COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judges Willis, Bray and Overton 

Argued at Norfolk, Virginia 

KEITH BYNUM 

 OPINION BY 

v. Record No. 2154-95-1 JUDGE RICHARD S. BRAY 

 NOVEMBER 12, 1996 

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 

 FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF VIRGINIA BEACH 

A. Bonwill Shockley, Judge 

 Melinda R. Glaubke for appellant. 

 John Byrum, Assistant Attorney General (James S. 

Gilmore, III, Attorney General; Daniel J. Munroe, 

Assistant Attorney General, on brief), for appellee. 

 Keith Bynum (defendant) was convicted in a bench trial for 

receiving stolen property in violation of Code § 18.2-108. 

Defendant complains on appeal (1) that the trial court 

erroneously declined to suppress evidence resulting from an 

unlawful search, and (2) that the evidence was insufficient to 

support the conviction. We disagree and affirm the decision. 

 In accordance with well established principles, we consider 

the sufficiency of the evidence to support a criminal conviction 

upon a review of the record 

 in the light most favorable to the 

Commonwealth, granting to it all reasonable 

inferences fairly deducible therefrom. The 

judgment of a trial court sitting without a 

jury is entitled to the same weight as a jury 

verdict and will not be set aside unless it 

appears from the evidence that the judgment 

is plainly wrong or without evidence to 

support it. 

Martin v. Commonwealth, 4 Va. App. 438, 443, 358 S.E.2d 415, 418 
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(1987) (citing Code § 8.01-680). "The weight which should be 

given to evidence and whether the testimony of a witness is 

credible are questions which the fact finder must decide." 

Bridgeman v. Commonwealth, 3 Va. App. 523, 528, 351 S.E.2d 598, 

601 (1986). 

 We similarly review a trial court's ruling on a suppression 

motion, assessing the evidence in the "light most favorable to 

. . . the prevailing party below," the Commonwealth in this 

instance, and the decision of the trial judge will be disturbed 

only if plainly wrong. Commonwealth v. Grimstead, 12 Va. App. 

1066, 1067, 407 S.E.2d 47, 48 (1991). Our consideration of the 

record includes evidence adduced at both the trial and the 

suppression hearing, if any. DePriest v. Commonwealth, 4 Va. 

App. 577, 583, 359 S.E.2d 540, 542-43 (1987), cert. denied, 488 

U.S. 985 (1988). To prevail on appeal, the defendant must "show 

. . . that the denial of [his] motion . . . constitute[d] 

reversible error." Motley v. Commonwealth, 17 Va. App. 439, 

440-41, 437 S.E.2d 232, 233 (1993). 

 During the early morning hours on February 8, 1995, Virginia 

Beach police executed a search warrant for a local motel room. 

Uniformed Officers Sean Coerse and Steven Bishard were assigned 

to watch from inside and prevent unauthorized persons from 

entering the room. While the search was underway, Coerse 

observed defendant and two women approach the door. When Coerse 

opened the door, defendant "immediately turned around and began 
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walking away." Aware of suspected narcotics activity at the 

motel, Coerse decided to "get a conversation going with 

[defendant]," hoping to gain "consent to search his person." 

 Coerse called to defendant and asked "if [he] could help 

him." Defendant "stopped[,] . . . turned . . . around," and 

answered that "he had come to visit . . . people . . . in the 

room." Coerse had seen no vehicle arrive at the motel and, after 

further inquiry, defendant explained that the three had been 

"dropped off." Defendant laughingly denied involvement in 

narcotics trafficking and acceded to Coerse's request to search 

his person, "plac[ing] his hands up on the wall." Because Coerse 

was "searching for narcotics and specifically crack cocaine," a 

"very small item," he "stuck [his] hands in [defendant's] pockets 

and removed the contents," without objection from defendant. 

Coerse discovered a "Toyota car key" in a trouser pocket and 

remarked to defendant, "I thought . . . you didn't drive here." 

Defendant responded that he had found the key on the ground 

immediately in front of the motel room door and voiced "[n]o 

problem" with police keeping the key. 

 Coerse passed the key to Officer Bishard, and Bishard 

proceeded to a parking area located at the rear of the motel. 

Finding a Toyota automobile with its engine still "warm," Bishard 

ran a "status check" and learned that the vehicle had been 

reported stolen the preceding day. Coerse immediately located 

defendant, then seated on a nearby bench, and confronted him with 
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Bishard's findings. Defendant denied knowledge of the offense 

and was released by police after completion of a "field interview 

card."1

 Following discovery of defendant's fingerprints on the 

automobile, he was arrested several days later. During 

subsequent police interrogation, defendant admitted possessing 

the stolen vehicle at the motel, claiming that "crack fiends" 

oftentimes allowed him to use their vehicles in exchange for 

cocaine. 

 SUPPRESSION OF EVIDENCE 

 Defendant first argues that he consented to a search only 

for drugs and that Coerse "exceeded the scope" of such consent 

when he "seize[d] the [car] key, . . . ask[ed] any questions or 

[took] further action regarding that key." 

 "The constitutional guarantee which defendant invokes 

secures citizens in their persons and property against 

unreasonable seizures." Greene v. Commonwealth, 17 Va. App. 606, 

610, 440 S.E.2d 138, 140 (1994). 

 However, "[t]he purpose of the Fourth 

Amendment is not to eliminate all contact 

between the police and the citizenry, but 'to 

prevent arbitrary and oppressive interference 

by enforcement officials with the privacy and 

personal security of individuals.' As long 

as the person to whom questions are put 

remains free to disregard the questions and 

walk away, there has been no intrusion upon 

that person's liberty or privacy as would 

under the Constitution require some 

 

 1The field interview included defendant's name, address, 

occupation, physical description, and photograph. 
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particularized and objective justification." 

Id. (quoting United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 553-54 

(1980)). "Voluntarily responding to a police request, which most 

citizens will do, does not negate 'the consensual nature of the 

response.'" Grinton v. Commonwealth, 14 Va. App. 846, 849, 419 

S.E.2d 860, 862 (1992) (quoting I.N.S. v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 

216 (1984)). Thus, a police/citizen encounter and related 

exchange remain consensual and without Fourth Amendment 

implications "as long as 'a reasonable person would understand 

that he or she could refuse to cooperate.'" Lawrence v. 

Commonwealth, 17 Va. App. 140, 144, 435 S.E.2d 591, 593 (1993) 

(quoting United States v. Wilson, 953 F.2d 116, 121 (4th Cir. 

1991)), aff'd. per curiam, 247 Va. 339, 443 S.E.2d 160 (1994). 

 Notwithstanding Coerse's motives, the initial encounter and 

attendant exchange between defendant and Officer Coerse were 

clearly voluntary, without suggestion of coercion or 

intimidation. Defendant willingly responded to the officer's 

inquiries, dismissed with a laugh any involvement with narcotics, 

and expressly agreed to a search of his person, placing his hands 

against the wall without prompting by Coerse. 

 "A consensual search is reasonable if the 

search is within the scope of the consent 

given." Grinton v. Commonwealth, 14 Va. App. 

846, 850, 419 S.E.2d 860, 862 (1992). The 

United States Supreme Court has articulated 

the standard for measuring the scope of an 

individual's consent under the Fourth 

Amendment to be "'objective' reasonableness--

what would the typical person have understood 

by the exchange between the officer and the 

suspect?" Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 
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251 (1991). Furthermore, the Court stated 

that, "[t]he scope of a search is generally 

defined by its expressed object." Id.

Bolda v. Commonwealth, 15 Va. App. 315, 316-17, 423 S.E.2d 204, 

205-06 (1992). 

 "A suspect may of course delimit as he chooses the scope of 

the search to which he consents. But if his consent would 

reasonably be understood to extend to a particular container, the 

Fourth Amendment provides no grounds for requiring a more 

explicit authorization." Lawrence, 17 Va. App. at 145, 435 

S.E.2d at 594 (quoting Jimeno, 500 U.S. at 252). "The scope of 

[the] search may be further defined during the course of the 

search by the passive acquiescence of the person whose property 

is being searched." Grinton, 14 Va. App. at 851, 419 S.E.2d at 

863; see also Lawrence, 17 Va. App. at 146, 435 S.E.2d at 594-95. 

 Both the presence of consent to search and any related 

limitations are factual issues for the trial court to resolve 

after consideration of the attendant circumstances. See Limonja 

v. Commonwealth, 8 Va. App. 532, 540, 383 S.E.2d 476, 481 (1989) 

(en banc), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 905 (1990). 

 In Lugar v. Commonwealth, 214 Va. 609, 611-12, 202 S.E.2d 

894, 897 (1974), the Supreme Court restricted the scope of a 

consensual search for a fugitive to "a reasonable search of 

places [within an] apartment where [he] might hide." However, 

where the object may be more easily concealed, a search may 

properly assume much different parameters. For example, in a 
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consensual search of an automobile for narcotics, police may 

search a container found within the vehicle, absent specific 

limitations to the contrary. Grinton, 14 Va. App. at 851, 419 

S.E.2d at 862-63 (citing Jimeno, 500 U.S. at 251). While 

searching for coins, police may "look into every part of [a] 

building," as coins "might have been hidden in one or more boxes 

of diminutive size."2 Blair v. Commonwealth, 225 Va. 483, 489, 

303 S.E.2d 881, 886 (1983); see Beavers v. Commonwealth, 245 Va. 

268, 275-76, 427 S.E.2d 411, 417, cert. denied, 510 U.S. 859 

(1993). 

 Officer Coerse was searching for crack cocaine, a small item 

subject to concealment in the "corner" of a pocket. In agreeing 

to the search, defendant understood its purpose and voiced no 

objection when Coerse conducted the search by emptying his 

pockets. Under such circumstances, the trial court correctly 

concluded that the search was reasonably conducted and within the 

scope of defendant's consent, both express and implied. 

Discovery of the key was clearly an incident of the consensual 

search and the related inquiries and investigation were merely a 

 

 2Although Blair arose under a search warrant, the scope of a 

search warrant defines the reasonableness of the attendant search 

as a defendant's consent defines the reasonable scope of a 

warrantless search. United States v. Dichiarinte, 445 F.2d 126, 

129 n.3 (7th Cir. 1971). 
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continuation of the voluntary encounter. 

SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE 

 Conviction of defendant for violation of Code § 18.2-108 

required proof that the automobile was (1) previously stolen by 

another, and (2) received by defendant, (3) with knowledge of the 

theft, and (4) a dishonest intent. Starks v. Commonwealth, 225 

Va. 48, 54, 301 S.E.2d 152, 156 (1983); see Code § 18.2-108. 

Defendant argues only that the Commonwealth's evidence failed to 

sufficiently establish his guilty knowledge. Manifestly, 

"[a]bsent proof of an admission against interest, such knowledge 

necessarily must be shown by circumstantial evidence. . . . 'It 

is sufficiently shown if the circumstances proven are such as 

must have made or caused the recipient of stolen goods to believe 

they were stolen.'" Lewis v. Commonwealth, 225 Va. 497, 503, 303 

S.E.2d 890, 893 (1983) (quoting Reaves v. Commonwealth, 192 Va. 

443, 451, 65 S.E.2d 559, 564 (1951)). 

 The record discloses that defendant was found in possession 

of the stolen automobile within hours of its theft, falsely 

denied any connection to the vehicle, but later admitted 

acquiring it from a cocaine "fiend" in exchange for narcotics. 

Such evidence, together with the entire record, sufficiently 

established the guilty knowledge requisite to the conviction. 

 Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. 

 Affirmed.