J

- S22016

- 22

NON

- PRECEDENTIAL DECISION

- SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

IN THE INTEREST OF: E.F., A MINOR

APPEAL OF: N.S., MOTHER :

:

:

:

: IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

No. 606 EDA 2022

Appeal from the Order Entered January 25, 2022 In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Juvenile Division at No(s): CP

- 51

- DP

- 0001045

- 2020

IN THE INTEREST OF: Z.G., JR.,

A MINOR

APPEAL OF: N.S., MOTHER :

:

:

:

:

: IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

No. 607 EDA 2022

Appeal from the Order Entered January 25, 2022 In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Juvenile Division at No(s): CP

- 51

- DP

- 0001046

- 2020

BEFORE: BOWES, J., McCAFFERY, J., and SULLIVAN, J.

MEMORANDUM BY Mc C AFFERY, J.: FILED AUGUST 30

, 2022

N.S. (Mother) appeal s 1 from the permanency review order s entered

January 25 , 20 2 2 , in the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas, suspending

visitation with her daughter , E.F., born in October 2012, and son, Z.G., Jr.

(Z.G.) , born in June 2020 (collectively, the Children), pending further order of

court. While the Philadelphia Department of Human Services (DHS) has filed

motions for goal change s and for termination of Mother ’ s parental rights, at

_________________ __________ ______ ____ _______

1 Mother ’ s two appeals were consolidated by this Court on May 18, 2022.J

- S22016

- 22

- 2

-

this time the goal remains reunification. Mother avers the trial court erred by:

(1) failing to make reasonable efforts to maintain the parent

- child

relationship; (2) considering her criminal case, in which she is accused of

abusing the Children ’ s sibling; and (3) determining that termination of

visitation was in the Children ’ s best interest. W e affirm.

I. Appealability of Order s

Preliminarily , we sua sponte review wh ether we have jurisdiction to

review the instant appeal. In particular, we must determine whether the

order s in question are appealable order s

. See Interest of L.B.

, 229 A.3d

971, 975 (Pa. Super. 2020)

. “‘ An appeal lies only from a final order, unless

permitted by rule or statute. ’ Generally, a final order is one that disposes of

all claims and all parties. See Pa.R.A.P. 341(b)

. ” Id.

In Interest of L.B.

, the juvenile court issued a permanency review

order, which suspended the father’s visitati on pending a recommendation by

the child’s therapist, and set a date for a subsequent permanency review

hearing. Id. at 974

- 75. On appeal, this Court concluded the order was not a

final order, as it did not dispose of all claims and parties. 2 Id. at 97 5.

_________________ __________ ______ ____ _______

2 Meanwhile, “ [a]n order granting or denying a goal change request, in a case involving a dependent child, is an appealable order. ” Interest of: L.B. , 229 A.3d at 975 n.4 (citation omitted).J

- S22016

- 22

- 3

-

However, the Interest of L.B. Court determined the order was

appealable under the collateral order doctrine. Interest of L.B.

, 229 A.3d at

976

- 77

.

The “ collateral order doctrine ” exists as an exception to the finality

rule and permits immediate appeal as of right from an otherwise interlocutory order where an appellant demonstrates that the

order appealed from meets the following elements: (1) it is separable from and collateral to the main cause of action; (2) the right involved is too important to be denied review; and (3) the
question presented is such that if review is postponed until final judgment in the case, the claimed right will be irreparably lost.

See Pa.R.A.P. 313.

Our Supreme Court has directed that Rule 313 be interpreted narrowly

. . . . To invoke the collateral order doctrine, each of the

three prongs identified in the rule ’ s definition must be clearly

satisfied.

Id. at 975 (citations omitted). The Court determined the first prong was

satisfied, where the father ’ s challenge

— to “ the juvenile court ’ s decision to

outsourc e to a therapist the determination of when his visits with [the child]

may or may not resume ”

— w as “ clearly separable from and collatera l to the

main cause of action. ” Interest of L.B.

, 229 A.3d at 977. The Court further

reasoned:

[B] ecause this order resulted in the complete denial of visitation,

it is both a “ right

. . . too important to be denied review, ” and “ if

review is postponed until final judgment in the case, the claimed right will be irreparably lost. ” [ See ] Pa.R.A.P. 313(b). Accordingly,

. . . this order satisfies both the second and third

prongs of the collateral order doctrine.

Id. at 976.J

- S22016

- 22

- 4

-

We conclude t he instant order, indefinitely suspending all of Mother ’ s

visitation , while the permanency goal remained reunification , is analogous to

the order in Interest of L.B. Mother ’ s challenge to the suspension of her

visitation is separate from and collateral to th e main dependency matter ; the

complete denial of visitation to her is a right too important to be denied

review; and her claim will be irreparably lost of review is postponed until final

judgment in this matter. See Interest of L.B.

, 229 A.3d at 97 6

- 7 7

.

Accordingly, we conclude the orders are appealable pursuant to the collateral

order doctrine , and we have jurisdiction to review Mother’s appeal. See

Pa.R.A.P. 313; Interest of L.B.

, 229 A.3d at 9 76

- 77.

II. Facts & Procedural History

We first summarize the relevant history concerning the Children ’ s

sibling, M.T.S., Jr. (Sibling) , who is not a subject of the instant dependency

matters , but who is significant to the trial court’s finding of aggravated

circumstances against Mother. On Au gust 28, 2018

, DHS received a child

protective services (CPS) report alleging Mother physically abused (Sibling),

then one year old

. A t this time, E.F. was approximately five years old, and

Z.G. was not born yet. 3 DHS obtained an order of protective cus tody for

Sibling

, and he was placed in the care of the maternal grandmother

_________________ __________ ______ ____ _______

3 See Trial Ct. Op., 4/20/20, at 6

- 7, 12 (E.F. was seven years old in the fall of 2020).J

- S22016

- 22

- 5

-

( Grandmother ), with whom E.F. lived

. Sibling was adjudicated dependent on

September 12 th and committed to DHS. Trial Ct. Op. at 2, 6

.

Mother gave birth to Z.G. on June 22, 2020. Mother, E.F., and Z.G.

moved into a shelter. Trial Ct. Op. at 7

- 8. DHS visited them and i n

- home

services were implemented. Id. at 8. At that time, “ Mother had been

attending mental health treatment . . . since October 2019. She completed

parent ing education

. . . and a housing program on April 29, 2020. ” Id.

At this juncture, we note Mother was diagnosed with bipolar disorder,

attention deficit hyperactivity disorder , and suicidal ideations while

incarcerated. Trial Ct. Op. at 3. Mother also told DHS “ she suffers from

anxiety and depression. [She] has an IQ of 65 and is currently o n probation

in Montgomery County for charges related to assault, retail theft, and drugs. ”

Id. at 11. Furthermore, E.F. ’ s father and Z.G. ’ s father “ are not involved in

the care of their respective children. ” Id. at 12.

On July 20, 2020, the trial court discharge d DHS ’ commitment of Sibling

and ordered his return to Mother ’ s care. Trial Ct. Op. at 8. On July 31st,

Mother was discharged from the shelter due to her non

- compliance with rules.

Id. She and the Children moved into an apartment. On August 3rd, a

Community Umbrella Agenc y (CUA) visited the family and determined the

Children were safe at that time. Id.

On September 8, 2020, DHS received a child protective services report,

stating Sibling was taken to the emergency room that day by a young adultJ

- S22016

- 22

- 6

-

male cousin, who stated “ all the bruises came from a fall from the j ungle gym ”

the day before. 4 Trial Ct. Op. at 9. “ An X

- ray revealed [Sibling] sustained a

left humeral condylar avulsion fracture

, ” or an injury to the elbow. See i d.

Hospital staff determined Sibling “ had multiple bruises and abrasions on his

arms[,] legs [and upper lip], swelling of his left arm[,] bruises on his eyes and

right ear[,] a healing loop mark and healing abrasion on his back, and elevated

liver enzymes. ” Id. at 9

- 10. The Child Protection Team found : (1) “ the

patterned bruising was the result of being hit with a cord or belt ; ” and (2) “ the

injuries to his head and the f r actured arm would not have resulted from a

single fall, as reported [.] ” Id. at 10. Sibling required surgery for his arm.

Id. Mother admitted to DHS that Sibling was i n her car e at the time of the

alleged playground incident, and claimed he was “ clumsy and sustains many

bruises due to his light complexion. ” Id. at 11.

“ On September 9, 2020, DHS visited Mother ’ s home after learning that

she had not taken Z.G. to the hos pital for a skeletal exam, as requested. ”

Trial Ct. Op. at 11. Mother “ stated that Z.G. was in the care of his Mater n al

Aunt . . . and E.F. was in the care of her Paternal Grandmother. ” Id.

Meanwhile, on September 11th, DHS obtained an order of protect ive custody

for Sibling “ and placed him in the care of Maternal Aunt. ” Id. at 12. On

_________________ __________ ______ ____ _______

4 When DHS visited the hospital the following day, it “ was in formed that [Sibling ’ s] Father had transported him to the hospital. ” Trial Ct. Op. at 10.J

- S22016

- 22

- 7

-

September 18th, he “ was placed in a confidential medical foster home[,]

where he currently remains. ” Id.

On October 2, 2020, DHS filed urgent dependent petitions for E.F. and

Z.G. On October 26th, Mother was arrested in connection with the abuse of

Sibling and charged with aggravated assault, simple assault, endangering the

welfare of children, and recklessl y endangering another person. She was

incarcerated at Riverside Correctional Facility, and released on December 15th

with a condition that she have no contact with Sibling. Trial Ct. Op. at 13. It

appears this criminal matter was still pending at the ti me of the January 25,

2022, emergency hearing. See N.T. at 35.

On December 29, 2020, Mother removed E.F. and Z.G. from the homes

they were residing in. That same day, “ upon further assessment by DHS and

the Philadelphia Police , [the Children] were found at the home of ” S.R., and a

safety plan was implemented for them to remain there. Trial Ct. Op. at 13.

On January 6, 2021, at a permanency review hearing for Sibling, the

trial court found aggravated circumstances existed, 5 and ordered that no

efforts be made to reunify him with Mother. Trial Ct. Op. at 14

- 15. On the

same day, the trial court also found aggravated circumstances with respect to

_________________ __________ ______ ____ _______

5 See 42 Pa.C.S. § 6302 (defining “ a ggravated circumstances ” to include

circumstance where “ [t] he child or another child of the parent has been the victim of physic al abuse resulting in serious bodily injury, sexual violence or aggravated physical neglect by the parent [ ] ” ).J

- S22016

- 22

- 8

-

Mother and the Children , adjudicated them dependent, transferred legal

custody to DHS, and placed the Children in a confidential foster care location.

Id. at 15. The court directed that Mother “ have line of sight, sound supervised

visits at the agency. ” Id.

Mother was referred for an intensive anger management program, to attend [Behavioral Health Services] for consultation/evaluation, and to be referred for a parental capacity evaluation[ and] the

Court ’ s Central Evaluation Unit (CEU) for a forthwith drug screen, dual diagnosis assessment, and three random drug screens , as well as to the Achieving Reunification Center (ARC) for appropriate

services.

Id.

Mother had visits with the Children through November 2021

. N.T.

Motion , 1/25/22, at 27. DHS reported that f rom January of 2021, “ Mother

has displayed increasingly unmanageable behaviors. [She] ha s lodged at

least [23] complaints and/or grievances concerning the Children ’ s status,

various assigned Community Umbrella Agency . . . staff members, and/or

various foster caregivers. ” Trial Ct. Op. at 16. By way of example, on January

14, 2021, Mother w as

visibly upset that CUA manager Ronara Jones had brought the Children to [a supervised] visit and declared she would file a police report against Ms. Jones for harassment and threats, alleging that Ms. Jones had threated to kill her, blow her head off[ ] and never let [her] see the kids again. Mother was able to de

- escalate after

redirection.

Id. at 17 (emphasis omitted)

. That same month, Mother also threated “ to

shoot the case management team. ” Id. at 37; N.T. at 16. Over that same

period (beginnin g January of 2021), DHS received at least 14 reports allegingJ

- S22016

- 22

- 9

-

the mistreatment or neglect of the Children in their various confidential foster

placements, all of which were investigated and found to be “invalid.” Trial Ct.

Op. at 15. After May of 2021, DHS was “unable to verify Mother’s mental

health treatment.” Id. at 25.

Between January 2021 and January 2022, E.F., who was then eight or

nine years old, was placed in 11 different foster homes . Trial Ct. Op. at 38.

Kasey Roscoe, a former CUA case manager in this case, testified:

The movement to different foster homes occurred because Mother told E.F. she did not have to listen to the foster parents and [to] be defiant. The foster parents [were] unable to deal with [E.F.]

and . . . submit[ted] their 30

- day notice to end her stay. At supervised visits, Mother . . . question[ed] E.F. about the foster parents and then reports would be filed, and E.F. would have to be moved to another foster home. [N.T. at 29

- 30.]

Id. Although it wa s recommended for E.F. to be evaluated for mental health

treatment, Mother refused to sign consent forms. Id. at 16, 17, 42.

On December 16, 2021, DHS filed the underlying motions for an

emergency hearing regarding Mother ’ s visitation with E.F. and Z.G. DHS

noted the Children’s next case listing was February 3rd, but averred: (1) the

Children experienced significant displacement disruptions due to Mother’s

increasingly unmanageable behavior; and (2) DHS and CUA were unable to

effectiv e ly re

- direct Mother’s escalating behavior at supervised visits, and thus

unable to ensure the Children’s emotional and physical safety. DHS requested

virtual visitation between Mother and the Children, as well as permission to

authorize that E.F. be refe rred for trauma therapy. On January 19, 2022, DHSJ

- S22016

- 22

- 10

-

filed petitions for a goal change and for the termination of Mother’s parental

rights.

The trial court conducted a hearing on January 25, 2022. DHS advised

the court it sought to proceed on the motion to modify Mother ’ s visitation only.

N.T. at 6, 8. DHS would then proceed on the termination petition at the

already

- scheduled February 3rd hearing, where it would present the testimony

of an expert witness

. Id. at 7.

Mother was present , testified, and w as represented by counsel. DHS

presented the testimony of : Crystal Robinson, CUA Assistant Program

Director; Ms. Roscoe, former CUA case manager; and Tommy SanMiguel,

former CUA case manager supervisor. The Children were represented by a

child advocate

. We note that at the time of the hearing, E.G. was nine years

old and Z.G. was 19 months old.

Crystal Robinson oversaw the Children ’ s case from December 2019 to

May of 2021. She testified that i mplementation of the trial court ’ s orders was

“ difficult ” as a result of Mother ’ s conduct

. N.T. at 10

- 11

. She explained:

[I] t was very difficult for

. . . the case managers [and] supervisors to offer redirection for simple things such as what to feed the [C]hildren or not to do certain things, [such as] lifting up clothes and checking them and exposing their body parts in the middle of

a visit. 6

_________________ __________ ______ ____ _______

6 Previously, Mother “reportedly exhibited inappropriate behavior during visits [with Sibling] and undressed [him] to check for marks and bruis es[. T]he [c]hild appeared uncomfortable at those times.” Trial Ct. Op. at 14.J

- S22016

- 22

- 11

-

N.T. a t 11. Mother became “irate and upset” when the case management

team said something “that she doesn’t want to hear” or there was a change

“that she doesn’t like.” Id. at 23. She screamed and cursed at, and was

disrespectful to, the staff who supervised the visits. Id. at 21. Thi s behavior

occurred so soften that caseworkers did not want to supervise visits. Id. at

12. Accordingly, CUA “ had a significant amount of case management changes

as a result of [Mother ’ s] constant complaints, investigations, grievances,

police reports, r equests for stay

- away orders and threats. ” Id. at 10

. One

CUA social worker did obtain a stay

- away order against Mother. Id. at 25.

Ms. Robinson recounted Mother ’s threat in J anuary 2021

, immediately

following the Children ’ s placement, to shoot the case m anagement team

. Id.

at 15

. Ms. Robinson did not believe Mother ’ s supervised visitation should be

expanded, as the quality of visits did not improve. Id. at 18.

Ms. Roscoe , who managed this case from May of 2021 to January of

2022

, testified, by way of further example of Mother’s inappropriate behavior

,

about a supervised visit in October of 2021. Ms. Roscoe informed Mother that

visits falling on Thanksgiving and Christmas would be rescheduled “to earlier

in the week,” and Mother be came upset, yelled, and screamed. N.T. at 36.

Mother called the “ hotline ” and reported she “wanted a new case manager”

and that Ms. Roscoe did not “want to do [her] job.” Id. at 37. The Children

were present at this time. M other also made a police report against Ms.

Roscoe , alleging Ms. Roscoe was harassing Mother, going to “her job and herJ

- S22016

- 22

- 12

-

home[ and] waiting for her to come out, calling her asking to meet up,” and

threatening she knew “people that could end [Mother’s] life[ .]” Id. at 38

- 39

.

Additionally, Ms. Roscoe testified that during visits, Mother en courage d

E

. F

. to make complaints against her foster parents and to defy her foster

parents. N.T. at 30

, 32

. Mother additionally attempt ed to gain information

,

including from E

. F

. , about the Children ’ s confidential placements, and she took

a picture of a foster parent ’ s car license plate. Id. at 31, 34 , 46 , 52

. She

further told E

. F

. to take pictures and video s of S ibling during their sibling

visits, despite the stay

- away order in her pending criminal matter. Id. at 35

.

Ms. Roscoe opined it was not possible to implement line of sight/line of hearing

supervised visitation , either in the community or at the agency. Id. at 42.

Ms. Robinson and Ms. Roscoe both testified E.F. ’ s behavior in the foster

homes and school worse ned, as E.F. lied, stole, acted out, and acted defiantly.

N.T. at 19, 29. Ms. Roscoe stated that “ usually, ” following a visit, the foster

parent would r eport E.F. ’ s behavior was worse, and E.F. would tell them “ her

mom said . . . she doesn ’ t have to listen to them, ” and E.F. ignored the foster

parents “ when they ’ re redirecting her on things. ” Id. at 47. Ms. Robinson

stated this behavior contributed “ to the disruptions in the placements. ” Id.

at 19. As stated above, E.F. had 11 different placements from January 2021

to January 2022

. Id. at 30

. Eventually

, the Children , who had been placed

together, wer e separated as a result. Id. at 48

.J

- S22016

- 22

- 13

-

Z.G. , who was 19 months old, “ play[ed] around in the room ” during

visits. See N.T. at 29. Ms. Roscoe believed that “ because he ’ s a baby,

[Mother ’ s behavior did not] affect him too much. ” Id. Z.G. has remained in

the same placement since the Children were separated. Id. at 48.

Nevertheless, g iven the multiple placement disruptions, it was d ifficult to

implement necessary services. Id. Furthermore, due to E.F. ’ s instability,

sibling visits had not been instituted as of the date of the hearing

. Id.

Ms. Roscoe ’ s supervisor and f ormer CUA case manager supervisor

,

Tommy SanMiguel, was assigned to the Children ’ s case from May of 2021

through January 2022. N.T. at 52. He likewise testified that Mot her ’ s

behaviors persisted with unsuccessful redirection : “ Every month, there was

an issue with the case, that we decided to [have the CUA staff supervise the

visits,] because clearly [the] workers were overwhelmed with the case. ” Id.

at 53. Mr. SanMiguel also described an unsuccessful attempt during a visit in

November of 2021 to provide Mother a letter with protocols for supervised

visitation. See i

d. at 5 6

. Mother refused to accept the letter and, in the

Children ’ s presence, had a 30

- minute “ outburst, ” in which she stated “ she ’ s

not willing to follow the rules[ and does not] care about the rules, ” “ curs[ed]

out ” Mr. SanMiguel, and used a derogatory racial slur. Id. at 56

- 57. Mr.

SanMiguel believed “ the only way t hat we could do [visitation] would be

virtually. ” Id. at 60.J

- S22016

- 22

- 14

-

Mother testified that during visits, she never threatened anyone, and no

CUA staff or anyone supervising the visits ever redirected her or told her she

was acting inappropriately. N.T. at 67 , 6 9

. Instead, “ the only time [she] was

approached ” by a staff person was when Mr. SanMiguel attempted to give her

a letter about the visits, but she refused because it “ was inappropriate ” and

interruptive of her time with the Children. Id. at 68. Mother d enied asking

E.F. for information about the foster parents or for pictures of Sibling. Id. at

7 1. Mother also testified Ms. Roscoe “sat outside” her home in a red car and,

during one visit, threatened that the Children would be adopted and Ms.

Roscoe’s “baby dad . . . would make [Mother] disappear.” Id. at 72

- 73.

Following the testimony, the trial court found Mother posed a grave

thr eat 7 to the Children and “ any contact, even supervised, remote contact

would be detrimental to their health. ” N.T. at 84. The court accordingly

suspended all visitation pending further order. The court ’ s written orders also

prohibited Mother ’ s remote c ontact with the children. Permanency Review

Orders, 1/25/22, at 2. The court maintained the Children ’ s permanency goals

of reunification.

Thereafter, on February 2 3, 2021, Mother pro se filed a timely notice of

appeal at each docket

, pertaining to each child, along with Pa.R.A.P.

_________________ __________ ______ ____ _______

7 The trial court used the term, “existential threat,” but its on the record discussion and opinion support a finding of a “grave threat.” See N.T. at 84; Trial Ct. Op. at 42

- 44.J

- S22016

- 22

- 15

-

1925(a)(2)(i) concise statements of errors complained of on appeal. 8 This

Court sua sponte consolidated the two appeals on May 18 , 202 2

.

III. Statement of Questions Involved

On appeal, Mother raises the following issues for our review :

1. Whether the trial court erred as a matter of law and abused its

discretion by not making reasonable efforts to maintain the relationship [between] Mother and Children [and] to preserve the parental relationship insofar as:

a. The last time Mother saw Children was back in November

of 2021, even though the visits were not officially suspended

until the January 2022 court date.

b. Mother is never given access to any information about the Children, such as medical information.

2. Whether the trial court erred, abused its discretion and accepted an accusation as fact by introducing evidence that is currently pending under another case where Mother has not been

_________________ __________ ______ ____ _______

8 As the trial court docket indicated Mother was still represented by private counsel, Edward Wiley, Esquire, this Court entered Attorney Wiley on our dockets as counsel. See Commonwealth v. Ellis

, 626 A.2d 1137 , 1139 (Pa.

1993 ) ( there is no constitutional right to hybrid representation at t rial or on appeal). On March 31, 2022, this Court directed Attorney Wiley to file amended Rule 1925(b) Statements by April 11 th

. Soon thereafter, Kimberly Keenen, Esquire, entered her appearance for Mother in the trial court. As it was unclear who repre sented Mother on appeal, this Court entered an order on April 6 th directing both Attorney Wiley and Attorney Keenen to respond as

to Mother ’ s representation. No responses were received. In fact, Attorney Wiley never responded to this Court ’ s orders nor withdrew from these appeals.

Nevertheless

, as these appeals are designated Children ’ s Fast Track

a ppeals and amended concise s tatements were required to be filed by

Mother ’ s counsel, on April 20, 2022, thi s Court directed Attorney Keenen to

file amended concise s tatements by April 27 th

. Attorney Keenen complied

, and has filed the appellate brief on behalf of Mother.J

- S22016

- 22

- 16

-

convicted and repeatedly asserted her innocence in a case of her

other minor child accidentally falling insofar as:

a. Suspension of visits of Children with Mother appear to be

due to Mother ’ s pending criminal trial related to other minor

child

— trial is coming up in October.

b. Trial court is moving towards termination of parental rights, but Mother denies the charges levied against her and

intends to fight the criminal allegations at trial. She enjoys

her constitutionally guaranteed right to silence in the face of

these accusations. Should Mother be required to testify in

this proceeding prior to her criminal trial, those rights would

be violated.

3. Whether the trial court erred and abused its discretion in determining the best interest of the Children would best be served by terminating visitation in light of the evidence regarding the
parent child bond and the detrimental effect of severing the bond

between the minor [C] hildren and [M] other

. . . insofar as:

a. Children have good relationships with Mother and enjoy seeing her.

b. The longer it goes without Mother having any contact with Children, that much more difficult [sic] it will be for Children

to continue to develop a bond with [ M ] other.

Mother ’ s Brief at 4

- 5

.

Mother’s third issue mistakenly refers to the termination of her parental

rights. Mother’s rights have not been terminated, and the order underlying

this appeal indefinitely suspended her visitation. Furthermore, we note

Mother presents all these issues together under one heading in the argument

section of her brief

— “[DHS] failed to establish by clear and convincing

evidence Mother’s visits should be suspended

. ” Id. at 9

- 10. W e remind

Attorney Keenen: “ The argument shall be divided into as many parts as thereJ

- S22016

- 22

- 17

-

are questions to be argued; and shall have at the head of each part

. . . the

particular point treated therein, followed by such discussion and citation of

authorities as are deemed pertinent. ” S ee Pa.R.A.P. 2119 (a)

.

I V

. Standard of Review & Relevant Law

We first observe our standard of review in dependency cases:

[W]e must accept the facts as found by the trial court unless they are not supported by the record. Although bound by the facts, we are not bound by the trial court's inferences, deductions, and conclusions therefrom; we must exercise our independent judgment in reviewing the court's determination, as opposed to its findings of fact, and must order whatever right and justice

dictate. We review for abuse of discretion. Our scope of review, accordingly, is of the broadest possible nature. It is this Court's responsibility to ensure that the record represents a comprehensive inquiry and that the hearing judge has applied the appropriate legal principles to that record. Nevertheles s, we accord great weight to the court's fact

- finding function because the court is in the best position to observe and rule on the credibility of the parties and witnesses.

Interest of L.B. , 229 A.3d at 977 ( citation omitted )

.

I n dependency cases, where reunification remains the family service

goal, parental visitation will not be denied or reduced unless it poses a grave

threat to the child

. In re C.J.

, 729 A.2d 89, 9 5 (Pa. Super. 1999). See also

id. at 94 (“[B] ecause of the constitutionally prot ected liberty interest parents

have to such visitation, parental visitation is usually not denied or limited

unless visitation with the parent poses a grave threat to the child. ”). In such

circumstances, the “grave threat” standard, and not the child’s be st interests,

applies. Id. at 96. “The policy underlying the ‘grave threat’ standard reflects

the desirability of continuing contact between the parent and the child. ItJ

- S22016

- 22

- 18

-

underscores the importance of each parent's maintaining a meaningful and

sustaining relationship with the child.” Interest of L.B. , 229 A.3d at 976

(citation omitted).

This Court has explained:

The “ grave threat ” standard is met when the evidence clearly

shows that the parent is unfit to associate with his or her children;

the parent can then be denied the right to see them. This

standard is satisfied when the parent demonstrates a severe mental or moral deficiency that constitutes a grave threat to the

child.

In terest of C.B.

, 861 A.2d 287 , 293 (Pa. Super. 2004) (citations omitted).

When making this determination, we must take into consideration

the express legislative policy of preservation of the family. [ See ]

Juvenile Act, 42 Pa.C.S. § 6301 et seq. Therefore, the trial court

is required to consider options such as structured visitation with

the aid of an agency; only where there are no practicable visitation options can visitation be denied.

. . .

Interest of Coast

, 561 A.2d 762, 772 (Pa. Super. 1989) ( en banc ) ( some

citation s omitted).

IV. Suspension of Visitation

Mother avers the trial court erred in suspending her visitation rights

.

She reason s : (1) although her visitation was suspended in January 2022, she

has not seen the Children since November 2021 and had not been provided

any school or medical information about the Children ; and (2) the court’s order

“ appear [s] to be due to Mother ’ s pending criminal trial related to ” another

child, but “ Mother denies the charges levied against her and intends to fightJ

- S22016

- 22

- 19

-

the criminal allegations at trial

. ” 9 Mother’s Brief at 9

- 10. Mother also

maintains: (1) “[s]he has never failed to perform parental duties[, her] love

for her children has been evident [;]” (2) “ she has gone above and beyond to

complete everything that has been asked of her[;]” (3) she “has been

consistent with mental health treatment, attending therapy, anger

management classes[, and visitation,] she is employed, and her home is

appropriate.” Id. at 9. We conclud e no relief is due.

First, we note Mother fails to cite to the place in the record supporting

her insistence that she “has been consistent with mental health treatment,

attending therapy, [and] anger management classes.” See Pa.R.A.P. 2119(c)

(i f reference is made to the evi dence, the argument must set forth the place

in the record where the matter referred to appears ); Mother’s Brief at 9. At

the hearing, Mother offered no testimony or evidence about her compliance

with mental health and other treatment. Meanwhile, DHS ave rred it was

unable to verify Mother’s mental health treatment after May of 2021. See

Trial Ct. Op. at 25.

_________________ __________ ______ ____ _______

9 Mother also avers, “S he enjoys her constitutionally guaranteed right to

silence in the face of these accusations . Should Mother be required to testify in this proceeding prior to her criminal trial, those rights would be violated.”

See Mother’s Brief at 10 (emphasis added)

. This statement is not entirely
apparent ; Mother did testify a t the underlying January 25, 2022, emergency hearing on DHS’ visitation motion. We note Mother may be referring to the February 3, 2022, termination hearing, see id. (“[T]he Trial Court is moving towards termination of parental rights.”), but Mother does not specify so.J

- S22016

- 22

- 20

-

Critically, Mother fails to address the extensive testimony, as well as the

trial court’s findings, as to her escalating and inappropriate conduct at

visitation and with DHS and CUA staff , which directly affected the quality of

the visits, the Children’s emotional health and safety at the visits, and the

frequent changes in the Children’s placement. The trial court found both Ms.

Robinson and Ms. Rosc oe testified credibly, while specifically finding Mother

was not credible. Trial Ct. Op. at 35, 38, 43. At the conclusion of the hearing,

the court stated Mother was a “ pathological liar ,” who may not be able to

“distinguish between reality and her own s ubjective inventions as to [her]

interactions” with the caseworkers. N.T. at 84.

Meanwhile, we conclude the record supports the trial court’s finding that

Mother’s visitation should be suspended because it poses a grave threat to the

Children. The court reasoned :

The totality of the record reflects that the Children have experienced instability during the numerous confidential placements. Mother ’ s aggressive, attacking, disruptive behaviors

and unfounded complaints have contributed to the Children ’ s instability. Mother specifically instructs E.F. not to cooperate and obey the foster parents and spends visitation time questioning the

C hild about the foster families. E.F. has had 11 different placements during her one

- year placement and needs trauma therapy [;] however, Mother will not sign consents. E.F. is 9 years old and needs stabilization and a safe, therapeutic environment.

Throughout the continuing life of this dependency case, the

C ourt has made various attempts to restructure visitation, in

many forms, from line of sight/line of hearing supervised visits at

DHS to weekly virtual supervised line of sight/line of hearing

visitation. DHS and CUA team members have made various
attempts to supervise visits, all to no avail. All forms of visitation

have thus far been unsuccessful due to Mother ’ s behavior duringJ

- S22016

- 22

- 21

-

the visits and the filing of unfounded complaints and grievances.

After the visits, E.F. ’ s behavior with the foster parents is disruptive

and she repeats what Mother has told her that she does not have

to obey or listen to the caregivers.

This C ourt heard credible, persuasive testimony from the CUA

managers and supervisors regarding Mother ’ s behavior and

actions and gives their testimony great weight. Mother ’ s testimony, on the other hand, is not credible and holds no weight

with this [c]ourt. Therefore, this C ourt finds the evidence presented by DHS is clear and convincing that Mother ’ s visitation

is contrary to the safety or well

- being of the Children and would
present a grave threat to them at this time.

Trial Ct. Op. at 42

- 43

. We reiterate the undisputed testimony by Ms.

Robinson

, Ms. Roscoe

, and Mr. SanMiguel , that due to Mother’s conduct,

continued supervised line of sight/line of hearing visitation was not possible.

N.T. at 18, 42, 60.

We conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding

visitation would pose a grave threat to the Children, and thus indefinitely

suspending Mother’s visitation.

V. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the order s of the trial court

suspending Mother ’ s visitation.

Order s affirmed.J

- S22016

- 22

- 22

-

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq. Prothonotary

Date: 8/30/2022