89 FERC ¶ 61,285

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION

18 CFR Part 35

[Docket No. RM99-2-000; Order No. 2000 ]

Regional Transmission Organizations

(Issued December 20, 1999)

AGENCY: Federal Energy Regulatory Commission

ACTION: Final Rule

SUMMARY: The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (Commission) is amending its

regulations under the Federal Power Act (FPA) to advance the formation of Regional

Transmission Organizations (RTOs). The regulations require that each public utility that

owns, operates, or controls facilities for the transmission of electric energy in interstate

commerce make certain filings with respect to forming and participating in an RTO. The

Commission also codifies minimum characteristics and functions that a transmission

entity must satisfy in order to be considered an RTO. The Commission's goal is to

promote efficiency in wholesale electricity markets and to ensure that electricity

consumers pay the lowest price possible for reliable service.

EFFECTIVE DATE: This Final Rule will become effective [on the 60th day after

publication in the Federal Register.]
Docket No. RM99-2-000 - 2 -

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

Alan Haymes (Technical Information)

Federal Energy Regulatory Commission

888 First Street, N.E.

Washington, D.C. 20426

(202) 219-2919

Brian R. Gish (Legal Information)

Federal Energy Regulatory Commission

888 First Street, N.E.

Washington, D.C. 20426

(202) 208-0996

James Apperson (Collaborative Process)

Federal Energy Regulatory Commission

888 First Street, N.E.

Washington, D.C. 20426

(202) 219-2962 

SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION:
Docket No. RM99-2-000

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY ................................ 1

II. BACKGROUND ................................................ 9

 

A. The Foundation for Competitive Markets: Order Nos. 888

and 889 ................................................. 10

B. Developments Since Order Nos. 888 and 889 .................... 12

1. Industry Restructuring and New Stresses on the Transmission

Grid .............................................. 14

2. Successes, Failures and Haphazard Development of Regional

Transmission Entities ................................. 21

3. The Commission's ISO and RTO Inquires; Conferences with

Stakeholders and State Regulators ........................ 29

III. DISCUSSION ................................................. 32

A. Existence of Barriers and Impediments to Achieving Fully Competitive

Electricity Markets ........................................ 32

B. Benefits That RTOs Can Offer to Address Remaining Barriers and

Impediments ............................................. 70

C. Commission's Approach to RTO Formation ...................... 99

1. Voluntary Approach ................................. 101

2. Organizational Form of an RTO ........................ 117

3. Degree of Specificity in the Rule ....................... 126

4. Legal Authority ..................................... 130
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -iiD. Minimum Characteristics of an RTO .......................... 151

1. Independence (Characteristic 1) ........................ 152

2. Scope and Regional Configuration (Characteristic 2) ........ 238

3. Operational Authority (Characteristic 3) .................. 267

4. Short-Term Reliability (Characteristic 4) ................. 282

E. Minimum Functions of an RTO .............................. 323

1. Tariff Administration and Design (Function 1) ............. 324

2. Congestion Management (Function 2) .................... 332

3. Parallel Path Flow (Function 3) ......................... 386

4. Ancillary Services (Function 4) ......................... 393

5. OASIS and Total Transmission Capability (TTC) and Available

Transmission Capability (ATC) (Function 5) .............. 426

6. Market Monitoring (Function 6) ........................ 435

7. Planning and Expansion (Function 7) .................... 466

8. Interregional Coordination (Function 8) .................. 492

F. Open Architecture ........................................ 497

G. Transmission Ratemaking Policy for RTOs ..................... 505

1. Pancaked Rates ..................................... 513

2. Reciprocal Waiving of Access Charges Between RTOs ...... 517

3. Uniform Access Charges .............................. 519
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -iii4. Congestion Pricing .................................. 525

5. Service to Transmission-Owning Utilities That Do Not 

Participate in an RTO ................................ 526

6. Performance-Based Rate Regulation ..................... 533

7. Other RTO Transmission Ratemaking Reforms ............. 547

8. Additional Ratemaking Issues .......................... 573

9. Filing Procedures for Innovative Rate Proposals ............ 577

H. Other Issues ............................................. 999

1. Public Power and Cooperative Participation in RTOs ........ 578

2. Participation by Canadian and Mexican Entities ............ 578

3. Existing Transmission Contracts ........................ 598

4. Power Exchanges (PXs) .............................. 604

5. Effect on Retail Markets and Retail Access ................ 608

6. Effect on States with Low Cost Generation ................ 614

7. States' Roles with Regard to RTOs ...................... 618

8. Accounting Issues ................................... 628

9. Market Design Lessons ............................... 632

I. Collaborative Process ..................................... 643

J. Implementation Issues ..................................... 652

1. Filing Requirements ................................. 652
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -iv2. Deadline for RTO Operation ........................... 665

3. Commission Processing Procedures ..................... 672

4. Other Implementation Issues ........................... 679

IV. ENVIRONMENTAL STATEMENT ............................... 680

V. REGULATORY FLEXIBILITY ACT CERTIFICATION ............... 693

VI. PUBLIC REPORTING BURDEN AND INFORMATION COLLECTION

STATEMENT ................................................ 694

VII. EFFECTIVE DATE AND CONGRESSIONAL NOTIFICATION ........ 698

VIII. DOCUMENT AVAILABILITY ................................... 698

REGULATORY TEXT ......................................... 701

APPENDIX .................................................. 719
1

See Promoting Wholesale Competition Through Open Access Non-discriminatory

Transmission Services by Public Utilities and Recovery of Stranded Costs by Public

Utilities and Transmitting Utilities, Order No. 888, 61 FR 21,540 (May 10, 1996), FERC

Stats. & Regs. ¶ 31,036 (1996) (Order No. 888), order on reh'g, Order No. 888-A, 62 FR

12,274 (March 14, 1997), FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 31,048 (1997) (Order No. 888-A),

order on reh'g, Order No. 888-B, 81 FERC ¶ 61,248 (1997), order on reh'g, Order No.

888-C, 82 FERC ¶ 61,046 (1998), appeal docketed, Transmission Access Policy Study

Group, et al. v. FERC, Nos. 97-1715 et al. (D.C. Cir.).

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION

Before Commissioners: James J. Hoecker, Chairman;

 William L. Massey, Linda Breathitt, and

 Curt Hébert, Jr.

Regional Transmission Organizations Docket No. RM99-2-000

Order No. 2000 

FINAL RULE

(Issued December 20, 1999)

I. INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY

In 1996 the Commission put in place the foundation necessary for competitive

wholesale power markets in this country—open access transmission. 1 Since that time,
Docket No. RM99-2-000 - 2 -

2Regional Transmission Organizations, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 64 FR

31,390 (June 10, 1999), FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 32,541 at 33,683-781 (1999).

the industry has undergone sweeping restructuring activity, including a movement by

many states to develop retail competition, the growing divestiture of generation plants by

traditional electric utilities, a significant increase in the number of mergers among

traditional electric utilities and among electric utilities and gas pipeline companies, large

increases in the number of power marketers and independent generation facility

developers entering the marketplace, and the establishment of independent system

operators (ISOs) as managers of large parts of the transmission system. Trade in bulk

power markets has continued to increase significantly and the Nation's transmission grid

is being used more heavily and in new ways.

On May 13,1999, the Commission proposed a rule on Regional Transmission

Organizations (RTOs) that identified and discussed our concerns with the traditional

means of grid management. 2 In that Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NOPR), the

Commission reviewed evidence that traditional management of the transmission grid by

vertically integrated electric utilities was inadequate to support the efficient and reliable

operation that is needed for the continued development of competitive electricity markets,

and that continued discrimination in the provision of transmission services by vertically

integrated utilities may also be impeding fully competitive electricity markets. These

problems may be depriving the Nation of the benefits of lower prices and enhanced
Docket No. RM99-2-000 - 3 -

3As discussed more fully later, appropriate regional institutions could improve

efficiencies in grid management through improved pricing, congestion management, more

accurate estimates of Available Transmission Capability, improved parallel path flow

management, more efficient planning, and increased coordination between regulatory

agencies.

reliability. The comments on the NOPR overwhelmingly support the conclusion that

independent regionally operated transmissions grids will enhance the benefits of

competitive electricity markets. Competition in wholesale electricity markets is the best

way to protect the public interest and ensure that electricity consumers pay the lowest

price possible for reliable service. 

Regional institutions can address the operational and reliability issues now

confronting the industry, and eliminate any residual discrimination in transmission

services that can occur when the operation of the transmission system remains in the

control of a vertically integrated utility. Appropriate regional transmission institutions

could: (1) improve efficiencies in transmission grid management; 3 (2) improve grid

reliability; (3) remove remaining opportunities for discriminatory transmission practices;

(4) improve market performance; and (5) facilitate lighter handed regulation.

Thus, we believe that appropriate RTOs could successfully address the existing

impediments to efficient grid operation and competition and could consequently benefit

consumers through lower electricity rates resulting from a wider choice of services and
Docket No. RM99-2-000 - 4 -

4

The Commission received 334 initial and reply comments in response to the

NOPR. The commenters, and abbreviations for them as used herein, are listed in an

Appendix to this Final Rule.

service providers. In addition, substantial cost savings are likely to result from the

formation of RTOs.

Based on careful consideration of the thoughtful comments submitted in response

to the NOPR, 4 the Commission adopts a final rule that generally follows the approach of

the NOPR. Our objective is for all transmission-owning entities in the Nation, including

non-public utility entities, to place their transmission facilities under the control of

appropriate RTOs in a timely manner. Therefore, we are establishing in this rule

minimum characteristics and functions for appropriate RTOs; a collaborative process by

which public utilities and non-public utilities that own, operate or control interstate

transmission facilities, in consultation with state officials as appropriate, will consider

and develop RTOs; a proposal to consider transmission ratemaking reforms on a casespecific basis; an opportunity for non-monetary regulatory benefits, such as deference in

dispute resolution and streamlined filing and approval procedures; and a time line for

public utilities to make appropriate filings with the Commission to initiate operation of

RTOs. As a result of this voluntary approach, we expect jurisdictional utilities to form

RTOs. If the industry fails to form RTOs under this approach, the Commission will

reconsider what further regulatory steps are in the public interest.
Docket No. RM99-2-000 - 5 -

Pursuant to our authority under section 205 of the Federal Power Act (FPA) to

ensure that rates, terms and conditions of transmission and sales for resale in interstate

commerce by public utilities are just, reasonable and not unduly discriminatory or

preferential, and our authority under section 202(a) of the FPA to promote and encourage

regional districts for the voluntary interconnection and coordination of transmission

facilities by public utilities and non-public utilities for the purpose of assuring an

abundant supply of electric energy throughout the United States with the greatest possible

economy, this rule requires the following.

First, the Commission establishes minimum characteristics and functions that an

RTO must satisfy in the following areas: 

Minimum Characteristics:

1. Independence

2. Scope and Regional Configuration

3. Operational Authority

4. Short-term Reliability

Minimum Functions:

1. Tariff Administration and Design

2. Congestion Management

3. Parallel Path Flow

4. Ancillary Services

5. OASIS and Total Transmission Capability (TTC) 

and Available Transmission Capability (ATC)

6. Market Monitoring

7. Planning and Expansion

8. Interregional Coordination
Docket No. RM99-2-000 - 6 -

Industry participants, however, retain flexibility in structuring RTOs that satisfy the

minimum characteristics and functions. For example, we do not propose to require or

prohibit any one form of organization for RTOs or require or prohibit RTO ownership of

transmission facilities. The characteristics and functions could be satisfied by different

organizational forms, such as ISOs, transcos, combinations of the two, or even new

organizational forms not yet discussed in the industry or proposed to the Commission. 

Likewise, the Commission is not proposing a "cookie cutter" organizational format for

regional transmission institutions or the establishment of fixed or specific regional

boundaries under section 202(a) of the FPA.

We also establish an "open architecture" policy regarding RTOs, whereby all RTO

proposals must allow the RTO and its members the flexibility to improve their

organizations in the future in terms of structure, operations, market support and

geographic scope to meet market needs. In turn, the Commission will provide the

regulatory flexibility to accommodate such improvement.

Second, to facilitate RTO formation in all regions of the Nation, the Commission

will sponsor and support a collaborative process to take place in the Spring of 2000.

Under this process, we expect that public utilities and non-public utilities, in coordination

with state officials, Commission staff, and all affected interest groups, will actively work

toward the voluntary development of RTOs.
Docket No. RM99-2-000 - 7 -

5An RTO proposal includes a basic agreement filed under section 205 of the FPA

setting out the rules, practices and procedures under which the RTO will be governed and

operated, and requests by the public utility members of the RTO under section 203 of the

FPA to transfer control of their jurisdictional transmission facilities from individual

public utilities to the RTO. Most RTO proposals by public utilities are likely to involve

one or more filings under FPA sections 203 and 205, but the number and types of filing

may vary depending upon the type of RTO proposed and the number of public utilities

involved in the proposal. Under the Rule, a utility may file a petition for a declaratory

order asking, for example, whether a proposed transmission entity would qualify as an

RTO or if a new or innovative method for pricing transmission service would be

acceptable, to be followed by appropriate filings under sections 203 and 205.

Third, we provide guidance on flexible transmission ratemaking that may be

proposed by RTOs, including ratemaking treatments that will address congestion pricing

and performance-based regulation. We also propose to consider on a case-by-case basis

incentive pricing that may be appropriate for transmission facilities under RTO control.

Finally, all public utilities (with the exception of those participating in an approved

regional transmission entity that conforms to the Commission's ISO principles) that own,

operate or control interstate transmission facilities must file with the Commission by

October 15, 2000, a proposal for an RTO with the minimum characteristics and functions

to be operational by December 15, 2001, 5 or, alternatively, a description of efforts to

participate in an RTO, any existing obstacles to RTO participation, and any plans to work

toward RTO participation. We expect that such proposals would include the transmission

facilities of public utilities as well as transmission facilities of public power and other

non-public utility entities to the extent possible. Through the required filings, public
Docket No. RM99-2-000 - 8 -

utilities will make known to the public any plans for RTO participation and any obstacles

to RTO formation. 

A public utility that is a member of an existing transmission entity that has been

approved by the Commission as in conformance with the eleven ISO principles set forth

in Order No. 888 must make a filing no later than January 15, 2001. That filing must

explain the extent to which the transmission entity in which it participates meets the

minimum characteristics and functions for an RTO, and either propose to modify the

existing institution to the extent necessary to become an RTO, or explain the efforts,

obstacles and plans with respect to conforming to these characteristics and functions.

The goal of this rulemaking is to form RTOs voluntarily and in a timely manner. 

The alternative to a voluntary process is likely to be a lengthy process that is more likely

to result in greater standardization of the Commission's RTO requirements among

regions. Although the Commission has specific authorities and responsibilities under the

FPA to protect against undue discrimination and remove impediments to wholesale

competition, we find it appropriate in this instance to adopt an open collaborative process

that relies on voluntary regional participation to design RTOs that can be tailored to

specific needs of each region. 
Docket No. RM99-2-000 - 9 -

6

See supra note 1.

7Open Access Same-Time Information System (Formerly Real-Time Information

Networks) and Standards of Conduct, Order No. 889, 61 FR 21,737 (May 10, 1996),

FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 31,035 (1996), order on reh'g, Order No. 889-A, 62 FR 12,484

(March 14, 1997), FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 31,049 (1997), order on reh'g, Order No. 889-

B, 81 FERC ¶ 61,253 (1997).

II. BACKGROUND

In April 1996, in Order Nos. 888 6 and 889, 7 the Commission established the

foundation necessary to develop competitive bulk power markets in the United States:

non-discriminatory open access transmission services by public utilities and stranded cost

recovery rules that would provide a fair transition to competitive markets. Order Nos.

888 and 889 were very successful in accomplishing much of what they set out to do.

However, the orders were not intended to address all problems that might arise in the

development of competitive power markets. Indeed, the nature of the emerging markets

and the remaining impediments to full competition that became apparent in the nearly

four years since the issuance of Order Nos. 888 and 889, and the insightful comments and

information presented to us by a wide array of industry participants in this rulemaking

proceeding have made clear that the Commission must take further action if we are to

achieve the fully competitive power markets envisioned by those orders.
Docket No. RM99-2-000 - 10 -

8Order No. 888, FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 31,036 at 31,682.

9

Id. at 31,652.

A. The Foundation for Competitive Markets: Order Nos. 888 and 889

In Order Nos. 888 and 889, the Commission found that unduly discriminatory and

anticompetitive practices existed in the electric industry, and that transmission-owning

utilities had discriminated against others seeking transmission access. 8 The Commission

stated that its goal was to ensure that customers have the benefits of competitively priced

generation, and determined that non-discriminatory open access transmission services

(including access to transmission information) and stranded cost recovery were the most

critical components of a successful transition to competitive wholesale electricity

markets. 9 

Accordingly, Order No. 888 required all public utilities that own, control or

operate facilities used for transmitting electric energy in interstate commerce to (1) file

open access non-discriminatory transmission tariffs containing, at a minimum, the nonprice terms and conditions set forth in the Order, and (2) functionally unbundle wholesale

power services. Under functional unbundling, the public utility must: (1) take

transmission services under the same tariff of general applicability as do others; (2) state

separate rates for wholesale generation, transmission, and ancillary services; and (3) rely

on the same electronic information network that its transmission customers rely on to
Docket No. RM99-2-000 - 11 -

10Id. at 31,654-55.

11Order No. 888, FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 31,036 at 31,730.

obtain information about its transmission system when buying or selling power. 10 Order

No. 889 required that all public utilities establish or participate in an Open Access SameTime Information System (OASIS) that meets certain specifications, and comply with

standards of conduct designed to prevent employees of a public utility (or any employees

of its affiliates) engaged in wholesale power marketing functions from obtaining

preferential access to pertinent transmission system information.

During the course of the Order No. 888 proceeding, the Commission received

comments urging it to require generation divestiture or structural institutional

arrangements such as regional independent system operators (ISOs) to better assure nondiscrimination. The Commission responded that, while it believed that ISOs had the

potential to provide significant benefits, efforts to remedy undue discrimination should

begin by requiring the less intrusive functional unbundling approach. Subsequent to

issuance of Order No.888, it has become apparent that several types of regional

transmission institutions, in addition to the kinds of ISOs approved to date, may also be

able to provide the benefits attributed to ISOs in Order No. 888. 

Order No. 888 set forth 11 principles for assessing ISO proposals submitted to the

Commission. 11 Order No. 888 also stated:
Docket No. RM99-2-000 - 12 -

12Id. at 31,655.

[W]e see many benefits in ISOs, and encourage utilities to consider ISOs as

a tool to meet the demands of the competitive marketplace. As a further

precaution against discriminatory behavior, we will continue to monitor

electricity markets to ensure that functional unbundling adequately protects

transmission customers. At the same time, we will analyze all alternative

proposals, including formation of ISOs, and, if it becomes apparent that

functional unbundling is inadequate or unworkable in assuring nondiscriminatory open access transmission, we will reevaluate our position

and decide whether other mechanisms, such as ISOs, should be

required. [12]

Below, we summarize our experiences with functional unbundling from the date of

issuance of Order Nos. 888 and 889.

B. Developments Since Order Nos. 888 and 889

In the nearly four years since Order Nos. 888 and 889 were issued, numerous

significant developments have occurred in the electric utility industry. Some of these

reflect changes in governmental policies; others are strictly industry-driven. These

activities have resulted in a considerably different industry landscape from the one faced

at the time the Commission was developing Order No. 888, resulting in new regulatory

and industry challenges.

Order Nos. 888 and 889 required a significant change to the way many public

utilities have done business for most of this century, and most public utilities accepted

these changes and made substantial good faith efforts to comply with the new

requirements. Virtually all public utilities have filed tariffs stating rates, terms and
Docket No. RM99-2-000 - 13 -

13Based on data supplied to the Commission by Resource Data International.

conditions for comparable service to third-party users of their transmission systems. In

addition, improved information about the transmission system is available to all

participants in the market at the same time that it is available to the public utility's

merchant function and market affiliate as a result of utility compliance with the OASIS

regulations. 

The availability of tariffs and information about the transmission system has

fostered a rapid growth in dependence on wholesale markets for acquisition of generation

resources. Areas that have experienced generation shortages have seen rapid

development of new generation resources. For example, in the Northeast Power

Coordinating Council (NPCC) region (including New England, New York and parts of

eastern Canada), where there was deep concern about adequacy of generation supply only

three years ago, approximately 30,000 MW of generation is proposed or actually under

construction. 13 That response comes almost entirely from independent generating plants,

which are able to sell power into the bulk power market through open access to the

transmission system. Power resources are now acquired over increasingly large regional

areas, and interregional transfers of electricity have increased. The very success of Order

Nos. 888 and 889, and the initiative of some utilities that have pursued voluntary
Docket No. RM99-2-000 - 14 -

restructuring beyond the minimum open access requirements, have placed new stresses on

regional transmission systems—stresses that call for regional solutions.

1. Industry Restructuring and New Stresses on the Transmission

Grid

Open access transmission and the opening of wholesale competition in the electric

industry have brought an array of changes in the past several years: divestiture by many

integrated utilities of some or all of their generating assets; significantly increased merger

activity both between electric utilities and between electric and natural gas utilities;

increases in the number of new participants in the industry in the form of both

independent and affiliated power marketers and generators as well as independent power

exchanges; increases in the volume of trade in the industry, particularly sales by

marketers; state efforts to introduce retail competition; and new and different uses of the

transmission grid. 

With respect to divestiture, since August 1997, generating facilities representing

approximately 50,000 MW of generating capacity have been sold (or are under contract

to be sold) by utilities, and an additional 30,000 MW is currently for sale. In total, this

represents more than ten percent of U.S. generating capacity. In all, 27 utilities have sold

all or some of their generating assets and seven others have assets for sale. Buyers of this

generating capacity have included traditional utilities with specified service territories as

well as independent power producers with no required service territory.
Docket No. RM99-2-000 - 15 -

14See Commission's website, www.ferc.fed.us/electric/mergers.

15See Commission's website, www.ferc.fed.us/electric/PwrMkt. The Commission

recognizes that a significant portion of the sales represent the retrading of power by a

number of different market participants, such that there may be multiple resales of the

same generation. Nonetheless, the volume of and intensity of trading continues to

increase in the wholesale electricity market.

Since Order No. 888 was issued, more than 40 applications have been filed for

Commission approval of proposed mergers involving public utilities. 14 Most of these

merger proposals involve electric utilities with contiguous service areas, although some of

the proposed mergers have been between utilities with non-contiguous service areas. In

addition, an increasing number of applications involve the combination of electric and

natural gas assets. 

There has been significant growth in the volume of trading, and particularly the

number of marketers, in the wholesale electricity market. For example, in the first

quarter of 1995, according to power marketer quarterly filings, marketer sales traded by

only eight active power marketers, totaled 1.8 million MWh. By the first quarter of 1999,

such sales escalated to over 400 million MWh, traded by over 100 power marketers. 15

The Commission has granted market-based rate authority to more than 800

entities, of which nearly 500 are power marketers, (including over 100 marketers

affiliated with investor-owned utilities). The remaining entities include approximately
Docket No. RM99-2-000 - 16 -

16See Commission's website, www.ferc.fed.us/electric.

17See the Energy Information Administration website,

www.eia.doe.gov/cneaf/electricity/chg_str/regmap.html.

equal numbers of affiliated power producers, investor-owned utilities and other

utilities. 16

State commissions and legislatures have been active in the past few years studying

competitive options at the retail level, setting up pilot retail access programs, and, in

many states, implementing full scale retail access programs. As of November 1, 1999,

twenty-one states had enacted electric restructuring legislation, three had issued

comprehensive regulatory orders, and twenty-six states plus the District of Columbia had

legislation or orders pending or investigations underway. 17 Fifteen states had

implemented full-scale or pilot retail competition programs that offer a choice of

suppliers to at least some retail customers. Eight states have initiated programs to offer

access to retail customers by a date certain.

Because of the changes in the structure of the electric industry, the transmission

grid is now being used more intensively and in different ways than in the past. The

Commission is concerned that the traditional approaches to operating the grid are

showing signs of strain. According to the North American Electric Reliability Council

(NERC), "the adequacy of the bulk transmission system has been challenged to support
Docket No. RM99-2-000 - 17 -

18Reliability Assessment 1998-2007, North American Electric Reliability Council

(September 1998), at 26 (Reliability Assessment). 

19Id.

20Id.

21The TLR procedures are designed to remedy overloads that result when a

transmission line or other transmission equipment carries or will carry more power than

its rating, which could result in either power outages or damage to property. The TLR

procedures are designed to bring overloaded transmission equipment to within NERC's

Operating Security Limits essentially by curtailing transactions contributing to the

overload. See North American Electric Reliability Council, 85 FERC ¶ 61,353 (1998)

(NERC).

the movement of power in unprecedented amounts and in unexpected directions." 18

These changes in the use of the transmission system "will test the electric industry's

ability to maintain system security in operating the transmission system under conditions

for which it was not planned or designed." 19 It should be noted that, despite the

increased transmission system loadings, NERC believes that the "procedures and

processes to mitigate potential reliability impacts appear to be working reliably for now,"

and that even though the system was particularly stressed during the summer of 1998,

"the system performed reliably and firm demand was not interrupted due to transmission

transfer limitations." 20

An indication that the increased and different use of the transmission system is

stressing the grid is the increased use of transmission line loading relief (TLR)

procedures. 21 And, according to published reports, the incidence of TLRs is growing.
Docket No. RM99-2-000 - 18 -

22Power Markets Week, November 8, 1999 at 1, citing NERC data.

23Reliability Assessment at 26.

24Id. at 7.

25Id.

While in all of 1998 over 300 TLRs were called, in the first ten months of 1999, over 400

TLRs have been called, resulting in over 8,000 MW of power curtailment in the threemonth summer period beginning June 1999. 22

It appears that the planning and construction of transmission and transmissionrelated facilities may not be keeping up with increased requirements. According to

NERC, "business is increasing on the transmission system, but very little is being done to

increase the load serving and transfer capability of the bulk transmission system." 23 The

amount of new transmission capacity planned over the next ten years is significantly

lower than the additions that had been planned five years ago, and most of the planned

projects are for local system support. 24 NERC states that, "The close coordination of

generation and transmission planning is diminishing as vertically integrated utilities divest

their generation assets and most new generation is being proposed and developed by

independent power producers." 25

The transition to new market structures has resulted in new challenges and

circumstances. For example, during the week of June 22-26, 1998, the wholesale electric

market in the Midwest experienced numerous events that led to unprecedented high spot
Docket No. RM99-2-000 - 19 -

26See Staff Report to the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission on the Causes of

Wholesale Electric Pricing Abnormalities in the Midwest During June 1998, (Sept. 22,

1998) (Staff Price Spike Report) at 3-8 to 3-11. Unusually high spot market wholesale

prices also occurred during the summer of 1999. The Commission is not aware that any

formal evaluations of market data have been performed for that occurrence of price

abnormalities.

27Id. at v.

market prices. Spot wholesale market prices for energy briefly rose as high as $7,500 per

MWh, compared with an average price for the summer of approximately $40 per MWh in

the Midwest if the pricing abnormalities are excluded. 26 This experience led to calls for

price caps, allegations of market power, and a questioning of the effectiveness of

transmission open access and wholesale electric competition.

The Commission staff undertook an investigation of the pricing abnormalities.

Staff's report concluded that the unusually high price levels were caused by a

combination of factors, particularly above-average generation outages, unseasonably hot

temperatures, storm-related transmission outages, transmission constraints, poor

communication of price signals, lowered confidence in the market due to a few contract

defaults, and inexperience in dealing with competitive markets. 27

The Commission's staff found that the market institutions were not adequately

prepared to deal with such a dramatic series of events. Regarding regional transmission

entities, the staff report observed: "The necessity for cooperation in meeting reliability

concerns and the Commission's intent to foster competitive market conditions underscores
Docket No. RM99-2-000 - 20 -

28Id. at 5-8.

29Ohio's Electric Market, June 22-26, 1998, What Happened and Why, A Report

to the Ohio General Assembly, at iii.

30Maintaining Reliability in a Competitive U.S. Electricity Industry; Final Report

of the Task Force on Electric System Reliability (Sept. 29, 1998) (Task Force Report). 

The Task Force was comprised of 24 members representing all major segments of the

electric industry, including private and public suppliers, power marketers, regulators,

environmentalists, and academics.

the importance of better regional coordination in areas such as maintenance of

transmission and generation systems and transmission planning and operation." 28

Support for this view comes from many sources. For example, the Public Utilities

Commission of Ohio, in its own report on the high spot market prices, recommended that

policy makers "take unambiguous action to require coordination of transmission system

operations by regionwide Independent System Operators." 29

On September 29, 1998, the Secretary of Energy Advisory Board Task Force on

Electric System Reliability published its final report. 30 The Task Force was convened in

January 1997 to provide advice to the Department of Energy on critical institutional,

technical, and policy issues that need to be addressed in order to maintain bulk power

electric system reliability in a more competitive industry. The Task Force found that "the

traditional reliability institutions and processes that have served the Nation well in the

past need to be modified to ensure that reliability is maintained in a competitively neutral

fashion;" that "grid reliability depends heavily on system operators who monitor and
Docket No. RM99-2-000 - 21 -

31Task Force Report at x-xi.

32Id. at 76.

control the grid in real time;" and that "because bulk power systems are regional in

nature, they can and should be operated more reliably and efficiently when coordinated

over large geographic areas." 31

The report noted that many regions of the United States are developing ISOs as a

way to maintain electric system reliability as competitive markets develop. According to

the Task Force, ISOs are significant institutions to assure both electric system reliability

and competitive generation markets. The Task Force concluded that a large ISO would: 

(1) be able to identify and address reliability issues most effectively; (2) internalize much

of the loop flow caused by the growing number of transactions; (3) facilitate transmission

access across a larger portion of the network, consequently improving market efficiencies

and promoting greater competition; and (4) eliminate "pancaking" of transmission rates,

thus allowing a greater range of economic energy trades across the network. 32

2. Successes, Failures, and Haphazard Development of Regional

Transmission Entities

Since Order No. 888 was issued, there have been both successful and unsuccessful

efforts to establish ISOs, and other efforts to form regional entities to operate the

transmission facilities in various parts of the country. While we are encouraged by the

success of some of these efforts, it is apparent that the results have been inconsistent, and
Docket No. RM99-2-000 - 22 -

33Pacific Gas & Electric Company, et al., 77 FERC ¶ 61,204 (1996), order on

reh'g, 81 FERC ¶ 61,122 (1997) (Pacific Gas & Electric).

34Pennsylvania-New Jersey-Maryland Interconnection, et al., 81 FERC ¶ 61,257

(1997), order on reh'g, 82 FERC ¶ 61,047 (1998) (PJM). 

35New England Power Pool, 79 FERC ¶ 61,374 (1997), order on reh'g, 85 FERC ¶

61,242 (1998) (NEPOOL).

36Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corporation, et al., 83 FERC ¶ 61,352 (1998),

order on reh'g, 87 FERC ¶ 61,135 (1999) (Central Hudson).

37Midwest Independent Transmission System Operator, et al., 84 FERC ¶ 61,231,

order on reconsideration, 85 FERC ¶ 61,250, order on reh'g, 85 FERC ¶ 61,372 (1998)

(Midwest ISO).

38See 16 Texas Administrative Code § 23.67(p). Furthermore, on June 18, 1999,

S.B.7 was enacted to restructure the Texas electric industry allowing retail competition.

The bill requires retail competition to begin by January 2002. Rates will be frozen for

three years, and then a six percent reduction will be required for residential and small

commercial consumers. 

much of the country's transmission facilities remain outside of an operational regional

transmission institution.

Proposals for the establishment of five ISOs have been submitted to and approved,

or conditionally approved, by the Commission. These are the California ISO, 33 PJM

ISO, 34 ISO New England, 35 the New York ISO, 36 and the Midwest ISO. 37 In addition,

the Texas Commission has ordered an ISO for the Electric Reliability Council of Texas

(ERCOT). 38 Moreover, our international neighbors in Canada and Mexico are also
Docket No. RM99-2-000 - 23 -

39See Policy Proposal for Structural Reform of the Mexican Electricity Industry,

Secretary of Energy, Mexico (Feb. 1999); Third Interim Report of the Ontario Market

Design Committee (Oct. 1998); TransAlta Enterprises Corporation, 75 FERC ¶ 61,268 at

61,875 (1996) (recognition of the restructuring in the Province of Alberta, Canada to

create a Grid Company of Alberta).

pursuing electric restructuring efforts that include various forms of regional transmission

entities. 39

The PJM, New England and New York ISOs were established on the platform of

existing tight power pools. It appears that the principal motivation for creating ISOs in

these situations was the Order No. 888 requirement that there be a single systemwide

transmission tariff for tight pools. In contrast, the establishment of the California ISO

and the ERCOT ISO was the direct result of mandates by state governments. The

Midwest ISO, which is not yet operational, is unique. It was neither required by

government nor based on an existing institution. Two states in the region subsequently

required utilities in their states to participate in either a Commission-approved ISO

(Illinois and Wisconsin), or sell their transmission assets to an independent transmission

company that would operate under a regional ISO (Wisconsin).

As part of general restructuring initiatives, several states now require independent

grid management organizations. For example, an Illinois law required that its utilities

become members of a FERC-approved regional ISO by March 31, 1999, and Wisconsin

law gives its utilities the option of joining an ISO or selling their transmission assets to an
Docket No. RM99-2-000 - 24 -

40See Virginia Electric Utility Restructuring Act, S1269 (Mar. 25, 1999). In

Virginia, electric utilities are required by January 2001, to join or establish regional

transmission entities.

41See The Arkansas Electric Consumer Choice Act of 1999, Act 1, 82nd General

Assembly (Apr. 1999).

42See Amended Substitute Senate Bill No. 3, 123rd General Assembly (July 6,

1999).

independent transmission company by June 30, 2000. In both states, the backstop is a

single-state organization if regional organizations are not developed. Recently,

Virginia, 40 Arkansas 41 and Ohio 42 have also enacted legislation requiring their electric

utilities to join or establish regional transmission entities. 

The approved ISOs have similarities as well as differences. All five Commissionapproved ISOs operate, or propose to operate, as non-profit organizations. All five ISOs

include both public and non-public utility members. However, among the five, there is

considerable variation in governance, operational responsibilities, geographic scope and

market operations. Four of the ISOs rely on a two-tier form of governance with a nonstakeholder governing board on top that is advised, either formally or informally, by one

or more stakeholder groups. In general, the final decision making authority rests with the

independent non-stakeholder board. One ISO, the California ISO, uses a board consisting

of stakeholders and non-stakeholders. 

Four of the five ISOs operate a single control area, but the large Midwest ISO does

not currently plan to operate a single control area. Three are multi-state ISOs (New
Docket No. RM99-2-000 - 25 -

43The California PX offers day-ahead and hour-ahead markets and the ISO

operates a real-time energy market. Participation in the PX market is voluntary except

that the three traditional investor-owned utilities in California must bid their generation

sales and purchases through the PX for the first five years. New York will offer dayahead and real-time energy markets that will be operated by the ISO. PJM and New

England offer only real-time energy markets, although PJM has proposed to operate a

day-ahead market. The ERCOT ISO is the only other ISO that does not currently operate

a PX.

44There are indications, however, that the Midwest ISO is considering the

formation of a power exchange. See Joint Committee for the Development of a Midwest

Independent Power Exchange, "Solicitation of Interest-Creation of an Independent Power

Exchange for the U.S. Midwest," February 5, 1999.

45See Automated Power Exchange, Inc., 82 FERC ¶ 61,287, reh'g denied, 84

FERC ¶ 61,020 (1998), appeals docketed, No. 98-1415 (D.C. Cir. Sept. 14, 1998) and

No. 98-1419 (D.C. Cir. Sept. 14, 1998).

England, PJM and Midwest), while two ISOs (California and New York) currently

operate within a single state. The current Midwest ISO members do not encompass one

contiguous geographic area. The ISO New England administers a separate NEPOOL

tariff, while the other four administer their own ISO transmission tariffs. 

Three ISOs operate or propose to operate centralized power markets (New

England, PJM and New York), and one ISO (California) relies on a separate power

exchange (PX) to operate such a market. 43 The Midwest ISO has not proposed an ISOrelated centralized market for its region. 44 In addition, at least one separate PX has

begun to do business in California apart from the PX established through the restructuring

legislation. 45
Docket No. RM99-2-000 - 26 -

The existing ISOs are also evolving in terms of their governance structure and as a

result of operating experience with the transmission systems and the various markets they

operate. For example, the Commission rejected the original governance proposals for

two ISOs: the New England ISO and New York ISO. In both cases, the Commission

concluded that the vertically integrated utility members of the ISO would have too much

voting power in the various advisory committees that provide advice and

recommendations to the non-stakeholder Boards. The ISOs resubmitted governance

proposals that gave balanced representation to the various sectors of stakeholders, and the

Commission subsequently approved both revised governance structures.

In addition, the Commission has considered a number of significant modifications

of market rules proposed by the existing ISOs in the seven months since issuance of the

RTO NOPR. In particular, a number of rules for the California ISO and New England

ISO have been modified, affecting the products traded in, and the timing of, the markets

for energy, ancillary services, balancing services and transmission.

An additional few transmission restructuring proposals that were pending as of the

date of issuance of the RTO NOPR have been approved by the Commission, and others

have been filed since that date. In July 1999, the Commission granted a petition for

declaratory order filed by Entergy Services Inc., in which the majority concluded that

passive ownership of a transmission entity by a generating company or other market

participant could meet the ISO principles contained in Order No. 888. The order stated,
Docket No. RM99-2-000 - 27 -

46See Entergy Services, Inc., 88 FERC ¶ 61,149 (1999) (Commissioner Massey

dissented from this order).

47See FirstEnergy Operating Companies, et al., 89 FERC ¶ 61,090 (1999).

48See Application of Alliance Companies in Docket No. ER99-3144-000 (filed

June 3, 1999). The Commission issued an order on this application concurrently with the

issuance of this Final Rule. See Alliance Companies, 89 FERC ¶ ___ (1999) (Alliance

Companies).

however, that the passive ownership must be properly designed, such that the

transmission entity is truly independent of the market participants. 46 Another filing that

was pending when the NOPR was issued was the request by FirstEnergy to sell its

transmission assets to a newly-formed affiliate. The Commission approved the

disposition of jurisdictional facilities, noting that the proposed action would not adversely

affect competition, rates or regulation. In addition, the Commission noted that the

creation of the transmission-owning affiliate would facilitate the subsequent transfer of

FirstEnergy's transmission facilities to an RTO, which FirstEnergy pledged to do within

two years of Commission approval of the disposition of facilities to its affiliate. 47

Since issuance of the RTO NOPR, the Alliance Companies filed a proposal to

create an RTO. Applicants suggest that the RTO could take one of two forms, either an

ISO or a transco, but note that they prefer a transco configuration in which, at least

initially, the five transmission-owning participants could hold five percent ownership

stakes in the transco. 48
Docket No. RM99-2-000 - 28 -

49Recently, however, parties in the Pacific Northwest have resumed RTO

discussions.

50However, trade press reports suggest that while MAPP members continue to try

to reach consensus, the Midwest ISO is in discussion with MAPP members to join the

Midwest ISO. See Inside FERC, July 26, 1999; The Energy Report, Nov. 1, 1999 at 931.

51Recent press reports, however, indicate that Desert STAR has incorporated as a

non-profit organization, a first step toward the launch of an ISO. See Energy Daily, Nov.

5, 1999 at 2.

52See Application of Mountain West Independent Transmission Administrator in

Docket No. ER99-3719-000 (filed July 23, 1999).

Not all efforts to create ISOs have been successful. For example, after more than

two years of effort, the proponents of the IndeGO (Independent Grid Operator) ISO in the

Pacific Northwest and Rocky Mountain regions ended their efforts to create an ISO. 49

More recently, members of the Mid-American Power Pool (MAPP), an existing power

pool that covers six U.S. states and two Canadian provinces, failed to achieve consensus

for establishing a long-planned ISO. 50 In the Southwest, proponents of the Desert STAR

ISO have not been able to reach agreement to date on a formal proposal after more than

two years of discussion.51 In the interim period, some of the participants in the Desert

STAR ISO have filed at the Commission a proposal to create the Mountain West

Independent Scheduling Administrator, which would oversee the scheduling of

transmission service within Nevada. 52

Various reasons have been advanced to explain the difficulty in forming a

voluntary, multi-state ISO. Reasons include: "cost shifting," which involves increases in
Docket No. RM99-2-000 - 29 -

transmission rates for some parties; disagreements about sharing of ISO transmission

revenues among transmission owners; difficulties in obtaining the participation of

publicly-owned transmission facilities; concerns about the loss of transmission rights and

prices embedded in existing transmission agreements; and the preference of certain

transmission owners to sell or transfer their transmission assets to a for-profit

transmission company in lieu of handing over control to a non-profit ISO.

3. The Commission's ISO and RTO Inquiries; Conferences with

Stakeholders and State Regulators

In light of the various restructuring activities occurring throughout the United

States, the Commission has held 11 public conferences in nine different cities across the

country to hear the views of industry, consumers, and state regulators with respect to the

need for RTOs and their appropriate roles and responsibilities.

The Commission initiated an inquiry in March 1998 pertaining to its policies on

ISOs. A notice establishing procedures for a conference gave the following rationale:

In Order Nos. 888 and 889 and their progeny, the Commission established

the fundamental principles of non-discriminatory open access transmission

services. Nevertheless, many issues remain to be addressed if the Nation is

to fully realize the benefits of open access and more competitive electric

markets.

* * *

Given the dramatic changes taking place in both wholesale and retail

electric markets and the many proposals under consideration with respect to

the creation of ISOs or other transmission entities, such as transmissiononly utilities, it is time for the Commission to take stock of its policies in
Docket No. RM99-2-000 - 30 -

53Inquiry Concerning the Commission's Policy on Independent System Operators,

Notice of Conference, Docket No. PL98-5-000, at 1-2 (March 13, 1998).

54A summary of those views was included as Appendix A to the NOPR in this

docket. 

5563 FR 53,889 (Oct. 7, 1998).

order to determine whether they appropriately support our dual goals of

eliminating undue discrimination and promoting competition in electric

power markets. [53]

Accordingly, the Commission held a series of eight conferences in 1998 to gain insight

into participants' views on the formation and role of ISOs in the electric utility industry. 

The first conference was held in April 1998 at the Commission's offices in Washington,

D.C. Between May 28 and June 8, 1998, the Commission held seven regional

conferences in Phoenix, Kansas City, New Orleans, Indianapolis, Portland, Richmond

and Orlando. As a result of these conferences, the Commission heard approximately 145

oral presentations and received a large number of written comments on the appropriate

size, scope, organization and functions of regional transmission institutions. A number of

different of viewpoints were expressed. 54

On October 1, 1998, the Secretary of Energy delegated his authority under section

202(a) of the FPA to the Commission. In doing so, the Secretary stated that section

202(a) "provides DOE with sufficient authority to establish boundaries for Independent

System Operators (ISOs) or other appropriate transmission entities." 55 The Secretary

also stated: "FERC is also increasingly faced with reliability-related issues. Providing
Docket No. RM99-2-000 - 31 -

56Regional Transmission Organizations, Notice of Intent to Consult with State

Commission, 63 FR 66,158 (Dec. 1, 1998), FERC Stats & Regs. ¶ 35,534 (1998).

57See Appendix for a list of commenters.

FERC with the authority to establish boundaries for ISOs or other appropriate

transmission entities could aid in the orderly formation of properly-sized transmission

institutions and in addressing reliability-related issues, thereby increasing the reliability

of the transmission system."

On November 24, 1998, we gave notice in this docket of our intent to initiate a

consultation process with State commissions pursuant to section 202(a). 56 The purpose

of the consultations was to afford State commissions a reasonable opportunity to present

their views with respect to appropriate boundaries for regional transmission institutions

and other issues relating to RTOs. Conferences with State commissioners were held in

St. Louis, Missouri, on February 11, 1999; in Las Vegas, Nevada, on February 12, 1999;

and in Washington, D.C., on February 17, 1999. In all, we heard oral presentations by

representatives of 41 state commissions during these consultations, with others

monitoring or providing written comments. 57 During these sessions, we received much

valuable advice. Furthermore, we have had additional consultations since issuance of the

RTO NOPR in May 1999.
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -32-

58FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 32,541 at 33,696.

59Id. at 33,697.

III. DISCUSSION

A. Existing Barriers and Impediments to Achieving Fully Competitive

Electricity Markets

In the NOPR, the Commission expressed its belief that there remain important

transmission-related impediments to a competitive wholesale electric market. The

Commission grouped these remaining impediments into two broad categories: (1) the

engineering and economic inefficiencies inherent in the current operation and expansion

of the transmission grid, and (2) continuing opportunities for transmission owners to

unduly discriminate in the operation of their transmission systems so as to favor their own

or their affiliates' power marketing activities. 58 

With respect to engineering and economic inefficiencies, the NOPR noted that the

transmission facilities of any one utility in a region are part of a larger, integrated

transmission system which, from an electrical engineering perspective, operates as a

single machine. 59 Engineering and economic inefficiencies occur because each separate

operator usually makes independent decisions about the use, limitations and expansion of

its piece of the interconnected grid based on incomplete information, even though any

action taken by one transmission provider can have major and instantaneous effects on

the transmission facilities of all other transmission providers. The Commission noted
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -33-

60See id.

61See id. at 33,699.

62Id. at 33,700.

that, while this was not a new phenomenon, the demands placed on the transmission grid

had changed in recent years due to (1) increases in bulk power trade, (2) large shifts in

power flows, and (3) an increasingly de-integrated and decentralized competitive power

industry. 60 As a consequence of these changes in trade patterns and industry structure,

certain operational problems had become more significant and difficult to resolve. 

Engineering and Economic Inefficiencies

The NOPR identified a number of specific economic and engineering

inefficiencies. First, the NOPR noted that the reliability of the nation's bulk power

system was being stressed in ways that have never been experienced before, and

questioned the continued feasibility of one-on-one coordination of an interconnected

transmission grid encompassing more than 100 transmission owners and 140 separate

control areas. 61 Second, the NOPR observed that there were increasing difficulties in

accurately computing Total Transmission Capacity (TTC) and Available Transmission

Capacity (ATC), assessments that require reliable and timely information about load,

generation, facility outages and transactions on neighboring systems, as well as

consistency in methodologies among systems. 62 Third, the NOPR noted that efficient

congestion management required regional actions, and that the current methods for
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -34-

63Id. at 33,701-02.

64See id. at 33,702-03.

65Id. at 33,703.

managing congestion (e.g., Transmission Line Loading Relief procedures in the Eastern

Interconnection), which do not attempt to optimize regional congestion relief, were

cumbersome, inefficient and disruptive to bulk power markets. 63 Fourth, the NOPR

expressed concern that the uncertainty associated with transmission planning and

expansion had increased with the increasing number and distance of unbundled

transactions and the wider variation in generation dispatch patterns. The NOPR pointed

to a noticeable decline in planned transmission investments and expressed concern that,

without a regional approach to planning and expansion, it would be difficult to address

complex and controversial issues that arise when the benefits of an expansion do not

necessarily accrue to the transmission system that must undertake the expansion. 64

Finally, the NOPR explained that pancaked transmission rates (where a separate access

charge is assessed every time the transaction contract path crosses the boundary of

another transmission owner) restrict the size of regional power markets. The Commission

added that the balkanization of electricity markets hurts consumers who pay higher

transmission rates and have access to fewer generation options. 65 
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -35-

66Id. at 33,704.

67Order No. 888, FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 31,036 at 31,682.

68As noted in the NOPR, in Order No. 888, the Commission received and

considered numerous comments that functional unbundling was unlikely to work, and that

more drastic restructuring, such as corporate unbundling, was needed. For example, the

Federal Trade Commission advised the Commission that a functional unbundling

approach ". . . would leave in place the incentive and opportunity for some utilities to

(continued...)

Continuing Opportunities for Undue Discrimination

With respect to continuing opportunities for undue discrimination, the NOPR

observed that, when utilities control monopoly transmission facilities and also have

power marketing interests, they have poor incentives to provide equal quality

transmission service to their power marketing competitors. 66 The NOPR explained that

the Commission had made this point in Order No. 888:

It is in the economic self-interest of transmission monopolists, particularly

those with high-cost generation assets, to deny transmission or to offer

transmission on a basis that is inferior to that which they provide

themselves. The inherent characteristics of monopolists make it inevitable

that they will act in their own self-interest to the detriment of others by

refusing transmission and/or providing inferior transmission to competitors

in the bulk power markets to favor their own generation, and it is our duty

to eradicate unduly discriminatory practices. [67]

In the NOPR, the Commission noted that functional unbundling does not change the

incentives of vertically integrated utilities to use their transmission assets to favor their

own generation, but instead attempt to reduce the ability of utilities to act on those

incentives. 68
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -36-

68(...continued)

exercise market power in the regulated system. Preventing them from doing so by

enforcing regulations to control their behavior may prove difficult." However, the

Commission decided at the time to adopt the less intrusive and less costly remedy of

functional unbundling. FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 32,541 at 33,707.

69The NOPR described specific examples of undue discrimination that had been

brought to its attention through formal complaints, informal complaints made to the

Commission's enforcement hotline, oral and written comments made in conjunction with

public conferences held by the Commission, and pleadings filed with the Commission in

various dockets. The complaints generally involved: (1) calculation and posting of ATC

in a manner favorable to the transmission provider; (2) standards of conduct violations,

(3) line loading relief and congestion management, and (4) OASIS sites that are difficult

to use. See id. at 33,707-13. 

The NOPR expressed concern about continuing indications that transmission

service problems related to discriminatory conduct remain and concluded that these

problems are impeding competitive wholesale power markets. 69 The NOPR also noted

that instances of actual discrimination may be undetectable in a non-transparent market

and, in any event, it is often hard to determine, on an after-the-fact basis, whether an

action was motivated by an intent to favor affiliates or simply reflected the impartial

application of operating or technical requirement. The NOPR added that, while

continued discrimination may be deliberate, it could also result from the failure to make

sufficient efforts to change the way integrated utilities have done business for many

years. The Commission expressed concern that the difficulty in determining whether

there has been compliance with our regulations raises the question as to whether

functional unbundling is an appropriate long-term regulatory solution. 
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -37-

70As noted in the NOPR, transmission customers are reluctant to make even

informal complaints because they fear retribution by their transmission supplier; the

complaint process is costly and time-consuming; the Commission's remedies for

violations do not impose sufficient financial consequences on the transmission provider to

act as a significant deterrent; and, in the fast-paced business of power marketing, there

may be no adequate remedy for the lost short-term sales opportunities in after-the-fact

enforcement. See FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 32,541 at 33,706.

71Id.

The NOPR explained that the Commission considers allegations of discrimination,

even if not reduced to formal findings, to be a serious concern for two reasons. First, this

can be indicative of additional, unreported, discriminatory actions, because there are

significant disincentives to filing and pursuing formal complaints that would result in

definitive findings. 70 The NOPR expressed a concern that actual problems with

functional unbundling may be more pervasive than formally adjudicated complaints

would suggest. Second, the NOPR explained that allegations of discrimination are

serious because, if nothing else, they represent a perception by market participants that

the market is not working fairly. If market participants perceive that other participants

have an unfair advantage through their ownership or control of transmission facilities, it

can inhibit their willingness to participate in the market, thus thwarting the development

of robust competition. The NOPR added that such mistrust can also harm reliability. 71 

The NOPR explained the potential for undue discrimination increases in a

competitive environment unless the market can be made structurally efficient and

transparent with respect to information, and equitable in its treatment of competing
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -38-

72See id. at 33,714.

73See, e.g., Duquesne, Entergy, Florida Power Corp., NU, Kentucky Commission,

NECPUC, Ohio Commission, Texas Commission, DOE, American Forest, Arkansas

Cities, East Texas Cooperatives, EPSA, First Rochdale, FMPA, Oglethorpe, PNGC,

Powerex, Public Citizen, SoCal Cities, Sonat, Williams.

participants. Also, a system that attempts to control behavior that is motivated by

economic self-interest through the use of standards of conduct will require constant and

extensive policing and requires the Commission to regulate detailed aspects of internal

company policy and communication. The NOPR added that functional unbundling does

not necessarily promote light-handed regulation and undoubtedly imposes a cost on those

entities that have to comply with the standards of conduct and abide by rules that limit the

flexibility of their internal management activities. The NOPR stated that the perception

that many entities that operate the transmission system cannot be trusted is not a good

foundation on which to build a competitive power market, and it created needless

uncertainty and risk for new investments in generation. 72

Comments

Engineering and Economic Inefficiencies

Virtually all commenters support the NOPR's premise that engineering and

economic inefficiencies exist in the operation, planning and expansion of the regional

transmission grid and that these inefficiencies hinder electric system reliability and a fully

competitive bulk power market. 73 Many commenters state further that, in the new
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -39-

74See, e.g., EPRI, Florida Power Corp, Duquesne, Entergy, SoCal Cities, Merrill

Energy, TAPS, IPCF, Powerex.

75FMPA at 24.

industry structure, coordinated regional transmission planning has become a thing of the

past and new transmission additions that will benefit reliable grid operations are being

delayed. 74 

FMPA states that grid fragmentation harms reliability. 75 NU and EPRI note that

recent demand growth has meant new stresses on grid reliability and there is less

coordination of generation and transmission planning. TXU Electric states that, as the

shift from regulation to competition accelerates, and restructuring efforts proliferate, the

regional transmission grid is being exposed to stresses that cannot be alleviated without

regional solutions.

WPPI describes a situation in 1997 in which the 345-kV transmission facility

between MAPP and MAIN was overloaded as a result of transactions scheduled within

MAPP, and Wisconsin operators became aware of the problem only when the constrained

345-kV facility automatically separated in response to the overload. WPPI explains that,

with the 345-kV facility shut down, other transmission facilities in the region overloaded,

causing the transmission system over a large region to come perilously close to a

blackout. WPPI adds that, because transmission providers do not have information about

their neighbors' on-system transactions to serve native load, they are unable to predict the
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -40-

76TAPS, Appendix A, at 8

77TAPS, Appendix A at 2-5.

impact of potential TLR events. WPPI says that, in the face of this uncertainty,

transmission providers have to make overly conservative, but inaccurate assumptions

which unnecessarily reduce the amount of transmission capacity available to the market. 

TAPS states that, when the owners of a constrained interface between MAPP and

MAIN tried to remove the line for service for maintenance, they found that 500 MW of

flow remained on the line even after all scheduled transactions were terminated. TAPS

explains that there were so many transactions in the region at the time that transmission

operators could not determine the source of this 500 MW loop flow and were unable to

ask other parties to cut their schedules to permit the necessary maintenance. 76 TAPS

asserts that transmission owners have engaged in "creative" concepts such as CBM to

reduce ATC and argues that price spikes are exacerbated, if not caused by the failure to

have regional transmission information and control in one place. 77

TDU Systems complaint that the current system balkanizes regions into a series of

submarkets, each with its own dominant incumbent transmission owner/generator that

collects its own transmission toll.
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -41-

78Entergy at 8.

EPRI contends that the current off-line ATC calculations result in inconsistencies

of ATC values. Entergy argues that the accuracy of ATC will continue to be a problem

as long as contract path pricing is used. 78 

Minnesota Power notes that reliability across the broader region suffers simply

because of different standards for ATC calculations within and across NERC regions and,

indeed, different terminology and operating practices. Minnesota Power states that: the

market currently suffers as participants attempt to deal with multiple OASIS sites;

existing tagging and reservation practices that limit transactions due to the complexity of

arrangements; its transactions are subject to curtailment pursuant to two different

procedures, NERC TLR and MAPP LLR; and congestion management alternatives to line

loading relief have not succeeded because they lack regional coordination.

Minnesota Power argues that energy price volatility will continue to increase unless there

is a viable process, supported by transmission rights and secondary transfer markets, 

where a participant can secure transmission daily, or as needed, to bring the least cost

supply to its customers. 

EPSA asserts that one of the major impediments to robust competitive bulk power

markets is the current balkanization of the system with dozens of individual utilities,

NERC Regional Councils, and security coordinators, and state laws and regulations
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -42-

79EPSA specifically points to the SERC as a region where "state commissions and

utilities may be arguing that they don't 'need' RTOs to promote competitive markets," at a

time when Southeastern markets trail the rest of the nation in proposed merchant plant

development and power trading, "both hallmarks of robust wholesale competition and

workable open access policies." EPSA notes that SERC is the largest NERC region, both

in load and peak demand, yet SERC and FRCC together constitute only 5.2 percent of the

wholesale power trades nationwide. 

imposing a patchwork of often inconsistent and incompatible rules for the use of the

interstate transmission system. EPSA argues that the operational and economic

inefficiencies detailed in the NOPR are not unique to certain region as and may be most

pronounced in those regions where competition has yet to take hold. 79 

SoCal Edison states that existing transmission systems were designed to serve

native load customers in a defined area, in the most efficient manner possible, in

conjunction with the generation that it owned and operated, and were not designed to

function as common carriers. SoCal Edison concludes that that radical changes in

downstream generation markets are having, and will continue to have, significant and

largely adverse effects of transmission systems. Consumers Energy echoes this concern,

noting that it should be obvious that the current transmission system was designed to

deliver locally generated power to local markets with interfaces used primarily for

reliability purposes. Consumers Energy states that the system is simply not engineered to

move large quantities of power from many distant generation sources to millions of end

users.
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -43-

Williams concludes that problems with congestion management, pancaked

transmission rates, parallel path or loop flows, inaccurate ATC postings, and transmission

facilities management and expansion planning continue to impede the development of

robust, competitive wholesale electric markets in the United States. 

PECO states that current TLR procedures allow one entity to cause the curtailment

of numerous third party transactions on a regular basis to preserve power delivery in its

single control area, regardless of the impact on other control areas. PECO argues that,

while physical operation of the grid is maintained under these TLR procedures, reliable,

inter-control area power delivery is not assured and market participants are denied fair

access to the grid.

Tampa Electric states that, within peninsular Florida, transmission users must

often go to several individual transmission providers and OASIS nodes, sign multiple

agreements with various providers and attempt to piece together and navigate through

various partial paths to connect a power sale to a buyer. Tampa Electric concludes that

access to transmission services within this region is not as open as it could be to facilitate

an efficient, robust wholesale market. 

AEP states that coordination that previously existed in a fully integrated electric

system of the construction of new generation and transmission facilities has eroded due to

the separation of these functions. AEP states that congestion constraints could potentially

inhibit the development of additional generation capacity or provide a disincentive to add
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -44-

80AEP at 1, and Attachment to AEP's comments (Statement of Paul Moul). As

discussed in the Transmission Ratemaking section (Section G), elimination of pancaked

rates (multiple access charges assessed only because the transaction crosses a corporate

boundary) does not constitute a prohibition on distance sensitive rates.

81See, e.g., Transmission ISO Participants, H.Q. Energy Services, Powerex.

generating capacity where needed. AEP also notes that the priorities of state regulatory

agencies sometimes favor the needs of native load customers that can create conflicts

among competing interest at the regional level. AEP also states that developers of new

merchant generation plants have become less willing to share their long-term planning

goals with transmission owners due to the business strategies that accompany a more

competitive power market. However, AEP argues that removal of pancaking is not

consistent with economic efficiency and may distort future transmission expansion

because the cost of transmission should be based on distance and location. 80

Several commenters state that needed transmission expansion is not taking place

because of a lack of pricing incentives to build new transmission. 81 EPRI states that

failure to satisfy grid expansion needs is resulting in increasing frequency and duration of

power disturbances and outages costing $50 billion per year. 

WPPI points out that transmission planning must be undertaken on a regional, not

a state basis, noting that import capability from MAPP into Wisconsin is sometimes

constrained by facilities located outside of Wisconsin, e.g., transformers and lines located

in Illinois and Minnesota. On the other hand, Allegheny asserts that the industry has not
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -45-

82See, e.g., FMPA, IMEA, NECPUC, Ohio Commission, Texas Commission,

American Forest, Arkansas Cities, East Texas Cooperatives, Oglethorpe, PNGC,

Powerex, Williams, WPSC.

83For illustration, Southern Company points out that a customer in its service area

can transmit power 500 miles away for $3/MWh whereas a customer wanting to transmit

power from Boston to Washington, DC (also a distance of 500 miles) will have to go

through the three PJM, New England and NY ISOs and pay a total of approximately

$14/MWh.

failed to plan and coordinate on a regional basis and cites examples of study groups and

planning committees, such as VEM (Virginia-ECAR-MAAC) and GAPP (General

Agreement on Parallel Paths).

Most commenters assert that pancaked transmission access charges prevent

efficient access to regional markets and distort the generation market. 82 A few

commenters, however, question the benefits associated with eliminating rate pancaking. 

Southern Company observes that the severity of pancaking effects may vary from region

to region. 83 

Continuing Opportunities for Undue Discrimination

Comments dealing with continuing opportunities for undue discrimination fall

generally into two camps. On the one side, transmission customers and some

transmission providers agree with the NOPR's premise that opportunities for

discrimination exist, that perceptions of discrimination are also a serious impediment to

competitive bulk power markets, and that functional unbundling does not reflect the
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -46-

84E.g., American Forest, Los Angeles, TAPS, UAMPS, Steel Dynamics, Turlock,

Cinergy, Statoil, WPPI, NJBUS, MidAmerican, LG&E, Clarksdale, Michigan

Commission, New Smyrna Beach, Industrial Consumers, IMPA, First Rochdale, East

Texas Cooperatives, FMPA, TDU Systems, Canada DNR, Allegheny, IMEA, Sonat,

Public Citizen, EPSA, CCEM/ELCON, UtiliCorp and FTC.

85United Illuminating, Southern Company, MidAmerican, Duke, PSE&G, FP&L,

Entergy, FirstEnergy, Alliance Companies, Lenard and Florida Power Corp.

optimal long-term regulatory solution. 84 On the other side, a number of transmission

providers disagree with these premises. 85 

Comments Asserting That Discrimination Still Exists 

AMP-Ohio points to an event last summer when it was unable to transmit power

from a generator on AEP's system to a load on the FirstEnergy system and was forced to

purchase power from FirstEnergy at $4000/MWh. AMP-Ohio contends that AEP and

FirstEnergy were simultaneously reporting zero ATC during the hour, i.e., an event that

cannot be rationalized by AMP-Ohio (i.e., an interface that is fully loaded in both

directions at the same time would, in AMP-Ohio's view, cancel out). 

UAMPS argues that three transmission owners that jointly own segments of a

single transmission line have avoided releasing the capacity of this line under their open

access tariffs through a series of contractual arrangements that distributes transmission

rights directly to each of their merchant functions. As a result, only the transmission

owners' merchant functions have the ability the schedule transmission service over the

line. UAMPS contends that this example, and others, confirm the Commission's
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -47-

perception that the remedies mandated in Order No. 888 have not eliminated

discrimination. UAMPS states that it is intuitively obvious that when the transmission

function and merchant function ultimately serve the same master, neither can be truly

independent. 

Hogan contends that, without an efficient regional spot market and its ease of

access, the problems of discrimination will persist. FTC concludes that several years of

industry experience confirm the concern that discrimination remains in the provision of

transmission services by utilities that continue to own both generation and transmission. 

FTC concludes that reliance on behavioral rules have proved to be less than ideal. 

Cinergy contends that reliance on CBM by some transmission providers this

summer provided their native load an unfair operational edge over network service in the

import of power through interconnects that were the subject of TLR orders. Cinergy

argues that the more severe impact on market efficiency is caused by the lack of

information underlying the transmission provider's implementation of TLRs, and raises

significant opportunities for transmission providers to use alleged reliability reasons to

hide conduct actually motivated to protect their own or their affiliate's own power market. 

Cinergy concludes that market participants will never know the real answer because it

may be impossible to prove abuse of the TLR procedures with access to information on

the nature and cause of constraints and the lack of consistency in implementing TLRs

across the regions. Cinergy adds that, even where there may be sufficient evidence to
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -48-

prove discrimination, potential complainants may fear retribution by the transmission

provider, and may also be hesitant to file complaints because of the litigation costs of the

complaint process and the lack of remedy for lost short-term market opportunities. 

Enron/APX/Coral Power state that the following types of relatively overt, although

difficult to detect, discrimination occur: (1) offers of attractive transmission service to a

transmission owner's affiliate or merchant function that are not similarly offered to others;

(2) advance notification to the affiliate or merchant function of the availability of

transmission service or the availability of a new service; and (3) changes in procedures,

such as scheduling deadlines, for obtaining transmission service in ways that benefit the

affiliate or merchant function. Enron/APX/Coral Power (as well as CCEM/ELCON,

UtiliCorp and EPSA) also argue that a "principal form of discrimination grows out of the

exemption from the pro forma OATT and OASIS that is enjoyed by transmission bundled

with service to captive 'native-load' customers." Enron/APX/Coral Power believes that, if

the Commission were to conduct an investigation of compliance with the Commission's

open access requirements and the uses of their own transmission system during periods of

extreme peak loads and volatile prices during the past summer, the Commission would

uncover evidence of widespread abuses. According to Enron/APX/Coral Power, these

abuses would include instances where the transmission provider imported power on a

network basis, as if it were intended to service captive, native load customers, only to

turn around and sell that power competitively, off-system; where scheduling requirements
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -49-

86TAPS cites to a 1912 Supreme Court case involving the control of a railway

terminal by several railroads which their competitors were required to use. See United

States v. Terminal RR Ass'n, 224 U.S. 383, 397 (1912).

or deadlines were changed without adequate notice to third parties; and where ATC

amounts that either were not posted or were posted in an untimely manner. 

NASUCA concludes that, despite Order No. 888, there is still reason for concern

that continued discrimination in the provision of transmission services by vertically

integrated utilities may be impeding competitive electric markets.

 EPSA states that the prospect of real competition continues to be threatened by

(1) arbitrary and discriminatory curtailment and line loading relief policies, and (2)

needlessly complex and overly restrictive transmission planning, expansion and

interconnection practices.

TAPS argues that the anticompetitive effects of allowing a subset of competitors to

control essential facilities have been long recognized. 86 TAPS provides specific

examples that it claims show that discrimination exists: (1) the price spikes in June 1998

and Summer of 1999 where the asserted ATC was inadequate to allow external

generation resources to meet the needs of the market; (2) failure of a transmission owner

to provide necessary upgrades; and (3) a transmission owner taking negotiating positions

contrary to a clear provision of the Open Access Transmission Tariff (OATT). In its

reply comments, TAPS describes a recent situation where AEP, acting in its role as the
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -50-

NERC Security Coordinator, informed IMPA that it had implemented a TLR seven

minutes earlier, too late for IMPA to replace the curtailed schedule with another

transaction at market prices, which were $35/MWh. TAPS contends that IMPA had no

effective choice but to make up the shortfall by purchasing emergency energy from AEP

at $100/MWh. In following hours that day, IMPA elected to purchase power from AEP

at $35/MWh rather than continue its other purchase options (at $17/MWh) and risk

further curtailments. TAPS observes that AEP substantially profited from delayed

communication of the TLR, by selling power to IMPA at nearly three times the thenmarket price. TAPS states that, even assuming AEP was acting properly on this occasion,

this example illustrates the inherent conflict of interest in combining security coordinator

functions with that of market participant. TAPS argues that this diminishes the faith in

the market place and breeds mistrust. Based on the examples it provides and on the

evidence reviewed in the NOPR, TAPS recommends that the Final Rule make formal

findings that undue discrimination remains widespread throughout the industry.

Steel Dynamics states that the Commission needs to build confidence that

transmission customers will not be victimized when markets get tight and claims the

Commission's record to date has been uneven. Steel Dynamics cites a case in which the

Commission determined that Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation had committed several

violations of the OASIS posting requirements and standards of conduct in order to favor

its marketing affiliate over a third-party user. 
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -51-

Clarksdale states that it has experienced problems with the posting of ATC by

Entergy on the OASIS. Clarksdale states that on July 21, 1999, it attempted to purchase

from Cajun Electric Cooperative 20 MW of power for whatever length of time that Cajun

would have had it available up to one week. Entergy denied the transaction on the basis

that the ATC between Entergy and Cajun was zero. Clarksdale complained and the next

day the ATC for this interface was shown to be 1,700 megawatts; however, by that time

Cajun had sold the power to another entity and it was no longer available for Clarksdale. 

Clarksdale submits that the incident, along with others Clarksdale reported, compels the

conclusion that the function of security coordination should be entirely separate from the

transmission owner and from the generation owner and that participation in an absolutely

independent RTO should be mandated by the Commission in the final rule.

FMPA states that, whether because of discriminatory motivations or simply

because of balkanized perspectives (or both), there have been numerous instances of

Florida's dominant transmission owners falling short on the transmission planning

performance. According to FMPA, Florida's dominant transmission owners have failed

to promptly address regionally significant constraints (until addressing them became

advantageous for their own merchant function), and have continued to impose

discriminatory transmission-related construction requirements. FMPA claims that relying
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -52-

87FMPA at 23-24.

on functional separation rules to curb the self interest of market-interested transmitters

when huge sums of money are at stake is like "relying on words to hold back the tide." 87

WPPI states that it routinely experiences and observes subtle and difficult to detect

problems in the marketplace. WPPI states that, because they are subtle and difficult to

detect, they are not susceptible to any prompt and effective regulatory remedy. WPPI

adds that prosecution of complaints is expensive and time consuming and customers do

not have the ability to prosecute each such incident. 

WPPI contends that transmission owners are able to dispatch their resources in

order to manipulate their exposure to TLRs, while customers cannot. WPPI characterizes

this tactic as a "shell game" because it is purportedly accomplished by designating

fictional sources and sinks and treating one transaction as two separate transactions. 

WPPI contends that these actions leave other transmission users to bear the costs of

curtailments and denials of service. WPPI argues that these manipulations of TLRs are

"rampant." 

WPPI states that during summer peak periods, when it claims power prices

exceeded $5,000/MWh in the Eastern Interconnection, at least one Midwestern

transmission-owning utility appears to have been able to abuse its control-area operator

authority to gain a market advantage. According to WPPI, as a control-area operator, the
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -53-

88WPPI at 31.

transmission owner at issue declared that power shortages had created an emergency

situation which allowed it to relax the transmission limitations that it had imposed on

other market participants, enabling the transmission owner to acquire less expensive

power from the MAPP region. WPPI claims that the transmission owner thereby gained a

market advantage, at a time when market advantages were worth huge sums. WPPI

claims that most if not all other control-area operators in the region played by the rules

and did not abuse the system to access less expensive power for which ATC ostensibly

was not available. WPPI asserts that utilities that are not control-area operators had no

choice other than to buy high cost, locally generated power, and that they "lack not only

the right, but also the might" 88 to declare an emergency or to recalculate ATC to help

themselves. WPPI and Cinergy maintain that this recent event provides a clear example

of the continuing potential, under present industry structure, for vertically integrated

utilities to abuse their transmission control to gain market advantages and for that reason,

among others, the Commission should mandate that entities under its jurisdiction

participate in RTOs.

TDU Systems provide a number of examples which raise their concerns about

undue discrimination, including: (1) failure of an incumbent IOU to reduce its own outof-region power sales during a period when the system was experiencing overloads and
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -54-

the transactions of other transmission users were jeopardized; (2) overly aggressive and

selective enforcement of tariff requirements on transmission customers than are imposed

on the transmission providers' own merchant function; (3) selectively targeting generating

units that are jointly owned by competitors when redispatch of the transmission system is

required to relieve line loading; (4) self-serving ATC calculations in circumstances when

transmission customers have no way of knowing whether access is being denied

legitimately or through manipulation for competitive gain; and (5) onerous and lengthy

negotiations to obtain system studies. TDU Systems contend that there is a fire under the

smoke of allegations of discrimination, and those complaining of the anecdotal nature of

its information haven't provided any evidence to show that discrimination is not

occurring. 

TXU Electric states that, if a truly successful, restructured competitive electric

industry is to achieve its full potential, it is incumbent of all concerned, transmission

providers, users and regulators alike, to move beyond the impediments of the past,

including hidden motivations on the part of some, unfounded fears of hidden motivations

on the part of others, and a general environment of distrust. TXU Electric adds that,

transmission users and regulators must have confidence that the transmission grid is truly

an open, non-discriminatory and robust commercial highway and transmission providers

must inspire that confidence. TXU Electric concludes that the Commission's voluntary

collaborative approach is an important step in the right direction. 
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -55-

LG&E states that, under the current system, transmission owners' operational

decisions, even if well intentioned, are surrounded by a cloud of suspicion that, acting in

the name of reliability, the transmission owner has enhanced its position in the generation

market. LG&E agrees that this perception that the transmission system is not being

operated in an even handed manner undermines confidence in the non-discriminatory

open access implemented under Order No. 888. 

Virginia Commission agrees that allegations of discrimination represent only

known problems, and there may be many unknown ones remaining given that it is

difficult for transmission users to identify and demonstrate instances of discrimination. 

Canada DNR states that discriminatory behavior by transmission operators,

identified in the NOPR as the second significant driver for establishment of RTOs, is not

perceived as a key impediment to the evolution of efficient bulk power markets in

Canada.

Dynegy argues that transmission provides have the incentive and ability to

discriminate in today's markets due to the combination of control over transmission with

participation in power markets and the existing regulatory structure that exempts

transmission providers from the open access rules of Order Nos. 888 and 889 for its

bundled, native load customers. Dynegy argues that the "native load" exemption can be

and is often manipulated to favor the transmission providers' own or affiliated merchant

functions. 
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -56-

PECO notes that, in their capacity as vertically integrated utilities, transmission

providers have access to critical market sensitive information with respect to each

transaction (e.g., source, sink), at a time when they are in direct competition in the same

markets and with the same transmission customers whose market information they have. 

PECO argues that, in spite of the existence of functional unbundling and codes of

conduct, the serious potential for conflicts of interest and abuse inherent in the current

structure cannot be ignored. 

Comments Asserting That Discrimination Is Not a Problem

A number of commenters, mostly transmission owners, do not believe that

significant discrimination problems remain with respect to wholesale transmission access

pursuant to Order No. 888. As a general matter, those transmission owners whose actions

are cited in other pleadings as examples of undue discrimination disagree with those

characterizations of the cited events and declare that they provide non-discriminatory

transmission service under their OATT. These transmission owners contend that the

disputes cited in the pleadings are not the result of discriminatory practices; rather, they

are the result of the priority accorded native load customers under the OATT, and good

faith errors on the part of the transmission provider trying to administer complex rules

and tariff changes that have necessitated fundamental changes to the structure of

companies and the way they do business. 
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -57-

EEI contends that many of the difficulties transmission customers encounter in

obtaining price, availability and transmission service result in a technology gap that can

be, and often is, interpreted as discriminatory behavior. EEI also contends that many

allegations of discrimination are "rooted at their heart" on the scarcity of transmission

resources and not overt attempts to discriminate against specific customers. 

PSE&G argues that supposition and anecdotal evidence of alleged abuses by

transmission owners does not justify a radical change in the existing regulatory scheme. 

PSE&G contends that, while the incentive to maximize shareholder value is certainly a

powerful force in the marketplace, the requirements of law, such as Order Nos. 888 and

889, will prevail.

Duke argues that mere anecdotes of discrimination, involving unnamed parties and

without reference to specific facts, are not evidence of anything, let alone discrimination,

and cannot form the basis of a reasoned decision. Duke also lists a number of formal

complaint proceedings where the Commission found the transmission provider to have

acted properly. Entergy argues that those alleging discrimination, as competitors of

transmission providers, have an economic incentive to make their own allegations. 

Entergy adds that, if perceptions of discrimination were impeding competitive markets,

there would not be 20,000 MW of generation investment proposed in its region. 

United Illuminating complains that many of the allegations of undue

discrimination presuppose that all utilities are the same, i.e., vertically integrated
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -58-

transmission, distribution and generation companies, and do not recognize that a number

of utilities are divesting their generation business. 

Southern Company states that the goal of non-discriminatory transmission service

is already being satisfied in the Southeast. Southern Company asserts that it has

separated its transmission and reliability functions from its wholesale merchant function

up to the level of "very senior management." Southern Company submits that it is

unaware of any pending allegations of discrimination against it. Southern Company adds

that the Southeast is characterized by large transmission systems such as Southern

Company, Tennessee Valley Authority, and Entergy and that these transmission systems

are already planned and operated on a regional basis. Southern Company also points out

that it alone covers a region as large as (if not larger than) many ISOs currently in

existence. Under these circumstances, Southern Company believes that the Commission's

open access initiatives have worked in the Southeast and that additional steps are not

required to ensure non-discriminatory transmission service.

MidAmerican asserts that complaints received by the Commission about alleged

discrimination should not be the primary basis for determining if the market is successful. 

According to MidAmerican, if it is assumed that an adequate number of parties are

competing successfully, it could be concluded that the complaints may be indications of

ill-defined problems not yet resolved, isolated market flaws, or indications of a successful

market with somewhat inadequate tools. 
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -59-

 Duke believes that its transmission organization is meeting the needs of its

customers as evidenced by the very few and relatively insignificant complaints Duke has

received regarding the administration of its OATT. Duke believes that Order No. 888 has

been quite successful and, although it agrees with the Commission that elimination of

balkanized transmission operations through the formation of larger, regional operations is

ultimately preferred, Duke does not believe Order No. 888 should be abandoned hastily.

Duke argues that disputes are primarily the result of the complexity of the priority

scheme in the Commission's pro forma tariff, the rules for which are still being

developed; the inherent tension between the Commission's comparability requirement and

the requirements of state-regulated native load customers; and the obligation to ensure

reliability of the transmission grid on a real time basis. Duke asserts that the vast

majority of transactions occurring as a result of Order No. 888 do not produce

transmission disputes and, to the extent that isolated instances of discrimination have

occurred, the Commission has adequate authority to address the problem. 

Duke also maintains that a major source of confusion involves the rights of native

load customers versus wholesale transmission users under the pro forma tariff and that

this issue remains subject to disagreement and needs further clarification. Duke says its

conclusion is reinforced by its experience as a market participant in areas where there are

ISOs. Duke asserts that the establishment of ISOs in California, NEPOOL and PJM has

not resulted in the elimination of disputes over tariff ambiguities. Duke questions the
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -60-

89See Northern States Power Co. (Minnesota) and Northern States Power Co.

(Wisconsin), 83 FERC ¶ 61,098, clarified, 83 FERC ¶ 61,338, reh'g, clarification and stay

denied, 84 FERC ¶ 61,128 (1998), remanded, Northern States Power Co., et al. v. FERC,

176 F.3d 1090 (8th Cir. 1999), reh'g denied (unpublished order dated Sept 1, 1999), order

on remand, 89 FERC ¶ 61,178 (1999) (request to withdraw curtailment procedures

pending) (Northern States).

assertion that disagreements between customers and individual transmission owners are

indicative of significant ongoing discrimination.

Florida Power Corp. and FP&L's comments are similar to Duke's. Florida Power

Corp. and FP&L state that they have not received any formal complaints alleging undue

discrimination with regard to their OATT. Florida Power Corp. and FP&L agree that the

increasing number of transactions has led to a concomitant increase in transmission

disputes; however, they characterize the disputes as legitimate disagreements over policy

or meaning of the pro forma tariff as opposed to true allegations of discriminatory

conduct. Like Duke, Florida Power Corp. and FP&L believe that many of the allegations

of potentially discriminatory conduct are attributable to two primary areas: (1) rights of

native load customers versus wholesale wheeling customers; and (2) disputes arising from

the complex priority scheme in the pro forma tariff. According to FP&L, disputes will

still occur until the issues relating to priority rights are resolved. FP&L argues that the

Commission cannot expect that any remedy will eliminate discrimination claims in light

of the Eighth Circuit Court's decision in Northern States Power Co. v. FERC. 

89
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -61-

FPL and Florida Power Corp. argue that unsubstantiated allegations do not

constitute evidence of discrimination and should be characterized as legitimate disputes

over tariff interpretation, while EEI describes some of the allegations as "one-sided

characterizations of cases now being litigated." FPL also contends that some intervenors

adopt the stance that, whenever the transmission provider and customer are in

disagreement, it evidences discrimination. Florida Power Corp. states that, if undue

discrimination exists outside of Florida, it is a function of the newness of the

Commission's open access rules, and it is far too soon to declare functional unbundling

ineffective. Florida Power Corp. agrees with the Commission's statement that it may be

impossible to distinguish an inaccurate ATC presented in good faith from an inaccurate

ATC posted for the purpose of favoring the transmission provider's marketing interests,

but concludes that, once technical issues have been resolved about ATC calculations, the

volume of disputes will be greatly diminished. Florida Power Corp. adds that there is no

evidence of a pattern of industry-wide undue discrimination, and concludes that mere

perceptions cannot provide a justification for generic remedial action.

Entergy, FirstEnergy, Alliance Companies and Lenard argue that there is no

credible or substantial evidence in the record that transmission owners have been

engaging in discriminatory practices in providing transmission services under Order Nos.

888 and 889 and, therefore, the Commission should not, and lawfully cannot, rely on

mere allegations of discriminatory conduct. FirstEnergy states that it has doubled its
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -62-

90FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 32,541 at 33,697.

control area reservation and back office staff to handle the five percent of its transmission

business that is wholesale related and still is having difficulty keeping pace with OASIS

and tagging administrative processes. FirstEnergy asserts that due to relatively new

processes associated with open access transmission, there are often good faith disputes

over the proper interpretation of the Commission's requirements and these disputes should

not be mischaracterized as continued discrimination.

Commission Conclusion

Engineering and Economic Inefficiencies

In this Final Rule, we affirm our preliminary determination that the engineering

and economic inefficiencies identified in the NOPR 90 are present in the operation,

planning and expansion of regional transmission grids, and that they may affect electric

system reliability and impede the growth of fully competitive bulk power markets. The

sources of these inefficiencies involve: difficulty determining ATC; parallel path flows;

the limited scope of available information and the use of non-market approaches to

managing transmission congestion; planning and investing in new transmission facilities;

pancaking of transmission access charges; the absence of clear transmission rights; the

absence of secondary markets in transmission service; and the possible disincentives

created by the level and structure of transmission rates. Virtually all commenters agree
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -63-

that at least some of these inefficiencies exist. There is substantial agreement among

commenters that most of the engineering and economic obstacles identified by the NOPR

arise from the current industry structure and can be rectified through development of

regional transmission entities. 

As noted by Allegheny, the industry historically has done an excellent job of

regional coordination in implementing voluntary standards to maintain the security of the

transmission system through various study groups and planning committees. However,

virtually all commenters agree that new competitive pressures are interfering with the use

of traditional methods of coordinated regional transmission planning. As a result, new

transmission additions that will benefit reliable grid operations are being delayed. Some

commenters state that the increasing frequency and duration of power outages have cost

the economy billions of dollars, and they predict that unless this problem is addressed

now the reliability of power supply will worsen. The traditional use of regional

coordination through study groups and planning committees is no longer effective

because these entities are usually not vested with the broad decisionmaking authority

needed to address larger issues that affect an entire region, including managing

congestion, planning and investing in new transmission facilities, pancaking of

transmission access charges, the absence of secondary markets in transmission service,

and the possible disincentives created by the level and structure of transmission rates. 
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -64-

We recognize, as some commenters point out, that the degree to which these

inefficiencies act as obstacles to electric competition and reliability varies from system to

system. However, we believe it is clear that such inefficiencies exist and are sufficiently

widespread that they must be addressed to prevent them from interfering with reliability

and competitive electricity markets.

Continuing Opportunities for Undue Discrimination

As noted, many transmission customers and some transmission providers argue

that there are continuing opportunities for undue discrimination under the existing

functional unbundling approach. A number of the commenters provide examples of

events that, in their view, indicate that transmission owners are engaging in undue

discrimination. These commenters also generally believe that even the perception of

undue discrimination is a significant impediment to the evolution of competitive

electricity markets. A number of transmission providers challenge the relevancy of these

examples, characterizing them as unsubstantiated or anecdotal allegations that do not rise

to the level of evidence of undue discrimination necessary to support generic action. 

These transmission providers further contend that many disputes simply reflect good faith

efforts of transmission providers to interpret the Commission's pro forma tariff and

standards of conduct. These commenters also generally share the view that the

Commission should not base its decisions in this rule on mere perceptions that may be

prevalent in the industry. 
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -65-

For the most part, the challenges mounted by these commenters are focused

against a determination by the Commission that it should mandate participation in RTOs

in this Rule. As noted in Section C.1 of this Rule, we have also determined that a

measured and appropriate response to the evidence presented and concerns raised is to

adopt a voluntary approach to the formation of RTOs. However, as discussed below, we

do conclude that opportunities for undue discrimination continue to exist that may not be

remedied adequately by functional unbundling. We further conclude that perceptions of

undue discrimination can also impede the development of efficient and competitive

electric markets. These concerns, in addition to the economic and engineering

impediments affecting reliability, operational efficiency and competition, provide the

basis for issuing this Final Rule. 

At the outset, it is important to note that the conclusion that there are continuing

opportunities for undue discrimination should not be construed as a finding that particular

utilities, or individuals within those utilities, are acting in bad faith or deliberately

violating our open access requirements or standards of conduct. However, we cannot

ignore the fact that the vertically integrated structure reflected in the industry today was

created to support the business objectives of a franchised monopoly service provider that

owned and operated generation, transmission and distribution facilities primarily to serve

requirements customers at wholesale and retail in a non-competitive environment. 

Clearly, there are aspects of this vertically integrated structure that are difficult to
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -66-

91See Wisconsin Public Power Inc. SYSTEM v. Wisconsin Public Service

Corporation, 83 FERC ¶ 61,198 at 61,855, 61,860, order on reh'g, 84 FERC ¶ 61,120

(1998) (WPSC's actions raised "serious concerns" as to functional separation; WP&L's

actions demonstrated that it provided unduly preferential treatment to its merchant

function); Washington Water Power Co., 83 FERC ¶ 61,097 at 61,463, further order, 83

FERC ¶ 61,282 (1998) (utility found to have violated standards in connection with its

marketing affiliate); Utah Associated Municipal Power Systems v. PacifiCorp, 87 FERC

¶ 61,044 (1999) (finding that PacifiCorp had failed to maintain functional separation

between merchant and transmission functions).

transition into a competitive market. As we noted in the NOPR and Order No. 888,

vertically integrated utilities have the incentive and the opportunity to favor their

generation interests over those of their competitors. If a transmission provider's

marketing interests have favorable access to transmission system information or receive

more favorable treatment of their transmission requests, this obviously creates a

disadvantage for market competitors.

While we have attempted to rely on functional unbundling to address our concerns

about undue discrimination, there are indications that this is difficult for transmission

providers to implement and difficult for the market and the Commission to monitor and

police. In cases in which the Commission has issued formal orders, we have found

serious concerns with functional separation and improper information sharing with

respect to at least four public utilities. 91 In addition, our enforcement staff is receiving

an increasing number of telephone calls about standards of conduct issues, ranging from

simple questions about what is permissible conduct to more serious complaints alleging
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -67-

92See, e.g., Communications of Market Information Between Affiliates, Docket

No. IN99-2-000, 87 FERC ¶ 61,012 (1999) (Commission issued declaratory order based

on hotline complaint clarifying that it is an undue preference in violation of section 205

of the FPA for a public utility to tell an affiliate to look for a marketing offer prior to

posting the offer publicly).

93Petition at 15. 

94FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 32,541 at 33,711-12.

actual violations of the standards of conduct. In a number of cases, our staff has verified

non-compliance with the standards of conduct. 92 The petitioners for rulemaking in

Docket No. RM98-5-000 allege that there are common instances of "unauthorized

exchanges of competitively valuable information on reservations and schedules between

transmission system operators and their own or affiliated merchant operation

employees." 93 They also cite OASIS data showing an instance where a transmission

provider quickly confirmed requests for firm transmission service by an affiliate, while

service requests from independent marketers took much longer to approve. We believe

that some of the identified standards of conduct violations are transitional issues resulting

from a new way of doing business, and we acknowledge that many utilities are making

good-faith efforts to properly implement standards of conduct. However, we also believe

that there is great potential for standards of conduct violations that will never even be

reported or detected. Moreover, as we stated in the NOPR, 94 we are increasingly

concerned about the extensive regulatory oversight and administrative burdens that have

resulted from policing compliance with standards of conduct. The use of standards of
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -68-

95For example, EPSA has told us:

Furthermore, even if the exercise of such discrimination could

be adequately documented and packaged in the form of a

complaint under section 206 of the Federal Power Act under a

more streamlined complaint process contemplated by the

Commission, it would still be extremely costly and inefficient

to deal with such complaints on a case-by-case basis. More

than likely, the potential power transactions for which

transmission principally was sought would disappear by the

time a Commission ruling was obtained. Motion to Intervene

and Comments of Electric Power Supply Association in

Support of Petition for Rulemaking, Docket No. RM98-5-000

(filed Sept. 21, 1998), at 3.

conduct is not the best way to correct vertical integration problems. Their use may be

unnecessary in a better structured market where operational control and responsibility for

the transmission system is structurally separated from the merchant generation function of

owners of transmission. 

We also cannot dismiss the significance of reports of undue discrimination simply

because they are not reduced to formal complaints. As many intervenors have asserted,

the cost and time required to pursue legal channels to prove discrimination will often

provide an inadequate remedy because, among other things, the competition may have

already been lost. 95 The fact that evidence of discrimination in the fast-paced

marketplace is not systematic or complete is not unexpected. The fact remains that

claims of undue discrimination have not diminished, and there is no evidence that

discrimination is becoming a non-issue. 
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -69-

96For example, a representative of Blue Ridge told us: 

There simply is no shaking the notion that integrated

generation and transmission-owning utilities have strategic

and competitive interests to consider when addressing

transmission constraints. Functional unbundling and

enforcement of [standard of] conduct standards require

herculean policing efforts, and they are not practical. 

Regional ISO Conference (Richmond), Transcript at 20. 

97NERC Reliability Assessment 1998-2007, at 39.

Finally, we continue to believe that perceptions of discrimination are significant

impediments to competitive markets. Efficient and competitive markets will develop only

if market participants have confidence that the system is administered fairly. 96 Lack of

market confidence resulting from the perception of discrimination is not mere rhetoric. It

has real-world consequences for market participants and consumers. As stated by NERC,

there is a reluctance on the part of market participants to share operational real-time and

planning data with transmission providers because of the suspicion that they could be

providing an advantage to their affiliated marketing groups, 97 and this can, in turn,

impair the reliability of the nation's electric systems. Lack of market confidence may

deter generation expansion, leading to higher consumer prices. Fears of discriminatory

curtailment may deter access to existing generation or deter entry by new sources of

generation that would otherwise mitigate price spikes of the type that have been

experienced during peak periods in the last two summer peak periods. Mistrust of ATC

calculations will cause transactions involving regional markets to be viewed as more risky
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -70-

98FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 32,541 at 33,714.

and will unnecessarily constrain the market area, thereby reducing competition and

raising prices for consumers. The perception that a transmission provider's power sales

are more reliable may provide subtle competitive advantages in wholesale markets, e.g.,

purchasers may favor sales by the transmission provider or its affiliate, expecting greater

transmission service reliability. We believe that the potential for such problems increases

in a competitive environment unless the market can be made structurally efficient and

transparent with respect to information, and equitable in its treatment of competing

participants.

In summary, we affirm our conclusion in the NOPR that economic and

engineering inefficiencies and the continuing opportunity for undue discrimination are

impeding competitive markets. As noted below, we conclude that RTOs will remedy

these impediments and that it is essential for the Commission to issue this Final Rule. 

B. Benefits That RTOs Can Offer to Address Remaining Barriers and 

Impediments

In the NOPR the Commission explained how the use of independent RTOs could

help eliminate the opportunity for unduly discriminatory practices by transmission

providers, restore the trust among competitors that all are playing by the same rules, and

reduce the need for overly intrusive regulatory oversight. 98 The Commission further

identified a number of significant benefits of establishing RTOs: (1) RTOs would
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -71-

99These efficiencies include, among other things, regional transmission pricing,

improved congestion management of the grid, more accurate ATC calculations, more

effective management of parallel path flows, reduced transaction costs, and facilitation of

state retail access programs.

100FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 32,541 at 33,716-20.

101See, e.g., PJM, DOE, Illinois Commission.

improve efficiencies in the management of the transmission grid; 99 (2) RTOs would

improve grid reliability; (3) RTOs would remove opportunities for discriminatory

transmission practices; (4) RTOs would result in improved market performance; and (5)

RTOs would facilitate lighter-handed governmental regulation. 100 The Commission

requested comments on the benefits of RTOs and the magnitude of these benefits.

Comments

Description of Benefits

Many commenters support the establishment of RTOs throughout the United

States to effectively remove the remaining impediments to competition in the power

markets. 101 Illinois Commission states that the pursuit of competition as the driving

force for markets in the electric industry requires developing new institutions and

accepting new practices, and RTOs are the logical next organizational step in the electric

industry restructuring process. Entergy agrees that significant benefits can be achieved

by the creation of properly-structured, large RTOs and that the Commission has

accurately described many of those benefits in the NOPR. Ohio Commission believes
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -72-

that a properly structured RTO will facilitate efficient regional generation markets, while

preventing incumbent holding companies from improperly exercising their market power.

PG&E acknowledges that the benefits of Order No. 888 have been largely reaped,

and still significant impediments to an efficient competitive marketplace remain in place

where RTOs are not yet operational. Moreover, industry restructuring has led to new and

complex operational issues that were unanticipated at the time Order No. 888 was issued. 

RTOs represent the most promising and efficient regulatory method for the Commission

to address these issues. Without RTOs, it would be incumbent on the Commission to

take very detailed and intrusive actions because the transmission grid cannot operate

reliably and efficiently unless the competitive and operational issues are resolved. 

Ontario Power agrees that the electric power industry should now move beyond

the functional unbundling approach prescribed in Order Nos. 888 and 889. TDU Systems

asserts that wholesale electric markets will benefit immensely if RTOs can simply

provide transmission service on an unbiased basis, treating all customers fairly, and take

the lead role in regional transmission planning.

On the other hand, a number of vertically integrated utilities do not support

government action to form RTOs. For example, Duke recognizes that there may be

transmission functions performed today within individual company control centers,

within existing control areas, or within existing reliability councils that may be better

and/or more efficiently performed by a regional transmission organization. However,
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -73-

Duke also believes that the industry is voluntarily working to identify such functions or

processes and is effecting meaningful changes and improvements in a timely manner. 

Accordingly, Duke believes that this progress should not be pre-empted by regulatory

mandates, and that there are insufficient data, at this time, to draw meaningful

conclusions regarding the magnitude of benefits that will result from RTO formation.

Similarly, MidAmerican argues that benefits of RTOs can be realized without

RTOs. MidAmerican claims that existing regional organizations, such as MAPP, are

capable of meeting the Commission's concerns about eliminating existing impediments to

an efficient competitive marketplace. FP&L states that the NOPR does not attempt to

quantify any of the claimed benefits of RTOs. FP&L is unaware of any data that

specifically and objectively show that ISOs have saved ratepayers money in those areas

where ISOs have been established. Nor is it aware of any specific quantification of any

other actual or projected benefits of ISOs.

Some commenters contend that the costs of establishing RTOs must not exceed the

benefits. Cal DWR argues that significant start-up costs and costs associated with

duplicative efforts have been higher than the NOPR appears to recognize. These costs

entail not only costs of the new organization itself, but also market participants’ costs in

travel, staffing, and other expenses and investments necessary to participate or operate in
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -74-

102See, e.g., Cal DWR, California Board, Southern Company, Aluminum

Companies.

103IndeGO is an independent grid operator proposal that has been discussed for the

Pacific Northwest and Rocky Mountain area.

104See, e.g., Big Rivers, Chelan, California Board, Industrial Customers, Arizona

Commission, EEI, Idaho Commission, Washington Commission.

new structures. Other commenters suggest that each proposal contained in the NOPR

should be carefully evaluated for its cost consequences. 102

Seattle notes that its region has the lowest cost electricity in the Nation and an

already thriving wholesale market with little price volatility. Assuming that an RTO is

projected to result in additional transmission costs, Northwest consumers will be less

willing to incur these costs than consumers in regions where power costs are high and

wholesale prices are extremely volatile. Snohomish and Aluminum Companies assert

that one of fatal flaws of the IndeGO proposal 103 was that its demonstrable benefits did

not clearly outweigh the costs of its start-up and operation. Snohomish requests that the

Commission not impose an RTO with similar flaws upon the Northwest. A number of

commenters also urge the Commission to reject any RTO filing for the Northwest or

other regions that fails to provide a strong demonstration that its benefits will

substantially outweigh its projected costs. 104

To ensure that RTOs are formed in a cost effective and efficient manner, SRP

proposes a phased approach to RTO development that would allow RTOs to gradually
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -75-

105As noted earlier, many of the principal benefits of RTOs (e.g., congestion

management, improved reliability, parallel path flow resolution) are discussed in greater

detail later as RTO minimum characteristics and functions; however, some of the

commenters cited here mention these benefits as part of their overall discussion of RTOs

improving efficiencies in the management of the transmission grid. 

take on new functions and responsibilities in response to the needs to the market. In

addition, the Commission should require RTOs to establish criteria against which they

will measure cost effectiveness and efficient performance and to make adjustments where

criteria are not being met.

Canada DNR states that structural differences between the Canadian and American

electric power industries mean that there may be fewer potential benefits from the

formation of RTOs in Canada than those identified by the Commission for the United

States. Consequently, it believes that Canadian jurisdiction should be able to assess the

costs and benefits of RTO proposals. In addition, it notes that some may find that,

although the benefits do warrant the associated costs, they may address impediments to

efficient electricity markets through other means.

Comments on RTOs Improving Efficiencies in the Management 

of the Transmission Grid 105

PJM agrees with the Commission that placing as many grid management functions

as possible under an RTO is the best means of bringing the benefits of RTOs to the

marketplace. A number of commenters address specific RTO actions as examples of grid

management efficiencies, including use of regional transmission pricing, accurate
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -76-

estimation of ATC, efficient planning for grid expansion, and facilitating state retail

access programs.

FMPA claims that a just and reasonable RTO transmission rate, with a unified

regional loss factor or factors, would provide a regionally rational approach, which is not

provided by the existing fragmented regime. Pancaking has long prevented FMPA and its

members located on the Florida Power Corp. transmission system from economically

delivering the output from their portions of the St. Lucie nuclear plant to their loads. 

Similarly, WPSC notes that without an RTO that encompasses the Midwest region,

unjustified pancaked transmission rates may inhibit the efficient flow of power across the

region.

PacifiCorp supports the Commission goal of eliminating transmission pancaking,

to the extent practical. PacifiCorp maintains that such a goal could be furthered by the

creation of the most geographically expansive RTOs that are technically workable. The

goal also could be met, however, if multiple RTOs within the western United States agree

to reciprocally eliminate charges in connection with the "export" or "import" of power

from one RTO to another. In the western United States, such "reciprocity" agreements

may be preferable to the creation of a single RTO that otherwise is too large to be

efficient, safe and reliable, or of a single RTO for which operating principles must be

unreasonably compromised to attract all necessary transmission owners.
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -77-

Allegheny asserts that even with an RTO, grid inefficiencies such as rate

pancaking and congestion will continue unless an appropriate pricing mechanism is

adopted. The various RTO structures, regardless of size and number, would still need to

work cooperatively to ensure that the various interfaces are sufficient to maintain the

reliable operation of the system. The formation of an RTO, by itself, does not bring a

particular benefit.

Rochdale asserts that a properly structured independent RTO, with a broad

geographic scope, could eliminate incorrect calculations of ATC and TTC. Furthermore,

the motive for discrimination and possible manipulation that exists where transmission

owners with affiliated power marketers are responsible for reporting ATC and TTC

would become moot. FMPA contends that, without an RTO, most market participants

would remain unable to replicate or trust the transmission owners' ATC calculations. 

FMPA indicates that customers and regulators cannot properly review transmission

providers' ATC accounting without access to their TTC starting points; however, existing

Florida OASIS sites do not provide TTC information. In addition, ATC calculations

require extensive application of engineering judgment. FMPA questions whether marketinterested transmission providers can be trusted to exercise such judgment disinterestedly. 

Consequently, FMPA believes that an RTO could provide unbiased ATC information.
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -78-

106Comments are addressed in greater detail in the discussion of planning and

expansion as an RTO minimum function. 

107Comments are addressed in greater detail in the discussion of short-term

reliability as an RTO minimum characteristic.

Many commenters believe that RTOs would provide more efficient planning for

transmission and generation investments. 106 For example, Entergy agrees that the

creation of RTOs can lead to more efficient and effective planning and expansion of the

transmission system. However, to ensure efficient investment in the transmission system,

Entergy proposes that the Commission encourage innovative pricing policies to replace

traditional cost-of-service ratemaking in certain respects. Minnesota Power also agrees

that an RTO would help identify the best place on the grid to locate new generation. It

believes that the centralization of regional reliability planning is a big step forward for

enabling independent power producers to build projects and also is a significant benefit to

each transmission owner who deals with requests from generation groups.

Illinois Commission and Texas Commission state that electricity consumers in

states adopting retail direct access can directly and fully benefit from the operation of

properly constituted RTOs and their concomitant improvements in system efficiency,

reliability and market competition.

Comments on RTOs Improving Grid Reliability

Many commenters agree that an RTO could provide improved reliability. 107

Minnesota Power supports the formation of a single regional body that operates the
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -79-

108See, e.g., American Forest, TDU Systems, WPPI, Sonat, Illinois Commission,

Arizona Commission, FMPA, Tampa Electric, Advisory Committee ISO-NE. Comments

are addressed in more detail later in the discussion of existing discriminatory conduct.

regional grid and enforces reliability rules for the entire region. It suggests that a nonprofit RTO can be expected to enforce reliability rules fairly and aggressively and, thus,

require minimal Commission oversight. On the other hand, a for-profit RTO may be

perceived as biased towards making a profit at the expense of reliability and may require

additional scrutiny by the Commission.

Michigan Commission strongly supports creating an RTO for the Midwest that is

large enough to ensure reliability. It is very concerned that splitting the Midwest region

into improperly sized competing ISOs, RTOs, and/or Transcos will affect regional

reliability and delay the benefits of competition. Also, splitting a region into multiple

RTOs reduces access to economic generation due to increased transmission charges. 

Michigan Commission believes competition and reliability within the region will be

served best if the Transmission Alliance and Midwest ISO are joined.

Comments on RTOs Removing Opportunities for Discriminatory

Transmission Practices

Many commenters, mostly transmission customers, agree that RTOs will remedy

continuing opportunities for undue discrimination. 108

As both a buyer and seller of wholesale electricity, Oglethorpe supports the

evolution of competitive markets for generation service. To ensure that competitive
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -80-

markets evolve and perform in a workable manner, market participants should be assured

access to the transmission system on a fair and comparable basis, without regard to

transmission ownership. It believes that true competition can occur only with

widespread, open and nondiscriminatory access to the transmission system. UtiliCorp

claims that removing control over access to transmission from the remaining large

transmission-owning utilities and placing such control in properly structured RTOs will

go a long way toward eliminating the remaining obstructions to effective competition in

wholesale markets for electric power. 

Virginia Commission agrees that discrimination exists and that RTOs can help

facilitate competition and police non-competitive activities. However, Virginia

Commission believes that it is premature to conclude that there is no role for rigorous

governmental regulation. Virginia Commission urges that the Commission not rely

exclusively on RTOs to detect, prevent and penalize violations of the FPA and should

itself provide for expedited handling of allegations regarding discrimination and market

power abuses.

On the other hand, a number of commenters, mostly transmission owners, do not

believe that RTOs are needed to address undue discrimination because they do not

believe that significant discrimination problems remain with respect to wholesale
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -81-

109See, e.g., United Illuminating, Southern Company, MidAmerican, Duke,

PSE&G, FP&L, Entergy, FirstEnergy, Alliance Companies, Lenard, Florida Power Corp.

transmission access pursuant to Order No. 888. 109 PSE&G argues that, if a

misperception exists in the marketplace as to the trustworthiness or incentives of

transmission owners as a whole, it may signal a need for an industry-wide educational

campaign that discusses transmission operation and system reliability. However, such a

misperception does not, in and of itself, warrant altering the structure of the industry.

Comments on RTOs Resulting in Improved Market Performance

DOE asserts that open and comparable transmission access can reduce both

concentration in generation markets (by expanding the boundaries of the relevant market)

and the potential to discriminate through vertical control but cannot, in its view, eliminate

all market power. The establishment of an independent RTO can and should

substantially mitigate the potential exercise of market power through vertical control,

because dispatch and related transmission services will be provided by an independent

entity with no financial interest in wholesale market participants. Furthermore, the

expected contribution of an RTO in reducing the risk of horizontal market power will be

realized only if RTOs have sufficient "critical mass." Appropriately sized RTOs are

necessary to assure a transparent and fair marketplace for all generation.

EPA notes that RTOs can play an important role in the development of

environmentally preferred or "green" electricity products for use by states that are
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -82-

implementing retail electricity competition. As the operator of the transmission system,

an RTO will have access to detailed information on the operations of individual

generators as well as fuel type and air emissions, even where such information is

considered confidential. RTOs are uniquely situated to assemble the information

necessary to determine environmental attributes of specific retail electricity products for

purposes of consumer information disclosure. EPA notes that this is already occurring in

New England, where ISO-NE has agreed to provide the states with information on

environmental attributes and resource mix for individual generators. In addition to

facilitating consumer information disclosure, EPA notes that this information will support

other state policies, such as renewable portfolio standards and generation performance

standards.

Comments on RTOs Facilitating Lighter-Handed Governmental

Regulation

Although most commenters agree that properly-designed RTOs can be selfgoverning to a certain extent, the vast majority of commenters believe that the

Commission has either overstated the reliance it should place on self-governance or has 

reached this conclusion prematurely. Most of these commenters suggest that there is

insufficient evidence at this time to reach the conclusion that RTO formation would

necessarily result in lighter-handed regulation. A number of commenters also caution

that the Commission should not significantly reduce its oversight of RTOs until they are
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -83-

proven to be effective. British Columbia Ministry states that the structure of future RTOs

should minimize additional layers of administration and oversight. However, at least one

commenter, Cal DWR, noting that RTOs are themselves transmission monopolies subject

to the FPA, argues that the Commission should continue its course of regulating RTOs to

ensure compliance with legal and policy requirements.

PJM generally supports the Commission's conclusion regarding light-handed

regulation. It notes that, where ISOs’ decisions are independent and conducted through

an extensive stakeholder processes to produce collaborative solutions to market issues,

the Commission can defer confidently to those decisions. Under such circumstances, the

Commission can be assured that ISO proposals to changes market rules and procedures

would promote competitive markets and are not designed to favor any one group of

market participants.

PJM argues further that the Commission accord greater flexibility to properly

structured RTOs to change market rules and procedures without Commission filings. 

An RTO with an established stakeholder process could publish some changes in market

rules on its internet site, without requiring prior Commission approval. In the event that a

market participant objected, it could file a complaint with the Commission. PJM says the

benefit is that the market would not be hindered by delay in implementing new rules. 

Other rules could be permitted to go into effect upon filing, rather than at the end of the

Commission review process.
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -84-

Some commenters suggest that the Commission be particularly deferential to

decisions that result from ADR processes. For example, PNGC supports strong and

broad dispute resolution power in an RTO. It argues that many small transmission users

currently have no effective way to be heard regarding service complaints, outage

restoration, and adequacy of equipment or maintenance because of the high cost of

bringing such a dispute to the Commission. In addition, Desert STAR asserts that where

the Commission has approved the charter governance and ADR processes of an RTO as

being sufficiently broad-based and independent, the Commission should give some

deference to decisions reached through the RTO’s ADR processes. However, deference

in dispute resolution to an RTO should not impair a transmission user’s fundamental

rights under section 211 of the FPA. Because the RTO will be a jurisdictional entity, the

Commission is an appropriate appeals forum. Similarly, Seattle supports the Commission

proposal to defer to RTOs on matters involving commercial, operating and planning

practices, as well as to resolve disputes, but argues that it is too early to tell whether

ISOs, transcos or other forms of RTOs can be deferred to in lieu of regulatory filings.

MidAmerican welcomes the Commission’s proposed lighter-handed approach to

regulation, but questions whether lighter-handed regulation, in fact, will be derived from

the proposed rule. MidAmerican proposes that the Commission issue a policy statement

to provide general guidance on how it intends to give deference to RTOs. For example,

the policy should outline that, if a transmission owner follows RTO directives, it will be
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -85-

presumed that the transmission owner does not have transmission market power and that

it is not capable of transmission market discrimination. The Commission should give

deference to RTOs to design tariffs that include rate incentives and should permit returns

on equity that compensate transmission owners for additional risks and for competitive

market development.

A number of commenters argue that there is as yet no evidence to support the

conclusion that RTO formation should lead to lighter-handed regulation. Duke and

Entergy argue that each of the existing ISOs has been mired in significant litigation with

market participants, and the Commission's dockets are loaded with cases arising out of

decisions made by ISOs. They and NECPUC suggest that this raises the possibility that

RTOs represent a new layer of regulatory oversight of market activities, supplementing

rather than replacing federal and state regulation. FP&L states that the independence and

objectivity of the Florida Public Service Commission make it unnecessary to create a

formal (and costly) separate entity to operate and oversee the Florida grid as an RTO.

Other commenters suggest that the probability that RTOs can be self-regulating

may be overstated. APPA argues that existing ISOs still represent the interests of the

transmission owners that formed these ISOs. In addition, it argues that each ISO is a

market participant because its revenue recovery is affected by the performance of

transmission, ancillary services, and energy imbalance spot markets. It suggests that the
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -86-

right to self-regulation must be earned in the marketplace, not bestowed by regulators in

advance.

NECPUC argues that not only must an RTO be properly structured to be selfregulating, so must the utilities involved, or the RTO will constantly be involved in the

business of dispute resolution. It suggests that during a transition phase, a certain level of

active regulation may be inescapable. For example, it notes that the Commission stepped

in quite definitively in developing the governance of the New England Power Pool. 

NECPUC believes that strong intervention by the Commission was effective at achieving

progress when the parties in New England stalemated.

PG&E claims that an RTO is uniquely situated to handle a number of

responsibilities, including reliability enforcement and sanctions, market monitoring, and

reporting non-reliability market-related violations. However, a single entity, no matter

how well-structured and independent, cannot successfully fulfill several competing roles

simultaneously, i.e., serve as judge, jury and advocate. While the RTO can do much to

create region-specific processes that meet the needs of market participants, the

Commission must retain ultimate oversight. The RTO is not a substitute for this function. 

With the tremendous volume of transactions flowing through an RTO, even small errors

in energy or financial accounting can lead to huge cost shifts. Market participants need to

have a remedy at the Commission if issues are not resolved adequately by the RTO.
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -87-

Other commenters believe that the Commission may have to play a strong role in

ADR. Arizona Commission urges the Commission to give respect rather than deference

to decisions reached through an RTO's ADR processes. TDU Systems state that the

ability of an RTO transmission customer to obtain ultimate Commission review of a

dispute with the RTO (or another RTO customer) should not be cut off. RTO tariffs

should contain ADR provisions that allow for mediation or other low-cost forms of ADR

so disputes can, if possible, be resolved without resort to the Commission. If this is not

possible, the Commission should consider any dispute that comes to it after the

conclusion of ADR at an RTO on a de novo basis.

In dealing with disputes between RTOs and their customers, TDU Systems

suggests that the Commission be sensitive to the issue of "minority rights." The

Commission should ensure that transmission customers with complaints against their

RTOs get due process and a full and fair opportunity to air their concerns. Just because a

customer may take a position in a dispute not shared by many others does not mean that it

is automatically wrong.

Moreover, TDU Systems believe that the Commission, in considering the ADR

issue, should make a distinction between ISOs or other RTOs that are not-for-profit or

quasi-governmental in nature and for-profit RTOs. For-profit RTOs may not necessarily

be well suited to be the arbiters of disputes, especially where they are an involved party. 

It would be inappropriate for the Commission simply to "off load" dispute resolution
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -88-

duties to a private for-profit entity, especially if the entity is an interested party in the

dispute. ISOs, on the other hand, are more quasi-governmental in nature, and if fully

independent, may be in a better position to attempt to resolve a dispute, subject to

Commission review.

Duke asserts that streamlined filings and approval procedures could reduce costs

that would otherwise be borne by market participants. Reducing regulatory burdens

could constitute one form of incentive to encourage RTO participation. The policy could

be applied equally for non-profit and for-profit RTOs. On the other hand, TDU Systems

argues that opportunities for streamlined RTO filings could set a very dangerous

precedent, especially if applied to incentive rate filings of for-profit RTOs. RTOs will

still be monopolies (although hopefully large horizontal ones, rather than smaller,

vertically integrated ones). The norm for RTO filings should still be full Commission

scrutiny. Entergy argues that the Commission should encourage proposals submitted by

RTOs designed to increase regulatory efficiencies and reduce regulatory burdens imposed

on RTOs. The Commission should specifically declare its willingness to entertain

proposals to streamline filing requirements. The Commission could encourage innovative

ways to reduce regulatory costs by authorizing performance-based rates that reward

RTOs for reducing regulatory costs.
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -89-

110The benefits described in this section are not intended to include all benefits

that RTOs could provide. Some of the principal benefits of RTOs (e.g., more effective

management of parallel path flows, improved congestion management) are addressed in

later discussions of RTO minimum characteristics and functions. 

Commission Conclusion

We conclude that properly structured RTOs throughout the United States can

provide significant benefits in the operation of the transmission grid. The comments

received reinforce our preliminary determination in the NOPR that RTOs can effectively

remove existing impediments to competition in the power markets. 

Description of Benefits

We conclude that RTOs will provide the benefits that we described in detail in the

NOPR, and others that commenters mention. 110 While we acknowledge that the level of

RTO benefits may vary from region to region depending on the current transparency and

efficiency of markets, the Commission believes that benefits from RTO's would be

universal. These benefits will include: increased efficiency through regional

transmission pricing and the elimination of rate pancaking; improved congestion

management; more accurate estimates of ATC; more effective management of parallel

path flows; more efficient planning for transmission and generation investments;

increased coordination among state regulatory agencies; reduced transaction costs;

facilitation of the success of state retail access programs; facilitation of the development

of environmentally preferred generation in states with retail access programs; improved
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -90-

111FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 32,541 at 33,716-20.

grid reliability; and fewer opportunities for discriminatory transmission practices. 111 All

of these improvements to the efficiencies in the transmission grid will help improve

power market performance, which will ultimately result in lower prices to the Nation's

electricity consumers. 

As stated in the NOPR, we expect that RTOs can reduce opportunities for unduly

discriminatory conduct by cleanly separating the control of transmission from power

market participants. An RTO would have no financial interests in any power market

participant, and no power market participant would be able to control an RTO. This

separation will eliminate the economic incentive and ability for the transmission provider

to act in a way that favors or disfavors any market participant in the provision of

transmission services.

Most commenters support the premise that RTOs can be beneficial in addressing

the remaining transmission-related impediments to full competition in the electricity

markets. Although we recognize certain differences in perspective about the existence of,

or potential for, widespread discrimination by current transmission owners, no one

seriously disputes the benefits of a marketplace where service quality and availability are

uniform, where users of the network are treated equally, and where commercially

important data are readily available to all. Although some commenters support the NOPR

proposal only if the costs of establishing RTOs do not exceed the benefits, a subject
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -91-

discussed further below, most believe that the benefits listed in the NOPR are accurate

and can be achieved through an RTO.

We recognize that some commenters believe that either RTOs alone will not solve

all of the identified problems, or individual benefits can be achieved in ways other than

creating RTOs. Both of these observations may have some merit. However, we believe

that the creation of RTOs is one action that can address all of the identified impediments

to competition and provide all or most of the identified benefits. 

We also recognize that there are those who worry that the costs of establishing an

RTO will outweigh the benefits. We believe this concern fails to account for the

flexibility we have built into this rule. While many look at the high costs involved with

respect to establishing some existing ISOs and PXs, this rule does not require an RTO to

follow any specific approach. For example, this rule does not require the consolidation

of control areas nor does it require the establishment of a PX. We are allowing

significant flexibility with respect to how and, in some cases, when the minimum

characteristics and functions are satisfied. Accordingly, we do not believe it will be

necessary to expend the same level of resources that were expended, e.g., in California, to

create an RTO satisfying our minimum characteristics and functions. We therefore

conclude that the flexibility built into the Final Rule will allow RTOs to create

streamlined organizational structures that are not overly costly. Moreover, with five ISOs

now operating in the United States, there is considerable experience available regarding
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -92-

what works and what does not with respect to regional transmission entities. This

experience should make it somewhat easier, and more cost efficient, to create new RTOs. 

As we stated in the NOPR, by improving efficiencies in the management of the

grid, improving grid reliability, and removing any remaining opportunities for

discriminatory transmission practices, the widespread development of RTOs will improve

the performance of electricity markets in several ways and consequently lower prices to

the Nation's electricity consumers. To the extent that RTOs foster fully competitive

wholesale markets, the incentives to operate generating plants efficiently are bolstered. 

The evidence is clear that market incentives can lead to highly efficient plant operations. 

The incentives for more efficient plant operation can also affect existing generation

facilities. Especially noteworthy is the recent experience that indicates improvements in

the generation sector in regions with ISOs. Regions that have ISOs in place are

undergoing dramatic shifts in the ownership of generating facilities. Large-scale

divestiture and high levels of new entry in California and the Northeast are changing the

ownership structure of these regions' generators. Access to customers and the presence of

competing suppliers are creating the incentives for better-performing plants. 

By improving competition, RTOs also will reduce the potential for market power

abuse. As discussed earlier, eliminating pancaked transmission prices will expand the

scope of markets and bring more players into the markets. By eliminating the mistrust in

the current grid management, entry by new generation into the market will become more
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -93-

112One of these scenarios assessed transmission effects only, the second assessed

generation efficiencies in addition to transmission effects, and the third posited increased

entry of new supply and demand choices.

113The Integrated Planning Model (IPM) was developed for the U.S.

Environmental Protection Agency by ICF Inc. See 3.3.1 of the Commission Staff's

Environmental Assessment in this proceeding.

likely as new entrants will perceive the market as more fair and attractive for investment. 

And with more players, the market becomes deeper and more fluid, allowing for more

sophisticated forms of transacting and better matching of buyers and sellers.

Estimation of Benefits

The full value of the benefits of RTOs to improve market performance cannot be

known with precision before their development, and we do not yet have a sufficiently

long track record with existing institutions with which to measure. The Commission staff

has estimated a subset of the potential cost savings from RTOs as part of its National

Environmental Policy Act analysis. In the Environmental Assessment (EA) for this

rulemaking, three scenarios were developed to estimate potential economic and

environmental effects of the rulemaking. 112 The scenario analysis was conducted using a

computer simulation model of the continental U.S. electric power system over the period

1997 to 2015. 113 The Commission adopts staff’s analysis. 

The results of the EA modeling present a range of potential cost savings resulting

from the changes in modeling assumptions in each scenario. Although this Final Rule

does not mandate RTO formation, full development of RTOs as envisioned by the
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -94-

114Order No. 888, Final Environmental Impact Statement, FERC/EIS-0096, FERC

Stats. & Regs. ¶ 31,036 at 31,860-96.

Commission in this rule could offer substantial economic benefits. The EA scenarios

modeled resulted in average annual savings of up to $5.1 billion per year over the 2000-

2015 period. Based upon review of the EA scenarios and comparison with other existing

analyses of competitive electric power markets, the best estimate from the EA analysis of

annual benefits that could result from RTO formation is $2.4 billion per year. This

estimate results from a scenario in which the modeling assumptions for transmission and

generation efficiency are selected for consistency with other economic analyses of

competitive power markets, including the Order No. 888 Environmental Impact Statement

analysis conducted by Commission staff in 1996. 114 

These estimates do not represent a complete economic analysis of the rulemaking

because the EA analysis addressed only factors that may change the dispatch of power

plants or future generating capacity decisions. The model accounts for production costs

(capital additions, operations and maintenance expenses, and fuel) equal to roughly onethird of the annual sales revenue now passing through the industry, and does not include

such cost categories as existing (sunk) capital, the distribution system, and end user

charges such as taxes. If other cost savings were realized, for example, from merger-like

consolidation savings in the transmission grid, these savings would be additional to those

estimated in the EA. Benefits from elimination of market power and improved intra-
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -95-

115See, e.g., California ISO, Cost Performance Benchmarking Study of

Independent System Operators, revised version of Feb. 17, 1999.

regional congestion management are also not included in the calculation and could

represent significant additional savings.

The costs of RTO formation are not explicitly captured in the EA analysis, nor are

any potential costs associated with the provision of incentives for RTO formation or

operation. Costs of RTO formation cannot be well estimated because of the wide range

of design choices that the rule allows for a new RTO. For instance, the choice of

building a dedicated telecommunications and data infrastructure, as opposed to relying on

existing infrastructures, can have a large effect on the initial cost of an RTO. 115

Based on review of cost studies for existing ISOs, it appears unlikely that the costs

of RTO formation will exceed RTO cost savings on an annualized basis over time. This

is because most of the costs are capital investments that occur at the beginning of the

RTO’s operation. But whether the costs in the initial period are under $10 million or up

to several hundred million dollars (and more likely between these two figures) for an

RTO, they are small in comparison with the ongoing annual savings that RTOs may

provide.

As discussed above, our best estimate of cost savings from RTO formation is $2.4

billion annually, with potential cost savings estimated to be as high as $5.1 billion

annually. This represents about 1.1 to 2.4 percent of the current total costs of the U.S.
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -96-

116Defined as revenue from sales to ultimate users, which were reported as $215

billion in 1997. See Energy Information Administration, Annual Energy Review 1997,

DOE/EIA-0384(97) (July 1998).

117See, e.g., Department of Energy, Supporting Analysis for the Comprehensive

Electricity Competition Act, DOE-PO-0059 (May 1999).

118DOE's Economic Analysis of the Comprehensive Electricity Competition Act

shows an estimated cost savings from a national policy of retail access to be $20 to $32

billion per year. See id.

electric power industry. 116 Such savings can be considered in the context of recent

analysis of the economic benefits of further industry restructuring. 117 The wholesale

cost savings the Commission is anticipating from the formation of RTOs are properly

viewed as distinct from the larger savings that may result from competitive retail power

markets. However, RTOs can also help achieve retail access and its associated benefits

by creating a robust wholesale power market. In this sense the cost savings from retail

access depend on the Commission fulfilling its RTO objectives. 118

Light-Handed Regulation

One of the benefits of RTOs that we identified in the NOPR was that the existence

of a properly structured RTO would reduce the need for Commission oversight and

scrutiny, which would benefit both the Commission and the industry. We stated that

to the extent an RTO is independent of power marketing interests, there would be no need

for the Commission to monitor and attempt to enforce compliance with the standards of

conduct designed to unbundle a utility's transmission and generation functions. We also
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -97-

119Inquiry Concerning the Commission’s Pricing Policy for Transmission Services

Provided by Public Utilities Under the Federal Power Act, 59 FR 55031 (Nov. 3, 1994),

FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶31,005, at 31,140, 31,145, 31,148 (1994) (Transmission Pricing

Policy Statement).

stated that an independent RTO with an impartial dispute resolution mechanism could

resolve disputes without resort to the Commission complaint process, and that it is

generally more efficient for these organizations to resolve many disputes internally rather

than bringing every dispute to the Commission. Further, we noted that the Commission

has in the past indicated its willingness to grant more latitude to transmission pricing

proposals from appropriately constituted regional groups 119 and, to the extent that RTOs

increase market size and decrease market concentration, the competitive consequences of

proposed mergers would become less problematic and thereby help further streamline the

Commission's merger decision-making process.

We continue to believe that the types of reduced regulatory scrutiny mentioned in

the NOPR, and summarized above, are possible and appropriate for RTOs. A number of

commenters, however, have expressed concern that it is premature to reduce regulation of

RTOs, and that RTOs will be monopolies that will require continued regulation. We

believe that this concern stems from a misunderstanding of our concept of light-handed

regulation. Admittedly, this concept is subject to varying interpretations.

We clarify that we will continue to apply the level of regulation and scrutiny that

is necessary to ensure that public utilities comply with the FPA and our regulations. Only
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -98-

120Policy Statement Regarding Regional Transmission Groups, 58 FR 41626 (Aug.

5, 1993), FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 30,976 (1993) (RTG Policy Statement).

121Order No. 888, FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 31,036 at 31,732.

when we determine that a different form of regulation will adequately protect the public

interest, we will allow a reduced oversight role for the Commission. 

Furthermore, our encouragement of the use of ADR by participants in RTOs to

resolve disputes without resort to formal complaint proceedings is not new. In our RTG

Policy Statement, we encouraged RTGs to develop alternative dispute resolution

procedures for resolving transmission issues, particularly technical and reliability issues. 

We also stated that we would be willing to entertain proposals for some degree of

deference to decisions rendered pursuant to an ADR process, pursuant to procedures that

are specified in an agreement and assure due process for all participants. 120 We stated

there, and we reaffirm here, that while the Commission cannot delegate its authority, it

can give deference to resolutions that meet the standards of the FPA.

We reiterated this concept in the eleven ISO principles we set forth in Order No. 

888. We stated there that an ISO should provide for a voluntary dispute resolution

process that allows parties to resolve technical, financial, and other issues without resort

to filing complaints at the Commission. 121 We have also expressed our willingness to

grant some deference to changes to an open access tariff by an ISO concerning a regional
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -99-

122See PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., 84 FERC ¶ 61,212 (1998).

solution to an identified regional problem based on what we understand is a broad

consensus. 

122

Accordingly, we believe that some degree of deference can be granted on certain

issues to independent RTOs that have appropriate procedural mechanisms in place to

ensure fair representation of viewpoints. We cannot delineate here precisely the degree

of deference that is appropriate, or on what issues. To the extent some issues can be

fairly resolved within a region without formal Commission procedures, a benefit accrues

to both the parties and the Commission.

In addition, we note that some of the innovative ratemaking policies discussed

later in this Final Rule are consistent with light-handed regulation, since we expect that

these policies may result in reduced levels of regulatory scrutiny. We emphasize,

however, that we will not delegate or fail to exercise our regulatory responsibilities. We

also recognize that the degree of deference and reduced regulatory scrutiny accorded to

an RTO may necessarily depend on the ability of the RTO to reach consensus solutions to

regional issues.

C. Commission's Approach to RTO Formation

The NOPR proposed an approach to RTO formation that embraces several general

principles: first, as a matter of policy, we should strongly encourage transmission owners
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -100-

123FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 32,541 at 33,762. 

124Id.

125These engineering, economic and discrimination issues are discussed in Section

III.A above.

to participate voluntarily in RTOs; second, we should be neutral as to organizational form

(e.g., ISO or transco) of an RTO as long as it satisfies our minimum characteristics and

functions; and third, we should provide maximum flexibility as to the specifics of how an

RTO can satisfy the minimum characteristics and functions. We sought comment on

these principles and specifically asked whether we should generically mandate RTO

participation 123 or whether market-based rates or merger approvals should be

conditioned on RTO participation. 124

Based on the wide array of comments received, which we discuss next, and the

voluminous record compiled in this rulemaking proceeding, we conclude that a voluntary

approach to RTO formation represents a measured and appropriate response to the

technical impediments to competition that have been identified as well as the lingering

discrimination concerns that have been raised. We believe that voluntary formation of

RTOs will address the fundamental economic and engineering issues which confront the

industry and the Commission, and will help eliminate any actual or perceived

discriminatory conduct by entities that continue to control both generation and

transmission facilities. 125 Further, we believe that the voluntary process adopted in this
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -101-

rule, in conjunction with the innovative transmission pricing reforms that we will permit

RTOs to seek, will be successful in achieving widespread formation of RTOs in a timely

manner. Our adoption of a voluntary approach to RTO formation in this Final Rule does

not in any way preclude the exercise of any of our authorities under the FPA to order

remedies to address undue discrimination or the exercise of market power, including the

remedy of requiring participation in an RTO, where supported by the record. 

1. Voluntary Approach

Comments

Comments as to whether the Commission should require formation of and/or

participation in RTOs break down into five main categories: (1) the Commission should

require formation of and participation in RTOs; (2) formation of and participation in

RTOs should be voluntary; (3) the Commission should encourage voluntary RTOs, but

with strong enforcement mechanisms; (4) RTOs should be voluntary, but if they do not

form or if utilities do not participate, the Commission should mandate them; and (5)

RTOs should be voluntary, but the requirements of the NOPR effectively create a

mandate.

Most investor-owned utilities argue that RTOs should be voluntary. Most

municipal utilities, customer groups, consumer advocates, and marketers argue that the

Commission should require RTOs. State commissions and cooperatives are more evenly
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -102-

126E.g., APPA, Empire District, FMPA, Great River, Lincoln, UAMPS, UMPA.

split. These characterizations, however, are broad generalizations, and there are strong

exceptions to each statement. 

Comments That the Commission Should Require Formation of and

Participation in RTOs

The most extensive argument for mandating RTOs comes from TAPS and is

representative of the positions of a number of public power utilities and other

transmission customers. 126 TAPS argues that the non-mandatory approach leaves the

keys to reform in the hands of the wrong people—the monopolists who have market

power— and that the voluntary creation of RTOs will give opportunities for monopolists

to maintain their market power. TAPS presents extensive arguments as to the

Commission's authority to mandate and its obligation under the FPA to do so. They state:

Only by mandating that jurisdictional utilities participate in . . . RTOs will

the Commission protect against . . . utilities' inclinations to form alternative

RTOs that are structured to perpetuate or enhance their competitive

position. Compelling such participation is also the only way for the

Commission to satisfy its statutory obligations to eradicate undue

discrimination and protect against unjust and unreasonable pricing of both

transmission service and wholesale generation sales.

TAPS further argues that past attempts to allow voluntary formation of RTOs have not

been successful. Only where states have required ISOs or where the Commission has

required them as part of a merger proceeding have effective ISOs been formed. 
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -103-

127E.g., Minnesota Power, WEPCO, PG&E, PECO.

TDU Systems also presents extensive arguments for a mandate. It argues that the

need for a national system of RTOs is urgent; that the Commission cannot rely purely on

voluntary actions of transmission owners; that only a mandate will create RTOs in a

timely fashion; and that inducements are counterproductive. WPPI states that the

financial incentive to protect a transmission owner's generation investment is much

stronger than any transmission incentive FERC can give to induce RTO participation.

First Rochdale argues that voluntary RTOs will create too great an emphasis on forcing

parties to litigation and other costly, time consuming dispute resolution.

Some investor-owned utilities support a mandate. 127 For example, Cinergy

presents arguments similar to those of TAPS, and believes that "all jurisdictional utilities

must be required to transfer control of their transmission facilities to a qualified ISO,

which shall integrate those facilities into an RTO approved by the Commission."

A number of marketers believe that RTOs must be mandated. Sonat is not

convinced that incentives alone are sufficient to persuade transmission providers to

follow through with RTO formation. NEMA believes that participation by all

transmission owners should be mandatory, but that the form of the RTO should be

allowed to evolve.
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -104-

Many industrial customers agree that RTOs must be required. PJM/NEPOOL

Customers argue that the goals of the Commission cannot be achieved without mandatory

participation by all transmission owners in RTOs. They go further to state that

experience from both the Midwest ISO/Alliance debate over formation of ISOs and from

the natural gas industry demonstrates monopolists will not act effectively to eliminate

discrimination without strong mandates attached to strong penalties.

Residential consumer advocates and environmental organizations concur. Public

Citizen says that the Commission should order the creation of three non-profit public

transmission companies (one each for the Eastern, Western, and ERCOT

interconnections) and order each public transco to purchase all of the transmission

facilities needed to provide customers with transmission service.

Project Groups recommends that the final rule be strengthened to require that if

owners do not voluntarily transfer control of facilities to an approved RTO by a date

certain, the Commission will either order the transfer (in the case of jurisdictional

utilities) or take other actions designed to minimize the opportunities for resisting owners

to use their facilities in anti-competitive ways.

A number of state commissions support a mandatory RTO regime imposed by the

Commission. Illinois Commission does not believe that the voluntary approach set out in

the NOPR is likely to obtain its objectives and especially not in a timely manner, noting

that voluntary efforts "for more than six years" have failed and that the encouragements
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -105-

and incentives contained in the NOPR are unlikely to change the situation. Indiana

Commission points to its experience with the Midwest ISO/Alliance debates as indicating

that the Commission must take a more assertive role. Montana Commission agrees,

pointing to unwillingness of transmission owners to give up control and to concerns about

cost-shifting. It recommends that the Commission strengthen the NOPR to ensure the

prompt formation of RTOs using all the tools at its disposal. Pennsylvania Commission

argues that in order to be stable, both as to their authority and with respect to membership

participation, RTOs must be mandatory. Virginia Commission argues that the goal of

independence is in conflict with a voluntary approach.

Wisconsin Commission argues that the Commission should move forward quickly

and require all transmission facilities to be placed under the control of an RTO. In the

absence of any action from FERC to require utility membership, it states, it is unclear

how any effort to resolve the "Swiss cheese" problems already experienced in the

Midwest can succeed. Ohio Commission argues that it continues to believe that the

mandatory participation and boundary drawing approach is more appropriate.

Comments That Formation of and Participation in RTOs Should Be

Voluntary

The most extensive presentation of the argument that RTOs should and must be

voluntary comes from Indianapolis P&L and FP&L, which make mostly legal arguments

that are addressed below. Southern Company argues that a voluntary, flexible RTO
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -106-

128Other transmission-owning utilities supporting voluntary development and

opposing mandates are Detroit Edison, Duke, Entergy, Florida Power Corp., SCE&G,

Metropolitan, MidAmerican, NEPCO et al., NU, NSP, Montana-Dakota, Tampa Electric,

TXU Electric, United Illuminating, CP&L, Central Maine and Virginia Power. 

policy is consistent with desires of the states as reflected in statements given at the

consultations with the states held by the Commission. It also avers that an RTO is not

required to achieve the goals of the NOPR. Alliance Companies and Trans-Elect argue

that voluntary formation is the key to RTO success, noting that the Commission's

voluntary approach of encouraging regionalization of the transmission grid has been

successful and there is no reason to doubt its continued success.

EEI suggests that the voluntary approach is working well, indicating that five ISOs

have been approved serving 46 percent of U.S. customers and 38 percent of total MWh

sales. They state that four other regions have proposed or are about to propose RTOs

which will result, within three years since the issuance of Order No. 888, in nearly 63

percent of the nation's electricity customers being served by regional transmission

entities. They go on to argue that a mandate could stimulate litigation that would slow

this voluntary development. 128

A number of public power entities, including municipal utilities, cooperative

utilities, Federal Power Marketing Administrations, and others, also support a voluntary

approach. TVA argues that FERC's proposal to make RTO participation voluntary is a

wise one, that as RTOs demonstrate their effectiveness and the benefits of RTOs become
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -107-

129Other public power and cooperative entities supporting voluntary formation of

RTOs include Big Rivers, East Kentucky, Georgia Transmission, South Carolina

Authority, SMUD, Seattle, JEA, LPPC, NRECA, Los Angeles, MEAG, Oglethorpe,

Platte River, NPRB, NPPD, RUS and Tri-State.

more evident, transmission owners likely will be persuaded to participate and the holes in

the RTOs should disappear. CMUA argues that mandatory RTOs are not likely to be

formed through collaborative processes and therefore are not likely to take into account

broad stakeholder input. Tacoma Power supports voluntary formation because some

utilities may not find that the cost savings are sufficient to warrant the expenditure

necessary. Also, it states that public power utilities may face legal obligations or

restrictions that inhibit their participation and that such utilities should not face penalties

or sanctions for not participating. 129

A number of state commissions support voluntary formation of RTOs. Alabama

Commission argues that the Commission does not have authority to mandate RTOs.

Florida Commission agrees and states that any action by the Commission must be on a

case-by-case basis, and the Commission should defer to states in developing regional

approaches. Michigan Commission believes that there is a solution short of mandating

RTO formation, but that uses FERC's unique national perspective and authority to

facilitate larger RTO formation. Wyoming Commission urges the Commission not to
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -108-

130Other state commissions supporting voluntary formation include South

Carolina, Iowa, New York, and Washington. Other entities supporting voluntary

formation of RTOs include NYPP, SRP and Cal ISO.

131Concurring are H.Q. Energy Services, Midwest Energy and Oregon Office.

codify or mandate anything other than the general framework for RTOs and thereby allow

the voluntary process an opportunity to work. 130

Comments That the Commission Should Encourage Voluntary RTOs

But With Strong Enforcement Mechanisms

The Justice Department argues that the NOPR makes a strong case for mandating

RTOs. It recommends that a regime of "carrots and sticks" be carefully designed to

reasonably guarantee complete voluntary compliance, rather than merely promote greater

voluntary compliance.

Enron/APX/Coral Power argue that the Commission should take steps to induce

transmission owners to participate in RTOs. 131 They doubt, however, that performancebased ratemaking alone will be a sufficient inducement and recommend Commission

procedures to prevent transmission owners that fail to participate in RTOs from misusing

their transmission systems to favor their own or affiliated uses of their systems. These

could include regional proceedings to impose added safeguards against violations,

presumptions of ineligibility for market-based rates, and presumptions that mergers are

inconsistent with public interest absent membership in an RTO.
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -109-

Comments That RTOs Should Be Voluntary, But if They Do Not Form,

the Commission Should Mandate Them

PNGC argues that if a voluntary RTO encompassing the Pacific Northwest does not

come about in a reasonably short time, the Commission should explore its authority or

seek new authority to mandate participation in RTOs. Fertilizer Institute believes that the

Commission has sufficient authority to mandate RTOs but would likely be bogged down

in endless litigation should it do so, and so recommends that the Commission pursue a

voluntary approach, but, should that not work, proceed with a requirement. WPSC argues

that encouraging voluntary participation in RTOs is the appropriate starting place.

However, the Commission must be prepared to take more direct action, including

increased legislative authority, to ensure the participation of utilities that do not

voluntarily choose to join an RTO.

Comments That RTOs Should Be Voluntary, But the Requirements of

the NOPR Effectively Create a Mandate

Puget states that if the Final Rule continues to reflect a position that

nonparticipation in the RTO will result in negative regulatory consequences for the

nonparticipant, then the RTO proposal cannot really be said to be voluntary. CP&L

argues that mandatory filings, coupled with threats of withholding benefits and/or leveling

penalties for those that do not choose to "voluntarily" join and RTO, do not present a

picture of a truly voluntary process.
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -110-

Comments on Sanctions for Non-Participation

Most vertically integrated public utilities oppose conditioning market-based rates

and merger approval on RTO participation, while most transmission customers favor the

Commission using conditioning authority. A number of utilities express concern that the

Commission may be exceeding its legal authority, and that conditioning would undermine

the voluntary nature of the RTO initiative. Florida Power Corp. argues that the

Commission cannot impose penalties for failure to participate voluntarily in an RTO in

contravention of the FPA. Puget contends that the possibility of penalties for nonparticipation means that no provision is made for participation to be truly voluntary. Duke

expresses concern that potential revocation of market-based rate authorization and refusal

to find a merger in the public interest are actions that make it legally or economically

impossible for any public utility not to participate in an RTO. EEI observes that such

linkage would change settled law requiring reasoned analysis or factual findings.

Similarly, Consumers Energy submits that summary withdrawal of existing market-based

rate authorization must be justified by substantial evidence of changed circumstances. 

CP&L claims that the Commission cannot impose RTO participation conditions on a

proposed merger that go beyond the consistency with the public interest standard under

the FPA.

Two commenters suggest that the Commission must proceed on a case-by-case

basis. MidAmerican contends that there is no clear indication that the number of parties
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -111-

competing in generation markets is so small to cause inadequate levels of competition. 

Since changes to restructure the industry into RTOs will be costly and difficult for all

parties, mandates or sanctions should be based only on willful violations of Commission

policy. LG&E concurs that only where the record supports a case-specific finding that a

transmission owner's failure to participate in an RTO will result in undue discrimination or

the ability to exercise market power should the Commission take remedial steps to address

the situation so that the Commission is on firm legal grounds. 

On the other hand, a number of commenters believe the Commission must require

RTO participation as a condition of future market-based rate transactions and

authorizations. TAPS notes that this is necessary for the Commission to meet its

obligation to protect consumers from unjust and unreasonable rates if it intends to pursue a

lighter-handed regulatory approach, adding that only RTOs of appropriate size and

structure will be able to meet fully the Commission’s statutory obligation to protect

consumers. Oneok and New Smyrna Beach argue that manipulation and undetectable

anticompetitive conduct for which there is no practical after-the-fact remedy are concerns

that could be alleviated by an RTO and that, accordingly, denial of merger approval or

market-based rate authorization is well within the Commission's authority when

anticompetitive factors have not been mitigated.

PJM/NEPOOL Customers, Great River, East Texas Cooperatives and PNGC

support revoking market-based rate authorization to remedy inherent discrimination
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -112-

resulting from non-participation and also using non-participation as a factor in merger

analysis. APPA favors imposing the merger condition in the form of an immediate

requirement to participate given the Commission’s prior experience with conditioning

mergers with commitments to join an ISO. American Forest supports conditioning all

future market-based rate transactions on participation. H.Q. Energy Services encourages

the Commission to explore the full extent of its authority under the FPA to compel

participation in RTOs.

Enron/APX/Coral Power recommend that the Commission create a rebuttable

presumption that RTO participation is required for approval of market-based pricing or a

transfer of facilities under section 203 of the FPA. For market-based rate authorizations,

the Commission should establish a presumption that a decision by a transmission owner

not to participate in an RTO is evidence that it is misusing its transmission facilities to

advantage its merchant function. This presumption could be rebutted through a

demonstration that stand-alone operation of the non-participant’s grid serves the public

interest as well as or better than participating in an RTO. They suggest that utilities

currently with market-based rate authorizations should be ordered to show cause by the

December 15, 2001, implementation deadline why their market rate authorizations should

not be revoked. Enron/APX/Coral Power also recommend that all sales, leases, mergers

and consolidations of transmission systems be conditioned on RTO participation based on

a presumption that it is inconsistent with the public interest to dispose of transmission
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -113-

facilities without eliminating the incentive to discriminate by committing the operation of

those facilities to an RTO.

Industrial Consumers believes that the engineering and economic efficiencies of

RTO participation loom so large that the Commission is justified in adopting a

presumption that a decision by a transmission owner not to participate in an RTO is

evidence that it is misusing its transmission facilities. Industrial Consumers recommends

that the Commission assert jurisdiction over the transmission component of bundled sales,

and order that the rates, terms and conditions offered under the OATT apply to all eligible

customers. This would deprive vertically-integrated utilities of the incentive to resist RTO

participation. 

State commission commenters tend to favor the Commission using conditioning

authority, but some are not sure this will necessarily encourage participation in RTOs. 

Oregon Commission comments that unless a utility can demonstrate that it cannot

manipulate the transmission system to its advantage or that an RTO is impossible, the

Commission should revoke its ability to sell at market-based rates. Complaints of unfair

practices without credible reasons should be prima facie evidence of market power.

Pennsylvania Commission recommends that the Commission revisit previously granted

market-based rate authorizations. Indiana Commission cautions, however, that a

recalcitrant utility that does not join an RTO may not perceive loss of market-based

pricing authorization as detrimental. Illinois Commission does not oppose conditioning
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -114-

merger and market-based rate approvals on RTO participation, but it also believes that the

threat of these penalties may be inadequate to induce RTO participation.

Comments on Consequences for Failure to File, or Filing Alternative

Explanation

The majority of comments on this issue support the Commission taking additional

action if adequate RTOs do not form. PJM/NEPOOL Customers suggests that strict

penalties must be assessed against actions inconsistent with RTO formation. Oneok

suggests that certain benefits that are within the Commission's authority and discretion to

grant or deny should be withheld from utilities unwilling to participate. Project Groups

recommend that the Final Rule provide that the Commission itself create RTOs if the

stakeholders are unable or unwilling voluntarily to do so by a reasonable date certain.

PNGC suggests that if RTOs do not form within a reasonable time, the Commission

should explore its authority or seek new authority to mandate participation by all utilities. 

On the other hand, Duke is concerned that the Commission may not accept valid

reasons for nonparticipation and use the October 15, 2000, alternative filings as vehicles to

mandate RTO membership. Duke offers that the Commission cannot consider imposing

penalties for non-participation while simultaneously claiming that its policy on

participation is voluntary. Seattle cautions that the Commission should exercise care not

to unfairly sanction transmission-owning utilities that cannot participate in an RTO (e.g.,
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -115-

132FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 32,541 at 33,685.

where good cause is shown that participation would violate state and local legal

obligation, or the costs of RTO participation outweighs the benefits).

Commission Conclusion 

Based on the record before us with respect to undue discrimination and market

power, as well as with respect to economic and engineering issues affecting reliability,

operational efficiency, and competition in the electric industry, it is clear that RTOs are

needed to resolve impediments to fully competitive markets. However, we continue to

believe, as we proposed in the NOPR, that at this time we should pursue a voluntary

approach to participation in RTOs. 

We acknowledge that there are many commenters who are skeptical that a

voluntary approach will be able to accomplish our stated objective, which, as we stated in

the NOPR, 132 is for all transmission-owning entities to place their transmission facilities

under the control of RTOs in a timely manner. In general, they argue that those with a

market advantage will not easily give it up, and that voluntary efforts to date have not been

very successful in creating effective regional entities.

However, we believe that a voluntary approach as we have structured it, with

guidance and encouragement from the Commission, is most appropriate at this time. 

Given the rapidly evolving state of the electric industry, we want to allow involved
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -116-

participants the flexibility to develop mutually agreeable regional arrangements with

respect to RTO formation and coordination. Further, we want the industry to focus its

efforts on the potential benefits of RTO formation and how best to achieve them, rather

than on a non-productive challenge to our legal authority to mandate RTO participation.

We believe the voluntary approach to RTO formation can be more successful now

than in the past for several reasons. The pace of industry restructuring is accelerating. 

Many formerly vertically integrated utilities have recently recognized the strategic benefits

to them of concentrating solely in one of the traditional utility areas (generation,

transmission, or distribution). Moreover, the NOPR has focused industry attention on

RTOs and their benefits. Further, this Final Rule is providing clear rules and guidance on

what is necessary to form an RTO. Through this Final Rule, we are also committing the

Commission to act as a catalyst in RTO discussions by initiating and encouraging a

collaborative process. Finally, we have provided in this Final Rule for certain favorable

ratemaking treatments for those who assume the risks of the transition to a new structure,

which should, at a minimum, eliminate any rate disincentives to RTO formation.

We are not adopting as a generic policy in this Final Rule either that RTO

participation is required in order to retain or obtain market-based rate authorization for

wholesale power sales, or that RTO participation is required for a disposition of

jurisdictional facilities to be in the public interest. However, in response to those who

argue that the Commission has a statutory responsibility to remedy undue discrimination
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -117-

and anticompetitive effects when evaluating market-based rate and merger requests, we

recognize that we may have to consider, in individual cases, issues that arise as to whether

market power has been mitigated in the absence of RTO participation or as to whether a

merger would be in the public interest without RTO participation.

While we have concluded on this record that it is in the public interest to provide

for a voluntary approach to RTO formation that relies upon encouragement, guidance, and

support from the Commission, this does not mean that all aspects of this Rule are

voluntary. The filing requirements set forth in section 35.34(c) of the new regulations are

mandatory. In other words, public utilities must file either an RTO proposal or a report on

the impediments to RTO participation. In addition, to qualify as an RTO, an applicant

must comply with the minimum characteristics and functions and other specific RTO

requirements set forth in the new regulations. We will also expect that all transmission

owners will participate in good faith in the collaborative process that we are establishing

herein.

2. Organizational Form of an RTO

Comments

A number of commenters address the proposal to allow flexibility in the type of

structure allowed for RTOs. Several of those commenting recommend maintaining the

NOPR's flexibility and that the Commission not prescribe either a transco, ISO or some
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -118-

133See, e.g., EEI, Lincoln, LG&E, SERC and Washington Commission.

134See, e.g., Allegheny, Entergy, INGAA and Trans-Elect.

135See, e.g., Sierra Pacific, H.Q. Energy Services and Detroit Edison.

136MidAmerican.

137CTA.

other structure. 133 FirstEnergy advocates flexibility and says that no one knows today

what the best structure will be for the future so, therefore, the Commission should allow

customization reflecting regional needs. Several commenters, such as APPA, argue that

the Commission's flexibility on type of organization should go beyond the standard ISO

and transco structures and include gridcos, wirecos, not-for-profit and for-profit forms of

each organization, and hybrid organizations.

Numerous commenters state a preference in favor of for-profit transcos although

many of these commenters still recommend that other structures be allowed at each

region's option. 134 In favoring transcos, commenters cite the greater efficiency due to a

transco's profit motive. 135 Commenters further argue that for-profit transcos can better

serve the goal of independence because the transco would make all business decisions, 136

can more cleanly divide Commission-regulated transmission from state-regulated

distribution, 137 and can operate more efficiently by integrating investment decisions,
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -119-

138Duke.

139LPPC, Los Angeles, Gainesville and Public Citizen.

140See, e.g., NASUCA, PJM and ICUA. 

141NASUCA at 20.

142See, e.g., PJM and ISO-NE.

facility design, construction and O&M into a unified strategy. 138 A few additional

supporters of transcos prefer that they be not-for-profit. 139 Gainesville recommends

further that transcos in Florida become an instrumentality of the state.

In contrast to the above, ISOs are preferred by a number of commenters. 140 PJM

argues that ISOs are necessary to ensure independence, provide more independent market

monitoring and have a fiduciary duty to the public interest. PJM also notes that ISOs can

meet the Commission's objectives more quickly than transcos. NASUCA reports that

some of its members oppose for-profit transcos because of their "natural incentive to

extract monopoly rents from consumers." 141 Some of those who prefer ISOs contend that

transcos would favor transmission solutions over generation solutions to congestion. 142

This argument is contested in the reply comments of Trans-Elect and others. NEPCO et

al. maintains that the alleged bias in favor of transmission solutions can be overcome by

using performance-based rates to replace standard rate base regulation.
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -120-

143See, e.g., ISO-NE.

144See, e.g., Sierra Pacific, Duke and Enron/APX/Coral Power.

Some commenters favor a hybrid involving an ISO with a gridco or with another

type of organization. 143 As noted above, many commenters recommend flexibility and

believe that either an ISO or transco would satisfy the needs of an RTO if designed

properly.

Several commenters cited problems that need to be worked out for both transcos

and ISOs. Professor Joskow notes that ISOs would suffer efficiency losses from the

separation between ownership and operation of transmission assets. This separation

makes it harder to apply incentive regulation because it divides decisions that affect the

costs of transmission between two organizations. On the other hand, Professor Joskow

says that an ISO may be superior to a transco where transmission ownership is presently

so balkanized that loop flow and congestion cannot be managed, but he asserts that this

advantage may decline over time as the industry changes. Southern Company says that

while some see ISOs as ineffective bureaucracies which add to transmission risk, the

creation of transcos presents substantial tax and financial problems.

A few commenters contend that the NOPR's provisions produce a bias in favor of

ISOs even though this intent is not noted. 144 For example, Duke argues that the NOPR

provisions for stakeholder participation in formation, governance and market monitoring
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -121-

functions seem more geared toward the ISO form of organization. These commenters

recommend that the Final Rule not include such a bias.

A number of commenters suggest multi-layered structural alternatives. For

example, ISO-NE proposes an ISO and gridco operating in tandem. A non-profit ISO

would direct the operation of the transmission system and run day-ahead and real-time

power markets coupled with a grid entity that owns and maintains the transmission in the

area operated by the ISO. This, they claim, would require a final rule that defines an RTO

as an entity, or a combination of entities working in collaboration, that satisfies the

minimum characteristics set forth in the NOPR. Under the model discussed by ISO-NE,

the ISO would have responsibility for assuring open transmission access, operating the

regional transmission assets (including provision of switching orders to the gridco),

monitoring power markets, serving as a clearing agent and possibly serving as a

clearinghouse, and maintaining short-term reliability. The gridco would own and maintain

transmission assets, operate transmission assets in response to ISO directions consistent

with safety requirements, and build new transmission facilities (including licensing,

permitting and siting responsibilities). Joint responsibilities would include planning

upgrades to transmission system.

ISO-NE argues that ISOs alone would have disadvantages in the realm of

transmission expansion due to fragmentation of transmission ownership. A gridco,

however, could raise investment capital, bring parallel and complementary strengths to an
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -122-

ISO, and should bring crisp and decisive implementation of transmission planning and

expansion decisions. Pairing an ISO with a gridco, ISO-NE argues, would eliminate the

problems inherent in a transco by separating transmission ownership from market

administration and market monitoring.

Midwest ISO suggests a structure that it believes could meld the best of both ISOs

and transcos, i.e., an ISO that would allow an independent transmission company to

operate under the Midwest ISO. This model would not require that all transmission be

owned by a single gridco—transmission owners could decide whether to operate directly

through the ISO, or spin assets off to a gridco that would operate under the ISO. Midwest

ISO argues that this proposal overcomes the problems encountered in expecting all

transmission owners to divest their transmission assets to separate companies.

PGE points out that, "for an RTO to achieve . . . critical mass in the near term, it

must be capable of managing a regional transmission market in which a variety of

subsidiary transmission structures will be in place. Such subsidiary structures may include

single-company and sub-regional ITCs, integrated utilities located in states that already

have restructured their retail electric markets, integrated utilities located in states that have

not yet restructured, and publicly-owned and federal utilities." PJM argues that ISOs

should be present even in regions that form separate transmission-owning companies to

avoid continued conflict regarding the neutrality and commercial consequences of grid

management decisions. 
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -123-

Professor Hogan states that it is very unlikely that a pure transco model is viable at

all. He further indicates that, "the advantages of an independent transmission company

can be pursued through the gridco model with an accompanying ISO." He suggests that

this approach is already well advanced in the United States and elsewhere, and that by

separating ownership of the wires from control of system operations, it would be easy to

accommodate a complex pattern of ownership. 

ComEd says that characteristics and functions should be performed by two linked

organizations that make up a binary RTO: a for-profit ITC under the oversight of an

independent not-for-profit regional transmission board. 

Michigan Commission believes that wirecos, transcos and ISOs are all interim

transitional organizations along the path toward very large RTO-like organizations. Even

if vestiges of the smaller interim organizations continue to exist, they should operate under

some kind of RTO umbrella to assure appropriate regional control. Missouri Commission

proposes a zonal model in which the zones are areas where generation is integrated

through the transmission grid in such a way as to minimize restrictions on sources of

generation used in the area. In the future, independent transmission companies may form

with the possibility that adjacent control areas will join to form larger zones. In such a

case, an RTO is a collection of zones for purposes of administering the regional

gatekeeper function and providing markets for transmission congestion. Each zone would
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -124-

be responsible for maintaining its transmission facilities and coordinating both the use and

expansion of those facilities with the RTO.

WEPCO proposes that each RTO should be composed of two parallel organizations

to serve the same region under a common, independent board: a Regional Reliability

Council to develop regional reliability rules and a not-for-profit ISO that operates under

those regional rules.

Cal DWR suggests a three-tiered structure that builds on existing organizations. 

Existing NERC regional councils should set broad governing criteria for ISO reliability

issues, parallel path flow issues, and for regional planning. More than one ISO may be

located in each NERC region. These should control area reliability, administer

transmission terms and conditions, and create market mechanisms to manage congestion,

among other functions. Transmission owners should support, but not duplicate the roles

of NERC regional councils.

Commission Conclusion 

We will not limit the flexibility of proposed structures or forms of organization for

RTOs. We are prepared to accept a transco, ISO, hybrid form, or other form as long as the

RTO meets our minimum characteristics and functions and other requirements.

Some of the commenters argue that the NOPR's requirements either favor one form

of organization over others or make one or the other forms very difficult to construct. It is

not our intention to favor or disfavor transcos, ISOs, or other organizational form. We
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -125-

acknowledge that some of our minimum requirements might affect transcos and ISOs

differently, but there also may be different acceptable ways for an ISO or transco to satisfy

the minimum requirements. However, we designed this Final Rule to be neutral as to

organizational form, and we do not believe that the requirements for forming an RTO in

this Final Rule favor any particular RTO structure.

Arguments are made that an ISO is the better form of RTO because an ISO has no

incentive either to favor transmission solutions to solve congestion constraints or to

perpetuate congestion. ISOs are easier to form, in most cases, because there are fewer tax

and mortgage consequences as there is no actual transfer of ownership.

On the other hand, some argue that transcos are preferable because they introduce a

profit motive for efficient operation and expansion. Performance-based rates are normally

considered more effective with transcos than with ISOs. Advantages are cited for having

the same entity both propose and carry out transmission expansion and maintenance. 

The transco and ISO forms of organization each has its advantages and

disadvantages as do combination forms and other forms that have been suggested. In

many cases, the situation facing transmission owners in a particular region may influence

the appropriate form of organization to propose. In other cases it may be a matter of

preference for how the participants wish to do business. Some may propose to start

operation in one form and transform to another form at a future date. Tax consequences,
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -126-

public ownership, bond indentures and current organization will each have an impact on

the decision of what form of organization a particular RTO will propose. 

This Rule does not necessarily require that a single organization perform all of the

functions itself. To mention but a few examples, we specifically clarify in other parts of

this Final Rule that the security coordinator function and the OASIS function could be

shared with another RTO or contracted out, and that appropriate scope may be achieved in

creative ways. We will entertain appropriate tiered or other structures. We require only

that the RTO be responsible for ensuring that the requirements are met in a way that

satisfies our Rule.

Because of the differing conditions facing various regions, we offer flexibility in

form of organization. We welcome innovative structures and forms that meet the needs of

the market participants while satisfying the minimum requirements of this Rule. 

3. Degree of Specificity in the Rule

Comments

Many commenters believe that our proposed flexible approach is either still too

rigid, or that it should provide clearer guidance. INGAA argues for less specificity in the

Final Rule. INGAA points to the success of Order No. 636, wherein the Commission

required open access, functional unbundling, and a new rate design, and it established

specific requirements for operational control and pipeline capacity trading, all without

having to specify the structure of the conforming gas transmission entity. NU similarly
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -127-

points to the precedent of the restructured gas industry. It states that the Commission

should avoid the perils of imposing a rigid system pursuant to the mistaken belief that it

can be easily and swiftly changed later to respond to future needs of the marketplace. 

CP&L also cautions that the principle of flexibility could prove illusory in practice and

that there is a danger that, if guidance from the Commission takes the form of overly

restrictive rules, it will stifle the development of innovative proposals. PG&E submits that

the Commission should simply define a broad standard that provides for independence and

evaluate particular RTO proposals on a case-by-case basis. South Carolina Commission

also counsels that the Commission should not attempt to mandate a particular form of

RTO, or establish its size or region, because this will not ensure that an efficient market

will develop. It posits that any RTO policy should be flexible enough and dynamic

enough to allow for both regional and organizational differences and for growth and

changes in the future.

SCE&G claims that the NOPR is overly prescriptive with respect to both scope and

timing. TXU Electric submits that the NOPR's approach to reliance on minimum

characteristics and functions seems to reflect a significant number of fundamental policy

decisions that have already been made without the benefit of any of the very

experimentation the NOPR extols. Southern Company argues that the Commission should

recast the characteristics and functions as voluntary guidelines at this early stage in the

development of RTOs, since it is unclear what the best form of RTO will be. 
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -128-

ISO supporters, such as NYPP and Central Maine, recommend that the

Commission reject proposals to impose rigid and inflexible rules on RTOs and remain

flexible especially with regard to existing ISOs and RTO pricing. ISO-NE counsels that

tolerance for a diversity of approaches is essential, as well as politically pragmatic, due to

the fact that different regions will have different histories, industry elements, and local

regulatory policies that need to be accommodated.

FirstEnergy supports the NOPR's flexibility because there is no best model to deal

with regional variations. Alliance Companies and Washington Commission also

recommend that the Commission adhere to a flexible RTO policy, open to voluntary

regional experimentation in the design of RTO structures. In addition, both Southern

Company and Trans-Elect recommend that the Commission maintain flexibility toward

transcos. And while a transco supporter, Entergy, sees the NOPR as properly flexible in

regard to for-profit and not-for-profit RTOs. Finally, Duke agrees that RTOs should

satisfy key principles, as long as they are not so prescriptive as to promote only one type

of RTO. 

On the other hand, Illinois Commission submits that the NOPR’s minimalist

approach will lead to creation of lowest common denominator RTOs that minimally

comply with the characteristics and functions and general guidance as to geographic scope

and membership. Project Groups suggests that the Commission expand and strengthen the

minimum characteristics. TDU Systems recommends that the Commission resist calls to
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -129-

water down its Final Rule and urges more substance. TAPS claims that calls for more

flexibility are really a cover for diluted, ineffective RTOs that will lack the scope,

independence and authority to get the job done.

Commission Conclusion 

While many commenters think that our proposal to rely on guidance and flexibility

to promote establishment of appropriate RTOs is either too rigid or too non-specific, we

conclude that we struck an appropriate balance in the NOPR.

Although we and the electric industry see many problems associated with the

operation of the Nation's transmission systems and we see a general need for regional

transmission solutions, we cannot at this time foresee the best organizational means to

resolve every problem. Given this situation, we believe that the right balance is a

minimally intrusive, solution-oriented approach that provides guidance and specifies only

the fundamental RTO characteristics and functions. 

We do not agree with those commenters who contend that the NOPR approach

adopted herein is either overly or insufficiently prescriptive. Certainly the minimum

characteristics and functions do reflect a number of threshold requirements, but

collectively, these requirements serve to define the minimum necessary to improve the

operation of the Nation's transmission systems. While we agree that there is no best

answer and we encourage regional innovation, we cannot simply define a standard of
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -130-

independence and nothing else. This would leave the industry without direction and

provides no guidance on how we would evaluate the various RTO proposals. 

Finally, we do not agree with those who suggest that our electric regulation must

follow our natural gas pipeline industry Order No. 636 model, where the Commission did

not attempt structural unbundling of the pipeline industry but simply relied on more

limited, functional unbundling. The situations in the two industries are different regarding

the need for regional entities. Most importantly, there was not in the gas industry the

degree of vertical integration of production, transmission, and distribution that historically

existed in the electric industry. In addition, the gas industry has no analog to loop flow,

transmission loading relief, the need for large regional calculations of ATC, or the use of

generation energy and reactive power output to manipulate transmission flow, among

other reasons. 

4. Legal Authority

In the NOPR, we noted that sections 205 and 206 of the FPA, 16 U.S.C. 824d and

824e, give the Commission both the authority and responsibility to ensure that the rates,

charges, classifications, and services of public utilities (and any rule, regulation, practice,

or contract affecting any of these) are just and reasonable and not unduly discriminatory,

and to remedy undue discrimination in the provision of such services. We stated that in

fulfilling its responsibilities under FPA sections 205 and 206, the Commission is required

to address, and has the authority to remedy, undue discrimination and anticompetitive
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -131-

145FERC Stats. & Regs.¶ 32,541 at 33,695.

effects. 145 We also noted that the Commission has the authority and responsibility under

section 203 of the FPA to review mergers and other transactions involving public utilities,

including dispositions of jurisdictional facilities by public utilities, and that the

Commission may grant an application under section 203 upon such terms and conditions

as it finds necessary to secure the maintenance of adequate service and the coordination in

the public interest of jurisdictional facilities.

Further, we noted that section 202(a) of the FPA authorizes and directs the

Commission "to divide the country into regional districts for the voluntary interconnection

and coordination of facilities for the generation, transmission, and sale of electric energy." 

The purpose of this division into regional districts is for "assuring an abundant supply of

electric energy throughout the United States with the greatest possible economy and with

regard to the proper utilization and conservation of natural resources." Section 202(a)

states that it is "the duty of the Commission to promote and encourage such

interconnection and coordination within each such district and between such districts."

We solicited comments on whether the Commission should generically mandate

RTO participation by all public utilities to remedy undue discrimination under sections

205 and 206 of the FPA, whether market-based rates for generation services could

continue to be justified for a public utility that does not participate in an RTO, whether a
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -132-

146Id. at 33,762.

merger involving a public utility that is not a member of an RTO would be consistent with

the public interest, whether non-participants that own transmission facilities should be

allowed to use the non-pancaked transmission rates of the RTO participants in that region,

whether transmission services provided by a transmitting utility need to be under RTO

control to satisfy the discrimination standards of sections 211 and 212 of the FPA, and

whether a public utility's lack of participation would otherwise be in violation of the

FPA. 146

Comments

The comments on the Commission's legal authority to mandate participation in

RTOs span the spectrum from those asserting that we clearly have that authority to those

asserting that we clearly do not, with others taking a less definitive position in between. 

Supporting Commission's Authority to Mandate RTO Participation

Representative of those asserting that the Commission has the authority to mandate

RTO participation are the joint comments filed by APPA, ELCON, TAPS, and TDU

Systems ("APPA et al. (WP)"). These parties argue that the FPA as presently constituted

gives the Commission "ample" legal authority to require participation by public utilities in

properly structured and configured RTOs. APPA et al. assert that section 202(a) permits

the Commission to determine rational and efficient regional boundaries; section 203
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -133-

147E.g., UAMPS, PJM/NEPOOL Customers, Illinois Commission, Michigan

Commission, Cinergy, Industrial Consumers, First Rochdale, East Texas Cooperatives,

FMPA.

provides authority to require RTO participation as a standardized condition to mitigate the

increased generation and transmission concentration brought about by mergers; "it would

be fully consistent with, and indeed required by" FPA section 205 to insist on RTO

participation as a condition necessary to yield competition robust enough to produce just

and reasonable market-based rates; requiring RTO participation falls within the

Commission's broad discretion to fashion a remedy for undue discrimination under FPA

sections 205 and 206; and the Commission could reasonably conclude that it is no longer

just and reasonable for transmission service to be planned, implemented, or priced on a

less-than-regional basis. Other commenters echo some or all of these points in asserting

that the Commission currently has sufficient legal authority to mandate RTO

participation. 147

Some other commenters emphasize the authority contained in particular statutory

sections. One commenter states that FPA section 202(a) is an express delegation of

authority to the Commission to make policy, and the stated goal of that section of assuring

an abundant supply of electric energy with the greatest possible economy provides ample

authority to support the conclusion that transmission facilities should be operated by an

RTO. This commenter states that it is well established administrative law that there is
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -134-

148Professor Koch, citing Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense

Council Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).

149Citing American Paper Institute, Inc. v. American Elec. Power Serv. Corp., 461

U.S. 402, 419-20 (1983).

150Oneok.

great deference given to an agency charged with policymaking responsibility. 148 Another

commenter, FMPA, argues that the Commission's interconnection authority under FPA

sections 202(b) and 210 provides ample basis for mandating RTO participation. 

According to FMPA, the Commission could find that RTO participation is necessary to

"make effective" an interconnection, pursuant to FPA section 210, that has been rendered

ineffective by fragmented and anticompetitive practices of transmission owners. FMPA

also asserts that the Commission could use this authority through a rulemaking without

following the individual procedural requirements of section 212. 149

In addition to those commenters finding clear authority in the FPA for an RTO

mandate, a number of commenters support the suggestion, as one commenter put it, that

certain benefits and rights that are within the Commission's authority and discretion to

grant or deny should be withheld from utilities unwilling to participate in an RTO. 150

PNGC states that the Commission should use "big sticks" to obtain RTO participation, and

Michigan Commission says the Commission "should use every stick, carrot, orangecolored stick and tool it can." Some commenters assert specifically that the Commission

has the authority, and should use its authority, to condition mergers under section 203 and
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -135-

151E.g., Oneok, TAPS, APPA, PJM/NEPOOL Customers, Illinois Commission,

Industrial Consumers, East Texas Cooperatives, FMPA, TDU Systems and PNGC.

152E.g., TDU Systems, PNGC and PJM/NEPOOL Customers.

condition market-based rate authority under section 205 of the FPA on RTO

participation. 151 Some commenters also favor limiting access to non-pancaked

transmission rates of RTOs to those who participate in RTOs. 152

Even some commenters that generally oppose the idea of an RTO mandate

acknowledge that market-based rate authority or mergers could, on a case-by-case basis,

be conditioned on RTO participation. For example, Florida Power Corp. states that the

Commission could find, "given certain factual circumstances," that the granting of marketbased rate authority would not be appropriate "unless the entity agreed to commit its

transmission facilities to an RTO." United Illuminating states that whatever conditioning

authority the Commission may have for market-based rates or mergers could not be used

as a basis for a generic rulemaking.

NECPUC cites to other sections of the FPA that the Commission might rely upon

to promote RTO establishment. It supports the use of the complaint process under section

206 of the FPA in specific cases. It also suggests the use of FPA section 207 proceedings,

which can be initiated by state commissions, as a vehicle for requiring RTOs where the

Commission finds interstate service inadequate or insufficient. NECPUC also urges the
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -136-

153E.g., Southern Company, Puget, Avista, CP&L, Duke, STDUG, FirstEnergy,

NYPP, Indianapolis P&L, FP&L, Detroit Edison, Florida Power Corp., Florida

Commission, Alabama Commission.

154E.g., EEI, United Illuminating, Southern Company, Central Maine, CP&L,

Duke, NYPP, Florida Power Corp, Florida Commission.

155E.g., EEI, Central Maine, Southern Company, Duke, NYPP, Dalton Utilities,

Indianapolis P&L, Florida Power Corp., Entergy.

use of joint boards and cooperative procedures between the Commission and the states

under FPA section 209 as a means of resolving RTO issues.

Opposing Commission's Authority to Mandate RTO Participation

At the other end of the debate on the Commission's legal authority with respect to

RTOs are those that assert that the Commission's authority to mandate RTOs is nonexistent or very limited. 153 A number of commenters emphasize that FPA section 202(a)

is explicitly voluntary and therefore provides no support for the Commission's authority to

mandate RTOs. 154 FP&L states that it is questionable whether the Commission could use

FPA section 202(a) as a tool to promote competition, given that section 202(a) is for the

"coordination and interconnection of facilities," and coordination is arguably inconsistent

with competition.

Some argue that the exercise of FPA section 206 authority to remedy discrimination

on a generic basis by requiring RTOs would have to be supported by more explicit

findings of discrimination than are contained in the NOPR. 155 For example, Florida

Power Corp. and United Illuminating contend that the Commission cannot use an industry-
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -137-

156Citing Associated Gas Distributors v. FERC, 824 F.2d 981 (D.C. Cir. 1987),

cert. denied, 485 U.S. 1006 (1988).

wide solution to remedy a problem that does not exist industry-wide, 156 and the record

does not demonstrate an industry-wide problem. EEI and others argue that the

Commission may only impose a remedy that is reasonable and appropriate in light of the

specific discriminatory findings made and the actual practices to be corrected, and the

NOPR fails to demonstrate such a nexus. Southern Company notes that the Commission

has not made any finding of discrimination and that the "perception" of discrimination is

an insufficient basis on which to invoke FPA sections 205 and 206. CP&L asserts that

section 206 may give the Commission some authority with respect to requiring RTOs, but

only in individual cases after hearings and substantial evidence of discriminatory

practices. Southern Company contends that the Commission's remedial authority under

section 206 must be construed in light of the voluntary nature of section 202(a) and the

Commission cannot do anything indirectly under section 206 that it cannot do directly

under section 202(a). Central Maine asserts that discrimination findings would not apply

against a "wires only" company such as itself, and similarly, Indianapolis P&L argues that

it has no ability to discriminate in favor of its own wholesale generation and therefore

could not be forced to join an RTO as a remedy for discrimination.

Some commenters question the Commission's authority to condition market-based

rates or mergers on RTO participation. Central Maine argues that the Commission could
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -138-

157Citing Altamont Gas Transmission Co., v. FERC, 92 F.3d 1239, 1246 (D.C.

Cir. 1996).

not conclude on a generic basis that an RTO is needed in every market-based rate case,

and that the Commission could not change its existing policy on market-based rates

without substantial evidence and reasoned decisionmaking. CP&L states that the

Commission cannot use FPA section 205 authority to grant market-based rates merely to

advance preferred policies, and cannot use FPA section 203 to condition mergers absent

specific findings in a particular case. Duke contends that the Commission has no authority

to issue a rule that imposes sanctions for non-participation that would make nonparticipation practically or economically unfeasible. Similarly, NYPP states that mergers,

market-based rates, and access to non-pancaked transmission rates are economic

necessities, and using them as conditions would effectively require RTO participation. 

Indianapolis P&L asserts that it would be inequitable and unjustifiable to withhold marketbased rate authority from a utility that has a good reason not to participate in an RTO, and

further, that the Commission may not pressure a utility to engage in an activity that it may

not require through direct regulation. 157 Similarly, Puget states that if the Commission is

not mandating RTOs, which is beyond its authority, then the rule must contain no

penalties for non-participation. 
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -139-

158See Northern States, supra note 89.

159E.g., Southern Company, Puget, Indianapolis P&L, FP&L, Florida Commission.

Several commenters point to the recent court decision in Northern States 158 as

limiting the Commission's authority with respect to RTOs. 159 These parties assert that

Northern States stands for the proposition that the Commission may not directly or

indirectly interfere with state regulation of retail service, and that the NOPR would result

in traditional utility retail responsibilities being shifted to RTOs. Specifically, for example,

Puget alleges that redispatch and planned maintenance are reliability functions that affect

the utility's ability to serve native load and are subject to state law. Indianapolis P&L

asserts that Northern States makes clear that the Commission may act only under authority

given by Congress. 

A variety of other legal arguments are made in opposition to any Commission

efforts to mandate RTO participation. Southern Company contends that since there has

been no finding that Order Nos. 888 and 889 have failed, there has been no reasonable

explanation as to why the Commission should change that policy. CP&L argues that the

Commission's authority to enforce FPA section 205 is in the enforcement provisions of

FPA sections 314, 316, and 317. CP&L also states that it would be discriminatory to have

higher pancaked rates for non-participants in RTOs while participants get the advantage of

non-pancaked rates. Duke and Florida Power Corp. assert that requiring involuntary
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -140-

160Citing Richmond Power & Light Co. v. FERC, 574 F.2d 610 (D.C. Cir. 1978)

and Otter Tail Power Co. v. U.S., 410 U.S. 366 (1973).

wheeling and imposing common carrier status is outside the Commission's authority, 160

and likewise, so is mandating RTOs. Florida Power Corp. contends that requiring RTO

participation would force a utility to join an ISO or divest its transmission or generation

assets, and the Commission cannot compel divestiture. Florida Power Corp. and Southern

Company make the point that the Public Utility Holding Company Act granted the SEC,

not the FERC, the authority to restructure the electric utility industry. Florida Power

Corp. further argues that requiring RTO participation would be a "taking" of utility

property for which just compensation would be owed, and that the "taking" problem is

exacerbated by utilities being liable for facilities no longer under their control. Florida

Commission states that the Energy Policy Act of 1992 indicated that the Commission

should proceed with transmission access issues case-by-case, not generically.

Other Comments On Legal Authority 

DOE submitted comments strongly supporting the Commission's efforts to establish

RTOs. DOE states that while the Commission has substantial authority to accomplish

much of what needs to be done, Federal legislation clarifying Commission authority,

especially with respect to non-jurisdictional utilities, would greatly facilitate RTO

formation. 
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -141-

161Consumers Energy.

One commenter raised the issue of what authority the Commission would rely upon

to require the filings in proposed section 35.34(c). This commenter wants the

Commission to clarify that the filings would be required pursuant to the information

gathering authority under FPA sections 304, 307, and 311, and not under authority of

section 205, which the commenter asserts provides no such authority. 161

There were only a few comments in response to the Commission's inquiry about

sections 211 and 212 or other FPA standards. Florida Power Corp. submits that the

Commission cannot rely on FPA sections 211 and 212 to mandate RTOs. Florida Power

Corp. notes that in Order Nos. 888 and 888-A, the Commission recognized that it does not

have the authority to order wheeling pursuant to FPA sections 211 and 212 except on a

case-by-case basis after an evidentiary hearing resulting in specific findings. Florida

Power Corp. argues that because the Commission is fashioning an industry-wide generic

solution and not acting on a case-by-case basis, the Commission cannot rely on sections

211 and 212 in this proceeding. 

 NARUC also notes that Congress revised FPA sections 211 and 212 to provide

FERC with authority to address requests for non-discriminatory transmission service on a

case-by-case basis. NARUC argues that the goal of promoting regional flexibility is more

readily served by case-by-case consideration. In this way, NARUC believes that the
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -142-

162We need not decide in this case the extent of the Commission's authority to

mandate generically RTO participation.

Commission can use FPA sections 211 and 212 to take a more tailored approach rather

than "one-size-fits-all" regulations that ignore market development and local conditions.

Commission Conclusion

Much of the discussion in the comments on the Commission's legal authority with

respect to RTOs focuses on whether the Commission has the statutory authority to

mandate that transmission owners participate in an RTO. As discussed elsewhere in this

Final Rule, we have decided not to mandate generically that all public utility transmission

owners must join an RTO. We conclude that the Commission possesses both general and

specific authorities to advance voluntary RTO formation. We also conclude that the

Commission possesses the authority to order RTO participation on a case-by-case basis, if

necessary, to remedy undue discrimination or anticompetitive effects where supported by

the record. 162 Of course, RTO participation is not the only remedy that the Commission

might employ to address these problems. 

FPA sections 205 and 206

As we stated in the NOPR, the Commission is granted the authority and

responsibility by FPA sections 205 and 206, 16 U.S.C. 824d and 824e, to ensure that the

rates, charges, classifications, and service of public utilities (and any rule, regulation,

practice, or contract affecting any of these) are just and reasonable and not unduly
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -143-

163Once such a finding is made, the Commission is required to remedy it. See,

e.g., Southern California Edison Company, 40 FERC ¶ 61,371 at 62,151-52 (1987), order

on reh'g, 50 FERC ¶ 61,275 at 61,873 (1990), modified sub nom., Cities of Anaheim v.

FERC, 941 F.2d 1234 (D.C. Cir. 1991); Delmarva Power and Light Company, 24 FERC

¶ 61,199 at 61,466, order on reh'g, 24 FERC ¶ 61,380 (1983).

164Order No. 888, FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 31,036 at 31,669.

165Gulf States Utilities Co. v. FPC, 411 U.S. 747, 758-59, reh'g denied, 412 U.S.

944 (1973). See City of Huntingburg v. FPC, 498 F.2d 778, 783-84 (D.C. Cir. 1974)

(Commission has a duty to consider the potential anticompetitive effects of a proposed

Interconnection Agreement.)

discriminatory, and to remedy undue discrimination in the provision of such services. In

fulfilling its responsibilities under FPA sections 205 and 206, the Commission is required

to address, and has the authority to remedy, undue discrimination and anticompetitive

effects. The Commission has a statutory mandate under these sections to ensure that

transmission in interstate commerce and rates, contracts, and practices affecting

transmission services, do not reflect an undue preference or advantage (or undue prejudice

or disadvantage) and are just, reasonable, and not unduly discriminatory or

preferential. 163 Additionally, as discussed in Order No. 888, 164 there is a substantial

body of case law that holds that the Commission's regulatory authority under the FPA

"clearly carries with it the responsibility to consider, in appropriate circumstances, the

anticompetitive effects of regulated aspects of interstate utility operations pursuant to

[FPA] §§ 202 and 203, and under like directives contained in §§ 205, 206, and 207." 165
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -144-

There are two principal contexts in which the authority of FPA sections 205 and

206 has been raised. One is the use of requiring participation in RTOs as a remedy for

undue discrimination by public utilities. As discussed above, many commenters believe

that the evidence of undue discrimination is sufficient to justify generically mandating

RTO participation as a remedy, and many others argue that the record on undue

discrimination is insufficient to impose a generic, industry-wide solution. We have

concluded in our discussion elsewhere in this Rule that continuing opportunities for undue

discrimination exist in the electric transmission industry. However, we have also

concluded that a voluntary approach to eliminating such opportunities through RTO

formation (including the filing requirements and Commission supported collaboration

efforts identified herein) represents a measured and appropriate response to the significant

undue discrimination and other competitive impediments identified in this record.

The other context in which our authority under FPA sections 205 and 206 is raised

is whether permitting a public utility to charge market-based rates for wholesale electricity

sales can continue to be justified if the seller or its affiliate owns or operates transmission

assets that have not been placed under the control of an RTO. The Commission has a

responsibility under FPA sections 205 and 206 to ensure that rates for wholesale power

sales are just and reasonable, and has found that market-based rates can be just and

reasonable where the seller has no market power. The Commission has determined that to

show a lack of market power, the seller and its affiliates must not have, or must have
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -145-

166See, e.g., Heartland Energy Services, Inc., 68 FERC ¶ 61,233 at 62,060 (1994);

Louisville Gas & Electric Company, 62 FERC ¶ 61,016 at 61,143-44 (1993) (Heartland). 

See also Louisiana Energy and Power Authority v. FERC, 141 F.3d 364 (D.C. Cir. 1998)

(court upholds Commission's use of market-based rate authority).

167See, e.g., Heartland, 68 FERC at 62,061, 62,063-64.

adequately mitigated, market power in the generation and transmission of electric energy,

and cannot erect other barriers to entry by potential competitors. 166 In the past, the

Commission has found that an open access transmission tariff mitigated transmission

market power. 167

As discussed above, some commenters believe that the Commission should insist

upon RTO participation as a condition necessary to yield competition robust enough to

support market-based rates, while others argue that we cannot use market-based rate

authority to advance preferred policies or as a penalty. We are not adopting in this Final

Rule a generic policy that participation in an RTO is a necessary condition to a public

utility receiving, or retaining, market-based rate authority, nor do we propose to use the

denial of market-based rate authority as a penalty for not voluntarily complying with this

Rule. However, we do have an obligation to ensure that rates for wholesale power sales

are just and reasonable, and we adhere to our precedent that market-based rates can be just

and reasonable only where transmission market power has been mitigated and there are no

other barriers to entry.

 
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -146-

16863 FR 53889 (Oct. 7, 1998).

FPA section 202(a) and PURPA section 205

Section 202(a) of the FPA, the authority for which has been delegated to the

Commission by the Secretary of Energy, 168 authorizes and directs the Commission "to

divide the country into regional districts for the voluntary interconnection and

coordination of facilities for the generation, transmission, and sale of electric energy." 

The purpose of this division into regional districts is for "assuring an abundant supply of

electric energy throughout the United States with the greatest possible economy and with

regard to the proper utilization and conservation of natural resources." Section 202(a) of

the FPA states that it is "the duty of the Commission to promote and encourage such

interconnection and coordination within each such district and between such districts."

Some commenters assert that FPA section 202(a) gives us broad authority and

discretion to promote RTOs to support an abundant supply of electric energy with the

greatest possible economy, while others contend that the authority is limited by the

"voluntary" nature of the provision. We need not decide the precise confines of section

202(a) authority here. Clearly, this section gives the Commission the authority, after

consultation with state commissions, to establish boundaries for regional districts for the

voluntary interconnection and coordination of facilities in order to assure an abundant

supply of electric energy with the greatest possible economy. We have decided in this
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -147-

169The legislative history, as well as the Commission's past use of section 202(a),

indicates that the provision applies to both public utilities and non-public utilities. See S.

Rep. No. 621, at 49 (1935) ("public as well as private plants are included"); Reliability

and Adequacy of Electric Service, Order No. 383, 41 FPC 846,47 (1969) (information on

coordination requested pursuant to section 202(a) from public and non-public utilities). 

17016 U.S.C. 824a-1.

Rule that we will exercise this authority, at least in the first instance, by allowing

transmission owners, in consultation with other interested parties and state commissions,

to propose to us what they believe to be appropriate regional districts. In this regard, we

conclude that the Commission, pursuant to FPA section 202(a), clearly has the authority to

direct public utilities as well as non-public utilities 169 to consider the regional

coordination that would result from joining an RTO and to participate in Commissionsanctioned RTO discussions.

As we are not in this Final Rule mandating any particular interconnection or

coordination of facilities, we need not address whether the language in FPA section 202(a)

referring to "voluntary" interconnection and coordination limits our authority. It is clearly

the intent and requirement of this section that the Commission encourage and promote a

regional approach, which is what we are doing in this Final Rule.

Section 205 of PURPA 170 also supports the Commission's authority to encourage

and promote regional coordination. This section, which addresses power pooling, gives

the Commission the authority to exempt electric utilities from state laws or regulations

which prohibit or prevent voluntary coordination, and to recommend to electric utilities to
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -148-

171In Public Service Company of New Mexico, 25 FERC ¶ 61,469 at 62,038

(1983), the Commission stated that, "Our mandate under PURPA to promote voluntary

coordination is similar to that exercised by our predecessor, the Federal Power

Commission, for more than 40 years under Section 202(a) of the Federal Power Act."

Accord Pacific Gas and Electric Company, 38 FERC ¶ 61,242 at 61,791 (1987) (PURPA

"reaffirms the Commission's authority to promote voluntary coordination of electric

utilities"). 

enter voluntarily into negotiations for pooling arrangements where opportunities for

conservation, efficiency, and increased reliability exist. The Commission has previously

interpreted section 205 of PURPA as essentially complementing the functions under

section 202(a). 171

FPA Section 203

The Commission has the authority and responsibility under section 203 of the FPA

to review mergers and other transactions involving public utilities, including dispositions

of jurisdictional facilities by public utilities. There are two aspects of this authority that

relate to RTO formation. First, public utilities' transfers of control of jurisdictional

transmission facilities to entities such as RTOs would require section 203 approval. 

Under section 203 of the FPA, the Commission must approve a proposed disposition of

jurisdictional facilities if it is consistent with the public interest. 

Second, the Commission may grant an application under section 203 upon such

terms and conditions as it finds necessary to secure the maintenance of adequate service

and the coordination in the public interest of jurisdictional facilities. FPA section 203(b)
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -149-

172El Paso Electric Company and South West Services, 68 FERC ¶ 61,181 at

61,914-15 (1994), dismissed, 72 FERC ¶ 61,292 (1995).

173Inquiry Concerning the Commission's Merger Policy Under The Federal Power

Act, 61 FR 68595 (Dec. 30, 1996), FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 31,044 at 30,115, 30,121,

30,137 (1996).

explicitly gives the Commission authority to condition a public utility's proposed

disposition of jurisdictional assets "upon such terms and conditions as it finds necessary or

appropriate to secure the maintenance of adequate service and the coordination in the

public interest of facilities subject to the jurisdiction of the Commission." Thus, for

instance, the Commission has used section 203 conditioning authority to require that all

mergers be conditioned on the offer of comparable open access transmission. 172 In the

Commission's Merger Policy Statement, it was recognized that the development of fully

competitive generation markets is in the public interest and that turning over control of

transmission assets to an ISO might be an appropriate remedy for anticompetitive effects

of a merger. 173 

Some commenters urge the Commission to make RTO participation a standardized

condition to all mergers in order to mitigate increased generation and transmission

concentration, while others claim that RTO imposition as a section 203 condition would

require specific findings in a particular case. We do not find as a generic matter in this

proceeding that no merger could be consistent with the public interest in the absence of

RTO participation. However, as noted in the Merger Policy Statement with respect to
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -150-

174See Northern States, supra note 89.

ISOs, turning control of transmission assets over to an RTO might be an appropriate

remedy for the anticompetitive effects of a merger. In general, our processing of merger

applications can be facilitated to the extent the merging parties have resolved potential

anticompetitive issues through means such as RTO participation.

Other Legal Issues 

Commenters have suggested other statutory authorities that may be relevant to our

efforts to encourage RTOs. These include FPA section 207, which upon state commission

complaint authorizes the Commission to remedy inadequate or insufficient interstate

service; FPA sections 202(b) and 210, which address the Commission's authority to order

interconnections and make effective an interconnection; FPA section 209, which

authorizes the Commission to refer matters to joint boards composed of Commission and

state representatives; and FPA sections 211 and 212, which address the Commission's

authority to require transmission services. We agree that, under appropriate

circumstances, these authorities may indeed be relevant to RTO formation. However, we

do not, and need not, rely upon them for what we are requiring in this Final Rule, so we

will not address here what authority they might confer.

In response to those commenters who assert that the Northern States 174 court

decision somehow limits our authority with respect to RTOs, we disagree. As reflected in
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -151-

175Northern States Power Co. (Minnesota) and Northern States Power Co.

(Wisconsin), 89 FERC ¶ 61,178 (1999).

our recently issued order on remand 175 of the Northern States court decision, that decision

addresses narrow circumstances involving transmission curtailment where the third-party

transmission customer has redispatch options. We do not interpret the decision as limiting

our authority to encourage or require RTO participation. Moreover, we note that

formation of RTOs is likely to eliminate or significantly reduce the potential for the type

of conflict encountered in Northern States.

With respect to the commenter seeking clarification of the authorities we are

relying upon to require the filings we are mandating in this Rule, we clarify that we are

relying upon the authorities contained in FPA sections 202(a), 304, 307, and 309 for the

filings we are requiring under new sections 35.34(c) and (g). To the extent a public utility

proposes to participate in an RTO, we will process that application pursuant to FPA

sections 203, 205 or other sections as appropriate. 

D. Minimum Characteristics of an RTO

In the NOPR, we proposed minimum characteristics and functions for a

transmission entity to qualify as an RTO. These characteristics and functions are designed

to ensure that any RTO will be independent and able to provide reliable, nondiscriminatory and efficiently priced transmission service to support competitive regional
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -152-

176FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 32,541 at 33,726.

177Id. at 33,727.

bulk power markets. In the section that follows, we discuss the four minimum

characteristics for an RTO, which are: 

(1) independence from market participants; 

(2) appropriate scope and regional configuration;

(3) possession of operational authority for all transmission facilities under the

RTO's control; and 

(4) exclusive authority to maintain short-term reliability.

In our discussion below, we clarify and revise to some extent our discussion in the NOPR,

but we affirm these as the minimum characteristics of an RTO. 

1. Independence (Characteristic 1)

As a first required characteristic, the Commission stated that all RTOs must be

independent of market participants. To achieve independence, we proposed that RTOs

must satisfy three conditions. First, the RTO, its employees, and any non-stakeholder

directors must not have any financial interests in any market participants. 176 Second, the

RTO must have a decision-making process that is independent of control by any market

participant or class of participants. 177 The NOPR defined market participant as any entity

or its affiliate that buys or sells electric energy in the RTO’s region or in any neighboring
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -153-

178Id. at 33,729.

region that might be affected by the RTO’s actions. We said that this second condition

would be judged on a case-by-case basis. However, the Commission also proposed, by

way of example, that an RTO could satisfy this second condition with (a) a nonstakeholder governing board and (b) a prohibition on market participants having more than

a de minimis (one percent) ownership interest in the RTO. Third, the RTO must have

exclusive and independent authority to file changes to its transmission tariff with the

Commission under section 205 of the FPA. 178 

Comments

A large number of commenters address different facets of the independence

characteristic. To make the summary of comments more manageable, we grouped the

comments by key sub-issues: the basic principle; who is a market participant; RTO

economic interests in market participants and energy markets; voting interests of one

market participant and affiliates; voting interests of classes of market participants; passive

ownership interests; RTO governing boards; role of state agencies; and section 205 filing

rights. 

The Basic Independence Principle

In the NOPR, the Commission reiterated its earlier statement that "the principle of

independence is the bedrock upon which the ISO must be built" and that this standard
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -154-

179Id. at 33,726.

180EEI at 25.

181TDU Systems at 41.

182Nine Commissions at 8.

183FP&L at 32.

should apply to all RTOs, whether they are ISOs, transcos or variants of the two. 179

Virtually all commenters agree with this principle. For example, EEI states that "[a]

decisionmaking process independent of the control of any market participant or class of

market participants should be an important aspect of the independence principle." 180 The

TDU Systems say that "[f]ull independence is vitally important to the success of RTOs . . .

and cannot be safely compromised." 181 The Nine Commissions urge that RTOs must be

"truly independent of market participants in word, deed and appearance." 182 Despite the

almost unanimous acceptance of the principle, there are fundamental disagreements

(discussed in later sections) among commenters as to how the principle should be

implemented, especially for RTOs that would operate as stand alone, for-profit transcos

Some commenters question whether complete independence comes at too high a

cost. For example, FP&L recommends that the Commission "not consider independence

in a vacuum." It contends that "it would make little sense to trade off the greatest degree

of independence for the highest cost structure." 183 Salomon Smith Barney makes a

similar point. It contends that strict application of the independence standard could thwart
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -155-

184Salomon Smith Barney at 5.

185WEPCO at 9.

the development of for-profit RTOs. Therefore, it urges the Commission "not to

promulgate rules that maintain absolute purity but also throttle the . . . voluntary formation

of RTOs." 184 Konoglie/Ford/Fleishman, three individuals from the financial community,

express concern that independence will usually be interpreted to mean a separation

between ownership and control as currently practiced in ISOs. They argue that, if the ISO

model becomes the norm, it could lead to higher capital costs because those who own the

transmission assets would not be able to make basic investment and operating decisions. 

They point out that ownership usually imparts control in most U.S. industries and that

transmission operating and investment efficiencies are unlikely to be achieved unless this

becomes the norm in a restructured U.S. electricity industry.

 PJM and WEPCO contend that a for-profit transmission company can never be

independent because it will always be biased in its operating and investment decisions. 

Specifically, they assert that a for-profit transco will always be biased toward transmission

solutions over other solutions (such as generation redispatch) and its own transmission

assets over transmission assets owned by others. WEPCO, therefore, concludes that

independence can be achieved only if there is an ISO operating over a for-profit

transmission company. 185
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -156-

186Illinois Commission at 29.

Other commenters argue that it would be naive to believe that independence, by

itself, will lead to an effective RTO. They argue that an RTO may be completely

independent but it must also have sufficient operational and decisionmaking authority if it

is to be effective. For example, the TDU Systems assert that independence will not be

sufficient if transmission owners attempt to reserve certain decisions for themselves. It

points to the transco proposals of the Entergy and the Alliance Companies as examples of

a proposed RTO having insufficient decisionmaking authority. NECPUC, representing six

New England commissions, argues that an RTO must have independent funding and urges

the Commission to include this as an explicit requirement in the final rule. NCPA states

that an RTO will not be truly independent unless it is able to make and implement

independent procurement decisions.

Who Is a Market Participant?

There is substantial disagreement among commenters about the proposed definition

of market participant. Some commenters argue that it should be expanded; others contend

that it should be narrowed. In the first group, Illinois Commission urges us to expand the

definition of a stakeholder because "[a] market interest can arise through functions and

activities other than just buying or selling electricity." 186 Enron/APX/Coral Power echo

this point and contend that an RTO should "not be subject to control by, and has no
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -157-

187Enron/APX/Coral Power at 8.

188See Duke Power at 27. See also Midwest Municipals, Avista and American

Forest.

189United Illuminating disagrees. It asserts that "transmission owners without

power marketing interests" should not be considered as market participants. United

Illuminating at 37.

interest in the success of any vendor or buyer in the competitive functions of the industry."

187 Duke recommends expanding the definition to include "any distribution company or

neighboring transmission company and/or any buyer or seller of ancillary services." 188

PJM urges that the definition of a market participant include any entity that owns

transmission facilities or provides or buys transmission service. 189 

TAPS, representing an informal group of transmission dependent utilities in 24

states, also urges us to adopt a broad definition of market participant to ensure RTO

neutrality. It argues that millions of dollars of investments and operating costs will be

affected by RTO decisions. It gives several examples of how RTO decisions can have

major economic impacts. As a transmission planner, an RTO will have substantial

responsibility for routing new transmission lines. Depending on its decisions, it can help

or hurt one gas pipeline or another or one generator or another. As a transmission tariff

administrator, it will have significant discretion in choosing how to price congestion. Any

decision that it makes (e.g., zonal versus nodal pricing) could have significant impacts on

the profitability of particular generators. As the supplier of last resort for ancillary
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -158-

190TAPS at 63.

191CP&L at 23-24. American Forest believes that "the Commission did not intend

such a broad exclusion, and seeks clarification on this point." American Forest at 4.

192CP&L at 23-24.

193LPPC points out that the term "affiliate" is used in defining market participant

(continued...)

services, it will have considerable discretion in defining the types and quantities of

ancillary services that are needed. Depending on its decisions, some generators "will win,

and others will lose." 190 Finally, as the "transmission-request gatekeeper," it will have

substantial influence on who gets service and on what terms. To ensure both the

appearance and reality of neutrality in these various decisions, TAPS urges us to adopt a

broad definition of market participant.

In contrast, others contend that the proposed definition is too broad. CP&L states

that a literal application of the proposed definition "would make every single residential,

commercial, industrial and wholesale electric customer (and all of their affiliates) market

participants." 191 It recommends that the definition be narrowed by changing it to "those

entities that are active in wholesale and non-regulated retail power markets using

transmission of the RTO." 192 LPPC asks that the Commission define the term "affiliate"

because it is not defined anywhere in the NOPR. It also suggests that the definition of

affiliate be limited to "common control" rather than using the five-percent ownership

interest standard of PUHCA. 193
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -159-

193(...continued)

but is not defined anywhere in the proposed rule. 

194Sierra Pacific at 17.

195Salomon Smith Barney at 5. 

A number of commenters focus specifically on the question of whether a

"distribution only" entity (i.e., an entity that performs the sole function of transporting

electricity at distribution voltages) should be considered a market participant. Montana

Power urges us against expanding the definition to include an entity that operates

"distribution-only facilities." It argues that an RTO and a distribution entity are both

"delivery entities" and efficiencies can be gained by having one entity provide "total

delivery service" from high to low voltages. These efficiencies of vertical integration

could include the savings that would result from having maintenance performed on both

transmission and distribution facilities by the same crews, the sharing of shop and

warehouse space and the sharing of various administrative support functions. Sierra

Pacific generally supports this view and asserts that it does not believe that a "transmission

owner could so operate its facilities to materially assist affiliated transmission and

distribution interests to the disadvantage of unaffiliated entities." 194

Salomon Smith Barney takes a more cautious view. It states that an RTO owned by

distribution entities "could manipulate the grid to favor their customers over the customers

of other distributors." 195 Trans-Elect argues that the Commission's recent attempt to
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -160-

196Trans-Elect at 5 citing Northern States Power Co. v. FERC, 176 F.3d 1090 (8th

Cir. 1999).

197Sierra Pacific at 16.

impose non-discriminatory curtailment procedures on all users of the grid in the NSP

service territory demonstrates that this problem already exists. 196 Arguing that it would

be undesirable to lose distribution entities as potential investors in RTOs, Salomon Smith

Barney recommends that the Commission require RTOs to follow market-based priority

rules in curtailment situations to reduce the likelihood that an RTO would favor affiliated

distribution entities.

Both Sierra Pacific and NEPCO et al. raise concerns about the interaction of the

market participant definition and "state-mandated backstop power supply obligations." 

NEPCO et al. asserts that all 23 states that have opted for retail competition to date have

usually imposed a default supplier obligation (which also is referred to as a "standard offer

supplier" or a " provider of last resort" obligation) on one party which is usually the

incumbent provider. Sierra Pacific notes that the nature and duration of this mandated

obligation varies from state to state "but at least some of the programs are structured so

that the POLR [provider of last resort] does not compete for new customers and has no

incentive to retain existing POLR customers." 197 Both commenters argue that providers

of last resort should not automatically be considered as market participants, even though

they buy and sell electricity, because this would reduce the pool of potential transco
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -161-

198Id.

199One exception is Salomon Smith Barney. It argues that this requirement is

"altogether unreasonable, in that it could require the most qualified directors and

employees to dispose of mutual funds, pension plans and old investments whose tax base

makes disposition unreasonable." Salomon Smith Barney at 3.

investors. Sierra Pacific states that the Commission should "leave the door open to

consider the POLR issue on a case-by-case basis" and that the final regulations should

explicitly say that a provider of last resort would not be deemed a market participant if its

state mandated obligation gives it no incentive to make such sales. 198

Finally, NEPCO et al. raises the issue of incumbent utilities that have tried to divest

themselves of their generating assets but have not yet succeeded. It points to its

difficulties in divesting its minority ownership interests in nuclear plants. It requests that

an entity not be automatically deemed a market participant because of these minority

ownership interests especially if it has taken actions to eliminate its control over the

retained ownership interest (e.g., through a long-term contract that would give marketing

rights to a non-affiliated entity). 

RTO Economic Interests in Market Participants and Energy Markets

Many commenters, representing a wide range of industry constituencies, agree with

the NOPR's proposal that the RTO, its employees and any non-stakeholder directors must

not have any financial interests in electricity market participants. 199 Duke recommends

that, where divestment is required, the Commission should continue its past practice of
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -162-

200With respect to future financial interests, Salomon Smith Barney states that

"[p]rivate enterprises do not normally, control the lives of their ex-employees." Salomon

Smith Barney at 3.

201NASUCA at 17.

202See Midwest Independent System Operator, 85 FERC ¶ 61,250 (1998). See

also Southern Company, Duke, TDU Systems and Avista. 

allowing employees to divest personal investments in a manner that does not cause them

significant financial harm.

Most commenters agree that the focus should be on current financial interests. 200

Several commenters point out that it would be virtually impossible for an RTO to hire

knowledgeable and experienced employees if the Commission were to require no past

financial connections to market participants. They assert that some of the most

knowledgeable candidates for RTO positions, at least in an RTO's early years of

operation, are likely to be individuals who have retired from companies that are market

participants and it is likely that these individuals will be receiving pensions from their

former employers. In situations like this, NASUCA urges the Commission to "exclude

from this prohibition . . . employee pension plans and other post-employment benefits

received while a former employee of a market participant." 201 Others urge that the

Commission follow the precedent that was established in the Midwest ISO decision. 202 

Individuals would not be automatically excluded from RTO employment or directorships

if their pension does not directly depend on the economic performance of their former
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -163-

203TDU Systems at 39.

204FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 32,541 at 33,727.

205Avista at 11. 

employers (e.g., a defined benefit pension plan). TDU Systems suggests that reasonable

exceptions should be made "in the case of defined benefit pension plans, general mutual

funds (as opposed to utility/energy sector funds) that hold stock or bonds of market

participants, or other similar financial holdings where the holder cannot direct specific

investments or benefit directly from stock performance." 203

In the NOPR, we asked whether there was a need to "define the financial

independence requirement in more specific terms." 204 The answer from almost all

respondents was "no." For example, TDU Systems recommend that we issue a general

rule with a set of guidelines and then allow for its application on a case-by-case basis.

Avista agrees and states that any financial independence standard "require[s] case-by-case

consideration as well as the common sense application of the rule of reason." 205

PJM/NEPOOL Customers states that RTOs will have the benefit of the conflict of interest

standards that have been drafted for each of the functioning ISOs. They also recommend

that the Commission commence a separate rulemaking on this issue.

Some commenters contend that the NOPR's treatment of financial independence is

too narrowly drawn. For example, Dynegy argues that while ISOs "may ostensibly be
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -164-

206Dynegy at 35.

207EPSA Reply Comments at 12.

208See NEMA at 19. See also EPSA Reply Comments. 

independent of market participants—they are not independent of the market itself." 206 As

evidence of this phenomenon, it points to instances when the California ISO has tried to

impose price caps on energy prices. EPSA expresses a similar view and points to the price

caps proposed by ISO New England and approved by this Commission during the June

1999 heat wave, when energy prices reached $1,600 a megawatt-hour, as another example

of undesirable and inappropriate intervention by a transmission provider in energy

markets. In crafting a definition of independence, EPSA urges the Commission to require

that RTOs "should be indifferent to the price at which the commodity they transport clears

the market." 207

Others argue that this conflict is unavoidable as long as the Commission imposes a

requirement that RTOs be the supplier of last resort for certain ancillary services. 208

According to these commenters, this obligation will often require that the RTO be a buyer

in certain ancillary service markets. If the supplier of last resort obligation is also

combined with a requirement that the RTO buy efficiently, then it is inevitable that the

RTO will be interested in whether the prices are high or low (i.e., it is no longer simply a

disinterested market operator). 
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -165-

209See, e.g., EEI, Duke, CP&L and PacifiCorp.

210EEI notes that the NOPR mentions the one percent cap on voting interests by

market participants in the National Grid Company in England and Wales but observes

that there was no obvious justification given at the time the decision was made.

211EEI at 26.

Active (Voting) Ownership Interests in the RTO

a. By Individual Market Participants and Their Affiliates

A number of commenters oppose a one-percent cap on allowed voting interests of

market participants in RTOs as a necessary requirement for achieving independence. 209 

EEI states that such a cap is not "necessary, rational or supportable" for achieving the goal

of independence. 210 It recommends that the Commission allow market participants or

their affiliates to own up to ten-percent voting interests in RTOs. EEI also asks for a

clarification of whether an ownership restriction would "apply only to ownership in the

RTO itself or does it also apply to ownership interests in the transmission facilities under

the operational control of the RTO." 211 PJM, which is organized as a non-profit limited

liability corporation (LLC), asks the Commission to clarify whether its "members" would

be considered owners.

CTA also argues for a higher cap. It states that the NOPR's emphasis on ownership

is misplaced. Instead, the Commission should be concerned with the "actual control over
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -166-

212CTA at 4.

213Alliance Companies at 18.

214Most investor-owned utilities agree with EEI. An exception is Cinergy which

urges the Commission to incorporate the one-percent ownership standard in the final

regulations "exactly as proposed" because such a prohibition "is vital to preserving a

RTO's financial independence characteristic." Cinergy at 17.

215Entergy at 28.

the day-to-day affairs of the system, not some arbitrary percent ownership test." 212 The

Alliance Companies express the concern that, even though the one percent cap appears to

have been proposed as a "safe harbor," it could quickly become "the only port of entry to

Commission approval." 213

EEI observes that other government agencies allow five or ten percent ownership in

voting shares before assuming that these ownership interests conveyed control. 214 For

example, it notes that the SEC definition of an "affiliate" under PUHCA is limited to

entities that own or control more than five percent of the voting stock of a public utility. It

also observes that this Commission, in determining whether a company is an affiliate of a

natural gas pipeline or an electric utility, applies a rebuttable presumption of control only

when a utility owns ten percent or more of a company's voting stock. Entergy states that

"there do not appear to be instances under U.S. law where one-percent ownership is

considered to give rise to a risk of control." 215
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -167-

216Allegheny Reply Comments at 10.

217In contrast, APPA states that affiliated transcos should be allowed "only where

such private companies operate under the direct, ongoing supervision of a strong, fully

functional regional Independent System Operator." APPA at 28. 

218FP&L at 26.

219See, e.g., Midwest Municipals, APPA, TDU Systems and Industrial Consumers.

Several commenters question why there should be any limits on the amount of

voting shares that can be held by a market participant. For example, Allegheny asserts

that "[t]he desire to maintain or obtain ownership of transmission assets by market

participants should not be regarded as an evil to be avoided at all costs." 216 FP&L states

that there is no need to prohibit affiliated transcos. 217 It argues that the Commission

should allow 100-percent ownership of voting equity and ensure non-discriminatory

transmission access through codes of conduct and state commission oversight, in the case

of a single state RTO. It observes that "in the natural gas industry there are numerous

transcos (pipelines) that are affiliated with gas producers, marketers and/or distribution

companies and there is no basis to conclude that this structure would be less likely to

succeed in the electric power industry." 218

Other commenters disagree and urge the Commission to adopt even stricter

standards on ownership than those presented in the NOPR. 219 For example, APPA

recommends that the final rule prohibit any ownership interests in RTOs by market
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -168-

220 APPA clarifies that it does not oppose market participants owning "for-profit"

transcos if the transcos come under the supervision of strong fully functional ISOs. 

Industrial Consumers recommend that a one-percent cap should be adopted in the final

rule as a general requirement rather than as a possible safe harbor. In addition, it

recommends that the cap be calculated on a corporate-wide basis to avoid the situation of

multiple affiliates each with a one-percent interest. See Industrial Consumers at 30.

221See South Carolina Authority at 18.

222TDU Systems at 41 citing FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 32,541 at 31,145.

participants. 220 APPA states that even a one-percent ownership would represent an

unjustifiable and unnecessary exception to the independence standard. South Carolina

Authority agrees with APPA and argues that the NOPR failed to present a "public policy

benefit" for allowing even a de minimis ownership interest. 221 NASUCA also shares this

view. In addition, it asserts that as soon as the Commission allows any ownership by

market participants it will be forced to continually track the share of each market

participant, including affiliates. NASUCA argues that this would be "time-consuming,

difficult and expensive" and would represent the very antithesis of the independent, lightly

regulated structure that the Commission wished to foster.

 TDU Systems concurs and observes that any ownership by market participants will

trigger the "chasing after conduct" regulation that the Commission said it hoped to avoid.

222 In addition, TDU Systems criticizes EEI's ten percent proposal. TDU Systems asserts

that EEI fails to understand the rationale for the "safe harbor" proposal in the NOPR. 

TDU Systems argues that the regulatory purpose of a "safe harbor" is to ensure that "no
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -169-

223TDU Systems Reply Comments at 14 (italicized in the original).

224Consumer Groups Reply Comments at 8.

225Cinergy at 18.

case-by-case review of the regulatory agency is required." 223 Therefore, TDU Systems

contends that it would be inappropriate to adopt EEI's proposed ten percent because this

percentage is not in the "safe harbor" but, as recognized by other regulatory agencies,

raises a clear risk of control. Consumer Groups supports this view and points to one case

in which a court decided that a three-percent ownership interest of a company's common

stock was found to be "sufficient to assert control over the corporation because the

ownership of the other common shares was widely dispersed." 224

The Alliance Companies, who support a ceiling of five percent ownership in voting

interests by market participants, state that they "are aware of no practical means of

tracking who has an ownership interest at a threshold of less than five percent " because

SEC regulations require reporting of ownership in publicly traded companies only at fivepercent ownership and above. In contrast, Cinergy asserts that enforcing a lower

ownership limit should not be a problem. It states that the Commission could keep track

of ownership interests "through transmission owners' representations and subsequent

audits if the need arises." 225

APPA, which argues for absolute and total prohibition on voting ownership by

market participants, asserts that even with access to SEC data it will be difficult for the
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -170-

226South Carolina Authority at 8 (quoting from FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 32,541 at

33,718 (emphasis added by the quoter)).

227South Carolina Authority at 14.

228TDU Systems at 42.

Commission to keep track of who really owns voting shares since they are often registered

in "street" names. Therefore, it urges the Commission to impose a total prohibition on

ownership by market participants. South Carolina Authority agrees and further argues that

anything less would fail to achieve the Commission's characterization of an RTO as entity

in which "the control of transmission operation is cleanly separated from power market

participants." 226 It concludes that "[t]here is nothing 'clean' about permitting incumbent

transmission owners to indefinitely maintain an ownership interest, voting or otherwise, in

the newly created RTO." 227

EPSA suggests a compromise that would allow greater flexibility with respect to

initial ownership interests. It proposes that the Commission establish time limits on voting

ownership. TDU Systems makes a similar recommendation with respect to passive

ownership. While TDU Systems states that it would prefer an absolute prohibition on

market participants owning voting shares, it suggests that the Commission might consider

allowing transmission owners to "hold passive, non-voting ownership interests. in excess

of one percent as an extraordinary transition measure." 228 However, TDU Systems
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -171-

229Salt River at 11. United Illuminating agrees and states that if the Commission 

"were to adopt a higher de minimis standard, such as five or ten percent ownership

interest, it would be relatively easy for five or six market participants owning such

percentages to control the operations of an RTO." United Illuminating at 39-40.

recommends that such interests be reduced to one percent or below in a "relatively short

period of time." 

b. By Classes of Market Participants

SRP asserts that the NOPR is flawed because it is not sufficient to place a

limitation on the ownership interests that can be held by a single participant and its

affiliates while ignoring the possibility that other owners may have similar interests. SRP

urges the Commission to recognize that "[a]n interest that may be considered de minimis,

when viewed in isolation, could still result in effective control when aggregated for a

group with common interests." 229 Therefore, it recommends that limits be placed not

only on the ownership interests of an individual market participant but also on the

ownership interests by other market participants with similar economic interests. SRP

does not recommend a specific percentage for a group cap, but Industrial Consumers urge

the Commission to cap the voting interests of any group at five percent.

FP&L contends that there is no need for ownership caps for a group of market

participants because they will often have conflicting economic interests. It gives the

example of a group of transmission owners with ownership interests in an RTO who also

own affiliated power marketers. FP&L argues these marketing affiliates will compete
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -172-

230Alliance Companies at 21-22.

231EEI Reply Comments at 21.

232Id.

against each other and this rivalry will mitigate the potential for collusion among the

parent companies that jointly own the RTO. Alliance Companies agree with this view. 

They assert that "[i]n today's competitive power markets, all market participants, including

those traditionally classified within the same stakeholder group are likely to be

competitors" and, therefore, that it is unlikely that there will be a "nexus of interest." 230

EEI argues that ownership caps on groups of market participants would be

"impractical and extremely burdensome on Commission resources" because the

Commission would have to keep track of ownership levels by every market participant and

also align market participants into specific groups with "alleged common interests." 231 In

addition, it contends that this task would be difficult to do because markets are evolving

and the business objectives of individual firms will change as they buy or sell assets. 

Moreover, while accepting that "some market participants may have common interests at

certain times" EEI believes that such "coalitions" would be "fragile, short-lived and

unlikely to result in a serious threat to the independence of the RTO." 232

A number of commenters assert that a cap on voting interests will thwart capital

formation in new and existing transmission facilities. For example, UtiliCorp contends

that such a cap "may potentially choke off significant sources of capital" for the formation
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -173-

233UtiliCorp at 7.

234Alliance Companies at 19.

235In contrast, APPA asserts that "if the underlying business model is sound,

investors will come." APPA at 36.

of for-profit transcos. 233 Various commenters from the financial community argue that

such a cap would make it difficult to create RTOs that function as for-profit transcos. 

Salomon Smith Barney states that current owners of transmission assets need to retain a

larger ownership interest, at least for a transition period, in order to avoid heavy capital

gains taxes. It estimates that many current transmission owners would have to pay capital

gains taxes on about 35 to 50 percent of the current book value of their transmission assets

if they were to sell these assets.

 Alliance Companies asserts that restrictions on ownership would reduce the

potential pool of investors (i.e., buyers of transmission assets) and therefore reduce the

price that current owners could receive for their assets. They contend that this would be

especially damaging because it would place limits on ownership by "those entities that are

most likely to understand the potential value of the business model." 234 Alliance

Companies states that the Commission should allow five-percent individual ownership

interests by industry participants because this will provide confidence to other, non-energy

industry investors that the transco will be a financial success. 235 In general, the Alliance

Companies and other commenters that share this view take the position that a one-percent
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -174-

236See, e.g., EEI, Enron/APX/Coral Power and UtiliCorp.

237EEI at 26. EEI relies on a legal memorandum that concludes that passive

ownership interests are "necessarily permissible, no matter how large and no matter what

other interests they are combined with." EEI Appendix H at 17.

238Enron/APX/Coral Power at 14.

239Southern Company at 42.

cap for market participants will be a major impediment to the creation of for-profit

transcos and that the de facto effect of such a cap will be to limit the industry to the ISO

model.

Passive (Non-Voting) Ownership Interests in the RTO

A number of privately-owned utilities stress that the final rule must distinguish

between passive and voting interests in RTOs. 236 For example, while EEI is willing to

accept a ten-percent cap on ownership of voting interests by individual market

participants, it states that "[t]here should be no limit on the amount of passive ownership

interest" because "[p]assive owners who lack voting rights have no ability to control the

firm." 237 Enron/APX/Coral Power also support this position. They urge the Commission

to "explicitly and unambiguously allow incumbent utilities and other power industry

participants to possess passive but not controlling ownership interests in an RTO." 238

Southern Company states that "[p]assive ownership of transmission facilities—even up to

100 percent—should not be a concern." 239 United Illuminating, while recommending that

the Commission allow passive ownership, recommends that we should not issue generic
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -175-

240United Illuminating at 7.

241EEI at 26.

242Entergy at 29.

rules because passive ownership is a "complex matter that must be reviewed on a case-bycase basis." 240

EEI contends that some of the opposition to passive ownership by market

participants may simply reflect a misunderstanding of the fiduciary responsibilities that the

board of a for-profit transco has to its passive owners. EEI asserts that, under Delaware

law and various model statutes, the fiduciary responsibilities of a for-profit transco board,

its managers and owners that hold voting rights to a passive owner are limited to

maximizing the value of the transmission assets and "not the value of any other assets that

may be held by the passive owner." 241 According to EEI, a transco board has no

fiduciary obligation to take actions to produce economic benefits for other assets such as

generating units that happen to be owned by its passive owners. Entergy states that if

there are any lingering doubts about the fiduciary obligation of the board and its voting

members, a provision could be inserted in the "transco's limited liability agreement that

specifically directed that managers would have no fiduciary duty to consider the private

interests of members" and that such a provision would be enforceable under Delaware

law. 242
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -176-

243Consumer Groups Reply Comments at 9.

244EEI at 26 citing Entergy Services, Inc., 88 FERC ¶ 61,149 (1999).

245South Carolina Authority at 22.

Consumer Groups, however, questions the legal feasibility of this approach. It cites

to several law review articles which it argues raise doubts as to whether fiduciary duties

assigned by a state law to the directors of a subsidiary corporation can be removed by

private agreement. It also cautions the Commission not to get lost in "a lawyer's duel over

conflicting citations about the treatment of passive and affiliated ownership interests"

when the fundamental issue is the need to safeguard independence and "avoid any

appearance of partiality." 243

 EEI points to our recent decision in Entergy Services, Inc., as demonstrating that

the Commission recognizes that passive ownership is not inconsistent with the

independence principle under the ISO principles of Order No. 888. 244 It asks that the

Commission reach the same policy conclusion for any similar independence requirement

in the final RTO rule. In contrast, the South Carolina Authority observes that the while

the Entergy decision could be read to imply that the Commission has "prejudged this

issue," the Commission should now use the opportunity of this NOPR to take another look

at the issue. 245

EEI also points to actions or policies taken by other federal regulatory agencies that

it argues support its contention that passive ownership does not necessarily convey
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -177-

246Sierra Pacific at 11.

247Id.

control. It observes that the definitions of "holding company," "affiliate" and "subsidiary

company" in PUHCA are all tied to ownership of voting rather than non-voting shares. 

Similarly, EEI states that the FCC "attribution rules" used to determine when broadcasters

and cable companies own or control another broadcaster or cable company are keyed to

voting rather than passive ownership interests. According to EEI, these policies

demonstrate that other federal regulatory agencies do not believe that passive ownership

conveys control and that the Commission should adopt a similar policy.

EEI also contends that the Commission has already allowed a "passive economic

interest" in all of the ISOs that have been approved to date. Sierra Pacific makes a similar

argument. Sierra Pacific contends that "profits" made by an ISO go back to the

transmission owners even though they may have relinquished operational and

decisionmaking control. It argues that "this arrangement [in ISOs] is the essence of a

passive ownership interest." 246 The principal difference is that "the passive ownership

interest in a Transco involves ownership in the transco itself rather than the assets

operated by the Transco." 247 However, it argues that in substance both types of interests

are the same since they allow the owner to share in the profits derived from operating their

transmission facilities without having any influence over that operation. Sierra Pacific

concludes by urging the Commission to allow passive ownership in both types of
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -178-

248Sierra Pacific at 12

249Enron/APX/Coral Power at 14. 

250TDU Systems Reply Comments at 22.

251See, e.g., APPA, Industrial Consumers and South Carolina Authority.

institutions to avoid creating "an artificial incentive in favor of ISOs instead of

Transcos." 248

Enron/APX/Coral Power point to the example of National Grid Company (NGC) in

England and Wales as a real world example of passive ownership of a for-profit transco by

market participants. For several years after privatization in 1990, the regional electricity

companies (RECs) were allowed to own NGC but were "expressly barred from

participating in day-to-day management or interfering with the ability of NGC to fulfill the

purpose of privatization." 249 However, in reply comments TDU Systems contends that

Enron/APX/Coral Power fails to mention that this passive ownership arrangement was

terminated after several years. Citing to a recent interview with Callum McCarthy, Great

Britain's Director of Gas and Electricity Supply, TDU Systems points out that the RECs

were "told to divest these interests, and did so." 250

In contrast, TDU Systems and others ask the Commission not to allow passive

ownership in the final rule. 251 TDU Systems say that "the line between passive and
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -179-

252TDU Systems at 41.

253Entergy at 42.

254Salomon Smith Barney Reply Comments at 15.

255South Carolina Authority at 21.

active ownership is often not a bright line." 252 As an example, it states that in the recent

Alliance transco filing, the divesting transmission owners "hold supposedly passive

ownership interests in the Transco, but retain the right to pass on a number of different

business transactions." 253 TDU Systems assert that if the Commission opens the door to

ownership of RTOs by market participants, it will be forced to engage in substantial

"conduct policing." Salomon Smith Barney concurs and states that passive ownership

"will prove troublesome for both the utilities and FERC" because it creates a "need to

constantly police supposedly passive ownership positions to make sure that they remain

passive in all respects." 254 

South Carolina Authority echoes this point. It argues that by allowing passive

ownership the Commission would be put in the difficult job of determining "how 'passive'

a particular 'passive interest' really is." 255 It urges the Commission not to compromise its

"bedrock position on independence" because it will lead to "an endless series of extensive

battles over ownership structure, corporate bylaws and rules, layered on top of continuing
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -180-

256Id. at 24.

257Id.

258See, e.g., Entergy and Southern Company.

259Consumer Groups Reply Comments at 11.

allegations of discrimination in the marketplace." 256 It asks "why . . . risk compromising

the independence principle?" 257

Just as several commenters raise capital formation arguments in support of the need

to allow some voting interests by market participants, many of these commenters also raise

similar arguments in support of allowing passive ownership. 258 In general, they contend

that current owners are not likely to sell transmission assets voluntarily to others if selling

leads to a large capital gains tax payment. They contend that passive ownership provides

a creative way to allow transfer of grid operations to an independent party while reducing

the tax burden on current transmission owners.

In contrast, Consumer Groups asserts that there are mechanisms other than passive

ownership that would "permit 'divestiture' without tax consequences" and that an

important advantage of these other mechanisms is that they would "better assure

independence." 259 As one example, Consumer Groups asserts that a vertically integrated

utility could spin off its transmission assets to its shareholders. While recognizing that the

IRS Code seems to eliminate the favorable tax treatment if the spun-off corporation is sold

within two years of the original distribution, Consumer Groups states that this is a
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -181-

260Enron/APX/Coral Power at 14. 

261ISO-NE at 20.

rebuttable, not an absolute, prohibition and that a recent IRS proposed rule seems to

suggest that favorable tax treatment could be retained if the spin-off of transmission assets

is done in response to regulatory mandates. South Carolina Authority raises a different

argument against regulatory policies to accommodate passive ownership. It asks why the

Commission should feel obligated to minimize the federal corporate income tax

responsibilities of privately owned utilities.

 Several commenters recommend that we accept passive ownership at least as a

necessary transition device. For example, Enron/APX/Coral Power state that "there will

likely need to be some years of passive ownership by industry participants before the

RTOs will have demonstrated their viability as stand-alone transmission businesses that

can successfully be taken public." 260 ISO-NE, which favors a single grid company for all

of New England, observes that because of "tax and other considerations, current owners of

transmission assets may wish to avoid immediate divestiture, and may wish to retain

indirect ownership." 261 Salomon Smith Barney predicts that most utilities will want to

dispose of passive and minority interests over time. NECPUC, representing the six New

England commissions, echoes this point. It states that the Commission may have to accept

"[t]ransitional periods in which the ownership interests of market participants are phased

out over time." If such transitions are allowed, NECPUC urges us to ensure that they are
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -182-

262NECPUC at 11.

263See, e.g., Advisory Committee ISO-NE, APX, Avista, Desert STAR, Industrial

Consumers, PJM, Reliant, South Carolina Authority and UtiliCorp. In general, these

commenters adopt the convention used in the NOPR that a non-stakeholder is

synonymous with a non-market participant. See note 187 in FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶

32,541 at 33,726.

264Justice Department at 4. The Southern Company states that if the Commission

requires non-stakeholder boards RTOs that are ISOs, then it must allow transmission

owners the right to establish "performance standards" for the RTO and the right to

withdraw if the RTO fails to meet these standards. Southern Company at 40-41.

"carefully monitored." 262 TDU Systems, as noted earlier, recommends that passive

ownership should be used only as an "extraordinary transition measure" and should be

allowed only for a short period of time. 

RTO Governing Boards

Many commenters recommend that membership on RTO governing (i.e.,

decisional) boards be limited to non-stakeholders. 263 For example, the Justice

Department urges the Commission to consider barring all market participants from any

decision-making role. It says that this approach assures “a clean structural break.” 264 If

stakeholders are allowed on the governing board, the Justice Department recommends that

independents (i.e., non-stakeholders) should constitute a majority of the board’s voting

members and that the board’s voting rules not allow vetoes by any one class of

stakeholders. Most commenters who support an independent board recommend that the

maximum size of the board not be specified in the final rule but instead be left to the
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -183-

265UtiliCorp at 11.

266Midwest Municipals at 19.

discretion of the participants. Two exceptions are the South Carolina Authority, which

recommends that board size be limited to seven to nine directors, and the Midwest

Municipals, which suggests that the Commission question any non-stakeholder board that

has more than 10 to 15 members.

Other commenters state that a danger of non-stakeholder boards, such as those

already approved by the Commission for several ISOs, is that they become isolated and

sometimes unresponsive to stakeholder concerns. UtiliCorp, for example, asserts that

“one of the most frequently heard criticisms of the ISOs currently in existence is their

unresponsiveness and lack of accountability.” 265 Several other commenters echo this

concern and recommend that an independent board be required to consult formally and

informally with advisory committees of stakeholders (i.e., a two-tier form of governance). 

For example, the Midwest Municipals recommend that RTOs with non-stakeholder boards

"be required to have a senior management or advisory committee made up of market

participants from each relevant market sector and subordinate, issue oriented committees"

similar to those that exist in the PJM, New York and New England ISOs. 266 STDUG

recommends that if a non-stakeholder board is formed "it must be accompanied by some
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -184-

267STDUG at 7-8.

268EPSA at 15.

action forming mechanism that forces the board to listen and consider the concerns of all

members or stakeholders in the RTO." 267

 EPSA urges the Commission to pay close attention to the composition and

functions of any committee structure that operates underneath a governing board because

independent governance “does not stop at the ISO board.” 268 It contends that this is

necessary for independence because advisory committees of stakeholders will often have

de facto decisionmaking power. Dynegy makes specific recommendations for any

stakeholder committees that operate below and report to an RTO board. It recommends

that such committees be governed by "segment voting"—each industry segment would

have a proportional vote; each market participant would have to choose to participate in

one market segment; and the votes within a segment would be split among however many

entities choose to participate in that segment. It observes that this approach has been

adopted or proposed in the PJM, NEPOOL and New York ISOs.

Other commenters urge us not to prohibit stakeholder or hybrid boards consisting

of stakeholders and non-stakeholders such as the one that exists in California. Cal ISO,

noting that it is the only FERC-jurisdictional ISO with a stakeholder board, states that

“[t]he Cal-ISO stakeholder board has worked" and urges us to confirm the acceptability of

a stakeholder board in the final rule if the board is structured to ensure that no market
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -185-

269Cal ISO at 15. Cal ISO points out that this has been achieved through a board

of governors in which (1) no one voting class is able to block or veto an action, and (2)

no two classes together are able to form a sufficient majority to make decisions, and (3)

no entity (including its affiliates and subsidiaries) is able to participate in more than one

voting class. See Attachment A-1 of Cal ISO.

270 "A governance structure that includes fair representation of all types of users

would help to ensure that the ISO formulates policies, operates the system, and resolves

disputes in a fair and non-discriminatory manner." Order 888, FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶

31,036 at 31,730-731 

271Dynegy recommends that five "segments" for the stakeholder representatives:

transmission owners, transmission-dependent utilities, marketers, end-users and

independent power producers. Dynegy at 42. 

272California Board at 6.

participant or class of market participants can control the decisions of the RTO. 269 

Dairyland points out that the Commission has encouraged and approved stakeholder

boards under the independence principle for ISOs in Order No. 888. 270 Dynegy

recommends a hybrid governing board with "disinterested" (i.e., non-stakeholder)

members comprising one-third of the board and stakeholder members comprising the

remaining two-thirds. 271 However, it observes that mandated stakeholder representation

would be "inappropriate" for an RTO that is a for-profit transco. California Board urges

us to allow a variety of governance forms including stakeholder boards "until and unless

experience shows that one form" is clearly superior to other forms of governance. 272 TXU

Electric states that "stakeholder representation is a legitimate form of governance for a
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -186-

273TXU Electric at 9.

274NARUC at 11.

275See, e.g., Illinois Commission.

regional transmission organization" and, in fact, is the required form of governance under

the recently enacted Texas electric restructuring statute. 273

Role of State Agencies

Commenters express a wide range of opinions on the appropriate role of state

agencies. The comments fall generally into two categories: the role of state agencies

during the developmental stage and the role of state agencies after an RTO begins

operating.

Many commenters believe that state commissions and other state agencies should

have a major role in RTO development. NARUC argues that state commissions "should

fully participate in RTO formation and development." 274 State commissions generally

take the position that their involvement is important because the size, scope and functions

of an RTO will be critical for the success of their state-by-state retail choice programs. 275 

NECPUC notes that it had an important role in shaping the design of the ISO-NE before

any formal filing was made at the Commission. Nine Commissions, representing state

commissions from the East-Central, Midwest and Southwest regions, gives a specific

example of how the Commission should defer to state commissions. They state that if a

critical mass of state commissions in their region reach agreement on the appropriate
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -187-

276Nine Commissions at 6.

277Enron/APX/Coral Power at A-3.

278Conlon states that these are his views and are not necessarily the views of any

present or former Commissioners or staff of the California PUC.

boundaries for an RTO, then FERC "should provide deference to that collective state

determination." 276

 Other commenters outside of the state regulatory community also address the issue

of the appropriate role for state commissions. For example, Enron/APX/Coral Power say

that state regulators and politicians should play a role in encouraging local transmission

owners to join RTOs but "[t]he role of states . . . should extend no further." 277

Once an RTO becomes operational, Enron/APX/Coral Power argue that state

commissions should have no special role and, in fact, the RTO "should be protected from

local interference." Their argument for minimizing the role of state agencies is that "no

other commercial activity (with the possible exception of telecommunications) is more

intrinsically in interstate commerce." Conlon, the former President of the California

Public Utilities Commission, expresses a similar view ("local control, although desirable

from a states' rights standpoint, should be sacrificed to get interstate control of the entire

interconnection.") 278

 On the issue of voting rights for state commissions, Enron/APX/Coral Power 

argues that it would be inappropriate for any state commission to be a voting member of
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -188-

279NECPUC at 9.

280Arizona Commission at 5.

281In contrast, Reliant recommends that "state officials should serve as board

members in order to avoid conflicts in future decisions." It appears that Reliant is

referring to future decisions of the state agencies. Reliant at 5.

an RTO. Their rationale is that the state commission would lose its ability to monitor the

relationship between the RTO and any entity that may be serving the state's domestic load

if it is also a voting member of the RTO board. NECPUC expresses a similar view. 

While recommending that state commissions have extensive communication with the RTO

and its participants, it concludes that state commissions "should not have a vote in the

governance of the ISO New England." 279 Arizona Commission says that states should

have the right of ex officio membership but that "FERC should not force the states to be

voting members." 280 ISO-NE also shares this view. It contends that it would be

"awkward" for a state official to serve as a voting director of an RTO for several reasons. 

First, it could create a conflict between the state official's duties as an RTO board member

and his or her regulatory or administrative duties at the state level. ISO-NE argues that

many state conflict of interest laws may expressly prohibit such service because of the

conflicts it would create. 281 Second, in the case of a multistate RTO, it may difficult for

an official from one state to vote for decisions that are good for the residents of all the
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -189-

282ISO-NE at 3.

states served by the RTO. Third, the solution of having a board member from each state

"could create gridlock or unwieldy boards." 282

Florida Commission makes a distinction between for-profit and non-profit RTOs. 

It says that it would be inappropriate for members of a state regulatory body or other state

officials to serve on the board of a for-profit transco. However, Florida Commission

believes that it may be appropriate for a state commissioner to serve on the board of a nonprofit RTO if disputes involving the RTO and other parties do not come before the state

commission.

Washington Commission expresses a different view. In its opinion, the role of state

commissions should vary depending on the type of board. It recommends that state

involvement could be limited to the selection of the non-affiliated board members for a

non-stakeholder or hybrid board. In contrast, if there is a stakeholder board, Washington

Commission urges that states be granted "voting member status." In the case of a forprofit transco, it urges the Commission to require a formal advisory role for the states. 

Section 205 Filing Rights

Many IOUs and public systems oppose the NOPR’s proposal to require that RTOs

have "exclusive and independent authority to file changes to its transmission tariff with the
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -190-

283See, e.g., AEP, Alliance Companies, CMUA, Duke, Florida Power Corp.,

LPPC, Metropolitan, Midwest Municipals, Montana-Dakota and Southern Company.

284Citing NEPOOL, 79 FERC ¶ 61,974 at 62, 585 (1997). See, e.g., PJM, Cal

ISO, Industrial Consumers, Montana Commission, NECPUC and NASUCA.

285SRP Reply Comments at 12.

286350 U.S. 332 (1956).

Commission under section 205 of the Federal Power Act." 283 In contrast, those who

support the proposal assert that it is a necessary and logical implication of the

Commission's previously stated policy that the "[a]uthority to act unilaterally . . . is a

crucial element of a truly independent ISO." 284 SRP recommends that "the need for an

RTO to independently administer its own tariff must be balanced against the need for

individual transmission owners to maintain control over their ability to recover their

revenue requirements and meet their debt service obligations." 285

 Those who oppose the proposal focus on the case of an RTO that is an ISO. 

Transmission ISO Participants argues that the proposal is bad law and bad policy. Citing

the Supreme Court decision in United Gas Pipe Line Co. v. Mobile Gas Service Corp., 

286

it asserts that the Commission does not have the legal authority to grant section 205 filing

rights to an ISO. It contends that the FPA grants this fundamental right to transmission

owners that are public utilities. While a transmission owner may "voluntarily cede" this

right to an ISO, the Commission cannot compel a transmission owner, either directly or

indirectly, to give up this legal right. Puget Sound argues that the proposal would have the
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -191-

287Transmission ISO Participants at 20.

288Quoting 81 FERC ¶ 61,122 at 61,506 (1997).

289However, the California ISO asserts that it has "exclusive and independent"

authority "to modify the design of rates for transmission and ancillary services." See Cal

ISO at 18. 

effect of reducing the transmission-owning utility to little more than a "bystander" and

could constitute an illegal "taking" under the Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. 

Transmission ISO Participants also claims that the Commission’s previous

decisions in this area have not been consistent. It asserts that the Commission "required

transmission owners to cede their section 205 rights to the ISO in our order approving the

PJM ISO." 287 But it points to the fact in a 1997 California ISO order that the

Commission seemed to establish a much smaller role for the ISO ("the ISO is responsible

for only collecting the revenue requirement.") 288 Furthermore, it notes that in this same

order the Commission decided to set all rate design and rate methodology issues in the

dockets established for the filings made by the transmission owners, and not in a docket

for the transmission tariff filing made by the ISO. 289

Many commenters also address whether it would be practical to give RTOs FPA

section 205 filing rights for transmission rate design and terms and conditions that directly

affect access while transmission owners would retain section 205 rights for overall

revenue requirements. A number of commenters say that this distinction is unworkable
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -192-

290See, e.g., EEI, Transmission ISO Participants and Southern Company.

291See, e.g., Cal ISO, PJM ISO, Industrial Customers, Montana Commission,

NECPUC and NASUCA.

292PJM at 53.

293PJM at 54. The California, New York and New England ISOs agree with PJM

(continued...)

because the two are inextricably connected (i.e., changes in rate design can have major

impacts on revenue collections). 290

However, other commenters argue that the Commission cannot realistically expect

an RTO to be a neutral and unbiased transmission provider unless the RTO has full legal

authority to propose changes in its own transmission tariff. 291 PJM states that "its ability

to function would be severely hindered" unless it has the ability to unilaterally make tariff

filings. It points to several recent instances of emergency filings with us as examples of

why it must have its own independent filing authority without getting the prior approval of

transmission owners or any other group. It argues that it will not be able to satisfy its

responsibility to "provide for safe and reliable operation of the transmission grid and

operation of a robust, competitive, and non-discriminatory electricity market" without

such authority. 292 However, PJM does state that transmission owners, rather than the

RTO, should have the unilateral right to seek changes in the RTO's tariff to address

changes in the transmission owners revenue requirements with respect to transmission

facilities. 293
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -193-

293(...continued)

on this point.

294Oneok at 8.

 Oneok, a power marketer, states that an RTO needs its own section 205 filing

authority because it would not be able to reach a consensus and act quickly if it must get

the prior approval of all stakeholders. However, Oneok suggests an alternative to what

was proposed in the NOPR. It recommends a two-tier approach to transmission tariff

filings. Under this proposal, "transmission-owning utilities would be free to file changes

to their rates (or rate structures) at any time" to their single customer, the RTO. 294 The

RTO would then be free to "repackage" the transmission capacity and services that it

purchased under these separate transmission owner tariffs in its own RTO transmission

tariff filed under section 205. Oneok states that there are precedents for this approach in

prior Commission practices.

Commission Conclusion

The Basic Independence Principle

In the NOPR, we repeated our earlier statement that "the principle of independence

is the bedrock upon which the ISO must be built "and emphasized that this principle must

apply to all RTOs, whether they are ISOs, transcos or variants of the two. We also stated

that "[a]n RTO needs to be independent in both reality and perception." We reaffirm both

principles in the Final Rule.
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -194-

In applying these principles in the context of ISOs, we have stressed the importance

of a decisionmaking process that is independent of control by any market participant or

class of participants. This, in turn, required that we pay considerable attention to

governance (e.g., voting shares and voting rules). Because ISOs are typically non-profit

and non-share corporations, we generally did not have to consider the effect of ownership

interests on the independence of the ISO. This will change with the emergence of forprofit RTOs, such as transcos, that have ownership interests. For these types of RTOs, we

will have to examine how ownership of the RTO by market participants could affect the

independence of its decisionmaking process. 

Who Is a Market Participant?

The overall purpose of the independence standard in the Final Rule is to ensure that

an RTO will provide transmission service and operate the grid in a non-discriminatory

manner. Equal access requires RTOs to be independent. Implementation of this standard

then requires answering the question: independence from whom? Our logic in the

NOPR, which we have adopted in the Final Rule, is to define a group of entities, referred

to as market participants, whose economic or commercial interests are likely to be affected

by an RTO's decisions and actions.

Commenters provided many helpful comments on the definition of market

participant that was proposed in the NOPR. As noted in the summary, the commenters

generally fall into two broad categories: those who argue that the NOPR definition is too
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -195-

broad and those that argue that it is too narrow. We find that these views were not always

inconsistent since the commenters were often discussing different aspects of the definition. 

 After a careful review of the comments, we conclude that it is necessary to change the

definition of a market participant that was proposed in the NOPR. The revised definition

at section 35.34(b) is: 

(2) Market participant means:

(i) Any entity that, either directly or through an affiliate, sells or

brokers electric energy, or provides transmission or ancillary services to the

Regional Transmission Organization, unless the Commission finds that the

entity does not have economic or commercial interests that would be

significantly affected by the Regional Transmission Organization's actions or

decisions; and 

(ii) Any other entity that the Commission finds has economic or

commercial interests that would be significantly affected by the Regional

Transmission Organization's actions or decisions.

(3) Affiliate means the definition given in section 2(a)(11) of the

Public Utility Holding Company Act (15 U.S.C. 79b(a)(11)).

Before discussing how this definition is different from the NOPR definition, it is

useful to consider why a definition of market participant is needed in the first place. It is

the Commission's view that an RTO must be independent of any entity whose economic or

commercial interests could be significantly affected by the RTO's actions or decisions. 

Without such independence, it will be difficult for an RTO to act in a non-discriminatory

manner. Therefore, the definition focuses on those entities whose economic and

commercial interests can be significantly affected by the RTO's behavior. However, it

should be emphasized that the definition of a market participant is simply a starting point
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -196-

for implementing the independence standard. The definition is used as a reference point

for establishing limits on ownership (i.e., an RTO's ownership of market participants and

market participants' ownership of an RTO) and standards for independent decisionmaking

or governance. As discussed below, the fact that a particular participant is defined as a

market participant does not preclude it from having any active or passive ownership

interest in an RTO.

We agree with many commenters that the NOPR definition was too broad in

defining a market participant to be "any entity that buys or sells electric energy in the

RTO's region or in any neighboring region that might also be affected by the RTO's

actions." As several commenters pointed out, a literal reading of this definition would

make market participants of every residential, commercial, industrial and wholesale

electric customer in the RTO region and some neighboring regions. This is clearly too

encompassing and was not our intent. We therefore are narrowing the definition of a

market participant in the Final Rule to include those who sell or broker electric energy but

not those who buy electric energy.

We recognize, however, that there may be circumstances where buyers of electric

energy could buy a controlling interest in a for-profit RTO and manipulate its access and

curtailment decisions to their advantage. Such an outcome would clearly be inconsistent

with the independence standard. Therefore, as a backstop, we are adding paragraph (b) to

the definition ("any other entity that the Commission finds has economic or commercial
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -197-

295It is conceivable that RTO A might provide transmission service to a

(continued...)

interests that would be significantly affected by the RTO's actions or decisions"). The

addition of this paragraph allows us, on a case-by-case basis, to consider whether

particular buyers of electric energy (or any other entity) could manipulate an RTO's

decisions to the disadvantage of other RTO customers.

We are also dropping the phrase "in the RTO’s region or in any neighboring region

that might also be affected by the RTO’s actions." Given the high degree of integration

within the Eastern and Western Interconnections, the growth of transactions involving

buyers and sellers separated by hundreds of miles and the participation of energy concerns

in multiple markets, we conclude that it would be virtually impossible to apply a

geographically delineated standard. However, we will consider requests for waivers from

entities in other Interconnections who can demonstrate that their economic or commercial

interests would not be significantly affected by the RTO's actions or decisions. 

We are also making one other change to the NOPR definition to expand its scope. 

Paragraph (a) expands the NOPR definition by including entities that provide transmission

or ancillary services to an RTO. We believe that it would compromise an RTO's

independence if one or more transmission owners could influence the RTO's decisions to

the detriment of other market participants. Therefore, it is appropriate to include providers

of transmission service as market participants. 295 With regard to the creation of RTOs
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -198-

295(...continued)

neighboring RTO B. In such a situation, RTO A would be considered a market

participant. RTO A might also acquire ownership interests in RTO B as a first step

towards consolidation of the two RTOs. We would anticipate granting a waiver to RTO

A from the market participant definition and any associated ownership restrictions if we

had reason to believe that the waiver could lead to a larger and more effective RTO.

that are transcos, we have developed policies on the level of ownership that market

participants may possess, as discussed below, in order to ensure that the operating

decisions of the RTO are truly independent and non-discriminatory.

We believe that it is necessary to include ancillary service providers as market

participants since the RTO is the supplier of last resort for ancillary services. As a

consequence, the RTO is likely to have considerable discretion in defining the types and

quantities of ancillary services needed and how they will be procured (e.g., market

design). An RTO's decisions in any of these dimensions can have major economic effect

on one or more providers of such services. Therefore, we define these entities as market

participants to ensure that they are not in a position to influence the RTO's decisions to

their own advantage.

Several other commenters urged us to include distribution entities as market

participants. At present, most distribution entities provide a bundled service. The bundled

service includes the sale of electric energy as well as the delivery of this electric energy

over local distribution facilities. Since these traditional distribution entities are selling

electric energy, they would be considered market participants under the definition. 
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -199-

However, several commenters pointed out that a new type of distribution entity is likely to

emerge with the spread of retail competition. This type of distribution entity would

simply transmit electric energy over distribution facilities for others and would not sell

electricity.

The issue is whether this type of pure distribution entity should be considered a

market participant. Several commenters pointed to the danger of allowing one or two

distribution entities to control an RTO. Their concern is that these distribution entities

could use their control over the RTO to favor their distribution facilities over the facilities

of non-affiliated distribution entities when the RTO has to choose among competing

requests for transmission service or alternative curtailment actions. Other commenters 

minimize this risk and argue that distribution entities should be allowed to own RTOs

because there are economies in having a single entity provide total delivery service (i.e.,

transmit electric energy at high and low voltages). The Commission does not wish to

create impediments to the efficient integration of transmission and distribution facilities. 

Therefore, we will not include pure distribution entities in paragraph (a) of the market

participant definition. However, if we are presented with evidence that a distribution

entity is able to influence an RTO's actions or decisions to the disadvantage of other users,

we may find such a distribution entity to be a market participant under paragraph (b) of

the definition. Paragraph (a) of the revised definition defines all sellers of electric

energy, whether retail or wholesale, as market participants. Several commenters urge us to
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -200-

exclude retail providers of last resort from the definition. These are entities that are

required by state commissions or state law to be backup suppliers to retail customers who

choose not to switch suppliers in a state-mandated retail competition program. We have

decided to include such entities in the market participant definition because they are

sellers of electric energy. However, the obligations and responsibilities of such entities

are still being developed on a state-by-state basis. As a consequence, even though such

entities may be generically referred to as "suppliers of last resort," their responsibilities

and incentives may vary widely. The Commission believes that certain factors, (e.g., an

entity's sole electric sales are made to satisfy a state requirement and it does not compete

for retail load) would support a finding that the entity is not a market participant. 

NEPCO et al. point to the problem of incumbent utilities that have tried to divest

themselves of generating assets but have not yet succeeded. They say that this is likely to

be a particular problem for utilities that own minority interests in nuclear plants since it is

currently difficult to sell such interests. NEPCO et al. request that they not be

automatically deemed a market participant because of these ownership interests. Once

again, we will entertain requests for exemption. For example, we would be willing to give

an exemption if the current owner could clearly demonstrate that it has transferred to nonaffiliated entities both the marketing rights and any profits resulting from the sale of

electric energy associated with its ownership interest. Any compensation that the market
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -201-

296Dynegy at 35.

participant receives from the non-affiliated entity should not be tied to profits on specific

sales made by this entity.

RTO Economic Interests in Market Participants and Energy Markets

We reaffirm the NOPR proposal that the RTO, its employees and any nonstakeholder directors must not have any financial interests in market participants. As

noted in the NOPR, our focus will be on current financial interests. Since this principle

raises a number of specific issues, especially with respect to pension rights and benefits, 

we will continue our current policy of implementing this principle on a case-by-case basis.

Several commenters argued that the NOPR’s treatment of financial independence

was too narrowly drawn. For example, Dynegy, pointing to the example of ISOs, argues

that while ISOs "may ostensibly be independent of market participants--they are not

independent of the market itself." 296 The participation of RTOs in the market stems from

certain obligations that we require of any RTO: it is the supplier of last resort for required

ancillary services and it must attempt to procure such services efficiently in competitive

markets. These two requirements mean that most RTOs will be operators of bilateral and

spot markets in ancillary services as well as buyers in these same markets. In addition, 

they will be resellers of any ancillary services that they purchase. 
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -202-

297This is discussed more fully under Market Monitoring. See infra section

III.E.6.

 It is our intention that RTOs perform functions that make the transmission

infrastructure operate efficiently, not that they take actions in ways that skew competitive

outcomes in the market. Nevertheless we acknowledge that RTO operations may have

that effect. Moreover, the two requirements may lead to an outcome that an RTO is not

indifferent to whether the prices are high or low. Given this possible conflict, we will

require that all RTOs must propose an objective monitoring plan to assess whether the

RTOs involvement in these markets favors its own economic interests over those of its

customers or members. 297

 Passive Ownership Interests in the RTO

As we have emphasized, the Commission wishes to give industry participants every

reasonable opportunity to create RTOs through their own voluntary actions. However, we

also recognize that mere exhortations that the industry participants should volunteer to

create independent transmission entities will not ensure a truly open and reliable grid in

the reasonably foreseeable future. The Commission must take actions to ensure that the

stand-alone transmission business is financially attractive and viable. We must also

provide a high degree of regulatory certainty and not foreclose viable options for creating

and developing RTOs. To provide more certainty, the Final Rule provides guidance on
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -203-

298See infra section 111.G.

299See EEI, Southern Company, United Illuminating, Enron/APX/Coral Power,

ISO-NE, NECPUC, Salomon Smith Barney and Konoglie/Ford/Fleishman.

our future policies for establishing revenues, incentives and performance-based regulation

for proposed RTOs. 298

We also recognize that the voluntary creation of RTOs requires that current owners

of transmission assets must be willing to transfer operational control of these assets to

RTOs or to divest their interests in their entirety. Therefore, it is important that we

provide current transmission owners with flexibility in deciding how they will relinquish

ownership or control of their transmission facilities to an RTO. Numerous commenters,

ranging from IOUs to state commissions to marketers, urge the Commission not to make

RTO policy in a vacuum. In particular, they stress that the Commission needs to

understand that there are many existing legal and tax disincentives to the outright sale of

such assets to an RTO. 299

Among these potential impediments, commenters identify the federal capital gains

tax most frequently. There was agreement among many commenters that it would be

unrealistic for the Commission to expect current transmission owners to sell their

transmission facilities to an RTO if the sale becomes a taxable event that triggers a large

capital gains tax. Therefore, they urge the Commission to accommodate financing and

ownership arrangements that facilitate the creation of for-profit RTOs while minimizing
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -204-

300FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 32,541 at 33,726.

the tax burden on current transmission owners who are willing to take actions that would

promote the Commission’s RTO policies. Many commenters argue that the Commission

could significantly accelerate RTO development if we were to allow current transmission

owners to retain a passive ownership interest in new RTOs. Several commenters contend

that if the Commission fails to accommodate such arrangements, this initiative will be

unproductive because our policies would be effectively biased against the creation of forprofit transmission companies that seek RTO status. They assert that such an outcome

would be inconsistent with the statement in the NOPR that the Commission wishes to

encourage all types of RTOs, whether they are transcos, ISOs or combinations of the

two. 300

In response to these comments, we reaffirm that it is the Commission’s policy to

encourage all types of RTOs. In light of our evolving experience with the workability of

certain RTO models, it would be inappropriate for us to mandate a single RTO model of

ownership and operation. While the dominant approach to date has been ISOs, we are

receptive to alternative approaches that can provide evidence of the legitimacy of various 

models of ownership and operation. Because the institutions which we propose to

sanction pursuant to this Final Rule will be so influential in operating the Nation's

infrastructure over a period of time, the Commission resolves to implement its
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -205-

301As discussed below, this overriding consideration is also relevant to active

voting interests.

302See U.S. Department of Energy, Maintaining Reliability in a Competitive U.S.

Electricity Industry: Final Report of the Task Force on Electric System Reliability, at xv

(September 29, 1998); North American Reliability Council, Electric Reliability Panel,

Reliable Power: Renewing the North American Electric Reliability Oversight System at

17 (Dec. 22, 1997)

independence criteria with an open mind and, to the extent practicable, with flexibility. At

this juncture, we therefore propose to remove unnecessary impediments to the creation of 

transmission companies by allowing market participants to maintain passive ownership

interests in RTOs. 

 We reaffirm our belief that "[a]n RTO must be independent in both reality and

perception." 301 This same conclusion was also reached by the DOE Reliability Task

Force and the NERC Reliability Panel, two widely respected industry groups comprised of

representatives from all sectors of the industry. The DOE Reliability Task Force

concluded that regional reliability entities must be "truly independent of commercial

interests so that their reliability actions are—and are seen to be—unbiased and untainted." 

The Electric Reliability Panel concluded that "[t]o dispel suspicions that the system

operator favors one participant over another . . . the operator must be independent of

market participants." 302

The Commission concludes that an RTO will not be successful unless all market

participants believe that the RTO will operate the grid and provide transmission service to
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -206-

303See, e.g., Consumer Groups, South Carolina Authority, TDU Systems,

Industrial Customers , APPA, Los Angeles, NASUCA, Arkansas Cities and Wolverine

Cooperative.

304The auditing requirements of this Rule represent one approach to addressing our

concern that it may otherwise be difficult to assess the ongoing independence of passive

ownership arrangements. We expect that parties will include in any rehearing requests

their views on this approach, in general, and the particular auditing requirements that we

have adopted. 

all grid users on a non-discriminatory basis. It is clear that the perception of a broad

cross-section of commenters is that passive ownership may interfere with the independent

operation of RTOs. 303 In the view of many commenters, passive ownership is only a

subtle mechanism to allow existing transmission owners to continue to control use of

transmission assets and ultimately deny equal access to competitors. Therefore, we must

provide assurances to all market participants that any passive ownership interest is truly

passive and will in no way interfere with the independent operation and decisionmaking of

the RTO. It is important to require a system of independent compliance auditing to ensure

that passive ownership arrangements remain passive over time and to provide assurances

to other market participants that the RTO is truly independent. 304

 Those who support the policy of allowing market participants to have passive

ownership in RTOs point to the fact that the Commission has accepted many instances of

passive ownership in the past. Typically, these arrangements have involved the sale and

leaseback of generating units in which a jurisdictional public utility will sell a generating

unit to a bank, insurance company or other financial institution. The financial institution
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -207-

305See Pacific Power and Light Co., 3 FERC ¶ 61,119 (1978); Baltimore Refuse

Energy Systems Co., Wheelabrator Millbury, Inc., 40 FERC ¶ 61,366 (1987).

306Salomon Smith Barney Reply Comments at 15.

will then lease back the generating unit to the jurisdictional utility. Even though the

financial institution is the owner of record, we have generally concluded that it is a passive

owner without any real operational control and, therefore, is not a jurisdictional public

utility under the FPA. 305

There are, however, several considerations that distinguish these earlier passive

arrangements from the ones that are being contemplated for RTOs. First, the passive

ownership arrangements for RTOs (e.g., two-tier LLCs, synthetic leases and leveraged

partnerships) may be complicated and multi-layered. Even those commenters who urge

that we accept passive ownership as a necessary transition mechanism admit that such

arrangements "will prove troublesome for both utilities and FERC" because they create the

"need to constantly police supposedly passive ownership positions to make sure that they

remain passive in all respects." 306

 Second, unlike financial institutions, the passive owners will typically own other

assets (e.g., generating assets) that could reap major economic benefits if an RTO's

decisions can be influenced to their advantage. Therefore, unlike financial institutions, the

passive owners in RTOs may have a direct economic incentive to influence the RTO’s

operating and investment decisions to favor other economic interests. 
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -208-

In response to a request for a declaratory order from Entergy Services, Inc., the

Commission found that passive ownership of a transmission entity by a generating entity

or other market participant could meet the Commission's ISO standards relating to

governance and independence if it were properly designed. Because Entergy's proposal

was incomplete, the Commission provided some limited guidance related to: board

selection and removal, potential issues about the board's fiduciary duties, attraction of

capital and issues about the transmission entity contracting with member companies. In

this rule we provide further guidance which we believe will help RTO applicants who may

be considering some form of passive ownership structure.

Based on these considerations, the Commission's policy on proposals for passive

ownership of RTOs by market participants will have three key elements: 

(1) Passive ownership proposals will be reviewed on a case-by-case basis. The

Commission will approve a proposal only if we are satisfied that the passive

owners have relinquished control over operational, investment and other decisions

to ensure that the RTO will treat all users of the grid—passive owners and

others—on an equal basis in all matters. The burden of proof is on the RTO to

demonstrate that control of the RTO is "truly independent" and that the RTO has a

decisionmaking process that is independent of control by the passive owners. 

(2) The Commission requires any RTO with passive ownership interests approved

by the Commission to undertake an obligation and propose processes for an
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -209-

307See supra note 304.

independent compliance audit to ensure the independence of its decisionmaking

process from the passive owners. The first independence audit will be required two

years after initial approval of the RTO and every three years thereafter. The

independence compliance audit must be submitted to the Commission in a public

document without any requirement for approval by the RTO board. 307

(3) The Commission will take appropriate action if it finds evidence of abuses. 

 We will now discuss implementation of these elements. The first element of our

policy is that any RTO that wishes approval for passive ownership above the limits set for

active ownership must demonstrate in its application that the passive owners will

relinquish effective control over operational and investment decisions. Specifically, the

RTO must demonstrate that the proposed arrangement has been designed to ensure that it

can treat all users of the grid—passive owners and others—on an equal basis in the

provision of non-discriminatory transmission service. 

It will be difficult for the Commission to make an assessment of whether a

particular passive arrangement achieves true independence in decisionmaking for the RTO

board and its management unless an RTO provides complete information about the rights

that passive owners have reserved for themselves both as owners of the RTO and as

providers of facilities and services to the RTO. In judging any proposal, our overriding
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -210-

308For example, this could include information on the market behavior of one or

more non-affiliate market participants acquired through a market monitoring program and

information on the RTO's proposed investment and operational plans, except where the

Commission has approved it as necessary to protect the passive owner's capital

investment.

concern is that the arrangements provide a high degree of assurance that those who are not

passive owners will have equal access to the services provided by the RTO. 

 To assure ourselves that this standard is satisfied, the Commission will need

information on the following issues: fiduciary responsibilities of the RTO board and

management to passive owners; ability of the RTO to raise capital independently of its

passive owners; ability of the RTO to make investment and financing decisions

independently of its passive owners; the extent of control by passive owners over board

selection and removal; the extent of control by passive owners over transmission rates,

terms and conditions; control of passive owners over issuance of new membership

interests and/or equity; services that will be provided by the passive owners or their

employees to the RTO; and the extent of access of passive owners to information not

available to other market participants. 308 An RTO application seeking approval for

passive ownership should provide any other relevant information that will allow the

Commission to assess whether passive owners have reserved rights for themselves that are
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -211-

309We note that many of these same concerns also apply to RTOs that allow

market participants to have ownership interests in voting securities.

310When there is a change in the factual circumstances that were the basis for the

Commission's approval of market-based pricing, we require that a public utility notify us

immediately of this change or at the next update of their market power analysis. This

update occurs once every three years. With respect to passive ownership, we will require

that the passive owner must notify us immediately of any change in governance in

ownership or governance that takes place after our initial approval.

superior to those of other market participants and if such rights constitute control over the

RTO. 309

The second element requires a mechanism for assuring ourselves and market

participants that any passive ownership arrangement remains passive over time. The

Commission will require the RTO to notify us immediately of any changes in the

underlying agreements or facts that occur after the initial filing. The Commission has

relied on a similar system of self-monitoring in cases in which we have approved marketbased rates. Specifically, we have required that any public utility that receives marketbased pricing must notify us of any factual changes that call into question whether it

should be allowed to continue to charge market-based rates. 310

We will also require a system of independent compliance auditing. The auditing

must be performed by individuals or organizations that are not affiliated with the RTO or

its owners. The purpose of the auditing would be to ensure that what is passive on paper

is passive in reality throughout the transition period. In particular, auditors would assess 

whether the passive owners have retained rights or privileges in their role as owners or
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -212-

311See supra note 304.

providers of services that would put non-owner participants at a competitive disadvantage. 

 The audits would cover the RTO's actions and decisions with respect to operations and

investments. In order for this to be a credible auditing system, the auditors should have

clear authority to obtain any information or data necessary to perform their audits and they

should have the right to report any findings and recommendations to the Commission

without prior approval of the RTO or any of its owners/members. An initial audit must be

performed two years after our approval of the passive ownership arrangements and every

three years thereafter. 311 If there is evidence of abuse or we are unable to determine if the

ownership interests continue to be passive, the Commission will not hesitate to order 

appropriate remedial action, including possible termination of passive ownership interests.

We understand that passive ownership arrangements are likely to take many forms

and that the Commission has not had much experience in examining these types of

arrangements in the context of RTOs. We encourage market participants to investigate the

options available for passive ownership to identify those types of arrangements that will

provide the greatest assurance of independence. For example, we note that the SEC's Rule

250.7(d) establishes criteria under which entities may have ownership interests that do not

trigger SEC jurisdiction under PUHCA. The criteria under Rule 250.7(d) are that: (1) the

entity owns the facility as a company, a trustee or holder of a beneficial interest under a
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -213-

trust; (2) the facility is leased under a net lease directly to a public utility company and

such facility is to be employed by the lessee in its operations; (3) the company is

otherwise primarily engaged in business other than that of a public utility; (4) the terms of

the lease have been approved by the regulatory authority having jurisdiction over the

lessee; (5) the lease extends for an initial term of not less than 15 years; and (6) the rent

reserved under the lease shall not include any amount based, directly or indirectly, on

revenues or income of the lessee public utility. While it is unclear whether these exact

criteria can be applied to the passive ownership arrangements that may be involved in the

formation of an RTO or whether they would address the particular independence issues

raised in this Rule, we believe that it would be acceptable for market participants to

develop passive ownership arrangements that are purely financial. A passive ownership

arrangement that is demonstrated to be purely financial could be relieved of the auditing

requirement in this Rule.

 Active Ownership Interests in the RTO

We now turn to a discussion of active as opposed to passive ownership. Most

commenters used the term "active" ownership interests to refer to ownership of voting

securities that give the owner the ability to influence or control an RTO's operating and

investment decisions. We adopt this definition for purposes of our discussion and will use

the terms "active" and "voting" interchangeably.
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -214-

312CTA at 4.

313However, independence does not automatically guarantee that an RTO will be

effective in providing non-discriminatory access to the grid. Independence must also be

combined with adequate operational and legal authority in order for the RTO to provide

non-discriminatory access.

314In response to EEI’s request for a clarification, we clarify that we are referring

only to corporate or shareholder ownership in the RTO itself and not to ownership of

transmission facilities under the RTO’s operational control. The fact that such facilities

are owned by market participants would not be a concern unless the owners retain legal

rights and operational responsibilities that make it difficult for an RTO to provide nondiscriminatory transmission service to other market participants.

Several commenters who were strong proponents of allowing high or unlimited

voting interests by market participants argue that in the NOPR the Commission was wrong

to focus on any particular ownership percentage. Instead, they contend that what really

matters is "actual control over the day to day affairs of the system, not some arbitrary

ownership percent ownership test." 312 We agree that the independence of an RTO

ultimately depends on who makes the decisions. 313 But control of decisionmaking

ultimately depends on who votes and how many votes each party has.

Consequently, we do not think that the Commission can ignore market participants’

ownership of voting interests in the RTO. 314 To do so would require us to presume that

even though a market participant has the legal right to vote for its own commercial

interests, it will choose to vote for the public interest (or the general interests of all market

participants). Therefore, we conclude that ownership of voting interests does matter and
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -215-

315This is not the first time that we have emphasized the importance of voting

rights. In various cases dealing with voting shares and voting rules for ISOs, we required

that proposed arrangements be reformed to assure that no individual market participant

or class of market participants could dominate the decisions of stakeholder committees

that advised the ISO’s board. See New England Power Pool, 88 FERC ¶ 61,079 (1999);

Central Hudson Gas and Electric Corp., et al., 88 FERC ¶ 61,229 (1999).

316See, e.g., APPA, Consumer Groups and South Carolina Authority.

we cannot remain agnostic about the ownership of voting interests in an RTO by

individual market participants, their affiliates or classes of market participants. 315

a. Active Ownership by Individual Market Participants and 

Affiliates

A number of transmission customers argue that the cleanest solution would be an

"absolute prohibition" on ownership of voting interests by any market participant 316 We

agree that this would produce a high level of certainty that an RTO is truly independent

and anything less than an absolute prohibition introduces some risk. However, if our goal

is to encourage the voluntary creation of RTOs, we have to accept that current owners

may not relinquish ownership or control of their transmission assets unless it is in their

economic interests to do so. In order to create a viable, for-profit, regional transco, at

least some current transmission owners must be willing to sell their transmission assets to

a new transmission company. Many commenters point out that this voluntary action is not

likely to happen if the current owners anticipate large capital gains taxes as a consequence
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -216-

317FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 32,541 at 33,704-14.

of the sale. The solution, according to many commenters, is to allow current owners to

retain some voting interests, some non-voting (i.e., passive) interests or both.

As with passive ownership, the Commission must balance two conflicting goals: 

the need to assure that any RTO will be truly independent; and of not creating

disincentives for transmission owners to voluntarily relinquish ownership or control of

their transmission assets. Against the backdrop of these two goals, the specific question

that confronts us is how much ownership of active voting interests in RTOs should be

allowed for market participants. 

Several investor-owned utilities urged us to allow current transmission owners to

retain as much as 100 percent voting interest in new for-profit transcos. They argue that

we allow 100 percent ownership combined with codes of conduct in the natural gas

industry and there is no reason why this model should not also apply to a restructured

electricity industry. We disagree with this recommendation. The two industries, while

similar in some respects, also differ significantly in the degree of vertical integration. The

electricity industry is starting with a much higher level of vertical integration. As we

noted in our NOPR discussion of the complaints filed since the issuance of Order No. 888,

it is difficult to monitor compliance with codes of conduct when there is substantial

vertical integration (i.e., those who own generation and also own transmission). 317

 
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -217-

318Id. at 33,714.

Moreover, it is a very intrusive form of regulation and ultimately requires us to be

"chasing after conduct." If such regulation is to be effective, we have to be concerned

with internal corporate organization and "who spoke to whom in the company

cafeteria." 318 This is not light-handed regulation. Therefore, we see little value in

replicating this model in the new world of RTOs.

It would be equally unworkable to adopt the recommendations of some

transmission customers that we should allow no ownership of RTOs by market

participants from the outset. While this is a clean solution and greatly reduces the need to

monitor for discriminatory behavior, it also reduces the likelihood that many current

transmission owners will voluntarily relinquish ownership or control of their transmission

facilities. As a consequence, it is likely to produce significant delays in the creation of

RTOs that can support more competitive markets that would benefit consumers. 

Therefore, the Commission has concluded that it is in the public interest to permit some

ownership of RTOs by market participants for a transition period. Within five years of

RTO approval, however, active ownership by market participants must end unless the

RTO seeks, and the Commission approves, an extension. Any request for extension,

including a request occasioned by changed circumstances, must demonstrate that the
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -218-

extension is consistent with the independence standard of this rule and is otherwise in the

public interest.

For the transition period, the Commission will establish a safe harbor of five

percent for active ownership interests by market participants. We will allow any market

participant to own up to five percent of an RTO's outstanding voting securities without

the need for case-by-case review by the Commission. An active ownership interest at five

percent or lower will be construed as not providing the owner with control. 

The Commission will carefully evaluate, on a case-by-case basis, proposals that

involve an ownership percentage higher than five percent. In deciding whether to allow

active ownership interests that exceed five percent, we will look at various factors

including the voting interests held by other class members (i.e., other market participants

with similar economic interests), the amount of passive ownership held by market

participants, the degree of dispersion of voting interests among other market participants

and the general public, and the rights retained by the owners as suppliers of facilities and

services to the RTO. While there is no prohibition on RTO proposals that involve higher

ownership percentages, it would heighten the concerns identified above and would require

justification by the applicants to overcome these concerns. 

We note that other Federal regulatory agencies have chosen to use a five percent

value in similar situations. The SEC employs a five percent value in deciding when one
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -219-

319See 15 U.S.C. 79b (a) (11).

320Federal Communications Commission, In the Matter of Implementation of the

Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act 1999; Implementation of

Cable Act Reform Provisions of the Telecommunications Act of 1996; Review of the

Commission's Cable Attribution Rules, FCC LEXIS 5243, *53 (October 20, 1999) citing

Securities and Exchange Commission v. Savoy Industries, Inc., 587 F.2d 1149 (D.C. Cir.

1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 913 (1979).

321Id.

322Id.

entity is an affiliate of another under PUHCA. 319 The SEC also requires that any person

who becomes a direct or indirect owner of more than five percent of any class of stock of

a company must file a public statement with the SEC. In commenting on this latter

requirement, the FCC observed that its purpose is "to ensure that investors are alerted to

potential changes in control . . . which confer on their holders the potential for influence

or control." 320 Less than two months ago, the FCC established a five-percent "voting

share benchmark" for assessing ownership interests in companies that are cable TV

operators. In justifying its decision to stay with a five-percent value, the FCC noted that

"[t]here is a body of more recent academic evidence that tends to confirm our earlier

conclusions, demonstrating that interest holders of [five percent] can likely exert

considerable influence on a company's management and operational decisions." 321 The

FCC concluded that "ownership percentages starting at [five] percent can influence

management polices." 322
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -220-

We recognize that this Commission has used higher percentages in other contexts. 

For example, in determining whether a company is an affiliate of a natural gas pipeline or

an electric utility, we have applied a rebuttable presumption of control only when a utility

or pipeline owns ten percent or more of the company's voting stock. As a general matter,

since the success of RTOs will depend on both the perception and reality of independence,

the Commission believes that caution requires us to allow only very limited voting

interests by market participants. The Commission believes that a lower percentage is

necessary in this instance because we allow other market participants with similar

economic interests (i.e., members of the same class) to have voting interests. Therefore,

we believe that it is appropriate to impose a lower cap to reduce the risk that owners with

similar outside economic interests may create a voting bloc. If, after our initial approval,

we find evidence that control over the RTO is being exercised by an individual market

participant or a class of market participants, we will not hesitate to take appropriate action,

including ordering one or more entities to divest their ownership interests in the RTO.

The Commission recognizes that there are risks associated with allowing market

participants to have any active ownership interests in an RTO. Even with a five percent

active ownership interest, there is a risk that one or more market participants will be able

to influence the RTO's decisionmaking process to the disadvantage of other market

participants. Consequently, the RTO may fail to be an entity in which "the control of 
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -221-

323FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 32,541 at 33,718.

324Id. at 33,727.

transmission operation is cleanly separated from power market participants." 323

Accordingly, we will require that all market participants divest themselves of any active

ownership interests no later than five years after our approval of the RTO. We will

consider requests for extensions to this "sunsetting" requirement on a case-by-case basis. 

Any request for extension, including a request occasioned by changed circumstances, will

be granted if the requester demonstrates that the extension is consistent with the

independence standard of this Rule and is otherwise in the public interest. We will also

require that any RTO that proposes active ownership by a market participant must adopt a

system of independent compliance auditing to ensure that the active voting interests held

by an individual market participant or classes of market participants do not convey

decisionmaking control. 

b. Active Ownership by Classes of Market Participants

In the NOPR, we stated that "[a]n RTO must have a decisionmaking process that is

independent of control of any market participant or class of participants." 324 While we

suggested a safe harbor of one percent ownership in voting securities by an individual

market participant and its affiliates, we did not propose any specific cap on ownership of

voting securities by a class of participants. Based on a review of the comments received,
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -222-

325See Alliance Companies, supra note 48. 

we have concluded that a policy on ownership by classes of market participants is

necessary to ensure the independence of the RTO. Thus, we will review RTO proposals

with respect to class ownership, considering potentially relevant factors such as voting

interests held by other market participants or classes of market participants, the degree of

passive ownership by market participants, the degree of dispersion of voting interests, and

the rights retained by the owners as suppliers of facilities and services to the RTO. We

recognize that this is a fact-specific determination that will require the Commission to

evaluate, on a case-by-case basis, proposals that involve ownership by more than one

market participant. We will adopt a benchmark of 15 percent class ownership. Our

willingness to allow ownership by a class of participants that exceeds fifteen percent will

depend on the particular circumstances of the filing (e.g., the presence of offsetting voting

interests by another class of market participants with competing economic or commercial

interests or proposals to sunset active ownership). 325 Moreover, intervenors may also

advance arguments that a 15 percent class ownership is inappropriate under certain factual

circumstances.

Comments on this issue reflect widely divergent views. SRP criticizes the NOPR

for failing to recognize that "[a]n interest may be considered de minimis when viewed in

isolation, could still result in effective control when aggregated for a group with common
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -223-

326EEI Reply Comments at 21.

327 See New England Power Pool, 88 FERC ¶ 61,079 (1999); Central Hudson Gas

and Electric Corp., et al., 88 FERC ¶ 61,229 (1999).

interests." SRP contends that while the Commission explicitly recognized the importance

of classes in the NOPR, we failed to do anything about it. In contrast, FP&L and others

argue that there is no need for any ownership caps for a group of market participants since

they will often have conflicting interests. EEI echoes this point by observing that any

"coalitions" are likely to be "fragile, short-lived and unlikely to result in a serious threat to

the independence of the RTO." 326 It also contends that it will be difficult to keep track of

ownership interests and to categorize market participants into specific groups with

"alleged common interests." Therefore, while EEI proposes a ten- percent cap on

ownership interests in voting securities by individual market participants, it recommends

that there be no cap on the ownership interests of any group of participants.

In several ISO orders, we rejected proposed governance arrangements because we

concluded that the voting weights and rules given to classes or sectors of participants

would allow transmission owners to dominate the decisionmaking process. 327 We believe

that the concerns that motivated these orders also hold true with respect to ownership of

RTOs. It would make little sense to establish a policy on ownership by individual market

participants and their affiliates while allowing five or six generators or marketers to group

together to force an RTO to adopt a policy that favors their interests.
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -224-

The Commission is unpersuaded by the assertions that similarly situated market

participants will not have a "nexus of interests." While we recognize, for example, that

individual generators may actively compete against each other for specific sales, this does

not imply that there is a total absence of common economic interests among generators

relative to marketers or distributors. If we were to accept this argument, it would require

us to ignore the fact that the Commission routinely receives joint pleadings from nonaffiliated parties with similar economic interests. Similarly, over the last two years, we

have frequently observed various non-affiliated entities within ISOs voting as a bloc on

issues where they have similar economic interests (e.g., existing generators voting against

new generators who seek lower interconnection charges when they connect to the grid).

There is a second reason why we believe it is necessary to review class or sector 

ownership of voting securities in RTOs. With ISOs, we have allowed sector or class

representation on the advisory and technical committees that are charged with giving

advice or making recommendations to non-stakeholder governing boards. We have

accepted these arrangements even though the votes of some classes exceed 20 percent

because all other classes are represented and have roughly equal voting power. Thus,

independence is achieved through a diffusion of voting power among all the affected

classes. While this arrangement may work for ISOs that are typically non-profit and nonshare corporations, we do not think it is viable option for RTOs that have ownership

shares that must be purchased. In particular, we cannot assume that all affected classes of
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -225-

328See supra note 304.

market participants will have the financial resources to purchase ownership interests that

would guarantee them a vote at the table. Therefore, we cannot presume that there will be

a balance of voting power as was the case for the ISOs. In the absence of such

countervailing voting blocs, we believe that it is necessary to establish lower limits on the

amount of voting shares that can be owned by members of any one class of market

participants. 

Based on our experience to date, we do not think it is impractical to define classes

of market participants with similar economic interests. This has been routinely done as

part of the governance design in every one of the ISOs that we have approved. The

Commission will not establish categories of classes in this Final Rule. Instead, we will

allow each RTO to propose the classes that it believes are relevant to its region. However,

we are inclined to define such classes broadly to avoid bypassing the class cap through

narrowly defined classes. 

In addition, we will require independent compliance auditing to ensure that market

participants that have ownership interests will not use these ownership interests to put

other non-owner market participants at a competitive disadvantage. 328

 The auditing should be performed by individuals or organizations that are not

affiliated with the owners or RTO. The auditors would have clear authority to obtain any
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -226-

information or data necessary to perform their audits, and they would have the right to

report any findings and recommendations to the Commission without prior approval of the

RTO or any of its owners/members. An initial audit should be performed two years after

our approval of the RTO. This will be the only audit required for active ownership unless

the RTO or the active owners request and receive approval for an extension of active

ownership interests beyond five years. If such an extension is granted, then follow-up

compliance audits must be performed at three year intervals, beginning with a three-year

audit filed along with any request for extension. 

As we discussed above with respect to passive ownership, applicants will have a

continuing obligation to inform the Commission of any changed circumstances regarding

active ownership. Moreover, the Commission would expect auditing for compliance with

the individual and class caps established at the time of RTO approval. Where feasible, the

auditors would rely on publicly available information on ownership interests (e.g., SEC

data sources). Where such information is not publicly available (e.g., individual 

ownership interests of less than five percent), the auditors should have the authority to

obtain this information from market participants and their affiliates. Any market

participant that wishes to have an ownership interest in an RTO must agree to provide this

information to the auditor or the Commission upon request. We would expect that market

participants will comply with both the individual and class caps at all times. If the auditor
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -227-

finds that either cap has been violated, it must notify the Commission and the affected

owners immediately and also recommend a remedy.

Since the caps do not guarantee a lack of control, the Commission expects that the

auditors will also look for evidence of control over RTO decisionmaking at lower levels of

ownership. These audit reports would be closely reviewed by the Commission and if there

is evidence of abuse or unwillingness to cooperate with the auditors, the Commission will

not hesitate to order owners to divest themselves of their active ownership interests.

RTO Governing Boards

Many commenters urge us to impose specific, detailed requirements on RTO

governance. Commenters make recommendations on many different aspects of

governance: the desirability of stakeholder, non-stakeholder or hybrid boards, the size of

boards, the relationship between non-stakeholder boards and stakeholder advisory groups,

the number of classes for stakeholder boards, the appropriate voting entitlements for

individual classes on a stakeholder board; and optimal voting rules. Most of the

recommendations seemed to be targeted for RTOs that are ISOs. In the Final Rule, we

have decided not to impose any specific requirements on RTO governing boards other

than the general requirement that they must satisfy the overall principle that their

decisionmaking process should be independent of any market participant or class of
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -228-

329One exception is the New York ISO where decisionmaking is explicitly shared

(continued...)

participants. We have opted not to impose more detailed governance requirements for

three reasons.

First, we anticipate that RTOs will take many different forms that reflect the needs

and different starting points of each region. We expect to see proposals from ISOs,

transcos and hybrids. It is unlikely that a single approach to governance will work for the

different types of RTOs that are likely to emerge. At this early stage, it would be

counterproductive to impose a "one size fits all" approach to governance when RTOs may

differ significantly in structure and patterns of ownership.

Second, our experience to date has been largely limited to reviewing governance

proposals of ISOs that operate but do not own transmission facilities. A governance

model that works for an ISO may not be appropriate for transcos or other types of forprofit transmission enterprises. 

Third, even among the ISOs, there are different models of governance. As we noted

in the NOPR, the dominant governance model (PJM, New England, New York and the

Midwest) for ISOs is a two-tier form of governance. The top tier consists of a nonstakeholder board, while the lower tier consists of advisory committees of stakeholders

that may recommend options to the non-stakeholder board. Generally, the top tier has the

final decisionmaking authority. 329 In contrast, California, employs a decisionmaking
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -229-

329(...continued)

by a non-stakeholder Board of Directors and stakeholder Management Committee.

Modification of the ISO tariffs under the FPA requires approval of the ISO Board and the

Management Committee. If they fail to agree on a modification, either the Board or the

Management Committee may make a filing under FPA section 206. See Central Hudson

Gas & Electric Corp., et al., 88 FERC ¶ 61,138 (1999).

330We will require every ISO to submit an audit of the independence of its

governance process two years after its approval as an RTO.

board for its ISO that consists of both stakeholders and non-stakeholders representatives. 

And we note that the recently passed Texas restructuring law would require a pure

stakeholder governing board for the ERCOT ISO. Given the variety of governance forms

that exist or are proposed for ISOs and the limited experience with these different

approaches, the Commission believes that it is premature to conclude that one form of

governance is clearly superior to all other forms in every situation.

Therefore, we will not mandate detailed governance requirements for RTO boards. 

Instead, the approach that we adopt in the Final Rule is that any RTO governance

proposals, whether from an ISO, transco or a hybrid arrangement, will be judged on a

case-by-case basis against the overarching standard that its decisionmaking process must

be independent of individual market participants and classes of market participants. 330

While we are not imposing any other specific requirements, the Commission

believes that it is appropriate to give some general guidance based on the governance

arrangements that we have reviewed to date. Where there is a governing board with
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -230-

classes of market participants, we would expect that no one class would be allowed to veto

a decision reached by the rest of the board and that no two classes could force through a

decision that is opposed by the rest of the board. Where there is a non-stakeholder board,

we believe that it is important that this board not become isolated. Both formal and

informal mechanisms must exist to ensure that stakeholders can convey their concerns to

the non-stakeholder board. Where there are stakeholder committees that advise or share

authority with a non-stakeholder board, it is important that there be balanced

representation on the stakeholder committees so no one class dominates its

recommendations or its decisions.

We note that this general guidance is based on our experience with governance

proposals of ISOs. The Commission recognizes that these observations may not be

completely relevant for an RTO that intends to operate as a for-profit transmission

company. Nevertheless, we emphasize that the common element for all types of RTOs

must be that they satisfy the threshold principle that their decisionmaking should be

independent of market participants. 

Role of State Agencies

We do not impose any specific requirements on the role of state agencies in RTOs. 

Such specificity would be counterproductive in light of the variation in the legal

responsibilities of state commissions and RTO design across regions. However, we agree
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -231-

with NARUC that state commissions "should fully participate in RTO formation and

development." When we undertake our collaborative efforts with the industry after

issuance of the Final Rule, we encourage state commissions and other state agencies to

play a key role in this effort. State involvement is important for several reasons, especially

where RTOs are a critical element of the retail choice programs of many states. State

commissions are in a unique position to assess whether a particular RTO design will help

or hinder their efforts to promote retail competition. 

Once an RTO becomes operational, it appears that most states believe that it would

be inappropriate for a state official, whether a state commission representative or some

other state employee, to serve as a voting member of an RTO board. We note that

NECPUC, representing the six New England state commissions, was joined by most other

state commissions and commenters from other sectors of the industry in recommending

that state officials should not be voting members of any RTO governing body. ISO-NE

presents three reasons why it would be problematic for a state official to serve as a voting

member of an RTO governing board. First, it would create a conflict between the state

official's duties as an RTO board member and his or her regulatory or legal responsibilities

at the state level. Second, in the case of a multi-state RTO, it would be difficult for an

official of one state to represent the interests of others states if the state interests are in
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -232-

conflict. Third, the solution of allowing each state to have its own voting member on the

RTO board could lead to large and unwieldy boards for multi-state RTOs.

While most commenters agreed that state officials should not serve as voting

members of RTO boards, most of these same commenters were comfortable with allowing

state officials to serve as ex officio members. It was thought that state officials would be

better informed in making their own decisions if they could closely observe the

considerations and constraints that were weighed by the RTO in making its decisions. It

was thought that the ability of state officials to observe the RTO’s decisionmaking process

would be especially useful if the RTO had to recommend one or more expansions to the

existing grid.

While we see considerable merit in the arguments that state officials should not be

voting members of an RTO governing board (and note that most state commissions share

this view), the Commission is not imposing such a prohibition. Since RTOs do not yet

exist, it would be premature to conclude that state officials should not participate as voting

members of RTO boards. There may be special circumstances in some regions that would

make it in the public interest to give voting rights to one or more state government

representatives. Therefore, we will be willing to entertain such proposals and perhaps

revisit the issue after we gain more experience.

Section 205 Filing Rights
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -233-

331New England Power Pool, 79 FERC ¶ 61,374 at 62,585 (1997).

In the NOPR, we proposed that the RTO must have exclusive and independent

authority to file changes in its transmission tariff under section 205 of the Federal Power

Act. This proposal triggered hundreds of pages of comments. Upon consideration of the

comments received, as discussed below, we will modify our proposal, in part, to make

clear that transmission owners who do not also operate their transmission facilities retain 

certain section 205 rights. 

Most commenters on this issue fall into two categories. Those who oppose the

proposal in the NOPR argue that it is bad law and bad policy. They contend that the

Commission does not have the legal authority to grant section 205 rights over their

transmission facilities to some other entity. While a transmission owner may voluntarily

cede this right to an RTO, they argue that the Commission cannot compel a transmission

owner, either directly or indirectly, to give up this legal right. Many transmission owners,

representing IOUs, public and cooperative systems, argue that the transfer of this right to

an RTO would increase their risk of recovering revenues to which they are lawfully

entitled. On the other hand, those who support the proposal argue that it is a necessary

and logical implication of our previously stated policy that the "[a]uthority to act

unilaterally . . . is a crucial element of a truly independent transmission provider." 331

They contend that an RTO will not be able to function as an independent and neutral
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -234-

332Under FPA section 201(e), a public utility is any person who owns or operates

jurisdictional facilities.

transmission provider if it has to seek the approval of transmission owners or other market

participants every time it wishes to modify its tariff. They point to numerous tariff

changes that the various ISOs have had to make as real world evidence of their need to

move quickly and make filings at the Commission when they encounter a tariff problem

that needs to be corrected. 

 Based on the comments received, we reaffirm our determination that RTOs, in

order to ensure their independence from market participants, must have the independent

and exclusive right to make section 205 filings that apply to the rates, terms and conditions

of transmission services over the facilities operated by the RTO. This determination,

however, is subject to several important clarifications discussed below. 

We recognize that for some RTOs (in particular, ISOs), both the transmission

owners and the RTO will be public utilities with respect to the same transmission

facilities, 332 i.e., one or more entities will own the facilities and a different entity will

operate the facilities and actually sell the transmission provided by the facilities, and that

this presents a somewhat unusual situation insofar as sections 205 and 206 of the FPA are

concerned. The FPA does not explicitly address who has filing authority or responsibility

in this circumstance. We conclude that while the RTO must have independent and

exclusive authority to propose changes in the rates, terms and conditions of transmission
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -235-

333Of course, a transmission owner may voluntarily agree to relinquish this right

during the RTO negotiation process or subsequently.

service provided over the facilities it operates, it also is reasonable for the transmission

owners to retain certain independent section 205 filing rights with respect to the level of

the revenue requirement that the transmission owners receive from the RTO and that the

RTO, in turn, will collect from the transmission customers through its rates. We therefore

clarify that a transmission owner must have independent authority to set the level of its

portion of the revenue requirement to be collected by the RTO. 333

Importantly, we further clarify that we expect the authorities of the transmission

owners and the RTO to be exercised as follows. The transmission owners may make

section 205 filings to establish the payments that the RTO will make to the transmission

owners for the use of the transmission facilities that are under the control of the RTO; the

RTO, in turn, will make section 205 filings to recover from transmission customers the

cost of the payments it makes to transmission owners as well as its own costs, and propose

any other changes in the rates, terms and conditions of service to transmission customers. 

Thus, the transmission owners may have on file a tariff that assures their recovery of

transmission revenues from the RTO and, while they may be affecting the level of the

RTO's revenue requirement, they will not be permitted to make section 205 filings for
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -236-

334We note that some existing ISOs have adopted an approach where the

transmission owners' revenue requirement is filed with the Commission in a separate

transmission rate filing (e.g., California ISO), while others incorporate the revenue

requirement of the transmission owners, as changed from time to time, in the ISO's tariff. 

In either case, only the ISO is authorized to make filings that change the tariff sheets in

the ISO's tariff.

RTO services to transmission customers and will not interfere with the independence of

the RTO to file proposed changes to the open access tariff. 334 

We believe this division of filing rights reflects a reasonable interpretation of the

FPA as applied to these circumstances, and that it appropriately balances the need to

ensure the independence of the RTO with the need to provide transmission owners the

opportunity to recover revenues. To avoid unnecessary disputes and coordinate the

interaction of these independent section 205 filings, we will require the RTO and the

transmission owners to give prior notice to each other of any planned section 205 filings. 

Further, we strongly encourage transmission owners and RTOs to resolve rate issues prior

to the filing of proposed rate changes.

We recognize that the division of filing rights described above may not be the only

way to accommodate the concerns raised. Accordingly, the Commission will entertain

other approaches as long as they ensure the independent authority of the RTO to seek

changes in rates, terms or conditions of transmission service and the ability of

transmission owners to protect the level of the revenue needed to recover the costs of their
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -237-

transmission facilities. The Commission will require RTOs to provide a detailed

description of the process to allow us to assess its fairness and workability.

 

 
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -238- 

335FERC Stats. & Regs. at 33,729.

336Id. at 33,730.

2. Scope and Regional Configuration (Characteristic 2)

The NOPR proposed as the second minimum characteristic of an RTO that the

RTO must serve an appropriate region—a region of sufficient scope and configuration to

permit the RTO to effectively perform its required functions and to support efficient and

nondiscriminatory power markets. 335 The NOPR noted that there is likely no one "right"

configuration of regions and proposed to establish a set of factors that encourage

appropriate regional configuration without prescribing boundaries. The NOPR suggested

that a region that is large in scope would facilitate the effective performance of many of

the RTO’s functions, but also recognized that there may be factors that might limit how

large an RTO should be. 336 The NOPR also proposed a set of factors that may affect the

location of regional boundaries These factors indicate that boundaries should facilitate

essential RTO functions and goals, recognize trading patterns, mitigate the exercise of

market power, do not unnecessarily split existing control areas or existing regional

transmission entities, encompass contiguous geographic areas and highly interconnected

portions of the grid, and take into account useful existing regional boundaries (such as

NERC regions) and international boundaries. The NOPR put forth for discussion the

appropriateness of existing configurations, such as the three electric interconnections
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -239- 

337See, e.g., South Carolina Authority, Cleco, SRP, LG&E, Detroit Edison,

Wyoming Commission, Entergy, UtiliCorp, NECPUC, MidAmerican, Enron/APX/Coral

Power, Duke, NASUCA, Industrial Consumers, Connectiv, Massachusetts Division, Iowa

Board.

within the continental United States, the ten NERC reliability councils, and the 23 NERC

security coordinator areas.

The NOPR also requested comments on what portion of the transmission facilities

within an appropriate region the RTO must control in order to be approved as an RTO. 

The Commission recognized that it might be difficult to obtain 100 percent participation

of all transmission owners within a region, but that, on the other hand, it would not be

appropriate to approve an RTO proposal that included only a small portion of the

facilities of the region. The Commission also requested comments on how much

deference the Commission should give to regions proposed to us, and to what extent state

commission approval or disapproval should be taken into account.

a. How Should Initial Boundaries be Established?

Comments

Most commenters agree with the Commission's proposal not to initially prescribe 

the boundaries for appropriate regions. 337 Among the rationales asserted by these

commenters is that this is a matter best left in the first instance to the stakeholders in the
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -240- 

338See, e.g., South Carolina Authority, NASUCA, Florida Power Corp.

339See, e.g., Entergy, MidAmerican.

340See, e.g., Southern Company, NECPUC, Nine Commissions, Florida

Commission.

341See, e.g., Duke, FirstEnergy, Allegheny, Iowa Board.

342See, e.g., NYPP.

various regions, 338 there should be deference to proposals by transmission owners and

market participants, 339 FERC should give deference to state commissions on scope and

configuration, 340 boundaries should be determined naturally in a way that facilitates

market transactions, 341 and size and configuration must be determined on a case-by-case

basis. 342 

However, some commenters argue that the Commission should prescribe regional

boundaries. APPA, East Texas Cooperatives, TDU Systems and the Michigan

Commission urge that the Commission use section 202(a) authority to establish initial

boundaries. APPA asserts that the Commission should establish a rebuttable presumption

in favor of specific regional district boundaries based on the topology of the transmission

network to enhance system security. East Texas Cooperatives argues that after the

Commission established regional districts, the burden would be on those proposing

different regions to show that they provide at least the benefits of the prescribed districts. 

Michigan Commission states that the electricity market is currently too immature to
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -241- 

determine by itself the size of the markets, and that firm guidance is needed rather than

allowing the RTO boundaries to be set by participants.

Several other commenters do not go as far in asserting that the Commission should

initially set boundaries, but argue that the Commission should take a strong role in

assuring proper boundaries. For example, Cinergy urges that the Commission be

aggressive in establishing boundaries consistent with the proposed criteria, noting that the

willingness of the Commission to exercise its authority over boundaries will determine

the success of the Commission's restructuring efforts. Coalition of Alliance Users

maintains that the Commission should take a direct and active role in formulating RTO

boundaries. WEPCO believes that the role of the Commission should be to set criteria

that encourage the establishment of sensible RTO boundaries. Project Groups assert that

if the stakeholders in a region do not determine boundaries by the end of 2000, the

Commission should make the determinations. LG&E states that while the Commission

should show deference to voluntary RTOs, it should not hesitate to disapprove proposals

with geographic shortcomings.

Commenters express a variety of views regarding whether particular regional

configurations would be appropriate. Some commenters support interconnection-wide
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -242- 

343See, e.g., South Carolina Authority, Conlon, Industrial Consumers, First

Rochdale, Los Angeles, PG&E, Sonat.

344See, e.g., South Carolina Authority, Desert STAR, MidAmerican, TDU

Systems, CREDA, SNWA, CRC, Platte River, PSNM, SRP, Metropolitan.

RTOs as a desirable goal, 343 while others regard either an Eastern or Western

interconnection RTO as unworkably large. 344 

Commenters offer specific ideas about the number and placement of RTOs. 

PG&E states that the long-term goal should be four or five RTOs nationwide. Williams

argues for 3 to 10 RTO nationwide, while Project Groups advocates 3 to 12 RTO

nationwide. WEPCO proposes the formation of five RTOs: (1) three in the Eastern

interconnection (one covering MAPP, MAIN, ECAR and portions of SPP; one covering

SERC, Florida and the rest of SPP; and one covering NPCC and MAAC); (2) one for

WSCC; and (3) one for ERCOT. APPA, supported by East Texas Cooperatives,

suggests: (1) no more than three RTOs in the West; (2) the combination of PJM, NY ISO

and ISO-NE into one RTO with the possible participation of Ontario; (3) the combination

of the Alliance RTO, Midwest ISO, and MAPP into one RTO; (4) Kansas to the

Carolinas under one RTO; and (5) separate RTOs for Florida, ERCOT and HydroQuebec.

With respect to specific regions, ISO-NE contends that it already operates a region

of appropriate size and configuration. Mass Companies agrees that ISO-NE is an
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -243- 

345See, e.g., Michigan Commission, South Carolina Authority, Midwest ISO,

Midwest ISO Participants, NASUCA..

346See, e.g., Florida Commission, JEA, FP&L, Florida Power Corp., Tallahassee,

Gainesville.

347See, e.g., SRP, Metropolitan. 

appropriate region. NYC argues that the formation of a northeastern RTO with a broader

geographic scope than the NY ISO would help remove existing institutional impediments

to the construction of new transmission lines. American Forest argues that PJM is too

small, while NASUCA and Mid-Atlantic Commissions believe that PJM satisfies the size

criteria. Some commenters object to a split between the area represented by the proposed

Alliance RTO and the Midwest ISO. 345 Most of the Florida commenters assert that

peninsular Florida represents an appropriate region. 346 For example, Florida

Commission claims that peninsular Florida is a large and efficient marketplace that does

not share parallel flows with other electrical regions; however, it states that the Florida

panhandle could be in a region with all of SERC or a subregion of SERC.

 Although some commenters encourage a Western interconnection-wide RTO, the

majority of commenters support three or four RTOs for the Western interconnection,

noting that the interests in the WSCC are too diverse and the area too large for control by

a single entity. 347 Cal ISO contends that California satisfies the minimum size criteria,

but does not represent the maximum feasible area. Commenters from the Pacific
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -244- 

348See, e.g., Seattle, PGE, Industrial Customers, BC Hydro, Powerex, Tacoma

Power, PNGC.

349See, e.g., South Carolina Authority, SPP.

Northwest generally agree that a region including Washington, Oregon, and all or

portions of Idaho and Montana is distinct enough to warrant an RTO limited to that

area. 

348 CREDA and Platte River envision one RTO for the Pacific Northwest, one for

California and one for the Rocky Mountain/Desert Southwest area; CRC suggests a

similar alignment, with the exception of the Rocky Mountain and Southwest areas as

separate RTOs. 

A number of commenters make the point that, regardless of where RTO

boundaries are drawn, it is important that there be integration and coordination among

RTOs. 349 NERC believes that there are two seams issues: reliability practices across

seams and market practices across seams. TDU Systems suggests that there be a set of

regions for reliability/operations purposes within a larger region for rates and scheduling. 

Industrial Consumers state that, if multiple RTOs are formed within an interconnection,

RTOs should be required to coordinate their operations to collectively "simulate" an

interconnection-wide RTO. Cinergy suggests that, if there were more than one RTO in a

large interconnection, a "super" RTO could be established to operate and coordinate

inter-RTO activities. Montana Commission states that RTO boundaries are less

important than ensuring that seams do not interfere with the market, and proposes, as do
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -245- 

others such as Ontario Power and CMUA, that the Commission require adjacent RTOs to

embody consistent methods of access, pricing, and congestion management to encourage

seamless trading. PacifiCorp asserts that reciprocity agreements among RTOs may be

easier to achieve than having all parties in a large region agree to one RTO. Allegheny

suggests that appropriate transmission pricing could provide some of the same benefits as

a large RTO. 

Several commenters express concern that multiple RTO proposals for the same

region will be submitted. Indiana Commission contends that the NOPR leaves the door

open for more than one RTO proposal for approximately the same wholesale power

market region and this could limit the operational efficiency and increase the cost of

transmission in the region. It suggests that the Commission consider requiring formal

mediation or play an assertive role in such circumstances. Snohomish suggests favoring

the RTO proposal that is negotiated pursuant to the most open process that included

consumers, transmission dependent utilities and others with a vital interest in the effective

and efficient operation of the transmission grid. Midwest ISO Participants submit that the

proponents of multiple RTOs meet a heavy burden and demonstrate the need for more

than one RTO. In particular, it would require demonstration that the proposals: do not

balkanize the market; allow for effective congestion relief; maintain reliability; facilitate
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -246- 

construction of new transmission facilities; and allow for effective tariff administration

and unbiased ATC determination throughout the region.

Commission Conclusion

We adopt the NOPR proposal on this characteristic. All RTO proposals filed with

us must identify a region of appropriate scope and configuration. The scope and

configuration of the regions in which RTOs are to operate will significantly affect how

well they will be able to achieve the necessary regulatory, reliability, operational, and

competitive benefits. 

As proposed in the NOPR, we will not at this time prescribe initial boundaries for

RTOs. Section 202(a) of the FPA does give us the authority, after consultation with state

commissions, to fix and modify boundaries for regional districts for the voluntary

interconnection and coordination of facilities. We acknowledge those commenters who

believe that it may be more efficient for the Commission to establish at least a rebuttable

presumption that particular boundaries are appropriate starting points. However, we

conclude, as a matter of policy, that we should not attempt to draw boundaries at this

time. We are convinced that the transmission owners, market participants, and regulators

in a particular region have a better understanding of the dynamics of the transmission

system in that region, and that they should, at least in the first instance, propose the

appropriate scope and regional configuration of an RTO. There are many technical
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -247- 

350See Statement of Ohio Commission Chairman Craig Glazer, RTO Conference

(St. Louis), transcript at 85-87.

considerations involved in discerning the appropriate scope and regional configuration of

an RTO, and we believe that those most familiar with such considerations in a region are

in a better position to propose a workable solution.

As noted above, some commenters advocate that the NERC regions be starting

points; others advocate that the Interconnections be the goal; and still others propose

specific configurations that would divide the Nation as many as three to 12 RTOs. 

Consistent with our decision to let the parties take the initiative to propose what is

appropriate for their region, we will not specifically endorse any particular scheme for

RTO configuration.

This is not to say, however, that we will deem appropriate any regional

configuration proposed. As stated in the regulatory text for this characteristic, an

appropriate region is one of sufficient scope and configuration to permit the RTO to

effectively perform its required functions and to support efficient and nondiscriminatory

power markets. A proposed RTO could simply be too limited to satisfy several of the

necessary functions. Further, we are aware that transmission owners could seek to gain

strategic advantage by the way an RTO is formed. For example, an RTO could be placed

to act as a toll collector on a critical corridor. 350 An RTO could propose a configuration

that interferes with the formation of a larger, more appropriately configured RTO. 
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -248- 

351The proposal could be accepted, however, as something less than an RTO that

represents an improvement over the status quo. 

352See section F on Open Architecture.

As we review a proposal by a regional transmission entity for its scope and

regional configuration, if we determine that the scope is inappropriate, that entity will not

be deemed to be an RTO, and its participants will not be deemed to be RTO

participants. 351 In response to the commenters questioning what the Commission would

do if it received multiple RTO proposals for a region, we note that we hope the

collaborative process we are encouraging in this Final Rule would foreclose that

circumstance. However, if we are faced with multiple proposals, we would have to

determine which RTO proposal best meets the objectives of this Rule.

As we stated in the NOPR, we are aware that there is likely no one "right"

configuration of regions. One particular boundary may satisfy one desirable RTO

objective and conflict with another. We recognize here, and elsewhere in this Final

Rule, 352 that the industry will continue to evolve, and the appropriate regional

configurations will likely change over time with technological and market developments. 

The Commission is also mindful of the interests of individual states regarding RTO

boundaries. Given all these considerations, the Commission believes that the public

interest will best be served if we provide guidance in this Final Rule, in the form of
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -249- 

353See, e.g., UtiliCorp, Desert STAR, Midwest ISO Participants, Metropolitan,

NECPUC, LG&E, PJM/NEPOOL Customers, Midwest Municipals, Industrial

Consumers, Dairyland, TDU Systems, ISO-NE, Midwest Energy, APX, APPA, Cal ISO.

354See, e.g., Cinergy, American Forest, EPSA, UtiliCorp, PG&E, NSP,

Pennsylvania Commission, NJBUS, LG&E, Enron/APX/Coral Power, NASUCA,

PJM/NEPOOL Customers, Cal ISO, Texas Commission, Conlon, Dynegy, Nine

Commissions, Michigan Commission, Lincoln, WPSC, First Rochdale, East Texas

Cooperatives, Los Angeles, Ohio Commission, EME, Ontario Power, H.Q. Energy

Services, Ogelthorpe, UMPA, PG&E, Indiana Commission.

355See, e.g., Cinergy, WPSC, Lincoln, Ohio Commission, PG&E.

factors that affect appropriate regional configuration, without actually prescribing

boundaries.

b. Scope and Configuration Factors

Comments

A large number of commenters agree that the factors listed in the NOPR for

determining a proper scope and configuration for an RTO are generally appropriate. 353

Industrial Consumers propose that the factors be codified as part of our regulations. 

Florida Commission, on the other hand, argues that the factors should not be mandated as

part of the Commission's regulations.

Many commenters argue that the RTO region should be as large as possible, i.e.,

bigger is better. 354 Several commenters suggest the minimum size should be the NERC

regions. 355 Conlon suggests a minimum area should be one containing a load of 50,000

MW. PJM states that its organization demonstrates that a very large RTOs is feasible, in
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -250- 

356See, e.g., LG&E, ComEd, Midwest ISO Participants, Midwest ISO.

357See, e.g., AEPCO, Tallahassee.

358See, e.g., Enron/APX/Coral Power, FirstEnergy, Tri-State.

359See, e.g., Dairyland, Minnesota Power.

that it manages a grid serving more than 57,000 MW of generation and containing more

than 8,000 miles of high voltage transmission lines. PJM states that even larger control

areas are possible as technology advances. PJM/NEPOOL Customers, claiming that all

potential factors that might limit size can be overcome, argue that the Commission should

not conclude that there are factors that limit size. As discussed below with respect to the

congestion management function, some commenters make a particular point of

emphasizing the importance of large scope to effective congestion management. 356

Other commenters argue that bigger is not necessarily better and that there are

factors that limit size. 357 CMUA argues that the role of security coordinator and

operational characteristics of a region may limit geographic scope. STDUG claims that

size breeds inefficiency. Several commenters claim that requiring maximum scope upon

creation may discourage RTO formation or make it more costly and take longer to

achieve. 358 NYPP expresses concern that, if an RTO is too large, it may not be able to

handle local reliability issues. Other commenters believe that the ability to plan new

transmission facilities may limit scope. 359 AEPCO expresses concern that the voice of
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -251- 

360See, e.g., South Carolina Authority, Desert STAR, MidAmerican, TDU

Systems, CREDA, SNWA, CRC, Platte River, PSNM, SRP, Metropolitan.

361See, e.g., Industrial Customers, Powerex, Tacoma Power.

smaller participants could be lost in a larger RTO. Florida Power Corp. claims that there

may be a security risk associated with concentrating control of too large an area into a

single facility, and that large areas of non-pancaked rates may eliminate incentives for

proper generator siting decisions. A number of commenters believe that either the

Eastern interconnection or the Western interconnection is too large an area to be

controlled by one RTO. 360 New York Commission argues that the Commission should

recognize that experience must be gained in stages before an RTO encompassing an

entire interconnection can be implemented. Several commenters in the Pacific Northwest

cite the failed attempt to create IndeGo as evidence that trying to create too large an RTO

is unworkable, and at some point "bigger" creates more problems than it solves. 361

Some commenters offer subjective parameters for the scope of an RTO. For

example, SNWA proposes that the RTO be large enough to accommodate as many market

participants as possible, but not so large as to be overly burdensome to manage. SRP

argues that a balance must be struck between an RTO that is too small to cover a

meaningful wholesale power market and one that is too large to form and operate

effectively. TDU Systems argue that RTOs should comprise the largest regions that
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -252- 

362See, e.g., CMUA, APPA, Florida Commission, Minnesota Commission.

363See, e.g., UtiliCorp, Reliant, Duke, South Carolina Commission, NU, Florida

Power Corp., Detroit Edison.

364See, e.g., South Carolina Authority, Williams, NSP, Dynegy.

could operate in a coordinated fashion within a short period of time with reasonable

investments of funds. 

A number of commenters emphasize particular factors that they consider

important in determining scope and configuration. Some commenters assert that

reliability and system security should be the primary determinant of scope and

configuration. 362 Others place prime importance on trading patterns and facilitating

market transactions. 363 EEI states that the most efficient size and configuration of an

RTO should be left to the market to determine. Other commenters propose electrical

configuration and physical power flows as important factors. 364 CREDA and Desert

STAR argue that the preservation of a Federal Power Marketing Administration project

marketing area is an important consideration. Chelan argues that cost shifts need to be

considered in determining scope. Platte River contends that established security

coordinators should be a factor. Southern Company argues that joint ownership

agreements should be a factor. Tacoma Power claims that traditional business

relationships and social and political commonality are factors that affect scope.
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -253- 

365See, e.g., Industrial Consumers, First Rochdale, Minnesota Power, STDUG,

NARUC.

366See, e.g., Ohio Commission, EAL, Florida Power Corp..

Commenters are divided on whether points where transmission facilities are

constrained should be used as an RTO boundary or internalized within an RTO. Some

commenters claim that constraints should be internalized to the extent possible and not

constitute boundaries between regions. 365 NERC states that boundaries should not be

placed at weak interconnections because a single entity is better able to strengthen them. 

On the other hand, other commenters believe that constrained facilities should constitute

the boundaries, either because they may form a natural boundary between robust systems

or because it makes more sense to internalize markets than to internalize constraints. 366

APPA states that, because it is not possible to internalize all constraints, the goal should

be to alleviate or mitigate the effects of interregional constraints through additional

construction and RTO operating rules and pricing policies. NECPUC argues that it does

not matter where constraints are if compatible methods of locational pricing are adopted

by contiguous RTOs. MidAmerican and Duke assert that constraints are not natural

boundaries between regions because the location of points of constraint change over time

as market conditions change. Several commenters, such as Dairyland and Desert STAR,
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -254- 

367This reiterates the conclusion we reached in the eleven ISO principles in Order

No. 888, where we stated that "[t]he portion of the transmission grid operated by a single

ISO should be as large as possible." Order No. 888, FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 31,036 at

31,731.

take the position that the issue whether to design RTO boundaries at constrained

interfaces cannot be stated generically, and must be decided on a case-by-case basis.

Commission Conclusion

The factors we believe should be used to develop appropriate regions are set out

here and called regional configuration factors. These cover such considerations as how

large a region should be and how boundaries should be evaluated. We do not see a

benefit to placing them in regulatory text, as suggested by one commenter, and we will

not do so. The factors are intended as guidance and, as such, must necessarily be applied

flexibly.

Regional Configuration Factors

As stated above, the principal consideration in evaluating the appropriate scope of

an RTO is that such scope must permit the RTO to perform its functions effectively. As

we stated in the NOPR, many of the characteristics and functions for an RTO proposed in

this section suggest that the regional configuration of a proposed RTO should be large in

scope. 

367 For example:
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -255- 

C Making accurate and reliable ATC determinations: An RTO of sufficient

regional scope can make more accurate determinations of ATC across a

larger portion of the grid using consistent assumptions and criteria.

C Resolving loop flow issues: An RTO of sufficient regional scope would

internalize loop flow and address loop flow problems over a larger region.

C Managing transmission congestion: A single transmission operator over a

large area can more effectively prevent and manage transmission

congestion.

C Offering transmission service at non-pancaked rates: Competitive benefits

result from eliminating pancaked transmission rates within the broadest

possible energy trading area.

C Improving Operations: A single OASIS operator over an area of sufficient

regional scope will better allocate scarcity as regional transmission demand

is assessed; promote simplicity and "one-stop shopping" by reserving and

scheduling transmission use over a larger area; and lower costs by reducing

the number of OASIS sites.

C Planning and coordinating transmission expansion: Necessary transmission

expansion would be more efficient if planned and coordinated over a larger

region.
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -256- 

We note that the comments on this issue express a range of views. Many

commenters assert that the bigger the RTO is the better, and that there really are no

serious limitations to RTOs representing loads as large as several hundred thousand

megawatts. Other commenters suggest a number of considerations that may militate

against RTOs that are too large, including the role of security coordinator, operational

characteristics, costs of formation, local reliability issues, and the effect on smaller

participants. In the NOPR, we recognized that there may be a limitation on how many

facilities or transactions can be overseen reliably by a single operator, imposed either by

hardware design or costs, or imposed by human limitations to process the required

amount of information. We further recognized that the difficulty and cost of transferring

operational control over many transmission systems to one RTO may affect regional

configuration. We also noted that, as regions get larger and involve more existing owners

of transmission, reaching consensus on an appropriate transmission rate design for the

region may prove challenging. 

We note that a number of commenters make the point that, at least for some

purposes and functions, the scope of an individual RTO is less important if it is part of a

group of RTOs that have adequately eliminated the negative effects of "seams" between

itself and the other RTOs. NERC identifies two seams issues: reliability practices across

seams and market practices across seams. We further note that other commenters suggest
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -257- 

368In a recent conference to address interregional ISO coordination in the

northeast, the three northeast ISOs (ISO New England, New York ISO, and PJM ISO)

and other market participants discussed current and future coordination efforts among the

ISOs intended to simplify market transactions and enhance reliability in the northeast. 

See http://www.dps.state.ny.us/isoconf.htm.

that large RTOs could be "simulated" through coordinated operations and consistent

methods of access, pricing, and congestion management, and that there may be different

acceptable scopes for reliability and operations purposes on one hand, and rates and

scheduling on the other. 368 We also detect a common theme that runs through a number

of comments: large geographic size is most important for trading areas. Thus, the

concept of large "seamless trading areas" for power emerges as a "scope" issue that is

distinct from the scope of the region for organizing the transmission functions of an RTO. 

We conclude that a large scope is important for an RTO to effectively perform its

required functions and to support efficient and nondiscriminatory power markets. 

Adequate scope is not necessarily determined by geographic distance alone; other factors

include the numbers of buyers and sellers covered by the RTO, the amount of load

served, and the number of miles of transmission lines under operational control. The

scope must be large enough to achieve the regulatory, reliability, operational and

competitive objectives of this Rule.

We are receptive to flexible and innovative ways for an RTO to achieve sufficient

scope. Where a proposed regional transmission entity may be of sufficient scope for
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -258- 

some RTO purposes, but not others, an RTO may be able to achieve sufficient "effective

scope" by coordination and agreements with neighboring entities, or by participating in a

group of RTOs with either hierarchical control or a system of very close coordination. 

We do not foreclose the possibility that an RTO may satisfy some of the minimum

characteristics and functions by itself, while satisfying others through a strong

cooperative agreement with neighboring RTOs to create a "seamless trading area." The

functions of a large RTO may be met by eliminating the effect of seams separating

smaller RTOs through a contract or other coordination arrangement. One of our concerns

about an RTO's scope is that the existing impediments to trade, reliability, and

operational efficiency be eliminated to the greatest extent possible. However, an RTO

application that proposes to rely on "effective scope" to satisfy Characteristic 2 must

demonstrate that the arrangement it proposes to eliminate the effect of seams is the

practical equivalent of eliminating the seams by forming a larger RTO.

Factors for Evaluating Boundaries

In addition to the factors affecting the size of a region, other factors may affect the

delineation of regional boundaries. As stated in the NOPR, the Commission proposed

that RTO boundaries be drawn so as to facilitate and optimize the competitive, reliability,

efficiency and other benefits that RTOs are intended to achieve, as well as to avoid

unnecessary disruption to existing institutions. The Commission proposed in the NOPR a
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -259- 

list of factors it would consider in evaluating the configuration for a proposed RTO. 

Nearly all of the comments agree that these factors are generally appropriate. 

We recognize that different factors may suggest different configurations and that

assessing the appropriateness of a region's configuration will require balancing factors

and a flexible approach. Given this qualification, the Commission, in evaluating an

RTO's boundaries, will consider the extent to which the proposed boundaries:

Facilitate performing essential RTO functions and achieving RTO goals: The

regions should be configured so that an RTO operating therein can ensure nondiscrimination and enhance efficiency in the provision of transmission and ancillary

services, maintain and enhance reliability, encourage competitive energy markets,

promote overall operating efficiency, and facilitate efficient expansion of the transmission

grid. For example, we understand that there have been instances where transmission

system reliability was jeopardized due to the lack of adequate real-time communication

between separate transmission operators in times of system emergencies. To the extent

possible, RTO boundaries should encompass areas for which real-time communication is

critical, and unified operation is preferred.

Encompass one contiguous geographic area: The competitive, efficiency,

reliability, and other benefits of RTOs can be best achieved if there is one transmission

operator in a region. To be most effective, that operator should have control over all
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -260- 

369Commenters are also divided on whether weak interfaces should be

encompassed within an RTO or act as a natural boundary. After consideration, we

conclude that there is not a universal answer applicable to all situations. Consequently,

we will address this issue as it arises in RTO proposals on a case-by-case basis. 

transmission facilities within a large geographic area, including the transmission facilities

of non-public utility entities. This consideration could preclude a noncontiguous region,

or a region with "holes." However, as we discuss below, we will not automatically deny

RTO status where the RTO is not able to obtain full participation in its region. 

Encompass a highly interconnected portion of the grid: To promote reliability and

efficiency, portions of the transmission grid that are highly integrated and interdependent

should not be divided into separate RTOs. One RTO operating the integrated facilities

can better manage the grid. This is not to say, however, that every weak interconnection

belongs on a regional boundary. Where a weak interface is frequently constrained and

acts as a barrier to trade, it may be appropriate to place that interface within an RTO

region. It may be more difficult to expand a weak interface on the boundary between two

regions; this may act as a barrier to trade between the two regions. 369

Deter the exercise of market power: While the industry should work toward a goal

of virtually seamless trade between RTOs, it may be that initially a significant amount of

trade may be contained within an RTO, especially if the RTO or the market establishes a

power exchange that covers the same area as the RTO. Thus, to have a competitive
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -261- 

market, it is important to create an RTO region that is not dominated by a few buyers or

sellers of energy. Also, the RTO configuration should not be one where the RTO

participants can exercise transmission market power by collecting congestion fees on a

critical corridor.

Recognize trading patterns: Given that a goal of this initiative is to promote

competition in electricity markets, regions should be configured so as to recognize trading

patterns, and be capable of supporting trade over a large area, and not perpetuate

unnecessary barriers between energy buyers and sellers. There may exist today some

infrastructure or institutional barriers unnecessarily inhibiting trade between regions that

could be economically reduced. RTO boundaries should not perpetuate these

unnecessary and uneconomic barriers.

Take into account existing regional boundaries (e.g. , NERC regions) to the extent

consistent with the Commission's goals for RTOs: An RTO's configuration should, to the

extent possible, not disrupt existing useful institutions. The Commission recognizes that

utilities have been working together regionally in different contexts for some time, and

that there is value in preserving historical institutions and relationships; but we also

recognize that in the evolving market, efficiencies may call for new configurations.

Encompass existing regional transmission entities: Because existing ISOs, and any

other regional transmission entities we may hereafter approve, already integrate
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -262- 

transmission systems, it may not be efficient to divide them into different regions. This is

not to say, however, that RTO boundaries must coincide with existing regional

transmission entities. An appropriate region may well be larger, and there may be

circumstances that support combining or reconfiguring existing entities.

Encompass existing control areas: Many existing control areas are relatively

small. It may be advisable not to divide them further. However, parties would not be

precluded from proposing to divide a control area if they show this to be beneficial.

Take into account international boundaries: The Commission recognizes that

natural transmission boundaries do not necessarily coincide with international

boundaries. Indeed, a large part of Canada's transmission system, and a small part of

Mexico's transmission grid, is interconnected on a synchronous basis with that of the U.S. 

Accordingly, an appropriate region need not stop at the international boundary. 

However, this Commission does not have, and is not intending by this rule to seek,

jurisdiction over the facilities in a foreign country. We will ask our international

neighbors to participate in discussion of these issues. Perhaps what may be thought of as

a "dotted line" boundary at the international border could be used to indicate that a

natural transmission region does not necessarily stop at the border, while this

Commission's jurisdiction does. 
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -263- 

Although most commenters generally support these factors, other considerations

are proposed as factors. For example, some commenters claim that we should make

reliability and system security the dominant factor, while other commenters propose that

we make trading patterns and market transactions the dominant factor. After

consideration, we do not think it appropriate to identify one factor as the most important. 

Although it is essential that reliability not be jeopardized by RTO formation, and it is

important to promote competition, we do not believe that one goal needs to be sacrificed

to achieve the other. 

Other commenters suggest additional factors that they deemed important to RTO

boundaries, including, for example, established security coordinators, joint ownership

arrangements, and Federal power marketing administration project marketing areas. We

do not intend the factors we have listed to be exclusive: other factors may have merit for

a particular region. We encourage parties to identify additional factors they believe

relevant as we consider specific RTO proposals.

c. Control of Facilities Within a Region

We proposed in the NOPR to accept as RTOs only those proposals for which a

region of appropriate scope and configuration is identified and the proponents represent a

large majority of the transmission facilities within the identified region. 
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -264- 

370See, e.g., Desert STAR, Southern Company, Metropolitan, MidAmerican,

Nevada Commission, Avista, Enron/APX/Coral Power, Duke, PJM/NEPOOL Customers,

Cal ISO, Midwest Municipals, CRC, NPRB, Minnesota Power, Tri-State, TVA.

We solicited comments on how best to balance our goal of having RTOs in place that

operate all transmission facilities within an appropriately sized and configured region

against the reality that there may be difficulties in obtaining 100-percent participation in

all regions in the near term. We asked if we should deny RTO status for any proposal

that does not include all transmission facilities within an appropriate region, or if we

should require that the RTO at least negotiate certain agreements with any nonparticipants within its region to ensure maximum coordination.

Comments

Almost all commenters argue that RTO status should not be withheld if the RTO

participants are unable to obtain participation by all transmission owners in the region. 370

Several commenters, such as Desert STAR and Minnesota Power, note that, if the

Commission does not mandate 100 percent participation, it does not make sense to make

it a condition of RTO approval. Other commenters propose standards to consider in

determining when a proposed RTO represents sufficient facilities in the region. For

example, Desert STAR suggests that the RTO have more than a majority of transmission

owners and has not restricted membership. Southern Company proposes a standard that

sufficient facilities include most of the major transmission facilities and the RTO can
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -265- 

show benefits. MidAmerican proposes that the RTO be able to demonstrate that it would

improve the wholesale market of any subregion of the country without hindering the

wholesale market of any other region of the country. Enron/APX/Coral Power argues

that an RTO should be approved if it provides an improvement even with "gaps." 

Midwest Municipals believe that an RTO should be accepted if the Commission can

make the judgment that the proposal with "gaps" is likely to encourage others to join

through the strength of its operations and the facilities support the development of a

competitive generation market. CRC suggests a standard that the proponents make a

showing that they have diligently tried to accommodate the concerns and needs of the

nonparticipating transmission owners. 

Some commenters, such as NJBUS and Cal ISO, believe that an RTO should

include the participation of all jurisdictional transmission owners in the region. Duke,

however, opposes any attempt by the Commission to determine the appropriate level of

participation, stating that the market should determine the participation level. Some

commenters, such as Metropolitan, support having the RTO develop coordinated

operations agreements with non-participants, while other commenters, such as Avista and

Duke, caution that requiring such agreements would be contrary to market principles and

would give the non-participating party too much bargaining power.
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -266- 

Seattle contends that the Commission should guard against utilities that would add

to the RTO some facilities that are not necessary for RTO operations merely to obtain

incentives. It argues that small municipal control areas should have some latitude to

determine which of their facilities are regional for RTO purposes. Seattle also questions

what "participation" entails for a utility that has limited transmission facilities.

Commission Conclusion

To satisfy the scope and configuration characteristic of this Final Rule, all or most

of the transmission facilities in a region must be included in the RTO. Any RTO

proposal filed with us should intend to operate all transmission facilities within its

proposed region.

We recognize, however, that the proponents of an RTO may not be able to obtain

agreement by all transmission owners in a region of appropriate scope and configuration

to transfer operating control of their facilities to the RTO. This may occur, for example,

because certain facilities may be owned by governmental entities that have restrictions on

transfer of control that may require time to resolve. We do not believe that it would be

desirable to deny RTO status or delay RTO start-up where the transmission owners

representing a large majority of the facilities within a region are ready to move forward,

while a few others are not. On the other hand, we do not believe it would be desirable to
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -267-

371FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 32,541 at 33,734 and proposed § 35.34(i)(3). In the

NOPR, we used the terms "operational authority" and "operational responsibility"

interchangeably. For purposes of clarity and consistency, we will use only the term

"operational authority" to describe this function and have revised the proposed regulatory

text accordingly.

approve an RTO proposal for a region if the proponents represent only a small portion of

the facilities in an otherwise satisfactory region.

Not knowing the full extent of difficulties that may be involved to achieve

participation by all transmission facilities, we will not decide generically to automatically

deny RTO status for lack of full participation. If an RTO proposal does not cover all the

transmission facilities within its proposed region, it should identify the reasons for this, 

any continuing efforts to include all facilities, and any interim arrangements with the nonrepresented facility owners to coordinate transmission functions within the region. The

Commission may at a future time determine whether the use of its authorities under FPA

sections 202(a) and 206 is appropriate to rationalize proposed regions in order to

accomplish the objectives of those sections, as discussed elsewhere in this Final Rule.

3. Operational Authority (Characteristic 3) 

In the NOPR, the Commission proposed that the RTO have operational authority

for all transmission facilities under its control. 371 We stated that this requirement raised

two questions: Which functions must an RTO perform? How should an RTO perform

the functions that it has reserved for itself? With respect to the question of which
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -268-

372FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 32,541 at 33,734 and proposed § 35.34(i)(3)(ii).

functions an RTO should perform, the Commission proposed that, at a minimum, the

RTO must have operational authority over all transmission facilities transferred to the

RTO and must be the security coordinator for its region. 372 As security coordinator, the

RTO would be responsible for real-time monitoring of system conditions (including

voltage, frequency, transmission and generation availability, and power flows) in order to

anticipate potential reliability problems, and for directing and coordinating relief

procedures to respond to transmission loading problems (such as assisting the control area

in alleviating the loading, halting additional interchange transactions, reallocating the use

of the transmission system, selecting the transmission loading relief procedure, and

implementing emergency procedures, including directing that the control area

immediately redispatch generation, reconfigure transmission or reduce load). Those

proposing an RTO may also decide to have their RTO perform other traditional control

area functions (such as maintaining the energy balance, interchange schedules and system

frequency). The Commission proposed, however, that an RTO would not be required to

be a single control area because of concerns over potentially high costs and technical

limitations. Instead those proposing an RTO would be given flexibility in determining

the best division of functions between the RTO and any providers of other control area

functions if there are no other grid operators in its region. However, the Commission
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -269-

373Id.

374Id. and proposed § 35.34(i)(3)(i).

375Id.

376Id. at 33,735.

insisted that an RTO must be ultimately responsible for providing reliable and nondiscriminatory transmission service. 373

 

With respect to the second question of how an RTO will perform its functions, the

Commission proposed that an RTO be given considerable flexibility in determining

whether it will control facilities directly, delegate functions, or use a combination of these

methods. 374 For example, we stated that an RTO proposal could have the RTO operate a

single control area, or establish a master-satellite hierarchical control structure with one

central and multiple distributed control centers (in either case it could propose to lease

equipment and convert employees from existing control centers). 375 The Commission

also proposed that the RTO must submit a public report assessing its operational

arrangements no later than two years after it begins operations. 376
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -270-

377Operational authority refers to the authority to control transmission facilities,

either directly or through contractual agreements with the entities that do have direct

control. In contrast, security coordination refers to real-time monitoring of system

conditions in order to anticipate potential reliability problems, and directing and

coordinating relief procedures to respond to transmission loading problems. 

378See, e.g., APPA, Cal ISO, Duke, East Texas Cooperatives, Entergy, EPSA, First

Rochdale, Georgia Transmission, Illinois Commission, IMEA, ISO-NE, Michigan

Commission, Minnesota Power, Montana-Dakota, NASUCA, NECPUC, Nevada

Commission, Mid-Atlantic Commissions, PacifiCorp, PJM, PJM/NEPOOL Customers,

SNWA, Southern Company, SRP, SPRA, Tri-State, UtiliCorp, WPSC.

379See, e.g., Illinois Commission, IMEA, NASUCA, PJM/NEPOOL Customers.

380See, e.g., First Rochdale, IMEA, UMPA.

381See, e.g., Montana-Dakota, Tacoma Power.

Comments

Comments on the Functions an RTO Must Perform?

Most commenters agree that the RTO must have operational authority 377 for the

transmission facilities under its control. 378 Some commenters claim that this authority is

necessary to prevent anticompetitive behavior by transmission owners. 379 Some

commenters further contend that this authority must extend to all facilities involved in

wholesale transactions so that the transmission owner does not retain control of "access

ramps" that happen to be at low (34kV or 69kV) voltage levels. 380 In contrast, some

utilities express concern that RTO authority over low voltage facilities will unnecessarily

complicate operations. 381
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -271-

382See, e.g., Florida Commission, Puget. It appears that the Florida Commission

interprets a transfer of operational control as a transfer of retail dispatch authority. 

Although other commenters such as WPSC support the RTO having operational

authority, they believe that the Commission may need legislative action to obtain the

authority to require such a transfer.

383See, e.g., Florida Power Corp., Georgia Transmission, JEA, MidAmerican,

Southern Company, Enron/APX/Coral Power.

Several commenters oppose operational authority over the transmission system by

the RTO. Some commenters claim that the Commission does not have the legal authority

to require transmission owners to transfer control to any other entity. 382 Midwest

Energy and SPP believe a transfer of authority would be too costly to implement. Other

commenters maintain that the owner and operator of the transmission system must be the

same entity in order to avoid liability disputes. 383 Mass Companies suggests that

transmission owners retain authority to ensure the safe and prudent management of their

facilities. ComEd suggests that transmission owners retain operational authority with the

RTO having oversight responsibility.

Commenters are divided whether the RTO should be required to be a control area

operator. The existing ISOs in California, New England and PJM, which are all control

area operators, report that this structure is working in their regions. Some commenters

express concern over potential harm to competitive markets if control area authority is not
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -272-

384See, e.g., APPA, APS, Arkansas Consumers, NASUCA, NJBUS, TDU Systems.

385See ,e.g., Conlon, Illinois Commission, Los Angeles, FirstEnergy, Minnesota

Power, SRP, TDU Systems.

386See, e.g., CP&L, ECAR, EEI, Entergy, EPSA, Southern Company.

387It appears that the Florida Commission and JEA believe that such a transfer

would involve RTO control of retail dispatch. It also appears that Dynegy believes that

the basic control area function of frequency control is identical to dynamic scheduling,

which they believe should not be centralized or consolidated.

transferred to an independent entity. 384 ICUA recommends that the RTO be the sole

control area operator. Many other commenters support a single control area as the

ultimate goal, but suggest that the RTO be allowed to evolve to this structure and not be

required to consolidate control areas immediately. 385 Other commenters express concern

about potential costs associated with control area consolidation, but agree that such action

would be acceptable if and when the RTO decides it is necessary for reliability or other

reasons. 

386

 

Commenters that oppose requiring control area consolidation provide a variety of

reasons. 

387 Enron/APX/Coral Power state that only an RTO that is a transco should

perform control area functions. The Florida Commission is concerned that control area

consolidation may result in a security risk. Tri-State and WEPCO believe that there are

higher priorities in RTO development (such as eliminating pancaking, and promoting
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -273-

388See, e.g., NASUCA, First Energy, Otter Tail, PJM, PJM/NEPOOL Customers,

Professor Hogan, Project Groups, SPRA, UtiliCorp, Williams, WPPI. We also discuss

below in more detail the issue of congestion management as an RTO minimum function.

389See, e.g., East Texas Cooperatives, WPPI, Project Groups.

390See, e.g., Allegheny, APPA, APX, Cal ISO, ComEd, Dynegy, East Texas

(continued...)

regional system planning) and that emphasizing control area consolidation may inhibit

RTO formation.

With respect to specific control area functions, numerous commenters discuss the

need for an RTO to have some control of generation in order to ensure system reliability,

especially during emergency situations. 388 Minnesota Power suggests that the

Commission include "control generation as required to ensure reliability" as an additional

minimum function in the final rule. It also recommends that responsibility for area

control error (ACE) and automatic generation control (AGC) be transferred to the RTO as

control area functions because separating these functions from transmission operations

can lead to reliability problems. Other commenters request that the balancing function be

transferred to the RTO to prevent discriminatory behavior by transmission owners. 389 

There is widespread agreement among commenters that the RTO must be the

security coordinator. Marketers, utilities, existing ISOs and customers all agree that

coordination and reliability will be enhanced if a regional organization is responsible for

maintaining grid security. 390 Some commenters state that the authority of a security
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -274-

390(...continued)

Cooperatives, Enron/APX/Coral Power, Entergy, EPSA, LG&E, Mass Companies,

MidAmerican, Midwest Energy, Montana-Dakota, NASUCA, NECPUC, NERC, NJBUS,

PJM/NEPOOL Customers, PPC, Professor Hogan, Seattle, South Carolina Authority,

SPP, SRP, Tri-State, UtiliCorp, Williams.

391See, e.g., LG&E, PJM/NEPOOL Customers, SPP, UtiliCorp. See also supra

section III.D.1 for a more detailed discussion of independence as an RTO minimum

characteristic.

392See, e.g., Montana-Dakota, PJM/NEPOOL Customers, South Carolina

Authority, Williams.

coordinator to receive commercially sensitive information to order the curtailment of

transactions and the shedding of firm load also grants it the ability to favor its own

merchant functions. Confidence in comparable and non-discriminatory transmission

service, therefore, will be improved if these functions are performed by an entity that is

independent of all market participants. 391 Though essentially in support of our proposal,

NERC and MidAmerican assert that is not necessary to link each RTO to a single security

center, but rather it is possible to allow a single security coordinator to assume

responsibility for more than one RTO. NERC points out that if an RTO performs all the

characteristics and functions specified in the NOPR, it will necessarily be a security

coordinator. 

A number of parties state that the RTO must have access to real-time system

information in order to perform its functions as security coordinator. 392 Montana-Dakota

explains further that security centers, by definition, will be equipped with the hardware
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -275-

393See, e.g., East Texas Cooperatives, First Rochdale, Illinois Commission,

PJM/NEPOOL Customers.

and software required to assume basic operational control of the system, which are

beyond that required strictly for security functions. 

Only two commenters express concern over the need for the RTO to be the

security coordinator. ComEd, though supporting some security functions for the RTO,

asserts that the RTO's role can be limited simply to one of oversight. ComEd does not

believe that the RTO needs access to real-time data, and instead would allow the

individual control areas to perform the bulk of the security functions. The only

commenter that argues against making the RTO a security coordinator is Avista, which

states that the security coordinator in the Pacific Northwest is already an independent

body and has the authority necessary for ensuring reliability; therefore, no changes are

required.

Comments on How an RTO Should Perform Its Functions

Overall, commenters strongly agree with the Commission's proposal to permit

those proposing an RTO the authority to decide the type of control they require: direct,

functional or a combination. Some commenters believe direct control is the best

approach to prevent abuse of sensitive information and better ensure reliability. 393 

However, Manitoba Board and Canada DNR express concern that continued coordination

between U.S. and Canadian utilities might be undermined if highly centralized systems
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -276-

394See, e.g., MidAmerican, Seattle, South Carolina Authority.

395See, e.g., ECAR, Enron/APX/Coral Power, EPSA, East Texas Cooperatives,

First Rochdale, Industrial Consumers, ISO-NE, LG&E, Los Angeles, Lincoln,

MidAmerican, Montana-Dakota, NECPUC, NASUCA, Otter Tail, PJM, PJM/NEPOOL

Customers, Project Groups, Seattle, South Carolina Authority, Tri-State. Many of these

commenters support eventual consolidation when any cost and technical barriers are

overcome and if the RTO decides it is necessary.

396See, e.g., EAL, East Texas Cooperatives, ISO-NE, Industrial Consumers,

LG&E, NASUCA, PJM, PJM/NEPOOL Customers, Powerex, Project Groups, Tri-State.

are developed and controlled by U.S. entities. A few commenters contend that it is best

for the RTO to delegate control authority. 394 The majority of commenters support some

form of hierarchical control structure, where the RTO would establish a master control

center and direct the operations in the existing geographically distributed control centers,

which would become satellite centers. 395 PJM and ISO-NE indicate that they both

currently operate with a hierarchical control structure, where the ISO control center is the

master control room that directs the actions of the satellite control centers. 

A number of supporters of the hierarchical structure specifically request that the

Commission ensure that the RTO has the authority to direct all actions at the satellite

control centers and that the satellite centers will be independent in order to prevent

discriminatory transmission service and the transfer of commercially valuable information

to market participants. 396 Montana-Dakota and Otter Tail believe a major benefit of the

hierarchical structure is improved emergency response and system security in a large
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -277-

397See NERC Operating Manual Policy 2 which can be found at www.nerc.com.

As we have stated before, the dividing line "between transmission control and generation

control is not always clear because both sets of functions are ultimately required for

reliable operation of the overall system." Midwest ISO, 84 FERC at 62,151. The idea

that the entity that controls the transmission system must have some degree of control

over some generation seems to be generally recognized. See Docket No. ER98-1438-000

Applicants' Response at 3.

398We note that the definition of a control area, and consequently the functions

that must be performed by a control area, is currently being reexamined by the NERC

Control Area Criteria Task Force in an open forum. See NERC web page at

www.nerc.com.

region if the RTO is coordinating and directing the actions of all operators in the region. 

Finally, Enron/APX/Coral Power believe the standardization of balancing practices for a

large region is an important benefit of a hierarchical system. 

Commission Conclusion

Which Functions Must an RTO Perform?

We reaffirm the determination proposed in the NOPR that an RTO must have

operational authority for all transmission facilities under its control and also must be the

security coordinator for its region. We recognize that it is difficult to draw a precise line

between transmission control and generation control, 397 and we also recognize that given

the changing nature of the industry, terminology such as "control area operator" is

undergoing definitional changes. 398 Accordingly, it is difficult to state precisely what

functions an RTO must have in order to have full operational authority for transmission

facilities. Moreover, our desire to allow RTOs flexibility dissuades us from trying to be
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -278-

too precise. However, certain concepts are basic and generally understood in the

industry.

One necessary aspect of operational authority as used here refers to the authority

to control transmission facilities. This includes, but is not limited to, switching

transmission elements into and out of operation in the transmission system (e.g.,

transmission lines and transformers), monitoring and controlling real and reactive power

flows, monitoring and controlling voltage levels, and scheduling and operating reactive

resources. Functions such as these must be included within the operational authority of

an RTO. 

We conclude, as proposed in the NOPR, that the RTO is also required to be the

NERC security coordinator for its region. The role of a security coordinator is to ensure

reliability in real-time operations of the power system. As security coordinator, the RTO

will assume responsibility for: (1) performing load-flow and stability studies to

anticipate, identify and address security problems; (2) exchanging security information

with local and regional entities; (3) monitoring real-time operating characteristics such as

the availability of reserves, actual power flows, interchange schedules, system frequency

and generation adequacy; and (4) directing actions to maintain reliability, including firm

load shedding. 

We believe that the RTO must be security coordinator for several reasons. The

functions of the security coordinator are enhanced when they are performed over large
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -279-

39984 FERC at 62,158.

regions. In addition, the independence of the security coordinator is important for

ensuring non-discriminatory transmission service, and the RTO will have that

independence. As we stated in Midwest ISO:

This role [the role of a security coordinator] is central to maintaining grid

reliability and non-discriminatory access. Under proposed NERC policies,

security coordinators would be required to anticipate problems that could

jeopardize the reliability of the interconnected grid. In the course of performing

these reliability functions, the Security Coordinator would receive considerable

information which is commercially sensitive. Therefore, it is important that the

proposed Midwest ISO Security Coordinator be performed by an entity that is

independent of market participants. [399]

However, we will allow flexibility in how the RTO performs its security

coordinator functions. For example, an RTO may contract these responsibilities out to an

independent security coordinator if this is justified. Also, this requirement does not

prevent more than one RTO from sharing a single security coordinator as suggested by

NERC.

As proposed in the NOPR, we will not at this time require the RTO to operate

what traditionally has been thought of as a single control area for its region. However,

the RTO must perform the control functions required to satisfy the minimum

characteristics and functions in this Final Rule, including the transmission control and
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -280-

400For example, several commenters state that an RTO must have some authority

over generation to ensure system reliability. The RTO is required to have some authority

as a minimum characteristic, as discussed with respect to short-term reliability.

401In our order approving the Midwest ISO, we stated that our approval of the ISO

was based on the applicants' commitment that the ISO would be able to "take all actions

necessary to provide nondiscriminatory transmission service, promote and maintain

reliability." Midwest ISO, 84 FERC at 62,159.

security coordinator functions discussed above, 400 in a non-discriminatory manner for all

market participants. 401 We will permit those developing an RTO proposal flexibility in

deciding on the particular division of operational responsibilities with existing control

areas. 

We recognize that the feasibility of consolidating existing control areas into a

single such area may be limited by cost and technical considerations. However, we note

that physical consolidation may be unnecessary when a hierarchical control structure is

used to define a single control area by making existing control areas subject to RTO

direction (and so avoiding the high costs and technical uncertainty associated with

centralization of physical control for a very large RTO region). Hierarchical control is a

form of power system control that relies on a master-satellite control structure, which

establishes a single controlling authority without requiring the construction of a single,

consolidated control room. Existing control centers are not replaced, but continue to

operate, independent from market participants, as satellite control centers reporting to the

RTO master control center. The RTO security center assumes the dual role of the master
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -281-

402See, e.g., Marija Ilic and Shell Liu, Hierarchical Power System Control: Its

Value in a Changing Industry, Springer-Verlag, 1996. 

403This issue is also addressed in greater detail in our discussion of the RTO's role

as a provider of ancillary services as an RTO minimum function.

control center and security center, with clear authority to direct all actions at the satellite

centers. 402

We conclude that each region should be free to decide if and when the region will

transition to a hierarchical control structure, consolidate the control areas in its region, or

adopt a different control structure that best meets the region's needs.

How Should the RTO Perform Its Functions?

We conclude that those designing the RTO should have flexibility to decide how it

would exercise its operational control authority. The RTO operate the transmission

system through direct physical operation by RTO employees, contractual agreements with

other entities (e.g., transmission owners and control area operators) or implement a

hierarchical control structure involving a combination of direct and functional control. 

Under these arrangements, the personnel of existing control centers might become

employees of the RTO or remain as employees of the control center owner, while being

supervised by RTO personnel. We will leave it to the discretion of the region to decide

on the combination of direct and functional control that works best for its

circumstances. 403
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -282-

 However, regardless of the method of control chosen, the RTO must have clear

authority to direct all actions that affect the facilities under its control, including the

decisions and actions taken at any satellite control centers. The system of operational

control chosen must ensure reliable operation of the grid and non-discriminatory access to

the grid by all market participants. In addition, to ensure that the RTO does not become

locked into an operational system that is unsatisfactory, the Commission will require the

RTO to prepare a public report that assesses the efficacy of its operational arrangements

no later than two years after it begins operations.

4. Short-Term Reliability (Characteristic 4)

The fourth proposed characteristic of an RTO is that it must have exclusive

authority for maintaining the short-term reliability of the transmission grid under its

control. In the NOPR we identified four basic short-term reliability responsibilities of an

RTO: (1) the RTO must have exclusive authority for receiving, confirming and

implementing all interchange schedules; (2) the RTO must have the right to order

redispatch of any generator connected to transmission facilities it operates if necessary

for the reliable operation of these facilities; (3) when the RTO operates transmission

facilities owned by other entities, the RTO must have authority to approve and disapprove

all requests for scheduled outages of transmission facilities to ensure that the outages can

be accommodated within established reliability standards; and (4) if the RTO operates

under reliability standards established by another entity (e.g., a regional reliability
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -283-

404FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 32,541 at 33,735.

405See, e.g., American Forest, Cal ISO, California Board, Cinergy, CMUA, CSU,

EAL, Enron/APX/Coral Power, Entergy, EPSA, Industrial Customers, NASUCA,

NECPUC, PJM, PNGC, SMUD, UtiliCorp, H.Q. Energy Services, Mass Companies,

Mid-Atlantic Commissions, MidWest Energy, Minnesota Commission, NY ISO,

PacifiCorp, PG&E, Williams, WPSC. 

council), the RTO must report to the Commission if these standards hinder its ability to

provide reliable, non-discriminatory and efficiently priced transmission service. 404

Comments

General Comments

Commenters address both general concerns about reliability as well as the four

basic proposed short-term reliability responsibilities of an RTO. Most commenters

generally agree that the RTO should have the responsibility for short term-reliability. 405

Several commenters raise questions regarding definition and scope of "short-term"

reliability. TEP requests that the Commission further define the time period involved. It

suggests that designating a specific time period (whether one month, six months or a

year) would be beneficial to evaluating this characteristic. Enron/APX/Coral Power

requests that the Commission make clear that "short-term" is intended to mean "realtime."

While agreeing that the RTO should be given ultimate control over facilities

necessary to preserve reliability, SMUD expresses concern that the RTO should not be
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -284-

encumbered with responsibility for facilities that do not serve a regional transmission

function. TANC requests that the RTO's responsibility over reliability not infringe on the

management responsibilities of local regulatory authorities or interfere with the

management and operation of the local system facilities of a utility distribution company. 

PG&E requests that the Commission require that the RTO rely primarily on market

mechanisms to maintain reliability. However, PJM/NEPOOL Customers urge the

Commission to ensure that the RTO’s actions in maintaining the short-term reliability of

the grid do not unreasonably impinge on the freedom of business decisions inherent in a

competitive supply market. Several commenters, such San Francisco and Minnesota

Commission, state that because the primary function of a RTO is ensuring short-term

reliability, it should be more clearly defined and should not be compromised by any other

RTO market functions.

PJM suggests that the Commission grant additional authorities to the RTO to

ensure reliability, including the authority to (1) collect information, (2) direct operations

in the control area, (3) assure that those it directs will respond in a predictable manner

(which the RTO can achieve through training and drills) and (4) declare an emergency,

direct emergency operations, and determine when emergency conditions have ended.

Southern Company notes that the industry has little, if any, experience in granting

a new entity control over the operations of a transmission system that encompasses a
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -285-

406Southern Company notes that the California and ERCOT ISOs operate within

the boundaries of a single state. In PJM, New York and New England, the control of the

grid remains remarkably unchanged because the ISOs in those regions were already

operating the system on behalf of the transmission owners and adopted the institutions

and infrastructures of an ISO.

407FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 32,541 at 33,735-36.

broad, multi-state region. 406 It claims that transmission owners and State commissions

must be assured that the RTO is capable of operating a regional transmission system

reliably before an RTO is formed. New York Commission indicates that the authority of

States to require the maintenance of electric system reliability should be recognized in

establishing responsibilities. Iowa Board believes that there is a need for greater regional

development of reliability standards to reflect regional needs and conditions. It requests

that State commissions be involved in the decisionmaking process of an RTO to ensure

that electric facilities are properly sized and located and that additions are not detrimental

to the reliability of the grid.

Comments on Interchange Scheduling

The Commission proposed that, in the context of the RTO’s role as the recipient

and evaluator of all requests for transmission service under its own FERC-approved

tariff, an RTO that is a control area operator must also receive, confirm, and implement

all interchange schedules between adjacent control areas. 407 The Commission expressed

concern that non-RTO control area operators would receive commercially sensitive
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -286-

408See, e.g., Cal ISO, CMUA, Entergy, Mass Companies, NECPUC, Nevada

Commission, PJM/NEPOOL Customers, PJM, SMUD, Southern Company, WPSC,

PG&E.

information involving its competitors in implementing interchange schedules and

questioned whether there is any Commission action, other than its current code of

conduct standards, and short of requiring consolidation of all control areas within a

region, which could address this concern.

Several commenters agree that the RTO should have authority over receiving,

confirming and implementing all interchange schedules. 408 PJM believes that an

independent ISO is in the best position to exercise the scheduling authority of an RTO. It

suggests that an RTO that is independent of commercial interests in the market does not

face the commercial information problem because it does not compete with market

participants and consequently would make scheduling decisions in an unbiased and fair

manner.

PJM/NEPOOL Customers claims that interchange scheduling oversight must be

performed by an independent entity because it would be neither possible nor desirable for

a non-RTO control area operator to perform this function without access to commercially

sensitive information. It suggests that the RTO maintain direct control over interchange

scheduling either by using RTO employees or a master satellite arrangement where

ultimate responsibility remains in the RTO master control area operating room. APX
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -287-

409See also Southern Company.

410See, e.g., Duke, Florida Power Corp.

suggests that requiring a contractor (acceptable to the RTO and the control area operator)

to operate the control area operator facility could help address this concern.

Enron/APX/Coral Power believes that the risk is eliminated if transmission

operations, including control-area operations, are operationally separated from the load

and generation of vertically-integrated utilities. Barring such complete separation, this

risk could nevertheless be substantially obviated if the RTO provided control area

operators with information only about scheduled net interchanges between control areas

without disclosing the individual transactions making up the new schedules. 409

However, other commenters contend that control area operators will continue to

need information on individual transactions in order to implement interchange schedules

and to ensure real-time reliability. 410 Desert STAR believes that work should be done in

this area to determine what information is required by control area operators and when

they must receive it in order to carry out their reliability responsibilities

Florida Commission states that this issue has already been resolved within the

Florida Reliability Coordinating Council (FRCC) by requiring all entities who operate

control areas within the region that require access to commercially sensitive information
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -288-

411FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 32,541 at 33,736.

412See, e.g., Cal ISO, Cinergy, CMUA, NECPUC, PJM, UtiliCorp, Entergy,

Allegheny, LG&E, Lincoln, Metropolitan, Minnesota Power, Nevada Commission, Otter

Tail, Southern Company, TDU Systems, NASUCA, Reliant, Mass Companies, TAPS.

to sign agreements that separate reliability personnel and the relevant information from

their wholesale merchant personnel.

Several commenters, such as Duke and Florida Power Corp., state that no

additional Commission action is necessary. These commenters believe that the existing

code of conduct standards are working and the reciprocity provisions of Order No. 888

provide for compliance with the code of conduct standards by all non-public utility

control area operators. Florida Power Corp. also notes that within the FRCC, all entities

operating control areas are required to sign agreements verifying functional separation.

Comments on Generation Redispatch

In the NOPR, the Commission proposed that the RTO's reliability authority

include the ability to order redispatch of any generator connected to the transmission grid

when necessary for the reliability of the grid. However, the RTO would have no

authority over initial unit commitment and normal dispatch decisions. 411

Several commenters agree that the RTO have some authority to order redispatch

when necessary to maintain the the reliability of the grid. 412 Sithe, however, believes

that, in the evolving competitive marketplace, redispatch authority alone is insufficient. It
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -289-

413See, e.g., Cinergy, Chelan, Southern Company, LG&E, Reliant.

argues that the RTO should also provide appropriate incentives to the owners of assets

that are needed for reliability to maintain those assets and make them available for

operation in constrained areas. Sithe urges the Commission to consider adopting a final

rule that provides RTOs with sufficient commercial authority, "including the necessary

financial resources" to enter into market-rate business arrangements, that assure

availability of assets needed for reliability. Sithe states that without this authority, the

RTO may not have sufficient tools to fully ensure reliability, because must-run generators

would have little incentive to continue to operate in constrained areas.

CMUA maintains that it is insufficient to vest authority in the RTO to maintain

short-term reliability without also vesting enforcement powers to ensure compliance with

RTO dispatch instructions. Allegheny and other commenters agree that RTOs should be

able to direct redispatch, particularly if the redispatch is accomplished under a marketbased compensation scheme as a part of transmission service pricing methodology that

uses the redispatch costs to set marginal system use costs. However, they argue that in no

case should the RTO be able to direct generation redispatch unless the generator is

compensated at market value (unless market power issues are involved). 413

Avista expresses serious concern with the breadth of a redispatch requirement. It

believes that the right to order redispatch of generation should be negotiated among the
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -290-

414See, e.g., CMUA.

parties in the region without a presumption that the RTO must have broad redispatch

authority, except in emergency circumstances. Avista and others note that a negotiated

approach is particularly important to operators of hydroelectric resources which are

subject to numerous environmental and operating restrictions that limit their ability to

redispatch. 414 Avista and SMUD request that the Commission clarify that the RTO’s

authority to redispatch is limited to emergency circumstances affecting reliability. 

Chelan believes that RTOs should be required to enter into arm's-length

agreements with those generators that are willing to service redispatch requests, and

compensate those generators for supplying this service. RTOs should not be allowed to

unilaterally redispatch a generating unit without the generator’s consent, and without

compensation.

Commenters, such as Cal ISO and Nevada Commission, suggest that the

Commission require reliability-related services (i.e. redispatch) be provided to RTOs

under a set of uniform rates, terms and conditions. Such a requirement would reduce the

Commission’s administrative burden of contracts governed by different sets of terms and

conditions.

EME believes that the RTO's control over dispatch of generation should be

carefully circumscribed. It recommends that reliability functions be internalized into
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -291-

415Metropolitan believes the Cal ISO’s definition of system emergency

appropriately describes the circumstances in which redispatch may be appropriate. A

"system emergency" is described as "any abnormal system condition which requires

immediate manual or automatic action to prevent loss of load, equipment damage or

tripping of system elements which might result in cascading outages or to restore system

operation to meet the minimum operating reliability criteria." 

416See, e.g., PG&E, Southern Company, Reliant, SMUD.

explicit procedures for congestion pricing. It states that in most cases proper pricing

signals can provide sufficient incentives for generators to schedule operation of their

facilities to ensure system reliability. 

Industrial Consumers states that the RTO’s redispatch decisions regarding "any

generator" must be qualified to excuse on-site generators that serve an industrial load,

especially those that serve a critical steam host. For environmental, safety and economic

reasons, these units should not be forced to redispatch except as a last resort option.

Metropolitan supports an RTO having authority to order redispatch of any

generating unit when necessary for the reliability of the grid. However, "reliability" must

be carefully defined to avoid RTO interference with normal market operations by

redispatching generation for its own convenience, or to alleviate adverse market

conditions. 415

Several commenters oppose the proposal to allow the RTO to redispatch

generation. 416 PG&E believes that the proposal would give too much latitude to RTOs

and create an incentive to impose centrally determined fixes on market operations, rather
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -292-

than allowing market mechanisms to self-correct. Therefore, PG&E argues that RTOs

should be allowed to redispatch generation facilities only when there is a true reliability

emergency as specified in the RTO tariff. Moreover, RTOs should be able to redispatch

only those units that have actually participated in the market.

PJM/NEPOOL Customers believes that the authority as proposed in the NOPR is

too broad and must be further defined. It requests that the Commission ensure that this

authority is exercised only during only the most serious circumstances when grid

reliability is truly in danger. It suggests that the Commission promulgate or pre-approve

reliability standards for determining when the RTO can order redispatch of generators,

the amount of generation assets that the RTO will have authority over and standards for

the redispatch order. Southern Company recommends that the Commission provide only

general guidance concerning redispatch and allow the regions to develop more specific

procedures.

When considering allowing an RTO to redispatch a Federal hydroelectric

generator, SPRA emphasizes that the Commission must recognize that individual Federal

hydroelectric generators are under the control of either the Corps, the Bureau of

Reclamation or the International Boundary Waters Commission, not the PMA. While a

PMA may belong to an RTO, it is unlikely that other Federal agencies will. The
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -293-

417FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 32,541 at 33,736-37.

Commission must give careful consideration to determine that RTO redispatch authority

does not prohibit or limit a PMA's ability to fulfill its statutory obligations.

Comments on Transmission Maintenance Scheduling

In the NOPR, the Commission proposed that an RTO which operates transmission

facilities owned by other entities be authorized to approve or disapprove all requests for

scheduled outages of transmission facilities in order to ensure that maintenance outage

schedules meet applicable reliability standards. 417

The Commission requested comments on a number of issues related to this

proposed requirement: Does it cede too much or too little authority to the RTO? If the

RTO requires a transmission owner to reschedule its planned maintenance, should the

transmission owner be compensated for any costs created by the required rescheduling? 

Would it be feasible to create a market mechanism to induce transmission owners to plan

their maintenance so as to minimize reliability effects? Should an RTO that is an ISO

have any authority to require rescheduling of maintenance if it anticipates that the

planned maintenance schedule will adversely affect power markets? If the RTO is a

transco, can it manipulate its transmission maintenance schedules in a manner that harms

competition?
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -294-

418See, e.g., Cal ISO, NECPUC, PJM, Desert STAR, Entergy, PGE, Allegheny,

Avista, LG&E, Lincoln, Tri-State, WPSC, CRC, Duke, EAL, First Rochdale, Industrial

Consumers, ISO-NE, Metropolitan, Montana-Dakota, NASUCA, New Smyrna Beach,

NYPP, Oneok, PG&E, Southern Company, SRP, Turlock, WPPI, Florida Power Corp.,

Nevada Commission.

The Commission stated that the RTO's regional perspective will allow it to

coordinate individual maintenance schedules with each other as well as with expected

seasonal system demand variations. Because the RTO will have access to extensive

information, it will see the "big picture" and be able to make more accurate assessments

of the reliability effect of proposed maintenance schedules than individual, sub-regional

transmission owners.

Commenters address essentially three issue related to transmission maintenance

scheduling: the RTO's authority; appropriate compensation; and use of market

mechanisms.

RTO Authority to Schedule Transmission Maintenance

Many commenters support giving an RTO authority over transmission

maintenance scheduling. 418 Duke, however, believes that an enforcement mechanism

may also be needed. First Rochdale recommends that transmission owners be given the

right to protest an RTO’s actions to the Commission. Reliant, however, opposes RTO

authority over maintenance scheduling, arguing that transmission maintenance decisions

must reside with transmission facility owners. 
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -295-

Seattle and NYPP suggest that the Commission define an RTO role only for

scheduling facility outages that are clearly associated with the regional transmission

network because internal subtransmission and radial transmission facilities do not have

regional significance. Turlock supports restricting the RTO's authority to the grid it

manages to prevent its outage scheduling authority extending beyond the grid for which it

is responsible. On the other hand, TDU Systems claims that an RTO should also

coordinate maintenance of interconnected distribution facilities that are not under its

control, if maintenance on those facilities would adversely affect RTO operations. 

 Duke suggests that with the creation of an RTO that is not a transco, a set of

governing principles for outage coordination should be established. The parties should

agree on the timing of requests for planned maintenance and the timing of responses to

those requests. If for any reason, other than the gross negligence of the transmission

owner, a scheduled maintenance outage were determined to be a problem after an

agreement is reached, rescheduling the outage would require the mutual consent of the

transmission owner and the RTO. 

EAL recommends that appropriate contracts with existing transmission facility

owners that ensure the continued reliable operation of the grid are required. Principal

elements of such contracts would include standards of service, provisions for information

sharing and reporting, maintenance scheduling, transmission facility ratings, testing and
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -296-

performance expectations. Maintenance scheduling should include provisions for

maintenance deferral under instructions from the RTO if required for system security

reasons only.

NYPP states that arrangements for outages should be made well in advance of the

outage start date because RTO approval of proposed schedules could become the critical

path. If approval is delayed, or subsequently revoked, the transmission owner will incur

significant expenses that should be reimbursed.

Montana-Dakota suggests that the effects of rescheduling can be decreased by

having the RTO review and approve all transmission maintenance schedules on a weekly,

monthly and quarterly basis. After reviewing the transfer capability and market effects of

the proposed outage, the RTO should communicate the need to reschedule to the

transmission owner far enough in advance of the planned outage to allow the owner to

reschedule, possibly to avoid any cost impact. Montana-Dakota notes, however, that the

closer the date of the outage, the higher the probability of an economic impact.

Southern Company requests that the Commission clarify that once an RTO

approves a scheduled outage, it should be allowed to change that schedule only if

implementing the plan would compromise system integrity or reliability. 

Seattle believes that the NOPR fails to provide adequate assurances to

transmission owners that a timely maintenance schedule will be adopted by the RTO. 
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -297-

419See, e.g., PJM, TANC, WPSC, Avista, Lincoln, CRC, Duke, Metropolitan,

Minnesota Power, Montana-Dakota, NASUCA, NPRB, NYPP, PJM/NEPOOL

Customers, Reliant, TDU Systems, Turlock, Florida Power Corp., Reliant, Desert STAR,

Southern Company.

The RTO must establish timely dates certain for maintenance outage requests from

operating entities. To do this the RTO must adequately balance safety considerations,

and the cost of deferring maintenance with commercial impact. For these reasons, an

RTO should not be permitted to arbitrarily postpone required maintenance.

Compensation

Nearly all of the commenters believe that transmission owners should be

compensated in some form if they are required by an RTO to reschedule maintenance. 419

 Avista argues that the transmission owners’ shareholders should not bear the burden of

decisions made by an independent body that result in reduced revenues or increased costs

for the transmission owner.

Metropolitan states that if an RTO requests a transmission owner to reschedule

planned maintenance for reliability concerns, a transmission owner should be

compensated only for its direct costs necessarily and reasonably incurred in complying

with the RTO’s request. Direct costs may include, for example, increased labor or

equipment expenses arising from the rescheduled maintenance. However, Metropolitan

does not believe a transmission owner should recover lost opportunity costs arising from

the rescheduled maintenance because opportunity costs are uncertain and speculative.
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -298-

 Southern Company argues that, if an RTO requires a transmission owner to

reschedule a previously approved outage, the RTO should compensate the transmission

owner for any additional costs caused by the rescheduling.

NASUCA believes that the RTO should compensate transmission or generation

owners only to the extent that incremental costs are incurred due to the rescheduling of

outages. NASUCA argues that it is unlikely that owners would incur significant

incremental costs, especially for transmission outages. 

Some commenters such as PGE and Minnesota Power state that if an RTO

requires a transmission owner to reschedule its planned maintenance for reliability

reasons in an emergency situation, the RTO should not be required to compensate the

transmission owner. However, if an RTO requires a transmission owner to reschedule its

planned maintenance for economic reasons, the RTO should be required to compensate

the transmission owner for liquidated damages. 

Other commenters such as Tri-State and Cal ISO oppose transmission owners

being compensated for the rescheduling of maintenance work. Cal ISO states that, where

an RTO properly exercises such authority by requiring a transmission owner to

reschedule a maintenance outage, that transmission owner is not entitled to compensation

for the costs associated with rescheduling. Tri-State recommends factoring any
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -299-

additional expense into the revenue requirement that the transmission owner receives

from the RTO.

Market Mechanisms

PJM/NEPOOL Customers suggests that the RTO enact a compensation mechanism

in transmission outage rescheduling situations or propose to use a market mechanism to

encourage transmission owners to plan maintenance so as to minimize reliability effects. 

Minnesota Power, however, argues that maintenance rescheduling to benefit power

markets is analogous to generation redispatch and should be paid for by the benefitting

market participants.

Montana-Dakota believes that an RTO should have the authority to reschedule

maintenance for market effects if there is an incremental cost reimbursement mechanism

in place that would provide an incentive to the transmission owner to change maintenance

schedules to benefit the market. 

Metropolitan argues that an RTO with authority to unilaterally reschedule

transmission maintenance for market considerations could have a destabilizing effect on

the power market. Emerging markets require predictability to thrive, and therefore RTOs

should interfere in market operations only when necessary to address reliability concerns.

Florida Power Corp. suggests that, while it may be feasible to develop a market

mechanism to induce transmission owners to plan their maintenance to minimize
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -300-

420FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 32,541 at 33,737.

reliability effects, it would be far simpler to retain the existing structure in which a single

entity both owns and operates the transmission system. When ownership and operation

are combined, a single entity is responsible for both reliability and maintenance, and thus

has a natural incentive to seek an optimal balance between these activities. Thus, Florida

Power Corp. opposes RTOs having authority to reschedule maintenance to manage the

performance of the market.

Turlock also does not believe an RTO should have authority to make transmission

outage decisions based on market considerations. Turlock, as well as Desert STAR and

CRC, believe instead that consideration should be given to motivating transmission

owners to appropriately schedule their maintenance outages, to minimize impacts on

competitive markets.

Comments Generation Maintenance Scheduling

The short-term reliability characteristic, as proposed in the NOPR, would not give

an RTO authority over proposed generation maintenance outage schedules. However, the

Commission noted that some generation control is necessary for reliable operation of a

transmission system. The Commission asked whether an RTO should have some

authority over generation maintenance schedules and, if so, how much. 420
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -301-

421See, e.g., Cinergy, NECPUC, PJM, Desert STAR, WPSC, Cal ISO, EAL,

Industrial Consumers, ISO-NE, Turlock, Florida Power Corp., Metropolitan, Minnesota

Power, Montana-Dakota, NASUCA, Nevada Commission, NYPP, PSNM, TDU Systems.

422See, e.g., Desert STAR, Metropolitan, Turlock, Florida Power Corp., PSNM,

NYPP.

423See, e.g., WPSC, LG&E, Montana-Dakota.

The majority of commenters support an RTO having at least some authority over

generation maintenance schedules. 421 However, most commenters suggest limiting the

RTO's authority. Some commenters suggest that an RTO have authority only for

generating units that are "must-run" or that the RTO has under contract due to the

requirement to maintain system reliability. 422 Desert STAR believes that an RTO should

not attempt to manipulate the commercial power market when reliability is not affected.

Cinergy supports an RTO having the ability to request changes to a schedule to

serve reliability needs, coordinate transmission outages, and maximize grid efficiency to

increase ATC for transmission customers' use, so long as generators receive

compensation at market-based prices for missed market opportunities. Other commenters 

agree that an RTO should compensate the generation owner if a schedule change is

necessary. 

423
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -302-

424See, e.g., Duke, PJM/NEPOOL Customers, SPRA, Tri-State, Empire District.

425See, e.g., Enron/APX/Coral Power, FirstEnergy, Mass Companies,

Metropolitan.

A few commenters claim that the RTO should not have any authority over

generation maintenance schedules. 424 SPRA states that requiring such authority would

discourage or prevent participation by PMAs because other Federal agencies own the

hydroelectric plants that generate the power marketed by the PMAs.

Tri-State does not believe that an RTO should have approval authority over

generation maintenance outages because these outages are driven by the cost

considerations associated with generation plant equipment replacement or rehabilitation. 

However, Tri-State agrees that an RTO must have advance knowledge of the scheduled

generation outages in order to assure transmission system reliability and adequacy of

reserves. Other commenters concur with a notification requirement. 425 Cinergy notes,

however, that while it believes a generator may be required to submit its maintenance

schedule to an RTO, the RTO should be prohibited from sharing that information with

any other market participants, or affiliates of market participants.
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -303-

426FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 32,541 at 33,737.

427See also LG&E.

Comments on Performance Standards

In the NOPR, the Commission discussed the establishment of performance

standards by an RTO for transmission facilities under its direct or contractual control. 426

For example, an RTO could establish a standard that identifies specific performance

targets for planned and unplanned outages of facilities. The Commission requested

comments on whether a non-profit ISO could establish incentive schemes for the

transmission owners whose facilities it operates.

PJM believes that an RTO will be capable of developing performance standards

and incentives to encourage transmission owners and generators to operate and maintain

reliable facilities. It states that market participants cooperatively can create marketoriented incentives to maintain their transmission and generation facilities effectively. 427

Duke also believes that incentive schemes can be developed. It suggests that the

revenues collected from users by the RTO could be returned to transmission owners

according to a prearranged formula that incorporates quality standards for reliability. 

Thus, the revenue allocation would reflect transmission owner performance in providing

a reliable system.
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -304-

PSE&G believes that RTOs will, and should, be able to offer incentives to

participants to ensure that reliability standards are not only met but exceeded. It states

that a mechanism of linking payment with performance, measured against accepted

benchmarks, has worked well for many years in PJM.

EAL states that appropriate contracts with existing transmission facility owners

that ensure the continued reliable operation of the grid are required. It suggests that these

contracts include standards of service, provisions for information sharing and reporting,

maintenance scheduling, transmission facility ratings, testing and performance

expectations.

Industrial Consumers believes that an RTO could establish performance standards

for transmission facilities that takes into account the “reliability” of each facility. It

argues that a facility that has frequent unplanned outages should not receive the same

compensation as a facility whose availability is more reliable. It suggests that a

transmission owner be precluded from recovering fixed costs during periods of unplanned

outages that exceed some minimum threshold based on superior performance.

Cal ISO indicates that its tariff provides for the implementation of maintenance

standards, and penalties under those standards, to ensure both adequate maintenance and

system reliability. These provisions act in concert with the California ISO's authority to

coordinate and approve maintenance outages. 
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -305-

428FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 32,541 at 33,737-38.

Southern Company believes that the establishment of performance standards for

transmission facilities controlled by an RTO is misplaced. Transmission owners plan and

operate their transmission systems according to NERC and regional reliability standards,

as well as State legal and regulatory requirements. Thus, while Southern Company

doesn't claim that performance-based incentives are inappropriate, it points out that there

already are existing standards to ensure reliable system operations.

Comments on Facility Ratings and Operating Ranges

Reliable operation of the transmission system in the short-term requires both

continuous monitoring of equipment availability and loading, and actions to maintain

loading levels within the established operating ranges and equipment ratings. The NOPR

suggested that RTOs are best situated to establish ratings and operating ranges for two

reasons. First, they will have the most complete information about expected and realtime operating conditions. Second, RTOs will be trusted because they will not have any

economic interests in electricity market outcomes and they will not be owned or

controlled by any market participants. The Commission proposed to let RTO established

equipment ratings prevail in a dispute with a transmission owner pending the outcome of

a dispute resolution process. 428
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -306-

Nearly all commenters that address this issue oppose the NOPR proposal. South

Carolina Authority urges the Commission to proceed with caution to prevent avoidable

damage to persons or property. SRP argues that ratings and operating ranges influence

the useful life and maintenance cost of equipment, as well as the level of service to the

end-use customer, and notes that each transmission owner has a legitimate interest in the

ratings. SRP believes that the ideal situation would be to establish ratings by mutual

consent of the transmission owner and RTO. If they cannot agree, the issue should go to

dispute resolution.

NYPP and Mass Companies oppose this proposal because transmission owners

have the fiduciary responsibility to protect their assets. Furthermore, they state that the

rating of equipment necessarily requires a particularized knowledge of the equipment and

related facilities that is unlikely to be possessed by the RTO. 

Metropolitan believes that a well-established reliability organization is best suited

for establishing maximum transmission line ratings that can be sustained over most of the

hours in a year because it will include the cooperation of technical groups representing all

systems, not just those under RTO control. It sees no benefit from moving this

responsibility to RTOs when the reliability councils have historically performed this

function with a minimum of controversy. EAL suggests that since the owner of the

transmission facility assumes the equipment, personnel and public risks for the operation
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -307-

429FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 32,541 at 33,738.

of its equipment, the RTO could fulfill an audit role to ensure that facility ratings by the

owners follow industry norms.

Seattle suggests that the Commission instruct RTOs to work cooperatively with

facility owners, since ratings on most power transmission equipment are a function of age

and past usage, and a new entity will not have such historical information.

Southern Company states that transmission owners have responsibilities to their

shareholders and State commissions to operate their equipment safely and reliably. 

SPRA believes that this proposal has the potential to create significant liability risks for

the United States.

Entergy believes that a transco has an advantage at performing this function

because it will have the natural incentive to maintain the highest and safest ratings for the

transmission facilities since it will be solely and directly responsible for the risks and

rewards of equipment ratings.

Comments on Liability for Actions

Given that an RTO has responsibility for system reliability, the NOPR requested

comments on the appropriate extent of an RTO's liability for its actions, and whether

RTO facility ownership changes this determination. 429
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -308-

430See, e.g., Seattle, PGE, Desert STAR, PSNM, South Carolina Authority.

431See, e.g., NY ISO, Cal ISO, Nevada Commission, New York Commission.

Most commenters believe that liability must be linked to the entity operating and

controlling the transmission assets. Several commenters recommend that all RTO

governing documents and operating agreements clearly establish the RTO’s liability for

any facilities that it operates but does not own. 430 SRP recommends that the

Commission not set a hard and fast rule, but rather give deference to assignments of

liability worked out between the RTO and the transmission owner in the course of

negotiating an operating agreement.

Salomon Smith Barney believes that an RTO should be paid to run the network,

and should suffer the consequences if it is not run well. Given this reasoning, it believes

that an RTO requires sufficient capital to bear the risk, and that it operates under a

regulatory scheme that acknowledges that higher risk taking requires a higher return.

Other commenters focus on how to apportion liability. Several commenters

suggest that the governing standard for liability for a particular activity should be the

same standard that the Commission has approved for comparable ISO conduct. Thus, for

example, the RTO would be subject to liability only on account of its reliability activities

when damage caused by its actions is found to be the result of gross negligence or

intentional misconduct. 431
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -309-

432See, e.g., Avista, Minnesota Power, SPRA, MidAmerican, Florida Power Corp.

Other commenters believe that, if the RTO assumes authority to ensure proper

maintenance and reliability of the system, it should assume that role fully (i.e., assume

liability for its decisions) and it should hold transmission owners harmless for any

increased cost responsibility. 432

Tri-State believes that an RTO should not be held liable for the inevitable errors

and omissions that will occur during transmission system operations except in the

instance of gross negligence. It believes that without some form of indemnification, the

RTO could be the target of numerous lawsuits alleging financial harm as a result of RTO

actions.

TANC believes that the RTO should be held liable for the consequential damages

resulting from the RTO’s instructions, if damage is caused to the transmission owners

facilities as a result of the RTO requiring a transmission owner to operate its facilities in a

manner that is inconsistent with prudent utility practice.

Comments on Reliability Standards

In the NOPR, the Commission expressed a potential concern regarding an RTO’s

implementation of reliability standards that are established by another entity. The

Commission identified two specific concerns: (1) regional or sub-regional reliability

groups may not be as independent from market participants as RTOs; and (2) almost
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -310-

433FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 32,541 at 33,738-39.

434See, e.g., Entergy, NECPUC, NASUCA.

every reliability standard will have a commercial consequence. The NOPR proposed to

require an RTO to notify the Commission immediately if implementation of externally

established reliability standards will prevent it from meeting its obligation to provide

reliable, non-discriminatory transmission service. 433

Most commenters generally support the proposal in the NOPR, although a few

commenters believe that the NOPR proposal does not go far enough. On the other hand,

some commenters seek clarification or oppose the NOPR proposal; most commenters that

oppose the NOPR proposal believe that RTOs must be subordinate to national or regional

reliability groups.

PJM/NEPOOL Customers and other commenters agree that the RTO is an

appropriate institution to evaluate whether other rules and requirements are impacting its

ability to perform its function and to inform the Commission of this fact. 434

PSE&G requests that the Commission clarify in its Final Rule that RTOs, not

reliability trade associations, will have primary responsibility for resolving reliability

issues in the future. It suggests that reliability trade associations can continue to play a

role in developing reliability standards to be incorporated into RTO tariffs; these

standards would then be implemented by the RTOs and ultimately enforced by the FERC. 
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -311-

435See, e.g., Cal ISO, Duquesne, Nevada Commission, Statoil.

The standards, however, must be developed through a fair and open consensus process,

such as the American National Standards Institute (ANSI) process.

EPSA believes that reliability standards should be uniform throughout the United

States. Reliability standards should be established at the national level through an

industrywide representative organization, subject to review and approval by the

Commission. Reliability rules should deviate regionally only if necessary to reflect

specific operating conditions that are unique to a particular region. EPSA requests that

existing reliability rules be considered carefully by the RTO, and reviewed by the

Commission, as to their function and importance. EPSA and other commenters suggest

that RTOs replace existing regional reliability councils as the entity responsible for

maintaining compliance with nationally established reliability standards. 435

Conlon claims that the RTO must have the ability to establish various reliability

standards that every participant. He suggests that the RTO, or the Commission with

delegated authority to the RTO, set mandatory standards and impose sanctions or fines

for violations.

Cal ISO believes that RTOs are the appropriate entities to establish reliability

standards. Regional organizations (not a single national standard-setter) should have the

flexibility to develop standards that reflect regional priorities as well as individual issues
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -312-

related to particular areas or configurations in the transmission grid. It recommends that

RTOs have the authority and responsibility to develop regional reliability standards,

subject to general oversight by an appropriate independent national reliability

organization such as NAERO.

Similarly, Entergy believes that the RTO should have the primary role, authority

and responsibility to adopt, implement and enforce regional reliability standards. Entergy

further argues that this authority must be subject to regional oversight, especially as to

reliability issues between and among interconnected RTOs.

Some commenters argue that the Commission should provide additional authority

to RTOs. For example, PJM believes that an RTO should have exclusive authority for

administering the regional reliability of the bulk power system. It argues that no entity

external to an RTO’s region should have authority to dictate reliability rules that

adversely affect the reliability in a region served by an RTO. Thus, PJM believes the

Commission should extend this proposal beyond the proposed reporting requirement. In

its opinion, RTOs that are responsible for a particular area of the bulk power market

system best can develop tools that are designed to meet the needs of their individual

areas. PJM requests that the Commission insist in its rule that RTOs play a significant

role in setting any national reliability standards. Sithe suggests that RTOs should also

have independent authority to modify existing rules, and/or to place new rules before the
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -313-

436See, e.g., Canada DNR, Manitoba Board, Cal DWR, Entergy, Minnesota

Commission, PSE&G.

Commission for its review and approval in order to promote rules that intrude less into

the markets and that promote efficiency goals, as well as system reliability.

Illinois Commission argues that the proposal is not adequate and that the

Commission must more directly address the concern over lack of independence between

reliability standards development, enforcement organizations and commercial market

interests. Illinois Commission suggests some possibilities: (1) require NERC/regional

reliability council reform so that the process of establishing and enforcing reliability

guidelines, standards, and policies is independent of discriminatory

generation/transmission owner influence; (2) require that all NERC/regional reliability

council guidelines, standards, and policies be approved by FERC prior to their adoption;

or (3) reform NERC so that it is independent of generation/transmission owners, then

eliminate MAIN and ECAR and require the Midwest ISO to act as the regional standards

setting entity and as the reliability enforcement entity for the Midwest Region.

A few commenters seek clarification. 436 British Columbia Ministry requests that

the Commission clarify how the RTO roles and responsibilities overlap with duties

outlined for the Self Regulating Reliability Organization in the North American Electric

Reliability Council's draft legislation. New York Commission and Iowa Board request
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -314-

that the Commission recognize the authority of the states to require the maintenance of

electric system reliability. 

NERC and several other commenters generally oppose the proposal. NERC urges

the Commission to include an obligation that the RTO adhere to the reliability rules

adopted by NERC and the relevant regional reliability council as a condition of becoming

an RTO. NERC states that RTOs must be designed, implemented and operated consistent

with NERC operating and planning policies. NERC notes it will revise its operating and

planning policies to recognize and accommodate these emerging institutions, as

necessary.

Several commenters such as Duke and SERC supports the work of NERC to

establish consistently applied reliability standards and supports NERC’s authority to

enforce these standards. Duke also supports NERC and the regional reliability councils

continuing to play a vital role in setting reliability standards. NERC oversight of

reliability should prevent different RTOs from applying different standards and will

ensure that inter-RTO reliability matters will be dealt with effectively. CEA suggests that

the reliability responsibilities authorized for RTO's be respectful of the carefully balanced

design of the evolving NERC/NAERO.

SRP requests that each RTO be required to join NERC, or NAERO when formed. 

In addition, other commenters such as SRP and Los Angeles propose that RTOs be
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -315-

437The Commission has authorized the establishment of the New York State

Reliability Council and has accepted the relationship between it and the NY ISO.

required to use planning and design criteria that comply with the criteria established by

the appropriate NERC (or NAERO when established) regional reliability council. 

NYPP believes that properly constituted local and regional reliability councils

authorized by FERC should have the authority to establish criteria necessary to maintain

the reliability of the transmission system including the reliability of discrete locations

(e.g., the supply of reactive power to support voltage in load pockets). 437

FirstEnergy requests that the role of the regional reliability councils be clarified 

with respect to regional RTOs. Also it would have us identify the need boundaries so

that each RTO reports only to one regional reliability council. In addition, the regional

reliability councils may need to undergo a transformation similar to NERC/NAERO to

expand the role of the various industry segments.

Commission Conclusion

The Commission adopts the proposal in the NOPR that the RTO must have

exclusive authority for maintaining the short-term reliability of the grid that it operates. 

Although many commenters support this requirement, some pose additional questions

regarding how this function will be performed by the RTO. Some commenters request

that the Commission define better the time period associated with "short-term" reliability. 

We clarify that the term "short-term" is intended to cover transmission reliability
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -316-

responsibilities short of grid capacity enhancement. It includes all time periods, including

but not limited to "real-time," necessary for the RTO to satisfy its reliability

responsibilities, up to the planning horizon. There is no time gap between what is

included within short-term reliability and the RTO's planning responsibilities.

Commenters also request more specificity in describing the RTO's functions. The

facilities that will be under RTO control, the specific functions that the RTO must

perform, and how the RTO will execute its responsibilities and direct operations, are all

defined above in the section on operational authority. PJM's additional request that the

RTO have authority to collect information is discussed in both the operational authority

and the market monitoring sections. 

PG&E requests that the RTO rely on market mechanisms to maintain short-term

reliability. PJM/NEPOOL Customers requests that reliability and commercial activities

be kept separate. We will not require the RTO to rely on market mechanisms in every

instance to maintain short-term reliability. The Commission believes that some reliability

functions may not be conducive to supply through competitive market mechanisms since

a reliable power system provided to one customer cannot be withheld from other

customers, viz., many reliability functions are, in economic terms, "public goods." In

Order No. 888, we identified some functions necessary to maintain grid reliability as

ancillary services and required them to be provided as separate products. These services
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -317-

and their potential inclusion in emerging markets is discussed in the section on ancillary

services below. We cannot conclude at this time that it is appropriate to rely solely on

market mechanisms to supply the reliability functions that the transmission system

operator must perform, but we expect that over time most of the generation services that

perform these functions will be competitively procured.

Interchange Scheduling 

We conclude that the RTO must have exclusive authority for receiving, confirming

and implementing all interchange schedules, which are often coincident with schedules

for unbundled transmission service. This function will automatically be assumed by

RTOs that operate a single control area. If the RTO structure includes control area

operators who are market participants or affiliated with market participants, the RTO will

have the authority to direct the implementation of all interchange schedules. As stated in

the NOPR, a remaining concern is that non-RTO control area operators, who are also

competitors in energy markets, have unequal access to commercially sensitive

information and could use this knowledge of their competitors' schedules and transactions

to gain an unfair competitive advantage in the energy markets. In the event that the RTO

filing includes a structure in which non-RTO control area operators receive sensitive

information, we will require the RTO to monitor for any unfair competitive advantage,

and report to the Commission immediately if problems are detected. In addition, to
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -318-

438Redispatch for congestion management is addressed under different rules, as

discussed in the section on congestion management.

address concerns about protecting commercially sensitive information, we will require the

RTO or any entities who operate control areas within the RTO's region that require access

to commercially sensitive information to sign agreements that separate reliability

personnel and the relevant information they receive from their wholesale merchant

personnel.

Redispatch Authority

We conclude that the RTO must have the right to order the redispatch of any

generator connected to the transmission facilities it operates, if necessary for the reliable

operation of the transmission system. 438 We also require each RTO to develop

procedures for generators to offer their services and to compensate generators that are

redispatched for reliability. In order to maintain the reliability of the transmission

system, the entity that controls transmission must also have some control over some

generation. In general, we believe this control should be through a market where the

generators offer their services and the RTO chooses the least cost options. This authority

does not extend to initial unit commitment and dispatch decisions for generators. 

However, for reliability purposes, the RTO should have full authority to order the

redispatch of any generator, subject to existing environmental and operating restrictions

that may limit a generator's ability to change its dispatch.
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -319-

439In general, a power system can be in one of three states: normal, emergency

and restorative. When all constraints and loads are satisfied, the system is in its normal

state; when one or more physical limits are violated, the system is in an emergency state;

and when part of the system is operating in a normal state yet one or more of the loads is

not met (partial or total blackout), the system is in a restorative state.

Some commenters request that we define what is meant by redispatch for

reliability. We clarify that we intend the authority for generator redispatch to be used by

the RTO to prevent or manage emergency situations, such as abnormal system conditions

that require automatic or immediate manual action to prevent or limit equipment damage

or the loss of facilities or supply that could adversely affect the reliability of the electric

system, or to restore the system to a normal operating state. 439

Transmission Maintenance Approval

We conclude that, when the RTO operates transmission facilities owned by other

entities, the RTO must have authority to approve and disapprove all requests for

scheduled outages of transmission facilities to ensure that the outages can be

accommodated within established reliability standards. Control over transmission

maintenance is a necessary RTO function because outages of transmission facilities affect

the overall transfer capability of the grid. If a facility is removed from service for any

reason, the power flows on all regional facilities are affected. These shifting power flows

may cause other facilities to become overloaded and, consequently, adversely affect

system reliability.
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -320-

440Since some of these transmission owners may also own generation, they may

have an incentive to schedule transmission maintenance at times that would increase the

prices received from their power sales. A transmission company, not affiliated with any

generators, would not have these same incentives.

The RTO is expected to base its approval on a determination of whether the

proposed maintenance of transmission facilities can be accommodated within established

state, regional and national reliability standards. The RTO's regional perspective will

allow it to coordinate individual maintenance schedules with other RTOs as well as with

expected seasonal system demand variations. Since the RTO will have access to

extensive information, it will be able to make more accurate assessments of the reliability

effect of proposed maintenance schedules than individual, sub-regional transmission

owners.

If the RTO is a transmission company that owns and operates transmission

facilities, these assessments will be an internal company matter. However, if there are

several transmission owners in the RTO region, the RTO will need to review transmission

requests made by the various transmission owners. 440 In this latter case, we expect the

RTO to: receive requests for authorization of preferred maintenance outage schedules;

review and test these schedules against reliability criteria; approve specific requests for

scheduled outages; require changes to maintenance schedules when they fail to meet

reliability standards; and update and publish maintenance schedules as needed.
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -321-

We conclude that, if the RTO requires a transmission owner to reschedule planned

maintenance, the transmission owners should be compensated for any costs created by the

required rescheduling only if the previously scheduled outage had already been approved

by the RTO. 

We encourage the RTO to establish performance standards for transmission

facilities under its direct or contractual control. Such standards could take the form of

targets for planned and unplanned outages. The rationale for this requirement is that two

transmission owners should not receive equal compensation if one owner operates a

reliable transmission facility while the other operates an unreliable facility. For RTOs

that are transcos, we will require that such quality standards be made explicit in any rate

proposal.

Generation Maintenance Approval

We conclude that the RTO is not required to have authority over proposed

generation maintenance schedules. However, we acknowledge that there are reliability

advantages to the RTO having this authority, and we would accept RTO proposals where

the participants choose to grant the RTO such authority. In our order approving the

Midwest ISO, we observed that "the dividing line between transmission control and

generation control is not always clear because both sets of functions are ultimately
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -322-

441Midwest ISO, 84 FERC at 62,180.

required for reliable operation of the overall system." 441 Because of this close

connection between generation and maintenance of system reliability, it is essential for

generator owners and operators to provide the RTO with advance knowledge of planned

generation outage schedules so that the RTO can incorporate this information into its

reliability studies and operations plan. However, although a generator may be required to

submit its maintenance schedule to an RTO, the RTO should be prohibited from sharing

that information with any other market participants, or affiliates of market participants.

Facility Ratings

After consideration of the comments, we conclude that is inappropriate here to

require RTOs to establish transmission facility ratings. We encourage, however, such

ratings to be determined, to the extent practical, by mutual consent of the transmission

owner and the RTO, taking into account local codes, age and past usage of the facilities. 

The Commission acknowledges the concern that changes in existing equipment

ratings may lead to problems of equipment safety and possible damage. We further

recognize that the RTO may initially need to rely upon existing values for equipment

ratings and operating ranges so as not to disrupt reliable system operation. However, as

an RTO gains experience operating or directing the operation of the transmission

facilities in its region, we expect this responsibility to migrate to the RTO, as facility
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -323-

ratings have at least an indirect effect on the ability of the RTO to perform other RTO

minimum functions (e.g., planning and expansion, ATC and TTC). If there is a dispute

over equipment ratings, the parties should pursue resolution through an ADR process

approved by the Commission.

Liability

After consideration, we will determine the extent of RTO liability relating to its

reliability activities on a case-by-case basis.

Reliability Standards

We conclude that the RTO must perform its functions consistent with established

NERC (or its successor) reliability standards, and notify the Commission immediately if

implementation of these or any other externally established reliability standards will

prevent it from meeting its obligation to provide reliable, non-discriminatory transmission

service.

E. Minimum Functions of an RTO

In the NOPR, we proposed seven minimum functions that an RTO must perform. 

In general, we proposed that an RTO must: 

(1) administer its own tariff and employ a transmission pricing system that will

promote efficient use and expansion of transmission and generation

facilities; 
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -324- 

442FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 32,541 at 33,739-740. The authority to file changes in

the RTO tariff is discussed above under the Independence Characteristic.

(2) create market mechanisms to manage transmission congestion; 

(3) develop and implement procedures to address parallel path flow issues; 

(4) serve as a supplier of last resort for all ancillary services required in Order

No. 888 and subsequent orders; 

(5) operate a single OASIS site for all transmission facilities under its control

with responsibility for independently calculating TTC and ATC; 

(6) monitor markets to identify design flaws and market power; and 

(7) plan and coordinate necessary transmission additions and upgrades. 

We basically affirm these seven functions with the clarifications and revisions as noted

below. In addition, we have added interregional coordination as an eighth minimum

function, as discussed below.

1. Tariff Administration and Design (Function 1)

Sole Administrator of Tariff

In order to ensure non-discriminatory service within the region, the NOPR

proposed that the RTO be the sole administrator of its own transmission tariff. 442 The

RTO would thus be the sole authority making decisions on the provision of transmission

service including decisions relating to new interconnections. The NOPR requested

comments on several aspects of this standard, including how the authority over
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -325- 

443See, e.g., Allegheny, APX, SMUD, NASUCA, NY ISO, East Kentucky,

Utilicorp, JEA, LG&E, Enron/APX/Coral Power, EPSA, South Carolina Authority, First

Energy, Cal DWR, California Board, PacifiCorp and NSP.

444PJM.

445PJM/NEPOOL Customers.

446UAMPS.

interconnections would work for ISOs that do not own transmission and would not be

performing the construction. The NOPR also sought comment on whether authority over

interconnection should apply to all new interconnections, including those for reliability

and connections to other regions.

Comments

The vast majority of commenters addressing these issues agree with the proposal

that the RTO be the sole administrator of its own tariff. 443 Commenters noted many of

the benefits of an RTO being the sole tariff administrator: it will eliminate confusion;

reduce transactions costs; assure that access decisions are independent; 444 reduce

reliability concerns; 445 and ensure consistent ratemaking across the RTO. 446 Some

commenters suggest that their respective organizations already meet this requirement,

including ISO-NE and NY ISO, which ask whether sharing authority with transmission

owners for non-discriminatory access meets the standard.
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -326- 

447Entergy.

448Illinois Commission.

449Canada DNR.

450New Smyrna Beach.

451See, e.g., Entergy, PJM, South Carolina Authority, Southern Company, TriState, Desert STAR, East Texas Cooperatives, Enron/APX/Coral Power, Sithe and

PG&E.

452Cal ISO.

But some of the commenters that support the proposal had specific concerns and

suggestions: the Commission should adopt specific pricing regulations and expressly

permit expedited declaratory orders on pricing; 447 the Commission should take a more

active approach in developing innovative rates; 448 there may be a problem for an RTO

located in both the United States and Canada if there is disagreement over the tariff by

the respective authorities; 449 and quicker decisions are likely if a stakeholder board is not

involved. 450

A number of commenters also supported the proposal with respect to the RTO's

authority over interconnections. 451 Some of these commenters expressed concerns and

recommendations about the Commission's proposal, e.g., transmission owners should be a

part of the decision process; 452 transcos will be better able to integrate interconnection

decisions into a unified strategy covering investment, operations, maintenance and facility
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -327- 

453Duke.

454Minnesota Power.

455PG&E.

456Southern Company.

457Distributed Power and EAL.

458SPRA.

459TANC.

design; 453 RTOs should not have the authority to deny a generator that is not optimally

located on the grid; 454 interconnection policy should rely more heavily on market

mechanisms; 455 the transmission owner should develop the actual interconnection

agreement to insure adequate protections for its equipment; 456 national fees and technical

standards should be established for interconnections; 457 authority over interconnections

should involve coordinated planning and construction, not "autonomous, unilateral

authority"; 458 RTOs need to develop procedures and guidelines so that there are no

adverse impacts of interconnection on existing facilities; 459 RTOs should have authority

to assess the impact of a new interconnection on regional facilities but should only have
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -328- 

460Metropolitan.

461Williams.

authority over interconnections involving RTO facilities, not all regional facilities; 460

and an RTO must be required to show harm to deny an interconnection request. 461

A few commenters opposed the Commission's proposal or suggested making

significant modifications. With respect to tariff administration, Seattle opposes the

Commission giving RTOs with small control areas blanket authority to approve new

interconnections and also argues that the RTO should not be given authority over the

interconnection of customer based backup and load shaving generators, QFs, or

subtransmission and radial transmission facilities (used to reinforce municipal grids). 

TXU Electric argues that the Commission should be more flexible and allow RTOs to

choose whether to administer the tariff of other entities. TXU Electric notes that in

ERCOT, each owner has its own tariff with its own revenue requirement but with

uniform terms and conditions of access and that this approach can protect the owner

better than an RTO tariff. Florida Commission recommends that the question of tariff

administration be determined on a regional basis with endorsement by state regulators.

With respect to RTO authority over interconnections, Mass Companies argues that

the RTO should not have the authority over interconnections because such authority is

unlawful, impairs reliability, and because the transmission owner is in a better position to
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -329- 

perform this function. SRP suggests that an RTO’s exclusive right to administer its own

tariff and the right to control interconnections may establish a property right that would

jeopardize a public power’s tax free status by being declared a private business use. This

would be a potential problem if the RTO were not a governmental entity or a 501(c)(3)

non-profit organization. To prevent this, SRP says that the RTO would have to be

structured carefully with these concerns in mind. DOE indicates that the authority over

interconnection is a concern for PMAs because of the NEPA requirements which must be

accommodated. Industrial Consumers would amend the proposed Regulatory Text on

tariff administration to add "throughout the interconnection within which the Regional

Transmission Organization resides" to the requirement to promote efficient use and

expansion. Industrial Consumers also propose that the Regulatory Text on

interconnection be amended to add the responsibility to coordinate transmission needs

across the interconnection. Finally, Industrial Consumers would amend the provision that

RTOs review and approve requests for new interconnections to add "by new loads that

take service at transmission voltages and by any new generation resource regardless of

the nominal voltage at the generator's point of interconnection. Any proposal to increase

the nameplate-rated capacity at an existing generating site shall be treated as a new

request for interconnection" to clarify that the RTO is to authorize such interconnections

and minimize entry barriers to new sources of generation.
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -330- 

462Of course, eligible applicants always have the right to seek interconnections

from the Commission pursuant to sections 202(b) and 210 of the FPA.

463See, e.g., ISO-NE at 9.

Commission Conclusion

We note the strong support for this standard in the comments and we adopt the

NOPR's requirement that the RTO be the sole provider of transmission service and sole

administrator of its own open access tariff. Included in this is the requirement that the

RTO have the sole authority for the evaluation and approval of all requests for

transmission service including requests for new interconnections. 462

With the RTO the sole provider of transmission service, transmission customers

have a nondiscriminatory and uniform access to regional transmission facilities. This

type of access cannot be assured if customers are required to deal with several

transmission owners with differing tariff terms and conditions. As noted in the NOPR, the

RTO must be the provider of transmission service in the strong sense of the term. Mere

monitoring and dispute resolution are insufficient to meet the requirements of this

standard.

The requirement that the RTO administer its own tariff and not the tariff or tariffs

of other entities received little objection in the comments, even from ISOs where this

requirement is not currently being met. 463 One commenter, SCE&G proposes that the

RTO's tariff only cover its own costs and wheeling. The transmission owners would
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -331- 

maintain standard open access tariffs which would be administered by the RTO. We

reject this proposal. To provide truly independent and nondiscriminatory transmission

service, the RTO must administer its own tariff and have the independent authority to file

tariff changes.

Mass Companies argues that the RTO is not in as good a position as transmission

owners to judge requests for new interconnections. SPRA and Metropolitan suggest that

an RTO's authority over new interconnections should be limited. Because the ability for

customers to obtain nondiscriminatory access to the regional transmission system,

whether over existing facilities or over new facilities, is integral to a competitive market

for generation, we reject these proposals to modify our original position on new

interconnections.

Other commenters, as noted above, support this standard but have specific

concerns they would like to see the Commission address. The concerns listed do not

cause us to change our original proposal. These concerns, to the extent they apply,

should be voiced at the time RTO proposals are filed and they will be considered on a

case-by-case basis.

Multiple Access Charges

The NOPR proposed that the RTO's tariff must not result in transmission

customers paying multiple access charges. We affirm that proposal in this Final Rule. 
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -332- 

464FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 32,541 at 33,741-43.

Because the issue of multiple access charges is a rate issue, we discuss in detail the

comments we received on this issue, the reasons for our conclusion, and the concepts of

pancaked rates, license plate rates, and uniform access charges in Section III.G of this

Final Rule addressing transmission ratemaking policy for RTOs. 

2. Congestion Management (Function 2)

In the NOPR, we proposed to include congestion management as a minimum

function that an RTO must perform. 464 Specifically, we proposed to require the RTO to

ensure the development and operation of market mechanisms to manage transmission

congestion. We proposed that the RTO must either operate such markets itself or ensure

that the task is performed by another entity that is not affiliated with any market

participant. In carrying out this function, we stated that the RTO must satisfy certain

standards or demonstrate that an alternative proposal is consistent with or superior to

satisfying the standard. We further proposed that the market mechanisms must

accommodate broad participation by all market participants, and must provide all

transmission customers with efficient price signals regarding the consequences of their

transmission usage decisions. We proposed to allow RTOs considerable flexibility in

experimenting with different market approaches to managing congestion through pricing. 

However, we stated that proposals should ensure that (1) the generators that are
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -333- 

465Id. at 33,754-55.

dispatched in the presence of transmission constraints are those that can serve system

loads at least cost, and (2) limited transmission capacity is used by market participants

that value that use most highly. We asked for comments as to what specific requirements,

if any, may best suit these goals. 465

We stated in the NOPR that traditional approaches to congestion management such

as those that rely exclusively on the use of administrative curtailment procedures may no

longer be acceptable in a competitive, vertically de-integrated industry. We thus

concluded that efficient congestion management requires a greater reliance on market

mechanisms, and stated our belief that a large regional organization like an RTO will be

able to create a workable and effective congestion management market. We stated that

while it is our intent to give RTOs considerable flexibility in experimenting with different

market approaches to managing congestion, we believe that a workable market approach

should establish clear and tradeable rights for transmission usage, promote efficient

regional dispatch, support the emergence of secondary markets for transmission rights,

and provide market participants with the opportunity to hedge locational differences in

energy prices.

The Commission invited comments on the requirement that RTOs must be

responsible for managing congestion with a market mechanism, and posed the following
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -334- 

466See, e.g., United Illuminating, CSU, Duke, NASUCA, Los Angeles, NYPP,

DOE, SMUD, Otter Tail, PG&E, FirstEnergy, Mass Companies, Enron/APX/Coral

Power, Nevada Commission.

questions. Can decentralized markets for congestion management be made to work

effectively and quickly? Can the RTO's role be limited to that of a facilitator that simply

brings together market participants for the purpose of engaging in bilateral transactions to

relieve congestion? If not, will these markets require centralized operation by the RTO or

some other independent entity? How can an RTO ensure that enough generators will

participate in the congestion management market to make possible a least-cost dispatch? 

Are there any special considerations in evaluating market power in a congestion market

operated or facilitated by an RTO? In addition, we proposed to allow up to one year after

start-up for this function to be implemented. We noted that market approaches to

congestion management may take additional time to work out, and asked for comments

on whether this additional implementation time period is warranted, and whether one year

is an appropriate additional time period.

Comments

Using Market Mechanisms to Manage Congestion

Although opinions vary as to the proper role of the RTO in managing congestion,

many commenters believe that efficient congestion management requires greater reliance

on market mechanisms. 466 CSU believes that congestion management is uniquely
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -335- 

467See, e.g., NERC, Sithe, NASUCA, Cinergy, Professor Hogan, PJM, Dr. Ilic.

amenable to a market solution. CSU states that there will be a continuing need for some

type of market mechanism to address constraints and this mechanism is best established

at the regional level and best placed with an entity independent of wholesale power

market participants. 

Some commenters emphasize that it is better to use market mechanisms to manage

congestion than to rely on the physical interruption of power flows. 467 NERC contends

that if the industry had in place more market-oriented mechanisms that dealt effectively

with constraints, then the frequency of transmission loading relief (TLR) procedures

would decrease. Professor Hogan claims that with efficient pricing, users have the

incentive to respond to the requirements of reliable operation. He asserts that, absent

such price incentives, market choices would need to be curtailed in order to give the

system operator enough control to counteract the perverse incentives that would be

created by prices that did not reflect the marginal costs of dispatch. PJM/NEPOOL

Customers argues that, when faced with a transmission congestion circumstance, the RTO

should redispatch generators to the extent possible.

Also, Statoil claims that the use of TLR procedures is inherently discriminatory. 

Statoil claims that most transmission owners serving retail load do not engage in

interchange transactions or use the pro forma tariff at the same level as new competitive
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -336- 

468See, e.g., PJM, Professor Hogan, CSU, Sithe, NERA, Duke, PJM/NEPOOL

Customers, H.Q. Energy Services, Minnesota Power, FTC.

469See, e.g., APX, SPP, South Carolina Authority, Alliant Energy, WPSC, NSP,

TANC, Williams.

market entrants attempting to enter historically captive markets. Statoil thus argues that,

even if TLR is applied in a comparable manner, it will still disproportionately and

adversely affect new competitive market entrants.

Role of the RTO in Congestion Management

Commenters offer a variety of views concerning the proper role of the RTO in

congestion management. Some advocate an active role for the RTO in operating an

energy market that is highly centralized. 468 Others envision the RTO's role as being

much smaller, perhaps limited to that of a facilitator that brings together market

participants for the purpose of engaging in voluntary transactions to relieve

congestion. 469 Still others, such as Southern Company and EEI, believe that RTOs are

not necessary to make congestion management work. EEI argues that while congestion

management does require a coordinated regional or interconnection-wide solution, it does

not require the extensive infrastructure and responsibilities associated with what the

Commission has proposed to define as RTOs. EEI notes that NERC’s Congestion

Management Working Group is exploring available options for congestion management,

independently of whether RTOs exist.
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -337- 

PJM/NEPOOL Customers believes that an independent entity must operate any

congestion management market. It believes also that that entity must have sufficient

power and centralization to address congestion problems effectively and quickly. 

Consequently, it urges the Commission not to consider proposals that include a

decentralized market for congestion management or that limit the RTO role to that of a

facilitator of bilateral transactions to relieve congestion. In addition, it contends that the

RTO must retain sufficient authority over generators that choose to make themselves

available to ensure that those generators will participate in the congestion management

market. Duke states that, eventually, decentralized markets may organize in a manner to

accomplish effective congestion management, but at this time, the congestion

management function should be centrally managed.

PJM claims that RTOs can facilitate efficient, broad-scale congestion

management. PJM states that by combining multiple transmission systems over a large

geographic region, an RTO can have an effective pricing system to price efficiently actual

transmission flows in a region. PJM argues that not only should the Commission require

that RTOs be responsible for managing congestion with market mechanisms, the

Commission also should prohibit any other entity from acting in a manner that detracts

from the RTO’s ability to employ its market mechanisms.
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -338- 

Cleveland believes that an effective way to manage congestion may be to combine

a market-based mechanism with a power exchange. It states that the RTO's redispatch

function and the bidding process available through a power exchange should jointly

operate to minimize the congestion. 

 H.Q. Energy Services contends that control over the management of congestion

goes hand-in-hand with control over reliability. It believes that, ideally, an RTO should

establish a congestion pricing system that manages congestion with minimal operator

intervention. However, H.Q. Energy Services argues that, without control over

reliability, an RTO will not be in the position to accurately and fairly allocate available

transmission capacity because it cannot send the correct congestion pricing signals.

Sithe contends that the Commission should not allow overly decentralized systems

whereby individual utilities in a region continue to manage congestion relief, especially if

those utilities continue to own generation. Arkansas Consumers believe that the RTO's

congestion management function helps provide a remedy for any anti-competitive activity

on the part of generators or transmission owners. First Rochdale contends that only fully

independent operation of an RTO is likely to lead to open markets in which all entities

can compete freely. Duke asserts that there are no special considerations in evaluating

market power in a congestion market operated or facilitated by an RTO.
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -339- 

Other commenters stress that the RTO's role in managing congestion using market

mechanisms should be strictly limited. Indeed, the South Carolina Authority opposes a

centralized arrangement for managing congestion as being unduly restrictive and perhaps

anti-competitive. WPSC argues that the role of the RTO should be limited to acting as a

clearinghouse so that market participants are aware of the range of alternatives available

for dealing with congestion. WPSC contends that the market will then dictate which

mechanisms are used in any particular instance. SPP suggests that the RTO can be a

facilitator of congestion relief and that there is no need for the Commission to require that

the RTO adopt a centralized approach, such as locational marginal pricing, for managing

congestion. SPP states that it is a facilitator of congestion relief and intends to continue

in that role under its new proposal. SPP states that it will identify which generators can

relieve a constraint and the relative impact of redispatching those generators. It will then

be the customer’s responsibility to contract with the owner of these generators for

redispatch services. SPP notes that this method relies on the market and bilateral

contracts for the redispatch solutions. SPP claims that the market can also provide for

price assurance and for long-term redispatch obligations. PG&E claims that with the

proper information, bilateral market-based redispatch could be used within an hour of the

occurrence of congestion on any part of the controlled system. 
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -340- 

APX argues that the RTO should not conduct the trading process because it will

impede the adaptation of trading to market conditions, which is essential for market

development. APX claims that all competitive industries use decentralized trading

through forward contracts, and no competitive industry uses a central bidding agent to

create its market. Consequently, APX believes that the Commission should limit the

RTO’s role in congestion management to that of a provider of last resort. PG&E argues

that although the RTO may administer certain market mechanisms such as congestion

management, it is important that the RTO not view itself as responsible for energy pricing

and other aspects of supply and demand interactions, all of which, PG&E contends, can

be most effectively managed by the market unless material and lasting market flaws are

present.

Similarly, Cinergy argues that the mechanism for price transparency in the

commodity market should be developed and implemented by the market, not the RTO. 

Cinergy recognizes, however, that an economic congestion management system depends

on a power market mechanism that provides price transparency for determining economic

dispatch of generation. Consequently, Cinergy notes, RTOs will be confronted with

issues of applying an economic dispatch valuation mechanism. Cinergy argues that such

mechanism should evolve from the marketplace, not directly from the RTO. Cinergy

proposes that the RTO would administer the congestion management system, but would
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -341- 

470See, e.g., Otter Tail, NERC, Allegheny, EME, NASUCA, East Kentucky,

Williams, Minnesota Power, CSU. See also supra section III.D.3, which addresses the

appropriate scope of the RTO's operational authority.

not be involved in the commodity market infrastructure unless its involvement was

mutually agreeable among all stakeholders.

Williams claims that decentralized markets for congestion management, operating

under the auspices of RTOs, can work effectively and quickly in an environment in which

market participants have the correct incentives. Williams states that depending upon the

geographic size of RTOs and the extent of congestion within each, zones for congestion

management may have to be developed. Williams provides a detailed description of how

a zonal approach to congestion management can be implemented.

Both CP&L and Enron/APX/Coral Power believe that the role of the RTO in

congestion management should depend on the time frame in which the decisions are

being made. These commenters prescribe different roles for the RTO in each of three

different time frames.

The Direct Dispatch Authority of the RTO

While supporting the use of pricing and other market mechanisms to manage

congestion, a number of commenters state that an RTO must have authority to direct

redispatch if necessary to ensure grid reliability. 470 For example, Otter Tail contends

that the RTO should have direct authority to order redispatch of generation for purposes
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -342- 

of relieving congestion and during system emergencies. Otter Tail states that this

dispatch should be directed for the generating units that can most economically reduce

the congestion. Otter Tail states that because there is a need for immediate, real-time

response to system contingencies and to relieve transmission congestion, the RTO should

have control of generating units. East Kentucky contends that to effectively manage

congestion, the RTO must have absolute authority to order redispatch of all generators on

the RTO transmission system. However, for this to work, East Kentucky states that the

RTO will have to compensate the generator with firm transmission service for the

additional out-of-pocket costs incurred due to the redispatch, plus an amount for lost

margins on lost revenue. It suggests that generators with non-firm transmission service

would have to redispatch as directed by the RTO but would have to bear their own costs.

NERC notes that market mechanisms may offer better ways of dealing with

congestion management than does physical interruption of power flows, but asserts that it

will always be necessary to have a non-market mechanism such as transmission loading

relief in place to ensure that the stability of the grid is always maintained. However,

EME believes that the extent of RTO control over dispatch of generation should be

carefully circumscribed to ensure maximum development of competitive markets in

wholesale power and ancillary services. Seattle contends that where transparent power

supply markets exist, price differences are widely known to the market and congestion
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -343- 

can be resolved bilaterally with no intervention by an RTO. PJM notes that since

implementing LMP, it rarely has needed to take emergency actions to alleviate

transmission congestion.

Minnesota Power believes that RTOs must have the authority to require that all

generators, existing and new, agree to redispatch as a condition of grid connection. 

Minnesota Power also believes that the RTO must have the authority to penalize

generators who subsequently refuse a redispatch order, or claim a false unplanned outage. 

CSU asserts that generation redispatch is essential in Front Range Colorado, which can

be expected to have an increasing population of gas-fired generation within the

boundaries of the constraints. It contends that the inability to redispatch these units for

any reason other than reliability would severely hinder the ability of an RTO to address

capacity constraints. 

MidAmerican states that, although congestion must be managed using pricing

signals from the market, circumstances may occur where immediate actions are required

and time does not permit normal bidding to allow the marketplace to respond. It contends

that during such events, the RTO must be required to follow previously established

procedures.

However, Seattle argues that the RTO should not have authority to redispatch

generation to accomplish congestion management without unanimous consent of the
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -344- 

471See, e.g., Williams, Powerex, Manitoba Board, Salomon Smith Barney.

stakeholders. Seattle notes that many Northwest generating plant operators are subject to

fishery-related hydroelectric dispatch constraints. Seattle states that because these

constraints are particular to the owners of the generating facilities, these resources are not

well suited to third party dispatch.

Managing Congestion by Eliminating It

Some commenters contend that the ultimate goal of RTOs should be the

elimination of congestion within their respective areas of control. 471 Powerex believes

that it is better to eliminate congestion at its source through facilities upgrades, if

economically and environmentally feasible, rather than attempting to manage congestion

on a long-term basis through congestion pricing schemes. Salomon Smith Barney

believes that the Commission has overemphasized congestion pricing as a vehicle to price

the existing network rather than as a vehicle to induce investment when such investment

is an economical alternative. 

TDU Systems state that they do not want management of significant transmission

congestion to become a long-term function of RTOs. They claim that minor congestion

(i.e., congestion that is economically dealt with through redispatch of generators) will

always be a feature of wholesale transmission markets, and an RTO should properly

manage it. However, they argue that an RTO should deal with significant persistent
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -345- 

472See, e.g., NASUCA, CMUA, NSP, PG&E, Statoil, SMUD, UtiliCorp,

PacifiCorp, PJM/NEPOOL Customers, Metropolitan, Cal DWR.

transmission congestion by constructing (or having constructed) the appropriate

transmission or generation facilities.

Desirable Attributes of Market Mechanisms

Many commenters offer their views on the desirable attributes of any market

mechanisms that are used to manage congestion. 472 For example, PJM/NEPOOL

Customers urges the Commission to employ three general criteria to evaluate any

proposal: simplicity, visibility and predictability. They state that the proposed approach

to relieve the congestion should be simple to administer, both for customers and for the

RTO. They believe that market participants should be able to examine the operation of

the congestion management mechanism on a real-time basis and verify that transmission

access is being appropriately accorded to entities that most desire transmission service. 

They state that such visibility will engender confidence by market participants in the

congestion management mechanism. In addition, they believe that the congestion

management mechanism must be predictable to all transmission users to determine the

anticipated price that will be necessary to ensure the continuation of transmission service

if congestion occurs. 

 Cinergy states that an economically efficient congestion management system must

begin with properly defining information posting requirements. Accordingly, Cinergy
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -346- 

argues that the Final Rule should ensure that requisite information on congestion is

posted on the OASIS. Similarly, Williams and Industrial Consumers believe that RTO

access to region-wide information on network conditions and power transactions, coupled

with efficient congestion management and well specified transmission rights, could help

RTOs in taking preemptive actions against potential curtailment incidents. Statoil and

EPSA believe that, ideally, economic rationing schemes should be uniform across RTOs

and should be implemented as an ancillary service under a regional transmission tariff. 

Montana Commission asserts that congestion management must be efficient. CMUA

believes that congestion management mechanisms must do their job, but not unreasonably

interfere with choices by market participants.

Some commenters believe that efficient congestion management requires a

transparent commodity market. Cinergy states that market mechanisms that include

locational pricing and financial rights for firm transmission have been successfully

implemented where they are supported by a power exchange or pool pricing mechanism

that provides market-clearing prices and price transparency. CalPX emphasizes the value

of a separate power exchange and argues that the bifurcation of the exchange and

transmission operator functions does not add to the market cost of congestion

management, as some have suggested. Also, Otter Tail believes that the development of

an hour-ahead power exchange within the RTO would improve grid reliability.
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -347- 

473See, e.g., PJM/NEPOOL Customers, United Illuminating, Allegheny, EPSA,

SMUD, Los Angeles, NASUCA, Duke, NERC, Professor Hogan, EME, PJM, DOE,

CSU.

474See, e.g., PJM/NEPOOL Customers.

475However, Montana Commission asks the Commission to specify more precisely

the nature of the pricing and congestion management methods that will satisfy the

NOPR's efficiency objectives. 

Many commenters support the NOPR's requirement that market mechanisms be

used to manage congestion and note the particular value of using price as a tool to

manage congestion. 473 Some commenters specifically endorsed the proposed

requirement that congestion pricing proposals must meet the two efficiency objectives set

forth in the NOPR. 474 PJM/NEPOOL Customers state that these two objectives are

fundamental to the operation of a market and to the ultimate goals of electricity supply

competition. 475 SMUD believes that a well-designed congestion management policy,

that provides proper locational price signals without creating opportunities for gaming or

cost shifting, will attract market participation. SMUD agrees that market participants

must be given efficient price signals concerning their use of the transmission system, but

claims that this is difficult because the existing transmission grid was not designed with

the capability to operate as a common carrier or to serve customers in an open access

manner. Also, a few commenters expressed doubts about the overall value of using
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -348- 

476See, e.g., LIPA, Transmission ISO Participants.

477See, e.g., EPSA, Tri-State.

478See, e.g., NASUCA, NJBUS, PJM/NEPOOL Customers, EPSA,

Enron/APX/Coral Power.

pricing mechanisms to manage congestion, 476 and others cited reasons to move

cautiously. 477 Tri-State is skeptical that market mechanisms for managing congestion

will lead to a least-cost dispatch. Tri-State states that entities with firm transmission

rights on the congested path may be reluctant to participate voluntarily in generation

redispatch that will jeopardize the economics of long-term power supply contracts or firm

resources, even if the result would lower costs.

Several commenters suggest principles to guide the design of congestion pricing

mechanisms. 478 NASUCA states that any mechanism for using congestion prices for

managing transmission system flows should be easy to implement; designed to minimize

cost shifts; designed to support an economically efficient dispatch; and coordinated with

the underlying transmission rate design. PacifiCorp states that key components of a good

market-based congestion clearing methodology are: (1) tradable transmission capacity

reservations; (2) a system in which all parties who can clear congestion can bid to do so;

(3) the establishment of congestion costs far enough in advance to facilitate reasoned

decision-making; and (4) the avoidance of any RTO rules that substantially reduce

liquidity in power markets. UtiliCorp believes that a congestion management system
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -349- 

should establish tradeable rights for transmission usage, promote efficient regional

dispatch, support the emergence of secondary market for transmission rights, and give

market participants the opportunity to hedge locational differences in energy prices. 

However, Enron/APX/Coral Power disagrees on the latter feature. It contends that the

monopoly wires business should not be allowed to encroach on what they see as the

highly competitive and innovative business of providing hedges against locational price

differences of energy or capacity or against price volatility of these or any other

competitive products.

Cal DWR and Metropolitan urge the Commission to adopt RTO ratemaking

principles that include off-peak rates. Cal DWR believes that customers should face

accurate transmission price signals and, therefore, transmission prices should be lower in

periods of off-peak demand for transmission. Cal DWR believes that off-peak pricing

provides an accurate price signal over the longer term, promoting investment necessary to

shift transmission usage to off-peak periods. In addition, Metropolitan believes that offpeak pricing can help to resolve problems of cost-shifting.

A number of commenters emphasize certain benefits of a well designed congestion

pricing policy, claiming that price signals can assist RTOs and market participants in

determining the efficient size and location of both new generation and new grid
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -350- 

479See, e.g., Allegheny, EME, United Illuminating, EPSA, SMUD, Los Angeles,

NASUCA, CSU.

480Other commenters emphasize the need for significant investments to expand

transmission capacity. See, e.g., EPRI, Salomon Smith Barney.

expansions. 479 Los Angeles argues that ensuring accurate market signals through the

creation of a congestion pricing mechanism will be the keystone to future system

planning. Los Angeles states that these signals should alert generators to the advantages

of siting in congested areas, motivate marketers and distribution companies to develop

demand-side management options, and generally foster marketplace innovation. Los

Angeles also believes that congestion price signals should help in determining the proper

size of transmission upgrades that the RTO might build to relieve congestion. Otter Tail

believes there exists a great need for new transmission capacity and, indeed, argues that

the overall focus of the NOPR and FERC transmission policy should be on providing the

appropriate financial incentives to assure investment in and expansion of the system. 480

To ensure that price signals translate into appropriate expansion of the grid, SMUD

believes that the RTO must be sufficiently independent and strong to require the

expansion of the grid. NASUCA notes that, while congestion cost pricing may help to

signal where new generation and transmission lines are needed, it may not be necessary

for the efficient daily operation of the transmission grid.
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -351- 

481See, e.g., Transmission ISO Participants, SoCal Edison, H.Q. Energy Services,

LIPA, NWCC.

Other commenters believe that it may be difficult to design market mechanisms to

provide incentives for the efficient expansion of the grid. 481 H.Q. Energy Services states

that currently, the rules for congestion management do not act as a sufficient incentive to

transmission owners to upgrade facilities. NWCC states that it is unclear whether

congestion charges can act as a means of driving transmission expansion, since adding

transmission is, by nature, capacity-based. NWCC also states that it is unclear whether

congestion costs will be an adequate incentive for market participants to finance

transmission expansion on their own, given the extensive permitting and regulatory

requirements that are involved. LIPA states that, while new location-based pricing

mechanisms have not been in place long enough to determine if they will provide

empirical evidence that is helpful in identifying efficient transmission expansions, it

believes that the mechanisms do not provide sufficient incentives for development of

transmission. Also, LIPA claims that they do not provide a useful signal when reliability,

as opposed to economic efficiency, drives the need for transmission enhancements. 

SoCal Edison criticizes the congestion management policies implemented by the

Cal ISO, stating that procedures intended to encourage the voluntary mitigation of

congestion through investment in new transmission may not provide a sufficient

incentive. SoCal Edison contends that, while correct congestion price signals will assist
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -352- 

482See, e.g., Professor Hogan, PJM, NERA, Sithe, Allegheny, Mid-Atlantic

Commissions, DOE, Duke, United Illuminating, EME.

in the identification of transmission investment needs, they will not eliminate

fundamental disputes among affected market participants over the responsibility for the

costs of new transmission or eliminate the risks associated with attempting to construct

new transmission projects. It asserts that the Commission cannot simply assume that the

market will respond to congestion signals if, at the same time, it is creating a regulatory

climate that discourages investment in new transmission. SoCal Edison believes that

impediments to grid expansion can be overcome only if the Commission adopts

transmission pricing policies that more accurately reflect the value that new transmission

investments bring to electric consumers. Similarly, FirstEnergy argues that if the

Commission desires an efficient generation market that optimizes the public good, then a

mechanism that allows transmission owners to capitalize on increases in the transmission

capacity at fair market value must be found. FirstEnergy contends that the interaction of

these free market forces will drive the proper allocation of resources between

transmission and generation over the long term. 

Locational Marginal Pricing

A number of commenters advocate the use of locational marginal pricing (LMP)

for congestion management. 482 Professor Hogan states that, with LMP, the securityconstrained economic dispatch process would produce prices for energy at each location,
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -353- 

incorporating the combined effect of generation, losses and congestion. He states that the

corresponding transmission price between the location where power is supplied and

where it is used would be determined as the difference between the energy prices at the

two locations. Professor Hogan therefore contends that this same framework is easily

extended to include bilateral transactions. Professor Hogan states that, with LMP, the

system operator coordinates the dispatch and provides the information for settlement

payments, with regulatory oversight to guarantee comparable service through open access

to the pool run by the system operator through a bid-based economic dispatch. He claims

that PJM implemented LMP after experimenting with an alternative market model and

pricing approach that proved to be fundamentally inconsistent with a competitive market

and user flexibility. He states that the earlier pricing system allowed market participants

the flexibility to choose between bilateral transactions and spot purchases, but did not

simultaneously present market participants with the costs of their choices. He states that

this created perverse incentives. Professor Hogan argues that LMP is the only workable

system that can support a non-discriminatory competitive market that allows for

participant choice and flexibility.

PJM states that the Commission correctly concludes that LMP will "encourage

efficient use of the transmission system, and facilitate the development of competitive

electricity markets." PJM notes that, under LMP, transmission customers are assessed

congestion charges consistent with their actual use of the system and the actual redispatch
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -354- 

that their transactions cause. It claims that this provides an economic choice to non-firm

transmission customers to self-curtail their use of the transmission system or pay

congestion charges determined by the market. PJM believes that by basing congestion

charges on the true redispatch cost, parties behave in a rational and efficient manner. It

states that the market determines the clearing price for transmission congestion and which

customers ultimately utilize the transmission system. PJM states that the use of fixed

transmission rights (FTRs) enables market participants to pay known, fixed transmission

rates and to hedge against congestion charges.

The FTC believes that accurate LMP signals for investment to reduce congestion

may become even more important as distributed generation presents opportunities for

small-scale, fine-tuned (with respect to both size and location) generation investments to

relieve transmission congestion, in place of large-scale transmission or generation

investments. EME endorses the LMP pricing approach adopted by PJM and the New

York ISO, and states that the Midwest ISO and the Alliance RTO should be encouraged

to adopt similar approaches. The CalPX notes that the separation of the CalPX and the

ISO in California does not prevent the use of a locational pricing model that incorporates

the individual buses and transmission lines in the network.

Allegheny believes that "[c]onsistent locational marginal price dislocations readily

identify system expansion, or other congestion relief, requirements as well as serve as an

indicator of the most economic fix to congestion patterns over time." It claims that there
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -355- 

483See, e.g., APX, LIPA, TDU Systems, CP&L, Virginia Commission, Tri-State,

Dynegy.

would be no incentives for the RTO or transmission owners to maintain congestion, since

there is no financial impact on them from LMP because any excess payments received by

the RTO during congestion are returned to holders of FTRs. Allegheny recommends that

the Commission remain flexible in considering other pricing innovations for congestion

management, but believes that a simplified locational marginal pricing methodology

should be established as a default market mechanism against which other pricing

innovations are evaluated.

Some commenters, however, criticize the locational marginal pricing approach to

congestion management. 483 APX argues that, because LMP requires the RTO to

implement a centrally optimized dispatch, it will discourage, if not eliminate, the

commitment of forward contracts in the energy market and replace the price discovery of

forward markets with ex post pricing. APX contends that because LMP price

calculations occur only periodically and in a single iteration, price visibility is restricted

compared to a continuous forward market. APX claims that this diminished visibility can

make the result less efficient and more vulnerable to an exercise of market power. APX

contends that, for most industries, a process of continuous trading creates efficiency in a

competitive market, while the LMP optimization process has no role for trading. APX

asserts that no competitive industry uses optimization to simulate and substitute for
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -356- 

market outcomes. APX contends that under LMP, the system operator, not the market,

will specify the structure of the optimization problem. APX claims that markets process

information much more flexibly and comprehensively through the self-interested trading

behavior of buyers and sellers. APX asserts that this is the strength of markets and the

critical shortcoming of LMP.

Dynegy claims that markets for FTRs have yet to fulfill their promise to provide

market participants with critically important price certainty for their transmission

transactions. For example, Dynegy states that allocation problems still exist, in that only

a small portion of available FTRs is being auctioned off in certain markets while a large

number are being withheld for incumbents' use. Dynegy argues that in order for FTRs to

provide a truly effective hedge against transmission price increases resulting from LMP in

the hourly market, hourly FTRs would have to be available in a liquid market at a

moment’s notice, but nothing close to such a market exists. Dynegy suggests that,

because the LMP model has yet to be implemented successfully due to the lack of a liquid

FTR market, the time is ripe to look at other models, such as a physical rights model. 

LIPA claims that neither the opportunity to obtain fixed transmission rights nor the

prospect of locational price reductions are sufficient to encourage efficient generation and

transmission expansions. For example, LIPA notes that awarding a transmission

expander transmission rights that entitle it to collect congestion rents on the expanded

capacity creates an incentive that runs counter to the purpose of the expansion; i.e., the
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -357- 

484The Brattle Group believes that, in addition to locational congestion pricing,

some form of regulatory incentives may be needed to bring about efficient investment in

the transmission grid.

more successful the expansion is in eliminating congestion, the less value the incentive

has for the expander. Also, LIPA believes that locational pricing systems are biased

toward using generation to solve congestion problems on the transmission grid and, as a

result, could lead to market power abuse by an operator that sites a new generator in a

load pocket and then takes advantage of transmission limitations to manipulate the

operation of other generators that it owns.

The Virginia Commission claims that pricing mechanisms incorporating locational

marginal prices tend to produce intense signals over short time frames, particularly when

constraints are seasonal and driven by extraordinary events such as extreme weather. The

Virginia Commission therefore believes that, at least initially, locational marginal prices

may provide incentives for short-term actions for congestion relief, rather than longer

term solutions such as the construction of additional transmission or generating facilities

in a particular location. 484 The Virginia Commission also states that the use of locational

marginal pricing is heavily dependent on the existence of transparent short-term

competitive power markets. It urges the Commission to evaluate carefully proposals that

place greater reliance on market mechanisms through the use of price signals, and to

condition the use of such mechanisms on the existence of such things as fully functioning
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -358- 

485See, e.g., PG&E, PJM/NEPOOL Customers, FTC, Tri-State, Dynegy.

power exchanges, the establishment of fixed transmission rights and the existence of

secondary markets for such rights. 

CP&L argues that while the proposed congestion management rule appears to

permit only PJM-redispatch types of arrangements, CP&L does not believe that the PJM

model is the only workable congestion management process. Rather, CP&L believes that

congestion is best managed through the coordinated reservation and scheduling of

transactions on the grid rather than post-congestion fixes. Also, TDU Systems states that

it may be difficult to transplant the PJM model to regions that do not have a centrally

dispatched, tight power pool to use as an RTO platform. 

Some commenters claim that LMP is more complex than necessary, 485 although

Allegheny believes that today's technology mitigates these concerns. The FTC states that,

despite the apparent virtues of LMP, it may be reasonable to back away from a full

application of an LMP approach if doing so provides benefits to consumers from

increased competition in generation markets. For example, the FTC states that, in light of

its alleged complexity and the difficulty that financial markets may have in anticipating

congestion charges, LMP may inhibit the formation of efficiency-enhancing futures

markets in electricity generation and trading because congestion prices are more uncertain

under LMP than under other pricing approaches (such as zonal transmission congestion

pricing). The FTC thus suggests that the Commission may want to continue to entertain
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -359- 

486See, e.g., PJM, SMUD, DOE, Enron/APX/Coral Power, EPSA, NSP, Seattle,

Professor Hogan, EME.

487See, e.g., DOE, NSP, Enron/APX/Coral Power, Seattle, Nevada Commission.

488See, e.g., APX, Enron/APX/Coral Power, Tri-State, Desert STAR.

alternatives to LMP if a reasonable case is made that benefits to consumers are greater

under the alternatives than under LMP.

Managing Congestion with Tradable Transmission Rights

Several commenters emphasize the importance of including explicit transmission

rights in any congestion management plan that relies on market mechanisms. 486 EPSA

believes that when transmission rights are clearly defined and allocated, ATC calculations

can be made more accurately and congestion management simplified. DOE notes that

financial transmission rights will provide a hedge against long-term fluctuations in spot

prices, will encourage the development of competitive markets and will likely contribute

to efficient generation and transmission resource planning. SMUD emphasizes that,

without the pricing hedge provided by such rights, it cannot guarantee its customerowners low cost or reliable transmission service.

A number of commenters emphasize that transmission rights must be tradeable in a

secondary market. 487 Indeed, some commenters believe that the use of firm (physical)

transmission rights along with a robust secondary market in these rights is the most

workable solution for efficient congestion management. 488 Seattle notes that with an
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -360- 

effective market for transmission rights, market participants may be afforded

transmission-based options for resolving congestion. It states that market participants that

invest in transmission facilities that increase capacity can receive the right to use or sell

that capacity. Enron/APX/Coral Power believes that the RTO should be charged with

developing a workable market approach to congestion and parallel-path management

based on clear and tradeable rights for transmission usage that promote efficient regional

dispatch, and support the emergence of secondary markets for transmission rights. 

Enron/APX/Coral Power contends that this will require that RTO systems be operated as

they are in the Western Interconnection based on physical rights. It suggests that, in

order to ensure a firm right to schedule service over an interface when it is constrained, a

customer would have to demonstrate ownership of sufficient property rights in the

interface. Enron/APX/Coral Power suggests three options for obtaining rights: (1) from

the RTO in the primary auction or other primary form of allocation; (2) from holders of

rights in the secondary market; and (3) from the RTO in the form of short-term released

rights not scheduled by their holders. Enron/APX/Coral Power states that by defining

and enhancing physical property rights, the market for those rights will provide ex ante

transmission prices that include the cost of purchasing rights in constrained interfaces. It

claims that this will permit dispatch decisions to be made on the basis of delivered energy

prices. Enron/APX/Coral Power states that to ensure that no market participant can
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -361- 

exercise market power by hoarding property rights, the rights should be designed as useor-lose so that if a right is not scheduled it can be used by others on a non-firm basis.

Similarly, Dynegy proposes a physical rights model in which a limited amount of

firm physical rights would be sold and only those holding physical rights would be

allowed to schedule when capacity is constrained. Under Dynegy's proposal, only those

with preassigned FTRs would be allowed to schedule on a firm basis at a set price. 

Dynegy states that others could submit non-firm schedules, subject to curtailment, or, if

the party is willing, redispatch. Dynegy adds that the proponents of rights that are

financial only argue that it is impossible to define physical rights as "100 percent firm"

from a given source to a given sink. Dynegy states that, while such arguments are

convincing, the capacity between a source and sink may actually be available for a

significant percentage of the time to a reasonable degree of certainty and, accordingly,

could be sold as firm.

APX states that the definition of transmission property rights requires the

calculation of stable power distribution factors that show the proportion of a power

transaction that flows over each path on the grid connecting the source-sink pair. It states

that after defining the property rights, the RTO can conduct an auction to allocate them. 

APX states that, following the auction, holders of transmission rights can retain them or

trade them in a secondary forward market. APX believes that FTR trading will provide a

more direct and comprehensive valuation of rights than LMP. Desert STAR states that it
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -362- 

489See, e.g., NERA, Professor Joskow, Allegheny.

490Professor Joskow notes that Enron/APX/Coral Power claims that two

unpublished papers he has co-authored with Jean Tirole conclude that physical rights

designed on a use-it-or-lose-it basis (so that they cannot be hoarded) more effectively

prevent the exercise of market power than financial rights, which can always be hoarded. 

He states that this is not what the papers conclude.

plans to rely on firm transmission rights markets as the primary vehicle for managing

commercially significant congestion, and the use of incremental/decremental generation

bids to manage other congestion.

Other commenters, however, doubt that a system of physical transmission rights

can be used effectively to manage congestion. 489 NERA states that most commodity

markets operate according to a process based on physical contracts or rights traded in

decentralized markets separated from physical operations. NERA adds, however, that

most commodities do not flow on an integrated grid where network externalities are so

strong and complex that a monopoly system operator is needed. NERA argues that

network externalities on any complex electricity grid make it virtually impossible to

define physical transmission rights that will use the system fully and yet can be traded in

decentralized markets. Also, Professor Joskow believes that on complex electric power

networks with loop flow, a financial rights system can be designed more easily and can

work more smoothly and efficiently than can a physical rights system. 490

Some commenters offer additional notes of caution regarding the use of

transmission rights. For example, APPA states that one must guard against market
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -363- 

participants using transmission rights to act strategically. APPA argues that if a generator

can adversely affect transfer capability, it may seek to purchase and resell transmission

rights in the secondary market after manipulating its internal operations to create

congestion on the grid. RECA considers proposals that allow customers to purchase

long-term rights to mitigate the risk of congestion pricing to be unacceptable because

such proposals result in long-term firm customers having to pay a premium for price

stability. Also, CSU contends that no party should hold any entitlement over a

constrained path due to transmission ownership which predates the formation of the RTO. 

CSU argues that, because all parties dedicating bulk transmission assets to the RTO will

be fully compensated for their embedded costs, there should exist no reserved rights of

use other than those purchased from the RTO. In addition, Great River is concerned that

the NOPR's proposal regarding the establishment of clear and tradable transmission rights

is not consistent with the flexibility that transmission customers currently have under

network service. Great River urges the Commission to carefully consider congestion

management proposals that preserve network-like service, even if such proposals do not

result in the identification of asset-based transmission rights.
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -364- 

491See, e.g., Cal ISO, Montana Commission.

Other Mechanisms for Managing Congestion

Some commenters support yet other market mechanisms for managing

congestion. 491 EPSA notes that other pricing approaches that deserve consideration

include the RTO's use of supply-side bids to relieve congestion in load pockets, as well as

the use of bilateral arrangements to solve congestion problems. Also, NSP recommends

that the RTO offer a "firming" service, at posted rates, that would provide customers with

the assurance that their transaction will occur under most curtailment conditions. In

addition, NSP proposes that the RTO offer a real-time redispatch service that will allow

transmission customers to buy through congestion at real-time prices. Cal ISO notes that

the Commission has accepted its zonal approach to congestion management, which relies

on market mechanisms to manage inter-zonal congestion. PG&E claims, however, that

while providing a more understandable picture of congestion, such a system must still

solve the problem of intra-zonal congestion. Also, the Montana Commission

recommends that the congestion management regime that was developed as a part of the

IndeGO proposal serve as a model for how to manage congestion on the transmission

system. However, Avista claims that the IndeGo proposal proved to be too complicated

to solve a problem that exists only on a few select transmission paths in the Pacific

Northwest.
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -365- 

492See, e.g., TDU Systems, NCPA, Los Angeles, Wyoming Commission, SMUD, 

South Carolina Authority.

493See, e.g., APPA, RECA, TDU Systems, Los Angeles, EPSA.

Costs and Revenues in Congestion Management

A number of commenters urge the Commission to pay close attention to issues

related to the distribution of the costs and revenues of congestion management among

market participants. 492 In particular, several commenters caution that congestion pricing

mechanisms should ensure that congestion costs are fairly allocated and should not result

in excessive revenues or monopoly profits for transmission owners. 493 APPA states that

only after we have a nationwide framework of truly independent RTOs should the

Commission consider a new approach to transmission pricing that would allow the RTO

to price transmission capacity rights and usage on congested paths above embedded costs

while discounting uncongested paths below embedded costs, subject to a balancing

account to ensure that the total transmission revenue requirement is not over-recovered.

Similarly, TDU Systems believe that while the formation of RTOs is a unique

opportunity to experiment with new forms of transmission pricing, the Commission

should be mindful that an RTO will be a large regional transmission monopoly. TDU

Systems question the wisdom of designing congestion pricing mechanisms to ensure that

limited transmission capacity is used by market participants who value that use most

highly. It states that such an auction-to-the-highest-bidder approach could reap monopoly
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -366- 

rents for transmission providers, at the expense of consumers. TDU Systems thus argues

that over-reliance on economic self-interest and market mechanisms in transmission

pricing may become a recipe for new forms of undue discrimination. It suggests that an

incentive to avoid expanding the system in order to collect monopoly rents can be

removed by placing any excess revenues from congestion pricing in a fund earmarked for

transmission system expansion. 

TDU Systems also recommends that the Commission encourage congestion

management plans that distinguish between congestion caused by the RTO’s obligation to

provide service to firm transmission customers, and congestion caused for economic

reasons. It argues that, in the case of the former, the costs of relieving the congestion

should be averaged over the firm RTO transmission customers that are using its system. 

However, it claims that economic congestion occurs because market participants wish to

take advantage of short-term production cost economies to minimize their power costs. 

In this case, TDU Systems argues that the specific loads purchasing the generation should

pay the associated congestion costs. Also, RECA states that long-term firm transmission

customers are the ones that use and pay to support the system throughout the year, but the

auction approach allows a short term trader to outbid these customers at the very times

they need it most. Enron/APX/Coral Power notes that, if the RTO's regulated rates for

transmission service, including congestion management, are properly designed to reward

the RTO for cutting operating costs and maximizing throughput, then it would not have to
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -367- 

assign the grid expansion costs to new generators that interconnect. Instead, the RTO

would charge the new generator only the cost of local interconnection with the grid.

Dynegy claims that, with respect to each transmission provider's system, there is a

predictable level of constraints and, similarly, some representative level of costs

associated with relieving those constraints. Dynegy believes that such costs should be

rolled into firm transmission rates that can be quoted up front and with certainty. Dynegy

argues that transmission providers would have an economic incentive to operate their

transmission systems efficiently if they are given an uplift cost target, and are rewarded

for beating the target and penalized for exceeding the target. EPSA states that some

congestion pricing mechanisms can impose potentially huge costs on individual

transactions, which can be detrimental to the goal of fostering wholesale competition. 

EPSA thus urges the Commission to consider whether these pricing mechanisms provide

greater benefits than a system that internalizes more of the congestion costs. Indeed,

EPSA argues that it is still appropriate to spread many of those costs to all system users

because redispatch generally benefits all users of the transmission system.

NCPA asserts that, in order to prevent large increases in the cost of generation for

customers in congested areas, some non-discriminatory way must be found to return the

extra revenues collected to those customers. NCPA believes that this will require

restructuring of tariffs, but failure to address the problem is likely to keep utilities with

customers in congested areas out of the California ISO. Similarly, the South Carolina
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -368- 

494See, e.g., Allegheny, Platte River, NERC.

Authority is concerned that certain centralized market mechanisms would cause cost

shifts for those participating in an RTO, and if so, potential participants opt out. Also, the

Wyoming Commission is concerned that, by offering rewards for transmission investment

such as a higher return on equity, the Commission would effectively be discouraging a

more market-oriented review of alternatives to building transmission to solve congestion

problems.

Some commenters emphasize the importance of ensuring full cost recovery for

generators that are redispatched by an RTO to alleviate transmission constraints or to

provide other support services. 494 NERC contends there must not be disincentives, in

the form of unrecovered costs, to having generators perform these vital functions. 

MidAmerican asserts that optimal dispatch will occur during congestion management as

long as all power suppliers are fully compensated at market prices. Cinergy claims that,

unless generators have the ability to recover lost revenues for reducing generation in

response to congestion management needs, generators have no incentive to follow

dispatch orders. SMUD contends that the Commission needs to develop congestion

management principles that ensure that market participants will receive fair market value

for facilities that they have owned and operated for many years.
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -369- 

495See, e.g., LG&E, ComEd, Midwest ISO Participants, Midwest ISO.

Importance of Scale in Congestion Management

A number of commenters argue that the achievement of an appropriate scale by an

RTO will be important to the effective management of congestion. 495

LG&E states that the Commission should require RTOs to be of sufficient size to

be capable of meaningfully addressing congestion. It believes that if a proposed RTO’s

ability to address congestion would be impaired by its size or configuration, then the

Commission should either refuse the RTO’s application or should condition approval on

attaining the necessary size and configuration to manage regional congestion issues. 

Industrial Consumers state that, although congestion management can be addressed with

non-market solutions such as transmission loading relief procedures, it is far better to

internalize the problem within an RTO with an appropriate scope and configuration. 

Minnesota Power notes that, currently, it can have transactions curtailed by two different

procedures, NERC Transmission Loading Relief and MAPP Line Loading Relief. It

claims that an RTO will provide transmission users with region-wide, standard,

congestion management.

The Midwest ISO states that an appropriately sized RTO will be able to relieve

congestion on a broad scale. However, it claims that its own redispatch options will be

limited by the failure of border companies, such as FirstEnergy and AEP, to join it. Also,

it notes that longer term congestion relief involves the construction of transmission
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -370- 

facilities. It claims that, if border companies are not members, the Midwest ISO will not

have the ability to coordinate required transmission construction by those entities. Also,

the Midwest ISO Participants state that new transmission facilities required to relieve

constraints may involve both the companies of the Alliance RTO and the Midwest ISO

Participants. The Midwest ISO Participants believe that, with planning and authority split

between these two regional entities, these facilities may not be optimally constructed or

located. 

Ontario Power, however, takes a different view. It claims that many of the

advantages that would flow from expanding U.S. markets to include Ontario can be

realized without requiring the Independent Electricity Market Operator (IMO) in Ontario 

to join a larger RTO at this time. Ontario Power believes that these advantages could be

achieved by negotiating agreements between the IMO and other RTOs. Also, Central

Maine states that if transmission line loading relief is performed on a market basis, many

of the benefits that might result from merging existing ISOs could be realized without

actually requiring those ISOs to merge.

Tri-State argues that the Commission should provide an incentive for nonparticipating transmission owners to join an RTO by allowing the RTO to use a pricing

and congestion management structure that withholds the benefits of the RTO from

entities that refuse to turn control of their transmission assets over to the RTO. Also,

Vernon claims that non-participants can take unfair advantage of ISO-controlled facilities
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -371- 

496See, e.g., NERC, Mass Companies, Industrial Consumers, Montana

Commission, Indiana Commission, AEP.

by scheduling their own loads over ISO grid facilities that parallel the non-participant

paths, instead of scheduling them over their own wires. Vernon contends that having thus

freed up their own wires, the non-participants can then put their facilities to various uses,

such as to avoid the increased ISO grid congestion. 

Congestion Management Between RTOs

Many commenters believe that effective congestion management must take into

account effects that extend beyond the RTO's boundaries. 496 NERC states that

congestion management approaches that work within a particular region may not

adequately deal with transactions that originate or terminate outside the region. NERC

believes that as RTOs develop congestion management approaches, the Commission must

require that they be compatible with what is happening elsewhere. 

Industrial Consumers believe that congestion management, especially during

emergency conditions, is an interconnection-wide responsibility. It asserts that, if

multiple RTOs are allowed within an interconnection, congestion management must be

coordinated across RTO boundaries. Industrial Consumers argues that an RTO can

accomplish this only by sharing data on system conditions (e.g., ATC calculations) with

neighboring RTOs, agreeing to protocols for cross-boundary actions to mitigate
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -372- 

497See, e.g., ISO-NE, EAL, New Smyrna Beach, Industrial Consumers.

congestion, and cooperating in a process to ensure fair compensation to generators that

are redispatched.

UAMPS believes that if a state is involved in the consideration of various potential

solutions to regional congestion, it will likely be more willing to accept that a particular

proposal to construct new transmission within its borders is indeed the most efficient

solution to a genuine problem, and to provide the necessary approvals for that

construction.

Transcos and Congestion Management

Some commenters are concerned that, if a for-profit company owns transmission

(e.g., a transco), it may not have the correct incentives to manage congestion

efficiently. 497 ISO-NE argues that if such a company seeks to operate transmission and

markets as an RTO, it will have competing responsibilities and economic interests. ISONE believes that, given the company’s economic motivations, market participants may

have insufficient confidence in such a company’s determinations of whether a

transmission-expansion solution to congestion is preferable to a generation-based

solution. EAL believes that compensating a wire-owning RTO on the basis of invested

capital could lead to over-building of transmission. New Smyrna Beach is concerned that

a for-profit transmission company will exhibit a bias toward transmission construction

when other, more economical alternatives might exist. New Smyrna Beach states that the
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -373- 

Commission should consider requiring the RTO to conduct a competitive bidding process

when it determines that transmission construction, or an alternative, is needed to relieve

transmission constraints.

Industrial Consumers asserts that transcos would compete head-on with generation

companies wherever there is congestion. It thus believes that transcos-as-RTOs would

have a serious conflict of interest if they have the authority over congestion management

and over the decision whether to eliminate congestion with new generation or

transmission facilities. Industrial Consumers believes that where new generation is a

more cost-effective option than construction of new transmission facilities, the cheaper

option should be built, and markets should be given the opportunity to make the choice. 

Industrial Consumers believes, however, that this will require that the markets have

access to redispatch costs, congestion valuations (from a secondary market for capacity

reservations), and other data on grid conditions. This is information that is better

disclosed by a disinterested independent RTO than a self-interested transco or generation

company.

Cal DWR questions whether either ISOs or transcos have an incentive to use

transmission alternatives (such as demand-side management, load shedding, distributed

generation, or generation) to reduce the overall cost of transmission. However, it believes

that this problem may be more acute for a transco, for which revenues and return are

directly tied to the use of their transmission assets. 
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -374- 

498See, e.g., Trans-Elect, FirstEnergy, Entergy.

However, other commenters claim that there is no basis for concerns that a transco

will favor a transmission solution to constraints. 498 Entergy contends that, if a

generation solution is the most efficient way to resolve congestion, a new generator will

likely realize that and try to locate in the appropriate area. Entergy states that an RTO's

obligations as an open access transmission provider leave it with no choice but to

interconnect with the new generator. Also, Entergy argues that an RTO will not have the

unfettered ability to propose and build inefficient transmission solutions. It believes that

review by state regulators with siting authority, and prudence review by the Commission,

will make it difficult for an RTO to build inefficient and unnecessary transmission

additions. Enron/APX/Coral Power and JEA believe that a transco may, in fact, be well

suited for congestion management. Enron/APX/Coral Power states that placing

responsibility for managing congestion in the RTO's hands complements their view that

an RTO-Transco must be obligated to assume delivery risk (i.e., deliver physically firm

power) in exchange for being rewarded for cutting costs and increasing system

throughput. 

The Need for Flexibility in the Design of Market Mechanisms

Commenters in general showed considerable support for the NOPR's proposal to

give RTOs considerable flexibility in experimenting with different market approaches to
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -375- 

499See, e.g., Mass Companies, SRP, CP&L, Southern Company, PJM/NEPOOL

Customers, United Illuminating, Georgia Commission, JEA, Florida Commission, NYPP,

Cinergy.

managing congestion. 499 Mass Companies state that the NOPR's willingness to allow

RTOs latitude to develop local approaches to congestion management is particularly

appropriate, given the difference in conditions in different parts of the country. CP&L

believes that congestion management is an area where a one-size-fits-all solution would

miss the mark and unnecessarily increase the cost of forming and operating an RTO. 

SRP believes that a flexible approach is needed because the use of market mechanisms

for congestion management is in its infancy, and poorly designed market mechanisms can

exacerbate problems and adversely impact reliability.

The Florida Commission states that the details of proposals for managing

congestion using a market mechanism should be determined on a regional basis with

endorsement by the state regulatory body. The Florida Commission recommends that the

Commission continue to monitor discussions of these issues within NERC and not

duplicate or foreclose their development and resolution at NERC. 

Montana-Dakota recommends that the Commission not limit the experimentation

with market mechanisms to the provision of firm transmission service. Montana-Dakota

believes that there is potential to further improve transmission services by allowing RTOs

the ability to implement congestion management methods for non-firm services rather

than relying only on the use of TLR to curtail such services.
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -376- 

500See, e.g., PJM/NEPOOL Customers, United Illuminating, Florida Power Corp.,

Desert STAR, Oregon Commission, NERC.

Many commenters express support for the proposal to allow RTOs flexibility in

developing approaches to congestion pricing. 500 Some, such as Florida Power Corp. and

Desert STAR, believe that allowing flexibility in pricing may provide incentives for

transmission owners to join or form an RTO. Florida Power Corp. argues that such

flexibility allows transmission owners to deal with issues such as cost shifting, and

believes that providing more specific guidance will only limit possible options. 

However, the FTC cautions that the Commission should not allow its policy of

flexibility to continue indefinitely. The FTC states that although experimentation with

transmission congestion pricing alternatives to LMP may be appropriate at present, it

does not believe that great uncertainty about the most effective approach to transmission

congestion management need exist indefinitely. It suggests that the Commission may

wish to establish a date in the not-too-distant future when it will undertake a comparative

analysis of the consumer costs and benefits of alternative transmission pricing regimes. 

The FTC states that if one or more approaches provide substantially superior results for

consumers, the Commission may wish to initiate a rulemaking on policies to encourage

RTOs to adopt these approaches. The Oregon Commission recommends that the

Commission evaluate the effectiveness and efficiency of various congestion pricing

experiments, and based on its evaluation, require RTOs to use the better methods. 
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -377- 

501See, e.g., Industrial Consumers, Allegheny, PGE, Entergy.

502See, e.g., SMUD, Tri-State, CMUA, TANC, Desert STAR, Cinergy.

However, the Oregon Commission estimates that the process of refining congestion

pricing methods may take a decade or more.

NERC states that there are strongly held, differing opinions throughout the

industry on how congestion prices should be designed. NERC states that, while

flexibility is one important consideration, the various regional solutions must be able to

work together. It believes that the Commission can provide the leadership needed to

bring the industry to closure on these issues. NERC notes that this may require the

Commission to be more proscriptive, and it should not hesitate to do so. In this regard,

Minnesota Power suggests that the Commission encourage neighboring RTOs with

constrained interfaces to jointly develop constraint relief procedures including common

constraint pricing where appropriate.

Timing of Implementation

With regard to the NOPR's proposal to allow RTO's up to one year after start-up to

implement the congestion management function, commenters express a variety of

opinions. Some indicate that one year is an appropriate additional time period. 501

Others, however, believe that it is essential that the RTO have some form of congestion

management system in place when it begins operation. 502 SMUD and CMUA state that

a significant deterrent to participating in the Cal ISO has been the fact that, in California,
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -378- 

Cal ISO transmission is strictly a short-term transaction given that Cal ISO has not yet

fully implemented FTRs. SMUD emphasizes that, without the hedge provided by FTRs,

it cannot guarantee its customer-owners low cost or reliable transmission service. TANC

believes that allowing an RTO to begin operations without a congestion management

procedure in place greatly increases the opportunity for market power abuses as well as

market inefficiency. 

Duke states that, ideally, the permanent congestion management function should

be in place on the first day of RTO operation. Then, Duke notes, it would not be

necessary to incur the cost of implementing, and developing strategies and behavior

appropriate to an initial system, only to have to incur additional costs and changes in

behavior to adapt to a permanent system. However, Duke states that congestion

management issues are complex and substantial information management systems must

be put in place. Consequently, Duke believes one year from the time the RTO becomes

operational may not be a sufficient length of time to implement the congestion

management function.

Desert STAR states that the new approaches to congestion management called for

by newly competitive markets will take additional time to work out and, therefore, the

Commission should be willing to consider additional time on a case-by-case basis. 

However, in order to ensure reliable operation, Desert STAR believes some congestion

management system must be in place when the RTO begins operation.
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -379- 

Some commenters believe that more than one year of additional time may be

needed for the RTO to implement the congestion management function. NSP states that

if the RTO has a state-estimator model with the necessary properties, it is possible that a

congestion management system, of the type preferred by NSP, could be implemented

within about 18 months from the time of project initiation. However, for regions without

the necessary models, NSP expects the time-line would likely be three years from time of

project initiation.

Montana Power believes that there will be many "growing pains" associated with

implementation of RTOs that will take time to work out, especially in areas like the

Pacific Northwest, which have no history of tight pool operation. Montana Power

believes that allowing one-year for implementing a market mechanism for congestion

management is a very aggressive schedule. Montana Power thus encourages the

Commission to allow up to three years. Similarly, Avista states that, with the IndeGo

experience in mind, it encourages the Commission to allow two to three years for

implementation of this function, especially where it is demonstrated that the RTO will

comply immediately with other characteristics and functions identified in the

Commission’s Final Rule. 

The Florida Commission believes that the Commission should not impose any

arbitrary time period for implementation of congestion management. It states that NERC

is working with the regions on this issue and FERC should monitor those activities before
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -380- 

setting any deadlines, if at all. Also, JEA believes that requiring the congestion

management function to be in place within one year from the start-up of RTO operation

may be feasible only for those RTOs structured as transcos from the beginning.

Commission Conclusion

As we proposed in the NOPR, we conclude that an RTO must ensure the

development and operation of market mechanisms to manage congestion. Furthermore,

as we proposed, we will require that responsibility for operating these market

mechanisms reside either with the RTO itself or with an another entity that is not

affiliated with any market participant.

We agree with the large number of commenters that believe that the use of market

mechanisms to manage congestion is superior to the use of administrative curtailment

procedures or other approaches that do not take into account the relative value of

transactions that are curtailed and those that are allowed to go forward. In addition, we

conclude that the RTO or an independent entity must assume an active role in developing

and implementing any congestion market mechanisms, because the use of such

mechanisms must necessarily be closely coordinated with the operational activities that

the RTO performs on a day-to-day and, in many cases, moment-to-moment basis.

Some commenters argue that an RTO should not be allowed to operate a

centralized market for congestion management. The commenters contend that, if such a

market is operated by an RTO or other entity that is independent of the market, a robust
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -381- 

503See, e.g., the market redispatch experiment of NERC (Docket No. ER99-2012-

000).

market in forward contracts for energy will not develop. As a result, these commenters

claim, society will never obtain the efficiency benefits that would otherwise flow from a

marketplace in which buyers and sellers are able to trade actively among themselves. 

These commenters also argue that the price certainty provided by forward markets will be

replaced with the uncertainty of prices that are determined after the fact. 

We disagree with these commenters and see no reason why the RTO's operation of

a market for congestion management should inhibit the ability of others to offer forward

contracts for energy, or other market instruments that provide price certainty. We

recognize that some of the market redispatch programs undertaken to date are

experimenting with various ways to manage congestion efficiently-including relying upon

decentralized markets to effect the necessary redispatch. 503 It is too early to tell if these

decentralized markets will work efficiently. But given the short time frame in which

system operators often must react to congestion situations, experience may ultimately

show that markets for congestion management can achieve more efficient and effective

results if they are centrally operated. Therefore, we will not deny here the RTO, or other

independent entity, the opportunity to operate a market-either centralized or decentralized-for congestion management.
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -382- 

504See PJM, 81 FERC at 62,252-53.

As we proposed in the NOPR, we will require the RTO to implement a market

mechanism that provides all transmission customers with efficient price signals regarding

the consequences of their transmission use decisions. We are convinced that efficient

congestion management requires that transmission customers be made aware of the cost

consequences of their actions in an accurate and timely manner, and we believe that this

is best accomplished through such a market mechanism. Also, as we proposed in the

NOPR, we believe that congestion pricing proposals should seek to ensure that (1) the

generators that are dispatched in the presence of transmission constraints are those that

can serve system loads at least cost, and (2) limited transmission capacity is used by

market participants that value that use most highly. Although we agree with some

commenters that price signals can also assist in determining the efficient size and location

of new generation and grid expansions, we share the view of LIPA and others that price

signals alone cannot be relied upon to identify all needed enhancements.

While we will not prescribe a specific congestion pricing mechanism, we note that

some approaches appear to offer more promise than others. As we stated in our order

approving the PJM ISO and reiterated in the NOPR, markets that are based on locational

marginal pricing and financial rights for firm transmission service appear to provide a

sound framework for efficient congestion management. 504 A number of commenters

express strong support for the LMP approach. As PJM notes in its comments, LMP
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -383- 

assesses congestion charges directly to transmission customers in a manner consistent

with each customer's actual use of the system and the actual dispatch that its transactions

cause. In addition, LMP facilitates the creation of financial transmission rights, which

enable customers to pay known transmission rates and to hedge against congestion

charges. We further note that, where financial rights holders are entitled to receive a

share of congestion revenues, the availability of such rights helps to address the concerns

of commenters who fear that congestion pricing can lead to the over-recovery of

transmission costs. The Commission recognizes, however, that LMP can be costly and

difficult to implement, particularly by entities that have not previously operated as tight

power pools.

The principal alternative to LMP advocated by commenters is an approach that

manages congestion by means of physical transmission rights that are tradable in a

secondary market. Under this approach, the RTO may be required to issue the

transmission rights initially through an auction or allocation process. Market participants

would then generally have to demonstrate ownership of sufficient rights in a constrained

interface before they would be allowed to schedule firm service over the interface. Such

an approach greatly reduces the role of the RTO in congestion management. While the

approach of trading physical transmission rights in a secondary market may prove to be

workable in regions where congestion is minor or infrequent, in other regions where

congestion is more of a chronic problem, it may not be workable. Also, commenters such
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -384- 

as NERA and Professor Hogan claim that the network interactions on complex electricity

grids make it difficult to define physical transmission rights that will use the system fully

and yet can be traded in decentralized markets. We expect RTOs and any affected

stakeholders to consider carefully such issues as they formulate specific pricing

proposals.

While our experience has shown that, in specific situations, some approaches to

congestion pricing appear to have advantages over others, we have not yet identified one

approach as being clearly superior to all others. Furthermore, the Commission recognizes

that an RTO's choice of a congestion pricing method will depend on a variety of factors,

many of which may be unique to that RTO. Therefore, we will allow RTOs considerable

flexibility to propose a congestion pricing method that is best suited to each RTO's

individual circumstances.

Some commenters appear to confuse the need to redispatch generators to maintain

reliability with the need to take specific actions to relieve congestion. Commenters

generally agree that the RTO should have clear authority to order redispatch for reliability

purposes. However, for congestion management, we conclude here that the RTO should

attempt to rely on market mechanisms to the maximum extent practicable. We recognize,

of course, that there may be times when even well-functioning markets will fail to

provide the RTO with the options it needs to alleviate a specific instance of congestion. 

In those cases, the RTO must have the authority to curtail one or more transmission
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -385- 

service transactions that are contributing to the congestion. Although the act of curtailing

a transaction may sometimes require the redispatch of generation, we clarify that we are

not requiring the RTO to redispatch any generators exclusively for the purpose of

managing congestion.

In the NOPR, we stated that a workable market approach to congestion

management should establish clear and tradeable rights for transmission usage, promote

efficient regional dispatch, support the emergence of secondary markets for transmission

rights, and provide market participants with the opportunity to hedge locational

differences in energy prices. Most commenters agree that these are reasonable features of

any congestion management proposal. However, Enron/APX/Coral Power believes that

the RTO should not be allowed to provide a hedging instrument. It contends that the

"monopoly wires business" should not be allowed to encroach on what it views as the

highly competitive and innovative business of providing hedges against locational price

differences of energy or capacity, or against price volatility of these or any other

competitive products. In response, we note that, while decentralized markets may

ultimately prove to be capable of providing such products, as these commenters claim, we

do not yet have evidence to that effect. Therefore, in the interest of allowing RTOs

flexibility to experiment with different market approaches, we will not prohibit the RTO

from offering such products through markets that it may operate.
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -386- 

505The terms "parallel path flow" and "loop flow" are sometimes used

interchangeably to refer to the unscheduled transmission flows that occur on adjoining

transmission systems when power is transferred in an interconnected electrical system.

506FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 32,541 at 33,743-44.

Finally, with regard to the timing of implementation of the congestion management

function, we will adopt our proposal to allow the RTO to take up to one year after startup to implement market mechanisms for managing congestion. Most commenters agree

that some period of time is needed for implementation. However, a number of them

indicate that the RTO must have some form of congestion management system in place

when it begins operation. We agree, and clarify that, upon start-up, the RTO must have

in place effective protocols for managing congestion while preserving reliability. 

Because the NOPR did not make this point explicitly, we do so here.

3. Parallel Path Flow (Function 3)

In the NOPR, the Commission proposed to require that an RTO develop and

implement procedures to address parallel path flow issues within its region and with other

regions. 505 The Commission noted that measures to address parallel path flow between

regions may not necessarily be in place on the first day of RTO operation, and proposed

to allow up to three years after start-up for this function to be implemented. 506 The

Commission sought comments on whether such an additional implementation time period

is warranted, and whether three years is an appropriate additional time period.
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -387- 

507See, e.g., ComEd, East Texas Cooperatives, EPSA, Industrial Consumers,

LG&E, NASUCA, NSP, PJM, Southern Company and Williams. However, Cinergy

argues that parallel path flows should not be considered as a separate function but should

be considered as a characteristic under the scope and regional configuration because that

will allow an RTO to address congestion management issues along with parallel path

issues.

508Industrial Consumers also notes that the first sentence in the proposed

regulation should be modified to read as: "RTO must develop and implement procedures

to address parallel path flow issues within its region and with other regions in the

interconnection within which it resides." (Suggested change underlined) 

509See, e.g., EPSA, Florida Power Corp., FTC, Georgia Transmission, LG&E,

Mass Companies, NSP and PJM.

Comments

Virtually all commenters support the NOPR's proposal to require that an RTO

develop and implement procedures to address parallel path flow issues as a separate

function. 507 Industrial Consumers states that parallel path flow-related disputes will

diminish as a result of RTOs addressing this issue. 508 But PGE notes that grandfathering

existing transmission contracts may impede the RTO's ability to address loop flow. 

Many commenters assert that parallel path flow and congestion management issues

are closely related to one another since both the issues involve identification of power

flows resulting from a specific transaction. 509 Therefore, they argue that any solution to

parallel path flow should recognize this close relationship. For example, Industrial

Consumers believes that an RTO can take preemptive actions against potential

curtailment situations to manage congestion resulting from loading of chronically
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -388- 

510See, e.g., LG&E, Michigan Commission, NASUCA, New Smyrna Beach, NSP,

PJM and South Carolina Authority.

511See, e.g., Cleveland, East Texas Cooperatives, Georgia Transmission, Industrial

Consumers, NY ISO, Southern Company, TEP. Industrial Consumers note that several

other issues need to be addressed at the interconnection level and not at the regional level. 

They are: ATC calculation, inadvertent flows and congestion management.

512Central Maine Reply at 9; NYPP Reply at 10.

constrained transmission interfaces due to loop flow. PJM suggests that the use of

redispatch solutions like LMP not only is more efficient and beneficial to a competitive

market, but is preferable to curtailing transactions under TLR to address congestion due

to loop flow. South Carolina Authority is convinced that over the long run the problem

of parallel path flow needs to be addressed as a planning issue, focusing on appropriate

reinforcements to constrained transmission lines. 

Many commenters recommend that an RTO should encompass as large a region as

possible so that it can "internalize" most of the loop flow within its region. 510 However,

others argue that the loop flow issue can be solved satisfactorily only if it is addressed at

the interconnection level. 511 They believe that while a large RTO will "internalize" most

of the parallel path flows within its region, parallel path flows between RTOs will

remain. Some other commenters are convinced that cooperative efforts among regional

entities works best when it comes to resolving issues such as parallel path flow issue. 512

NERC notes that it is in the process of developing the needed information system to

address the parallel path flow issue on an interconnection basis and urges the
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -389- 

513See, e.g., PG&E, Seattle, SRP and TEP.

Commission to direct the RTOs to work closely with it to coordinate efforts to resolve

this issue. Southern Company and Industrial Consumers support NERC's initiative in

solving the loop flow issue. Cleveland states that the national grid should be viewed as a

single electrical system which calls for a universal approach rather than a regional

approach to resolve the loop flow issue. The universal approach, Cleveland argues, will

not only improve the integrity and reliability of the national grid but also eliminate the

need for any policy shift in the future.

Commenters from Western System Coordinating Council (WSCC) assert that the

loop flow issue in their region was solved by the adoption of WSCC Flow Mitigation

Plan (Plan) that provides for controlling unscheduled flows through the use of phase

shifting transformers. 513 SRP suggests loop flow in WSCC should continue to be

addressed at the WSCC level and not at the RTO level because WSCC may end up with

four or more RTOs. PG&E recommends that the establishment of property rights such as

FTRs be explored as a means to solve loop flow issues, on the basis that developing

property rights will ensure the most efficient use of the transmission lines. 

Enron/APX/Coral Power urges RTOs in the Eastern Interconnection to move toward the

Western model. NASUCA believes that RTOs should perform a cost-benefit analysis of

controlling loop flows with phase shifting transformers. 
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -390- 

514See, e.g., Cal ISO, Desert STAR, Entergy, Industrial Consumers, NECPUC,

NERC, NY ISO, PGE, SRP, Tri-State, TVA, UtiliCorp and WPSC. Cleveland also

argues that a similar grace period should be given for the implementation of function # 5.

(TTC and ATC Calculation). Cleveland at 14.

Most commenters support the NOPR's proposal for an additional implementation

time period of three years for coordination among RTOs. 514 They argue that the proper

resolution of loop flow presents a number of complex issues that may require

negotiations and agreements among neighboring RTOs and that the additional time period

will give them an opportunity to coordinate their efforts. Allegheny supports an

additional time period for implementation of this function but urges the contract path

methodology be replaced at a faster pace than three years. Industrial Consumers notes

that an additional time period of three years is necessary for NERC to solve the loop flow

issue at the interconnection level. However, Florida Power Corp. and Florida

Commission observe that the severity of parallel path flow varies from region to region

and therefore opposes setting an arbitrary time limit for the implementation of this

function. Duke likewise believes that the deadline for the implementation of this function

should be determined by the Commission on a case-by-case basis. 

Commission Conclusion

We reaffirm our preliminary determination that an RTO should develop and

implement procedures to address parallel path flow issues within its region and with other

regions. Most commenters agree that the formation of RTOs, with their widened
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -391- 

geographic scope of transmission scheduling and expanded coverage of uniform

transmission pricing structures, provide an opportunity to "internalize" most, if not all, of

the effect of parallel path flow in their scheduling and pricing process within a region. 

NERC notes that it is in the process of developing the needed information system to

address parallel path issues on an interconnection basis, and we will direct RTOs to work

closely with NERC, or its successor organization, to resolve this issue. As noted by

Industrial Consumers, parallel path flow-related disputes will diminish as a result of

RTOs addressing this issue.

Commenters from Western System Coordinating Council (WSCC) state that they

adopted the WSCC Flow Mitigation Plan (Plan) to address parallel path flow issue in

their region. SRP suggests that parallel path flow in WSCC continue to be addressed at

the WSCC level and not at the RTO level because WSCC may end up with more than one

RTO. We will not here make any judgments on the merits of WSCC's Plan as a solution

for parallel path flow issues. However, we clarify that this rule does not prevent

addressing parallel path flow issues on a larger-than-single-RTO basis. In fact, we

require RTOs to develop and implement procedures for addressing parallel flow issues

with other regions.

In the NOPR we proposed that the RTO have measures in place on the date of

initial operation to address parallel path flow issues within its own region. We also noted

that measures to address parallel path flow issues between RTO regions may not
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -392- 

515Florida Power Corp., Florida Commission and Duke.

necessarily be in place on the first day of RTO operation. We proposed to allow up to

three years after start-up for this function to be implemented. Most commenters support

the NOPR's proposal for an additional time period of three years. A few commenters 515

prefer a case-by-case approach. Since severity of the parallel path flow varies from

region to region, some parts of the Nation may choose to resolve inter-regional parallel

path flow issues sooner than the required three years. Consequently, we will adopt our

proposal in the NOPR that the RTO have measures in place to address parallel path flow

issues in its region on the date of initial operation. We also adopt three years as an

adequate time period for implementation of measures to address parallel path flow issues

between regions.

We recognize that these measures to address parallel path flows combined with the

requirement that the RTO be the sole provider of transmission services over facilities that

it owns or controls will eliminate or diminish the ability of transmission users to choose

among different contract paths owned by different service providers within the RTO

region. However, these users will have the ability to move power anywhere within the

RTO at a single rate and under a single set of terms and conditions. We believe this is

pro-competitive and represents one of the fundamental benefits that is envisioned by the

Rule. As we noted in the NOPR, the creation of large RTOs that can internalize most, if

not all, of the effect of parallel path problems through their scheduling and pricing actions
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -393- 

516See FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 32,541 at 33,744.

517FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 32,541 at 33,744.

provides a unique opportunity to resolve a major operating concern that has caused

problems on both the Eastern and Western Interconnections and which is a significant

impediment to promoting efficient competition in generation markets. 516 Therefore, in

reviewing the competitive implications of a proposed RTO application under section 203,

we believe that any inability of transmission customers to choose among different

contract path suppliers within an RTO will be outweighed by their enhanced ability to

reach numerous buyers and sellers of electricity throughout the region.

4. Ancillary Services (Function 4)

The fourth proposed minimum function is that the RTO must serve as the supplier

of last resort for all ancillary services required by Order No. 888. 517 This supply

obligation for the RTO is necessary because only the single grid operator will be able to

provide certain ancillary services, not all transmission customers may be able to selfsupply (some own generation, others do not), and because it typically is more efficient for

the RTO to provide some ancillary services for all transmission users on an aggregated

basis.

In carrying out this function, the Commission proposed that all market participants

would have the option of self-supplying or acquiring ancillary services from third parties. 

In addition, the RTO must have the authority to decide the minimum required amounts of
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -394- 

518See, e.g., Entergy, Industrial Consumers, NECPUC, Cal ISO, EPSA,

FirstEnergy, LG&E, PacifiCorp, Empire District, EME, Southern Company, UtiliCorp,

PGE, PNGC, PSNM, TDU Systems, Nevada Commission.

519See also Florida Power Corp.

each ancillary service and, if necessary, the locations at which these services must be

provided; must be able to exercise direct or indirect operational control over all ancillary

service providers; must promote the development of competitive markets for ancillary

services whenever feasible; and must ensure that its transmission customers have access

to a real-time balancing market.

Comments

Supplier of Last Resort

Comments on whether an RTO should serve as a supplier of last resort are mixed. 

A large number of commenters support the Commission's proposal, as written. 518

Detroit Edison believes that the RTO should serve as the sole supplier of ancillary

services to transmission customers and that the RTO should be permitted either to

purchase services directly from generation suppliers or to purchase generation resources

for this purpose. First Energy believes that the RTO's obligation as the supplier of last

resort for ancillary services cannot be eliminated, since it is the basis of reliability. 519

On the other hand, a few commenters suggest that the Commission allow

flexibility. Duke believes that an RTO should always have the responsibility for ensuring

that transmission customers have arranged adequate ancillary service and that those
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -395- 

520See, e.g., NASUCA, Seattle, CalPX, Mass Companies.

521Southern Company notes that NERC's Interconnected Operations Services

Working Group is currently addressing the ancillary services that should be required in a

competitive environment and has issued a proposed policy for public comment and

review.

522NWCC recommends that additional research regarding the application of

ancillary services to wind and other intermittent generation technologies be conducted.

services are delivered. They suggest that where a competitive market for ancillary

services exists, the RTO should not be required to provide such ancillary services as a

supplier of last resort. 520 And a number of commenters take issue with one or more

aspects of the proposed requirements, although many of these commenters generally

support the proposal.

For example, some commenters suggest that more information is needed. 

Southern Company suggests that the Commission allow NERC to finalize an ancillary

services policy before mandating changes to ancillary service requirements. 521 Professor

Hogan suggests further investigation into developments in ancillary services. 522

Other commenters believe that the focus of the proposal should be narrowed. Los

Angeles suggests that an RTO should be the "safety net" of last resort for providing

generation-based ancillary services. As such, the RTO would not play a significant role

in the energy market and can remain essentially indifferent to energy market issues. 

PG&E believes that an RTO could set appropriate rules for ancillary services but would

not itself procure such services from the marketplace absent clearly defined emergency
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -396- 

situations or in its role as provider of last resort. Avista states that while a transitional

"supplier of last resort" role may be appropriate, an RTO should generally not become

deeply involved in any of the markets for generation services.

A number of commenters suggest that the obligation to provide ancillary services

should be expanded to include more or different sellers. MidAmerican believes that each

control area should retain responsibility for the provision of ancillary services and should

be allowed to self-provide or acquire necessary ancillary services in the most economical

means it sees fit to meet performance compliance standards. East Texas Cooperatives

suggests that the Commission require both transmission owners and the RTO to offer

ancillary services at cost-based rates unless a seller can demonstrate a competitive market

in a particular ancillary service. PPC and Desert STAR also believe that the role of

provider of last resort of ancillary services would better rest with local control areas or

independent generators that can supply ancillary services. Steel Dynamics requests that

the final rule require generation-owning members of RTOs to maintain Commission

approved cost-based tariff schedules for ancillary services. Georgia Transmission

believes that any RTO members that are capable of providing ancillary services should be

the providers of "first resort," and the ability to acquire such services from different

providers would enhance competition in these markets. 

While not specifically objecting to the RTO being the supplier of last resort for

ancillary services, some parties suggest that the Commission should allow other
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -397- 

523See, e.g., CMUA, LPPC, California Board, San Francisco, Oneok, SMUD,

Avista, Sithe, Seattle.

524See also Empire District.

mechanisms to work. 523 California Board urges the Commission to allow consideration

of other means for ensuring that the need for ancillary services is addressed. It

recommends that the final rule reflect a requirement that the RTO filings must indicate

how default provision of ancillary services will be accomplished without necessarily

requiring the RTO to be the provider of last resort. Enron/APX/Coral Power advocates a

form of performance-based ratemaking in which the RTO would have an incentive to

perform its ancillary service function as efficiently and economically as possible. Florida

Commission recommends that an RTO only be responsible for providing non-competitive

ancillary services and should require users to purchase or self-provide the other

competitive services.

Similarly, FTC suggests that the Commission consider arrangements in which the

RTO's primary role is to provide a market mechanism for transmission customers to

acquire ancillary services for themselves. It argues that this method may reduce costs by

allowing customers to customize their purchases of ancillary services to better fit their

specific needs. 524 Some commenters suggest that final RTO regulations expressly

recognize the administration of an ancillary service exchange as an alternative to the

provider-of-last-resort obligation that is imposed on a RTO under the proposed
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -398- 

525See, e.g., Cinergy, APX, EAL, NY ISO, JEA.

526FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 32,541 at 33,745.

527See, e.g., WPSC, APS, Florida Commission, Duke.

regulations. 525 For example, ISO-NE believes that a competitive market for ancillary

services is a superior supply mechanism, and ISO-NE suggests that the text of proposed §

35.34(j)(4) be amended to read:

An RTO must develop and maintain a market or other contractual

arrangements for the supply of all ancillary services required by Order No.

888, FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 31,036 (Final Rule on Open Access and

Stranded Costs), and subsequent orders.

Comments were also sought on the circumstances under which an RTO's

obligation as supplier of last resort could be eliminated. 526 Several commenters believe

that the supplier of last resort obligation can be eliminated once a viable competitive

market develops within the RTO region. 527 For example, WPSC suggests that an RTO

must continue to fulfill the role of supplier of last resort for these services or a power

exchange must be available to supply these services. WPSC believes that it would be

difficult to predict the circumstances under which the market for ancillary services is

sufficiently robust that the RTO's role as supplier of last resort may be eliminated. 

WPSC believes that it would be a mistake to eliminate that role in any market where the

generation market concentration levels as measured by the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index

exceed 1,800. TDU Systems states that it is not aware of a market in any of the ancillary
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -399- 

528See, e.g., PGE, TDU Systems, Cal ISO, Duke, Tri-State.

services that is now sufficiently competitive to warrant elimination of an ancillary service

from this obligation. However, TDU Systems acknowledges that there may never be a

competitive market for certain ancillary services and that an alternative mechanism must

be created.

The NOPR also asked for comments on whether a different set of ancillary

services requirement for RTOs is needed because RTOs will not own generating

resources. Comments on this issue were mixed. 

Sithe and several other commenters 528 generally believe the Commission’s initial

set of guidelines on ancillary services is reasonable, and that a new set of ancillary

services requirements for RTOs is unnecessary. LG&E adds that, as already is the case

under the open access tariff, an RTO should be allowed to choose to add to the list of

ancillary services in recognition of local or regional conditions. MidAmerican believes

that while no additional or revised ancillary services are required, an RTO must ensure

that sufficient transmission capacity is available to allow delivery of backup supply,

planning reserves and the existing six ancillary services.

On the other hand, Los Angeles believes that a different set of ancillary services

requirements than those required currently from a vertically integrated utility should

apply to an RTO which does not own generation resources. They envision an ultimate

industry structure of complete desegregation of generation and transmission assets so that
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -400- 

529See also Eric Hirst.

any incentive (either real or perceived) for the transmission provider to act in a

discriminatory manner is eliminated.

NSP requests that the Commission refer to the draft NERC policy that discusses

the role of an operating authority as an unbundled procurement agent for community

ancillary services. They describe this document as a good "guidepost" for the

Commission to follow in the RTO NOPR, and for the establishment of additional

ancillary services such as system blackstart and frequency responsive reserve. 529 Desert

STAR and Cal ISO agree that additional blackstart ancillary service may be required. 

TDU Systems believes that RTOs should be required to offer backup service and an

additional load following service. It describes backup service as required to meet

contingencies during periods following those covered by the OATT’s reserve services,

and load following service as required to complement the OATT’s minute-to-minute

regulation service with a service matching hour-to-hour variations in load. Industrial

Consumers recommends that the Commission remove Schedule 4 (energy imbalance

service) from any tariff administered by an RTO. They suggest that this service be

provided by the real-time balancing market as proposed in the NOPR.

Self-Supply Option

Nearly all who commented on the self supply option generally agree that, where

feasible, all market participants should have the option of self-supplying or acquiring
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -401- 

530See, e.g., CMUA, Cal ISO, LG&E, PG&E, PJM/NEPOOL Customers, PPC,

APX, Metropolitan, MidAmerican, NSP, Seattle, SMUD, Desert STAR, TDU Systems,

Tri-State.

ancillary services from third parties. 530 Some commenters strongly endorse the selfsupply model. For example, APS believes that it should be the aim of the RTO to have

each transmission customer self-supply its generation-related ancillary service

requirements to the fullest extend practical. Los Angeles suggests that the role of the

RTO should be limited to ensuring that the transmission customer has adequately

provided for the necessary ancillary services for each transaction, and the RTO provide

such services only in the event of non-compliance. It believes that the RTO should

develop specific rules and protocols that would support the self-provision of ancillary

services. Some commenters, including PJM/NEPOOL Customers and LG&E, suggest

that it is important for the development of a competitive market in ancillary services that

RTO customers not be required to purchase them from the RTO, and that an RTO must

not prohibit or interfere with the ability of all market participants to have the option of

acquiring competitive ancillary services or providing such services through buy/sell

transactions from customer-owned generation.

On the other hand, FirstEnergy states that the Commission should be very cautious

that policies that encourage self-supply of ancillary services do not compromise the very

ability of the RTO to ensure reliable and secure network operation. It maintains that the

provision of "self-supplying" ancillary services is untested, the infrastructure needed is as
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -402- 

531FirstEnergy notes that NERC is developing certification and verification criteria

for ancillary service providers.

532See, e.g., Industrial Consumers, PJM, Turlock, Cal ISO, Florida Power Corp.,

PJM/NEPOOL Customers, LPPC, PGE, SMUD, TDU Systems, NYPP, Tri-State, Nevada

Commission.

yet undeveloped, and the process of providing them could potentially lead to abuses. 

FirstEnergy identifies this issue as one of the reasons that NERC is pushing for

mandatory compliance requirements. 531 It believes that an RTO must have the ability to

evaluate and accept/approve those NERC-certified sources that reliably contribute to

support the grid.

Authority to Determine Amounts and Location of Ancillary Services

Most commenters generally support the proposal that the RTO have the authority

to determine the quantities and, where appropriate, the location at which ancillary

services must be provided. 532 In addition, CMUA suggests that the RTO be responsible

for enforcing compliance with established standards.

PJM/NEPOOL Customers requests that RTO decisions regarding the amounts and

locations of ancillary services consider both stakeholder input and NERC standards. It

believes that this requirement would ensure that the RTO does not impose unnecessarily

high ancillary service obligations that will inhibit the operation of the competitive market. 

In addition, PJM/NEPOOL Customers asks that the Commission ensure that the RTO

exercises this authority only to the extent necessary for reliability purposes, since
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -403- 

533Citing FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 31,036 at 31,705 (1996).

534See also Eric Hirst.

decisions regarding ancillary services could impact the competitive electricity supply

market.

NYPP requests that the RTO's authority not be exclusive. It suggests that properly

constituted local and regional reliability councils authorized by FERC should have the

authority to establish criteria necessary to maintain the reliability of the transmission

system including the reliability of discrete locations.

Duke notes that the Commission has previously recognized NERC's leadership

role in developing concepts in the area of ancillary services. 533 It encourages the

Commission to recognize and adopt NERC's development of ancillary service definitions

and reliability standards. 534

Industrial Consumers and Steel Dynamics request that the Commission first

approve the standards by which the RTO determines the requirements. They requests

that these standards include the development of "metrics," i.e., standardized units of

measurement such that the performance of each service can be verified. In addition,

Industrial Consumers recommends modifying the requirement to ensure seamless

application between multiple RTOs and for transactions that only go through an RTO. It

suggests adding an additional requirement to § 35.34(j)(4)(ii):
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -404- 

535See, e.g., PJM, Cal ISO, Florida Power Corp., Cinergy, Los Angeles, PSNM,

SMUD, Duke.

536See also Cinergy.

The Regional Transmission Organization must support the minimum

required amounts of each ancillary service for transactions between itself

and other Regional Transmission Organizations in the interconnection and

through itself.

Control Over Ancillary Services Providers

All commenters that commented on this subject believe that the RTO should be

able to exercise some operational control, either directly or indirectly, over any supplier

of ancillary services. 535 SMUD supports the RTO establishing well documented and

specific operating criteria and the ability to require compliance with such operating

criteria, including monetary penalties and commission-approved sanctions. JEA believes

that this control should be exerted only where pre-existing contractual rights are

established. 536

Some commenters would broaden the requirement. For example, FirstEnergy is

concerned that limiting the RTO's control to ancillary services providers rather than all

generation located within the RTO may compromise the RTO's ability to operate the

transmission system reliably. It suggests that the Commission allow a greater flexibility

for the RTO and all generation owners located within the RTO to develop an agreement

for provision of ancillary services through the RTO that provides for the necessary

requirements for voluntary generation participation in the ancillary services market
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -405- 

537See also NYPP, PSNM.

538See, e.g., FTC, LPPC, Avista, APX, PJM/NEPOOL Customers, Seattle.

including operational control if appropriate, and the necessary requirements for calling on

ancillary services from connected generation necessary for the reliable operation of the

transmission system. 

On the other hand, PJM/NEPOOL Customers suggest that the RTO control be

limited to those providers that the RTO will rely on to fulfill its obligation as supplier of

last resort for ancillary services. It claims that control over additional generators is

unnecessary and may affect the operation of the competitive market.

Metropolitan recommends that the Commission allow RTO indirect control of

existing large hydroelectric plants to protect and facilitate use of existing systems that

have been operational for a substantial period of time and to preserve the integrity of the

FERC hydro license. It states that allowing indirect control would eliminate the need for

costly installation of software and infrastructure. 537

Promote Competitive Markets for Ancillary Services

Most commenters support the proposal in the NOPR that RTOs promote

competitive markets for ancillary services. 538 Seattle suggests that the RTO provide

incentives to ensure a robust, transparent market with many buyers and sellers of

ancillary services. PJM/NEPOOL Customers states that it is important that the RTO not

impede the development of competitive markets for ancillary services and that the RTO
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -406- 

539See also TDU Systems.

actually facilitate the development of these markets. However, it stresses that the RTO

and incumbent transmission owners should not be permitted to have market-based rates

for ancillary services until a viable competitive market for such services develops. 539

Sithe advocates that the final rule grant RTOs the authority to administer spot

markets for ancillary services and establish rules obligating all participants to meet

uniform requirements. PG&E believes that the RTO should not be the sole purchaser of

ancillary services. Instead, it should facilitate the development of bilateral markets for as

many of the ancillary services as possible, thereby allowing market participants to selfprovide those ancillary services.

Access to Real-Time Balancing Markets

In the NOPR, the Commission proposed that an RTO must ensure that its

transmission customers have access to a real-time balancing market. We proposed that

the RTO must either develop and operate such markets itself or ensure that this task is

performed by another entity that is not affiliated with any market participant. The

Commission noted that although system-wide balancing is a critical element of reliable

short-term grid operation, this does not necessarily require that there be a moment-tomoment balance between the individual loads and resources of bilateral traders and loadserving entities and the schedules and actual production of individual generators. We

also noted that unequal access to balancing options for individual customers can lead to
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -407- 

540See, e.g., Duke, PJM, Illinois Commission, Cal ISO, NERA.

541See, e.g., Enron/APX/Coral Power, Eric Hirst, NYPP, Powerex, East Texas

Cooperatives, Industrial Consumers, Professor Hogan.

unequal access in the quality of transmission service available to different customers, and

that this could be a significant problem for RTOs that serve some customers who operate

control areas and other customers who do not. The Commission proposed to give RTOs

considerable discretion in how a real-time balancing market would be operated.

We invited comments on the use of market mechanisms to support overall system

balancing and imbalances of individual transmission users. In addition, we invited

responses to the following questions. Is it feasible to rely on markets to support a

function that is so time-sensitive? Can such markets be made to function efficiently if the

RTO is not a control area operator? For the imbalances of individual transmission

customers, should a distinction be made between loads and generators? Should

customers have the option of paying for all imbalances in such a market or only

imbalances within a specified band? 

Several commenters hold the view that it is indeed feasible to rely on markets to

support a balancing function that is time-sensitive, 540 and many agree that access to a

real-time balancing market would be of considerable benefit to market participants. 541

NERA claims that technical logic dictates that an electricity system have a central process

to co-ordinate real-time physical operations. NERA argues that to the extent that this
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -408- 

process is not based on markets, it must be based on less efficient command-and-control

methods. NERA also claims that economic and commercial logic requires that a

commodity market have short-term trading arrangements to bring market positions into

agreement with physical reality, and argues that to the extent that market trading does not

reflect physical reality, some non-market process must close the gap between the market

and reality. NERA asserts that these two propositions imply that the best way to

maximize the role of the market and minimize the role of non-market processes is to base

real-time physical operations on a spot market and to allow market participants to use this

market for commercial purposes to the extent they find this useful.

Enron/APX/Coral Power states that access to a real-time energy balancing market

is central to assuring comparability in open access, and Industrial Consumers believes

that this proposal is the beginning of a much needed "paradigm shift" in the manner in

which ancillary services are defined and provided in the marketplace. Eric Hirst states

that implementation of a real-time balancing market would permit FERC to eliminate the

Order No. 888 requirement that transmission providers offer an energy imbalance service

to transmission customers. He argues that elimination of energy imbalance service, with

its awkward and arbitrary deadband and penalty payments, would be a pro-competitive

change. Professor Hogan claims that without an efficient spot market and the associated

transparent spot prices, it will be much more expensive and difficult to arrange balancing

and settlement for the increasing number of retail access programs in the states. East
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -409- 

542See EPA and Project Groups.

543See, e.g., PJM, PJM/NEPOOL Customers, Professor Hogan, NERA.

544See, e.g., Tri-State, Illinois Commission, MidAmerican, Duke.

Texas Cooperatives agrees that real-time balancing markets are desirable but believe that

simply commanding RTOs to promote the development of competitive markets for

ancillary services provides no incentive for the RTO and its members to do so. 

Also, two commenters argue that access to real-time balancing markets would

eliminate some significant barriers to entry for non-traditional resources such as

renewable and distributed energy. 542 In particular, EPA notes that providing such access

would eliminate arbitrary energy imbalance penalties that are a major barrier to

intermittent resources such as wind and solar energy.

Some commenters believe that the RTO itself should develop and operate a realtime balancing market. 543 PJM/NEPOOL Customers believe that the development of

such a market is an essential function of the RTO that will facilitate the further

development of retail competitive supply markets. PJM states that a real-time balancing

market can best be provided through a power exchange operated by an RTO. 

Commenters are divided as to whether the development of a real-time balancing market

requires that the RTO be a control area operator. Several believe that such markets are

possible whether or not the RTO operates a control area. 544 Indeed, MidAmerican

believes that, to function efficiently, these markets normally must operate in a region that
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -410- 

545See, e.g., PJM/NEPOOL Customers, Southern Company, FirstEnergy.

546See, e.g., Professor Hogan, Allegheny.

is larger than a typical control area. However, others take an opposite view. 545 

FirstEnergy, for example, argues that the timing, dispatch and telecommunications

infrastructure needed to operate a real-time balancing market today can only be done by a

control area operator and then only for a combined load within a control area with ample

generation resources under automatic generation control. 

Some commenters provide detailed recommendations regarding the rules that

should govern the RTO's operation of real-time balancing markets. 546 Professor Hogan

notes that the complex network interactions in an electric grid require that there be an

entity that can provide certain critical coordinating services, and that the most obvious

example of such services is energy balancing. He states that the operator should offer an

energy balancing redispatch service where market participants can make offers to buy and 

sell energy.

He believes that the best approach would be to run the balancing market as a "bidbased, security-constrained economic dispatch" with voluntary participation by

generators and loads. Professor Hogan emphasizes that the RTO must not reject

voluntary bids, stating that the natural extension of open access and the principles of

choice would suggest that participation in the coordinated balancing market offered by

the operator should be voluntary. He states that market participants can evaluate their
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -411- 

547See, e.g., Seattle, FirstEnergy, Florida Power Corp..

own economic situation and make their own choice about participating in the operator's

economic dispatch or finding similar services elsewhere. He believes that any other rule

would require some form of discrimination, and adds that there should be a strong burden

of proof for those who argue that it is necessary to restrict voluntary bids, or discard

consideration of some bids. Professor Hogan claims that experience in PJM and

elsewhere shows that his suggested approach can work.

However, several commenters take a very different view, claiming that the

development of a real-time balancing market is not a viable option. 547 For example,

FirstEnergy is concerned that a real-time balancing market is not practical to implement. 

It claims that transmission customers do not yet have the real-time metering and

associated communication needed to dispatch and match fluctuating loads to generation. 

FirstEnergy argues that it would be much better to tie this service to the NERC effort of

certifying ancillary service providers for control of generation, and activate the service

when the technology and installation can be accommodated. Seattle states that it

performs its own real-time energy balancing and expects to continue to do so. Seattle

opposes adding this function to an RTO because Seattle believes it will increase the

overhead costs of the organization. Seattle believes that market participants that require

this service should contract with third parties that stand ready to provide it. Florida

Power Corp. states that, given the complexity of implementing short term transmission
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -412- 

548See, e.g., Southern Company, Tri-State.

549See, e.g., UtiliCorp, Avista, APX..

service in general, it is difficult to imagine that a market for energy imbalance service

could be developed. It argues that if the market is limited to the generators needed for

control, the development of market mechanisms will depend on resolving issues such as

the mitigation of potential market power. Florida Power Corp. suggests that an RTO

could contract with generators to perform this balancing function using a mechanism that

is market-like in that generators would be selected based on their bids to perform the

function over some designated period of time, albeit not on an hourly basis.

Several commenters believe that control areas or RTOs should not be the sole

provider of energy imbalance services, 548 while others argue that the role of RTOs

should be limited to that of a supplier of last resort. 549 UtiliCorp states that, in addition

to serving as a supplier of last resort, the RTO must ensure public access to real-time

balancing information. SMUD argues that any burden on the RTO that falls outside of

the core function of ensuring regional transmission reliability will add cost and

complexity to an already costly and complex endeavor. SMUD recommends that the

Commission should limit its focus on generation to the role that generation-related service

plays in promoting reliable transmission. Desert STAR and FirstEnergy believe that the

Commission should give deference to RTOs regarding the development of markets for

real-time balancing. 
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -413- 

FirstEnergy believes that, ultimately, ancillary service provision must be based on

a free-market pricing mechanism, and Southern Company believes that if a real-time

balancing market is desired in a region, it will develop without a mandate. FirstEnergy

asserts that the detrimental effects of regulated and capped ancillary service markets have

been observed in the California and PJM markets. Also, APX believes that the

Commission should let the market, not the RTO, provide the trading arrangements in the

power industry. APX asserts that efficiency in the competitive market comes from the

de-centralized trading activity of self-interested buyers and sellers, and that competition

will develop further when market participants self-provide their ancillary services which

they acquire in forward contract markets. In APX's view, the RTO should not provide a

centrally optimized dispatch because a central dispatch will discourage, if not eliminate,

the commitment of forward contracts in the energy market and replace the price discovery

of forward markets with ex post pricing. To the extent that the RTO must acquire

ancillary services, including balancing services, APX believes that the RTO should

acquire them from a market created by market participants, and not create its own

markets. NERA, however, states that this argument ignores the fact that preventing the

ISO from operating balancing markets does not eliminate the network interactions and

real-time events that are inherent in any electricity network. Rather, according to NERA,

it merely forces the ISO to manage these interactions and events by less efficient and

more intrusive non-market means. NERA contends that if the objective really is to
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -414- 

550See, e.g., Enron/APX/Coral Power, LG&E, PJM/NEPOOL Customers,

FirstEnergy, TDU Systems, Florida Power Corp..

maximize the role of competitive market forces and minimize the extent to which the

monopoly ISO determines the outcome, the ISO should operate market-clearing

mechanisms that reflect network interactions and real-time events as accurately as

possible. Similarly, ISO-NE claims that it does not understand how operating a market in

which (as in New England, currently) an RTO does not buy and sell the pertinent

commodities can constitute "taking a position" in those markets such that its operation is

perceived as biased. ISO-NE believes that because it does not own market assets or

commodities, an ISO-type RTO is exceptionally well situated to run a fair and nondiscriminatory market. ISO-NE states that the linkages among transmission

operation/dispatch, generation commitment/dispatch, and economic and market forces

strongly support the integration of a physical market with an RTO's operations. 

Nevertheless, ISO-NE states that other financial power markets are welcome and can coexist in the same region with an RTO market.

Several commenters offered their views as to whether unequal access to balancing

options leads to unequal access in the quality of transmission service available to

different customers, and whether this is a significant problem when RTOs serve some

customers that operate control areas and other customers that do not. 550 A number of
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -415- 

551See, e.g., Enron/APX/Coral Power, PJM/NEPOOL Customers, TDU Systems.

commenters believe that the present system does lead to undue discrimination. 551

Enron/APX/Coral Power states that both the NERC and pro forma tariff rules are

inequitable and discriminatory in that large customers rarely will be significantly out of

balance due to the law of large numbers. Enron/APX/Coral Power states that such

customers are given great flexibility to balance their scheduled deliveries and load, while

smaller customers are much more likely to exceed the 1.5 percent deviation band, making

them immediately subject to penalties. Enron/APX/Coral Power believes that by offering

real-time balancing to all transmission customers, the NOPR promises to redress this

inequity. TDU Systems recommends that, pending the development of competitive

balancing markets, the existing inequity between control area operators and other users be

partially redressed by enlarging the deadband for imbalances to be repaid or received in

kind to no less than five percent of scheduled amounts. It also recommends that the penal

character of these charges should be reduced to a ten percent premium, except in cases of

abuse.

PJM/NEPOOL Customers argue that, to the extent current control area operators

wish to maintain access to inadvertent energy accounts to pay back imbalances and avoid

penalties, other transmission customers must have the same opportunity. In the

alternative, it recommends that all users be required to cash-out through the RTO

balancing process. Utility Engineers recommends implementing a pricing plan for
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -416- 

inadvertent interchange by participants of the RTO, where the price for inadvertent

interchange is geographically differentiated to reflect losses and constrained transmission

paths. They claim that such a pricing plan would need a continuous auction, which could

be achieved through establishing a pricing formula.

With regard to providing access to inadvertent energy accounts, other commenters

argue that there are valid reasons for distinguishing between customers that are control

areas and those that are not. FirstEnergy argues that no other entity, other than control

areas, can or should have that access to inadvertent accounts. It claims that, if market

participants are provided with the authority to "go inadvertent" as control area operators

currently have, the strain on the grid would drastically degrade system reliability,

requiring much higher reserve capacity requirements. FirstEnergy believes that marketers

would "borrow" from the grid during high price time periods and make whole on their

borrowing during low price time periods, thus distorting the true price signal. Florida

Power Corp. notes that in addition to balancing generation against load, control area

balancing also includes a requirement for contributing to the maintenance of system

frequency. In contrast, it notes that the non-control area transmission customer's

balancing requirement is limited to the directly measured load it serves. Florida Power

Corp. also claims that, if a system of payments was substituted for the inadvertent

payback system presently used, control area operators would simply be circulating large

sums of dollars between themselves to accomplish the same result at a higher
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -417- 

administrative cost. LG&E suggests that the Commission treat such technical issues

separate from the RTO NOPR and work in conjunction with NERC’s parallel efforts in

this area. Also, Florida Commission believes that inadvertent energy accounting between

control areas should continue to be allowed within the operating standards of NERC. 

With regard to any requirement that loads and resources must be in balance from

moment-to-moment, Professor Hogan and Eric Hirst believe there is no need for

individual loads and generation to balance their schedules separately, and PJM/NEPOOL

Customers states that balancing should be required only to ensure that generators deliver

the amount scheduled and committed. Professor Hogan argues that individual balancing

requirements both complicate the task for the RTO and provide a device to reinforce

market power. Eric Hirst states that the RTO's costs of providing or absorbing imbalance

energy should be charged equitably to those that under-generate and over-consume, with

compensation to those that over-generate and under-consume. He states that this will

result in charges and payments netting roughly to zero in each hour. However,

Enron/APX/Coral Power believes that any RTO proposal should include development of

an ex post energy balancing market in which buyers and sellers are given a finite amount

of time after the market has closed to find others with offsetting positions. 

Regarding the imbalances of individual transmission customers, commenters

disagree as to whether a distinction should be made between loads and generators. 

MidAmerican and Florida Power Corp. believe that loads and generators should be
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -418- 

treated differently. MidAmerican contends that it is much easier to control generators

than it is to control load, and in the future managing imbalances will become more

complex in that control from the load-side will involve the response of potentially

thousands of entities that may or may not respond as quickly as central generation. 

MidAmerican states that a distinction exists between loads and generators both in

magnitude and response time. Florida Power Corp. claims that load and generators are

not always similarly situated. It states that the nature of energy imbalance service

depends on whether a generator and the load that it serves are in the same control area or

are in different control areas. Eric Hirst, TDU Systems, and Duke believe that, in

general, the market rules and principles should be the same or comparable for generators

and loads, although TDU Systems believes that loads may be less likely than generators

to abuse the system by leaning on it. Eric Hirst states that the use of imbalance markets

would eliminate the asymmetry between generation and load in FERC’s definition of

energy imbalance. 

Finally, the NOPR also asked whether customers should be able to pay for all

imbalances in a market or only imbalances within a specified band. Duke believes that it

is appropriate to let the market participants determine how imbalances will be determined

and paid. PJM/NEPOOL Customers believes that the RTO should provide transmission

users with as many service offerings as possible, including the ability to opt for different

balancing pricing proposals. Florida Power Corp., however, believes that there should
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -419- 

only be one method of settling the imbalance market. It claims that complexity and

opportunities for gaming increase with options for settlement.

MidAmerican believes that transmission customers should pay for all energy

imbalances caused by the mismatch of scheduled energy and actual load. It recommends

that imbalance charges be based on market prices at the time the imbalance occurred, and

should include a penalty, in appropriate circumstances, to deter future imbalances. 

MidAmerican contends that if transmission customers are allowed to avoid payment

within a specified bandwidth, gaming of the transmission system will occur.

 PJM/NEPOOL Customers and Professor Hogan, however, argue that the RTO

should not be allowed to impose balancing penalties on transmission users. Eric Hirst

states that RTOs should maximize the use of price signals rather than penalties to

encourage appropriate behavior on the part of generators and loads, and Professor Hogan

states that such prices should reflect the marginal cost for power. Eric Hirst believes that

penalties should be imposed only to counter the perverse incentives that are created when

metering or billing procedures require prices to be calculated over time intervals that do

not correspond to those used to measure generation and consumption quantities. Using

the example of the California ISO, he states that mismatches between ten minute prices

and hourly quantities provide unintended incentives to generators to ignore ISO dispatch

instructions or to ignore their schedules. He claims that aligning the time periods for
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -420- 

552See, e.g., LPPC, Los Angeles, Georgia Transmission, JEA, PPC. A direct

supplier of ancillary services either owns or operates generation.

price determination and billing would eliminate these perverse incentives. He adds that,

where penalties are needed, they should be closely tied to the costs incurred by the ISO.

TDU Systems argues that if markets for balancing services are fully competitive,

transmission users should be able to use them to deal with any amount of imbalance. 

TDU Systems recommends that until such markets are fully competitive, it may be

necessary to restrict such purchases to a deadband to prevent abuse. It believes that any

such deadband should be less restrictive than that of the pro forma tariff. In that regard, it

recommends that the minimum within-band allowance should be no less than the greater

of two megawatts or five percent for loads or capacities up to 200 MW, with declining

percentage tolerances as loads and capacities increase in size.

Commission Conclusion

We conclude that an RTO must serve as the provider of last resort of all ancillary

services required by Order No. 888 and subsequent orders.

Since some commenters interpreted the "supplier" of last resort obligation as

proposed in the NOPR to require that the RTO be the direct supplier of ancillary

services, 552 we have made a minor change to the requirement by substituting the term

"provider" for "supplier." We clarify that this obligation requires that the RTO have

adequate arrangements in place for the provision of ancillary services.
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -421- 

The ancillary services adopted in Order No. 888 were defined using the control

area and its operator as the basis because a majority of transmission service was provided

by control area operators and they controlled the generation facilities that supplied

ancillary services. We note that since we are not requiring that the RTO to be a single

control area operator, we can not require an RTO that owns no generation to be the direct

supplier of ancillary services. Therefore we will give the RTO and its participants

flexibility in developing adequate arrangements for the provision of ancillary services to

all transmission customers that request service over the facilities under RTO control.

The RTO could fulfill its ancillary services obligations through a variety of

mechanisms, including contractual arrangements, indirect or direct control of specified

generation facilities, or market mechanisms. However, regardless of the method of

provision, the ancillary services must be included in the RTO administered tariff so that

transmission customers will have access to one-stop shopping for transmission service.

We conclude that all market participants must continue to have the option of selfsupplying or acquiring ancillary services from third parties subject to any general

restrictions imposed by the Commissions's ancillary services regulations in Order No. 888

and subsequent orders. In such instances, the RTO must determine if the transmission

customer has adequately obtained these services. The Commission believes that allowing

self-supply provides a possible competitive check on the RTO to ensure that to the extent

it does provide the services, it acquires them at lowest cost.
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -422- 

In the NOPR we asked whether additional or revised ancillary services are needed.

While a completely unbundled and competitive environment may require a modification

to the ancillary services required by Order No. 888, comments suggest that an immediate

change is unnecessary. We will not, at this time, make changes to the ancillary services 

described in Order No. 888. However, we will allow an RTO to propose other services in

recognition of local or regional conditions.

We conclude that the RTO must have the authority to decide the minimum

required amounts of each ancillary service and, if necessary, the locations at which these

services must be provided. All generators or other facilities that provide ancillary

services must be subject to direct or indirect operational control by the RTO. The RTO

must promote the development of competitive markets for ancillary services whenever

feasible. To ensure the reliable operation of the system, an RTO must have authority to

determine quantities and locations for ancillary services. The RTO should consider

stakeholder input as well as established industry standards in determining these

requirements. The Commission anticipates that some of the generation-based ancillary

services could be acquired in short-term markets. This has been the approach taken by

most of the ISOs that we have approved, and we see no reason that this would be

different for transcos or other types of RTO entities. Apart from establishing the general

requirement to use competitive markets, the Commission will allow the RTO
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -423- 

considerable flexibility in determining many of the detailed market design questions, with

case-by-case review by us.

As we proposed in the NOPR, we conclude that an RTO must ensure that its

transmission customers have access to a real-time balancing market that is developed and

operated by either the RTO itself or another entity that is not affiliated with any market

participant. We have determined that real-time balancing markets are necessary to ensure

non-discriminatory access to the grid and to support emerging competitive energy

markets. Furthermore, we believe that such markets will become extremely important as

states move to broad-based retail access, and as generation markets move toward nontraditional resources, such as wind and solar energy, that may operate only intermittently.

Some commenters believe that implementation of real-time balancing markets

presents technical problems that may prevent RTOs in some areas of the country from

making such markets available to market participants. For example, some argue that it is

difficult if not impossible for an RTO that is not a control area operator to operate an

efficient real-time balancing market. These commenters suggest that to the extent such

markets are feasible and desirable in a particular region, the RTO, its stakeholders and

market participants should be given the flexibility to develop markets in accordance with

their needs and capabilities.

We are not convinced that, at this time, technical considerations preclude the

development of a real-time balancing market for any potential RTO. As discussed
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -424- 

elsewhere in this Final Rule, we are requiring each RTO to be the security coordinator for

its region and to have, at a minimum, the authority to exercise a combination of direct and

functional control over facilities within its region. Thus, even if an RTO is not a control

area operator, it should have sufficient operational authority to ensure that a real-time

balancing market can be implemented. With regard to the issue of flexibility, we believe

that real-time balancing markets are essential for development of competitive power

markets. Therefore, although we will give RTOs considerable discretion in how they

operate real-time balancing markets, we will not allow implementation of such markets to

be discretionary.

Our conclusions regarding provision of real-time balancing markets are similar to

our conclusions regarding markets for congestion management; that is, we will not

prevent an entity other than an RTO that is unaffiliated with market participants, from

seeking to offer transmission customers a real-time balancing market. However, because

this function is so time-sensitive and requires such close coordination with the actual

dispatch, experience may ultimately show that it cannot be performed to a high degree of

efficiency unless it is made a part of the RTO's central or hierarchical dispatch activities. 

Also, we do not agree that an RTO's operation of a real-time balancing market will

interfere unduly with the efforts of others to establish markets in forward contracts for

energy.
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -425- 

We asked in the NOPR whether customers should have the option of paying for all

imbalances in a real-time balancing market or only imbalances within a specified band. 

Based on the comments received, we decline to give a generic solution for all RTOs in

this rule. An RTO may propose one approach or the other but should explain how it

proposes to overcome any disadvantages of the approach selected. 

In the NOPR, we noted that unequal access to balancing options can lead to

unequal access in the quality of transmission service, and that this could be a significant

problem for RTOs that serve some customers who operate control areas and other

customers who do not. We conclude that control area operators should face the same

costs and price signals as other transmission customers and, therefore, also should be

required to clear system imbalances through a real-time balancing market. We believe

that providing options for clearing imbalances that differ among customers would be

unduly discriminatory.

Finally, we asked in the NOPR whether, for the imbalances of individual

transmission customers, a distinction should be made between loads and generators. We

conclude that, for the purpose of determining cost responsibility for imbalances, no

distinction needs to be made. The system-wide balance between load and generation is

affected comparably by changes in load and changes in generation. Therefore, the cost of

an imbalance is unaffected whether the imbalance is determined ultimately to be the

responsibility of load or of generation. However, commenters point out certain
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -426- 

553FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 32,541 at 33,747.

554Id. at 33,748.

differences between loads and generators (such as in the time needed to respond to an

operator's instructions) that are important from the standpoint of system operation. These

differences can be relevant to the determination of the appropriate penalties to assess to

loads and generators that fail to submit accurate schedules. Thus, for purposes of

assessing penalties for inaccurate schedules, we conclude that a penalty mechanism that

treats loads and generators differently may be appropriate.

5. OASIS and Total Transmission Capability (TTC) and

Available Transmission Capability (ATC)

In the NOPR, the Commission proposed that an RTO must be the single OASIS

site administrator for all transmission facilities under its control and independently

calculate TTC and ATC. The Commission stated that the most controversial aspect of

OASIS operation is the calculation and posting of ATC 553 and noted that there is

widespread dissatisfaction with the reliability of posted ATC numbers. To alleviate this

problem, the Commission proposed that the RTO become the administrator of a single

OASIS site for all transmission facilities over which it is the transmission provider. 554

The NOPR outlined three levels at which an RTO could be involved in ATC calculations. 

At Level 1, the RTO would post ATC values received from transmission owners. At

Level 2, the RTO would receive raw data from transmission owners and itself calculate
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -427- 

555See id.

556Id.

557See, e.g., NASUCA, WPSC, EAL, NERC, Industrial Consumers, Entergy, Mass

Companies, JEA, LG&E, NY ISO, NJBUS, Sithe, TAPS, How Group, Southern

Company, PG&E, PJM, UtiliCorp, Williams, Cinergy, Oneok, East Texas Cooperatives,

Cal DWR, Tri-State, Seattle, New Smyrna Beach, RUS, Cinergy, Nevada Commission,

(continued...)

ATC values. At Level 3, the RTO would itself calculate ATC values based on data

developed partially or totally by the RTO.

In the NOPR, the Commission envisioned that RTOs would operate at Level 3 to

ensure that ATC values are based on accurate information and to minimize the

opportunities for manipulation. 555 The Commission also proposed that: (1) an RTO

must formulate a validation system to check any ATC data supplied by others; (2) in the

event of a dispute over ATC values, the RTO's data should be used pending the outcome

of the dispute resolution process; and (3) the RTO must formulate the operating standards

(subject to regional and national reliability requirements) underlying ATC

calculations. 556

Comments

Most commenters who address the subject agree with the Commission's

observations regarding dissatisfaction with ATC/TTC data. Moreover, most commenters

on the subject endorse the proposal that an RTO must be the single OASIS site

administrator for all transmission facilities under its control. 557 Some commenters,
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -428- 

557(...continued)

and Enron/APX/Coral Power.

558See, e.g., Sithe, RUS, TAPS, PG&E, SMUD, Cal DWR, New Smyrna Beach,

East Texas Cooperatives, WPSC, EAL, NERC, NASUCA, Seattle, Georgia

Transmission, First Rochdale, Tri-State, Industrial Consumers, Enron/APX/Coral Power,

Cinergy, Oneok, PJM, Williams, Empire District, PJM/NEPOOL Industrial Customers,

Entergy, Mass Companies, Nevada Commission, NJBUS, and LG&E.

559E.g., FMPA, East Texas Cooperatives, NJBUS, Empire District, Entergy,

Oneok, First Rochdale, Seattle, EAL, Sithe, WPSC, Sithe, PG&E, SMUD, New Smyrna

Beach, and PJM/NEPOOL Customers.

however, are opposed to mandating the RTO as the OASIS site administrator. For

example, Central Maine argues that it should not be precluded from operating its own site

because as a "wires-only company" it has an incentive to operate an efficient site in order

to maximize use of transmission capacity. EEI asserts that OASIS operation can occur

independently of formation of an RTO and that the tasks and problems of OASIS

operation will not become naturally easier to solve with the creation of an RTO.

Most commenters also support the Commission's proposal to have the RTO

independently calculate ATC and TTC. 558 In addition, a number of commenters

emphasize that independent and disinterested RTOs could be trusted and empowered to

maintain reliable ATC data and calculate accurate values. 559 Moreover, several

commenters are concerned with consistency across RTOs and contend that RTOs must
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -429- 

560See, e.g., Industrial Consumers, Seattle and WPSC.

also coordinate ATC values with adjacent regions and with the NERC regional reliability

councils. 560 

Many commenters concur with the Commission's conclusions about the different

levels of RTO involvement in ATC calculations. These commenters believe that Level 1

is insufficient for reliable and trustworthy data and that an RTO should independently

calculate ATC values. Several commenters, however, disagree about the appropriate

timing for Level 3 compliance. Some commenters, such as Cinergy, argue that upon

commencement of operation, an RTO should be required to perform all studies and

analysis needed for accurate ATC values consistent with Level 3. APX supports each

RTO reaching Level 3 as quickly as possible. Enron/APX/Coral Power asserts that upon

commencement of operation, an RTO should operate at Level 2 and, as it gains

operational experience, migrate to Level 3. SMUD supports RTO operation at Level 3

but is concerned about the significant costs associated with developing data. 

JEA is opposed to any RTO structure that gives an RTO complete authority over

ATC calculations for transmission that JEA will continue to own. JEA asserts that

transmission owners are in the best position to assess the capabilities of their own

transmission system. Therefore, absent formation of a transco, JEA does not support

relying on an RTO for ATC and TTC calculations because JEA argues that ownership
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -430- 

561See, e.g., Williams, EPSA, Cinergy, Empire District and PJM/NEPOOL

Customers.

and control of the assets would be split between two or more entities whose interests are

not always the same.

Both Cal ISO and NY ISO argue that the final rule should provide flexibility in the

OASIS requirements to accommodate network systems like the Cal ISO and the NY ISO

in which transmission service is not explicitly reserved. In addition, numerous

commenters argue that the Commission should expand the minimum requirements to have

every RTO employ a single set of OASIS practices and terminology. 561 They note that

consistency in OASIS procedures will allow seamless trades across RTOs.

How Group also focuses its comments on the standardization of transmission

transactions. It notes that without some level of standardization only a limited number of

market participants who learn all of the differences between RTOs can perform

transactions that span multiple RTOs. How Group proposes that each RTO establish a

coordinating committee with neighboring RTOs and transmission customers in order to: 

(1) coordinate the naming of interconnected facilities, sources, sinks, paths, points of

receipt and/or delivery between the RTO and its neighbors; (2) coordinate the sharing of

necessary data for the calculation of transmission capability on interconnected paths; and

(3) foster coordination with neighbors in adopting standardized business practices. It also

suggests that continued industry-wide coordination is necessary to formulate common
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -431- 

562See, e.g., Ontario Power, Williams, NERC and EPSA. 

definitions for types of transmission and ancillary services, curtailment priorities, and

timing requirements for arrangement of transmission services. 

Only one commenter expressed concern about the proposal to use the RTO's ATC

values in the event of a dispute. Southern Company contends that the existing

transmission owner's data are preferable to the RTO's data. Southern Company argues

that existing transmission owners have experience in operating the regional transmission

facilities and, therefore, are best qualified to determine ATC values.

Some commenters raise other OASIS-related issues that were not addressed in the

NOPR. For example, commenters argue that: (1) all reservations and scheduling,

including that for network service, should occur on the OASIS; (2) sanctions should be

levied against transmission providers that skew their ATC values; and (3) the power flow

methodology rather than the contract path model should be used for scheduling. 562 A

few commenters address issues relating to Capacity Benefit Margin (CBM). NASUCA

argues that administration of CBM should be a required function of RTOs and that a

uniform methodology for calculating CBM is needed. Similarly, Idaho Commission

asserts that requiring the posting of CBM on OASIS with a narrative explanation of its

derivation would be beneficial. Empire District states that the Commission should

provide better guidance about how to calculate CBM.
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -432- 

Commission Conclusion

After considering the comments, we continue to believe that an RTO must be the

single OASIS site administrator for all transmission facilities under its control. As

numerous commenters note, independent RTOs can be trusted to maintain an OASIS site

with reliable and current data that is easy to use. In addition, a single OASIS site for each

region instead of multiple sites will enable transactions to be carried out more efficiently. 

However, in response to those who argue for flexibility in OASIS requirements,

we clarify that this requirement does not mean that each RTO must itself operate the

OASIS for its region. Our concern is that there be no more than one OASIS site for the

facilities under the RTO's control, and that the RTO ensure that the OASIS site operator

have the same attributes of independence we require for an RTO. Thus, we will allow an

RTO the flexibility to contract out OASIS responsibilities to another independent entity,

if justified. More specifically, we do not intend to keep an RTO from participating in a

"super-OASIS" jointly with other RTOs.

We reaffirm that an RTO should operate at what the NOPR characterizes as Level

3 for ATC/TTC calculations, which requires the RTO itself to calculate ATC values

based on data developed partially or totally by the RTO. Most commenters believe that

Levels 1 and 2, where the RTO would accept the transmission owners' ATC calculations

or data, are insufficient for reliable and trustworthy ATC values. Level 3 ensures that
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -433- 

ATC values are based on accurate information and consistent assumptions. When data

are supplied by others, the RTO must create a system for tests and checks that ensure

customers of coordinated and unbiased data. We also agree with commenters who

recommend that RTOs coordinate ATC values with adjacent regions.

We recognize that the NOPR was silent on the appropriate timing for Level 3

compliance. Commenters suggested that: (1) an RTO should reach Level 3 compliance

upon commencement of operation; (2) an RTO should reach Level 3 as quickly as

possible; or (3) an RTO should operate at either Level 1 or 2 upon commencement of

operation and as it gains operational experience, migrate to Level 3. We conclude that an

RTO OASIS site, including ATC calculations, must be fully operational at Level 3 upon

commencement of service. All parties to a transmission transaction need precise ATC

values to make scheduling decisions.

We affirm that in the event of a dispute over ATC values, the RTO's values should

be used pending the outcome of a dispute resolution process. Only one commenter,

Southern Company, disagreed with this proposal and we are not persuaded by its

arguments. Each RTO must develop procedures to validate its ATC values.

How Group and other commenters address issues relating to the standardization of

transmission transactions. Standardization of transactions involves two separate

concerns: (1) many transactions will cross RTO boundaries; and (2) numerous customers
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -434- 

563We believe that the communications standards and protocols would, like the

current OASIS, make use of: (1) the Internet for communications; (2) interactive displays

using World Wide Web browsers; (3) file uploads and downloads for computer-tocomputer communication; and (4) templates defining the file uploads and downloads.

will do business with multiple RTOs. Without standardized communications protocols

and business practices, the costs of doing business will be increased as market

participants will be required to install additional software and add personnel to transact

with different RTOs and regions. Therefore, to promote interregional trade, standardized

methods of moving power into, out of, and across RTO territories will be needed.

We believe that standards for communications between customers and RTOs must

be developed to permit customers to acquire expeditiously common services among

RTOs. For example, we envision the creation of standardized communications protocols

to schedule power movements and to acquire auction rights. These protocols would not

standardize what the rights are, or the nature of the auctions. Instead, the focus of the

communications protocols would be on how customers communicate their intentions to

an RTO and how customers receive an RTO's responses. 

We agree with How Group and others that certain business and communication

standards 563 are necessary, and we believe that these standards will facilitate the

development of efficient markets. We believe, however, that these issues need further

examination based on a complete record. 
-435-

A few other commenters discussed issues that were not addressed in the NOPR. 

For example, commenters argue that: (1) all transmission transactions (reservations and

scheduling) should occur on the OASIS; (2) sanctions should be levied against

transmission providers that skew their ATC values; and (3) the power flow methodology

for scheduling, rather than the contract path model, should be utilized. In addition,

NASUCA, Empire District and the Idaho Commission raise issues relating to CBM. 

These issues are too detailed for this proceeding and we will not address them at this

time. Commenters will have the opportunity to bring up these issues in response to

specific RTO filings, as well as during OASIS Phase II proceedings and in the CBM

docket (Docket No. EL99-46-000).

6. Market Monitoring (Function 6)

In the NOPR, the Commission proposed that RTOs perform a market monitoring

function. Specifically, RTOs would be required to: (1) monitor markets for transmission

service and the behavior of transmission owners and propose appropriate action; (2)

monitor ancillary services and bulk power markets that the RTO operates; (3)

periodically assess how behavior in markets operated by others affects RTO operations

and how RTO operations affect those markets; and (4) provide reports on market power

abuses and market design flaws to the Commission and affected regulatory authorities,

including specific recommendations. In addition, the Commission asked a number of
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -436-

564See, e.g., New York Commission, South Carolina Authority, Mass Companies,

LG&E, ISO-NE, TAPS, SMUD, NECPUC, WPSC, Project Groups and Tri-State.

questions regarding the role of RTOs in market monitoring, the tools RTOs should use,

and similar issues.

Comments

Commenters address a number of issues regarding the market monitoring function. 

The issues can be grouped into three general areas: (1) the need for and scope of a

market monitoring function; (2) who should perform the market monitoring function and

how it should be performed; and (3) what are the specific components or procedures of a

market monitoring plan.

Need For and Scope of Market Monitoring

As a general proposition, a variety of commenters favor having RTOs serve as

market monitors. 564 Commenters, such as Blue Ridge, argue that RTOs should conduct

market monitoring because they will be in the best position to deal with the growing

volume of multiparty transactions and discern any manipulation or preferential treatment.

Several commenters, such as the Florida Commission, note that the appropriate role for

RTOs in market monitoring and the various aspects of the function will depend upon the

nature of the RTO that is ultimately established. TEP claims that RTO market monitoring

needs to be flexible given the costs involved in such a function. PP&L Companies

believes that RTO market monitoring should focus on properly structuring business rules
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -437-

565See, e.g., Metropolitan, DOE, CMUA, NASUCA and Project Groups.

to foster efficient transactions and gathering statistical information to make available to

the Commission or other enforcement agencies. EEI and Allegheny recommend that

RTO market monitoring identify market design flaws and propose solutions that lead to

greater efficiency, competitiveness and reliability.

A number of commenters support having the RTO should serve as the "first line of

defense" for detecting design flaws and market power abuses. 565 Cal ISO suggests that 

the RTO serve as a first line of defense in conjunction with state commissions and local

regulatory authorities in the region, particularly in the operation of hourly and real-time

markets where potential buyers may not have the ability to decline electric service, and

where transmission and ancillary services markets tend to have high concentrations. PJM

believes that market monitoring by RTOs provides a continual check on market activities

and accordingly, RTOs should have clear authority to investigate potential market power

abuses or flaws and to compel market participants to produce relevant information. 

SMUD contends that although RTO monitoring should be the first line of defense, an

independent RTO monitoring unit must not be a substitute for review by the Commission

and other regulatory agencies. 

In contrast, some commenters, such as Cinergy, argue that, if transmission markets

realize the efficiencies envisioned in the NOPR, the commodity market should be able to

regulate itself, with the Commission and the courts serving as backstops. SNWA
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -438-

cautions that RTOs may be too focused on safe and reliable operations to be a first line of

defense. Some commenters, such as Metropolitan and Southern Company, claim that

there is no benefit in having RTO monitoring replicate the costly regulatory responsibility

that already exists in state and Federal agencies. 

Several commenters propose an expansive RTO market monitoring role. 

NECPUC proposes that monitoring include mitigation of both market flaws and market

power. East Texas Cooperatives and SMUD believe that RTO market monitoring should

include remedying market abuse. Project Groups believes that an RTO should monitor

energy and ancillary services markets and their interplay, and develop indices and criteria

to evaluate activities and behaviors that may reflect market power abuse. Advisory

Committee ISO-NE suggests that the RTO monitor transmission and ancillary services

markets to identify design flaws and market power, and to administer or propose remedial

actions. Dynergy claims that monitoring should include oversight of transmission

owners' behavior. EPSA proposes that the RTO also document any significant market

impacts attributable to application of reliability rules.

Some commenters support limits on market monitoring by the RTO. Commenters,

such as Southern Company and Entergy, argue that RTO monitoring should not reach to

any market the RTO does not operate, nor should it encompass market power abuse and

the effect of existing structural conditions on the competitiveness of electricity markets.

Entergy adds that the RTO will not be in a good position to monitor markets it does not
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -439-

566See, e.g., Desert STAR, CRC and Tri-State.

operate. Several commenters claim that the purpose of monitoring should be to look for

market flaws, not act as policeman looking for bad behavior. 566 Desert STAR

recommends that any proposed remedy be restricted to market flaws within the RTO's

area of operation. Enron/APX/Coral Power argues that evaluation of the structure of

power markets and policing market power lies outside of an RTO's core competencies as

the operator of the transmission system. Tri-State opposes RTO monitoring of power

markets because it would add to the complexity and cost of RTOs and impermissibly

involve the RTO in issues about generation market power. NY ISO opposes monitoring

to the extent that it encompasses the RTO playing an investigative and enforcement role. 

Nonetheless, in its view, the RTO could mitigate evident market power problems on a

prospective basis by applying pre-approved remedies.

Sithe recommends that RTOs not have the authority to compel the provision of

commercially sensitive data and should instead rely on nonproprietary information to

monitor markets. PG&E contends that commercially sensitive information should not be

released to anyone except in accordance with Commission-approved rules. PP&L raises

concerns regarding the ability of the RTO market monitoring organization to guarantee

confidentiality of commercially sensitive information supplied to it. Seattle argues that

any claims of commercial sensitivity must be tempered by the need to create an efficient,

self-policing, transparent market for nondiscriminatory transmission services.
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -440-

567See, e.g., CP&L, TDU Systems, PP&L and PG&E.

568See, e.g., Industrial Consumers, Williams, Southern Company, PSE&G,

Arizona Commission, Georgia Transmission and East Kentucky.

Various commenters would limit the RTO market monitoring function to

information gathering. 567 They argue that the NOPR proposal is overly broad, too

extensive and open-ended, and a potentially burdensome requirement. Sithe argues that

the application of mitigation measures by the RTO could have real commercial impacts

on market participants that often cannot easily be measured or repaid after the fact;

therefore, market participants should have an opportunity to review and comment on

monitoring procedures prior to their implementation. Seattle claims that the Commission

should take a minimalist approach by facilitating market monitoring through greater

public information disclosure. PG&E believes that the RTO should not regulate the

functioning of the energy market. Duke supports RTO identification and description of

alleged market abuses to appropriate authorities through the regulatory framework that

exists today. 

Other commenters question the need for or otherwise oppose an RTO market

monitoring function, in general, as a form of back door regulation. 568 They contend that

RTO monitoring will be unduly burdensome, overtaxing and costly to the ratepayers. Los

Angeles and Salomon Smith Barney argue that RTO monitoring may interfere with the

proper relationship between the RTO and its customers, which they claim should be
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -441-

focused solely on providing nondiscriminatory open access transmission services. 

UtiliCorp argues that the assignment of market monitoring functions to a commercial

entity such as a transco (other than those functions concerned strictly with transmission

pricing) may raise antitrust concerns both for the transco and its customers.

Commenters differ on whether market monitoring should continue indefinitely. 

East Texas Cooperatives believes that continuous RTO market monitoring is necessary

because, in its view, antitrust laws and complaints to the Commission provide only a

slow, after-the-fact remedy. Entergy recommends that any RTO self-monitoring be 

allowed to terminate after a fixed period, subject to Commission approval. Industrial

Consumers suggests that market monitoring be limited to the period when the risk of

discriminatory conduct is greatest. Los Angeles claims that, once the Commission

determines that generation markets are workably competitive, market forces should be

allowed to discipline the markets. If an RTO market monitoring function is required,

PSE&G suggests a five-year sunset provision.

Who Should Perform Market Monitoring and How Should it Be 

Performed

Many commenters address the issue of whether the RTO should perform market

monitoring depending on the form of the RTO (i.e., whether the RTO is a for-profit or a

not-for-profit organization). Most commenters raise concerns about and generally oppose
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -442-

569See, e.g., Dynegy, South Carolina Authority, Industrial Consumers and East

Texas Cooperatives.

570See, e.g., PJM/NEPOOL Customers, Cal ISO, Tri-State and Metropolitan.

571See, e.g., Entergy and Duke.

572See, e.g., PJM, ISO-NE, NY ISO, WPSC and East Texas Cooperatives.

a for-profit RTO monitoring markets. 569 The commenters generally argue that, due to its

economic and business interests, a for-profit RTO cannot objectively monitor itself. 

CP&L submits that a for-profit RTO may be a competitor of other market participants in

the provision of congestion relief and ancillary services, which would make unbiased

monitoring of those markets difficult. TDU Systems would limit a for-profit RTO's role

to data collection. Other commenters recommend that for-profit RTOs employ a fully

independent organization to monitor market conditions. 570 A few commenters, however,

support for-profit RTOs serving as market monitors. 571 Entergy claims that market

monitoring conducted by a transco could be as effective as for any other type of RTO as

long as procedures are in place that ensure its independence.

Commenters also address whether an RTO that is an ISO needs to insulate its

market monitoring function from other RTO functions to ensure independence and

objectivity. A number of commenters generally believe it is appropriate for ISOs to

internally monitor market activities either through staff devoted to the function or through

a committee of ISO members assigned to the function. 572 They argue that an ISO, which

would be free of commercial interests, can be trusted by market participants, and
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -443-

therefore should not have to undertake costly establishment of autonomous monitoring

units. Mid-Atlantic Commissions note that PJM ISO's monitoring unit is a neutral body

that has access to and maintains confidentiality of market sensitive data in accordance

with sharing arrangements with each of the states in the region. California Board

contends that, if the internal unit is independent and has the ability to report and/or

consult with state and Federal authorities without needing additional approval, those

regulators are likely to respect the opinions and recommendations of the market

monitoring unit. CalPX suggests that RTOs and separate power exchanges coordinate

their market monitoring functions and jointly conduct research to lower costs. EPSA

suggests that the information and market data, if collected by an independent and

unbiased RTO, could be relied upon by market participants in formulating business

strategies, and by regulators for purposes of reviewing and approving modifications to

regulated aspects of RTO structures and operations. 

Most commenters, however, would require an ISO (i.e., a not-for-profit RTO) to

make its market monitoring function more independent. Pennsylvania Commission

contends that an independent ISO is absolutely necessary to perform market monitoring

functions. EEI points out that while an RTO's independence may ensure that its

recommendations do not favor particular market participants, this does not ensure that it

will monitor its own performance objectively. In its view, an ISO should use outside

experts within the monitoring committee or on an ad hoc basis to address concerns about
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -444-

objectivity. Similarly, PG&E contends that experience has shown that an ISO's rules and

actions may interfere with the proper functioning of the market. Industrial Consumers

contend that an RTO's operations must be sufficiently transparent that it is the market

participants that do the real monitoring. FTC suggests that internal RTO monitoring

could be problematic if the internal monitoring unit is given enforcement powers, because

this could both devolve into re-regulation and raise conflict of interest issues. FTC

recommends that the Commission's RTO rules explicitly make clear that self-monitoring

controlled by an RTO does not create an antitrust exemption for the RTO and its

participants.

Los Angeles believes that market monitoring should be conducted by an

independent body. CP&L, however, believes that delegation to a private party is

questionable, where its objectivity may also be challenged on grounds of conflict of

interest, particularly, if the delegated authority includes the ability to impose sanctions

and penalties. Oregon Commission believes that RTOs should appoint a local committee

to use RTO data to monitor the market for ancillary services because RTOs, as major

buyers and sellers of such services, will want to protect their market shares. The

Commission should consider establishing its own regulatory advisory bodies to monitor

markets. DOE also claims that the Commission should avoid reliance upon RTO

monitoring to the exclusion of the Commission's own monitoring efforts. Alliant believes

that moving responsibility for monitoring market power to another organization would
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -445-

allow the RTO to focus on the many technical demands that will be placed on it. 

Metropolitan believes market monitoring should occur on two levels: an internal group

responsible for data gathering and publication and frequent preliminary analysis of

anomalous conduct; and formal analyses performed by a group or committee independent

of RTO management whose results and recommendations would not require RTO

approval.

 LG&E proposes that the RTO make its monitoring findings public and refer them

to an appropriate regulatory body. Industrial Consumers opposes giving deference to the

RTO's recommendations for correcting such market power abuses and flaws. Instead, it

believes that stakeholders and market participants should use the RTO reports to make

their own recommendations. 

 NYPP believes that structural solutions are matters for legislators, courts or

regulatory agencies. In contrast, PJM believes that, if the market issue is a structural one,

the RTO should be able to propose structural remedies to the Commission.

In the case of localized market power, MidAmerican submits that it would be

inappropriate for the RTO to take corrective competitive actions in the case of localized

must run generating unit market power. Similarly, PG&E contends that RTOs should

allow temporary supply and price issues to be resolved by the competitive forces of the

market, unless there is a threat to the physical supply of power or a Commission

determination that markets are not workably competitive.
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -446-

573See, e.g., Salomon Smith Barney, South Carolina Commission, PG&E,

Enron/APX/Coral Power and Duke.

574See, e.g., SMUD, Tri-State, Cinergy, TDU Systems, EPSA, Industrial

Consumers, CMUA, PJM/NEPOOL Customers, NY ISO, ISO-NE and DOE.

CalPX believes that monitoring and reporting should be simplified in order to

reduce costs and to rationalize staff and committee work loads. Also, the RTO and power

exchange compliance related staffs should jointly conduct research that is beneficial both

to increase coordination and reduce costs. NY ISO submits that RTOs that are ISOs

should not be required to establish costly and otherwise burdensome autonomous market

monitoring units.

Many commenters address the issue of the appropriate role for the Commission

and the state commissions in market monitoring. Commenters overwhelmingly believe

that the Commission and state commissions have an important role to play, whether it is a

primary role as market monitors, or a secondary role providing oversight of market

monitoring activities by RTOs. 

Some commenters believe that market monitoring is better handled by the existing

statutory and regulatory agency frameworks than by RTOs. 573 They suggest a

continuing, if not mandatory, role for the Commission and other Federal and state

authorities in conjunction with any market monitoring undertaken by RTOs. 574 PP&L
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -447-

575411 U.S. 747 (1973).

Companies argues that, in Gulf States Utilities Co. v. FPC, 

575 the Supreme Court made it

clear that the Commission is charged with serving as the first line of defense to protect

and preserve competition in wholesale power markets.

TDU Systems and Sithe contend that regulatory commissions cannot abdicate to

RTOs the responsibility to ensure that wholesale electric markets are free of market

power. Many commenters see RTOs serving to forward any claims of market abuse and

market power to the various federal and local regulatory agencies consistent with their

respective jurisdictions. PJM and LG&E see the Commission reviewing remedies and

approving penalties and sanctions. Desert STAR and CRC see the Commission acting as

a backstop to an RTO's ADR process or mitigation plan. EEI suggests that RTOs

regularly inform the Commission about monitoring results, which will enable it to

respond quickly to problems not resolved by the RTO. SoCal Cities suggest that RTOs

share responsibility to remedy structural defects in the market or impose general

sanctions for market power abuse with appropriate state and federal agencies, but not

duplicate their responsibilities such as implementation of the FPA. CalPX believes that

there is a decreasing role for regulatory oversight as a result of a progression toward

greater RTO self-regulation.

Florida Power Corp. and Nevada Commission suggest close coordination of RTO

market monitoring with state regulators. Nevada Commission also suggests that RTOs
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -448-

collaborate their monitoring efforts with neighboring RTOs, as well as audit the records

of those parties who violate the RTO's rules. Project Groups recommends adding an

eighth minimum function under which RTOs provide data support for states' policies,

monitoring the competitive impacts of emissions regulations, verifying compliance with

state generation portfolio standards.

NARUC claims that the states need to be heavily involved in RTO market

monitoring and that the Commission should work with the states to make utility codes of

conduct more effective. In its view, such collaboration is the most effective means of

monitoring market power in generation, since the RTO would have information for the

region on transmission planning, generation expansion and transmission constraints, and

state commissions would have utility specific data and information on local operations. 

NARUC argues that such collaboration is critical because state commissions are

responsible for both evaluating local markets to assure competitiveness and for licensing

electric supplies, and abusers of market power can inhibit competition and distort the

prices of locally regulated services. NASUCA similarly claims that market participants,

state and federal regulatory agencies, and state consumer advocates periodically review

the indices and screens to be used for RTO market monitoring. The RTO should

periodically issue confidential reports to federal and state regulatory authorities and state

consumer advocate offices, that describe the state of the markets and the results of

matters under investigation. 
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -449-

576See, e.g., Florida Commission, New York Commission and Michigan

Commission.

577See, e.g., Florida Power Corp., CMUA and DOE.

A number of state commissions suggest a continuing oversight role over RTO

monitoring by the Commission and the states. 576 Oregon Commission recommends that

the Commission establish its own regulatory advisory bodies to monitor ancillary services

markets. For a for-profit RTO, it recommends that a regional oversight committee

perform this function with the Commission reviewing any oversight committee reports. 

Commenters also address a number of issues related to the ability of RTOs to

perform self-assessments. A number of commenters believe that RTOs are capable of

objective analysis. NY ISO contends that an ISO will have no incentive to distort the

results of its analysis. Cinergy recommends that RTOs be limited to monitoring the

behavior of the markets they administer because of the ready access to relevant

information. Los Angeles comments that, if the RTO is not primarily responsible for

providing ancillary services, it should not be burdened with surveying that market.

Other commenters oppose RTOs monitoring the markets that they operate because

of conflict of interest concerns. 577 EEI argues that independence from market

participants does not ensure that the RTO will be able to monitor its own performance

objectively, e.g., a non-profit RTO may not have sufficient incentives to minimize the

costs under its control. Oregon Commission comments that RTOs cannot be entrusted to
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -450-

monitor ancillary services markets, where they will be providing services and have

incentives to protect market share. Industrial Consumers contends that market

participants must perform monitoring and, accordingly, an RTO's operations should be

fully transparent. SNWA and PG&E claim that the RTO should establish an independent

body to monitor and evaluate its performance.

Some commenters, such as Salomon Smith Barney and Michigan Commission,

oppose the RTO monitoring markets where the RTO takes a market position because the

RTO plays the dual role of seller of services and policeman. Alliant contends that an

RTO will be competing with generation providers in congestion management and have an

incentive to build transmission facilities. Similarly, CP&L contends that a for-profit RTO

may compete with others in providing ancillary services, and therefore any proposal by

the RTO monitor for remedial action raises serious conflict of interest concerns. 

Industrial Consumers suggests that, even in markets where the RTO is the supplier of last

resort, the RTO should not have quasi-regulatory powers.

Commenters also address the issue of whether RTOs should be required to provide

periodic assessments of markets they do not participate in or operate, thereby assessing

the effect of existing structural conditions on the competitiveness of their region's

electricity markets. Some commenters oppose this proposal. Tri-State opposes an RTO

monitoring of power markets because it would not only violate the Commission's goal of

separation between transmission and power sales, it would also add a level of complexity
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -451-

and cost to the operation of the RTO. Justice Department believes that the RTO cannot

reasonably be expected to monitor activities with which it has no involvement. Justice

Department therefore recommends that the Commission consider requiring each separate

electric power trading institution to monitor any market that it operates.

On the other hand, a number of commenters favor extending RTO monitoring

responsibility to markets they do not operate. PJM/NEPOOL Customers argues that the

independence of the RTO would enable market participants and the Commission to have

confidence in the RTO's assessments. ISO-NE favors RTOs monitoring power markets. 

NASUCA recommends that RTOs monitor bulk power markets, capacity markets,

transmission rights markets, ancillary services markets and any other potentially

competitive markets. FTC suggests that, where an RTO is smaller than one of the major

interconnects, the Commission may wish to encourage all the RTOs within each of the

interconnects to coordinate their efforts to examine the effects of market rules or

variations between RTOs in market rules on the volume and price of inter-RTO

transactions. Cal ISO also sees collaborative market monitoring and assessment by

neighboring RTOs and at the national level.

Florida Power Corp. recommends that an RTO that is an ISO be required to make

regular assessments as to whether it has sufficient operational authority to ensure its

ongoing ability to provide reliable, open access transmission service on a comparable

basis to all customers—nonetheless, the RTO should not be self-regulating. 
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -452-

For those regions where the real-time balancing function is performed by an ISO,

Advisory Committee believes that the ISO should monitor market power in generation

markets. SoCal Edison claims that, where markets are not yet workably competitive, the

RTO, with Commission approval, should ensure that prices are just and reasonable

through appropriate temporary mechanisms such as price caps. PG&E counters that, in

no case, should RTOs be permitted to use control of a power exchange for unilaterally

capping prices set by the market. 

Many commenters address the issue of how the RTO should report, if at all, its

monitoring activities. The Commission did not propose to establish detailed standards on

the format and content of monitoring reports, noting that such matters are best left to the

RTO. We asked commenters to address whether reporting should be limited to when a

specific problem is encountered, or whether periodic reporting on the state of competition

and transmission access would be more appropriate.

Commenters express mixed views on reporting requirements. CRC supports the

concept of RTOs reporting to the Commission regarding RTO design flaws, and New

York Commission suggests that RTOs report on market power abuse as well. Florida

Power Corp. submits that, if market monitoring is necessary, it should be performed by

the RTO reporting and filing appropriate information with state and Federal regulators. 

Project Groups wants the provision of data to support state programs pertaining to the

monitoring of the competitive impacts of emissions regulations. Project Groups argue
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -453-

that RTOs would be uniquely positioned to support data collection for verification of

green marketing claims and compliance with information disclosure requirements and

portfolio standards. EEI opposes a Commission mandate for RTOs to track generation

source and emissions data. EEI recommends the RTO voluntarily undertake this task to

meet specific state compliance requirements provided appropriate safeguards protect

competitively sensitive information. EEI expresses concern regarding the possibility that

the RTO would have authority to collect and disclose information from a generation

source where the state has not imposed such a requirement. 

Several commenters favor issuance of monitoring reports at regular intervals. 

Project Groups believes that RTO monitoring units should issue public reports on their

activities and findings, including annual reports on the general state of the market. 

Metropolitan supports reporting at regular intervals from an external monitoring source;

however, during initial startup, more frequent reporting is advisable to assist participants'

understanding of the market operation. East Texas Cooperatives believes that RTOs

should prepare periodic reports to the Commission with the precise form left to the

discretion of the RTO.

California Board contends that regular reports on market performance should issue

at least on a yearly basis, and include all relevant data that can be made publicly

available. NASUCA contends that, to further create trust in the RTOs' ability to

effectively and objectively monitor the market, RTOs should periodically issue reports
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -454-

578See, e.g., Entergy, Duke, PG&E, PSE&G, PJM/NEPOOL Customers and

Williams.

describing the state of the markets that it is monitoring, items under investigation by the

RTO, and any results from completed investigations. In its view, market participants,

state and federal regulatory agencies and state consumer advocates should participate in

the development and periodic review of the indices and screens the RTO will use to

monitor the operation of the markets. Reports should be provided to state and federal

regulatory authorities as well as state consumer advocate offices, on a confidential basis,

to enable them to independently assess whether additional investigation is merited. Cal

ISO submits that the Commission should specify regular reporting requirements for the

RTO's monitoring unit. PJM believes that RTOs should periodically report results of

monitoring activities to the Commission and state agencies.

Components of a Market Monitoring Plan

Commenters address various issues regarding particular elements of a market

monitoring plan. Many commenters address the issue of whether RTOs should be

allowed to impose penalties and sanctions. Most commenters would limit the RTO's

ability to impose penalties or sanctions. Many of them argue that such authority should

remain the province of the regulatory and antitrust agencies. 578 Justice Department

claims that RTOs lack experience either in detecting exercises of market power or in

making recommendations on correcting market power problems. SPRA questions
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -455-

whether the imposition of sanctions by the RTO may conflict with the Supremacy Clause

of the Constitution and whether affected public power bodies could only consent to such

sanctions if they do not create indefinite or uncertain liabilities. PP&L argues that,

because it will be judge and jury, the RTO must demonstrate competitive harm before

taking any market action. Some commenters, such as CP&L, note that a for-profit RTO

may not be objective in imposing sanctions because it competes with other market

participants. Other commenters, such as Salomon Smith Barney, claim that RTOs should

be limited to extracting ordinary commercial penalties when market participants fail to

follow the market's rules. EPSA claims that RTOs should be empowered to intervene in a

market within the strict confines of the Commission's oversight only when a situation has

the potential to become catastrophic. Mass Companies opposes allowing a private RTO

or one that is operated by a non-stakeholder board to enforce violations of market

standards and impose sanctions and penalties.

Canada DNR claims that it will be problematic for Canadian entities subject to the

jurisdiction of Canadian provincial and Federal energy regulators also to be subject to an

RTO that has its disciplinary authority backstopped by the Commission. In its view, the

issue will not be resolved by simply having the appropriate Canadian regulator serve as

the regulatory backstop to the RTO for each Canadian entity because the Canadian

regulator may take a different position than the Commission. 
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -456-

A few commenters support authority for RTOs to impose penalties and sanctions. 

Among them, CalPX believes that RTO governing boards and power exchange market

monitoring committees must be able to take appropriate action either by referral to

regulatory agencies or directly through applicable sanctioning authority. It views this as

critical for self-policing and providing prompt remedies before problems detrimentally

affect market results. ISO-NE believes that an RTO should have the ability to impose

penalties and sanctions, but suggests that the RTO not act as an antitrust agency, in order

to increase the acceptability of sanctions among participants.

The Commission specifically sought comment on whether penalties should be

limited to violations of RTO rules and procedures, or whether the RTO should be allowed

to impose penalties for the exercise of market power. More commenters oppose than

support RTOs imposing sanctions and penalties for market power abuse. Among them,

Allegheny and Metropolitan claim that this is a proper function of regulatory or antitrust

authorities. Central Maine argues that the Commission cannot grant RTOs the authority

to impose corrective actions without affording the affected public utilities with procedural

due process. EEI believes that the RTO tariff may include RTO authority to impose fines

or sanctions to ensure compliance with RTO rules in accordance with the costs imposed

by their actions. Pointing to similar positions taken by Justice Department and FTC, EEI

contends, however, that the RTO should not attempt to define or prosecute alleged

exercise of market power because it is not a regulatory body or an antitrust agency
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -457-

authorized to take such actions. It also suggests that limited additional authority might be

granted during the transition to restructured markets to permit the RTO to deal effectively

and timely with identified market design flaws, software errors, or other unanticipated

situations that could be costly if no action is taken. 

Cinergy also argues that the RTO should not be allowed to take corrective action

against individual market participants. It believe that claims of market abuse and the

exercise of market power should be forwarded to the Commission to address consistent

with its jurisdiction. Similarly, MidAmerican recommends that RTO penalties be limited

to (1) willful violations of material RTO directives related to the operation of regional

transmission facilities, Commission approved RTO standards for transmission facility

operations, and material provisions of RTO agreements that conflict with the RTO

transmission tariff, and (2) violations of RTO transmission tariff provisions relating to

operating reserves and energy imbalances. NASUCA recommends that compliance with

RTO rules be enforced with penalties and sanctions imposed through a collaborative

process involving all market participants, regulatory agencies and consumer advocates. 

However, the Final Rule should specify that any actions taken by the RTO cannot

substitute for penalties or other remedies which may stem from independent

investigations by governmental authorities. Similarly, ISO-NE and SNWA generally

would impose sanctions based on a participant's engaging in patterns of conduct defined

in the RTO's rules or its tariff.
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -458-

NYPP, DOE, and LG&E generally concur that RTO sanctions and penalties

should only be levied for violations of RTO rules and procedures, whereas penalties and

sanctions for market power abuses are matters for the regulatory and antitrust agencies,

legislators, or the courts. Florida Power Corp. argues that, since an RTO does not have

authority to grant or terminate market-based rate authorizations premised respectively on

the absence or presence of market power, the RTO should therefore have no role in

passing judgement or imposing penalties for the exercise of market power. 

On the other hand, some commenters, such as East Texas Cooperatives, are more

comfortable with RTO imposition of penalties and sanctions for market power abuse. 

PJM recommends that RTOs be able to take corrective action to ameliorate market abuses

or flaws and to seek Commission approval to add penalties and sanctions to its market

monitoring plan. NECPUC recommends that market monitoring be expanded to include

formalized mitigation and sanction rules in connection with market design,

implementation flaws and market power. NY ISO claims that RTOs should mitigate

evident market power problems, on a prospective basis, by applying pre-approved

remedies. CRC submits that RTOs investigate whether market power abuse results from

a design flaw and report the results to the Commission for approval of its mitigation plan. 

WPSC sees RTOs being effective because they will have access to real-time data on

system conditions and should be given authority to take appropriate corrective action

immediately to respond to market abuses. 
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -459-

Some commenters also want sanctions against market participants for reliability

rule violations. PSNM claims that RTOs should defer to existing mechanisms where they

exist (such as the WSSC's Reliability Management System RMS, and NERC Reliability

Standards and Measures) for sanctions against market participants for poor performance,

rather than create new monitoring and sanction systems for RTOs. Similarly, Desert

STAR submits that any RTO should be allowed to pass the reliability performance

standards sanctions on to participants who do not comply. SMUD concurs that an

important aspect of enforcing reliability standards is ensuring that the RTO has sufficient

authority to police and investigate the markets they administer, and assess fines and other

appropriate penalties, or resolve disputes amongst market participants as to any alleged

market abuse.

A few commenters also address the Commission's questions about how much

discretion the RTO should have in setting penalties (e.g., should the RTO's penalty

authority be limited to collecting liquidated damages). Nevada Commission submits that

RTOs should be allowed to impose specific penalties and sanctions for non-compliance

with RTO rules based on liquidated damages and not punitive damages. Cal ISO and

Metropolitan believe that penalties should be limited to liquidated damages. Cal ISO

argues that for cases of repeated or intentional violations or serious abuses of market

power, the RTO should seek relief, including imposition of punitive damages, from the

Commission or other appropriate agencies such as the Justice Department. Metropolitan
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -460-

argues that liquidated damages sought by an RTO should be approved by the

Commission. And Duke opposes the RTO assuming the role of market monitor and

enforcer; therefore, it recommends that terms and conditions for any penalties the RTO

might impose should be agreed upon by contract during the RTO development process.

On the other hand, WPSC claims that the RTO should have the discretion to

determine the amounts of adequate sanctions and penalties to discourage anti-competitive

conduct. Whether the RTO has acted properly can always be reviewed after the fact

through a dispute resolution procedure either through the Commission or the Justice

Department. NASUCA contends that sanctions and other penalties should be large

enough to be an effective deterrent. It suggests that a for-profit RTO may have incentives

to impose unjustified penalties and should be required to allocate all revenue derived

from sanctions and penalties in a way that benefits customers. SMUD offers that, since

liquidated damages are a mere proxy designed to make a victim whole for a transgression,

they do not really serve as a deterrent to market abusive conduct.

Several commenters address whether the SEC model of regulating stock

exchanges, i.e., requiring extensive and sophisticated market monitoring of stock

exchanges, should applicable to RTO market monitoring. Some commenters, such as EEI

and PP&L, do not believe the model is applicable. EEI claims that monitoring scheme in

the securities industry is an exception because in most industries the market participants

bring competitive problems to the attention of antitrust authorities. Sithe also opposes
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -461-

any emulation of the NASD or NYMEX model of self-regulation at this time because of

the limited amount of market experience to date.

PJM/NEPOOL Customers and Cal ISO, however, contend that the RTO

monitoring function should be similar to that of a stock exchange because the RTO is

designed to ensure that the exchange of electricity can occur readily and easily in a

competitive marketplace. 

Commission Conclusion

In the NOPR, the Commission proposed that RTOs perform a market monitoring

function. Many commenters raise a number of issues regarding market monitoring. The

issues largely encompass the following concerns: the need for and scope of a market

monitoring function; who should perform this function and how it should be performed;

and what are the specific components or procedures of a market monitoring plan. 

The Commission recognizes that the market monitoring concept is new and not yet

well-refined, either at the Commission or within existing ISOs. We also acknowledge the

apprehensions of some parties that market monitoring by an RTO could intrude into

markets and affect their behaviors. The Commission, however, is engaged in finding

ways to understand market operations in real-time, so that it can identify and react to any

problems that are preventing the most efficient operations. It also has a responsibility to
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -462-

579See Gulf States Utilities v. FPC, 411 U.S. 747, 758-59 (1973).

protect against anticompetitive effects in electricity markets. 579 If we are to satisfy this

goal, we must systematically assess whether our policies and decisions are consistent

with this responsibility. Market monitoring is an important tool for ensuring that markets

within the region covered by an RTO do not result in wholesale transactions or operations

that are unduly discriminatory or preferential or provide opportunity for the exercise of

market power. In addition, market monitoring will provide information regarding

opportunities for efficiency improvements. 

However, in light of the different forms of RTOs that could be developed by

market participants and the varying types of markets an RTO may be operating within its

region, different market monitoring plans are likely to be appropriate for different RTOs. 

Consequently, after careful consideration of the comments, the Commission will require

that RTO proposals contain a market monitoring plan that identifies what the RTO

participants believe are the appropriate monitoring activities the RTO, or an independent

monitor, if appropriate, will perform. We believe that such approach will provide those

proposing an RTO sufficient flexibility to design a monitoring plan that fits the corporate

form of the RTO as well as the types of markets the RTO will operate or administer. We

have revised the regulatory text for the RTO market monitoring function to reflect our

decision to allow this flexible approach.
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -463-

Although we decline at this time to prescribe a particular market monitoring plan

or the specific elements of such a plan, the RTO must propose a monitoring plan that

contains certain standards. The monitoring plan must be designed to ensure that there is

objective information about the markets that the RTO operates or administers and a

vehicle to propose appropriate action regarding any opportunities for efficiency

improvement, market design flaws, or market power identified by that information. The

monitoring plan also must evaluate the behavior of market participants, including

transmission owners, if any, in the region to determine whether their behavior adversely

affects the ability of the RTO to provide reliable, efficient and nondiscriminatory

transmission service. Because not all market operations in a region may be operated or

administered by the RTO (e.g., there may be markets operated by unaffiliated power

exchanges), the monitoring plan must periodically assess whether behavior in other

markets in the RTO's region affect RTO operations and, conversely, how RTO operations

affect the efficiency of markets operated by others. Reports on opportunities for

efficiency improvement, market design flaws and market power abuses in the markets the

RTO operates and administers also must be filed with the Commission and affected

regulatory authorities.

In developing its market monitoring plan, the RTO should identify the markets that

will be monitored, i.e., transmission, ancillary services or any other market it may

develop (e.g., congestion management). With regard to those markets, the monitoring
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -464-

plan should examine the structure of the market, compliance with market rules, behavior

of individual market participants and the market as a whole, and market power and

market power abuses. The monitoring plan should also address how information will be

used and reported. The monitoring plan should indicate whether the RTO will only

identify problems and/or abuses or whether it also will propose solutions to such

problems. We note that sanctions and penalties may be appropriate for certain actions

such as noncompliance with RTO rules. However, the monitoring plan should clearly

identify any proposed sanctions or penalties and the specific conduct to which they would

be applied, provide the rationale to support any sanctions, penalties or remedies (financial

or otherwise) and explain how they would be implemented. With regard to the reporting

of market monitoring information, the monitoring plan should indicate the types and

frequency of reports that will be made and to whom the reports will be sent. Under the

FPA, the Commission has the primary responsibility to ensure that regional wholesale

electricity markets served by RTOs operate without market power. An appropriate

market monitoring plan must provide an objective basis to observe markets and, if

appropriate, provide reports and/or market analyses. Market monitoring also will be a

useful tool to provide information that can be used to assess market performance. This

information will be beneficial to many parties in government as well as to power market

participants. This includes state commissions that protect the interests of retail

consumers, especially where they are overseeing the development of a competitive
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -465-

electric retail market. We note, however, that the market monitoring function for the

RTO does not limit the ability of each state within the RTO's region or other authorities

to decide the nature and extent of its own market monitoring activities. 

We are not requiring a plan that necessarily involves the collection of data the

RTO would not collect in its ordinary course of business. We believe that the

information collected through the RTO market monitoring plan will reflect data that the

RTO will collect or have access to in the normal course of business (e.g., bid data,

operational information). In light of our requirements that the RTO have operational

control over the transmission facilities transferred to it and the RTO be the security

coordinator for its region, the RTO will be in the best position to perform (or provide

information to another entity, if appropriate, for it to perform) objective monitoring

functions for the markets that the RTO operates or administers in the region. 

In response to commenters' arguments that RTO market monitoring results in an

impermissible shift of Commission authority to other entities, we emphasize that

performance of market monitoring by RTOs is not intended to supplant Commission

authority. Rather it will provide the Commission with an additional means of detecting 

market power abuses, market design flaws and opportunities for improvements in market

efficiency. Further, because market monitoring plans will be required to be filed with

and approved by the Commission as part of an RTO proposal, we will retain the ability to

determine what, how and by whom activities will be performed in the first instance.
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -466-

Because we believe market monitoring is essential, we decline to set any sunset

date for monitoring at this time. However, as bulk power markets evolve and become

more competitive, we may revisit the need for the type of monitoring the Rule requires.

7. Planning and Expansion (Function 7)

In the NOPR, the Commission proposed that the RTO planning and expansion

process must satisfy certain standards. Specifically, RTOs would be required to: (1)

encourage market-motivated operating and investment actions for preventing and

relieving congestion; and (2) accommodate efforts by state regulatory commission to

create multi-state agreements to review and approve new transmission facilities,

coordinated with programs of existing Regional Transmission Groups (RTGs) where

necessary. We suggested that RTOs be designed to promote efficient use, which requires

efficient price signals such as congestion pricing, and efficient expansion of their regional

grid, which requires control over planning and expansion. We specifically proposed that

the RTO have ultimate responsibility for both transmission planning and expansion

within its region. If the RTO is unable to satisfy the planning and expansion requirement

when it commences operation, we proposed that the RTO must file a plan with specified

milestones that will ensure that it meets this requirement no later than three years after
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -467-

580FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 32,541 at 33,751-53.

581See, e.g., United Illuminating, Wyoming Commission, Industrial Consumers,

Champion, NSP, PG&E, Williams, LG&E, FTC and APX. 

initial operation. In addition, the Commission sought comment on whether three years is

an appropriate amount of time for implementation of this function. 580

Comments

Encourage Market-Motivated Operating and Investment Actions for

Preventing and Relieving Congestion

Many commenters support the Commission's proposal to require that an RTO must

ensure the development and operation of market mechanisms to plan and refinance

transmission system expansion. As part of this an RTO should provide all transmission

customers with efficient price signals that show the consequences for their transmission

use decisions. 581

Some commenters, such as JEA and Williams believe that this role is best

performed by for-profit entities because system expansion decisions must be driven by

economic considerations. Entergy also contends that a transco will not create any bias in

the method of grid expansion.

Los Angeles agrees that an RTO should rely upon market signals and market

solutions in assessing all feasible options (e.g., construction of new generation, redispatch

of existing generation, grid expansion) to assure the least-cost option is pursued. 

NASUCA also argues that the Commission should mandate that RTOs use least-cost
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -468-

planning on a region-wide basis for transmission system expansions and upgrades. It

notes that the larger the region over which least-cost planning is conducted, the more

economically efficient the outcome is likely to be. If market solutions do not develop or

are not timely, Los Angeles believes that the RTO must have the power to resolve the

transmission problem. LG&E proposes that RTOs be permitted to use competitive

bidding as a means to meet new transmission investment needs.

EPA believes that RTOs should adopt a resource planning process with sufficient

flexibility to consider non-traditional resources and to assign appropriate values to their

unique benefits. EPA further believes that RTOs should be encouraged to take into

account environmental costs and benefits that are not reflected in resource prices. 

Puget suggest that the Commission should recognize that the concept of RTOs

may contain some elements that do not enhance the reliable operation of the transmission

grid. Puget requests that the Commission should address more fully how it will mitigate

the effects of the severance of generation and transmission planning and operation and

how it plans to ensure maximum reliability at the lowest integrated costs.

NASUCA recommends that the Commission require RTOs to develop a baseline

regional transmission expansion plan that would identify the regional system's ability to

meet essential NERC reliability criteria and isolate potential constraint areas of the

existing system where upgrades may be necessary or additional generation desirable. 

Such a baseline plan could provide a valuable tool to market participants in signaling the
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -469-

582See, e.g., EME and Seattle.

best locations for new generation projects. Entergy proposes the use of a regional

transmission plan that includes a regional transmission planning summit process

involving all stakeholders. 

TAPS, however, questions whether market-based mechanisms to expand the

transmission grid will emerge readily from an efficient short-term transmission pricing

regime that accounts properly for the costs of congestion. TAPS asserts that, while

efficient congestion pricing is an important component of a well-designed transmission

regime, it is not the answer to the concerns that have been raised regarding the lack of

economic and regulatory incentives to expand the transmission grid.

Many commenters agree that RTOs should be responsible for conducting the

studies necessary to assess the need for new transmission system enhancement. 582

However, some commenters argue that the role of the RTO should be to facilitate market

investment by others in new transmission and generation, not to lead the market by

making its own plans for new facilities. For example, Seattle suggests that the RTO

should generate information on the locations, frequencies and costs of congested paths to

guide capital investment. It believes that the RTO need not make capital investments

directly; rather it should seek market mechanisms, such as requesting bids for needed

capacity, to encourage investments. EME states that performance of this role requires
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -470-

583See, e.g., PNGC, Wisconsin Commission, EAL, Entergy, PJM, Minnesota

Power and Montana-Dakota. 

accurate accounting for the impact of congestion and new generation, and proper

allocation of costs to those that require such costs to be incurred. 

To ensure that transmission expansion decisions are not biased, ComEd proposes

that RTO functions be performed by two linked organizations that together make up a

"Binary RTO." ComEd envisions that the Binary RTO would consist of for-profit

independent transmission companies (ITCs), each operating a large aggregation of

existing transmission systems, under the oversight of an independent, not-for-profit

Regional Transmission Board (RTB). The ITCs will identify transmission additions,

upgrade opportunities, and prepare long-range plans which would be reviewed by the

RTB and subsequently integrated in an RTB-wide planning system.

Powerex believes that it is better to eliminate congestion at its source through

facilities upgrades, if economically and environmentally feasible, than to attempt to

manage congestion on a long-term basis through congestion pricing schemes.

Many commenters support the concept that RTOs must be responsible for

transmission planning and that single-system planning should be the objective of the RTO

planning process. 583 Commenters differ, however, on the extent of the RTO's role in the

planning process. Some commenters, such as Powerex, argue that the RTO must have

control over transmission service, planning, system impact studies and facilities studies,
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -471-

and the authority to determine the need for, and require the implementation of,

transmission upgrades by member utilities. Other commenters, such as LIPA and H.Q.

Energy Services, propose that, in the absence of transmission expansion proposals from

current or proposed market participants, the RTO should have the responsibility for

assessing whether transmission improvements are needed and, if a need is found, the

RTO should have the authority to order such expansion. 

Some commenters such as NY ISO, on the other hand, express concern that

exclusive authority by the RTO over transmission planning is overly restrictive. NY ISO

claims that entities which are responsible for coordinating transmission expansion, but

which lack authority to make enforceable planning decisions, can nevertheless achieve

the Commission's primary transmission expansion-related goal, i.e., ensuring that

investments in new transmission facilities are coordinated to ensure a least-cost outcome

that maintains or improves existing reliability levels.

H.Q. Energy Services objects to NY ISO's arguments as being merely concerned

with preserving its so-called "two-tier" governance system which provides NY ISO

transmission owners with significant authority, or veto power, over interconnections with

generating facilities and over decisions related to transmission system planning and

expansion. H.Q. Energy Services does not believe that the two-tier approach is

appropriate unless the RTO has ultimate decision-making authority.
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -472-

584See, e.g., San Francisco, SoCal Cities and CMUA.

585See, e.g., NYPP, Industrial Customers, Mass Companies and Nevada

Commission.

Many commenters agree with the proposal that an RTO must be ultimately

responsible for all transmission expansions and upgrades. 584 These commenters claim

that transmission operations must be conducted on an independent and fair basis and must

be undertaken by an impartial entity if transmission services are to be offered on a truly

non-discriminatory basis. They argue that vesting the RTO with the ultimate

responsibility for expanding transmission systems eliminates the conflict that is inherent

in vesting these responsibilities with an entity that also has commercial interests that are

competing with users of the system.

Although SMUD supports having the RTO be responsible for transmission

planning and expansion, it cautions that, in such a paradigm, people that have no

responsibility to the ratepayers will be deciding planning and expansion issues. 

Therefore, SMUD argues that the Commission needs to scrutinize the recovery of the

costs of such expansion to ensure that such expansion decisions and costs are prudent,

just and reasonable.

Several commenters agree that the RTOs can and should play a significant role in

the transmission planning and expansion process. 585 Some of these commenters, such as

NYPP and Mass Companies, however, do not believe that the Commission should require
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -473-

that RTOs have authority to order a transmission owner to modify or expand its

transmission system. Nevada Commission believes that transmission owners should be

allowed to assist an RTO in the development of grid planning criteria and could take the

lead in such grid planning with RTOs performing more of an overview role. Professor

Joskow states that the transmission owners, operating through a sound RTO/ISO

transmission planning process should be expected to be the primary, but not necessarily

the exclusive, source of network enhancement initiatives. WEPCO argues that

transmission owners should be integrated into the RTO regional transmission plans where

they can be improved and expanded to meet regional needs most efficiently. Turlock

contends that the RTO's authority over the transmission system it operates must be

limited to that system. Turlock argues that the RTO should not have the ability to force

expansion of lower voltage or tangentially related facilities which are beyond the area of

its responsibility, even if those other facilities might have a small but theoretically

possible impact on the RTO's facilities.

CP&L supports a coordinated planning approach which would be similar to the

planning approaches identified in the Midwest ISO and the Alliance RTO filings, where

the RTO would have responsibility for review of the transmission plan, but the individual

transmission-owning entities would provide the necessary input to facilitate the

development of the comprehensive RTO transmission plan. East Kentucky argues,
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -474-

however, that an individual transmission owner should be able either to require or to veto

the building of a particular RTO facility. 

MidAmerican disagrees with the proposal that the RTO have the ultimate

responsibility for both transmission planning and expansion in the region. MidAmerican

claims that existing regional transmission groups (RTGs) have clear and prominent roles

in transmission expansion decisions in which planning for transmission improvements are

coordinated through collaborative processes that already involve many interested

stakeholders in the widest fashion possible. MidAmerican states that throughout the

MAPP region there is broad support for continuing transmission planning and expansion

decisionmaking as a collaborative function and that the existing collaborative processes

adequately accommodate RTO participation. 

Central Maine believes that RTOs/ISOs can and should play a significant role in

the transmission planning and expansion process, but disagrees with the Commission's

proposal to give ISOs ultimate responsibility for transmission planning and expansion.

Central Maine does not object to ISOs having oversight responsibility in these area, but

Central Maine believes that the planning and engineering functions should be a shared

responsibility between utilities and RTO, i.e., the Commission should consider utility

planners as a satellite to the ISO/RTO similar to satellite function served by utility control

centers in monitoring, switching and dispatching. Central Maine states that the
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -475-

586See, e.g., Project Groups, LIPA and SRP.

Commission should grant individual transmission owning utilities an equal voice in

determining the technical aspects of transmission planning and expansion.

Although Big Rivers believes that, as proposed in the NOPR, the RTO should be

the default provider of transmission planning and expansion, it agrees with NRECA that

incumbent transmission owners should have the first opportunity to build required

transmission system expansion with RTO ability to facilitate needed construction by

others. 

Some commenters suggest specific tasks and functions that the RTO should

perform or have the ability to require as part of the transmission planning and expansion

function. 586 For example, SRP proposes that at a minimum, each RTO should have the

authority to: (1) direct transmission owners to study and evaluate system performance

and to develop plans to solve known reliability or adequacy problems; (2) revise or

combine elements of transmission owners' plans to achieve the most efficient and reliable

transmission expansion plan; (3) approve or reject any component of the RTO

transmission plan developed by a transmission owner; and (4) approve facility additions

by third parties.
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -476-

587See, e.g., Illinois Commission, DOE and New Smyrna Beach.

Accommodate Efforts by State Regulatory Commission to Create MultiState Agreements to Review and Approve New Transmission Facilities

Many comments concur that multi-state agreements are to be encouraged and that

the RTO should be designed to work within that structure. 587 Commenters, including

NSP and Nevada Commission, encourage the Commission to provide an active role for

RTOs to participate with state and local government in the siting and licensing of new

facilities. PJM states that a cooperative relationship between RTOs and the states is

essential to effective transmission expansion planning. In PJM's view, states are more

likely to trust the planning decisions of RTOs that have no commercial interest in

transmission and generation expansion than decisions made by transmission-owning

entities, which have commercial interests.

Cinergy recommends that the final rule include a Commission commitment to

proceed aggressively to establish a forum to encourage coordination of RTO planning and

expansion among states through multi-state certification agreements and multi-state

regional planning boards. Cinergy notes, however, that the creation of a forum or agency

to review grid planning and expansion that would consider the public interest beyond the

constraints of state boundaries may require federal legislation. If so, the Commission

should be aggressive in its dialogue with Congress to obtain the requisite legislative

relief.
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -477-

The Kentucky Commission suggests creating a voluntary "Joint Board on Regional

Transmission Siting" to develop and review standards for transmission expansion. The

Joint Board would include participation from the Commission, state commissions, RTOs,

and other interested parties. The Joint Board would also convene ad hoc committees to

review specific transmission expansion proposals. Pennsylvania Commission also prefers

a joint Federal-state approach towards regulating RTO site approvals, expansion,

innovation and customer service. It notes that a joint Federal-state approach has been

used with success in other areas, such as the Susquehanna River Basin Commission, the

Delaware River Basin Commission and the Joint Pipeline Office which regulates the

Trans-Alaska Pipeline System.

Illinois Commission recommends that accommodation of multi-state efforts be

expanded to include the possibility of multi-state regional regulatory oversight

organizations. Such organizations could be instrumental in coordinating regional

solutions to regulatory and policy issues.

Otter Tail expresses concern that multi-state agreements may not actually add to

the efficient use and expansion of the interstate transmission system due to a danger that

these types of agreements could be mired in state-versus-state political conflict and

become unworkable, to the detriment of transmission owners, generators, and ultimately

customers. Industrial Consumers also does not believe that requiring an accommodation

with "multi-state agreements" is necessarily productive. It states that nothing now
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -478-

588See, e.g., Wisconsin Commission, Industrial Customers and SRP.

prevents such coordination among states, yet there is no obvious evidence that this will

work. Industrial Customers believes that states will always reserve the right to veto a

project that may be partially situated within their jurisdiction, regardless of the benefits

elsewhere. 

East Texas Cooperatives believes that retention of state public utility commission

authority over siting (and other necessary approvals) is necessary to control the risk of

overbuilding because RTOs will have no real incentive to limit facility construction.

Commenters generally express support for the proposal that the RTO build on

existing RTG processes. 588 For example, Industrial Consumers urges that the

Commission require existing RTGs to merge their functions with the RTOs because

RTGs should not be allowed to develop an institutional culture that diverges from the

goals and objectives of RTOs.

New Smyrna Beach and Oneok claim that market participants will undoubtedly

benefit from a multi-state siting process for transmission because it may make siting of

new generation easier if there is more certainty that related transmission siting decisions

will be made on a timely basis with one-stop shopping. 

Several commenters address the role of the Commission in the RTO planning and

expansion process. Detroit Edison and Wolverine Cooperative support the establishment

of the Commission as the primary channel of certification for transmission siting,
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -479-

construction, and expansion. Detroit Edison states that regional reliability organizations

and the RTOs in each reliability region should be permitted to determine necessary

changes and additions in transmission with input from transmission owners, control area

operators, and other interested parties. It is vital, it states, that a single administrative

agency resolve issues related to the siting of transmission facilities on a regional basis and

have the authority to approve transmission expansion plans on a timely basis. Detroit

Edison believes that the Commission should fill the important role of sole regulator over

transmission siting and construction, just as it currently does in approving the siting and

construction of natural gas pipelines, and it urges the Commission to work to gain such

authority.

Pennsylvania Commission recommends that, if an RTO determines that

transmission expansion is necessary, it should file with the Commission to demonstrate

that need. Once the Commission determines a need exists within the RTO, the RTO

should then file with the appropriate states for a determination of the siting issues. 

Pennsylvania Commission believes that vesting authority for determining the need for

transmission expansion with the Commission solves several problems that are certain to

arise in state forums. Federal determination of the need for transmission expansion

obviates the burden of filing with multiple jurisdictions and possibly receiving conflicting

determinations.
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -480-

Otter Tail states that Commission should seriously consider whether the public

interest would be better served through adoption of a transmission siting policy that is

similar to review of interstate natural gas pipelines. 

NY ISO claims that in many cases transmission expansion is delayed or blocked

entirely by environmental and other transmission siting regulations. Nevertheless, NY

ISO supports the NOPR's proposal that RTOs participate in efforts to create multi-state

transmission expansion agreements.

East Kentucky believes that there needs to be some regulatory oversight authority

for facilities that are deemed necessary by an RTO planning staff. East Kentucky

proposes that this regulatory authority be the Commission or a regional regulatory

authority.

Conlon recommends that the Commission have the necessary authority to enforce

reasonable siting request, or critically needed future transmission lines could be delayed

causing a reliability risk. Granting the right of eminent domain to transcos or ISOs in

Federal legislation would be another approach. This could be accomplished by the

Commission recommending to Congress that it have the right of eminent domain.

LG&E believes that it is important that state authority over system expansion not

impede necessary improvements that enhance the efficiency of the regional grid that is, or

will be, subject to RTO control. Ultimately there may be a need for a congressional

solution to the current balkanized system for authorizing grid expansion. In its
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -481-

comments, the East Central Area Reliability Council explicitly calls for such legislative

action based on its concern that transmission facility expansion requests will fail as they

become bogged down in multiple state reviews. LG&E shares this concern. Still, until

such time as the statutory framework for transmission expansion is amended, LG&E

believes that RTOs represent an opportunity for coordinating regional transmission

expansion needs among transmission owners and state authorities.

Project Groups maintains that RTOs should be required to coordinate and lead in

the development of comprehensive least cost regional plans for assuring short- and longterm system reliability, and they must coordinate the actions necessary for implementing

timely system upgrades and additions pursuant to those plans. For example, RTOs must

be given the authority to petition state and local regulators for necessary siting

authorizations, including certificates of need or public necessity and environmental

permits, as well as the authority to order construction of facilities sited and permitted

under state regulatory authorities. The Commission should encourage state reliance on

RTO-approved plans as the primary basis for the exercise of eminent domain powers

under state law.

Puget notes that state condemnation powers granted to utilities are usually limited

for the benefit of the citizens of the state in which the utility operates. It is not clear that

a state utility can delegate its state condemnation power to a regional RTO. Therefore,
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -482-

the final rule should expressly address how state condemnation authority can be legally

exercised by a regional RTO.

NASUCA maintains that the RTO regional planning efforts must not displace state

government siting authority. NASUCA states that the final rule should specifically

recognize state statutory authority to regulate siting of transmission facilities. For other

planning and expansion matters, the Commission should require RTOs to establish a

process to ensure that the RTO obtains input from state government agencies with respect

to the regional transmission plan. Nevada Commission states that it is imperative that the

RTO coordinate transmission siting and planning with state agencies. Tri State believes

that states should continue to fulfill their traditional roles in siting transmission facilities. 

However, it notes that it may be necessary for the states to consult with the RTO on

transmission facility certification since the RTO will be charged with overall

responsibility for transmission planning and will be required to work cooperatively with

states and other regional groups.

CP&L supports state and local governments retaining the authority for certification

and siting of new transmission facilities. These government agencies are closer to the

local residents who will be affected and can best evaluate the great number of factors that

must be considered in approving transmission routes.

Several commenters address the issue of eminent domain authority as a component

of the transmission planning and expansion function. East Kentucky believes that the
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -483-

issue of eminent domain needs to be addressed for not only RTOs, but also for the entire

open access transmission network. East Kentucky questions whether an entity, if

required by an RTO or the Commission to construct a transmission facility, has eminent

domain authority that is sufficient to allow the entity to acquire all property rights

necessary to construct the required facility. Consequently, East Kentucky argues that, as

a general proposition, Congress needs to grant federal eminent domain authority to any

entity that is required by the Commission or any form of RTO to build a facility so that

such entity can acquire private property rights under Federal law. Because it believes that

siting of transmission has become the principal impediment to transmission expansion,

EPSA also advocates that the RTO should be delegated sufficient authority to direct

transmission owners or others to excise their eminent domain authority, as necessary, to

implement transmission system expansion plans independent of the source of funds or the

beneficiary of the project. Under current law, this authority must come from the states. 

Thus, EPSA also advocates the passage of Federal legislation that vests the Commission

with primary jurisdiction over major transmission planning and siting decisions, perhaps

subject to a requirement that the Commission consult with a regional siting authority or a

consortium of affected state siting boards. 

Central Maine disagrees and recommends that the Commission should reject

EPSA's comments. Central Maine notes that, if a state government intends that an RTO

have the power of eminent domain, the state legislature will grant it. Central Maine
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -484-

589See, e.g., Tri State, SoCal Edison and PNM.

590See, e.g., NECPUC, Duke and South Carolina Authority.

591See, e.g., Champion, NYC, Turlock, SRP, TDU Systems and Industrial

Customers.

argues that RTOs should not be granted the power to do something indirectly that they

may not do directly. Consequently, it believes that EPSA must pursue its proposal

through the enactment of state legislation.

Whether Three Years Is an Appropriate Amount of Time for

Implementation of This Function

Several commenters support the Commission's proposal to allow up to three years

to implement the planning and expansion function. 589 Some commenters, however,

believe that three years is too short. 590 South Carolina Authority suggests a five-year

period. Florida Commission believes that it is premature to set any time limit for

implementation of the planning and expansion function.

On the other hand, several commenters believe that three years is too long a

period. 591 Most of these commenters believe that the planning and expansion is such an

important function that its implementation should not be delayed at all. NYC suggests

that implementation should not delayed more than a year. SRP argues that the 

uncertainty the currently exists about who ultimately will be responsible for building and

paying for new transmission facilities is causing delays in upgrades. According to SRP,

requiring the RTO to perform this function upon commercial operation will eliminate this
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -485-

uncertainty. Industrial Customers also argues that any delay should not be used as an

excuse to stall the construction of any facility for which the need has been established. 

SRP suggests that, if a delay in implementation is permitted, the RTO should be required

to identify the entity responsible for financing and building transmission expansion prior

to the RTO assuming such responsibility.

Commission Conclusion

We reaffirm the NOPR proposal that the RTO must have ultimate responsibility

for both transmission planning and expansion within its region that will enable it to

provide efficient, reliable and non-discriminatory service and coordinate such efforts with

the appropriate state authorities. In carrying out this overall responsibility, the

Commission has concluded that the NOPR's three separate requirements for RTO

planning and expansion must also be satisfied or, in the alternative, the RTO must

demonstrate that an alternative proposal is consistent with or superior to these three

requirements. Specifically, an RTO must satisfy the requirement to: (1) encourage

market-motivated operating and investment actions for preventing and relieving

congestion; (2) accommodate efforts by state regulatory commissions to create multi-state

agreements to review and approve new transmission facilities, coordinated with programs

of existing Regional Transmission Groups (RTGs) where necessary; and (3) file a plan

with the Commission with specified milestones that will ensure that it meets the overall
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -486-

592FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 32,541 at 33,751-52.

593Id. at 33,752.

planning and expansion requirement no later than three years after initial operation, if the

RTO is unable to satisfy this requirement when it commences operation. 

As noted above, the RTO should have ultimate responsibility for both transmission

planning and expansion within its region. The rationale for this requirement is that a

single entity must coordinate these actions to ensure a least cost outcome that maintains

or improves existing reliability levels. In the absence of a single entity performing these

functions, there is a danger that separate transmission investments will work at crosspurposes and possibly even hurt reliability. We also recognize that the RTO's

implementation of this general standard requires addressing many specific design

questions, including who decides which projects should be built and how the costs and

benefits of the project should be allocated. 592 As with other requirements of the Final

Rule, we propose to give RTOs considerable flexibility in designing a planning and

expansion process that works best for its region. It is both inevitable and desirable that

the specific features of this process "should take account of and accommodate existing

institutions and physical characteristics of the region." 593 We emphasize that, as the

transmission provider in the region, the RTO is required to provide service under a tariff

that is consistent with or superior to the Commission's pro forma tariff, and that tariff

obligates the transmission provider to expand and modify its system to provide the
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -487-

594See, e.g., Section 15.4 of the pro forma tariff which requires the transmission 

provider to use due diligence to expand or modify its transmission system to provide

requested services. Also, Section 28.2 of the pro forma tariff requires the transmission

provider to plan, construct, operate and maintain its transmission system in order to

provide network service, and to endeavor to construct and place into service sufficient

transmission capacity to deliver network resources to network customers on a basis

comparable to its own use of the transmission system. 

595We note that existing ISOs have addressed similar issues successfully. For

example, the PJM ISO is responsible for expansion planning, but the transmission owners

remain obligated to undertake upgrades necessitated by the plan, 81 FERC ¶ 61,257 at

62,275 (1997).

services requested under the pro forma tariff. 594 Because an RTO may not own all of the

facilities it operates, we clarify that nothing in this Rule relieves any public utility of its

existing obligation under the pro forma transmission tariff to expand or upgrade its

transmission system upon request. Accordingly, we shall evaluate each RTO proposal to

ensure that the RTO can direct or arrange for the construction of expansion projects that

are needed to ensure reliable transmission services. 595 However, the Commission

reiterates, as discussed below, its strong preference for market-motivated operating and

investment actions.

We further note that the pricing mechanisms and actions used by the RTO as part

of its transmission planning and expansion program should be compatible with the pricing

signals for shorter-term solutions to transmission constraints (i.e., congestion

management) so that market participants can choose the least-cost response. Otherwise,

their choices may reflect less efficient outcomes for the marketplace. For example, if the
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -488-

price of expansion overstates its cost (or the price of congestion management understates 

actual congestion cost), market participants likely will continue congestion management

solutions to a transmission constraint when expanding the system to relieve congestion is

more efficient. 

Market-Motivated Actions

Planning new generation or new transmission requires a coordinated approach to

ensure reliability and efficient congestion management. However, this does not

necessarily imply that all transmission expansions must be centrally planned by the RTO. 

Where feasible, an RTO should encourage market approaches to relieving congestion. A

market approach will require providing all transmission customers with access to welldefined transmission rights and efficient price signals that show the consequences of their

transmission usage decision. If the RTO's market approach is successful, the decisions of

where, when and how to relieve congestion will be driven by economic considerations. 

Most commenters agree with the NOPR proposal that RTOs should rely upon

market signals and market solutions in assessing all feasible options (e.g., construction of

new generation, redispatch of existing generation, as well as expansion of the

transmission grid) to assure that the least costly option is pursued. If an RTO can

facilitate market-motivated decisions, several commenters point out that its planning role

may largely be limited to extreme circumstances where continuing congestion in an area

threatens reliability. However, we also recognize that different market approaches to
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -489-

596For example, TDU Systems and other commenters suggest that, by promoting

competition for new construction, the RTO can minimize construction cost and also

reduce its own risk profile. For example, an ISO in Victoria, Australia (VPX), which

operates, but does not own transmission assets, uses competitive bidding for new

transmission facilities. At the Regional ISO Conference in Richmond, Virginia on June

8, 1998, Raymond Coxe described how VPX's strategy resulted in a number of bidders

competing for the right to build, own and operate new facilities. He concluded that the

"result of this competition was a lower price to the consumers of Victoria than would

have resulted from regulated transmission service by the largest incumbent provider."

Transcript at 86, Docket PL98-5-006. 

relieving congestion are still in the early stages of development. Similarly, while market

approaches to expansion are the subject of much discussion, they are also in the early

stages of development. 596 It is not the intent of the Commission either to mandate a

market approach to the exclusion of an executive decision by the RTO or to mandate any

particular market approach. 

 Nevertheless, if any market-driven approach is to be successful, there must be

accurate price signals that reflect the costs of congestion and expansion costs. As we

stated in the NOPR, accurate price signals are the link between current usage and future

expansion. Therefore, as discussed in more detail in Section III.E.2 Congestion

Management, every RTO must establish a system of congestion management that

establishes clear rights to transmission facilities and provides market participants with

price signals that reflect congestion and expansion costs. In implementing its planning

and expansion responsibility, an RTO must ensure that its decisions are not unduly

discriminatory and produce efficient outcomes.
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -490-

The Commission reaffirms its statement in the NOPR that independent governance

of the RTO is a necessary condition for nondiscriminatory and efficient planning and

expansion. While accurate price signals can signal the need for expansion, such

expansion may not be achieved if an RTO operates under a faulty governance system

(e.g., a governance system that allows market participants to block expansions that will

harm their commercial interests).

Multi-State Agreements and RTGs.

The final rule fully recognizes the statutory authority of the states to regulate siting

of transmission facilities. Currently, state and local governments and regulatory agencies

have exclusive authority over the siting process. Therefore, an RTO's planning and

expansion process must be designed to be consistent with these state and local

responsibilities.

RTOs must accommodate efforts by state regulatory commissions to create multistate agreements to review and approve new transmission facilities. The Commission

encourages the development of multi-state agreements or compacts to review and approve

new transmission facilities. This would expedite transmission construction and eliminate

duplicative (and possibly conflicting) reviews by multiple states. To facilitate any

voluntary actions taken by our state colleagues, we will require that the RTO planning

and coordination system must able to accommodate the possible emergence of new

regional regulatory systems.
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -491-

Existing RTGs have clear and prominent roles in transmission expansion decisions

in which planning for transmission improvements are coordinated through collaborative

processes. To avoid duplicative efforts, the RTO process must build on existing RTG

planning processes. Over time, since the RTO will have ultimate responsibility for

planning the entire transmission system within its region, we expect that the functions of

an RTG will be assumed by an RTO to avoid unnecessary duplication of effort.

Three-Year Implementation.

If the RTO is unable to satisfy the planning and expansion function when it

commences operation, it must file a plan with the Commission with specified milestones

that will ensure that it meets this requirement no later than three years after initial

operation. Recognizing that the planning and expansion function may require

coordination among multiple parties and regulatory jurisdictions, we do not require this

function to be in place at the initial operation of the RTO. We continue to believe that

three years is a reasonable deadline for creating an operational planning and expansion

system. Therefore, we will not extend this deadline or the requirement to file a plan with

the Commission with an implementation timetable. This time period could be affected by

the RTO's scope, the number of states and market participants, and implementation costs;

however, the urgent needs of the electricity markets make us disinclined to extend these

deadlines.
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -492-

597Order No. 888, FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 31,036 at 31,730-32.

598FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 32,541 at 33,758.

However, the delay should not stall the construction of new or enhanced facilities

for which needs have been established, unless the RTO makes a positive decision that the

facility is not in the best interests of the region. Delaying transmission expansion could

result in significant market inefficiencies as well as unacceptable risks to reliability given

the long regulatory and construction lead times required to build new facilities.

8. Interregional Coordination (Function 8)

In Order No. 888, the Commission identified eleven principles it would use to

assess Independent System Operator (ISO) proposals submitted to the Commission. 597

One of these principles required that the ISO develop mechanisms to coordinate with

neighboring control areas to ensure reliability and the provision of transmission services

that cross system boundaries. The RTO NOPR encouraged transmission entities to

consider ways to reduce impediments to transactions among themselves, 598 but a

coordination requirement was not included explicitly in the RTO NOPR. Several

commenters pointed out that there was no explicit coordination requirement proposed in

the RTO NOPR and recommended including a function for RTOs similar to the

coordination principle in Order No. 888.

Comments
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -493-

599Many parties supported this requirement including NERC, Justice Department,

NARUC, NASUCA, Oneok, PJM, Duquesne and Industrial Consumers.

Several commenters identify coordination with other regions as a necessary

element that should be added more explicitly to the RTO functions. 599 These

commenters express this need as either required to ensure reliability or necessary for bulk

power markets to operate over sufficiently large areas. For example, NERC states that

the need for such coordination effort has increased as the management of short-term

reliability of the interconnected bulk power system and the operation of increasingly

competitive bulk power markets have become inseparable. Accordingly, NERC

recommends that an additional function be added to the final rule that requires RTOs to

integrate their market interface practices and reliability practices. It identifies OASIS

standards, information sharing with neighboring RTOs, ancillary services requirements,

parallel path flows, transmission loading relief, and interregional congestion management,

as practices and standards that need to be integrated.

Duquesne states that efficiencies can be realized from coordinating and developing

a seamless marketplace. It recommends that the Commission require RTOs to coordinate

and plan for seamless and uniform transmission rules, scheduling systems and

procedures, and reliability standards. In addition, Oneok suggests that the Commission

encourage neighboring RTOs to form reliability compacts under which loop flow and
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -494-

600ISO-NE, NY ISO and PJM recently signed a memorandum of understanding

concerning interregional coordination activities.

601This is similar to the existing ISO Principle #10 in Order No. 888 for single

control area ISOs: "An ISO should develop mechanisms to coordinate with neighboring

control areas."

other issues involving interregional reliability impacts can be resolved. 600 Also,

Wyoming Commission believes that the Commission should be flexible with respect to

inter-RTO interaction and that it may be appropriate to address these issues later rather

than in initial RTO filings.

Commission Conclusion

Coordination of activities among regions is a significant element in maintaining a

reliable bulk transmission system and for the development of competitive markets. In the

NOPR, we discussed several region-to-region coordination activities in connection with

the parallel path, congestion management, and expansion planning functions. However,

the comments persuade us to add a more general inter-regional coordination requirement

as one of the minimum RTO functions.

We will require an RTO to develop mechanisms to coordinate its activities with

other regions whether or not an RTO yet exists in these other regions. 601 If it is not

possible to set forth the coordination mechanisms at the time an RTO application is filed,

the RTO applicant must propose reporting requirements, including a schedule, for itself to

provide follow-up details as to how it is meeting the coordination requirements of this
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -495-

602"Interconnection" is a term used by the North American Electric Reliability

Council and others to refer to an interconnected alternating current transmission system. 

Engineering considerations require all generators connected to any one interconnection to

operate in a coordinated manner, that is, synchronously.

function. We expect the RTO to work closely with other regions to address inter-regional

problems and problems at the "seams" between the RTOs. Therefore, as recommended

by NERC and others, we will add the following regulatory text to our RTO Final Rule

functions:

(8) Interregional Coordination: The Regional Transmission Organization

must ensure the integration of reliability practices within an interconnection

and market interface practices among regions.

An RTO proposal must explain how the RTO will ensure the integration of

reliability and market interface practices. An RTO may ensure the integration of these

practices either by developing integration practices itself or by cooperating in the

development of integrated practices with an independent entity that covers all regions or,

for reliability practices, covers an entire interconnection. The term, interconnection, 602

refers here to any one of three large U.S. transmission systems. The Eastern

Interconnection covers most of the area east of the Rocky Mountains in the United States

and Canada. The Western Interconnection covers an area that is mostly west of the

Rocky Mountains in the United States and Canada, as well as a small portion of Mexico. 

The Electric Reliability Council of Texas (ERCOT) Interconnection covers much of

Texas.
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -496-

This provision does not mean that all RTOs necessarily must have a uniform

practice, but that RTO reliability and market interface practices must be compatible with

each other, especially at the "seams." RTOs must coordinate their practices with

neighboring regions to ensure that market activity is not limited because of different

regional practices.

We understand, as NERC pointed out in its comments, that the reliability and

market interface practices are becoming highly interrelated. The reliability practices

affect how markets interface with each other, and the market interface practices affect

reliability. For example, TLR and congestion management are both used to unload an

overloaded transmission interface, and these two practices must work together. We

consider congestion management and TLR are best used as sequential steps to unload a

line, with congestion management used first to unload a line in a market-oriented manner,

and TLR used to unload a line in a fair manner when either congestion management is

unavailable or an emergency condition requires immediate action. We therefore list

below TLR as a reliability practice and congestion management as a market interface

practice, understanding that these and other practices listed affect both reliability and

markets.

The integration of reliability practices involves procedures for coordination of

reliability practices and sharing of reliability data among regions in an interconnection,

including procedures that address parallel path flows, ancillary service standards,
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -497-

603FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 32,541 at 33,753.

transmission loading relief procedures, among other reliability-related coordination

requirements in this Final Rule. 

The integration of market interface practices involves developing some level of

standardization of inter-regional market standards and practices, including the

coordination and sharing of data necessary for calculation of TTC and ATC, transmission

reservation practices, scheduling practices, and congestion management procedures, as

well as other market coordination requirements covered elsewhere in this Final Rule.

F. Open Architecture

In the NOPR, the Commission stated its commitment to a policy of "open

architecture" and proposed to require that RTOs be designed so that they can evolve over

time. The Commission noted that there should be no provision in any RTO proposal that

precludes the RTO and its members from improving their organization to meet market

needs. 603 The Commission sought comments regarding the open architecture policy in

general and the flexibility needs of RTOs in particular.

Comments

Virtually all commenters support the NOPR's open architecture concept and

recommend that an RTO have the ability to evolve over time as it gains operating
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -498-

604See, e.g., APX, Arizona Commission, Cal ISO, Central Maine, Consumers

Energy, CP&L, Conectiv, Desert STAR, DOE, Duke, Entergy, EPSA, FirstEnergy,

Florida Commission, Georgia Transmission, Illinois Commission, Industrial Consumers,

LG&E, NERC, NPCC, NSP, NU, NY ISO, Oglethorpe, PJM, Seattle, Southern

Company, SMUD, SRP, TDU Systems, TEP, Tri-State and WEPCO.

605NSP states that the configuration of electric markets will be much different five

or ten years from now.

606WEPCO notes that costs savings associated with creating large, efficient

electricity markets will dwarf the savings attained by reducing the number of operators

through control area consolidation.

experience. 604 They endorse the principle of flexibility to accommodate the changing

needs of the market. 605 WEPCO notes that open architecture should permit flexibility

and urges the Commission not to require an RTO to be the only control area operator in

the region. 606 Ontario Power states that the open architecture policy should enable

RTOs to accommodate Canadian entities in the future. Oglethorpe observes that open

architecture policy would allow RTOs to utilize existing infrastructure and avoid high

transition costs.

However, Central Maine and Southern Company argue that the flexibility implied

by open architecture should not be used carte blanche. For example, there should be

limits to an RTO's evolution process because transmission owners have some

fundamental rights, such as: (1) the right to terminate their participation in the RTO; (2)

the right to switch to another RTO; (3) the right to merge RTOs; (4) the right to recover
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -499-

their costs and a return on investment; and (5) the right to protect their assets and

employees from damages and injuries.

LG&E states that the flexibility inherent in the open architecture concept should

be applied fairly to all market participants, including those transmission owners that have

already committed to existing or proposed ISOs. For example, a member of an existing

ISO should be allowed to move to another RTO.

Industrial Consumers perceives a potential downside to the open architecture

policy in that it may give existing IOUs a license to continue their opportunistic behavior

rather than facilitating true market transformation. Therefore, Industrial Consumers

argues that it supports the notion of flexibility inherent in the open architecture policy

only in the absence of market power. Illinois Commission argues that the pace of

evolutionary improvement of RTOs should not remain in the hands of vertically

integrated utilities because their interest in structural change may not be consistent with

the public interest.

Cinergy, EPSA and Georgia Transmission state that the flexibility implied by open

architecture should not be used to support deviations from minimum characteristics and

functions. However, CP&L believes that the proposed minimum characteristics and

functions are too stringent and do not allow for much flexibility that a changing market
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -500-

607CP&L and Southern Company state that the Commission should establish basic

RTO guidelines through a policy statement rather than by a rule. They contend that the

rules under the NOPR are too prescriptive, and will stifle the development of new RTOs.

608CP&L notes that participants in Midwest ISO identified certain conditions that

could be altered only by the transmission owners, including revenue distribution, pricing

methodology and withdrawal rights.

609Entergy at 42.

needs. 607 Georgia Transmission supports the Commission's commitment to providing

regulatory flexibility to allow RTOs to evolve.

 Many commenters state that the open architecture concept is so broad that it will

prevent stakeholders from developing meaningful RTO proposals. To bring some

certainty to the negotiating parties to an RTO proposal, CP&L recommends that the

Commission find that some necessary and reasonable limitations on modifications to

RTOs are permissible, and these can be overridden only by unanimous consent or a

supermajority vote. 608 MidAmerican states that the Commission should accept RTO

proposals that contain stated limitations, such as a transmission owner's right to withdraw

from an RTO. MidAmerican argues that such limitations are consistent with the

Commission's open architecture policy and would prevent transmission owners from

being discouraged to join RTOs. To promote certainty, Entergy notes that the

Commission should establish a general policy of grandfathering previously approved

RTOs and not altering their requirements except in extraordinary circumstances. 609
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -501-

Southern Company is concerned that RTOs could evolve in ways that are

undesirable to the participants that initiated its formation. Therefore, it argues that the

parties should have some assurance that certain key provisions of an RTO would not

change in the name of RTO evolution. For example, functions, boundaries, transmission

rate design, and allocation of transmission revenues should not be amended by the RTO

except by vote of the transmission owners, at least for the duration of a specified

transition period. Southern Company contends that the transmission owners will then

know what they are "getting into" when they join an RTO.

Many commenters recommend that the Commission should not mandate the

ultimate organizational form of the RTO given the electric industry's current state of

structural flux and the uncertainty of the future. These commenters argue that the

Commission's open architecture policy should encourage market participants to develop

transmission institutions that are effective in meeting the needs of the marketplace. 

FirstEnergy and NU state that there is a range of organizational and functional forms—

power pool (tight and loose): gridco, transco, marketco—which can accomplish the

Commission's goal of improving the efficiency of the transmission grid, and only time

and market forces should determine which form is best suited for a specific region of the

country. Southern Company believes that there should be no requirement that would

prohibit an RTO with no transmission ownership to transform into one that owns

transmission (i.e., change from an ISO to a transco). 
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -502-

610 PSE&G Reply Comments at 6-7.

PJM urges the Commission to clarify that RTOs can propose improvements to the

RTO independently of its members to meet changing market needs. PSE&G is opposed

to giving such authority to RTOs because it believes that the market participants rather

than RTOs should drive changes in the structure and operation of electric markets. 610

Cal ISO recommends that the Commission's open architecture policy should support the

creation of a structure that facilitates the addition of new participants, both within and

outside of the existing RTO boundaries. Illinois Commission urges the Commission to

modify the proposed paragraph 35.34(k) of proposed regulations to include an affirmative

expectation that RTOs will change to meet new competitive market needs and to improve

over time.

Commission Conclusion

As proposed in the NOPR, we adopt the principle of open architecture in order

that the RTO and its members have the flexibility to improve their organizations in the

future in terms of structure, geographic scope, market support and operations to meet

market needs. We will require that the RTO design have the ability to evolve over time. 

In addition, we will provide flexibility to allow RTOs to propose changes to their

enabling agreements to meet changing market, organization and policy needs.

Open architecture will permit RTOs to evolve in several ways, as long as proposed

changes continue to satisfy RTO minimum characteristics and functions. As a first
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -503-

example, open architecture will allow basic changes in the organizational form of the

RTO to reflect changes in facility ownership and revised corporate strategies. As noted

by Southern Company, an RTO that initially does not own any transmission facilities

might acquire ownership of some or all of those facilities. With an open architecture

design, the RTO's enabling agreements should anticipate and facilitate changes of this

nature.

Second, open architecture design accommodates change in the geographical scope

of RTOs. Electric markets are evolving quickly and future market trading patterns cannot

be foreseen at the time of RTO organization. An open architecture design will enable an

RTO to grow geographically and possibly merge with another RTO as changes in markets

suggest a realignment of organizations to meet evolving market needs.

Third, market support is another area that benefits from open architecture design. 

For example, an RTO may not initially operate a PX to support a regional spot market,

but later determine that the establishment of a PX would provide additional benefit in its

region. With open architecture, the RTO can propose to add a PX function (or a PX

monitoring function) to its design. Open architecture design ensures that such future

developments that are beneficial to the marketplace are not foreclosed.

Fourth, open architecture design accommodates changing operational needs. Most

commenters agree that, as RTOs gain operating experience, some changes will become

necessary. Cal ISO acknowledges that it had to make significant changes to its tariff and
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -504-

operational practices as it gained operating experience, and it believes further

modifications are likely to be identified as additional experience is gained regarding

evolving competitive markets. 

Finally, as noted in the NOPR, technological change make changes in RTO design

inevitable and desirable. Accommodating that change will require flexibility and

adaptability in the RTO organization; open architecture will permit design modification to

keep pace with technology.

Some commenters argue that the flexibility implied by open architecture design

should not be interpreted to mean unfettered ability on the part of the RTO to modify its

structure or processes. We agree. Although under our open architecture policy the RTO

will have the ability to propose whatever changes it believes are appropriate to meet the

evolving needs of the RTO and the region, any such proposals or changes to existing

agreements, which will be changes to the RTO's jurisdictional rate schedule(s) and

contracts, will be subject to Commission review and approval under the FPA. The

Commission will consider the merits of any changes to an approved RTO on a case-bycase basis. Interested parties will have the opportunity to comment on any such proposal. 

This process will enable all parties and the Commission to guard against proposed

changes that are likely to stifle competition.
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -505-

G. Transmission Ratemaking Policy for RTOs

We have concluded that the success of the Commission's efforts to have effective

and efficient RTOs is dependent in large measure on the feasibility and vitality of the

stand-alone transmission business. For that reason, and to promote economic efficiency,

the RTO transmission ratemaking policies of the Commission are an important factor of

RTO success. In light of the restructuring of markets and market institutions that is

taking place, we now believe that it will be helpful to inform the industry about what we

consider to be appropriate and inappropriate transmission pricing practices for RTOs, and

about a framework for RTOs to propose efficient and fair pricing reform. Accordingly,

we provide guidance below on a number of fundamental ratemaking issues.

We believe that it is critically important for RTOs to develop ratemaking practices

that: eliminate regional rate pancaking; manage congestion; internalize parallel path

flows; deal effectively and fairly with transmission owning utilities that choose not to

participate in RTOs; and provide incentives for transmission owning utilities to efficiently

operate and invest in their systems. In particular, the Commission encourages RTOs to

develop and propose innovative ratemaking practices, particularly with respect to

efficiency incentives. We therefore devote a significant portion of the discussion in this

section of the Final Rule to performance-based regulation (PBR) and other RTO

transmission ratemaking reforms.
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -506-

611We have adopted and expanded the regulatory text proposed by Edison Electric

Institute in its comments (see EEI, Appendix E).

In addition to the guidance offered here, we have added regulatory text

(section 35.34 (e)) with regard to PBR and other RTO transmission ratemaking

reforms, 611 which now identifies a select list of innovative transmission rate treatments. 

The Commission will consider such innovative rate treatments for entities that file

proposals under the new section 35.34 and that meet the minimum characteristics and

functions required in the Final Rule. The Applicant must explain how the proposed rate

treatment would help achieve the goals of RTOs, including efficient use of and

investment in the transmission system and reliability benefits to consumers; provide a

cost-benefit analysis, including rate impacts; and explain why the proposed rate treatment

is appropriate for the RTO proposed by the Applicant. This means that filings under

section 35.34(e) must be complete and fully explained; must demonstrate that the

resulting rates are just, reasonable, and not unduly discriminatory or preferential; must

identify how the rate treatment promotes efficiency and what benefits result; and must

demonstrate that the rate treatment does not impede the RTO from meeting the minimum

characteristics and functions required under this Final Rule. The Commission encourages

properly developed transmission pricing proposals from RTOs that comply with the

guidance set forth below and the amended regulatory text.
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -507-

612FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 32,541 at 33,754.

 We agree with those commenters that urge the Commission to reform its

transmission pricing policies to reflect new realities of the industry. For example, a

number of commenters point to the unbundling requirements of Order Nos. 888 and 889,

the vertical de-integration of generation and transmission for some utilities, the advent of

wholesale and retail competition in energy markets, entry into markets of a range of new

players, including independent generators and marketers, and other developments as a

signal that the Commission's traditional cost-of-service ratemaking practices for

transmission assets should be reevaluated. Some commenters suggest that the advent of

competitive power markets necessitates a more robust transmission network as well as

enhanced operating capabilities of the network, compared to the previous era of vertically

integrated utilities providing service in monopoly franchise areas. They argue that the

Commission's traditional transmission ratemaking practices are unlikely to support such a

robust transmission network and enhanced operating capabilities. 

To put our concerns about transmission pricing in perspective, the NOPR said that

"the Commission expects RTOs to reform transmission pricing, and in return we propose

to allow RTOs greater flexibility in designing pricing proposals." 612 The NOPR also

said that our willingness to provide flexibility in reviewing pricing proposals dates back

to the Transmission Pricing Policy Statement, issued by the Commission in 1994. In the
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -508-

Policy Statement, we identified five principles that transmission pricing proposals should

conform to, including the principle that pricing proposals should meet the traditional

revenue requirement. In order that this principle not undermine innovative pricing

proposals, the Policy Statement noted that non-conforming pricing proposals would be

considered, but that such proposals would have to satisfy additional factors, i.e., promote

competitive markets and produce greater overall consumer benefits. In the five years

since the Policy Statement was issued, we have approved five ISOs with innovative

transmission pricing, but otherwise have received few innovative transmission pricing

proposals. We believe that, as a general matter, sensible pricing reform that could

promote competition and efficiency in other contexts will achieve maximum benefits only

when applied on a regional, rather than a single-system basis. This is true because of the

inability of single systems to capture such efficiencies, but sensible pricing reform is one

of the efficiencies that will likely flow from RTOs. And while we do not think the

Policy Statement has been an impediment to transmission pricing innovation, we now

believe, based on the myriad comments we received, that the Commission should now

provide greater specificity on appropriate transmission pricing reforms by RTOs.

The rationale for providing greater specificity on transmission pricing for RTOs

and amending the regulatory text at this time is three-fold. First, we recognize that

transmission pricing issues are some of the most complex issues facing the industry. 

Second, a potential barrier to the development of RTOs, at least RTOs that span multiple
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -509-

transmission systems, is the difficulty that stakeholders have had reaching consensus on

transmission pricing. This is not surprising, given that transmission pricing reform to

accommodate regional needs and usage patterns can affect what customers pay for

transmission service and how transmission revenues are allocated among multiple owners

of transmission within a region. Third, we are concerned that as we move to greater

reliance on market forces, the incentives that market participants have to make efficient

operating and investment decisions for both generation and transmission facilities are

based in part on the price signals that flow from transmission pricing. That is,

transmission pricing is a key determinant of the efficient operation of energy, ancillary

service and balancing markets, and congestion management.

At the outset, we want to make clear that, contrary to the apprehensions of some

commenters, the Commission is not proposing to "bribe" transmission-owning utilities to

join an RTO. Rather, the Commission stated in the NOPR that it would consider

innovative pricing proposals because we believed then, and now believe more strongly,

that a reassessment of transmission pricing policy is warranted, given the fundamental

changes in industry structure that have already occurred as well as those which may flow

from the RTO Final Rule. In addition, as pointed out by Professor Joskow, delays in

RTO formation occasion costs because of more limited competition in generation

markets, and these costs may be avoided to the extent that the Commission considers

transmission pricing reforms. Furthermore, as discussed below, since the costs of
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -510-

transmission are a small portion of total electric costs, getting transmission pricing right

means that the industry will be able to capture significant net benefits from promoting

competitive generation markets.

While the NOPR did not propose specific rules on transmission pricing reform, we

believe it is now critical to provide further specificity to the industry. We recognize the

need to establish clear and specific requirements for RTO development, provide certainty

and clarity about our willingness to entertain transmission pricing reforms that are

appropriate for RTOs, and assure utilities that they will not be penalized for RTO

participation. To the extent consistent with ensuring that transmission rates are just,

reasonable, and not unduly discriminatory, we believe transmission pricing disincentives

to joining an RTO should be eliminated so that transmission-owning utilities will find

RTO participation to be a dynamic business opportunity. Utilities that join RTOs should

be accorded transmission pricing that reflects the financial risks of turning facilities over

to an RTO and that reflects other changes in the structure of the industry. Those risks

may increase or decrease in particular instances. At the same time, we wish to make clear

that the Commission is very concerned about potential impacts of market restructuring on

the customers in "low-cost" states, and the Commission therefore intends to monitor the

effects of RTO formation on such customers, specifically the potential for cost-shifting

effects of RTO pricing proposals.
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -511-

613See, e.g., Federal Power Commission v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591

(1944); Bluefield Water Works & Improvement Co. v. Public Service Commission of

West Virginia, 262 U.S. 679 (1923).

Traditional transmission pricing approaches reflect the industry structure as it

existed when Order No. 888 was issued: a vertically integrated industry where

transmission systems were designed primarily to meet the needs of local loads. Our

primary focus, both in terms of access and pricing was comparability; that is, all

transmission users should receive access under rates, terms and conditions comparable to

those the transmitting utility applies to itself to serve its own customers. RTOs reflect a

somewhat different approach, in which the transmission system must also be designed

and operated to meet the needs of regional markets. It is not unreasonable to expect that,

as the transmission system is restructured to meet these changing needs, significant

pricing reform may be needed as well. Indeed, since a properly developed RTO will be

designing methods to support regional congestion management and regional expansion,

transmission pricing reform is inevitable.

We caution that we do not view transmission pricing reform as a program designed

for the sole purpose of enhancing the revenues of transmission owners at the expense of

transmission customers. Nor are we abandoning the fundamental underpinnings of our

traditional transmission pricing policies, i.e., that transmission prices must reflect the

costs of providing the service. 613 While many aspects of transmission pricing reform are
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -512-

labeled incentive pricing, many are aimed at eliminating disincentives to the efficient use

and expansion of regional transmission grids to support emerging competition in

generating markets.

We view transmission pricing reform, not only as an important component of how

stand-alone transmission companies can become viable and efficient network businesses,

but also as an important means for transmission-owning utilities which maintain

ownership but cede control of their transmission assets to an RTO to capture the benefits

of more efficient system operation and additional grid investment. We believe that the 

opportunities for pricing reform identified in this Rule should have no effect on an RTO's

decision about how it will be structured. All RTOs, regardless of ownership structure,

are therefore eligible to propose transmission pricing reforms that suit their strategic and

economic objectives to the extent consistent with this Final Rule.

We also believe that the potential for any increase in transmission-related revenues

available to transmission providers that are efficient and responsive in meeting the needs

of their customers must be balanced by the potential for a decrease in profits if the

transmission provider does not meet those needs. Moreover, a properly developed RTO

can be expected to produce significant efficiencies, and we would expect that

transmission owners, transmission customers and generation market participants will

share in the economic benefits resulting from the efficient design and operation of the

RTO. 
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -513-

As the industry begins the collaborative process of establishing RTOs, it is

important that the Commission provide some certainty and specificity about the preferred

types of transmission pricing reforms, and some certainty and specificity about the types

of proposed transmission pricing reforms that appear more problematic. Accordingly, the

remainder of this section discusses eight specific transmission ratemaking topics: 

pancaked rates; reciprocal waiving of access charges between RTOs; use of single system

access charges; congestion pricing; service to transmission-owning utilities that do not

participate in an RTO; performance-based regulation; other RTO transmission ratemaking

reforms; and additional ratemaking issues.

1. Pancaked Rates

As described in the NOPR, the elimination of rate pancaking for large regions is a

central goal of the Commission's RTO policy, and has been a feature of all five ISOs the

Commission had approved. Rate pancaking occurs when a transmission customer is

charged separate access charges for each utility service territory the customer's contract

path crosses. The NOPR proposed that RTO tariffs not result in transmission customers

paying multiple access charges to recover capital costs over facilities that it controls. The

NOPR sought comments on the impact of the non-pancaked rate requirement on

voluntary RTO formation because of abrupt rate changes. It also sought comments on

how the regional configuration may relate to these potential rate changes.
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -514-

614See, e.g., NASUCA, PJM, LG&E, Industrial Consumers and WEPCO.

Comments

The overwhelming majority of the comments favor the proposed prohibition on

pancaked rates, 614 although some commenters express concern over cost shifting. Some

commenters, such as Minnesota Power, suggest that the cost shifting effect of nonpancaked rates would discourage voluntary RTO formation.

Some commenters suggest alternative approaches to the strict non-pancaked rate

described in the NOPR. For example, WPSC advocates the use of flow-based, distancesensitive rates as a replacement for pancaked rates. Allegheny argues that removing rate

pancaking can cause disruptive shifts in rates and revenue requirements which are solved

only temporarily with transitional rates. Allegheny proposes its form of locational

marginal pricing method to solve this problem. NSP favors non-pancaked rates but notes

that rates for the high-voltage system that differ from those for the low-voltage system

may be an effective long-term rate strategy. MidAmerican recommends that the

prohibition against rate pancaking be changed to allow transmission owners to charge a

home-zone rate based on local cost determination and a wide-area charge outside the

home area. MidAmerican argues that this approach would minimize cost shifting. The

pancaked rate prohibition would change to: "promote wide-area transmission rates with

due consideration to shifting of costs among transmission service providers and between
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -515-

615See New Smyrna Beach and Coalition of Alliance Users.

state and federal delivery rates. Finally, Williams recommends that the Commission also

consider other pricing methods such as those based on mileage or network usage and

market-based rates, where possible, because it considers cost of service rates inefficient

and unresponsive to the market.

A few commenters question an absolute prohibition against pancaked rates. AEP

and Florida Power Corp. warn that a strict prohibition against pancaked rates may, at

times, work against efficient solutions. There should not be a strict prohibition without

regard to size or locational factors. Florida Power Corp. argues that this approach is

consistent with the Commission's Transmission Pricing Policy Statement. Customers of

both AEP and Florida Power Corp. dispute this view. 615 Southern Company notes that

an absolute prohibition against pancaked rates may hurt retail customers whose rates are

supported by transmission revenue. Transmission owners should be assured in the final

rule that they will be able to recover their full revenue requirement in the face of any

pancaked rate prohibition. The Commission should, according to Southern Company,

also clarify that a prohibition against pancaked rates does not prevent the use of zonal or

other distance-sensitive rates. Desert STAR argues that a single region-wide rate may not

be appropriate in a large region with legitimate cost differences among companies, and

suggests that license plate rates may mitigate cost shifting but will not always eliminate it.
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -516-

616Section 35.34 (k)(1)(ii). However, see the discussion below regarding service

to transmission-owning utilities that do not participate in an RTO.

Commission Conclusion

In the NOPR, we described the elimination of rate pancaking as a central goal of

our RTO policy. After receiving comments on the subject, mostly in favor of the

proposed prohibition, we affirm that the RTO tariff must not result in transmission

customers paying multiple access charges to recover capital costs. 616

Except for transactions within the ISOs now in place, transmission customers are

faced with additional access charges for every utility border they cross. The distances

need not be great to be assessed two, three or more access charges for a single

transaction. This duplication can severely restrict the area in which generation can

economically be secured. A main reason that an RTO can expand the marketplace for

generation to a large region is that an RTO can implement non-pancaked rates for each

transaction. A wider area served by a single rate means more generation is economically

available to any customer which means greater competition for energy.

Some commenters warn that a blind adherence to non-pancaked rates can produce

inefficiencies in some circumstances. Some argue that large distances and special

conditions can add to transmission costs in a way not reflected in single system rates. 

They would leave open the option for distance-sensitive rates or completely new rate

innovations that may not fit the strict definition of a non-pancaked rate. We are sensitive
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -517-

617See, e.g., Sithe, WPSC, Minnesota Power, Ohio Commission, and Midwest ISO

Participants.

to some of these concerns, but we do not view a policy requiring non-pancaked rates as

posing the problems that some commenters describe. We take this opportunity to

reaffirm that we will continue to be receptive to distance-sensitive rates and other rate

features that can be supported.

2. Reciprocal Waiving of Access Charges Between RTOs

The elimination of pancaked rates within an RTO was intended to increase the

efficiency of trade in that region. The NOPR furthered that concept by encouraging

RTOs to agree among themselves to waive access charges on a reciprocal basis for

transactions that cross RTO borders. If accomplished, this would have the effect of

increasing effective trading areas. The NOPR sought comments on how the Commission

could facilitate reciprocal waivers of access charges, and whether there are other

impediments to inter-regional trade.

Comments

A majority of the commenters support the concept of a reciprocal waiver of access

charges to encourage inter-regional trade. 617 Of those who support waivers, some,

including Duke and SRP, specifically recommend that waivers be voluntary. Some

supporters of waiving access charges note that it is not just the pancaked charges that

inhibit inter-regional trade but also variations in business practices and procedures
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -518-

618See, e.g., Ontario Power and Oregon Office.

between RTOs. These commenters 618 recommend that the Commission ensure that such

incompatibilities not be allowed to hamper trade between RTO regions.

Several commenters, both supporting and opposed to waiver of access charges,

warn that the waivers proposed in the NOPR can cause cost shifting. Duke argues that

cost shifting can be remedied by the structure of the rate. DOE and First Energy also

express concerns about cost shifting. Southern Company generally opposes waivers of

access charges unless transmission owners' revenues are protected.

Some commenters oppose waiving access charges between RTOs for reasons other

than cost shifting concerns. South Carolina Authority claims that reciprocal agreements

between RTOs waiving access charges are discriminatory and that independent

monitoring groups would be needed to prevent gaming of reciprocity agreements. CP&L

argues that waivers create a bias to sell outside of the RTO. Tri-State proposes the use of

distance-sensitive export pricing mechanisms instead of waivers.

PP&L Companies claim that inter-regional trade solutions should be arrived at

through a collaborative effort of stakeholders. NECPUC and Desert STAR argue that the

Commission should grant deference to participants' solutions for inter-regional trade. 

Florida Commission argues that the Commission should wait until intra-regional trade

barriers are dismantled before dealing with inter-regional trade.
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -519-

Commission Conclusion

We asked in the NOPR for comments on the policy of allowing RTOs to reach

reciprocal agreements to waive access charges for transmission that crosses an RTO

border. Most commenters supported the approval of such waivers and some asked the

Commission to further support inter-regional trade by requiring uniform practices and

procedures among RTOs. Some commenters maintain that incompatible or varying

procedures between RTOs can be as dampening to inter-regional trade as multiple rates.

We will continue to encourage reciprocal waivers of access charges between

RTOs as long as they are reasonable in terms of cost recovery, cost shifting, efficiency,

and discrimination. We also encourage terms and procedures that are compatible from

region to region to the extent appropriate. Accordingly, we have added an RTO function

to integrate reliability and market interface practices with other regions, as discussed

above.

3. Uniform Access Charges

Each ISO approved by the Commission has struggled with the problem of cost

shifting among the various individual transmission owners that make up the ISO. A

single access rate would mean that the customers of low-cost transmission providers

would see a rate increase and high-cost transmission providers would be concerned about

not meeting their revenue requirements. The potential for cost shifting has been a
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -520-

619Consider that registering a car in one state, paying that state's fees, and

obtaining a license plate from that state, allows that car to be driven on the roads and

highways of all other states. 

620FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 32,541 at 33,754.

621See, e.g., Montana Commission, Oglethorpe, Tri-State, FirstEnergy, Alliance

Companies, AEP and DOE.

622See, e.g., Allegheny, Industrial Consumers, Northwest Council, APS, Desert

(continued...)

stumbling block for several regions seeking to establish regional transmission

organizations.

The Commission has allowed a flexible approach to this problem, and in each ISO

approved by the Commission to date the solution has been to adopt a "license plate" rate

for a transitional period of five to ten years before moving to a single uniform access

charge. A license plate rate provides access to the regional transmission system at a

single rate although that rate may vary based on where the customer is located. 619 The

NOPR proposed to continue to employ a flexible approach, including the use of license

plate rates. The NOPR requested comments on whether the license plate approach is

appropriate for the long term. 620

Comments

A clear majority of commenters favors the use of license plate rates in general,

with a nearly even split between those that would allow license plate rates only for a

transitional period 621 and those that would allow them as a permanent feature. 622 Of
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -521-

622(...continued)

STAR and SPP.

623See, e.g., Kentucky Commission, Gainesville, Big Rivers, Puget and Ontario

Power.

624See, e.g., East Kentucky and PJM.

the approximately 64 commenters who addressed this subject, only about nine were

clearly opposed to license plate rates for either the long term or for a transitional period. 

And several commenters advocate the use of license plate rates as a general concept but

did not address directly the NOPR's question concerning their long-term use. 623

Several commenters argued that the use of license plate rates should be for a 

transition period roughly coincident with the phase-in of retail competition. For example,

Duke argues that license plate rates avoid cost-shifting, and will therefore make it easier

for companies to collect their retail revenue requirements in jurisdictions without retail

competition, where state regulators may disallow higher transmission rates.

Commenters that support license plate rates as a long-term solution argue that

license plate rates are an aid to RTO formation. 624 SoCal Edison claims that license

plate rates avoid cost shifts, are administratively more efficient, provide a basis for

efficient transmission operation, and provide incentives for system expansion. SoCal

Edison favors their use in the long term.

Of those opposed to license plate rates in general, some suggest a different pricing

methodology. CMUA prefers an integrated, two-part rate. The first part of the rate
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -522-

reflects the revenue requirement of the overall RTO (principally above 200 kV) and the

second part reflects the local systems to the extent used. CMUA argues that license plate

rates do not follow the rules of cost causation, do not promote needed enhancements and

do not promote comparability in rates. Minnesota Power recommends a two-part rate

with a demand component to collect fixed costs and a variable component for losses. 

WPSC advocates the use of flow-based, distance-sensitive rates rather than license plate

rates. APPA claims that license plate rates do not go far enough. A four part approach is

suggested in their place: assure recovery of revenue requirement; honor existing

contracts and phase in regional rates; sub-functionalize the grid by voltage; and, once

trusted RTOs are in place, allow congestion rates above embedded costs and noncongestion rates below, all subject to a revenue requirement true-up. RECA recommends

that zones for transmission access charges be formed based on cost and other differences,

not on existing service areas. SMUD claims that Cal ISO’s license plate rate encourages

inefficient operation.

Some commenters provide more general reactions to the cost shifting problem. 

Wyoming Commission recommends that the Commission not codify a specific approach

to license plate rates and other measures with cost-shifting ramifications but rather defer

to regional and state processes to establish guidelines within a region. PSNM is

concerned about the impact of the loss of existing contracts on its license plate rate

calculation. Manitoba Board is concerned about shifting costs to low-cost, transmission-
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -523-

dependent areas. Platte River does not want its low costs averaged with higher cost

systems. United Illuminating encourages the Commission to continue its flexibility in

permitting different approaches in the recovery of sunk costs. Aluminum Companies

argues that the Commission needs to offer more guidance on cost shifting and that rate

increases due to cost shifting should be constrained to the benefits involved. Further, cost

shifts should not be allowed unless competition is fostered.

Commission Conclusion

We conclude that the Commission should continue to provide flexibility with

respect to RTO proposals for allocation of fixed transmission cost recovery. The

Commission will permit RTO proposals to use license plate rates, as defined above, for

several reasons. First, commenters overwhelmingly support the use of license plate rates,

and demonstrated convincingly that problems associated with cost-shifting are not easily

resolved by means other than the use of license plate rates. Second, the Commission is

concerned that the potential for cost-shifting could act as an impediment to RTO

formation, thereby denying all stakeholders the benefits that come from RTO

membership.

Moreover, although license plate rates are not necessarily an ideal method for

fixed cost recovery, we note that all ISOs have sought approval from the Commission for

license plate rates, at least during their startup phase. No commenter has provided

convincing evidence that the use of license plate rates by existing ISOs produces
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -524-

significant harms, although several commenters suggest various rate designs, including

multi-part rates, as alternatives to license plate rates.

Although commenters overwhelmingly support the use of license plate rates, they

are split on whether such rates should be used only for a transitional period, or whether

the Commission should allow them as a permanent feature. This is a difficult issue. On

the one hand, we are reluctant to require RTOs to suspend use of license plate rates after

some arbitrary date certain at which time they will be required to transition to single

system access rates; on the other hand, we are reluctant to announce generically that

license plate rates may be a permanent feature of an RTO. Furthermore, the use of

license plate rates could depend on idiosyncratic facts, e.g., the geographic makeup of the

RTO, or the transmission cost differences in various subregions of the RTO. 

We therefore believe that it is appropriate to allow RTOs to propose the use of

license plate rates for a fixed term of the RTO's choosing. However, RTOs that propose

the use of license plate rates must make clear how transmission expansion will be priced,

that is, whether license plate rates or some other mechanism will be applied to the cost of

new transmission facilities, and how such pricing affects incentives for efficient

expansion. In addition, we will require that before the end of the fixed term, the RTO

must complete an evaluation of fixed cost recovery policies based on the factual situation

of the particular RTO, and file with the Commission its recommendations on any changes

that should be instituted. We emphasize that we are not requiring that the RTO continue
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -525-

625FERC Stats. and Regs. ¶ 32,541 at 33,742.

or abandon the use of license plate rates at that time, but we will require the RTO to

justify its choice to continue or discontinue using license plate rates, or otherwise change

the method for fixed cost recovery. We believe that this approach provides participants

in RTOs significant flexibility, and is consistent with the principles articulated in the

open architecture requirement for RTOs.

4. Congestion Pricing

Congestion pricing and congestion management are closely related. Comments on

these issues have been treated jointly, and are summarized above in the discussion of

congestion management.

Commission Conclusion

With respect to congestion pricing, the Commission emphasized that it intends to

be flexible in reviewing pricing innovations, and sought comments on what specific

requirements, if any, best suited the Commission's RTO goals. A number of commenters

agreed with the Commission's conclusion in the NOPR that "markets that are based on

locational marginal pricing and financial rights for transmission provide a sound

framework for efficient congestion management." 625

We reemphasize the basic principles for congestion pricing articulated in the

NOPR, i.e., that proposals should "ensure that the generators that are dispatched in the
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -526-

626Id. at 33,754-55.

627Id. at 33,759.

presence of transmission constraints must be those that can serve system loads at least

cost, and limited transmission capacity should be used by market participants that value

that use most highly." 626

We recognize that congestion pricing, especially when complex problems

associated with parallel path flows are addressed, is in its infancy. Rather than prescribe

a specific method, we encourage experimentation with reasonable congestion

management techniques. We would expect that such experiments be consistent with the

open architecture requirements of the rule, and that information from such experiments be

made widely available to all interested parties, so that other RTOs can learn from each

others' experience.

5. Service to Transmission-Owning Utilities That Do Not

Participate in an RTO

The Commission asked commenters to discuss the treatment by an RTO of a nonparticipating transmission owner in a region if the transmission owner does not

participate in its region’s RTO. 627 For example, we asked whether it would be

appropriate to allow RTO members to provide transmission service at individual system

rates to non-participating transmission owners located in the RTO region thereby denying

non-participants the benefits of non-pancaked transmission rates.
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -527-

628Montana-Dakota, Allegheny, PG&E, Tri-State, PNGC and Empire District.

Comments

Of those commenters that generally support the proposed strategy, most argue that

non-participants should not enjoy the benefits of non-pancaked rates. 628 PG&E submits

that the reasoning the Commission applied in Order No. 888 applies here (i.e., in Order

No. 888, the Commission rejected the claim that a reciprocity requirement required

explicit Commission jurisdiction over the transmission customer finding that, as a matter

of fairness, a public utility providing open access through a non-discriminatory tariff

deserved the right to obtain comparable access over the transmission systems of its

customers). Empire District is particularly concerned that utilities on the border of an

RTO may receive many advantages of the RTO without accepting any of the burdens of

participation, yet at the same time make it more difficult for competitors to service its

load by staying out of the RTO.

Other commenters are conditional in their support. For example, Oneok wants the

Commission to draw a hard line on non-participation and be willing to employ negative

incentives; however, Oneok points out that denial of non-pancaked rates will be more

costly to marketers and consumers. South Carolina Authority suggests that the

Commission consider the extent to which the transmission owner is actually able to

participate in an RTO before permitting denial of RTO service under non-pancaked rates. 
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -528-

In the case of publicly owned utilities, there may be restrictions in the enabling act or

charter, the applicable state constitution or the utility's bond covenant that effectively

prohibit it from participating in a particular RTO. This would also apply if the RTO is

not the product of the "region's RTO" involving all stakeholders in the designated region

but is a business entity designed to advance the financial objectives of particular

sponsors. Similarly, SPRA argues that, in the event that it is unable to immediately join

an RTO, the RTO should recognize that SPRA has an OATT that provides for

comparable treatment to the RTO. And New Smyrna Beach states that, although denial

of non-pancaked rates to nonparticipants has merit, it may be a moot issue in Florida

where FP&L's transmission is so extensive that pancaked rates would be a more costly

alternative for marketers and consumers of electricity.

 Other commenters believe the proposal is a flawed concept or otherwise oppose

it. Avista and PPC argue that it is not appropriate to allow an RTO to provide

transmission service at individual system rates to non-participating transmission owners

as such a policy would deny them the benefits of non-pancaked rates and defeat the

central goal of its proposal. Metropolitan concurs that non-participating transmission

owners should share in the benefits of non-pancaked rates. Southern Company and

CP&L claim that the Commission cannot punish utilities that find it in the best interests

of their stakeholders not to join an RTO. SMUD believes that RTOs must provide

nondiscriminatory access to transmission it controls at cost-based rates to all customers,
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -529-

since they contribute to the RTO’s cost recovery. SMUD argues that the Commission,

through its NOPR has, in essence, found that pancaked rates are not just and reasonable

and that they should be corrected; thus, the Commission cannot allow an RTO to charge

pancaked rates in violation of the FPA section 205 prohibition on unjust or unreasonable

rates.

Snohomish, Turlock, Big Rivers and Dairyland all make similar arguments–

charging higher pancaked rates to utilities that do not participate in the RTO is patently

unfair, violates the Commission’s duty to eliminate discriminatory rates, and would

penalize consumers of customer-owned utilities who have no practicable choice about

whether to participate in the RTO. Dairyland says that this could open the door to

creation of RTOs that purposely do not accommodate non-public utilities. SRP posits

that imposition of pancaked rates on non-participants in an RTO would effectively turn

the Commission's stated policy goal of voluntary participation into an RTO mandate

inviting years of litigation. 

Two state commissions question the effectiveness of pancaked rate sanctions

against non-participants. Indiana Commission contends that a recalcitrant utility may not

perceive pancaked rates as detrimental and may not feel compelled to join an RTO. 

Illinois Commission feels that imposition of penalties involving restricted access to RTO

transmission rates would either be self-defeating for the Commission or detrimental to the

electricity consumers of the affected utility. In its view, the solution to this conundrum is
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -530-

629824 F.2d 981, 1024 (D.C. Cir. 1987).

630574 F.2d 610, 620 (D.C. Cir. 1978).

for the Commission to abandon its unworkable voluntary approach to RTO participation,

and utilize its authority under FPA sections 205 and 206 and examine its authority under

FPA sections 202(a), 211 and 212 to mandate participation. However, Nevada

Commission submits that the Commission must ensure that a transmission-owning utility

that refuses to join an RTO should not be allowed to derive any economic benefit from

the existence of RTOs.

ISO commenters have diverse views on this issue. Desert STAR argues that a

blanket ban on prohibiting a party that does not join an RTO from deriving any benefit

from the RTO whatsoever may be too broad an approach. NYPP, citing Associated Gas

Distributors v. FERC 629 and Richmond Power & Light v. FERC 630 for the proposition

that the Commission cannot achieve indirectly what it cannot do directly, submit that the

Commission cannot impose any coercive measure on or deny benefits to utilities that do

not participate in an RTO. In addition, NY ISO argues that previously approved ISO's

transmission-owning members should be eligible for whatever RTO participation

incentives and benefits are ultimately adopted in this proceeding. On the other hand,

PJM/NEPOOL Customers support denial of non-pancaked transmission rates to

nonparticipants.
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -531-

Canadian entities generally oppose imposition of pancaked rates against nonparticipants. Canada DNR contends that a decision not to participate in an international

RTO by a Canadian jurisdiction should not place entities in that jurisdiction engaged in

trade with the U.S. at a disadvantage relative to U.S. RTO participants. BC Hydro

concurs that the decision to join an RTO should not be made a prerequisite for

participation of Canadian provincial utilities or their affiliates to participate in the U.S.

electricity market. CEA observes, however, that Canadian utilities see access to the U.S.

market as a significant business opportunity that requires a transparent and open bulk

transmission system operating in both directions. Grand Council et al. submits, however, 

that applying no penalties or incentives to Canadian utilities, while giving them unfettered

access to U.S. markets without being subject to corresponding obligations, is inconsistent

with the RTO concept. And H.Q. Energy Services submits that, if the Commission

decides not to require RTO participation, it should strongly encourage voluntary

participation by denying certain benefits such as the use of the system-wide tariff to

nonparticipants.

Commission Conclusion

Regarding the question raised in the NOPR about whether a non-participating

transmission owner in an RTO region should receive all the benefits of the RTO in its

region, we share the concerns of most commenters that transmitting utilities may receive

the benefits of an RTO in its region without accepting any of the burdens of participation
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -532-

in the RTO. Accordingly, where a transmission customer of an RTO or the customer's

affiliate owns, controls or operates transmission in the RTO's region, and is not

participating in that particular RTO, we intend to permit that RTO to propose rates,

terms, and conditions of transmission service that recognize the participatory status of the

customer.

We do not intend that every such proposal will necessarily be accepted by the

Commission. Each RTO must justify any proposal on a case-by-case basis. The proposal

should recognize the various situations of non-participating transmission owners. As

pointed out by commenters, some transmission owners may face legal obstacles to

participation that may need to be taken into account in the proposal.

It is not our intent to permit an RTO to apply such a proposal to a nonparticipating transmission owner in another region. As discussed above, Empire District

expressed concern about whether this provision would apply to a non-participating owner

"on the border" of an RTO. We would permit an RTO to argue that the non-participant

should be part of its RTO region based on engineering or other objective criteria. 

An RTO will provide several benefits for parties in the region, including

elimination of individual system rates. We asked in the NOPR whether it would "be

appropriate to allow RTO members to provide transmission service at individual system

rates to non-participating transmission owners located in the RTO region." (emphasis
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -533-

631 FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 32,541 at 33,759.

632Id. at 33,755.

added) 631 SMUD argues that the Commission in its NOPR has found, in effect, that

individual system rates are not just and reasonable and so cannot allow transmissionowning utilities in an RTO to charge individual system rates.

SMUD is incorrect. We have not made a generic determination that individual

system rates are not just and reasonable in an RTO region. A non-participating public

utility transmission owner in an RTO region may itself file a single company rate and

argue that it is just and reasonable for use by its neighbors who join the RTO.

Instead of making a generic determination about these matters, we will permit an

RTO and its transmission-owning public utility members to make the case that it is just

and reasonable to charge individual system rates to a transmission customer who is a nonparticipating transmission owner in its RTO region. We will decide each RTO proposal

on its merits.

6. Performance-Based Rate Regulation

The NOPR suggested that, once RTOs are formed, performance based regulation

(PBR) can facilitate good grid operation. 632 We noted that PBR can incorporate

price/revenue caps, price incentives, or performance standards. The NOPR sought

comments on how PBR should be applied to an RTO and whether it should be voluntary.

Comments
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -534-

633See, e.g., EPSA, PJM, Los Angeles, Georgia Transmission, Illinois

Commission, PacifiCorp and Desert STAR.

634See, e.g., Florida Power Corp., MidAmerican, Tri-State, FirstEnergy, Alliance

Companies, Duke and PGE.

The vast majority of commenters favor PBR of some form to promote efficient

operations by RTOs. 633 And most commenters that favor PBR specifically state that

PBR should be voluntary for RTO participants. 634

Professor Joskow recommends that the Commission promote the view that PBR

will eventually be required. He suggests that there is sufficient experience with PBR,

such as in England and Wales. He argues that PBR should be based on a standard price

cap that focuses not only on direct transmission service costs, but also focuses on the cost

of congestion management, losses, ancillary services, reactive power, and connection of

new generators. EEI notes that a price cap, based on a reasonable ROE revenue

requirement, is the most widely used method. EEI argues that price caps reduce rate

cases, give an incentive to improve productivity, and share productivity savings with

customers. Brattle Group does not propose a specific PBR scheme but says that, at this

point, approval should be case-by-case. Care should be taken that a PBR is not based on

a single element, causing distortions elsewhere.

Other supporters have specific comments regarding the implementation of PBR. 

Entergy recommends that the Commission provide more specific guidance on the use of

PBR. DOE warns that PBR should not be allowed to prevent a PMA that is a part of an
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -535-

RTO to under-recover its revenue requirement. New Smyrna Beach and Oneok only

support PBR if there is a downside as well as an upside potential associated with

transmission performance. Allegheny states that the Commission must settle on a

definition of performance, the performance criterion should be economic reliability, the

owner must have an opportunity to recover investment, the Commission should recognize

that some aspects of performance will be outside of the control of the RTO, and the

particular PBR rate calculation should be considered on a case-by-case basis.

A number of commenters recommend that PBR not be instituted immediately upon

the formation of the RTO. California Board, Trans-Elect, and WPSC maintain that time

is needed to establish base year benchmarks. PG&E and APPA say that PBR should be

set aside until the RTO is up and functioning and Arkansas Consumers and Wyoming

Commission argue that the RTO should first demonstrate that it can and will provide

reliable and non-discriminatory service before PBR is established.

At least eight commenters were opposed to PBR for RTOs as a Commission

policy. Industrial Consumers, Williams, and CMUA do not think that PBR can be

effective in promoting efficiency in the operation of RTOs. Salomon Smith Barney and

East Texas Cooperatives believe that RTOs will be able to game the system and take

advantage of PBR. PJM/NEPOOL Customers, Lincoln, and NASUCA argue that PBR

should not be allowed for RTOs because they are unnecessary. NASUCA is also

skeptical of PBR for RTOs because some areas where performance is important are not
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -536-

635See, e.g., APPA, Minnesota Power and CMUA.

under the RTO's control. NJBUS argues that PBR will not put a stop to transmission

discrimination.

NEPCO et al. disagree with those commenters who oppose PBR. 635 PBR is

effective, as shown in the United Kingdom, and they are not "bribes" given freely to

transmission owners. Enron/APX/Coral Power does not agree with NASUCA and

California Board that there is not enough experience on which to base PBR. According

to Enron/APX/Coral Power, there is a large amount of experience in regulating

transmission plus a lot of experience with the ramifications of EPAct.

A few additional commenters neither strongly support nor oppose PBR, but offer

specific comments about PBR use. Project Groups recommends that the Commission

construct a way to de-couple revenues from transmission rates so that efficient

transmission service rather than total throughput determines revenue. Florida

Commission states that questions as to the advisability and particulars of a PBR

mechanism should be left to regional solutions that have the endorsement of the state

regulatory bodies. Big Rivers states that PBR is inappropriate for cooperatives and public

power utilities. WEPCO believes that RTOs should be not-for-profit and that PBR

should be available only to the for-profit transmission owner. Metropolitan is concerned
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -537-

636See, e.g., Paul Joskow and Richard Schmalensee, Incentive Regulation for

Electric Utilities, Yale Journal of Regulation, Vol. 4 at 1-49 (1986); Sanford Berg and

Rajiv Sharma, Techniques for Assessing Firm Efficiency, University of Florida Public

Utilities Research Center Working Paper (June 1999); Peter Navarro, Seven Basic Rules

for the PBR Regulator, Electricity Journal at 24-30 (April 1996); G. Alan Comnes,

Steven Stoft, et al., Six Useful Observations for Designers of PBR Plans, Electricity

Journal at 16-23 (April 1996); Lorenzo Brown and Ingo Vogelsang, Incentive Regulation:

a Research Report, Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, Office of Economic Policy,

Technical Report 89-3 (1989); and Jean-Jacques Laffont and Jean Tirole, A Theory of

Incentives in Procurement and Regulation, MIT Press (1993).

637The Policy Statement articulated five regulatory standards: (1) incentive

ratemaking must be prospective; (2) participation must be voluntary; (3) incentive

mechanisms must be understood by all parties; (4) benefits to consumers must be

quantifiable; and 5) quality of service must be maintained.

that PBR might cause RTOs to neglect needed expansions and upgrades and jeopardize

reliability.

Commission Conclusion

At the outset, we think it is important to emphasize that PBR is far from a new

concept. Over the last 10 to 20 years, a significant amount of research, primarily by

economists, has been done regarding the conceptual basis of, and efficient designs for,

PBR. 636 This research addresses its use in the electric utility industry as well as other

regulated industries. It is also important to note that the Commission has been receptive

to PBR proposals, at least since issuance of the Policy Statement on Incentive Regulation

in October 1992. In that Policy Statement, we provided guidance to public utilities as

well as natural gas and oil pipelines considering proposing some form of PBR. 637

Although the Policy Statement invited public utilities to develop and file incentive
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -538-

638We note that PBR mechanisms have been widely used by state regulators and

the FCC as applied to the U.S. telecommunications industry. See, e.g., John Kwoka,

Implementing Price Caps in Telecommunications, Journal of Policy Analysis and

Management, Vol 12, No 4 at 726-52 (1993).

regulation proposals, the Commission has not received any proposals from public

utilities. 638

The Commission's current interest in PBR stems from the proposition that PBR

will allow the Commission to rely on market-like forces, to the maximum extent possible,

to create incentives for RTOs to efficiently operate and invest in the transmission system. 

This does not mean that we expect that transmission services will be provided in

competitive markets any time soon, or at all. We recognize that transmission service will

retain most or perhaps all of the characteristics of a natural monopoly for the foreseeable

future, and that some type of explicit price regulation will therefore be required to prevent

monopoly abuse. But we believe that PBR, especially if accompanied by explicit and

well-designed incentives, may provide significant benefits over traditional forms of costof-service regulation. We believe this view of PBR is entirely consistent with other

initiatives taken by the Commission, such as Order Nos. 888 and 889, to promote

competitive power markets, and given the impracticality of competitive transmission

markets, to rely on market-like forces to the maximum extent possible.

Before providing further specificity on PBR, it is useful to restate the overarching

concerns of commenters. A large number of commenters support the use of PBR, and
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -539-

639 Professor Joskow at ES-iv.

many of them, as discussed above, believe that PBR and other forms of incentive

regulation will significantly enhance the incentives RTOs have to make efficient

operating and investment decisions. For example, Professor Joskow notes:

It is very important for the Commission to adopt regulatory mechanisms

that provide transmission owners and operators with powerful economic

incentives to operate transmission networks efficiently and to invest the

resources necessary to expand their capabilities efficiently. These

incentives should be an integral component of a performance-based

regulatory (PBR) framework for the regulation of transmission rates that

rewards transmission owners for achieving these objectives and penalizes

them for failing to do so. [639]

On the other hand, a somewhat smaller group of commenters, mostly transmission

customers, oppose the use of PBR. They express doubts about whether PBR will provide

good incentives for RTOs to operate and invest efficiently. They are also concerned that

PBR design is so difficult that RTOs will easily game the system, which will likely result

in higher revenues for RTOs and therefore higher prices for transmission services for all

transmission customers.

Commenters describe a wide array of PBR mechanisms, including some relatively

unsophisticated proposals and others which are analytically complex. For example, a

number of commenters have proposed that the Commission entertain transmission rate

moratoriums, e.g., where transmission rates are locked into their current levels for a

limited period of years. To the extent the transmission provider can achieve any
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -540-

transmission costs savings, these would be retained by the transmission provider. In this

sense, it falls within the concept of PBR.

It is argued that this rate treatment may promote the establishment of independent

transmission companies because it provides the certain revenue stream that is needed to

obtain financing for the purchase of transmission systems from existing owners. It is also

argued that this approach is analogous to a hold harmless commitment for existing

customers which may simplify the efforts of those state regulators who value transmission

rate certainty during their conversion to retail choice. This approach would also reduce

litigation at the Commission during the moratorium. Finally, if the rate level selected

takes into account the existing transmission component of bundled retail power rates, it

addresses the concern expressed by many that one deterrent to participation in RTOs is

the fear and uncertainty that transferring retail transmission services from state to

Commission jurisdiction leads to reduced revenues. 

Other commenters suggest that the essence of PBR is to set cost and performance

benchmarks and then reward or penalize an RTO based on performance relative to those

targets. Clearly, such an approach presents significant analytical challenges. Ideally, an

RTO's cost and operating performance can be compared with other, similar entities. One

benefit of setting such targets is that it overcomes the asymmetric information problem,

i.e., a transmission service provider will usually have better knowledge of the potential
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -541-

640We note that there have been some early attempts to compare the relative cost

and performance of ISOs in the U.S. See, e.g., California ISO, "A Comparative Analysis

of Operating ISOs in the United States" (Oct. 15, 1998).

efficiency gains than will regulators. Benchmarking performance helps reduce the

information imbalance. 640

We have carefully considered all of the comments about PBR. We conclude that

the Commission should encourage RTOs to consider use of PBR, although we recognize

the difficult analytical challenges that RTOs will face. To facilitate such consideration,

we are providing additional specificity on PBR. We address several threshold procedural

issues, and articulate additional design principles that should provide a framework for

RTO consideration of PBR.

A first threshold issue is whether the Commission should require that RTOs use

PBR or whether it should be voluntary. There is almost no support for making PBR

mandatory, and we therefore will not require RTO filings to include PBR proposals,

although we encourage such proposals.

A second threshold issue is what types of RTOs are eligible for PBR. As

discussed above, some commenters argue that PBR is not appropriate for cooperativelyowned and publicly-owned transmission owning utilities. Similarly, other commenters

argue that PBR is appropriate only for profit-making RTOs. We conclude that, although

the application of PBR may vary according to the type of RTO, there is no reason to limit
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -542-

641For example, PJM states that it can facilitate the application of PBRs to its

transmission owners by using the stakeholder process to set the performance parameters

and, once the parameters are in place, to independently evaluate the transmission owners'

performance and apply the PBR. 

the applicability of PBR to certain members or types of RTOs. The Commission

welcomes RTO filings with PBR proposals from any source. For example, in the context

of an ISO or a tiered ISO/transco that has been described by some commenters, the

activities that contribute to performance may be shared between the RTO and the

transmission owners. This does not invalidate the use of PBRs; however, the RTO design

would simply ensure that the rewards and penalties associated with activities performed

by transmission owners flow through to the owners to achieve the desired result. 641 In

addition, we see no impediment to the use of PBR to provide incentives for efficient

behavior by non-profit RTOs. We note that some existing ISOs have in place

performance incentives for some of their managers, and such an incentive scheme may

have application for RTOs which do not own the transmission assets they control.

A third threshold issue is how PBR proposals will be formulated and when they

will be filed. The Commission recognizes that PBR design involves highly complicated

issues, and that there is the possibility that a bad PBR proposal can result in lower quality

transmission service, at higher costs, compared with service that might prevail under

traditional ratemaking practices. One key element in the process of designing a PBR

proposal would be to ensure adequate input from all stakeholders. We believe that the
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -543-

642As noted infra, this is one of the pricing reforms that will be available for a

defined transition period during which RTOs are being established.

best PBR designs will emerge when all stakeholders have an opportunity for input, even

if a filed PBR design does not represent full consensus. We therefore conclude that

RTOs that wish to implement PBR need not necessarily file the PBR proposal at the time

the RTO makes its compliance filing if more time is needed to negotiate among

stakeholders the details of a well-designed PBR. Some commenters suggest that an

additional consideration in allowing delayed filings of PBR is the need to evaluate

operating experience of the RTO before appropriate benchmark measures for PBR can be

developed.

The Commission also believes it is appropriate to provide additional specificity on

what constitutes good PBR design. We continue to endorse the regulatory standards

included in the Incentive Regulation Policy Statement, described above. And we note

that in some regions, certain types of PBR mechanisms may be better suited than others. 

For example, where there are already state-imposed rate moratoriums, continuation of

such programs after RTO formation may be an appropriate PBR approach. Alternatively,

a transmission rate moratorium based on the existing rate level may be appropriate for a

transitional period during RTO formation. 642 Similarly, in an area that has experience

with a particular performance-based mechanism, extension and perhaps refinement of

such a program after RTO formation may be the most appropriate policy.
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -544-

643We note that a PBR system that uses a variant of price cap regulation of the

National Grid Company has been in use for nine years in England and Wales. More

recently, the price cap has been combined with a separate incentive mechanism that

focused on reducing congestion on the grid. Since this is the longest-running PBR

targeted to grid operations, we encourage any RTO that intends to propose PBR to

examine the strengths and weaknesses of the British approach.

We encourage RTOs to file fully documented PBR proposals that are consistent

with the amended regulatory text. PBR proposals should include a detailed explanation

of how the PBR mechanism will work, as well as all of the information necessary for the

Commission and all market participants to evaluate the benefits and costs of

implementing the PBR mechanism. 

Based on the comments we received in this docket, as well as our understanding of

international 643 and state experience with incentive regulation, we expand on the

considerations for PBR addressed in the amended regulatory text by offering the

following additional principles for RTOs to consider in designing PBR proposals. 

PBR should not be applied piecemeal. To the extent possible, PBR programs

should focus on the entire operation of the RTO, rather than smaller parts of the

operation. Commenters caution that PBR programs that focus narrowly, e.g., only on the

cost aspects of RTO operations, may result in inattention by the RTO to the quality of

service offered. Similarly, a focus on only one aspect of costs, e.g., short-run costs, may

result in reduced costs for that single aspect, but higher total costs for the RTO.
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -545-

PBR should encompass both rewards and penalties. Although some PBR designs

employ either rewards or penalties, but not both, most commenters suggest, and the

Commission agrees, that the most effective and most fair designs will likely encompass

both. One rationale for this is that it is not always clear what incentives an RTO will

respond to, and therefore the prospect of higher revenues as well as the threat of lower

revenues may induce an RTO to provide the best possible performance. An additional

rationale is that under the FPA, the Commission is required to set rates for transmission

service at just and reasonable levels. To the extent that rates may vary within a

range–both up and down–as a function of RTO performance, this statutory requirement

may be better satisfied.

PBR rewards and penalties should create incentives for an RTO to make efficient

operating and investment decisions, and should not compromise system reliability. A

significant concern in any PBR application is the possibility that incentives will distort

RTO decisionmaking. For example, commenters caution that an RTO may manage

congestion through a combination of generation redispatch and investment in

transmission infrastructure, and that poorly designed PBR mechanisms could distort RTO

decision-making toward the most profitable, rather than the least-cost, solution, or toward

an approach that inappropriately reduces system reliability. An additional concern is that

PBR mechanisms may create bias with respect to the trade-off between investment in
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -546-

generation and transmission, or in siting generation and transmission facilities in the most

efficient places on the grid.

The benefits of PBR should be shared between the RTO and its customers. The

Commission believes that as a matter of fairness, the efficiency gains occasioned by PBR

should be shared. This will involve difficult analytical issues, including identifying

efficiency gains, measuring them, and determining the effect of sharing such gains on the

strength of the incentives faced by the RTO. The Commission does not believe it would

be appropriate to specify the exact distribution of such gains, as such a decision is better

left to negotiation by all stakeholders.

To the extent possible, the rewards and penalties should be prescribed in advance

based on known and measurable benchmarks. PBR designs involve an inevitable tradeoff between simplicity and administrative ease on the one hand, and the potential benefits

of the program. Although relatively simple designs such as rate freezes provide

significant incentives for an RTO to reduce its costs, they produce relatively limited

incentives to maintain reliability, promote service quality, or manage congestion. PBR

mechanisms that benchmark an RTO's performance, either to its own historical 

performance, to industry performance indices, to some normative goal, or to a

combination of these, may be designed to provide incentives for more efficient operation

and investment decision-making. The Commission recognizes that designing

sophisticated PBR mechanisms will be a significant challenge for RTOs already
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -547-

644Alternatively, the RTO could seek guidance in a more formal proceeding, e.g.,

if an RTO files a petition for a declaratory order seeking approval of its PBR proposal. 

645FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 32,541 at 33,755.

646Id. at 33,756.

grappling with other development issues. The Commission, therefore, will make its staff

available through our pre-filing process to work with RTOs to help identify and resolve

issues on an informal basis prior to their filing a PBR proposal. 644

7. Other RTO Transmission Ratemaking Reforms

The Commission proposed in the NOPR to consider innovative pricing proposals

for transmission owners who turn over control of their transmission facilities to an

RTO. 645 The types of pricing that the Commission proposed to consider include: a

higher ROE on transmission plant; allowing the transmission owner to retain the benefits

of cost saving attributable to RTO formation; acceleration of transmission cost recovery

in rates; non-traditional valuation of transmission assets such as an estimate of

replacement costs for assets purchased at higher than net original cost; and liberalized

allowance of levelized or non-levelized rate methods. The Commission proposed that

transmission owners meet all of the requirements to become an RTO before an innovative

pricing proposal is accepted. 646
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -548-

647While we used the term incentive pricing in the NOPR, this term is an

imprecise description of the various transmission pricing reforms that will be addressed in

this Rule, and we now describe these pricing reforms as innovative rate proposals. 

However, the comments sections that follow continue to use the term incentive because

the parties used this term in their comments. 

648See, e.g., Avista, TEP, Duquesne, APS, NEPCO et al., Florida Power Corp.

Comments

A large number of commenters addressed the Commission's proposals to consider

transmission pricing reforms for RTOs. About 30 commenters expressed support, and

about 30 commenters expressed opposition. There were also a number of comments

which did not explicitly support or oppose this aspect of the NOPR.

Supporting Innovative Pricing 

647

Of the commenters that support innovative pricing, a common theme is that if

RTO formation is to be voluntary, incentives are required to encourage participation. 648

For example, Justice Department recommends that the positive and negative incentives be

designed to secure universal compliance rather than have some utilities not participate

because the advantage of continuing outside of the RTO is greater than the incentive to

join. EEI supports incentives since RTO formation will probably not generate increased

earnings for transmission owners since most of the efficiencies will be a benefit to others. 

EEI suggests that an application for RTO formation and incentives should include some

assessment of the benefits from which the incentives are generated but a precise

calculation of benefits should not be required because of the extreme difficulty in making
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -549-

such an estimate. PacifiCorp is in favor of incentives but is concerned that a "case by

case" consideration of incentives may jeopardize their realization because customers will

call for lower transmission rates in the short term once the RTO has been formed. 

PacifiCorp argues that a more detailed uniform policy on incentives "up front" is

preferred.

On the other hand, several commenters suggest that the Commission should

consider incentives only on a case-by-case basis. Desert STAR says that different RTOs

may need different sets of incentives as will public power transmission owners. 

MidAmerican supports case-by-case consideration of incentives to join an RTO, and

favors a higher ROE reflecting the fact that transmission is not limited to selling to a

captive customer base in a bundled context but is serving a wholesale marketplace at

greater risk. Duke is in favor of incentives for transmission expansion, but cautions that

incentives should not bias investment and other decisions, should be considered on a

case-by-case basis, and may not be very effective where operation is separated from

ownership. Oregon Office is in favor of incentives for meeting all of the RTO

characteristics and functions faster than the industry average, but not for average speed in

accomplishing RTO formation.

A number of commenters favor offering incentives to public utilities that are

already members of an ISO as well as to provide incentives for public utilities to join an

RTO. For example, PJM says that incentive rates should be offered to new and existing
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -550-

RTO members to reflect the benefits generated and to prevent inefficient consequences

such as transmission owners moving from an existing ISO to a new RTO to receive

incentive rates. PSE&G favors a correspondingly higher ROE and faster depreciation of

transmission assets for transmission owners who participate in RTOs, including those

who have already joined an existing organization. LG&E says that incentive plans can be

useful in promoting RTO participation and that existing members of RTOs should be

allowed to propose incentive rates as well. LG&E stresses that it is just as important not

to enact policies on rates that might jeopardize revenue requirement recovery and thus act

as a disincentive. An additional consideration is offered by PP&L Companies which

argues that existing participants in RTOs should be allowed the same incentive rates as

those which are just forming because the benefits of an existing RTO are greater than

those of a start-up RTO not yet in operation.

The proposed incentive addressed most frequently by commenters is allowing a

higher rate of return on transmission assets. Georgia Transmission believes that higher

ROEs as an incentive to voluntarily join an RTO is appropriate because of the benefits

that participation would bring. NSP and others argue that ROE must be sufficient to

attract capital and compensate utilities for the risks involved. Conectiv and EEI argue

that the current rate of return policy should be modified, arguing that the DCF method

gives results that are too low to provide adequate returns to transmission owners causing

a reduction in building at a time when more transmission is critically needed. According
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -551-

to Conectiv, the DCF method should be abandoned or its application should be modified

to account for the current industry situation and be more reflective of conditions in the

general economy and reflect reasonable transmission asset lives. Cinergy, in reply

comments contends that the record in this proceeding is sufficient to establish a

presumption of reasonableness for higher ROEs.

SoCal Edison does not believe that pure incentives in the form of ROE "awards"

are necessary for encouraging participation in RTO but it does argue that higher returns

may be justified on transmission assets controlled by an RTO because the original owner

no longer has control over planning and expansion decisions. In addition, distributed

generation and bypass may be found to increase risk. SoCal Edison says that it is very

important to prevent the move to RTO control from being a financial loss due to

Commission rate setting or because of greater risk and higher costs. SoCal Edison does

agree with the proposal to allow accelerated depreciation of transmission assets to

encourage participation.

 TXU Electric is in favor of consideration of higher ROEs for RTO participants

and thinks it is more important to take a more global look at transmission ROEs in a new

and uncertain industry environment where transmission investment is important. TXU

Electric warns that it would be inappropriate to penalize RTO participation with reduced

earning potential because unbundled transmission ROEs are lower than ROEs allowed in

bundled rates. Conlon suggests that the Commission could allow a higher return on
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -552-

assets of a transco or ISO to serve as an incentive for IOUs to transfer ownership. 

Southern Company explains that there are major tax consequences to the sale of

transmission assets to form a transco and recommends that the Commission find ways to

accommodate such a transition. As to rate incentives, Southern Company advocates a

change in the Commission's ratemaking policy in order to increase returns to be more

commensurate with non-regulated businesses. Southern claims that recent court rulings

support higher returns on transmission service.

A number of commenters argue that participation in an RTO increases financial

risk, and that incentives are therefore required to encourage RTO participation. For

example, Empire District says that turning over control of transmission assets to an RTO

increases the risk because someone else will control their operation, justifying higher

ROEs for participation. PSE&G argues that a stand-alone transmission company or an

RTO is more risky than an integrated electric utility where transmission was a strategic

asset. FirstEnergy justifies higher ROEs by noting a number of sources of risk, including

emergence of distributed generation, vulnerability of firms that are less diversified than

integrated utilities, and quicker phase out of older generation plants which may result in

stranding some transmission plants. Midwest ISO argues that RTO membership may

cause a loss in earnings due to reduced transmission revenues, higher costs, and

operational risks. United Illuminating believes that risk for transmission investment is

higher for assets controlled by an RTO and that accelerated depreciation is warranted
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -553-

because transmission companies can no longer count on captive customers, and industry

changes have the possibility to abandon transmission plant before its physical life is over. 

WPSC is in favor of higher ROEs for transmission owners who join RTOs but not as a

pure incentive. WPSC's justification for higher ROEs would be the greater risk due to

removal of pancaked rates, new generation options, loss of higher state returns, and new

technologies. WPSC supports the other rate incentives as long as the benefits exceed the

costs based on careful examination.

Some commenters address the broad range of proposed incentives. For example:

• Trans-Elect argues in favor of incentives to include: acquisition premiums,

hypothetical capital structures, higher ROE, accelerated recovery of costs, rate

moratoriums, and expedited FPA section 205 and 203 approvals. Trans-Elect

would limit incentives to those that do not harm transmission customers. It notes

that PBRs would allow transmission owners to share in cost savings but some

operating history may be needed before they are put in place. It argues that

acquisition premiums may assist in the formation of independent transcos, and

suggests that if there is a rate moratorium in place, RTOs should be allowed to

recover acquisition premiums after the moratorium.

• FirstEnergy advocates flow through of cost savings to owners, non-traditional

valuation of assets, flexibility in the use of levelized rate methodology, retention of

hourly non-firm revenues, deference to management in dispute resolution,
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -554-

649See, e.g., AEP, United Illuminating, PP&L Companies, NU, Otter Tail, NYPP,

(continued...)

elimination of codes of conduct where there is structural separation, and

simplification of filing requirements. Some of these measures should be offered

on a limited basis to RTOs not yet meeting all of the characteristics and functions. 

Incentive plans should weigh costs versus benefits. Cal DWR goes further, saying

that incentives should not be allowed until benefits are actually proven.

• Los Angeles recommends that the Commission consider several options for the

valuation of assets transferred to an RTO in order to reflect the true value of the

assets to native load customers. Selected options to explore include: an up-front

acquisition premium used to moderate rates to native load customers, provide

native load customers a congestion premium, or grant native load customers an

exemption to congestion charges.

• NYPP is in favor of sufficient ROE to provide for expansion and accelerated

depreciation to compensate for increased risks as opposed to a "bonus" type

incentive to join an RTO. Its members contend that this type of incentive should

be available to all transmission owners, not just the ones who meet the NOPR's

characteristics and functions.

A number of commenters note that incentives are needed to facilitate efficient

expansion of transmission assets. 649 Transmission ISO Participants view the incentive
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -555-

649(...continued)

FirstEnergy, Transmission ISO Participants, Allegheny and Salomon Smith Barney.

650PJM/NEPOOL Customers, Lincoln, TDU Systems, APPA, WEPCO.

needed to induce new transmission construction as more important than incentives to

encourage RTO formation. IPCF suggests that FERC should offer transmission owners

incentives to expand their networks without meeting all of the requirements of becoming

an RTO in order to reverse the trend against building caused by Order No. 888. 

Williams says that decisions to expand transmission facilities must be made by for-profit

entities, must be driven by economic considerations, and the returns allowed must be

commensurate with the greater risks today, Williams cautions that returns for RTO

participants certainly should not be at a rate that results in a penalty.

Opposing Innovative Pricing

Many commenters oppose the use of incentives for many different reasons. One

common theme is that incentives are inappropriate because RTO participation should be

mandatory. 650 PJM/NEPOOL Customers argues that the Commission should mandate

RTO formation because of the transmission owners' duty to operate in an efficient

manner, and because transmission customers will likely pay the costs of the incentives. 

Ohio Commission prefers mandatory participation and questions whether the proposed

incentives will be effective. If incentives are used, Ohio Commission recommends that

the Commission consider evaluating which incentives will be effective, balancing
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -556-

incentives with disincentives, and recognize regional differences especially in arriving at

a solution for the Midwest.

Another common theme is that the costs of incentives may well outweigh the

benefits of RTO participation. Illinois Commission argues that if the Commission finds

that there are benefits in RTO creation, they should be mandatory. According to Illinois

Commission, the examples of incentives proposed in the NOPR, i.e., ROE enhancement,

revaluation of transmission facilities at replacement cost, accelerated depreciation, and

flexibility in use of levelized cost, would consist of money transfers to transmission

owners without contributing to cost control or efficiency. South Carolina Authority is

opposed to incentives or disincentives to promote RTO participation unless a factual

determination is made that they are absolutely necessary. Similarly, RECA is generally

opposed to incentives but would recommend their consideration if savings to the public

are well established. RECA finds the rate freeze proposal the least objectionable.

APPA advocates mandatory participation in RTOs and strongly objects to the use

of incentives to achieve participation. It argues incentives would be ineffective because

of the small proportion that Commission-regulated transmission makes up of the total

utility revenue compared to the value of transmission in maximizing generation and

merchant revenue. To be effective, APPA argues that the cost would be so large that it

would not be offset by the benefits of the RTO. Also, APPA raises the participation issue

of whether to give incentives to existing ISO members. Seattle warns against
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -557-

transmission owners "dumping" transmission facilities into an RTO to receive incentives

when those particular facilities are of no benefit to the RTO being formed.

Some commenters argue that it is inappropriate for the Commission to provide

incentives for the provision of a monopoly service. Metropolitan argues that incentives

should not be offered because many of the customers who pay for the incentives are the

same customers who paid for the original transmission facilities. TDU Systems argues

that ROEs for transmission service in an RTO is less risky because of the concentration

of monopoly business and the lack of any regulatory gap since all transmission under an

RTO will be regulated by the Commission. TDU Systems notes that transmission

entities, since they are monopolies, should not earn the same return as firms in other

industries. TDU Systems argues that other NOPR proposals, including rate freezes,

accelerated recovery of costs and investment, and revaluation of assets, are also an

inappropriate enrichment of transmission owners and are unneeded to attract investors. 

And TDU Systems argues that the proposal for an acquisition premium is troublesome

because customers have already been paying for these assets for years. TDU Systems

also suggests it will be difficult to calculate what level of incentives would be required to

persuade a transmission owner to participate in an RTO and the likelihood of offering a

greater incentive than is needed.

Some commenters suggest that providing incentives would violate the

Commission's statutory requirement to set rates at just and reasonable levels. NRECA
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -558-

believes that transmission owners should not be rewarded for unjust conduct with

incentives and that the Commission should rely on standard cost-of-service based rates. 

TAPS, which favors mandatory RTO formation, argues that incentives are unnecessary

and could nullify the benefits of electric industry restructuring. TAPS argues that

incentive rates, including each of the examples suggested in the NOPR, would violate

FPA's requirement for just and reasonable rates because they do not reflect the cost of

providing transmission service. TAPS does recommend that the Commission remedy

unintended disincentives such as utilities' fear of the unknown. UAMPS also favors

mandatory participation, and argues that incentives would unfairly raise transmission

costs to the benefit of monopoly transmission owners. UAMPS also argues that it is not

feasible to divide the benefit of RTO participation before these benefits are even known. 

In response to the comments of several IOUs, UAMPS argues that the claim that standalone transmission companies are more risky is unsubstantiated and should be heard in

another proceeding. NASUCA argues that EEI and others are incorrect in saying that the

DCF method does not produce reasonable results. According to NASUCA, the DCF

method takes explicit account of the transmission owners' risk and the realities of the

current regulatory climate.

Some commenters suggest that incentives will not necessarily increase RTO

participation, or will not necessarily produce the benefits which the NOPR describes. For

example, ICUA notes that incentives cannot be relied upon to achieve participation by all
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -559-

necessary utilities. WPPI opposes incentives to participate in RTOs citing the RTO

activity that has already taken place without incentives and the contention that the

Commission should designate boundaries and require participation within one year.

Wyoming Commission does not agree that increasing the ROE will be sufficient to

encourage more transmission building. According to Wyoming Commission, low

building activity may be attributable to difficulty in meeting siting requirements,

uncertainty related to retail access and native load, and competition for more localized

generation. Wyoming Commission does not think that the Commission should rush too

quickly into some innovative ratemaking before the industry has committed to making

RTOs work as planned. And the Wyoming Commission suggests that a higher ROE for

transmission investment may discourage a balanced consideration of options.

A number of commenters generally opposed incentives, believing that sanctions or

penalties against public utilities which do not join RTOs is superior to providing

incentives. NASUCA argues that mandates or disincentives for not joining at the time of

merger or market-based rate requests should be used rather than incentives. Incentives

would not be cost based and would therefore make rates unjust and unreasonable. As to

specific incentive proposals, NASUCA says that using replacement cost for transferred

assets would allow higher rates than necessary as an incentive and would charge

customers for assets they have already paid for. Such incentives could set off a

transmission sell-off in anticipation of an adjustment and some companies may refuse to
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -560-

651PJM Interconnection L.L.C., 88 FERC ¶ 61,109 (1999).

form transcos until they were granted the same adjustment as any other company. 

NASUCA is opposed to accelerated depreciation of assets for similar reasons. NASUCA

also states that incentive rates could harm electric competition by increasing transmission

costs. And Big Rivers states that the incentives proposed in the NOPR are inappropriate

for rural electric cooperatives.

Other Comments

A few commenters did not take an explicit position on the use of incentives, but

made general comments on the Commission's proposals. For example:

• Cal ISO is more concerned that there not be disincentives to RTO participation

than offering incentives. In particular, Cal ISO points out the disincentive created

by the Commission's annual fee policy, from which temporary relief was

granted651 but a permanent solution is needed.

• New Century recommends against the use of "remedial measures" to encourage

participation such as the suspension of market-based rate authority, denial of

merger authority, and denial of non-pancaked rate access to RTO facilities.

• Entergy says that the NOPR's statements on incentives are vague and would cause

too much regulatory uncertainty. Entergy asks the Commission to provide more

explicit provisions as to what incentives would be approved.
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -561-

652Note that these mechanisms are discussed below on a thematic basis, although

(continued...)

• Canada DNR is concerned that Canadian transmission owners not be placed at a

disadvantage for non-participation in an RTO in terms of incentives and

disincentive.

• SRP supports incentives as long as they are applied to both public power entities

and investor owned companies equitably.

• Metropolitan contends that it would not receive much benefit from any incentives

offered to RTOs because it is a public entity and because its asset base is so

heavily depreciated. However, replacement cost methodology could be of use in

mitigating cost shifts from rolling in higher costs of other utilities.

Commission Conclusion

As noted earlier, the NOPR and the comments use the term incentive pricing as a

label for the transmission pricing reforms that we raised for discussion. Certainly, good

pricing affects behavior. But good pricing also achieves a valuable goal, in terms of

competition, system expansion, or efficient practices that benefit more than the

transmission owners or the RTO. In this section we provide greater specificity with

respect to certain transmission pricing mechanisms that may be appropriate for RTOs. 

These mechanisms were described in the NOPR or otherwise proposed by commenters,

and are included in the amended regulatory text. 652 We emphasize that we do not intend
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -562-

652(...continued)

the regulatory text lists them on an individual basis.

this policy guidance to be interpreted as a Commission regulatory requirement for a

specific transmission pricing method, nor should it be interpreted as a guarantee that the

Commission will approve any particular innovative pricing proposal. We emphasize that

all innovative pricing proposals filed by RTOs must be fully and adequately supported in

accordance with this Final Rule and the regulatory text. We believe that we are providing

sufficient guidance for RTOs to make critical decisions with respect to transmission

pricing policies. If industry participants believe that further guidance from the

Commission is needed to resolve transmission pricing issues, they may request such

guidance through requests for declaratory orders or further rulemakings.

As discussed earlier, transmission pricing reform is needed as a result of the rapid

restructuring of the industry that is underway, particularly with respect to changes in the

ownership and control of transmission assets, and changes in the transmission services

being provided in competitive generating markets. As a result of these changes, and

consistent with a number of commenters' arguments, we have concluded that the

Commission, at a minimum, needs to mitigate various "disincentives" that may prevent

transmission owners from efficiently operating their systems. Commenters cite to the

potential that transmission owners will earn lower returns for providing unbundled

transmission service than they earned for providing bundled service, even though risks
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -563-

653For example, Salomon Smith Barney, citing to an article by Leonard Hyman

notes that the direct, total costs of transmission service represents about six to seven

percent of the average customer's bill, and raising transmission prices even as high as 25

percent in order to attract capital adds only two percent to the overall electric bill.

associated with transmission ownership have increased. Commenters suggest a number

of sources of increased risk. One source is the potential for bypass of transmission assets

due to distributed generation and the phasing out of older generators from service. Other

sources are directly related to RTO formation. For example, some commenters assert that

stand-alone transmission companies (e.g., transcos) are riskier because they have a lessdiversified portfolio of assets than a vertically integrated utility. Other commenters argue

that participation in an RTO that is an ISO is inherently riskier, suggesting that increased

risk comes from ownership of transmission assets that are ceded for purposes of

operational control to another, non-affiliated entity.

Other commenters argue that a reevaluation of transmission pricing is needed

because it is absolutely critical that the transmission grid support competitive generating

markets, and the only way that the Commission can ensure this will happen is to pursue

pricing policies that encourage it. Some commenters suggest that because the

contribution of transmission to total costs of energy is relatively small, 653 overinvestment

in transmission will not significantly affect delivered electricity prices. Further, the

Commission should be much more concerned about underinvestment, not overinvestment,
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -564-

654Professor Joskow points out that external factors, such as licensing

requirements, the need for rights of way, and NIMBY (i.e., "not in my backyard")

opposition to transmission expansion already places significant constraints on

overinvestment in major new transmission projects.

in the transmission grid. 654 Stated another way, an efficient transmission grid is a

prerequisite to achieving competitive generating markets, and the potential benefits for

consumers far exceed any limited overinvestment that may occur on transmission service. 

A related argument is that efficiency benefits of improved transmission service will be

captured by producers and customers of generation, not transmission providers; therefore,

greater incentives for RTOs to provide good transmission operations and efficient

investments in the grid are warranted.

The NOPR sought comments on several procedural issues related to transmission

pricing reform and incentives. One issue was whether these pricing reforms should be

available to participants of existing ISOs, or be available only to transmission owners that

join RTOs as a result of the Commission's RTO initiative. We have concluded that

members of an existing ISO organization that satisfy the minimum RTO requirements in

the regulatory text should be allowed to seek transmission pricing reform as newly

formed RTOs, so that they can avail themselves of the same incentives for efficient

operation of and investment in the transmission grid. Furthermore, we believe that the

Commission's approach to evaluating innovative transmission reforms should be neutral

with respect to the organizational structure of the Applicant, so that RTOs that own
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -565-

transmission assets as well as RTOs that do not own transmission assets would be equally

eligible for such ratemaking treatments.

Another issue is whether the Commission would prescribe which transmission

pricing reforms it would accept and which it would not accept, or whether the

Commission would consider such proposals on a case-by-case basis. We conclude that a

case-by-case evaluation of transmission pricing reform proposals is appropriate, given

that such proposals are not generic in nature, and a proposal may be appropriate in some

RTO circumstances but not in others. However, the Commission believes some further

specificity on transmission pricing reform is warranted to provide industry participants

with the Commission's evolving views, as RTOs consider the appropriateness of various

reform measures.

Therefore, we provide greater specificity on three transmission pricing reform

measures: (1) ROE; (2) levelized rates; and (3) accelerated depreciation and incremental

pricing for new transmission investments. We note that some of these measures may be

useful only as transitional devices that may be necessary to spur the prompt creation of

RTOs and, therefore, we intend to offer these pricing options only for a defined period of

time, as detailed later in this Final Rule. On the other hand, other pricing reforms may be

useful as permanent features, and will not be limited only to the period during which

RTOs are forming. Finally, while certain of these innovative pricing proposals may be

more helpful to one RTO structure than another (e.g., ISO vs transco), we do not believe
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -566-

655Some commenters recommend abandoning the DCF method of calculating ROE

entirely. We are not adopting that recommendation.

that any of these pricing proposals would be incompatible with any particular structure

adopted by RTOs.

a. Return on Equity (ROE)

More commenters focused on ROE-based proposals than any other type of

transmission pricing reform. These commenters make two main points. One argument is

that higher ROEs will be demanded by the market as a matter of course as the industry

restructures and the risk of transmission business increases, and the Commission must

allow higher ROE to reflect participation in RTOs. A second argument is that joining an

RTO adds another level of risk that warrants a specific adjustment to ROE (e.g., going to

the high end in the range of reasonable ROE, or a specific basis point adjustment). 655

As discussed above, commenters urge the Commission to provide flexibility in

allowing ROE-based programs for RTOs. Many of these commenters specifically urge

the Commission to ensure that there are sufficient incentives for an RTO to make needed

investments in transmission infrastructure. On the other hand, a number of commenters

oppose ROE-based programs on the grounds that they constitute a "bribe" for utilities to

provide service that they are statutorily required to provide.

We believe that there are a number of issues surrounding ROE that must be

addressed by the Commission. For example, we believe that allowing an RTO to propose
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -567-

a formula rate for determining return on equity is consistent with our view that risks and

rewards for transmission owners should reflect market-like forces to the extent possible. 

Allowing a formula rate of return would decouple a transmission owner's earnings from

its own equity valuation, and would tie it more to external standards such as industrywide performance. Such an approach is also consistent with the benchmarking that may

occur under PBR.

We also agree that the risk profile of the transmission business is changing as the

industry restructures, and that it may vary as a function of the structure each transmission

company elects. For example, the risk associated with owning facilities that are leased

for a sum certain to another entity operating an RTO may be different from the risk

associated with operating a stand-alone transco that is facing a significant expansion

program. We therefore conclude that ROE-based initiatives–as well as other ratemaking

reforms discussed below-may be applicable to all types of RTOs, without regard to

organizational structure.

We further recognize that historical data typically used to evaluate ROEs may not

be reliable since it reflects a different industry structure from the one that exists recently. 

And we believe that as patterns of transmission ownership and control evolve, new

approaches to compensating transmission owners for different capital structure mixes

may be warranted, including allowing a transmission owner to seek a return on invested
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -568-

656As noted infra, this is one of the pricing reforms that will be available only for a

defined transition period during which RTOs are being established.

657As noted infra, moratoriums are among the pricing reforms that will be

available for a defined transition period during which RTOs are being established.

capital, independent of its exact capital mix. 656 As noted above, we are willing to

consider moratoriums tied to the rates the transmission provider earns on transmission

assets with respect to bundled retail power sales, and the moratorium option may be tied

to the existing transmission rate level, or to the existing return on equity. 657

Finally, we agree that the uncertainty associated with the transition of the industry,

and in particular participation in RTOs, may increase risks in the short-run. Certainly,

our goals have not changed, which are to ensure that customers have access to

nondiscriminatory service at just and reasonable rates, and that transmission owners have

an opportunity to earn a reasonable rate of return on their investment. We recognize that

in this era of rapid change, new approaches to setting ROE may be needed to implement

that standard. We therefore invite RTOs to submit proposals for ROE-based programs

that are in conformance with these new approaches.

We note that pricing reforms involving ROE would clearly be compatible with all

types of RTO structures that involve a determination of return on equity on transmission

rate base, e.g., transcos, ISOs, or tiered organizational structures.

.
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -569-

658See, e.g., American Electric Power Service Corp., Opinion 440, 88 FERC ¶

61,141 at 61,441-42 (1999) (AEP); Allegheny Power Service Corp., Opinion 433, 85

FERC ¶ 61,275 at 62,117 (1998); Kentucky Utilities Co., Opinion 432, 85 FERC ¶

61,274 at 62,100-03 (1998) (KU). 

659See AEP, 88 FERC at 61,441-42.

b. Levelized Rates

A number of commenters argue that the Commission should allow RTOs to adopt

levelized rates. A levelized rate is designed to recover all capital costs through a uniform,

nonvarying payment over the life of the asset, just as a traditional home mortgage

payment does. The Commission, has held in a number of recent proceedings that both

levelized and nonlevelized rates can produce reasonable results, depending on the

circumstances. 658 The Commission stated in these cases that where a utility proposes to

switch from a nonlevelized net plant rate design method, "[i]n supporting such a switch, a

utility must prove that its proposed method is reasonable in light of its past recovery of

capital costs using a different method." 659

The Commission believes that levelized rates are preferable in an RTO

environment because all customers, regardless of when they take service, face the same

price. Also, given a depreciated investment base, levelized rates based on existing

investments will be higher than non-levelized rates and will address concerns that RTO

formation will decrease revenues.
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -570-

The principal objection to allowing levelized rates for RTOs is that it may raise

RTO transmission rates in the short-run. The Commission has been reluctant outside the

RTO context to approve switches from or to levelized rates proposed by public utilities

under traditional cost-of-service ratemaking because of the opportunities that switching

may provide for utilities to over recover transmission costs. However, consistent with our

discussion above of how market restructuring may require innovation in transmission

pricing, we believe that levelized rates may be appropriate in circumstances, as here,

where an RTO reflects a fresh start with respect to the provision of transmission services,

and potentially the customers for those services. This is especially true in cases where

RTO formation occurs coincident with market restructuring, such that the transmission

customers of the RTO may be significantly different than the traditional, captive

customers, that formerly took transmission service. We therefore conclude that the

Commission should allow increased flexibility for RTO proposals that include ratemaking

practices based on levelized rates. Clearly, this pricing reform, which relates to the

method used to compute the transmission revenue requirement in the first instance, is

compatible with any type of RTO structure, e.g., transco, ISO, or tiered structure.

c. Accelerated Depreciation and Incremental Pricing for New

Transmission Investments

While a number of commenters have suggested accelerated depreciation as a

transmission pricing reform that should be considered, these arguments are premised on
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -571-

660See Order No. 888, wherein the Commission allows recovery of stranded costs

(primarily generation related) only when they are unrecoverable from customers that

depart the system, and only upon a definitive showing that the utility had a reasonable

expectation of continuing to serve the customer after the customer's departure.

the possibility that transmission costs will be stranded by changes in the industry, such as

bypass of portions of the transmission system. We think that these concerns are

speculative at this point in the industry's restructuring. For example, we are not

convinced that the problem of stranded transmission assets is anywhere near the level of

concern that stranded generating assets represents. 660 In any event, should certain

limited transmission facilities become stranded, nothing prevents proposals to recover

prudent costs under traditional ratemaking policies.

We will, however, make a distinction between accelerated depreciation for

existing transmission assets, and accelerated depreciation for new transmission facilities. 

While we will not bar proposals of this type for existing assets, we cannot give any

encouragement to them in the Final Rule. On the other hand, we believe that it is

appropriate for the Commission to provide those willing to make new transmission

investments with the flexibility to propose that such assets follow non-traditional

depreciation schedules. The purpose of providing such flexibility is to remove

disincentives for the construction of new facilities. We think such flexibility is warranted

because the fundamental nature of transmission investment may be changing with respect

to the entities that will make investments in the transmission system in the future and who
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -572-

pays for the new transmission facilities. Furthermore, given the rapid changes in market

structure and dynamics that have occurred and will likely continue, we are not certain that

traditional determinations of the economic life of new transmission facilities remain

appropriate.

In addition, we believe it is appropriate for the Commission to provide flexibility

for pricing of new facilities, such that proposals for pricing of new facilities that combine

elements of incremental prices with embedded-cost access fees will be considered. 

Although we are concerned that such ratemaking practices have the potential to lead to

higher prices for new transmission services, and also potential to lead to overinvestment

in transmission facilities, e.g., where generation redispatch could accomplish the same

objective at lower cost, we believe that such practices, if carefully constructed, will create

appropriate incentives for efficient investment in new transmission facilities. We also

believe that this pricing reform will be attractive to all types of RTO structure, e.g.,

transcos, ISOs, or tiered structures. It may also be used by any RTO that chooses to rely

on third parties to construct new facilities. 

d. Acquisition Adjustments

A number of commenters suggest that the Commission adopt new policies for

acquisition adjustments that would provide assurances to purchasers of transmission
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -573-

661See Minnesota Power & Light Company and Northern States Power Company,

43 FERC ¶ 61,104 at 61,342 (1988), for a discussion of the Commission's existing 

policies with respect to the ratemaking treatment for acquisition premiums. See also Duke

Energy Moss Landing LLC, et al. 83 FERC ¶ 61,318 (1998).

facilities that acquisition premiums would be recoverable through transmission rates. We

do not adopt this suggestion in this Final Rule. 661

8. Additional Ratemaking Issues

A number of comments on ratemaking issues address topics not specifically

enumerated in the NOPR.

Comments

• Williams, CSU, Alliance Companies and WPSC encourage the Commission to

consider rate designs based on mileage or network usage.

• Great River, NCPA and IMPA raise the concern that cooperatives and public

power entities need assurance that they will receive full customer credit and

compensation as was explicitly stated in Order No. 888. SoCal Edison claims that

full compensation will be forthcoming and will not be a problem.

• Ohio Commission recommends that a tariff for border transactions (between

RTOs) be implemented that makes the market over the combined regions seamless

to persuade some regional organizations to combine.

• PPC notes that IndeGO ran into a problem with developing rates for combined

systems with very different levels of quality and cost, and that systems at a
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -574-

position of lower quality should be required to meet combined system standards at

their own cost.

• Puget argues that RTO rates must provide for the collection of stranded costs.

• PSNM sees a problem with load-side generation customers who do not have to pay

their fair share of total system transmission costs.

• Powerex objects to the proposal to segment companies' service areas into subzones for pricing purposes.

• Alliance Companies and AEP favor the flexibility in RTO rate filings that would

allow companies to make proposals that reflect market forces. 

• Alliant Energy is concerned that RTO structures promote workable markets and

that transmission rates be permitted to include a fair accounting of RTO start-up

costs.

• East Texas Cooperatives recommends that RTO pricing structures adequately

compensate small transmission owners who join the RTO, creating an incentive to

join and be a more equitable system.

• Georgia Transmission says that ratemaking for RUS borrowers must take into

account the requirements of any RUS loans. In addition, Georgia Transmission

recommends that the cost of RTO formation be allowed in RTO rates.

• Metropolitan, Cal DWR, and SoCal Cities favor the use of time-of-use pricing or

off-peak rates for transmission.
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -575-

• Oregon Office recommends load-based fees for transmission rather than volume

based charges.

• IMEA argues that the RTO start-up and administrative costs should be allocated to

all customers including bundled native retail load. In contrast, LG&E notes that if

native load is assigned RTO administrative costs there may be under recovery

because of retail rate freezes.

• Industrial Customers argue that assets used for remote generation should be

excluded from the RTO.

• Merrill Energy says that the incremental pricing of new transmission upgrades

prevents expansion because customers are unwilling to pay.

• NERC is concerned about the recovery of costs related to reliability-related

generators.

• NRECA is concerned about compensation by an RTO for low-use transmission

facilities owned by cooperatives, because large transmission owners are opposed

to revenue sharing. NRECA notes that if a cooperative joins an RTO, transactions

for all will increase and there is more to share. Also, there should be protection

for joint use agreement income.

• Project Groups says that pricing must facilitate entry and usage by efficient,

environmentally benign resources. Grid access barriers to these resources need to
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -576-

be eliminated. NMA/WFA/CEED respond by saying that the policies that Project

Group objects to are equitable overall.

• Seattle argues that hub and spoke pricing should be used and discrete interregional tariffs are needed.

• NWCC notes that the characteristics of wind-produced power presents problems

fitting into an RTO pricing arrangement and says that wind power works best with

energy-based pricing systems.

• Detroit Edison advocates a two-part pricing structure similar to that proposed by

the Alliance RTO. It includes a local rate and a regional rate. To encourage

participation, Detroit Edison proposes that the Commission allow RTOs to

develop market-based transmission pricing methodologies.

Commission Conclusion

Commenters raise a number of important ratemaking issues that must be

considered in the establishment of RTOs. We clarify that the reasonable costs of

developing an RTO may be included in transmission rates. Other issues are at a level of

detail and specificity that we do not believe should be resolved in this Final Rule. 

Therefore, these issues will be considered as they apply to individual RTO proposals on a

case-by-case basis.
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -577-

9. Filing Procedures for Innovative Rate Proposals

We shall evaluate all RTO proposals including any innovative rate treatment based

on the applicant's demonstration of how the proposed rate treatment would help achieve

the goals of regional transmission organizations, including efficient use of and investment

in the transmission system and reliability benefits. We shall also require applicants to

provide a cost-benefit analysis, including rate impacts, and demonstrate that the proposed

rate treatment is appropriate for the proposed RTO and that the rate proposal is just,

reasonable, and not unduly discriminatory. 

In addition, pricing proposals involving moratoriums and returns on equity that do

not vary according to capital structure may not be included in RTO rates after January 1,

2005. Thus, if the Commission approves an RTO rate proposal involving, e.g., a rate

moratorium, unless otherwise ordered, the moratorium would end on or before January 1,

2005. We are limiting these rate proposals for a defined period during the formative

stage of RTOs because, while either may be appropriate as transitional rate mechanisms,

they do not promote long-term efficiency through rate design. In addition, the limited

duration for these rate treatments will encourage the earliest possible filings, while at the

same time giving some flexibility to those filings that may be delayed. 
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -578-

662FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 32,541 at 33,756-57.

663Id. at 33,757.

664See id.

H. Other Issues

1. Public Power and Cooperative Participation in RTOs

In the NOPR, the Commission stated its objective of encouraging all transmission

owning entities including transmission owned or controlled by public power entities and

cooperatives, including Federal Power Marketing Agencies (PMAs), Tennessee Valley

Authority (TVA), and other state and local entities to place their transmission facilities

under the control of an RTO. 662 To this end, we expressed an expectation that public

power entities would fully participate in the collaborative process for forming RTOs. 663

In addition, we noted that some public power entities filed open access tariffs with the

Commission and others are participating in ISOs and other regional institutions. The

Commission, however, is aware and concerned that public power entities face several

difficult issues regarding RTO formation and participation. 664 

The first issue is the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) Code "private use"

restrictions on the transmission facilities of public power entities financed by tax-exempt

bonds. We noted that IRS temporary regulations may allow facilities financed by

outstanding tax-exempt bonds to be used to wheel power in accordance with Order No.

888, but that these temporary regulations may not allow the issuance of additional tax-
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -579-

665Id.

666See id.

667See, e.g., Oglethorpe, Allegheny, Montana Power, CREDA, Tallahassee,

Arkansas Cities, PPC, California Board, Industrial Customers, Entergy, BC Hyrdo,

(continued...)

exempt bonds for expanded transmission or permit transfer of operational control of

existing transmission facilities financed by tax-exempt bonds to a for-profit transco. 665

The Commission asked for comments on the extent to which IRS Code restrictions may

limit the transfer of operational control or other forms of control, or ownership of public

power transmission facilities to a for-profit transco or other forms of an RTO. 

The Commission also requested comments on state and local charter limitations,

prohibitions on participating in stock-owning entities, the current policies of various local

regulatory entities that affect or impede full public power participation in RTOs and legal

restrictions or other considerations regarding PMAs that prevent their participation in

RTOs. We questioned whether the Commission should consider some forms of associate

membership or participation and other special accommodations in order for public power

entities to overcome obstacles to RTO participation. 666

Comments

Most commenters support the Commission's position that a properly formed RTO

should include all transmission owners, including cooperatives and public power, in a

specific region. 667 As EEI notes, public power participation will enhance the reliability
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -580-

667(...continued)

Powerex, Aluminum Companies, MEAG, Arizona Commission, Nevada Commission,

East Texas Cooperatives, Lincoln, NPPD, Wyoming Commission, Georgia Transmission,

WPSC, PGE, Montana Commission, SMUD, Cal ISO, MLGW, Loveland Customers,

NASUCA, Duke, LG&E, CP&L, South Carolina Authority, STDUG, NCPA, PP&L

Companies, Desert STAR, PG&E and EEI. 

668See, e.g., EEI, Snohomish, MLGW, Loveland Customers, Montana

Commission, Wyoming Commission, Aluminum Companies, Industrial Customers and

Powerex.

and economic benefits of an RTO. Furthermore, some commenters argue that in some

areas of the country, especially in the Northwest and Southeast, RTO formation may be

impractical without public power participation. 668 Virtually all commenters recognize

that regulatory and legal restrictions exist that may impede public power and cooperative

participation in RTOs. EEI, SERC and Metropolitan argue that the best way to facilitate

non-jurisdictional utility participation in RTOs is for the Commission to avoid a "onesize-fits-all approach" and to provide flexible rules in order to accommodate the unique

needs of public power entities.

Section 141 of the IRS code imposes limitations on the use of non-governmental

entities of public power facilities financed with tax exempt bonds. These private use

limitations restrain the form and extent of participation by public power systems in

RTOs. The key private use limitation that is material to RTO participation is a bar on the

sale of the output of facilities financed with tax exempt debt to non-governmental entities

on terms not available to the general public. Commenters note that in January 1998, the
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -581-

669E.g., Los Angeles, SoCal Cities, LPPC, APPA, Tacoma, NCPA, SRP, TAPS,

EEI, NPPD and East Texas Cooperatives.

670See, e.g., EEI, TAPS, SRP, Georgia Transmission, Arkansas Cities, Nevada

Commission, PP&L Companies, TANC, Desert STAR, NCPA, Montana-Dakota

Enron/APX/Coral Power and Tallahassee. 

IRS issued temporary regulations relating to the application of the private use rules to

public power entities that provide some relief for transmission facilities. These

temporary regulations permit issuers of outstanding tax exempt bonds to offer open

access transmission services and competitive access to distribution systems, and to join

RTOs, provided that certain conditions are met, particularly that the facilities continue to

be owned by the municipal entity. The temporary regulations, however, do not provide

the same relief to issuers of new tax exempt bonds. Many commenters assert that the

temporary regulations will expire in January 2001 and that these regulations are

incomplete and not permanent. 669 LPPC notes that the ability of issuers to continue to

rely on the temporary regulations after expiration is unclear and therefore, issuers taking

actions permitted under the temporary regulations risk having tainted the tax-exempt

status of their bonds on the expiration of the regulations.

Commenters offer varying solutions to the "private use" restriction problem. 

Many commenters urge the Commission to actively attempt to influence the IRS and

Congress to remove and/or mitigate the tax impediment. 670 SRP also recommends that

the Commission require all RTOs to demonstrate that they have made a good faith effort
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -582-

671See Reply Comments of Arkansas Cities at 6.

to reduce barriers to participation and to accommodate legal restrictions faced by

potential participants. Arkansas Cities proposes a transitional grandfathering of existing

tax-exempt bonds. Arkansas Cities notes that such legislation is pending in Congress and

is identified as the Bond Fairness and Protection Act (BFPA). Arkansas Cities states

"that if enacted, the BFPA would clarify tax laws and regulations governing tax exempt

bonds so that publicly owned utilities would be able to participate in the development of

competitive electric utility markets." 671 Duke asserts that the leasing of transmission

facilities to an RTO is a viable option. Moreover, LPPC states that public power entities

have to be allowed to participate in a way that permits them to retain sufficient

operational control of their transmission systems to stay within the private use limitations. 

In addition, LPPC, Snohomish, Arkansas Cities and East Texas Cooperatives argue that

public power entities need an opt-out provision if their tax exempt status is threatened. 

TEP recommends that the final rule contain a template for addressing how transactions

can be administered if they involve the use of tax exempt facilities. TEP proposes that

(1) an RTO should operate in a manner that either preserves the tax exempt status of such

facilities or provides compensation to the facilities' owner to the extent it incurs economic

harm; and (2) that an RTO should develop specific rules governing the operation and

administration of tax-exempted financed facilities.
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -583-

NRECA details the obstacles confronting cooperatives including the requirement

that in order to maintain tax exempt status under Section 501(c)(12) of the IRS Code, at

least 85 percent of a cooperative's income must come from the cooperative's members. If

such member-derived revenue does not equal at least 85 percent of total revenue, then a

cooperative would lose its tax-exempt status. Georgia Transmission argues that there is a

real risk that participation in an RTO could result in a cooperative losing its tax exempt

status if the revenue received from the RTO (assuming the RTO is not a member of a

cooperative) exceeds 15 percent of the cooperative's total income. The revenue received

from the RTO would stem from revenue attributed to use of the cooperative's

transmission facilities controlled by the RTO. 

One remedy to this problem, suggested by AEPCO and Wolverine Cooperative, is

to increase an RTO's compensation to the cooperative to include a gross-up of net

margins to cover the income tax expense. Under this approach, the RTO would pay the

cooperative the full revenue requirement for the transmission facilities, including any

other taxes. East Kentucky proposes that a conduit or a pass-through relationship

between the RTO and the cooperative would satisfy the IRS restrictions and allow a

cooperative to maintain its member-derived character. According to East Kentucky, the

RTO would act as an agent for the cooperative by collecting the transmission revenues

and holding these revenues in a trust on behalf of the cooperative. Furthermore, Georgia

Transmission suggests that the Commission allow a cooperative to leave an RTO if it
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -584-

672See, e.g., LPPC, NPRB, Snohomish, Clarksdale, MEAG and CAMU.

673For example, the Nebraska Constitution provides: "No city, county, town,

precinct, municipality or other sub-division of the state, shall ever become a subscriber to

the capital stock, or owner of such stock, or any portion or interest therein of any . . .

private corporation or association."

appears that it may lose its tax exempt status because of the level of RTO and other nonmember revenue it expects to receive in a given year. 

Another impediment to public power participation in RTOs is mortgage

restrictions. AEPCO notes that under the terms of a typical RUS mortgage, either

transfer of control of transmission assets to an RTO or a sale, unless authorized by RUS,

would be an event of default. East Texas Cooperatives argues that the Commission

should require all RTOs to accommodate mortgage restrictions by allowing cooperatives

to retain control of their facilities until the mortgage restriction is lifted or a creditor or

RUS approves the transfer. In its comments, RUS recognizes that development of RTOs

may offer considerable benefits to RUS borrowers, and RUS states that it is exploring

means to facilitate borrower participation consistent with the Rural Electrification Act

and RUS's fiduciary duties to the U.S. Treasury and taxpayers.

According to several commenters, 672 many public power entities operate under

explicit state constitutional restraints with respect to their ability to participate in the

ownership of a privately-owned RTO. 673 Further, some state constitutions include
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -585-

674For example, the Colorado Constitution states: "Neither the state, nor any

county, city, town, os township shall lend or pledge credit or faith thereof, directly or

indirectly, in any manner to, or in aid of, any person, company or corporation, public or

private, for any amount, or for any purpose whatever; or become responsible for any debt,

contract or liability of any person, company or corporation, public or private, in or out of

the state."

675For example, Washington law provides: "Any two or more [Washington] cities

or public utility districts or combinations thereof may form an operating agency . . . for

the purpose of acquiring, constructing, operating, and owning plants, systems and other

facilities and extensions thereof, for the generation and transmission of electric energy

and power." 

676Nebraska law provides that : "[T]he plant, property, or equipment of a public

power district shall never . . . by outright sale, or lease, become the property or come

under the control of any private person, firm, or corporation engaged in the business of

generating, transmitting, or distributing electricity for profit." Nebraska Rev. Stat. § 70-

646.01.

restrictions on the use of public funds. 674 Several states, however, expressly authorize

public power entities to join with other public entities in the ownership and operation of

electric transmission facilities. 675 In addition, state and local laws impose additional

restrictions on the activities and operations of public power entities that could affect the

operations of any RTO in which they hold an ownership interest. For example, some

laws prohibit the sale or lease of transmission facilities to a for-profit entity. 676

In states in which laws allow a public utility district to sell or lease its transmission

facilities to an RTO, the laws impose requirements on such sale or lease. For instance,

Washington law would require the property to be offered in a competitive bidding
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -586-

677See LPPC at 17.

process, and no sale could occur without voter approval. 677 Furthermore, LPPC notes

that state and local laws in California, Florida, Nebraska, and Texas would require the

approval of the City Council, the public utility commission, the governing board, or other

governmental authority before a transfer of facilities could occur. CAMU and NPPD also

state that many municipals and power authorities have statutory authority to condemn

property and that it is unlikely that this eminent domain authority can be delegated to an

RTO.

Enron/APX/Coral Power notes that an unwillingness to participate in an RTO for

commercial reasons should render non-jurisdictional transmission owners ineligible for

RTO services and savings. Moreover, Duke argues that public power must take the lead

in resolving these issues for themselves. Duke notes that investor-owned utilities have

overcome numerous obstacles to become RTO participants. Furthermore,

Enron/APX/Coral Power argues that public power and other non-jurisdictional

transmission owners that elect to share in the benefits of an RTO must be held to the

same characteristics and functions as jurisdictional transmission owners. Cinergy

suggests that the Commission commence regional technical conferences to address legal

obstacles to public power entities' participation in RTOs and to explore possible

alternatives to operational and functional integration of public power systems into RTOs. 
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -587-

678See, e.g., LG&E, Otter Tail, WPSC, Alabama Commission, Montana

Commission, and DOE. 

679See, e.g., CAMU, CMUA, STDUG, CREDA, NY ISO, Powerex, PP&L

Companies, Desert STAR, CP&L, LPPC, MEAG and Tennessee Authority.

Commenters also address issues relating specifically to PMAs. Many commenters

support the expansion of the FPA to give the Commission jurisdiction over all

transmission owners. 678 CREDA points out that PMAs are restricted by: (1) enabling

statutes; (2) congressional appropriations; (3) the inability to grant indemnification

without congressional approval; (4) the sovereign immunity doctrine; and (5) their load

serving responsibilities. MLGW notes that other PMA restrictions include the TVA

"fence restriction," whereby, TVA's organic statute prohibits TVA from performing any

transmission service that would result in the delivery of power generated by TVA outside

the specified TVA service area. MLGW further notes that existing long-term contracts

between TVA and its distributors are another barrier to RTO participation by PMAs. To

remedy these problems, TVA and others 679 argue that the Final Rule should provide

enough flexibility to ensure that public power obstacles can be addressed and mitigated. 

On the issue of whether the Commission should consider special accommodation,

commenters disagree over whether the Commission should provide incentives to public

power entities in order to make RTO membership financially attractive. EEI and APPA
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -588-

urge the Commission to adopt an RTO policy that makes membership attractive to public

power entities in terms of efficiency and benefits.

SoCal Edison is strongly opposed to the Commission providing incentives in the

form of uniform grid-wide rates or transmission credits. SoCal Edison argues that these

incentives are nothing more than inequitable cost shifts to retail ratepayers. Likewise,

Duke argues that public power entities should not be provided with competitive

advantages in order to encourage voluntary RTO participation.

In contrast, IMPA and SoCal Cities urge the adoption of a final rule that provides

proper credits or compensation for facilities contributed to an RTO, including customerowned facilities. Furthermore, East Kentucky states that return on equity can be

mitigated by allowing cooperatives to earn a rate of return similar to investor-owned

utilities. Vernon argues that the entitlement for transmission facilities contributed to the

RTO grid and the appropriate level of compensation are matters that should not be

determined nationally on a generic basis, but rather, should be decided in the context of

each RTO. SRP supports PBRs and other incentives as long as they are applied to both

public power entities and investor owned companies equitably. Metropolitan contends

that it would not receive much benefit from any ROE incentives offered to RTOs because

it is a public entity and because its asset base is so heavily depreciated. However, a

replacement cost methodology could be of use in mitigating cost shifts for Metropolitan

due to rolling in higher costs of other utilities. Oregon Office recommends that public
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -589-

power entities be eligible for the same incentives as offered others to the extent that the

Commission regulates their rates. 

A few commenters discuss issues relating to public power and the filing

requirements. South Carolina Authority states that any RTO proposal should contain a

detailed description of the efforts made by petitioners to accommodate the transmission

facilities of publicly owned utilities. Similarly, SRP, APPA and LPPC recommend that

the Commission require each RTO proposal to demonstrate: (1) how a good faith effort

was made to accommodate public power participants, particularly deciding ownership

structure; and (2) where public power entities are not included, why there are no

reasonable terms and conditions under which the RTO could accommodate its

participation. Lincoln and Cinergy essentially concur.

Commission Conclusion

We reaffirm our preliminary determination that a properly formed RTO should

include all transmission owners in a specific region, including municipals, cooperatives,

Federal Power Marketing Agencies (PMAs), Tennessee Valley Authority and other state

and local entities. As noted by some commenters, public power and cooperative

participation in RTOs will enhance the reliability and economic benefits of an RTO. 

Furthermore, participation by public power entities and cooperatives is vital to ensure that

each RTO is appropriate in size and scope.
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -590- 

Virtually all commenters note that public power entities and cooperatives face

numerous regulatory and legal obstacles regarding RTO participation. Commenters assert

that these obstructions include: (1) IRS "private use" restrictions and the temporary

regulations enacted to mitigate the "private use" restrictions; (2) the requirement that at

least 85 percent of a cooperative's income must come from the cooperative's members

(IRS Code Section 501(c)(12)); (3) RUS mortgage restrictions; (4) state constitutional

restraints; (5) state and local laws; and (6) specific legal restrictions applicable to PMAs. 

In addition, commenters offer a variety of solutions to mitigate or eliminate these

obstacles to public power participation in RTO formation and operation. 

We acknowledge that public power entities face several difficult issues regarding

RTO participation and we appreciate the potential solutions offered by numerous

commenters. At this time, however, we will not analyze each of the specific resolutions

proposed by the various commenters. Instead, on an RTO-by-RTO basis, we will

examine submitted proposals that provide public power and cooperatives with the

flexibility to join an RTO without jeopardizing their tax or mortgage status. We note,

however, that the offered solutions must be consistent with the minimum functions and

characteristics outlined in the Final Rule. 

We are aware that some public power entities and cooperatives have found ways

to participate in existing ISOs. For example, we approved the formation of the NY ISO

contingent upon a ruling of the Internal Revenue Service that the formation and operation
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -591- 

680See Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp., et al., 83 FERC ¶ 61,352 at 62,405

(1998).

681See Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp., et al., 88 FERC ¶ 61,138 at 61,402-

03 (1999).

682See Midwest Independent Transmission System Operator, Inc., et al., 84 FERC

¶ 61,231 (1998).

of the NY ISO would not jeopardize the tax-exempt status of the New York Power

Authority. 680 Furthermore, we are encouraged by the recent efforts of the Member

Systems of the New York Power Pool (NYPP) to include and accommodate the

participation of Long Island Power Authority (LIPA) in the NY ISO. NYPP proposed

language in their OATT that provides LIPA will not be required to provide transmission

service where the provision of such service would result in the loss of its tax-exempt

status for its bonds. NYPP also proposed additional scheduling protocols and procedures

to ensure the continued tax-exempt status of LIPA. The Commission accepted the

proposed language as described above. 681 We also note that there are two cooperatives

Hoosier Energy Rural Electric Cooperative, Inc. and Wabash Valley Power Association

that are members of the Midwest ISO. 682 We are hopeful that similar agreements

between RTOs and public power entities and cooperatives can be reached to provide

flexibility and achieve broad regional RTO participation by all entities. 

We expect public power entities and cooperatives to participate fully in the

collaborative process for forming RTOs. During the collaborative process, the
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -592-

Commission hopes that the parties will explore, in detail, the impediments and various

solutions to public power and cooperative participation in RTOs. As discussed below

with respect to the collaborative process, we will make staff resources available to assist

in facilitating communication between all entities and in designing regional solutions to

full RTO formation and participation. Moreover, in all filings under this Rule, we require 

a description of efforts made to accommodate participation by public power entities and

cooperatives in RTOs.

We recognize that there is uncertainty regarding what may happen after the IRS

temporary "private use" regulations expire on January 22, 2001. Accordingly, we intend

to continue to support efforts to mitigate the "private use" and other tax restrictions. 

Furthermore, in its comments, RUS recognizes that the development of RTOs may offer

considerable benefits to RUS borrowers. RUS states that it is exploring means to

facilitate borrower participation in RTOs. The Commission welcomes the efforts of RUS

to facilitate borrower participation in RTOs, and also encourages RTOs to seek ways to

accommodate mortgage restrictions. It would be unfortunate if public power entities and

cooperatives were not able to participate in RTOs and share in the benefits available in a

regional organization because of tax rules and other government restrictions.
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -593-

683FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 32,541 at 33,758.

684Id. at 33,758-59.

685Id. at 33,759.

686See PG&E, Desert STAR, Michigan Commission and Industrial Consumers. 

2. Participation by Canadian and Mexican Entities

In the NOPR, the Commission noted that currently, electricity trading regions exist

across national borders and therefore, Mexican and Canadian involvement in RTO

formation would be beneficial to both countries, as well as to the United States. 683 The

Commission asserted that regional institutions should include all market participants in

order to provide direct access to information and the benefits of non-pancaked rates. The

NOPR also proposed that in order to prevent wasteful duplication of grid facilities,

reliability standards implemented by RTOs must be acceptable to the affected nations. 684

The Commission also emphasized that Canadian and Mexican authorities would be

responsible for approving prices and other terms and conditions of transmission service

provided over any RTO transmission facilities located in their country. 685

Comments

The U.S. entities that submitted comments on this issue support the efforts by the

Commission to encourage participation in RTOs by Canadian and Mexican entities. 686

For example, PG&E states that given the high degree of operational interconnection
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -594-

687See, e.g., Ontario Power, H.Q. Energy Services, BC Hydro and Canada DNR.

688See, e.g., Powerex, CEA, Manitoba Board, British Columbia Ministry, Alberta,

Canada DNR, BC Hydro and Ontario IMO.

689E.g., Manitoba Board, British Columbia Ministry, BC Hydro, Canada DNR,

CEA and Ontario Power.

between our national grid and components of their systems, participation by these entities

is beneficial.

Similarly, some Canadian entities believe that significant benefits can be achieved

by trading over "natural" or "appropriate" transmission regions that do not necessarily

stop at the border. 687 Other Canadian entities welcome the opportunity to participate in

the RTO proceedings and support the Commission's efforts to encourage international

collaboration. 688 

 Canadian entities are concerned with sovereignty issues and urge the

Commission to adopt flexible RTO rules that allow voluntary participation by Canadian

utilities. 689 According to the Manitoba Board and Ontario IMO, one option in this

regard would be to allow members of an RTO the freedom to conduct

transactions—through a contractual relationship—at the international border with foreign

utilities that do not join a cross-border RTO. Furthermore, Canada DNR asserts that a

decision not to participate in an international RTO by a Canadian jurisdiction should not

place entities in Canada engaged in trade with United States at a disadvantage. Grand
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -595-

Council et al. proposes that the Commission sever the Canadian issues from this

proceeding and open a separate docket to examine the international issues raised by the

restructuring of electricity markets. Grand Council et al. urges the Commission to

cooperate with Canada and Mexico to establish a genuine tri-national consultative

process in order to resolve international issues based on an adequate record. Alberta

notes that each individual Province has jurisdictional responsibility for the development

of the electrical industry within each Providence and accordingly, only the Province has

the jurisdiction to pass legislation to develop a competitive electricity market.

Commission Conclusion

After reviewing the comments, we continue to believe that Canadian and Mexican

involvement in RTO formation and operation would be beneficial to both countries, as

well as to the United States. As we stated in the NOPR, expansion of electricity trade in

the North American bulk power market requires that regional institutions include all

market participants so that everyone may enjoy direct access to market information and

the benefits of non-pancaked transmission rates. Commenters from the United States and

Canada agree that significant benefits can be achieved by trading over "natural" or

"appropriate" transmission regions that do not necessarily stop at the border. 

We note first that we are pleased with the level of participation in our proceedings

by Canadian parties, and we encourage their continued participation as RTO formation
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -596-

progresses. We especially appreciate the RTO Consultation Conference sponsored by

Natural Resources Canada in Ottawa in November 1999.

In response to Canadian comments, we point out that the Final Rule makes

participation in an RTO voluntary for U.S. transmission owners, and participation is

certainly voluntary for Canadian transmission owners. Further, we emphasize that our

RTO Rule does not in any way require competition in retail electricity markets, whether

they are located in the United States under state regulation or in Canada under provincial

regulation. For those Canadian entities that want to join an RTO, the Final Rule is

flexible: they may propose a cross-border RTO or a Canadian-only RTO that is

compatible with the Rule. The Final Rule is not exclusionary: Canadian entities are not

precluded from joining a cross-border RTO.

Several parties were concerned that a cross-border RTO would have its rates,

terms, and conditions subject to the rate jurisdiction of at least two regulators. If a crossborder RTO forms, we will be open to proposals for innovative approaches for jointly

overseeing a cross-border RTO with domestic and foreign utilities For example, one

approach might be for the cross-border RTO to try to develop a proposal acceptable to

both regulators, with the understanding that any regulatory difficulty would normally be

referred back to the RTO for resolution and resubmission to both regulators. Another

approach might be to have different but complementary rate designs in the two countries.
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -597-

In the case of a Canada-only RTO, some Canadian transmission providers believe

that having contractual and other agreements for coordination between separate RTOs

across the border is better than having a cross-border RTO. However, some Canadian

transmission customers are concerned that this would maintain a lack of standardization

of market rules across the border. The RTO Rule is intended to permit a U.S. RTO on

the Canadian border to develop contractual and other agreements for coordination with its

Canadian RTO neighbor. Further, we have added a new minimum RTO function that an

RTO must ensure the integration of reliability practices with other regions in the same

interconnection and market interface practices with other regions. We clarify here that

this provision applies to integration with interconnected regions in Canada and Mexico.

For either a cross-border or a Canada-only RTO, we acknowledge the sovereign

authority of Canadian governments over Canadian entities and transactions that take place

in Canada. Moreover, we re-emphasize that our Rule does not affect the authorities of

Canadian government entities to approve prices and other terms and conditions of

transmission service provided over any transmission facilities located in Canada. These

conclusions apply equally to Mexico. 

We encourage Canadian and Mexican entities to participate in continued RTO

consultations and, if appropriate, formation and filings for cross-border RTOs. In

particular, we urge Canadian and Mexican entities to attend the appropriate regional
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -598-

690FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 32,541 at 33,757.

workshops to be held in the spring of 2000. These workshops will provide a forum for

initial discussion of the issues associated with a cross-border RTOs.

Regarding the suggestion to establish a tri-national consultative process with

Canadian and Mexican authorities to resolve international electric industry issues, we

note that there are existing institutions and processes for resolving international disputes. 

The RTO process is just getting underway, and it is not clear that significant international

disputes will develop or, if they should develop, that they would require a non-traditional

method of resolution. Indeed, the RTO itself through its dispute resolution process may

provide a new and quicker way to resolve some disputes.

3. Existing Transmission Contracts

In the NOPR, the Commission asked for comments addressing what the

appropriate treatment should be for existing transmission agreements when an RTO is

formed. We noted that in Order Nos. 888 and 888-A, the Commission specifically chose

not to abrogate existing requirements contracts and transmission contracts when the

utility filed an open access transmission tariff. 690 We stated, however, that an RTO

represents an entirely different context. In the NOPR, the Commission recognized the

importance of balancing a uniform approach for transmission pricing with the equities
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -599-

691See id. at 33,757-58.

692Id. at 33,758.

693E.g., TANC, Turlock, UAMPS, Desert STAR, CMUA, Sithe, Georgia

Transmission, Lincoln, PG&E, NPRB, NCPA, Great River, NRECA, Loveland

Customers, San Francisco, Platte River, Florida Commission, Nevada Commission, DOE,

Wolverine Cooperative, Tri-State, CREDA, EPSA, Big Rivers, SPP, SoCal Cities, TEP,

PJM/NEPOOL Customers, Metropolitan, STDUG and PacifiCorp. 

inherent in existing transmission contracts. 691 Furthermore, we noted that the potential

financial impact of giving up an advantageous transmission arrangement may serve as a

disincentive to joining an RTO. In the NOPR, we proposed to address the issue of

existing transmission contracts on an RTO-by-RTO basis, rather than resolve the issue

generically. 692

Comments

Many commenters argue that the Commission should preserve and protect existing

transmission contracts. 693 These commenters note that existing contracts represent

negotiated rights and obligations achieved through mutual negotiation. SRP believes that

the Commission should grandfather existing transmission contracts in order to protect

customers from cost shifts and prevent uncertainty in the marketplace. Turlock argues

that the preservation of existing contracts, while cumbersome, is the bedrock of

predictability and reliability and a key element of contract law. NPRB states that existing

contracts should be honored until the contract expires or until the parties come to a new
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -600-

694See, e.g., Williams, EPSA, First Energy, Duke, PSNM, LG&E, PGE and

MidAmerican. 

agreement. STDUG asserts that in order to be properly inclusive, an RTO must take

members as it finds them, existing contracts, warts, and all. In contrast, CP&L asserts

that the elimination of grandfathered agreements to the greatest extent possible ensures

the most level playing field for all market participants. 

A few commenters propose a reasonable transition period to allow parties to

existing contracts to conform their arrangements to an RTO tariff. 694 EPSA notes that

the transition period should be of sufficient length to reduce the financial and other

burdens on the customer and on the original transmission provider. PSNM argues that at

a minimum, a transition period of as long as ten years is needed to move the existing

transmission contracts to RTO service. Furthermore, TAPS proposes that the

Commission provide entities with an open season for transmission customers to choose to

terminate or switch service under the terms of an RTO tariff. Alternatively, TAPS

suggests that the Commission apply a just and reasonable standard to all transmission

customers who seek contract modifications. Regarding contract modification, Southern

Company asserts that in order to promote fairness, both parties to a contract must have an

equal opportunity to modify the existing agreement. In addition, Entergy argues that the

Commission should encourage all entities to re-negotiate existing contracts. 
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -601-

695See, e.g., WPSC, Great River, DOE, ICUA, Entergy, TDU Systems, TEP,

South Carolina Authority, MidAmerican, SNWA, UAMPS and TAPS.

696See United Gas Pipe Line Co. v. Mobile Gas Serv. Corp., 350 U.S. 332, 338

(1956); FPC v. Sierra Pacific Power Co., 350 U.S. 348, 353 (1956).

Several commenters support the Commission's preference that issues relating to

the continued validity of existing transmission contracts be addressed on an RTO-byRTO basis. 695 WPSC argues that treatment of existing transmission contracts within a

particular RTO should be consistent. Turlock urges the Commission to proceed with

caution when addressing existing contracts. On the other hand, PSE&G asserts that the

Commission should not address the treatment of existing contracts on a case-by-case

basis because this leads to arbitrary and inconsistent results. Instead, PSE&G and Dalton

Utilities argue that the Commission should address the issue of existing transmission

contracts on a generic basis consistent with Order No. 888 and the Mobile-Sierra doctrine

(recognizing the need to preserve the sanctity of contracts where possible). 696 Sithe and

NRECA concur that a generic policy is appropriate.

Cal ISO argues that the Commission's policies on existing contracts deserve

revisiting, at a minimum for the limited purpose of conforming scheduling and metering

rules to those of the RTO/control area operator. Cal ISO states that it has experienced the

challenges of workability when the ISO was required to honor existing contracts, but not

permitted to interpret them or conform their scheduling rules to those of the regional
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -602-

697E.g., CMUA, Desert STAR, Georgia Transmission, Wolverine Cooperative, Cal

ISO, Entergy, Tri-State, SNWA, Metropolitan and TEP. 

698See PJM, 81 FERC ¶ 61,257 at 62,280-81 (1997).

699See Midwest Independent Transmission System Operator, Inc., et al., 84 FERC

¶ 61,231 at 62,169-70, order on reh'g, 85 FERC ¶ 61,372 at 62,418-20 (1998).

organization. Cal ISO notes that it has experienced the most significant market

inefficiencies associated with existing contracts in the area of scheduling and information

gathering. 

A few commenters note that not honoring existing contracts would create

disincentives for both transmission customers and owners to join an RTO. 697 For

example, CMUA and Georgia Transmission argue that the financial impact of giving up

an advantageous transmission arrangement would be a significant disincentive to RTO

membership.

Commission Conclusion

At this time, we continue to believe that it is not appropriate to order generic

abrogation of existing transmission contracts. We recognize that existing contracts

represent negotiated rights and obligations achieved through mutual negotiation. 

However, in PJM 698 and the Midwest ISO 699 we adopted the rationale that it was

unreasonable and discriminatory to maintain the pancaked rates in existing contracts for

others when transmission-owning utilities had designed a non-pancaked rate approach for
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -603-

their own transactions. In our examination of existing contracts, we intend to balance the

preference for preservation of existing contracts with the importance of consistency in

transmission pricing and the elimination of pancaked rates. 

As the above comments demonstrate, there is no consensus on how the

Commission should manage the transition from existing transmission contacts to RTO

service. In fact, parties offer diverse and conflicting views as to what the Commission

should do regarding existing transmission contracts. Some commenters would have us let

all contracts run their course with no opportunity to modify or terminate. Others

advocate an elimination of existing agreements to the greatest extent possible. Yet others

argue for a transition period ranging in duration for up to ten years to move existing

transmission contracts to RTO service.

Rather than adopting one extreme position or the other, we will take a measured

approach with regard to the treatment of existing transmission contracts. We intend to

address the issue of existing transmission contracts on an RTO-by-RTO basis, rather than

resolve the issue generically. Accordingly, each RTO can propose whatever contract

reform is necessary, including the limited changes suggested by the Cal ISO for the

limited purpose of conforming scheduling, information gathering, and metering rules to

those of the RTO. To this end, we encourage each RTO to address how and when it

might convert existing contracts and submit a contract transition plan that contains
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -604-

specific details about the procedures to be utilized involving the conversion from existing

contracts to RTO service. Again, our goal in reviewing existing transmission contracts

and contract transition plans is to balance the desire to honor existing contractual

arrangements with the need for a uniform approach for transmission pricing and the

elimination of pancaked rates. 

4. Power Exchanges (PXs)

The NOPR described the apparent advantages and disadvantages of having a

power exchange coincident with an RTO. As further described in the NOPR, supporters

state that PXs can reduce price volatility by providing price transparency, reduce the

impact of defaults by spreading transaction risks among all participants through credit

standards and reserve fund requirements, facilitate risk hedging by providing a basis for a

futures market, and help facilitate retail access programs. Detractors argue that the

principal functions of a PX are not natural monopoly functions. They contend that PXs,

compared with bilateral markets, force participants to buy and sell electricity using

standardized contracts, which may not suit their particular needs. They further argue that

competition within the electricity market and its full benefits can only be achieved if there

is competition for the PX market. 
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -605-

700FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 32,541 at 33,760.

701See, e.g., Entergy, NJBUS, NY ISO, TDU Systems, Wisconsin Commission

and UtilitCorp. 

702See, e.g., Pennsylvania Commission, Duke and California Board.

703See, e.g., PJM, ISO-NE and TAPS.

704See, e.g., EPSA and MidAmerican.

The NOPR left it to each region to determine whether there is a need for a power

exchange and whether the RTO should operate it. 700 The NOPR said that the

Commission will accept any RTO proposal that includes a power exchange in its design

as long as its operation of the power exchange does not compromise its independence as a

transmission service provider. The Commission sought comments on a number of

questions related to power exchanges, including whether regional flexibility is

appropriate and how RTOs should deal with an independent power exchange.

Comments

Commenters' views on power exchanges are mixed. The largest group of

commenters basically agree with the NOPR. 701 A smaller group of commenters

recommend that the Commission require that RTO applications include provisions for a

power exchange, 702 with some recommending that the power exchange be internal to the

RTO 703 and some recommending that the PX be independent of the RTO. 704 CalPX

argues strongly that a power exchange should be separate from the RTO, given the
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -606-

705See, e.g., APX, SMUD, Southern Company, Tri-State and Lincoln.

continuing need to separate market and transmission functions; the need for market

transparency to facilitate determination of whether congestion is being exploited; the

need to provide a credible reference price for new retail choice market entrants; and the

potential need for the RTO and power exchange to serve differing geographic areas. 

CalPX also submits that there is no concrete evidence that an RTO-operated power

exchange will be more efficient and economical than an unrelated power exchange. 

NYMEX agrees that an RTO should be permitted to operate a power exchange, as long as

a proper code of conduct is in place. PJM points to its success with a combined

ISO/power exchange.

Another group of commenters argue that power exchanges should not be included

in RTOs, but should be allowed to occur naturally as needed. 705 Elaborating on this

point of view, Salomon Smith Barney advises that the power exchange should not be in

the RTO because it could throttle innovation and that the Commission should let the

market decide. If there are really advantages to be gained, as some claim, from the

operation of a single power exchange associated with the RTO, then such a power

exchange will naturally develop. Florida Power Corp. argues that, while a region may

prefer that its RTO closely coordinate with the power exchange, the two should not be

part of the same organization because there is a fundamental difference in the business
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -607-

706See, e.g., Duke, Florida Power Corp. and Desert STAR.

objectives of the two . Similarly, EPSA contends that the Commission's vision of an

RTO being an entity independent from all generation and power marketing interests is

fundamentally incompatible with an RTO-run power exchange. Nevada Commission

offers that a power exchange is not necessary to the formation of an RTO. And while

PG&E sees every region needing a real-time balancing market regardless of whether it is

run in-house by the RTO, PG&E also prefers that markets should otherwise be left to

develop on their own accord.

Comments were received on additional aspects of the power exchange concept. 

PG&E argues that an RTO should not be allowed to use control of a power exchange to

alter or cap prices set by the market. LG&E submits that the RTO should be required to

be the provider of last resort for ancillary services, although market participants should

not be required to purchase from the RTO. NASUCA notes that the NOPR does not

cover some important power exchange issues such as exactly which markets would be

included. NASUCA recommends that a NOI on power exchanges and related power

market issues be initiated soon after the final rule.

Several commenters state that multiple power exchanges in a region should have

equal standing before the RTO. 706 FTC, however, recommends that the Commission

assess whether competition is feasible in power exchange services. Similarly, CalPX
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -608-

notes that multiple power exchanges may hurt the market's function because each power

exchange would be small, and therefore would not offer high levels of depth, liquidity

and efficiency. NYMEX counters that there should be no credence given to the idea that

one power exchange should enjoy any form of artificial franchise vis-a-vis others.

Commission Conclusion

The NOPR proposed leaving it to each region to determine whether there is a need

for a power exchange and whether the RTO should operate the power exchange. We

have decided to adopt the NOPR proposal. As the commenters have pointed out, there

are advantages and disadvantages to the inclusion of a PX in the RTO structure. We do

not believe that including a PX as part of the RTO structure would necessarily preclude

the market benefits associated with bilateral transactions. We believe an RTO can

accommodate both a bilateral market and a PX market. As the individual structures of the

various RTOs supported by the regions are likely to be quite varied, we think that it is

best to let market preferences dictate the form of any one or more regional power

exchanges and whether the RTO should operate a power exchange.

5. Effect on Retail Markets and Retail Access

The NOPR addressed the impact of RTOs and any associated PXs on retail

competition and the states' jurisdiction over retail competition. For example, the

Commission found that RTOs will enhance the effectiveness of retail competition:
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -609-

707FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 32, 541 at 33,704.

708See, e.g., TXU Electric, DOE, First Rochdale, Illinois Commission and

Williams.

We believe that the likelihood of success for existing and planned retail

choice initiatives is significantly enhanced if the Commission can ensure

fair and efficient access to a regional market without pancaked transmission

access charges, and that we need to take steps beyond Order No. 888 to

accomplish this. 707

In addition, the Commission found that an RTO does nothing to interfere with the state's

authority to decide retail access policy, but asked whether a PX is necessary for

successful retail competition.

Comments

Several commenters state that RTOs were either essential or of great benefit in the

implementation of retail competition. 708 Mid-Atlantic Commissions notes that PJM has

worked closely with the Pennsylvania, New Jersey and Delaware Commissions to assist

with the implementation of their retail choice legislation in an organized fashion, while

maintaining that the grid will be operated in a reliable fashion without any major

economic or operational changes. According to Mid-Atlantic Commissions, this has also

further provided those states in the region that have not implemented retail choice with a

stable organization that continues to maintain reliability.
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -610-

709See, e.g., Iowa Board and Puget.

A few commenters express concern that the Commission's RTO policy could

threaten the states' ability to control the pace of retail access and retail competition. 709

South Carolina Commission counsels that the Commission should try to avoid affecting

retail restructuring through its efforts to establish an RTO process. Central Maine raises

the concern that retail choice programs already developed in concert with existing ISOs

may be adversely impacted by any changes to such ISOs that are found to be necessary

for them to conform to the RTO requirements (e.g., energy service company and other

load serving entity contracts entered into in reliance upon the existing ISO market

structures).

Puget views allowing RTOs to make FPA section 205 filings that unilaterally

propose changes to the RTO tariff as conflicting with the Commission's commitment to

respect the retail access efforts of the individual states. Puget argues that a unilateral

decision by an RTO to provide transmission service to a retail customer and make that

customer an eligible customer under the pro forma tariff would force states without retail

access to accept such access as a fait accompli. Puget also fears that the term "market

participant" as ultimately defined may include any entity that buys or sells electric energy

in the RTO's region or in any neighboring region that might be affected by the RTO's

actions. If so, since market participants must also have the option of self-supplying or
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -611-

acquiring ancillary services from third parties, this further suggests that retail customers

may have the ability to acquire transmission service regardless of whether the affected

state has yet decided retail choice and stranded cost recovery issues. Industrial

Customers, however, question the legal basis for Puget's apparent suggestion that utilities

be allowed to decide which retail customers may access RTO transmission.

EPSA contends that, while states tout each state's rights to protect its retail native

load customers, some actions taken under this banner to limit exports of power actually

disadvantage adjoining state's retail customers or participants in the bulk power markets. 

Therefore, the Commission should move forward with a rulemaking to assure full

transmission comparability for retail customers of all states, and to prevent individual

states from continuing to disadvantage each other and to prevent individual utilities from

continuing to disadvantage other market participants. New York Commission also

submits that this proceeding is not the place to address the issue of preemption of state

jurisdiction over bundled retail electric sales.

TAPS raises the question of jurisdictional conflict as to which facilities need to be

regulated at the federal or state level, and whether the policies of the Commission toward

open access will be undercut by transmission owners using the seven factor

transmission/distribution classification test to place new generation at a disadvantage

relative to existing generation owned by the transmission provider. TAPS contends that

the Commission must take steps to ensure that RTOs contain the appropriate facilities and
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -612-

710See, e.g., LG&E and Southern Company.

that refunctionalization of transmission to distribution does not interfere with competition

by creating RTOs that control little or no transmission. 

Another concern expressed is that RTOs may cause cost shifting to retail

customers that could interfere with restructuring. 710 As to the impact of the power

exchange on retail competition, both CalPX and MidAmerican argue that power

exchanges assist in the effectiveness of retail competition programs by providing

transparent and credible reference prices.

Commission Conclusion

We continue to be persuaded that RTOs can positively affect each state's

implementation of its retail choice program, without interfering with those states that

have not yet adopted such programs. As noted by commenters, existing ISOs have

already successfully facilitated retail choice programs in areas where only some of the

states have adopted such programs, and the ISOs were able to do so without clashing with

or frustrating the other states that have not undertaken such programs. We do not believe

that an RTO could interfere with a state’s decisions on whether or how fast to implement

retail choice within its borders, either through the RTO's Section 205 filing authority or

otherwise through the RTO's jurisdictional obligation to provide non-discriminatory and

non-preferential transmission service. 
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -613-

711See supra section III.G.

Commenters pointed to potentially extensive reclassification of transmission

facilities to local distribution as part of the unbundling of retail rate schedules to

implement retail choice programs, and how this might lead to RTOs that are "empty

vessels" with little significant transmission under their control. We agree that RTOs must

control all transmission facilities that are necessary to support competitive wholesale

power markets. For this reason, we specified the scope, configuration and operational

control requirements adopted in this Final Rule. We will judge any proposed

reclassification on a case-by-case basis. We note that any reclassification of transmission

facilities to local distribution will require Commission approval and will not remove from

the Commission's jurisdiction any facilities used to deliver power to wholesale customers. 

Furthermore, under the principle of open architecture (discussed supra in section III.F ),

the Commission expects RTOs to remain flexible such that, if over time circumstances

should change and certain facilities need to be reclassified as transmission, procedures

will be in place to do so. 

With regard to RTO pricing causing transmission cost shifting that adversely

affects retail choice customers, this issue is discussed in the Transmission Ratemaking

section of this Final Rule. 711 The Commission will continue to review transmission rate

proposals to ensure that they are just and reasonable, and not unduly discriminatory.
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -614-

712For a further discussion of PXs, see supra section III.H.4.

713FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 32,541 at 33,722.

714See id.

Finally, on the matter of whether a power exchange is needed to facilitate states' 

retail choice programs, it is our view that, to the extent that a region forming an RTO

chooses to voluntarily establish an RTO-affiliated power market, we anticipate that any

such power exchange would provide retail choice customers with transparent and credible

reference prices for power and other information that otherwise might not be available.

712

6. Effect on States with Low Cost Generation

In the NOPR, we recognized that states with relatively low cost power are

concerned that an RTO would result in local utilities selling their low cost power to other

states. 713 However, we noted that a state that is low cost today may not be low cost

tomorrow without an RTO in its area. 714 In addition, we stated that utilities that now

have low cost generation will help assure access to future low cost generating plants by

participating in an RTO and that new low cost generation plants are more likely to be

attracted to regions with a well-functioning regional market governed by an RTO. We

sought comment from state commissions regarding how an RTO in their state would

affect power costs.
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -615-

Comments

A number of commenters raise concerns about the effect of RTOs on states with

low cost electricity. These concerns center around one issue—that the costs of creating

an RTO may outweigh the benefits.

South Carolina Commission argues that customers in South Carolina enjoy very

high quality service and pay some of the lowest rates. Duke power concurs, noting that,

it is not necessarily true that North Carolina and South Carolina will conclude that

sufficient long-term benefits exist for these states to justify costs of RTO membership. 

Duke argues that any proposed RTO should be shown to provide tangible benefits to the

relevant region.

Alabama Commission believes that RTOs will cause states to lose the efficiency of

integrated systems and lead to retail competition, whether it is in the interest of customers

or not. Southern Company agrees, noting that due in large part to the low cost status of

southeastern states, they are proceeding cautiously with retail competition and

restructuring initiatives. This does not mean that these states are ignoring the potential

benefits of restructuring. Indeed, Southern Company notes that states in its service

territory are actively studying the potential advantages and disadvantages of retail

competition but have not yet concluded that the potential benefits outweigh the costs and

risks associated with changing the current industry structure.
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -616-

SMUD points out that it has not joined the Cal ISO over similar concerns. It

indicates that its customers already enjoy low cost electricity and that participation in the

Cal ISO could not ensure that SMUD's retail rates would be any lower, and on the

contrary, the cost of participation would cause rate increases.

Kentucky Commission indicates that inefficiencies may occur for a variety of

reasons and examples of inefficiencies include: multiple RTOs in a small region; several

layers of governance within one RTO; and too many tasks shifted from the RTO members

to the RTO itself. Kentucky Commission argues that if the proposed transmission

organizations are not operated at levels of maximum efficiencies and minimum

reasonable costs, the Commission will have failed to promote one of its primary

objectives, the growth and success of the wholesale power market. Kentucky

Commission further argues that the Commission must be mindful of these costs in

developing rules for the establishment of RTOs

Commission Conclusion

We are mindful of the potential costs of setting up and running an RTO, but we

anticipate that the collaborative process will result in an RTO proposal that incorporates a

design that, overall, increases the existing level of transmission system and market

efficiency for each region. As we discuss more fully in the Scope, Implementation and

Benefits sections of this Final Rule, we are taking a results-oriented, practical approach to

establishment, organization, implementation and operation of RTOs. We do not expect
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -617-

that regions with no existing institutions will necessarily invest in new, high-cost RTO

infrastructure. Instead, such a region may propose an RTO that relies on existing

infrastructure to accomplish its mission. However, we expect the RTO to satisfy the

minimum characteristics and functions and to improve the efficiency of regional

transmission service.

In response to the concern of low cost states that RTOs could result in exports of

their low cost power to other states, we do not believe that an RTO will cause utilities to

sell their lowest cost power out of state. While retail choice arguably might lead to low

cost power being sold out of state because incumbent utilities no longer have an

obligation to serve local in-state loads, this would occur with or without an RTO in the

region. Where there is no retail choice, our Final Rule does not affect a state

commission's authority to require a utility to sell its lowest cost power to native load, as it

always has. We point out that, if the utility's transmission is operated by an RTO and its

higher cost power can be sold more readily to new, more distant customers, this will lead

to recovery of more capital costs and lower retail rates. In the long term, low cost states

may benefit from an RTO that facilitates expanded access to wholesale electricity

markets, increasing the choice of low cost resources available to utilities as they acquire

new power resources. 
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -618-

715FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 32,541 at 33,724.

7. States' Roles with Regard to RTOs

In the NOPR, we noted that states want a role in the governance of any RTOs for

their states, and we proposed to be flexible in accommodating the states' needs. 715 The

NOPR encouraged RTO design to accommodate appropriate state oversight, especially

with regard to planning and siting new multi-state transmission facilities. We sought

comments on the appropriate state role in RTOs on these and other RTO matters.

Comments

Comments on the states' roles in RTO development and governance were fairly

extensive, with by far the greater percentage of comments supporting a strong and clearly

defined state role. Comments can be grouped into four primary categories: (1)

governance; (2) formation; (3) siting and planning authority; (4) regional regulation.

Governance

Almost all commenters on this issue expressed support for a clear state role in

governance; however, there were differences as to exactly what that role should be. 

Some commenters believe that states should be allowed to determine their own role in

governance, either as members of advisory panels to the board of directors, as voting

members of the board, as non-voting members of the board, or having authority to
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -619-

appoint board members. Some commenters, however, feel strongly that states should not

be permitted to be voting members of boards.

Commenters argue that the appropriate state role in an RTO is a matter of local

control. For example, Northwest Council states that the Commission should not set

restrictive rules on the type of state participation in RTO governance, but should allow

the states to propose to the Commission the kind of roles they view as appropriate, e.g.,

voting members of a stakeholder board, ex officio status on an independent board, and so

forth. 

The California Board suggested that state officials should be allowed as either

voting or non-voting members. Los Angeles has no objection to state board membership,

either voting or non-voting, if a state has determined that a government official can best

represent that state's interests. The Washington Commission agrees that states should be

able to define their own role. Mid-Atlantic Commissions note that they have a

Memorandum of Understanding with the PJM ISO Board of Managers to facilitate

communication and promote a cooperative relationship.

Some commenters, however, think that state officials should not have voting

membership on boards of directors since that could raise conflict of interest problems

where the state official would have to approve decisions of the board while sitting as a

regulator. For example, Minnesota Power believes that state cooperation will be

enhanced if state officials participate as members of an RTO advisory board, but they
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -620-

716See also MidAmerican, Montana-Dakota, PSNM, East Kentucky and NPRB. 

717E.g., ISO-NE, PJM, Midwest ISO, MidAmerican, Project Groups, PSNM, Iowa

Board, Arizona Commission and UAMPS. 

should not participate as voting members of an RTO because the RTO process could be

compromised by parochial state politics. ISO-NE agrees, pointing out that some states'

conflict of interest laws may expressly prohibit such service, and that it might be difficult

for an official from one state to make decisions as a board member that are good for

residents of all states encompassed by the RTO. 716 WEPCO believes the appropriate

role of the states in RTO governance includes active participation in regional planning

efforts and continued oversight of siting of new transmission facilities. In addition, many

commenters supported an advisory role for state officials, through advisory boards. 717

Formation

Numerous commenters supported a role for states in the formation of RTOs. ISONE points out that the states in its region had a significant role in the development of the

ISO. In addition, the California Board argues that states should have a role in

determining the structure of the RTO and any other market institutions that are formed to

serve the citizens of their respective states. California Board further notes that

mechanisms to ensure that states' interests are protected might include statutory or

regulatory reliability criteria; independent market monitoring by the states or requiring
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -621-

market monitoring reports to be provided to the state; and accountability to the states to

ensure adequacy of transmission and generation planning.

The Michigan Commission notes that most states have little direct authority to

order the development of an RTO, especially when the RTO encompasses several states. 

According to the Michigan Commission, at best state commissions should serve in an

advisory role as the utilities develop the structure and guidelines of the RTO proposal. 

The Michigan Commission, however, joins a few other states in urging the Commission

to defer to state recommendations once the basic RTO characteristic and functional

guidelines have been met.

NARUC comments extensively on the potential collaborative process and the

importance of state participation in this process and other steps in the formation of RTOs. 

To achieve the public policy goal of assuring reliable service at an affordable cost,

NARUC argues that states should fully participate in RTO development and formation,

particularly in matters for end-use native load customers. NARUC notes that based on

some states’ retail choice or ISO experiences, state oversight can play a significant role in

assuring a well-functioning ISO and competitive wholesale and retail markets .

NARUC further suggests that once RTOs are formed, continuing interaction is

necessary, and market development and evolution will be continuous. NARUC believes

that RTO formation must continue to be a dynamic process requiring continuing dialogue

between FERC and the states. NARUC further believes that once organizations are
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -622-

formed and approved, some type of formal reporting to FERC and the states by the

organizations on an annual basis would be appropriate. 

Nine Commissions suggests that state commissions are well positioned to balance

the competitive motivations of utilities in the RTO formation process with the interests of

all other stakeholders in defining markets in their respective regions and conforming the

RTO boundaries to those markets. According to Nine Commissions, the state

commissions' continued cooperation with FERC will ensure that the mutual public

interests of providing reliable electric service will be met, and that market participants in

every region of the country will be treated comparably. 

Siting, Planning and Reliability

A number of commenters, many state commissions, and quite a few other parties,

argue strongly that the Commission should be careful not to preempt traditional state

regulatory authority in promulgating its rule. In particular, commenters suggest that the

Commission should not usurp state authorities over siting, planning, and reliability of the

transmission system. Some commenters proposed solutions to state/Federal jurisdiction

issues in the RTO context, such as joint state/Federal review bodies. The Alabama

Commission suggests that FERC should not take any action that would infringe on state

jurisdiction.

South Carolina Commission asserts that transmission siting should remain in the

hands of the states and local governments. South Carolina Commission further asserts
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -623-

that states must continue to have a significant role with regard to matters of reliability for

end-use native load customers. The Iowa Board concurs and suggests that the

Commission’s RTO policies cannot alter states’ continued interest in local matters such

as transmission and generation siting, local transmission and distribution interface issues,

adequacy of generation and transmission, service quality, and retail rates.

The Montana Commission notes that in roughly half the states with siting laws the

function is not vested in the regulatory commission, but rather in a separate energy

policy, environmental or commerce agency. They recommend that the Commission

amend the language in the Final Rule to make it clear that the Commission does not

intend to preempt state siting authority as part of this NOPR.

UAMPS warns that RTOs may create a separation between generation planning

and transmission planning that endangers reliability. UAMPS argues that states must be

left with authority to assure reliability and that retail competition issues should also be

left to the states. UAMPS suggests that because state cooperation and participation will

be so critical to an RTO's effectiveness, in addition to the four minimum characteristics

the Commission has proposed, RTOs should be required to provide specifically for

significant state involvement in their development and operation. Allegheny, on the

contrary, states that system operations in an RTO will be pursued for the good of the

RTO service area, not of any one state. Allegheny notes that if that fact yields a dilution

of state authority it must be the price paid for RTO benefits.
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -624-

Regional Regulation

A number of commenters propose or support regional regulatory cooperation or

joint state/Federal sharing of jurisdiction. The Kentucky Commission proposes the

creation of a Federal/state “joint board,” that is styled similarly to the Universal Service

Joint Board currently used by the Federal Communications Commission, state utility

commissions, and other parties. The Kentucky Commission suggests creating this

voluntary Board to develop and review standards for transmission expansion. The Joint

Board would include participation from FERC, state commissions, RTOs, and other

interested parties. The Joint Board would also convene ad hoc committees to review

specific transmission expansion proposals. These committees would include the

participants described above, and would include representatives from regulatory

commissions in states where the expansion is proposed. The RTO would present the ad

hoc committee with a plan for transmission expansion with appropriate documentation for

need, cost effectiveness, and alternatives. The committee would in turn pass on its

recommendation or refusal of support for the plan to the specific state commissions for

their official approval. The Kentucky Commission believes that such an arrangement

could avoid Federal/state conflict while allowing both levels of government to exercise

appropriate jurisdiction. In addition, ISO-NE points to existing regional regulatory

groups such as NECPUC that could continue to provide valuable assistance to the
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -625-

Commission in the collaborative process to encourage RTO formation envisioned in the

NOPR.

Nine Commissions argues that an appropriate regional oversight venue will lead to

more consistent treatment of issues and parties between state and Federal regulatory

forums. With appropriate deference by both FERC and the states, such a regional venue

could obviate the need for many parties to expend redundant resources to participate in

multiple state and Federal regulatory processes for matters relating to transmission and

RTOs. 

Nine Commissions notes that one possible mechanism to effectuate such a regional

venue is interstate compacts, which are provided for in the Administration’s proposed

electric industry restructuring legislation. Nine Commissions argues that regional

regulatory organizations have the advantage of being able to coordinate state interests for

providing regional recommendations to FERC. State oversight functions (e.g. siting,

local outages, customer complaints) would not change. According to Nine Commissions,

such regional regulatory organizations would provide greater coordination among states

within the region, allowing for ADR processes that could satisfy multiple state

jurisdictional requirements, and such organizations would monitor markets that have

evolved beyond state borders and facilitate joint FERC and multi-state facilities siting. 

Pennsylvania Commission prefers a joint Federal/state approach toward regulating

RTO siting approvals, expansion, innovation and customer service. Pennsylvania
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -626-

Commission notes that a joint approach would resolve the vexing problem of

Federal/state jurisdictional uncertainty and a joint Federal/state approach would avoid the

potential for creative forum shopping by individual stakeholders, who will always seek to

cast a dispute in jurisdictional terms so as to dictate a jurisdictional resolution to the

perceived favorable outcome. A joint Federal/state approach has been used with success

in other areas, such as the Susquehanna River Basin Commission, the Delaware River

Basin Commission and the Joint Pipeline Office for the Trans-Alaska Pipeline System. 

Likewise, the Virginia Commission believes that there is no conflict between state goals

and Commission goals and that the two levels of government should be able to work

together and avoid conflict as long as both parties recognize that the common goal is the

public interest. 

Commission Conclusion

We continue to believe that states have important roles to play in RTO matters. 

For example, most states must approve a utility joining an RTO, and several states have

required their utilities to turn over their transmission facilities to an independent

transmission operator. Also, states must approve the siting of transmission facilities that

are called for in an RTO expansion plan.

We believe, however, that it is not appropriate to try to set out a full set of states'

roles in this Rule. It is difficult, and not necessary, to reach generic conclusions about

states' roles given the diversity of possible RTO forms and state authorities. For example,
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -627-

a state's role may be different for an ISO, transco, and other organizational form, and it

may be different for a multistate RTO and a single-state RTO, if any. States differ

regarding the authorities they have vested in their regulatory and siting agencies. Further,

states differ regarding their jurisdiction over municipal and cooperative utility owners of

transmission facilities.

Regional interests forming an RTO should consult with the states about what state

roles best fit the agencies' authorities and preferences and the organizational form of the

RTO. This role could vary from state to state within an RTO. Therefore, this Rule takes

a flexible approach that allows states to play appropriate roles in RTO matters, consistent

with this Commission's exclusive responsibilities and authorities under the FPA..

We note that we have discussed the role of states for particular RTO functions

elsewhere in this Final Rule. Regarding RTO formation, the Background discussion

above discusses the role that several states played in creating many of the existing ISOs. 

It also describes our initial consultations with state regulators on RTO formation and our

roles in FPA section 202(a) implementation; in those consultations we offered to continue

the RTO dialogue with states in the future. The form of consultation to be used should be

decided based on the issues and the region so we will not endorse or reject here any

particular form of collaboration. However, in the Collaborative Process discussion

below, we set out our plans to invite states and others to work with us to foster RTO

formation beginning early next year.
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -628-

In our discussion above of the Independence characteristic, we discuss the role of

state agencies in governance, making the point that states will play a key role in RTO

formation and development but declining to specify generically a state's role in

governance. Also, in our discussion above of the RTO Planning and Expansion function

we recognize the exclusive authority of state and local governments and regulatory

agencies over the siting of transmission facilities, and we include in our regulations the

standard that an RTO must accommodate efforts by state regulatory commissions to

create multi-state agreements to review and approve new transmission facilities.

8. Accounting Issues

Although not discussed in the NOPR, EEI commented on some accounting aspects

of RTOs. It urges the Commission to address two primary accounting issues for of

RTOs: (1) the need to revise the Uniform System of Accounts (USofA) and related

reports to reflect new RTO and other unbundled rate structures; and (2) the ability of

RTOs to use regulatory accounting.

a. Revision of the Uniform System of Accounts

Comments

EEI contends that because the Commission's USofA was developed when utilities'

products were bundled and fully regulated, it needs to be revised to support the

Commission's adopted policies and this proposed rule. EEI believes that with unbundling
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -629-

718Another significant area cited is whether the Commission should modify its

original cost accounting requirements for property acquisitions to conform with the

evolving fair value requirements of the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB). 

See Appendix I to EEI Comments at 11.

of rates, the USofA will need to be revised to reflect, among other things, 718 cost

functionalization (e.g., by generation, transmission, distribution, etc.). EEI also believes

that the Commission should specifically address the accounting to be used for RTO

reporting purposes, as the current USofA was not designed for use by RTOs. EEI states

that it is very willing to work with the Commission's staff to address the specific changes

that should be made to the USofA.

Commission Conclusion

 The Final Rule permits the various regions to select different organizational forms

for RTOs. Our open architecture structure for RTOs permits applicants to select the

business organization best suited to the needs of its members and RTO participants. It

would therefore be difficult to prescribe in this proceeding specific changes to our

existing USofA that would accommodate the needs of all RTOs. 

We believe a better course at this juncture would be to require RTOs to conform

their accounting to our USofA (as have ISOs) and to submit questions of doubtful

interpretation to the Commission for individual or generic rulings on particular

transactions, events and circumstances. 
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -630-

719The special accounting rules are primarily contained in Statement of Financial

Accounting Standards No. 71, Accounting for the Effects of Certain Types of Regulation

(SFAS 71). One of the primary accounting differences is the ability to defer expense

recognition of an incurred cost if it is probable that the utility will recover that cost in

future cost-based regulated rates.

720Conversely, according to EEI, the inability of an entity to use SFAS 71

accounting could have an adverse effect on earnings, which may be viewed unfavorably

by investors. According to EEI, one example would be where the Commission approves

a rate levelization plan (e.g., under capital lease transactions) under which rate recovery

of certain costs would be deferred until future years. If a utility could not defer expense

(continued...)

However, we agree with EEI's observation that unbundling of utility services, and

other changes in the industry require the Commission to re-examine its existing

accounting and related reporting requirements. This is true not only for the new types of

utilities that have emerged in the industry such as ISOs, PXs and RTOs, but also for

traditional public utilities. The Commission staff has been and will continue to meet with

EEI and others, and will continue its efforts to address the specific changes that may be

needed as the industry restructures. 

b. Ability to Use Special Accounting

Comments

EEI asks the Commission to consider the impact of its actions on the ability of

RTOs to use the special accounting rules applicable to cost-based rate-regulated

entities. 719 EEI believes that the ability to use regulated accounting would be

advantageous to RTOs and viewed favorably by the investment community. 720 EEI
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -631-

720(...continued)

recognition of such costs, earnings would be depressed in the early years of the

levelization plan. 

urges the Commission to structure alternative ratemaking methods (e.g., price and

revenue caps, incentive-based rates and price indexing) to allow RTOs to continue to use

the special accounting of SFAS 71. In this regard, EEI believes that if the Commission

decides it is advantageous to stimulate the establishment of RTOs by ensuring that all

start-up costs are ultimately recovered through FERC jurisdictional rates, it could issue

ratemaking orders that defer expense recognition of these costs, and allow for future

ratemaking recovery. Similarly, EEI urges the Commission to address the time frame

over which software development costs could be recovered through rates and to allow

utilities to defer expense recognition of such costs. To enhance cash flows from

operations, EEI suggests that the Commission accelerate the amortization of all

capitalized software costs. These actions, according to EEI, would likely be viewed

favorably by the investment community. 

Commission Conclusion

RTOs may propose and we are willing to consider alternative ratemaking methods

including proposals to delay rate recovery of certain expenses. We will not prescribe any

specific requirements at this time but allow RTOs to propose those methods which are

appropriate for each RTO's facts and circumstances. In this regard, we intend to take a
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -632-

721The Commission has already given considerable guidance on numerous market

design issues in a number of orders. See Pennsylvania-New Jersey-Maryland

Interconnection, L.L.C., 81 FERC ¶ 61,257 (1997); Central Hudson Gas & Electric

Corp., et al. 86 FERC ¶ 61,062 (1999); New England Power Pool, et al. 87 FERC ¶ 

61,045 (1999); AES Redondo Beach, et al., 87 FERC ¶ 61,208 (1999).

722See Staff Report to the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission on the Causes

of Wholesale Electric Pricing Abnormalities in the Midwest During June 1998

(September 28, 1998).

flexible regulatory approach toward approving RTO rate design proposals and strive to

include adequate information in our rate orders on the appropriate accounting treatments.

9. Market Design Lessons

We expect that bid-based markets will be a central feature in many RTO

proposals. To date, the Commission has analyzed and approved, with various

modifications, bid-based market designs for four ISOs. The purpose of this section is to

summarize the lessons learned from these real-world market experiments. The summary

provided below is not intended to favor one market design over another, but is intended to

assist RTOs in evaluating existing market designs and meeting the deadlines set forth in

this rule. 721 

Cal ISO, PJM and ISO-NE have had operational experience with their respective

market designs. For the most part the markets operated by these ISOs have functioned

well, and they have not experienced many of the problems encountered in the bilateral

markets in the Midwest and the Southeast. 722 However, each of the operational ISOs has
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -633-

723The NY ISO has had little operational experience with the particulars of its

markets design.

724See New England Power Pool, et al., 87 FERC ¶ 61,055 (1999); AES Redondo

Beach, et al., 87 FERC 61,208 (1999); New York Independent System Operator, Inc. et

al., 88 FERC ¶ 61,228 (1999).

725For example, energy and operating reserve products may be offered in realtime.

encountered some market design problems that have resulted in unexpected or

undesirable market outcomes. 723 These outcomes have led some ISOs to file many

market design changes and requests for temporary remedies or protections until

permanent design changes can be implemented. 724

a. Multiple Product Markets

The bid-based markets that we have approved to date are premised on the

assumption that acceptance of voluntary supply and demand bids which maximize overall

net benefits will also maximize efficiency. Each approved ISO design employs some

bid-based mechanism to ramp resources up and down to balance the system, manage

congestion, and to supply some ancillary services. Employing bids that indicate a

generator's willingness to be ramped down, ramped up, or placed in reserve is an

economic way to balance the system, manage congestion and maintain appropriate

reserves, both in real time and in any day-ahead markets. However, if more than one

product is being sold in the same temporal market, 725 efficiency is maximized when

arbitrage opportunities reflected in the bids are exhausted (i.e., after the RTO's markets
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -634-

726One would expect that services with more stringent technical requirements 

ordinarily have higher costs for providing those services. The prices of these services

should reflect the costs. For example, spinning reserves have more stringent requirements

and would be expected to command a higher price than non-spinning reserves. 

727See Report of the Market Surveillance Committee of the California Independent

System Operator, October 18, 1999 (MSC October Report). Both ISOs have seen prices

for services such as non-spinning reserve products, which do not require a unit to be

running, higher than the energy price. Also, according to the Market Surveillance

Committee (MSC) of the Cal ISO, market participants have an incentive to submit

schedules that will cause congestion so that their units can be called upon to relieve the

congestion and receive payments for not generating that are greater than payments

received for generating. 

have cleared, no technically qualified market participant would have preferred to be in

another of the RTO's markets). In addition, efficient bid-based markets elicit prices that

are consistent with technical and cost requirements. 726 For example, a situation where

generating units are paid more for not generating than for generating as has happened in

ISO-NE and the Cal ISO may be an indication of an inefficient market. 727

b. Physical Feasibility

Proper design of the market clearing procedures ensures that prices balance the

supply and demand for energy, and all transactions, in the aggregate, are physically

feasible with appropriate levels of reserves. Some market designs have allowed ISOs to

accept schedules that have not been physically feasible (e.g., Cal ISO), while other ISO

market designs include mechanisms to ensure the physical feasibility of transactions (e.g.,

the NY ISO and PJM). Some ISOs have encountered instances where transmission
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -635-

728See MSC October Report, at 67, 74-75.

constraints have prevented the use of needed reserves, 728 and this is inconsistent with the

operator's obligation to make certain that reserve requirements are met and that reserves,

along with necessary transmission, are available to respond appropriately to

contingencies.

c. Access to Real-Time Balancing Market

Real-time balancing refers to the moment-to-moment matching of loads and

generation on a system-wide basis. Real-time balancing is usually achieved through the

direct control of select generators (and, in some cases, loads) that increase or decrease

their output (or consumption in the case of loads) in response to instructions from the

system operator. Over the last several years, the Commission has seen an increasing use

by system operators of market mechanisms that rely on bids from generators to achieve,

overall, real-time balancing. In order to maintain system balance, the operator also

manages congestion while maintaining the appropriate level of reserves. It is expected

that any RTO balancing markets will be available to all grid users, i.e., including

individual grid users that engage in bilateral transactions. The fact that the overall system

must be in balance moment-to-moment does not mean that there must be a moment-tomoment balance between the specific load and resources involved in individual bilateral

transactions. Making a real-time balancing market available to all grid users ensures that
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -636-

729Costs and benefits associated with self-schedules are congestion costs created

by the transaction or congestion relief that the transaction makes possible.

730Thin markets refers to a situation in which the amount bid into the market is

either not enough to match demand, or just enough to match demand.

all users are treated equally for purposes of settling their individual imbalances. The four

operating ISOs approved by the Commission already operate such markets.

d. Market Participation 

Markets are most efficient when generators and loads, whether internal or external

to the RTO, are allowed full and flexible participation in the markets. While generators

and loads have the option to choose between participating in any RTO-facilitated markets

or other markets, the RTO must have generation and ancillary service quantity

information, and any necessary technical information, from self-schedulers in order to

balance the system and ensure reliability. This allows bilateral and forward financial

markets and independent PX markets to co-exist and complement RTO physical markets. 

Participants that self-schedule would be expected to pay for the costs that they impose on

the physical system at market prices and be paid for the benefits that they supply to the

physical system at market prices. 729

 Unnecessary constraints on the imports of services can lead to increases in price

volatility due to thin markets. 730 Allowing exports will give generators flexibility to take

advantage of opportunities outside of the RTO boundaries, while allowing load serving
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -637-

731The flexibility of demand-side bidding may be limited unless real-time meters

are installed. Otherwise, demand-side bidding can simply take the form of interruptible

load.

entities external to the RTO a chance to purchase services. Broadening market

participation deepens the market and enhances overall efficiency.

e. Demand-Side Bidding

Existing ISO markets offer generators flexible participation, but they often do not

offer customers demand-side bidding options. Demand-side bidding is desirable to the

extent it is technically feasible, because without it, demand response decreases and

market power is easier to exercise. 731 The availability of price responsive demand also

reduces price volatility in the markets. 

f. Bidding Rules 

A market that provides the flexibility for all generators to bid a reasonable

approximation of the costs they incur including start-up, minimum load, energy, and

ramping costs will be efficient. Whether it is cost-effective to start up a generator and

make it available for dispatch depends on the prices and scheduled quantities over the

multiple hours and services for which the generator is committed, not on the prices in any

single hour or for any single service. Allowing participants to bid these costs helps

provide for a more efficient dispatch of generating units to meet load and other services,

because it allows the start-up decisions underlying the dispatch schedules to be based on
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -638-

prices and quantities for a period greater than a single hour. Not permitting start-up and

minimum load bids can reduce efficiency because the decision to start up and dispatch

generators is made separately for each hour, resulting in start up decisions that can cause

losses for generators. Also, when the start-up and minimum load bids are submitted

along with minimum run and down times, generators are ensured that they will not be

dispatched in a way that is physically damaging to the unit. 

g. Transaction Costs and Risk

Transaction costs associated with participation in well functioning RTO markets 

should be low, and market participation should involve no unnecessary risks. For

example, in sequentially clearing markets, bidders are exposed to the risk that they may

be chosen in one of the markets that clears first, yet would have preferred to have been

chosen in a market that cleared later. In order to hedge against such risks, bidders may

undertake expensive and time consuming bid preparation strategies to decrease the

likelihood that such profitable opportunities would be missed. 

h. Price Recalculations

In some instances, it may be necessary to post prices on a preliminary basis while

the final price calculations are verified. For example, in ISO-NE, the computer

algorithms generate new dispatch points every five minutes, and preliminary market

clearing prices are based on these dispatch algorithms. However, the actual dispatch

instructions are issued manually. In circumstances where time does not permit all
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -639-

732See ISO New England, Internal Review of Operations, June 7-8, 1999, Report

issued August 20, 1999. Electronic dispatch is under consideration in ISO-NE.

changes in dispatch to be communicated and effected through manual processes in a

timely manner, the market clearing price resulting from the computer algorithm must be

adjusted to reflect the actual dispatch in the hour. 732 While an RTO must ensure that the

final market clearing prices are correct, market clearing procedures should minimize price

recalculations. Also, any price recalculation should be done quickly. Otherwise, market

participants could incur large transaction costs in attempts to hedge against such risk. 

Risk exposure can be further reduced if market participants can engage in bilateral

transactions, or participate in other markets, to lock in prices prior to participating in the

RTO-facilitated markets.

i. Multi-Settlement Markets

Multi-settlement markets may involve a day-ahead and real-time market. For realtime markets, prices are determined by real-time dispatch quantities, and deviations from

day-ahead schedules are priced at the real-time price. When day-ahead schedules are

financially binding, they are financial commitments subject to payments for deviations at

the real-time price. If market participants adhere to day-ahead schedules, they need not

participate in the real-time markets. If needed for reliability, bids need to be physically

binding and may be subject to Commission-approved penalties for failure to adhere to the

bid. Without financially binding commitments in the day-ahead market, the riskiness of
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -640-

733Portfolio bidding refers to bids that aggregate all generating units under the

same ownership. This is in contrast to generation owners bidding in each unit separately.

734Report of the Market Surveillance Committee of the California Independent

System Operator, August 19, 1998 at 35-36 (MSC August Report).

market participation increases since the day-ahead bids could be changed before real-time

dispatch. If bids for ancillary services are accepted, the accepted capacity must be

physically ready to meet reliability commitments when called upon. The lack of a

physical capacity commitment has been a problem in some ISOs.

j. Preventing Abusive Market Power

 An efficient market design does not favor market participants that have the

potential to exercise market power and minimizes the incentives for market participants to

engage in abuse of market power. For example, since large players are more likely to

cause market power problems, a market design that favors large players (e.g., portfolio

bidding 733) may create an incentive for consolidation and resulting market power

problems. Fewer restrictions on imports of services will help guard against thin markets,

which in turn will help mitigate market power. ISO's have experienced problems with

thin markets, and easing restrictions on imports should help. 734 Also, artificially

segmenting a product market into separate geographic markets for the same product can
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -641-

735The Cal ISO at one time segmented their product markets into separate

geographic markets that corresponded to the defined congestion zones even when no

congestion existed. It has since reformed this practice. See MSC August Report, at 32-

33. 

also create additional price volatility and opportunities for the exercise of market

power. 

735

 

If market participants are allowed to submit bids which can then be changed before

financial settlements are completed, these non-binding bids can be used as a signaling

device to facilitate collusive behavior. 

k. Market Information and Market Monitoring

 One property of an efficient market has market clearing prices and quantities

being made available immediately. This information enables market participants and

potential future market participants to assess the market and plan their businesses

efficiently. It will also allow market participants to spot errors in the market clearing

process and get them corrected.

Disclosure of individual bids could be made eventually, but not immediately. 

Such disclosures will allow detection of market design and implementation flaws, and

allow study of the market by independent analysts and market participants. It may lead to

the exposure of the exercise of market power. To detect the withholding of capacity, a

simple screen is to provide the output, reserve quantities, and maximum capacity of each

generator. Immediate disclosure of individual bids is undesirable because it might
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -642-

736The Commission approved the disclosure of bid information in the following

orders. See PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., 86 FERC ¶ 61,247 at 61,890, order on reh'g, 88

FERC ¶ 61,274 (1999); Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. et al. 86 FERC ¶ 61,062 at

61,204, order on reh'g, 88 FERC ¶ 61,138 (1999).

737Socialization of costs means that costs that could be assigned to a particular

market participant(s) are instead spread over all participants regardless of whether or not

they caused the costs.

738While it is desirable from an efficiency standpoint to eliminate the averaging of

costs, the costs associated with calculating cost causation in some instances could be

shown to outweigh the benefits of eliminating averaging.

facilitate collusion by the market participants. It also might affect the bids of market

participants who wish to keep their costs confidential. However, after six months or a

year, the information on individual bids has essentially no value for collusion and

discloses little new information about any bidder's current costs. Nonetheless, the

information's value for market monitoring remains high. 736

l. Prices and Cost Averaging

Market designs that base prices on the averaging or socialization of costs, 737 may

distort consumption, production, and investment decisions and ultimately lead to

economically inefficient outcomes. Where possible and cost effective, cost causality

principles can be used to price services and eliminate averaging. 738 

For example, in some congestion management mechanisms, the cost of alleviating 

congestion is spread over all loads. This scheme could have some generators creating

monetary benefits for other generators. In addition, it could lead to over-consumption of
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -643- 

739MSC October Report, at 112.

power by some loads and under-consumption by other loads. Moreover, such averaging

mechanisms for congestion management do not send the correct price signals for the

location of new generation, thus leading to problems with long-term implications. 739

Moreover, if pass-throughs or uplift charges are paid by all load to ensure bid-cost

recovery, as in some approved ISO market designs, it may be appropriate to couple these

pricing mechanisms with incentive mechanisms for the RTO to control them. 

I. Collaborative Process

The Commission proposed a regional collaborative process to facilitate the

creation of RTOs. State commissions had encouraged the Commission to sponsor

activities in each region of the country that will bring together representatives of public

and private electric utilities, state regulators, consumer groups, representatives from

Canada or Mexico, as appropriate, and any other interested parties that need to be part of

such a process. The Commission proposed that regional workshops be held after the

Final Rule is issued to determine what, if any, impediments exist to the formation of

RTOs in a particular region and how the Commission staff could help to overcome those

impediments. Staff resources that will be available for the collaborative process include

technical staff, dispute resolution staff, and any other staff assistance that would be

beneficial.
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -644- 

740See, e.g., Nine Commissions, Illinois Commission, Indiana Commission,

Michigan Commission, Montana Commission, Nevada Commission, South Carolina

Commission, Wisconsin Commission and Wyoming Commission.

741See, e.g., APPA, NRECA, CMUA, SRP, Snohomish, Seattle, RUS, East Texas

Cooperatives, IMEA, and Arkansas Cities.

742See, e.g., Powerex, BC Hydro and Canada DNR.

Comments

Almost all commenters support the Commission's collaborative proposal. Of the

49 comments that addressed this issue, 47 are generally supportive. These commenters

include a number of state commissions. 740 In addition, NARUC supports the

continuation of a "dynamic process requiring continuing dialogue between FERC and the

states." A number of public power entities also support the process. 741 Numerous

Canadian entities also filed comments regarding the usefulness of a collaborative process

for the international aspects of RTO formation. 742

Only Florida Commission and CP&L are not fully supportive. Florida

Commission suggests that FERC collaboration will not work in Florida but may work in

other regions of the country. CP&L is not supportive because the collaborative process

could be used by the Commission "as a means of forcing utilities to develop RTO

proposals on the Commission's timetable" which results in the Commission "being

disingenuous when it describes its RTO policy as 'voluntary'." Otherwise, CP&L believes

the conferences will only serve as an opportunity for participants to "posture" and that
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -645- 

limited Commission resources should not be used for meetings that "are not likely to

produce positive results."

Specific comments about the collaborative process address three basic issues:

inclusiveness, process and procedures, and outcomes.

Inclusiveness

The NOPR stated that "the Commission expects public utilities and non-public

utilities, in coordination with appropriate state officials, and affected interest groups in a

region to fully participate in working to develop an RTO." It further stated that the

regional public workshops will be convened in cooperation with the affected state

officials and that transmission owners and operators will be invited.

Many commenters advocate an open collaborative process that would include a

full complement of participants. They suggest that the regional meetings include

representatives of all stakeholders, for-profit transmission companies, not-for-profit

transmission entities, state regulators, state legislators, state Governors, state energy

officials, state and non-state consumer advocates, state economic and environmental

regulators, environmental action interests and public power/municipals. Some

commenters indicate that in certain regional efforts to form an RTO, the deliberations

have excluded key interests and, as a result, the outcomes were not widely supported. 

For example, PJM/NEPOOL Customers note with respect to the PJM formation process

that "[O]nly after all stakeholders were included in organizational discussions was true
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -646- 

progress made toward implementing an ISO that adequately addresses all parties' needs." 

PNGC states that "[I]f other users do not have a seat at the table while merchant functions

do, obviously a level playing field is not created." New Orleans cites Entergy's "failure to

even attempt to build a regional consensus concerning its transco as a reason that

inclusive regional conferences are needed."

Process and Procedures

Commenters raise a number of questions regarding the collaborative process and

specifically with respect to the regional public workshops. Many commenters support the

use/availability of the Commission's Dispute Resolution Service (DRS) staff or the use of

outside facilitators. Some commenters request that the Commission clarify that the

meetings will be open meetings that can be attended by any person. Several commenters

urge the Commission to take the cost and travel time to attend meetings into account in

planning the regional public workshops. Some specific locations are suggested for sites

for the regional workshops: New Orleans, Minneapolis/St. Paul, and Seattle or Portland.

Several commenters suggest that the collaborative process begin prior to spring

2000 in at least one region of the country—the Upper Midwest. Commenters suggest that

there is no need to wait and that the region would benefit by immediate assistance from

Commission staff as described in the NOPR.

Some commenters ask the Commission to be mindful that the number of regional

meetings scheduled may not only be costly but unproductive as well. Two commenters
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -647- 

specifically say that we must not allow the "death by meetings" syndrome to be realized. 

Some interests may want to stall RTO formation by promoting an "endless" series of

meetings that are not productive but are designed to "preserve the status quo." A few

commenters suggest that the role of Commission staff at the regional events should not be

that of meeting referee but primarily to provide policy guidance on key RTO issues and

proposals. NRECA proposes the creation of several Commission staff teams to "facilitate

and informally monitor each RTO formation process" and provide "neutral guidance" in

the regions. Some commenters ask that the Commission establish procedural rules in

writing in advance of the regional workshops so that all parties will know and understand

the rules prior to the meetings. Some commenters also request that all reports,

information and data produced for the meetings be readily available to all participants.

Outcomes

The Project Groups suggest that the Commission should "clearly delineate the

substantive results expected" from the collaborative process. They suggest that

collaboration progress reports be filed with the Commission and that "work products" be

required, including: (1) identification of RTO boundaries; (2) a list of all transmission

owners and facilities in the region; (3) a draft operating agreement; (4) a draft governance

structure and bylaws; (5) proposed operating protocols; (6) a proposed budget/financial

structure; (7) a draft tariff; and (8) how the proposals meet the Commission's guidelines,

including a timetable.
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -648- 

Commission Conclusion

A key element of this Final Rule is our commitment to the use of the collaborative

process to assist in the voluntary formation of RTOs. By collaborative process, we mean

a process whereby transmission owners, market participants, interest groups, and

governmental officials can attempt to reach mutual agreement on how best to establish

RTOs in their respective regions. We reiterate our commitment of Commission staff

resources, to the extent possible, to assist parties in developing RTO proposals.

We are encouraged that state Commissions, public utilities, public power entities

and cooperative utilities, power marketing interests, and consumer and environmental

groups support the use of a collaborative process. We are further encouraged that efforts

to develop RTOs continue in the West and Midwest, and that other areas are reviewing

the potential benefits of RTOs in their respective areas. We believe that this represents a

growing recognition throughout the nation that RTOs will improve competition in electric

markets and enhance the reliability of the nation's electric grid.

We welcome participation in the RTO collaborative process by our sovereign

neighbors, Canada and Mexico. We believe that it is in our mutual best interest to have

electricity flow efficiently and economically across our international boundaries. We

pledge to continue to work cooperatively with officials from Canada and Mexico to

encourage the operation and improvement of an international electric system that benefits

all consumers. 
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -649- 

The Commission believes that the collaborative process must accommodate the

fact that different regions of the country are in different stages of RTO formation and

must be flexible enough to allow for these differences. Therefore, we will initiate the

collaborative process with a series of five workshops in the Spring of 2000. The primary

objective of each workshop will be to develop a consensus agreement by regional

participants establishing a strategic process and a schedule for any further collaboration. 

The appropriate collaboration process will depend on whether the region is considering

formation of an ISO, transco, or other form of RTO. To achieve this objective,

participants will share information about the status of RTOs or RTO proposals in the

region, identify impediments to RTO formation in the area, explore which process(es)

could most expeditiously advance agreements on RTO formation, and determine what

role(s), if any, Commission staff should play in advancing discussions in each region. 

One result of these discussions may be regional decisions that more than one RTO would

be appropriate in the area encompassed by participants at the workshop. Therefore, the

collaborative processes that follow the various workshops may differ significantly. This

includes possible variations in the role that will be played by Commission staff in each

RTO formation effort.

The Commission believes that regional workshops in the Spring of 2000 will

expedite the RTO formation process. In selecting locations for the initial Spring 2000

workshops, we recognize trends in the broader regionalization of the nation's electric
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -650- 

system. We also consider the evolving electric markets as well as the configuration of the

regional grid. We emphasize that the selection of locations for initial workshops is not to

indicate a preference for specific RTO boundaries, but to provide convenient workshop

locations. With these considerations in mind, we designate the following workshop

locations. Parties may attend more than one regional workshop. We expect all

transmission owners to attend at least one workshop.

Workshops will be held in the following cities in February, March or April, 2000:

1. Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 

2. Cincinnati, Ohio

3. Atlanta, Georgia

4. Kansas City, Missouri

5. Las Vegas, Nevada

Workshops are expected to last for two days. Additional information about the

regional workshops will be provided in January 2000.

At the request of parties, the Commission staff may play a role in the formation of

RTOs. Commission staff will convene the regional RTO workshops and provide policy

and technical guidance consistent with this rule. The Commission will supply meeting

space for the five initial Spring 2000 workshops. Regional participants are expected to

bear the costs of collaborative meetings after the initial five workshops. Commission

staff time and staff travel expenses will be provided as resources allow.
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -651- 

We believe that it is critical to make the Spring 2000 Workshop phase of the

collaborative process open to all interested parties. In order to promote an open process,

we will provide public notice of Spring 2000 Workshop events to allow all interested

parties to attend. We shall also make available agendas and procedural rules to all parties

in advance of the regional workshops. Agendas may vary from one workshop to another.

The Spring 2000 Workshops represent the initial step of the collaborative process. 

We expect that other meetings will be convened following the workshops by parties in

each region to bring the parties together to form an RTO in each region. Commission

staff may also convene additional meetings if this would help RTO formation. The postworkshop meetings of parties in regions may be held with or without Commission staff

participation. We will make available the Commission's Alternative Dispute Resolution

staff upon the request of an RTO group in formation. At the request of such a group,

independent private professional facilitation services may be arranged by Commission

staff and must be sponsored by the parties within the region. As needed and requested by

parties forming an RTO in a region, Commission staff members will be available to act as

settlement judges, mediators, facilitators or observers. 

We believe that the best interests of the nation's electric consumers will be served

by the formation of RTOs. Therefore, we encourage parties to establish strategic

schedules at the Spring 2000 Workshops and to convene subsequent meetings with the
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -652- 

743FERC Stats. & Regs ¶ 32,541 at 33,761-63.

goal of forming an RTO expeditiously. Commission staff will monitor progress with

respect to the results or outcomes in each region.

We expect that, following the initial Commission-sponsored workshops, parties in

each region will work collaboratively to identify the appropriate RTO regions, identify all

transmission owners and facilities in each region, and develop a timely application in

accordance with the Final Rule.

We have designated James Apperson of the Commission Staff to serve as the

collaborative process contact. He may be contacted at (202) 219-2962 with any questions

or comments about the RTO collaborative process.

J. Implementation Issues

1. Filing Requirements

In the NOPR, the Commission proposed that all public utilities that own, operate

or control interstate transmission facilities (except those already participating in a

regional transmission entity in conformance with the eleven ISO principles enumerated in

Order No. 888) must file with the Commission by October 15, 2000 either (1) a proposal

to participate in an RTO that will be operational no later than December 15, 2001, or (2)

an alternative filing describing efforts to participate in an RTO, obstacles to RTO

participation, and any plans and timetable for future efforts. 743 For those public utilities
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -653- 

that file an RTO proposal on or before October 15, 2000, we proposed to permit them to

file a petition for a declaratory order asking whether a proposed transmission entity that

would be operational by December 15, 2001, would qualify as an RTO, with a

description of the organization and operational structure, a list of the intended

participants of the institution, an explanation of how the institution would satisfy each of

the RTO minimum characteristics and functions, and a commitment to submit necessary

FPA section 203, 205 and 206 filings promptly after receiving the Commission’s

determination on the declaratory order petition. Finally, we proposed that the

requirements not apply to a public utility that owns, operates or controls transmission that

also is a member of an existing transmission entity that the Commission has found to be

in conformance with the Order No. 888 eleven ISO principles; instead, each such public

utility would be required to make a filing no later than January 15, 2001, that (1) explains

the extent to which the transmission entity in which it participates meets the minimum

characteristics and functions of an RTO; (2) proposes to modify the existing institution to

become an RTO; or (3) explain efforts, obstacles and plans with respect to conforming to

these characteristics and functions.

Comments

Most commenters responding on this issue oppose one or more aspects of the

proposed filing requirements. For example, a number of public utilities and two state

commissions argue that the October 15, 2000, filing requirement does not provide enough
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -654- 

time. Southern Company contends that the proposed filing deadline requirement is likely

to be counterproductive because it imposes an artificial deadline that may interfere with

regional discussions. Moreover, once established, a prematurely formed RTO may itself

prove to be an obstacle to more effective transmission organizations. Southern Company

also claims that the proposed mandatory filing requirements are inconsistent with a truly

voluntary approach. If the requirement is retained, Southern Company suggests that the

Commission clarify that the alternative filings will be treated as status reports and not be

subject to deficiency orders or otherwise lead to proceedings in which punitive measures

might be taken, because any consideration or use of penalties seriously undermines the

Commission commitment to the voluntary nature of RTOs.

Wyoming Commission recommends that the deadlines not be made mandatory in

any way in the Final Rule because RTO formation is supposed to be voluntary. Since it

is unclear as to what happens to those entities who file an explanation as to why they did

not join an RTO, Wyoming Commission urges the Commission to defer to each region's

process and timetable in developing an RTO and acknowledge that not all regions are

processing at the same pace. It recommends that the Commission convert the October 15,

2000, deadline into a milepost for reporting RTO development.

CP&L submits that the time frame is unrealistic because it contemplates that new

RTOs can be developed, approved by the Commission, set up, and begin operation in less

than two years. Experience has shown that almost every RTO to date has taken at least
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -655- 

four years to go through that process. Therefore, the Commission should modify the

filing requirements to simply require informational filings on the status of RTO

development.

Sierra Pacific is concerned about insufficient time being allowed for transcos to

form. It points out that the precedent regarding ISOs is much more well-developed than

that regarding transcos. The certainty surrounding ISOs makes them more attractive

particularly when a decision to form the entity must be made relatively quickly to meet

the proposed October 15, 2000, filing date. To lessen the incentive to rush to join an

ISO, Sierra Pacific suggests that: (1) the date for filing an RTO proposal should be

extended to June 15, 2002; (2) the Commission permit transition mechanisms that will

allow transmission owners to eventually join transcos; and (3) the Commission not

require participation in an ISO to become a trap from which a transmission owner cannot

extricate itself. ComEd provides supporting arguments, noting that where divestiture of

transmission assets is involved to form transcos, the necessary transition period will

largely be dictated by the sheer complexity—legal, financial (bonds and mortgage), real

estate (titles/easements), taxation—of separating a designated portion of any electric

utility that has historically been a vertically integrated utility.

Based on its experience with the Midwest ISO formation process, Kentucky

Commission also argues that the proposed date to join an RTO or respond with reasons

for not joining is too short. It points out that, if the Commission completes the Final Rule
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -656- 

by the end of 1999, transmission owners will have less than one year to make a final

decision on participation. Kentucky Commission urges the Commission to give

transmission owning utilities additional time to look into joining an RTO, so that RTOs

are not pushed so quickly that the best model fails to materialize as a result of market

evolution that remains underway. South Carolina Commission and Big Rivers share the

concern that the proposed timeframe is too ambitious, given the complexity of RTO

related matters and the need to reach some level of consensus among those with vested

interests.

Several commenters noted that meeting the October 15, 2000, filing requirement

will depend on the Commission's standard of review of those filings. For example, TDU

Systems observes that the proposed filing requirements have no teeth. TDU Systems

contends that a public utility that decides not to participate in an RTO can make an

alternative filing setting out the reasons why it is not doing so and what plans it has to

work towards participation. In TDU Systems' view, while the proposed regulations are

consistent with voluntary participation, they are inconsistent with full and effective

participation in RTOs. TDU Systems counsels that the Commission should resist calls to

water down the RTO regulations even more, so as to treat alternative filings as mere

status reports that allow transmission monopolists to hold on to their monopolies.

Duke submits that if the Commission is willing to accept valid, well-justified

explanations as to why a utility has not become an RTO member, the October 15, 2000,
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -657- 

filing requirement is reasonable, noting that until state commission review of

restructuring and RTOs is completed, it may be premature for a utility to commit

resources to RTO membership. Similarly, Iowa Board suggests that, where transmission

providers are making legitimate progress, a report to that effect should not be received

with automatic disfavor. Alternative filings are legitimate progress reports should be

given equal validity with definitive proposal filings.

A few commenters explicitly support the October 15, 2000, filing requirements. 

For example, SRP believes it to be an acceptable balance between mandated participation

and the status quo. PJM/NEPOOL Customers also support the filing by a date certain

because this would expedite the collaborative process and ensure that no entity can

effectively block RTO formation by engaging in inappropriate negotiation tactics. And

Oglethorpe views the October 15, 2000, time frame as necessary to assure the timely

development of RTOs and help develop fully competitive efficient wholesale markets. 

Cinergy, noting that only after the Commission has had opportunity to review the October

15, 2000, filings will it be able to determine whether it should order participation in or

reconfiguration of particular RTOs, suggests that by April 15, 2000, all public utilities be

required to file a statement of position in which each utility identifies each state in which

it owns transmission, and the RTO in which it is considering membership and its

potential scope and configuration to the best of its knowledge.
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -658- 

744See, e.g., NY ISO, Cal ISO, NYPP and ISO-NE.

A number of commenters address issues and treatments relating to existing ISOs. 

Virtually all of the existing ISOs assert that the Commission should allow the previously

approved ISOs to continue to develop without undue interference in order to foster

experimentation and testing of proposals. 744 Cal ISO argues that the Commission should

find that existing regional entities generally meet the RTO criteria and that the

Commission should confirm its determination not to require substantial changes in

approved ISOs that would undermine difficult to reach consensus on critical issues. 

Similarly, the Pennsylvania and New York Commissions recommend that FERC

grandfather the existing ISOs that meet the RTO characteristics and functions. The

Pennsylvania Commission states that it does not want to tinker with the inner workings of

PJM, nor constantly revisit and revise operations and functions. The New York

Commission is concerned that the New York ISO tariff may have to incorporate the

"ordinary negligence" liability and indemnification provisions set forth in the pro forma

tariff if the ISO becomes qualified as an RTO, and that this will increase the ISO's

exposure to litigation. The South Carolina Commission supports NARUC's position

urging the Commission to grandfather existing ISO boundaries that are satisfactory to the

states. Similarly American Forest, CalPX and Mid-Atlantic Commissions want the

Commission to respect existing ISOs.
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -659- 

Furthermore, PJM/NEPOOL Customers contend that their ISOs are in basic

conformance with the minimum functions and characteristics. To the extent that any

deficiencies are found, the ISOs should be allowed to engage in continued

experimentation without interference from the Commission. The Wyoming Commission

also fails to see why existing ISOs, already having gone through a rigorous approval

process, should have to re-certify as RTOs. Moreover, EEI notes that the Commission

should weigh the incremental gains achieved through economies of scale, efficiency, and

additional savings against the potential incremental costs of reorganization, new computer

programming, infrastructure changes, and changes required to achieve effective

communication and coordination. NYPP proposes that ISOs be allowed to evaluate the

costs and benefits of forming an RTO after some years of market experience; hence, they

oppose putting members of existing ISOs on the same time frame for compliance as nonmembers of ISOs/RTOs. United Illuminating recommends that the Commission continue

to honor and not abrogate pricing arrangements of existing ISOs. United Illuminating

also contends that, since existing ISO members have no opportunity to discriminate

because they have turned control of their transmission over to their respective ISO, the

Commission cannot generically abrogate existing ISO pricing arrangements pursuant to

its FPA section 206 authority in this rulemaking. Central Maine offers that consolidating

the PJM, New England and New York ISOs into a super-ISO will require costly

expansion of telemetry, communication, and computer equipment, that it could result in a
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -660- 

745E.g., Illinois Commission, New Orleans, SMUD and Turlock.

746See, e.g., SMUD, PJM/NEPOOL Customers, NYPP, Cal DWR, MEAG,

American Forest and Central Maine. 

decrease in reliability, and that simple interregional coordination could accomplish the

Commission’s goals without consolidation.

A few non-ISO entities oppose any grandfathering of existing regional

transmission organizations. 745 For example, New Orleans argues that the Commission

should not exempt existing regional transmission entities from requirements of RTO

formation because only through universal application will all regions of the country

receive the benefits of open and competitive electric markets. H.Q. Energy Services

suggests that a larger territory, such as the combined territory served by existing the New

York, PJM and New England ISOs, would be more effective than the NY ISO standing

alone. PG&E counsels that freezing the existing ISO structures in place would not serve

reliability or the marketplace and would be inconsistent with the open architecture

requirement. It believes that the Commission has struck an appropriate balance imposing

a reporting requirement on existing ISOs.

Most commenters agree that existing operational transmission entities should

gradually evolve toward RTOs during a transition period, rather than making immediate

and drastic changes. 746 According to SMUD, a transition period will enable customers

to avoid bearing unnecessary costs. 
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -661- 

A few commenters address the specific filing requirements outlined in the NOPR. 

The New York Commission asserts that the NY ISO should not have to make a filing

because it possesses the requirements of an RTO. In addition, the Cal ISO argues that

existing entities, rather than individual public utilities, should be responsible for the RTO

filing requirements. Likewise, PJM suggests that existing ISOs report to the Commission

prior to any report by its public utility members, as the existing ISO is in a better position

to provide the Commission with the most accurate information by which to evaluate

whether the ISO satisfies the minimum characteristics and functions for RTOs. PJM

suggests that existing ISOs and existing transmission entities file reports no later than

December 31, 2000, explaining whether they satisfy the Commission's requirements for

RTOs and identifying any additional authority they may require for this purpose. On the

other hand, EPSA welcomes the proposal requiring a showing of how the existing

transmission institutions meet the minimum characteristics and functions by January 15,

2001, as a way to help address and solve continuing discrimination within current ISOs

and address whether these institutions should be combined into larger groupings. 

Similarly, NYC wants the NY ISO's January 15, 2001, filing to demonstrate how its

efforts to improve regional cooperation will overcome the institutional impediments that

have contributed to the city’s load pocket condition.

Finally, commenters raise a number of miscellaneous issues: Puget questions

whether there will be negative implications for any entity the choose to cease
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -662- 

participation in an RTO; DOE points out that RTOs may need to fund pensions for

transferred employees, and existing transmission providers may need to fund early

retirements or other compensation for displaced employees; UMPA recommends that

recourse to the Commission in a de novo capacity must be part of all RTO dispute

resolution procedures; and Indiana Commission, Snohomish and Midwest ISO express

concern about how the Commission intends to handle multiple RTO proposals covering

approximately the same region.

Commission Conclusion

The Commission will adopt the NOPR proposal requiring that all public utilities

that own, operate or control interstate transmission facilities (except those already

participating in an approved regional transmission entity) file by October 15, 2000, either

a proposal to participate in an RTO or an alternative filing describing efforts and plans to

participate in an RTO. As proposed initially, we will consider a petition for declaratory

order setting forth the items listed in section 35.34(d)(3) as a proposal to participate in an

RTO.

We believe that the October 15, 2000, date for filing proposals is realistic. It is not

overly aggressive, given the amount of guidance we have provided in this Rule and the

amount of flexibility we are permitting in how to satisfy the minimum characteristics and

functions. In addition, the collaborative process that we are promoting in this Rule will

provide an opportunity for all interested parties with their varied interests to resolve many
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -663- 

747Of course, these reports may be filed prior to October 15, 2000.

of their differences, in advance, and reach consensus on the RTO solution that best fits

the overall needs of their respective region. The October 15, 2000, filing date should

help keep the parties focused and accelerate their efforts toward selecting an appropriate

RTO model.

The October 15, 2000, date for filing is also reasonable because, even if a public

utility is unable to file an RTO proposal at that time, we are permitting the public utility

to make an alternative filing reporting on the status of pertinent RTO formation and

development, the obstacles that have prevented the filing of an appropriate RTO proposal,

and any of the public utility's plans and timetable for future efforts directed toward RTO

formation and participation. 747 Given the importance that the Commission places on

RTO development, it is important for us to understand no later than October 15, 2000 just

how much progress the industry is making on forming RTOs. If the October 15, 2000,

filings reveal obstacles that prevent serious progress toward RTO formation are reported

for a given region, we will be able to act early enough to provide guidance on what steps

we think are appropriate to help address the obstacles (e.g., further collaborative efforts). 

And where serious regional progress is reported, but more time is requested in connection

with meeting a particular RTO requirement, we will be able to act early enough to try to
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -664- 

accommodate the local needs, complications and complexities that the particular region

faces.

Some concern has been expressed that the October 15, 2000, filing date is too

short to allow transcos to form because of the inherent legal, financial, real estate and

taxation complexities associated with the transfer of ownership of the affected

transmission assets. We are not proposing that the restructuring be completed by October

15, only that a proposal be filed, or an alternative filing as described in this Rule. 

Moreover, we take note of the fact that other forms of major corporate restructuring,

including mergers, have proceeded from initial idea to formal proposal in a shorter time

when the motivation is sufficient. Therefore, we do not think the time allowed is too

short for transco proposals.

We also reaffirm the proposed January 15, 2001, filing date for transmitting public

utility members of an existing approved transmission entity to address the extent to which

that entity conforms to the minimum characteristics and functions of an RTO, any plans

to make it conform, and any obstacles to full conformance with our Final Rule. We note

that RTOs will not be "starting from scratch." There is significant information available

about both the good and bad experiences with ISOs, and this information should help

RTOs meet this filing deadline.

While we are allowing a later filing date for existing transmission institutions to

file (January 15, 2001, versus October 15, 2000), we do this because, in general, the
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -665- 

transmission owners in those regions have already made substantial progress in

establishing regional entities. Nonetheless, the Commission needs to know, for all

regions, including those covered by existing approved transmission institutions, the extent

of progress toward formation of fully functional RTOs. To the extent that an existing

ISO, for example, is less than adequate with regard to one of the necessary characteristics

or functions, we would expect the existing institution to be working on a plan of action to

make the remedial improvements that are required to bring it into conformance with the

Final Rule. 

In sum, we continue to believe that the October 15, 2000, and January 15, 2001,

filing dates represent an acceptable balance between the need to move toward RTOs as

soon at possible and the need for sufficient time for transmission owners and market

participants to develop proposals.

2. Deadline for RTO Operation

The Commission proposed that all public utilities participate in an RTO that will

be operational by December 15, 2001. In addition, we contemplated implementation of

the congestion management function within one year after startup (by December 15,

2002), and implementation of inter-regional parallel path flow coordination and

transmission planning and expansion functions within three years after startup (by

December 15, 2004).
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -666- 

Comments

Most commenters suggest the December 15, 2001, deadline should be changed to

a later date or that the Commission provide greater flexibility in meeting the deadline. 

On the other hand, Oregon Commission explicitly favors the December 15, 2001,

deadline, arguing that the time line is designed in stages so that the easiest requirements

come earliest. EPSA fears that further delay of any of the operational deadlines for any

of the required RTO functions (i.e., for initial startup, congestion management, parallel

path flow coordination, or transmission planning and expansion) will only encourage

further debate and dialogue without driving the industry towards acceptable resolutions,

and prolong the problems of residual discrimination and remaining market inefficiencies.

Two commenters propose an earlier deadline. PG&E contends that the transition

period for RTOs to meet all requirements must be as short as possible—no more than one

or two years to fully operational RTOs may be reasonable. Sithe similarly argues that,

while the negotiations and proceedings associated with voluntarily RTOs can take years

to complete, the California experience suggests that an RTO can be established quickly if

a deadline exists. Sithe recommends that the Commission reconsider its time frame and

do everything it can to hasten the process of putting in place RTOs with all minimum

characteristics and functions. It observes that, as proposed in the NOPR, an RTO could

defer for up to three years the filing of a plan for transmission planning and grid
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -667- 

expansion. The details may not be finally approved by the Commission for at least

another year such that a delay of over five years could result.

SRP and American Forest express concern about who will be responsible for

building and paying for new transmission facilities until the RTO takes on this

responsibility. In particular, SRP suggests that the Commission require each RTO filing

to describe who will be responsible for financing and building transmission expansions

during the interim.

Most commenters, however, view the proposed deadline as too aggressive, and

recommend that it be eliminated or extended. CP&L views the operating deadline as

arbitrary and capricious, and argues that the deadline will impose higher implementation

costs and inefficiency that will not benefit the public or the industry. South Carolina

Authority believes that to assume that a large group of stakeholders with diverse interests

can somehow come together and agree on a particular RTO model and configuration by

October 15, 2000 that is up and running by December 31, 2001, is unrealistic. East

Kentucky suggests that the timetable be extended approximately two years. Montana

Power encourages extension by one year because areas like the Pacific Northwest will

probably need significant infrastructure to be developed or re-deployed and the 14 month

time frame contemplated after RTO proposals are due on October 15, 2000, is not

sufficient time.
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -668- 

748Note that a number of comments opposing deadlines are based on the difficulty

of attaining specific RTO functions. These comments are also addressed in the sections

regarding the specific functions.

A number of commenters favor a flexible approach and allowing provisional RTO

status. Cinergy offers that, to overcome obstacles such as legal impediments to public

power participation, alternative means of RTO participation be considered such as joint

operations without the functional integration of public systems’ facilities to allow them to

control the private use of their systems. SERC generally concurs. Williams contends that

not all RTOs will be able to develop at the same pace, and supports provisional RTO

status with dates certain respecting those functions not able to be performed at startup. 748

SNWA recommends that, if necessary, a phase-in approach should be used in the

implementation of an RTO to smooth the implementation process. Project Groups

contends that, given the California experience, the cost of attempting to do everything at

once is significant. Transmission ISO Participants urges flexibility for transmission

owning members of exiting ISOs since the current structure represents an imperfect and

probably unfinished agenda. EEI contends that the Commission should allow flexible

timetables to establish RTOs that are transcos, contending that a vertically integrated

utility that selects the option of moving transmission assets to a transco faces complex

financial and tax issues. Nevada Commission urges the Commission to clarify that there

is no prohibition against forming interim organizations such as an independent system
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -669- 

administrator until such time as a viable RTO for the region is formed. South Carolina

Commission claims that each RTO proposal should be reviewed on a case-by-case basis

for general adherence to the Commission’s overall policy goals.

Indiana Commission cautions, however, that careful consideration should be given

to what will be lost by the acceptance of an RTO "lite." It argues that existing

transmission entities may see little value in maintaining relatively high standards and

could view the Commission acceptance of lower standards as an incentive to gravitate to

lower standards. PG&E recommends the Commission grant waivers from its

requirements only in limited cases and only for short durations. AEPCO, contends that

there should be a reasonable basis for granting waivers, particularly for non-jurisdictional

entities. In particular, a request for waiver should consider: (1) how much additional

RTO transmission would result from inclusion of the facilities in an RTO; and (2)

whether the RTO would be functional without inclusion of the entity's facilities. Sithe

argues that care should be taken when considering whether to permit RTOs to go into

effect without meeting functions and in granting waivers, and suggests that the

Commission establish clear requirements for RTO approval, strictly scrutinize proposals,

and not hesitate to reject inadequate proposals.

Commission Conclusion

We have decided to retain the originally proposed startup and other functional

implementation deadlines (RTO startup by December 15, 2001, implementation of
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -670- 

congestion management by December 15, 2002, and implementation of the parallel path

flow coordination and transmission planning and expansion functions by December 15,

2004).

As a general proposition, we believe that, given the urgent needs of electricity

markets as discussed elsewhere in our Final Rule, we have an obligation to promote RTO

operation at the earliest feasible date. Even where a market may already be served by an

ISO or other approved transmission entity, we are concerned that such market may

remain hampered to the extent that the approved entity has yet to fully conform with our

Final Rule.

In response to those who contend that December 15, 2001, is too ambitious for

RTO start-up, we note several points. First, we, and the industry, now have had the

benefit of the experience of the formation of five ISOs under Commission jurisdiction, an

ISO in ERCOT, some international experience with regional transmission entities, and

substantial discussion of the subject of regional transmission entities within the industry. 

While the time-frame we are suggesting for RTO formation may have been unrealistic

several years ago, much has been learned since then which should facilitate more rapid

formation. 

Second, our Final Rule is providing substantial flexibility that should permit an

RTO to satisfy the minimum characteristics and functions in a cost efficient manner. For

example, we are not requiring control area consolidation; we are not requiring the
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -671- 

establishment of a PX; we are allowing an RTO to meet its operational control obligation

through indirect or hierarchical control arrangements via contractual agreements with the

existing infrastructure such as transmission owners and control area operators; and we are

allowing an RTO to satisfy its security coordinator functions through contractual

arrangements with an external security coordinator, as long as it is independent. An

acceptable RTO structure need not be a monolithic organization that requires an extended

period of time to become fully set up so that it can directly "push all of the buttons." 

Moreover, we are allowing a longer phase-in period for functions that may be more

difficult to establish, such as congestion management, parallel path flow measures, and

transmission planning and expansion. 

With respect to the comments that question the December 15, 2002, deadline for

implementing the congestion management function, we believe that lack of effective and

market-oriented congestion management is a critical issue in the industry, and that it

needs attention soon. We acknowledge that developing a sophisticated congestion

management program can be an extremely complex and time consuming matter. 

However, implementation of economic approaches to congestion management by some of

the approved ISOs shows the feasibility of these concepts where there is an institution to

undertake the organization of this function over a large area.

Some say that transmission congestion is not a serious problem in their regions,

and that they therefore should not be required to develop a complex congestion
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -672- 

management plan within a short time-frame. We agree that an RTO should not have to

expend large resources to address a problem that does not exist. However, we are

concerned that an RTO fully analyze the extent to which transmission congestion does or

could interfere with electricity sales in its region, and that it be prepared to address

congestion if it becomes a more serious problem through changing markets. As markets

become more competitive and the volume of discrete transaction increases, transmission

congestion may become serious unless action is undertaken beforehand. Where

transmission congestion is infrequent, this Rule does not preclude the establishment of

relatively less complex forms of market-compatible congestion management such as

generation redispatch protocols.

In sum, we think that the phased startup and other functional implementation

deadlines are reasonable.

3. Commission Processing Procedures

The Commission recognized that RTO formation would be complicated by the

requirements for Commission approval of transfer of control of jurisdictional facilities

under FPA section 203 and Commission approval of RTO transmission rates, terms and

conditions under FPA section 205. In the NOPR, the Commission requested comments

on whether the Commission should provide expedited or streamlined processing
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -673- 

749FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 32,541 at 33,759.

procedures for RTO filings and asked for suggestions regarding how the Commission can

further expedite and streamline procedures. 749

Comments

Views on streamlined and expedited processing of RTO filings are mixed. 

Commenters that generally favor streamlining include Desert STAR and TEP, which

suggests that filing requirements be kept simple and flexible.

A number of commenters offer specific suggestions for streamlining and

expediting the process, including:

• Florida Commission believes that once an RTO or other structure has been agreed

upon by a group of entities, the Commission should expedite all required processes

in order to allow the participants to start implementing the agreed upon changes.

• Tallahassee recommends that the Commission should clarify that it is not

revisiting the functional test for distinguishing transmission and distribution

facilities addressed in Order No. 888.

• Entergy asserts that significant delay in obtaining Commission approvals will

make it difficult for Entergy to institute a transco within the time-lines established

by state restructuring laws in Arkansas and Texas. Providing clear rules on the

required and permissible features of RTOs as the Commission did in its July 30,
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -674- 

1999 Declaratory Order for Entergy and providing clear standards on pricing

policies will help. Entergy argues that the Commission should make explicit its

willingness to consider requests for expedited approval when a showing is made

that expedition is necessary, as it has done for California ISO.

• Trans-Elect notes that if a transfer of facilities cannot close under Section 203

until the related FPA section 205 proceeding is concluded, an expedited Section

205 filing must also take place. One way to do this is to waive an Initial Decision

and set a date certain for the Commission’s section 205 decision.

• PJM/NEPOOL Customers recommend that a standard RTO governance structure

be adopted that allows participation by all stakeholder groups. It would expedite

processing by requiring that any RTO filing demonstrate that all stakeholders were

included in the formation process.

• SMUD recommends that the Final Rule require that RTOs be designed, developed

and implemented in a manner that does not require numerous tariff amendments to

remedy market ills that could be addressed prospectively or at a speed that does

not dramatically increase RTO development costs.

On the other hand, some commenters urged the Commission to exercise caution

regarding streamlining and expediting:

• East Texas Cooperatives observes that a poorly configured RTO can potentially be

more harmful to the industry than the status quo, by allowing large transmission
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -675- 

owners to dominate regional grid management, maintain pancaked rates and

discriminate in allocating transmission revenue.

• Indiana Commission recommends that state commissions and other interested

parties have full opportunity to thoroughly review, comment, and have an impact

on the RTO proposals once they are filed with the Commission.

• Puget indicates that a negative implication of allowing streamlined filing and

approval procedures for RTO participants is that regulatory burdens will be

leveled against nonparticipants while those who join an RTO will be freed from

what the Commission implicitly recognizes are unnecessary requirements. A truly

voluntary system would not continue to impose unnecessary regulatory

requirements on nonparticipants and there is no reason for the Commission to

delay implementing these regulatory reforms now before a final decision is made

regarding the wisdom or efficacy of RTOs, or to condition the implementation of

such reforms on an entity's participation in an RTO. 

• Duke contends that, given the size and complexity of the typical section 203 and

205 of the FPA filings, it is not clear that reducing the time that parties are granted

to review such filings and provide initial comments may be appropriate. 

Nonetheless, the Commission should work to dismiss irrelevant issues used as

leverage to extract concessions unrelated to RTO formation, it should consider use

of less formal hearing procedures for issues that do not require discovery, and the
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -676- 

Commission should limit the time period allowed for evidentiary hearings. Duke

acknowledges that the effect of streamlined filing and approval procedures could

be to reduce costs that would otherwise be born by market participants.

Commission Conclusion

While there is broad-based consensus for simplifying the Commission’s RTO

filing process and responding to RTO proposals expeditiously, we must maintain an

appropriate balance between streamlining and expediting the filing and processing of

RTO proposals and ensuring due process and the development of an adequate record. 

Given the amount of flexibility we have built into the Rule as to organizational structure,

it is difficult to predict what issues will be raised by the RTO proposals and the degree of

complexity raised by such issues. Accordingly, while the Commission has the goal of

ensuring the rapid formation of RTOs, and will attempt to process each RTO proposal as

expeditiously as possible, certain RTO proposals will take longer to analyze and review

depending upon the complexity of the issues and the level of support among the affected

parties. Therefore, in addition to the specific guidance provided elsewhere in this Rule,

we provide further guidance and note the following factors which are intended to assist

public utilities in streamlining their required filings and help expedite the processing of

the RTO proposals. 

One factor that should facilitate faster processing is that the Final Rule permits

delayed implementation dates for various highly complex FPA section 205 related RTO
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -677- 

provisions (congestion management by December 15, 2002, and parallel path flow

coordination and transmission planning and expansion each by December 15, 2003). 

Therefore, initial RTO proposals need not contain the details for these provisions, but

need only contain a commitment to complete the provision and a timetable for submitting

appropriate future filings. Likewise, we need not act on those matters initially in our

RTO orders. 

Expeditious processing of an RTO submittal is more likely to occur if the RTO

proposal is the result of a comprehensive and open collaborative process with widespread

support from transmission owners, market participants, and affected state commissions. 

While we cannot pre-approve unopposed proposals, many of our potential concerns could

be minimized to the extent the proposal has broad support.

Another potential streamlining measure is that public utilities are permitted to file

RTO proposals jointly with other entities. For example, in the case of existing ISOs and

other approved regional transmission entities, the regional entity may file on behalf of the

individual public utilities. This will reduce the volume of submittals that must be

developed by public utilities and be reviewed by the Commission. 

We note that, with the exception of governance, experience gained from past ISO

proceedings, will be directly transferable whether the form of RTO is an ISO or a transco. 

For transcos, as discussed elsewhere in the Final Rule, restrictions on ownership of
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -678- 

750We recognize that, while there is no statutory deadline to act on section 203

filings, there is a 60-day statutory clock requiring action on section 205 related filings

within 60 days from the date of filing, in the absence of a proposed effective date

extending beyond the 60-day time frame. However, in most instances, we expect that the

RTO submittals will typically propose FPA section 205 effective dates that will be

beyond the 60-day nominal clock. 

751This proposed time frame refers to applications that are consistent with the

guidance provided in this Rule and that provide all the necessary information. We further

note that the Commission’s review process will restart in the event that applicants modify

their proposal or supplement the supporting information in their application.

transcos that we have adopted are designed to work in tandem with restrictions on

governance in order to ensure adequate levels of independence.

We believe that RTO proposals that reflect the above factors, should allow the

Commission to minimize the amount of time necessary to analyze and process the

submittal. While the Commission cannot guarantee that we will be able to respond to

every proposal within a pre-set period of time, we will make every reasonable effort to

issue an initial order on an RTO proposal within 60 days, 750 after the comment period

closes. 751 With respect to RTO proposals that present contested issues or problematic

RTO provisions, we will make every effort to expedite consideration of the proposed

RTO and we will continue to consider alternatives to formal procedures (e.g., ADR

procedures), where warranted, to avoid initiating a hearing.

What the Commission has approved for ISO forms of governance can be used as

models for governance of RTOs that are ISOs. Nothing in this Rule prohibits the types of
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -679- 

independent governance structures we have approved to date. All of the ISOs approved

to date, except one, have a two-tier form of governance wherein a non-stakeholder board

at the top generally has final decision-making authority on most issues. Below this board

are advisory groups or committees comprised of stakeholders that provide advice and may

share some decision-making authority. With regard to the second-tier, the Commission

has required that no one constituency in any group or committee be allowed to dominate

the recommendation or decision-making process over the objection of the other classes,

and that no one class holds veto power over the will of the remaining classes. The

California ISO's governance structure is different. It has a single-tier hybrid decisionmaking board comprised of both stakeholders and non-stakeholders. No two classes can

push through a decision over the objection of other classes, and no one class has veto

power over the will of the remaining classes.

4. Other Implementation Issues

Commission Conclusion

An additional issue some commenters raised in connection with implementation

concerns how the Commission intends to handle multiple RTO proposals that pertain to

the same or overlapping regions. We expect that proper adherence to the collaborative

process and the RTO scope and configuration factors we have identified, in the first

instance, will bring order to the formation of RTOs such that the Commission will not

need to step in and decide the matter of competing RTOs at the filing stage. 
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -680-

Several miscellaneous RTO implementation issues that were raised by some

commenters concern the terms of withdrawal for members from an RTO, the RTO’s

funding of staff compensation in connection with transfers of personnel from other

entities, and the Commission serving as a backstop for RTO’s ADR processes. These

matters, however, are best left to case-specific determinations in response to particular

RTO proposals.

In response to those who argue for or against rejection or waiver in connection

with less-than-fully-conforming RTO submittals, we believe the concepts of rejection and

waiver are not appropriate. We have provided a significant degree of flexibility in the

minimum characteristics and functions, and in many instances specifically allow for

alternative ways to satisfy those characteristics and functions. Proposals that do not

satisfy the minimum characteristics and functions will not be approved as RTOs. That

does not mean that such a proposal would be summarily rejected; in fact, it may still be

an improvement over the status quo as long as it is consistent with the FPA requirements. 

However, it may be questioned the extent to which entities that are not participating in

RTOs have acted to eliminate the impediments to competition we have identified in this

Final Rule. 

IV. ENVIRONMENTAL STATEMENT

This section reviews and adopts the Environmental Assessment (EA) prepared by

the Commission staff in connection with this Final Rule. It identifies the alternatives
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -681-

considered by the agency in reaching its decision; analyzes and considers whether and to

what extent, if any, the chosen alternative—adoption of this Final Rule—affects the

quality of the human environment; and states the Commission's decision.

Summary

The analysis compares generation and emission trends under the Final Rule to

baseline trends without the Final Rule. The analysis indicates that the Final Rule will

result in little generation change on a net national basis, but there may be shifts in

regional generation. Economic benefits of the Final Rule can be realized with no

significant, adverse environmental impacts. Further, the potential exists for

environmental benefits to be realized, through the encouragement of newer, cleaner

resources.

Discussion

A. Background

To further the policies and goals of the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969

(NEPA), Commission staff prepared an EA in order to examine potential impacts that

could result from implementing the Commission's Rule, and to serve as the basis for

considering whether the Final Rule will have significant impacts on the quality of the

human environment. On May 14, 1999, the Commission issued a notice of intent to

prepare an EA, and a request for comments on the scope of the issues that should be
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -682-

752As noted in the EA, a number of comments filed during scoping relate to

matters outside the scope of the EA, and for the most part deal with policy issues that are

addressed in the Rule.

addressed in the EA. On July 8, 1999, a public scoping meeting was held at the

Commission. On October 22, 1999, the Commission issued an EA, and invited interested

parties to comment on the EA. Comments were due on November 22, 1999.

The Commission received two filed comments on the EA (NMA/WFA/CEED and

Project Groups on behalf of multiple public interest groups). Specific comments are

addressed in the relevant sections below. 752

B. Scope of the Analysis

The EA examines potential environmental impacts that could result from

implementing the Commission's Final Rule. The impacts are necessarily uncertain

because they would be the product of changes in economic regulation that may alter the

future behavior and perhaps the future structure of electricity supply markets. In turn,

these behavioral and structural changes could lead to a different set of environmental

conditions than would otherwise be the case. The analysis recognizes the uncertainty of

the Rule's potential effects on future markets. It presents a systematic view of possible

future market changes and assesses a range of possible responses to market changes, but

should not be seen as predictive of specific market or environmental outcomes. 
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -683-

The EA addresses a broad range of potential economic changes that could result

from the Rule. These impacts include changes in the mix of electric generating plants

built in the future, shifts in the utilization of existing plants, and increases in interregional

transmission. The analysis, therefore, includes major air pollutants: sulfur dioxide (So2),

nitrogen oxides (NOx), mercury, and carbon dioxide associated with various types of

generating plants and fuels. The EA addresses potential environmental impacts at

national and regional levels. 

Project Groups expressed concern that the EA does not retrospectively analyze the

impacts of open access policies to date. As stated in 1.3.2 of the EA, we believe it is

neither possible nor desirable to analyze such changes. Data collection lags, and the short

period of time that has elapsed since the issuance of Order No. 888, would preclude us

from drawing meaningful conclusions.

Project Groups also stated that economic impacts are not specifically reported in

the EA, making it more difficult to evaluate the impacts of the Rule. We note, however,

that the modeling and analysis conducted for the EA are the basis for the economic

discussion contained in the Final Rule. These economic results do not provide a

complete analysis of the potential economic impacts because the analysis considers only

economic effects which may relate to operating decisions or new capacity, and thus may

lead to environmental consequences. However, there are other economic benefits from
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -684-

competitive wholesale electric power markets which have little or no effect on the

environment. 

C. Analytic Approach

Because the impacts that could result from the rulemaking are uncertain, an

analytic approach known as scenario analysis was used. In this approach, alternative

views of the future are postulated and analyzed with and without the Final Rule. 

Potential environmental impacts are evaluated by comparing the analytic results of the

scenarios. First, an analytic base case was developed. This base case relies on the

assumption that the Commission would pursue current policy with respect to wholesale

electric competition using existing rules and procedures, including case-by-case

implementation of regional market arrangements.

Having established an appropriate base case, the EA analyzed future impacts

assuming that the Rule is in effect. Staff adopted the assumption that the Final Rule,

although voluntary, would result in the establishment of RTOs throughout the study area

with the characteristics and functions set forth in the Final Rule. Three scenarios were

developed to reflect a range of possible economic and environmental outcomes: 

Transmission Efficiency Scenario; Transmission/Generation Efficiency Scenario; New

Entry Scenario. 
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -685-

D. Alternatives to the Rule

The primary alternative to the Final Rule is for the Commission to maintain the

status quo, that is, to continue its existing open access policies. The result of this noaction alternative, without implementing the Final Rule, is that the Commission would

effectuate an open transmission grid, but not address changes in the industry that have

occurred since Order No. 888 was adopted. However, the no-action alternative describes

what is likely to happen if the Commission takes no action over and beyond

implementation of existing policies. Once this baseline is established to portray what is

likely to happen in the electric industry during the study period, the projected impacts of

the Final Rule can then be determined against this backdrop.

In addition to the Final Rule and the no-action alternative, several alternative

approaches were considered and ultimately rejected. The alternative of analyzing

mandatory RTOs, as compared with voluntary RTOs as set forth in the Final Rule, was

rejected as moot, since the EA assumes that voluntary RTO formation proceeds with little

delay and is successful in creating RTOs with the functions and characteristics contained

in the Rule. Hence, assumptions for voluntary RTOS and mandatory RTOs are

analytically indistinguishable in terms of their effects on the transmission grid and on the

electric sector generally. 

The other major alternative considered was the analysis of alternative fuel price

assumptions. Project for Sustainable FERC Energy Policy suggested that we prepare
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -686-

such an analysis. However, as we noted in the EA, this alternative was ultimately

rejected for two reasons. First, as reflected in scenarios analyzed in the EIS for Order

No. 888, plausible variation in gas prices relative to coal prices is unlikely to have a

major impact on the environmental effects of the Final Rule. Therefore, a gas price

scenario was selected that had the general characteristics of other forecasts, namely, that

gas prices will rise relative to coal prices. The selection of this gas price scenario does

not represent an endorsement of this particular gas price path. Although we believe it to

be a reasonable projection, it is a merely a representative projection of gas prices for

purposes of the EA. Second, there is no need to consider an alternative where

competition favors gas over coal because such a scenario would have little adverse

impact, especially when compared with scenarios that tend to favor increased coal use

relative to gas use. In the rule scenario we selected, we included, therefore, a number of

improvements in coal technology as a result of the RTO Rule, to ensure that the potential

impacts of any increased coal use relative to the base case would be considered in

assessing the environmental consequences of the rule. 

E. Analytic Framework and Assumptions

It is expected that the impacts of the Final Rule will result primarily from changes

in the types and locations of power plants and transmission facilities constructed in the

future and changes in the operating patterns of existing power plants, including changes

in the fuel mix. To examine the impacts thoroughly, the modeling approach chosen
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -687-

includes detailed representations of electric power plants and the electric transmission

grid, and allows for an economic (least-cost) compliance with existing and future

environmental regulatory requirements. 

Computer modeling capable of simulating regional electric utility dispatch and

capacity expansion over time was used to characterize electric power markets in the base

case and rule scenarios. We used a large supply optimization model of the U.S.

electricity supply sector, which emphasizes pollution estimation and pollution control. It

has been used for Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) regulatory analysis in publicly

accessible proceedings since 1996.

Analytic assumptions are a critical part of the modeling. Because the model

cannot tell us directly what the RTO-related changes will be, it must assess how a set of

assumed changes in the cost and/or physical properties or the electricity system could

lead to changes in the use of the system, and hence to changes in emissions. 

A series of specific assumptions were developed to model the base case and

scenarios. Assumptions common to all modeled cases include current and future prices

of fossil fuels, particularly coal and natural gas, and current and future requirements

imposed on the electric sector by environmental laws and regulations. These

requirements include: for SO2, continuation of the Title IV Acid Rain Program, with

Phase II coverage and levels of permitted emissions; for NOx, Title IV requirements on

coal-fired boilers (Phase I and Phase II); emissions cap restrictions in the Ozone
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -688-

Transport Region starting in 1999, and implementation of the Final Rule governing ozone

transport issued by the EPA in 1997, modeled in accordance with the EPA's guidance. 

This EPA Rule imposes a cap on NOx on large utility boilers in 22 states in the eastern

United States and limiting summer NOx emissions to 543,800 tons; no regulatory

restrictions are assumed for mercury or CO2.

 Project Groups commented that, since assumptions made in the EA about future

environmental regulations are critical in determining the outcome of the analysis, changes

in future environmental regulations (particularly due to legal challenges) from those

assumed in the EA could result in different environmental impacts. Accordingly, the

comment states that the EA should reflect possible changes. We note that there are many

important analytic assumptions embodied in the modeling for the EA. Environmental

regulations are directly represented in the analysis, and changes in these assumed

regulations do have a large effect on the results of the modeling. In particular, the

presence or absence of SO2 and NOx caps is a key assumption. Nevertheless, these

assumptions are based on regulations which are final, as opposed to proposed regulations

or speculative regulatory actions. These rules and associated regulatory analyses from

EPA were used as the basis for the EA assumptions. Accordingly, it would be premature

and speculative to consider changes, if any, from pending legal challenges or speculative

future regulatory changes. 
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -689-

In a broader sense, it is clear that successful competitive energy markets will be

complemented by cost-effective environmental regulation, because the incentives for

efficient behavior on the part of market participants can be decentralized and the need for

intrusive regulatory action is lessened. Emissions trading programs such as those for SO2

and NOx are an important example of such cost-effective regulation.

Other invariant assumptions include: net electric demand growth (with the

exception of New Entry Scenario); load shape (how demand varies with season and time

of day within each model region); costs and performance of new power plants; and

capacity and generation of nuclear, hydroelectric, pumped storage, and import supply.

Because of the importance of the transmission system in the Rule, assumptions

were made about potential changes that may come about either because of the Rule's

requirements or because of its increased incentives for better grid operation and

investment. In addition, the Final Rule is expected to develop more competitive bulk

electric power markets. Competition is expected to increase the incentives for efficient

behavior among market participants. To assess the potential effects of such increased

efficiencies on the environment, some assumptions affecting new and existing power

plants were changed. Finally, to respond to concerns expressed by parties in the scoping

process regarding the role of new entrants in developing competitive power markets,

particularly the RTOs, a model scenario was developed that specifically addresses new

entry and enhanced consumer choice. 
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -690-

F. Impacts

The EA analyzes the electric power capacity and generation projections on a

national and regional level for the base case, and presents the corresponding

environmental impacts. Projected trends in generating capacity, including economic

additions, retirements and modifications, and generation by plant type for the base case,

are analyzed for the years 2005, 2010, and 2015. The data indicate that virtually all

future capacity additions are expected to be gas-fired combined cycle or combustion

turbine units; coal will nevertheless remain the dominant fuel for generation. Growth in

natural gas, however, will be rapid, with the share of generation increasing from 13

percent in 1997 to 32 percent in 2015; total generating capacity is expected to grow at a

slower rate than demand, resulting in plants that will generally be operated at higher

capacity factors; regional patterns of generation reflect regional demand growth as well as

changes in interregional trade in electricity. In most regions, growth in demand is met by

gas-fired (or oil/gas switching) plants, although in the Midwest existing coal-fired

capacity meets part of the growth in the early years of the forecast.

The EA projects national emissions in the base case for SO2, NOx, mercury, and

CO2. There are also regional emissions projections for NOx. The analysis indicates the

following: 

1. SO2 emissions will decline gradually to 9.5 million tons in 2015. Variations in

such emissions during the forecast period primarily reflect economic use of the
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -691-

Title IV emissions banking program, under which emitting parties may elect to

over-control SO2 in any year and bank the extra reductions as emission credits for

later use; 

2. Regional SO2 emissions generally will follow the same pattern as the national

emissions total. However, emissions reductions and shifts are not expected to

occur uniformly across regions because the SO2 emissions trading program allows

emitting parties with higher costs of pollution control to purchase allowances from

emitting parties with lower control costs. This can lead to increases in emissions

from certain regions; 

3. NOx emissions are projected to decline to 4.1 million tons in 2015. These

reductions are due to the development of NOx regulations under the Clean Air Act. 

Furthermore, summer or 'ozone season' (May to September) NOx emissions are

projected to decrease to 1.3 million tons in 2015; 

4. Regional NOx emissions are projected to follow a pattern similar to the national

trend; however, the implementation of NOx controls is assumed to take the form

of an emission cap and permit trading program similar to the Title IV SO2

program. Consequently, certain regions may experience different NOx emissions

trends because of the relative costs of controlling NOx and the possibility of

trading between emitting parties; 
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -692-

5. CO2 is projected to increase throughout the analysis period by 27 percent. 

Because CO2 is an unregulated pollutant at the present time, and because both coal

and natural gas emit CO2, the rise in both coal and gas-fired generation leads to a

substantial increase in CO2 emissions during the analysis period; and 

6. Mercury emissions range between 50.6 and 53.2 tons during the forecast period

with no clear trend distinguishable. Mercury is also uncontrolled at the present

time, but emissions are closely linked to coal use (with considerable variation of

mercury content in coal from specific seams). The relative stability of coal-fired

generation in later years of the analysis period leads to the observed pattern of

mercury emissions.

The analysis indicates that the Midwest is expected to produce slightly more

power, the East Coast to produce slightly less power. These changes are likely to be

greatest in the near-term, and to decline toward baseline levels over time. The Final Rule

would result in the slight shifting of the baseline fuel mix projections toward coal and

away from fuel oil and, to some extent, natural gas; these changes are small relative to the

overall trend in the fuel mix, in which natural gas remains the most rapidly growing fuel. 

This is consistent with the change in regional levels of generation.

The analysis shows that the overall emissions of SOx, NOx, mercury, and CO2, are

directionally consistent with the observed changes in power generation and fuel mix. 

That is, emissions tend to increase early in the forecast period and then decline over time,
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -693-

753See 5 U.S.C. 604. 

with several instances of emissions reductions. The greatest change in any regulated

pollutant (a rise of 3.6 percent or 381,000 tons of SO2 in one scenario) occurs as a result

of changing patterns of emissions banking and trading, which is consistent with the

design of the SO2 cap and trade regulatory program. Regional variations in annual and

summer NOx are also possible and are also consistent with regulatory program design. 

Emissions budgets are met at all times. Other emission changes are relatively small

because coal-fired plants, which contribute a disproportionate share of these emissions,

are already heavily utilized and so are unable to increase their output significantly in the 

rulemaking scenarios. In one scenario designed to examine increased new entry and

demand flexibility, substantial emissions reductions occur as a result of lower demand for

electricity combined with cleaner new supply options.

V. REGULATORY FLEXIBILITY ACT CERTIFICATION

The Commission received no comments on its certification, in the NOPR, that the

proposed rule would not have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of

small entities and that an initial regulatory flexibility analysis is not required by 5 U.S.C.

§ 603. The Commission adheres to its earlier reasoning and thus concludes that a final

regulatory flexibility analysis also is not required. 753 In making this determination, the

Commission is required to examine only the direct compliance costs that a rulemaking
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -694-

754Mid-Tex Elec. Coop. v. FERC, 773 F.2d 327 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (Commission

need only consider small entities "that would be directly regulated"); Colorado State

Banking Bd. v. RTC, 926 F.2d 931 (10th Cir. 1991) (Regulatory Flexibility Act not

implicated where regulation simply added an option for affected entities and did not

impose any costs).

7555 CFR 1320.11, 44 U.S.C. 3507(d).

imposes upon small businesses. It is not required to consider indirect economic

consequences, nor is it required to consider costs that an entity incurs voluntarily. 754

This rulemaking does not impose significant compliance costs upon small entities. 

Instead, it leaves them with the choice of whether to join an RTO. The only costs that are

mandated are the minimal costs associated with filing a statement, in the event a public

utility does not make an RTO filing, explaining its efforts to join an RTO, any barriers it

encountered, and any future plans to join an RTO. Thus, this rulemaking will not have a

significant economic impact upon any small entities.

VI. PUBLIC REPORTING BURDEN AND INFORMATION COLLECTION

STATEMENT

The OMB regulations require OMB to approve certain reporting and

recordkeeping (collections of information) imposed by agency rule. 755 The NOPR was

submitted to OMB at the time of issuance. OMB did not comment nor did it take any
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -695-

756Electric Rate Schedule Filings.

757Application for Sale, Lease, or Other Disposition, Merger or Consolidation of

Facilities or for the Purchase or Acquisition of Securities of a Public Utility.

action on the proposed rule. FERC identifies the information provided under Part 35 as

FERC-516 756 and under Part 33 as FERC-519. 757

No comments from the public on the burden estimate were received. The filing

requirements remain essentially the same as those in the NOPR so, therefore, the

estimated annual filing burden remains the same. The burden estimates for complying

with this proposed rule are set out in Table 1. The total annual hours for collection

(reporting + recordkeeping, (if appropriate)) is 7,600.

Information Collection Costs:

The Commission has projected the average annualized cost for all respondents to be:

Annualized Costs (Operations & Maintenance):

$401,518 (7,600 hours ÷ 2080 hours per year x $109,889 =$401,518).

The cost per respondent is $7,722 (participants and non-participants).

Table 1: Estimated Annual Burden

Data Collection Number of

Respondents

Number of

Responses

Hours Per 

Response

Total

Annual

Hours

FERC-516 112 1 300 3,600

FERC-516 240 1 40 1,600
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -696-

FERC-519 112 1 200 2,400

Totals 7,600

1

Filings to propose participation in an RTO under § 35.34 (d).

2Alternative filings under § 35.34 (g).

Comments were solicited on the Commission's need for this information, whether

the information will have practical utility, the accuracy of the provided burden estimates,

ways to enhance the quality, utility, and clarity of the information to be collected, and

any suggested methods for minimizing respondents' burden, including the use of

automated information techniques.

Title: FERC-516, Electric Rate Schedule Filings;

FERC-519 Application for Sale, Lease, or Other Disposition, Merger or

Consolidation of Facilities or for the Purchase or Acquisition of Securities of a

Public Utility.

Action: Proposed Data Collections.

OMB Control No.: 1902-0096 and 1902-0082.

The applicant shall not be penalized for failure to respond to this collection of

information unless the collection of information displays a valid OMB control number.

Respondents: Business or other for profit, including small businesses.

Frequency of Responses: One time.

Necessity of Information: The Final Rule revises the requirements contained in 18 CFR

part 35. The Commission is promoting the voluntary establishment of RTOs nationwide

by December 2001. In particular, the Commission will establish in this rule
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -697-

characteristics and functions which applicants must meet to become Commissionapproved RTOs. The Commission will engage in a collaborative process with state

officials and others to facilitate RTO development. The rule will require that each public

utility that owns, operates or controls transmission facilities participate in one-time filings

proposing an RTO or make a filing explaining why they are not participating in an RTO

proposal.

Internal Review: The Commission has assured itself, by means of internal review, that

there is specific, objective support for the burden estimates associated with the

information requirements. The Commission's Office of Markets, Tariffs and Rates will

use the data included in filings under 18 CFR 35.34 to evaluate efforts for the

interconnection and coordination of the U.S. electric transmission system and to ensure

the orderly formation of RTOs as well as for general industry oversight. These

information requirements conform to the Commission's plan for efficient information

collection, communication, and management within the electric power industry.

The Commission received approximately 334 comments and reply comments on

its NOPR but none on its reporting burden. The Commission's responses to the

comments are addressed in the preamble of the this Final Rule. The Commission is

submitting a copy of the Final Rule along with information collection submissions for the

data collections identified above to OMB for its review and approval.
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -698-

7585 U.S.C. 804(2).

Interested persons may obtain information on the reporting requirements by

contacting the following: Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, 888 First Street, NE,

Washington, DC 20426 [Attention: Michael Miller, Office of the Chief Information

Officer, Phone: (202) 208-1415, fax: (202)208-2425, E-mail: mike.miller@ferc.fed.us]

or send your comments to the Office of Management and Budget, Office of Information

and Regulatory Affairs, Washington, DC 20503, [Attention: Desk Officer for the Federal

Energy Regulatory Commission, phone: (202)395-3087, fax: (202)395-7285].

VII. EFFECTIVE DATE AND CONGRESSIONAL NOTIFICATION

This rule will take effect [on the 60 th day after publication in the Federal

Register]. The Commission has determined, with the concurrence of the Administrator of

the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs of the Office of Management and

Budget, that this Rule is a "major rule" within the meaning of section 351 of the Small

Business Regulatory Enforcement Act of 1996. 758 The Rule will be submitted to both

Houses of Congress and the Comptroller General prior to its publication in the Federal

Register. 

VIII. DOCUMENT AVAILABILITY

In addition to publishing the full text of this document in the Federal Register, the

Commission provides all interested persons an opportunity to view and/or print the
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -699-

contents of this document via the Internet through FERC's Home Page

(http://www.ferc.fed.us) and in FERC's Public Reference Room during normal business

hours (8:30 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. Eastern time) at 888 First Street, N.E., Room 2A,

Washington, D.C. 20426.

From FERC's Home Page on the Internet, this information is available in both the

Commission Issuance Posting System (CIPS) and the Records and Information

Management System (RIMS).

• CIPS provides access to the texts of formal documents issued by the

Commission since November 14, 1994. CIPS can be accessed using the

CIPS link or the Energy Information Online icon. The full text of this

document will be available on CIPS in ASCII and WordPerfect 8.0 format

for viewing, printing, and/or downloading.

• RIMS contains images of documents submitted to and issues by the

Commission after November 16, 1981. Documents from November 1995

to the present can be viewed and printed from FERC's Home Page using the

RIMS link or the Energy Information Online icon. Descriptions of

documents back to November 16, 1981, are also available from RIMS-onthe-Web; requests for copies of these and other older documents should be

submitted to the Public Reference Room.
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -700-

User assistance is available for RIMS, CIPS, and the Website during normal

business hours from our Help line at (202) 208-2222 (e-mail to WebMaster@ferc.fed.us)

of the Public Reference Room at (202) 208-1371 (e-mail to

public.referenceroom@ferc.fed.us).

During normal business hours, documents can also be viewed and/or printed in

FERC's Public Reference Room, where RIMS, CIPS, and the FERC Website are

available. User assistance is also available.

List of Subjects in 18 CFR Part 35

Electric power rates, Electric utilities, Reporting and recordkeeping requirements

By the Commission.

(S E A L )

 David P. Boergers,

 Secretary.
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -701-

In consideration of the foregoing, the Commission amends Part 35, Chapter I, Title

18 of the Code of Federal Regulations, as follows:

PART 35 - FILING OF RATE SCHEDULES

1. The authority citation for Part 35 continues to read as follows:

Authority: 16 U.S.C. 791a-825r, 2601-2645; 31 U.S.C. 9701; 42 U.S.C. 7101-

7352.

2. Part 35 is amended by adding a new Subpart F and a new § 35.34 to read as

follows:

Subpart F - Procedures and Requirements Regarding Regional 

Transmission Organizations

§ 35.34 Regional Transmission Organizations.

(a) Purpose. This section establishes required characteristics and functions for

Regional Transmission Organizations for the purpose of promoting efficiency and

reliability in the operation and planning of the electric transmission grid and ensuring

non-discrimination in the provision of electric transmission services. This section further

directs each public utility that owns, operates, or controls facilities used for the

transmission of electric energy in interstate commerce to make certain filings with respect

to forming and participating in a Regional Transmission Organization.
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -702-

(b) Definitions. 

(1) Regional Transmission Organization means an entity that satisfies the

minimum characteristics set forth in paragraph (j) of this section, performs the functions

set forth in paragraph (k) of this section, and accommodates the open architecture

condition set forth in paragraph (l) of this section.

(2) Market participant means:

(i) Any entity that, either directly or through an affiliate, sells or brokers electric

energy, or provides transmission or ancillary services to the Regional Transmission

Organization, unless the Commission finds that the entity does not have economic or

commercial interests that would be significantly affected by the Regional Transmission

Organization's actions or decisions; and 

(ii) Any other entity that the Commission finds has economic or commercial

interests that would be significantly affected by the Regional Transmission Organization's

actions or decisions.

(3) Affiliate means the definition given in section 2(a)(11) of the Public Utility

Holding Company Act (15 U.S.C. 79b(a)(11)). 

(4) Class of market participants means two or more market participants with

common economic or commercial interests.

(c) General rule. Except for those public utilities subject to the requirements of

paragraph (h) of this section, every public utility that owns, operates or controls facilities
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -703-

used for the transmission of electric energy in interstate commerce as of [effective date of

Final Rule] must file with the Commission, no later than October 15, 2000, one of the

following: 

(1) A proposal to participate in a Regional Transmission Organization consisting

of one of the types of submittals set forth in paragraph (d) of this section; or 

(2) An alternative filing consistent with paragraph (g) of this section. 

(d) Proposal to participate in a Regional Transmission Organization. For purposes

of this section, a proposal to participate in a Regional Transmission Organization means: 

(1) Such filings, made individually or jointly with other entities, pursuant to

sections 203, 205 and 206 of the Federal Power Act (16 U.S.C. 824b, 824d, and 824e), as

are necessary to create a new Regional Transmission Organization;

(2) Such filings, made individually or jointly with other entities, pursuant to

sections 203, 205 and 206 of the Federal Power Act (16 U.S.C. 824b, 824d, and 824e), as

are necessary to join a Regional Transmission Organization approved by the Commission

on or before the date of the filing; or

(3) A petition for declaratory order, filed individually or jointly with other entities,

asking whether a proposed transmission entity would qualify as a Regional Transmission

Organization and containing at least the following:

(i) A detailed description of the proposed transmission entity, including a

description of the organizational and operational structure and the intended participants;
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -704-

(ii) A discussion of how the transmission entity would satisfy each of the

characteristics and functions of a Regional Transmission Organization specified in

paragraphs (j), (k)and (l) of this section; 

(iii) A detailed description of the Federal Power Act section 205 rates that will be

filed for the Regional Transmission Organization; and

(iv) A commitment to make filings pursuant to sections 203, 205 and 206 of the

Federal Power Act (16 U.S.C. 824b, 824d, and 824e), as necessary, promptly after the

Commission issues an order in response to the petition.

(4) Any proposal filed under this paragraph (d) must include an explanation of

efforts made to include public power entities in the proposed Regional Transmission

Organization.

(e) Innovative transmission rate treatments for Regional Transmission

Organizations.

(1) The Commission will consider authorizing any innovative transmission rate

treatment, as discussed in this paragraph (e), for an approved Regional Transmission

Organization. An applicant's request must include:

 (i) A detailed explanation of how any proposed rate treatment would help achieve

the goals of Regional Transmission Organizations, including efficient use of and

investment in the transmission system and reliability benefits to consumers;

(ii) A cost-benefit analysis, including rate impacts; and
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -705-

(iii) A detailed explanation of why the proposed rate treatment is appropriate for

the Regional Transmission Organization.

The applicant must support any rate proposal under this paragraph (e) as just, reasonable,

and not unduly discriminatory or preferential.

(2) For purposes of this paragraph (e), innovative transmission rate treatment

means any of the following: 

(i) A transmission rate moratorium, which may include proposals based on

formerly bundled retail transmission rates; 

(ii) Rates of return that (a) are formulary; (b) consider risk premiums and account

for demonstrated adjustments in risk; or (c) do not vary with capital structure; 

(iii) Non-traditional depreciation schedules for new transmission investment; 

(iv) Transmission rates based on levelized recovery of capital costs; 

(v) Transmission rates that combine elements of incremental cost pricing for new

transmission facilities with an embedded-cost access fee for existing transmission

facilities; or

(vi) Performance-based transmission rates.

(3) A request for performance-based transmission rates under this paragraph (e)

may include factors such as: 

(i) A method for calculating initial transmission rates (including price caps and any

provisions for discounting); 
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -706-

(ii) A mechanism for adjusting initial rates, which may be derived from or based

upon external factors or indices or a specific performance measure; 

(iii) Time periods for redetermining initial rates; and 

(iv) Costs to be excluded from performance-based rates. 

(4) An innovative transmission rate treatment or any other rate proposal made for

an approved Regional Transmission Organization may be requested as part of any filing

that is made under paragraph (d) of this section or in any subsequent rate change proposal

under section 205 of the Federal Power Act (16 U.S.C. 824d). Unless otherwise ordered

by the Commission, an approved Regional Transmission Organization may not include in

rates any innovative transmission rate treatment under paragraphs (e)(2)(i) and

(e)(2)(ii)(c) of this section after January 1, 2005.

(f) Transfer of operational control. Any public utility's proposal to participate in a

Regional Transmission Organization filed pursuant to paragraph (c)(1) of this section

must propose that operational control of that public utility's transmission facilities will be

transferred to the Regional Transmission Organization on a schedule that will allow the

Regional Transmission Organization to commence operating the facilities no later than

December 15, 2001.

Note to paragraph (f): The requirement in paragraph (f) of this section may be

satisfied by proposing to transfer to the Regional Transmission Organization ownership

of the facilities in addition to operational control. 
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -707-

(g) Alternative filing. Any filing made pursuant to paragraph (c)(2) of this section

must contain:

(1) A description of any efforts made by that public utility to participate in a

Regional Transmission Organization; 

(2) A detailed explanation of the economic, operational, commercial, regulatory,

or other reasons the public utility has not made a filing to participate in a Regional

Transmission Organization, including identification of any existing obstacles to

participation in a Regional Transmission Organization; and 

(3) The specific plans, if any, the public utility has for further work toward

participation in a Regional Transmission Organization, a proposed timetable for such

activity, an explanation of efforts made to include public power entities in the proposed

Regional Transmission Organization, and any factors (including any law, rule or

regulation) that may affect the public utility's ability or decision to participate in a

Regional Transmission Organization.

(h) Public utilities participating in approved transmission entities. Every public

utility that owns, operates or controls facilities used for the transmission of electric

energy in interstate commerce as of [effective date of Final Rule], and that has filed with

the Commission on or before [effective date of Final Rule] to transfer operational

control of its facilities to a transmission entity that has been approved or conditionally

approved by the Commission on or before [effective date of Final Rule] as being in
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -708-

conformance with the eleven ISO principles set forth in Order No. 888, FERC Statutes

and Regulations, Regulations Preamble January 1991-June 1996 ¶ 31,036 (Final Rule on

Open Access and Stranded Costs), must, individually or jointly with other entities, file

with the Commission, no later than January 15, 2001:

(1) A statement that it is participating in a transmission entity that has been so

approved; 

(2) A detailed explanation of the extent to which the transmission entity in which

it participates has the characteristics and performs the functions of a Regional

Transmission Organization specified in paragraphs (j) and (k) of this section and

accommodates the open architecture conditions in paragraph (l) of this section; and

(3) To the extent the transmission entity in which the public utility participates

does not meet all the requirements of a Regional Transmission Organization specified in

paragraphs (j), (k), and (l) of this section, 

(i) A proposal to participate in a Regional Transmission Organization that meets

such requirements in accordance with paragraph (d) of this section, 

(ii) A proposal to modify the existing transmission entity so that it conforms to the

requirements of a Regional Transmission Organization, or 

(iii) A filing containing the information specified in paragraph (g) of this section

addressing any efforts, obstacles, and plans with respect to conformance with those

requirements.
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -709-

(i) Entities that become public utilities with transmission facilities. An entity that

is not a public utility that owns, operates or controls facilities used for the transmission of

electric energy in interstate commerce as of [effective date of Final Rule], but later

becomes such a public utility, must file a proposal to participate in a Regional

Transmission Organization in accordance with paragraph (d) of this section, or an

alternative filing in accordance with paragraph (g) of this section, by October 15, 2000 or

60 days prior to the date on which the public utility engages in any transmission of

electric energy in interstate commerce, whichever comes later. If a proposal to participate

in accordance with paragraph (d) of this section is filed, it must propose that operational

control of the applicant's transmission system will be transferred to the Regional

Transmission Organization within six months of filing the proposal.

(j) Required characteristics for a Regional Transmission Organization. A Regional

Transmission Organization must satisfy the following characteristics when it commences

operation:

(1) Independence. The Regional Transmission Organization must be independent

of any market participant. The Regional Transmission Organization must include, as part

of its demonstration of independence, a demonstration that it meets the following:

(i) The Regional Transmission Organization, its employees, and any nonstakeholder directors must not have financial interests in any market participant. 
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -710-

(ii) The Regional Transmission Organization must have a decision making process

that is independent of control by any market participant or class of participants.

(iii) The Regional Transmission Organization must have exclusive and independent

authority under section 205 of the Federal Power Act (16 U.S.C. 824d), to propose rates,

terms and conditions of transmission service provided over the facilities it operates. 

Note to paragraph (j)(1)(iii): Transmission owners retain authority under section 205 of

the Federal Power Act (16 U.S.C. 824d) to seek recovery from the Regional Transmission

Organization of the revenue requirements associated with the transmission facilities that

they own. 

(2) Scope and regional configuration. The Regional Transmission Organization

must serve an appropriate region. The region must be of sufficient scope and

configuration to permit the Regional Transmission Organization to maintain reliability,

effectively perform its required functions, and support efficient and non-discriminatory

power markets.

(3) Operational authority. The Regional Transmission Organization must have

operational authority for all transmission facilities under its control. The Regional

Transmission Organization must include, as part of its demonstration of operational

authority, a demonstration that it meets the following: 

(i) If any operational functions are delegated to, or shared with, entities other than

the Regional Transmission Organization, the Regional Transmission Organization must
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -711-

ensure that this sharing of operational authority will not adversely affect reliability or

provide any market participant with an unfair competitive advantage. Within two years

after initial operation as a Regional Transmission Organization, the Regional Transmission

Organization must prepare a public report that assesses whether any division of

operational authority hinders the Regional Transmission Organization in providing

reliable, non-discriminatory and efficiently priced transmission service.

(ii) The Regional Transmission Organization must be the security coordinator for

the facilities that it controls. 

(4) Short-term reliability. The Regional Transmission Organization must have

exclusive authority for maintaining the short-term reliability of the grid that it operates. 

The Regional Transmission Organization must include, as part of its demonstration with

respect to reliability, a demonstration that it meets the following:

(i) The Regional Transmission Organization must have exclusive authority for

receiving, confirming and implementing all interchange schedules. 

(ii) The Regional Transmission Organization must have the right to order

redispatch of any generator connected to transmission facilities it operates if necessary for

the reliable operation of these facilities.

(iii) When the Regional Transmission Organization operates transmission facilities

owned by other entities, the Regional Transmission Organization must have authority to
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -712-

approve or disapprove all requests for scheduled outages of transmission facilities to

ensure that the outages can be accommodated within established reliability standards.

(iv) If the Regional Transmission Organization operates under reliability standards

established by another entity (e.g., a regional reliability council), the Regional

Transmission Organization must report to the Commission if these standards hinder it

from providing reliable, non-discriminatory and efficiently priced transmission service.

(k) Required functions of a Regional Transmission Organization. The Regional

Transmission Organization must perform the following functions. Unless otherwise

noted, the Regional Transmission Organization must satisfy these obligations when it

commences operations.

(1) Tariff administration and design. The Regional Transmission Organization

must administer its own transmission tariff and employ a transmission pricing system that

will promote efficient use and expansion of transmission and generation facilities. As part

of its demonstration with respect to tariff administration and design, the Regional

Transmission Organization must satisfy the standards listed in paragraphs (k)(1)(i) and

(ii) of this section, or demonstrate that an alternative proposal is consistent with or

superior to satisfying such standards.

(i) The Regional Transmission Organization must be the only provider of

transmission service over the facilities under its control, and must be the sole administrator

of its own Commission-approved open access transmission tariff. The Regional
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -713-

Transmission Organization must have the sole authority to receive, evaluate, and approve

or deny all requests for transmission service. The Regional Transmission Organization

must have the authority to review and approve requests for new interconnections.

(ii) Customers under the Regional Transmission Organization tariff must not be

charged multiple access fees for the recovery of capital costs for transmission service over

facilities that the Regional Transmission Organization controls . 

(2) Congestion management. The Regional Transmission Organization must ensure

the development and operation of market mechanisms to manage transmission congestion. 

As part of its demonstration with respect to congestion management, the Regional

Transmission Organization must satisfy the standards listed in paragraph (k)(2)(i) of this

section, or demonstrate that an alternative proposal is consistent with or superior to

satisfying such standards.

(i) The market mechanisms must accommodate broad participation by all market

participants, and must provide all transmission customers with efficient price signals that

show the consequences of their transmission usage decisions. The Regional Transmission

Organization must either operate such markets itself or ensure that the task is performed

by another entity that is not affiliated with any market participant.

(ii) The Regional Transmission Organization must satisfy the market mechanism

requirement no later than one year after it commences initial operation. However, it must

have in place at the time of initial operation an effective protocol for managing congestion.
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -714-

(3) Parallel path flow. The Regional Transmission Organization must develop and

implement procedures to address parallel path flow issues within its region and with other

regions. The Regional Transmission Organization must satisfy this requirement with

respect to coordination with other regions no later than three years after it commences

initial operation.

(4) Ancillary services. The Regional Transmission Organization must serve as a

provider of last resort of all ancillary services required by Order No. 888, FERC Statutes

and Regulations, Regulations Preamble January 1991-June 1996 ¶ 31,036 (Final Rule on

Open Access and Stranded Costs), and subsequent orders. As part of its demonstration

with respect to ancillary services, the Regional Transmission Organization must satisfy the

standards listed in paragraphs (k)(4)(i)-(iii) of this section, or demonstrate that an

alternative proposal is consistent with or superior to satisfying such standards.

(i) All market participants must have the option of self-supplying or acquiring

ancillary services from third parties subject to any restrictions imposed by the Commission

in Order No. 888, FERC Statutes and Regulations, Regulations Preamble January 1991-

June 1996 ¶ 31,036 (Final Rule on Open Access and Stranded Costs), and subsequent

orders.

(ii) The Regional Transmission Organization must have the authority to decide the

minimum required amounts of each ancillary service and, if necessary, the locations at

which these services must be provided. All ancillary service providers must be subject to
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -715-

direct or indirect operational control by the Regional Transmission Organization. The

Regional Transmission Organization must promote the development of competitive

markets for ancillary services whenever feasible.

(iii) The Regional Transmission Organization must ensure that its transmission

customers have access to a real-time balancing market. The Regional Transmission

Organization must either develop and operate this market itself or ensure that this task is

performed by another entity that is not affiliated with any market participant.

(5) OASIS and Total Transmission Capability (TTC) and Available Transmission

Capability (ATC). The Regional Transmission Organization must be the single OASIS

site administrator for all transmission facilities under its control and independently

calculate TTC and ATC. 

(6) Market monitoring. To ensure that the Regional Transmission Organization

provides reliable, efficient and not unduly discriminatory transmission service, the

Regional Transmission Organization must provide for objective monitoring of markets it

operates or administers to identify market design flaws, market power abuses and

opportunities for efficiency improvements, and propose appropriate actions. As part of its

demonstration with respect to market monitoring, the Regional Transmission Organization

must satisfy the standards listed in paragraphs (k)(6)(i)-(iii) of this section, or demonstrate

that an alternative proposal is consistent with or superior to satisfying such standards.
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -716-

(i) Market monitoring must include monitoring the behavior of market participants

in the region, including transmission owners other than the Regional Transmission

Organization, if any, to determine if their actions hinder the Regional Transmission

Organization in providing reliable, efficient and not unduly discriminatory transmission

service.

(ii) With respect to markets the Regional Transmission Organization operates or

administers, there must be a periodic assessment of how behavior in markets operated by

others (e.g., bilateral power sales markets and power markets operated by unaffiliated

power exchanges) affects Regional Transmission Organization operations and how

Regional Transmission Organization operations affect the efficiency of power markets

operated by others.

(iii) Reports on opportunities for efficiency improvement, market power abuses and

market design flaws must be filed with the Commission and affected regulatory

authorities. 

(7) Planning and expansion. The Regional Transmission Organization must be

responsible for planning, and for directing or arranging, necessary transmission

expansions, additions, and upgrades that will enable it to provide efficient, reliable and

non-discriminatory transmission service and coordinate such efforts with the appropriate

state authorities. As part of its demonstration with respect to planning and expansion, the

Regional Transmission Organization must satisfy the standards listed in paragraphs
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -717-

(k)(7)(i) and (ii) of this section, or demonstrate that an alternative proposal is consistent

with or superior to satisfying such standards.

(i) The Regional Transmission Organization planning and expansion process must

encourage market-driven operating and investment actions for preventing and relieving

congestion.

(ii) The Regional Transmission Organization’s planning and expansion process

must accommodate efforts by state regulatory commissions to create multi-state

agreements to review and approve new transmission facilities. The Regional Transmission

Organization's planning and expansion process must be coordinated with programs of

existing Regional Transmission Groups (See § 2.21 of this chapter) where appropriate.

(iii) If the Regional Transmission Organization is unable to satisfy this requirement

when it commences operation, it must file with the Commission a plan with specified

milestones that will ensure that it meets this requirement no later than three years after

initial operation.

(8) Interregional coordination. The Regional Transmission Organization must

ensure the integration of reliability practices within an interconnection and market

interface practices among regions.

(l) Open architecture.

(1) Any proposal to participate in a Regional Transmission Organization must not

contain any provision that would limit the capability of the Regional Transmission
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -718-

Organization to evolve in ways that would improve its efficiency, consistent with the

requirements in paragraphs (j) and (k) of this section.

(2) Nothing in this regulation precludes an approved Regional Transmission

Organization from seeking to evolve with respect to its organizational design, market

design, geographic scope, ownership arrangements, or methods of operational control, or

in other appropriate ways if the change is consistent with the requirements of this section. 

Any future filing seeking approval of such changes must demonstrate that the proposed

changes will meet the requirements of paragraphs (j), (k) and (l) of this section.
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -719-

Appendix - List of Commenters

Abbreviation -- Commenter

1. Advisory Committee ISO-NE -- Advisory Committee to the Board of Directors of

ISO New England

2. AEP -- American Electric Power Service Corporation and its public utility

operating company subsidiaries: Appalachian Power Company, Columbus

Southern Power Company, Indiana Michigan Power Company, Kentucky Power

Company, Kingsport Power Company, Ohio Power Company and Wheeling

Power Company

3. AEPCO -- Arizona Electric Power Cooperative, Inc.

4. Alabama Commission -- Alabama Public Service Commission

5. Alberta -- Provence of Alberta, Electricity Branch

6. Allegheny -- Allegheny Energy, Inc.

7. Alliance Companies -- American Electric Power Service Corporation, Consumers

Energy Company, Detroit Edison Company, FirstEnergy Corp. and Virginia

Electric and Power Company

8. Alliant Energy -- Alliant Energy Corporation

9. Aluminum Companies -- Alcoa Inc., Columbia Falls Aluminum Company, Kaiser

Aluminum & Chemical Corporation and Vanalco, Inc.

10. American Forest -- American Forest & Paper Association

11. AMP-Ohio -- American Municipal Power-Ohio, Inc.

12. APPA -- American Public Power Association

13. APPA et al. (WP) -- Legal White Paper prepared on behalf of and sponsored

jointly by the American Public Power Association, the Electric Consumers

Resource Council, the Transmission Access Policy Study Group and the

Transmission Dependent Utility Systems

14. APS -- Arizona Public Service Company

15. APX -- Automated Power Exchange, Inc.

16. Arizona Authority -- Arizona Power Authority

17. Arizona Commission -- Arizona Corporation Commission

18. Arizona ISA -- Arizona Independent Scheduling Administrator Association

19. Arkansas Cities -- Cities of Benton, Bentonville, North Little Rock, Osceola,

Piggott, Prescott and Siloam Springs, Arkansas; the Clarksville Light and Water

Company; Conway Corporation; Hope Water and Light Commission; City Water
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -720-

and Light Plant of the City of Jonesboro, Arkansas; Paragould Light and Water

Commission; and the West Memphis, Arkansas Utilities Commission

20. Arkansas Consumers -- Arkansas Electric Energy Consumers

21. Avista -- Avista Corporation, Inc.

22. Bangor Hydro -- Bangor Hydro-Electric Company

23. BC Hydro -- British Columbia Hydro & Power Authority

24. Big Rivers -- Big Rivers Electric Corporation

25. Blue Ridge -- Blue Ridge Power Agency

26. Brattle Group -- The Brattle Group (Peter Fox-Penner and Philip Hanser)

27. British Columbia Ministry -- British Columbia, Canada, Ministry of Employment

and Investment, Electricity Development Branch

28. Cal DWR -- California Department of Water Resources

29. Cal ISO -- California Independent System Operator Corporation

30. California Board -- California Electricity Oversight Board

31. California Commission -- Public Utilities Commission of the State of California

32. CalPX -- California Power Exchange Corporation

33. CAMU -- Colorado Association of Municipal Utilities

34. Canada DNR -- Canada Department of Natural Resources

35. CCEM/ELCON -- Coalition for a Competitive Electricity Market and the

Electricity Consumers Resources Council

36. CEA -- Canadian Electricity Association

37. Consumers Energy -- Consumers Energy Company

38. Central Maine -- Central Maine Power Company and Maine Electric Power

Company

39. Champion -- Champion International Corporation

40. Chelan -- Public Utility District No. 1 of Chelan County

41. Cinergy -- Cinergy Services, Inc.

42. Clarksdale -- Clarksdale Public Utilities Commission

43. Cleco -- Cleco Corporation

44. Cleveland -- City of Cleveland, Ohio

45. CMUA -- California Municipal Utilities Association

46. Coalition of Alliance Users -- Coalition of Municipal and Cooperative Users of

Alliance Companies' Transmission

47. ComEd -- Commonwealth Edison Company

48. Conectiv -- Conectiv (Atlantic City Electric Company and Delmarva Power &

Light Company

49. Conlon -- Mr. P. Gregory Conlon

50. Consumer Groups -- Industrial Consumers, American Public Power Association,

National Rural Electric Cooperative Association, Transmission Access Policy
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -721-

Study Group, Transmission Dependent Utility Systems, Consumer Federation of

America and International Mass Retail Association

51. CP&L -- Carolina Power & Light Company

52. CRC -- Colorado River Commission of the State of Nevada

53. CREDA -- Colorado River Energy Distributors Association

54. CSU -- Colorado Springs Utilities

55. CTA -- Competitive Transmission Association, Inc.

56. Dalton Utilities -- Board of Water, Light and Sinking Fund Commissioners of the

City of Dalton, Georgia

57. Dairyland -- Dairyland Power Cooperative

58. Desert STAR -- Desert STAR

59. Detroit Edison -- Detroit Edison Company

60. Distributed Power -- Distributed Power Coalition of America

61. DOE -- United States Department of Energy

62. Dr. Illic -- Dr. Marija Illic and Yong Yoon

63. Duke -- Duke Energy Corporation

64. Duquesne -- Duquesne Light Company

65. Dynegy -- Dynegy Inc.

66. EAL -- ESBI Alberta Ltd.

67. East Kentucky -- East Kentucky Power Cooperative, Inc.

68. East Texas Cooperatives -- East Texas Electric Cooperative, Inc., Northeast Texas

Electric Cooperative, Inc., Sam Rayburn G&T Electric Cooperative, Inc., Tex-La

Electric Cooperative of Texas, Inc.

69. ECAR -- East Central Area Reliability Council

70. EEI -- Edison Electric Institute

71. EME -- Edison Mission Energy

72. Empire District -- Empire District Electric Company

73. Enron/APX/Coral Power -- Enron Power Marketing, Inc., Automated Power

Exchange and Coral Power, L.L.C.

74. Entergy -- Entergy Services Inc.

75. EPA -- United States Environmental Protection Agency

76. EPRI -- Electric Power Research Institute

77. EPSA -- Electric Power Supply Association 

78. Eric Hirst -- Mr. Eric Hirst

79. Fertilizer Institute -- The Fertilizer Institute

80. First Rochdale -- 1st Rochdale Cooperative Group, Ltd.

81. FirstEnergy -- FirstEnergy Corp.

82. Florida Commission -- Florida Public Service Commission

83. Florida Power Corp. -- Florida Power Corporation

84. FMPA -- Florida Municipal Power Agency
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -722-

85. FP&L -- Florida Power & Light Company

86. FTC -- Staff of the Bureau of Economics of the Federal Trade Commission

87. Gainesville -- Gainesville Regional Utilities

88. Georgia Transmission -- Georgia Transmission Corporation

89. GPU Energy -- GPU Energy

90. Grand Council et al. -- Grand Council of the Crees, Greenpeace Canada, the Sierra

Club of Canada, Mouvement Au Courant, the Centre D'Analyses de Politiques

Energetiques and New England Coalition for Energy Efficiency and the

Environment

91. Great River -- Great River Energy

92. H.Q. Energy Services -- Energy Services Group of Hydro-Quebec and H.Q.

Energy Services (U.S.) Inc.

93. How Group -- OASIS How Working Group

94. ICUA -- Idaho Consumer-Owned Utilities Association

95. Idaho Commission -- Idaho Public Utilities Commission

96. Idaho Power -- Idaho Power Company

97. Illinois Commission -- Illinois Commerce Commission

98. IMEA -- Illinois Municipal Electric Agency

99. IMPA -- Indiana Municipal Power Agency

100. Indiana Commission -- Indiana Utility Regulatory Commission

101. Indianapolis P&L -- Indianapolis Power & Light Company

102. Industrial Consumers -- Electricity Consumers Resource Council, the American

Iron & Steel Institute and the Chemical Manufactures Association

103. Industrial Customers -- Industrial Customers of Northwest Utilities

104. INGAA -- Interstate Natural Gas Association of America

105. Iowa Board -- Iowa Utilities Board

106. IPCF -- International Powerline Communications Forum

107. ISO-NE -- ISO New England Inc.

108. JEA -- JEA

109. Justice Department -- United States Department of Justice

110. Kentucky Commission -- Kentucky Public Service Commission

111. Konolige/Ford/Fleishman -- Kit Konolige, Daniel F. Ford and Steven I. Fleishman

112. Lenard -- Mr. Thomas M. Lenard

113. LEPA -- Louisiana Energy & Power Authority

114. LG&E -- LG&E Energy Corp.

115. Lincoln -- Lincoln, Nebraska Electric System

116. LIPA -- Long Island Power Authority 

117. Los Angeles -- Los Angeles Department of Water and Power

118. Loveland Customers -- Loveland Area Customers Association

119. LPPC -- Large Public Power Council
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -723-

120. Manitoba Board -- Manitoba Hydro-Electric Board

121. MAPP -- Mid-Continent Area Power Pool

122. Mass Companies -- Boston Edison Company, Cambridge Electric Light Company

and Commonwealth Electric Company

123. Massachusetts Division -- Massachusetts Division of Energy Resources

124. MEAG -- Municipal Electric Authority of Georgia

125. Merrill Energy -- Merrill Energy LLC

126. Metropolitan -- Metropolitan Water District of Southern California

127. Michigan Commission -- Michigan Public Service Commission

128. MidAmerican -- MidAmerican Energy Company

129. Mid-Atlantic Commissions -- Delaware Public Service Commission, District of

Columbia Public Service Commission, Maryland Public Service Commission,

New Jersey Board of Public Utilities and Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission

130. Midwest Energy -- Midwest Energy, Inc.

131. Midwest ISO -- Midwest Independent Transmission System Operator, Inc.

132. Midwest ISO Participants -- Allegheny Energy, Ameren, Central Illinois Light

Company, Cinergy Corp., Commonwealth Edison Company, Hoosier Energy

Rural Electric Cooperative, Inc., Illinois Power Company, Kentucky Utilities

Company, Louisville Gas & Electric Company, Southern Indiana Gas & Electric

Company, Southern Illinois Power Cooperative, Wabash Valley Power

Association, Inc. and Wisconsin Electric Power Company

133. Midwest Municipals -- Missouri River Energy Services, Iowa Association of

Municipal Utilities and Minnesota Municipal Utilities Association

134. Minnesota Commission -- Minnesota Public Utilities Commission

135. Minnesota Power -- Minnesota Power

136. Missouri Commission -- Missouri Public Service Commission

137. MLGW -- Memphis Light, Gas and Water Division

138. Montana Commission -- Montana Public Service Commission and Montana

Department of Environmental Quality

139. Montana Power -- Montana Power Company

140. Montana-Dakota -- Montana-Dakota Utilities Co.

141. NARUC -- National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners

142. NASUCA -- National Association of State Utility Consumer Advocates

143. NCPA -- Northern California Power Agency

144. NEMA -- National Energy Marketers Association

145. NECPUC -- New England Conference of Public Utilities Commissioners, Inc.

146. NEPCO et al. -- New England Power Company, National Grid Group, plc and

Montaup Electric Company

147. NERA -- National Economic Research Associates, Inc.

148. NERC -- North American Electric Reliability Council
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -724-

149. Nevada Commission -- Public Utilities Commission of Nevada

150. New Century -- New Century Energies, Inc. and its operating utility companies:

Public Service Company of Colorado, Southwestern Public Service Company and

Cheyenne Light, Fuel and Power Company

151. New Orleans -- Council of the City of New Orleans

152. New Smyrna Beach -- Utilities Commission, City of New Smyrna Beach, Florida

153. New York Commission -- New York State Public Service Commission

154. Nine Commissions -- Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission, Virginia State

Corporation Commission, Public Utilities Commission of Ohio, Indiana Utility

Regulatory Commission, Illinois Commerce Commission, Michigan Public Service

Commission, Missouri Public Service Commission, Arkansas Public Service

Commission and Oklahoma Corporation Commission

155. NiSource -- NiSource Incorporated

156. NJBUS -- New Jersey Business Users

157. NMA/WFA/CEED -- National Mining Association, Western Fuels Association,

Inc. and Center for Energy and Economic Development

158. NU -- Northeast Utilities System

159. Northwest Council -- Northwest Power Planning Council

160. NPCC -- Northeast Power Coordinating Council

161. NPPD -- Nebraska Public Power District

162. NPRB -- Nebraska Power Review Board

163. NRECA -- National Rural Electric Cooperative Association

164. NSP -- Northern States Power Company

165. NU -- Northeast Utilities System

166. NWCC -- National Wind Coordinating Committee

167. NY ISO -- New York Independent System Operator, Inc.

168. NYC -- City of New York

169. NYEBF -- New York Energy Buyers Forum

170. NYMEX -- New York Mercantile Exchange

171. NYPP -- Member Systems of the New York Power Pool (Central Hudson Gas &

Electric Corporation, Consolidated Edison Company of New York, Inc., Long

Island Power Authority, New York State Electric & Gas Corporation, Niagara

Mohawk Power Corporation, Orange and Rockland Utilities, Inc., Rochester Gas

and Electric Corp. and Power Authority of the State of New York)

172. Oglethorpe -- Oglethorpe Power Corporation

173. Ohio Commission -- Public Utilities Commission of Ohio

174. Oneok -- Oneok Power Marketing

175. Ontario IMO -- Ontario Independent Electricity Market Operator

176. Ontario Power -- Ontario Power Generation Inc.

177. Oregon Office -- Oregon Office of Energy
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -725-

178. Otter Tail -- Otter Tail Power Company

179. PacifiCorp -- PacifiCorp

180. PECO -- PECO Energy Company and Horizon Energy

181. Pennsylvania Commission -- Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission

182. PG&E -- PG&E Corporation 

183. PGE -- Portland General Electric Company

184. PGP -- Public Generating Pool

185. PJM -- PJM Interconnection, L.L.C.

186. PJM/NEPOOL Customers -- PJM Industrial Customer Coalition, NEPOOL

Industrial Customer Coalition and Coalition of Midwest Transmission Customers

187. Platte River -- Platte River Power Authority

188. PNGC -- Pacific Northwest Generating Cooperative

189. Powerex -- British Columbia Power Exchange Corporation

190. PP&L Companies -- PP&L Inc., PP&L EnergyPlus Co., L.L.C., PP&L Montana,

L.L.C.

191. PPC -- Public Power Council

192. Professor Hogan -- Professor William W. Hogan

193. Professor Joskow -- Professor Paul L. Joskow

194. Professor Koch -- Professor Charles H. Koch, Jr.

195. Project Groups -- Alliance for Affordable Energy, American Wind Energy

Association, Center for Clean Air Policy, Center for Energy Efficiency and

Renewable Technologies, Citizen Power, Inc., Citizens for Pennsylvania's Future,

Delaware Division of the Public Advocate, Environmental Law & Policy Center of

the Midwest, Land & Water Fund of the Rockies, Legal Environmental Assistance

Foundation, Minnesotans for an Energy-Efficient Economy, Natural Resources

Defense Council, Northwest Energy Coalition, Office of the People's Counsel of

the District of Columbia, Pace Energy Project, Pennsylvania Energy Project,

Public Citizen, PJM Public Interest/Environmental User Group, Renew Wisconsin,

Southern Environmental Law Center, Tennessee Valley Energy Reform Coalition,

Union of Concerned Scientists, Wisconsin's Environmental Decade

196. PSE&G -- Public Service Electric and Gas Company

197. PSNM -- Public Service Company of New Mexico

198. Public Citizen -- Public Citizen

199. Puget -- Puget Sound Energy, Inc.

200. Rayburn -- Rayburn Country Electric Cooperative, Inc.

201. RECA -- Residential Electric Consumers Association

202. Reliant -- Reliant Energy, Incorporated

203. RUS -- Rural Utilities Service of the Department of Agriculture

204. Salomon Smith Barney -- Global Power Group of Salomon Smith Barney

205. San Francisco -- City and County of San Francisco
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -726-

206. SCE&G -- South Carolina Electric & Gas Company

207. Seattle -- Seattle City Light Department

208. SERC -- Southeastern Electric Reliability Council

209. Sierra Pacific -- Sierra Pacific Resources, Inc.

210. Sithe -- Sithe Energies, Inc.

211. SMUD -- Sacramento Municipal Utility District

212. Snohomish -- Public Utility District No. 1 of Snohomish County, Washington

213. SNWA -- Southern Nevada Water Authority

214. SoCal Cities -- Cities of Anaheim, Azusa, Banning, Colton, and Riverside,

California

215. SoCal Edison -- Southern California Edison Company

216. Sonat -- Sonat Power Marketing, L.P.

217. South Carolina Authority -- South Carolina Public Service Authority

218. South Carolina Commission -- Public Service Commission of South Carolina

219. Southern Company -- Southern Company Services, Inc. acting as agent for

Alabama Power Company, Georgia Power Company, GulfPower Company,

Mississippi Power Company and Savannah Electric and Power Company

220. SPP -- Southwest Power Pool, Inc.

221. SPRA -- Southwestern Power Resources Association

222. SRP -- Salt River Project Agricultural Improvement and Power District

223. St. Joseph -- St. Joseph Light & Power Company

224. Statoil -- Statoil Energy, Inc.

225. STDUG -- Southwest Transmission Dependent Utility Group

226. Steel Dynamics -- Steel Dynamics, Inc.

227. Tacoma Power -- City of Tacoma, Department of Public Utilities, Light Division

228. Tallahassee -- City of Tallahassee, Florida

229. Tampa Electric -- Tampa Electric Company

230. TANC -- Transmission Agency of Northern California 

231. TAPS -- Transmission Access Policy Study Group

232. TDU Systems -- Alabama Electric Cooperative, Inc., Arkansas Electric

Cooperative Corporation, Golden Spread Electric Cooperative, Kansas Electric

Power Cooperative, Inc., North Carolina Electric Membership Corporation, Old

Dominion Electric Cooperative, Seminole Electric Cooperative, Inc. and South

Mississippi Electric Power Association

233. Tennessee Authority -- Tennessee Regulatory Authority

234. TEP -- Tucson Electric Power Company

235. Texas Commission -- Public Utility Commission of Texas

236. Trans-Elect -- Trans-Elect, Inc.

237. Transénergie -- Transénergie
Docket No. RM99-2-000 -727-

238. Transmission ISO Participants -- Baltimore Gas & Electric, Boston Edison

Company, Cambridge Electric Light Company, Commonwealth Energy Company,

Conectiv, GPU Energy, Niagara Mohawk Power Company, Northeast Utilities

Service Company, PECO Energy Company, PP&L, Inc., Potomac Electric Power

Company, Public Service Electric and Gas Company, Vermont Electric Power

Company, Inc.

239. Tri-State -- Tri-State Generation and Transmission Association, Inc.

240. Turlock -- Turlock Irrigation District

241. TVA -- Tennessee Valley Authority

242. TXU Electric -- TXU Electric Company

243. UAMPS -- Utah Associated Municipal Power Systems

244. UMPA -- Utah Municipal Power Agency

245. United Illuminating -- United Illuminating Company

246. UtiliCorp -- UtiliCorp United, Inc.

247. Utility Engineers -- Utility Economic Engineers

248. Vernon -- City of Vernon, California

249. Virginia Commission -- Virginia State Corporation Commission

250. Virginia Power -- Virginia Electric and Power Company

251. Washington Commission -- Washington Utilities and Transportation Commission

252. WEPCO -- Wisconsin Electric Power Company

253. WICF -- Western Interconnection Coordination Forum

254. Williams -- Williams Companies, Inc.

255. Wisconsin Commission -- Public Service Commission of Wisconsin

256. Wolverine Cooperative -- Wolverine Power Supply Cooperative, Inc.

257. WPPI -- Wisconsin Public Power, Inc.

258. WPSC -- Wisconsin Public Service Corporation

259. Wyoming Commission -- Wyoming Public Service Commission