# L_2022206EN.01000101.xml

| 8.8.2022 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | L 206/1 |
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8.8.2022

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

L 206/1

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COUNCIL REGULATION (EU) 2022/1369

of 5 August 2022

on coordinated demand-reduction measures for gas

THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,

Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, and in particular Article 122(1) thereof,

Having regard to the proposal from the European Commission,

Whereas:

| (1) | The Russian Federation, the Union’s main external gas supplier, has started a military aggression against Ukraine, a Contracting Party of the Energy Community. The escalation of the Russian military aggression against Ukraine since February 2022 has led to gas supplies declining markedly, in a deliberate attempt to use gas supply as a political weapon. Pipeline flows of gas from Russia through Belarus have stopped and gas supplies through Ukraine have steadily decreased. Overall gas flows from Russia are now less than 30 % of average gas flows in the period 2016-2021. That supply reduction has led to historically high and volatile energy prices, contributing to inflation and creating a risk of further economic downturn in Europe. |
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(1)

The Russian Federation, the Union’s main external gas supplier, has started a military aggression against Ukraine, a Contracting Party of the Energy Community. The escalation of the Russian military aggression against Ukraine since February 2022 has led to gas supplies declining markedly, in a deliberate attempt to use gas supply as a political weapon. Pipeline flows of gas from Russia through Belarus have stopped and gas supplies through Ukraine have steadily decreased. Overall gas flows from Russia are now less than 30 % of average gas flows in the period 2016-2021. That supply reduction has led to historically high and volatile energy prices, contributing to inflation and creating a risk of further economic downturn in Europe.

| (2) | Against this background, the Commission, further to its communication of 8 March 2022 entitled ‘REPowerEU: Joint European Action for more affordable, secure and sustainable energy’, presented the REPowerEU plan on 18 May 2022 with the aim to end the Union's dependence on Russian fossil fuels as soon as possible, and at the latest by 2027. To achieve that aim, the REPowerEU plan sets out measures related to energy savings and energy efficiency and proposes an accelerated roll-out of clean energy to replace fossil fuels in homes, industry and power generation. Further measures on the supply side could include, inter alia, better coordination of gas purchases and the facilitation of joint purchases by European gas market operators on the international gas market, as well as best efforts to preserve electricity production capacities that do not rely on imported gas supplies. |
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(2)

Against this background, the Commission, further to its communication of 8 March 2022 entitled ‘REPowerEU: Joint European Action for more affordable, secure and sustainable energy’, presented the REPowerEU plan on 18 May 2022 with the aim to end the Union's dependence on Russian fossil fuels as soon as possible, and at the latest by 2027. To achieve that aim, the REPowerEU plan sets out measures related to energy savings and energy efficiency and proposes an accelerated roll-out of clean energy to replace fossil fuels in homes, industry and power generation. Further measures on the supply side could include, inter alia, better coordination of gas purchases and the facilitation of joint purchases by European gas market operators on the international gas market, as well as best efforts to preserve electricity production capacities that do not rely on imported gas supplies.

| (3) | The Union has taken further measures to increase its level of preparedness as regards gas supply disruption. Regulation (EU) 2022/1032 of the European Parliament and of the Council (1) was adopted to ensure the filling of underground storage sites for the coming winter seasons. |
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(3)

The Union has taken further measures to increase its level of preparedness as regards gas supply disruption. Regulation (EU) 2022/1032 of the European Parliament and of the Council (1) was adopted to ensure the filling of underground storage sites for the coming winter seasons.

| (4) | Furthermore, in February 2022 and in May 2022 the Commission carried out in-depth reviews of all national emergency plans and has also carried out in-depth monitoring of the security of supply situation. The measures taken by the Union since February 2022 were designed to enable a full phase-out of Russian gas by 2027, and to reduce the risks stemming from a further major supply disruption. |
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(4)

Furthermore, in February 2022 and in May 2022 the Commission carried out in-depth reviews of all national emergency plans and has also carried out in-depth monitoring of the security of supply situation. The measures taken by the Union since February 2022 were designed to enable a full phase-out of Russian gas by 2027, and to reduce the risks stemming from a further major supply disruption.

| (5) | However, the recent escalation of disruption of gas supply from Russia points to a significant risk that a complete halt of Russian gas supplies may materialise in the near future, in an abrupt and unilateral way. The Union should therefore anticipate such a risk and prepare, in a spirit of solidarity, for the possibility of a full disruption of gas supply from Russia at any moment. Immediate proactive action is necessary to anticipate further disruptive action and strengthen the resilience of the Union to future shocks. Coordinated action at Union level can avoid serious harm to the economy and to citizens resulting from a possible gas supply interruption. |
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(5)

However, the recent escalation of disruption of gas supply from Russia points to a significant risk that a complete halt of Russian gas supplies may materialise in the near future, in an abrupt and unilateral way. The Union should therefore anticipate such a risk and prepare, in a spirit of solidarity, for the possibility of a full disruption of gas supply from Russia at any moment. Immediate proactive action is necessary to anticipate further disruptive action and strengthen the resilience of the Union to future shocks. Coordinated action at Union level can avoid serious harm to the economy and to citizens resulting from a possible gas supply interruption.

| (6) | The current legal framework for security of gas supply set by Regulation (EU) 2017/1938 of the European Parliament and of the Council (2) does not adequately address disruptions of a major gas supplier lasting more than 30 days. The lack of a legal framework for such disruption leads to a risk of uncoordinated action by Member States, which threatens to endanger security of supply in neighbouring Member States and may place an additional burden on the Union’s industry and consumers. |
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(6)

The current legal framework for security of gas supply set by Regulation (EU) 2017/1938 of the European Parliament and of the Council (2) does not adequately address disruptions of a major gas supplier lasting more than 30 days. The lack of a legal framework for such disruption leads to a risk of uncoordinated action by Member States, which threatens to endanger security of supply in neighbouring Member States and may place an additional burden on the Union’s industry and consumers.

| (7) | In its resolution of 7 April 2022 on the conclusions of the European Council meeting of 24-25 March 2022, the European Parliament called for a plan to continue ensuring the Union’s security of energy supply in the short term to be presented. In its meetings on 31 May and 23 June 2022, the European Council requested the Commission to make proposals for improving preparedness for possible major supply disruption as a matter of urgency, with a view to securing energy supply at affordable prices. Following that request from the European Council, the Commission is exploring together with the Union’s international partners ways to curb rising energy prices, including the feasibility of introducing temporary import price caps where appropriate. Further to that request, the Commission is also pursuing work on the optimisation of the functioning of the European electricity market, including the effect of gas prices on it, so that it is better prepared to withstand future excessive price volatility, delivers affordable electricity and fully fits a decarbonised energy system, while preserving the integrity of the single market, maintaining incentives for the green transition, preserving the security of supply and avoiding disproportionate budgetary costs. |
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(7)

In its resolution of 7 April 2022 on the conclusions of the European Council meeting of 24-25 March 2022, the European Parliament called for a plan to continue ensuring the Union’s security of energy supply in the short term to be presented. In its meetings on 31 May and 23 June 2022, the European Council requested the Commission to make proposals for improving preparedness for possible major supply disruption as a matter of urgency, with a view to securing energy supply at affordable prices. Following that request from the European Council, the Commission is exploring together with the Union’s international partners ways to curb rising energy prices, including the feasibility of introducing temporary import price caps where appropriate. Further to that request, the Commission is also pursuing work on the optimisation of the functioning of the European electricity market, including the effect of gas prices on it, so that it is better prepared to withstand future excessive price volatility, delivers affordable electricity and fully fits a decarbonised energy system, while preserving the integrity of the single market, maintaining incentives for the green transition, preserving the security of supply and avoiding disproportionate budgetary costs.

| (8) | Article 122(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union enables the Council to decide, on a proposal from the Commission and in a spirit of solidarity between Member States, upon the measures appropriate to the economic situation, in particular if severe difficulties arise in the supply of certain products, notably in the area of energy. The risk of a complete halt of Russian gas supplies by the end of 2022 constitutes such a situation. |
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(8)

Article 122(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union enables the Council to decide, on a proposal from the Commission and in a spirit of solidarity between Member States, upon the measures appropriate to the economic situation, in particular if severe difficulties arise in the supply of certain products, notably in the area of energy. The risk of a complete halt of Russian gas supplies by the end of 2022 constitutes such a situation.

| (9) | Given the imminent risk of disruption of gas supplies to the Union, Member States should take measures now to reduce their demand ahead of the 2022-23 winter season. Such voluntary demand reduction would contribute in particular to the filling of storage capacities, which would not be depleted by the end of the 2022-23 winter season and would therefore enable Member States to cope with possible cold spells in February and March of 2023 and facilitate the filling of storage capacities to ensure adequate levels of security of supply for the 2023-24 winter season. Reducing demand for gas will also help ensure adequate supply and drive energy prices down, to the benefit of Union consumers. Therefore, measures taken at Union level to reduce demand would benefit all Member States by decreasing the risk of a more substantial impact on their economies. |
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(9)

Given the imminent risk of disruption of gas supplies to the Union, Member States should take measures now to reduce their demand ahead of the 2022-23 winter season. Such voluntary demand reduction would contribute in particular to the filling of storage capacities, which would not be depleted by the end of the 2022-23 winter season and would therefore enable Member States to cope with possible cold spells in February and March of 2023 and facilitate the filling of storage capacities to ensure adequate levels of security of supply for the 2023-24 winter season. Reducing demand for gas will also help ensure adequate supply and drive energy prices down, to the benefit of Union consumers. Therefore, measures taken at Union level to reduce demand would benefit all Member States by decreasing the risk of a more substantial impact on their economies.

| (10) | The volume of the voluntary demand reduction takes into account the volumes of gas demand which would be at risk of non-delivery in the event of a full disruption of Russian gas supply. The reduction effort should be the same for all Member States, based on a comparison with each Member State's average consumption over the last five years. |
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(10)

The volume of the voluntary demand reduction takes into account the volumes of gas demand which would be at risk of non-delivery in the event of a full disruption of Russian gas supply. The reduction effort should be the same for all Member States, based on a comparison with each Member State's average consumption over the last five years.

| (11) | Voluntary demand-reduction measures may not by themselves be sufficient to ensure security of supply and market functioning. Therefore, in order to promptly address the specific challenges of the ongoing and anticipated severe worsening of gas supply shortages and avoid distortions between Member States, a new instrument introducing the possibility for a mandatory gas demand reduction for all Member States should be established. It should become operational sufficiently in advance of autumn 2022. Under such instrument, the Council could, on a proposal from the Commission, declare a Union alert by means of an implementing decision. Conferring an implementing power on the Council adequately takes into account the political nature of the decision to trigger a mandatory Union-wide demand-reduction obligation and its horizontal implications for Member States. Before presenting such a proposal, the Commission should consult the relevant risk groups, as set out in Annex I of Regulation (EU) 2017/1938 (‘risk groups’), and the Gas Coordination Group (GCG), established by that Regulation. A Union alert should only be declared in the event that the voluntary demand-reduction measures prove to be insufficient to address the risk of a serious supply shortage. Five or more competent authorities of Member States which have declared national alerts pursuant to Article 11(1), point (b), of Regulation (EU) 2017/1938 should be given the possibility to request the Commission to present a proposal to the Council to declare a Union alert. |
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(11)

Voluntary demand-reduction measures may not by themselves be sufficient to ensure security of supply and market functioning. Therefore, in order to promptly address the specific challenges of the ongoing and anticipated severe worsening of gas supply shortages and avoid distortions between Member States, a new instrument introducing the possibility for a mandatory gas demand reduction for all Member States should be established. It should become operational sufficiently in advance of autumn 2022. Under such instrument, the Council could, on a proposal from the Commission, declare a Union alert by means of an implementing decision. Conferring an implementing power on the Council adequately takes into account the political nature of the decision to trigger a mandatory Union-wide demand-reduction obligation and its horizontal implications for Member States. Before presenting such a proposal, the Commission should consult the relevant risk groups, as set out in Annex I of Regulation (EU) 2017/1938 (‘risk groups’), and the Gas Coordination Group (GCG), established by that Regulation. A Union alert should only be declared in the event that the voluntary demand-reduction measures prove to be insufficient to address the risk of a serious supply shortage. Five or more competent authorities of Member States which have declared national alerts pursuant to Article 11(1), point (b), of Regulation (EU) 2017/1938 should be given the possibility to request the Commission to present a proposal to the Council to declare a Union alert.

| (12) | The Union alert should serve as a Union-specific crisis level, which should trigger a mandatory demand reduction, independently of national crisis levels pursuant to Article 11(1) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1938. Once a Union alert has been declared, Member States should reduce their gas consumption within a pre-defined period. The volume of the mandatory demand reduction takes into account the volumes of gas demand which could be at risk in the event of a full disruption of Russian gas supplies to the Union and should fully take into account any demand reduction already achieved. The volume of the mandatory demand reduction should also take into account the level of storage filling as reported pursuant to Article 6d(1) and (2) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1938, the development concerning the diversification of sources of gas, including liquefied natural gas (LNG) supplies and the development of fuel substitutability in the Union. |
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(12)

The Union alert should serve as a Union-specific crisis level, which should trigger a mandatory demand reduction, independently of national crisis levels pursuant to Article 11(1) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1938. Once a Union alert has been declared, Member States should reduce their gas consumption within a pre-defined period. The volume of the mandatory demand reduction takes into account the volumes of gas demand which could be at risk in the event of a full disruption of Russian gas supplies to the Union and should fully take into account any demand reduction already achieved. The volume of the mandatory demand reduction should also take into account the level of storage filling as reported pursuant to Article 6d(1) and (2) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1938, the development concerning the diversification of sources of gas, including liquefied natural gas (LNG) supplies and the development of fuel substitutability in the Union.

| (13) | Demand reductions achieved by Member States before the Union alert is declared will be reflected in the volume of the mandatory demand reduction. |
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(13)

Demand reductions achieved by Member States before the Union alert is declared will be reflected in the volume of the mandatory demand reduction.

| (14) | In view of the significant distortions of the internal market which are likely to occur if Member States react in an uncoordinated manner to a potential or actual further disruption of Russian gas supply, it is crucial that all Member States reduce their gas demand in a spirit of solidarity. All Member States should therefore achieve the voluntary and mandatory demand-reduction targets. While some Member States might be more exposed to the effects of a disruption of Russian gas supplies, all Member States could be negatively affected and could contribute to limiting the economic harm caused by such disruption, be it by freeing up additional volumes of pipeline gas or LNG cargoes which can be used by Member States with significant gas deficits, by the positive effect on gas prices which a demand reduction is likely to have or by avoiding market distortion through uncoordinated and contradicting demand-reduction measures. This Regulation therefore reflects the principle of energy solidarity, which has recently been confirmed by the Court of Justice as a fundamental principle of Union law (3). |
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(14)

In view of the significant distortions of the internal market which are likely to occur if Member States react in an uncoordinated manner to a potential or actual further disruption of Russian gas supply, it is crucial that all Member States reduce their gas demand in a spirit of solidarity. All Member States should therefore achieve the voluntary and mandatory demand-reduction targets. While some Member States might be more exposed to the effects of a disruption of Russian gas supplies, all Member States could be negatively affected and could contribute to limiting the economic harm caused by such disruption, be it by freeing up additional volumes of pipeline gas or LNG cargoes which can be used by Member States with significant gas deficits, by the positive effect on gas prices which a demand reduction is likely to have or by avoiding market distortion through uncoordinated and contradicting demand-reduction measures. This Regulation therefore reflects the principle of energy solidarity, which has recently been confirmed by the Court of Justice as a fundamental principle of Union law (3).

| (15) | However, certain Member States are, due to their specific geographical or physical situation, such as not being synchronised with the European electricity system, or their lack of direct interconnection to the gas interconnected system of another Member State, not able to free up significant volumes of pipeline gas to the benefit of other Member States. Member States should therefore be given a possibility to rely on one or more grounds to limit their mandatory demand-reduction obligations. The Member States concerned should commit to making all efforts to remove the interconnection deficits as soon as possible. |
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(15)

However, certain Member States are, due to their specific geographical or physical situation, such as not being synchronised with the European electricity system, or their lack of direct interconnection to the gas interconnected system of another Member State, not able to free up significant volumes of pipeline gas to the benefit of other Member States. Member States should therefore be given a possibility to rely on one or more grounds to limit their mandatory demand-reduction obligations. The Member States concerned should commit to making all efforts to remove the interconnection deficits as soon as possible.

| (16) | Regulation (EU) No 347/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council (4) puts in place a framework for Member States and relevant stakeholders to work together in a regional setting to develop better-connected energy networks with the aim, in particular, to connect regions currently isolated from European energy markets and to strengthen existing and promote new cross-border interconnections. Cross-border interconnections strongly contribute to the security of supply. In light of the current disruption of gas supply from Russia, such cross-border interconnections play a key role in ensuring the functioning of the internal energy market and in the distribution of gas to other Member States, in a spirit of solidarity. In this context, Member States should pursue their efforts to improve the integration of their networks, including by assessing the potential increase of new cross-border interconnection capacity in line with the objectives of Regulation (EU) 2022/869 of the European Parliament and of the Council (5). |
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(16)

Regulation (EU) No 347/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council (4) puts in place a framework for Member States and relevant stakeholders to work together in a regional setting to develop better-connected energy networks with the aim, in particular, to connect regions currently isolated from European energy markets and to strengthen existing and promote new cross-border interconnections. Cross-border interconnections strongly contribute to the security of supply. In light of the current disruption of gas supply from Russia, such cross-border interconnections play a key role in ensuring the functioning of the internal energy market and in the distribution of gas to other Member States, in a spirit of solidarity. In this context, Member States should pursue their efforts to improve the integration of their networks, including by assessing the potential increase of new cross-border interconnection capacity in line with the objectives of Regulation (EU) 2022/869 of the European Parliament and of the Council (5).

| (17) | In order to facilitate Member States’ efforts to fulfil the objectives of Regulation (EU) 2022/1032 with regard to gas storage, the volume of gas used by Member States for storage in excess of the intermediate target for 1 August 2022 should also be taken into account for the purpose of determining the volume of their mandatory demand reduction. |
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(17)

In order to facilitate Member States’ efforts to fulfil the objectives of Regulation (EU) 2022/1032 with regard to gas storage, the volume of gas used by Member States for storage in excess of the intermediate target for 1 August 2022 should also be taken into account for the purpose of determining the volume of their mandatory demand reduction.

| (18) | In addition, to take proper account of the high dependency on gas of Member States’ critical industries, Member States should be able to exclude gas consumption in those industries when determining the volume of their mandatory demand reduction. Monitoring by the Commission should ensure that national limitations do not lead to undue distortions of the internal market. Member States should also be able to limit the volume of their mandatory demand reduction where such limitation is necessary to maximise the supply of gas to other Member States and where they are able to produce evidence that their interconnector commercial export capacities to other Member States or their domestic LNG infrastructure are used to re-direct gas to other Member States to the utmost extent. The Commission should monitor that the conditions for the application of those derogations are fulfilled. |
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(18)

In addition, to take proper account of the high dependency on gas of Member States’ critical industries, Member States should be able to exclude gas consumption in those industries when determining the volume of their mandatory demand reduction. Monitoring by the Commission should ensure that national limitations do not lead to undue distortions of the internal market. Member States should also be able to limit the volume of their mandatory demand reduction where such limitation is necessary to maximise the supply of gas to other Member States and where they are able to produce evidence that their interconnector commercial export capacities to other Member States or their domestic LNG infrastructure are used to re-direct gas to other Member States to the utmost extent. The Commission should monitor that the conditions for the application of those derogations are fulfilled.

| (19) | The Member States, with regard to specific demand circumstances from interconnected Member States, should be able to temporarily limit the mandatory demand reduction where necessary to ensure security of energy supply, including where a Member State faces an electricity crisis as referred to in Regulation (EU) 2019/941 of the European Parliament and of the Council (6). Account should also be taken of the storage capacity and the storage level in excess of the intermediate target, as set out in Annex Ia to Regulation (EU) 2017/1938. |
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(19)

The Member States, with regard to specific demand circumstances from interconnected Member States, should be able to temporarily limit the mandatory demand reduction where necessary to ensure security of energy supply, including where a Member State faces an electricity crisis as referred to in Regulation (EU) 2019/941 of the European Parliament and of the Council (6). Account should also be taken of the storage capacity and the storage level in excess of the intermediate target, as set out in Annex Ia to Regulation (EU) 2017/1938.

| (20) | Member States should be free to choose the appropriate measures to achieve the demand reduction. When identifying appropriate demand-reduction measures and prioritising customer groups, Member States should consider making use of the measures identified by the Commission in its communication of 20 July 2022 entitled “Save Gas for a Safe Winter”. Member States should in particular consider economically efficient measures such as auctions or tender schemes, by which they can incentivise a reduction of consumption in an economically efficient manner. The measures taken at national level may also include financial incentives or compensation to market participants affected. |
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(20)

Member States should be free to choose the appropriate measures to achieve the demand reduction. When identifying appropriate demand-reduction measures and prioritising customer groups, Member States should consider making use of the measures identified by the Commission in its communication of 20 July 2022 entitled “Save Gas for a Safe Winter”. Member States should in particular consider economically efficient measures such as auctions or tender schemes, by which they can incentivise a reduction of consumption in an economically efficient manner. The measures taken at national level may also include financial incentives or compensation to market participants affected.

| (21) | Any measure taken by Member States to achieve the demand reduction must comply with Union law and in particular Regulation (EU) 2017/1938. In particular, such measures should be necessary, clearly defined, transparent, proportionate, non-discriminatory and verifiable, and should not unduly distort competition or the proper functioning of the internal market in gas or endanger the security of gas supply of other Member States or of the Union. It is necessary to consider the interests of protected customers also in relation to gas supply to centralised heating systems in the case of security of supply crisis. |
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(21)

Any measure taken by Member States to achieve the demand reduction must comply with Union law and in particular Regulation (EU) 2017/1938. In particular, such measures should be necessary, clearly defined, transparent, proportionate, non-discriminatory and verifiable, and should not unduly distort competition or the proper functioning of the internal market in gas or endanger the security of gas supply of other Member States or of the Union. It is necessary to consider the interests of protected customers also in relation to gas supply to centralised heating systems in the case of security of supply crisis.

| (22) | In order to ensure that demand-reduction measures are implemented in a coordinated manner, Member States should establish regular cooperation within each of the relevant risk groups. Member States are free to agree on the coordination measures best suited in a given region. The Commission and the GCG should be able to have an overview of the national measures implemented by the Member States and share best practices for the coordination of measures within the risk groups. Member States should also use other bodies to coordinate their action. |
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(22)

In order to ensure that demand-reduction measures are implemented in a coordinated manner, Member States should establish regular cooperation within each of the relevant risk groups. Member States are free to agree on the coordination measures best suited in a given region. The Commission and the GCG should be able to have an overview of the national measures implemented by the Member States and share best practices for the coordination of measures within the risk groups. Member States should also use other bodies to coordinate their action.

| (23) | In order to ensure that the national emergency plans reflect the voluntary or mandatory demand-reduction measures set out in this Regulation, the competent authority of each Member State should take the necessary steps to update the national emergency plan established pursuant to Article 8 of Regulation (EU) 2017/1938 by 31 October 2022. Given the short timeframe for that update, the coordination procedures pursuant to Article 8(6) to (11) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1938 should not apply. However, each Member State should consult other Member States on the update of its national emergency plan. The Commission should convene the risk groups, the GCG or other relevant bodies to discuss potential issues related to demand-reduction measures. |
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(23)

In order to ensure that the national emergency plans reflect the voluntary or mandatory demand-reduction measures set out in this Regulation, the competent authority of each Member State should take the necessary steps to update the national emergency plan established pursuant to Article 8 of Regulation (EU) 2017/1938 by 31 October 2022. Given the short timeframe for that update, the coordination procedures pursuant to Article 8(6) to (11) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1938 should not apply. However, each Member State should consult other Member States on the update of its national emergency plan. The Commission should convene the risk groups, the GCG or other relevant bodies to discuss potential issues related to demand-reduction measures.

| (24) | Regular and effective monitoring and reporting are essential for the assessment of progress made by the Member States in the implementation of the voluntary and mandatory demand-reduction measures, and for measuring the social and economic impact of those measures as well as the impact on employment. The competent authority of each Member State or another entity designated by the Member State should monitor the demand reduction achieved on its territory and regularly report the results to the Commission. The GCG should assist the Commission in monitoring the fulfilment of the demand-reduction obligations. |
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(24)

Regular and effective monitoring and reporting are essential for the assessment of progress made by the Member States in the implementation of the voluntary and mandatory demand-reduction measures, and for measuring the social and economic impact of those measures as well as the impact on employment. The competent authority of each Member State or another entity designated by the Member State should monitor the demand reduction achieved on its territory and regularly report the results to the Commission. The GCG should assist the Commission in monitoring the fulfilment of the demand-reduction obligations.

| (25) | To prevent significant economic harm to the Union as a whole, it is crucial that each Member State reduce its demand after a Union alert has been declared. That reduction will ensure that there is sufficient gas for all, even during the winter. The demand reduction across the Union is an expression of the principle of solidarity, enshrined in the Treaty. It is therefore warranted that the Commission supervise strictly that the mandatory demand reductions are carried out by Member States. In the event that the Commission identifies a risk that a Member State may not be able to fulfil its mandatory demand-reduction obligation, the Commission should be able to request that Member State to submit a plan setting out a strategy and measures to effectively achieve the mandatory demand reduction. That Member State should take due account of any comments and suggestions made by the Commission regarding that plan. |
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(25)

To prevent significant economic harm to the Union as a whole, it is crucial that each Member State reduce its demand after a Union alert has been declared. That reduction will ensure that there is sufficient gas for all, even during the winter. The demand reduction across the Union is an expression of the principle of solidarity, enshrined in the Treaty. It is therefore warranted that the Commission supervise strictly that the mandatory demand reductions are carried out by Member States. In the event that the Commission identifies a risk that a Member State may not be able to fulfil its mandatory demand-reduction obligation, the Commission should be able to request that Member State to submit a plan setting out a strategy and measures to effectively achieve the mandatory demand reduction. That Member State should take due account of any comments and suggestions made by the Commission regarding that plan.

| (26) | As the solidarity principle gives every Member State the right to be supported by neighbouring Member States under certain circumstances, Member States who ask for such support should also act in a spirit of solidarity when it comes to reducing their domestic gas demand. Therefore, when requesting a solidarity measure under Article 13 of Regulation (EU) 2017/1938, Member States should have implemented all appropriate gas demand-reduction measures. The Commission should be able to request the Member State requesting a solidarity measure to submit a plan with measures to achieve possible further demand reductions. That Member State should take due account of the Commission’s opinion. |
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(26)

As the solidarity principle gives every Member State the right to be supported by neighbouring Member States under certain circumstances, Member States who ask for such support should also act in a spirit of solidarity when it comes to reducing their domestic gas demand. Therefore, when requesting a solidarity measure under Article 13 of Regulation (EU) 2017/1938, Member States should have implemented all appropriate gas demand-reduction measures. The Commission should be able to request the Member State requesting a solidarity measure to submit a plan with measures to achieve possible further demand reductions. That Member State should take due account of the Commission’s opinion.

| (27) | The Commission should inform the European Parliament and the Council regularly about the implementation of this Regulation. |
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(27)

The Commission should inform the European Parliament and the Council regularly about the implementation of this Regulation.

| (28) | Considering the imminent danger to the security of gas supply brought about by the Russian military aggression against Ukraine, this Regulation should enter into force as a matter of urgency. |
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(28)

Considering the imminent danger to the security of gas supply brought about by the Russian military aggression against Ukraine, this Regulation should enter into force as a matter of urgency.

| (29) | Given the exceptional nature of the measures set out in this Regulation, this Regulation should apply for one year after its entry into force. By 1 May 2023, the Commission should report on its functioning to the Council and may, if appropriate, propose to prolong its period of application. |
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(29)

Given the exceptional nature of the measures set out in this Regulation, this Regulation should apply for one year after its entry into force. By 1 May 2023, the Commission should report on its functioning to the Council and may, if appropriate, propose to prolong its period of application.

| (30) | Since the objective of this Regulation cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States, but can rather be better achieved at Union level, the Union may adopt measures, in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity as set out in Article 5 of the Treaty on European Union. In accordance with the principle of proportionality, as set out in that Article, this Regulation does not go beyond what is necessary to achieve that objective, |
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(30)

Since the objective of this Regulation cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States, but can rather be better achieved at Union level, the Union may adopt measures, in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity as set out in Article 5 of the Treaty on European Union. In accordance with the principle of proportionality, as set out in that Article, this Regulation does not go beyond what is necessary to achieve that objective,

HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION:

Article 1

Subject matter and scope

This Regulation establishes rules to address a situation of severe difficulties in the supply of gas, with a view to safeguarding Union security of gas supply, in a spirit of solidarity. Those rules include improved coordination, monitoring of and reporting on national gas demand-reduction measures and the possibility for the Council to declare, on a proposal from the Commission, a Union alert as a Union-specific crisis level, triggering a mandatory Union-wide demand-reduction obligation.

Article 2

Definitions

For the purposes of this Regulation, the following definitions apply:

| (1) | ‘competent authority’ means a national governmental authority or a national regulatory authority designated by a Member State to ensure the implementation of the measures provided for in Regulation (EU) 2017/1938; |
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(1)

‘competent authority’ means a national governmental authority or a national regulatory authority designated by a Member State to ensure the implementation of the measures provided for in Regulation (EU) 2017/1938;

| (2) | ‘Union alert’ means a Union-specific crisis level triggering a mandatory demand reduction and which is not related to any of the crisis levels pursuant to Article 11(1) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1938; |
| --- | --- |

(2)

‘Union alert’ means a Union-specific crisis level triggering a mandatory demand reduction and which is not related to any of the crisis levels pursuant to Article 11(1) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1938;

| (3) | ‘gas consumption’ means the overall supply of natural gas for activities on the territory of a Member State, including the final consumption of households, industry and electricity generation, but excluding, inter alia, gas used to fill storage capacities, in line with the definition for ‘supply, transformation and consumption of gas’ used by the Commission (Eurostat); |
| --- | --- |

(3)

‘gas consumption’ means the overall supply of natural gas for activities on the territory of a Member State, including the final consumption of households, industry and electricity generation, but excluding, inter alia, gas used to fill storage capacities, in line with the definition for ‘supply, transformation and consumption of gas’ used by the Commission (Eurostat);

| (4) | ‘feedstock’ means ‘non-energy use of natural gas’ as referred to in energy balances calculations by the Commission (Eurostat); |
| --- | --- |

(4)

‘feedstock’ means ‘non-energy use of natural gas’ as referred to in energy balances calculations by the Commission (Eurostat);

| (5) | ‘reference gas consumption’ means the volume of a Member State’s average gas consumption during the reference period; for Member States where gas consumption increased at least by 8 % in the period from 1 August 2021 to 31 March 2022 compared to the average gas consumption during the reference period, ‘reference gas consumption’ means only the volume of gas consumption in the period from 1 August 2021 to 31 March 2022; |
| --- | --- |

(5)

‘reference gas consumption’ means the volume of a Member State’s average gas consumption during the reference period; for Member States where gas consumption increased at least by 8 % in the period from 1 August 2021 to 31 March 2022 compared to the average gas consumption during the reference period, ‘reference gas consumption’ means only the volume of gas consumption in the period from 1 August 2021 to 31 March 2022;

| (6) | ‘reference period’ means the periods from 1 August to 31 March during the five consecutive years preceding the date of entry into force of this Regulation, starting with the period from 1 August 2017 to 31 March 2018; |
| --- | --- |

(6)

‘reference period’ means the periods from 1 August to 31 March during the five consecutive years preceding the date of entry into force of this Regulation, starting with the period from 1 August 2017 to 31 March 2018;

| (7) | ‘intermediate target’ means the intermediate target as set out in Annex Ia to Regulation (EU) 2017/1938. |
| --- | --- |

(7)

‘intermediate target’ means the intermediate target as set out in Annex Ia to Regulation (EU) 2017/1938.

Article 3

Voluntary demand reduction

Member States shall use their best efforts to reduce their gas consumption in the period from 1 August 2022 to 31 March 2023 at least by 15 % compared to their average gas consumption in the period from 1 August to 31 March during the five consecutive years preceding the date of entry into force of this Regulation (‘voluntary demand reduction’). Articles 6, 7 and 8 shall apply to those voluntary demand-reduction measures.

Article 4

Declaration of a Union alert by the Council

1.   The Council, on a proposal from the Commission, by means of an implementing decision, may declare a Union alert.

2.   The Commission shall present the proposal for such a Union alert where it considers that there is a substantial risk of a severe gas supply shortage or where an exceptionally high demand for gas occurs, for which the measures in Article 3 are not sufficient and which results in a significant deterioration of the gas supply situation in the Union, but where the market is able to manage the disruption without the need for non-market-based measures.

3.   The Commission shall also submit a proposal to the Council to declare a Union alert where five or more competent authorities that have declared an alert at national level pursuant to Article 11(1), point (b), of Regulation (EU) 2017/1938 so request.

4.   The Council, acting by a qualified majority, may amend the Commission’s proposal.

5.   Before submitting a proposal to the Council to declare a Union alert, the Commission shall consult the relevant risk groups, as set out in Annex I of Regulation (EU) 2017/1938 (‘risk groups’), and the Gas Coordination Group (GCG), established by Article 4 of that Regulation.

6.   On a proposal from the Commission, the Council may, by means of an implementing decision, declare an end to the Union alert and to the obligations pursuant to Article 5. The Commission shall present the proposal for such implementing decision to the Council where it considers, following an assessment, that the underlying basis for the Union alert no longer justifies the maintenance of that alert, and after consultation of the relevant risk groups and the GCG.

Article 5

Mandatory demand reduction in the event of a Union alert

1.   Where the Council declares a Union alert, each Member State shall reduce its gas consumption in accordance with paragraph 2 (‘mandatory demand reduction’).

2.   For the purpose of mandatory demand reduction, for as long as the Union alert is declared, gas consumption in each Member State over the period from 1 August 2022 to 31 March 2023 (‘reduction period’) shall be 15 % lower compared to its reference gas consumption. Any demand reductions achieved by Member States during the period before the Union alert was declared shall be taken into account for the purpose of the mandatory demand reduction.

3.   A Member State whose electricity system is synchronised only with the electricity system of a third country shall be exempted from applying paragraph 2 in the event it is desynchronised from that third country's system for as long as isolated power system services or other services to the power transmission system operator are required to ensure the safe and reliable operation of the power system.

4.   A Member State shall be exempted from applying paragraph 2 for as long as that Member State is not directly interconnected to a gas interconnected system of any other Member State.

5.   A Member State may limit the reference gas consumption used for calculation of the mandatory demand-reduction target pursuant to paragraph 2 by the volume of gas equal to the difference between its intermediate target for 1 August 2022 and the actual volume of stored gas on 1 August 2022, if it fulfils the intermediate target on that date.

6.   A Member State may limit the reference gas consumption used for calculation of the mandatory demand-reduction target pursuant to paragraph 2 by the volume of gas consumed during the reference period as feedstock.

7.   A Member State may limit the mandatory demand reduction by 8 percentage points, provided that it demonstrates that its interconnection with other Member States measured in firm technical export capacity compared to its yearly gas consumption in 2021 is below 50 % and that capacity on interconnectors to other Member States has in fact been used for the transport of gas at a level of at least 90 % for at least one month before the notification of the derogation, unless the Member State can show there was no demand and the capacity was maximised, and that its domestic LNG facilities are commercially and technically ready to re-direct gas to other Member States up to the volumes required by the market.

8.   A Member State facing an electricity crisis may temporarily limit the mandatory demand reduction pursuant to paragraph 2 to the level necessary to mitigate the risk for electricity supply if there are no other economic alternatives to replace the gas necessary for producing electricity without seriously endangering security of supply. In that case, the Member State shall notify the reasons for the limitation and provide sufficient evidence for the exceptional circumstances justifying the limitation. Where necessary, the Member State shall update the risk preparedness plan pursuant to Article 10 of Regulation (EU) 2019/941.

9.   A Member State shall notify its decision to limit the mandatory demand reduction pursuant to paragraphs 5, 6, 7 and 8 to the Commission, together with the necessary evidence that the conditions for limiting the mandatory demand reduction are fulfilled. A notification in respect of paragraphs 5, 6 and 7 may already be made after the entry into force of this Regulation and shall not be made later than two weeks after a Union alert has been declared. A notification in respect of paragraph 8 may be made no later than two weeks after the situation of an electricity crisis referred to in that paragraph has arisen. The Member State shall also inform the relevant risk groups and the GCG of its intention.

10.   On the basis of the notification and after consultation of the risk groups and the GCG, the Commission shall assess whether the conditions for a limitation pursuant to paragraphs 5, 6, 7 and 8 are fulfilled. In the event that the Commission finds that a limitation is not justified, it shall adopt an opinion indicating the reasons why the Member State should remove or modify the limitation of the mandatory demand reduction. That opinion shall be adopted no later than 30 working days after the complete notification pursuant to paragraph 9.

11.   Where the conditions for the limitation of the mandatory demand reduction in paragraphs 5, 6, 7 and 8 are no longer fulfilled, the Member State shall apply the mandatory demand-reduction target pursuant to paragraph 2.

12.   The Commission shall continuously monitor whether the conditions for a limitation of the mandatory demand reduction pursuant to paragraphs 5, 6, 7 and 8 are fulfilled.

13.   Articles 6, 7 and 8 shall apply to mandatory demand-reduction measures without prejudice to existing long-term contracts.

Article 6

Measures to achieve the demand reduction

1.   Member States shall be free to choose the appropriate measures to reduce demand. The measures referred to in Articles 3 and 5 shall be clearly defined, transparent, proportionate, non-discriminatory and verifiable. When selecting the measures, Member States shall take into account the principles set out in Regulation (EU) 2017/1938. The measures shall, in particular:

| (a) | not unduly distort competition or the proper functioning of the internal market in gas; |
| --- | --- |

(a)

not unduly distort competition or the proper functioning of the internal market in gas;

| (b) | not endanger the security of gas supply of other Member States or of the Union; |
| --- | --- |

(b)

not endanger the security of gas supply of other Member States or of the Union;

| (c) | comply with the provisions of Regulation (EU) 2017/1938 as regards protected customers. |
| --- | --- |

(c)

comply with the provisions of Regulation (EU) 2017/1938 as regards protected customers.

2.   When taking demand-reduction measures, Member States shall consider prioritising measures affecting customers other than protected customers, as defined in Article 2, point 5, of Regulation (EU) 2017/1938, and may also exclude those customers from such measures on the basis of objective and transparent criteria which shall take into account their economic importance as well as, among others, the following elements:

| (a) | the impact of a disruption on supply chains that are critical for society; |
| --- | --- |

(a)

the impact of a disruption on supply chains that are critical for society;

| (b) | the possible negative impacts in other Member States, in particular on supply chains of downstream sectors that are critical for society; |
| --- | --- |

(b)

the possible negative impacts in other Member States, in particular on supply chains of downstream sectors that are critical for society;

| (c) | the potential long-lasting damage to industrial installations; |
| --- | --- |

(c)

the potential long-lasting damage to industrial installations;

| (d) | the possibilities for reducing consumption and substituting products in the Union. |
| --- | --- |

(d)

the possibilities for reducing consumption and substituting products in the Union.

3.   When deciding the demand-reduction measures, the Member States shall consider measures to reduce gas consumed in the electricity sector, measures to encourage fuel switch in the industry, national awareness-raising campaigns, and targeted obligations to reduce heating and cooling, to promote switching to other fuels and reduce consumption by industry.

Article 7

Coordination of demand-reduction measures

1.   To ensure appropriate coordination of voluntary and mandatory demand-reduction measures pursuant to Articles 3 and 5, Member States shall cooperate with each other within each of the relevant risk groups.

2.   The competent authority of each Member State shall update its national emergency plan established pursuant to Article 8 of Regulation (EU) 2017/1938 by 31 October 2022 at the latest, to reflect voluntary demand-reduction measures. Each Member State shall also update its national emergency plan, as appropriate, in the event of a declaration of a Union alert pursuant to Article 4 of this Regulation. Articles 8(6) to (10) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1938 shall not apply to the updates of the national emergency plans made pursuant to this paragraph.

3.   Member States shall consult the Commission and the relevant risk groups before adopting the revised emergency plans. The Commission may call for meetings of the risk groups and the GCG, taking into account any views expressed by the Member States in that context, to discuss issues related to national demand-reduction measures.

Article 8

Monitoring and enforcement

1.   The competent authority of each Member State shall monitor the implementation of the demand-reduction measures on its territory. Member States shall report on the demand reduction achieved to the Commission every two months and not later than by the 15th of the following month. The risk groups and the GCG shall assist the Commission in the monitoring of the voluntary and mandatory demand reduction.

2.   Where the Commission identifies, on the basis of the reported demand-reduction figures, a risk that a Member State will not be able to fulfil the mandatory demand-reduction obligation pursuant to Article 5, the Commission shall request the Member State to submit a plan setting out a strategy to effectively achieve the demand-reduction obligation. The Commission shall also request a Member State requesting a solidarity measure pursuant to Article 13 of Regulation (EU) 2017/1938 to submit a plan setting out the strategy to achieve possible further gas demand reductions, in line with Article 10(2) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1938. In both cases, the Commission shall issue an opinion with comments and suggestions on the submitted plans and inform the Council of its opinion. The Member State in question shall take due account of the Commission's opinion.

3.   The Commission shall inform the European Parliament and the Council regularly about the implementation of this Regulation.

Article 9

Review

By 1 May 2023, the Commission shall carry out a review of this Regulation in view of the general situation of gas supply to the Union and present a report on the main findings of that review to the Council. Based on that report, the Commission may in particular propose to prolong the period of application of this Regulation.

Article 10

Entry into force and application

This Regulation shall enter into force on the day following that of its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union.

Official Journal of the European Union

It shall apply for a period of one year from its entry into force.

This Regulation shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States.

Done at Brussels, 5 August 2022.

For the Council

The President

M. BEK

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(1)  Regulation (EU) 2022/1032 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 June 2022 amending Regulations (EU) 2017/1938 and (EC) No 715/2009 with regard to gas storage (OJ L 173, 30.6.2022, p. 17).

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(2)  Regulation (EU) 2017/1938 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2017 concerning measures to safeguard the security of gas supply and repealing Regulation (EU) No 994/2010 (OJ L 280, 28.10.2017, p. 1).

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(3)  Judgment of the Court of Justice of 15 July 2021, Germany v Poland, C-848/19 P, ECLI:EU:C:2021:598.

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Germany v Poland

(4)  Regulation (EU) No 347/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 April 2013 on guidelines for trans-European energy infrastructure and repealing Decision No 1364/2006/EC and amending Regulations (EC) No 713/2009, (EC) No 714/2009 and (EC) No 715/2009 (OJ L 115, 25.4.2013, p. 39).

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(5)  Regulation (EU) 2022/869 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 May 2022 on guidelines for trans-European energy infrastructure, amending Regulations (EC) No 715/2009, (EU) 2019/942 and (EU) 2019/943 and Directives 2009/73/EC and (EU) 2019/944, and repealing Regulation (EU) No 347/2013 (OJ L 152, 3.6.2022, p. 45).

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(6)  Regulation (EU) 2019/941 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 June 2019 on risk-preparedness in the electricity sector and repealing Directive 2005/89/EC (OJ L 158, 14.6.2019, p. 1).

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