### I n the 

# United States Court of Appeals For the Seventh Circuit

____________________ No. 15

- 3778
U NITED S TATES OF A MERICA , Plaintiff

- Appellee ,

v.

R OBERT R ANJEL , Defendant

- Appellant

.

____________________ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois , Eastern Division.

No. 02 CR 720

- 1

— Samuel Der

- Yeghiayan , Judge

.

____________________
A RGUED N OVEMBER 1, 2016

— D ECIDED S EPTEMBER 29, 2017

____________________

Before E ASTERBROOK , R OVNER , and S YKES , Circuit Judges

. S YKES , Circuit Judge

. In 2002 Robert Ranjel was indicted for participating in a Latin Kings drug

- trafficking conspiracy operating in Aurora, Illinois . He fled to Mexico and r emained there for nearly a decade. He surrendered in 2011 and a jury later convicted him of conspiracy and related drug crimes . T h e district judge imposed a sentence of 235 months in prison followed by a f ive

- year term of supe rvised release

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Ranjel raises s everal claims of sentencing error. He a rgues that the judge (1) mis calculat ed the drug quantity ; (2) misapplied a guidelines enhancement for his role as a manager or supervisor in the conspiracy ; (3) misapplied a guidelines enhancement for obstruction of j ustice ; (4) err oneously considered evidence of his involvement in a gang

related murder ; and (5) fail ed to explicitly note that the guidelines recommended a three

- year term of supervised release or explain why he opted for a five

- year term

. We affirm. Ranjel waived the fifth claim of error . T he ot her s are meritless

. I. Background Ranjel was a member of the Latin Kings gang and was deeply involved in its drug

- trafficking operation in Aurora , Illinois . In 2002 he was indicted for conspiracy t o distribute controlled substances , see 21 U.S.C. § 846 , and three counts of distributin g cocaine , see id

. § 841(a)(1). When the arrest warrant issued , Ranjel fled to Mexico and remained there for almost a decade. In 2011 h e turned himself in to the U.S. Consulate in Monterrey, Mexico , and was returned to the United States . H is case proceeded to trial the following year

. The government ’s evidence included testimo ny from federal agents, a confidential informant , and several coco nspirators , as well as recordings of wiretapped phone calls among the coconspirators . The jury convicted Ranjel on all
counts.
T he judge ordered a presentence re port (“PSR” ) and sp ecifically direct ed the p robation o ffice to “release the senten cing recommendation portion of the PSR ” to both co unsel

. The judge also ordered counsel to file any objections orNo. 15

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corrections in writing , together with sentencing memo randa and position statement s on the recommended conditions of supervised release

. The PSR estimated that th e drug quantity attributable to Ranjel as relevant conduct was approximately 2.06 kil ograms of cocaine . That translated to a base offense level of 26. As relevant here, the probation office recommended application of a three

- level enhancement under U.S.S.G

. § 3B 1 .1(b) for Ranjel’s role as a manager or supervisor in the conspira cy

. T he probation office also recommended applic ation of a two

- level enhancement for obstruction of justice based on Ranjel’s flight to Mexico and nearly ten years as a fugitive. See U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1

. Finally , the PSR noted that the guidelines term of s upervised release was three years but recommended that the judge impose a five

- year term i nstead. The PSR also include d specific recommendations for mandatory, discretionary, and special conditions of supe rvised release. Ranjel’s attorney filed a sentencing memorandum raising several objections to the PSR , but he did not object to any of the recommend ations regarding supervised release

. More over, in a separate filing entitled Position on Conditions of Supervised Release , Ranjel’s attorney acknowledged that he had reviewed the PSR’s recommendations and “makes no objection thereto.”
At sentencing the judge ruled on counsel’s objections, u ltimately accept ing the PSR’s recommenda tions. T he go vernment then presented witnesses who testi fied about Ranjel ’s involvement in a gang

- related murder. Ranjel had been charged with the murder but was acquitted. The judge nonetheless credited the testimony of the government’s4 No. 15

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witness es and took the murder i nto account in weighing the sentencing factors under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). The judge impos ed a sentence of 235 months in prison , the top of the guidelines range, and a five

- year term of supervised release

as recommend ed by the PSR

. This appeal followed.
II

. Discussion Ranjel limits his appeal to sentencing issues . M ost are a ttacks on the judge’s fact ual finding s . T hat’s a steep hill to climb . W e will not disturb a sentencing court’s factual findings unless they are clearly erroneous

. United States v. Austin , 806 F.3d 425, 430 (7th Cir. 2015) (drug

- quantity calculations reviewed for clear error); United States v. Etchin , 614 F.3d 726, 738 (7th Cir. 2010) (credibility determinations warrant “especially deferential” review); United States v. Arceo , 535 F. 3d 679 , 687 (7th Cir. 2008) ( obstruction

- of

- justice findings are reviewed for clear error); United States v. Hankton , 432 F.3d 779, 793 (7th Cir. 2005) ( a finding that the defendant had the role of a man ager or supervisor is r eviewed for clear error). Under th e deferential clear

- error standard, we will revers e only if “after reviewing the entire record, we are left with the firm and definite conviction that a mistake has been made.” United States v. Marty , 450 F.3d 687, 689

– 90 (7th Cir. 2006) (quotation marks omi tted ).
A. Drug Quantity
The judge adopted the PSR ’s estimate that Ranjel ’s o ffense conduct encompassed transactions totaling about 2.06 kilograms of cocaine. Th at figure was largely based on the trial testimony of Juan Corral, Ranjel’s supplier, and frequent recorded phone calls between the two

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Corral described three di stinct but overlapping groups of drug sales , each covering multiple weeks during the first half of 2002

. The first series occurred from February 1 to March 31 and totaled 50 7 grams of cocaine. The second series started in the spring and continued through the end of June. Corral testified that during this period he sold Ranjel quarter

- kilogram quantities of cocaine a “few times

. ” The PSR estimated that a “ few times” meant at least three, for a total of 750 grams. Finally, Corral testified that he sometimes sold Ranjel additional one

- eighth kilogram quantities of cocaine. Th e r ecorded phone calls backed up this testimony, capturing sales of this quantity roughly every other week betwee n April 1 and June 24, for a total of no t less than 750 grams. The three subtotals sum to 2.0 0 7 kilograms (507 + 750 + 750 = 2007 grams )

. In addition to th ese transactions , Ranjel also sold a pproximately 49 grams of cocaine to conf idential informants in th ree separate transactions, bringing the combined total to 2. 06 kilograms

. Ranjel challenges these calculations, argu ing that the 750

- gram subtotal w as double

- counted. Not so. T he PSR mad e clear that the identical subtotals were based on two separate sets o f transactions with C orral , and t he frequency and amounts of these separate sales were corroborated by recorded phone calls. Ranjel argues more generally that the drug

- quantity ca lculations were based on unreliable or imprecise evidence. In particular, he attacks Corral’s testimony, which he says was vague and marred by poor memory given the passage of time. Ranjel can hardly seek refuge in the passage of time, for which he is solely responsible. Regardless, c alculating drug quantities is “often difficult, and district courts may6 No. 15

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make reasonable though imprecise estimates based on information that has indicia of reliability.” United States v. Bozovich , 782 F.3d 814, 818 (7th Cir. 2015); see also United States v. Araujo , 622 F.3d 854, 863

– 64 (7th Cir. 2010) ( holding that the extrapolation of drug amounts “is permissible so long as it is based on reliable data regarding the size and frequency of the defendant’s transactions”). Corral was Ranjel’s main supplier, and his testimony was corroborated by more than 7 5 recorded phone calls between the two. And on this record the 2.06

- kilogram total is a conservative estimate

. The e vidence showed that Ranjel used other c ocaine suppliers in addition to Corral and also that he sol d marijuana and prescription pills , neithe r of which was added to the total drug quantity

. We find no error.

B. Sentencing Enhancements Ranjel next challenges the application of the guidelines enhancement for his role as a manager or supervisor in the conspiracy . The guidelines recommend a three

- level upward adjustment to the base offense level “[i]f the defendant was a manager or supervisor ... and the criminal activity involved five or more participants or was otherwise extensive.” U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1 (b) . The judge applied this adjustment based
on tr ial testimony establishing that Ranjel personally d irected at least three other coconspirators to package, distri bute, or sell cocaine to various buyers. Other testimony established that the Latin Kings drug

- trafficking conspiracy involved far more than fi ve people

. Ranjel argues that the judge erroneously found that he

“ managed five participants in a criminal activity.” But the judge made no such finding ; nor was he required to. The enhancement applies if the defendant managed or supe r-No. 15

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vised “one or more other participants” in criminal activity that involve d five or more people. § 3B1.1 cmt. n. 2. T rial

e vidence established that Ranjel directed one coconspirator to hold drugs, another coconspirator to sell drugs, and a third coconspirator to deliver cocaine to various retailers, collect payment , and deliver the money to him. In other words, Ranjel “exercised some control over others involved in the commission of the offense,” which is enough to apply th e § 3B1.1(b) enhancement. United Stat es v. Pagan , 196 F.3d 884, 892 (7th Cir. 1999) (quotation marks omitted).

Nor was it error to hold Ranjel accountable for obstru ction of justice. See § 3C1.1. His flight to Mexico and nearly ten years as a fugitive easily qualifies as obstruction of justic e, drawing a two

- level enhancement under § 3C1.1

. Ranjel argues that the government was not prejudiced by his fugitive status because federal drug agents knew where he was and could have extradite d him if they wanted to

. He also argues that his flight to M exico did not impose add itional costs on the government or otherwise affect the go vernment’s case in any concrete way

. A ctual prejudice is not needed

. “ [S] ection 3C1.1 applies to those defendants who attempt to obstruct or to impede the administration of justice, as well as to those who actually succeed in doing so.” United States v. Porter , 145 F.3d 897, 904 (7th Cir. 1998) (emphasis added)

. F leeing to another country is always “likely to burden a criminal investigation or prosecution significantly

— likely to make the investigation or prosecution significantly more costly or less effective than it would otherwise have been

. ” United States v. Nduribe , 703 F.3d 1049, 1053 (7th Cir. 2013). Moreover, al though pro of of actual prejudice is not required,8 No. 15

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here the go vernment established that Ranjel’s Mexican sojourn imposed some real costs : A cooperator who pu rchased cocaine from Ranjel died while Ranjel was at large ; drugs had to be retested because the crime lab kep t its notes for only ten years ; and government agents and law

enforcement witnesses retired or were no longer with their agencies by the time Ranjel faced trial , ma king them more difficult to locate . The judge properly applied the enhanc ement for obstructi on of justice.
C. Ranjel’s I nvolvement in a G ang - R elated M urder
At sentencing the government called th re e witnesses who testified to Ranjel’s involvement in a 1990 murder of a rival gang member. According to the se witnesses, Ranjel and two fellow Latin Kings drove to the victim’s home , and each fired a gun into the house , killing the victim . Ranjel was tried for this murder and acquitted. Even so, an acquit tal does n o t preclude the judge from considering the underlying conduct for sente ncing purposes a s long as the government proves the conduct by a preponderance of the evidence. United States v. Watts , 519 U.S. 148, 156

– 57 (1997). Ranjel does not contest th e legal point. Rather, he argues that the govern ment relied in part on a written proffer from a coconspirator, which is hearsay, and its witnesses “were admitted perjurers

. ” But hearsay is permissible at senten cing. See United States v. Grigsby , 692 F.3d 778, 787 (7th Cir. 2012). And the judge acknowledged that “[a]ll three witnes ses are convicted felons” who “told lies at times to the go vernment officials, police officers and others.” He also reco gnized that the witnesses “eventually cooperated with the government and received reduced sentences based on thoseNo. 15

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coop erations .” Nonetheless, the judge found their testimony credible.
A sentencing judge ’s credibility determinations are ent itled to exceptional defer ence. United States v. Johnson , 342 F.3d 731, 735 (7th Cir. 2003). I t was the judge’s job to take the measure of th e government’s witnesses , account ing for the various reason s to doubt their testimony . The judge did so here. He found the witnesses believable and considered this evidence in weighing the § 3553(a) sentencing factors. Th ere was no erro r

. D. Supervised Rele ase Finally, Ranjel argues that the judge committed a proc edural error by fail ing to expressly calculate and state for the record that the g uide lines term of supervised release was three year s

. He also contends that the judge did not ad equately explain his decision to impose an above

- guidelines term of five years. T he government responds that Ranjel waived th ese argument s by failing to raise them in the district court when he was explicitly invited to object.
Waiver is the intentional relinquish ment of a known right. United States v. Bloch , 825 F.3d 862, 873 (7th Cir. 2016). We have encouraged judges to provide advanced notice to the parties of the contemplated term and conditions of super vised release

. See United States v. Kappes , 782 F.3d 828 , 842

– 44 ( 7th Cir. 2015). N otice eliminates surprises at the hearing and allow s the defendant to “present an informed response” to t he proposed term and conditions

. Id. at 843. The sentencing hear ing is the “main event,” and when notice is given before the hearing , the parties can “prepare and10 No. 15

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identify the issues they wish to address” ahead of time

. United States v. Lewis , 823 F.3d 1075, 1083 (7th Cir. 2016). Ranjel faced a statutory minimum three

- year term of s upervised release and a maximum of life

. S ee 21 U.S.C. §§ 846, 841(b)(1)( C ) . The PSR gave him ample notice that the guid elines recommended the minimum three

- year term

. S ee U.S.S.G. § 5D1.2. T he probation office expressly recommen ded that the judge impose a five

- year term instead , and this part of the PSR was r eleased to Ranjel’s counsel

. The judge ordered the parties to file written objections in advance of the sentencing hearing

. Ranjel did so , raising several obje ctions

. B ut he did not object to the calculation of the guid elines term of supervised release or the specific recommend ation of a n above

- guidelines term of five year s. And in a separate filing specifically responding to the proposed conditions of supervised release, counsel expressly acknow ledged that he had reviewed the recommendations and “makes no objection thereto.” At the sentencing hearing, the judge asked Ranjel ’s atto rney if he had any further objections to the PSR other than those in his sentencing memora n dum

. Counsel confirmed that he did not. Near the end of the hearing, the judge asked Ranjel’s attorney if he

— the judge , that is

— had “considered all of [his] arguments

. ” Co unsel confirmed this as well. A fter imposing sentence, the judge asked if Ranjel’s attorney wanted to raise any other issue s

. Counsel said , “ no. ” In short, “ [ t ] here were no su r prises ” at this sentencing proceeding

— certainly not on any aspect of supervised release. Lewis , 823 F.3d at 1082. The judge gave Ranjel mult iple opportunities to objec t to the recommended term of supervised release; he ne ver did

. We have no difficultyNo. 15

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concluding that Ranjel waived any procedural or substantive challenge to the five

- year term of supervised re lease.
A FFIRMED

.