NO T R EC OM M EN DE D F OR F UL L- TEX T P UB LIC AT ION F ile Nam e: 10a0587n.06 No. 05-6798 UN ITED STA TES C OU RT OF AP P EA LS F OR THE SI XT H C IR CU IT

RONEIL CORNELIS ON, P etitioner -Appellant, v. JOH N M OTLE Y, Wa r de n, Respondent-Appellee. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ON AP PEA L F RO M THE U NI TED STATES DIST RI CT CO UR T F OR THE EA S TE RN D IS TR IC T O F K EN TU CKY

Be for e : M ER RI TT, G IBBO NS, RO G ER S, C ir c uitJudg e s. J U LI A SM I THGIBBONS, Circuit Judge. P eti ti on er-ap pel lan t R on e il Co rn e lis on a pp e a ls the di str ic t c ourt ’s or de r d e nyinghis habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. For the following
rea sons, we af

firm the district cour

t’s decision. I. On J anuar

y 15, 1998, Cornelis o n wa s i n d icted by a g rand jury

for his involvement in the No ve mbe r 4 , 1 99 7, be a tin g de a th of Ric ky No land in R ic hmo nd , K e ntu c ky . F oll ow inghis a rr e st, Co rnel is on g a ve a

vid e ota pe d s ta te me nt ( “ the c on fe ssi on ta pe ” ) i n w hic h h e wa s in fo rm e d o f h is rig hts under Miranda v. Arizona , 384 U. S. 4 36 (1 96 6) , c on fi rm e d th a t he un de rs too d th os e ri g hts , and pr oc e e de d to make se lf

-i nc ri min ati ng st ateme nts . Co rn e lis on fi le d a mot ion to s up pr e ss h is confe ssion. The state trial court reviewe d the confession tape, held an evidentiary hear ing at which the ta pe wa s p lay e d a

nd the po lic e of

fi c e r t e sti fi e d, a nd

fo un d th e fo llo wi ngfa c ts:No. 05-6798

Cornelison v. Motley

-2- I n this case, the de tective c ommences r eadingthe re quisite Miranda rig hts to the defe ndant. The de fenda

nt inquires, “What if Iwant my lawy er pr esent fir st? ” The detec tive responds[,] “that’s up to y ou.” Detective Pedig o repe ated f or the de fenda

nt that he had the rig ht to stop t he questionin g at any time in order to have a lawy er prese nt. After some conver sation, the defe ndant commenc es writing on the waive r form and the n say s, “I would like to have a lawy er, thoug h, Iwant that on the r ecor d” an d wr i t es o n t h e w ai v er

fo rm . . . . [ At t h e s u

p p re s s i o n h ea ri n g, ] D et ec t i v e P ed i go te s ti f ie d th a t h e w a s u n s u r e a n d w a n te d to c la r if y th e d e f e n d a n t’ s in te n t w h e n h e n e xt asked, “ Do y ou want y our lawy er pr esent or do you want to talk to us . . . whicheve r y ou want to do.” The n the def endant completed the for m and laid down the pe n. Detec tive Pedigo r esponded with, “Does that mean that y ou want to talk to us? ”; and the def endant nods his hea d. The de tective sa y s, “I s that a y es? ”, and the defe ndant answe rs, “Ye s.” J oint Appendix (“JA”) 48–49. Cornelison then g ave a

statement in which he confe ssed t hat he “g ot his kicks in” when he and two other s beat Nola

nd. The trial c ourt denied the motion to s uppress, finding that Cornelison’s statements wer e mer ely

a cla rification of his rights and not a n invocation of his r ight to c ounsel. The trial court noted that Cornelison was filling out the waiver form whe n he made ref

ere nce to c ounsel “on the r ecor d” and he ld that a re asonable office r would not have understood Cornelison to have inv ok e d h is Si xth A me ndme nt r ig ht t o c ouns e l. A jury found Cornelison g uilty

of murder

as a principal or an acc omplice, and he re ceive d
a 30 -y e ar s e nte nc e . H e a

pp e a le d h is c on vic tio n to the Ke ntu c ky Sup re me Court , wh ic h a ff ir me d h is conviction. Among the issues it de cided, the Kentucky Supreme Court a ffirme d the trial court’s denial of Cornelison’s suppression motion, re ly ing upon a videotape of the suppression hear ing ( “the suppression hea

ring tape ”)
. I n a footnote, the court re marke d that Cornelison had made a motion to supplement the rec ord with the orig inal confe ssion tape , but “it appea rs as thoug h said motion was
never filed and thus the r ecor d contains only a videotape of the suppre ssion hearingduring whichNo. 05-6798

Cornelison v. Motley

-3- the taped statement was ma de. As such, the qualit y o f t he stateme nt is poor and portions are unintelligible.” JA 164 n.1. Th e state su

pr e me c ourt

the n r e c ounte d th e e xch a ng e be tw e e n th e po lic e a nd Cor ne lis on : A r e vie w o f [Cornel is on’s ] state me nt r e fl e c ts that a ft e r [h e ] wa s r e a d h is Miranda rig hts, he inqui red, “What if I want my lawy er present first? ” The de tective infor med [C orne l i s o n ] t hat the dec ision was up to him and that he had the r ight to stop the questioning at any

point if he wante d an attorne y prese nt. The conve rsation c on ti n u e d w i t h t h e d e t e c t i v e e xp l a i n i n g t o [C o r n e l i s o n ] t h e w a i v e r o f r i g h t s fo rm . After a short per iod of time, [C ornelison] appear s to sig n the form while stating , “I would like to have a

lawy er, t h o u g h, Iwant that on the r ecor d.” The detec tive t h e r e a f t e r a s k e d , “ D o y o uw a n ty o u r l a w y e r p r e s e n to r

d o y o uw a n t to ta lk

t o u s ?” [C ornelison] then completed the for m and laid down the pen. The de tective state d,
“ Do e s th a t me a n y ou

wa nt to ta lk to u s?” [Cor

ne lis on ] nod de d h is h e a d a ff ir ma tiv e ly and then r esponded “ y es.” J A 164–65. Th e c ourt de te rm ine d that Cor ne lis on “ inq

uir e d a bo ut havin g a n atto rn e y

pr e se nt .
. . wh ile signingthe waive r for

m.” J A 165. Although Cornelison may have use d an attorne y

had one be en prese nt, the court found that “he pr efe rre d to contin ue talking .” JA 165. The court then a pplied Miranda and Davis v. United States , 51 2 U. S. 45 2 (1 99 4) (h old ing that a n “ a mbi g uo us or e qu ivo c a l” reque st for counse l does not require au thorities to cease questioning) , and held that Corne lison’s “see king inf

ormation about an attorney while signing the waiver form cr eate d an ambig uity and, as
a re sult, the detective w as justified in his belief that [Cornelison] was not unequivoc ally invoking his right to counse l but rather c larify ing the exis tence and ef

fec t of that rig ht.” J A 166. T h e K en tu ck y

S u p re m e C o u rt d en i ed C o rn el i s o n ’s m o t i o n t o s u p p l em en tan d

fo r r eh ea ri n g, which wa s filed afte r the c ourt issued its opinion. I n this mot ion, Cornelison’s counsel stated that he wa s una

ble to o bta in a

c op y of the c on fe ssi on

ta pe fr om C or

ne lis on ’s re la tiv e s and

c ho se toNo. 05-6798

Cornelison v. Motley

-4- e xami ne c los e ly th e su pp ressio n h e a ri ngta pe . H e c on c e de d th a t th e su pp re ssi on he a ri ngta

pe is “ce rtainly less than easily audible” and asked the court to re consider its opinion once the confe ssion tape wa s found. Cornelison did not submit the original confession tape a s part of the rec ord bef ore the state su

pr e me c ourt a nd , inst e a d, re lie d upo n the su pp re ssi on he a ri ng ta

pe that the state su

pr e me court c ons i d er ed . There afte r, Cornelison, pr o s e , filed a post-c onviction motion t o vacate the
c o n v i c t i o na n d

s e n t e nc e pu rs ua nt to K

y . R
. C r i m . P
. 1 1
. 4 2 , w h i c h t h e s t a t e c o u rt s d e n i e d
. JA 209–10. His conviction bec ame f inal on Marc h 10, 2004. I n De c e mbe r 2 00 4, Cor

ne lis on fi le d th is habeas a c tio n in fe de ra l di str ic t c ourt . A mon g his cla im s , h e a ll e g e d

th a t t h e s tate c o u rts e r

r o n e o u s ly d e n ie d h is mo ti o n to s u

p p r e s s th e c onfession. Cornelison’s counsel prepa red a transcr ipt of the confe ssion tape for the fe dera l proce eding s, and, althoug h his pe tition re fer s to “ an intelligible copy of the videota ped interr og ation,” the district cour t do c ke t doe s not ind ic a te that Corn e lis on e ve r fi le d the c on fe ssi on ta pe its e lf wi th t he dis tr ic t c ourt
. Th e dis tr ic t c ourt a do pte d the ma g istra te jud g e ’s re c omm e nd a tio n to dismi ss the pe tit ion in its e nti re ty

on the me ri ts. On

the su pp re ssi on iss ue, the dis tr ic t c ourt

he ld t hat th e state su

pr e me court ha d corr ectly

applied Miranda in affir

ming Cornelison’s conviction. J A 233–40. The district court a lso adopted the mag istrate judge ’s conc lusion that, under Es te lle v . M c Gu ire , 502 U.S. 602 (1991), habeas corpus does not lie to reviewquestions of state evide ntiary law. JA 239. W e g rante d Cornelison a ce rtificate of appe alability for two issues c oncer

ning the Miranda claim only . Orde r Gra nting Cer tificate of Appea lability , Cornelison v. Motley , 05-6798 (6th Cir. Fe b. 14, 2007).No. 05-6798

Cornelison v. Motley

-5- II. W e r e v i e w t h e d e c i s i o n o f t h e d i s t r i c tc o u rtt o d e n y habeas relief de novo
. Ha rri s v . S tov all , 21 2 F .3 d 9 40 , 9 42 (6 th C ir . 2 00 0) . T his c a se is g ov e rn e d b y the An tit e rr or ism

a nd Ef fe c tiv e De a th Pe n a lt y A c t o f 1 9 9 6 ( “ A E D PA ” ) , 2 8 U
. S. C. § 2241 et seq ., which prohibits fede ral c ourts from issuing wr its of habeas corpus on claims adjudicated on the mer i t s i n state cour t unless that adjudication: (1 ) res ul ted in a

de c isi on that w a s c on tr a ry

to, or inv olv e d a

n unr e a so na

ble application of, c lear ly

established F eder al law, a s deter mined by the S upreme Court of the United States; or (2) r esulted in a de cision that was base d on an unre asona b l e d et er mination of the fa ct s i n l i gh to f t h e e v i d en ce p re s en t edi n t h e S t at e c o u rt p ro ce ed i n g. 28 U. S.C. § 2 25 4( d) . A s th e Sup re me Co urt ha s e xpla ine d, a de c isi on is “ c on tr a ry

to” c le a rl y established fede ral law “if the state court arr ives at a conclusion opposite to that r eac hed b y [ t he Supreme Court] on a question of l aw or if the s tate court decide s a case diff ere ntly than this Court h as on a se t of materia lly indisti ng uishable fa cts.” Terry W illiams v. Taylor , 529 U.S. 362, 413 (2000). A state cour

t unrea sonably

applies go v er n i n g fede ral lawif it “identifies the c orre ct g overningleg al principle f rom [the Supreme Court’s] decisi o n s b u t unrea sonably applies that principle to the fa cts of the pr isoner’s c ase.” Id
. The state c ourts’ factual determinations “ar e pre sumed corr ect a bsent clea r and c onvincing
e vid e nc e to t

he c on tr a ry , [28 U. S.C. ] § 22 54 (e )( 1) , a nd a de c isi on a dju dic a te d on the me ri ts in a state
c ourt a nd ba se d o n a

fa c tua l de te rm inatio n w ill no t be ov e rt ur ne d o n f a c tua l g ro un ds un le ss objectively

unrea sonable in lig ht of the evidenc e prese nted in the state-c ourt proce eding .” Miller-El

v . Co c k re ll , 53 7 U. S. 3 22 , 3 40 (2 00 3) (c itatio ns omi tte d) ; se e als o F le mi ng v . M e tri sh , 556 F.3d 520,No. 05-6798

Cornelison v. Motley

-6- 52 5 ( 6th Cir . 2 00 9) . T his pr e su mpt ion a pp lie s to “ imp lic it fi nd ing s of fa c t” de du c e d b y the state courts fr om their revie w of the c redibility of the e vidence befor e them. McQ ueen v . Scroggy , 99 F.3d 1302, 1310 ( 6th Cir. 1996). A state cour t’s resolution of ambig uities in the rec ord is entitled to “some def

ere nce f rom this court.” United St ates v. Mc Coner , 530 F.3d 484, 495 ( 6th Cir. 2008); see also Rae dekev. Trombley , No. 08-1407, 2009 U.S. App. L EXI S 6350, at *13 (6th Cir. Mar. 23, 2009) (g iving de fer ence to the s tate cour t’s “cha rac terization of the testimony ” bec ause the petitioner had not re butted the pre sumption of corre ctness af forde d to the state cour

t’s finding s of fa ct). Cornelison argues that his reque st for counse l w as unambig uous when he stated, ac cording t o the transc ript of the conf ession tape made by

his lawy er that was provided to the h a b eas c ou rt ,

“ Uh , y ou kn owwh a t I ’m

say ingIwa

nt m y lawy e rs to b e he re to kn ow wh a t I ’m ta lki nga bo ut f ir st of all, y ou know what I ’m saying,” and “I would like to ha ve a la wy er, I would like to have that on
rec ord, I would like to ha

ve my lawy er here so.” Thus, he contends, the dec ision of the Kentucky Supreme Court constituted an “ unrea sonable a pplication” of clea

rly established fe dera l law under Miranda and Edwards v. Arizona , 451 U.S. 477 (1981). Cornelison re quests an evide ntiary hear ing and the oppor

tunity to introduce a

nother c opy

of the c onfession tape that, he say s, demonstrates that he re quested c ounsel befor e g iving a statement to the police. He contends that the c onfession tape rebuts the state courts’ f

indings of f

act by clea r and c onvincing evidenc e. Th e su c c e ss of Cor

ne lis on ’s a

pp e a l de pe nd s o n tw o q

ue sti on s: ( 1) wh e the r h e is e nti tle d to
an e vid e nti a ry

he a ri ngin t

he dis tr ic t c ourt a t wh ic h he c ou ld i ntr od uc e the c on fe ssi on

ta pe ; and , if not, (2) whe ther the district court corr ectly conclude d that the Kentuc ky Supreme Court’s de cision,
on the re c or d b e fo re it, wa s c on sis te nt w ithc le a rl y e sta bli sh e d fe de ra l law. We c on c lud e that he isNo. 05-6798

Cornelison v. Motley

-7- not entitled to an evide ntiary hear ing a

nd that the dec ision of the state supre me cour t was not contra ry to, nor did it invol ve an unrea sonable application of, g overningfede ral law . 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). A. Cornelison is not entitl ed to an evidentiary hear ing be cause he has not satisfied the

“ d i l i g e n c e ” r e qu i r e m e n t o f 2 8 U
. S
. C
. § 2 2 5 4 ( e ) ( 2 )
. A E D P A l i m i t s t h e a b i l i t y o f f e d e r a l c o u rt s to g ra nt a n e vid e nti a ry

he a ri ng . In p e rt ine nt p a rt , th e statut e pr ov ide s: (2) I f the a

pplicant has fa iled to develop the f actua l bas i s of a c laim in St ate c ourt proce eding s, the court shall not hold an evidentiary hear ing on the claim unless the a pp lic a nt s ho ws that— (A) the claim re lies on— (i) a ne w rule of

constitutional law . . .; or (ii) a factua l predicate that could not have been pr eviously discovere d throug h the exercise of

due dilige nce; a

nd (B ) t h e fa cts underly

ing the claim would be suff icient to establish by

clea r a nd con vi nc inge vid e nc e that but f or c on sti tut ion a l e rr or , n o r e a so na ble fac tfinder would ha

ve found the applicant g

uilty of the unde rlying of

fense
. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2) . The Supreme Court has interpre ted the “f ailed to develop” clause of § 2254(e) (2) to mea

n not whet h er the fa cts could have been disc overe d but instead whethe r the prisone r wa s d ili g e nt i n h is e ff

or ts. Th e purp os e of

the fa ult c omponent of

“ fa ile d” is t o ensure the prisoner

undertak es his own dilige nt searc h for e vidence . Dilige nce f or purp os e s o f t

he op e nin g c la

us e de pe nd s u

po n wh e the r the pr iso ne r ma de a re a so na ble attempt, in light of the infor mation available at t h e ti me, to investigate and pur sue claims in state cour

t . . . . Michae l W

illiams v. Taylor , 529 U.S. 420, 435 (2000). As we have he ld, “ [i]f the pe tit ion e r f a ils th e dil ig e nc e re qu ir e me nt o f § 22 54 (e )( 2) , h e is channe led into the strict require ments of s ubparts (A) and (B) ,” which pe rmit an evidentiar y hear ingNo. 05-6798

Cornelison v. Motley

-8- if the cla im rests on a new rule of constitutional law or on a factual predicate “‘that could not have been previously discovere d throug h the ex erc ise of due dilig ence .’” Hu tc his on v . B e ll , 303 F.3d 720, 729 (6th Cir. 2002) (c itation omit ted). I n th is c a se , th e Ke ntu c ky Sup re me Cou

rt re lie d u po n th e su

pp re ssi on he a ri ngta

pe be c a us e Cornelison failed to submit a copy of the c onfession tape into the appellate r ecor d. The orig inal confe ssion

ta p e w a s p r e s e n te d

to th e s tate tr ia l c o u rt, a n d Co r n e li s o n c a n n o t s h o w th a t t h is ta pe “could not have been pr eviously discovere d” duringhis state court appellate proce eding s or in the pr e se nt habeas proce ed i n gs . I ndeed, Corne lison’s state court a ppellate c ounsel conc eded that he relied upon the suppression hea ring tape be cause he wa s not able to obtain a copy of t he conf ession tape f rom Cornelison’s relatives. Cornelison’s lawy er did not explain why the confe ssion tape was not obtained from the state trial cour t or , by motion, from the prosec ution. See M ichael W illiams , 529 U.S. at 434–35 (holding that the “fa iled to de velop” clause does not ba r an evide ntiary

hear ing wher e, f o r e xa mp le , th e p r o s e c u ti o n c o n c e a le d e v id e n c e )
. T h e tr a n s c r ip t o f th e c o n f e s s io nta pe provided to the habeas court doe s not entitle Cornelison to an evidentiary hear ing be cause that tape, or a tra nscript there of, could have bee n, but w as n o t , p ro v ided to the state supre me cour t and “[f]ederal c ourts sitti ng in habeas are not an alter native for um for try i n g facts and issues which a prisoner ma de insuffic ient eff ort to pursue in state pr ocee dings.” Id. at 4 3 7
. Under the strict
re qu ir e me nts of

§ 22 54 (e )( 2) , Cor

ne lis on “ fa ile d to de ve lop ” the fa c tua l ba sis he no w a sse rt s f or his Miranda claim when he was be fore the Kentuc ky Supreme Court and, thus , he is not entitled to an
e vid e nti ary

he a ri ngin f

e de ra l c ourt
.No. 05-6798

Cornelison v. Motley

-9- Cornelison’s attempt to surmount § 2254(e) (2) on the streng th of Ste war t v . E rwi n , 503 F.3d 488, 500 (6th Cir. 2007), is unavailing . I n E rwi n , the habeas rec ord conta ined none of the in f o r mati o n r e li e d

u p o n b y th e s tate c o u rts in

s e n te n c in g th e p e ti ti o n e r . 5 0 3 F
. 3 d a t 4 9 9

– 5 0 0
. We
rema nded the matter

to the district court and or dere d the state to produc e the r ecor d t h at was essential for habeas revie w. Id . at 501. We did so pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254(f), whic h provides that if the petitioner, “ beca use of indi gen cy o r other re ason is unable to produc e such pa rt of the
re c or d, the n th e Sta te sh a ll pr od uc e su c h pa

rt of the re c or d a nd the F e de ra l c ou rt sh a ll d ir e c t th e Sta te to do so by

order direc ted t o an ap p ro p ri at e State off icial.” Se e id . H ow e ve r, thi s c a se is dis tin g uis ha

ble fr om Erwin beca

use Corneli s on did not provide the state supre me cour t with the confe ssion tape althoug h it had been pla y ed at the suppr ession hear ing a nd, thus, presumably

was available . Co rn el i s o n h as not demonstrate d that the tape w as unava ilable or that the pr osecution somehow pre vented him from pr esenting it. M o re o v er, in Er win , the habeas rec ord lac ked the rele vant par

ts of the state c ourt rec ord throug h no fa u l t of the pe titioner’s. Her e, Cornelison’s counsel appare ntly possesses either the confession tape, of which a tr anscr ipt was made f or fe dera l proce eding s, or the suppre ssion hearingtape. T hus, Cornelison has not shown that “bec ause of indige ncy or ot her r eason,” he has be en unable to produce the re levant tape s or their tra nscripts. 28 U.S. C. § 2 2 5 4 ( f

)
. Rath e r , h e h a s c h o s e n , a t e a c h s ta g e o f li ti g a ti o n , to s u b mi t in c o mple te and dif fe re nt e vid e nc e of

the po lic e int e rv ie w that ha s fa ile d to per su a de state a nd fe de ra l c ourt s to ru le in his favor.No. 05-6798

Cornelison v. Motley

-10- B. Be cause Cornelison is not entitl ed to an evidentiary hear ing to introduc e the c onfession tape , we must deter

mine whether the decision of Ke ntucky Supreme Court, on the re cord be fore it, was “contr ary to” or involved an “unre asonable application” of clea rly established fe dera l law. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). The e ssence of Cornelison’s cla im is t hat the police c ontinued to inter rog ate him in violation of fe dera l law af

ter he invoked his rig h t to counsel. Under Edwards v. Arizona , once a custodial suspect invokes his rig ht to counsel, the police may not further

interrog ate him until counsel has bee n made available unless the s uspect initiates furthe r communication. 451 U.S. at 484. Further more, in Davis v. U

nited States , the Sup re me Court he ld that the imm e diate c e ssatio n o f i nte rr og a tio n is trig g ere d by a clea

r and unambig uous reque st f or counsel. 512 U.S. at 459. I f a suspe ct makes a n ambig uous or equivocal asser tion of his right to counse l, questioning may continue. Id .; se e als o Berghuis v. Thompkins , 1 30 S. Ct . 2 25 0, 22 61 (2 01 0) (“ An ‘i mpl ic it w a ive r’ of

the ‘r ig ht to r e ma in
s i l en t ’ i s s u ff

i ci en t t o ad m i ta s u s p ec t ’s s t at em en ti n t o ev i d en ce . ” ( qu o t i n g N. Carol ina v. Butler , 441 U.S. 369, 376 (1979)))
. Thus, a suspect must a ssert his r ight to counsel “w ith sufficient cla rity that
a re asonable office r would per ceive it as such under the circumstances.” Franklin v. Bradshaw , 545 F .3 d 4 09 , 4 14 (6 th C ir . 2 00 8) (c itatio ns omi tte d) ; se e als o U n i t e d S t a t e s v . H ur st , 228 F.3d 751, 7 5 9

– 6 0 (6 t h C i r. 2 0 0 0 ) ( ap p l y i n g Da v is to the invocation of both the rig ht to counsel and the rig ht to remain silent). Th e i n quiry is objective. Fran k

lin , 545 F.3d at 414. Significa ntly , the suspect
mus t “ make so me a ff

ir ma tiv e ‘s ta te me nt’ or

‘r e qu e st’ wh os e or din a ry me a nin gsh ow s h is d e sir e to deal with the police throug h counsel.” United States v. Suarez , 263 F.3d 468, 483 ( 6th Cir. 2001)No. 05-6798

Cornelison v. Motley

Cornelison asserts that he unambig uously and unequi v o cally

invoked his rig ht to counsel 1 when he stated, “I

want my lawy ers to be here to know what I ’m talking about first off .” Howe ver, thi s st a te me nt w a s n ot i n th e re c or d o n a pp e a l. -11- (c itatio ns omi tte d) ; see also Edwards , 451 U.S. at 484 (indicating that the re q u es t m u s t show the
su sp e c t’ s “ de sir e to d e a l w ith the po lic e on ly thr ou g h co un se l” ). F or e xamp le , we have he ld t hat a statement such a s “may

be I should talk to an attorney by the name of Wil liam Evans” trig g ers the Edwards prohibition on further c ustodial interrog ation. Ab e la v . M ar tin , 38 0 F .3 d 9 15 , 9 25 –2 7 ( 6th Cir . 2 00 4) . H ow e ve r, “ a n a c c us e d’ s po str e qu est response s to further interrog ation may not be used to cast re trospective doubt on the clar ity of the initial reque st itself.” Sm ith v . I lli no is , 469 U.S. 91, 100 (1984). As the state su

pr e me c ourt fo un d, Cor

ne lis on wa s r e a d h is Miranda rig hts and then he asked,

“ Wha t if Iwa nt my lawy e r prese nt f

ir st?” T he po lic e tol d Co rn e lis on that th e de c isi on

wa s u p to him , b ut t

he c on ve rs a tio n c on tin

ue d w iththe de te c tiv e e xpla ini ngthe wa ive r- of -r ig hts fo rm . Cr uc ia lly , th e state c ourt

fo un d th a t Co rn e lis on

sig ne d th e wa ive r f

or m whi le statin g tha

t he wo uld like a re quest for a

lawy er “ on the re cord.” The detec tive then soug ht to c larify whether Cornelison wanted his law y er pr esent, a nd Cornelison completed the form and laid down hi s pen. The detec tive
a sk e d w he the r C or

ne lis on wa nte d to ta lk to the po lic e , a nd Cor ne lis on no dd e d h is h e a d a ff

ir ma tiv e ly and re sponded, “Y es.” 1 Under these fac ts, the Kentucky Supreme Court r easona bly conclude d that , under Da v is , Cornelison’s alleg ed re quest for counsel was ambig uous and insufficient to r equire the police to stop the interrog ation. Cornelison’s relianc e upon Ab e la , 380 F.3d at 925–27, is misplace d. I n that case ,No. 05-6798

Cornelison v. Motley

-12- the petitioner wa s interrog ated by the police about a st abbing and he r esponded by stating, “ may

be I s h o u ld ta lk to a n a tt o r

n e y b y th e n a me o f Wi ll ia m E v a n s , ” a n d b y g iv in g th e p o lice off icer a b u s in e s s c ar d. Id. at 919. The of fice r left the r oom, presumably to contact the la

wy er. U pon
r e tu r n i n g , h e m a d e n o m e n t i o n o f t h e a t t o r n e y a n d p r o c e e d e d t o r e a d t h e p e t i t i o n e r his Miranda rig hts. Id . The pe titioner then signe d a wa iver a nd g ave a statement confes s i n g t o t h e cr ime. Id
. We he ld that a rea sonable office r would have understood that the petitioner had cl ea rl y and unequivoca lly

invoked his rig ht to counsel bec ause he had named a spec ific individual with whom he wa nted to speak and then showed the office r the lawy er’ s business car d. Id . at 926. I n this case, by contra st, Cornelison merely asked the police about a

n attorney but then proceede d to fill out and sign the waiver

form bef ore indicating that he wished to speak w ith the police. Th is s e qu e nc e of e ve nts a lso un de rm ine s Cor ne lis on ’s c on te nti on that hi s c on ve rs a tio n w ith the police, a fter he reque sted counsel, should not rende r hi s reque st ambig uous and equivoc al. See Sm ith , 469 U.S. at 97–98. I n Sm ith , a suspect was asked whether he wanted a l awy er pr esent during questioning and responde d, “Uh, y eah. I ’d like to do that.” Id
. at 93 (empha sis in orig inal). He was then aske d ag ain whethe r he wished to spe ak with the police and he did so afte r re sponding, “ Yea h and no, uh, I don’t know what’s what, re ally .” Id . The Supreme Court held that “[w]here nothing
a bo ut t he re qu e st f

or c ouns e l or

the c ir c ums tanc e s le a din g up to t he reques t wou ld r e nd e r i t
a mb igu o u s , a ll qu e s ti o n in g mu s t c e a s e .” Id . at 98. The Court e mphasized that its decision was “nar row” and that it did not a ddress “the circ umstances in w hich an acc used’s reque st for counse l may be cha rac terized as ambig uous or equivoca l as a re sult of events p re ce d i n g the re quest or of
nu anc e s inhe re nt i n th e re qu e st i tse lf , no r [did the Court ] d e c ide the c on se qu e nc e s of su c h ambi g uit

yNo. 05-6798

Cornelison v. Motley

B e c a u s e we a ff ir m th e dis tr ic t c ourt ’s de c isi on on the me ri ts o f C or

ne lis on ’s habeas p et i t ion, 2 we ne ed not re ach his a

rg ument that the court err ed in holding that his claims fa iled beca use fe dera l habeas revie w does not lie for err ors of state la w. See D ixon v. Clem , 492 F.3d 665, 673 ( 6th Cir. 2007) (holding that we “may aff irm on any g rounds supported by the rec ord even if diffe rent fr om the re asons of the district c ourt”) ( citation and quotation marks omitted). -13- or equivoc ation.” Id . at 99–100. B oth the “eve nts prece ding the reque st” and the “nuance s inherent in the reque st itself” show that Cornelison’s re quest was ambiguous a nd equivoca l
. Cornelison
a sk e d, “ What if

Iwa nt m y lawy e r p re se nt f

ir st?” a nd the n p ro c e e de d to sig n th e wa ive r f or m w hil e stating he wanted a

reque st for a la

wy er “o n the re cord.” The police then clar ified whe ther Cor ne lis on wi sh e d to sp e a k w iththe m, a nd he re sp on de d, “ Ye s. ” Th e po lic e did no t a tte mpt

to “we ar dow n [C ornelison] and persua de him to incriminate himself notwithstanding hi s ear lier reque st for counse l’s assistance .” Id
. at 9 8 (c i t i n g O r e g o n v . B r a d

s h aw , 4 6 2 U. S
. 1039, 1044 (1983)) . The “circumstanc es l eading up to the request” and the nature of the r equest re ndere d the reque st for counse l ambiguous a nd equivoca l. Id . at 97. Our re view of the rec ord presented to the Kentucky Supreme Court reveals that Corne lison failed to make a statement t hat a reasona ble offic er w ould have unde rstood to be an unambiguous
or un e qu ivo c a l r e qu e st f

or c ouns e l. T hu s, we c on c lud e that th e de c isi on of the Ke ntu c ky

Sup re me Court was neither

contra ry to nor involved an unrea sonable application of c lear ly established fe dera l law. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). III
. For the fore g oing r easons, we aff irm the district court’s de cision. 2