If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to 

revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

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S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N

C O U R T O F A P P E A L S

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

UNPUBLISHED

March 10, 2022

v No. 354783

Kent Circuit Court

MICHAEL CHARLES LEWIS, LC No. 18-010076-FH

Defendant-Appellant.

Before: RIORDAN, P.J., and K. F. KELLY and SWARTZLE, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

Defendant, Michael Charles Lewis, appeals by right his jury trial convictions of 

embezzlement by an agent or trustee of more than $20,00 but less than $50,000, and using a 

computer to commit a crime. Finding no errors warranting reversal, we affirm.

I. BASIC FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

In 2017, Bradley Brussow and defendant met with representatives from Courtesy Dodge,

an automobile dealership, to discuss a potential opportunity to have Brussow’s company, Prestige 

Energy Products, LLC (“Prestige Energy”),1install new lighting at the dealership. According to 

Brussow, defendant, who was Prestige Energy’s sales manager, prepared the documents and 

signed the contract on behalf of Prestige Energy.2 Courtesy Dodge paid Prestige Energy 75% of 

 

1 Brussow owned Prestige Energy, which he formed in 2017 as a division of Prestige Products, 

LLC, to provide LED lighting for commercial buildings. 

2 Although admitted at trial, defendant did not provide this Court with a copy of the contract 

between Prestige Energy and Courtesy Dodge. It is the appellant’s duty to provide this Court with 

all exhibits offered into evidence in his possession, MCR 7.210(C), and this Court may choose to 

deem an issue waived for failure to provide a necessary record, People v Callon, 256 Mich App 

312, 332; 662 NW2d 501 (2003). However, we may disregard the appellant’s waiver when the

missing record is not actually necessary for the Court’s review. See Leelanau Co Sheriff v Kiessel, 
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the contract price before the work began, which was deposited into Prestige Energy’s bank 

account.

The project stalled a few months after the work began, causing Robert Jordan, a parts 

manager for Courtesy Dodge, to contact defendant. Jordan was told by defendant that defendant 

and Brussow had a falling out and defendant’s company, Prestige NRGY Products, LLC (“Prestige 

NRGY”), would complete the work. Jordan agreed. After the work was completed, Paul Huiber, 

Courtesy Dodge’s Chief Financial Officer, issued a final check for $23,826.26 to Prestige NRGY

after defendant sent him payment instructions and a W-9. Defendant never presented the check to 

Prestige Energy, instead depositing it with Prestige NRGY. After a few months of waiting for 

final payment on the contract, Brussow contacted Huiber, who informed him that Courtesy Dodge 

had issued the final check to Prestige NRGY. 

Criminal charges were subsequently brought against defendant. After a jury trial, 

defendant was convicted of embezzlement and using a computer to commit a crime. This appeal 

followed.

II. STANDARDS OF REVIEW

This Court reviews de novo whether a criminal defendant was denied his constitutional 

right to present a defense. People v Unger, 278 Mich App 210, 247; 749 NW2d 272 (2008). This 

Court reviews for an abuse of discretion a trial court’s decision to admit or exclude evidence, 

People v Jambor, 273 Mich App 477, 481; 729 NW2d 569 (2007), as well as a trial court’s rulings

during closing arguments, People v Lacalamita, 286 Mich App 467, 472; 780 NW2d 311 (2009). 

An abuse of discretion occurs when the trial court’s decision falls outside the range of principled 

outcomes. People v Babcock, 469 Mich 247, 269; 666 NW2d 231 (2003).

III. DISCUSSION

Defendant first argues that the trial court denied him a right to present his defense when it 

sustained the prosecutor’s objection during defendant’s closing argument. Specifically, defendant 

asserts the trial court deprived him of the opportunity to argue that he lacked the required specific 

intent to defraud Brussow when it sustained the objection. We disagree.

During closing arguments, defense counsel argued:

Now when we’re talking about—you’ve heard the word contract over and 

over and over. So a contract is an agreement between these two businesses which 

is Courtesy and originally with Prestige Energy Products. What that contract does 

is it binds those two parties to perform as agreed in that written document. When 

Courtesy decided to change course and have Mike’s other company, Prestige 

NRGY finish this job, at that point maybe Courtesy was in breach of the contract 

 

297 Mich App 285, 289; 824 NW2d 576 (2012). Because the substance of the contract is not at 

issue on appeal—defendant argues that Brussow was not able to lay a proper foundation for its 

admission—we will review the issue.
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to Brad. I think it’s very marginal at best, but that’s the recourse. Brad could file 

a breach of contract suit against Courtesy and say, hey, wait a minute, that was my 

contract, you need to pay that $23,000 to me. That’s the remedy. But instead, he’s 

done a roundabout here and we’re before the court—

The prosecutor objected and, after a bench conference, the trial court instructed the jury as 

follows:

[T]o the extent there’s an argument to you that the remedies here are civil, that you 

can go out and sue somebody, whatever, and because of that there’s not a criminal 

matter involved, what I’m instructing you here is that the prosecuting attorneys 

make a decision about whether to charge someone criminally or not. And you can 

have situations where you can have something that may be both a civil wrong that 

you could sue somebody about. There could also be a criminal wrong that involves 

some type of illegal criminal behavior. It happens all the time. But just because 

you have one that’s civil doesn’t mean you can’t have a criminal situation involving 

the same dispute.

Now the bottom line here is the prosecutor made the decision to file criminal 

charges against the defendant. Whether there’s a civil claim out there or not really 

isn’t all that relevant. You have to determine whether the elements of the crime of 

embezzlement as charged with the use of a computer as charged have been proven 

beyond a reasonable doubt by the prosecuting attorney. And if you believe that 

they have, you would typically find the defendant guilty. If you believe that he

hasn’t proven all of the elements of these charges against the defendant, you would 

find him not guilty.

You should not, however, just make up your mind that because there’s a 

civil remedy this is meaningless, why are we here. We’re here because criminal 

charges have been filed, and your function as a jury is to determine whether the 

elements of these criminal charges have or have not been met, and that’s the law.

After the trial court sustained the prosecutor’s objection and after the trial court issued the 

above instruction, defense counsel argued:

Well, if Mike’s intent was to take as much money as he can, why would he 

direct [Joe Lufkin] to pay a supplier and why would he leave $6,000 in the account, 

because he could have just deposited the entire amount, put it in his pocket and said 

nothing to anyone else. And the reason is because this was a legitimate job for 

Prestige NRGY, and it was handled legitimately.

* * *

No matter how much you spin this and try to piece different pieces together 

here, the fact is they cannot show Mike intended to embezzle this money. And the 

reason they can’t do it is because he told Robert Jordan exactly what was going on. 

And if he wanted the job done by him, it was going to be by Prestige NRGY. And 

if he wanted the job to be done by Prestige Energy Products with Brad, that’s fine. 
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And Robert said, I want you, Mike Lewis and Prestige NRGY to get the job done, 

not Brad Brussow. There’s no intent. He told him. He wanted to go to the general 

manager and owner and tell them exactly, and he was directed not to by the 

Courtesy person in charge of this.

Rooted in the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, criminal 

defendants have a constitutionally guaranteed right to a “meaningful opportunity to present a 

complete defense.” Holmes v South Carolina, 547 US 319, 324; 126 S Ct 1727; 164 L Ed 2d 503, 

509 (2006) (quotation marks and citation omitted). “Instructional errors that directly affect a 

defendant’s theory of defense can infringe a defendant’s due process right to present a defense.” 

People v Kurr, 253 Mich App 317, 326-327; 654 NW2d 651 (2003).

As the record demonstrates, defense counsel continued to make the argument, after the trial 

court sustained the prosecutor’s objection, that defendant lacked the specific intent necessary to 

convict him of embezzlement. He argued that defendant was entitled to the money, highlighting 

that, according to Jordan, defendant was forthright about his plans to have Prestige NRGY 

complete the job. Defendant has not adequately explained how the objection regarding the 

alternative remedy of a civil suit relates in any way to his defense that he lacked the necessary 

intent, which relates to defendant’s state of mind during the commission of the crime. Whether 

the prosecutor brought criminal charges or whether Brussow filed a civil suit has no bearing on 

whether defendant intended to defraud Brussow.

Defendant also argues that, by sustaining the objection, the trial court denied him the 

opportunity to challenge Brussow’s credibility. This argument also lacks merit. The record 

demonstrates that Brussow’s credibility was a primary component of defendant’s case-in-chief. 

Defendant extensively questioned Brussow about Prestige Energy’s finances and about the 

business relationship between Brussow and defendant. Moreover, during closing argument, 

defense counsel argued:

Now keep in mind that Prestige NRGY was a business that was operating 

before this job was done, and this business operates today. It’s a legitimate 

business. This is an LED lighting business that Mike is the CEO of because Mike 

has expertise in LED lighting and Brad doesn’t. And Brad realized that he’s the 

goose that laid the golden egg, and he wanted to force him to stay with him, but he 

didn’t. He left, and that’s why Brad is mad, and that’s why Brad is motivated, that’s 

why Brad has done what he’s done to him by having these charges brought.

It is, therefore, disingenuous for defendant to claim that he was deprived of his opportunity

to “effectively” impeach Brussow. Defendant was given an opportunity to question Brussow and 

attack his credibility. Defendant was able to challenge the veracity of Brussow’s statements during 

cross-examination. To the extent that defendant claims Brussow was a liar and those lies caused 

the prosecutor to file charges, defendant had a full opportunity to present that defense. But 

defendant fails to adequately explain how Brussow’s decision—at the time—to not file a civil suit 
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relates to his credibility.

3

 The fact that the prosecutor decided to bring charges against defendantas opposed to Brussow filing a lawsuit—does not bear on defendant’s state of mind when he 

committed the crime. 

Next, defendant argues that the trial court deprived defendant of a fair trial when it admitted 

the contract between Prestige Energy and Courtesy Dodge into evidence because the contract did 

not satisfy the business-records exception to the hearsay rule. According to defendant, Brussow—

the witness that was offered to admit the contract—was not a “custodian” or “other qualified 

witness.” See MRE 803(6). Moreover, defendant argues that the trial court’s error was so 

egregious that it denied him the right to present a fair trial.

“In general, hearsay—an out-of-court statement offered to prove the truth of the matter 

asserted—may not be admitted into evidence.” People v Green, 313 Mich App 526, 531; 884 

NW2d 838 (2015), citing MRE 801 and MRE 802. However, as relevant here, hearsay is 

admissible if offered under the “business records exception”:

A memorandum, report, record, or data compilation, in any form, of acts, 

transactions, occurrences, events, conditions, opinions, or diagnoses, made at or 

near the time by, or from information transmitted by, a person with knowledge, if 

kept in the course of a regularly conducted business activity, and if it was the regular 

practice of that business activity to make the memorandum, report, record, or data 

compilation, all as shown by the testimony of the custodian or other qualified 

witness, or by certification that complies with a rule promulgated by the supreme 

court or a statute permitting certification, unless the source of information or the 

method or circumstances of preparation indicate lack of trustworthiness. 

[Emphasis added.]

This exception “is based on the inherent trustworthiness of business records.” Jambor, 273 Mich 

App at 482.

Brussow provided the foundation for the admission of the contract. There is no dispute 

that Brussow was not the “custodian,” as he testified that the responsibility fell to others at Prestige 

Energy. Thus, defendant claims that because Brussow was not present when the contract was 

signed and “did not know where it came from,” he is not an “other qualified witness.” However, 

it is “not necessary that the actual preparer of the business records be present to lay the foundation 

for the admission of the documents as the testimony of other ‘qualified’ witnesses [is] sufficient.”

People v Safiedine, 163 Mich App 25, 33; 414 NW2d 143 (1987). Moreover, defendant 

misconstrues the record by asserting that Brussow did not know where the contract came from. 

 

3 Defendant cites case law regarding jury nullification, but does not otherwise explain its relevance. 

To the extent he argues he was deprived of the opportunity to argue the defense of jury 

nullification, he has abandoned that argument. People v McPhearson, 263 Mich App 124, 136; 

687 NW2d 370 (2004) (“The failure to brief the merits of an allegation of error constitutes an 

abandonment of the issue.”).
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Brussow was the owner of Prestige Energy and testified he retrieved the document from the 

company’s electronic system where all of its regularly kept files, created for every job, are stored. 

Brussow was qualified to provide a foundation for the admission of the contract under 

MRE 803(6). Because the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it admitted the contract into 

evidence, it did not deny defendant a fair trial by doing the same. 

Affirmed.

/s/ Michael J. Riordan 

/s/ Kirsten Frank Kelly 

/s/ Brock A. Swartzle