C O U R T O F A P P E A LS EI GHTH D I STRI CT OF TEXAS ELPASO, TEXAS GI L BERT F I EL DI

NG , Ap pe lla nt,
v . THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

. § § § § § § No
. 08 -0 7- 00 08 4- CR

Appea l from the 41st DistrictCourt of El Paso County , Texas (TC# 20060D02215)
O P I N I O N This is an appea l from a conviction for the offe nse of se x ual assault, enha nced. A ppellant ple a de d guil ty

to t he c ourt , a

nd the c ourt a sse sse d pun ishme nt at tw e nty-f ive y e ars ’ i mpr iso nme nt. We a ff ir m. I. S UMMARY O F TH E T RI AL CO URT PROCE ED IN GS Appellant wa s char g ed in Count I of the indictment w ith the se cond-de g ree offe nse of se x ual assault. The indictment c ontained an e nhance ment provision a lleg ing a prior convic tion for sexual assault. Count I I alleg ed that Appellant had possessed coc aine in an a mount less than one g ram, a nd Count I I Ialleg ed that he ha d failed to re g ister as a sex offender

. Pr ior to t ri a l, A pp e lla nt f ile d a mot ion ent itled “ Spe c ia l Re qu e st f

or Jury Ins tr uc tio ns ,” in which he r equeste d that, if he we re f ound guilty

at trial, the jury

s h o u l d b e instructed at the punishment stage th at t h e punis hment rang e wa s enhanc ed to five to ninety -nine year s or life imprisonment, if it found that the enhanc ement for the prior se x ual assault convic tion was true. At the pretrial hear ing on that motion, Appellant’s counsel asse rted that plea neg otiations wi thth e S t at e w er e b ei n g d el ay ed , b ec au s e t h e d ef en s e w as un cl ea r w h et h er th e pu n i s h m en tra n geT h e i n di ct men t a l l eg ed t h at t h e of f en s e occ u r r ed on M ar ch 12, 2006. Se ct i on 12. 42 of t h e T ex as Pen al Code 1 wa s a men ded i n 2007. U n l es s ex pr es s l y s t at ed h er ei n t o t h e c on t r ar y , al l re f er en ce s t o t h e Pen al Code i n t h i s opi n i on sh a ll b e to the sta tute a s it re a d o n the d a te o f t h e o ff e n se . See n . 2. would be five to ninety -nine y ear s or life imprisonment, unde r section 12.42(b) of the Texas Penal Cod e , wh ic h sp e aks to e nh anc e me nt fo r se c on d- de g re e fe lon ie s, or mand ator

y lif e imp ri so nme nt, 1 under the provisions of section 12.42(c)( 2 ), d ealing with re peat se x offe nders. De fense counsel

ma int a ine d that the un c e rt a int y re g ard ing wh ic h se c tio n a pp lie d c a us e d him to be un a

ble to a dv ise Appellant reg arding the desirability of any plea offer made by the S tate, so he requested the c ourt’s
ru lin ga s to wh at c on sti tut e d th e c or re c t r ang e of

punis hme nt. At the pre trial hea

ring , defe nse counse l stat ed that sec tion 12.42(c)( 2) wa s vague and ambiguo u s , i n t h at it was place d within section 12.42(c) , which, Appe llant asserts, dea lt with the enhanc ement of f

irst-deg ree felonies. There fore , Appellant maintains, sec tion 12.42(c)( 2) wa s not applicable in the prese nt situation, beca use he was to be tried for sexual a ssault, which is a sec ondde g re e fe lony . F ur

the r, Ap pe lla

nt c onte nd s th at th e ambi guit y be tw e e n th e tw o s ub se c tio ns sh ou ld result in application of the rule of le nity , causingthe less seve re punishment ra ng e to be utilized. The State a

rgues that the plain languag e of subdivision (c) (2) pr ovides for ma n d atory life imprisonment of repe at sexual assault offe nders, e ven if the c harg ed off ense w as a se cond-de g ree felony , and that the L eg islature provide d specific ally in section 12.42(c) (2)( A)(iii) that, whe n using burg lary of habitation as a

n enhanc ement fa ctor, mandatory life imprisonment would only be applied wh e re the pr e vio us burg lary of ha bit atio n o ff

e ns e wa s a

fi rs t- de g re e fe lony . A c c or din g ly , th e State
c onte nd s, the L e g isl atur e c ou ld h ave sim ila rl y sp e c if ie d th at ma

nd ator y lif e imp riso nm ent wo uld only be imposed for

first-degree sexual assault, but chose not to do so. The trial c ourt denied Appellant’s requested inst ruction. At the guilty -plea hear ing, the court stated that the c orre ct rang e of punishment was mandatory life imprisonment under the indictmentT he ve r s i on o f T exa s P ena l C od e se ct i on 12. 42 i n e f f ect at t he t i me pert i nen t t o t hi s appeal , en t i t l ed “ P ena l t i es 2 fo r R e p e a t an d H a b itua l F e lo n y O ff e n d e rs ” p ro v id e d , i n re le v a n t p a rt: (b) I f i t i s sh o w n o n th e tr ial of a second

- d egree f el o ny t hat t he d ef

end ant has b een o nce b ef o re c o n v ic te d o f a fe lo n y, o n c o n v ic tio n he sh a ll b e p u n ish e d fo r a fi rs t-d e g re e felo n y. ( c) ( 1) E xce pt as provi ded by S ubdi vi s i on (2), i f i t i s sh own o n t he t r i al of a f i r s t
- degr ee f

el ony t hat t h e def en dan t h as be en on ce be f or e con v i ct ed of

a f el on y , on c on v i ct i on h e s h al l be pu n i s h ed by i mpr i s on men t i n t h e i n s t i t u t i on al di v i s i on of t h e T ex as D epa r t men t of Cr i mi n al J u s t i ce f

or l i f e, or f or any t er m o f

not mo r e t han 99 y ear s or l es s t han 15 y ear s . I n addi t i on t o i mp r i s onment , an i ndi vi dual may be pu n i s h ed by a f i n e n ot t o e x ce ed $10, 000. (2 ) A d e fen d a n t sha ll b e p u n ish e d b y im p riso n m e n t i n the institutio n a l d ivisio n fo r lif e if: ( A ) t he def

endan t i s conv i ct ed of

an of f ens e: then in place

. Pursuant to a plea- barg ain agree ment, the i n dictment was ther eaf ter amended to alleg e a pr ior (n on -f ir st d e g re e ) f

e lony burg lary of ha bit atio n c onvic tio n to replac e the pr ior se xua l a ssa

ult

c onvic tio n forthe e nh anc e me nt a lle g atio n. Ap pe lla nt t he n p le a de d guil ty

to t he se xua l a ssa

ult offe nse, enhanc ed by the burg lary of habitation conviction. Counts I I and I I I o f t h e original indictment, alleg ing posse ssion of coca ine and f ailure to re g ister as a sex offende r, we re dismissed, pursuant to sec tion 12.45 of the Penal Code. Pr ior to Ap pe lla

nt’ s ple a of guil ty , the c ourt inq uir e d whe the r h e un de rs too d th at th e se xua lassault offe nse would be enhanc ed with a differ ent offe nse and that the punishment rang e would be d i ff er en t
. Ap p el l an t re s p o n d ed th at h e di d un d er s t an d , th ath e u n d er s t o o d th atth e p un i s h m en tra n ge would be five to ninety -nine y ear s or life imprisonment, and that he was a war e of the terms of the p l e a - b ar g a i na g r e e m e n t
. Ap p e l l an ts t at e d th ath i s gu i l ty p l e a

w a s g i v e nf

r e e l y an d v o l un t ar i l y. Th e Court

the n a sse sse d App e lla

nt’ s p un ishme nt at tw e nty-f ive y e ars ’ i mpr iso nme nt. II. DI SCU SSIO N I n I ss u e N o . O n e , Ap p e l l an ta s s e rt s th atth e r e p e atan d h a b i tu a l f e l o n y o f f e n d e r s s t atu t e in

e f f e c t at t h e ti me p e rti n e n t t o th is a p p e a l ( ame n d e d

late r ) s h o u ld

b e c o n s tr

u e d in a ma n n er 2 3( i ) u n der Se ct i on 22. 021 [ ag g r av at ed s ex u al a s s au l t ] or 22. 011 [ s exu al as s aul t ] , P ena l Co de; (i i ) un d er Secti o n 20
. 0 4 (a)( 4 ), P enal C o d e, i f t he d ef end ant co m m i t t ed t he o f

f ense wi t h t he in te n t t o vi o l at e o r abuse t he v i ct i m s ex u al l y ; or ( i i i ) u nder Sect i on 30. 02 , P ena l Co de, p un i sha bl e u nder Sub sec tio n (d) of

t hat s ect i o n, i f

t he d ef end ant co m m i t t ed t he of f en s e wi t h t h e i n t ent to commi t a f el on y de s cr i bed by Subpar ag r aph ( i ) or ( i i ) or a f el on y u n der Se ct i on 21. 11 or 2 2
. 0 1 1 , P enal C o d e; and ( B ) t he def

endan t ha s been pre vi ous l y conv i ct ed of an of f ens e: (i) u n d e r S e c tio n 4 3 .2 5 o r 4 3 .2 6 , P e n a l C o d e . . .; ( i i ) u nder Sect i on 21. 11 , 22. 01 1, 22. 02 1, o r 2 5. 02 , P ena l Co de; (i i i ) u n der Se ct i on 20. 04( a) ( 4) , Pen al Code, i f t h e def en d ant co m m i t t ed t h e o ff

e n se wi t h t he i nt ent t o vi o l at e o r abuse t he v ic tim se x u a lly

. . . . (3) [ T ext om i t t ed ]; (4) [ T ext om i t t ed ]. A c t o f M a y 2 4 , 1 9 7 3 , 6 3 rd L e g ., R .S ., ch . 3 9 9 , § 1 , 1 9 7 3 T e x . G e n . L a w s 8 8 3 , 9 0 8 ; am ende d by Act of M ay 25, 1985, 6 9 th L e g ., R .S ., c h

. 5 8 2 , § 1 , 1 9 8 5 T e x . G e n . L a w s 2 2 0 1 ; am ende d by A ct of M ay 29, 1993, 73r d Le g . , R. S. , c h

. 900, § 1 .0 1 , 1 9 9 3 T e x . G e n . L a w s 3 5 8 6 , 3 6 0 3 -0 4 ; am ende d by A ct o f M ay 2 3 , 19 9 7 , 75 t h Leg., R
. S., ch. 66 5 , § 1 , 19 9 7 T ex. G e n . L a w s 2 2 4 7 , 2 2 4 7 -4 8 ; am ende d by Act of M ay 30, 2003, 78t h Le g . , R. S. , c h

. 1005, § 2, 2003 T ex . G en . La ws 2944, 2944- 45. T he cu rren t ve rsi o n o f t he releva nt p o rti o ns o f sec t i o n 1 2 .42 rea d s: 3 ( b) E xce pt as provi ded b y Subs ect i on ( c) ( 2), i f i t i s sh own o n t he t r i al of a s econd- degr ee f

el ony t hat t he d ef end ant has b ee n o n ce b ef o re convict ed of a f

el o ny , on co nvi ct i o n he s hal l be punis hed f o r a first-d e g re e felo n y. (c)( 1 ) If

i t i s shown o n t he t ri al of a f i rs t
- d egree f

el o ny t hat t he d ef

end ant has b een o nce b ef o re co nvi ct ed of a f

el o ny , on co nvi ct i o n he s hal l be punis hed by i m p ri sonm ent i n t he T exas D ep art m ent of C r i mi n al Ju s t i ce f

or l i f e, or f or an y t er m of

not m or e t h an 99 y ea r s or l es s t h an 15 y ea r s . I n a ddi t i on t o i mpr i s on men t , a n i n di v i du al ma y be pu n i s h ed by a f i n e n ot t o e x ce ed $10, 000. ( 2) N ot wi t hs t andi ng Subdi vi s i on ( 1), a def endan t s hal l be puni s hed by i mp r i s onment i n t he T exa s D e p a rtm e n t o f C rim ina l Ju stice fo r lif e if: ( A ) t he def

endan t i s conv i ct ed of

an of f ens e: ( i ) un der Sect i on . . . 22. 01 1, P ena l Co de;

. . .( B ) t he def endan t ha s been pre vi ous l y conv i ct ed of an of f ens e:

. . . ( i i ) un der Sect i on . . . 22. 01 1,
. . . P ena l Co de;

. . . (3) [ T ext om i t t ed ]; (4) [ T ext om i t t ed ]. T EX . P E N A L C O D E A NN . § 1 2
. 4 2 (b), (c) (1)- (2) (V ernon S up p . 20 0 8 ). consistent with the rule of statutory construction stating that a subsection applies only to the g reater inclusive section. In I ssues Nos. Two a

nd Three , Appellant question s wh ether the forme r sec tion 12.42 was ambiguous, within the m eaningof Bo y k in v . S tate , 818 S.W .2d 782, 785 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991), wh ic h d ir e c ts that the c ourt s shou ld not , exce pt in the mos t extra or din ary c ir c ums tanc e s, pr e sume to alter the la

nguag e provided by

the L eg islature. F urther, A ppellant asks whe ther, if the f ormer statute was not ambiguo u s , it should be construed in ac corda nce w ith the leg islative intent when

enac ted, bec ause to c onstrue it acc ordingto its pl ain meaning , would, he conte nds, be absur d. In I ssu e No . F our, Ap pe lla nt a rgue s that th e for me r s tatut e is v a gue or ambi guo us , in vio latio n o f d

ue pr oc e ss, be c a

us e it doe s not g ive fa ir no tic e of the ra ng e of punis hme nt a

pp lic a ble to the second offe nse of sexual a ssault. In I ssue No. Five, Appellant contends that, if th e f o rm er statut e is v a gue or

ambi guo us , it

sh ou ld b e c on str

ue d und e r t

he ru le of le nit y , whic h p ro vid e s th at, when it is unc lear from the applicable statute or statutes whe ther the pe nalty presc ribed for

violating

a c ri min a l la

w i s the lesse r o r t

he g re ate r o f t

wo po ssi ble int e rp re tatio ns , th e le sse r p un ishme nt i s p r e s um e d t o a p p l y. Specifica lly , with reg ard to Iss u es No s. One through Five, A ppellant observe s that former

se c tio n 12 .4 2, wh ic h pr ov ide d fo r inc re a se d pe na lti e s fo r re pe at and ha bit ua l of fe nd e rs , in dic ate d inA s a general pro p o si t i o n, we agree t hat A p p el l ant has co rr ect l y read subsect i o n (b). 4 subsection (b) that second-de g ree felony offe nders who had once befor e bee n convicted of a fe lony

wer e to be punished a s first-degree offe nders. Subsection (c ), h o we v er, which provided f or 4 incre ased punishments for first-degree felony

offe nders wh o had once befor e bee n convicted of a felony , provided in subdivision (2) that rep ea t s exual assault offende rs, amongothers, we re to be punished with life imprisonment. Appellant maintains that the application of t he ordinary rules of statut or y c on str uc tio n in dic ate t hat su

bd ivi sio n ( 2) pla inl y

and un ambi guo us ly

a pp lie d o nly

to i n d i v i d u a l s w h o h a d

b e e nc o n v i c t e d

o f a f i r s t
- d e g r e e f

e l o n y. Ap pe lla nt fu rt her conte nd s th at, s inc e se xua l a ssa ult is o nly a se c on d- de g re e fe lony , it s enhanc ement wa s controlled by subsection (b), not by

subsection (c )(2) . Fur

thermore , Appellant continues, eve n if the statute wer e considere d to be ambiguous or absurd, a nd extra-textual sources

we re c on su lte d to e sta

bli shthe le g isl ativ e int e nt, it wou ld be imp ro pe r, un de r t he ru le of le nit y , to
c on str ue the statut e a s im

po sin gthe g re ate r, ra

the r tha n the le sse r, of

the tw o p os sib le punis hme nts
. F ina lly , App e lla

nt a sse rt s, the tr ia l c ourt ’s c ontr ary c on str uc tio n w a s a lso e rr on e ou s b e c a us e it expo s e d h im to a ma

n d ato r y li f e s e n te n c e if c o n v ic te d un d e r Co un t I o f th e in d ic tm e n t (as wa s appar ently

intended by

the L eg islature) w ithout fair or rea sonable notice of such punishment at the time the offe nse wa s alleg edly co mmitt ed, ther eby violating the D ue Proce ss Clause of the Four teenth Amendme nt to the United States Consti tution. In I ssue No. Six , Appellant argues that the court err ed in de nying his request for a spec ial jury instruction which would have instructed the jury that Ap p el l an t was subject to first-de g ree felony punishment (rathe r than mandatory life imprisonment) in the eve nt that they found the e nhance ment provision in Court Iof the indictment to be true

. In I ssue No. Seven, A

ppellant asser

ts tha t h i s guilty

plea wa s involuntary , beca use it wasinduced by inacc urate information conc erningthe ra ng e of punishment, in violation of the Due Pr oc e ss C la

us e of the F ourt e e nth

Am e ndme nt. Finally , in I ssue No. Eig ht, Appellant co ntends that he wa s denied e ffe ctive assistanc e of counsel, in violation of the Six th Amendment to the United Stat es C onstitut ion, in that the court

err ed in its ruling on the rang e of punishment a pplicable to the offe nse char g ed in C o u n t I o f t he ind ic tme nt. As they involve the same leg al considerations, we will di scuss I ssues Nos. One thr oug h Five toge ther. Initially , we will re spond to the St at e’ s co n t en t ions that, in view of the issuance of an amende d indictm en t , Appellant has no standingto contest the constitutionality of for mer sec tion 12 .4 2( c )( 2) and

that th e qu e sti on

of the pr op ri e ty

of the a pp lic atio n o f t

he statut e to h im i s mo ot. The c o n s t i tutionality

of a c riminal statute is a question of law which we r eview de novo

. Ow e ns v . S

tate , 1 9 S. W.3 d 4 80 , 4 83 (T e x. Ap p. -- Am ari llo 20 00 , n o p e t.) ; State v. Salinas , 982 S. W. 2 d 9 , 1 0

- 1 1 ( T e x. Ap p . - - H o u s to n[1 s t D is t. ] 1 9 9 7 , p e t. r e f ’ d )

. Wh e nr e v ie w in gthe constitutionalit y

of a s t at u t e, we presume that the statute is valid and that the L eg islature has not acte d unrea sonably or arbitra rily in e nacting it. Ro dr igu e z v . S tate , 9 3 S. W.3 d 6 0, 69 (T e x. Cr im. Ap p. 20 02 ); Ex parte Granv iel , 561 S.W .2d 503, 511 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978). The burde n rests on the par ty challeng ing a

statute to establish its unconstitutionality

. Rodriguez , 9 3 S. W. 3 d at 69
. We
are oblige d to uphold the statute, if we can deter mine a rea sonable c onstruction which will rende r it constitut ional. El

yv . S tate , 5 82 S.W. 2d

41 6, 41 9 ( Te x. Cr im. Ap p. [Pan e l Op. ] 19 79 ). A s tatut e is, however , void for vagueness, if the conduct it see ks to prohibi t i s not clear ly define d. State v. Holcombe , 187 S.W .3d 496, 499 (Tex. Crim. App.), cert. de nied , ___ U.S. ____, 127 S. C t. 176 (2006). The burden of establishing that a st atute is unconstitutional lies with t he cha lleng er. Ex pa rteGranviel, 5 6 1 S
. W
. 2 d at 5 1 1
. In o ur r e v i e w , w e mu s t d e t e r m i n e ( 1 ) w h e th e r an o r d i n ar y, law-a biding pe rson re ceive d sufficie nt information from the statute that his conduct r isks violating the cr iminal law and (2) whe ther the statute pr ovides sufficie nt notice to law enf orce ment personne l to preven t arbitra

ry or discriminatory

enfor ceme nt. Tan ne r v . S tate , 8 3 8 S. W. 2 d

3 0 2 , 3 0 4 ( T e x. Ap p . -- E l P a s o 1 9 9 2 , n o p et
. ) ( ci t i n g Enge lk ing v . S tate , 750 S.W .2d 213, 215 (Tex. Crim. App. 19 88 )) . Astatut e is c on sid e re d v a gue if it fa ils to g ive a

pe rs on of or din ary int e lli g e nc e a

re a so na ble opportunity

to know what conduc t is prohibited. Holcombe , 1 87 S.W. 3d at 49 9. F ur

the r, if a statut e do e s n ot s ub sta

nti a lly imp lic ate c on sti tut ion a lly -p ro te c te d c on du c t or sp e e c h, it i s v a lid , unle ss i t is impermissibly vague in all applications. Id. (c i t i n g Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc. , 455 U.S. 489, 495, 102 S. C t. 1186 (1982)). The State maintains that Appe llant has failed to d em o n s t rate that the forme r statute wa s unconstitutional as applied to him, bec ause the indictment in this c ase was amende d to abandon the

a lle g atio n o f a pr ior se xua l a ssa ult fo r e nh anc e me nt. Ins te a d, in t he ame nd e d in dic tme nt, a (n on -f ir st deg ree ) burg lary

of habitation convic tion was alleg ed for enhanc ement. Appellant wa s, theref ore, actua lly sentenc ed usingthe punishment presc ribed in for mer sec tion 12.42(b), which is what he soug ht. There fore , the State contends, the alleg edly unconstitutional section 12.42(c)( 2) was ne ver
a pp lie d to him . T he State in si sts that th is m a de the a lle g atio n o f u nc on sti tut ion a lity

moo t w ith reg ard to his contentions. See E x parte Luna , 24 S.W .3d 606, 607-08 (Te x . App.--F ort Worth 2000,

no pe t.) . We dis a g re e wi th b oth c onte nti on s. Ap pe lla nt’ s c ouns e l a sse rt e d at th e pr e tr ia l hear ingtha t hi s in a bil ity to k no w whe the r h is

c lie nt wa s fa c ing a mand ator y lif e se nte nc e or a punis hme nt wit hin the punis hme nt ra

ng e fo r a fi rs tdeg ree felony , if he we re convicted and the jury found the enhanc ement to be true, cause d him to be

un a ble a de qu ate ly to ad

vis e his c lie nt an d to c on du c t e ff e c tiv e ple a

ne g oti atio ns . We fi nd

that th isis adequa te to avoid the State’s c ontentions that he has fa iled to demonstrate that the statute was

un c on sti tut ion a l a s a

pp lie d to him

or that hi s c la im w a s mo ot. Even thoug h we c onclude that Appe llant is able to contest the constitutional i t y of for mer section12.42(c )(2) , we f

ind that his claims are w ithout merit. Count Iof the indictment cha rg ed Appellant with sexual assault, which, standingalone, is a se cond-de g ree felon y p u n i shable “ by imprisonment in the inst i t u t i o nal division for any term of not more than 20 y ear s” and “ a fine not to exceed $10,000.” T EX . P EN A L C ODE ANN . § 22 .0 11 (f ); T EX . P EN A L C ODE ANN . § 12.33(a) , (b). For mer Pena l Code section 12.42(b) provided, “I f it is shown on the trial of a se cond-de g ree felony that the def

endant ha s been onc e bef ore c onvicted of a

felony , on conviction he s h all be punished for a first-degree felony .” Ordinar ily , punishment for a f irst-degree felony

is “imprisonment in the institutional divisi on for life or for any term of not more than 99 y ear s or less than 5 year s” and “ a fine not to exceed $10,000.” T EX . P EN A L C ODE ANN . § 12.32(a) , (b). In interpre ting a

statute, this Court shoul d eff ectuate the L eg islature’s c ollective i n t ent or p u rp o s e when it enacted the statute. Boyk in, 8 1 8 S. W. 2 d at 7 8 5
. In d e te r mi n in g s u c h inte nt or purpose, the r eviewingcourt should foc us upon the literal text of the statute and attempt to dis cer n its fair and obje ctive mea

ning. I f a statute is c lear and unambiguous, it is notwithin the purview of the cour ts to add to or subtract f

rom the statute. Id. The Court of Cri m i n al Appea ls has admonished Texas courts to adhe re to the f ollowing sta nd ard s: There is, of course , a leg itimate exception to this plain meaningrule: whe re application of a

statute’s plain languag e would lead to a bsurd conseque nces that the L e g isl atur e c ou ld n ot po ssi bly h av e i n t en d ed , we s h o u l d n o tap p l y

th e l an gu a ge lit e ra lly . Wh e n u se d in

the pr op e r mann er, th is na rr owe xce pti on

to t he pla in meaningrule doe s not intrude on the l awmaking power s of t he legislative bra nch, but rathe r demonstrates respe ct for that branc h, which we assume would not ac t in an a b s ur d w ay.W i t h r ega r d t o s ect i on 12
. 42 , t he “ s peci al provi s i on” c ont ai ned i n f ormer s ubs ect i on ( c) ( 2) w as pas s ed l at er 5 tha n the “g e n e ra l p ro v isio n ” c o d ifi e d in su b se c tio n (b ). See A ct of M ay 23, 1997, 75t h Le g . , R. S. , c h

. 665, § 1, 1997 T ex . G en . La ws 2247, 2247- 48.

T h e obj ec t of bot h f

or mer s u bs ec t i on s ( b) an d ( c) ( 2) wa s t o def i n e t h e pu n i s h men t ( or pu n i s h men t r an g e) f or 6 co ve red o f

f en ses. I f the plain languag e of a statute wou l d l ea d to absurd re sults, or if the languag e is not plain but rather ambiguous, then a n d only then , o ut o f a bs olute ne c ess ity , is it c on sti tut ion a lly pe rm iss ibl e fo r a

c ourt to c on sid e r, in a

rr ivi ngat a sensi b le interpre tation, such e x tra text ual fa ctors as e x ecutive or administrative i n t e r p r e t at i o n s o f

th e s t atu t e o r

l e g i s l at i v e h i s t o r

y. Id. at 785-86 (e mphases in orig inal; citation omitt ed). The Pena l Code provides that s ec t i o n s 311.011, 311.012, 311.014, 311.015, and 311.021 throug h 311.032 of Chapter 311 of the Gove rnment C ode (the Code Construction Act) apply to the construction of the Penal Code, unless a diff ere nt construction is require d by the context. T EX . P EN A L C ODE ANN . § 1. 05 (b ). Se c tio n 3 11 .0 26 of the Go ve rnme nt C od e state s: (a) I f a g ener al provision conflicts with a spe cial or loc al provision, the provisions shall be construe d, if possible, so that effe ct is g iven to both. (b) I f the c onflict betwe en the g ener al provision an d t h e special or loca l provision is irrec oncilable, the specia l or local provision pre vails as an e x ception to the g ener al provision, unless the g ener al provisi on is the later e nactment a nd the manife st intent is that th e g e ne ra l pr ov isi on pr e va il. T EX . G OV ’ T C ODE ANN . § 311.026. 5 This se ction is a codification of the common law doc trine of in p ar i m ate ria
. See B urke v

. Sta te , 2 8 S. W.3 d 5 45 , 5 46 -4 7 ( Te x. Cr im. Ap p. 20 00 ). Th e do c tr ine pr ov ide s th at: “Where o n e s tatute d e a ls w it h a s u b je c t in g e n e r a l te r

ms , an d an o th e r d e a ls w ith a pa rt of the same su

bje c t in a mor e de ta ile d w ay , th e tw o sh ou ld b e ha rm on ize d if po ssi ble ; but if

the re is a ny con fl ict, the latte r w ill pr e va il, re g ard le ss o f whe the r i t was pa ssed prior to the g ener al statute, unless it a ppear s that the leg islature intended to make the g ener al ac t controlling.” Id. (qu o t i n g Mi lls v . S

tate , 722 S.W .2d 411, 413-14 (Te x . Crim. App. 1986)). The doctrine of in p ar i

ma te ria a pp lie s on ly if the tw o s tatut e s h ave the same purp os e or ob je c t. Burke, 28 S.W .3d at 547. 6Appe l l an t a ppea r s t o pr oce ed on t h e pr emi s e t h at f or mer s u bdi v i s i on ( 2) ( an d, pr es u mabl y , s u bdi v i s i on s ( 3) 7 an d ( 4) ) of

s u bs ec t i on ( c) wa s , i n s ome man n er , s u bor di n at e t o f or mer s u bdi v i s i on ( 1) t h er eof

. W h i l e s u bdi v i s i on ( c) ( 2) wa s cl ea r l y s t at ed t o be an excep t i on t o t h e t er ms of s u bdi v i s i on ( c) ( 1) , a r ev i ew of bot h t h e t ex t a n d t h e s t r u ct u r e of subsect i o n (c) ( s ee n. 2) r eve al s t hat Ap pel l ant ’ s pre mi s e t hat s ubdi vi s i on ( c) ( 2) w as s ubordi nat e t o (i

. e. , a “ nex t
- s mal l er u n it” o f) su b d ivisio n (c )( 1 ) is fau lty. In his brief, Appellant concedes that “Subdivision (2) of Section 12.42(c) , rea d in isolation, do e s a pp e ar to su

pp or t the State ’s po sit ion . B ut, ” he ins ist s, “ take n a s a pa rt of Se c tio n 1 2. 42 (c ), it

a pp are ntl y a pp lie s o nly

to ‘ the tr ia l of

a fi rs t- de g re e fe lony ,’ and is the re fo re not app li cab le to Appellant’s prosec ution in this c ause, which wa s for a second- deg ree felony .” Appe llant continues by a sse rt ing that, “H a d th e L e g isl atur e int e nd e d Su bd ivi sio n ( 2) of

Se c tio n 1 2. 42 (c ) a lso to a pp ly in prosec utions for second- deg ree felonies, it pre sumably wou l d h ave [pref

ace d] S ection 12.42(b) [wit h] la ngua g e sim ila

r t o that of Sec tio n 12. 42 (c )( 1) , to th e fo llo wi nge ff e c t: ‘ Exc ept as provided in Subdivision (2) of Subsection ( c) of this Section . . . .’” ( italics in Appellant’s brief ). F ur the r, Ap pe lla

nt p oints t o Pe na l Co de se c tio n 1 .0 5( c )( 2) , whic h s tate s th at: (2) a ref

ere nce to a subchapte r, subsection, subdivision, par ag ra p h , o r ot her numbere d or lettere d unit without further ide ntification is a re fer ence to a unit of the ne xt-l arg e r u

nit of thi s c od e in whic h th e re fe re nc e a pp e ars . T EX . P EN A L C ODE ANN . § 1.05(c) (2). Appellant’s a ssertion is neither fact u al ly acc urate nor re levant. In the first plac e, for mer subdivi s ion (2) of subse ction (c) clea rly did relate to the prosec ution of cer tain case s of sec ondde g re e fe lon ie s. Mo re ov e r, we be lie ve that e a c h o f t he fo ur su bd ivi sio ns of

su bs e c tio n ( c ) s e ts f

or th

an e nh anc e d p e na lty

ra ng e wh ic h th e L e g isl atur e dir e c te d th e jud ic iary to imp os e up on

de fe nd ants who wer e convic ted as repe at felony offe nders under various scena rios. The “ next-larg er unit” of subsection (c ) w a s section 1 2
. 4 2 , wh i ch was (and is) e ntitled “Penalties for Repe at and Ha bitual F e lony Of fe nd e rs .” We t

he re fo re c on c lud e tha

t App e lla nt’ s “ c od e c on str

uc tio n” arg ument is 7 wi tho ut m e ri t.In Jones v . State, 225 S.W .3d 772 (Tex. App.--Houston [14th Dist.] 2007, no pet.), the c ourt

a dd re sse d thi s e xac t c onte nti on . Jon e s w a s c onvic te d o f a se c on d- de g re e fe lony

se xua l a ssa

ult , which wa s enhanc ed by

a prior se x ual-a ssault conviction. He wa s sentence d to life imprisonment under se ction 12.42(c) (2). See id. at 779. J ones argued that the ex ception languag e in forme r sec tion 12.42(c) (1) indicated that sec tion 12.42(c)( 2) wa s an e x ce p t i on only to the first-degree felony sentenc e enha

nceme nt in subsection (c)( 1). See id. at 780. J ones also argued that, since the sec tion 12.42(b) second-de g ree enhanc ement provision was not pre fac ed by the exception languag e found in subsection (c) (1), the ma ndatory life sentenc e enhanc ement provision in subsec tion (c)( 2) ser ved

as an e x ception only

to the first-degree felony sentenc e enhance ment provision in subsection (c)( 1) and wa s not a

n exception to the second- deg ree felony sentenc e provision in section 12.42(b). See id. at 781. Ther efor e, he c oncluded, he should not have been sentenc ed under section 12.42(c )(2) ; rathe r, he s h o u l d h av e b een sentence d under se ction 12.42(b), a s he wa s beingtried for a sec onddeg ree sexual assault after havingpreviously

been c onvicted of a

felony

. Id. at 779-81. I n addre ssing Jones’s conten t i o n s , th e F o urt ee n thC o urto b s erv edth ats u b s ec t i o n(c )(1) beg an with the languag e, “e x cept a s provided by Subdivis ion (2),” pr ior to the application to a defe ndant on trial for a

first-degree felony

. The court rea soned that this phrase dire cted one to subsection (c) (2) p r i o r t o c o n s i d e r at i o no f

th e l an gu a g e th atp e rt a i n e d t o a d e f e n d an to ntr i a l f

o r a f i r s t
- d e g r e e f

e l o n y. See id. at 781. Ther efor e, the e x ception languag e re quired a p plication of subsec tion (c)( 2), apa rt from subsec tion (c)( 1). T h e court rea soned that sec tion 12.42(c)( 1) constituted the g ener al

e nh anc e me nt p ro vis io n for a fi rs t- de g re e fe lony , whe re a s se c tio n 1 2. 42 (c )( 2) pr ov ide d a se pa rate sentenc e-e nhance ment provision for multipl e sexual-offe nse off ender s. Clearly , this int erpr etation would indicate that “ further identification” w as provided by the L eg islature, thus obviating the need for a pplication of sec tion 1.05(c)( 2) of the Pena l Code. Id.N ei t h er pa r t y ’ s br i ef c i t es u s t o a c as e wh er e t h e Cour t of Cr i mi n al Appea l s h as e x pr es s l y a ppl i ed t h e r u l e of 8 l eni t y , nor has our r esearch f o und any . I n C u e lla r v . S ta te , 70 S. W
. 3d 815 , 819 n. 6 (T ex. Cri m. Ap p. 200 2), a f i vemem ber major i t y s t at ed i n di ct a:

M o re o v e r, e v e n if

w e s u p p o s e , a s th e d isse n t d o e s, tha t t h e “e ff e c t o f [o n e sta tute up o n a n o the r] is amb i gu ous , ” we wo ul d t hen agr ee wi t h t he concu r r enc e t hat t he r ul e o f l eni t y wo ul d appl y . T he r ul e, a s su p p lied b y the U .S . S u p re m e C o u rt, e m b o d ie s “a p re su p p o sitio n o f o u r l a w to re so lve d o u b ts in t he enf o rcem ent of a p enal co d e agai nst t he i m p o si t i o n of a hars her puni shm e n t
. ” [Cit i ng B el l v. Uni t ed St at es , 349 U .S. 8 1 , 8 3 , 75 S. Ct
. 620 ( 19 55 ) ]
. T he r ul e of l eni t y i s , i n e s s enc e, an ot her ex t ratex t ua l f

ac t o r f o r a c o urt t o co nsid er if , an d o nly i f

, a statut e is am b i gu o us. M o re r ecentl y , how ever, a dif f erent f i ve- m em b er majo ri t y i n E x p a rt e F o rw a rd , 25 8 S
. W
. 3d 15 1, 15 4 n
. 19 ( T e x . Cr i m. App. 2008) , h as c al l ed Cuel l ar i n t o qu es t i on . T h e cou r t c i t ed T EX . C O D E C R IM . P R OC . A NN . a r t
. 1. 26 a n d t h en s ai d: Ar g u abl y t h i s pr ov i s i on ov er r i des t h e “ r u l e of l en i t y . ” I t i s mor e s t r on g l y w or ded t h an t h e Pen al Code c o u n te rp a rt tha t p ro v id e s, “T h e ru le tha t a p e n a l sta tute is to b e s tric tly c o n stru e d d o e s n o t ap p ly t o this c o d e . T h e p ro v isio n s o f t h is c o d e s h a ll b e c o n stru e d a c c o rd ing to the fair im p o rt o f t h e ir ter m s, to pr omot e j u s t i ce an d ef f ec t t h e obj ec t i v es of t h e code. ” [C i t i ng T EX . P E N A L C O D E A NN . § 1
. 0 5 (a)]

. E ven i f t he “ r ul e of

l eni t y ” a pp l i es t o t he cons t r uct i on of t he C od e of

C r i mi nal P r ocedur e, i t provi des the ru le o f d e c isio n o n ly “w h e n b o th a lter n a tive c h o ic e s o r d e finiti o n s a re m o re -o r-le ss e q u a lly reasonab l e. ” [Cit i ng Cuel l ar , 70 S.W
. 3 d at 82 3 n. 8 (Co chran, J. , co ncurri ng)]

. A t the lea st, Cuel l ar a n d F o rw a rd ma k e i t c l e a r t h a t , i f t h e “ r u l e of l e n i t y ” i s t o be g i v e n e f f e c t i n t he T exa s cour t s , i t wi l l be appl i cabl e onl y wh en t wo or more s t at ut es ar e a mb i gu ous . T hat i s not t he cas e h er e. The F ourtee nth Court also found that section 12.42( b ) and the two-time sex offender sentenc e-e nhance ment provision in 12.42(c)( 2) we re in p ar i m ate ria , as the y ha d th e same purp os e of enha ncingthe sentenc e of a

convicted f

elon who had a

prior fe lony

rec ord

. See id. at 782. There fore , application of the doctrine of in p ar i m ate ria dictates that sec tion 12.42(b) was intende d as the g ener al s entenc ing enhanc ement provision for those on trial for a second- deg ree felony , but that section 12.42(c) wa s the specif ic provision addre ssing se ntencingenhanc ement for those who had twice been c onvicted for specific ally -enume rate d sex crimes. The court held that J ones had be en proper ly sentenc ed to mandator

y life i mprisonment under section 12.42(c) (2), a s the languag e of that section unambiguously

applied to re peat sex offender s on trial for se cond-de g ree sexual assault. See id. Acc ording ly , we find that, with r eg ard to A ppellant’s first five issues, the statute in question in u nambi guo us , a

nd we ov e rr ule tho se iss ue s. 8In I ssue No. Six , Appe l l an t m aintains that the cour t erre d in failingto give his requeste d instruction. Ag ain, as the statute is una mbiguous, the c ourt did not err in fa iling to g ive the re quested in s tr u c ti o n . We o v e r

r u le I s s u e N o . Si x. I n I s s u e No. Seven, Appe llant argues that his plea wa s involuntary , beca use the trial c ourt inc or re c tly a dmo nis he d him on the ra ng e of punis hme nt. A guil ty ple a mus t be ent ered into voluntarily

and fr eely . T EX . C ODE C R IM . P R OC . ANN . a rt . 2 6. 13 (b ); An de rso n v . S tate , 182 S.W .3d 91 4, 92 1 n .1 (T e x. Cr im. Ap p. 20 06 ) ( He rv e y , J., c on c ur ri ng ). Whe n c on sid e ri ng the vo luntari ne ss of a guilty

plea, we must ex amine the e ntire re cord. Ma rti ne z v. S tate , 9 8 1 S. W. 2 d

1 9 5 , 1 9 7 ( T e x. Crim. App. 1998) (per

curiam). I f t he tr ia l c ourt

pr op e rl y a dmo nis he s a

de fe nd ant b e fo re a guil ty ple a is e nte re d, the re is a prima facie showing that the pl ea was bot h knowing and volunt ary . Id. Th e burd e n th e n s hif ts t o the def endant to show that he pleade d guilty without unde rstanding the conseque nces of his ple a and that he ther efor e suff

ere d harm. P e n a v . Sta te , 132 S.W. 3d 66 3, 66 6 ( Te x. Ap p. -- Cor pu s Chri sti 20 04 , n o p e t.) . T he re fo re , “ [a] d e fe nd ant who atte sts duri ngthe ini tia l ple a he ari ng that his ple a is voluntary b ears a ‘he avy burden’ to prove in a subse quent hea ringthat he ente red the plea involuntarily .” Coron ad

o v . S tate , 2 5 S
. W
. 3 d 8 0 6 , 8 0 9 (T ex . Ap p . -- W ac o 2 0 0 0 , p et
. re f’ d ) ( qu o t i n g, inte r a lia , Can tu v . S

tate , 988 S.W .2d 481, 484 (Tex. App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 1999, pet. re f’d) ). In th is c a se , App e lla

nt s tate d th at hi s p le a

wa s v olu

nta ry , th at he un de rs too d th at hi s punis hme nt r ang e wa s to be fi ve to nin e ty -n ine y e ars or lif e imp ri so nme nt, and

that th e ple a

ba rg a in was for twenty -five y ear s’ imprisonment. He assure d the court that his plea wa s fre e and voluntar y and that he w a s s ati s f

ie d w it hh is le g a l r e p r e s e n tati o n . F urth e r mo r e , th e c o urt’ s in s tr

u c ti on
conce rningthe ra

ng e of punishment wa s in all respec ts corre ct. We find that Appellant ha s not met his burden in demonstratingthat is plea wa s involuntary . I ssue No. Seven is ove rruled.C o u n se l’s ad v ic e w a s a d m itt e d ly giv e n r e luc ta n tly, a n d o n ly a fter th e tr ia l ju d g e m a d e he r p re tria l ru ling in 9 whi ch she deni ed A p p el l ant ’ s reque st ed i nst ruct i o n as t o t he range o f p uni shment. H o wever, s i nce t he t ri al co urt ’ s rul i ng was cor r ect , coun s el ’ s s ubs equen t advi ce was ne i t her i nef f ect i ve nor i nac cur at e. The e ntire thrust of Appe llant’s I s s u e No. Eight is that his trial counsel did not provide

e ff e c tiv e a ssi sta

nc e , be c a us e c ouns e l inc or

re c tly a dv ise d him on the ra ng e of punis hme nt for hi s of fe ns e , s o th at hi s gui lt y ple a wa s n ot k

no wi ng ly a nd int e lli g e ntl y

ma de . A s w e have pr e vio us ly

c on c lud e d that c ou

ns e l’ s a dv ise on the ra

ng e of punis hme nt wh ic h Ap pe lla nt wo uld have fa c e d, if he had e lected to g o to trial on the unamende d indictment, was co rr ec t , it necessa rily follows that I ssu e No . E ig ht i s o ve rr

ule d a s mo ot. 9

III. CONCLUSION We a ff ir m th e jud g me nt o f t

he tr ia l c ourt
.

KENNET H R. CARR, J ustice October 2, 2008 B e f o r e C h e w , C
. J. , M c C l ur e , a n d C ar r , JJ. (Publish)