## NO. 12-07-00307-CR IN THE COUR T OF APP EALS TWELFTH COURT OF APP EALS D ISTR ICT

TYLER, TEXA S

WILLIAM DAV

ID DENNIE, § APPEAL F ROM THE 8TH APPELLANT V. § JUDICIAL DISTRI CT COURT OF
TH E ST ATE OFTEX

AS, APP ELL EE § RAIN S CO UN TY

, T EXAS

MEMORA NDUM OPIN ION William D avid Dennie a

ppeals fr om his conviction for bail jumping and failure to appea r. In three issues, Appellant ar gues that the e vidence is insufficient to pr ove the extra neous off enses alleged during the punishment phase of the trial and that his attorne y di d n o t re n d er profe ssional assistance

. We affir

m.

B ACKG ROUND Appellant fa iled to appea

r for his trial for ag g ravated sexual assault. He wa s arr ested a bout five y ear s later in Oklahoma afte r he pr esente d his dece ased br oth er ’s i d en t i fication to a police office r duringa tra ffic stop. He was indicted f or the offense of bail jumping a nd failure to appea

r. He plea ded guilty

to that char g e. He also pleade d true to an e n h ance ment para g raph in the indictment alleg ing that he had a prior felony conviction for bur g lary . Appellant ele cted to have a jury assess punishment, and a trial on punishment was held. At the punishment trial, the State called two adult women who testified that Appellant had sexually assaulted them or

committed indecenc y

with a child with the m when they wer e childre n. Appellant testi fied and denied that he commit ted t he sex ual offenses. He also testified that he had not a ppear ed for trial beca

use he was “over

whelmed with [the county attorney ].” The jury assessed2

punishment at twenty

y ear s of imprisonment and a f ine of $10,000. This appe al followed.

S U FF I C I ENC Y OF THE E V I D ENC E I n his first and sec ond issues, Appellant ar gues that the e vidence is insufficient to prove that h e c o m m i t t e d

o ff en s es aga i n s tt h e t wo wo m en wh o t es t i fi edd u ri n g t h e p u n i s h m en th ea ri n g. Spe c if ic a lly , App e lla

nt a rgue s th a t th e e vi den ce was fa c tua lly ins uf fi c ie nt t o s ho w t

hat th e e ve nts
occur red. Duringthe p u n i s h m ent phase of the trial, the State ma y introduce e vidence of extraneous crimes or bad ac ts “that [are] shown bey ond a re asonable doubt by evidenc e to have be en committed by the def endant or for whic h he could be held cr iminally responsible . . . .” T EX
. C ODE C R IM
. P R OC
. ANN . a rt . 3 7. 07 , § 3( a )( 1) (V ernon Sup p. 20 08 ). Th e tr ia l c ourt , h ow e ve r, mus t make a thr e sh old deter mination that the se ntencing entity can r ationally find the def

endant c riminally

responsible for the extraneous misconduct be fore it can admit evidenc e of the ex trane ous offe nse at the punishment phase of a nonca pital trial. See Smith v

. St ate , 227 S.W .3d 753, 759–60 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). Appellant does no t complain that the trial c ourt should not have allowe d the evidenc e. In s t e a d , ci t i n g Zuni

ga v . St ate , 1 4 4 S. W. 3 d 4 7 7 , 4 8 4 ( T e x. Cr im

. A p p
. 2 0 0 4 ) , h e ar g u e s th a t the evidenc e supporting t h e extraneous offe nses was insuff icient. The Zuni

ga de c isi on

se t out a standard of

revie w for the fac t u al s ufficie ncy of the e vidence to support a ver dict. The c ourt of crimi n al appea ls disavowed Zuni ga and re stated the standa rd for fac tual sufficie ncy

revie w two y ear s later in Wa tso n v

. St ate , 204 S.W .3d 4 0 4 , 4 1 7 (T ex . Crim. App. 2006). Neve rtheless, we revie w the fa ctual suff

ici en cy o f t h e evide nce to support a conviction, not extraneous evidenc e
a dmi tte d in

the punis hme nt p ha se of

a tr ia l. Th is c ourt

ha s sp e c if

ic a lly he ld that a defe nd ant m ay c ha lle ng e the tr ia l c ourt ’s thr e sh old deter mination to allow ex tr an eo u s punishment evidence , but may not further

challeng e the sufficie ncy o f t h e evide nce of extraneous ac ts. See Ma lpic a v . St ate , 1 0 8 S. W. 3 d

3 7 4 , 3 7 9 ( T e x. App.–Tyler 2003, pe t. ref’ d) (“ We conclude that the only revie w possible of the suffic iency of the proof of an extraneous of

fense introduced at t h e p u n i s hment stag e is a re view under an abuse of dis c re tio n s tand ard

of the tr ia l ju dg e ' s thre sh old

ru lin g on a dmi ssi bil ity .” ); se eals o B r a d f ord v . St ate , No. 12-06-00122- CR, 2007 Tex

. App. L EXI S 2554, at *15–16 (Te x . App.–Tyler Mar . 30, 2007, no3

pe t.) (m e m. o p. , n ot d e sig nate d f or pu bli c a tio n) (n o s uf

fi c ie nc y re vie w for extra

ne ou s o ff e ns e evidenc e admitted duringtrial). Ac cording ly , we c annot re view t h e fa ct u al suffic iency of the

e vid e nc e of

e xtra ne ou s o ff

e ns e s a lle g e d d

ur ingAp pe lla

nt’ s p un ish me nt t

ri a l. We ov e rr

ule Ap pe lla nt’ s f ir st a nd se c on d is su e s.

I N EF FE C TI V E A SSI STA N C E O F C OU N SEL I n h is thir d is su e , App e lla nt a rgue s th a t he re c e ive d in e ff e c tiv e a ssi sta

nc e of c ouns e l. S p ec i fica lly , he ar g ues that trial counse l should have pre sented e vidence that his attorney for the underlying of

fense had told him not to appear at that trial. Appli cable Law Cla ims of

ine ff e c tiv e a ssi sta

nce o f cou nsel are e va luate d und e r t he tw o s te p a

na ly sis articulated in Stri ckland v. Washin gton , 466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct . 2052, 80 L . Ed. 674 (1984). The first step re quires an a

ppellant to demonstrate that trial counsel’s r epre sentation fell below a n objective standard of rea sonablene ss under prevailing profe ssional norms. See Stric kla nd , 4 66 U. S.

a t 68 8, 10 4 S. Ct . at 20 65 ; McFar lan d v . St ate , 928 S.W .2d 482, 500 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996). An ineffe ctive assistanc e of c o u n s el claim is not reviewe d for isolated or incidental deviations from profe ssional norms, but on the basis of the t otality of the re prese ntation. See Stric kla nd , 4 66 U. S. at 695, 104 S. Ct. at 2069. The sec ond step requir es the a ppellant to show prejudice from the de ficient pe rfor mance of his attorney

. See He rna nde z v . St ate , 9 88 S.W. 2d

77 0, 77 2 (T e x. Cr im. Ap p. 19 99 ). To e sta bli sh prejudice , an appe llant must show that there i s a re asonable probability that the re sult of the proce eding would have be en diffe rent but for counsel’s deficient pe rfor mance
. See Stric kla nd , 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S. Ct . at 2068. We beg in with the s trong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls withi n the wide r ang e of

rea sonable prof

essional assistance

. See Jac ks on v . St ate , 877 S.W .2d 768, 771 (Tex. Crim. App. 19 94 ). As pa

rt of thi s p re sumpt ion , we pres um e co un se l’ s a c tio ns and de c isi on s w e re re a so na

ble and were moti vated by

sound trial strateg y . See id . Appellant has the burden of proving ineffe ctive assistance of counse l. See id

.4

Ana lys is Th e a lle g e d in e ff

e c tiv e a ssi sta

nc e of c ouns e l is se t out in

Ap pe lla nt’ s b ri e f a s f

oll ow s:

A s st at ed ab o ve, A p p el l ant has represent ed t o A p p el l ant ’ s at t o rney o n ap p eal (t hrough i nvest i gat i o n) tha t A p p e llan t’s a tto rn e y o n the un d e rlying c h a rg e a n d a t t h e ti m e o f t h e failur e to a p p e a r a d v ise d him no t t o ap p ear.

The re fer ence is to a sentence in A ppellant’s statement of fac ts in which he asser ts that “Appellant ha s r e pr e se nte d to his a tto rn e y fo r a pp e a l ( thr ou g h inve sti g a tio n) that App e lla nt’ s atto rn e y

a t th e tim e of the un de rl yingof

fe ns e and fa ilu re to ap pe ar a dv ise d h im t o n ot b e [sic ] pr e se nt f or tr ia l.” Th is prese nt assertion not only contra dicts Appellant’s testim ony as t o why he did not appea r–that he w as “over whelmed” an d d i d n o t want to g o to prison–but is unsupported by the appe llate re cord. To de fe a t th e pr e sumpt ion

of re a so na ble pr of e ssi on a l a ssi sta

nc e , “ a ny a lle g a tio n o f i ne ff

e c tiv e ne ss m

us t be firmly founded in the r ecor d, and the r ecor d m u s t af fi rm ati vely

demonstrate the alleg ed ineffe ctiveness.” Tho mpson v . St ate , 9 S.W .3d 808, 814 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999). The c u s to ma

r y p r o b le m in p r e s e n ti n g in e f f e c ti v e a s s is ta

n c e o f c o u n s e l c la im s o ndirec t appea l is that there is not an explanation in the rec ord of the s t ra t egi c d ec isions made by trial counsel. See , e.g. , Bone v . St ate , 77 S.W .3d 828, 836 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) (“When, as he re, a
c los ingargume nt h a s a

ba sis in f a c t, l aw, and

a pp e a l to pu

bli c po lic y , c ourt s sh ou ld, a t le a st, pe rm it the advoc ate to explain her ra tionale bef

ore c ondemning her.” ). This ca se has that defic iency , but it has a more f

undamental pr oblem in that there is n o co m petent evide nce that counsel made the statement that Appe llant now s ay s that he made . We may not consider f

actua l assertions that ar e outside the rec ord. Whit e he ad v . St ate , 1 3 0 S

. W

. 3 d

8 6 6 , 8 7 2 ( T e x. C r i m
. A p p
. 2 0 04 ); se e als o Ramire z v . St ate , 104 S.W .3d 549, 55 1 n
. 9 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003) (appe llate re cord c annot be supplemented with e vidence not de veloped during the proce eding s; pr oper avenue for introduc ing evidenc e not containe d in the trial rec ord is a hea ring pursuant to a m otion for new tr ial or an application for

writ of habe as cor

pus). Appellate c ounsel’s statement in the br ief, whic h is itself a rendition of a statement made by Ap pe lla nt t o h is a pp e llate c ouns e l, i s n o e vid e nc e tha t anyon e tol d App e lla

nt n ot t o a pp e ar. B e c a

us e5

there is no evidenc e that Appellant was instructed not to appea r, Appellant has failed to prove that trial counsel should have called his pr edec essor attorney or that counsel’s r epre sentation fell below profe ssional norms. We overrule A ppellant’s third issue.

D I S P OS I T I ON Havingoverr

uled Appellant’ s three issues, w e a f f ir m the jud g me nt o f t

he tr ia l c ourt

.

JA M ES T. WOR THEN Chief J ustice

Opinion delivere d Marc h 4, 2009. P an el consi s t ed of

W ort hen, C. J. , G r i

f f i t h, J. , and H oyl e, J.

(DO N OT PUBL I SH)