* This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the

doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and col lateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the citation of orders and judg ments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under the terms and condi tions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3. 

## F I L E D United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit 

### OCT 23 2003 

### PATRICK FISHER Clerk UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

TENTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee, No. 02-5131

v. (N. D. Oklahoma) REY RAMIREZ-BUENO,

Defendant-Appellant. (D.C. No. 2:02-CR-02-C)

ORDER AND JUDGMENT *

Before EBEL , HENRY , and HARTZ , Circuit Judges.
Rey Ramirez-Bueno was convicted after a jury trial of knowingly and intentionally possessing with the intent to distrib ute in excess of five kilograms or more of a mixture or substance containing a detecta ble amount of cocaine, a violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 841(b)(1)(A )(ii). Prior to trial, Mr. Ramirez-Bueno moved to suppress evidence discoveredin his car by an Oklahoma Highway Patrolman during a December 13, 2001, traff ic stop. The district court1 After examining the briefs and appellate record, th is panel has

determined unanimously that oral argument would notaid in the disposition of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f). We therefore grant the parties’ request to decide this case on the briefs. -2- denied the motion, and Mr. Ramirez-Bueno now challe nges that ruling on appeal. For the reasons set forth below, we conclude that t he stop of Mr. RamirezBueno’s car and the resulting detention were reason able under the Fourth Amendment. We therefore affirm the district court’s denial of Mr. RamirezBueno’s motion to suppress, as well as his convicti on and sentence. 1

I. BACKGROUND On December 13, 2001, Highway Patrolman David King observed a car with Nevada license plates fail to signal when exit ing from the eastbound lane of I-44 in Creek County, Oklahoma. Trooper King follo wed the car through the toll booth and then stopped it. The car was driven by M r. Ramirez-Bueno, and one passenger, Ms. Shawna Hall, was riding in the frontseat. Trooper King requested Mr. Ramirez-Bueno to step out of the car and then asked him for his driver’s license. After Mr. Rami rez-Bueno retrieved the license, Trooper King requested Mr. Ramirez-Bueno t o accompany him to the patrol car. Mr. Ramirez-Bueno complied. Trooper K ing then informed him of the reason for the stop and explained that he would iss ue him a warning. As Trooper-3-

King prepared the warning, he asked Mr. Ramirez-Bue no who owned the car and where Mr. Ramirez-Bueno was going. Mr. Ramirez-Bue no told Trooper King that he was driving to Philadelphia to see his brother and his father for the holiday and that he planned to return to Las Vegas sometime aro und the first of the year. According to Trooper King, “the more questions thatI asked [Mr. RamirezBueno] about the trip, the more nervous he became. I could physically observe his chest rising and falling and his right leg was shaking on the floorboard.” Aplt’s App. at 36. Trooper King asked Mr. Ramirez-Bueno if the car was a rental. Mr. Ramirez-Bueno responded affirmatively, and Trooper King then approached the right side of the car and asked Ms. Hall for the re gistration. As she retrieved it from the glove compartment, Trooper King asked wher e she was traveling. Ms. Hall responded that she was going to Kansas City to see her family for Christmas. Trooper King then asked if she and Mr. Ramirez-Buen o were planning to travel anywhere else, and Ms. Hall responded that they wer e not. Trooper King told her that Mr. Ramirez-Bueno had said that they were goin g to Philadelphia. Ms. Hall responded that they might go there for a vacation. Trooper King asked if Mr. Ramirez-Bueno had any family living in Philadelphia , and Ms. Hall responded that he did not, adding that all of his family live d in Las Vegas.-4-

Trooper King returned to his patrol car and confronted Mr. Ramirez-Bueno with Ms. Hall’s account of their travel plans. Acc ording to Trooper King, Mr. Ramirez-Bueno became extremely flustered. He state d that his mother and father were in Kansas City and that he and Ms. Hall might stay there for three or four days and then go to Philadelphia “if the weather wa s right.” Id. at 40. According to Trooper King, he then suspected that “ some type of criminal behavior was being committed.” Id. at 48. Nevertheless, after completing the warning citation, Trooper King handed Mr. Ramirez-B ueno his license and told him that he was free to go. Before Mr. Ramirez-Bue no exited the patrol car, Trooper King then asked him if he had a few minutes to answer some questions. According to Trooper King, “there was a little bit of confusion [about] what I was asking, so I attempted to rephrase it to allow him to understand what I said, and [Mr. Ramirez-Bueno] finally said, ‘Questions? Okay. ’” Id. at 41. Mr. RamirezBueno then “shut the door back on the vehicle [a]nd failed to exit the vehicle.” Id. Trooper King asked for permission to search the c ar, and Mr. Ramirez-Bueno agreed. Trooper King returned to Mr. Ramirez-Bueno’s car wi th Chibo, his trained, drug-sniffing dog. Chibo alerted on the windows onboth sides of the car, and Trooper King discovered several packages in the doo r panels. Trooper King-5-

placed Mr. Ramirez-Bueno and Ms. Hall under arrest The packages weighed approximately twenty-eight pounds and tested positi ve for cocaine base. The government charged Mr. Ramirez-Bueno with one c ount of possessing cocaine with the intent to distribute it, a violati on of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 841(b)(1)(A)(ii). Mr. Ramirez-Bueno moved to suppr ess the evidence discovered during the traffic stop, and the court held a heari ng during which it heard testimony from Trooper King and viewed a tape of th e stop. In denying the motion to suppress, the district cou rt held that both Trooper King’s initial stop of the car and his subsequent q uestioning were reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. The court further conc luded that Mr. RamirezBueno had consented to the search of the car:

I think the more serious question the Court always has when we have somebody who has a primary language different from English is the issue of understandin g. In viewing the tape, in listening to the tape, there w as no indication that Mr. Ramirez does not understand Eng lish. There is a good indication that – he speaks broken English when he talks, but understanding and speaking are two different things, and I could detect nothing that w ould lead me to believe that from my observation and from my watching the tape and listening to it that he did n ot understand the words when they were spoken. Officer King says that his impressions were clearly that he understood everything. The Court would bel ieve from the evidence that is presented that that’s a f act, and therefore, there was a valid request, a valid conse nt, a knowing consent given for the search, and that the dog which alerted certainly gave Trooper King the proba ble cause to go further in the search itself. Once the dog-6- alerted, [Trooper King] had the right to go much f urther in the search to see what caused the alert. Aplt’s App. at 52-53. Mr. Ramirez-Bueno was convicted after a jury trial. The court sentenced him to 240 months’ incarceration.

II. DISCUSSION Mr. Ramirez-Bueno challenges the district court’s ruling on two grounds. First, he argues that the scope of Trooper King’s q uestioning exceeded the scope allowed by the Fourth Amendment during minor traffi c stops. Second, he contends that his difficulties in understanding Eng lish establish that he did not validly consent to the search of his car. In reviewing the denial of a motion to suppress, we accept the factual findings of the district court unless they are clea rly erroneous. United States v. Williams , 271 F.3d 1262, 1266 (10th Cir. 2001). “Judging the credibility of the witnesses, determining the weight to be given to ev idence, and drawing reasonable inferences and conclusions from the evid ence are within the province of the district court.” United States v. Hunnicutt , 135 F.3d 1345, 1348 (10th Cir. 1998). We consider the totality of the circumstan ces, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the government. Williams , 271 F.3d at 1266. The-7-

ultimate determination of reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment is a question of law which we review de novo. Id.

A. Reasonableness of the Detention The Fourth Amendment protects the “right of the pe ople to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, againstunreasonable searches and seizures.” U.S. Const. amend. IV. A traffic stop is a “seizure” within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, “even though the p urpose of the stop is limited and the resulting detention quite brief.” Delaware v. Prouse , 440 U.S. 648, 653 (1979). Such a stop, however, is more an alogous to an investigative detention than a custodial arrest. United States v . Jones , 44 F.3d 860, 871 (10th Cir. 1995). Accordingly, we analyze such stops under the princi ples developed for investigative detentions. See Terry v. Ohio , 392 U.S. 1 (1968); Williams , 271 F.3d at 1266-71 (applying Terryprinciples to a traffic stop). In assessing the reasonableness of an investigative detention, we a sk (1) “whether the officer’s action was justified at its inception,” and (2) “wh ether [the action] was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justifi ed the interference in the first place.” Terry , 392 U.S. at 20.-8-

Here, Mr. Ramirez-Bueno does not dispute the distri ct court’s conclusion that Trooper King acted reasonably in making the in itial stop for failing to signal a turn. Instead, he focuses on Trooper King’s subs equent questioning, arguing that once he obtained the driver’s license and regi stration, Trooper King lacked a reasonable suspicion to ask Ms. Hall about her trav el plans. Thus, Mr. RamirezBueno maintains, Trooper King’s questioning exceede d the scope permitted during a routine traffic stop and violated the Fourth Amendment. Mr. Ramirez-Bueno’s argument is foreclosed by our p recedent. As the government notes, this court has repeatedly held th at during a routine traffic stop, an officer may ask about travel plans. See Williams , 271 F.3d at 1267 (“[W]e have repeatedly held (as have other circuits) that questions relating to a driver’s travel plans ordinarily fall within the scope of a traffic stop.”); United States v.
West , 219 F.3d 1171, 1176 (10th Cir. 2000) (stating that “questions about travel plans are routine and ‘may be asked as a matter of course without exceeding the proper scope of a traffic stop’”) (quoting United S tates v. Hernandez , 93 F.3d 1493, 1499 (10th Cir. 1996)). These questions may be asked of both the driver and the passengers. See United States v. Rivera , 867 F.2d 1261, 1263 (10th Cir. 1989) (stating that an officer “could legitimately ask questions relating to the identity and travel plans of [the driver] and [his passenger]” and noting that the inconsistent answers provided by the two of them supported the finding of-9-

reasonable suspicion). Here, Trooper King’s questi oning of Ms. Hall was limited to her travel plans and did not extend the length o f the detention significantly. Thus, the questioning was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.

B. Consent to the Search Mr. Ramirez-Bueno also contends that his limited kn owledge of English indicates that he did not understand Trooper King’s request to search the car and that, as a result, he did not validly consent. His argument is based upon the fact that he answered “yes” to Trooper King’s question a s to whether he owned the car and “yes” to the question of whether the car was a rental. He also points to Trooper King’s testimony that he had to repeat seve ral questions. Whether Mr. Ramirez-Bueno voluntarily consented to the challenged detention or search is a question of fact, determin ed by the totality of the circumstances and reviewed for clear error. United States v. Zubia-Melendez , 263 F.3d 1155, 1162 (10th Cir. 2001). Here, the r ecord supports the district court’s conclusion that the search was consensual. At the hearing on the motion to suppress, Trooper King testified that he believe d that Mr. Ramirez-Bueno “understood exactly what I was asking.” Aplt’s App . at 44. Moreover, as noted above, the district court reviewed the entire tape of the stop and “detect[ed] nothing that would lead [it] to believe” that Mr. R amirez-Bueno did not understand Trooper King’s request. Id. at 53. In light of Trooper King’s-10-

testimony and the district court’s opportunity to r eview the tape of the stop, we discern no clear error in the district court’s ruli ng.

III. CONCLUSION For the reasons set forth above, we AFFIRM the district court’s denial of Mr. Ramirez-Bueno’s motion to suppress, as well as his conviction and sentence.

Entered for the Court,

Robert H. Henry Circuit Judge