2016 IL App (1st) 150956

No. 1-15-0956 

Opinion filed January 20, 2016 

THIRD Division

______________________________________________________________________________ 

IN THE

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

FIRST DISTRICT

______________________________________________________________________________ 

In re JORDYN L., a Minor, )

 ) 

 Respondent-Appellee ) 

 ) 

(The People of the State of Illinois, )

 ) 

Petitioner-Appellee, ) 

 ) 

v. ) 

 ) 

Paris L., ) 

 ) 

Respondent-Appellant). )

Appeal from the Circuit Court

of Cook County. 

No. 14 JA 150 

The Honorable 

John Huff, 

Judge Presiding. 

______________________________________________________________________________

JUSTICE FITZGERALD SMITH delivered the judgment of the court, with 

 opinion. 

Presiding Justice Mason and Justice Lavin concurred in the judgment and opinion.

OPINION

¶ 1 Mother/respondent-appellant Paris L. (respondent) appeals from an order entered by the 

trial court finding that her daughter, Jordyn L., was neglected and abused. She contends that 

the trial court erred in its determination because the evidence presented was insufficient to 

support its finding. She asks that we reverse the trial court's determination of neglect and 

abuse and dismiss the remainder of the cause. The State and the minor's public guardian 

have filed appellees' briefs. For the following reasons, we affirm. 
1-15-0956 

2 

¶ 2 BACKGROUND

¶ 3 Jordyn was born to respondent on October 11, 2013. At that time, and at the time of the 

hearings relevant to this appeal, respondent herself was a ward of the juvenile court, having 

been placed under the guardianship of the Department of Children and Family Services 

(DCFS) in 2007 at the age of 12, as she was removed from the custody of her mother 

Charletta L. and later from the guardianship of her grandmother, Antoinette L. 

¶ 4 On February 14, 2014, the State filed a petition for adjudication of wardship for Jordyn, 

alleging neglect based on injurious environment and abuse based on substantial risk of 

physical injury. As the basis for the petition, the State alleged that respondent was not in 

compliance with assigned services, including parent coaching, mental health services, 

psychological evaluation and individual therapy. The petition also noted that respondent had 

been previously diagnosed with intermittent explosive disorder, reactive attachment disorder, 

post-traumatic disorder and attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD); that she has a 

history of psychiatric hospitalizations due to aggression and elopement behaviors; that she 

refuses to disclose Jordyn's whereabouts and creates inappropriate care plans for her; that she 

is often observed to be aggressive and threatening towards others; and that she has made 

conflicting statements as to the putative father's identity and whereabouts. 

¶ 5 At the adjudication hearing, the State began by introducing several exhibits, particularly 

adjudication and disposition orders for respondent's several siblings. Those regarding Jamie 

T., dated 2001, found neglect based on injurious environment and abuse based on substantial 

risk of physical injury, naming mother Charletta as unable and unwilling to care for the child. 

Those regarding Ebony I., dated 2007, found abuse and neglect based on lack of care, 

injurious environment and substantial risk of physical injury as she was left with a caregiver 
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who whipped a sibling with an extension cord and because another minor was found to have 

multiple fractures consistent with abuse. Those regarding Jamaael L., also dated 2007, found 

neglect based on lack of care and injurious environment due to marks on his back caused by 

a belt and extension cord, as well as because another minor was found to have multiple 

fractures consistent with abuse. Both Ebony and Jamaael's orders named mother Charletta 

and guardian Antoinette. Those regarding another sibling, Cody L., dated 2011, found 

neglect based on lack of care, injurious environment, physical abuse and abuse based on 

substantial risk of physical injury, with an added finding of sustained abuse, again naming 

mother Charletta as unable to care for him. Further, the trial court took judicial notice of 

respondent's own adjudication and disposition orders, dated 2007–the same dates as Ebony 

and Jamaael's orders. The State also submitted respondent's medical records from Hartgrove, 

Riveredge and Streamwood hospitals. 

¶ 6 Heather Blankenship, respondent's case manager from the agency UCAN from July 16, 

2013 to January 15, 2014, testified that she first met respondent when she was pregnant with 

Jordyn and had just moved into UCAN's living program at its Cermak site. Blankenship 

immediately referred respondent for parenting and counseling services, assigned her a 

counselor and a doula, and referred her to the site's psychologist for a psychological 

evaluation. Blankenship recounted that on October 28, 2013, she met with respondent, who 

now had Jordyn with her. Respondent told her she felt as if she were suffering from 

postpartum depression. Blankenship explained to respondent the seriousness of this and told 

her she needed to meet with her counselor, and also encouraged her to meet with the site's 

psychologist. In addition, Blankenship spoke to respondent again about submitting to a 

psychological evaluation, as respondent had been involved in several physical altercations 
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with other residents at the site, sometimes when Jordyn was present. Blankenship followed 

up by informing respondent's counselor about her depression concerns. She later discovered 

that respondent never met with the psychologist, as suggested, and had not been meeting 

consistently with her parenting coach or her therapist. Respondent refused to agree to a 

referral for the psychological evaluation.

¶ 7 Blankenship further testified that, at the October 28, 2013 meeting with respondent, her 

supervisor told respondent that because she was "out of placement," i.e., away from the 

UCAN site, so often, and because of concerns for Jordyn, respondent would need to be in 

placement at the UCAN site every 24 hours. As Blankenship explained, this resulted from 

respondent's pattern of leaving the site with Jordyn for approximately three days, returning 

without Jordyn for a night, and refusing to tell site personnel where the child was. 

Blankenship stated that, apart from respondent's explanation that she was going to the home 

of Jordyn's father and her refusal to provide personnel with his full name or address, she did 

not know where respondent was going or where she was leaving Jordyn. When respondent 

was told she would have to be in placement every 24 hours, she became very upset and 

disrespectful; Blankenship's supervisor told her she would have to leave, which respondent 

did, in a very loud and disrespectful manner. 

¶ 8 Blankenship averred that, because of the altercations with other residents, it was decided 

that respondent should be moved from UCAN's Cermak site to its Clyde site, where the 

number of altercations involving respondent lessened. However, in describing respondent's 

move in November 2013, Blankenship recounted that she was charged with helping 

respondent transport her belongings. Blankenship arrived with a moving van, but respondent 

did not want her there. Blankenship's supervisor told her to move respondent regardless of 
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her resistence, so Blankenship began packing respondent's belongings and loading them into 

the van. During this time, respondent made threatening comments about Blankenship to her 

roommate and repeatedly told Blankenship not to touch her things. Once the van was 

packed, respondent got into one of the back rows of seats with Jordyn and was very 

disrespectful and verbally threatening to Blankenship, for example, telling her that she was 

going to "come up there to the front seat" if Blankenship did not adjust the music as she 

wished. Blankenship warned she would have to call the police if she did, and she stopped 

talking to respondent during the remainder of the drive. Then, upon arriving at the Clyde 

site, respondent refused to get out of the van, so Blankenship and another staff member 

began unloading her belongings. At this point, respondent, who had brought Jordyn inside to 

the site staff, became upset and disrespectful, cursing loudly at Blankenship on the street and 

threatening physical violence, whereupon police were called. 

¶ 9 Blankenship further testified that, based on this incident, her supervisor felt it was unsafe 

for her to remain on respondent's case and officially reassigned the case on January 15, 2014. 

On that date, Blankenship met with respondent to introduce her to her new caseworker, 

Maggie Cole, whereupon respondent expressed her happiness at the change. Blankenship 

averred that, at this time, respondent had not completed a psychological assessment or any 

mental health services with UCAN's psychologist, and was not consistently participating in 

counseling or parenting classes. Nor was respondent meeting with her parenting coach or 

counselor weekly as ordered, due to her absences from the placement site; she was only 

meeting with them about once a month. 

¶ 10 Finally, Blankenship testified that when she observed respondent with Jordyn, 

respondent was very attentive to her, making sure she was fed and soothed. She admitted 
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that respondent acted appropriately toward Jordyn and never felt that respondent was a 

physical threat to the child. However, Blankenship stated that respondent did "put the baby 

in harm's way" and agreed with the decision to put Jordyn in protective custody, since 

respondent had come into the same care due to severe abuse by Antoinette and there was 

suspicion that respondent was leaving Jordyn at Antoinette's home, which was where DCFS 

investigators had, at one point, found the child. 

¶ 11 Maggie Cole, respondent's subsequent case manager, testified that when she took over 

respondent's case, there were already several service referrals in place and still open for her, 

including a psychological evaluation, parenting services, therapy and a vocational program. 

Respondent had not yet completed the psychological evaluation and was not consistent with 

her parenting classes or therapy; and, she was enrolled in school and UCAN's life skills 

program, but was not attending either one. Cole further averred that, as of the time of the 

hearing, respondent had yet to begin any of these ordered services. Regarding respondent's 

behavior toward Jordyn, Cole noted that she had only seen the two together once, during 

which time respondent was very attentive to the child; Cole had no concerns that respondent 

would be physically aggressive toward Jordyn. Cole also testified that, in February 2014, she 

met with respondent, who indicated that she wanted to reestablish a relationship with her 

mother, Charletta, and that she wanted Jordyn to be a part of that relationship, as Charletta 

was Jordyn's grandmother. 

¶ 12 Ivory Flucas, a DCFS child protection investigator, testified that he was assigned to 

Jordyn's case in January 2014 to investigate the allegation that respondent was leaving 

Jordyn with Charletta. Flucas stated that he met with respondent in early January 2014 and 

explained to her that someone had reported that she had been leaving Jordyn with Charletta, 
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that Charletta had prior indicated reports against her, and that Charletta had a history of being 

in violent relationships. Respondent admitted that she had brought Jordyn to Charletta's 

home and was interested in developing a relationship with her so that Charletta could also 

develop a relationship with Jordyn. Flucas told respondent that this was not an appropriate 

place to leave Jordyn. Respondent told Flucas she was not aware that Charletta presented a 

danger to Jordyn, but that she would no longer leave Jordyn with her as she valued Jordyn's 

safety over a relationship with Charletta. 

¶ 13 Flucas further testified that he and his supervisor had a subsequent conversation with 

respondent on January 30, 2014, to explain to her that her decision making was endangering 

Jordyn and that she needed to abide by UCAN's instructions concerning Jordyn's safety. 

Respondent told Flucas that she was leaving Jordyn with the child's father. Flucas asked 

respondent to provide information about the father's identity so that UCAN could perform a 

safety assessment and explained that until such an assessment was done on anyone she 

wanted to leave Jordyn with, UCAN would not approve of her leaving the child with that 

person. Respondent refused to provide any information regarding Jordyn's father. 

¶ 14 Flucas averred that he met with respondent the next day, January 31, 2014, to again 

explain to her that UCAN and DCFS were mandated to ensure Jordyn's safety and that she 

needed to follow UCAN's rules regarding this, including those with respect to who could care 

for the child. Also at this meeting, a safety plan was formed, which respondent signed. 

Pursuant to the plan, respondent could not leave Jordyn alone with anyone until a family 

meeting was held, which was scheduled for February 7, 2014. Flucas stated that this safety 

plan was put into place because there was no one with whom respondent could leave Jordyn 

that UCAN felt comfortable. He also noted that respondent's judgment was flawed and she 
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had not yet shown the ability to safely choose someone to care for Jordyn. Flucas explained 

to respondent that if she violated this safety plan, DCFS had the authority to remove Jordyn 

from her care. 

¶ 15 Flucas next testified regarding the February 7, 2014 family meeting, at which he, his 

supervisor, several UCAN staff members and respondent were present. Respondent, 

however, did not have Jordyn with her. When asked where she was, respondent said that 

Jordyn was not with her father or her maternal grandmother, but respondent refused to 

disclose who was caring for her. Flucas asked respondent to make Jordyn available, but she 

refused, saying she did not trust DCFS or UCAN; she also again refused to disclose any 

information about the child's father. Flucas grew concerned because, as discussed during 

their last meeting, respondent had yet to show that she knew how to make appropriate 

decisions regarding Jordyn's safety. In addition, Flucas noted that, as per the January 31, 

2014 safety plan respondent had signed, the fact that Jordyn was not with her was a violation 

of the plan. At this point during the meeting, respondent was presented with a new safety 

plan. Under its rules, respondent could not leave Jordyn with anyone unless UCAN 

approved and respondent would have to make Jordyn available to her parenting coach once a 

week; if respondent did not follow these rules, DCFS would be able to take protective 

custody of the child. Respondent initially refused to sign this safety plan, but then did so 

after about 45 minutes. 

¶ 16 Flucas further testified that immediately after the meeting, he went to take protective 

custody of Jordyn because respondent had violated the first safety plan she had signed on 

January 31, 2014. He went to Antoinette's home with the police; a woman answered the 

door, refused to allow them to enter the home and stated that Jordyn was not there. The fire 
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9 

department was called and, after breaking down the door of the home, Jordyn was found 

therein. Flucas took protective custody of the child, stating that the baby was in danger of 

serious harm if returned to respondent because of respondent's refusal to follow DCFS and 

UCAN's instructions and because Antoinette had been determined to be an inappropriate 

caregiver due to her prior indicated reports. Flucas admitted that he and the staff realized the 

initial safety plan had been violated as soon as respondent appeared at the February 7, 2014 

meeting without Jordyn, but still offered her a second safety plan because they were "caught 

up in the moment." He explained that safety plans were reviewed every five working days, 

and that they were reevaluating the January 31, 2014 plan at the February 7, 2014 meeting, 

which respondent had originally agreed to attend with Jordyn but then did not and refused to 

disclose her whereabouts. He also noted that when he took protective custody, Jordyn had no 

marks or physical injuries and did not look malnourished. Flucas ultimately indicated 

respondent for placing Jordyn in an environment injurious to her health and welfare by her 

continuous placement of the child with people whom UCAN had not approved. 

¶ 17 The State next published respondent's medical records from three hospitals, which it had 

submitted at the outset of the adjudication hearing. Those from Riveredge Hospital showed 

that in 2007, respondent was admitted after becoming angry while in a group home; she set a 

dish towel on fire and tried to hit and bite the staff because they would not give her a radio. 

These records also indicated that respondent had been diagnosed with ADHD, that her 

discharge diagnoses were impulse control disorder and bipolar disorder and that she needed 

individual and group therapy. Respondent's records from Streamwood Hospital documented 

that she was admitted in early 2008 and that this was her seventh hospitalization. She 

presented there because there had been multiple daily incidents of her threatening others and 
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requiring restraint at her group home. These records further revealed that respondent had 

been removed from her mother and was placed in her grandmother's guardianship, but was 

then removed in 2006 due to physical abuse by her grandmother beginning at age 4 and 

continuing to age 12; respondent had a history of reactive attachment disorder, PTSD and 

aggression. Respondent reported to hospital staff at that time that she had been removed 

from her grandmother's care after her siblings were found to have signs of physical abuse by 

her grandmother and her boyfriend, and that her grandmother would hit them with extension 

cords. And, respondent's records from Hartgrove Hospital disclosed that she was referred 

there in 2009 from a residential therapy facility because of increasing aggression and 

outbursts, including getting into fights several times per week with both staff and peers. 

They also revealed that she had been sexually abused by an uncle and his friend, had

previously attempted suicide, and did not know where her mother was. 

¶ 18 Respondent testified at the adjudicatory hearing. She stated that after Jordyn's birth in 

October 2013, she was placed with her at UCAN's Cermak site, where she stayed for two 

weeks. She then left for three days, taking Jordyn to live with a friend at her friend's DCFS 

independent living program; respondent explained that she had health and safety concerns 

about the Cermak site. She averred that she went back and stayed at Cermak until November 

2013, when she moved to UCAN's Clyde site. She denied that the move took place because 

she had engaged in physical altercations with staff and residents at Cermak and stated instead 

that she moved due to a mice infestation at that site. She also denied that Blankenship was 

removed from her case because respondent had threatened her and stated instead that, while 

they had exchanged words, she "never really threatened her" and asked for Blankenship's 

removal because she was not meeting her needs. And, she further denied withholding 
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information from Cole about where Jordyn was, insisting that she never kept it secret and that 

the real reason staff was upset was because she was not sleeping at the UCAN placement 

with Jordyn. 

¶ 19 Respondent further testified that, when Jordyn was in her custody, she took her for two 

regular medical checkups and was not aware of any complaints from physicians or UCAN 

staff that Jordyn appeared abused or malnourished. She admitted that she had been taking 

Jordyn to Charletta's house and stated that she did not know Charletta "already had, like, 

issues going on" with DCFS. According to respondent, she had been "simply taking [her] 

daughter to her grandmother's house," and explained that she had only become aware of 

Charletta's DCFS situation at her first meeting with Flucas in early January 2014. 

Respondent acknowledged that she signed a safety plan, pursuant to which she understood 

she was not to take Jordyn to Charletta's house at all (regardless of whether respondent 

accompanied her) until Charletta's investigation was resolved. She insisted that this was only 

condition of the initial safety plan, and stated that it did not include the provision that she 

could not take Jordyn to anyone's home until the subsequent family meeting. 

¶ 20 With respect to the February 7, 2014 family meeting, respondent testified that when she 

arrived, she was asked where Jordyn was, and she promptly revealed that the child was at 

Antoinette's home, which she believed was not unsafe. She was then asked whether 

Antoinette had whipped children with an extension cord, whereupon respondent explained 

that she was aware of this, but that it was only "an allegation;" she admitted that she had been 

removed from Antoinette's care when she was 12 years old, but denied that it was because 

she was hit and stated instead that it was because "there were allegations and concerns with 

other children that were in her home" and a suspicion that Antoinette was allowing someone 
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else to live there. Respondent further explained that all the children were removed from 

Antoinette's custody only as "a precaution" and that Antoinette otherwise raised them, they 

"all turned out intact," and she "did not see how" Antoinette's home "would have been a 

potentially unsafe environment *** [or] not be safe for [her] child." 

¶ 21 Continuing her testimony about the February 7, 2014 meeting, respondent stated that it 

was held to review the first safety plan and that she was then asked to sign a second one, 

pursuant to which she was to report to her UCAN placement every night with Jordyn at 

curfew, she was not to take Jordyn to Charletta's home, and she was not to take Jordyn to the 

home of the man respondent had named as Jordyn's father as he had not yet been approved. 

She noted that additional requirements under this plan were that she was to report to UCAN 

with Jordyn at least once every 24 hours unless she obtained a preapproved overnight stay, 

she was not to stay overnight with Jordyn anywhere that was not preappoved, and she was to 

give UCAN information about all the adults who she wanted preapproved. Respondent 

acknowledged that, essentially, under the plan, she was not to leave Jordyn with anyone who 

UCAN had not approved as a caretaker. When she received this second safety plan, she told 

all those present that she wanted to see a handbook verifying that what was included therein 

did not violate her parental rights. She eventually signed the plan reluctantly and in anger, 

believing that if she did not, Jordyn would be placed into protective custody. She averred 

that, after the meeting, she went to pick Jordyn up from Antoinette's home, but Jordyn was 

already gone. Respondent further testified that the initial safety plan did not specifically state 

she was not allowed to bring Jordyn to Antoinette's home between the time she signed it and 

the February family meeting, just not to Charletta's home, to which she did not take the child. 

She then stated that the second safety plan also did not specifically state she could not bring 
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Jordyn to Antoinette's home and, if it did, she was not given time to abide by its terms. In 

respondent's view, she, as a parent, had the right to place Jordyn where she saw fit, as long as 

there was no reason to believe Jordyn would be harmed and as long as respondent was with 

her and returned back to UCAN before curfew. 

¶ 22 Near the end of the adjudication hearing, the court expressed concern that the safety plans 

referred to during this cause were not in evidence. The State was able to produce and submit 

the signature page of the second, February 7, 2014, safety plan certifying that respondent did 

sign it. The court also asked the parties whether they would consider continuing this matter 

under supervision pursuant to section 2-20 of the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (705 ILCS 

405/2-20 (West 2014)). After some discussion, the State refused, citing respondent's failure 

to comply with restrictions outlined in the safety plans in the past. The court then took the 

matter under advisement. When it reconvened, the court again asked the State whether it 

would reconsider its position on a continuance under supervision but, again, the State 

refused, citing respondent's eight prior hospitalizations, uncompleted services, aggressive 

behavior and the risks she created with respect to the child's safety. The court also reiterated 

its concern about the fact that the safety plans had not been submitted into evidence. It then 

explained that it made a "balance sheet" of facts of this case. It noted that respondent had 

engaged in some services such as parenting classes and sporadic therapy and that, by all 

accounts, she was attentive to Jordyn, she did not personally pose a threat to her welfare, and 

the number of confrontations in which she was involved at UCAN markedly declined when 

she was moved to the Clyde site. However, the court also noted that the "problem here" was 

respondent's "youth and her aggression against others *** [and her] bad judgment in leaving 

Jordyn" with those whom she chose. The court found concern with respondent's desire to 
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maintain a relationship with Charletta and encourage one between her and Jordyn. It further 

commented on the "line of violence that goes through this family" starting with Antoinette, 

then Charletta and reaching respondent, as well as the fact that respondent was about to age 

out of the juvenile system and no information had been submitted into evidence regarding 

where she would live with Jordyn or how she would care for her. At the end of its 

discussion, the court again decided to continue the matter, in the hope that, via subpoenas, 

the parties would present the written safety plans and evidence about respondent's future care 

plans into evidence. 

¶ 23 When the court next reconvened, the State tendered as an exhibit section 3 of the 

February 7, 2014 written safety plan, explaining all its efforts to obtain the complete plans 

but being unable to locate them. The court accepted the exhibit and read it. Following 

additional argument, the court concluded that, while this was perhaps "a weak case, 

nevertheless, *** the State has met its burden as to neglect injurious environment and abuse 

substantial risk of physical injury." The court specified that this was "the basis for the 

ruling." In support, it reiterated the evidence presented, including respondent's "terrible 

childhood" at the hands of her mother and grandmother, Jordyn's grandmother and great 

grandmother, noting that "the way [respondent] acts today reflects that." It also commented 

that respondent has been "extremely uncooperative with the services that were offered to her" 

and has "basically refused to do virtually everything," and considered her disappearances 

from her placement and her failure to inform anyone where she was. Finally, the court 

discussed respondent's "threatening" behavior towards others, noting that while it was not 

directed at Jordyn, it "could well have escalated into physical violence while the child was 

present." The court stated, "because of that, under the doctrine of anticipatory neglect," it 
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found by a preponderance of the evidence that the State had met its burden here. It then 

ordered that respondent would have nine months to engage in services and demonstrate 

reasonable effort and progress toward reunification. 

¶ 24 Immediately after issuing its ruling on the adjudicatory hearing, the court held a 

dispositional hearing. Ultimately, the court concluded that it was in Jordyn's best interest to 

be made a ward of the court, finding both parents unable, and respondent unwilling, to 

provide for her care. The court commented that "this has been an ongoing effort to get 

[respondent] engaged and she's just refused." Finally, with respect to permanency, the court 

heard argument and concluded that it is "in Jordyn's best interest to accept the goal of return 

home [in] 12 months." 

¶ 25 ANALYSIS

¶ 26 On appeal, respondent's only contention is that the evidence was insufficient to support 

the trial court's determination following the adjudicatory hearing that Jordyn was neglected 

due to injurious environment and abused due to substantial risk of physical injury. She 

asserts that the court's basis of "anticipatory neglect" is against the manifest weight of the 

evidence because it applies only to cases where there is evidence of harm to siblings of the 

child at issue at the hands of the responsible parent and, as Jordyn is respondent's only child, 

this doctrine was inapplicable here. Respondent further argues that there was no evidence of 

either neglect or abuse to Jordyn while in her custody, and she takes issue with both the age 

of the evidence surrounding her hospitalizations (i.e., that there has been no evidence of a 

diagnosis or hospitalization since 2009) and that the service plans were not admitted into 

evidence. 
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¶ 27 As a threshold matter, we wish to make clear for the record exactly what respondent is 

appealing before this court. As all the parties acknowledge, respondent included, her notice 

of appeal states that she is appealing from the trial court's adjudication, disposition and 

permanency orders. However, and again as all the parties acknowledge, respondent included, 

her brief on appeal challenges only the findings of abuse and neglect at the adjudicatory 

phase. Accordingly, this is the only matter before our court. In fact, we note that respondent 

purposefully abandons any additional challenges, as she states that "there is no basis to 

appeal the [disposition and permanency] orders" and that she "is not arguing for reversal of 

those orders in this Brief." Therefore, and by the consensus of all parties involved, we 

proceed with a review of only the trial court's adjudication order. See In re R.S., 382 Ill. 

App. 3d 453, 464 (2008) (while mother’s notice of appeal sought review of trial court’s 

disposition order regarding child, her failure to address that ruling in her brief on appeal 

resulted in waiver of that issue).

¶ 28 Turning to the merits of this cause, we begin with several legal principles concerning 

neglect and abuse, as these are the adjudicatory findings of the trial court which respondent 

challenges here. The Juvenile Court Act of 1987 defines neglected and abused minors, in 

relevant part, as follows: 

 "(1) Those who are neglected include: 

 *** 

(b) any minor under 18 years of age whose environment is injurious to his 

or her welfare; ***

 

* ** 

(2) Those who are abused include any minor under 18 years of age whose 
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parent ***: 

 

 *** 

(ii) creates a substantial risk of physical injury to such minor by other than 

accidental means which would be likely to cause death, disfigurement, 

impairment of emotional health, or loss or impairment of any bodily 

function." 705 ILCS 405/2-3(1), (2) (West 2014). 

"Neglect" is the failure to exercise the care that circumstances justly demand, and 

encompasses both willful and unintentional disregard of parental duty. See In re Sharena H., 

366 Ill. App. 3d 405, 415 (2006); accord In re Kamesha J., 364 Ill. App. 3d 785, 792-93 

(2006). As noted above, a "neglected minor" includes any child under age 18 whose 

environment is injurious to his welfare. See Kamesha J., 364 Ill. App. 3d at 792; In re T.SP., 362 Ill. App. 3d 243, 248 (2005) (a child can be found neglected if his environment is 

injurious to his welfare). An "injurious environment" is "an amorphous concept that cannot 

be defined with particularity, but has been interpreted to include the breach of a parent's duty 

to ensure a safe and nurturing shelter" for her children. Kamesha J., 364 Ill. App. 3d at 793; 

accord Sharena H., 366 Ill. App. 3d at 416; T.S-P., 362 Ill. App. 3d at 248. This is because 

our courts have consistently recognized that a parent has a duty to keep her children free 

from harm, and her refusal to do so clearly amounts to neglect under the statute. See 

Kamesha J., 364 Ill. App. 3d at 793. 

¶ 29 Again, the terms "neglect" and "injurious environment" do not have fixed and measured 

meanings but, rather, take their content from the particular circumstances of each case. See 

Sharena H., 366 Ill. App. 3d at 415; Kamesha J., 364 Ill. App. 3d at 793; T.S-P., 362 Ill. 

App. 3d at 248. Therefore, cases involving such allegations are sui generis and must be 
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decided on the basis of their unique facts. See Kamesha J., 364 Ill. App. 3d at 793. The 

State has the burden of proving the allegations by a preponderance of the evidence. See 

Sharena H., 366 Ill. App. 3d at 415; accord Kamesha J., 364 Ill. App. 3d at 793; T.S-P., 362 

Ill. App. 3d at 248. On review, a trial court's findings in this regard will not be reversed 

unless they are against the manifest weight of the evidence. See Sharena H., 366 Ill. App. 3d 

at 415 (reviewing court is to give deference to trial court's findings of fact, as trial court is in 

best position to observe conduct and demeanor of parties and witnesses, assess credibility 

and weigh evidence presented at adjudicatory hearing); accord Kamesha J., 364 Ill. App. 3d 

at 793. A trial court's findings are against the manifest weight of the evidence only when the 

opposite conclusion is clearly apparent. See In re Faith B., 359 Ill. App. 3d 571, 573 (2005). 

Ultimately, the trial court "has broad discretion in determining the existence of neglect and

abuse" (In re B.W., 216 Ill. App. 3d 410, 414 (1991)), and there is a “strong and compelling 

presumption in favor of the result reached by the trial court” in such child custody cases 

(Connor v. Velinda C., 356 Ill. App. 3d 315, 323 (2005)). And, we may affirm the trial 

court's ruling if any of its bases of abuse or neglect may be upheld. See In re Kenneth D., 

364 Ill. App. 3d 797, 802 (2006) (citing In re Faith B., 216 Ill. 2d 1, 14 (2005)). 

¶ 30 In the instant case, the trial court's findings of neglect based on injurious environment and 

abuse based on substantial risk of physical injury were not against the manifest weight of the 

evidence.

¶ 31 Respondent's main argument here is, as we noted earlier, that the trial court's findings 

cannot stand because it misapplied the concept of anticipatory neglect to her cause. Citing In 

re Arthur H., 212 Ill. 2d 441 (2004), she states that the "theory of anticipatory neglect" refers 

only "to sibling abuse while in the care of the parent," that is, that a finding of neglect based 
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on injurious environment or a finding of abuse based on substantial risk of physical injury 

may only be found under this concept if they are based upon the parent's similar behavior 

toward a sibling of the minor in question. In her view, then, and only then, may such 

findings be applied to the parent's relationship with the minor child at issue. She continues 

by insisting that, because Jordyn is her first and only child, and because she (respondent) is 

not the responsible parent for any other children including a sibling of Jordyn's or, more 

precisely, a sibling of Jordyn's who has been neglected or abused while in her care, the trial 

court's findings are automatically against the manifest weight of the evidence and must be 

reversed. As respondent's characterization of the doctrine of anticipatory neglect is entirely 

incorrect, we wholly disagree. 

¶ 32 Respondent is correct that in Arthur H., a trial court made findings of neglect premised 

on anticipatory neglect as to the child at issue who resided with the father, based upon what 

occurred with several of his siblings who resided with the mother. See Arthur H., 212 Ill. 2d 

at 468. Following the father's appeals, our state supreme court eventually reversed the trial 

court determinations, finding that the State failed to prove the allegations of neglect with 

respect to the named minor in relation to his father. In its decision, the court discussed 

anticipatory neglect and noted that it upheld its primary concept, namely, that " 'the juvenile 

court should not be forced to refrain from taking action until each particular child suffers an 

injury.' " Arthur H., 212 Ill. 2d at 477 (quoting In re Brooks, 63 Ill. App. 3d 328, 339 (1978)). 

The court made clear that the only reason for its reversal in that case was the specific 

circumstances presented with respect to the named child which, in the court's view, amounted 

to mere speculation of a risk of harm and failed to sustain the State's burden of proof. See 

Arthur H., 212 Ill. 2d at 477-78. 
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20 

¶ 33 From this, however, respondent blindly leaps to the unfounded conclusion that the 

doctrine of anticipatory neglect can only be applied in cases where, as in Arthur H., the 

minor at issue has siblings and the parent at issue is responsible for them. She exclusively 

links its applicability to a concept of transference–to be an applicable doctrine, the minor 

must have siblings who were neglected or abused and, since Jordyn has none, it cannot apply 

to her case. It is here where respondent's assertions fall apart.

¶ 34 Not only does respondent not provide us with any legal precedent to validate her 

argument, she specifically ignores the discussion of anticipatory neglect provided by our 

state supreme court in Arthur H. and reaffirmed by its progeny. As Arthur H. makes clear, 

transference of any sort may have some place in the doctrine of anticipatory neglect, but it is 

a very minor one. As that court stated, "[u]nder the anticipatory neglect theory, the State 

seeks to protect not only children who are the direct victims of neglect or abuse, but also 

those who have a probability to be subject to neglect or abuse because they reside, or in the 

future may reside, with an individual who has been found to have neglected or abused other 

children." Arthur H., 212 Ill. 2d at 468. Thus, anticipatory neglect protects both victims of 

neglect or abuse and those who may become neglected or abused. The court described that 

anticipatory neglect "flows from the concept of an 'injurious environment' " and, likewise, 

there is no per se rule that neglect or abuse of one child conclusively establishes, or does not 

establish, the neglect of another child–it amounts only to admissible evidence. Arthur H., 

212 Ill. 2d at 468-69. Accordingly, as with any neglect or abuse finding, the court specified 

that findings made under this doctrine " 'should be measured not only by the circumstances 

surrounding the sibling, but also by the care and condition of the child in question.' " Arthur 

H., 212 Ill. 2d at 468 ("[e]ach case concerning the adjudication of minors, including those 
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21 

cases pursued under a theory of anticipatory neglect ***, must be reviewed according to its 

own facts" (quoting In re Edward T., 343 Ill. App. 3d 778, 797 (2003))). 

¶ 35 Thus, even under anticipatory neglect, neglect or abuse to a sibling becomes incredibly 

less important than what is occurring with, and to, the specific minor in question, who is to 

be the central focus. It is, of course, relevant, but it is not determinative. See Arthur H., 212 

Ill. 2d at 468-69. Subsequent case law on the issue echos the same principles. For example, 

our very court restated as much in Kenneth D., wherein we described anticipatory neglect as 

not only a legal principle which seeks to protect those children who have a probability of 

being subject to neglect or abuse from an individual who has been found to have neglected or 

abused another sibling child, but also, and ultimately, as a method to protect, additionally, 

those children who are direct victims of neglect or abuse. See Kenneth D., 364 Ill. App. 3d at 

801. Again, we noted that while what has occurred with, or to, a sibling is relevant, the “care 

and condition of the child named in the petition” is key and must be taken into account. See 

Kenneth D., 364 Ill. App. 3d at 801; accord In re Edricka C., 276 Ill. App. 3d 18, 26 (1995). 

Moreover, our courts have repeatedly emphasized that the statutory provisions, which we 

outlined earlier, require simply “an injurious environment or substantial risk of harm” in 

order to sufficiently support a finding of neglect or abuse and, once this has been found, the 

trial court need not wait until the child becomes a victim or is permanently emotionally 

damaged to remove her–regardless of what has occurred with a sibling. In re M.K., 271 Ill. 

App. 3d 820, 826 (1995) (emphasis in original); accord In re D.W., 386 Ill. App. 3d 124, 138 

(2008); In re T.B., 215 Ill. App. 3d 1059, 1062-63 (1991); In re A.D.R., 186 Ill. App. 3d 386, 

393-94 (1989). 
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22 

¶ 36 While respondent’s characterization of anticipatory neglect presupposes a somewhat 

clever legal technicality, our review of this doctrine, and more importantly, of the cause 

before us, will not proceed in such a limited manner. To interpret anticipatory neglect as 

applicable only to children who have siblings would cause such a narrow interpretation of the 

concept as to render it absurd, something we will not do in the critical context of child 

custody cases. We are called here to ultimately address the best interest of Jordyn in light of 

the circumstances presented; no unsubstantiated legal maneuvering will hold us back. 

Therefore, we find, contrary to respondent’s insistence, that anticipatory neglect was properly 

applicable to the instant cause.

¶ 37 Even were this not so, we note, briefly but formidably, that the bases of the trial court’s 

adjudication of neglect and abuse here were injurious environment (neglect) and substantial 

risk of physical injury (abuse). From our review of the record, the trial court mentioned 

anticipatory neglect only one time in the midst of several continued appearances of the 

parties in court, doing so orally when it was discussing the instances in evidence in which 

respondent had engaged in confrontations with UCAN staff and peers which the court noted 

“could well have escalated into physical violence while the child was present.” The court 

never stated anticipatory neglect was the basis for its decision and, in fact, did not enter a 

finding of it; rather, it entered official findings of injurious environment and substantial risk 

of physical injury, which it explicitly specified were "the basis for the ruling." Accordingly, 

it is these latter findings we must review, not any asides regarding anticipatory neglect 

which, as the record shows, did not form the basis of the trial court’s decision at issue. 

¶ 38 In that regard, respondent continues her argument by asserting that, apart from any 

consideration of anticipatory neglect, the trial court’s determinations of neglect and abuse 
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23 

following the adjudicatory hearing cannot stand because the State failed to prove that Jordyn 

was neglected or abused. She cites evidence from the record indicating that Jordyn was 

never “injured or harmed in any way while in [her] custody,” that Jordyn was not bruised or 

malnourished, that Jordyn was otherwise properly cared for, and that she (respondent) was 

shown to be an attentive and nonthreatening mother to Jordyn. She further states that simply 

because she “was disrespectful, or verbally antagonistic, or engaged in several fights with 

peers that resulted in no harm, or threatened to put her hands on the caseworker, are not proof 

of neglect or abuse to Jordyn.” However, based on the record before us, we find that the 

State amply met its burden here of proving neglect and abuse by a preponderance of the 

evidence and, thus, that the trial court’s determinations were not against the manifest weight 

of the evidence. 

¶ 39 Respondent is correct that the evidence presented demonstrates, for all intents and 

purposes, that Jordyn, at least at this time, is a healthy and nourished child who has not been 

injured or harmed, that respondent has taken her to the doctor, and that respondent cares for 

her. But, this does not mean that Jordyn is not neglected and abused. Again, we have 

discussed at length that all that is needed to substantiate a finding of legal neglect and abuse 

under statutory terms is proof by a preponderance of the evidence of an injurious 

environment or a substantial risk of harm. See M.K., 271 Ill. App. 3d at 826; accord D.W., 

386 Ill. App. 3d at 138; T.B., 215 Ill. App. 3d at 1062-63; A.D.R., 186 Ill. App. 3d at 393-94. 

And, again, our courts have made clear that we need not wait until a child becomes a victim 

of physical abuse or permanent emotional damage before such a finding may be upheld. See 

M.K., 271 Ill. App. 3d at 826; accord D.W., 386 Ill. App. 3d at 138; T.B., 215 Ill. App. 3d at 

1062-63; A.D.R., 186 Ill. App. 3d at 393-94. 
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24 

¶ 40 Accordingly, while Jordyn's case is not one of the more dire this court has seen, it is no 

less critical. As the record shows, respondent herself was a made a ward of the court. She 

was taken from the custody of her mother Charletta and placed with her grandmother 

Antoinette, and later taken from Antoinette and placed in group homes. Both women were 

indicated in adjudication and dispositions orders from 2001 through 2011 for respondent and 

her several siblings, who were found to be neglected based on injurious environment and 

lack of necessary care, and abused based on substantial risk of physical injury. There was 

documentation that respondent's siblings were whipped with belts and extension cords and 

beaten so severely as to sustain multiple fractures and even permanent disability. There were 

further reports that unauthorized paramours were allowed by these women to live in their 

homes with respondent and her siblings. Despite her very own experience, and ignoring over 

a decade of neglect and abuse, respondent has repeatedly chosen to leave her infant daughter 

in Charletta's and Antoinette's homes, a choice that is clearly very dangerous. 

¶ 41 However, what is even more worrisome is the fact that respondent seems to believe that 

there is nothing wrong with her choice. For example, respondent testified that she did not 

know that Charletta had "issues going on" with DCFS and only found out about this after 

speaking to Flucas for the first time in January 2014; she also repeatedly testified, and 

expressed to others, that all she was doing was "simply taking her daughter to her 

grandmother's house," and she wanted her daughter to have a relationship with Charletta. 

And, with respect to Antoinette, she stated that she did not believe Antoinette's home was 

unsafe for Jordyn and all the incidents for which DCFS had indicated Antoinette were just 

"allegations." Yet, her testimony lies in direct contradiction to all the information presented 

in the record regarding Charletta and respondent's own comments to hospital staff during her 
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25 

many visits, wherein she explained that Antoinette had been physically abusive and had hit 

her and her siblings, for which she was removed from her care and custody. From all this, it 

is clear that there is a cosmic disconnect within respondent when it comes to Jordyn's safety–

either she does not care about it, or she is psychologically blinded by what she herself 

experienced that she cannot make appropriate decisions on this issue. Either way, this 

disconnect is clearly affecting her judgment at the cost of Jordyn's safety.

¶ 42 Respondent further takes issue here with the fact that the written safety plans involved in 

this cause were not submitted into evidence. Citing the trial court's comments about them 

being missing from evidence, she insists that the State could not have met its burden of 

proving that Jordyn was abused and neglected without them. We, just as the trial court here, 

acknowledge that much time was spent in this cause discussing the safety plans, namely, the 

initial plan from January 2014 and the subsequent plan from February 2014. However, we, 

again just as the trial court, find the fact they were not submitted into evidence to be 

irrelevant and not prohibitive of the decision rendered. First, the record makes clear that the 

trial court spoke at length with all the parties about why the safety plans could not be located; 

it listened to all the parties with respect to what occurred with the actual documents. The 

State was able to provide the court with two sections of the February safety plan, including 

respondent's signature. Second, there was much testimony regarding what was contained in 

the safety plans, particularly from Flucas, who testified at length about their formation, their 

content, and their explanation to respondent at the time she signed them, as well as from 

respondent, who disputed some of the requirements, including whether the plans specifically 

prohibited her from leaving Jordyn with Charletta and/or Antoinette. The trial court heard all 

this testimony and ultimately made credibility determinations in this regard–determinations 
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26 

that, without more, we are not at liberty to refute. See Sharena H., 366 Ill. App. 3d at 415; 

accord In re Marriage of Petraitis, 263 Ill. App. 3d 1022, 1035 (1993) (reviewing court "will 

not second guess the trial judge's determinations regarding credibility" of witnesses in child 

custody cases). Third, and most critically, the ultimate issue in this cause is not whether 

respondent violated the January or February safety plans, or even whether DCFS proceeded 

properly in taking custody of Jordyn immediately after the second safety plan was executed. 

It is whether the State met its burden in proving by a preponderance of the evidence that 

Jordyn is neglected due to an injurious environment and abused due to a substantial risk of 

physical injury. We, as did the trial court, find that the State has, indeed, met its burden here. 

That respondent wants to limit this discussion to technicalities, i.e., that as long as there was 

nothing specific in the safety plans regarding with whom she may leave Jordyn, she may 

leave her with whomever she chooses, will not be condoned. 

¶ 43 Finally, respondent's own history and conduct cannot be overlooked here. Again, she 

herself was, until recently, a ward of the court who was herself subjected to horrendous 

violence and abuse. Clearly, there are lingering issues within her, as she has chosen to return 

to those who inflicted that violence and abuse, and has chosen to bring her infant daughter 

with her. Respondent's medical records show repeated psychiatric hospitalizations during 

her earlier teen years before she became pregnant with Jordyn. These demonstrate anger 

issues and violence toward others–peers as well as those who hold positions of authority over 

her. Included therein are diagnoses of ADHD, impulse control disorder, bipolar disorder, 

reactive attachment disorder, and PTSD. She has been beaten and sexually violated at the 

hands of her very own family members, and she even attempted suicide. Presumably, these 
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27 

issues have not been treated, as she has refused to be psychologically evaluated since her last 

documented hospital stay in 2009. 

¶ 44 Once respondent became pregnant, these issues did not resolve themselves. In fact, they 

seemingly grew more intense. At this time, caseworker Blankenship was assigned to 

respondent. She immediately referred respondent for parenting and counseling services, 

assigned her a counselor and referred her to UCAN's psychologist for an evaluation. 

Respondent refused to participate in services. Once Jordyn was born, respondent reported 

feelings of postpartum depression and Blankenship again referred her to her counselor and 

UCAN's psychologist. Again, respondent refused to meet with the psychologist and was not 

meeting regularly with her therapist, either. Instead, respondent established a pattern of 

leaving placement with Jordyn for days at a time, returning without the infant, staying the 

night, and then leaving again for several days, while refusing to tell site personnel where she 

was going or where Jordyn was. She also refused to provide any information regarding who 

was caring for Jordyn, including the infant's father. Respondent grew more combative when 

she was told she would have to report to placement with Jordyn once every 24 hours. 

Eventually, UCAN personnel determined that respondent should be moved from its Cermak 

site to its Clyde site due to her several, and repeated, aggressive altercations with peers and 

staff–some which became physical and took place in Jordyn's presence. Respondent's move 

led to the incident with Blankenship, during which respondent threatened her with physical 

violence to the point that Blankenship had to be removed from respondent's case for safety 

reasons. Following her move to the Clyde site, the number of altercations in which 

respondent was involved decreased. However, again, her issues were not resolved. As her 

new caseworker, Cole, described, almost all of respondent's service referrals were still open. 
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28 

She still refused to be psychologically evaluated, and she did not participate in parenting 

services and personal therapy, as ordered. She was enrolled in school and UCAN's life skills 

program, but she was not attending either one. Even at the time of the trial court proceedings 

in this matter, respondent had not maintained consistent participation in, or even begun, her 

assigned services. 

¶ 45 It has been said that it takes a village to raise a child. Unfortunately, the village 

respondent has chosen to help her raise Jordyn is one dominated by serious potential violence 

and meriting great concern. In addition, she has made this choice knowingly, having herself 

experienced this exact same violence in her own past and in spite of all the redemptive 

chances and services repeatedly offered to her via UCAN and DCFS. She has elected not to 

trust them with the safety of her child and, inexplicably, to instead trust those who the record 

shows have certifiably neglected and abused children in the past. This poor decision making, 

coupled with her consistent failure to participate in services as assigned to her, sufficiently 

support the trial court's decision that Jordyn is neglected due to an injurious environment and 

abused due to a substantial risk of physical injury. 

¶ 46 We would note that the disposition order in this cause seeks a return home of Jordyn to 

respondent in 12 months. This gives respondent 12 months to come to terms with her issues, 

to seriously begin the completion of necessary services, and to put herself on the correct path 

toward proper decision making when it comes to Jordyn's safety and overall care. We 

sincerely hope she chooses to do so. 

¶ 47 CONCLUSION

¶ 48 Accordingly, for all the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. 

¶ 49 Affirmed.