* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined

that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent

except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.

R. 47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

 

No. 98-10124

Summary Calendar

 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

GEORGE D. FARQUHAR,

Defendant-Appellant.

- - - - - - - - - -

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Texas

USDC No. 3:96-CR-120-X

- - - - - - - - - -

December 9, 1998

Before HIGGINBOTHAM, JONES, and DENNIS, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

George D. Farquhar was convicted of mail fraud in a case

hereinafter referred to as the “boat case.” Farquhar subsequently

pleaded to one count of using fire to commit a felony in violation

of 18 U.S.C. § 844(h) in a case hereinafter referred to as the

“arson case.”

Farquhar contends that the district court clearly erred by

increasing his offense level for obstruction of justice in the boat

case because the concealment of evidence occurred in the arson case

not the boat case. In his challenge to the obstruction 
No. 98-10124

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enhancement, Farquhar completely ignores the fact that he failed to

appear for sentencing, a separate and adequate basis for the

enhancement under § 3C1.1 of the Sentencing Guidelines. The

district court's imposition of an increase for obstruction of

justice was not clearly erroneous. See United States v.

O’Callaghan, 106 F.3d 1221, 1223 (5th Cir. 1997). 

The district court did not err in denying credit for

acceptance of responsibility. Conduct which results in an offenselevel enhancement under § 3C1.1 for obstruction of justice

"ordinarily indicates that the defendant has not accepted

responsibility for his criminal conduct" except in "extraordinary

cases in which adjustments under both §§ 3C1.1 and 3E1.1 may

apply." § 3E1.1, comment. (n.4). See United States v. Ayala, 47

F.3d 688, 691 (5th Cir. 1995).

The disparity between Farquhar’s sentence and that received by

his coconspirators did not amount to a violation of his rights

under the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the Fifth

Amendment. See United States v. Rojas-Martinez, 968 F.2d 415, 419-

20 (5th Cir. 1992)

Farquhar asserts that his counsel was ineffective on the

general basis that counsel did not adequately "investigate,

develop[,] and present all facts, matters[,] and issues" relevant

to the case. Blue brief, 23-29. We will not reach the merits of

the claim because is not sufficient to allow the court "to evaluate

fairly the merits of the claim." United States v. Higdon, 832 F.2d

312, 314 (5th Cir. 1987). 
No. 98-10124

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Farquhar asserts that all of the errors alleged in his appeal,

even though they may be found to be harmless individually, combine

to create reversible error. As discussed above, Farquhar has

established no error, much less harmless error, in the district

court’s handling of this case. Even accepting the premise that

multiple harmless errors can accumulate to a reversible error, an

infinite number of allegations that produce no showing of any error

cannot add up to reversible error. “Twenty times zero equals

zero.” Mullen v. Blackburn, 808 F.2d 1143, 1147 (5th Cir. 1987).

Farquhar has filed a motion for leave to file a pro se

supplemental brief. It is against this court’s policy to consider

pro se motions and briefs from parties who are represented by

counsel. See United States v. Daniels, 572 F.2d 535, 540 (5th Cir.

1978). The motion is DENIED.

AFFIRMED; MOTION DENIED.