Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 79A05-1506-CR-635 | November 10, 2015 Page 1 of 4

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral 

estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Lennard Coleman, Sr

Michigan City, Indiana

Pro-Se

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Gregory F. Zoeller

Attorney General of Indiana

Christina D. Pace

Deputy Attorney General

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Lennard Coleman, Sr.,

Appellant-Defendant,

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Plaintiff

November 10, 2015

Court of Appeals Case No.

79A05-1506-CR-635

Appeal from the Tippecanoe 

Superior Court

The Honorable Thomas H. Busch, 

Judge

Trial Court Cause No.

79D02-0503-FB-18

Altice, Judge.

Case Summary
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 79A05-1506-CR-635 | November 10, 2015 Page 2 of 4

[1] In 2005, Lennard Coleman, Sr., was sentenced to the maximum term of twenty 

years1for Class B felony Robbery While Armed with a Deadly Weapon,2 and 

such sentence was enhanced by thirty years based upon his status as a Habitual 

Offender.3 In this appeal, Coleman, pro se, challenges the trial court’s denial of 

his motion to correct erroneous sentence.

[2] We affirm.

Facts & Procedural History

[3] In 2005, Coleman was convicted of robbery while armed with a deadly weapon

and found to be a habitual offender. Coleman appealed his conviction and 

sentence to this court, challenging his pretrial identification as improper and 

arguing that his sentence was inappropriate. Appellant’s Appendix at 75-84. This 

court affirmed Coleman’s conviction and sentence. Id. On April 22, 2015, 

Coleman filed a motion to correct erroneous sentence and the State filed its 

response thereto on April 30, 2015. The trial court entered an order denying 

 

1

Ind. Code § 35-50-2-5(a) (“A person who commits a Class B felony (for a crime committed before July 1, 

2014) shall be imprisoned for a fixed term of between six (6) and twenty (20) years, with the advisory 

sentence being ten (10) years.”).

2

Ind. Code § 35-42-5-1. Effective July 1, 2014, this offense was reclassified as a Level 3 felony. Because 

Coleman committed this offense prior to that date, it retains its prior classification as a Class B felony.

3

I.C. § 35-50-2-8 (“The court shall sentence a person found to be a habitual offender to an additional fixed 

term that is not less than the advisory sentence for the underlying offense nor more than three (3) times the 

advisory sentence for the underlying offense. However, the additional sentence may not exceed thirty (30) 

years.”).
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 79A05-1506-CR-635 | November 10, 2015 Page 3 of 4

Coleman’s motion to correct erroneous sentence on May 18, 2015. Coleman 

now appeals.

Discussion & Decision

[4] When reviewing the denial of a motion to correct erroneous sentence, we will 

review the court’s decision for an abuse of discretion. Felder v. State, 870 

N.E.2d 554, 560 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007). An abuse of discretion will be found 

only when the trial court’s decision is against the logic and effect of the facts 

and circumstances before it.” Id. Further, we note that a motion to correct

sentence may be used only to correct sentencing errors that are clear from the 

face of the judgment imposing the sentence in light of the statutory authority. 

Robinson v. State, 805 N.E.2d 783, 787 (Ind. 2004). Claims that require 

consideration of the proceedings before, during, or after trial may not be 

presented by way of a motion to correct sentence. Id. Our Supreme Court has 

clarified that the narrow confines of this rule are to be strictly applied. Id.

[5] Coleman’s challenges to the merits of his sentence are not alleged errors limited 

to the face of the sentencing judgment. Coleman challenges the aggravating 

and mitigating factors identified by the trial court, the weight accorded thereto, 

and the adequacy of the trial court’s sentencing statement. Coleman also 

argues that there are additional mitigating factors that were supported by the 

record and that the trial court improperly ordered his thirty-year sentence for his 

status as a habitual offender to run consecutively to his twenty-year sentence for 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 79A05-1506-CR-635 | November 10, 2015 Page 4 of 4

robbery. All of Coleman’s claims would require the court to go beyond the face 

of the sentencing judgment.

[6] To this end, we note that Coleman’s sentence is not facially erroneous. 

Coleman was sentenced to twenty years for his Class B felony robbery 

conviction and the trial court ordered that such sentence “shall be enhanced by 

thirty years for defendant being a Habitual Offender.” Appellant’s Appendix at 2. 

At the time Coleman was sentenced, the maximum term for a Class B felony 

was twenty years, with an advisory sentence of ten years. See I.C. § 35-50-2-

5(a). The habitual offender statute, I.C. § 35-50-2-8, provided for an 

enhancement of the underlying sentence of up to thirty years for being a 

habitual offender. Imposition of the maximum sentence does not make 

Coleman’s sentence erroneous.

[7] Coleman also argues that he received ineffective assistance of appellate counsel 

in his direct appeal and that he was mentally ill and thus unable to knowingly 

and intelligently waive his right to a jury trial with respect to his habitual 

offender enhancement. These arguments are not properly brought before the 

court through a motion to correct erroneous sentence. We therefore affirm the 

trial court’s denial of Coleman’s motion to correct erroneous sentence.

[8] Judgment affirmed.

[9] Riley, J., and Brown, J., concur.