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In The

Court of Appeals

Ninth District of Texas at Beaumont

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NO. 09-18-00186-CR

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JOE LEE CLEMENTS, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

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On Appeal from the 1A District Court

Jasper County, Texas

Trial Cause No. 13158JD

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MEMORANDUM OPINION

Pursuant to a plea bargain agreement, appellant Joe Lee Clements pleaded 

guilty to possession of a controlled substance. The trial court found the evidence 

sufficient to find Clements guilty, but deferred further proceedings, placed Clements 

on community supervision for three years, and assessed a fine of $1000. The State 

subsequently filed a motion to revoke Clements’s unadjudicated community 

supervision. Clements pleaded “not true” to the alleged violations, and after 
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conducting an evidentiary hearing, the trial court found that Clements violated the 

conditions of his community supervision, found Clements guilty of possession of a 

controlled substance, and assessed punishment at two years of confinement in a state 

jail facility. 

Clements’s appellate counsel filed a brief that presents counsel’s professional 

evaluation of the record and concludes the appeal is frivolous. See Anders v. 

California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967); High v. State, 573 S.W.2d 807 (Tex. Crim. App. 

1978). On February 13, 2019, we granted an extension of time for Clements to file 

a pro se brief. We received no response from Clements. We reviewed the appellate 

record, and we agree with counsel’s conclusion that no arguable issues support an 

appeal. Therefore, we find it unnecessary to order appointment of new counsel to rebrief the appeal. Cf. Stafford v. State, 813 S.W.2d 503, 511 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991). 

However, during our review of the record, we observed that the trial court’s written 

judgment includes an error that is capable of being reformed without the 

involvement of the trial court. The trial court determined that Clements was indigent 

but then rendered an award of attorney’s fees related to the motion to adjudicate guilt 

even though there was no evidence before the court to show that Clements’s 

indigency status had changed. Absent a change in a defendant’s status as an indigent, 

a trial court is not authorized to impose an award of attorney’s fees in the judgment 
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against a defendant who remains indigent when the judgment is pronounced. See 

Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. arts. 26.04(p), 26.05(g) (West Supp. 2018); see also

Wiley v. State, 410 S.W.3d 313, 315, 317 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013); Roberts v. State, 

327 S.W.3d 880, 884 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2010, no pet.). We are authorized by 

the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure to render the judgment the trial court should 

have rendered. See Tex. R. App. P. 43.2, 43.2. Because the record does not support 

the award, we modify the judgment by deleting the award of $450 for attorney’s fees 

related to the motion to adjudicate guilt (“MTAG”). We affirm the trial court’s 

judgment as modified.1

AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED.

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 STEVE McKEITHEN

 Chief Justice

Submitted on May 30, 2019

Opinion Delivered June 12, 2019

Do Not Publish

Before McKeithen, C.J., Kreger and Horton, JJ.

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Clements may challenge our decision in this case by filing a petition for 

discretionary review. See Tex. R. App. P. 68.