Interim Decision #3047 

MATTER OF GUTIERREZ 

In Exclusion Proceedings 

A-28737'747 

Decided by Board March 11, 1988 

(1) An immigration judge may permit an alien in exclusion proceedings to withdraw 

his application for admission; however, an alien may not be permitted to withdraw his application for admission unless he satisfies the immigration judge that 

factors directly relating to the issue of his admissibility indicate that 'justice may 

best be served" by permitting withdrawal and that he possesses both the intent 

and the means to depart immediately from the United States. 

(2) A balancing of the equities test is not an appropriate method by which to determine whether an alien merits permission to withdraw an application for admi3- 

Eciark. 

(9) It was never contemplated that the withdrawal of an application for admission 

would become a nonstatutory form of "relief' from excludability which an applicant could apply for after excludability became apparent. 

(4) Once the exclusion hearing has been conducted and the issues of excludability 

have been resolved, such permission should ordinarily only be granted with the 

concurrence of the Service. 

EXCLUDABLE: Act of 1952—Sec. 212(aX14) [8 U.S.C. § 1182(aX14)]—No valid labor 

certification 

Sec. 212(0(19) [8 U.S.C. §1182(aX19)]—Procured visa 

and seeks entry by fraud or willful misrepresentation of a material fact 

Sec. 212(aX20) [8 U.S.C. § 1182(aX20)]—No valid immigrant visa 

ON BEHALF OF APPLICANT: ON BEHALF OF SERVICE: 

Walter Rafael Pineda, Esquire Samuel Bettwy 

615 Sansome Street General Attorney 

San Francisco, California 94111 

BY: Milhollan, Chairman; Dunne, Morris, Vacca, and Heilman, Board Members 

In. a decision dated May 28, 1987, the immigration judge permitted the applicant to withdraw his application for admission to the 

United States. The Immigration and Naturalization Service has ap562 
Interim Decision #3047 

pealed. The appeal will be sustained and the record will be remanded_ L 

The applicant is a native and citizen of Mexico who was detained 

by the Service as he attempted to enter the United States at San 

Francisco International Airport on May 26, 1987. On that same 

date, the applicant was served with a Notice to Applicant for Admission Detained for Hearing before Immigration Judge (Form I122) advising him that he had been placed in custody pending a 

hearing before an immigration judge to determine whether he was 

excludable under sections 212(aX14), (19), and (20) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182(a)(14), (19), and (20) (1982 

& Supp. IV 1986), for, respectively, not having a valid labor certification, procuring a visa and seeking to enter the United States by 

fraud or willful misrepresentation of a material fact, and not being 

in possession of a valid immigrant visa. 

At the exclusion hearing, the immigration judge, without objection from the applicant's counsel, admitted into evidence an Order 

to Appear for Deferred Inspection (Form 1-546) dated May 26, 1987. 

That document reflects that the applicant sought admission as a 

returning lawful permanent resident and that he had in his possesaiou an. Alien Registration Receipt Card (Form I-151), which he informed. Service officers he had purchased on the street for $40. 

The applicant testified that he originally entered the United 

States in November 1978 and since that date had departed only 

once, for a 3-week period, in order to visit his infirm mother. 2He 

further advised that, during his stay in this country, he was continuously employed, never received public assistance, and always 

filed his income taxes. Moreover, he indicated that he is married to 

a lawful permanent resident and that they have one United States 

citizen_ child and are currently expecting another. Finally, he 

stated that be has no criminal record in this country and is able to 

pay for his transportation back to Mexico. 

Although the immigration judge found that the applicant was excludable under sections 212(014), (19), and (20) of the Act, he permitted the applicant to withdraw his application for admission, 

concluding that the favorable equities in the case outweighed the 

adverse factor of the attempted fraudulent entry. The immigration 

judge cited as positive considerations the fact that the applicant 

has a lawful permanent resident spouse who will be eligible for 

1This decision was originally entered on December 28, 1987. We have reopened on 

our own motion for the limited purpose of incorporating revisions for publication. 

2Upon his return from this trip, the applicant was detained by the Service and 

placed in the present proceedings. 

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Interim Decision #3047 

citizenship in 1 year, that he is the father of a United States citizen child and his spouse is expecting, that he has no arrest or welfare record, that he has been gainfully employed, and that he has 

been supporting and living with his family. 

On appeal, the Service argues that the immigration judge erred 

in permitting the applicant to withdraw his application for admission. It asserts that the immigration judge should not have employed a balancing test, as there is no legal authority to support 

the utilization of such a method to determine whether an alien 

merits withdrawal. 

The applicant contends that the decision of the immigration 

judge is correct. He argues that weighing favorable and adverse 

factors is a valid means by which to determine whether to exercise 

discretion in a withdrawal case. 

Under the terms of the Act, one of the principal detriments arising from an order of exclusion is the fact that the excluded alien 

cannot reapply for admission to the United States for a period of 1 

year. Section 212(a)(16) of the Act. The Act itself furnishes a 

remedy to this bar by means of advance consent from the Attorney 

General to reapply for admission. Id.; 8 C.F.R. § 212.2 (1988). However, if permission to withdraw an application for admission is 

granted to an applicant, his departure is not pursuant to an older 

of exclusion and permission to reapply for admission is not required. 

Neither statute nor regulation directly provides for the withdrawal of an application for admission. See Hernandez v. Casillas, 

520 F. Supp. 389 (S.D. Tex. 1981). Nevertheless, we have held that 

an immigration judge may permit an alien in exclusion proceedings to withdraw his application for admission. See Matter of 

Manalo, 15 I&N Dec. 4 (BIA 1974); Matter of Lepofsky, 14 I&N Dec. 

718 (BIA. 1974); Matter of Vargas -Molina, 13 I&N Dec. 651 (BIA 

1971). An alien. may not withdraw his application for admission as 

a matter of right but must satisfy the immigration judge that "justice may best be served" by permitting withdrawal. Matter of 

Vargas-Molina, supra; see also Matter of Le Flock 13 I&N Dec. 251 

(BIA 1969) ("miscarriage of justice" standard), modified, Matter of 

Vargas-Molina, supra. 

After a review of the decisions referenced above, we conclude 

that a balancing of the equities test is not an appropriate method 

by which to determine whether an alien merits permission to withdraw an application for admission, and that a narrower focus was 

intended. An immigration judge should not allow withdrawal 

unless an alien, in addition to demonstrating that he possesses both 

the intent and the means to depart immediately from the United 

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Interim Decision *3047 

States, establishes that factors directly relating to the issue of his 

admissibility indicate that granting withdrawal would be in the interest of justice (i.e., that justice would be ill served if an order of 

exclusion was entered). Moreover, we note that it was never contemplated that the withdrawal of an application for admission 

would become a nonstatutory form of "relief' from excludability 

which an applicant could apply for after excludability became apparent. In fact, we find that, once the exclusion hearing has been 

conducted and the issues of excludability have been resolved, such 

permission should ordinarily only be granted with the concurrence 

of the Service. 

In the case before us, even if we were to disregard the applicant's 

attempted fraudulent entry, we can discern no facts or circumstances relevant to the issue of his admissibility which suggest that 

justice demands that he be allowed to withdraw his application for 

admission. 3 

Accordingly, the decision of the immigration judge permitting 

withdrawal will be vacated and the record will be remanded so 

that he may afford the applicant a full hearing on the issue of excludability. 

ORDER,: The appeal is sustained. 

FURTHER ORDER: The decision of the immigration judge 

permitting the applicant to withdraw his application for admission 

is vacated, and the record is remanded to the immigration judge 

for further proceedings consistent with this opinion and the entry 

of a new decision. 

In a footnote to its appeal brief; the Service questions the ultimate authority of 

an immigration judge to permit the withdrawal of an application for admission. As 

the Service does not directly raise this issue on appeal, we shall not address it. 

Moreover, in view of our disposition of this case, we find it unnecessary to consider 

the other issues expressly raised by the Service on appeal, such ao those concerning 

the applicant's exercise of his fifth amendment rights, the revelation that the applicant is not married to the mother of his child, and whether fraudulent entry is a 

more egregious offense than entry without inspection. 

565