alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
(C. D. 782)

#### C. S. Emery & Co. *v.*United States

*9United States Customs Court, Third Division

(Decided June 18, 1943)

*Carroll A. Davis*for the plaintiff.

*Paul P. Rao,*Assistant Attorney General *(William J. Vitale,*special attorney), for the defendant.

Before Cline, Keefe, and Ekwall, Judges

Ekwall, Judge:

Plaintiff in this case alleges that the collector of customs at the port of St. Albans, Vt., assessed increased and additional duties on an importation of breakfast foods “without giving the consignees the Notice of Advance required by section 501 of the Tariff Act of 1930 and article 862 of the Customs Regulations of 1937,” thus causing the assessment of increased and additional duties. It is further claimed that this failure to give the required notice of advance renders the “assessment, ascertainment, and liquidation of increased and additional duties illegal, void, and without effect.”

The record discloses that the importer did receive notice of the appraisement but it is contended that it was not on the appropriate customs form. The notice of appraisement is a statutory requirement found in the opening sentence of section 501 of the Tariff Act of 1930, reading as follows:

> The collector shall give written notice of appraisement to the consignee, Ms agent, or his attorney, if (1) the appraised value is higher than the entered value, or (2) a change in the classification of the merchandise results from the appraiser’s determination of value. * * *. ,

It will be noted that the statute prescribes no particular form of words for the notice. It follows that any notice that complies with the statute is sufficient. *Larini, Cavallaro & Co.*v. *United States,*12 Treas. Dec. 500, T. D. 27715, G. A. 6478. That the notice received by the importer in the instant case was sufficient to advise importer that its goods had been appraised and that the appraised value was higher than the entered value is self evident. It gave the entry number, the date of entry, the date of the appraiser’s return, and stated that there was an addition by the appraiser to make market value, and also that there was an estimated additional duty due the Government amounting to $461.70. It gave also the number of the railroad car in which the goods had been transported and the number of packages in the importation. There is nothing vague, or indefinite, *10or misleading about this notice. We observe that the plaintiff does not claim either in the protest or brief that'it was misled.

Taking judicial notice of the records of our own court, we note that the plaintiff herein filed a petition under section 489 of. the Tariff Act •of 1930 for remission of the additional duties incurred on this importation which petition was dismissed because it was filed after the ■statutory time allowed therefor had expired. (See *C. S. Emery & Co.*v. *United States,*8 Cust. Ct. 434, Abstract 46789.)

Upon the record we find that the plaintiff has failed to sustain its burden of proof and its claim is therefore overruled.

Judgment will be rendered for the defendant.
A89A1903.

#### WENZCEL TILE COMPANY OF FLORIDA, INC. v. NEWMAN.

(391 SE2d 652)

Decided September 26, 1989

Rehearing denied March 9, 1990.

*Allen W. Johnson,*for appellant.

Deen, Presiding Judge.

The appellant, Wenzcel Tile Company of Florida, Inc. (Wenzcel), commenced this action against the appellee, R. A. Newman, to recover on an account. Newman defended on the basis that the debt for the purchase of tile products from Wenzcel was owed by his corporation, R. A. Newman, Jr., Inc., and not by himself individually. The jury returned a verdict for Newman, and, following the trial court’s denial of Wenzcel’s motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or for new trial, Wenzcel brings this appeal. Held:

1. In moving for directed verdict and for judgment n.o.v., Wenzcel contended that there was no evidence that it had transacted business with Newman’s corporation, rather than Newman individually. However, as noted by the trial court, there was evidence that the credit application for the purchase of the tile products was submitted in the corporation’s name, and that at no time did Wenzcel inform Newman of its decision, claimed during the trial, to extend credit only to Newman individually. Also, Wenzcel sent bills to the corporate address, and a number of the bills was paid by corporate checks. This evidence would support a finding that Wenzcel contracted with the corporate entity of R. A. Newman, Jr., Inc., and not Newman the individual.

A grant of either a motion for directed verdict or judgment n.o.v. is authorized only when the evidence and all reasonable deductions therefrom demand a verdict in favor of the movant. *Mercer v. Woodard,*166 Ga. App. 119 (13) (303 SE2d 475) (1983). Under this standard, the trial court properly denied Wenzcel’s motions.

2. The trial court instructed the jury about “the general rule that when an agent, in making a contract, discloses to the other contracting party that he is acting for a named principal, the principal is responsible and not the agent.” The trial court further charged the jury that “[a]n agent may expressly contract on his own credit and be bound, even though his principal be known.” Thus, contrary to Wenzcel’s contention on appeal, the trial court’s instructions on agent liability did not imply that mere disclosure of a principal will relieve an agent of any liability.

*Judgment affirmed.*

*Birdsong and Benham, JJ., concur.*

*777
      *Gail D. Stebbins,*for appellee.
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 97-2417

LIZA FLOYD, individually and as Representative

of the Estate of Marvin Floyd and Mike Floyd,

Plaintiff - Appellant,

versus

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, its agencies, Farm

Service Agency (f/k/a Farmer's Home Administration) and Small Business Administration

acting on behalf of the United States of

America,

Defendant - Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of

South Carolina, at Charleston. C. Weston Houck, Chief District

Judge. (CA-96-2082-12AJ)

Submitted: March 12, 1998 Decided: March 23, 1998

Before LUTTIG, WILLIAMS and MICHAEL, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Liza Floyd, Appellant Pro Se. Joseph Parkwood Griffith, Jr.,

OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Charleston, South Carolina,

for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

See Local Rule 36(c).
2

PER CURIAM:

Appellant appeals the district court's order granting summary

judgment to the Defendants in this civil action brought pursuant to

the Federal Torts Claim Act and 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 2671 (1994). We

have reviewed the record and the district court's opinion accepting

the recommendation of the magistrate judge and find no reversible

error. Accordingly, we affirm on the reasoning of the district

court. Floyd v. United States, No. CA-96-2082-12AJ (D.S.C. Sept.

29, 1997). We dispense with oral argument because the facts and

legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before

the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED
NO. 07-04-0314-CV

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SEVENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

AT AMARILLO

PANEL A

SEPTEMBER 2, 2004

______________________________

SCHOENBORN & DOLL ENTERPRISES, INC., 

INTERVENER INTO JUDY NOLAN, APPELLANT

V.

AMERICAN CLUB SYSTEMS, INC., APPELLEE

_________________________________

FROM THE 237TH DISTRICT COURT OF LUBBOCK COUNTY;

NO. 2002-517,144; HONORABLE SAM MEDINA, JUDGE

_______________________________

Before JOHNSON, C.J., and REAVIS and CAMPBELL, JJ.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Appellant Schoenborn & Doll Enterprises, Inc., Intervener into Judy Nolan, perfected

this appeal challenging the trial court’s summary judgment in favor of appellee American

Club Systems, Inc. Pending before this Court is Schoenborn’s motion by which it

represents it desires to have this appeal dismissed without prejudice. Without passing on
2

the merits of the case, the motion is granted and the appeal is hereby dismissed. See Tex.

R. App. P. 42.1(a)(1).

Don H. Reavis

 Justice
1 In The Court of Appeals Ninth District of Texas at Beaumont

_________________ NO. 09
- 1 6
- 00 076
- CR

_________________ JOHN PITT , Appellant
V. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

________________________________________ __________________________ On Appeal from the 75th District Court Liberty County, Texas Trial Cause No. CR27837

________________________________________ __________________________ MEMORANDUM OPINION Pursuant to a plea bargain agreement, John Pitt entered a plea of nolo
contendere to the offense of theft , a state jail felony

. The trial court found Pitt guilty of the charge as alleged in the indictment , sentenced Pitt to two years
confinement , but suspended his sentence and placed Pitt on community supervision
for five years and ass essed a fine of $500

. The State subsequently filed a motion to
revoke Pitt ’s unexpired community supervision , alleging four violations of the2 conditions of his community supervision

. Pitt pled “true” to violating the four
condition s of h is community supervision. After a hearing on the State’s motion to revoke, t he trial court found that Pitt violated the condition s of h is community supervision , revoked Pitt ’s community supervision, and sentenced Pitt to two years
in state jail

. Pitt ’s appellate counsel filed an Anders brief. See Anders v. California , 386 U.S. 738 (1967); High v. State , 573 S.W.2d 807 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1978). Counsel’s brief presents his professional evaluation of the record and concludes there are no argua ble grounds to be advanced in this appeal. Counsel provided Pitt with a copy of his Anders brief. We granted an extension of time for
Pitt to file a pro se brief , but we received no response from Pitt

. We have independently reviewed the clerk’s record and the reporter’s record, and we agree with Pitt ’s appellate counsel that no arguable issues support an appeal. Therefore, we find it unnecessary to order appointment of new counsel

to re

- brief Pitt ’s appe al. Cf. Stafford v. State , 813 S.W.2d 503, 511 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991). We affirm the trial court’s judgment. 1

1 Pitt may challenge our decision in this case by filing a petition for discretionary review. See Tex. R. App. P. 68.3 AFFIRMED.

______________________________ CHARLES KREGER Justice
Submitted on August 1, 2016 Opinion Delivered S eptember 7, 2016 Do not pub lish
Before Kreger, Horton, and Johnson, JJ.
January 16, 1946

No. 50832.

Suit 4504.

C. A. D. 319.

#### F. *W. Myers & Co., Inc.*v. *United States.*

C. D. 905 reversed.
<PAGE>

                                                                    EXHIBIT 10.4

                             Subcontracting Contract

Party A: Shandong Longfeng Group Company
Party B: New Dragon Asia Food (Yantai) Company Limited

Shandong  Longfeng Group Company  ("Party A") has invested 10% of the registered
capital in New Dragon Asia Food (Yantai)  Company  Limited ("Party B"). Based on
the actual  production  condition and the  consideration of obligations,  power,
profits  of the  shareholder,  Party A and Party B agreed to sign this  Contract
after consultation.

1.     Subcontract Period

       Subcontracting period is 50 years, i.e. from December 26, 1998 to
       December 25, 2048

2.     Subcontract Fee

       Party B shall paid RMB200,000 as Subcontract Fee to Party A for each
       financial year within the Subcontract Period.

3.     Both parties' responsibilities

       (i)    Party A :
              Party A shall advise, provide services and monitor on major
              decisions and production management to Party B. Party A shall also
              audit the operation condition and economic responsibilities of
              Party B within and at the end of the Subcontract Period.

       (ii)   After Party A received the Subcontract Fee, it does not entitled
              to receive the undistributed profits according to the actual
              proportion of investment in registered capital after deducting the
              Subcontract Fee.

       (iii)  Party B:

              (1)    Party B must obey the PRC laws and regulations, operate the
                     business according to the approved business areas and use
                     its operation power correctly.

              (2)    Party B should improve its decision-making and management
                     ability, enhance its operation capacity and profitability,
                     expand the market and increase the incomes.

              (3)    Party B shall strictly execute the policies of the company
                     and ensure every target can be successfully achieved.


<PAGE>

              (4)    Party B shall improve the equipment maintenance, quality
                     management, market expansion and self-development based on
                     the long-term business view.

4.    If Party B encounters earthquake, fire, typhoon, etc such unforeseeable or
      unavoidable  natural  accidents  which  directly  affect the completion of
      economic targets during Party B's operation period, then Party A and Party
      B can  negotiate to reduce the  Subcontract  Fee.  Normal change in market
      conditions and changes in competitive  environments shall not be an excuse
      to change the Subcontract Fee.

5.    Party A and Party B can negotiate to adjust the Subcontract Period.

6.    Any other matters not stated in this Contract  shall be negotiated by both
      Parties. Supplemental agreement can be signed if necessary.

7.    This  Contract  has 3 copies and is effective  after  signing with company
      chop.

Party A's legal representative:

Party B's representative:


December 26, 1998
<TABLE> <S> <C>


<ARTICLE>                     5
<LEGEND>
This schedule contains summary financial information extracted from the
Company's financial  statements for the three months ended September 30, 1998
and is qualified in its entirety by reference to such financial statements.

</LEGEND>
       
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<CASH>                                         606
<SECURITIES>                                   0
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<CURRENT-ASSETS>                               651
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<LOSS-PROVISION>                               0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                             (18)
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                (1,643)
<INCOME-TAX>                                   0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                            (1,643)
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<NET-INCOME>                                   (1,643)
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</TABLE>
I

106TH CONGRESS

1ST SESSION H. R. 1100

To correct an oversight in earlier legislation by directing the National Park

Service to grant to three individuals a right of use and occupancy

of certain property on Santa Cruz Island.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

MARCH 11, 1999

Mr. POMBO introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee

on Resources

A BILL

To correct an oversight in earlier legislation by directing

the National Park Service to grant to three individuals

a right of use and occupancy of certain property on

Santa Cruz Island.

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

3 SECTION 1. SANTA CRUZ ISLAND; ADDITIONAL RIGHTS OF

4 USE AND OCCUPANCY.

5 Section 202(e) of Public Law 96–199 (16 U.S.C.

6 410ff–1(e)) is amended by adding the following at the end

7 thereof:
2

•HR 1100 IH

1 ‘‘(5) In the case of the real property referred to in

2 paragraph (1), in addition to the rights of use and occu3 pancy reserved under paragraph (1) and set forth in In4 strument 90–027494, upon the enactment of this para5 graph, the Secretary shall grant identical rights of use and

6 occupancy to Mr. Francis Gherini of Ventura, California,

7 the previous owner of the real property, and to each of

8 the two grantors identified in Instrument No. 92–102117

9 recorded in the Official Records of the County of Santa

10 Barbara, California. The use and occupancy rights grant11 ed to Mr. Francis Gherini shall be for a term of 25 years

12 from the date of the enactment of this paragraph. The

13 Secretary shall grant such rights without consideration

14 and shall execute and record such instruments as nec15 essary to vest such rights in such individuals as promptly

16 as practicable, but no later than 90 days, after the enact17 ment of this paragraph.’’.

Æ
Exhibit 31.1**Certifications Pursuant to Section 302 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002**I, Thomas J. Crawford, certify that:1. I have reviewed this report on Form 10-Q of Stewart Enterprises, Inc.; 2. Based on my knowledge, this quarterly report does not contain any untrue statement of amaterial fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in lightof the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to theperiod covered by this report; 3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information included inthis report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition, results ofoperations and cash flows of the registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in thisreport; 4. The registrant’s other certifying officer and I are responsible for establishing andmaintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and15d-15(e)) and internal control over financial reporting (as defined in Exchange Act Rules13a-15(f) and 15(d)-15(f)) for the registrant and have: a) designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure controlsand procedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that material informationrelating to the registrant, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us byothers within those entities, particularly during the period in which this report is beingprepared;  b) designed such internal control over financial reporting, or caused such internalcontrol over financial reporting to be designed under our supervision, to providereasonable assurance regarding the reliability of financial reporting and the preparationof financial statements for external purposes in accordance with generally acceptedaccounting principles;  c) evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant’s disclosure controls and procedures andpresented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness of the disclosure controlsand procedures, as of the end of the period covered by this report based on suchevaluation; and  d) disclosed in this report any change in the registrant’s internal control over financialreporting that occurred during the registrant’s most recent fiscal quarter that hasmaterially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, the registrant’sinternal control over financial reporting; and5. The registrant’s other certifying officer and I have disclosed, based on our most recentevaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the registrant’s auditors and theaudit committee of the registrant’s board of directors (or persons performing the equivalentfunctions): a) all significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operation ofinternal control over financial reporting which are reasonably likely to adversely affectthe registrant’s ability to record, process, summarize and report financial information;and  b) any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employees whohave a significant role in the registrant’s internal control over financial reporting.Date: March 10, 2008 /s/THOMAS J. CRAWFORD
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<PAGE>
<ARTICLE> 9
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1997
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-1997
<PERIOD-END>                               MAR-31-1997
<CASH>                                           7,892
<INT-BEARING-DEPOSITS>                           4,745
<FED-FUNDS-SOLD>                                 3,650
<TRADING-ASSETS>                                     0
<INVESTMENTS-HELD-FOR-SALE>                    148,516
<INVESTMENTS-CARRYING>                          78,301
<INVESTMENTS-MARKET>                            77,901
<LOANS>                                        102,622
<ALLOWANCE>                                      1,105
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 355,831
<DEPOSITS>                                     320,545
<SHORT-TERM>                                       964
<LIABILITIES-OTHER>                              2,057
<LONG-TERM>                                          0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                        10,800
<OTHER-SE>                                      21,465
<TOTAL-LIABILITIES-AND-EQUITY>                 355,831
<INTEREST-LOAN>                                  2,095
<INTEREST-INVEST>                                3,523
<INTEREST-OTHER>                                     0
<INTEREST-TOTAL>                                 5,618
<INTEREST-DEPOSIT>                               2,919
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                               2,932
<INTEREST-INCOME-NET>                            2,686
<LOAN-LOSSES>                                       87
<SECURITIES-GAINS>                                 (38)
<EXPENSE-OTHER>                                  2,124
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                  1,093
<INCOME-PRE-EXTRAORDINARY>                       1,093
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                       835
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                      .39
<EPS-DILUTED>                                      .39
<YIELD-ACTUAL>                                       0
<LOANS-NON>                                        152
<LOANS-PAST>                                        60
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<CHARGE-OFFS>                                      143
<RECOVERIES>                                        15
<ALLOWANCE-CLOSE>                                1,105
<ALLOWANCE-DOMESTIC>                             1,105
<ALLOWANCE-FOREIGN>                                  0
<ALLOWANCE-UNALLOCATED>                              0
        

</TABLE>