexibility with regard to furnishing military assistance. 

STRATEGIC REVIEW AND OPERATIONAL PLAN

Question. Our legislation expects a fulsome operational plan for Pakistan and the 

cross-border region with Afghanistan to follow from the President’s important ‘‘strategic review.’’ This plan has certainly been under consideration since at least late 

last year given the Biden-Lugar Pakistan legislation introduced in July 2008 

authorizing $1.5 billion a year over 5 years in foreign assistance. 

• When will the administration provide Congress with a broad, coherent, operational strategy for our engagement with Pakistan, which utilizes all of our foreign policy tools and provides a clear delineation of goals and expectations over 

time? • The committee looks forward to the report you said you would provide on all 

intended allocations associated with the new policy approach to Pakistan. This 

will serve to inform Senators of a part of the operational plan as it is defined 

by allocations. 

Answer. The Strategic Review approved on March 27 articulates not only the 

administration’s core goal in Pakistan and Afghanistan—to disrupt and dismantle 

al-Qaeda and its safe havens, and prevent its return to either country—but also our 

supporting objectives and recommendations for action. Congress has been fully 

briefed on the review. 

Through an interagency process, we are also developing comprehensive measures 

of effectiveness, which establish goals in Pakistan over time and indicators of our 

progress toward those goals. This process will be completed soon, at which time we 

will be pleased to brief Members of Congress. 

To match our resources to our goals and objectives, we will provide the Congress 

a report—as you note—on all intended allocations associated with the new policy 

approach to Pakistan. The report will delineate how these allocations support our 

overarching objectives. 

ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE AND 25 DISTRICTS PLAN

Question. Our legislation is intended to provide the Obama administration with 

the flexibility to add significant new economic assistance for Pakistan in order to 

enhance our bilateral partnership over the long term. Pakistan remains one of the 

poorest countries in the world and is confronting a daunting security threat. 

• How will the bulk of the proposed assistance be used? What sectors will be 

prioritized? 

Answer. Our economic assistance strategy for Pakistan focuses on areas where 

poverty, disease, and unemployment come together to create breeding grounds for 

43 

radicalism. We are focused on improving the Pakistani Government’s ability to provide basic services, fair and efficient governance to its citizens, and economic opportunities for young people—all of which are intended to increase satisfaction with 

civilian government and decrease the appeal of extremist groups. 

Our programs are designed to provide agricultural assistance to both unstable and 

vulnerable areas. Programs will help small producers organize into groups that will 

be integrated into commercial value chains generating substantial income gains. We 

are also making women’s participation a priority in all agricultural activities. 

Our economic development assistance will focus on providing job skills training; 

generating employment; rehabilitating water and irrigation systems, bridges, roads, 

and markets; improving rural electrification/power distribution; and improving community infrastructure. 

In basic education, our priority goals are to dramatically increase access to 

schools, significantly raise chronically low enrollment rates, especially for girls, and 

improve educational quality. 

Our priority in health is to strengthen primary health care services, concentrating 

on priority geographic areas. A focus will be placed on maternal and child health, 

and prevention and treatment of major infectious diseases, including tuberculosis, 

malaria, and HIV/AIDS. 

In terms of governance and human rights projects, we will: Educate the public 

about and develop adjudication procedures for the Election Commission of Pakistan; 

build the capacity of the independent media; increase voting and civic participation 

among women; consult residents of the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) 

on their political future; train journalists in the FATA, North West Frontier Province (NWFP) and Balochistan; and combat gender-based violence. 

Finally, our rule-of-law programs will focus on: Law enforcement reform, training, 

and equipment provision; law enforcement aviation support; judicial reform; antimoney laundering efforts; counternarcotics alternative development projects; interdiction; and drug-demand reduction programs. 

Question. Describe the intended regional plan, focused on some 25 districts, associated with your strategy. 

Answer. Pakistan’s needs exceed the capacity of even a significantly expanded 

U.S. assistance program. We intend to focus U.S. assistance on critical needs in specific geographic locations with the greatest poverty levels, making them most vulnerable to militant and extremist recruitment. Affected districts are in the North 

West Frontier Province, southern Punjab, northern Sindh, Baluchistan, and the city 

of Karachi, as well as the Federally Administered Tribal Areas. 

We will provide assistance to unstable areas where there is active conflict with 

militants and vulnerable areas of extreme poverty and lack of opportunity that are 

fueling the growth of extremism. It will target the short- and medium-term needs 

of local communities, using quick-disbursing assistance linked to local governments. 

Assistance will involve local leaders and community organizations and include 

activities such as: Rehabilitation of water and irrigation systems, bridges, roads, 

markets, health clinics and schools, providing job skill training, and generating 

employment. 

In vulnerable areas where poverty, disease, and unemployment are creating a 

breeding ground for radicalism, we will strengthen the Government of Pakistan’s 

ability to provide basic services, fair and efficient governance to its citizens, and economic opportunities for young people. All these activities are intended to increase 

satisfaction with civilian government and decrease the appeal of extremist groups. 

Question. How will U.S. assistance be used in a cross-border strategy to effectively 

engage homogenous populations on both sides of the Pakistan-Afghanistan border? 

Answer. We strongly believe that a cross-border program is merited and necessary 

to carry out elements of the ‘‘one-theater’’ approach outlined in the President’s 

Afghanistan-Pakistan strategy. Such funding would allow us to plan regional development projects without being limited by the political boundary between the two 

countries. 

The following are examples of areas that could be targeted with this funding: 

• Border crossing points/transit corridors; 

• Bilateral exchanges (i.e., government, educational, vocational, sporting, media, 

and cultural programs, etc.); 

• Joint capacity-building exercises; 

• Trans-boundary humanitarian assistance for refugees; 

• Cross-border infrastructure (i.e., roads, irrigation/water, power, telecommunications, rail, etc.); 

• Health initiatives (i.e., polio eradication, etc.). 

44 

In order to effectively implement a cross-border program that reflects a unique 

‘‘one theater’’ approach, we would require adequate funding with adequate flexibility. 

NUNN-LUGAR AND PAKISTAN WMD SECURITY COOPERATION

Question. In a May 9, 2009, Washington Post article, President Zardari indicated 

that no one in the U.S. Government had asked him for more information about the 

location and security of Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal. Given the evident concerns surrounding Pakistani stability and the limited effectiveness of the Pakistan military 

in counterinsurgency and counterterror operations, our cooperation in this area 

would appear to be an easy prospect for bilateral cooperation. 

• What is the status of United States efforts with Pakistan on strengthening 

security cooperation? 

• What funds has the administration requested in the supplemental or FY 2010 

budget request to further assist Pakistan in securing the storage and accountability for its WMD? 

• What assurance can you provide the Congress that Pakistan WMD elements 

and systems are secure from capture or control by militants? 

Answer. Pakistan’s security forces are professional and highly motivated. They 

understand the importance of nuclear security and it is our understanding that they 

have taken significant steps to enhance it. 

We welcome Pakistan’s efforts in this area. The President has said that he feels 

confident that Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal will remain out of militant hands. 

The United States has provided assistance for these purposes, with the full 

cooperation of the Government of Pakistan. I cannot comment further on the details 

of this assistance in an unclassified setting. 

Question. As the Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan you control 

a significant number of resources and personnel on a limited time basis. It is important that the skills and mechanisms essential to effective USG response in emergent 

and ongoing crises globally are retained in the standing institutional structures at 

the State Department and USAID, as elsewhere, over the long term. It is also critical to exercise and build the capacity within our agencies to be more responsive 

and ensure efficiency. 

• How will you ensure that your office does not make the mistake of so many previous offices on ad hoc assignments by building a parallel, one of organization 

in response to your mission? 

• How do you intend to integrate your office’s work with existing State Department and USAID programs and offices directed toward Pakistan and Afghanistan? 

• What steps does the Department plan to take to ensure that expertise and 

resources committed to your office are integrated into the Department’s permanent structures for responding to global crises? 

Answer. My office is not a permanent organization, but rather is designed to 

respond to a unique foreign policy and national security challenge at a time of 

heightened engagement. I have been directed by the President and Secretary of 

State to lead a coordinated, civil-military effort to achieve our goals in Afghanistan 

and Pakistan. To do so, I have brought together experienced civil servants, Foreign 

Service officers, Intelligence officers, military officers, and well-known outside experts to create one unified team. My staff consists of senior representatives from the 

State Department, U.S. Agency for International Development, Department of 

Defense (Joint Staff and Office of the Secretary of Defense), Department of Agriculture, Department of Justice, the Intelligence Community and other agencies. 

They serve as key conduits to their home agencies and ensure that we remain connected and coordinated on an hourly basis. Virtually all have extensive field experience, including working closely with our military counterparts in various settings. 

Our outside experts provide essential advice and also help keep us connected to the 

NGO, think tank, and academic communities. 

Far from a parallel organization, my office is fully integrated with key, permanent 

offices of the State Department and other agencies. My deputy, Paul Jones, is dualhatted position both as the Deputy Special Representative for Afghanistan and 

Pakistan and also as the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Afghanistan and Pakistan. 

In this way, he serves as a critical coordination point between my office, the Afghanistan and Pakistan desks in the Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs, and 

other offices in the State Department that work on aspects of the Afghanistan-Pakistan challenge. Additionally, we recently requested and received approval for five 

45 

new Foreign Service officer positions on each of the Afghanistan and Pakistan 

desks. 

This new interagency model has already delivered excellent results. In numerous 

situations, we are able to move quicker and have better access to top level of multiple government agencies than if we were not collocated. We will continue to apply 

this whole-of-government approach to contingencies and our daily work, and we look 

forward to additional agencies—including Treasury and Homeland Security—sending representatives. 

This is the most diverse team of experts that I have worked with during my government career and its agility in implementing policy will be critical to delivering 

the results that I know the President and Congress expects. 

OFFICE OF THE COORDINATOR FOR RECONSTRUCTION AND STABILIZATION

Question. The resources your office employs include civilians deploying to Afghanistan and Pakistan. Your staff has indicated that your office will coordinate such 

civilian deployment. 

• How are you utilizing the longstanding, albeit still growing, capacity within the 

State Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization? 

Answer. S/CRS recently helped establish the Integrated Civilian Military Action 

Group (ICMAG) at Embassy Kabul. It facilitates joint planning and problem-solving 

at the national level and across specified lines of operation (e.g., rule of law), and 

also helps develop integrated civil-military guidance at the regional, provincial, and 

district levels. Through the ICMAG structure and processes, S/CRS planners have 

helped enable a whole-of-government approach. S/CRS also played a role in developing civil-military predeployment training for Regional commands, Brigade task 

forces, and PRTs. Further, newly offered courses offered at the Foreign Service Institute in Foundations of Reconstruction and Stabilization, hostile environments (security and medical), and whole-of-government planning for the Civilian Response 

Corps will provide additional training opportunities for personnel going to Afghanistan. 

At my request, S/CRS has fielded an interagency team—led by Ambassador Tim 

Carney—to support the Afghan Government’s efforts to conduct free and fair elections in August. 

The CRC ‘‘active component’’ will have over 100 interagency members by summer 

2009, and by 2010 will become fully staffed at 250 with an additional 1,000 Standby 

Corps members identified from within the USG. I have asked that the CRC contribute to the civilian increase by nominating well-qualified individuals to serve for 

1 year in the field. As the CRC grows, I expect its personnel to be in a position to 

support the significant increase in civilian deployments required for Afghanistan 

over the next few years to further ensure the whole of government planning, assessment and field operational capabilities required. 

Question. How do you intend to build S/CRS institutional capacity for the long 

term? 

Answer. The Secretary is committed to supporting the development of the Civilian 

Response Corps and to ensuring S/CRS has the capacity to provide core staff to key 

planning efforts for reconstruction and stabilization operations. S/CRS is able to provide support to regional bureaus and embassies with additional, trained personnel 

who can augment regional knowledge with planning and conflict specialties and who 

can assist in the management of coordination with the full range of USG actors 

required in R&S operations. This capacity is available to support Washington-based 

planning and operations management as well as field deployments. 

This capacity is online and available and has been utilized in a range of operations including Sudan, Haiti, Kosovo, and Afghanistan. It is not in competition 

with the implementation bureaus and departments/agencies, indeed, it serves to 

ensure all capabilities are brought to the table, integrated and made available 

immediately to support foreign policy goals of the Secretary. 

Long-term capacity development for surge operations will require continued congressional support for the involvement of partner agencies and for the baseline 

steady state staffing of State and USAID. 

Question. The Office of the Inspector General for State Department, the Office of 

Inspector General for USAID, and other agency IG provide ongoing essential oversight of their respective agency programs and projects upon which the respective 

agencies and Congress greatly rely. Although Afghanistan and Iraq present massive 

cross-agency programming, the resident tools and authorities of standing IG offices 

are capable of incorporating the necessary means to meet expectations in such 

circumstances. 

46 

• What role do you see for the IGs at the State Department and USAID in promoting the effectiveness of your office’s programs with regard to Pakistan and 

Afghanistan? 

Answer. The State Department OIG has increased, and is planning a further 

increase in, oversight activities in Pakistan and Afghanistan. OIG is currently 

engaged in a number of reviews relevant to South Asia stabilization and to other 

department programs now underway in the South Central Asia region. State OIG 

is primarily responsible for oversight of State Department programs in Afghanistan 

and Pakistan and coordinates regularly with USAID OIG, the DOD OIG and the 

Special IG for Afghanistan Reconstruction for all aspects of oversight work in South 

Central Asia. The newly created Pak-Af Sub-working Group, formed by all of the 

relevant inspectors general working in the region, facilitates this effort. 

Question. What recommendations do you have with regard to strengthening existing inspector general offices? Would you support providing additional authorities to 

State and USAID IG offices? 

Answer. We urge the Congress to fund State Department OIG’s current request 

in the FY 2009 supplemental bill and the FY 2010 appropriations request, both of 

which contain requests for additional oversight funding in South Central Asia. We 

also support the State Department OIG’s request to the authorizing committees for 

additional hiring authorities which provide flexibility in the hiring of onsite oversight personnel in the South Central Asia. Finally, while we know State OIG has 

been conducting oversight in Afghanistan and Pakistan, we strongly support the 

September 2009 planned opening of the State OIG field office in Kabul and support 

their current effort to open a field office in Islamabad in the near future. 

OPERATING EXPENSES

Question. S. 962 seeks to ensure that the executive branch will have the resources 

necessary to implement the expanded foreign assistance programs for Pakistan provided for in the bill. To this end, the bill authorizes $10 million to be made available 

for administrative expenses of federal departments and agencies in connection with 

the provision of assistance authorized by the bill. This $10 million would be in addition to other amounts already available to implement such assistance programs 

through the existing operating budgets of the Department of State, USAID, and 

other relevant agencies. 

• What amount(s) are available from existing resources to implement and administer the programs authorized by S. 962? Does the administration believe that 

the $10 million authorized will be sufficient to cover any additional administrative expenses it anticipates incurring to implement the expanded foreign assistance programs to Pakistan provided for in S. 962? 

Answer. Funds appropriated for FY 2009 Operating Expenses, via the Omnibus 

Appropriations Act and pending supplemental legislation, will cover current funding 

gaps. We plan to implement and administer the programs authorized by S. 962 

using funds appropriated for FY 2010. 

The best way to ensure that the Department of State and Mission Pakistan will 

have the resources for administering and implementing Foreign Assistance programs would be for Congress to enact the Pakistan FY 2010 request of $76.2 million 

for State operating expenses and the request of $30.8 million for USAID operating 

expenses for Pakistan. We hope that Congress will also move expeditiously to 

approve the FY 2009 supplemental including the requested amounts for State and 

USAID operating expenses, as well as $806.2 million requested by State for secure 

and upgraded facilities, all of which will enhance the capacity of our diplomatic and 

development efforts in Pakistan. 

That said, the authorization to use up to $10 million of Foreign Assistance annually to cover unexpected or incremental administrative costs associated with S. 962 

would seem sufficient. 

Question. If the administration believes that additional resources are needed 

beyond this extra $10 million, please identify the additional costs the administration 

expects to incur and indicate how much additional money the administration 

believes is needed to meet them. 

Answer. At this time we believe that the amounts requested in the President’s 

FY09 supplemental and FY10 request are sufficient to meet our needs, but will consult closely with Congress if additional needs are identified by our Embassy teams 

in Kabul and Islamabad. 

47 

Question. Please explain in detail the nature of any such costs, why they are 

required, and why they cannot be met through the existing operating budgets of relevant federal agencies. 

Answer. At this time we do not anticipate requiring additional resources beyond 

those amounts requested in the FY09 supplemental and FY10 request, but will consult closely with Congress if additional needs are identified by our Embassy teams 

in Kabul and Islamabad. 

PAKISTAN COUNTER-INSURGENCY CAPABILITY FUND (PCCF)

Question. The President requested $400 million in the supplemental appropriations request for the purposes of immediately supplying an effort to train and equip 

Pakistani security services for counterterrorism and counterinsurgency operations. 

• What agreements have been made with the Pakistan Government, and specifically with the military and security services, with regard to PCCF funding? 

Answer. No formal agreements have been made with Pakistan about the PCCF 

since it has not yet been approved by Congress. Embassy Islamabad and U.S. Central Command have spoken with senior Pakistani officials about building Pakistan’s 

counterinsurgency capabilities, as well as how the specific equipment/training that 

PCCF (if enacted) is intended to provide could be used to assist in current operations. 

Question. What specific forces and what command and control structures will benefit from this program? 

Answer. PCCF is intended to build the counterinsurgency capabilities of Pakistani 

security forces currently engaged in operations against extremists along their border 

with Afghanistan. It is implicit in the concept of PCCF that it remain flexible 

enough so the Combatant Commander—General Petraeus—can adapt our security 

assistance to changing circumstances, but at present we envision that the main entities that will benefit from PCCF will include: The regular forces of the Pakistan 

Army (including 11th Corps and 12th Corps); special forces of the Pakistan Army 

(including the Special Services Group commandos and their air-lift unit, the 21st 

Quick Reaction Squadron); Pakistan Army Aviation (including the helicopter units 

that fly Mi-17s, Bell-412s and Cobras); the paramilitary Frontier Corps; and other 

enabling units. Other entities will be considered on a case-by-case basis depending 

on the role that they play in meeting overall counterinsurgency objectives. 

Question. Secretary Gates and Secretary Clinton testified to the Appropriations 

Committee in April that the PCCF program would initially fall within DOD and 

move in a phased process over 2 years to State Department authority and control. 

• What are the deficient elements of the current security assistance programs 

currently at State Department? 

• How will the State Department develop the structures and capacity to manage 

this program? 

• How will the State Department participate in the implementation of this program and in the administrative and review process associated with it in order 

to build the necessary capacity? 

Answer. The Pakistan Counterinsurgency Capabilities Fund (PCCF) was requested as a Department of Defense authority to address the exceptional situation 

in Pakistan where there is an urgent need to allow the Combatant Commander to 

provide Pakistan with accelerated and enhanced counterinsurgency operational 

capabilities. The new fund provides for significant State Department input into 

implementation by requiring Secretary of State concurrence of DOD’s provision of 

assistance, and of DOD’s transfer of funds to other agencies to provide assistance. 

As the Chief of Mission, the U.S. Ambassador to Pakistan provides strategic direction to, and oversight of, the Office of the Defense Representative in Pakistan for 

all of its efforts, including the PCCF. Embassy Islamabad is also structured to manage both the PCCG and Foreign Military Financing (FMF)—which will continue to 

be administered by the Department of State—to maximize the impact of U.S. military assistance in support of our policy objective of stabilizing Pakistan. 

The State Department is currently undertaking a broad, strategic review of foreign assistance resources (including security assistance programs) in order to 

strengthen its ability to manage and coordinate programs, and improve the coherence and integration of our foreign aid programs to achieve unity of effort within 

the U.S. Government. Part of this review will include an examination of the appropriate balance of authorities vested between the Defense and State Departments, as 

well as the personnel and resources needed to execute these programs. 

48 

REGIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL ENGAGEMENT

Question. The committee recognizes your efforts to encourage cooperation and participation of other countries in providing support for Pakistan and the region in a 

more responsible and coordinated manner. 

• What other donor nations or organizations whose assistance and potential are 

you most encouraged by? 

Answer. Fostering international dialogue and coordinating and integrating international assistance are critical components of the President’s Afghanistan/Pakistan 

strategy. Our regional and international engagement furthers several objectives. 

First, we seek to vastly improve coordination and integration of international 

assistance flowing to both Pakistan and Afghanistan. On Pakistan we are seeking 

to increase donations for urgent humanitarian needs and to begin a coordinated 

international dialogue on longer term reconstruction. On Afghanistan, we are working with the international donor community, increasingly under the auspices of 

UNAMA, to create a common assistance framework that can guide and integrate all 

donors’ assistance to Afghanistan. We are also developing a comprehensive inventory of all donors’ assistance to Afghanistan in anticipation of supporting UNAMA 

and the Minister of Finance in its efforts to map all foreign assistance. 

The second element of regional and international engagement involves developing 

and strengthening strategic partnerships with the large number of regional and 

global stakeholders in a stable and secure Pakistan. Many of these partners share 

longstanding historical, political, and economic ties with Pakistan and recognize 

that a stable, secure, and democratic Pakistan is vital to our shared national interests. By harnessing the capabilities of these current and future partners, we will 

greatly increase our ability to address security, governance, and development goals 

in Pakistan coherently and comprehensively. 

Question. Your travel to the region has included a number of trips to India as 

well. Notwithstanding your deferring comment at the hearing, how will the U.S. 

Government ensure India is properly engaged on the issue of improving relations 

with Pakistan? What steps does the administration feel India might make to diminish the perceived threat to Pakistan? 

Answer. India plays a critical role in the region and we will continue to inform 

and consult the Indian Government on a regular basis to ensure that they are properly engaged on the issues. We will not be able to address regional challenges without India’s full involvement. India is vitally affected by events in the region, and 

we want to consult closely with New Delhi as we go forward. The national security 

of India, Pakistan, and the United States is clearly at stake as all three countries 

now face a common threat from violent extremism. 

PUBLIC DIPLOMACY AND STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS

Question. Our legislation provides a requirement for a comprehensive strategy to 

implement effective counterterrorism and counterinsurgency measures along the 

Pakistan-Afghanistan border areas that includes elements relating to the use of 

strategic communications. 

• What are the parameters of the strategy for such an element of the assistance 

effort in Pakistan? What agencies will be involved in designing and implementing such an effort? 

Answer. Under Special Representative Holbrooke’s and General Pertaeus’ leadership, we are implementing a new integrated civilian-military strategic communications effort in Afghanistan and Pakistan. This effort will focus on three simultaneous goals: Redefining our message; connecting to the people on the ground 

through cell phones, radio, and other means; and identifying and supporting key 

communicators who are able, through local narratives, to counter extremists’ propaganda and present a positive alternative. Additional personnel and structures in 

Kabul and the Afghan provinces and in Islamabad/Peshawar will be necessary to 

implement this new program and Special Representative Holbrooke is working with 

our Embassies in Kabul and Islamabad to identify and address these needs. 

Mobile phones are a vital tool for counterinsurgency and a mobile-equipped population is one that can be more effectively engaged and empowered to circumvent and 

challenge the militants. In the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), we will 

push for greater cell phone penetration throughout the different agencies. 

Radio is also a particularly effective means of reaching tribal populations because 

it is the most pervasive media. We will work to: (1) Expand radio production capacity through expanded training, and on-the-job mentoring programs for local radio 

staff members; (2) support locally developed, cross-border radio programming; ( 3) 

49 

expand our efforts to help develop community-based radio stations; (4) establish 

public-private partnerships; and (5) develop programming that fosters interaction 

and participation. 

Broad interagency participation will be key to developing and implementing our 

new communications strategy. In April, Special Representative Holbrooke’s office 

cohosted with DOD an interagency meeting attended by over 50 representatives 

from State, DOD, USAID, and the Intelligence Community, to discuss current strategic communication activities within Afghanistan and Pakistan, and the urgent 

need for a comprehensive and coordinated strategic communications plan for the region. We are also consulting with experts and engaging the private sector to develop 

new ideas. We have requested resources in support of our strategic communications 

efforts in the FY 2009 supplemental and FY 2010 budget and will remain in close 

consultation with Congress as we further define this effort. 

Question. What has the Government of Pakistan agreed to with regard to our 

efforts to operate in the area of strategic communications? 

Answer. Our strategic communications activities support Pakistani Government. 

This has included training programs to improve Pakistani Government communications capabilities, a media cell to support its Special Support Group for helping internal refugees, and development of an antiextremism media campaign. Most importantly, however, is our assistance to help the Pakistani Government empower local 

people to communicate messages that compete with extremist narratives. These 

have already included student radio programs, support for establishing radio stations in contested areas, and support for content produced by locals for broadcast. 

Going forward, we will seek greater collaboration with the Pakistani Government 

in implementing programs and in building its strategic communications capacity. 

Question. Where will authority for such operations reside? 

Answer. Authority for such operations will reside with Embassy Islamabad in the 

field and with the Secretary of State and me in Washington. 

Question. What will be the role of the Broadcasting Board of Governors, Voice of 

America, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty? 

Answer. The Broadcasting Board of Governors plays a vital role. The Voice of 

America (VOA) and Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL) reach 10 million 

people weekly in Afghanistan and VOA reaches 11 million weekly in Pakistan. 

Research in the Afghan-Pakistan border region is very difficult, but according to 

available qualitative and quantitative research, VOA’s Pashto-language Radio 

Deewa reaches sizable audiences in the FATA and NWFP. In the mix of U.S. communication initiatives, BBG’s reliable news and information programs are vital to 

U.S. security interests, especially in tribal areas where Taliban propaganda is pervasive. 

VOA in Pakistan broadcasts over AM transmitters and shortwave (SW) frequencies as well as on the Internet. FM broadcasts via a leased network of FM transmitters in Pakistan awaits ratification of a lease agreement by the Government of Pakistan. Use of an AM transmitter in Peshawar is pending ratification of a lease agreement by the Cabinet of Pakistan’s President. 

Transmitters based in Afghanistan also serve Pakistan. VOA has expanded from 

6 to 9 hours of live programming daily via SW and three FM transmitters (in Khost, 

Asadabad, and Gardez), and on the Internet. A new, high-power AM transmitter in 

Khost, Afghanistan, is ready to come online pending resolution of final wording in 

agreements with the Afghan Government. 

Under provisions of the pending FY 2009 supplemental request, funding would be 

available to further expand broadcasts in Pashto by VOA and Radio Free Europe/ 

Radio Liberty. The two broadcasters would share frequencies and produce complementary programming, as they do in a joint programming stream now in Afghanistan. They would share a new bureau in Peshawar. 

The single greatest challenge at this time is securing new delivery of programs 

on AM and FM to the border region and throughout Pakistan. 

RESPONSES OF AMBASSADOR RICHARD HOLBROOKE TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED

BY SENATOR ROBERT P. CASEY, JR. 

Question. As civilians flee the Pakistani Army offensive in the Swat Valley 

against Taliban extremists, the seeds of a future crisis are being planted. Since 

Thursday alone, 200,000 refugees are estimated to have poured into four camps set 

up by the United Nations and the local administrations of the city of Mardan. As 

many as 600,000 additional refugees are expected to arrive if fighting continues. 

50 

The effects of the crisis are somewhat mitigated as families in Mardan and surrounding area take in some of the refugees into their homes and guesthouses—an 

extension of traditional Pashtun hospitality. But at a certain point this hospitality 

will reach its limits. 

• How is the United States Government working with the government of Pakistan and international organizations to address the potentially catastrophic 

effects of a large-scale refugee crisis inside Pakistan? We all recognize the 

potential for alienation and extremism that can arise when refugee populations 

endure for extended time periods. 

Answer. As of June 18, Pakistan had verified 1.9 million displaced persons whom 

UNHCR had registered. The number is expected to grow to 2.5 million as people 

flee expected fighting in Waziristan and as more displaced persons are verified outside of the North West Frontier Province. UNHCR has raised its planning figure 

from 1.5 million displaced people (assumed in the U.N.’s May 19 Pakistan appeal) 

to 2.5 million. The U.S. Government has responded since early May by committing 

over $300 million to relief and reconstruction efforts and by mobilizing an international response. Secretary Clinton and I have personally rallied the international 

community, most recently in Europe and the gulf, to provide assistance to relieve 

the suffering of those displaced in Pakistan. 

Our assistance has brought food and nonfood items such as medical care, water, 

and sanitation to the internally displaced living in camps and host communities. On 

May 15, USAID deployed a Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART) to Pakistan 

to support relief efforts, manage the humanitarian response, and coordinate with 

the humanitarian community. To support the return of those displaced, the Government of Pakistan is offering one-time cash payments of $310 to each registered family. We will continue to work with U.N. agencies, nongovernmental organizations 

and the Government of Pakistan to provide humanitarian relief to those displaced 

and to enable their return as quickly and safely as possible so that they can begin 

the hard work of rebuilding their lives. 

• Does the administration foresee the need for additional assistance in the FY 

2009 supplemental bill that is working its way through the Congress to address 

this challenge? 

Answer. The administration requested an additional $200 million in the FY 2009 

supplemental for displaced persons in Pakistan. 

Question. In yesterday’s Washington Post, Selig Harrison, an author and former 

journalist who is an expert on South Asia, wrote an op-ed contending that U.S. policymakers are misapprehending the conflict in Pakistan. Rather than viewing it as 

a conflict between moderates and religious extremists, Harrison argues what is happening today in the FATA and other border regions of Pakistan reflects the age-old 

struggle between the Pashtuns of Afghanistan and western Pakistan vs. the Punjabi 

elites of eastern Pakistan. The FATA and other regions along the border, including 

the North West Frontier Province and Baluchistan, have always enjoyed a degree 

of autonomy from central rule in Islamabad to account for the ethnic split. 

Harrison thus argues that U.S. policy urging the Pakistan military to go into the 

Swat Valley and the broader regions with an all-out military assault is a prescription for disaster—it will only antagonize the ethnic strife between Pashtuns and 

Punjabis and bolster the rise of local Taliban extremists. Harrison urges the Obama 

administration to cease airstrikes in western Pakistan and instead encourage 

Islamabad to offer greater regional autonomy to these areas, thus providing an 

incentive for local Taliban to eject al-Qaeda figures and focus on their own regional 

development, as opposed to laying the seeds for a broader anti-Pakistani and antiWestern crusade. 

• What do you make of Harrison’s argument? Does current United States policy 

risk exacerbating ethnic tensions in Pakistan between Pashtuns and Punjabis? 

Answer. We disagree with Harrison’s premise that U.S. policy exacerbates ethnic 

tensions in Pakistan. The United States supports Pakistani military operations in 

the Swat Valley and other border regions as a critical step toward our strategic goal 

of disrupting, dismantling, and defeating al-Qaeda in Pakistan. Pakistan and the 

United States face a common enemy, and military operations targeting violent extremists within its borders will demonstrate Pakistan’s commitment to addressing 

the urgent security threat posed by extremist safe havens in Pakistan. Successfully 

neutralizing safe havens for extremists will require sustained counterinsurgency operations, followed by coordinated ‘‘hold and build efforts.’’ It is also critical to note 

that the Pakistani security operations under way in the North West Frontier Province enjoy unprecedented national support across almost all political parties, including the main opposition parties. 

51 

We are urging Pakistani civilian and military leaders to develop a coordinated 

counterinsurgency strategy, which includes military operations followed by dedicated efforts to reach out to the local population and reestablish connections with 

the central government. The idea is to erase the perceived vacuum in which the 

extremists have been operating, so that they do not return once military operations 

have ended. It is critical that the current military operations in the North West 

Frontier Province (NWFP) and the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) be 

followed by reestablishment of civilian security structures, and a major effort to 

return those who have been displaced, as well as help to reconstruct their homes 

and towns, as quickly as is feasible. We will support international organizations, 

such as the Asian Development Bank, World Bank, and the U.N.’s OCHA, to conduct damage assessments and compile cost estimates. Already Pakistani civilians 

are returning to some areas including Lower Buner and Lower Dir, and the UNHCR 

will assist others to return by providing transportation and supplies of some basic 

needs. 

We understand that ethnic strife has long been a problem in Pakistan—and that 

some groups continue to feel neglected, with the perception that others are more 

advantaged. We must work with the Pakistani leadership to ensure that the Pakistani Government provides security, economic stability and opportunity, and basic 

services for all Pakistani citizens. Through our bilateral assistance (security and 

nonsecurity), training, efforts to pass Reconstruction Opportunity Zone legislation, 

and engagement with Pakistani leaders across the political spectrum, we are 

endeavoring to assist our Pakistani partners toward those ends. 

Initiatives like Reconstruction Opportunity Zones (ROZs), now pending in Congress, can provide incentives for the reconstruction and bring badly needed jobs in 

some of Pakistan’s most vulnerable regions. We urge Congress to pass ROZ legislation very soon to help foster legitimate economic opportunity in an area where lack 

of positive alternatives has resulted in young men turning to illicit, destabilizing 

activities. We are also continuing to encourage other countries to come together to 

support Pakistan, as they did at the successful April 17 donors’ conference in Tokyo 

that raised over $5 billion in social safety net and development assistance. The 

stronger the Pakistani Government is, the stronger its capability to establish its 

writ in traditionally underserved parts of Pakistan, like the Federally Administered 

Tribal Areas. 

RESPONSES OF AMBASSADOR RICHARD HOLBROOKE TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED

BY SENATOR JIM DEMINT

Question. The Millennium Challenge Corporation tracks 17 policy indicators and 

USAID uses 5 strategic goals and a series of subcomponents as performance indicators and ratings. Unfortunately, just using MCC’s assessments, Pakistan has retreated on a number of key indicators. Please identify the specific metrics you intend to use in order to gauge success with the assistance provided to Pakistan under 

S. 962. 

Answer. Finding the correct metrics to assess effectiveness is a vital element of 

policy implementation. Since the recent completion of the administration’s Strategic 

Review of U.S. policy on Afghanistan and Pakistan, there has been an interagency 

effort to develop specific plans for implementation, including the preparation of 

metrics and conditions. 

The U.S. Government is moving forward urgently, but also deliberately. The 

administration requires a reasonable amount of time to assemble its team, get the 

appropriate people on the ground, assess the situation, and develop meaningful 

measures of effectiveness. The administration is seeking input from across government to reflect the interagency dimension—the Department of State, U.S. Agency 

for International Development, and the Departments of Defense, Justice, Commerce, 

Agriculture, to name a few. We also look forward to working with Congress on these 

measures. 

Question. For roughly 10 years, United States sanctions suspended IMET funding 

for Pakistan. However, in our current relations with Pakistan we have relied on 

friendships that were established when Pakistan’s future leaders were able to 

attend military schools in the United States. In order to confront al-Qeada and 

eliminate its ability to operate internationally, the United States must rely on the 

Pakistani military and intelligence services. How do you believe we should move forward with instilling American values and perspectives and rebuilding relationships 

with the Pakistani military? What role should IMET training play? 

52 

Answer. The International Military Education and Training (IMET) program is a 

critical element of our broad-based security relationships throughout the world. In 

addition to the high quality of the education and training the program provides for 

foreign military and civilian members, IMET also plays a vital role in the development of military-to-military relationships. IMET helps ensure that other nations’ 

militaries have a cadre of personnel that have trained in the United States and are 

familiar with U.S. military doctrine, methods, and values. This has proven extremely useful over the years in forging strong military-to-military relationships and 

promoting key U.S. values such as human rights and civilian control of the military. 

We are currently paying the price for the decade of sanctions against the Pakistani military under the Pressler amendment. During the 1990s, a generation of 

Pakistani military officers, who now hold senior leadership positions, were denied 

U.S. military education and training opportunities as well as the exposure to United 

States culture and values that such activities provide. A robust IMET program with 

the Pakistani military is one of the best tools we have to help shift the direction 

of the Pakistani military to a more pro-Western orientation in both outlook and doctrine, and to help reshape our bilateral security relationship. It is for this reason 

that the administration has almost doubled last year’s requested amount for IMET 

funding for Pakistan. 

Question. Going forward do you support, and will you commit to, providing a full 

and detailed list of all U.S. assistance to Pakistan—not just what may be authorized 

under S. 962—including a description of each program or project that receives any 

U.S. funding? 

Answer. I will provide a full and detailed list of all U.S. assistance to Pakistan, 

including a description of each program and project receiving U.S. funding. 

Question. After taking appropriate measures to ensure national security, are you 

willing to provide this information in a readily accessible format on the Internet? 

Answer. We would be happy to provide such a list available in a readily accessible 

format. We would, of course, be required to make certain exceptions to protect 

national security and to ensure the safety and security of assistance recipients and 

program implementers. We would, in such instances, be glad to brief Congress on 

such programs. 

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