IN THE C OU RT OF CRIM IN AL AP P EA LS OF TEXAS NO. AP- 75, 748

EX PARTE JOSE ANGEL MOR ENO , Appl i c ant
ON AP P L I CAT I ON F OR A WRI T OF HAB E AS CORP US I N CAUS E NO. 1 98 6- CR1 04 2 F ROM T HE 227 DISTR ICT C OU R T OF BEXA R CO U N TY TH P RI CE , J., delivered th e opinion of the Court in w hich K ELLER , P.J., and W OM ACK , J OHN S ON , K EAS LER , H O L C O MB , an d C OCH RAN , J J ., joi ne d. K ELLER , P.J., f iled a concurring opinion. Mey ers and H ERVEY , JJ. , di d n ot par t ic ip at e. O P I N I O N In this cause, we take t h e u n u su a l step of reconsidering, on o ur own initiat ive, a claim
r ai s ed in an ini ti al pos t- convi ct ion appl ic at ion f orwr itof habea s cor

pus in a capi ta l m

ur der cas e, b u t r e je c te d b y t h is C o u rt in a n o rd e r i ss u e d in 2 0 0 0 . S in c e th a t ti me, th e U n it e d S ta te s S u p re me Cour t ha s is s ued a pai r of deci s ions tha t cal l int o ques ti on the corr ectnes s ( inde ed, the obje ct ive
r eas onabl eness) of

ouror igi nal dis pos it ion of tha t c la im
. I n li ght of thos e dec is ions , and
cons ide r ing the appl ic ant ’ s dil ige nce in r ai s ing the cl ai min hi s ini ti al s ta te wr itappl ic at ion, we
w i l l t a k e a n o t h e r l o o k , a n d , u l t i ma t e l y , g ra n t re l i e f.M o r e n o — 2

1 On i t s f a c e , the app l i cant ’ s i ni t i a l wr i tappl i c a t i on purpor t e d t o b e f i l e d u nde r the a us pi c e s of A rt i cl e 11 .07 of the Cod e of C ri minal Pro cedu re. T EX . C ODE C RIM . P ROC . a rt. 1 1 .0 7 . H o w eve r, p o stcon vi ct i on hab eas c orp us p roceed i ngs i n cap i t al case s are govern ed b yA rt i cl e 11 .07 1 of the Co de, w hich became effect i ve on S eptember 1 , 199 5. T EX . C ODE C RIM . P ROC . a rt . 11.0 71
. See A ct s 19 95 , 74 Le g., th c h. 31 9, p. 27 64, e f

f
. Se pt . 1, 19 95. 2 M o ren o v. S tate , 858 S.W. 2d 453 ( Tex. Cr i m. App
. 1993). 3 492 U .S . 3 02 (1989) (he re i naf t er“ Pen ry I

” )
. I n Pe nr

y v . J ohns on , 53 2 U. S. 78 2 ( 2001 ) (he re i naf t er“ Penr y II ”) , the Su p re me Co u rt w o u ld r evisit Pe n ry’s case after h is retrial. 4 A tthe ti me of the app l i cant’ s offen se, t he rele vant special i ssues w ere: “(1) Wh ether the con du ctof t he d efend ant that caused the d eath o f the d eceased was c om mi t t e d d e l i be r a t e l ya nd wi t h the r e a s onabl e e xpe c t a t i on t ha tthe de a t h o f the d ece ase d o r an o the r w o u ld r esu lt ;

THE PROCEDURAL POSTURE Th e app licant f

iled this init ial s tate application f or w ri t o f hab eas corpus cha llenging his convi ct ion f

orcapi ta l m

ur der and dea th s ent ence on J anuar y 12, 1996. The a ppli canthad bee n

1 convi ct ed i n J anuar

y of 1987, and t his Cour t a f f irm ed h is c onvic ti on in 1993. I n gr ound f or 2

r el ie f number te n of his ini ti al wr itappl ic at ion, the appl ic antar gued t hatthe punis hm entchar ge
s ubm it te d to the jur

y had bee n f

la wed unde rthe Ei ghth A m endm entbeca us e i t di d not e mpower the jur y to give ef

f ect to certa in m it iga ti ng evi dence he had of f er ed atthe punis hm entphas e of tr ia l. He r el ie d pr inc ipa ll y upon the Uni te d St at es Supr em e C our t’ s opini on in Penr y v. Ly naugh (Penr y I ). Th e con victing cou rt recom m end ed that we rej ect this clai mon the m eri ts because 3 the jur y coul d adequa te lycons ide rthe parti cul ar m it iga ti ng evi dence tha t the appl ic anthad pr es ent ed wi thi n the ambitof the s ta tut ory s peci al is s ues , which in 1987 did notinc lude the 4M o r e n o — 3

(2) w hether t here is a reason able prob abil i t ythat the d efend ant wo uld c om mit cri minal act s of vi olence that wo uld con st i tute a t hreat t o so ci ety [.] See form er

T EX . C ODE C RIM . P ROC . ar t . 37. 071, § ( b) ( 1) & (2) , pri ort o am e ndm e ntby A c t s 19 91, 72 nd L e g . , c h. 83 8, p. 28 99, e f f
. Se pt . 1, 19 91. 5 Se e c ur r e nt

T EX . C ODE C RIM . P ROC . art. 3 7.0 71 , § 2 (e)(1) (“Th e co urt sh al l instructthe jury t hat i f the jur yre tur ns an a f

f i r ma t i v e fi ndi ng t o ea c h i s s ue sub mi t t e d unde r sub s e c t i on ( b) , i tsha l l ans werthe f ol l owi ng i s s ue : Whe t he r , t a ki ng i nt o c ons i de r a t i on a l l of the e v i de nc e , i nc l udi ng the c i r c um s t a nc e s of t he off e ns e , the de f

e nda nt ’ s c ha r a c t e r a nd ba c kg r ound , a nd t he pe r s ona l m or a l c ul pa bi l i t yof the def endant , ther e i s a suff

i ci entmi t i ga t i ng ci rc umst anc e or ci rc umst anc es t o warra ntthata s ent enc e of l i fe i mpri sonme ntwi t hout par ol e ra t herthan a dea t h se nt enc e be i mpose d.” ).

6 536 U
. S. 304 (2002 ). parti cul ar m it iga ti on in stru ction curr ent lyf ound in A r ti cl e 37. 071, Se ct ion 2( e) ( 1)
. I n an 5

u n p u b lish ed writ ten o rde r da ted Se p temb er 1 3 , 2 0 0 0 , th is C o u rt f o u n d th e c o n v ict in g co u rt’s f indi ngs of

f actand concl us ions of la w, inc ludi ng it s concl us ion wi th r es pectto gr ound f orr el ie f
n u mb e r t e n , t o b e s u p p o rt e d b y t h e re c o rd
. O n t h a t b a s i s w e d e n i e d re l i e f. The a ppli cantf

il ed hi s ini ti al f

eder al pet it ion f

orwr itof habea s cor

pus on J une 29, 2001. The f eder al dis tr ic t court s ubs equent ly gr ant ed the appl ic ant ’ s m oti on to abat e hi s f eder al pet it ion
s o tha t he coul d r eturn to s tat e co u rt to e xhaus t a newl y r ecogni zed c la im tha t he coul d not be
ex ec u ted co n siste n t w ith th e E ig h th Amen d ment b ec au se he is m en tal ly r eta rde d , u n d er Atki ns v. Virginia
. Thi s Court di s m is s ed hi s f ir s t s ubs equents ta te wr itr ai s ing the Atki ns claimbecau se 6 he f ailed to m ake o ut a prim a f acie claim of m ental ret ardation. When the applicant r eturned to f eder al court, the dis tr ic t c our t den ied r el ie f on al l of the cl ai m s r ai s ed i n his f eder al habea sM o r e n o — 4

7 M oren o v. D ret

ke , 362 F
. Supp. 2d 773 (W. D
. Te x. 2005 ). 8 M oren o v. D ret

ke , 450 F
. 3d 158 ( 5 Ci r. 2006). th
9 Mor e no v . Quar t e r man , 127 S.Ct
. 935 (2007). 10 127 S.Ct
. 1654 (2007). 11 127 S.Ct
. 1706 (2007). 12 Ab dul

- Kab i r

v . Quar t e r man , sup ra , a t 1669 ( “ The r ul e t ha t we r e a f f i r m t oda y–a r ul e t hat has be e n c l e a r l y e s t a bl i s he d s i nc e ou r op i ni on i n Pen ry I –i s thi s : Sp e c i a l i ns t r uc t i ons a r e ne c e s s a r ywhe n the jur ycou l d n ot otherw i se g i ve m ean i ng f ul ef f ect t o a def endant ’ s mi t i ga t i ng ev i dence
. ”)
. pet it ion i n a m em or andumopini on and or der is s ued on Mar ch 17, 2005. The a ppli cantdid not 7
carry his i nitial- writ Pen ry cl ai mf orwar d int o his f

eder al pet it ion. The F if

th Ci r cui t a f

f irm ed t he d istr i c t co u rt’s ju d g ment , an d in Jan u ary o f 2 0 0 7 , th e S u p reme C o u rt d en ied th e a p p lic an t’s 8 petition f or cer tior ari
. 9 In A p ri l o f 2 0 0 7 , th e S u p reme C o u rt issu ed o p in io n s in tw o co mpan io n ca ses, Ab du lKabir v. Quar te r man , and Br ewer v. Quar te r man . In th o se two o p in io n s, th e S u p reme C o u rt 10 11

r evi s it ed Penr

y I an d its p rog en y, an d sta ted th at a ju ry mu st b e e mpo we red b y th e tria l co u rt’s ins tr uct ions to giv e “ m eani ngf ul e f f ect ” t o al l m it iga ti ng evi dence tha t a capi ta l de f endant intr oduces atthe punis hm ent phas e of his tr ia l. I n li ght of

the s e opi nions , the appl ic antf il ed 12
a s econd s ubs equentappl ic at ion f or wr it of habea s cor

pus in s ta te court, ar guing thathe s at is f ie d the cr it er ia f

orf il ing a s ubs equent wr it as enum er at ed in Sect ion 5 of Arti cl e 11. 071 of

the Code of Cr im ina l P r ocedur e. Equal lydivi ded as to how to di s pos e of the ap p lic ant ’ s s econdM o r e n o — 5

13 S inc e d eclin ing to t ak e an y actio n o n the ap p li can t’ s sec o n d su b seq u en t w rit ap p li catio n , th is Co urt h as u nan i mo uslyd ecl ared thatano t her su bseq uen tw ri tapp l i cat i on re-rai si ng a Pen ry I claim co u ld be b rou ght und er A rt i cl e 11 .07 1, Secti on 5(a). See Ex pa rt e Ma rt i nez , 233 S.W .3d 31 9, 32 2-2 3 & n .8 (Te x. Cri m. App
. 2007).

14 T EX . R. A PP . P. 79 .2(d ) (“A m oti on fo r reh eari ng an ord er that den i es habeas corp us reli ef un der C od e o f C r i m i na l P r oc e du r e , a r t i c l e s 1 1. 07 o r 1 1. 07 1, m ay n ot b e f i l e d. T he C ou r tm a yo n i t s o wn i ni t i at i ve r ec onsi derthe c as e. ”)
. subse q u e nt writapp licati on (f ou r votes to allow the ap plicant to p roceed v ers us f ou r votes to dis m is s ) , thi s Cour t iss ued an or der on M ay 9, 2007, announci ng tha t w e dec li ned t o ta ke any act ion. 13 The ne xt da y , M ay 10, 2007, the dat e t he appl ic antwas s chedul ed t o be exe cut ed, he f il ed a “ s ugges ti on” t hatthe Cour t r econs ide rgr ound te n of his ini ti al habea s appl ic at ion on i ts own in i t i a t i v e , p u r s u a n t t o Ru l e 7 9
. 2 ( d ) o f t h e T e x a s Ru l e s o f A p p e l l a t e P r o c e d u r e . I n an 14 unpubli s hed or der

is s ued t hats am e day , we e xer ci s ed our aut hor ity to rec o n s ide rgr ound f or rel ief nu mber ten, and stay ed his impen ding execu tion. We i ssued an add iti on al order in the case
on Aug ust 22, 20 07 , dir ecting the parties to brief the f ollowin g q uestions:

• Whatjur is dic ti on does thi s Cour t ha ve t o r econs ide r , on it s own m oti on, a previou slyden ied ha beas claimwhe n the a pp licant subsequ ently f i l ed h is stat e-exhau sted claim s conce rning the sam e con viction in f ederal courts?

• Atthe ti m e t his C o u rt d en ied hi s f ir s t appli cat ion i n 2000, was the app licant’ s Pen ry - bas ed cl ai mbas ed on “ cl ear lyes tabli s hed” law ? Was h is c lai m ava ila b le i n 2 0 0 3 wh en h e f ile d h is se co n d , Atki ns -b a se d c la im?

• What is the le gal s igni f ic ance of the f act tha t the r em edy tha t the appl ic ant had r eques te d attr ia l w as a j ury - null if ic at ion i s s ue?

• Di d the appl ic antdem ons tr at e, in h i s o r i g ina l appli cat ion f orhabea s cor

pusM o r e n o — 6

15 81 6 S
. W. 2d 350, 36 7- 74 ( Te x. C r i m. App. 19 91) ( Ca mp be l l , J
. , c onc urri ng, j oi ne d b y Mc Cor mi c k, P. J
. , a nd Cl i nt on, Ov e rst r e e t , Ma l one ya nd Be na v i de s , J J
. ) T he r a t i ona l e f orr e c og ni z i ng a Pen ry I claim fo r the firs t ti me o n ap p eal o r in a p o st-c o n viction w rit w h en the trial o ccu rr ed p rio r to t he de c i s i on i n Pen ry I

i t s e l f wa s t ha t , a tthe t i me of

tr i a l , i twa s a “ r i g htno tr e c og ni z e d, ” s uc h tha tthe de f e nda ntc oul d n otha v e be e n ex pe c t e d t o obj e c tand t he r e bypre s e r v e er r or . We hav e si nc e c a l l e d the “ri ght not rec ogn i zed” excep t i on t o the c on t emp oran eou s ob ject i on rule i nto q uesti on , Sa n ch ez v. S tate , 12 0 S .W.3 d 3 59 , 367 (Tex . Cri m. A pp . 200 3), bu tno tun t i l three y ears aft er w e den i ed the app l i cant re l i ef on the merit s of his Pen ry I claim, in Se p temb er o f 2 0 0 0 . I n an y eve n t, th e ap p li can t d id ad eq u ately preserve the erro r at

tri al
. See no t e 17 , po st . 16 81 6 S .W.2 d 3 83 , 385 (Tex . Cri m. A pp . 199 1). S ee a lso E x p a rte K u n kle , 85 2 S
. W. 2d 499, 50 2 n.3 ( Tex. Cr i m. App
. 1993).

rel ief , that he was e n ti tl e d to prevail on the m eri ts of his Pen ry - bas ed c la im? Af te rbr ie f ing f r omthe parti es , the caus e wa s s ubm it te d to the Cour t on Novem ber 7, 2007. We turn ou r at tention to the m eri ts of the ap plicant’s Penr

y I cl ai m , es s ent ia ll y addr es s ing f ir s t the las t o f th e fou r spe cific q u est io n s w e a sk ed th e p artie s to b rief. THE P EN RY I CL AIM P ro ce ed ing to the M er its The a ppli cant was tr ie d in 1987, m or e t han t wo y ear s bef or e t he S upr em e Cour t’ s opini on in Penr y I
. I n Black v . State , this Co urt declar ed tha t Penr y I e rro r ma y b e ra is e d forth e first ti me on app e a l o r i n a p o s t - c o n v i c t i o n p r o c e e d i n g , a t l e a s t w h e r e , a s h e r e , t h e t r i a l p r e c e ded t he Supr em e Cour t’ s opini on. And i n Ex par te Goodman , the Cour t he ld thata Penr y I claim 15 could b e rai s ed f

orthe f ir s t t im e i n a pos t- convi ct ion habeas cont exteven w hen t he appl ic ant fa i l e d t o ra i s e i t o n d i re c t a p p e a l
. In t h e i n s t a n t c a u s e , t h e a p p l i c a n t c a l l e d t h e l a c k o f a 16 mitiga tio n in stru cti o n to th e tria l co u rt’s atte n tio n an d req u est ed wh at a mou n ts to a c rud e ju ry-M o r e n o — 7

17 The a ppl i c a nt ’ s t r i a l a t t or ne y s r e que s t e d t he t r i a l c our t t o i ns t r uc t t he j ur y , “ I f y ou fi nd any evid en ce in miti gatio n o f th e d ef en d an t’ s acts, an d it

c re ates a re aso n ab le d o u b t in yo u r m ind , y o u w il l so find by y ou r answ er t o the speci al i ssues by answ eri ng n o to the sp eci al i ssues.” Th e Sta t e ob ject ed t ha ta m i t i g a t i on i ns t r uc t i on ha d b e e n d e e me d u nne c e s s a r yi n Q u ino n ez v. S tate , 592 S. W. 2d 933, a t94 7 ( Te x. C r i m. App. 19 80)
. T hus a l e r t e d t o the na tur e of t he app l i c a nt ’ s re que s t( na me l y , f ors om e ki nd of j ur yi ns t r uc t i on t ha twoul d e na bl e the ju r or s t o g i v e e f f e c tt o the m i t i g a t i ng i mp a c tof hi s pu ni s hm e nt e v i de nc e be y ond the s c ope of t he s pe c i a l i s s ue s ) , the t r i a l c our te xpr e s s l yde ni e d i t . T he appl i c a ntdi d n ot r a i s e thi s de ni a l a s a po i ntof e r r oron appe a l , butexp r e s s l ycom pl a i ne d ab out i ti n cl a i m num be r t e n o f his i nit i al w ri tapp l i cat i on . nu lli f ication i nstruction as a prof f ered m eans of

rem edying th e perceived def iciency; he d id no t, howeve r , r ai s e t he i ssu e o n d irec t appea l. I n it s f indi ngs of

f actand conc lus ions of

la w 17 disposing of

the ap plicant’s initial writapp licati on , the con victing co urt pr oceed ed d ir ectly to the m eri ts of

the ap plicant’s Penr

y I claimand m ade n o r

uling on the ba sis of

proced ural def

ault. We ther ef

or e turn to the parti cul ar m it iga ti ng evi dence th at th e appli cantadduce d atthe pu nishm ent ph ase of

his tr ial. The Mi t igat in g Evid en ce Th e app lican t w a s b orn with a d ef orm ity to his lef

t ear . Appa rentlyaban do ned by his birt h p arents, he w as adop ted as an inf ant by Elias and Ca rm en M ore n o th rou gh a C atholic ado ption agen cy. Th e app licant grew up in a sm all hou se that he shar ed with his parents and h is grandmother. During th e f ir st seven year s o f his lif e, the app licant und erwent f ive surgeri es to try to co rrect h is d eformity. Ne ig h b o rho o d b o ys ta u n ted th e a p p lic an t b ec au se o f h is d eformity, and hi s m othe rwoul d cons ole him
. When the appl ic antwas s ti ll a s m al l c hil d, both hi s m othe r and his grandmother becam e very ill. His f ather was compelled to tak e a secon d job in order to
s uppor t hi s f

am il y and paym edi cal expens es of about$84, 000. Atti m es th e appli cantwasM o r e n o — 8

appar ent ly s ent to li ve wi th r el at ive s , nece s s it at ing f r equent change s in the s chool s he at te nded. Wh en th e a p p lic an t w a s a b o u t f if tee n yea rs ol d , h is moth er d ied , an ev en t th at h e to o k “ve ry h ard .” H e d rop p ed o u t o f sch o o l an d wo rke d a n u mber o f meni al j o b s w h ile liv in g in h is f ath er’s hous e, r el at ive lyuns upervis ed. The a ppli cantwas onlyei ghte en yea rs o ld atthe ti m e he
com m it te d his capi ta l of f ens e. Var ious f

am il y f r ie nds te s ti f

ie d tha t the appl ic ant“ has been a very g ood boy , ” wa s

“ poli te , ” “ r es pect f

ul t owar ds ever

y one, ” “ s inc er e” i n his r el igi ous devot ion, and capabl e of bei ng
r ehabi li ta te d. A chapla in a t the Bexa rCounty ja il who had couns el ed wit h the appl ic antte s ti f ie d tha t he did notim

pr es s her as “ a col d- bloode d kil le r , ” butm or e l ike “ a f rig h te ned chi ld. ” He des cr ibe d him s el f

to he ras “ pr et tymuch a l oner f ora l ong ti m e, an d d id n o t h av e . . . a l ot of clo se c o n n ec tio n s.” S h e “sen sed
. . . th at th ere wa s a lo t o f d ee p h u rt f

o r th at.” He ex p resse d “a gener al r em o r s e f

o rt h e s i t u a t i o n ” t o h e r . A n o t h e rc h a p l a i n f r o mt h e j a i l t e s t i f

i e d t h a t the appl ic antas ked hi mto pr ovide a ches s s et . When the chapla in c ompli ed i n a pr ompt m anner , the appl ic ant“ was very s ur

pr is ed t hatI had br ought i t t o him , br ought it to him s o quic kly ; and t hat he w as som ewh at sur

pris ed tha t som eon e wo uld ca rr y thr ou gh with wh at they sai d they wo uld d o f o r hi m.” I n gr ound f

or r el ie f te n of his ini ti al wr itappl ic at ion, ci ti ng Penr y I , the appl ic antar gued: The m it igat in g ev idence pr es ent ed i n the ins ta nt c as e i s bas ic al lytha t of rem orse, youth, . . . go od character , and tro u b led ch ildho od . [ Th e app licant] r eques te d an i ns tr

uct ion on the cons ide r at ion of m it iga ti ng evi dence bey ond the statutory s pecial iss ues. Th ese instr uction s wou ld hav e give n the ju rya veh icle f o r ex p ressin g its “rea so n ed moral re sp o n se” to mitiga tin g ev id en ce , yet t h ey w ereM o r e n o — 9

den ied by the trial cou rt . The c onvic ti ng court r ej ect ed t his ar gum entwi th the f oll owi ng concl us ion of

la w: The appli cant cont ends tha t the evi dence he pre s ent ed at t he puni s hm ent phas e of th e trial was bey ond the s cope of the s ta tut ory s peci al is s ue, the r eby nece s s it at ing the s ubm is s ion of his s peci al ly r eques te d ins tr uct ion. Se e: Pe nry v. Ly naugh, s upr a. The a ppli cantis not e nti tl ed t o r el ie f beca us e t he hol ding of Pe n ry is inappli cabl e under the f act s of the ins ta nt c as e. The f acttha t the appl ic antwas vie wed, by his f am il y and f

r ie nds , as a g o o d boy who coul d be reh ab ilita ted wa s n o t b eyo n d th e sc o p e o f th e is s u e re g a rdi n g f u tu re danger ous nes s , [an d] the r eques te d char ge wa s pr oper lyr ef us ed. J ohns on v. Texa s , 509 U. S. 350, 113 S. Ct. 2658, 12 5 L. Ed. 2d 290 ( 1993) ; Ric har ds on v. St at e, 901 S. W. 2d 941 ( Tex. Cr im
. App. 1994) , cert. den. 515 U. S. 1162, Ct. 2617 [si c ], 1 3 2 L .E d .2 d 8 5 9 (1 9 9 5 ); S a tt e rw h it e v . St a te , 8 5 8 S .W .2 d 4 1 2 (T e x . C ri m. Ap p . 1 9 9 3 ), ce rt. d en . 5 1 0 U.S . 9 7 0 , 1 1 4 S.C t. 4 5 5 , 1 2 6 L .E d .2 d 3 8 7 (19 9 3 ); Gosch v. State, 82 9 S.W.2d 7 75 (Tex. Crim . App. 19 91 ) [ cert . denied ] 509 U .S. 9 2 2 , 1 3 3 S.C t. 3 0 3 5 , 1 2 5 L .E d .2 d 7 2 2 (19 9 3 ). I n thus holdi ng tha t the appl ic ant ’ s m it iga ti ng evi dence was adequa te lyencom pas s ed wi thi n the f utur e dan g ero u snes s s peci al is s ue, the convi ct ing c our t appar ent lytook i nto a ccountonlythe ap p lic an t’s ev id en ce o f

g o o d ch ara cte r an d remorse . It m ad e n o ment io n o f th e a p p lic an t’s tr ou bled c hildh oo d an d d id no t ask wheth er that f acet of his mit igation evide nce w as adeq uately
c o v e r e d b y t h e s p e c i a l i s s u e s . I n t h e r e c e n t o p i n ions in A b d u l-Ka bir and Br ewer , the Uni te d St at es Supr em e Cour t ha s now m ade i t c le ar tha t our r es olut ion of the appl ic ant ’ s te nth gr ound f orr el ie f in hi s ini ti al wr itappl ic at ion, acc ept ing a s we di d the convi ct ing c our t’ s r ecomm ended concl us ion of

la w, was inc orr ect . At le as t wi th r es pect to his evi dence of a t r ouble d chi ldhood, the appl ic antwas ent it le d to s uch a s epar at e j ury ins tr uct ion. Ab dul-Kab ir

and Bre werMor e no
— 10

18 D elk v. S tate , 855 S.W. 2d 700 , 709 (Te x. Cri m. App
. 1993). 19 Smi th v
. Te

x as , 54 3 U. S
. 37 ( 20 04 ) ( he r e i na f t er “ Smi t h I ”) ; Ten na rd v. D ret ke , 54 2 U. S. 27 4 ( 2004 ). The Sup r e me C our tl a t e r r e v i s i t e d S mi t h’ s c a s e i n Smi th v
. Te x as , 12 7 S
. Ct
. 16 86 ( 2007 ) (he re i naf t er“ Sm i th II

”)
. 20 Smi th I , sup ra , a t44 ( “ t he j ur ym us tbe g i v e n a n e f f e c t i v e v e hi c l e wi t h whi c h t o we i g h m i t i g a t i ng evi den ce so lon g as the defen dan th as met a low thresh old for rel evance, w hich i s sati sfi ed b yevi den ce Af te rthe Supr em e Cour t’ s opini ons in Ab du l- Ka bir and Br ewer , itcannotbe doubt ed t hat a j ury mus t be em

power ed t o give m it iga ti ng val ue t o evi dence of a di s rupti ve o r t r ouble d chi ldhood be y ond what ever p robati ve val ue i t m ay have w ith r es pectto the s ta tut ory s peci al is s ues . I n the pas t, thi s Cour t ha s r ej ect ed t he nec es s ity f ora Penr y I ins tr uct ion ba s ed upon s uch evi dence , both beca us e it “ is unr el at ed to any as pect of how or why the death penal tywoul d be
an ap p rop riate o r in ap p rop riate resp o n se t o a d efe n d an t’s ac tio n s[,]” an d b ec au se t h e futu re danger ousn ess sp ec ial is s ue “ pr ovide s a vehi cl e f orthe jur

y to e xpr es s it s r eas oned m or al resp o n se” to su ch ev id en ce . Ne ith er o f th ese ex p lan ati o n s ca n n o w b e c o n sid ere d to o f f er a 18 ten ab le ju stificati o n f

o r f ail in g to su b mit a mitig ati o n in stru cti o n after Ab du l- Ka bir and Br ewer . The f ir s t e xpla nat ion i s a m ani f es ta ti on of

ei the rthe now- def

unct“ cons ti tutional
r el evanc e” t es t, orthe equal lydis cr edi te d “ nexus ” r equi r em ent . Over the pas t s ever al y ear s the Sup r e m e Cou r t ha s de f

i ni t i ve l y r e

j e c t e d t he ho l di ng s of

t hi s Cou r t a nd t he F i f

t h Ci r c ui t wi th
r es pectto e ach. A capit al def endantneed notdem ons tr at e t hathis pr of f er ed m it iga ti ng 19
c ir c u mst a n c e s r i se to so me p a rt ic u la r l e v e l o f gr a v it y o r se v e ri ty ; o n ly th a t t h e y h a v e so me rel evan ce t o a jury ’s no rm ative evalu ation of his death -worthiness. Nor need he d em on str ate 20Mor e no
— 11

w h ich tend s lo gicallyto p ro ve o r d isp ro ve so me f act o r circ u ms tan ce w h ich a fac t-fin d er co u ld r eas o n ab ly d eem to ha ve miti gatin g valu e.” ) (in tern al qu o tati o n s o mitted ); Ten na rd v. D ret ke , sup ra , a t28 5 (“O nce t his l ow t hresh old for rel evance i s met, t he Ei ghth A men dm ent requ i res t hat t he jurybe able t o co nsider an d g ive eff

ect to a ca p it al de fe n d an t’ s m it igating ev ide n ce. ”) (in tern al qu o tati o n s o mitted ); see al so Brew er , sup ra , a t 17 12 (“I t may w el l be true that Brew er’ s mit i gat i ng evi den ce w as l ess comp el l i ng than Pe nry ’ s , bu t , c ontr a r yt o the v i e w of t he CCA, t ha tdi f

f e r e nc e do e s no tpr ov i de a n a c c e pt a bl e j us t i f i c a t i on for re fusi ng t o appl ythe rea soni ng of Pen ry I t o thi s ca se . * * * N ow her e i n our Pen ry l i ne o f cases have we s ug g e s t e d tha tthe qu e s t i on whe t he r mi t i g a t i ng ev i de nc e cou l d h a v e be e n a de qua t e l yc ons i de r e d b y t he j uryi s a matt erpure l yof quant i t y , deg re e, or i mmut abi l i t y . ”)
.

21 Smi th I , s up ra , a t 4 5 ( n ex u s re q u irem en t i s “u n eq u ivo callyrej ected ”) ; Ten na rd , sup ra , a t28 7 (c api t al def

endant nee d notdem onst ra t e “ne xus” betw ee n mi t i ga t i ng ev i dence a nd t he of fe nse ). 22 Ten na rd , sup ra ( “ t he que s t i on i s s i mp l ywhe t he r the e v i de nc e i s of s uc h c ha r a c t e r tha ti t‘ mi g ht serve ‘ as a basis for a s e n te n c e less t han death.’ ” Skipp er [ v . So uth Car ol i na ], [4 7 6 U .S . 1 ,] at 5 [( 1986 )]
. ”)
. tha t his capi ta l of

f ens e wa s in s om e s ens e at tr ibut abl e t o his pr of f er ed m it iga ti ng ci r cum s ta nces bef or e obt ai ning a Penr

y I instr uction
. Circum stances of the of f end er him self

(as op po sed to 21 the ci r cum s ta nces of

the of f ens e) can r eas onabl y jus ti f y a jury as s es s m entof

a l if e s ent ence , regar dless of

whe ther they al so hav e a tend ency to ame li o ra te th e of f ense. If

those 22 ci r cum s ta nces ar e notal r eadyf ull y orm eani ngf

ull y encomp asse d wi thi n one or both of the
s ta tut ory s peci al is s ues , the n a s epar at e j ury ins tr uct ion i s cons ti tut iona ll y r equi r ed. Nor does our s econd expl anat ion curr ent ly hold wat er . We can no longe rm ai nta in that evide nce o f a tr ou bled childh oo d is adeq uately encompassed within the statutory special is sues. Both Ab du l- Ka bir

and ( espe cia lly) Br ewer

expr es s lys ta te tha t S upr em e Cour t pr ece denthas long
r ej ect ed t he noti on tha t a jury can m eani ngf ull y expr es s it s r eas oned m or al r es pons e t o evi denceMor e no
— 12

23 A b d u l-K a b ir , sup ra , a t16 73 (“a jur or co nsidering [A bd ul-Kab i r]’ s ev i den ce of c hi l dhoo d n e g l ect a nd a ba ndon me nt. . . orB r e wer ’ s e v i de nc e of
. . . a t r oubl e d ch i l dhoo d co ul d f e e l c om pe l l e d t o p r ov i de a ‘ y e s ’ a ns wert o [ t he f

utur e da ng e r ous ne ss sp eci al i s s ue ] , f i ndi ng hi ms e l f

wi t hout a m e a ns f

org i v i ng mea ni ngf ul ef fe ct to th e mitigating q u alit ies o f su ch evid en ce. ”) ; Brew er , sup ra , a t17 13 ( “ The tr a ns i e nt qual i t yof suc h mi t i ga t i ng ev i dence [ of ‘ t roubl ed ba ckg round’ ] may ma ke i tmore l i kel yt o fa l l i n par t wi thi n t he a mb i t of t he s pe c i a l i s s ue s ; howe v e r , a s we e xpl a i ne d i n Pen ry I , su ch evi den ce may st i l l have rel evance t o the defen dan t ’ s moral c ulpab i l i t ybey on d the scop e of the s pecial verdi ctqu est i on s. (i nternal quot a t i ons om i t t e d) * * * L i ke the ‘ c ons t i tut i ona l r e l e v a nc e ’ s t a nda r d tha twe rejecte d i n Ten na rd , a ‘ s uf f i c i e nte f f e c t ’ s t a nda r d [ i .e. , a s t a nda r d bywhi c h Pen ry I m ay b e satisf

ied s o lon g as ‘su ff

icien t,’ alb eit l e s s tha n ‘ f

ul l ’ m i t i g a t i ng e f

f e c tm a ybe g i v e n t o p r of

f e r e d m i t i g a t i ng e v i de nc e wi t hi n the c onf i ne s of the st at ut orys pec i al i ss ues ] has no foundat i on i n the de ci si ons of t hi s Court
. ”)
. 24 W e no w kn ow t hat cl earl yest abli shed Su prem e Cou rtpreceden tsi nce Pen ry I h as emph asi zed “th e imp o rtan ce o f allo w ing ju ries to give me an ing fu l effe ct t o an y mitigating ev ide n ce p ro vid ing a b asis for a sentence of l i fe rather than d eath.” A b d u l-K a b ir , sup ra , a t1672. I ndeed, the S upreme Court de c l a r e d t ha tt he pri nc i pl e s go v e r ni ng i t s dec i s i ons i n A b d u l-K a b ir a nd Brew er w ere cl earl yest abli shed even as of Sep t emb er of 19 90 , s om e t en y ears before w e reject ed the app l i cant’ s Pen ry I claim in h is i nit i al w ri tapp l i cat i on . Id
. a t16 59. of a t r ouble d ordis rupti ve chi ldhood wi thi n the narr ow conf ine s of the s peci al is s ues . A capit al 23 jury must be g iven g reat er l eeway to ex erci se it s r easone d mo ra l re sp on se und er t he E ighth Am endm ent . I n li ght of the Supr em e C our t’ s m os t r ece nt pr onouncem ent s , it now appe ar s tha t
ou r rej ection of the t enth groun d f or rel ief in the applicant’s initial writ app licati on was so plainly incorrectun der then-extant Sup rem e C ou rtpreceden ts as to hav e been “ ob jectively
u n re a s o n a b l e , ” e v e n a s o f S e p t e mb e r o f 2 0 0 0 , w h e n w e d e n i e d t h e a p p l i c a n t re l i e f. 24 I t i s evi dentto us now t hatin hi s te nth gr ound f or r el ie f in his ini ti al wr itappl ic at ion, the appl ic antpr es ent ed f

act s whi ch enti tl ed him to a new punis hm ent hear ing. The s ta tut ory s peci al iss ues alon e did n ot prov ide the ap plicant’s jury with an a deq uate m echan ism f or exercis ing its
r eas oned m or al judgm entwhet her his evi dence of

a tr ouble d chi ldhood w arr ant ed t he i mpos it ion of a l if e s ent ence ins te ad of the ult im at e pena lty of death. M ay we now gr anthim tha t r el ie f

onMor e no
— 13

25 See T EX . C ONST . a r t . V, § 3 1(c) (“Th e l egi sl ature may delegat e t o the .
. . Co urt of Crimi nal Appe a l s the po wert o p r om ul g a t e s uc h o t he r rul e s a s m a ybe pr e s c r i be d b yl a w of thi s Co nsti tut i on, su b je ct to su ch li mitation s an d p ro ced u re s as may b e p ro vid ed b y law .”) ; T EX . G OV ’ T C ODE § 22. 108( b) (“Th e cou rtof cri minal app eal s maypro mu l gat e a com preh e n s ive bo dy of ru l es of po st t ri al , app el l at e, a nd r e v i e w pr oc e dur e i n c r i mi na l c a s e s a nd f r om t i me t o t i me ma ypr om ul g a t e a s pe c i f i c rul e orrul e s of p o sttrial, ap p ellate, o r re view p ro ced u re in c rim ina l ca ses o r an ame n d me n t or ame n d me n ts t o a sp ecif ic r ul e orrul e s . * * * T he rul e s a nd a me ndm e nt s t o rul es rem a i n i n e f f e c tun l e s s a nd unt i l di s a ppr ov e d, modi fi ed, or cha nge d by the l eg i sl at ure . ”) 26 See no t e 14 , a n te . re c o n s i d e ra t i o n o f h i s c l a i m? T u rn i n g t o t h e re ma i n i n g q u e s t i o n s w e o rd e re d t h e p a rt i e s t o b ri e f,
we h o ld th at w e may.

RECONSI DERATI ON ON OUR OW N I NI TIATI VE

Jur is di ct ion We ado pted th e curr ent incarnation of Ru le 79.2(d) in 19 97 , pursuant to ou r l egislati vely endowe d aut hor ity to pr omulga te rule s of pos t- tr ia l pr ocedur e i n cr im ina l c as es . I t pr ovide s tha t 25 a h a b e a s a p p l i c a n t m a y n o t f i l e a m o t i o n f

o r r e h e a r i n g f

r o m a n o r d e r d e n y i n g r e l i e f , b u t t hat

“ [ t] he C our t m a y o n i t s o w n i n i t i a t i v e r e c o n s i d e rt h e c a s e . ” O n i t s f a c e , t h e ru l e p l a c e s no 26 te mpor al li m it at ion on our aut hor ity to r econs ide r a post - convi ct ion appli cat ion f orwr itof habea s
cor pus on ourown i nit ia ti ve. I n 1995, as part of

the le gis la ti on by whi ch it f ir s t enac te d Arti cl e 11. 071 of the Code of Cr im ina l P r ocedur e, the Legi s la tur e wi thdr ew t his Cour t’ s rule m aki ng aut hor ity “ wi th r es pect to rules of app ellate p rocedu re relat ing to an app licati on f or a writ of hab eas c orpus, b ut on ly t o the ext entthe rule s conf

li ctwi th a pr ocedur e under Arti cl e 11. 071, Code of

Cr im ina l P r ocedur e,Mor e no
— 14

27 See Ac t s 19 95, 74 L e g . , c h. 31 9, § 6, p. 27 72, e f f
. Se pt . 1, 19 95. th
28 E x p a rte S m ith , 9 7 7 S. W .2 d 6 1 0 , 6 1 1 (T ex . Cr im. A p p . 1 9 9 8 ); E x p a rte D a vis , 947 S. W. 2d 216, 222 (Tex. Cr i m. App
. 1996) (McCor mi ck, P. J. , c oncurri ng)
.

29 T EX . C ODE C RIM . P ROC . a r t . 11
. 071, § 1. as added bythi s Act [
. ] ” The S ta te s ugges ts tha t Rul e 79. 2( d) m ay conf li ctwi th A r ti cl e 11. 071, 27 ins of ar as thi s Cour t ha s decl ar ed tha t “ Arti cl e 11. 071 now cont ai ns the exc lus iv e pr ocedur es f or the exer ci s e of

thi s Cour t’ s or igi nal habea s cor pus jur is dic ti on in deat h penal ty cas es . ” Se ct ion 28 1 of Arti cl e 11. 071 pr ovide s tha t: “ Not wi ths ta nding a ny o th er pr ovis ion of

[ Chapt er 11 of the Co de of Crim inal Pr oced ure] , this art icle establis hes the p rocedu res f or an ap plication f

or a wri t of habea s cor

pus in wh ich th e appli cants eeks r el ie f f r oma j udgm entim

pos ing a penal tyof death. ” Pl ai nly , thi s pr ovis ion w as m eantto pr es cr ibe a parti cul ar pr ocedur al m echa nis mf or 29 the pur s uitof

habea s cor

pus r el ie f in de at h- penal ty cas es as oppos ed t o pr ocedur es tha t Cha pte r 11 prescr ibes f

or other p ost- con viction co ntexts. A rule au thorizing this Co urt t o recon siderits dis pos it ion of a post - convi ct ion wr it in a death- penal ty cas e does not i n any way es tabli s h a new or separat e proced ure f or applications f

or wri t of

hab eas c o rp u s in death -penalty cas es in
con tr aven tion o f

Section 1 of

Arti cle 11 .071 . We f

ind n o lang uag e in the b alance o f Arti cle 1 1
. 0 7 1 t h a t e i t h e r a l l o w s o r p ro h i b i t s t h i s C o u rt ’s re c o n s i d e ra t i o n o f o u r i n i t i a l d i s p o s i t i o n o f a capi ta l w r iton our own m oti on or expr es s ly orim pli ci tl y pr es cr ibe s te mpor al li m it at ions on any
s uch r econs ide r at ion. Althou gh we o bv iously would no t ch oo se to exercise this autho ri ty very of ten, especiallyMor e no
— 15

30 See T EX . C ODE C RIM . P ROC . a r t. 1 1 .0 7 1 & 2 8 U .S .C . § 2 2 4 1 , r e s p e c tiv e ly. 31 Ex pa r t e So

f f ar , 12 0 S
. W. 3d 344, 34 6 ( Te x. C r i m. App. 20 03) 32 Ex pa r t e So

f f ar , 143 S.W. 3d 804 , 805 (Te x. Cri m. App
. 2004). 33 A fed eral co urt h a s the a uthor i t yt o e nt e r t a i n a nd de ny a cl ai m on the merit s that has no tbeen e xha us t e d i n s t a t e c our t , e v e n i f no ta uthor i z e d t o gr ant

reli ef o n an un exh austed cl ai m. See 28 U.S. C. § 2254 (b)( 1)(A) & (b)( 2). y ear s af te ran i nit ia l or der

deny ing r el ie f

, under the m os t e xtr aor dina ry of ci r cum s ta nces we may do s o. Once we ha ve i nit ia ll y deni ed an appli cantr el ie f in hi s s ta te habea s pr ocee dings and he the n pr ocee ds thr ough the f eder al habea s cor

pus p roc ess and i s deni ed r el ie f the r e, is our aut hor ity to r evi s it the s ta te wr it appl ic at ion under Rule 79. 2( d) adver s el y im pact ed? We do not thi nk s o. St at e and f

eder al courts shar e conc urr enthabea s cor pus jur is dic ti on to r evi ew t he
cons ti tut iona l l egi ti m acyof a convi ct ion or

death s ent ence obta ined in sta te court. The 30

r es pect ive courts have f

as hione d certa in doc tr ine s –the abs te nti on doct r ine , on ourpart, and t he exhaus ti on doct r ine , on the part of the f eder al courts –in the i nte r es t of “ com ity , ef

f ic ie ncy , and expedi ency , ” “ avoi d an ce of pie cem eal li ti gat ion or inc ons is te nt r es ult s , and j udic ia l 31
econ omy .” Th ese doc tr ines are de signed so that, in exercis ing th eir con curr ent juris dictions, 32 the r es pect ive courts can ( to putitcol loqui al ly ) s ta y out of one anothe r ’ s way . But t hey ar e not juri sdictional do ctr ines. Itdo es n ot encroach up on any f ederal prer og ative f

or us to entertai n 33

r e he a r i ng of

a n i ni t i a l wr i t a f

t e rf e de r a l pr oc e e di ng s ha ve be e n r e s ol ve d a ga i ns t t he a pplicant.Mor e no
— 16

34 Wi l l i ams v . Ta

y l or , 529 U
. S. 362, 409- 12 ( 2000 ) ( “ St a t e d s i mp l y , a f e de r a l habe a s c our tm a ki ng the ‘ u n re aso n ab le ap p li catio n ’ inq u iry [u n d er 2 8 U .S .C . § 2 2 5 4 (d )( 1 )] sh o u ld a s k w h eth er the s tate cou rt ’ s app l i cat i on of cl earl yest abli shed federal l aw w as ob ject i vel yun reason able. * * * For pu rpo ses of t oda y ’ s opi ni on, t he mo s t i mp or t a ntpo i nti s tha ta n u n rea so n a b le appl i c a t i on of f e de r a l l a w i s di f

f e r e nt f r om a n i nco rrect

ap pli cat i on of f

e de r a l l a w. * * * Unde r § 2254 ( d) ( 1) ’ s ‘ unr e a s onabl e appl i c a t i on’ clau se, then , a fed er al ha b eas co u rt ma y n o t i ssu e the w rit simp lyb eca u se t h e c o u r t con clu d es in it s i nd epen den tjud gment th a t th e rel evant st at e-cou rtdecis i on app l i ed cle arl yest abli shed federal l aw erroneousl yor i ncorr ec t l y . Ra t her , the appl i ca t i on musta l so be unre as onabl e. ”)
. Af te ral l, the f

eder al courts do not r evi ew the “ corr ectnes s ” of s ta te - court r es olut ions of f eder al
con sti tutional issues in the cou rs e of f ederal habe as corpus proceed ings; un der the An tit err oris m
an d E f f ec tiv e D ea th Pe n alt y Ac t (“AE DP A” ), f ed era l h ab ea s co u rts are n o t at lib erty to o v ertu rn
a st a te -c o u rt d e c is io n u n le ss it re p re se n ts a n “o b je c ti v e ly u n re a so n a b le ” a p p li c a ti o n o f Su p re me Co urt pr ecede nt. An indiv idual state must sur ely r etain the au thority , if it s ho uld so c ho ose, to 34

r evi s it one of it s own judgm ent s if the r e is a compel li ng r eas on to bel ie ve thatitm ay not ha ve been “ corr ect ” on or igi nal s ubm is s ion. Thus , we f ind nothi ng in the f

acttha t the appl ic anthas been den ied r elief in his f ederal hab eas proceed ings t hat would som eho w i nh erentlydep ri ve this Cour t of the aut hor ity , under

ourown s tat e rul es of appel la te pr ocedur e, to r econs ide rthe app licant’ s Penr

y I c la im. That does not m ean tha t we a r e bound to do s o ortha t w e s hould e ver do s o li ghtl y . Even if com ity orthe pos s ibi li tyof inc ons is te nt r es ult s ar e n o t implic at ed atthi s junc tur e, judi ci al
economy and t he avoi dance of pie cem eal li ti gat ion r em ai n le git im at e conc erns tha t c ouns el agai ns t di s tur

bing our ini ti al dis pos it ion, absentcom pel li ng ci r cum s ta nces . Af te ral l, habea s
cor pus is an equi table r em edy , and, as the appl ic antconce des , “ [ e] quity ai ds the dil ige nt a nd notMor e no
— 17

35 Ca l l ah an v. G i l es , 155 S.W .2d 79 3, 79 5 (T ex. 19 41 ). S ee a lso Ex p a rte Ca rrio , 99 2 S
. W. 2d 486, 48 8 ( T e x. C r i m . Ap p. 1 99 9) ( “ We a g r e e wi t h the S t a t e tha tthe d oc t r i ne o f l a c he s i s a the orywh i c h we ma y , a nd s houl d, e mp l oyi n o urde t e r mi na t i on of whe t he r t o g r a ntr e l i e f

i n a ny gi v e n [ Art i c l e ] 11
. 07 c a s e .”) ; I n r e St e pt oe , 132 S.W. 3d 434 , 439-40 (Te x. Cri m. App
. 2004) (Coc hra n, J. , di ss ent i ng) ( “In Tex as habeas corp us law, as i n fed eral l aw , e qu i t yi s no t i ntend ed fo r tho se w ho sl eep o n thei r ri ghts. ”) (in tern al qu o tati o n s an d fo o tno te om it ted ); Ex p arte Dra ke , 883 S. W. 2d 213, 21 5 ( Te x. C r i m. App. 19 94) (“Because o f the un i qu e n ature of t he remed y , h abeas corp us reli ef i s un dersco red b yel ements of fai rness and e qui t y . ”)
. those wh o slumber on th eir ri gh ts. ” We s ho uld an d will be ex tr em ely hesit ant ev er t o ex erci se 35
ouraut hor ity to r econs ide ra dec is ion on a n ini ti al pos t- co n v ict io n habea s cor pus appl ic at ion, parti cul ar lyaf

te rthe pas s age of a su b sta nti al number of y ear s . I n al m os t e very ins ta nce, the State’ s legiti m ate inter est i n th e re p o se and f inality of its con victions–e ven its interes t in punis hm entas wei ghtyand i rr evocable as the death penal ty–wi ll be s ubs ta nti al inde ed and ought not t o be dis tur

bed, even i n the f

ace of a r eas onabl e and good f

ai th a r gum enttha t our

dis pos it ion
o n o rig in al s u b mission wa s “in co rrect.” Thatbei ng s ai d, howeve r , we do not hesi ta te to r econs ide r and gra nt r el ie f in the i ns ta nt case. Her e, the app licant did n ot “slu mb e r o n h is ri gh ts. ” He o bjected at tri al and rai sed his cl ai mti m el y in hi s ini ti al appl ic at ion f orwr itof habea s cor

pus . And as s oon as itbeca m e cl ear to hi mtha t our

or igi nal dis pos it ion w as not onl y “ inc orr ect , ” butinde ed, s o pla inl y inc orr ecttha t toda y itwoul d undoubte dlybe cons ide r ed “ obje ct ive lyunr eas onabl e” bythe Supr em e Cour t, the appl ic ant r enew ed his cl ai m , f ir s t in an at te mpte d s ubs equent wr it appl ic at ion, and t hen, when thi s Cour t w as unabl e t o mus te ra m aj or ity to t ake a ct ion on tha t, by way of his s ugges ti on tha t
we r e c on s i de r t he i s s ue f r om hi s i ni t i a l wr i t a pp l i c a t i on on ou r ow n i ni t i a t i ve . W e f i nd itMor e no
— 18

36 We r e i t e r a t e tha t , s i nc e f i l i ng a nd s e t t i ng the appl i c a nt ’ s t e nth g r ound f orr e l i e f f or r e c ons i de r a t i on o n ou r o w n i ni t i a t i v e , we ha v e g r a nt e d r e l i e f t o a nothe r c a pi t a l habe a s appl i c a nton a Pen ry I cl ai m t hat he b rou ght in a sub sequ ent post-con vi ct i on w ri tapp l i cat i on bro ugh tun der the ausp i ces of S ect i on 5 of A rt i cl e 11 .07 1. See no t e 13 , a n te . appr opr ia te under the s e ext r aor dina ry ci r cum s ta nces to e xer ci s e our aut hor ity under

Rule 79. 2( d) to reconsider our original disposition of the ap plicant’s Penr

y I c la im. 36

“ C l e a r l y E s t a b l i s h e d L a w” Nor do we thi nk it can f

ai r ly be s ai d tha t the appl ic ant“ s lum ber ed on hi s r ight s ” by f

ai li ng to rais e his Penr

y I cl ai min hi s f

ir s t s ubs equentwr itappl ic at ion w hic h he f il ed i n 2003. Of
cour s e, the cl ai m woul d have been jus t as “ cl ear ly es tabli s hed” in 2003 as itwas in 2000, when we denie d his ini ti al wr it appl ic at ion. But t her e wa s no new c as e l aw i n the int er im , ei the rf r om this Cou rtor f

romthe Sup rem e C ou rt , that s ho uld h ave alerted the ap pl ic a nt that his Penr y I cla im h ad g ain ed ren ew ed v ita lity. No t un til 20 0 4 , wi th th e ad v en t of th e S u p re me C o u rt’s opini ons in Tenn ard

and Smi th I

, co u ld it h av e b eg u n to b ec o me ap p are n t th at b o th th is C o u rt’s
a n d t h e F i ft h C i rc u i t ’s a p p l i c a t i o n s o f Penr y I wer e, in a n u mber o f ins ta nces , li kel y to be declared no t just “ incorrect ,” but ev en “objectively unreasona ble.” And no t until Ab du l- Ka bir and Br ewer

d i d t h e S u p re me C o u rt u n e q u i v o c a l l y d e c l a re t h a t o u r t re a t me n t o f e v i d e n c e o f a tr ouble d chi ldh o o d as b o th ha ving no pr act ic al m it iga ti ng im pact , and atthe s am e t im e, adeq uately co vered by the statutory special iss ues, w as a plain m isconstr uction of its preceden ts. Th e app licant shou ld no t be de nied relief up on ou r r econ sider ation o f his initi al P e n r

y I c la im on the gr ounds tha t he f

ai le d to exer ci s e appr opr ia te dil ige nce i n r eas s erti ng a Penr y I claiminMor e no
— 19

37 I f i t w as t he app l i cant’ s secon d subseq uen t w ri t app l i cat i on t hat w e w ere presentl yadd ressi ng, t he qu e s t i on w he t he r the appl i c a ntwoul d b e pe r mi tt e d t o p ur s ue hi s r e ne wed Pen ry I c l a i m woul d b e go ve r n e d b y Ex pa r t e Hood , 211 S.W .3d 76 7 (T ex. Crim. A pp . 200 7). Th ere w e held that once a hab eas app l i cant has “e xh austed” a c l ai m by rai si ng it un successfu l l yi n an i nit i al w ri t app l i cat i on , he mayrai se t he sa me cl a i m a g a i n i n a s ubs e que ntw r i tapp l i c a t i on i f l e g a l de v e l opm e nt s oc c ur r i ng a f t e r the di s pos i t i on of the i nit i al w ri tbreathe new l i fe i nto the cl ai m. Id
. , a t 776, & 77 8. I twa s on the ba s i s of thi s ho l di ng t ha twe pe r mi t t e d the appl i c a nti n Ex p arte Ma rt i nez , s upra , at 322- 23, t o p ur s ue hi s r e ne wed Pen ry I c l a i m i n a s ubs e que ntwr i tappl i cat i on . H e r e , a s i n M arti nez , because the ap pli cant fi l ed h i s fi rst s ubs e que ntw r i tapp l i c a t i on i n 2003, pri ort o t he Supr e me Cour t ’ s opi ni ons i n Ten na rd , Smi th I , A b d u lK a b ir , a nd Br ewer , h e w as notba r r e d, c ons i s t e ntwi t h o ura na l y s i s i n Ex pa r t e Hood , fro m r aisin g h is r e v i t a l i z e d Pen ry I

c l a i m i n h i s s e c ond s ubs e que ntwr i tappl i c a t i on. 38 Penr y II , sup ra ; Smi th I

, sup ra . See no t e 17 , a n te . 39 S t at e ’ s B r i e f

, a t9- 10. T hi s i s , i n f a c t , the e nt i r e t yof

the St a t e ’ s di s c us s i on of the l e gal sign ifican ce o f th e fa ct th at th e ap p li can t ask ed fo r a n u ll ification ins tru ction at trial. 2003, when he ti m el y and di li gent lypur s ued a newl y r ecogni zed Atki ns claim . We cann ot f ault the ap plicant an y m ore than w e can f ault ou rs elves. 37 Nul li f ic at ion I ns t ru ct ion Nor do we thi nk it f

at al to the appl ic ant ’ s r enew ed Penr y I cl ai mtha t he r eques te d the tr ia l
court to r em edy the def

ectin the puni s hm entchar ge by s ubm it ti ng to the j ury an i ns tr uct ion that the Supr em e Court s u bs equent lydecl ar ed, in P en ry II and i n Smi th I

, to be ina dequat e. The 38 St at e ar g u e s t h a t , i n l i g h t o f t h e s e r e c e n t p r e c e d e n t s , a n u l l i f i c a t i o n i n s t ru c t i o n f

a i l s t o r e m edy the Ei ghth A m endm entdef ic ie ncy , but c oncede s tha t “ [ p] erhaps the tr ia l judge was inf orm ed by the r eques te d char ge tha t s om e s or t of ins tr uct ions was neede d to ins ur e jur or s coul d give ef f ect to m it iga ti ng evi dence wher e the s peci al is s ues d o not. ” We a gr ee w ith the St at e’ s te nta ti ve 39
conce s s ion that , though f la wed, the appl ic ant ’ s r eques te d ins tr uct ion w as neverthe le s s s uf f ic ie ntMor e no
— 20

40 E. g. , Willi a m s v. S tate , 6 3 0 S .W .2 d 6 4 0 , 6 4 3 (T ex . Cr im. A p p . 1 9 8 2 ); S ton e v. S tate , 70 3 S
. W. 2d 6 5 2 , 6 5 5 (T ex . Cr im. A p p . 1 9 8 6 ); Ch a p m a n v. S tate , 9 21 S
. W. 2d 6 94 , 6 95 ( T e x. C r i m . Ap p. 1 99 6) ; F ra n cis v. S tate , 36 S. W.3d 121, 123 (Te x. Cri m. App
. 2000).

41 A pp l i cant’ s Bri ef, at20 -23
. Se e Ab dul

- Kab i r v . Quar t e r man , sup ra , at 16 62 (“Th e tri al jud ge r e f us e d t o g i v e a nyof

s e v e r a l i ns t r uc t i ons r e que s t e d b y[ Abdul
- Kab i r] t ha twoul d h a v e a uthor i z e d a ne g a t i v e a ns wert o e i t he r of t he s pe c i a l i s s ue s on t he ba s i s of ‘ a nye v i de nc e whi c h, i n [ t he j ur y ’ s ] op i ni on, mit i gat ed agai nst the impo si t i on of t he D eath P enalty , i nclud i ng any aspect ot the Defen dan t ’ s charact er o r re co rd .’”) (q u o ti n g the Jo int A p p en d ix o f th e p ar ti es, at 11 5 ) (f irst b ra ck ets su p p li ed ; sec o n d b ra ck ets i n the or i gi nal ).

42 S ee P ryta sh v. S tate , 3 S. W. 3d 522, 531 ( Te x. Cr i m. App. 19 99) ( “ The do c t r i ne of i nv i t e d e r r or i s pro perlytho ugh tof, no tas a speci es of w ai ver, bu tas est op pel.”)

43 Penr y II , sup ra , at 80 0 ; Smi th I

, sup ra , at 47 -8 ; Smit

h II , sup ra , 12 7 S.Ct
. at16 91
. Se e al s o E x to a le r t the t r ia l c our t t o the Ei ghth Amen d mentpr oble m , even i f the pr of f er ed s olut ion w as in a d e q u a te . A def

end ant’s requested jury i nstruction need no t be f lawless or even corr ect in
o rde r to ca ll th e tria l co u rt’s atte n tio n to a d eficie n cy in th e c h arg e an d th ere b y p rese rve erro r. 40 As the appl ic ant point s out in his br ie f , it is appar enttha t the pet it ione rin Ab du l- Ka bir had also al erte d the tr ia l c our t t o the def ic ie ncy in the jur

y char ge in his cas e by re ques ti ng whatam ounte d to a seri es of jury nu lli f

ication instr

uction s. Th e Sup rem e C ou rtwas ob viou slyaware of this 41
c i rc u ms t a n c e , b u t d i d n o t re g a rd i t a s a n y i mp e d i me n t t o fe d e ra l h a b e a s re l i e f. M or eover , itcoul d not r eas onabl y be sai d tha t the appl ic ant in a ny r es pect“ invi te d” Pen ry I err or by r equ esti ng a nu lli f ication instruction
. Th e tr ia l cou rtdid n ot giv e th e a p p lic an t’s 42

r eques te d null if

ic at ion ins tr

uct ion. Ther ef

or e, the kind of

inde pendenterr ortha t m ay ar is e f r om an instruction that au thorizes j urors to ign ore the ob ligation o f th e ir oaths an d rende r f alse
ans wer s to the s peci al is s ues , te nta ti vel y r ecogni zed i n P en ry II , Smi th I , and S mi th II , did not 43Mor e no
— 21

par t e Hood , sup ra , a t77
- 78.

44 See no t e 17 , a n te . 45 Ex p arte Ma rt i nez , sup ra , a t32 4. See T EX . C ODE C RIM . P ROC . a rt. 4 4 .2 9 (c ); C lar k v. S tate , 99 4 S.Ct
. 166 (Te x. Cri m. App
. 1999). occur in the appl ic ant ’ s tr ia l; noris tha t the er r or h e co mpla ine d aboutin the t ent h gr ound f or
r el ie f in hi s ini ti al writappl ic at ion. We ha ve al r eadyconcl uded t hatthe appl ic ant ’ s r eques te d ins tr uct ion, al ong wi th the St at e’ s r es pons e, was s uf f ic ie nt to put the tr ia l court on not ic e of the particular Eigh th Amendm ent err or that the app licant did raise in h is te n th g rou n d f o r relie f , viz : th at t h e c o u rt’s pu n ish ment ch arg e d id n o t emp o we r th e ju ry to g iv e mitig ati n g e ffe ct t o , int er alia , his evi dence of

a t r ouble d chi ldhood. 44

CO NC LU S I ON Beca us e t he evi dence tha t the appl ic antpr of f er ed atthe punis hm entphas e of his capi ta l
murder tr ial with r espect to his tr ou bled c hildh oo d co uld n ot be g iven meaning f ul ef f ect within th e c o n tex t o f

th e sta tu to ry sp ec ial issu es, th e trial co u rt erred in f ail in g to g iv e a sep ara te j u ry ins tr uct ion thatwoul d em

power the jur y to as s es s a li f

e s ent ence on the bas is of s uch m it iga ti ng
ev id en ce , n o tw ith sta n d in g its a n sw ers to th e sp ec ial issu es. We th ere f o re su sta in th e a p p lic an t’s te nth gr ound f

or r el ie f
. The puni s hm entpor ti on of the judgm entof

the tr ia l c our t i s vaca te d, and the appl ic antis r em anded t o the tr ia l c our t f ora new punis hm enthear ing. 45
Del i ver ed: Fe br uar y 6, 2008 Pub l i sh