No. 2-- 07--0322 Fil ed: 1-11-08

______________________________________________________________________________ IN THE APP ELL ATE C OURT

OF IL LINO IS SECOND DI STRICT

______________________________________________________________________________ NICOLE TORTORIELLO, ) Ap peal f rom th e Ci rcui t Court ) o f Ka ne Co un t y. Plai ntif f-A ppelle e, ) ) v. ) No. 06-- L--304 ) GERA LD NISSA

N OFNORTH A

UROR A, ) INC., a nd J .P. MOR

GA N CHA SE BA

NK , ) Honorable ) Judi th M. Brawka, Defendan ts-Appellan

ts. ) Judg e, Pres i di ng.

______________________________________________________________________________ JUSTICE O'MAL

LEY del i vered the opi ni on of the court: Defendan ts, Gera l d Ni ssa n of North A urora (Ge ra ld Nissan) and J .P . Mo rg an Cha se Ba nk (J.P. Mo rg an) , a ppe al the judg ment o f the t rial co ur t denying t heir mo t ions to stay court proceedings and compel

arbi trat ion pursua

nt to an arbi

trat ion c la use i n an automobil

e purchase a

greeme nt signed by Ge r ald Nis sa n a nd pla int iff, Nic o le Tort oriel lo. The trial

cour t denied defen

dants' motions because it fou nd t he ar bitr at ion clau se u nco nscio nable. We view t he clau se d iff er ent ly and so re ver se a nd
rem and f or fu rther proceed

i ngs . In June 2006, pl

ai ntif f s ued defe ndan ts, seekin g to resci nd he r purchase of a

preowned

Nis san au t o mo bile from

Gerald Nis san, a transaction fi nan ced by J.P. Morgan. Plai

ntif f al le ged comm

on-law fraud an d v i ol ati ons of t he Consum

er Fraud and Dec eptive

Busi ness Practices A

ct (Consumer Fraud A ct) (815 ILCS 505/1 et seq. (Wes t 200 4) ). Plaint iff at t ache d t o he r c omp lainttwo do cum ents, each entitled "U se d C ar Re t ail Bu yer s O r de r " a nd sig ne d b y pla int iff an d G er ald Niss an . B oth docum en tsNo. 2-- 07--0322

-2-

consist o f t he sa me t wo -side d pr epr inted for m but co nt ain different figure s in the sp ac esprov i de d f or t he contract t erms . One docume nt is dated Oc tober 2 2, 2005 (First Buy ers Order), and the other October 28, 200 5 (Sec ond B uy ers Order). Pla int iff alleged t hat , se ver al days aft er she signe d t he Fi rst Buy ers Order, Gerald Nissan

in form ed her that her finan

cin g for the pur chasewas not approved. Acco rd ingto pla

in tif f, Geral d Nis san "fa ls el y m is represented that [she] had no op t ion" bu t t o s ign a
sec ond contrac

t, the Sec ond B uy

ers Order, wh os e terms were less f avorable to her t han the Fi rst Buy ers Order. Both defen dants f il ed m ot ions to stay court proceedin

gs and com

pel arbi trat ion. The

y reli ed
on an arb i tration claus e tha

t appea rs on the re verse s i de of

the Se cond

Buy ers Order. At the

top of t he r ev er se sid e is t he he ad ing "T er ms a nd Co nd it io ns, " fo llo we d b y a s er ie s of si ngle-spaced par agr aphs wri

tten i n v ery fi ne pri nt. The densi

ty of text i s relie

ved som ewhat by a single blank line that sep ar at es e ach p ar agr aph. The par agr aphs are num bered an d each is prefa

ced wi th an un derli ned subj ect de scri

ption. Th e f

i na l pa rag raph, nu m be r 17 , con tainsthe ar bitr at ion p ro vision. We reproduce it he r e in ac t ua l siz e a nd in co nt ext , t o g ivean impre ssio n of t he o ver all appe ar ance of t he page:
"TERMS AND CONDIT IONS 1. Changes in Price

Manuf actur er has rese rve d theri ght to c hange theprice to Dealer of new motor vehicl es without notice, in the event the price to Dealer of new vehicl es of the series and bod y type ord ered in this contract is changed by the Ma

nufact urer pri or to del iv ery of the new motor v ehic le or dered unde

r thi s contr act. Deal er r eser ves t he ri ght to c hange the cash delive red price of such motor vehicle to Buyer accordingly. If such cash d elivered price is increased b y Dealer, Buyer m ay, if dissatisfied with the ch ange in price, can cel this order, in which event the used mo tor vehicle, if any, that

has been traded in as p art of the consideration of such n ew motor vehicle, shall be returned to Buyer up on pay men t of a rea so nab le charge for sto rage a nd rep airs ( if any) or , i f such use d motor vehi cle has pre vi ously be en sol d by Deal er, the amount r

ecei ved the ref rom, l ess a se ll ing commis sion of

15% and any expe

nse incurred in s toring, insu ring, cond itioning, or advertising sa id used moto r vehicle for sale shall be retu rned to Buyer. 2. Cha nges in Des ignManuf actur er has rese rve d theri ght to c hange thedesi gn of a ny new motor

vehi cle , chas sis, accessori es or pa rts the reof at any t ime w ithout notic e and wi thout obli gati on to make

the same or any si mil ar cha nge upon a

ny motor v

ehic le c hassi s, accessory or

parts prev iousl y purchased by or shi

pped to De

ale r, or being manufac tured or so ld in accordance wit

h Deal er' s order s. In t he ev ent of a ny such chang

e by Manuf

actur er, Deal er sha ll have no obli gati on to Buye

r to mak e the sa me or simila r changes in any moto r vehicl e, chass is, accesso ries or parts thereof c overed b y this co ntract eithe r before o r subs equen t to d elivery of the ne w moto r vehicle to Buyer. * * * 15. Sever abil ity If a ny term, covenant or cond ition of this contract or the application thereof to any person or circumstance shall, to any extent, be invalid or unenforceable, the remainder of thi s contr act or theapplicati

on of such term, covenant or provision, to persons or circumstances other than th ose to which it is held inval id or unenforceable shall not be affected thereby and each term, covenant or provision of this contract shall be vali d and be en forced to the fullest extent permitted by law. 16. Limi tation of De

aler 's Li abil ity Deal er' s enti re l iabi li ty to Buye

r, i f any, for a ny cla im, demands or

causes of act ion, whethe r i n tort, contra ct, c onsumer f

raud, fra ud or otherwise, is limit ed s olely to t he a mo un t se t fo rth as t he p urc has e pr ice o f th is co ntr act . No twit hs tan din g th e fo rego ing lim itatio n, if a disp ute , claim or cause of a ctio n ar ises as a res ult of the pu rch ase of t he v ehic le or any bre ach or a lleged bre ach of t his c on trac t, wh eth er in tort, contra ct, c onsumer f

raud, fraud or otherw

ise, D eale r, at i ts sole opti

on, may elect

to repur chase the ve hicl e sol d hereunde

r and r efund the purchase p rice of the vehicl e to Buyer, less any reasonable costs to Dealer associated wi th the repurchase. At Deal er' s sole disc reti on, such re purchase woul

d be the sole remedy availabl

e to Buyer in the event of a breach of this contract by Dealer. T he limitati on set forth h erein does not affect any disclaimer or other provision o f this con tract and creates n o sub stantive rights o f action against Dealer. 17. Arbi trat ion Any controversy, c

lai m, cause of act

ion, or other

dispute ari

sing out of or r

elat ing to thi s contract, or

the breach, t

erminat ion or i nvali dity there of, whether

in tort, contract, consumer fra ud or other

wise, exc ept a cause of act ion or cla im by De ale r to r ecov er f ull payment of

the purchase p rice, or cl

aim involv

ing the breach of any retail i nstallment contractNo. 2-- 07--0322

-3- as s et fo rth belo w, s hall be res olv ed by bindi

ng ar bitr ati on befor e a sol e arbi trat or i n DuPag e County, Il li nois i n accor dance w ith t he Commer

cia l Rul es of t he Amer ica n Arbi trat ion Associ ati on, and judg

ment upon any a

ward r endere d by the arbitrato r may b e entered in any co urt of co mpete nt ju risdiction. The arbi trat or shal l det ermi ne the r ig hts and obl

ig ati ons of the pa rti es a ccor din g to the s ubsta nti ve la ws of the S tat e of Il li noi s and t he ex pre ss te rms of this contra

ct. The o fficial lan gua ge o f th e arb itrat ion sh all be Englis h. Th e arb itrat or s hall not be emp owered to grant exemplary, pun itiv e, or consequen tial

dam ages or a ny dam ages in excess of those damage s permitte d under the express terms of t his contrac

t. T he party prev ail ing on substanti

all y all of i ts cl aims shal l be e ntit led t o recov er i ts costs , i ncludi ng att orney' s fees, for t

he arbi trat ion pr oceedi ngs, a s wel l as any anci ll ary pr oceedi ng, i ncludi ng a proceeding to compel or enjoi n arbi trat ion, to reque st i nteri m measur es or t o confi rm or set aside a

n awar d. Cl aims , causes of a

cti on and other

disput es ag ains t Buye r ar isi ng out of or related to the brea ch by Buyer of an y retail installment co ntract ex ecuted in conn ection with t his con tract are no t sub ject to a rbitration u nder th is paragraph ." Enlarged for better readabil ity, the arbi

trat ion provisi

on stat es: "17. A rb i trati on A ny con trov ers y , cl ai m , ca us e of ac ti on, oroth er

disputeari

si ng out of or re lating to this

contract, or t he b

reach, termi

nat io n o r in v al

i di ty th ereof , w h eth er i n tort,
con tra ct, co nsumer frau d o r o t her wise, exce pt a ca use of a ct ion o r c laim by Deal er to recover full pay me nt of the purchas e price , or cl aim invo lving the bre ach o f any ret ail installment contract as set

f orth be l ow, shal

l be resol ve d by bi ndi ng a rbi tration be f ore a s o le a r

bit r at o rin DuPage County, Illi

nois in accordance wi

th the Comm

ercia l R ule s of the A

me rican A rb i trati on Asso ciat ion, and jud gment upo n any awa rd re nder ed by t he ar bitr at or may be entered in any courtof c omp et ent jurisd ictio n. T he ar bitr at or shall det er mine the r ight s and obligat ions of

th e p ar ti es ac cordi n g to the s ubst ant ive laws o f the St at e o f Illinois and t he express terms of this contract. T he off ic ia l l anguage of the arb i

tration shal l be Engl i sh
. The arbi trator sh al l not b e em pow ere d to gr

an t exem pl ary , pu ni ti ve , or c ons eq

ue nti al da mag esor any da mag esi n e xc es s of thos e dam

ag espe rm

i tted u nd er th e e xpres s terms of

t his con tra ct. The party prev ail i ng on sub stan tia l l y al l of i ts cl ai m s sh al l be en titl ed to recover it s cost s, including at t o rne y's fe es , fo rt he ar bit r at io n p r o ce ed ing s, as we ll as any anci ll ary proceedi

ng, including a proceedin

g to compel

or en jo in a r bit ra

ti on , to re qu est i

n ter i m mea su re s or to conf i rm or set as i de an

awar d. Cl ai m s, ca use s of action an d other di sp ute s agai

nst Buy er
ar ising out of or re l ate d to the b

rea ch by Bu yer of an y re t ail ins t allme nt co nt r ac t ex ec ut ed in
conn ection wi th thi s con tract are n

ot subj ect to arbi

tration und er thi s pa ragra ph." Pa ra gr ap h 16 , w h i ch i s a l so i m pl i ca ted i n th i s a pp ea l , re ad s i n re l ev an t pa rt:No. 2-- 07--0322

-4-

"16. Li m i tati on of De al er ' s Li ab i l i

ty Dea ler's e nt ire liabili

t y to Buyer , if any, fo r a ny cla im, dem andsor ca us esof ac t io n, wh et he rin

to rt, co ntract, co nsum

er fraud, f raud or o therwis e, is l im ited solel y to t he am

ount set fort h as the purchase price of this contract. " Th e top t wo -t hirds o f the front side of the Second Buy ers Order contain s a series of b la nks f orsuch terms as the m

ake, model , and y

ear of the purchas ed car, as wel l as the sel

li ng price, sales t ax, and f ees. Thi s secti on of the f ront side also contains

several paragrap hs o f preprinted terms, including a p ar ag r ap h e nt it led "Wa rr an t y Dis cla imer , " w hic h r ea ds in re levant part (not in

actual si ze): "Dealer ex pr es sly di sc l ai m s a ny l i ab i l i ty to bu yer f or an y conse que nti al da mag es , da mag esf or l oss of us e, l oss of pr of i ts or i nc ome, l oss of ti me or in conven ie nce, or any

ot her i nci dental
orco nse qu en t ial d ama ge s a r is ing o ut o f t his c o nt r ac t o rt he o pe r at io n o f t he ve hic le purchased hereunder." The botto m thi

rd of the page is se t o ff by a so lid line , immed iat ely be lo w w hic h is a he ad ing t ha t is bolded an d cen tered on the pa

ge. The h

eadi ng rea ds i n actual s ize:

" SUBJECT TO TERM S & CONDITIONS O N REVERSE SID E AND THI RD PARTY FINA NCE APPROVAL " The font f or t he i mm edi ately surroundin

g li nes is consi

derabl y s ma ll er and n ot bolde d. Th e f

ont f or t he head ing is, in fact , t he larg est on t he pa ge bu t for t he main pag e t itle, which r ead s: " US ED CAR RETA ILBUY ER S O RDE R. " At t he ver y bot t om o f the f ront si de of the Se cond

Buy ers Order a

re spaces f or the b uy er' s personal

i nf orma tion and si gna ture. In h er re sp on se to th e m oti on s to com

pe l ar b i tra ti on , pl ai n ti f f argu ed th at the a rb i

trati on clause was both procedurall

y a nd sub stantiv

el y un conscionabl

e. Plai ntif f as sertedthat she "ne

ver saw the [ar bi trati on c l au se ], [s

he ] wa s n ot told to read the

[claus e]," a

nd " no one

never [ sic ] re f

er re d toNo. 2-- 07--0322

-5-

t he [claus e] ." Plaint iff

also ar gue d t hat t he clau se w as "o ne- sided , w itho ut co nsider at ion[ ,] and in conspicious." The trial cour t held a heari

ng on defendan

ts' motions. Pla int iff te st ified o n he r o wn b eha lf. She stated t ha t , o n O ct o be r22 , 20 05 , she pu r ch as ed a p r eo wn ed Nis sa n a t Ge r ald Nis san an d traded in h er Ch ev rol et M on te Carl o. The term

s of the a greem en t were contai

ne d i n the Fi rst Buy ers Order, whi ch plaint iff signed in the presen ce o f a fina ncing emp lo yee who m she did no t name . P laint iff testifi ed that she had no obje ct io n t o t he t er ms o f t he Fir st Bu yer s O r de ras she un de r st o o d t he m. Pla int iff acknowl edged

that t he reverse side of the Fi rst Buyers Order contains an arbi trat ion cl ause ide ntica l t o t he pr ovisio n in the S eco nd Bu yers O rd er . P laintiff tes t ifi ed t hat when s he sig ne d it she
was una ware of the arb i

tration claus e i n the Fi rs t B uye rs Order. Plai

ntif f ex pla in ed that no one at Ge r ald Niss an

ad v i se d h er to re ad th e b ack of

th e docu men t or i n f orm ed h er th at t here were an

y t er ms o n t he ba ck
. Pla intiff did no t re ad t he bac k o f the First Buyer s Or der on he r o wn initiat ive be f ore she signe d t he con

tra ct, be ca us e s he "d idn 't ge t an o pp o r t un it y." Pla int iff t es t ified t ha t Ge r ald Nis san gave h er copiesof t he First Buyer s Or der and t he r elat ed p ape rw or k she signed on October 22. Wh en asked if s he read the back of

the Fi rst Buyers Order b etween October 22 and October 28, the day she returned to Geral

d Ni ssan, pl ai

nti ff sai d: "Every

thin g was a done deal at t hat po in t, so I didn 't feel that I had to si

t do wn an d anal yze the contracts t hat were al ready provided to me the f

irst time." Pla int iff testifi ed t ha t, o n October 2 6, 2005, she receiv ed a phone call

from Tam

er Shams, Ge r ald Nis sa n's fin ance m anag er . I n t ha t co nve r sa t io n, Sh ams as ke d p laint iff t o r et ur n t o Ge r ald Nis san t o dis cu ss "t wo o pt io ns" wit h him
. Sh ams al so stat ed that plai ntif f n eeded to re-sign h

er pap erwork. Wh enpla int iff t o ld S ha ms t ha t she did no t wis h t o sig n a ny mo r e p ap er wo rk, Sh amsNo. 2-- 07--0322

-6-

repli ed that she wasrequired

"by law" t o d o s o a nd t hat her cr edit co uld be ne gat ively aff ect ed if she ref use d. Pla int iff t es t ified t ha t she we nt t o Ge r ald Ni ss an onOct obe r 2 8 and met w ith S hams, w ho presented pla int iff wi th the Secon d Buy ers Order. Plai

ntif f testif ie d that Shams

said nothin

g about her financing for t he sale refl

ected in the Fi rst Buyers Order an

d that he di d not all

ude to any problem wi th the transaction. Plai

ntif f n ot ic ed that the Second Buyers Order refl

ected the purch as e of

th e sam e preowned Ni ssan

shown in the Fi rst Buyers Order b

ut indi cated an in crease of $1,700 f

or her servi ce con tra ct. Pl ai n ti f f told S h am

s th at s h e d i d n ot w an t to s i gn th e Se co nd Bu yers O rd er and asked t ha t Ge r ald Nis sa n r et ur n he rt r ad e- in. Sh ams r efu se d a nd sa id t ha t Ge r ald Nis sa n w o uld sue pla int iff if she did no t sig n t he do cu men t . Pla int iff, be lievin g t ha t she ha d " no o pt io n t o wa lk away ," signed t he S ec o nd B uye rs Or de r a nd t he r ela t ed pa pe rw o rk . P laint iff testifi ed tha t ne i the r Sh am s n or anyone el se at Gerald Ni

ssan in form ed her that day

of an arb itrat ion c l aus e i n the Sec ond B uy

ers Order
. Pl ai

ntif f did not rea

d the back of Secon d Buy ersOr der on he r o wn initiat ivebef ore she si gned it , be ca us e s he wa s " rus he d" t hr o ug h t he pr o ce ss . Pla int if f adm itted, however, that she nev er requestedtim

e to read the con

tract i n f ull be f ore she s ign

ed i t. She also did not read t he b ack of t he Sec ond Buy

ers Order bef

ore leav in g Gerald Nis san that

day , because the docum

ent was "taken

away as soon as she signe d [ it] ." Plaint iff t est ifi ed t hat she wasgi

ven a copy of the si gne d Sec ond B uy

ers Orderwh en she left Ge r ald Nis sa n t ha t da y. W he n a sk ed if she h ad "read any thin g on the reverse si

de si nc e the n," pl ai ntif f repl i ed i n the negati

ve . Pla int iff testi f i ed th at she si

gne d the Secon d Buy ers Order i

nv olu ntari l y and un der " dures s." She testif ie d that no one at Gerald Ni ssan phy si cally threatened her b

ut t hatshe signe d t he Se co nd Buy ersOrder to pr ese rve her cr edit , w hich Shams c laimed wo uld be d amage d if she did no t sign t heNo. 2-- 07--0322

-7-

ag re em en t. Plaint iff

admit t ed t hat she never asked to speak to any one other t han

Sham s at Ge r ald Ni ssa n on Octobe r 28. Sh ams wa s def

en da n ts' sol e wi tn es s. He testi f i ed th at th e transa cti on re f l ec ted i n th e Fi rs t Buy ersOrder fail

ed because pla

in tif f' s f in anci ng was r eje ct ed
. Sh ams ex pla ine d t ha t "t he r e is a c er t ain ad v an ce y ou w oul d n ee d f rom th e b an k to get the deal approved" and that pl ai ntif f' s advan ce "was
co ming upsh ort" because

she owed m

ore o n he r trade-in, the Monte Carlo, t han the car was wo rt h. Sh ams tes ti f

i ed tha t he l ater s ecure d f

i na nc i ng f orpl ai nti f f f rom J.P. Morgan. Shams

acknowl edged that t he "d ea l ha d c ha ng ed " b ut he did not elab orat e. Shams testif ie d that, o nce h

e obtain ed fi nan ci ng, h e p h on ed

pl ai n ti f f an d s ai d: "[ T]h ere is s om e p ap er wor k th at I n ee d to g o ov er

wi th you a nd *** I n ee d y ou to co me in a nd r e- sig n so me p ap er wo rk. " P laint iff met wit h S ha ms a t Ge r ald Nissan a nd tol d him she desir ed a car wit h a su nro of, which wa s lack ing in the Nis san she h ad origi nal ly agreed to purchase
. Aft er Sh ams sho wed her a mod el with a sunr oo f, plaint iff dec ided t o p ur chas e t he Nis san she ha d e arli

er sel ected. Plai

ntif f then signed the Second Buy

ers Order and the rel

ated paperwork. Sh ams t es t ified t ha t pla int iff did no t "a sk [ fo r ] mo r e t ime to read t he documents." Sh ams testifi ed that p lai ntif f "could h ave decided n

ot to purchase any

cars f rom [Gerald Nis san]" b

ut that she nev er ex

pres sed such a des i re to Sha m s. The trial court is sued a wri

tt en order deny

in g defen dan t s' mot ions t o s t ay pr oc eed ings and
com pel arb i tration
. The t rial co ur t fou nd t he ar bitr at ion clau se bo t h pr oc edu ra lly and su bst an t ive ly
un co nsc io na ble base d o n t he fo llowing f actors, n o si ngl e one of w hi ch , the trial

court cautioned, was di sposi tive: "a. the

arbi trati on provi si on i n S ec ti on 1 7 i s n

ot co nsp icu o us wh en t he do cu men t is viewed as a wh

ole, nor on the back page ;No. 2-- 07--0322

-8- b. t he ar bit r at io n p r o visio n in S ec t io n 1 7 is ind ist ing uis ha ble in t he fine pri

nt b ut f or the title;
c. t he arbi

trat ion provisi on in

Section 17 i s not speci fi

cally referen ced or referred

to on the front page; d. t he ar bit r at io n p r o vis ion i n Sect i on 1 7 i s n

ot the res ul t of a p rior cou

rs e of meaningful

dealings o r t rad e usa ge bet ween t he par ties; e. th e a rb i trati on provi si on i n S ec ti on 1 7 w asnot

bargai ned f or between the parties butra t her is one p rovi si on i n a con tract of ad he si on w he re th ere ex i ste d a di sp ari ty of bar gaining po wer bet wee n t he dr aft er of t he co nt ra ct and t he par t y claim ingun co ns cio na bilit y; f. t he ar bitr at ion p ro vision in Sec t ion 1 7 wa s no t bro ught spe cifically t o t he pla int iff pur chas er 's at t ent ion; g. t he ar bit r at io n p r o visio n inSe ct io n 1 7 is at t he bo t t o m o f a fu ll pag e o f fi

ne pr int fil led fro m m

arg in to margin with t ext ; h. the arbi

trat ion provisi on in

Section 17 i s wri

tt en in 'legal ese' wi

thout cl ear notice to the purchaser that di spute resolution is si gni fi cantl y l im ited ( e.g. t he first sent ence of t he
se cti on is as lo ng o r lo nger t han eight of t he ot her si xteen paragraphs, and i

s so compl

ic ated, i t is ne arl y uni ntel l i gi bl e); i. the one -s i de d natu

re of the is sues to be arbi

trat ed i n Section 17ex cl

udes al l matters dea ling wit h t he pu rc hase r's financial o bligat ions ir re spe ct iveof o t her findings re gar ding t he dealer by the ar bitra to r; j. t he i nc l us i on of a p rovi si on w i thi n S ec ti on 1 7 i

n v i ol ati on of the Ill in ois Cons ume r Fra ud Act ex cl

udi ng a ny cons i derati

on of pun i tiv e dam ages ."No. 2-- 07--0322

-9-

I mmed iat ely

followi ng these f in din gs, the trial

cou rt n oted i n pa re n th es es : " con

tra st: the arbi trati on se cti on at issue in [ Kin

kel v. Cingular Wireless LLC , 223 Il l . 2d 1 (2 006)]." The trial

court concl

uded that pl ai nti f f "c an not b e f ai rl y sa i d to hav e been

aware of what she was agreei ng to in Section 17 whi ch is ino rd inat ely o ne- sid ed in t he d ra ft er 's fa v or." Defendan ts fi le d this tim el y a ppeal under Supreme Court Ru

l e 307 (a)(1). 1 88 Il

l . 2d R. 3 07(a)( 1). I. PLA INTIF F' S MOTIO

N TO STR

IKE Bef ore we consider the meri

ts o f thi s appeal, we address pla in tif f' s m ot ion to strike po rt ions of defen dants' openi

ng bri ef. Pl ai ntif f takes issuewit h t hre e as pec t s o f defend ant s' st at ement of facts. Fi rs t, plai ntif f asserts that d efendan

ts' citations that appear in the form, "RP Plai ntif f' s [or Defendan

t's] Ex. __ ," are i

m pr oper b ec au se

th e s ource

"s i m pl y ca n n ot [ sic ] be lo ca t ed
. " T he po int o f t his obj ec ti on elu de s u s. "R P, " a s d efe nd an t s e xp la in , qu i te obvi ous l y de si gnate s th e re port of proceedin gs for t he hea ring o n d efen da nt s' mot ions t o c omp el arbit ra t ion, t he o nly pro cee ding transcrib ed

in the record. It is

equally app ar ent t ha t t he de sig na t io n " E x. " r efe r s t o an ex hibit adm itted at t hat hearing. These ci tat ions a re entirel

y a ppropriate. Second, plai ntif f argues that defendan ts' qu o t at io n o f t he ar bit r at io n p r o visio n, bo lde d in pa r t un like t he o r igin al, "ma ke [ s] it appear as if the arb itration provi si ons were conspi cuous and easi

ly found." Def

endan ts bolded t he
essen tial pa rtsof the arbi

trat ion provisi on for em

phasis. We do not repro ach them for thi s. We can prope r ly ass ess the c onsp i cuousne ss of

the a rbi tration claus e f rom th e copy of the Sec ond B uy

ers Order that i s i nc l uded i n the rec ord. Plaint iff 's t hird co mplain t wit h de fend ant s' s t at eme nt o f facts is that defend ant s have mi srepresented

th e rec ord . Pl

ai n ti f f si n gl es out th e f oll owi n g s tate men ts from page 10 of defendan ts' br ief:No. 2-- 07--0322

-10-

"P laint iff claims tha t she never

re ad [the a rb i tra ti on ] c l au se

b ef oresi gn i n g e i th er A gr eemen

t. (RP 000066, RP 000119-20). She did n ot , in fact, choose to r ead any

thin g o nthe reverse side of the A greem en ts. ( Id. )" The rel eva nt testim ony on the pag es def

enda nts ci te is : "Q. Did y

ou, at t he ti

me y ou w ere a t th e dea l er sh i p on th e 2 8th [of O ctober 2 005], read a ny thi ng on the re verse s i de of

that docu

men t [the Se cond

Buy ers Order]? A. No. At the time
. Q. Now, if y

ou'll fl ip to the second page, o bvio us ly, t his is a p ho t o co py, bu t - - we ll, first of a ll, have yo u r ead anything o n t he r ever se side since t hen? A . No. * * * Q. You read the

f ront of ev ery do cument t hat you w er e hand ed o n Oct obe r 2 2nd and Oc tob er 28 th ? A . O n th e 2 8th , I d

i d n ot. On t he 22nd , t he do cument s t hat wer e pr ovid ed in fro nt of me, I r ea d t he fr o nt . T he y t o o k t he m aft er I sig ne d, so t he 22 nd wa s a ca rI ac t ua lly wanted. I mean, I wanted t hat deal. I si g ned f or it, so I r ead the f

ront o f i t, didn't get an oppo rtu ni ty to read t he back part." Plai ntif f cl ai ms that defenda

nts' stateme

nt that sh e " di d n ot, i n f ac t, choose t o r ead anything o n t he
reverse side o f the A gr eemen ts" (e m ph as i s a dded ) m i srep re se n ts t he ac t ua l mea nin g o f t he t es t imo ny. While pl ain t iff's t es t imo ny i mp l i es that she f reel y chose n ot to read th

e b ack s i de of

ei ther B uy ers Order after

sh e s i gn ed i t, she ex pressl y testi fi ed that she "di

dn't get an

oppor tunity

to read the back pa rt" of the Fi

rst Buy ers Order be f

ore she signe d it on O ct obe r 2 2 and t hat she was "rushed" throughNo. 2-- 07--0322

-11-

t he process on October 28 and so she al so did n ot read the reverse si

de of the Second Buy

ers Order be f ore si gni ng i t. If th e a b ov e- qu oted

sta tem en ts from def

endants suggest t hat plai

ntif f f reely chose not to read the

reverse side of ei ther B uy ers Order be f

ore signi ng i t, th en the i r cl ai m s do not accurately

refl ect the rec ord. In

our v i ew , h owe ve

r, d ef en da nts ' ass erti

on t ha t pla int iff "d id n o t , in f ac t, ch oos e to read any

thin g on the re v er se

si de of th e A gr eemen ts" i s a m b i gu ous an d m ay re f er to plai ntif f 's cond uct b ef ore or after she si

gned each Bu yer s Ord er . W

h i l e w e b el

i ev e th at def en da n ts sho uld have cl arif

ie d t hei r s tate men ts, th e rec ord

doe s n ot cl ea rl y con f ute th em , a n d w e ref us e to stri ke th em . Pla int iff also t ak es issu e w it h t he a rg ume nt se ct io n o f de fend ant s' o pe ning br ief. She asks that
we strike al

l c itations to federal

dis trict court deci si ons as wel l as t he ar gu me nts based on tho se citations. Pl

ai n ti f f ci tes ad moni ti on s f rom th e S ev en th Ci rcu i t Cou rt of Appeals as to t he preceden tial val ue o f fede ra l distr ict c ou rt cas es. Plaint iff claims tha t t hese cas es ho ld t hat t he de cisions of t he lower federal court s "are not to be ci

ted for any purpose
. " ( E mph as is a dd ed
. ) T his is an ind efe nsib le
ov er sta tem en t. For i nstanc e, An

ders on v . Rom

ero , 72 F.3d 5 18, 525 (7 th Ci r.1995), st ates that "[d]istrict co ur t dec isions ha ve no wei ght a s pre cedents" and "no aut hority" butma y b e ci ted as "evi dence of t he st at e o f the law. " Plaint iff 's argum en t has a m ore f und am en tal af f l i cti on, howev er. On the question of

what i s proper pract ic e in state co urts, she ci

tes prescripti ons by

federal appe l l ate
cou rtsfor pract ice i

n f ederal court s. She

clai m s tha t these f edera l pres cri pti ons a l so bi nd s tate court practiceby

vi rtue o f the f

ederal suprem acy clause (U.S. Const. , art . VI) , but t he sole case sh e cites, Wei ss v. V ill

age of D ow ner s Gr ove , 225 Ill . App. 3d 466 (1992), speaks to t he ent irely dist inc t que sti on of w hat subs t ant ive law-- st at e o r fed er al-- go ver ns fede ra l claims br o ug ht instat e cour ts. See Wei ss , 22 5 I ll. App. 3d at 469 ("Wh ere, as here, a State cour t considers a F ederal cl ai m un derNo. 2-- 07--0322

-12-

t he su pr emacy clau se o f the Uni ted States C onsti

tution (U.S. Const., art. VI), the St ate co urt must ap ply Fede ra l law to t he claim"). The mor e r elevant guidepost i s our re cent st at ement in Lam ar Wh iteco Outdoo r Corp. v. Ci ty of W est Chicago , 35 5 I ll. App. 3d 352, 360 (2005), t hat "[a]lthough t his co ur t is not bou nd

t o fo llow fed er al dist rict co ur t dec isions [ cita t ion] , su ch de cisions can provi de guida ncean d s erv e a s p ers ua si ve au thor i ty [ci tati on] ." D ef en da nts ' c i tati on to f ederal di str i ct c our ts i s n ot im proper per se . We

wil l gi ve thes e auth

oriti es n o greater d

ef eren ce than they are du e. For t he r eas ons sta

ted ab ove , we

de ny pl ai nti f f 's m oti on t o st rik e p o rt io ns o f de fend ant s' br ief. II. UNC ONSC IONA

BILI TY We now turn to the su bs tan ceof t his a pp ea l. Defe

ndan ts att ack the trial

court 's f in din g that t he ar b i tra ti on cl au se i n th e S ec on d B uy

er s Ord er

i s b oth pr oce du ra l l y an d sub sta n ti vel y unc onsc i onab l e. The threshol

d qu es ti on i s w ha t l aw appl i es . There

are two c onte

nd ers : s ec ti on

1 of t he Uni f orm Arb i tration Act (Arb i

tration Act) (710 ILCS 5/1 (West 20 04 ) (" [a ] w ri tten ag re em en t to
su bmit any

exi stin g con trover sy to ar b i tra ti on or a pr ov i si on i n a w ri tten con tra ct to s ub m i t to arbi trati on any co nt ro ver sy the re aft er ar ising bet wee n t he pa r t ies is va lid, en fo r ce ab le a nd irr ev o ca ble
save upon such

grou nds a s exi st f or th e re voc ati on of an y con trac t"))an d s ec ti on 2of

the Federal A rb i trati on Act (FAA

) (9 U.S.C. §2 (2000) ("[a] written provisi on in *** a contract ev ide nc in g a transaction i

nvol vi ng com me rce to set tle by

arbi trat ion a contro versy

thereafter ari si

ng out o f s

uch
co nt ra ct o r t ra nsa ct io n, o r t he r efu sa l t o pe rfo rm t he w ho le o r a ny pa rt t her eo f, oran ag r ee men t in
wr iting t o s ubmit t o a rbit ra t ion an e xisting contro versy aris in g out of such

a c ontr ac t, tra ns ac ti on, or
r efu sa l, shall be valid, ir re voc able, and e nfor cea ble, sa ve up on s uch g ro unds as e xi st a t law o rin equi ty for the re voc at ion o f any cont ra ct ")) . D efenda nt s ar gue t hat t he FAA ap plies bec aus e t heNo. 2-- 07--0322

-13-

unde rlying

t ra nsac t ion in t hi s c ase af fects i nterstate co mm

erce. Normally

, "[w]here a contract involvingin

terstat e comm

erce contains an arb itration cl ause, fe deral l

awpreempts state statut es even in stat e cour ts." Bisho p v. We Care Hai r Devel opmen t Cor p. , 31 6 I ll. Ap

p. 3d 11 82, 119 0 (200 0). Howev er, "i n ci rcumstances whe

re parties t o a c o nt r ac t ha ve ag r ee d t o ar bit r at e in ac corda n ce wi th sta te la w , t he FAA d oes not apply , even where i

nterst ate co mm

erce is i nvolv ed." Glaze r's Dist ribut or s o f Illinois, I nc. v. NWS-I ll inois, LLC , 376 Ill . App. 3d 411 , 42 1 (2 007 ); se e al so Vo lt Inf ormation Sci

ences, In c. v . B oard of

Tru ste es of th e L el an d S tan f ord Ju n i or U n i v er si ty , 489 U.S. 468, 479, 103 L. Ed . 2 d 48 8, 500 , 1 09 S . C t . 1 248 , 1 256 (1 989 ) ( "Ju st as [ t he pa rt ies] may limi t by contract t he iss ue s w hic h t he y will ar b i tra te [citation], so too ma

y the y s peci fy by contract t he rules under whi ch that ar bitr at ion will be con

du cte d. W

h ere * ** th e p ar

ti es h av e a gr ee d to a b i de b y sta te rules of a rbit ra t ion, enfo rc ing

t ho se rule s a cc o r din g t o t he t er ms o f t he ag r ee men t is fu lly co nsist ent wit h t he go als o f the FAA *** "). The Sec ond Buyer s Or der pr ovid es t hat it "s hall be go ver ned by t he inter nal laws o f the St at e o f Illinois," a nd t he ar bitr at ion p ro vision st at es t hat "[t ]he ar bit r at o rsha ll determ inethe righ ts a nd obl i ga ti ons ac cord i ng to the su bs tan ti ve l aw s of the State of Il l i noi s. " Pur suan t to Glaze r's and Vo lt , w e ap ply the Ar bitr at ion Act t o t he ar bitr at ion p ro vision. In fac t , we wo uld appl

y Il l i n oi s l aw ev en ab se n t th e ch oi ce -of

-law pr ov i si on . N ei th er pa rty presented t he t r ial c o ur t wit h t he qu es t io n o f w ha t law sh o ul d a pp ly. The t rial co ur t 's or der denying defendan ts' mot ions d oe s no t re fer a t all to t he FAA and ci tes the Arbi

trat ion A ct alone. It is n

ot our provin ce t o d ecide for t he first t ime in this litigat ion whe t he r the FAA appl i es, f or whe ther a tran sacti on im pacts in terstat e comm

erce i s a questi on of f

act. See Merritt-Chapm

an & Scott Corp.
v. Penns ylvania Tur npike C omm'n , 387 F.2d 768, 772 (3d Ci r. 1 96 7) (" i

t i s i m pos si b l e f or u s to dete rmine on appeal

whether the [FA

A] appl ie s. For to do so wo uld requi re us to make an i

ni tialNo. 2-- 07--0322

-14-

f ac tua l de term i na ti on wh et he rt he co nt r ac t ev ide nc ed 'a t r an sa ct io n inv o lving co mmer ce ' w it hin t he meaning of

§2 of the A ct" ); se e al so Else

v. Inf li ght Ci nem a International, Inc. , 465 F. Supp. 1239, 1244 (D.C. Pa. 197 9) ("[ w] het her inter st at e co mmerce is invo lved is a q ues t ion o f fact for t he dis trict court"). No ma tt er which statute we appl y , however, Ill i

noi s law wi

l l govern our a

na l y si s. "Wh

ether under f ederal ru l es or s tate l aw, thereis n

o arbitrat ion wi

thou t a valid cont ract t o arbitrat e." Ast e v. Metropo li tanLi f e In su ran ceCo. , 312 Ill . App. 3d 972, 975 (2 000). " 'I n d et er mining wh et he ra v alid arbi trati on agre em en t arose between the parties , [the court ] should l ook t o t he state law tha t
o r din ar ily governs the formation of contr acts.' " Ast e , 31 2 I ll . App. 3d at 976, quo ting Gibso n v. Ne i gh bor hood Heal th Clin ic s, Inc. , 12 1 F
. 3d 11 26 , 11 30 ( 7t h C ir
. 19 97 )
. I n a pp lyi ng t he FAA , "c our ts may not *** in val ida te arbitration agreem

ents under

state laws appl

ic abl e o nly to arbi trati on pr o visio ns" ( emp ha sis in o r igin al) ( Doctor' s Ass oci ate s, Inc. v . C as arotto , 517 U.S. 681, 687, 134 L. Ed. 2d 90 2, 909, 116 S. Ct . 1652, 1656 (1996)), but "general contract defenses

such as fraud , duress, or unconsci onabi

li ty, grounded i

n state co ntract law , m

ay ope rate to i nv al i da te a rb i trati on agreements" ( Ci

rcu i t Ci ty St o r es , I nc . v. Ad ams , 2 79 F .3 d 88 9, 892 (9 t h Cir. 200 2) ). Eve n if the FAA ap plie d, I llino is la w w o uld pr o vid e t he ult imat e c r it er ia fo rjud gin g p laint iff's cla ims o f
unc onsc i onab i l i

ty. Having deter

m i n ed th at I l l i n oi s l aw appl i es , w e tu rn to t he qu est ion o f who
-- t he tria l court
orth e a rb i tra tor- -s h oul d dec i de th e v al i di ty of th e a rb i tra ti on cl au se . D ef en da n ts argue that the trial courtsh oul d have re f erred to the arbi trator the question of

whether the arbi trat ion c la use's dis cl ai me r of punit ivedam

ages conf orms wi th the Cons um er F raud A

ct. As n ot ed, the trial

court in val ida ted t he arbi trati on claus e f or, int er alia , i

ts n on con f orm i ty wi th th e C on su

mer Fr aud A ct. (D ef en da n tsNo. 2-- 07--0322

-15-

do not d i sputetha t the tri al cou rt wa s th e a ppr opri atearbi ter f orthe remai

ni ng i ssuest ou ched on by t he co ur t in

it s d is positi on.) Defen

dants advan

ce two co ntentions

why the arbi trat or, not the trial
cou rt, sho uld have dec ided w het her t he disc laimer o f punit ive damag es is co nsist ent wit h t he Consum er Fr aud A ct. Fi rs t, d ef en da n ts assert that t he trial

court 's cons ide

ration of that particul

ar chal le ngeto the arb i

tration claus e vi ola

ted the pri nc i pl e tha t the court

"i s not to consider

th e m eri ts of the arbi trab l e i ss uebu t m us t su m mari l y de term i ne whether a

n a rb i trati on ag reement exi sts" ( Contract Devel

opmen t Cor p. v. Beck , 210 Ill . App. 3d 67 7, 6 79 (1 99 1) ). D ef

en da n ts f ai l to recogniz e that, though plai nt iff 's co mplaint allege s violat ions o f the Co nsumer Fra ud Ac t , t he dis cl ai me rof p unit ive damag es is no t one of the grounds al le ged. Thus, the l egi

tim acy of the dam

ages l i m i tation is not an "arbi

trable i ssue" b ut a basi s on whi

ch pl ai ntif f attacks the

arbi trati on cla us e it se lf. "The is sue of wh

ether a contract t o arbitrate exi sts must be determi ned b y the court , not an arb i trator." Bahu riak v. Bill

Kay Chry sl er Ply mouth, Inc. , 337 Ill . App. 3d 714, 719 (2003) ; see al so 710 ILC S 5/2(b) (West 2004) ("[o]n appli cation, the courtmay

sta y an arbi trati on proc ee din g comm enced or threatened

o n a sho win g t ha t t he r e is no ag r ee men t t o ar bit r at e" ( emp ha sis adde d)). Second, defen

dants ci te Buckey

e Check C ashi

ng, Inc. v. C ar deg na , 546 U.S. 440, 163 L. Ed. 2d 1038, 126 S. Ct. 1204 (2 006 ), which, in their words,"hel

d specifi cally that t he question of whether
a [ sic ] ter m s of a c on tra ct wi th an ar b i tra ti on [c l au se ] re

n dere d th e c on tra ct v oi d f or i l l eg al i ty wa s to be determi

ned b y a n arbi trat or, not the court ." Defen dant s o ve r lo o k a n imp o r t an t qu alific at io n in Bu ck eye 's h ol di

n g. Th e c our

t h el d th at " unless t he cha llenge is t o t he ar bit r at io n c lau se it se lf , t he is sue of t he co nt ra ct 's validity is co nsider ed by t he ar bit r at o rin t he firs t inst an ce . " ( E mph as is adde d.) Bu ck eye , 546 U.S. at 445- 46, 163 L. Ed. 2d at 1044, 1 26 S. C t. at 1209. In an y ev en t, Bu ck eye was inter pr et ingthe FAA, whi ch di vides r es po nsib i l i

tie s b etween the arb i

trator and th

e tri al courtNo. 2-- 07--0322

-16-

diffe r en t ly

tha n d oesthe A rb i trati on Act, which

i s th e a ppl i ca bl e s tatute he re. Un de r th e A rb i trati on A ct, "[t] he

i ss ueof whether a contract t o arbitrate exi sts must be determi ned b y the court , not an arb i trator" ( Bahuri

ak , 337 Ill . App. 3d at 719 ), re ga rdl es s of whether th

e c ha l l en geto the arbi trati on clause is in eff ect a chal le nge to the entire contract (wh i ch , i nc i den tal l y , could be

the c ase here because t he co nt ra ct co nt ains a g ener al disclaimer o f punit ive damag es) . T he trial court was correct in t aking upo n itse lf the issue of wh ether t he di sclai

mer of puni

tive dam ages in the arbitrat ion cl

ause com por ts wi th the Cons um er F raud A

ct. In what fol lows, we rev

ie w the trial court 's f in din gs on that is sue an d on the other facets of pl

ai ntif f' s clai m that the arbi

trat ion c la use i s i nva li d as uncons ci onabl

e. Bef ore ex am i ni ng th e arb i tration claus e, we s et f

orth our stan

dard of r eview. While defer ring to t he t r ial c o ur t 's find ing s o f fa ct su pp o r t ing it s d et er mina t io n o f u nc o ns cio na bilit y ( Cali guiri v. Fi rst Co lony Li f e In su ran ceCo. , 318 Il

l . Ap p. 3d 79 3, 800- 0 1 (2000)), we review de no vo b oth i ts
constru cti on of the arbi

trat ion c la

use ( Peach v . CIM Insuranc e Corp. , 3 52 Il l
. App. 3d 691, 694 (2004 )) an d its ul

timate de t er mina t io n o f u nc o ns cio na bilit y ( Ki nkel , 223 I ll . 2d at 22). T here is a "stro ng publ

ic poli cy i n f avor o f en

forcing arbi

trat ion agreemen

ts." Ki nkel , 223 Ill . 2d at 47. "U n con sc i on ab i l i ty can b e ei ther 'procedural'

or 'substanti

ve' or a co mb in

ation of both." Ra

zor
v. Hy undai Moto r Am

erica , 2 22 I ll. 2d 7 5, 99 ( 200 6) . T he t rial co ur t det er mined t hat t he arbi trati on provision wa s un

cons cionab l e i

n b oth sen

ses . A . Pr oce du ra l Un con sc i on ab i l i ty We at t en d fir st t o t he find ing o f pr o ce du r al u nc o nsc io na bil ity. Re cent ly, in Ki nkel , t he
su pr em e c our t ad opte d a l en gth y ex pos i ti on of pr oce du ra l un con sc i on ab i l i ty fro m the Fi

rst District A pp el l ate Co ur t in Frank' s Mai

ntenan ce & Engi neeri ng, Inc. v . C. A . Rob erts

Co. , 86 Ill . App. 3d 980, 989 -9 0 ( 198 0) . T he issue in Frank' s Mai ntenan ce was t he pr oc edu ra l and su bst ant ivefair nes s o f aNo. 2-- 07--0322

-17-

l i m i tation on liability, but t he sup re me co ur t in Ki nkel he ld t ha t t he fo llo win g r ema rks we r e a pp lica ble as wel l to an attack on an

arbi tration provi

sion: " 'Pro ce du

ra l un con sc i on ab i l i ty con sists of som e i m pr opri ety dur ingt he pr oc ess o f forming t he contract depri

vi ng a party of m ean i ngf ul choic e. [C i

tati on s. ] F ac torsto be consi dered
areall the ci

rc umst ance s su rr ou nding t he t ra nsac t ion includ ing t he manner in which the contract was entered i

nto, whethereach

pa rty had a re aso nable o ppo rt unit y to unde rst and t he t er ms of the con tract, an d w he the r i m porta nt te rms w ere hi dde n i n a maz e of f i n e p ri n t; b oth t he consp i cu ous ne ss

of the clausean

d the n eg oti ati ons rel ati ng to i t are i m porta nt, al be i t not
co nclusive fact or s in det er mini ng the is sue of

un consc i ona bi l i ty . [C i tati on. ] To b e a

pa rt of t he bar gain, a pr ovisio n l im iti ng t he de fendant 's liabil

ity must , u nless inco rp or at ed int o t he contract thr

ough pri or cou rs e of dea lings or t ra de u sag e, have been ba rg ained fo r, bro ught to t he pu rc hase r's att ention or be conspicuous.' " Ki nkel , 223 Ill . 2d at 23, quot in g Fra nk's Mai ntenan ce , 86 Ill . App. 3d at 989-90. Most of t he t rial co ur t 's fi ndi ngs rel ate to proceduralunconsci onabi li ty. The trial

court found that t he ar bi trati

on provi si

on i s " i nd i sti ng ui sh ab l e i n th e f i ne pri nt b ut f or th e ti tl e" an d s o is no t conspicuous, was "no t spe cifically re fere nced or re ferr ed t o o n t he fro nt pag e, " wa s "no t bro ught sp ec ifica lly

t o t he pla in tif f purch aser's a tt ention," was "not the result of a pri or co urse of m

eani ngf ul dealin gs or t ra de u sag e bet wee n t he parties," was"not barga i ne d f or" bu t rather was p artof a contract of adhe sion, and was written in "l egalese" an

d so was "nearly

uni ntell igi ble." Plai ntif f also cl ai ms that she was "coerced" in

to sign in g the Seco nd Buy

ers Order . This i s a

referen ce, we presum

e, to alle ged remarks by S ha ms th at n

eg ati v e c on se qu en

ce s, such as da mag e to pla int iff's cr ed it o rev en a la ws uit by Ger ald Nissa n, w ou ld flow fr om her re fusal t o s ign t he do cument . T he trial court , however, ma

deNo. 2-- 07--0322

-18-

n o f i n di n g th at p l ai n ti f f wa s s ub j ec t to co er cion o r d ur ess be yond w hat was inherent in the S eco nd Buyer s Or der , w hich, as we explai n bel ow, is a contract of ad

he sion. See , e.g. , Ki

nkel , 223 Ill . 2d at 26 ( no t ing t ha t t he t ypic al c o nt r ac t o f ad he sio n c o nt ain s " t er ms *** [t hat ] a re nonne go t iable and presented i n f i ne pri nt i n l anguag e tha

t the av erage cons um er m i ght n ot ful l y und erstan d"). Theref

ore, we do not consider

whet her plaint iff

was co er ced by thr eat s into signing the Se cond Buy ers Order. The trial court 's f

in din gs on pro cedural unconsci onabil ity rel ate t o either o f two quest ions: (1) whether p l ai

nti f f coul d or did n ot ic e the cl ause, i.e. , wh ethe r the c l aus e was

"pa rt of th e b argai

n," in t he w o rd s o f Frank' s Mai ntenan ce ; a nd ( 2) wh ethe r plai ntif f could or did un

derstand the c l aus e. Our discu ssio n of t he firs t qu es t io n is fram ed by the fi nal li ne i n the ab ove-quot ed l anguage f rom Frank' s Mai

ntenan ce : " To be a part of the bargain, [an arbi trat ion provisi

on] must, unless in corpo rated in

to the contract t hrough

a prior course of deal

in g or t rade usage, hav

e been bargai ned f or, brought to the purchaser' s at t ent ion or be cons pi cuous ." (Em

phasi s ad ded.) Fra nk's Mai ntenan ce , 86 Ill . App. 3d

at 990 . T he t rial co ur t fou nd, and defend ant s do not dispu t e, t hat t he arbi trati on provisi on was nei

ther bargai

ned f or nor incorporat ed i

nto the Se cond Buy

er's Order through a p rior cou

rs e of de al i ng ort ra de u sag e. The cla us e q uo t ed fr o m Frank' s Mai ntenan ce is, however, in the d isjunct ive, c onve ying t hat an ar bitr at ion p ro vision may be co nsider ed " par t of t he bar gain" if

it has at least one of t he cha ra ct er istics t he co ur t listed . D efenda nt s ar gue t hat t he arbi trati on pr ovisio n has t he sa

vi ng vi rtue of be i ng consp i cu ous . W e f

i nd tha t, th ough the arbi trati on clause itsel f was n

ot conspicuous, it was adequately brought to pla

in tif f' s attention by

another pr o visio n in t he co nt r ac t an d, t he r efo r e, wa s p ar t o f t he ba r ga in
. To ex pl ai n our h ol di n g, we f ocu s on two d i scre te fi ndi ngs b y the trial co ur t . T he first is the finding that t he arbi

trat ion c la use i s not conspic

uous because it i s "i

ndi stin guis hab le in fi ne pri nt butNo. 2-- 07--0322

-19-

f orthe ti tl e" an d i s " at the b ottom

of a f ul l pageof fine pr int filled mar gin t o mar gin wit h t ext ." The
sec ond is the co ur t 's finding t hat t he clau se "w as no t bro ught spe cifically t o t he plaint iff

pur chas er 's at t ent ion" and "is n

ot speci f i cal l y ref eren ced or re f

erre d to on

th e f ron t pa ge ." W e rev

i ew b oth fi ndi ngs de no vo be ca

us e they are base d on the tri al cou rt' s i nte rpreta ti on of the Sec on d Buy

ers Order
. See Peach , 352 Ill . App. 3d at 6 94. The co ur t re mark ed, wit hou t elabo ra t ion, t hat t he arbi trati on cla us e c o mpa r ed un fav o r ab ly wit h t he pr o visio n in Ki nkel , w hich the su pr eme co ur t he ld
was pr o ce du r ally u nc o nsc io na ble to a "d egr ee" but not eno ugh t o invalidat e it ind epe ndent ly of any subs t ant ivefl

aws ( Ki nkel , 223 I ll . 2d at 27). As Ki nkel was cent ra l to t he t rial co ur t 's de cision, and pla int iff ci tes it i n def endi ng the trial

court 's reasoni

ng, we exa

mi ne the cas e i

n detai l. A s we ex pla in be l ow, Ki nkel demonstrat es that an arbitrat ion cl ause that is

not itsel f cons

pic uous may be deem ed part of t he ba rgai n un der Frank' s Mai

ntenan ce if i t was bro ught t o t he co nsumer 's attention by ot her provisions i

n the con tract of w hi ch the c l aus e i s a p art. At issue in Ki

nkel was t he validity o f an ar bitr at ion clau se in the plai n ti f f ' s c on tra ct wi th Ci ngul ar for cel lul ar teleph one se rvice. The ar bitr at ion clau se a ppe ar ed o n t he r ever se side of t he contract i n a dense l y pri n ted se ries of pa ra gr ap h s wi

th th e general

headi ng " ' TERMS AND CONDITIONS .' " Kin

kel v. Cingular Wireless, LLC , 3 57 I ll. App. 3d 5 56, 558 (2 005 ). The fol l owin g provi sion was n

estl ed i n the m i ddl e of a p aragraph

nea r the bottom of

that page:

" ' INDEPENDENT AR BITRAT ION [.] Pl ea se re ad th i s p arag

ra ph ca re f ul l y . It af f ec ts ri gh ts th at you may

oth er wise h av e. (a) C IN GULA

R a n d y ou sh al l us e ou r b est ef f ortsto
se t t le an y di sputeorclaim arising fro m or re lating t o t his Agre ement . * ** I f CIN GUL AR and yo u d o no t r ea ch ag r ee men t wit hin 30 d ays, inst ead of su ingin cou rt , C IN GUL AR and yo uagree to arbitrate any a nd al l di sputes and c laims ( inc lud ing bu t no t limit ed t o cla imsNo. 2-- 07--0322

-20-

based on or ari si ng f rom an al l eg ed tort) a ri si ng out of orrel ati ng to thi s A gre em en t, or t o a ny pri orAgreem

ent for products o r service between y ou and CING ULAR

** *. *** Except wh erepr ohibit ed byla

w, CINGULAR a

nd y ou agree that no arbitrato r has the a uthori ty to[] (1) aw ar d r elie f in e xc es s o f wh at t his agr eement prov i de s[ ,] (2 ) award

pun i ti ve da mag esor any other dam ages

not m eas ured b y the prevail i

ng p arty's actual dam ages [,] or (3) order
consol i da ti on or cl as s a rb i trati on . Th e Arbi trator(s ) m

us t gi ve ef f ec t to the l i m i tati ons on CIN GUL AR's liabilit y as se t fo r t h in t his a gr ee men t , an y ap plic ab le t ar iff , law , o r r egu latio n.
*** Notwithstandi

ng the f orego in g, either party may bri ng a n acti on i n smal l clai m s court.' " (Em phasi s ad ded.) Ki nkel , 357 Il

l . Ap p. 3d a t 558. Near the top of the page was this statem ent:

" 'IMPORTANT NOTI CE: THI S AGREEMENT CO N TAINS MANDATORY ARBITRA

TION AND O TH ER IMP ORT AN T PROVISIONS LIMITING THE R EMEDIES AVAILABLE TO YOU IN THE EVENT O F A DISPUTE. PLEASE REFER TO THE SECTION ENTI TLED 'ARB ITRATION ' FOR DETAILS.' " Ki nkel , 357 Ill . App. 3d at 563-64. The app ellate co ur t in Ki

nkel included a co py of t he "Te rms and Co ndit ions" pag e in its a ppe ndix, butne it he r t he co py nor t he co ur t 's qu ot at ions fr om t he o riginal do cument ar e in act ual size . T he appe l l ate cou rt en de av ore d to des cri

b e th e text: "[T he arbi trat ion c la use] ap pe ar s in t he midd le of a long paragraph at t he bott om of the ter msand- co ndit ions pageon

the ba ck of the servi ceagree

men t. The a rb i trati on cl au se i s on e of five claus es a ppe ar ing in the sam e paragraph. The terms

and condi

tions are pri

nted on an

8- by 14- inch pag e co nt aining 123 lines of t iny si ngle-spaced text. By way of comparison, anNo. 2-- 07--0322

-21-

8- by 14- inch pag e co nt ains 61 l i ne s of 12-poi nt si ngl e-sp ace d ty

pe." Ki nkel , 357 Ill . App. 3d at 563. The plaint iff

in Ki nkel challenge d t he arbi

trat ion c la use as a wh

ole, and the c lass acti on wai ver i n p arti cul ar, arg ui ng un consc i ona bi l i ty . Pre su mab l y be ca us e i t wa s u nd i spute d that the a

rb i trati on claus e wa s neit her spe cifically bar gained for nor incor po ra t ed int o t he servi ce agreem

ent through a pri orco ur se o f dealing or trade us ag e, th e a ppe l l atecou

rt' s d i sc us si on of pr oce du ra l un con sc i on ab i l i ty focused sol el y on whet her t he cha llenged p ro visions w er e br ou ght to the pl ai ntif f 's attenti on or wer e c onspicuous. Th e c ourt h el d: ( 1) th e a rb i trati on c l au se asa w hol e w asnot c on spi cuous but wa s bro ught t o t he plaint iff

's attention, and (2) the c l ass action wa

i ver was ne i ther. Ki nkel , 357 Ill . App. 3d at 56 3-64. As fo rt he ar bit r at io n c la use as a whole, the cour t found t hat it "could not be less cons pi cuous ," because "[t]he print is so sm all that i t seems hi ghl y un li kel y tha t an y co nsu mer wo uld read the entire ter ms-and-conditions page." Ki nkel , 35 7 Il

l . A pp. 3d a t 563 . The c our t acknowl edged

t he bo lde d a nd all- ca pit aliz ed sig na l, "I nd ep en de nt Ar bit r at io n, " b ut fo un d t ha t it provided "far less visua l emphasis t han might be t he case with larger pr in t. " Ki nkel , 357 Ill . App. 3d at 563. The court also to ok not e of the al l-cap i tal ized provi so that wa

rne d of "Ma nda tory Arb i tration," bu t it determi

ned that "d ue to the mi

nuscule ty peface, the capital l

ett ers pro vide far l ess emp ha sis than they otherwise mi ght." Ki nkel , 357 Ill . App. 3d at 56 3-6 4. The co ur t fou nd t he
war ningof "M anda t or y Arbitr at ion" "su ffi cient t o w ar ra nt a co nclusio n t hat t he arbi trati on provi si on as a whole was conspicuous orbro ught t o t he plai ntif f 's attenti on." (E m phasi s ad ded.) Ki nkel , 357 I ll. App. 3d at 563-64. However, t he warn in g " [did] not hi

ng to brin g the pro vi sion b arring class arbitration to [the plain

tiff 's] att ention." Ki

nkel , 357 Ill . App. 3d a

t 564. The court concl

uded:No. 2-- 07--0322

-22-

"The [classac t io n wa iver ] w as o ffer ed t o t he p laint iff o n a t ak e- it
- o r - lea ve - it ba sis hid de n in
a ma ze of f in e prin t where it was un

li kel y to be n ot ic ed, much

le ss read. Thi s is s

uf f i ci en t f or a fi ndi ng of procedur al un

conscionabi

li ty." Ki nkel , 357 Il

l . Ap p. 3d a t 564. Ci ngul ar appe al ed to the su pre me c ourt th

e f i nd i ng on th e c l as s acti

on wai ver. Th e p laint iff did not appeal the appel

la te court 's rej ection of h

er chal le nge to the arbitration cl

ause asa whole . In analyzing t he issue of p ro ced ur al unco nscio nability, t he su pr eme co ur t mentio ned a n asp ect of t he servi ce contract t hat the appella te court , curiousl

y, di d not acknowledg e. On t he fro nt of t he
con tra ct, t he plaint iff

had init ialed a p re pr inted ack now ledgment th at s he had re ad t he t er ms and cond i tions on th

e b ack. Ki

nkel , 223 Il

l . 2d at 26
. The sup re me co ur t did no t dispu t e t he appella te court 's as sessm

ent that the cl ass acti on wai ver was "h i dden i n a m az e of f i n e p ri n t wh ere i t wa s u n l i ke l y to be n ot ic ed, much

less read" ( Ki

nkel , 357 I ll. App. 3d at 564). The cour t found t he i nconspicuousness of the clause itse lf offset by two points: (1) t he plaint iff

's signed ack now ledgment on t he fro nt of t he co nt ra ct t hat she ha d r ead t he t er ms and
co ndit ions on the back; and (2) the undisputed fact t hat "t he t er ms and c ond itio ns we re in [t he plai ntif f' s] possession and sh

e ei ther read them

or co uld h

ave read them i f she had ch

osen to do so." Ki nkel , 223 Il

l . 2d at 26
. The court recogniz ed that the service contract was a c o nt r ac t o f ad he sio n, t ypifie d b y t er ms that ar e "no nnego t iable andpre sente d i n f i ne pri nt i n l an gua getha t the avera geconsu mer m i gh t not fully und erstan d." Ki nkel , 2 23 Ill . 2d at 26. The arbitrat ion cl ause could not be i

nval id on these grounds al one, stressed the court , because " [s]uch contracts *** are a fact of modern li

fe." Ki nkel , 223 Ill . 2d at 26. The court ex pl ai ned:No. 2-- 07--0322

-23-

"C on sum ersrout in el y s ign such agreem

ents to o btain

credit cards, rental

cars, la nd a n d cellul ar tel eph one s ervi ce, h

ome f urni sh i ngs and app l i ances , l oa ns, a nd ot her pr od uct s and
s er vic es. I t ca nno t r ea so na bly be sa id t ha t all s uc h c o nt r ac t s a r e s o pr o ce du r ally unconscionabl

e as to be unenf

orceable." Ki

nkel , 223 Il

l . 2d at 26
. The court dis cussed two cases ci ted by the pl ai nti ff : Ra zor and Frank' s Mai

ntenan ce . T he pla int iffs in Ra

zor and Frank' s Mai

ntenan ce chal len ged waivers of consequential damages, no t arbi trati on cl auses, but the Ki

nkel cou rt f oun d th ei r a n al y se s rel ev an t none t he l ess . The

court concluded that t he cases were "largel y distingui shabl

e." Ki nkel , 223 Ill . 2d at 26. The court not ed that the di spute d pr

ovi si on in Fra nk's Mai

ntenan ce , like t hat in Ki

nkel , appeared on the reverse si de of a sa les do cument . T he differe nce w as t hat , in Frank' s Mai ntenan ce , "[the] clause

direct ing t he plaint iff 's attention to the condi

tions pri nted on the reverse was

stamped over, sug ges t ing t hat t he obs cur ed lang uag e wa s irr elevant and could be i gnored. " Ki

nkel , 223 Ill . 2d at 25. The front-page adviso ry in Ki

nkel wasunob structed
. The co ur t did fi

nd a si mi lari ty between the arbitration clause and the wai ver of cons equenti al dam ages in Ra

zor . The cl ause statedthat arbi tration costs w ere to be

set by the W i reless Ind ustry A rb i trati on Rul es , wh

i ch were a va i l ab l e f rom Ci ng ul ar or the A meri ca n A rb i trati on A ss oci ati on " 'upon request .' " Ki

nkel , 223 Ill . 2dat 8. This statement "was i

n f in e prin t near the bott om of an 8- by 14-in ch page that wasfilled , fr o m mar gin t o mar gin , wit h t ex t , " a nd it wa s no t emp ha siz ed in any way . Ki nkel , 223 Ill . 2d at 26-27. The Ki nkel co ur t fou ndpa r all els b etw een th i s " l ac k of informat ion" and t he fa ct s o f Ra zor , where the plai

ntif f f irst en countered the waiv

er of consequen

tial dam ages in the o wner 's manua l delivered wit h t he ca r, and t hus t her e wa s " '[ no] basis fo r c onc luding that pl ai n ti f f cou l d h av e s een th e c l au se [] b ef

oreen ter i n g i n to t he sales contract. ' " Ki

nkel , 223 Ill . 2dNo. 2-- 07--0322

-24-

at 25, quot in

g Ra zor , 22 2 I ll. 2 d a t 10 2. Ev en t ho ug h t he p laint iff in Ki nkel did no t challenge t he cost provisi

on of the arbi

trat ion c la use, the court held that that issue co uld not be answered " without viewing t he wa iver p ro vision in the context of the service agreemen t as a whole." Ki

nkel , 223 Ill . 2d at 22. The

court conc l

uded that, thoug

h therewas "a d egr ee o f pro ced ur al unco nscio nability" in "the
co nt ract of w hich the class a ct ion wa iver [ was ] a par t ," t he t aint w as no t sufficient by it se lf t o i n v al i da te the contract , an d t he co ur t pr oc eed ed t o a ddr ess t he plaint iff 's claims of su bst ant ive
unc onsc i onab i l i

ty. Ki nkel , 223 Ill . 2d at 27. The sup re me co ur t 's o pinion in Ki nkel teaches three l

essons perti

nen t t o t he cas e at han

d. First , c ont ra ct s o f adhes ion, typifi ed by t er ms t ha t ar e " no nne go t iab le a nd pr es en t ed in fine pr int in lan guage t hat the average co nsum er mi ght not ful

ly understand" ( Ki

nkel , 223 Ill . 2dat 26), ar e not per se unc onsc i onab l e f

rom a procedu ral stan dpoi nt. S ome added co er cio n o ro ve rr ea ch ing is
ne ces sary. Second, Ki

nkel teaches that even

an arbi trat ion c la use "hi dden in a maze o f fi

ne pri nt wh ere it [is] unl ikel y to be noticed, much less read" ( K in kel , 357 Ill . App. 3d at 564) may be consi dered "pa rt of t he bar gain" if it wa s bro ught t o t he consum er 's a t t en t io n e lse wh er e in t he co nt r ac t . T his
norm fo llow s fr o m t he d isjun ct ive p ro po sit io n o f Frank' s Mai ntenan ce , ad o pt ed by Ki

nkel , that " '[t]o be pa rt of t he ba rga i n, [an arbi trati on c l au se ] m

us t, un l es s i nc orporate d i

nto th e c ontr ac t thr ough pri or cour se of deal

in gs or tr ade usage, hav

e been bargai ned for , br ou ght t o t he pu rc hase r's a t t ent ion or be cons pi cuous .' " (Em

phasi s ad ded.) Ki nkel , 2 23 I ll. 2d a t 23, quo t ing Frank' s Mai ntenan ce , 86 I ll. Ap p. 3d a t 990. Thi rd, the procedur

al soun dne ss of an y particul ar p ro vision wit hin a n a r

bit r at io n c lau se is
assess ed b y con si deri n g " th e [ con

tra ct] as a whole." Ki

nkel , 223 Ill. 2d at 22. When Ki nkel reachedNo. 2-- 07--0322

-25-

t he s up re me c o ur t , t he p laint iff chal le nged onl y the cl ass acti on wai

ver i n the arbi trat ion c la use, but t he co ur t also t oo k no t e o f inf irmities in t he co st pr ovisio n of t he claus e. Ki nkel , 223 Ill . 2d at 26-27. Here, pla in tif f ch alle nges the arb itration cl

ause as a wh

ole, and our att ention h

as not been di

rected to an al l eged procedu ral f l aw i n a ny other prov

i sion i n the Sec ond B uy

ers Order. In light o f Ki

nkel , t he arbi

trat ion c la use i s not in

val id as pr oce du

ra l l y un con sc i on ab l e. Fi

rs t, t he cl ause was"pa rt of t he bar gain. " Like t he class a ct ion wa iver in Ki nkel , the arbi

trat ion c la

use, ensconce d

in one of sev

eral pa ragraphs i

n a page of

densel y pa cked, m i nu te p ri nt, wa s n

ot conspicuous by an y re as o na ble me as ur e. Yet , a lso like t he class act ion wa iver in Ki nkel , t he arbi trati on claus e wa s bro ught t o t he r ead er 's at t ent ion by a no t ice elsew her e in the co nt ra ct . T he signaling provision wa s the bol ded, a l l -capi tal ized s tatem en t, " SUBJECT T O TERMS & CONDITIONS ON REVERSE SIDE AND THIRD PARTY FI

NANCE APPROVA

L ," prin ted abo ve t he signature li

nes on the f

ront sideof t he Se co nd Bu yers O rd er . O f co ur se, unlike in Ki nkel , pla int iff did no t sig n o rinit ial a sep ar at e ac kno wledg ment t hat she ha d r ead t he co ndit ions o n t he
reverse si de of the contract, nor was t here a promi nen t and specifi

c notice of man da tory arbi trati on on the reverse si

de of the contract. This l ack wa s of

fse t , we be lieve , by a f

ac t t ha t wa s a bse nt in Ki nkel . A lt ho ug h pla int iff

did no t have an

opportuni

ty to rea d the back s i de of

the Se cond

Buy ers Orderat Ger ald Ni ssa

n on O ct obe r 28 , 20 05, i ts p repri nte d te rms h

ad be en i n h er p oss es si

on f or several day s, because

the forms f

or t he Fi rst and Second Buy

ers Orders were identic al
. Pla int iff signed the F i rst Buy ersOrder on Octo ber 22, 2005. She testif ie d that she wasco nt en t wit h t he t er ms of that ag reem en t as sh e un derstood them . Pl ai

ntif f had several

day s to revi ew the Fi

rst Buy ers Order be f ore returnin

g to Gerald Nis san on October 28 and s ign in g a contract t hat contain

ed ide nt ica l t er ms preprin ted in an ident ical for mat. The sup re me co ur t in Ki nkel fou nd it si gnifi cant that "t he t er ms andNo. 2-- 07--0322

-26-

co ndit ions were in

[the plai ntif f' s] possessi

on and sh e ei ther read them

or co uld h

ave read t hem if she had chosen to do so ." Ki

nke l , 223 Ill. 2d at 26. Plaint iff had e ven mor e o ppo rt unit y to re ad t he arbi trati on prov i si on than did t he plaint iff

in Ki nkel , w ho by all app ear ance s ag re ed t o t he t er ms the
sa me day she was presented them. Pl ai ntif f, we hold , c anno t re aso nably claim t hat she ha d insufficient noticeof the arbi

trat ion c la

use i n the Second Buy

ers Order. See Bunge Corp. v. Wi ll ia m s , 45 I ll. App. 3d 359, 364 (1977) (th e d ef en da nts ' c l ai m tha t the y ha d n o oppor tun i ty to rea d the a rb i trati on pr ovisio ns i

n th ei r c on tra cts to sell grai

n to t he pl

ai ntif f was "t o no avail" beca use "ea ch de fendant had be en a p arty to acontract t o sell

grain to [the plai

ntif f] on at l east one prior occasi on, and *** those con tra cts h ad b een made on i den ti ca l f orm s c on ta in in g i den tic al arb i tration provisions" ). Re lat ed ly, we n ote tha

t the "d i sp ari ty of ba rga i ni ng pow er" i de nti

f i ed by the tri al cou rt i s n ot fatal t o t he arb i tra t ion clau se. Su ch disp ar ity, t he su pr eme co ur t not ed in Ki nkel , i s ty

pical of
con tra cts of ad h es i on , w h i ch are n ot per se unc onsc i onab l e. Second, on

th e s ep arate

que sti on of whether p l ai

nti f f coul d or d

i d un de rs tan d the a rb i trati on cl ause, we

f i n d th at th e a rb i tra ti on cl au se i s n ot ab str us e to th e point of i

nva li dity . Like

the trial
co ur t 's finding o f a dispa rit y of bar gaining power, it s find ing t ha t t he ar bit r at io n c lau se wa s " ne ar ly uni ntell igi ble" because

of i ts "legal ese" does not distingui

sh the docum

ent from the gen er al ru n of
con tra cts of adhes ion. Such

contrac ts areknown f

or havi ng "l anguage that the ave

rage consum

er mightnot full

y un dersta nd" ( Ki

nkel , 223 Ill . 2d at 26). The trial court pla ced pa rticul ar e m phas i s on t he abstruseness of the clause, but its lack of cl arity is not unusual for legal contr acts, wh ic h a

re sel dom ex toll ed f or li m pid prose
. Besi des Ki nkel , plai ntif f ci tes Frank' s Mai

ntenan ce , Ra zor , Bahuri

ak , and An

de rs on v. Far

mers Hybr i d Cos. , 87 Il

l . Ap p. 3d 49 3 (198 0). These f our cas es a

re rea dil y di sti ngu i shab l e. Fra nk'sNo. 2-- 07--0322

-27-

Mai ntenan ce is dist inguishable he re for t he sa me rea so n it w as in Ki nkel , nam el y, the f ront-page adviso ry in Frank' s Mai

ntenan ce wa s e f f ac ed an d th usappe ared

"i rre l ev an t" ( Frank' s Mai

ntenan ce , 86 Ill. App . 3 d at 992 ). In Ra zor , the plai

ntif f f irst en countered the waiv

er of consequen

tial dam ages i n the owner' s m

anua l of the c ar she ha

d al ready purchased. Th

e court said: "S ur ely, what ever ot he r c ontex t th er e might be in which a c ont ra ct ual pr ovisio n wo uld be fou nd to be procedur all

y un conscionabl

e, t hat label

must appl y to a situation such as the case at bar wher e plaint iff

has t est ifi

ed t hat she ne ver sa w the c l au se ; n or i s th ere an y basis f or co ncluding t hat pla int iff co uld have s een t he cl ause, be f ore en teri ng i nto the s ales c ontract." (Em phasi s i n ori gi na l .) Ra zor , 222 Il

l . 2d at 10 1-02. The re is no question h

ere that plai

ntif f was presented with t he arbi

trat ion cl ause be f ore she signe d t he Secon d Buy ers Order. Ra

zor , t herefore, has no we i ght i n the ci rcum stan ces of th i s ca se. I n A nd ers on , 87 Ill. App. 3d at 50 1, t he appell ate co urt held that a damages l imit at io n app ear ingon th

e re ve rs e s i deof

an orde r-c onf i rm ati on s l i p w asnot c ons

picu ousan

d th usdi d n ot
co mply wi th s ec ti on 2 --3 16( 2) of

the Uniform

Comm ercia l C ode (Code) (Ill. Rev . Stat . 1971, ch. 26, par. 2--316(2) (now 810 ILCS 5/2-- 316(2) (West 2004))). The code pr o vid es : " A t er m o rcla us e is conspicuous wh

en i t i s s o wr i tten th at a reasonab l e p er son ag ai n st w h om i t i s to opera

te ou gh t to have noticed it." Il

l . Rev . Sta

t. 1971, ch. 26 , par. 1--201 (10) ( now 810 ILCS 5 /1--20 1(10) ( West 2004) ). Th e c ourt rea son

ed tha t, th ough the cl au se wa s i n c ap i tal l ette rs , th ere

wa s l i ttl e on t he fro nt side of the sl

i p to suggest that there we re any condi tions on the b ack: "In sma ll prin t, in the m

iddl e of the sl ip, was the fol lowi ng sen tence: ' Th

i s or der sub j ec t to
co ndit ions on

re ver se side her eo f and su bject t o a cce pt ance by the compan

y.' Thi s l anguage wa s no t co nsp icu o us in a ny man ne ran d, in fact , w as in smaller p rint t han o t her on t he fro ntNo. 2-- 07--0322

-28-

si de of t he o rd er slip. * ** We f i n d l i ttl e on th e f ron t si de , un der the c i rc um sta n ce s, to bring to a reasonable person's attent ion and n ot ice the existence of express d is cl aimers o n t he
reverse si de of the sl

ip. *** In s

hort, whil e the type used f

or discl ai mi ng the warranties was conspicuous, in

the sens e of bei

ng l arger than other type i

n the paragraph, the prese

nce of that paragraph on the reverse si

de of the order slip was no t at all cons picuo us, eithe r fro m the general appearance of

the slip or f

rom any conspicuous lan

guage on the f ront si de of the s l i p." A nd ers on , 87 Il

l . Ap p. 3d a t 502. A nd ers on 's gui

da nc e i s s evere l

y l i m i ted be ca us e the re ad er c an

not app re ciat e t he size o f the re levant
wr iting in the c ase . T he co ur t 's ch arac ter iza ti on of th e f ron t-p ag e p rov

i so as w ri tten i n "smal l pri n t" is no t pa rt icu lar ly ill

umina t ing, and t he c o ur t did no t ap pe nd a co py o f the s l i p to i ts op i ni on or attempt t o repro duce th e text i n ac tual si ze . We th

i n k th at, by an y rea son ab l e s cal e, th

e p rovi so on t he front side of the Second Buyers Order is not in "sm all print." A nd ers on , we concl

ude, is no he lp to pla i ntif f
. Plaint iff 's ci tation to Bahuri

ak is a cu rio sity, as no cl ai

m of unconsci onabi li ty was raised i

n that
case. In f ac t, th e a ppe l l atecou

rt h el d that the tri

al cou rt' s f i nd i ng s a s to the exi st en ce o f a v alid arbi trati on agreem ent were i nsuf fi ci ent for revi

ew and rem

anded f or fu rther f i ndi ngs . Bahuri

ak , 337 Il l . Ap p. 3d a t 720. We concl ude t ha t , ev en if t he ar bit r at io n c lau se is p r o ce du r ally unc onsc i onab l e "to a de gree," like t he class act ion wa iver in Ki nkel , that f

l aw i s i ns uf f i cien t by i tself to in va l i date the cl

aus e. B. Su b sta n ti v e U n con sc i on ab i l i tyNo. 2-- 07--0322

-29-

Substantive unconscionabil ity " 'relates to situations where a clause o rt er m in a c o nt r ac t is alle ge dly one -side d o r o ver ly harsh. ' " Zobrist v. Verizon Wi reless , 354 Ill . App. 3d 1139, 1147 (2004), quo ting Bish

op , 316 Il l . Ap p. 3d a t 1196. The tri al cou rt f oun d the a rb i trati on c l au se su bs tan ti ve l y un consc i on ab le beca use (1 ) t he clause i s " on e- si de d" i n i ts obl i ga ti ons ; a nd (2) the cl au se 's excl us i on of punit ive damag es vio late s t he Cons um er F raud A

ct. Nei ther is a g round f or in va l i dati ng th e arb i tration claus e. The re is , we recognize , an

im bal ance of dutiesin the arbi trat ion c la use. The cl

ause provi des that "[a ]ny co nt ro ve r sy , clai m, caus e of action or other dispute ari si ng out o f or rela

ting to [the]
con tra ct" is subj ect to arbi

trat ion e x cept ( 1) "a ca us e o f ac t io n o rcla im by De ale rt o r ec o ve rfull payment of

the purchase price" and (2) "[c]l ai ms , causes of action and other dis putes again

st Buyer
ar ising out of or related to t he b reach b y Buye r of any retail in stal lm ent contract ex ec ut ed in
co nnect ion wit h [t he] co nt ra ct ." Thu s, c laims by t he buyer ar ising ou t of o r r elat ing t o t he Se co nd Buy ersOrderare unqualifi

edly subj ect t o arbitrat ion, but signi fi cant exceptions exis

t for claims by the deal er. Wh at t he t rial co ur t fou nd lack ing is, in t he vernac ula r, mutuali ty of obl iga tion; b ut contractual promi ses ne ed

not h ave suc h prec i se

prop ortions . "The

pa rti esto a c ontr

ac t ne ed not have i dentic al ri gh ts and obli

gations." Ho fmeyer v. Will ow Sho re s Co ndo mini

um Ass'n , 309 Ill . App. 3d 380, 385 (1999 ). "The m

utuali ty requi remen t is sati sf ie d if each party

hasgiven su ffi

cient con si

de rati on f or t he ot her's promi se." Hofm ey er , 30 9 Il l . A pp. 3d a t 385 ; s eealso Vas silkovs ka v. Woo dfield Nissa n, Inc. , 35 8 I ll. Ap p. 3d 20 , 28 ( 20 05 ) ( "[ m]u t ua lit y o f o blig at io n is re qui re d on l y to th e exten

t th at b oth partiesto an

agree men t are bou nd ornei ther is bound; that is, if

the requirem

ent of consi

deration has be en met, m utual i ty of obl i gation i s n

ot essential ").No. 2-- 07--0322

-30-

How t hese pr inciples ap ply with r esp ect t o p ro mises t o a rbit ra t e is best gr asp ed by co mpar ing Bish op wit h Vassi

lkovs ka . I n Bish

op , t he p laint iffs operated hai r sa lons a s franc hisees o f the defend ant and sub l ea se d p rop er ty f rom th e def en da n t f or th e s al on s. The s

ub l ea se ag re em en ts contain ed "cros s- de f

aul t" c l au se s a

uth ori zi n g th e def en da n t to ev i ct a f ra n ch i se e f or a n y b re ach of i ts franch ise agree men t. The f ra n ch i se ag re em en ts c on tai n ed cl au se s s ub j ec ti n g to ar bit r at io n a ll cla ims
ar ising ou t of o r r elat ing t o t he ag re ement s, e xcep t evict ion p ro cee dings br ou ght pur sua nt t o t he "cros s- de f

aul t" cl auses. The pl

ai ntif fs chal le nged the arb itration cl

auses f or lack of mut ualit y, ar guing tha t "a n a rb i trati on a gre em en t i s n ot m utual l y b i n di n g w h ere on e p ar ty re se rves th e op ti on

to raise and resolve the maj ority of disputes in a cour t rat her than thro ugh arbitration." Bish op , 316 Ill . App. 3d at 1 19 8. Th e c our

t disa gr ee d, e x pl ai n i n g th at i t wou l d n ot i n v al i da te "an arb itration cl

ause that
co mpe ls on e p ar

ty to s ub m i t al l di spute s to ar

b i tr ation butal

l owsthe othe r pa rty the ch oi ceof pur suing arbi

trati on or litigation so l ong

asthe con tract i s oth

erw i se su ppor ted by con si de rati on on b oth sides." Bish

op , 316 I ll. A

pp . 3d at 1 19 8. T

h e c our t h el d th at, b ec au se

th e f ra n ch i se ag re em en ts
were u ndispu t edly sup po rt ed by co nsider at ion, t he ar bitr at ion clau ses d id no t need "ident ic a l obli gations." Bish

op , 316 Il l . Ap p. 3d a t 1198. In Vassi lkovs ka , the plai

ntif f s ign ed a purchase c ontract and a

sep ar at e ar bitr at ion ag re ement in pu rc has ing a veh icle fr o m t he d efe nda nt . T he p laint iff c laim ed t hat t he ar bitr at ion ag re ement la cked consi derat ion bec aus e it br oa dly req uire d t he plaint iff t o a rbit ra t e her claims unde r t he purchase co nt ra ct but effect ively exempte d t he de fendant fro m arbit ra t ingan y cla im it had co ncer ning t he plaint iff

's pe rfo rmance unde r t he pu rc hase co nt ra ct . T he appe l l ate court not ed t hat , u nlike t he courtin Bish

op , i t was " not con f

ronted wi th an arb i tration claus e i n a contract s upp or t ed by
consi de rati on on bot h sides." Vassi

lkovs ka , 358 Il l . Ap p. 3d a t 27. The arb i tration agree men t, rather,No. 2-- 07--0322

-31-

was "sep ar at e and apa rt fro m the p ur chas e co nt ra ct ," and there f ore th e a rb i tra ti on ag re em en t h ad to be sup po rt ed byi

ts own c onsi

derati on. Vassi lkovs ka , 35 8 I ll. App. 3d at 25. The court found s uch
consi de rati on l acki n g b ec au se

th e def en da n t' s prom i se to ar b i tra te wa s " emp t y" in t ha t it "c o mple t ely
exem pted i ss ue s th at c oul d a ri se f rom i ts s al e of th e a utom ob i l e to the plai

ntif f." Vassi lkovs ka , 358 Il l . Ap p. 3d a t 29. The ca se at ha nd is li

ke Bish op , not Vassi

lkovs ka , b ec au se

the prom i se to arbi trate i s p art of
a claus e wi thi n a l arger contrac t, the Sec ond B uy

ersOr der . As p laintiff has never que st ioned t hat t he Sec ond Buyer s Or der is sup po rt ed byconsi de rati on, the arbi trati on cl ause does not suff

er for la ck of m utual i ty of obl i gation. The tri al cou rt al so f oun d the a rb i trati on cl au se i nv al i d f orits excl usion of puni

tive dam ages. The cl ause provides that the arbi trat or "shal

l n ot be em powered to gr an

t exem pl ary , pu ni ti ve or consequential

da mag esi n e xc es s of thos e p er mit ted un

der the ex

pres s term

s of thi s con tract." Paragraph

16 on th e rev er se si de of th e S ec on d B uy

er s Ord er ex pr es sl y l i m i ts t he de aler's l i ab i l i

ty to t he pur ch as e p riceof

the ve hi cl e. A l so, th e f ron t side co nt ains an exp re ss d isclaimer o f punit ive damages. Section 10a(a) of the Cons ume r Fraud Act (815 ILCS 505/10a(a) (West 2004)) provides that the trial

court "i n i ts discretion ma

y award actual econom

ic dam ages or any

ot her rel ie f wh ic h t he co ur t dee ms pro per ." Su ch r elief may i nclude punit ivedam

ages. See Smit h v. Pr ime Ca bl e of Chi cago , 276 Ill. App. 3d 843, 858 ( 1995). Section 10c o f the Consumer Fraud Act (815 ILCS 505/10c (Wes

t 2004)) provides: "A

ny wai ve r or m odif i ca ti on of the righ ts, pro vi si ons, or remedi es of this Act shal l b e void and unen

forceable." As an

attempt t o catego rical

ly excl ude a form

of relie f aut hor ized by t he Consum er Fraud Ac t , t he pu nit ive da mag es dis cla imer in t he ar bit r at io n c lau se is voi d an d unenf orceab l e.No. 2-- 07--0322

-32-

The ar b i tra ti on cl au se i s n ot, h owev er , voi d i

n i ts entirety, for the puni

tive da ma ges di sclai me r is seve ra ble fro m the r emainder of t he cla us e. "I n d et er mining wh et he rit is appropriate to sever an un co nsc io na ble pr ovisio n fro m an agr eement and e nfor ce t he r emainder of t he ag r ee men t , I llino is
cou rts ar e t o c ons ider whet her t he pr ovisio ns o per at e indep ende nt ly of each o t her or whe th er th e va lid prov i si ons are 's o c l ose ly

con nect ed w ith u nenfo rc eable p ro visions t hat t o d o s o w ou ld be t ant amou nt to rewriting the Agreemen t. ' " Ki nkel , 35 7 I ll. App. 3d at 569, quo ting Abb ot t-I nterfast Corp. v. Harkabus , 250 Ill . App. 3d 13, 21 (1993). If the dis cl ai me r of puni tive da ma ges is st rick en, t he in tent of the arb i trati on cl ause rem ai ns es senti ally

ful fi ll ed, for there stil

l e xi sts the broad
re quir ement of a rbit ra t ion. Also s ignifi cant is the pr ese nce o f a seve ra bili t y clause in t he Se co nd Buy ers Order. Th

e clause re ads: "If an y term , cov en an t or con di ti on of t his co nt ra ct or t he ap plicat ion t her eo f to any pe rs on orcir cu mst an ce sh all, t o an y extent, be inva lid o run en fo r ce ab le, t he r ema ind er o f t his contract or t he ap plicat ion o f such t er m, co venant or pr ovisio n, t o p er so ns or circumstances ot her t ha n t ho se t o wh ich it is he ld in va lid o run en fo r ce ab le shall not be affect ed t her eby and each t er m, co venant or pr ovisio n of t his co nt ra ct shall be val id an d be enf orced to the fullest extent per mi

tt ed by law." "Th e e xi stenc e of a se ver ability clause in a co nt ra ct cer t ainly stre ngt hens the case f or t he sev erance of unen forceabl e provis ions

because it i ndicates that the

pa rti esi nte nd ed f or th e l aw f ul porti ons of t he co nt ra ct t o be enfo rc ed in t he absen ce of the unlawf

ul portions." Harkabus , 250 Ill . App. 3d at 21. Se aling t he is su e in fa vo r o f s ev eranc e i s " the stron g pol i cy i n f av or of en f orci ng arbi trati on agreements, whi ch

i s b est se

rve d by al l owi ng th e v al i d porti ons of

the a rbi tra tion ag re em

en t toNo. 2-- 07--0322

-33-

r ema in in fo r ce wh ile s ev er in g t he unc onscionabl e pro vi sion." Ki

nkel , 357 Ill . App. 3d at 569. Theref ore, we do not fi

nd the arbi

trat ion c la use sub stantiv

el y un conscionabl

e. We hold that the trial

court erred in

de claring t he ar bitr at ion clau se u nco nscio nable and unenf orceable in

its entirety. The clause is en forceable b

ut for its disclai

mer of puni

tive dam ages. We app re ciat e t he t rial co ur t 's sens itivity t o t he equi ties i n thi s case, but we m

ust conclude that its d ecisio n canno t be r eco nciled wit h Ki nkel 's pron oun cemen ts on unconsci onabi li ty. Mi ndf ul
as weare of the ex pre ss pol i cy i n f av orof a rbi tration, we n

ote that, af

ter Ki nkel , there is

li tt le chan ce that co nsumer s will "obt ain cre dit car ds, re nt al car s, land and c ellular t elepho ne se rvic e, ho me furn is hi ngsand appli

ances, loans, and ot her prod ucts and services" ( Ki nkel , 223 Ill . 2d at 26) without for go ingan

y as su ra n ce th at thei r cla ims r ela t ing t o t he se t ype s o f co nt r ac t s w ill hav e t he full protecti ons of

the c ourts. As a fi nal mat t er , d efe nda nt s u rg e u s t o cla rify th at J .P. Mor

ga n , thoug h n ot a s i gn

ator y to t he Se co nd B uye rs Or de r, is a t hird -p ar t y bene ficiar y of t he c o nt ra ct and so pla int iff is re qui re d to
ar bit r at e h er cla ims agains t bot h defen

dants. J. P. Mo rg an a ss er t ed t his p o sit io n be lo w a nd p laint iff did not contest it. The trial co ur t did no t ex pr es sly

addre ss the i ss uebu t proc ee de d on

the as su m ption that J.P . Mo rg an is bo und by t he ar bitr at ion clau se t o t he sa me ext ent as G er ald Nissa n. Pla int if f continue s not to dispu te th e iss ue . We a

gr ee wi th de f en da n ts th at J .P. Mor

ga n i s a th i rd -p ar ty bene f i ciary o f t he Se co nd Bu yers O rd er . " A thir d- par t y beneficiary is bou nd by t he t er ms of t he contract in the s ame manner as t he parties are bound." Stre am s C l ub , Ltd . v . Th

om ps on , 18 0 I ll. App. 3d 830 , 840 (1 989). "Th e th i rd -p ar ty b en ef i ci ar y doctri n e a pp l i es to arb i tration agree men ts." Dann ewi tz v. Equicredi

t Cor p. of Am

erica , 333 Ill . App. 3d 370, 373 (2002). "Where i t is sh own that th e s i gn

ator i es to the agreem

ent in tended that nonsignatorieswer e t o d er ive benefits fro m theNo. 2-- 07--0322

-34-

agr eement and w her e t he [ agr eement ] it self is susc ept ible to t his inter pr et at ion, t hen a rbit ra t ion i s proper." Da

n n ewi tz , 333 Ill . App. 3d at 373. The Second Buye rs Orderi s expres sl

y con di ti one d on "thi rd pa rty f i na nc e a ppr ova l ," a nd J.P . Mor ga n h ad the be ne f i t of pr o vid ing fina nc ing
. Ad di t io na lly, t he arbitration clausedo es no t dist inguish bet wee n claims bro ught by the d ealer and t hos e br ou ght by a third-party f

in anci er, but appli

es to "[a]ny" cl

ai m a risi ng out o f or rela

ting to the contract . See Joh ns on v. No ble , 240 Ill . App. 3d 731, 733 (1992) (employees of corpo ration that sign

ed contract wi th pl ai n ti f f wereth i rd -p ar ty b en ef i ci ari es of ar b i tra ti on cl au se

tha t covere d " [a] ny

cl ai m or contr oversy

ar ising ou t of o r r elat ingto [the] agreemen t"). Plai ntif f' s clai ms agai nst J.P. Morganare equa l l y sub j ect to arbi

tration as h er cl ai m s ag ai nst Geral d Ni ssa n. For the f oregoi ng r eas ons, we rev

ers e t he ju dgmen

t of th e c i rc ui t cou rt of Kan e C oun ty denying de fendant s' mot ions to stay proceedi ngsand compel

arbitration, and we remand this cause f or fu rther proceed

i ngs cons i sten t wi th thi s disposi tion
. Reversed a

nd rem anded. BOW MA N an d HUTC HINSO

N, JJ ., conc

ur.