UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT 

No. 08-5080

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Plaintiff - Appellee, 

 v. 

KEITH DEON BROWN, a/k/a Khayr Abdurrauf Basim Ibnbrown, 

 Defendant - Appellant. 

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of 

Maryland, at Baltimore. William D. Quarles, Jr., District 

Judge. (1:08-cr-00248-WDQ-1) 

Submitted: October 2, 2009 Decided: October 30, 2009 

Before NIEMEYER and SHEDD, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior 

Circuit Judge. 

Dismissed in part; affirmed in part by unpublished per curiam 

opinion. 

Russell Anthony Neverdon, Sr., Baltimore, Maryland, for 

Appellant. Solette Allison Magnelli, Assistant United States 

Attorney, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. 
PER CURIAM: 

 Keith Deon Brown pled guilty pursuant to a written 

plea agreement to distribution of five grams or more of cocaine 

base, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841 (2006). He was sentenced 

to 168 months’ imprisonment. Brown timely appeals. We dismiss 

in part and affirm in part. 

 The Government has moved to dismiss this appeal based 

on the provisions of the appellate waiver contained in Brown’s 

plea agreement. The plea agreement contains the following 

waiver of Brown’s right to appeal: 

The Defendant and this Office [of the U.S. Attorney] 

knowingly and expressly waive all rights conferred by 

18 U.S.C. § 3742 to appeal whatever sentence is 

imposed, including any fine, term of supervised 

release, or order of restitution and any issues that 

relate to the establishment of the advisory guidelines 

range as follows: the Defendant waives any right to 

appeal from any sentence within or below the advisory 

guidelines range resulting from Criminal History 

Category VI and an adjusted base offense level of 34, 

and this Office waives any right to appeal from any 

sentence within or above the advisory guidelines range 

resulting from Criminal History Category VI and an 

adjusted base offense level of 34. 

Brown, through counsel, opposes dismissal. He argues that the 

Government did not adhere to its end of the plea agreement and 

he did not receive effective assistance of counsel. 

 We first conclude that Brown has validly waived his 

right to appeal his sentence and its calculation. A defendant 

may, in a valid plea agreement, waive his appellate rights under 

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18 U.S.C. § 3742 (2006). United States v. Wiggins, 905 F.2d 51, 

53 (4th Cir. 1990). We review the validity of an appellate 

waiver de novo and will enforce the waiver if it is valid and 

the issue appealed is within the scope thereof. United 

States v. Blick, 408 F.3d 162, 171 (4th Cir. 2005). An appeal 

waiver is valid if the defendant knowingly and intelligently 

agreed to the waiver. Id. at 169. “An appeal waiver is not 

knowingly or voluntarily made if the district court fails to 

specifically question the defendant concerning the waiver 

provision . . . during the [Fed. R. Crim. P.] 11 colloquy and 

the record indicates that the defendant did not otherwise 

understand the full significance of the waiver.” United 

States v. Johnson, 410 F.3d 137, 151 (4th Cir. 2005) (internal 

quotation marks omitted). Ultimately, however, the issue is 

“evaluated by reference to the totality of the circumstances.” 

United States v. General, 278 F.3d 389, 400 (4th Cir. 2002). 

 Our review of the record persuades us that Brown 

knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to appeal his 

sentence. The waiver’s language is clear and unambiguous, and 

Brown responded in the affirmative when the district court 

explicitly inquired at the guilty plea colloquy whether Brown 

understood that the plea agreement foreclosed a later appeal of 

his sentence unless the court imposed either an illegal sentence 

or a sentence predicated on an offense level above 34. The 

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district court did neither. Accordingly, we conclude the waiver 

is valid and enforceable and that Brown’s challenge to his 

sentence falls within the scope of the waiver. The waiver thus 

precludes review of Brown’s sentence. Accordingly, we grant the 

Government’s motion to dismiss Brown’s appeal to the extent it 

challenges his sentence. 

 Brown’s remaining claims are not within the scope of 

the appellate waiver provision of his plea agreement. First, as 

to Brown’s argument that the Government failed to adhere to its 

obligations under the plea agreement, we simply discern no such 

noncompliance. 

 Further, we decline on direct appeal to entertain 

Brown’s assertions that his trial attorney afforded ineffective 

representation. Brown claims that his counsel erroneously 

assured him he would receive only the mandatory minimum ten-year 

sentence, misled him into pleading guilty because counsel failed 

to investigate the charges and was unprepared for trial, and did 

not sufficiently review the plea agreement with him, 

particularly the appellate waiver provisions and the negotiated 

base offense level. Brown also argues that such ineffective 

assistance undercuts the validity of his plea. Unless an 

attorney’s ineffectiveness is conclusively apparent on the face 

of the record, however, ineffective assistance claims are not 

generally addressed on direct appeal. See United States v. 

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Baldovinos, 434 F.3d 233, 239 (4th Cir. 2006); United States v. 

Richardson, 195 F.3d 192, 198 (4th Cir. 1999) (providing 

standard and noting that ineffective assistance of counsel 

claims generally should be raised by motion under 28 U.S.C.A. § 

2255 (West Supp. 2009)). Because we find the record in this 

case falls short of this exacting standard, we decline to 

address Brown’s ineffective assistance of counsel claims on 

direct appeal. 

 Accordingly, we grant the Government’s motion to 

dismiss, in part, and dismiss Brown’s challenge to his sentence. 

We affirm the remainder of the district court’s judgment. We 

dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal 

contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the 

court and argument would not aid the decisional process. 

DISMISSED IN PART; 

AFFIRMED IN PART