Present: Carrico, C.J., Lacy, Keenan, Koontz, and Kinser, 

JJ., and Compton and Stephenson, Senior Justices 

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VICTOR ALAN MOTLEY 

 OPINION BY 

v. Record No. 000417 CHIEF JUSTICE HARRY L. CARRICO 

 September 15, 2000 

VIRGINIA STATE BAR 

FROM THE VIRGINIA STATE BAR DISCIPLINARY BOARD 

 In this appeal of right, we review an order of the 

Virginia State Bar Disciplinary Board (the Disciplinary 

Board) involving Victor Alan Motley (Motley), a Richmond 

attorney. Dated November 5, 1999, the order imposed upon 

Motley an eighteen-month license suspension for mishandling 

a real estate transaction and mismanaging a trust account. 

Finding no error in the order, we will affirm. 

19 1. The Real Estate Transaction

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21 Background

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 The real estate transaction in question involved an 

oral contract for the sale and purchase of a house and lot 

in the City of Richmond, entered into in February of 1996 

between Evelyn J. Davis (Davis),1 the seller, and Rebecca 

Gray (Gray), the purchaser. Motley’s conduct with respect 

to the real estate transaction implicates DR 6-101 of the 

Virginia Code of Professional Responsibility, which was in 

1

 Evelyn Davis is also referred to in the record as Evelyn 

Meade and Evelyn Steele. Because the Disciplinary Board in 
effect at all times pertinent to this case.2 DR 6-101 dealt 

with competence and promptness and a lawyer’s duty to keep 

a client reasonably informed.

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 Retained by a realtor to act as settlement attorney in 

the transaction, Motley concedes he represented “both the 

seller . . . and the buyer.” Before consulting with 

Motley, Davis and Gray had agreed that Davis would sell the 

property to Gray for $35,000. Gray agreed to pay $4,000 in 

cash at closing and assume an existing deed of trust held 

by Suncoast Savings and Loan Association, FSA (Suncoast) 

for the balance. 

 Motley undertook the drafting of the necessary 

documents and the closing of the transaction. Closing was 

scheduled for February 15, 1996. Shortly before that date, 

Gray announced that she could pay only $2,000 at closing. 

Davis agreed to accept the $2,000, provided that Gray 

execute a deed of trust and note in favor of Davis to 

secure payment of the remaining $2,000 by May 15, 1996. 

its order referred to her as Davis, we will use the same 

name in this opinion. 

2

 Effective January 1, 2000, the Virginia Code of 

Professional Responsibility was replaced by the Virginia 

Rules of Professional Conduct. 

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 The subjects of competence, promptness, and a duty to 

inform are now contained in Rules 1.1, 1.3(a), and 

1.4(a),(b), and (c) of the new Rules of Professional 

Conduct, respectively. 

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 On February 15, Motley, Davis, and Gray met to close 

the transaction. Gray had no funds with her but stated she 

would pay $1,000 the next day and make another payment of 

$1,000 in a few days. The parties signed the closing 

papers, but agreed that the deed would not be recorded 

until the first payment of $1,000 was made. Davis gave 

Gray the keys to the house and agreed she could move in.

 On February 17, Gray gave Motley a non-certified check 

for $1,000 drawn on the account of a third party in an outof-state bank. Motley told Davis the check was not 

certified, but she agreed that the deed could be recorded. 

 Motley deposited the $1,000 check in his personal 

account, and the bank returned the check for “[n]ot 

sufficient funds.” Motley deposited in his trust account 

the proceeds of a personal loan in the amount of $3,026.27. 

He wrote trust account checks payable to his own order for 

a total of $2,300, leaving a balance of $726.27 of personal 

funds in the trust account. In addition, he wrote three 

trust account checks totaling $550 relative to the DavisGray transaction, including a check to Davis for $319.80, 

representing what Motley said was her part of the $1,000 

check that was returned for insufficient funds. These 

checks were not paid from funds provided by Gray but from 

Motley’s personal funds. 

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 Gray took possession of the property in late February 

or early March of 1996. In May 1996, Motley informed Davis 

that he had received from Gray a certified check for 

$1,500. Motley also told Davis that she owed him an 

additional $200 because Gray had only made good to the 

extent of $800 on the $1,000 check that was returned for 

“[n]ot sufficient funds.” After consulting another 

attorney, Davis agreed to accept the check, but she refused 

Motley’s demand that she pay him the extra $200. Although 

Davis should have received a total of $3,373.23 in cash 

from the sale of her property, she received only $1,819.80.

 Two documents Motley prepared and had Davis sign at 

the closing formed part of the basis for the Disciplinary 

Board’s finding that Motley had violated DR 6-101. The two 

documents were a promissory note dated February 15, 1996, 

and made payable to Gray for $3,366.78 and a deed of trust 

purportedly securing payment of the note. According to 

Motley, these documents were ostensibly designed to give 

Gray “security” for a debt in the sum of $3,366.78 Davis 

owed to a finance company for windows she had installed in 

the house at some point in time prior to the closing.

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 The deed of trust that was to provide this “security” is 

not part of the record, but the evidence shows it did not 

describe any property that was to stand as security for 

payment of the promissory note Davis signed in favor of 

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 Also forming part of the basis for the Disciplinary 

Board’s finding of a violation of DR 6-101 was Motley’s 

alleged failure to comply promptly with instructions of 

Suncoast to forward documentation necessary to complete 

Gray’s assumption of the existing deed of trust on the 

property. As late as March 21, 1996, Motley had not sent 

Suncoast “Proof of Insurance coverage and paid receipt.” 

Apparently, Motley never did send the information, but Gray 

did. 

10 2. Trust Account Problems

11 Background

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 Motley’s questionable handling of his trust account in 

the Davis-Gray transaction led to a broader investigation 

into his management of the account. Motley’s conduct with 

respect to the trust account implicates former DR 9-102, 

which dealt with preserving the identity of funds and 

property of a client, and DR 9-103, which prescribed 

record-keeping requirements.5

 Lacy O. Campbell, a State Bar investigator, made an 

analysis of Motley’s records for the period July 1, 1995, 

Gray. Apparently, it was Motley’s intent that property 

Davis obtained at some time in the future would later on be 

included in the deed of trust. 

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 The subjects of preserving identity and keeping records 

are now contained in Rule 1.15 of the new Rules of 

Professional Conduct. 

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through June 30, 1996. The analysis revealed numerous 

deficiencies in Motley’s record-keeping and accounting 

practices. We will detail the results of the analysis 

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 On June 5, 1996, Davis filed with the Virginia State 

Bar a complaint against Motley for his handling of the real 

estate transaction. On June 25, 1999, the Third District 

Subcommittee, Section Two, certified to the Disciplinary 

Board charges of misconduct against Motley relating both to 

his handling of the Davis-Gray real estate transaction and 

the management of his trust account. On July 8, 1999, the 

State Bar served Motley with the Subcommittee’s 

certification. On September 24, 1999, the Disciplinary 

Board held a hearing in the matter, and by order dated 

November 5, 1999, suspended Motley’s license to practice 

law for eighteen months. 

17 3. Issues on Appeal

18 A. Motions to Dismiss

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1. Delayed Notice

 Motley argues that the Disciplinary Board erred in 

denying his motion to dismiss the charges against him on 

the ground the charges were before the Disciplinary Board 

in violation of Part 6, Section IV, Paragraph 13 

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(B)(5)(c)(ii)(c) and Subsection (12) of the Rules of this 

Court. Subsection (12) contains the pertinent language: 

If the Subcommittee has elected to certify the 

Complaint . . . to the Board, it will promptly mail to 

the Clerk of the Disciplinary System a statement of 

the certified charges which shall include sufficient 

facts to reasonably notify Bar Counsel and the 

Respondent of the basis for such certification and the 

Disciplinary Rules alleged to have been violated. 

 Motley points out that the Third District Subcommittee 

determined on July 17, 1998, to certify charges of 

misconduct against him but did not send the certification 

to the Clerk of the Disciplinary System until June 25, 

1999, some eleven months later, and he was not served until 

July 8, 1999. This delay, Motley says, “violated 

procedural requirements under the [Rules] and prejudiced 

[his] right to a fair and prompt hearing.” 

 Motley does not explain, however, what prejudice he 

suffered as a result of the delay. In the absence of a 

showing of prejudice resulting to Motley from the failure 

to comply with the procedural requirement of prompt mailing 

contained in Subsection (12), dismissal of the charges 

24 against him would be inappropriate. See Jamborsky v. 

Baskins, 247 Va. 506, 511, 442 S.E.2d 636, 638-39 (1994) 

(delay of circuit court in complying with procedural 

requirement in juvenile transfer statute does not divest 

court of jurisdiction if no prejudice results); 

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Horne v. Commonwealth, 230 Va. 512, 518-19, 339 S.E.2d 186, 

191 (1986) (delay in taking accused before magistrate not 

ground for excluding evidence without resulting prejudice); 

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Potter v. Commonwealth, 10 Va. App. 113, 116, 390 S.E.2d 

196, 198 (1990) (delay in filing habitual offender 

information not ground for dismissal in absence of showing 

of prejudice resulting from the delay). 

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2. General Investigation of Trust Account

 Motley also moved for dismissal of the charges against 

him on the ground the enlargement of the investigation of 

misconduct from the original scope of the Davis-Gray real 

estate closing to a general investigation of his trust 

account “without due cause” violated his rights to due 

process and equal protection of the law under the 

Fourteenth Amendment. He was denied due process and equal 

protection, Motley says, “in that Bar Counsel exercised 

undue discretion by converting an investigation of a 

complaint relating to a single real estate closing into a 

general perusal of an attorney's trust account.” 

 Part 6, Section IV, Paragraph 13(B)(3) of the Rules of 

this Court provides in pertinent part that the authority of 

Bar Counsel to investigate and prosecute complaints 

includes the authority to examine the financial books 

and records maintained by an attorney . . . including, 

without limitation, any and all trust accounts . . . 

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maintained by the attorney . . . . Bar Counsel may 

also examine an attorney’s trust account whenever Bar 

Counsel reasonably believes that the trust account may 

not be in compliance with the . . . Code of 

Professional Responsibility. 

 Although Motley’s argument is not clear, he does not 

appear to attack the facial validity of the Rule quoted 

9 above. In any event, the Rule is presumed to be valid, see

Pulliam v. Coastal Emergency Servs., Inc., 257 Va. 1, 9, 

509 S.E.2d 307, 311 (1999), and Motley has not demonstrated 

in what manner or to what extent it suffers from facial 

invalidity. Accordingly, we will consider only the asapplied aspect of Motley’s attack upon the Rule, consisting 

of his argument that the investigation was transformed from 

its original limited scope into a general investigation of 

his trust account without due cause. 

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 In Seventh Dist. Comm. v. Gunter, 212 Va. 278, 183 

S.E.2d 713 (1971), we said: 

A proceeding to discipline an attorney is not a 

criminal proceeding and the purpose is not to punish 

him but to protect the public. It is a special 

proceeding, civil and disciplinary in nature, and of a 

summary character. . . . Being an informal proceeding 

it is only necessary that the attorney be informed of 

the nature of the charge preferred against him and is 

given an opportunity to answer. 

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Id. at 284, 183 S.E.2d at 717. 

 We are of opinion that Motley has failed to 

demonstrate that he suffered a deprivation of due process 

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or equal protection rights as a result of the broadened 

investigation itself or from the admission into evidence of 

certain exhibits obtained in the investigation.

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6 He was 

fully informed of the nature of the charges stemming from 

the broadened investigation, and he was given ample 

opportunity to answer. Furthermore, Bar Counsel had due 

cause from the investigation of Motley’s trust account in 

connection with the Davis-Gray real estate transaction for 

a reasonable belief that the account may not have been in 

compliance with the Rules in other respects as well. 

 Bar Counsel would have learned from the investigation 

into the Davis-Gray real estate transaction that Motley 

deposited proceeds from a personal loan into his trust 

account and deposited a check from a client (Gray) into his 

personal account. Indeed, Motley conceded as much during 

the proceedings below.7

 Former DR 9-102(A), styled “Preserving Identity of 

Funds and Property of a Client,” provided that all funds 

received or held by a lawyer on behalf of a client residing 

6

 Motley contends that the Disciplinary Board erred in 

admitting into evidence two exhibits over his objection 

that they were obtained in violation of his rights of due 

process and equal protection under the Fourteenth 

Amendment. 

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 Motley’s counsel conceded these facts in a letter dated 

December 9, 1996, to Campbell, the investigator for the 

State Bar. 

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in this state shall be deposited in a trust account and no 

funds belonging to the lawyer shall be deposited therein 

except under circumstances not pertinent here.

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Rule and the information disclosed by the investigation 

into the Davis-Gray real estate transaction, we find no 

abuse of discretion in Bar Counsel’s broadening of the 

scope of the investigation into Motley’s trust account. 

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B. Continuance

 Motley obtained a summons and had it served on Gray to 

appear as a witness at the hearing before the Disciplinary 

Board. Gray failed to appear, and Motley moved for a 

continuance. The Board denied the motion, stating that 

“the panel does not believe that Ms. Gray’s testimony would 

be material.” 

 Motley argues that Gray’s testimony was material and 

that it was reversible error for the Disciplinary Board to 

refuse to continue the case when she failed to appear. 

However, Motley’s counsel conceded during argument on the 

motion for a continuance that he had “never spoken to Ms. 

Gray,” and he even said “[s]he’s adverse.” Therefore, 

 

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service or other charges of the financial institution may 

be deposited in the trust account and that funds belonging 

in part to a client and part to the lawyer must be 

deposited in the account but the portion belonging to the 

lawyer must be withdrawn promptly after it is due. 

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Motley was hardly in a position to assert the materiality 

of Gray’s testimony or to claim prejudice from her failure 

to appear. 

 Even so, with the Disciplinary Board’s permission, 

Motley’s counsel made a proffer of what Gray would say “if 

[she] was here to testify.” Counsel said that Gray would 

corroborate Davis that “both agreed . . . that [with 

respect to the indebtedness Davis owed for the windows] 

they were going to have this note and hold it in good faith 

[and] that when it was over and there was no more risk to 

[Gray] as being the new property owner, then it would be 

torn up.” 

 However, assuming Gray would have testified in this 

manner, the testimony would have been completely beside the 

point. The crucial question is not whether Davis and Gray 

agreed to have a note. The question is whether Motley was 

incompetent in fashioning the arrangement between the 

parties in the manner that he did. We will deal with that 

question shortly, but it suffices to say at this point 

that, even had Gray testified as Motley says she would, the 

outcome of the inquiry into Motley’s competence would be 

the same. Hence, Gray’s testimony would not have been 

material. 

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corroborate Motley “about insurance being kept in place 

that [Davis] had on the property.” This related to 

Motley’s alleged failure, noted 

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supra, promptly to furnish 

“Proof of Insurance coverage and paid receipt” to Suncoast 

in connection with Gray’s assumption of the existing deed 

of trust on the property. Motley seeks to excuse his 

failure by saying that Gray and Davis “agreed that Davis’ 

existing hazard insurance would remain in force and[,] 

therefore, it would not be necessary to send a new hazard 

insurance policy to the lender.” But the fact that the 

parties agreed a new policy would not be obtained does not 

excuse Motley’s failure to furnish proof to Suncoast that 

the existing policy would remain in force and that the 

premium was current. Hence, Gray’s testimony would not 

have been material on this point either. 

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have been granted was a matter for the exercise of 

discretion on the part of the Disciplinary Board. Under 

the circumstances, we find no abuse of discretion in the 

denial of Motley’s motion for a continuance. 

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C. Recusal

 Motley sought to have two members of the Disciplinary 

Board recuse themselves from hearing the present proceeding 

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because they had participated in a previous disciplinary 

matter involving Motley that, at the time of the hearing, 

was before this Court on appeal. Motley argued that the 

two members became privy to information as a result of the 

prior proceeding that was inadmissible in the present case 

because the prior proceeding was on appeal and thus not 

final. The two members refused to step down, stating they 

felt “very strongly” that the “facts . . . raised” by 

Motley would not affect their impartiality and fairness in 

the present case. 

 Motley makes the same argument on appeal that he made 

before the Disciplinary Board. In addition, he says that 

“[i]t was highly prejudicial to have two panel members who 

had personal involvement with past disciplinary matters 

relating to [him]” and that “[i]t constituted error to deny 

[his] motion for [recusal].” 

 We disagree. In the first place, we think a member of 

the Disciplinary Board is subject to the same rules 

regarding recusal as are applicable to a trial judge, and 

Motley tacitly concedes this point. The fact that a trial 

judge is “‘familiar with a party and his legal difficulties 

through prior judicial hearings . . . does not 

automatically or inferentially raise the issue of bias.’” 

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73, 299 S.E.2d 863, 867 (1983) (quoting Barry v. Sigler, 

373 F.2d 835, 836 (8th Cir. 1967)). 

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involves the exercise of discretion. Deahl, 224 Va. at 

672, 299 S.E.2d at 867. Nothing in this record indicates 

that the two members of the Disciplinary Board abused their 

discretion in refusing to recuse themselves. 

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v. Commonwealth, 227 Va. 124, 141, 314 S.E.2d 371, 382 

(1984) (no abuse of discretion for trial judge to refuse to 

recuse himself because he had presided over previous trial 

in which defendant cursed him). 

12 D. Sufficiency of Evidence

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1. The Real Estate Transaction

 Motley’s conduct in the real estate transaction 

implicates former DR 6-101, which was styled “Competence 

and Promptness.” DR 6-101(A) provided that a lawyer “shall 

undertake representation only in matters in which [he or 

she] can act with competence.” DR 6-101(B) required that a 

lawyer “shall attend promptly to matters undertaken for a 

client,” and DR 6-101(C) required a lawyer to “keep a 

client reasonably informed about matters in which the 

lawyer’s services are being rendered.” 

 In discussing the Disciplinary Board’s finding that 

his conduct in handling the Davis-Gray real estate 

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transaction constituted incompetence, Motley reminds us 

that a violation of disciplinary rules must be established 

by clear proof, 

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Blue v. Seventh Dist. Comm., 220 Va. 1056, 

1062, 265 S.E.2d 753, 757 (1980), and he maintains that the 

finding of incompetence against him is not supported by 

such proof. Motley says “[t]he evidence is that Davis and 

[Gray] agreed to the transaction and Motley was carrying 

out their requests.” 

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 If, as is apparent, Motley is content to rest his 

defense against the use of the disputed promissory note and 

deed of trust upon the proposition that Davis and Gray 

agreed to the transaction and Motley was merely carrying 

out their requests, the defense simply will not suffice. 

What Motley permitted Davis to sign does not even conform 

to what he says the parties agreed to. 

 Motley says that “the parties agreed that Davis would 

execute a deed of trust note in the amount of $3,366.78 to 

protect [Gray] in the event a lien was placed on the 

property due to Davis’ default on the debt” and that Gray 

“would destroy the note when the debt for the windows was 

satisfied.” But nothing in the note Davis signed makes its 

payment conditional upon the placing of a lien on the 

property nor does the note contain any provision requiring 

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Gray to destroy it when the debt for the windows was 

satisfied. 

 Rather, the note Motley permitted Davis to sign is a 

fully negotiable instrument dated February 15, 1996, 

containing an unconditional promise to pay the fixed sum of 

$3,366.78 in monthly installments of $98 each beginning 

March 1, 1996, with payment in full due June 1, 1998. The 

note not only created an indebtedness requiring Davis to 

pay Gray $3,366.78 when Davis owed Gray no money at all, 

but it also subjected Davis to the danger of double 

liability if the note found its way into the hands of a 

holder in due course. 

 Furthermore, it is obvious from a reading of Davis’s 

testimony that she had no idea what she was getting herself 

into when she signed the note. She was asked by a member 

of the Disciplinary Board why she “signed a note promising 

to pay Ms. Gray money.” She replied, “I wasn’t paying Ms. 

Gray money. I was continuing to pay that bill [to the 

finance company].” Asked again why she signed the note, 

she said “[b]ecause that was my bill. It was a bill that I 

had created.” Asked if she understood that the note 

“doesn’t say” that she “really didn’t have to pay Ms. Gray” 

but she “had to pay somebody else,” she replied, “[n]o, I 

didn’t.” 

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 It is also obvious that Motley himself neither 

understood the nature of the situation he created for Davis 

nor appreciated the potential harm she could have suffered. 

A member of the Disciplinary Board asked Motley whether he 

had any concerns “that the note might be negotiated with a 

holder in due course,” and he replied, “I did, but you can 

question anything, but can you win on it?” 

 Motley concedes Davis was his client. As a result of 

that relationship, he owed her the duty to draft closing 

papers that accurately reflected the conditional nature of 

the liability she had agreed to undertake in favor of Gray. 

He also owed her the duty, in any event, to explain to her 

the true nature and potential consequences of what he 

actually prepared for her to sign and to advise her against 

signing anything to her prejudice. If this advice had 

created a conflict of interest because of his dual role in 

representing both Davis and Gray, then it would have been 

his duty to withdraw from representation of both. 

 Motley’s failure to prepare papers conforming to the 

conditional nature of the liability Davis had agreed to 

undertake constituted a violation of his duty under DR 6-

101(A)(1) to “act with competence,” and his failure to 

advise her of the true nature and potential consequences of 

what he actually prepared is both incompetence under DR 6-

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101(A)(1) and a violation of his duty under DR 6-101(C) to 

“keep a client reasonably informed about matters in which 

the lawyer’s services are being rendered.” And we think 

all these violations have been established by clear proof. 

 We also think the evidence clearly and convincingly 

established that Motley violated DR 6-101(B) by failing to 

“attend promptly” to the matter of forwarding to Suncoast 

“Proof of Insurance coverage and paid receipt.” As noted 

previously, Motley attempts to excuse this failure by 

saying that, because Davis and Gray agreed to continue the 

existing policy, there was no need to send the trust holder 

a new policy. However, the trust holder did not require 

proof of a new policy but only proof that there was 

“Insurance coverage,” a requirement that could have been 

satisfied easily with proof that the existing policy 

remained in force. And Motley clearly did not furnish that 

proof. 

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(a) DR 9-102(A) and (B) — Preserving Identity of Funds

 Motley argues there is no clear and convincing 

evidence that he put client funds into his personal 

account. However, as noted previously, Motley conceded 

before the Disciplinary Board that he deposited the $1,000 

check he received from Gray into his personal account. He 

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says now that he “inadvertently” made this deposit. Also, 

he argues that because the $1,000 check was subsequently 

returned for insufficient funds and a check is not legal 

tender, no client funds were actually deposited into his 

personal account. This is an ingenious argument, but 

lacking in merit. Furthermore, the argument ignores the 

fact, also conceded by Motley, that he deposited $3,026.27 

of personal funds into his trust account, which is likewise 

prohibited by DR 9-102(A) except in circumstances not 

pertinent here. 

 Motley also argues there is no clear and convincing 

evidence that he failed to keep a record of client funds 

coming into his possession, as required by DR 9-102(B)(3). 

He says his records are incomplete but do indicate 

“whenever [he] deposited client funds into his account.” 

However, the record shows clearly that Motley failed to 

maintain a subsidiary ledger card or an equivalent for the 

Davis-Gray real estate transaction, as required by DR 9-

103(A). 

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(b) DR 9-103 – Record-Keeping Requirements

 The Disciplinary Board found that Motley had violated 

DRs 9-102(A), -102(B)(3), -103(A)(1),(2), and (3), and -

103(B)(2),(3),(4),(5), and (6), all relating to recordkeeping and accounting procedures. Motley says that he had 

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trust ledger cards, bank statements, and other records 

“that were used to account for client funds deposited in 

trust and disbursements” which, “[a]lthough . . . 

incomplete,” did provide “a good faith attempt to account 

for the deposit and disbursement of client funds held in 

trust.” 

 However, the analysis made of Motley’s records by 

Campbell, the State Bar investigator, for the period July 

1, 1995, through June 30, 1996, disclosed numerous 

instances of incompleteness in subsidiary ledgers and cash 

disbursement journals. Similarly, cash receipts journals 

or equivalent records failed to provide identification of 

the sources of funds deposited. Also, Motley would deposit 

one amount but “[h]is ledger denote[d] another amount.” 

 Campbell found that “Motley was out of trust, on 

numerous occasions, on each of [numerous] clients.” A 

“look at . . . the checks that were pending, and . . . how 

much money was in the checking account [showed] there was 

not enough money to cover the checks.” For example, with 

respect to the handling of a settlement for one client, 

there were insufficient funds in the trust account to cover 

checks written on the settlement on thirty-two different 

occasions between August 15, 1995, and November 13, 1995, 

and, for another client, there were insufficient funds to 

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cover checks written on the settlement on at least twentyseven separate occasions between October 19, 1995, and 

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F. Mitigating Circumstances and Excessiveness of Sanction

 Motley argues that the eighteen-month license 

suspension “imposed by the [Disciplinary] Board was 

excessive and contrary to law because the Board failed to 

consider mitigating evidence.” According to Motley, the 

Disciplinary Board failed to consider evidence that he 

engaged in no deliberate conduct; did not violate any court 

order; did not steal any client funds or cause harm to any 

client; no longer handles real estate matters; and 

acknowledged the need for improvement in the handling of 

his trust accounts, has instituted improved accounting 

procedures, and is willing to make other necessary 

improvements. 

 It is true, as Motley says, that neither in the 

Disciplinary Board’s oral decision nor in its written order 

is there any mention of mitigating evidence. However, we 

are aware of no requirement that the Board state that it 

considered mitigating evidence when announcing a decision 

or issuing an order that disciplines an attorney. And a 

failure to state that mitigating evidence was considered 

does not mean that it was not considered. 

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 Furthermore, we are of opinion that the sanction 

imposed by the Disciplinary Board was not excessive even in 

light of the mitigating evidence. Motley’s mishandling of 

the Davis-Gray real estate transaction and his 

mismanagement of his trust account constitute serious 

violations of the disciplinary rules, justifying, when 

coupled with his disciplinary record,

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serious disciplinary treatment. 

 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the order of 

the Disciplinary Board. 

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Affirmed. 

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 In 1986, the Third District Committee dismissed a 

complaint against Motley with terms; in 1991, the Committee 

imposed a private reprimand upon Motley with terms; and in 

1992, the Committee dismissed another complaint against 

Motley with terms. 

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