[PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

________________________

No. 16-12007

________________________

D.C. Docket No. 1:12-cv-01352-ODE

JACQUELINE STEVENS, 

 Plaintiff - Appellant,

versus

U.S. ATTORNEY GENERAL, 

JUAN OSUNA, 

Director, Executive Office of Immigration Review, 

in his official capacity, 

FRAN MOONEY, 

Assistant Director for the Office of Management Programs, 

Executive Office of Immigration Review 

in her individual and official capacity, 

MARYBETH KELLER, 

Assistant Chief Immigration Judge, 

Executive Office of Immigration Review, 

in her individual and official capacity, 

GARY SMITH, 

Assistant Chief Immigration Judge, 

Executive Office of Immigration Review, 

in his individual and official capacity, et al.,

 Defendants - Appellees,

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INSPECTOR DOE,

Federal Protective Services, et al.,

 Defendants.

________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Georgia

________________________

(December 15, 2017)

Before JULIE CARNES and EDMONDSON, Circuit Judges, and WILLIAMS,*

District Judge.

EDMONDSON, Circuit Judge:

Plaintiff Jacqueline Stevens appeals the dismissal of claims she filed 

pursuant to Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Fed. Bureau of 

Narcotics, 91 S. Ct. 1999 (1971). Briefly stated, Plaintiff contends that her 

constitutional rights were violated when she was denied access to hearings at the 

Atlanta Immigration Court. Plaintiff seeks monetary damages, as well as 

injunctive and declaratory relief. We affirm the district court’s decision.

 * Honorable Kathleen M. Williams, United States District Judge for the Southern District of 

Florida, sitting by designation.

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I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff is a journalist and a university professor of political science. Her 

area of study focuses on the due process rights of those persons involved in 

deportation proceedings and on the conduct of Immigration Judges within the 

Executive Office of Immigration Review (“EOIR”).1

 Before the occurrences 

underlying this civil action, Plaintiff had published criticisms of deportation 

proceedings in general and of Immigration Judge William Cassidy’s performance 

in particular. 

This civil action arises from two dates on which Plaintiff sought to attend 

immigration hearings at the Atlanta Immigration Court.2

 On 7 October 2009, 

 1 The EOIR is an agency that adjudicates immigration cases within the Department of Justice. 

Under authority delegated by the Attorney General, the EOIR is responsible for the interpretation 

and administration of federal immigration laws, and for conducting immigration court 

proceedings, appellate reviews, and administrative hearings. THE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT 

OF JUSTICE, EXECUTIVE OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW, https://www.justice.gov/eoir/aboutoffice (last visited 14 December 2017).

2 Plaintiff contends on appeal that the district court erred by failing to consider (that is, failing to 

write about) Judge Cassidy’s liability for cancelling hearings on 22 June 2009, 12-15 January 

2010, and 15 April 2010. This argument is unpersuasive for several reasons.

First, about the supposed cancellation of hearings on these dates, Plaintiff’s amended complaint 

contains only one allegation: “Plaintiff was unable to observe deportation/removal hearings at 

the Immigration Court on June 22, 2009, January 12-15, 2010, and April 15, 2010, because upon 

information and belief, hearings were cancelled when it was determined that Plaintiff would 

likely be in attendance.” Plaintiff alleges no facts supporting her claim that the hearings were 

cancelled wrongfully or that Judge Cassidy (or any other Defendant) was responsible for or 

otherwise involved in cancelling the hearings. Nowhere else in Plaintiff’s amended complaint 

does she elaborate on the alleged supposedly improper cancellation of scheduled hearings: 

Plaintiff’s counts for constitutional violations stem only from her alleged “wrongful exclusion” 

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Plaintiff wished to attend three hearings listed on Judge Cassidy’s afternoon 

docket. One of the hearings was rescheduled at the request of respondent’s lawyer. 

Judge Cassidy then closed to the public the remaining two hearings. Because 

Plaintiff was no party, family member, or attorney-of-record for the respondents in 

those cases, she was not permitted to observe the hearings. 

On 19 April 2010, Plaintiff returned to the Atlanta Immigration Court and 

did observe morning hearings held before Judge Cassidy. The docket listed one 

additional hearing scheduled before Judge Cassidy for that afternoon. Judge 

Cassidy closed that hearing to the public and, accordingly, asked Plaintiff to leave 

the courtroom. In her complaint, Plaintiff alleged she was asked to leave the 

courtroom “shortly after 3 p.m.” Plaintiff asked Judge Cassidy for a “legal reason”

 

from immigration hearings that were held and “forcible removal” from the court building. For 

the cancellation of hearings, Plaintiff’s amended complaint, thus, contains no “short and plain 

statement” showing that she is entitled to relief, as required by Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). 

Second, Plaintiff first mentioned the cancellation of hearings in June 2009, January 2010, and 

April 2010 in her amended complaint, which was filed against Judge Cassidy in his official 

capacity only. Thus, even if Plaintiff’s amended complaint could be construed as asserting a 

claim against Judge Cassidy for liability for the cancellation of hearings on those days, the claim 

is against Judge Cassidy only in his official capacity. The district court determined -- and the 

parties agreed -- that Plaintiff’s damage claims against Judge Cassidy in his official capacity are 

barred by sovereign immunity. 

Third, a district court commits no reversible error merely because the opinion explaining its 

order fails to address expressly one of the claims in a multi-count civil complaint. See Am. 

United Life Ins. Co. v. Martinez, 480 F.3d 1043, 1069-70 (11th Cir. 2007) (affirming the district 

court’s dismissal of a claim despite the district court’s failure to address the claim in its order of 

dismissal). After all, we can affirm a district court’s ruling “for any reason supported by the 

record, even if not relied on by the district court.” Cochran v. United States Health Care Fin. 

Admin., 291 F.3d 775, 778 n.3 (11th Cir. 2002). 

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for his request and referred him to 8 C.F.R. § 1003.27, which deals with the

public’s access to immigration hearings. When Judge Cassidy repeated his request 

that Plaintiff leave his courtroom, Plaintiff asked whether the respondent had 

requested a closed hearing. Judge Cassidy replied “no” and that the respondent 

was proceeding pro se. Judge Cassidy then told Plaintiff that he could order 

security guards to remove her. In response, Plaintiff asked Judge Cassidy again for 

“a legal reason for closing the hearing.” Judge Cassidy said “no,” told Plaintiff to 

remain in the courtroom, and that he would return with the pertinent regulation. 

Judge Cassidy then left the courtroom. Plaintiff alleges her verbal exchange with

Judge Cassidy lasted about 90 seconds and occurred in “normal conversational

tones.” Plaintiff -- concerned that Judge Cassidy had returned to his chambers to 

order guards to remove her physically from the courtroom -- told Judge Cassidy’s 

assistant that she would be waiting in the Immigration Court lobby in the event the 

respondent requested her presence as an observer. 

Plaintiff moved to the Immigration Court lobby, where she complained to 

“an EOIR court staff member about Defendant Cassidy’s unlawful actions” in 

closing the courtroom. Plaintiff then began documenting the incident in her 

notebook. Between 3:15 and 3:20 p.m., three building security guards3 entered the 

 3 The building security guards were employees of Paragon Systems, Inc., a private company 

contracted to provide security services for the Atlanta Immigration Court. Although Plaintiff 

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lobby area. One of the officers asked Plaintiff to leave the building; and after a 

brief verbal exchange, the guards escorted Plaintiff outside. The parties dispute 

whether Plaintiff was removed from the building on Judge Cassidy’s orders. 

According to Plaintiff, she overheard one guard tell another guard that Judge 

Cassidy wanted her out of the building.4

Plaintiff filed this civil action in district court. In pertinent part, Plaintiff 

purported to raise these claims:5 (1) a Bivens claim for damages against Judge 

Cassidy in his individual capacity; (2) a claim for injunctive relief against all 

defendants, including Judge Cassidy; (3) Bivens claims for damages against Fran 

Mooney, Assistant Director of the EOIR’s Office of Management Programs, in her 

individual capacity; and (4) a claim for declaratory judgment. 

The district court dismissed Plaintiff’s Bivens claim against Judge Cassidy 

in his individual capacity on grounds that Judge Cassidy was entitled to absolute 

judicial immunity. The district court also concluded that Judge Cassidy was 

 

named as defendants the three Paragon guards and a Paragon supervisor, those defendants are 

not parties to this appeal.

4 For purposes of this appeal and the sake of argument, we will make two assumptions about the 

record (1) that the evidence in the record is sufficient to support a factual finding that Judge 

Cassidy directed the security guards to remove Plaintiff from the court building and (2) that 

Judge Cassidy in fact gave such a direction. 

5 In her complaint, Plaintiff sought to assert 8 counts against 13 different defendants; all claims 

were disposed of in a series of orders issued by the district court. On appeal, Plaintiff challenges 

only the district court’s dismissal of the claims identified here: the remaining, once-asserted 

claims are not before us on appeal. 

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entitled to judicial immunity from Plaintiff’s claim for injunctive relief. About 

Plaintiff’s claims for injunctive relief against the remaining defendants, the district 

court dismissed those claims for lack of standing. The district court also dismissed 

for failure to state a claim Plaintiff’s Bivens claims against Mooney. The district 

court then declined to exercise jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s claim for declaratory 

relief.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Whether an official is entitled to absolute immunity is a question of law that 

we review de novo. Mikko v. City of Atlanta, 857 F.3d 1136, 1142 (11th Cir. 

2017). We also review de novo the district court’s dismissal for failure to state a 

claim, accepting as true the factual allegations in the complaint and construing 

them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Butler v. Sheriff of Palm Beach 

Cnty., 685 F.3d 1261, 1265 (11th Cir. 2012). We review a district court’s decision 

not to exercise jurisdiction over a claim for declaratory judgment under an abuseof-discretion standard. Wilton v. Seven Falls Co., 515 U.S. 277, 289-90 (1995).

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III. DISCUSSION

A. Absolute Judicial Immunity

1. Immigration Judges

“Few doctrines were more solidly established at common law than the 

immunity of judges from liability for damages for acts committed within their 

judicial jurisdiction.” Cleavinger v. Saxner, 474 U.S. 193, 199 (1985). The 

immunity applies even when the judge’s conduct “was in error, was done 

maliciously, or was in excess of his authority . . . .” Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 

349, 356-57 (1978). 

This absolute immunity is intended “for the benefit of the public, whose 

interest it is that the judges should be at liberty to exercise their functions with 

independence and without fear of consequences.” Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 

554 (1967). A judge has a duty to decide all cases brought before him, including 

those cases that are controversial and that may “arouse the most intense feelings in 

the litigants.” Id. A judge’s “errors may be corrected on appeal, but he should not 

have to fear that unsatisfied litigants may hound him with litigation charging 

malice or corruption. Imposing such a burden on judges would contribute not to 

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principled and fearless decision-making but to intimidation.” Id.; see also 

Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 226-27 (1988) (“If judges were personally liable 

for erroneous decisions, the resulting avalanche of suits, most of them frivolous but 

vexatious, would provide powerful incentives for judges to avoid rendering 

decisions likely to provoke such suits. The resulting timidity would be hard to 

detect or control, and it would manifestly detract from independent and impartial 

adjudication.” (citation omitted)). 

Absolute immunity is not reserved for Article III judges only. “Absolute 

immunity flows not from rank or title or ‘location within the Government,’ but 

from the nature of the responsibilities of the individual official.” Cleavinger, 474 

U.S. at 201 (citation omitted). The Supreme Court has thus applied a “functional 

approach” in determining whether an official is entitled to absolute immunity. Id.; 

Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 512-13 (1978). Factors to consider in deciding 

whether to apply absolute immunity to a particular person include these elements: 

(a) the need to assure that the individual can perform his functions 

without harassment or intimidation; (b) the presence of safeguards 

that reduce the need for private damages actions as a means of 

controlling unconstitutional conduct; (c) insulation from political 

influence; (d) the importance of precedent; (e) the adversary nature of 

the process; and (f) the correctability of error on appeal.

Cleavinger, 474 U.S. at 202 (citing Butz, 438 U.S. at 512). 

In the light of these considerations -- as well as the public policy underlying 

the doctrine -- absolute immunity has been extended to state court judges, Pierson, 

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386 U.S. 547, administrative law judges and federal hearing examiners, Butz, 438 

U.S. at 514, federal and state prosecutors, Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 

(1976); Yaselli v. Goff, 275 U.S. 503 (1927), aff’g 12 F.2d 396 (2d Cir. 1926), 

grand jurors, see Imbler, 424 U.S. at 423 n.20, and to witnesses testifying in 

judicial proceedings, Briscoe v. Lahue, 460 U.S. 325 (1983). 

In considering whether the doctrine of absolute judicial immunity extends 

properly to Immigration Judges, we are guided by the Supreme Court’s decisions 

in Butz and in Cleavinger. We first recognize that -- as with judges of general 

jurisdiction and with administrative law judges -- Immigration Judges are tasked 

with resolving cases that “are every bit as fractious as those which come to court.” 

See Butz, 438 U.S. at 513. That immigration proceedings are adversarial in nature 

and often involve controversial issues of extreme significance to those persons 

involved underscores the importance of preserving the Immigration Judge’s 

independence. Cf. Stump, 435 U.S. at 364 (“The fact that the issue before the 

judge is a controversial one is all the more reason that he should be able to act 

without fear of suit.”). 

We also see an Immigration Judge’s role in immigration proceedings as 

sufficiently “functionally comparable” to that of a judge. Immigration Judges 

possess many of the same powers as a trial judge. These powers include the power 

to subpoena witnesses and evidence, to administer oaths, to receive and rule on 

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evidence, to question parties and witnesses, to issue sanctions, to make credibility 

determinations, and to render decisions. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(1), (c); 8 C.F.R. 

§§ 1003.10(b), 1003.35. 

In addition, the structure of immigration proceedings contains many 

safeguards -- similar (although not always identical) to those discussed in Butz in 

the context of administrative hearings6 -- that tend to reduce the risk of unchecked 

unconstitutional conduct by Immigration Judges. Immigration Judges are 

professional hearing officers. In deciding cases before them, Immigration Judges 

are required to exercise “independent judgment and discretion” and to resolve 

issues in an “impartial manner.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.10(a), (b). Immigration Judges 

are also bound both by agency precedent, 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(g), and by precedent 

established by the federal appellate courts. Parties to an immigration hearing may 

be represented by counsel, 8 C.F.R. § 1003.16, may present documentary evidence 

and witness testimony, 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.31, 1003.34, 1003.35, and are entitled to 

written notice of the Immigration Judge’s decision which “shall” include reasons 

for the decision, 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.37, 1240.12(a), 1240.13(a). Parties may also 

seek review of the Immigration Judge’s decision by the Board of Immigration 

 6 The administrative hearing process considered by the Supreme Court in Butz was governed by 

the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 551 et seq.; an Act which is not applicable to the 

immigration proceedings considered in this appeal.

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Appeals (“BIA”) and, if necessary, by the federal courts. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252; 

8 C.F.R. § 1003.38.7 

That immigration proceedings do not contain safeguards identical to those 

safeguards identified by the Supreme Court in Butz is not outcome determinative 

here. The Supreme Court’s opinion in Cleavinger demonstrates that Butz does not 

wholly define the limits of judicial-immunity availability. In determining whether 

members of a prison discipline committee were entitled to absolute immunity, the 

Supreme Court compared the procedural safeguards available under the prison’s 

disciplinary policy to those discussed in Butz. Cleavinger, 474 U.S. at 203-06. 

Although the Supreme Court concluded ultimately that the prison policy’s 

procedural safeguards were insufficient to warrant absolute immunity, no 

individual safeguard or combination -- or lack thereof -- was strictly determinative. 

See id. 

That having been said, we find it instructive that many of the safeguards 

pointed out as absent in Cleavinger are present here. For instance, the Supreme 

Court in Cleavinger cared about the lack of these procedural safeguards: (1) that 

prisoners subject to the prison’s disciplinary policy were “afforded neither a lawyer 

nor an independent nonstaff representative;” (2) that prisoners had “no right to 

 7 In addition to the existence of procedural safeguards governing immigration proceedings, the 

Office of the Chief Immigration Judge also provides expressly a process by which persons --

including non-parties -- can complain about an Immigration Judge’s conduct. See THE UNITED 

STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, EXECUTIVE OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW,

https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/eoir/legacy/2013/05/23/IJComplaintProcess.pdf.

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compel the attendance of witnesses or to cross-examine;” (3) that prisoners had 

“no right to discovery;” (4) that “[t]here was no cognizable burden of proof;” 

(5) that “[n]o verbatim transcript was afforded;” and (6) that “[i]nformation 

presented often was hearsay or self-serving.” Id. at 206. 

Aliens in deportation proceedings, however, have a right to representation 

by a lawyer, the right to examine evidence against them, and the right to crossexamine witnesses. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(4)(A), (B). The immigration court is also 

required to maintain a complete record -- including a “verbatim” recording -- of all 

testimony and evidence presented at the hearing. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(4)(C); 

8 C.F.R. § 1240.9. In addition, immigration proceedings are governed by a 

statutorily-proscribed burden of proof. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c). 

The Supreme Court in Cleavinger also expressed concern that the members 

of the disciplinary committee lacked independence. 474 U.S. at 203-04, 206. The 

Supreme Court specially noticed that the committee members were “not 

professional hearing officers.” Id. at 204. And, because the committee members 

remained employees of the Bureau of Prisons, “they [were] direct subordinates of 

the warden who reviews their decision.” Id. The committee members were often 

responsible for resolving disputes -- including making credibility determinations --

between the inmate over whom they sat in judgment and the fellow employee who 

had lodged the disciplinary charge. Id. The committee members were “thus under 

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obvious pressure to resolve a disciplinary dispute in favor of the institution and 

their fellow employee.” Id. (“It is the old situational problem of the relationship 

between the keeper and the kept, a relationship that hardly is conducive to a truly 

adjudicative performance.”). 

Immigration Judges, meanwhile, are under the supervision and direction of 

the Chief Immigration Judge, who has “no authority to direct the result of an 

adjudication assigned to another immigration judge.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.9(b), (c). 

And an Immigration Judge’s decisions are reviewed on appeal by the BIA: a 

division of the EOIR separate and apart from the Office of the Chief Immigration 

Judge and with no direct supervisory authority over Immigration Judges. See 8 

C.F.R. § 1003.1. Immigration Judges are also independent of the agency 

responsible for enforcing the federal immigration laws: the United States 

Citizenship and Immigration Services. See THE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF 

JUSTICE, EXECUTIVE OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW,

https://www.justice.gov/eoir/about-office (last visited 14 December 2017). Given 

these structural safeguards, immigration proceedings do not involve the same 

potential for institutional bias as recognized in Cleavinger: no “relationship 

between the keeper and the kept.” 

Considering both the adjudicatory role that Immigration Judges play within 

the immigration-hearing process and the existence of what we view -- in the light 

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of the Supreme Court’s guidance -- as sufficient pertinent safeguards, we are 

persuaded that Immigration Judges are judges entitled to absolute immunity for 

their judicial acts, without regard to the motive with which those acts are allegedly 

performed. And we underline that absolute immunity is not merely a defense to 

liability: it is an immunity from suit and from “the other burdens of litigation” that 

“is effectively lost if a case is erroneously permitted to go to trial.” Cf. Mitchell v. 

Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985).

2. Judge Cassidy’s Entitlement to Absolute Immunity

Having determined that the doctrine of absolute judicial immunity applies to 

Immigration Judges, we next decide whether Judge Cassidy’s complained-of 

conduct -- excluding Plaintiff from both a courtroom and from the courthouse --

falls within the scope of that immunity. A judge acting within his judicial capacity 

is unentitled to absolute judicial immunity -- and, thus, is subject to suit and to civil 

liability -- only when he acts in the “clear absence of all jurisdiction.” See Stump, 

435 U.S. at 356-57. Here, we must determine whether Judge Cassidy acted in his 

judicial capacity and, if so, whether he acted in the “clear absence of all 

jurisdiction.” 

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In determining whether a judge’s act is “judicial” for purposes of immunity, 

we consider (1) whether the act is one normally performed by judges, and 

(2) whether the complaining party was dealing with the judge in his judicial 

capacity. Id. at 362. 

About the first element, the Supreme Court has instructed that we look only 

to “the nature and function of the act, not the act itself.” Mireles v. Waco, 502 

U.S. 9, 13 (1991) (quotations omitted); see also Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 

229 (1988) (the Court’s immunity analysis is informed by “the nature of the 

function performed”). If we were to examine, instead, the factual details of the 

particular act being challenged, “then any mistake of a judge in excess of his 

authority would become a ‘nonjudicial’ act, because an improper or erroneous act 

cannot be said to be normally performed by a judge.” Mireles, 502 U.S. at 12 

(determining that the pertinent “act” was “the function of directing police officers 

to bring counsel in a pending case before the court”: not “a judge’s direction to 

police officers to carry out a judicial order with excessive force”). “If judicial 

immunity means anything, it means that a judge will not be deprived of immunity 

because the action he took was in error or was in excess of his authority.” Id. at 

12-13 (quotations and alterations omitted). 

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Judge Cassidy’s decisions to close particular immigration hearings to the 

public -- and to exclude Plaintiff from the courtroom -- were decisions made in the 

direct exercise of the judicial function. 

If Judge Cassidy ordered Plaintiff removed from the court building, he was 

also engaged in performing a judicial function. Judges have an obligation to 

maintain control over the courthouse and over the conduct of persons in the 

courthouse; the issuance of an order removing persons from the courthouse in the 

interest of maintaining such control is an ordinary function performed by judges: 

for example,8 where a person might not be complying with a court order or might 

be impeding the judicial proceeding.9

 Cf. Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 358 

(1966) (“the courtroom and courthouse premises are subject to the control of the 

court”); United States v. Smith, 426 F.3d 567, 569, 576 (2d Cir. 2005) (stressing 

 8 These circumstances are not necessarily the only circumstances in which public access (or 

access by a particular person) might be denied to court proceedings or to a courthouse – in the 

exercise of the judicial function by a judge acting in his judicial capacity. 

9 We reject the position that a judge’s ordering a person removed from a courthouse constitutes 

an administrative, legislative, or executive (apart from a judicial) function. A judge’s authority 

to control his courtroom -- and, necessarily, the environment surrounding his courtroom -- stems 

directly from his duties as a judge. For background, see Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219 (1988) 

(discussing the distinction between judicial acts and a judge’s administrative, legislative, and 

executive functions). See also Barrett v. Harrington, 130 F.3d 246, 256 n.11 (6th Cir. 1997) (“a 

judge acts in a judicial capacity when exercising control of the judge’s courtroom.” (citing 

Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966))); Gregory v. Thompson, 500 F.2d 59, 64 (9th Cir. 

1974) (denying absolute immunity to a judge who personally used physical force to remove an 

observer from the courtroom -- an act performed “normally” by a sheriff or a bailiff -- but 

explaining that judges have an “obligation” to “protect the sanctity and dignity of courtroom 

proceedings” and that the judge should have, instead, summoned a sheriff to escort the observer

from the courtroom). 

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the importance that the judiciary -- not the Marshals Service -- play the primary 

role in controlling access to federal buildings containing courtrooms); United 

States v. Ulan, 421 F.2d 787, 788 (2d Cir. 1970) (appeal from a conviction for 

assaulting and interfering with a U.S. Deputy Marshal, which arose after a district 

court judge ordered the Marshals to clear the courtroom and to escort all 

demonstrators outside the courthouse); Richman v. Sheahan, 512 F.3d 876, 880 

(7th Cir. 2008) (a state court judge ordered the son of a woman contesting a traffic 

ticket to leave the court building and, when he refused, ordered court security 

officers to arrest the man for contempt); United States v. Brugnara, 856 F.3d 1198, 

1205 (9th Cir. 2017) (district court judge ordered a belligerent juror removed from 

the building); State v. Bush, 714 P.2d 818, 823 (Ariz. 1986) (“the trial judge has 

the primary responsibility for controlling the conduct of spectators in the 

courtroom and the courthouse” and, if necessary, “may clear the courtroom and the 

courthouse of those who may be intimidating witnesses or other court 

personnel.”).10

Moreover, Judge Cassidy’s supposed order to remove Plaintiff from the 

building “arose directly and immediately out of” Judge Cassidy’s dealings with 

 10 These cases involve no claim of absolute judicial immunity. Thus, that the particular facts of 

these cases may differ from the facts involved in this appeal does not change our immunity 

analysis. We cite these cases only for the proposition that judges have an obligation to maintain 

control over their courtroom and courthouse: to illustrate that the act of ordering a person --

including a member of the press, demonstrator, or other observer -- removed from a court 

building is one performed “normally” by judges.

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Plaintiff in his judicial capacity: directing Plaintiff only moments earlier to leave 

his courtroom after closing to the public the immigration hearing.11 See Stump, 

435 U.S. at 361 (a factor tending to show that a judge acted within his judicial 

capacity is if “the confrontation arose directly and immediately out of a visit to the 

judge in his official capacity” (citing with approval McAlester v. Brown, 469 F.2d 

1280, 1282 (5th Cir. 1972))). We stress that -- for purposes of our immunity 

analysis -- we need not decide (and do not decide) whether Judge Cassidy’s 

decision, in this instance, to have Plaintiff removed from the court building was 

without error: that Judge Cassidy, on the pertinent afternoon, was acting within the 

scope of his judicial capacity when he dealt with Plaintiff is adequate. 

Next, we reject Plaintiff’s contention that Judge Cassidy acted in the “clear 

absence of all jurisdiction.” The parties do not dispute that Immigration Judges 

 11 Construing the record in Plaintiff’s favor, we cannot conclude that Judge Cassidy’s supposed

order to have Plaintiff removed from the court building was separate and distinct, with no 

overlap, from his request that Plaintiff leave his courtroom. The two events were separated in 

time -- at most -- by about fifteen minutes. Furthermore, when Judge Cassidy returned to his 

chambers and supposedly ordered guards to remove Plaintiff from the building, he had just 

directed Plaintiff twice to leave the courtroom and told Plaintiff that he could order guards to 

remove her. Although Plaintiff denies that she refused flatly to leave the courtroom, she does not 

dispute that she questioned the judge’s authority there or that she continued to remain in the 

courtroom -- despite Judge Cassidy’s requests for her to leave and warning he would summon 

guards to remove her -- until after Judge Cassidy had left the courtroom himself and he appeared 

to Plaintiff to be calling security. Upon her leaving the courtroom and entering the Immigration 

Court lobby, Plaintiff continued to complain to a court staff member about the legality of Judge 

Cassidy’s decision to close the hearing. She was still in the process of documenting the incident 

when guards arrived to escort her out of the building. Given Plaintiff’s story on how the events 

progressed, we see no clear-cut important break in the train between Judge Cassidy’s two 

supposed orders: the pertinent events of this single-afternoon’s occurrence are -- temporally and 

logically -- linked to Plaintiff’s words and conduct in front of Judge Cassidy and his order 

closing certain courtroom proceedings to the public.

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have express authority to order a hearing closed to the public under certain 

circumstances, including “for the purpose of protecting witnesses, parties, or the 

public interest.” See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.27. Again, we need not decide (and do not 

decide) today whether Judge Cassidy’s decision, in this instance, to close the 

hearings in the pertinent cases was correct: we decide that Immigration Judges 

possess the authority to close hearings. See Dykes v. Hosemann, 776 F.2d 942, 

947 (11th Cir. 1985) (rejecting the argument that a judge acted in the “clear 

absence of all jurisdiction” when he issued an erroneous ruling: that a judge’s 

ruling may have been in error “does not affect the fact that it was within his power 

to make that determination.”). 

In addition, even if Judge Cassidy lacked express statutory or regulatory 

authority to order Plaintiff removed from the court building, Judge Cassidy acted 

in no “clear absence of all jurisdiction” in doing so. Immigration Judges do have

express authority to “regulate the course” of removal hearings. See 8 C.F.R. 

§§ 1240.1(c), 1240.9. This authority triggers obligation. Based on this authority, 

the EOIR has recognized “that at times an Immigration Judge must be firm and 

decisive to maintain courtroom control.” See THE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF 

JUSTICE, EXECUTIVE OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW, Ethics and Professionalism 

Guide for Immigration Judges, at 3, https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/eoir/

legacy/2013/05/23/EthicsandProfessionalismGuideforIJs.pdf. 

Case: 16-12007 Date Filed: 12/15/2017 Page: 20 of 39 
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We decline to say -- as a matter of law -- that an Immigration Judge’s 

authority and obligation to maintain control over his courtroom vanishes at the 

threshold of the courtroom door. We oppose such an impractical, sharp-edged 

rule. Instead, an Immigration Judge’s express power over his courtroom implies 

necessarily the power to remove a person from the courtroom (and court building): 

for example, when a person might be perceived to threaten the integrity of judicial 

proceedings. The law has long accepted that, “[t]he grantor of anything to another, 

grants that also without which the thing granted would be useless.” S.S. Peloubet, 

A Collection of Legal Maxims in Law and Equity 43 (Rothman 1985) (1884) 

(“Cuicunque aliquis quid concedit, concedere videtur et id sine quo res ipsa esse 

non potuit.”). A judge’s authority to maintain control of his courtroom extends to 

the court building. See Sheppard, 384 U.S. at 358 (a case in which the Supreme 

Court discussed a trial court’s “duty” and “responsibility” to control news 

gatherers stationed inside the courtroom and throughout the court building). 

When judges believe that their immunity protection from private lawsuits 

can evaporate in novel situations or in heated controversies calling for a judge to 

act with discretion, the very reason for immunity is undercut: judges begin to think 

not only of what the law demands, but what is easiest and best for the judge, 

personally, and for the family finances -- and judicial independence is jeopardized. 

For immunity to be useful to protect judges from intimidation by threatened, 

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22

personally-burdensome lawsuits connected to the judge’s acts of discretion, the 

Supreme Court has told us that “the scope of a judge’s jurisdiction must be 

construed broadly”: a judge is not deprived of immunity merely because he acts in 

excess of his authority. See Stump, 435 U.S. at 356-57. So -- even if we are 

mistaken about the exact perimeter of an Immigration Judge’s authority -- we 

conclude Judge Cassidy did not act in the “clear absence of all jurisdiction” in 

directing that Plaintiff be removed from the court building; given the assumed state 

of affairs on the afternoon of 19 April 2010, enough connection to judicial 

proceedings was present.12

 12 Plaintiff contends that -- because the building security guards who escorted her from the court 

building were no employees of the EOIR or the Department of Justice -- Judge Cassidy acted in 

the “clear absence of all jurisdiction” when he supposedly ordered the security guards to remove 

Plaintiff from the building. 

The question of whether the security guards were obliged by law to carry out a supposed 

direction from Judge Cassidy is a different question than whether Judge Cassidy gave the 

direction while acting in his judicial capacity or in the “clear absence of all jurisdiction” for 

purposes of immunity. For example, we suspect that a judge could correctly call on privatecitizen passersby to assist in maintaining peace and order around the courtroom in some 

circumstances. Whether these private citizens would be obliged to do so might be questionable. 

But that the judge would be acting in a judicial capacity and not clearly in the absence of all 

jurisdiction would not be questionable at all.

If Judge Cassidy had no official authority over the building security guards, that circumstance

does not change our decision about immunity. In Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9 (1991), the 

Supreme Court concluded that a state court judge acted within his judicial capacity -- and not in 

the “complete absence of all jurisdiction” -- when the judge allegedly ordered two police officers 

to use excessive force to seize plaintiff (a lawyer who had failed to appear timely in the 

courtroom) and to bring plaintiff forcibly into the judge’s courtroom. Among other things, the 

Supreme Court rejected the assertion that the fact that the judge’s order was carried out by police 

officers somehow rendered the judge’s act “executive” in character. 502 U.S. at 12-13 (likening 

the judge’s direction to the police officers to a “judge’s issuance of a warrant for an executive

officer to search a home,” which the Court described as an “unquestionably” judicial act). 

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Because Judge Cassidy was acting within his judicial capacity -- and not in 

the “clear absence of all jurisdiction” -- we affirm the district court’s determination 

that Judge Cassidy was entitled to the absolute immunity of a judge.

About injunctive relief 

Absolute immunity protects Judge Cassidy both from Plaintiff’s Bivens

claim seeking money damages and also the claim for injunctive relief. See Bolin 

v. Story, 225 F.3d 1234, 1240-42 (11th Cir. 2000).13 

In Bolin, we decided that judicial immunity can bar claims for injunctive 

relief as well as for damages. Plaintiff plays up that Bolin involved Article III 

judges (including Circuit Judges) and points out that Immigration Judges are not 

identically situated. We take the point. And we accept that some of the reasoning 

in Bolin would not apply to the case of Immigration Judges. But we think the most 

 

Moreover, even to the extent the judge exceeded his authority in authorizing or ratifying the 

officers’ use of excessive force, the Supreme Court concluded the judge’s act -- “taken in the 

very aid of the judge’s jurisdiction over a matter before him” -- was not taken in the clear 

absence of jurisdiction. Id. at 13. 

13 Plaintiff’s contention that she has no other remedy to review Judge Cassidy’s conduct is 

inaccurate: a formal administrative process is available for filing complaints against an 

Immigration Judge. Plaintiff availed herself of that remedy. That the result reached by the 

process, in this instance, was not pleasing to Plaintiff does not establish the process is inadequate 

as a check on possible misconduct by Immigration Judges. 

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important ideas do apply, and the conclusion is on the same line: immunity bars 

injunctive relief against Immigration Judges. 

Litigation puts the weight of time, trouble, and expense on the attacked 

judge whether the plaintiff seeks damages or an injunction at the end of the action. 

To be entangled in litigation is a distraction and more. Also, if a plaintiff wins an 

injunction, the judge faces the threat of more time, trouble, and expense of 

defending against accusations that the judge is later in violation of the injunction 

and faces the threat of contempt punishments, including incarceration maybe. We 

stress that it is the threat of private parties instituting actions and proceedings (and 

not just the possibility that the judge will be a losing party in those 

actions/proceedings) that carries with it the chilling potential for judges as they 

work.

None of this hauling judges into court by private parties seems likely to 

advance the goal of fearless decision making by judges facing the obligation to 

make difficult decisions in intensely contentious situations. Without strong 

immunity to protect judges in their work, it would be too easy for the judges’ 

critics (and many judges, if they have served long, have critics) to hound the 

judges, by threatened litigation, to the point of actual interference -- conscious or 

unconscious -- in judicial decision making. The rule of the Bolin case covers 

Immigration Judges, too. 

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B. Claims Against Remaining Individual Defendants

1. Bivens Damages Claims

Plaintiff next challenges the district court’s dismissal, pursuant to Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 12(b)(6), of her Bivens damages claims against Mooney.14 In dismissing 

Plaintiff’s claims, the district court determined that the allegations in Plaintiff’s 

complaint were insufficient to show that Mooney had violated the Constitution. 

A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing 

that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). To survive dismissal 

for failure to state a claim, “a plaintiff’s obligation to provide the grounds of his 

entitlement to relief requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic 

recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. 

Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quotations omitted). Instead, “a complaint 

must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief 

 14 In Plaintiff’s appellate brief, the heading for this portion of her argument includes “Defendant 

Mooney and the Other Federal Defendants.” Likewise, in the “Statement of the Issues” and 

“Summary of the Argument” sections of Plaintiff’s brief, Plaintiff refers to both Mooney and to 

“the other government defendants.” Despite these passing references, however, Plaintiff raises 

no substantive argument challenging the dismissal of her Bivens damages claims against any 

defendant other than Mooney. As a result, the claims against other people are not before us on 

appeal. See Sapuppo v. Allstate Floridian Ins. Co., 739 F.3d 678, 681 (“[A]n appellant abandons 

a claim when he either makes only passing references to it or raises it in a perfunctory manner 

without supporting arguments and authority.”). 

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that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) 

(quotation omitted). To state a claim for relief under Bivens, “a plaintiff must 

plead that each Government-official defendant, through the official’s own 

individual actions, has violated the Constitution.” Id. at 676 (emphasis added). 

Mooney is liable only for her own misconduct, if any. About Mooney’s 

individual conduct, Plaintiff’s amended complaint alleges only that on 19 April 

2010, EOIR’s public affairs officer sent an email to several EOIR employees -- one 

of whom then forwarded the email to Mooney -- notifying them that Plaintiff was 

at the Atlanta Immigration Court. Alleging the mere passive receipt of an email 

alleges no misconduct on Mooney’s part and is insufficient to show that Mooney 

violated Plaintiff’s constitutional rights.15 Plaintiff’s complaint contains only one 

 15 We have read Plaintiff’s complaint (as she and her lawyers had amended it) and have 

construed the factual allegations in her favor, and we find no “plain statement” about how 

Mooney’s individual conduct in fact caused Plaintiff’s alleged injuries in this case. For example, 

Plaintiff has made no allegation that Mooney, in fact, instructed, directed, or ordered someone to 

escort Plaintiff out of the court building. Nor has Plaintiff alleged that Mooney actually had 

prior knowledge of Plaintiff’s wrongful removal from the building but failed to intervene. Cf. 

Keating v. City of Miami, 598 F.3d 753, 763-64 (11th Cir. 2010) (allegations that supervising 

officers approved orders permitting subordinate officers to discharge weapons, or directed 

subordinate officers to discharge weapons, were sufficient to satisfy the pleading requirement 

because the allegations established a causal connection between the supervising officers’ conduct 

and plaintiffs’ alleged injuries); Gonzalez v. Reno, 325 F.3d 1228, 1235 (11th Cir. 2003) (a 

causal connection between a supervisor’s conduct and the alleged constitutional violation may be 

“established by facts which support an inference that the supervisor directed the subordinates to 

act unlawfully or knew that the subordinates would act unlawfully and failed to stop them from 

doing so.”). We cite these examples only to explain the kinds of straightforward allegations of 

fact that might satisfy the federal pleading requirement, not to suggest that particular allegations 

or words are necessary to state a claim for relief. By the way, the complaint also contains no 

allegation that Mooney was stationed in Atlanta, was present in Atlanta on the pertinent day, or 

otherwise witnessed the complained-of conduct. 

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other factual allegation specific to Mooney: identifying Mooney as EOIR’s 

“Assistant Director for the Office of Management Programs” who, at all particular 

times, was “responsible for security, space and facilities.” To be a supervisor is 

not wrongful. In addition, Plaintiff’s unsupported conclusory assertions that 

Defendants generally -- including Mooney -- “caused, participated in, condoned, or 

covered up” various alleged wrongs also fail to satisfy the federal pleading 

standard. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a 

cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.”). 

Without more “factual enhancements” about Mooney, the complaint at most 

hints only at some possibility of Plaintiff’s entitlement to relief against Mooney: 

no showing per Rule 8 that Plaintiff is entitled. See id.; Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557. 

We affirm the district court’s Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal.16 

 16 On appeal, Plaintiff seeks to demonstrate Mooney’s personal involvement in the alleged 

constitutional violations by relying on deposition testimony. The district court, however, 

dismissed Plaintiff’s Bivens claims against Mooney pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), without 

considering material outside the complaint. In reviewing the district court’s ruling, therefore, we 

also look only to factual allegations in the complaint to determine whether Plaintiff stated a 

claim for relief. See Speaker v. United States HHS CDC & Prevention, 623 F.3d 1371, 1379 

(11th Cir. 2010) (“In appeals of Rule 12(b)(6) dismissals, it is generally true that the scope of the 

review must be limited to the four corners of the complaint.” (quotation omitted)).

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2. Claims for Injunctive Relief

In her complaint, Plaintiff sought permanent injunctive relief, enjoining the 

defendants “from unlawfully excluding Plaintiff from Defendant Cassidy’s 

courtroom” and “from excluding, removing or causing the exclusion or removal of 

Plaintiff from any federal facility within this Court’s jurisdiction, where 

deportation/removal hearings are conducted, as to which Plaintiff has a lawful right 

of access.” 

The district court dismissed for lack of standing Plaintiff’s claim for 

injunctive relief against the individual government defendants, including Mooney. 

Given the district court’s earlier determination that Plaintiff failed to allege facts 

sufficient to demonstrate that each defendant had committed a constitutional 

violation, the district court concluded that Plaintiff also failed to demonstrate the 

requisite past or threat of future personal injury necessary to establish standing. 

“[T]o establish Article III standing, a plaintiff must allege personal injury 

fairly traceable to the defendant’s allegedly unlawful conduct and likely to be 

redressed by the requested relief.” Dep’t of Commerce v. United States House of 

Representatives, 525 U.S. 316, 329 (1999). To satisfy this standing requirement, a 

plaintiff seeking prospective injunctive relief must “allege facts from which it 

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appears there is a substantial likelihood that he will suffer injury in the future.” 

Strickland v. Alexander, 772 F.3d 876, 883 (11th Cir. 2014). 

In this appeal, we have already determined that Plaintiff failed to allege facts 

sufficient to demonstrate a constitutional violation by Mooney in the past. Plaintiff 

has also alleged no facts that would demonstrate a “substantial likelihood” that she 

would suffer an injury “fairly traceable” to Mooney in the future. Plaintiff has thus 

failed to establish Article III standing to seek to enjoin Mooney. See id. 

To the extent that Plaintiff challenges the dismissal of her injunctive relief 

claim against “Other Administrators,”17 her argument also fails. As we have 

already noted, Plaintiff, on appeal, raises no meaningful challenge to the district 

court’s determination that Plaintiff failed to show a past constitutional injury 

caused by these other defendants. Nor did she allege facts sufficient to 

demonstrate that she is likely to suffer a personal injury in the future that is either 

fairly traceable to an individual defendant’s unlawful conduct or that is redressable

by the requested injunction. The district court committed no error in dismissing 

Plaintiff’s injunctive relief claim for lack of standing. 

 17 We construe the term “Other Administrators” to mean Defendants Eric Holder, Juan Osuna, 

MaryBeth Keller, Gary Smith, Cynthia Long, and Darren Eugene Summers.

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C. Declaratory Judgment

Plaintiff contends that the district court abused its discretion in declining to 

grant her declaratory judgment claim. 

The Declaratory Judgment Act confers on federal courts a “unique and 

substantial discretion in deciding whether to declare the rights of litigants.” 

Wilton, 515 U.S. at 286. “The statute’s textual commitment to discretion, and the 

breadth of leeway [the Supreme Court] has always understood it to suggest, 

distinguish the declaratory judgment context from other areas of the law in which 

concepts of discretion surface.” Id. at 286-87. 

The Declaratory Judgment Act has been characterized as an “enabling Act,” 

giving the district courts discretion to grant a new form of relief. Id. at 287-88. 

The Act, however, confers no “absolute right upon the litigant” and imposes no 

duty on the district courts. Id. Thus -- even when a civil action satisfies federal 

subject matter jurisdictional prerequisites -- a district court still maintains 

discretion about “whether and when to entertain an action under the Declaratory 

Judgment Act.” Id. at 282; see also Brillhart v. Excess Ins. Co. of Amer., 316 U.S. 

491, 494 (1942) (“Although the District Court had jurisdiction of the suit under the 

Federal Declaratory Judgments Act, it was under no compulsion to exercise that 

jurisdiction.”). “In the declaratory judgment context, the normal principle that 

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federal courts should adjudicate claims within their jurisdiction yields to 

considerations of practicality and wise judicial administration.” Wilton, 515 U.S. 

at 288. And we must be mindful that the “facts bearing on the usefulness of the 

declaratory judgment remedy, and the fitness of the case for resolution, are 

peculiarly within [the district court’s] grasp.” See id. at 289.

With this law in mind, we now consider the district court’s ruling in this 

case. Plaintiff’s complaint included two seemingly different requests for 

declaratory relief.18 On appeal, however, Plaintiff asserts only that the district 

court erred in failing to consider the following relief set out in Plaintiff’s 

complaint: 

That [the district court] require that, where a deportation/removal 

hearing is partially or completely closed to the public, the immigration 

judge make specific findings on the record documenting the reasons 

for closure in order that a reviewing court can determine whether 

closure was lawful and whether less restrictive alternatives existed.

In response to the district court’s show-cause order, Plaintiff put the request for 

declaratory judgment in a different way: “that hearings administered by the [EOIR] 

may not be closed to the public unless and until the presiding immigration judge 

 18 In Count VII of Plaintiff’s complaint -- titled “Declaratory Judgment” -- Plaintiff sought a 

declaration “that Plaintiff, the public and the press have the right, under the United States 

Constitution and federal law, to attend, observe, take notes on and report on deportation/removal 

hearings, to the extent authorized by the Constitution and federal law.” In the Complaint’s 

“Prayer for Relief,” Plaintiff requested both the declaration set out in Count VII and the relief 

asserted on appeal: a declaration that the Immigration Judge be required to make specific 

findings on the record documenting the reasons for closing an immigration hearing to the public. 

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32

makes a public on the record determination that closure is warranted under 

8 C.F.R. § 1003.27.” (some emphasis added).19

As an initial matter, in the light of the different -- and evolving -- requests 

for relief sought in Plaintiff’s complaint and in Plaintiff’s response to the district 

court’s show-cause order, we cannot say that the district court characterized 

unreasonably Plaintiff’s request as “unclear” and “amorphous and abstract.” We 

accept that a plaintiff’s failure to state definitely and consistently the declaratory 

relief sought is in itself a sufficient basis to deny such discretionary relief as a 

declaratory judgment.

Furthermore, the district court committed no clear error of judgment in 

determining that the relief requested “would do little to provide concrete relief and 

clarification to the parties in this case.” “[A] declaratory judgment may only be 

issued in the case of an ‘actual controversy.’” Malowney v. Fed. Collection 

Deposit Grp., 193 F.3d 1342, 1347 (11th Cir. 1999). “The controversy must be 

definite and concrete, touching the legal relations of parties having adverse legal 

interests.” Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 240-41 (1937). “It must 

be a real and substantial controversy admitting of specific relief through a decree 

 19 The import of the requests in the complaint and in the response to the show-cause order is not 

the same. The timing of findings called for in the response would be a significant additional 

restriction on Immigration Judges on top of the restricting requirement that Immigration Judges 

must make express findings. The timing requirement and the express-findings requirement both 

go beyond the duty simply to make a record that would justify closure of the courtroom.

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33

of a conclusive character, as distinguished from an opinion advising what the law 

would be upon a hypothetical set of facts.” Id. at 241. 

We stress -- and no one disputes -- that immigration hearings already are 

presumptively open to the public. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.27.20 That the 

circumstances in which an Immigration Judge may close a hearing are already 

limited by regulation undercuts significantly the necessity and usefulness of 

Plaintiff’s requested declaration. 

Moreover, this case is not one in which immigration hearings were closed 

and in which the record is obviously without facts to justify the closures. Instead, 

sufficient facts exist in the record to show the basis upon which the hearings were 

 20 Section 1003.27 provides expressly that “[a]ll hearings, other than exclusion hearings, shall be 

open to the public except” in these circumstances:

(a) Depending upon physical facilities, the Immigration Judge may place 

reasonable limitations upon the number in attendance at any one time with 

priority being given to the press over the general public;

(b) For the purpose of protecting witnesses, parties, or the public interest, the 

Immigration Judge may limit attendance or hold a closed hearing.

(c) In any proceeding before an Immigration Judge concerning an abused alien 

spouse, the hearing and the Record of Proceeding shall be closed to the public 

unless the abused spouse agrees that the hearing and the Record of Proceeding 

shall be open to the public. In any proceeding before an Immigration Judge 

concerning an abused alien child, the hearing and the Record of Proceeding shall 

be closed to the public.

(d) Proceedings before an Immigration Judge shall be closed to the public if 

information subject to a protective order under § 1003.46, which has been filed 

under seal pursuant to § 1003.31(d), may be considered.

8 C.F.R. § 1003.27.

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34

closed and from which a reviewing body could determine whether closure, 

pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 1003.27, was warranted. 

The district court also was aware that, by means of declaratory relief, the 

court was being asked to instruct immigration tribunals in how to discharge their 

duties: a sensitive point for separation of powers among other things. Given the 

circumstances, the district court could conclude properly that the nature of the 

dispute, danger, and uncertainty to which the court’s attention was being called 

was insufficient to demand the declaration requested. In short, Plaintiff has failed 

to satisfy the difficult burden of showing that the district court abused its “unique 

and substantial discretion” in deciding whether to exercise jurisdiction over 

Plaintiff’s claim for declaratory judgment. In the light of the substantial deference 

afforded district courts about what is useful and necessary in the declaratory 

judgment context, we accept the district court’s conclusion. 

AFFIRMED.

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35

WILLIAMS, District Judge, concurring: 

Although I concur in today’s result, I write separately to address the scope of 

the absolute judicial immunity standard articulated by the majority. Specifically, I 

believe their analysis expands the protections of judicial immunity further than is 

necessary to decide this case and beyond the boundaries set by the Supreme Court. 

First, I disagree with the blanket assertion that for judicial immunity 

purposes, ordering persons removed from the courthouse is an obligation for 

judges and an ordinary function performed by judges.1

 To be sure, ordering a 

person removed from a courthouse can be an “ordinary” judicial function where 

the person disrupts, threatens, or otherwise impedes a judicial proceeding before 

the judge. Absent this connection to an ongoing judicial proceeding, however, the 

“nature of the function” performed is not necessarily judicial. See Forrester v. 

White, 484 U.S. 219, 226-29 (1988) (distinguishing between truly judicial acts and 

“functions that judges may on occasion be assigned by law to perform,” and 

holding that although judges may be obligated to—and may “ordinarily”—hire and 

fire individuals in their staff, they are not entitled to absolute immunity for these 

administrative, rather than judicial decisions).

 1 The cases cited by the majority to support this proposition all involve individuals who disturbed 

ongoing proceedings in the courtroom or otherwise obstructed adjudicatory matters before the 

judge. None address judicial immunity.

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36

In this case, according to Professor Stevens’ own allegations, she was 

removed from the building after she did not immediately comply with IJ Cassidy’s

order to exit his courtroom so a sealed matter could proceed. As such, I agree that, 

on this record, IJ Cassidy’s removal of Professor Stevens was a normal judicial 

function, because he issued the order during and as part of an ongoing proceeding. 

Second, although I agree that the removal order “arose directly and 

immediately out of IJ Cassidy’s dealing with Plaintiff in his judicial capacity,” I 

disagree that in reaching this conclusion, we should rely on a metric of the 

temporal proximity—approximately fifteen minutes—between IJ Cassidy’s order 

that Professor Stevens exit the courtroom and her removal from the building. In 

my view, IJ Cassidy engaged with Professor Stevens in a judicial capacity not 

based on any temporal test (15 minutes, an hour, a day, a week, etc.), but because 

he was on the bench presiding over an immigration matter when he ordered 

Professor Stevens to exit his courtroom. She apparently failed to comply, and IJ 

Cassidy ordered her removal from the building to carry out his initial order. 

Professor Stevens’ removal thus “arose directly and immediately” out of an order 

issued during an ongoing proceeding. If that were not the case, however, and the 

removal order were merely “temporally related” to Professor Stevens’ presence in 

IJ Cassidy’s courtroom, then IJ Cassidy could not “meaningfully be distinguished” 

from any employee, clerk, law enforcement officer, security guard, or building 

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37

manager who could similarly initiate her removal from the building, and judicial 

immunity would not apply. Forrester, 484 U.S. at 229.2

Finally, although I agree that on this record IJ Cassidy is entitled to judicial 

immunity, I am concerned about the question of Professor Stevens’ remedy for his 

conduct. The decision in Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall. 335, 20 L.Ed. 646 (1872), 

which established the doctrine of absolute judicial immunity, explained that the 

doctrine was designed to further the public interest in an independent judiciary, 

sometimes at the expense of legitimate individual grievances. Id. at 349; Pierson

v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554 (1967). The Bradley Court accepted those costs to 

aggrieved individuals only because the judicial system itself provided other means 

of protecting individual rights: “Against the consequences of [judges’] erroneous 

or irregular action, from whatever motives proceeding, the law has provided for 

private parties numerous remedies, and to those remedies they must, in such cases, 

resort.” Fisher, 13 Wall., at 354. However, the facts of this case amply 

demonstrate that the Atlanta Immigration Court’s administrative procedures did 

 2 In Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 229 (1988), the Supreme Court held that judges’ decisions 

to hire and fire staff are not “judicial” because “a judge who hires or fires a probation officer 

cannot meaningfully be distinguished from a district attorney who hires and fires assistant 

district attorneys, or indeed from any other Executive Branch official who is responsible for 

making such employment decisions.” (citing Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. (10 Otto) 339, 25 

L.Ed. 676 (1880)); see also Gregory v. Thompson, 500 F.2d 59, 64–65 (9th Cir. 1974) (holding 

that a judge who himself forcibly expelled a litigant from his courtroom was not entitled to 

absolute immunity because his “choice to perform an act similar to that normally performed by a 

sheriff or bailiff should not result in his receiving absolute immunity . . . simply because he was 

a judge at the time.”).

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38

not provide an avenue for meaningful review to safeguard Professor Stevens’ 

rights, especially in light of her history with IJ Cassidy and the Executive Office 

for Immigration Review.

3

The doctrine of judicial immunity is an important one, and opinions 

narrowing that doctrine must be thoughtfully circumscribed. By the same token, 

however, opinions expanding the doctrine demand commensurate caution. I agree 

that, on this record, IJ Cassidy may invoke judicial immunity for his order 

removing Professor Stevens from the building. But that conclusion is based on a 

far narrower understanding of what acts qualify as “truly judicial acts” and are 

therefore entitled to absolute judicial immunity. Because I believe that the 

 3 The majority does not address the personal, non-judicial reasons that allegedly motivated IJ 

Cassidy to remove Professor Stevens from the building and that involved nearly the entire 

apparatus of the EOIR. See Harris v. Deveaux, 780 F.2d 911, 915 (11th Cir. 1986) (recognizing 

that judges’ acts may not be entitled to judicial immunity if they result from “events in their 

private, nonjudicial lives, events in which they ha[ve] a personal stake.”). Though they 

acknowledge that “Plaintiff had published criticisms of deportation proceedings in general and of 

Immigration Judge William Cassidy’s performance in particular,” they fail to mention that based 

on these criticisms—including a piece that denounced IJ Cassidy for mistakenly deporting an 

American citizen—IJ Cassidy and EOIR officials monitored and tracked Professor Stevens’ 

visits to courtroom proceedings all over the Southeast. For example, in June 2009, the Atlanta 

Court Administrator emailed nineteen EOIR officials notifying them of Professor Stevens’ 

upcoming visit to Atlanta to obtain public records. In January 2010, IJ Cassidy (in Atlanta, GA) 

emailed an Assistant Chief Immigration Judge (in Falls Church, VA) to notify him that Professor 

Stevens was visiting the Stewart facility in Georgia. In April 2010, Professor Stevens visited an 

immigration facility in Lumpkin, Georgia. Upon her arrival, the Court Administrator 

immediately emailed EOIR public relations staff that Professor Stevens “want[s] access to view 

the court hearing today . . . Please advise!” According to the record, no other individual had ever 

attracted this kind of attention from EOIR officials. Moreover, about a week after the expulsion 

giving rise to this lawsuit, an employee in the Department of Justice’s Public Affairs Office 

emailed his colleagues regarding the “[p]ossible banning of blogger from immigration court.” 

These facts animate the claim that the process available to Professor Stevens was not just 

“displeasing” but was arguably inadequate as a check on IJ Cassidy’s misconduct. 

Case: 16-12007 Date Filed: 12/15/2017 Page: 38 of 39 
39

majority’s analysis of IJ Cassidy’s entitlement to judicial immunity has the 

potential to undermine the constitutional right of open access to public 

proceedings, I respectfully concur in the outcome only. 

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