UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

Civil Action No. 17-479 (TJK) GREENPEACE, INC., Plaintiff , v. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY et al. , Defendants

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MEMORANDUM OPINION The Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) runs a government p rogram known as Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards (“CFATS”). The purp ose of CFATS is to identify chemical facilities that might be targeted by terrorists, and t o promulgate and enforce standards for reducing the risks arising fro m potential terr orist attacks on those facilities. DHS requires facilities to submit informati on about certain chemicals they p ossess and, based on those submissions and other informati on (including information receiv ed from the broader intelligence community), determines which f acilities pose a “high risk” of s ignificant terrorism-related harm. Those high-risk facilities are required to implement various se curity measures. Alternatively, facilities may reduce their chem ical holdings to levels that do not qualify them as high risk. Plaintiff Greenpeace, Inc. (“Greenpeace”) made a request pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”), 5 U .S.C. § 552, that DHS provide info rmation regarding previously high-risk facilities that have reduced their chemical holdings. After a lengthy administrative process, DHS produced two heavily-redacted lists of facility na mes, withholding those names that might serve to identify aparticular facility. DHS argues that the redacted information falls under FOIA’s law-enforcement ex emption, because releasing it wo uld threaten public safety by2 increasing the risks to human life and health from terrorist attacks. Greenpeace disagrees, claiming that FOIA and DHS’s own procedures require DHS to prod uce the records without redactions. Greenpeace has therefore brought suit against DHS and one of its components, the National Protection and Programs Directorate (“NPPD,” and toget her with DHS, “Defendants”). Greenpeace asserts claims under FO IA and the Administrative Pro cedure Act (“APA”), 5 U.S.C. § 551 et seq. , and petitions the Court for a writ of mandamus. Defendants have filed a motion to dismiss or, in the alternativ e, for summary judgment. ECF No. 11. Greenpeace has cross-moved for summary judgment. ECF No. 14. 1 For the reasons explained below, Defendants’ motion will be granted andGreenpeace’s will be denied. Greenpeace’s claims under the APA and for a writ of mandamus wi ll be dismissed. In addition, the Court will enter summary judg ment for Defendants on Greenpe ace’s FOIA claim. Factual and Procedural Background A. The CFATS Program Congress initially created the C FATS program in 2006. Falcon R eply Decl. ¶ 4; see Nat’l Propane Gas Ass’n v. DHS , 534 F. Supp. 2d 16, 18 (D.D.C. 2008) (describing history of program). The relevant act instructed DHS to issue “regulation s establishing risk-based performance standards for secur ity of chemical facilities and r equiring vulnerability assessments and the development and implemen tation of site security plans f or chemical facilities.” Nat’l

1 The Court has considered the following briefing on these motio ns: ECF No. 11-2 (“Defs.’ Br.”); ECF No. 14 at 3-42 (“Pl.’ s Br.”); ECF No. 17 (“Defs.’ Re ply”); ECF No. 19 (“Pl.’s Reply”). The Court has also reviewed each party’s statement of material facts and supporting declarations and exhibits. ECF N o. 11-1 (“Defs.’ SoMF”); ECF N o. 11-4 (“Fuentes Decl.”); ECF No. 11-5 (“Falcon Decl.”); ECF No. 11-6 (“Palmer Decl.”); E CF No. 14 at 43-52 (“Pl.’s SoMF”); ECF No. 14 at 53-78 (“Pl.’s Resp. SoMF”); ECF No. 14-2 (“Hind Decl.”); ECF No. 14-3 (“Orum Decl.”); ECF No. 14-4 (“Poje Decl.”); ECF No. 14-5 (“Sherman Decl.”); ECF No. 17-1 (“Defs.’ Resp. SoMF”); ECF No. 17-2 (“Palmer Reply Decl.”) ; ECF No. 17-3 (“Falcon Reply Decl.”).3 Propane , 534 F. Supp. 2d at 18 (quoting Department of Homeland Securit y Appropriations Act, 2007, § 550(a), Pub. L. No. 109-295, 120 Stat. 1355, 1388 (2006 )). DHS did so. See 6 C.F.R. pt. 27. In 2014, Congress enacted a f ormal statutory framework for the CFATS program. See Protecting and Securing Chemical F acilities from Terrorist Atta cks Act of 2014, 6 U.S.C. § 621 et seq. The Infrastructure Security C ompliance Division (“ISCD”), a c omponent of DHS located within NPPD, operates CFATS. Pl.’s Resp. SoMF ¶ 4. Under CFATS, DHS determines whe ther chemical facilities present “a high level of security risk,” which means that there is “the potential that a terrorist attack invol ving the facility could result in significant adve rse consequences for human life or health, national security or critical economic assets.” 6 C.F.R. § 27.205(a). The first st ep in making this determination is to identify which chemical facilitie s possess a “screening thresho ld quantity,” or “STQ,” of one or more “chemicals of interest.” See 6 C.F.R. §§ 27.105, 27.200(b)(2). The chemicals of interest and their respective STQs are listed in Appendix A to the CFATS regulations. See 6 C.F.R. pt. 27 app. A. DHS requires chemical f acilities to submit “Top-Scr eens,” reports listing each chemical of interest that the f acilities possess at or above th e STQ for that chemical. See Pl.’s Resp. SoMF ¶ 3; 6 C.F.R. § 27.200(b)(2). Based on the Top-Screens and othe r information, including information received from the broader intelligence community a bout the threat of attack, DHS makes a preliminary determination of which facilities are high risk and places thos e high-risk facilities into one of four tiers. See Pl.’s Resp. SoMF ¶ 3; 6 C.F.R . § 27.220. DHS makes a final “t iering” decision for each facility after a “securi ty vulnerability assessment.” 6 C.F.R. §§ 27.215, 27.220(b). High-risk facilities must then i mplement security measures inte nded to reduce the risks associated with terrorist attacks. Pl.’s Resp. SoMF ¶ 3.4 Facilities designated as high ris k can also request a redetermi nation of their status if they alter their operations—for exa mple, by reducing their holdings of chemicals of interest. See 6 C.F.R. § 27.205(b). Such facilities are informally referred to as “de-tiered,” because they are no longer considered high risk a nd thus are not placed in one of the four tiers. See Falcon Reply Decl. ¶ 11. In testimony before C ongress in February 2012, an NPPD official explained that, since CFATS’ inception, “more than 1,600 facilities [had] compl etely removed their chemicals of interest, and more than 700 othe r facilities [had] reduced their holdings of chemicals of interest to levels resulting i n the facilities no longer being considered high-risk.” Defs.’ Resp. SoMF ¶ 1. In February 2014, another NPPD official t estified be fore Congress that “more than 3,000 facilities [had] eliminated, r educed or modified their ho ldings of chemicals of interest.” Id. ¶ 3. B. Greenpeace’s FOIA Request and DHS’s Response On May 18, 2012, Greenpeace sent a letter to NPPD’s FOIA office requesting “copies of all releasable documents and record s that contain the most comp lete listing of chemical facilities that have reduced their holdi ngs of threshold quantities of ‘ch emicals of interest’ (COI) rendering them no longer ‘high risk ’ facilities under [CFATS].” Fuentes Decl. Ex. B, at 1; Hind Decl. Ex. C, at 1. 2 Almost ten months later, on March 13, 2013, NPPD issued an “i nterim response” stating that it had conducted a search and found 123 pages of responsive records, which would be withheld in full. F uentes Decl. Ex. C, at 1; Hi nd Decl. Ex. D, at 1. The asserted grounds for withholding the docum ents were FOIA Exemption 5, an d specifically, the

2 Greenpeace also requested additional records relating to “any safer chemicals, processes or methods these same facilities adopted to no longer be classifie d as ‘high risk.’” Fuentes Decl. Ex. B, at 1. NPPD subsequently informed Greenpeace it would wi thhold those documents in their entirety. See Fuentes Decl. Ex. D. Greenpeace has not challenged NPPD’s act ion on that additional request in this lawsuit. See Pl.’s Br. at 4 n.3.5 deliberative process privilege ; Exemption 7(E), an exemption fo r law-enforcement techniques, procedures and guidelines; and E xemption 7(F), an exemption for law-enforcement information whose release might endanger th e safety of any individual. Fue ntes Decl. Ex. C, at 1-2; Hind Decl. Ex. D, at 1-2. On May 12, 2013, Greenpeace appealed the interim response to DH S’s Associate General Counsel. Fuentes Decl. Ex. E; Hind Decl. Ex. E. Greenpeace ar gued that the claimed exemptions did not apply. Fuentes Decl. Ex. E; Hind Decl. Ex. E. In particular, citing Second Circuit case law, Greenpeace argued that Exemption 7(F) did not apply because DHS had not identified any particular i ndividual who would be harmed by rel ease of the information. Fuentes Decl. Ex. E, at 3 (citing ACLU v. Dep’t of Def. , 543 F.3d 59, 71 (2d Cir. 2008), vacated on other grounds , 130 S. Ct. 777 (2009)); Hind Decl. Ex. E, at 3. On September 27, 2013, while Greenpeace awaited a decision on its administrative appeal, NPP D finalized its earlier, “interim” response, standing by its decision t o withhold the records but relying only on FOIA Exemptions 5 and 7(F), not 7(E). Fuentes Decl. Ex. D. On June 27, 2014, Greenpeace received a response on its appeal from an attorney advisor at the U.S. Coast Guard Office of the Chief Administrative Law Judge. Fuentes Decl. Ex. H; Hind Decl. Ex. G. The attorney advis or explained that DHS’s Ge neral Counsel had assigned FOIA appeals arising within DHS t o that office. Fuentes Decl. Ex. H; Hind Decl. Ex. G; see also Hind Decl. Ex. F (2011 DHS memor andum assigning authority to C oast Guard). The attorney advisor ruled as fo llows: “NPPD’s decision to withhol d the records in their entirety pursuant [sic] is being rever sed. The Agency has not provided adequate explanation as to why the requested records should be w ithheld pursuant to FOIA Exemp tions (b)(5), (b)(7)(E), or (b)(7)(F).” Fuentes Decl. Ex. H , at 2; Hind Decl. Ex. G, at 2. The attorney advisor further6 explained that his decision was DHS’s “final action,” and that Greenpeace could seek review in federal district court. Fuent es Decl. Ex. H, at 2; Hind Decl. Ex. G, at 2. In an internal letter to NPPD’s F OIA office, the Coast Guard at torney advisor explained the basis for his decision. Pal mer Reply Decl. Ex. CC. He exp lained that he had relied on cases, including Second Circuit precedent cited by Greenpeace, holding that Exemption 7(F) is unavailable unless the agency i dentifies a specific person who would be harmed by release of the information. See id. NPPD disagreed with the attorney a dvisor’s analy sis of Exempt ion 7(F).
See Palmer Reply Decl. ¶¶ 12, 17. DHS ha d continued to take the p osition in litigation that Exemption 7(F) does not require the agency to identify a specif ic individual who would be harmed. See id. ¶¶ 12-14. The D.C. Circuit ul timately adopted that position i n 2015. Id. ¶ 15 & n.3 (citing Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr. (“EPIC”) v. DHS , 777 F.3d 518 (D.C. Cir. 2015)). Therefore, while NPPD determined to comply with the “letter” of the attorn ey advisor’s decision by releasing a redacted version of the documents, it would not fol low the attorney advisor’s reasoning in making those redactions. See id. ¶ 17. Defendants’ declarations further assert that DHS was not, in an y event, bound by the Coast Guard attorney advisor ’s decision. They assert that, as a matter of agency procedure, DHS’s Office of General Counsel res erves the right to review FO IA decisions made by Coast Guard attorney advisors. See Palmer Decl. ¶ 8; Palmer Repl y Decl. ¶ 7. In this case, Defen dants assert, the Office of General C ounsel did just that and determi ned that most of the material should be redacted pursuant to Exe mption 7(F), contrary to the attorney advisor’s reasoning in the internal letter. See Palmer Decl. ¶¶ 11-12; Palm er Reply Decl. ¶¶ 12-19. On December 15, 2014, NPPD released the 123 pages of records to Greenpeace, but in heavily redacted form. Fuente s Decl. Ex. I; Hind Decl. Ex. H. The redacted records consisted of7 two documents. The first was a l ist of facility names (the “Un regulated Facilities List”). Hind Decl. Ex. H. Most of the names we re redacted, and those remain ing were nondescript: examples include “Tucson, AZ,” “College Street,” “Main,” and “Almond.” Id. The Unregulated Facilities List concluded with approximately 20 blank pages followed by on e final entry. See id. The second document (the “Untiered Fac ilities List”) was a spreadsh eet with two columns. Fuentes Decl. Ex. J; Hind Decl. Ex. H, pt. II. Each entry in the first column consisted of a single number ranging from 0 to 19. See Hind Decl. Ex. H, pt. II. This fi eld represented the number of chemicals of interest that eac h facility held at or above STQs. See Pl.’s Resp. SoMF ¶ 6. The second column contained the name of each facility, and as in th e first document, most of the names were redacted. See Hind Decl. Ex. H, pt. II. NPPD ass erted that Exemption 7(F) co vered the redacted material, because it “constitutes information comp iled for law enforcement purposes the disclosure of which could r easonably be expected to endange r the life or physical safety of any individual.” Hind Decl. Ex. H, at 1. On February 13, 2015, Greenpeace fi led another appeal to DHS’s Associate General Counsel. Hind Decl. Ex. I. The appe al argued that the documen ts NPPD had produced were “indecipherable” due to the redac tions, which violated the earl ier decision by the Coast Guard attorney advisor. See id. at 1. On August 25, 2015, the same Coast Guard attorney advis or responded, explaining that NPPD was “obligated to comply” with his earlier decision but that his office had “no ability to force compliance.” Hind Decl. Ex. J. He advised that Greenpeace had exhausted its administrative re medies and could bring suit in f ederal district court. See id. C. DHS’s Search Process ISCD uses an electronic system called the Chemical Security Ass essment Tool (“CSAT”) to maintain records related to C FATS. Pl.’s Resp. SoMF ¶ 4. C SAT stores the information that chemical facilities submit to DHS pursuant to CFATS, including the information submitted in8 their Top-Screens. Id. ; Fuentes Decl. ¶ 16. DHS asserts that CSAT “is the only datab ase within DHS that stores the information necessary to produce a complete and contemporaneous listing of chemical facilities that have re duced their holdings of thresho ld quantities of chemicals of interest, thereby r endering them no longe r high risk facilities .” Pl.’s Resp. SoMF ¶ 4. Among the information in CSAT is a name for each facility; these name s are provided by the facilities themselves when they register in CSAT, and are not necessarily unique to each facility. Id. ¶ 8. In June 2012, ISCD searched for r ecords responsive to Greenpeac e’s requests by running two queries within CSAT. See id. ¶ 5. The first query yielde d a spreadsheet of 2,733 facilitie s that DHS had previously determin ed to be high risk but that, as of the date of the search, were no longer considered high risk. Id. ¶ 6. This spreadsheet (the Untie red Facilities List that DHS ultimately produced with redactions) included both the name of each facility and the number of chemicals of interest at or above STQs. Id. Some of the facilities on this list “still hold a screening threshold quantity of one or more chemicals of intere st” and thus continued to be regulated under CFATS, even t hough they were no longer consider ed high risk. Fuentes Decl. ¶ 17. The second query yielded the Unreg ulated Facilities List that D HS also redacted and produced to Greenpeace. This list, a subset of the Untiered Fa cilities List, contained the names of 1,687 facilities still in operation that had reported having no chemicals of interest at or above STQs. Pl.’s Resp. SoMF ¶ 7. Because these facilities have no chemical of interest at or above an STQ, they are not regulated und er CFATS. Fuentes Decl. ¶ 18 . DHS explains that, due to a technical error, about 20 blank page s were inserted into the li st before the last entry, but that this error did not cause any information to be withheld. Id. ¶ 22.9 DHS asserts that, by searching CSAT , it “conducted a search of all locations likely to contain responsive documents us ing methods reasonably expected to uncover all relevant documents.” Id. ¶ 23. D. DHS’s Redactions DHS heavily redacted both lists be fore producing them to Greenp eace. The redactions covered all “facility names thatwould allow an individual to i dentify the specific facility.” Fuentes Decl. Ex. A ( Vaughn index); Fuentes Decl. ¶ 26. DHS’s declarants state that perso nnel in NPPD’s FOIA office carefullyreviewed each entry on the list s to redact only those entries that would allow a facility to be identified. See Fuentes Decl. ¶ 33. DHS i nvokes Exemption 7(F) to justify these redactions, abandoni ng the other exemptions it ha d asserted. It explains that ISCD is a “regulatory enforcement divi sion” of DHS and that both lis ts are compiled from information obtained from regulated facilitie s, which face penalties if the y fail to comply with CFATS regulations. Fuentes Decl. ¶ 25. Therefore, DHS asserts, theywere “compiled for law enforcement purposes,” the thres hold requirement under Exemptio n 7. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7); see Fuentes Decl. ¶ 25. DHS offers two reasons why releas ing the redacted information “ could reasonably be expected to endanger the life or physical safety of any individ ual,” as is required to satisfy Exemption 7(F). 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7 ). First, these facilities represent “soft” targets. Falcon Reply Decl. ¶ 5. Even facilities that are not determined to be “high risk” under CFATS still contain dangerous chemicals. F uentes Decl. ¶ 30. Some facilit ies have chemicals of interest at or above STQs, but nonetheless ar e not considered high risk for a variety of reasons. Id. ; Falcon Reply Decl. ¶ 13. Moreover, e ven facilities that have no chemicals of interes t at or above STQs might still possess chemicals of i nterest at lower levels. Fue ntes Decl. ¶ 30. E ven lower levels of those chemicals can “presen t a risk to the lives and physica l safety of individuals,” particularly10 those that work at or liv e near the facilities. Id. ¶ 32. But because those facilities are not considered high risk, DHS does not require them to institute security measures , making them appealing targets for terrorists. Id. ¶¶ 28, 32. In addition, DHS claims, reveali ng this information could help terrorists identify facilities that are “high risk.” DHS explains that facilities “regularly move between regulated and unregulated status, and tiered and untiered status, based on fl uctuations in their chemical holdings and other facts that a ffect [DHS’s] risk assessment of the facility (e.g., based on new threat information received from the intelligence community).” Id. ¶ 31. If DHS were required to release the unredacted lists periodically, then comparing th e lists at different times would reveal the existence of some hi gh-risk facilities: if a facility appeared on the list but later was removed, then it would be identifiable as “high risk.” Id. DHS asserts that the risk of outing high-risk facilities is especially high give n the age of the Ju ne 2012 lists at issue in this case: DHS is currently reanalyzing its risk determinations and expect s that “approximately 5% of the previously untiered population of facilities will be determined to be high-risk and tiered.” Falcon Decl. ¶ 7. DHS claims that these threats are not just hypothetical. One N PPD employee attests to “numerous reports from the intelligence community” discussing “ the threat of terrorism involving chemicals and chemical facilities both in the United States and abroad.” Falcon Reply Decl. ¶ 6. There have also been actual chemical attacks overse as, including “attacks at two American-owned chemical facili ties in France in 2015” and a thw arted terrorist pl ot in Australia. Id. ¶ 7. Greenpeace responds by submitting a number of declarations (all from individuals who apparently have expertise in c hemical safety) challenging DHS’s claim that releasing the11 redacted information would pose a risk to life or physical safe ty. Greenpeace suggests that facilities that no longer have che micals of interest at or abov e STQs are no more dangerous than “thousands of other facilities that are unregulated by CFATS” throughout the country. Orum Decl. ¶ 14. It provides example s such as underground storage t anks (which are regulated by the EPA and also listed on many state government websites) and faci lities like dairy farms, which can be easily located online. Hind Decl. ¶ 17. Greenpeace further claims that not releasing the information would cause a safety r isk: it would inhibit “develo ping and publicizing knowledge of successful practices at facili ties” that have reduced their risk, and thereby “perpetuate unnecessary terroristtargets of opportunity.” Orum Decl. ¶ 7; see Poje Decl. ¶¶ 11-12. Greenpeace also asserts that much of the redacted information is already available to the public, such that there is no j ustification for withholding it. Many chemical facilities are “also regulated by other government agenc ies,” which have made availa ble lists of those facilities and the chemicals they store. O rum Decl. ¶ 15. Greenpeace notes t he EPA’s Toxic Release Inventory (“TRI”) program, wh ich Congress created to “provide the public with information about releases of toxic chemicals in their community.” Poje De cl. ¶ 10. Pursuant to the TRI program, facilities must make annua l disclosures of certain che micals they release or otherwise dispose of. Id. Greenpeace also points to the EPA ’s Risk Management Plan (“RM P”), which requires facilities to report holdings of certain substances ov er threshold amounts. Hind Decl. ¶ 18. The Houston Chronicle maintains a searchable onlin e listing of RMP-regulated facilit ies. Id. The chemicals covered by the T RI and RMP programs overlap wit h the chemicals of interest regulated by CFATS, meaning many of the facilities regulated byCFATS (and the TRI- and RMP-reportable chemicals they s tore) are alr eady publicly discl osed. Id. ¶¶ 18-21 & Ex. K; Poje Decl. ¶ 13. And Greenpeace asserts that information about thes e facilities can also be accessed12 through “a) web searches, phone books , tax records, or other pu blic databases or records; b) direct observation; or c) engineer ing or other analysis of info rmation sources that are lawfully disclosed or required to be disclosed.” Orum Decl. ¶ 13. DHS’s response is twofold. First , it points out that CFATS ove rlaps only incompletely with these other sources of pub lic information, meaning that re vealing the redacted names will provide terrorists with a new source of potential targets. See Falcon Reply Decl. ¶ 10. Next, and perhaps more importantly, DHS a sserts that the availability of public information about chemical facilities makes the redacted information more dangerous, not l ess dangerous. A terrorist could cross-check the already-public lis ts against the lists of facil ities that are not “high risk,” using the former to identify facilities hol ding chemicals they want to exploit, and the latter to determine which of those facilities are soft targets. See id. ¶ 11. Greenpeace also asserts that DHS has failed to satisfy FOIA’s s egregability requirement. Greenpeace claims that, to the extent some facilities have “com pletely and permanently remov[ed] chemicals of interes t from their operations,” there i s no threat to releasing those facilities’ names. Orum Decl. ¶ 8. Moreover, Greenpeace claim s, DHS should be able to identify those facili ties. By statute, DHS is required to “doc ument the basis” for determining that a facility will no l onger be subject to CFATS requirements

. Id. ¶ 9 (citing 6 U.S.C. § 622(e)(3)(A)). Nonetheless, DHS has redacted those facilitie s’ names. DHS responds that it cannot iden tify those facilities that have “completely and permanently” removed all chemical s of interest. First, the sta tutory provision Greenpeace relies on did not go into effect until 2015, just after DHS had made i ts December 2014 production of the documents at issue. Fa lcon Reply Decl. ¶ 12. Before 2015, the CFATS program did not maintain information about why fac ilities were “de-tiered” in a“searchable format.” Id. In any13 event, DHS explains, it does not ask facilities whether they have “completely and permanently” removed chemicals of interest . Facilities are often de-tiered because they have reduced one particular chemical of interest b elow its STQ; therefore, the r ecorded “reasons” for de-tiering those facilities do not include whether allof their chemicals of interest have been removed. Id. ¶ 13. In addition, facilities do not report whether they have “permanently” removed chemicals of interest, and so DHS has no way of knowing that fact. Id. ¶ 14. E. This Action On March 16, 2017, Greenpeace filed this lawsuit. ECF No. 1 (“ Compl.”). Greenpeace brings three causes of action. The first, under FOIA, alleges that the Coast Guard attorney advisor’s June 2014 decision ob ligated DHS to produce the entir ety of the requested records. Id. ¶ 23. Greenpeace claims it is ent itled to release of the recor ds, “without redactions,” under 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4). Id. ¶ 27. Greenpeace’s second cause of action, under the APA, sim ilarly alleges that DHS unlawfully withheld agency action by failing t o comply with the attorney advisor’s decision. Id. ¶ 30. Greenpeace asserts that, “[i]f no relief was available under FOIA,” it is entitled to declaratory a nd injunctive relief under the A PA. Id. ¶ 32. Finally, Greenpeace alleges that it is entitled to a writ of mandamus compelling DH S to produce the unredacted records in the event that FOIA and the APA do not provide the r equested relief. Id. ¶ 36. Defendants have moved to dismiss under Federal Rules of Civil P rocedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) or, alternatively, for summary judgment under Rule 56. ECF No. 11. Legal Standard A. Motion to Dismiss “A Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss tests the legal sufficiency of a plaintiff’s complaint; it does not require a court to ‘asse ss the truth of what is assert ed or determine whether a plaintiff has any evidence to back up what is in the complaint.’” Herron v. Fannie Mae , 861 F.3d 160,14 173 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (quoting Browning v. Clinton , 292 F.3d 235, 242 (D.C. Cir. 2002)). “In evaluating a Rule 12(b)(6) moti on, the Court must construe the complaint ‘in favor of the plaintiff, who must be granted t he benefit of all inferences th at can be derived from the facts alleged.’” Hettinga v. United States , 677 F.3d 471, 476 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (quoting Schuler v. United States , 617 F.2d 605, 608 (D.C. Cir. 1979)). “Bu t the Court need not accept inferences drawn by plaintiff if those infe rences are not supported by the facts set out in the complaint, nor must the court accept legal conc lusions cast as factual allegat ions.” Id. “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must have ‘facial plausibility,’ meaning i t must ‘plead[] factual content that allows the court to draw the re asonable inference that the defe ndant is liable for the misconduct alleged.’” Id. (alteration in or iginal) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)). District courts “may in appropriate cases dispose of a motion t o dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under [Rule] 12(b)(1) on the compla int standing alone.” Herbert v. Nat’l Acad. of Scis. , 974 F.2d 192, 197 (D.C. Cir. 1992). In such cases courts mus t, as when reviewing a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, “accept[] as true all of the factual allegations contained in the complaint.” KiSKA Const. Corp. v. WMATA , 321 F.3d 1151, 1157 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
B. Motion for Summary Judgment Under Rule 56, a court must grant summary judgment “if the mova nt shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any mater ial fact and the movant is en titled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). “Su mmary judgment i s appropriate ly granted when, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-movants and drawing all reasonable inferences accordingly, no reasonable jury could reach a verdict in their favor.” Lopez v. Council on Am.- Islamic Relations Action Network, Inc. , 826 F.3d 492, 496 (D.C. Cir. 2016). “[T]he mere existence of some alleged factual dispute betwee n the parties will not defeat anotherwise properly supported motion for su mmary judgment; the requirementis that there be15 no genuine issue of materialfact.” Id. (alteration in or iginal) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. , 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986)). “[T]he vast majority of FOIA cas es can be resolved on summary j udgment.” Brayton v. Office of U.S. Trade Rep. , 641 F.3d 521, 527 (D.C. Cir. 2011) . Congress enacted FOIA in 1966 to “pierce the veil of admi nistrative secrecy and to open agency action to the light of public scrutiny.” Morley v. CIA , 508 F.3d 1108, 1114 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (quoting Dep’t of Air Force v.
Rose , 425 U.S. 352, 361 (1976)). “FOIA ‘mandates that an agency di sclose records on request, unless they fall within on e of nine exemptions.’” EPIC v. DHS , 777 F.3d 518, 522 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (quoting Milner v. Dep’t of Navy , 562 U.S. 562, 565 (2011)). In FOIA cases, “to obtain summar y judgment the agency must show that it made a good faith effort to conduct a search f or the requested records, usi ng methods which can be reasonably expected to produce the information requested.” Mobley v. CIA , 806 F.3d 568, 580 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (quoting Oglesby v. U.S. Dep’t of Army , 920 F.2d 57, 68 (D.C. Cir. 1990)). “The court may rely on a ‘reasonably detaile d affidavit, setting forth the search terms and the type of search performed, and averring that all files likely to contain respon sive materials (if such records exist) were searched.’” Id. at 580-81 (quoting Oglesby , 920 F.2d at 68). “The court applies a ‘reasonableness’ test to determi ne the ‘adequacy’ of a search m ethodology, consistent with congressional intent tilting the scale in favor of disclosure . . . .” Morley , 508 F.3d at 1114 (quoting Campbell v. DOJ , 164 F.3d 20, 27 (D.C. Cir. 1998)). In addition, if the agency has invoked any of FOIA’s exemptions , the “burden is on the agency to justify withholding the requested documents, and the FOIA directs district courts to determine de novo whether non-disclosure was permissible.” EPIC , 777 F.3d at 522. “Summary judgment is warranted on the basi s of agency affidavits when th e affidavits describe the16 justifications for nondisclosure with reasonably specific detai l, demonstrate that the information withheld logically falls within the claimed exemption, and are not controverted by either contrary evidence in the record nor by evidence of agency bad faith.” Larson v. Dep’t of State , 565 F.3d 857, 862 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (quoting Miller v. Casey , 730 F.2d 773, 776 (D.C. Cir. 1984)). That is, the agency must provide a “ logical” or “plausible” justific ation for the exemption. Id. (quoting Wolf v. CIA , 473 F.3d 370, 374-75 (D.C. Cir. 2007)). The agency cannot re ly on “conclusory and generalized all egations of exemptions.” Morley , 508 F.3d at 1114-15 (quoting Founding Church of Scientology of Wash., D.C., Inc. v. NSA , 610 F.2d 824, 830 (D.C. Cir. 1979)). FOIA further requires that “[a] ny reasonably segregable portionof a record shall be provided to any person requesting such record after deletion of the portions which are exempt.” 5 U.S.C. § 552(b). The court has an affirmative duty to ensure that this requirement is satisfied, even if it must do so sua sponte

. See Morley , 508 F.3d at 1123. Analysis As explained below, the Court will grant Defendants’ motion and deny Greenpeace’s motion. Greenpeace’s claims under the APA and for a writ of mandamus will be dismissed for failure to state a claim and lack of subject matter jurisdictio n, respectively. In addition, the Court will grant summary judgment for Defendants on Greenpeace’s FOIAclaim. A. Motion to Dismiss As discussed below, the Court agrees with DHS that Greenpeace’s FOIA claim must be dismissed insofar as it asks the Court to “enforce” the Coast G uard attorney advisor’s decision, although the Court will allow the FOIA claim to proceed to summ ary judgment under a de novo standard of review. In addition , Greenpeace’s APA and mandamus claims must be dismissed in their entirety.17 1. Freedom of Information Act In its complaint, Greenpeace asserts that it has a right under FOIA to the unredacted records “[p]ursuant to” the J une 2014 decision of the Coast Gua rd attorney advisor. Compl. ¶ 23. That is, it seeks to have this Court “compel” DHS to abi de by the attorney advisor’s decision. Pl.’s Br. at 2. But such a claim is not cognizable under FOIA because it would entail this Court deferring to the atto rney advisor’s decision on the merits. FOIA, by contrast, requires the Court to “determine the matter de novo.” 5 U.S.C. § 552(a) (4)(B). “De novo means here, as it ordinarily does, a fresh, i ndependent determination of ‘the matter’ at stake; the court’s inquiry is not limited to or constricted by the administrative record, nor is any deference due the agency’s conclusion.” Doe v. United States , 821 F.2d 694, 697-98 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (en banc) (R.B. Ginsburg, J.) (interpreting i dentical language in PrivacyAct). That is, the Court is “to put itself in the agency’s place, to m ake anew the same judgment ea rlier made by the agency.” Id. at 698. Therefore, to the extent that Greenpeace seeks to “enforc e” the attorney a dvisor’s decision, Pl.’s Br. at 12, it does not stat e a valid claim for relief. Greenpeace argues that the following provision of FOIA gives ri se to such an “enforcement” claim: “Upon any determination by an agency to co mply with a request for records, the records shall be made promptly available to such p erson making such request.” 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(6)(C)(i). Butthis provision does not purport to provide a remedy. It merely goes to timing, requiring agencie s to release records “promptly ,” which “typically would mean within days or a few weeks of a ‘determination,’ not months or years.” Citizens for Responsibility & Ethics in Wash. (“CREW”) v. FEC , 711 F.3d 180, 188 (D.C. Cir. 2013). If the agency fails to live up to this obligation, the remedy is the o ne that the statut e provides: the requester can immediately seek de novo review in federal district c ourt. 5 U.S.C. § 5 52(a)(4)(B). “Where, as here, ‘a statute expressly provides a remedy, courts must be especially reluctant to18 provide additional remedies.’” Sandoz Inc. v. Amgen Inc. , 137 S. Ct. 1664, 1675 (2017) (quoting Karahalios v. Nat’l Fed’n of Fed. Emps., Local 1263 , 489 U.S. 527, 533 (1989)); see also Nw. Airlines, Inc. v. Transp. Workers Union of Am. , 451 U.S. 77, 94 (1981) (“It is, of course, not within our competence as federal judges to amend these comprehe nsive enforcement schemes by adding to them another privat e remedy not authorized by Congres s.”). In most cases, de novo review is a boon to plaintiffs: unlike the APA standard of rev iew, de novo review generally affords no defere nce to the agency’s decision s. See Cause of Action v. FTC , 799 F.3d 1108, 1115 (D.C. Cir. 2015). But cf. Ctr. for Nat’l Sec. Studies v. DOJ , 331 F.3d 918, 926-28 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (explaini ng that deference is due where executive branch invokes national-security and law-enforcem ent exemptions). Moreover, F OIA reverses the normal burden of proof, requiring the a gency, not the plaintiff, to pr ove that it conducted an adequate search and to justify any exemptions it claims. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B); EPIC v. NSA , 678 F.3d 926, 932 (D.C. Cir. 2012); Iturralde v. Comptroller of Currency , 315 F.3d 311, 313-14 (D.C. Cir. 2003). But FOIA plaintiffs must take the bitter with the sweet. The F OIA standard of review does disadvantage plaintiffs w ho would prefer to focus on the n iceties of agency procedure instead of the merits of their cla ims. Under the APA, it would be arbitrary and capricious for an agency to change its mind withoutacknowledging it had done so and providing an adequate explanation. See Encino Motorcars, LLC v. Navarro , 136 S. Ct. 2117, 2125-26 (2016). Similarly, it would be arbitrary and capricious for an agency t o deviate from an administrative law judge’s decision without a reasoned explanation. See Morall v. DEA , 412 F.3d 165, 177 (D.C. Cir. 2005). And under the APA , an agency generally canno t defend its actions in court for reasons that are absent from the administrative record. See Williams Gas Processing-Gulf Coast19 Co. v. FERC , 475 F.3d 319, 328-29 (D.C. Cir. 2006). Under a de novo standard, by contrast, all that matters is whether the ag ency reached the right outcome. Accordingly, an agency is free to advance new justifications f or withholding documents under FOIAonce it comes to court. See Bayala v. DHS , 827 F.3d 31, 35-36 (D.C. Cir. 2016). The briefs in this case have a ddressed numerous arcane question s, such as: whether the Court Guard attorney advisor is properly characterized as an “a dministrative law judge,” see Pl.’s Reply at 7 n.1; whether DHS ’s Office of the General Couns el fully delegated its FOIA appeals process to the Coast Gua rd Office of the Chief Administrative Law Judge, or instead retained the authority to reviewthe Coast Guard’s decisions, see Defs.’ Reply at 27-30; whether any such retention of authority amounted to an improper “secret veto,” Pl.’s Br. at 7-8; which decision represented DHS’s “fi nal action” on Greenpeace’s FOIA request, Pl.’s Reply at 6-10; and whether DHS regulations allo w for multiple administrative a ppeals, see Pl.’s Br. at 17 n.9. Not one of those issues matte rs, however, to the question befor e the Court: whether Greenpeace is entitled to the documents it seeks on the merits. That is not to say that FOIA’s pr ocedural provisi ons are irrele vant. Plaintiffs must exhaust their administrative r emedies under FOIA before going t o court. See CREW , 711 F.3d at 184. (Defendants concede that Greenpeace has satisfied that re quirement in this case. Defs.’ Reply at 2.) If the agency fails to follow FOIA’s procedures, “the ‘penalty’ is that the agency cannot rely on the administrative exhaustion requirement to kee p cases from getting into court.”
CREW , 711 F.3d at 189. But the agency s uffers no prejudice on the merits of its defense, nor could it, because review must be de novo

. Greenpeace also argues that Payne Enterprises, Inc. v. United States , 837 F.2d 486 (D.C. Cir. 1988), authorizes the remedy it seeks. See Pl.’s Br. at 17-19. That case concerns the20 availability of prospective reli ef—that is, an order that the a gency provide documents beyond those falling within the particu lar request before the court—ba sed on a “policy or practice” of agency misconduct. See Ctr. for Study of Servs. v. U .S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs. , 874 F.3d 287, 292 (D.C. Cir. 2017). Payne decidedly lacks any relevan ce in deciding th e propriety of a single FOIA request. Indeed, “the alle gation of a single FOIA violat ion [is] insufficient as a matter of law to state a po licy or practice claim” under Payne

. Scudder v. CIA , 281 F. Supp. 3d 124, 129 (D.D.C. 2017). Therefore, to the extent Greenp eace seeks merely to “enforce” t he attorney advisor’s ruling, without an inquiry into the merits of that ruling, its claim must be dismissed. Nonetheless, construing Greenpeace’s complaint liberally in its favor, it also sta tes a traditional claim for documents withheld “[i ]n violation of FOIA.” Compl. ¶ 25. The Court will accordingly consider the merits of Greenpeace’s claim on de novo review. That issue cannot be resolved on a motion to dismiss, and so the Court will considerit below on the parties’ crossmotions for summary judgment. 2. Administrative Procedure Act Greenpeace also requests, in the alternative, that the Court co mpel DHS to comply with the Coast Guard attorney advisor’s ruling under the APA. See Pl.’s Br. at 29-32. This APA claim fails because Greenpeace already has an adequate remedy under FOIA. The APA only authorizes the review of actio ns “for which there is no adequat e remedy in a court.” 5 U.S.C. § 704. In CREW v. DOJ , 846 F.3d 1235 (D.C. Cir. 2017), the D.C . Circuit considered w hether a FOIA policy-or-pra ctice claim under Payne was an “adequate remedy” that foreclosed similar relief under the APA. See id. at 1244. The D.C. Circuit note d that, where Congress has affo rded plaintiffs a private right of action, there generally is no APA remedy. See id. at 1244-45. That is particularly true where Congress has provided for de novo review, “given the frequent21 ‘incompat[ibility]’ between de novo review and the APA’s deferential standards.” Id. at 1245 (alteration in or iginal) (quoting Envt’l Def. Fund v. Reilly , 909 F.2d 1497, 1506 (D.C. Cir. 1990)). The D.C. Circuit conclude d that FOIA did offer an adequate remedy, reasoning that the “creation of both agenc y obligations and a mechanism for judici al enforcement in the same legislation suggests that FOIA its elf strikes the balance betwe en statutory dutie s and judicial enforcement that Congress desired.” Id. The same is true here. Greenpea ce’s theories about the effect of the agency process aside, this is a run-of-the-mill FOIA case involving a request that DHS turn over specific information it has withheld. Pla inly, FOIA offers an “adequate remedy”: it provides the exact relief that Greenpeace has re quested—an order to turn over the requested information—if Greenpeace can show it is actuall y entitled to that relief. Gr eenpeace’s argument is, in essence, that a FOIA claim is not an ade quate remedy in this case becaus e Greenpeace might fare worse under de novo review than under the APA standard of review. See Pl.’s Br. at 32. But as the D.C. Circuit has explained, an “adequate” remedy does not neces sarily mean an “identical” remedy. See CREW , 846 F.3d at 1245. The fact that Greenpeace must proceed unde r FOIA’s de

novo standard of review does not mean that FOIA’s remedy is inadequ ate. Therefore, Greenpeace’s APA claim must be dismissed for failure to state a claim. 3
3. Mandamus Finally, Greenpeace argues that it is entitled to a writ of man damus. The threshold jurisdictional requirements for mandamus require plaintiffs to demonstrate, among other things, “that no adequate altern ative remedy exists.” Am. Hosp. Ass’n v. Burwell , 812 F.3d 183, 189

3 While Defendants argue that the APA’s “adequate remedy” rule i s a jurisdictional bar and that the Court should dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1), see Defs.’ Br. at 13, they are incorrect. See Perry Capital LLC v. Mnuchin , 864 F.3d 591, 621 (D.C. Cir. 2017).22 (D.C. Cir. 2016). Greenpeace fails to meet this requirement be cause, as explained in connection with its APA claim, FOIA offers an adequate remedy if the government has unlawfully withheld information. Therefore, the “court must dismiss . . . for lack of jurisdiction.” Id. B. Motions for Summary Judgment For the reasons explained belo w, reviewing the record on a de novo basis, the Court concludes that it must enter s ummary judgment for Defendants onGreenpeace’s FOIA claim. 1. Adequacy of Defendants’ Search To obtain summary judgment, Defendants must show “a good faith effort to conduct a search for the requested record s, using methods which can be re asonably expected to produce the information requested.” Mobley v. CIA , 806 F.3d 568, 580 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (quoting Oglesby v. U.S. Dep’t of Army , 920 F.2d 57, 68 (D.C. Cir. 1990)). In this case, Greenpeace requested “the most complete listing of chemical facilities that have reduced their holdings of threshold quantities of ‘chemicals of i nterest’ (COI) rendering them no l onger ‘high risk’ facilities under [CFATS].” Hind Decl. Ex. C, at 1. In order to produce such a listing, Defendants queried CSAT, “the only database within DHS that stores the informationnecessary to produce a complete and contemporaneous lis ting of chemical facilities tha t have reduced their holdings of threshold quantities of chemicals of interest, thereby renderin g them no longer high risk facilities.” Pl.’s Resp. SoMF ¶ 4. Plaintiffs have admitted t hat CSAT is, in fact, the only such database. See id. Defendants’ queries returned li sts of facilities that previou sly had been considered high risk, but had s ince been determined not to be h igh risk. See id. ¶ 6. Greenpeace has not challenged the adequacy of this search, and the Court concludes that Defendants have met their bur den of showing a good faith effort to locate all re sponsive records using reasonable methods.23 2. Exemption 7(F) The parties do, however, vigorouslydispute the applicability o f Exemption 7(F). To satisfy Exemption 7(F), Defendants must show (1) that the infor mation was “compiled for law enforcement purposes” (a thresho ld requirement applying to all subsections of Exemption 7) and (2) that production of these mat erials “could reasonably be exp ected to endanger the life or physical safety of any individua l.” 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7).

a. “Compiled for Law Enforcement Purposes” As a threshold matter, the govern ment must establish “that the records were ‘compiled for law enforcement purposes.’” Pub. Emps. for Envtl. Responsib ility v. U.S. Section, Int'l Boundary & Water Comm’n, U.S.-Mexico (“ PEER ”), 740 F.3d 195, 203 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)). “[T]he agency’s activity ‘must be related to the enforcement of federal laws or to the maintenan ce of national security,’” and “the nexus between the [activity] and one of the agency’s law enforcement duties must be based oninformation sufficient to support at least ‘a colorable claim’ of its rationality.” Pinson v. DOJ , 202 F. Supp. 3d 86, 101-02 (D.D.C. 2016) (second altera tion in original) (quoting Pratt v. Webster , 673 F.2d 408, 420-21 (D.C. Cir. 1982)). Defendants argue that the records at issue satisfy this thresho ld requirement because ISCD is a “regulatory enforcem ent division” of DHS and because the records consist of information obtained from faciliti es regulated under CFATS. Fu entes Decl. ¶¶ 24-25. Greenpeace has not contested that the records satisfy Exemption 7’s threshold requirement, and the Court concludes that the y do. DHS’s mission is, among othe r things, to “pr event terrorist attacks within the United Stat es.” 6 U.S.C. § 111(b)(1)(A). T hat is a “law enforcement” function, because it involves “pr oactive steps designed to prev ent criminal activity and to maintain security.” PEER , 740 F.3d at 203 (quoting Milner v. Dep’t of Navy , 562 U.S. 562, 58224 (2011) (Alito, J., concurring)). A nd DHS compiled the particul ar information at issue pursuant to that function, in order to reduc e the risk from terrorist attacks at the chemical facilities it regulates. See 6 U.S.C. § 622(a)(2)(B); 6 C .F.R. § 27.100. “[S]teps by law e nforcement officers to prevent terrorism surely ful fill ‘law enforcement purposes.’ ” PEER , 740 F.3d at 203 (quoting Milner , 562 U.S. at 583 (Alito, J., concurring)). Therefore, this in formation, by its very nature, satisfies Exemption 7’s threshold requirement.
b. “Could Reasonably Be Expected to Endanger the Life or Physical Safety of Any Individual” The crux of the parties’ dispute is whether releasing the information in question “could reasonably be expected to endange r the life or physical safety of any individual.” 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(F). “That language is very broad.” PEER , 740 F.3d at 205. It “does not require that a particular kind of individual be at risk of harm; ‘any indivi dual’ will do.” Id. Nor is the agency required “to specificall y identify the individuals who w ould be endangered.” EPIC v. DHS , 777 F.3d 518, 520 (D.C. Cir. 2015). Moreover, disclosure “need not definitely endanger life or physical safety; a reasona ble expectation of endangerme nt suffices.” PEER , 740 F.3d at 205. Courts “have consistently defe rred to executive affidavit s predicting harm to the national security, and have found it unwise to undertake se arching judic ial review.” Id. (quoting Ctr. for Nat’l Sec. Studies v. DOJ , 331 F.3d 918, 927 (D.C. Cir. 2003)). The D.C. Circuit has held that, in cases “involving documents r elating to critical infrastructure, ‘it i s not difficult to show that disclosure may “endanger the life or physical safety of any individual.”’” Id. at 205-06 (quoting Milner , 562 U.S. at 582 (Alito, J., concurring)). Archetypal examples of critical i nfrastructure include “bridges , airports, railroad tracks, dams and research facilities.” Id. at 198. Courts have thus conclude d that Exemption 7(F) protec ts “inundation maps” that show the potential harm from burst dams, see id. at 206, documents25 discussing the risks from potentia l spills at vulnerable locati ons along oil pipelines, see Standing Rock Sioux Tribe v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs , 249 F. Supp. 3d 516, 522 (D.D.C. 2017), information about nuclear defense, see Ctr. for Pub. Integrity v. U.S. Dep’t of Energy , 234 F. Supp. 3d 65, 83 (D.D.C. 2017), and protocols for shutting down wireless devices that could be used to detonate bombs, see EPIC , 777 F.3d at 523. The parties disput e whether the chemical facilities at issue in this case constitute “critical infrastru cture.” Pl.’s Br. at 24; Defs.’ Reply at 12. Regardless of how they are l abeled, however, identifying i nformation about these facilities shares a key characteristic withthe foregoing examples: it rep resents highly useful information for terrorists pla nning attacks on them. All of the chemical facilities at issue, at one point, containe d chemicals at levels so dangerous they were categorized a s “high risk”—meaning there wa s the potential that a terrorist attack on these faciliti es “could result in significant adverse consequences for human life or health, national security or cr itical economic assets.” 6 C.F. R. § 27.205(a) (emphasis added). As Defendants point out, these facili ties continue to pose some ri sk to life or health arising from potential terrorist attacks. DHS’s risk methodology “is not de signed or intended to identify all facilities where an attack employing the facility’s chemicals w ould result in a l oss to human life.” Defs.’ Br. at 11. The CFATS program focuses its resour ces on facilities that are “high risk.” Other facilities are notnecessarily “no risk”—they maybe “low risk,” “medium risk,” or somewhere in between. Indeed, it seems unlikely that all chemi cal facilities previously categorized as “high risk” w ould now pose no risk at all. The government’s affidavits say just that: many facilities that are not “high risk” nonetheless cont inue to have chemicals of interest at or above STQs—amounts that DHS considers dangerous enough to warrant a report to the government. Fuentes Decl. ¶ 30; Falcon Reply Decl. ¶ 13. And even facilities with no26 chemicals of interest at or a bove STQs may continue to hold tho se chemicals at levels below STQs. Fuentes Decl. ¶ 30. And there is more. Whether a fa cility is consid ered “high risk ” does not depend merely on the chemicals of interest it holds. It is also based on inf ormation received from the broader intelligence community about the threat to those facilities. P l.’s Resp. SoMF ¶ 3; Fuentes Decl. ¶ 31. Accordingly, disclosing whichfacilities are considered “high risk,” and which are not, has the potential to reveal the gove rnment’s thinking about which f acilities are likely targets for terrorist attacks, and which are no t. Revealing the names of “ de-tiered” facilities would be dangerous in at least two respect s. First, it would provide te rrorists with valuable insight into how the United States government , including its intelligence se rvices, assesses the risk of attacks on chemical facilities in this c ountry. Making strategic insig hts about national security matters available to the general public ( including our country’s enemie s) has the inhere nt potential to cause harm. Cf. ACLU v. U.S. Dep’t of Defense , 628 F.3d 612, 624-25 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (discussing potential harm from providing terrorists with “insi ght” into “the CIA’s core mission of collecting and analyzing intelligence that reveals the plans , intentions and capabilities of the nation’s enemies”). Second, such r evelations would effectivelyidentify “de-tiere d” facilities as “soft targets” for terrorists . DHS does not require “de-tiered ” facilities to implement security measures under CFATS. See Falcon Reply Decl. ¶ 5. Releas ing the lists would thus allow terrorists to adjust their aim to focus on the very facilities that the government has decided are unlikely to be targeted. Moreover, as Defendants point out , this single request cannot b e viewed in isolation. If the lists of “de-tiered” facil ities are not exempt, then nothin g would stop FOIA requesters from seeking refreshed lists at diffe rent points in time. Defendant s’ affidavits confirm that facilities27 do, in fact, fluctuate into and outof “high risk” status as DH S’s assessments change. See id. ; Falcon Decl. ¶ 7. And whenever f acilities on an earlier versio n of the list disappear from a later version, that would mean those f acilities are once again “high risk,” revealing the identity of the very facilities DHS i s most determined to protect. Fuentes Dec l. ¶ 31. Greenpeace’s response is that DHS could limit future releases to mitigate this risk. Th at is, DHS could “redact or withhold the facilities that have previ ously been included and provide o nly the additions.” See Pl.’s Br. at 24. This approach, Greenpeace argues, would “limit[] the abili ty of any would-be bad actors from comparing the complete lists at various times.” Id. But Greenpeace provides no authority for its proposed approach. Rather , the idea that FOIA would re quire the release of certain information, but only to the firs t person who requests it, is o bviously quite preposterous. “There is no mechanism under FOIA for a p rotective order allowing onlythe requester to see whether the information bears out his th eory, or for proscribing its ge neral dissemination.” Nat’l Archives & Records Admin. v. Favish , 541 U.S. 157, 174 (2004). That is, “if the information is subject to disclosure, it belongs to all.” Id. at 172. Finally, it is telling that Congr ess has limited DHS’s ability to reveal the very information that Greenpeace has requested. By statute, DHS is required to make semi-annual reports to certain congressional committees , providing the number of instances in which facilities were either placed “in a lower risk tier” or “de-tiered,” along with the reasons for those decisions. See 6 U.S.C. § 622(e)(4)(B)(i). But DHS must provide this informat ion “in a sufficiently anonymized form to ensure thatthe information does not identif y any specific facility or company as the source of the in formation when viewed alone or i n combination with other public information.” Id. § 622(e)(4)(B)(ii). The deanonymized information Congress too k care28 to protect—names detailed enough to i dentify specific facilitie s—is precisely what Greenpeace wants DHS to disclose. For all these reasons, DHS has met its burden of showing that the information at issue, if released, “could reasonably be e xpected to endanger the life or physical safety of any individual.” 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7 )(F). That requires showing o nly “a reasonable expectation of endangerment” of human life or health, PEER , 740 F.3d at 205, which means some risk, not necessarily a high risk. Defendants have made such a showing here, because even though these facilities are no longer designate d as “high risk,” releasing i dentifying information about them could aid terrorists in identif ying targets and thus would incr ease the risk of deadly attacks. Cf. id . at 206 (“Terrorists or crimina ls could use [inundation map] i nformation to determine whether attacking a dam would be worthwh ile, which dam would provide th e most attractive target, and what the likely effect of a dam break would be.”). Greenpeace offers its own evidence to show that “[p]roviding th e list of chemical facilities that are no longer ‘high risk’ under CFATS cannot be reasonably expected to endanger anyone.” Pl.’s Resp. SoMF ¶ 11. But its showing is insufficie nt to create a genuine issue of material fact. First, Greenpeace argues that the risks of releasing the identi ties of these facilities are minor and outweighed by the benefi ts of taking such action. Th ey point out, for example, that many of the chemical facilities on the list have no chemicals o f interest at or above STQs. See Pl.’s Br. at 22-23. Of course, G reenpeace does not have inform ation from the intelligence community to inform its assessmen t of the risks involved. DHS does, and the Court owes deference to DHS’s assertion that potential attacks against suc h facilities continue to pose a risk because they may still hold those chemicals at lower levels. See PEER , 740 F.3d at 205; Fuentes29 Decl. ¶ 30. Nor can the Court conclude that Greenpeace has rai sed a genuine issue of material fact with its evidence (in the fo rm of expert affidavits) that “the more likely consequence of greater awareness of such reduc tions in inventories of dangerou s chemicals is that, like other government programs involving hazardous chemicals where regulat ed facilities are publicly disclosed, disclosure creates an incentive for reductions, and more facilities will reduce their inventories of chemicals of int erest, increasing safety.” Pl.’ s Br. at 23 (citing Poje Decl. ¶¶ 10- 12; Orum Decl. ¶¶ 7, 12). These affidavits miss the mark. Exe mption 7(F) merely requires the government to show “a reasonable expectation of endangerment” i f the records are released.
PEER , 740 F.3d at 205. It is not a “balan cing test” that requires the agency to weigh that danger against possible benefits of releasing the information. Pinson v. DOJ , 236 F. Supp. 3d 338, 368 (D.D.C. 2017). Therefore, DHS is not required to show that ris ks to human life and health from potential terrorist attacks outwe igh the possibility that withh olding the information might inhibit the development of best pract ices by the private sector. Greenpeace also relies heavily on the fact that the public alre ady has access to information about many of these f acilities and the chemicals th ey hold from various public sources (including the EPA). See Pl.’s Br. at 25-27. The Court ag rees in principle that “where information requested ‘is tru ly public, then enforcement of an exemption cannot fulfill its purposes.’” Cottone v. Reno , 193 F.3d 550, 554 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (quoting Niagara Mohawk Power Corp. v. U.S. Dep’t of Energy , 169 F.3d 16, 19 (D.C. Cir. 1999)). But the Court “must be confident that the informati on sought is truly public and that the requester receive no more than what is publicly available be fore [finding] a waiver.” Id. at 555. That is, the “same agency” must have previously disclosed th e “exact information” at issue

. Valfells v. CIA , 717 F. Supp. 2d 110, 117 (D.D.C. 2010); see Frugone v. CIA , 169 F.3d 772, 774 (D.C. Cir. 1999). This30 “insistence on exactitu de” protects “the Gove rnment’s vital int erest in information relating to national security and foreign affairs.” ACLU , 628 F.3d at 621 (quoting Wolf v. CIA , 473 F.3d 370, 378 (D.C. Cir. 2007)). Here, Greenpeace can show only that certain public disclosures by other agencies “overlap with” the lists of CF ATS-regulated facilities—not that any agency, much less DHS, has previously produced the ex act information at issue. See Pl.’s Br. at 26; Falcon Reply Decl. ¶ 10. In fact, the information Greenpeace seeks is qualitatively diff erent from publicly available information. Cf. ACLU , 628 F.3d at 620-21 (declining to re quire the production of cl assified information that, the government asserted, was “of a qualitativ ely different nature” from publicly available information). It woul d reveal not only the location of the facilities, but also the fact that DHS previously considered them as “high risk”—but now does not. This information is of a different nature and was compile d for a different purpose than information released by other agencies. For example, the EPA pr ovides certain information ab out chemical facilities in order to “promote emergency planni ng and to provide the public with i nformation about releases of toxic chemicals in their community.” Poje Decl. ¶ 10. DHS’s r isk determinations under CFATS, by contrast, are based on f acilities’ chemical holdings and insight from the intelligence community about the threat posed t o those facilities, for the p urpose of reducing the potential for harm arising from terrorist attacks. Pl.’s Resp. SoMF ¶ 3. Su ch information enriches, and does not merely repeat, the informa tion already in the public domain . As Defendants persuasively claim, terrorists might combine these different sources of info rmation to make better-informed decisions about which facilities to target. Falcon Reply Decl. ¶ 11. Therefore, Greenpeace’s evidence fails to raise a genuine issue of material fact: even if true, it does not undermine31 Defendants’ showing that releas ing the records at issue “could reasonably be expected to endanger the life or physical safety of any individual.” 5 U.S .C. § 552(b)(7)(F). While there are surely many har d cases under Exemption 7(F), th is is not one of them. The information in question was compiled by DHS in order to kee p our country safe from terrorist attacks. Dis closing it would reve al the location of facilities containing dangerous chemicals terrorists might tar get, as well as how the governmen t has assessed the risks posed by those facilities—all information that terrorists might exploit. Such disclosures would thus risk the life and health of persons working at or living near those facilities, who would be harmed in the event of a terrorist att ack. Therefore, DHS has properly i nvoked Exemption 7(F). 3. Segregability Finally, Greenpeace argues DHS has failed to segregate a subset of the facility names that can be released without endangeri ng human life or health. Unde r FOIA, any “reasonably segregable portion of a record s hall be provided to any person requesting such record after deletion of the portions which a re exempt.” 5 U.S.C. § 552(b). The agency is “entitled to a presumption that [it] complie d with the obligation to disclose reasonably segregable material.” Hodge v. FBI, 703 F.3d 575, 582 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (alte ration in original) ( quoting Sussman v. U.S. Marshals Service , 494 F.3d 1106, 1117 (D.C. Cir. 2007)). Defendants must, howe ver, identify the exempt material a nd “provide descriptions of excer pts deemed to be non-segregable, with explanations as to these decisions.” Am. Immigration Council v. DHS , 950 F. Supp. 2d 221, 248 (D.D.C. 2013). DHS has clearly identified the exempt material (which is marked with redaction boxes) and described it: “The redacted portions are facility names that would allow an individual to identify the specific facility.” Fuentes Decl. Ex. A ( Vaughn index). DHS also explains that it decided which names to redact by performing a line-by-line revi ew of each name individually.32 See Fuentes Decl. ¶ 33. Greenpeace does not dispute that DHS perf ormed this process reasonably. If anything, DHS may h ave been too generous: Green peace reports that several of the redacted entries “may reflect identifiable f acilities.” Pl .’s Br. at 9 n.6. Greenpeace does argue, however, that DHS should have segregated and produced the names of those faciliti es that no longer pose any risk. In particular, Gre enpeace claims, DHS could have identified facilities that “completely and permanent ly remov[ed] chemicals of interest from their operations.” Orum Decl. ¶¶ 8-9. Greenpeace points to an NPPD official’s 2012 testimony that “since [CFATS’] inception, more than 1,600 facil ities completely removed their chemicals of interest.” Def s.’ Resp. SoMF ¶ 1. Similarly, in 2014, an official testified that “more than 3,000 facilities have eliminated , reduced or modified their holdings of chemicals of interest.” Id. ¶ 3 (emphasis added). Greenpeace also argues that some facili ties may only hold chemicals of interest that are c ommon (such as a nitromethane, which is used in race cars and can be purchased legally) and thus pose no special risk. See Pl.’s Br. at 28 (c iting Falcon Decl. ¶ 6). Finally, Greenpeace point s to the fact that DHS is requi red, by statute, to record the reasons why any chemical facility is “de-ti ered.” Pl.’s Br. at 28-29 ( citing 6 U.S.C. § 622(e)(3)). Those records, Greenpeace asserts, should allow DHS to identify whichfacilities have completely divested themselves of chemicals of interest, or at least of al l chemicals except the common ones that pose no real risk. See id. Defendants concede that there i s no risk from facilities that h ave “completely and permanently” divested themselves of all chemicals of interest. Defs.’ Reply at 21. It explains, however, that it cannot readily i dentify those facilities from its records. Many of the records it keeps on facilities are not “searchable,” Falcon Reply Decl. ¶ 12, meaning that Greenpeace’s approach would require manuall y combing through the records for each facility to determine the33 reasons why it was “de-tiered .” And even to the extent DHS’s r ecords are easily searchable, they do not contain the information tha t Greenpeace desires. The re corded reason a facility is detiered may be that it has brought a single chemical of interest below its STQ—even though the facility still has other chemi cals of interest at or above STQs

. See id. ¶ 13. 4 And even if DHS did plumb its records to identif y facilities that have “complet ely” removed chemicals of interest, the records do not capture wheth er facilities have “permanently ” removed chemicals of interest—a fact that DHS simply does not track. See Falcon Reply Decl. ¶ 14. Indeed, the facilities themselves may not knowwith certainty that they wil l never again possess these chemicals. In light of these facts, the Court agrees with Defendants that they have satisfied FOIA’s segregability requirement. FOI A only requires the government t o release all “ reasonably segregable” information. 5 U.S .C. § 552(b) (emphasis added). Greenpeace effectively wants DHS to determine which facilities have no risk, so that their names can be unredacted. But DHS does not make such determinati ons in the ordinary course. It d ecides whether facilities are “high risk;” it does not determine wh ich facilities pose “no risk.” Unsurprisingly, then, DHS does not generally record facts—such wheth er facilities have “permanentl y” divested themselves of chemicals of interest—that would be necessary to make a “no ris k” determination. DHS no doubt could undertake to identify “no risk” f acilities, and perhaps would even succeed at identifying some of them based on information it alr eady possesses. FOIA does not,

4 Defendants explain that the congressional testimony Greenpeace cites, which referred to facilities that “completely” re moved or “eliminated” all chemic als of interest, actually meant the reduction of all chemicals of inter est to levels below STQs. D efs.’ Reply at 22. This explanation is backed up by Defendants’ declarations. See Fuentes Decl. ¶¶ 19, 30. Gr eenpeace has offered no evidence rebutting these decl arations, and so the Court conc ludes that the testimony was not based on DHS’s knowledge of any fac ilities with absolutely no c hemicals of interest.34 however, require agencies to “cr eate records,” “conduct researc h,” or otherwise “dig out all the information that might exist, in whatever form or place it migh t be found.” Nat’l Sec. Counselors v. CIA , 898 F. Supp. 2d 233, 269 (D.D.C. 2012). Nor does it require agencies to “perform searches which are not compatible with their own docum ent retrieval systems.” People for Am. Way Found. v. DOJ , 451 F. Supp. 2d 6, 14 (D.D.C. 2006) (quoting Assassination Archives & Research Ctr., Inc. v. CIA , 720 F. Supp. 217, 218 (D.D.C . 1989)). It certainly does not require DHS to undertake an individualized analysis of 2,73 3 facilities to determine, in the first instance, which should be considered “no risk.” But as G reenpeace admits, it wants DHS to do just that: “to review the files for each facility.” Pl.’s R eply at 21. Because DHS cannot determine which individual facilities pose no risk without an unreasonable effort, its segregability approach—redacting any name that could serve to i dentify a facility—passes

muster. 5
Conclusion For all of the above reasons, Def endants’ Motion to Dismiss or, in the alternative, for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 11) is GRANTED , and Greenpeace’s Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 14) is DENIED . The Court will dismiss Greenpeace’s second claim for relief (APA) for failure to st ate a claim, dismiss Greenpeace’s third claim for relief (mandamus) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, and enter judgment for Defendants on Greenpeace’s first claim for relief (FOIA), in a separate order.
/s/ Timothy J. Kelly TIMOTHY J. KELLY United States District Judge Date: May 1, 2018

5 Indeed, given the nature of this information, the Court suspec ts that DHS’s initial approach— withholding this information entirely—was the correct one.