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# United States Court of Appeals For th e Seventh Circuit

____________________

No. 14

- 3 204 J ONATHAN A RNOLD , Plaintiff

- Appellant ,

v.

L ETICIA V ILLARREAL , Defendant

- Appellee

.

____________________ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois , Eastern Division

. No. 09 C 7399

— Amy J

. St. Eve , Judge

.

____________________
A RGUED M ARCH 29 , 201 6

— D ECIDED A PRIL 6, 2017

____________________

Befor e F LAUM , E ASTERBROOK , and S YKES , Circuit Judges

. S YKES , Circuit Judge

. In the fall of 2004, Jonathan Arnold and Leticia Villarreal exchanged marriage vows in California in a ceremony solemnized by a priest and a rabbi . B ut the y failed to file their marriage license with the county recorder within 10 days of the ceremony as require d by California law. Shortly b efore the license expired, t he county record er2 No. 14

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sent a letter informing them that the license had not yet been filed and r eminding them t hat they needed to file it to complete the legal process . The couple did not hing and the license expired unfiled

. Although they were not l egally married, t he couple r emained together for about three years , had a child, and purchased a condo in California

. B y the summer of 2007 , t heir relationship had deteriorated , and they separately filed for divorce

— she in California , he in Illinois

. The divorce proceedings were terminated when the y stipu lated that they

were n ever married.
Arnold then sued Villarreal in federal court in Chicago on various fraud theories . He claim ed that she tricked him into believing the two were legally married to induce him to give her gifts, including the California condo . The district
court entered summary judg ment for Villarreal, characteri zing the suit as “frivolous.” F rivolous is an apt description

. First, the undisputed facts show that Villarreal told Arnold early on that she suspected they weren’t legally married

. I ndeed, she insisted that they get a new marriage license and do the whole thing over. They obtain ed a new license but did nothing further. Second, e ven if we a ccept that at some point along the way Vil larreal lull ed Arnold with reassurances that they were legally married , Arnold w as not justified in rely ing on her representations

. He knew , because the county recorder had told them in writing , that the marriage l icense had not been filed as required by California law . Accordingly, w e affirm the district court’s judgment . We also grant Villar real’s motion f or sanctions against Arnold for filing a frivolous appeal

.No

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I. Background
Arnold and Villarreal met in 2003 . In January 2004 Arnold proposed marriage and Villarreal accepted . O n October 1 , 2004, the couple applied for and received a ma rriage license from the Los Angeles County recorder’s office

. The license was valid through December 30 , 2004 . O n November 21 they held a wedding ceremony in the pictu resqu e resort town of Dana Point . Father Erwin Castro, one of
two clergymen who p articipated in the ceremony (the other was a rabbi) , signed the couple’s marriage license but failed to complete and file it. He did not fill in the date and loc ation of the ceremony ; he did n o t obtain a witness’s signature ; and he failed to perform his statutory duty to return the

c ompleted license to the c ounty recorder within 10 days of the ceremony

. See C AL

. F AM

. C ODE § 359(e) (requiring the person solemnizing the marriage to return the license to the county recorder “within 10 days after the ceremony”). Arnold accuses Villarreal of taking the marriage license away from Castro

. Villarreal disputes this, but the key fact is undisputed: the completed marriage license was never filed with the recorder’s office

. On December 27 the couple received a letter from the r ecorder’s office informing them that their license had not yet been returned for filing and w ould expire on December 30

. The letter urged them to immediately address the matter and reminded them that filing a completed license was essential to protect their “marital and pr operty rights.” The couple took no action in response to the let ter.
I n mid

- 2005 as the couple anticipated the birth of their first child , Villarreal grew uneasy about the validity of their marriage and told Arnold that she thought their failure to4 No. 14

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file th e marriage license meant that they weren’t legally married. Ar nold dismissed her concerns. Neverthe less, in an attempt to appease her , Arnold agreed to a do

- over. I n August 2005 they applied for and received another marriage license . Remarkably, th ey again failed to follow through, and a completed marriage license was n ever filed.
Villarreal gave birth to their baby on August 21, 2005. Abou t eight months later Arnold signed a power of attorney in favor of Villarreal, which she used to obtain financing and purchase a California condominium in both their names

. T he loan and purchase documents refer to the pair as a married couple . Arnold later transferred his interest in the condo to Villarreal. He claims he gave her the condo

— as well as other gifts

— only beca use he believed they were married

. After nearly three years, the couple’s relationship began
to disintegrate and they separated. I n the summer of 2007, they filed separate divorce petitions

— Arnold i n Illinois and Villarreal in California. They eventually s tipulate d that they

were never legally married , and the divorce proceedings

were terminated

. 1 Apparently unwilling to leave the matter there, Arnold sued Villarreal in federal court in Illinois alleging various fraud claims and seeking compensatory damages totaling about $1 million and another $1 million in punitive dama ges

. He accused Villarreal of trick ing him into giving her his property by misrepresenting that they were lawfully ma rried

. Villarreal moved for summary judg ment, initially
t aking the position that Arnold’s fraud suit failed because he

1 The California court retained jurisdiction over the parties’ dispute concerning custody of their child.No

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wasn’t deceived about anything : t he y really were validly married under California law. The district judge stayed the

case while Villarreal returned to California state court to try to undo her stipulation. The state court re fused to vacate its judgment

. Once the California court had spoken , the district judge lifted the stay , and Villa rreal again moved for summary judg ment. T his time she argued that Arnold’s fraud suit failed because he could not have justifi ably relied on any misrepresentation s she might have made about the legal validity of their marriage. Arnold r espon ded on the merits and also sought time for additional discovery under Rule 56(d) of the Federal Rule s of Civ il Procedure

. Judge John Grady , the district judge initially assigned to the case , granted Villarreal’s motion and denied Arnold’s Rule 56(d) request

. The judge r ejected Arnold’s argument that he justifiabl y reli ed on Villarreal’s representations as both “ preposterous” on its face and utterly belied by the undisputed record evidence . The judge also held that “[ n ] o amount of discovery would remedy the flaws in Arnold’s frivolous theory.”
Arnold moved to alter the judgment under Rule 59 (e) of the Federal Rule s of Civil Procedure . He argu ed that the
court had failed to consider all of the relevant evidence in the record. Meanwhile, in anticipation of Judge Grady’s retirement, the case was administratively transferred to Judge Amy St. Eve . She denied the Rule 59 (e) motion , agre eing with Judge Grady that “ [ t ] he undisputed facts amply demonstrate that Arnold’s claims are frivo lous.”6 No. 14

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Although his claims had been deemed friv olous by not one but two district judges, Arnold nevertheless filed this appeal

. Villar real re sponded on the merits and moved for sanctions against Arnold for filing a frivolous appeal

. II. Discussion The parties agree that California law applies to Arnold’s claims , so t o the extent that the appeal entails a dispute about the law, our task is to predict how the Supreme Court of California would resolve it

. 2 See BMD Contractors , Inc. v. Fid. & Deposit Co. of Md. , 679 F.3d 643, 648 ( 7th Cir. 2012)

. As relevant here, Arnold invokes t hree different prov isions of California law : Californ ia Civil Code sections 1709 ( fraudulent deceit ) , 1572 ( actual fraud ) , and 1573 ( constru ctive fraud ). We do not need to analyze these claims separat ely

. Each one require s Arnold to prove that he justifiably relied on Villarreal’s mis representations regardin g the validity of their marriage. Conroy v. Regents of Univ. of Cal. , 203 P.3d 1127, 1135 (Cal. 2009) (fraudulent deceit); Chi

. Title Ins. Co. v. Superior Court , 220 Cal. Rptr. 507, 513 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985) (actual fraud and constructive fraud). Given the undisputed facts, Arnold cannot prevail on this common element of his fraud claims.

2 Subject

- matter jurisdiction is secure under 28 U.S.C. § 1332 because (1) Arnold and Villarreal are citizens of different states and (2) the “domestic relations” exception to diversity jurisdiction doesn’t apply. Arnold brings fraud claims; the case doesn’ t fall within the domestic

relations exception just because his factual allegations touch on the subject of marriage. See Friedlander v. Friedlander , 149 F.3d 739, 740

– 41 (7th Cir. 1998).No

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W e begin , however, by not ing the distinct possibility that Arnold’s claim s are categorically bar red as a matter of law

. California courts follow the general rule that one may never justifia bly rely on a representa tion of law (as opposed to a representation of fact) because the law is equally accessible to all

. See Cicone v. URS Corp. , 227 Cal. Rptr. 887, 891 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986) ; 5 W ITKIN , S UMMARY OF C AL

. L AW ( 10 TH ), T O RTS § 779 (2005) ; a ccord Lyon Fin

. Servs

. , Inc. v. Ill

. Paper & Copier Co. , 732 F.3d 755 , 765 ( 7th Cir. 2013) (explaining the ratio nales commonly given for the rule). T he misrepresentation s
a lleged here appear to be legal in nature : Arnold claims that Villarreal misled him about the legal status of their relatio nship and the legal consequence s of their failure to file their marriage license with the county recorder.
Th e general rule is subject to a “fiduciary relation ship” exception, however, and the ex ception might appl y here. 37 A M

. J UR . 2 D Fraud and Deceit § 103 ( 2016 )

. A rnold and Villarreal d id not have a literal fiduciary relationship, but California courts ap pear to have extended the fiduciary exception to a broader category of “confidential relatio nship s. ” Cicone , 227 Cal. Rptr. at 891; Bank of Am. v. Sanchez , 38 P.2d 787 , 789 (Cal. Ct. App. 1934) ( s tating that the exce ption “ has been extended to every possible case in which a fidu ciary relation exists as a fact [ , ] ... [including] moral, social , domestic , or merely personal [relationships] ”). And
t here is some indication that Arnold a nd Villarreal’s rel ationship would be considered “confidential” in the sense meant by California law. See Spellens v. Spellens , 305 P.2d 628, 643 (Cal. Ct. App. 195 6) (holding that a jury could reason ably find that parties who were engaged to be married occ upied “ a confidential relation ship ”) , vacated on other grounds ,8 No. 14

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Spellens v. Spellens , 317 P.2d 613 (Cal. 1957) ; Mathewson v. Naylor , 64 P.2d 979 (Cal. Ct. App. 1937) ( same ).
We’re hesitant to go further down this road. The parties haven’t briefed this p ossible legal barrier to Ar nold’s claims, and the California case s on this doctrine are fairly old. U ltimately , we have no need to predict how the California Supre me Court would construe the “confidential relatio nship” exception on these facts. Arnold’s fraud claims clearly fail for a different reason

. California law holds that a plaintiff cannot justifi ably rely

on a misrepresentation when his own condu ct i s manife stly

unreasona ble “in the light of his own intelligence and info rmation .” All. Mortg

. Co. v. Rothwell , 900 P.2d 601, 609 (Cal. 1995) ( en banc) (quotation marks omitted) . Whether the plaintiff ha s acted so unreasona bly that recovery should be denied is normally a jury question, but it “may be decided as a matter of law if reasonable minds can come to only one conclusion based on the facts.” Id

. (quotation marks omi tted).
It’s u ndisputed that Arnold knew the marriage license

was never filed with the recorder’s office as required by state law

. H e received the recorder’s letter to that effect and did nothing to rectify the problem

. Moreover, as the birth of their child approached, Villarreal told Arnold that she was worried that they weren’t legally ma rried , so they restarted the process by ap plying for a new marriage license. The county recorder issued the new license, but the couple did nothing to follow through and it too expired. On these facts Arnold’s claim that he justifiably reli ed on Villarreal ’s later affirmations of the validity of the ir marriage is manifestlyNo

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unreasonable

. 3 Judge Grady properly entered summary judgment for Villarreal.

For the same reason, Judge Grady’s rejection of Arnold’s Rule 56(d) mo tion for additional discovery was eminently sound

. A district judge may delay consideration of a summary

- judgment motion and order additional discovery if the requesting party demonstrates that “it cannot present facts essential to justify its opposition.” F ED

. R. C IV

. P. 56(d). We re view these orders deferentially, for abuse of discretion only

. Sterk v. Redbox Automated Retail, LLC , 770 F.3d 618, 622

– 23 (7th Cir. 2014). Judge Grady was clearly right to deny Arnold’s Rule 56(d) motion. As t he judge aptly put it, “ [ n ] o amount of discove ry would remedy the flaws in Arnold’s frivolous theory.” The undisputed evidence already in the record establishe d beyond question that any reliance by Arnold was manifestly unrea sonable based on what he knew about his own failure to ensure that the marria ge license was properly completed and timely filed

. Finally , Villarreal has moved for sanctions under Rule 38 of the Federal Rule s of Appellate Procedure , which autho rizes us to award “just damages and single or double costs” against an appellant for filing a frivo lous appeal. An appeal is frivolous “when the result is obvious or when the appe l-

3 Arnold harps on two entirely i rrelevant fact s: (1) Villarreal hel d herself out as his wife when she purchased the California condo ; and (2) she argued in her first summary

- judgment motion that they were legally married. That Villarreal may have kept innocent third parties in the dark (e.g., the seller of the condo, the mortgage lender, the court) does not bear on the question whether Arnold ’s alleged reliance was justified given what he himself knew.10 No. 14

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lant ’ s argument is wholly without merit.” Harris N.A. v. Hershey , 711 F.3d 794, 802 (7th Cir. 2013) (quotation marks omitted)

. That describes this appeal.
Rule 3 8 sanctions are discretionary, not mandatory. Id

. But Arnold’s appeal is precisely the kind for which an award of sanctions is most app ropriate. He filed it after two district judges had characterized his suit as frivolous. There is no theory of justifiabl e re li ance that could overcome the undi sputed fact that he knew his marriage license was never properly completed and filed as required by California law

. Arnold ’s appeal simpl y re hash es his allegation that Villa rreal assured him that the marriage was lega lly valid and repeat s bromides about the court’s obligation to draw all inferences in his favor. He appears to think that catching Villarreal in a lie is enough to entitle him to relief. It is not. Arnold has utterly failed t o confront what two district judges recognized: that his fraud claims are not merely meritless but are frivolous

. We are left with the distinct impression that he prosecuted this appeal simply to harass Villarreal . As Judge Grady drily noted , the courts “are not a pr oper v enue for petty score

- settling.” Accordingly, Villarreal may submit, within 28 days, an affidavit and supporting papers specifying the damages she incurred in this frivolous appeal . A rnold’s response is due within 28 days of Villarreal ’s submission.
A FFIRM ED ; R ULE 38 S ANCTIONS O RDERED

.