NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

ANNETTE SERNA, an individual, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

 v. 

NORTHROP GRUMMAN SYSTEMS 

CORPORATION, a Delaware Corporation, 

Defendant-Appellee.

No. 21-55238 

D.C. No. 

2:16-cv-02047-FMO-JEM 

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Central District of California

Fernando M. Olguin, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted June 9, 2022

Pasadena, California

Before: M. SMITH, BADE, and VANDYKE, Circuit Judges.

Appellant Annette Serna (“Serna”) appeals the district court’s denial of her 

motion to vacate an arbitration award and, alternatively, its order compelling 

arbitration. The parties dispute whether (1) a binding arbitration agreement required 

Serna to arbitrate her claims and (2) the arbitrator’s decision to dismiss Serna’s 

claims under the California Fair Employment and Housing Act (“FEHA”) should be 

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

FILED

JUL 12 2022

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2 

vacated because he exhibited a “manifest disregard of the law”—one of the few 

grounds for judicial review of an arbitrator’s decision under the Federal Arbitration 

Act (“FAA”). See 9 U.S.C. § 10(a); Biller v. Toyota Motor Corp., 668 F.3d 655, 

665 (9th Cir. 2012). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm 

the district court. 

We affirm the district court because (1) Serna was required to arbitrate under 

Northrop’s 2010 arbitration policy, which explicitly covered “future” claims 

between Serna and Northrop, and (2) the arbitrator’s independent finding that Serna 

was not a qualified individual under the FEHA was a factual finding, and the FAA 

does not allow judicial review of whether an arbitrator’s factual findings “are 

supported by the evidence in the record.” Bosack v. Soward, 586 F.3d 1096, 1105 

(9th Cir. 2009).

First, the district court did not err when it compelled arbitration. Serna is 

subject to a binding 2010 arbitration policy because she received it by mail and 

email, had access to it via Northrop’s employee intranet, and continued her 

employment after receiving the policy. See Davis v. Nordstrom, Inc., 755 F.3d 1089, 

1093 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing Schachter v. Citigroup, Inc., 47 Cal. 4th 610, 619 

(2009)); Craig v. Brown & Root, Inc., 84 Cal. App. 4th 416, 420 (2000). The 2010 

policy expressly states that “any claim, controversy, or dispute, past, present, or 

future,” between Serna and Northrop would be subject to binding arbitration. 
3 

Serna’s FEHA claims are “past, present, or future” claims against Northrop and, 

accordingly, she was required to arbitrate them. 

Serna does not dispute that she was bound by the 2010 arbitration policy when 

it was issued or that the 2010 policy covered future claims. Instead, she argues that 

she is no longer bound by the 2010 policy because it was “superseded” when 

Northrop issued an updated policy in 2013. But even assuming the 2010 agreement 

was superseded when Northrop reauthorized it in 2013, Serna’s position that the 

policy’s express requirement to arbitrate all future claims was no longer binding

cannot be correct—if it were, Serna would no longer be required to arbitrate any

future claims despite the arbitration policy stating that it covers any future claims. 

Nothing in the 2010 policy states that a future reauthorization of that policy would 

retroactively nullify Serna’s express agreement in 2010 to arbitrate “any ... future”

claims arising out of her employment with Northrop. See Shivkov v. Artex Risk Sols., 

Inc., 974 F.3d 1051, 1063 (9th Cir. 2020) (“Because we cannot say with certainty 

that the parties did not intend for the arbitration clause to survive expiration of the 

contract, the parties’ arbitration obligations remain intact.” (citation and internal 

quotation marks omitted)). 

Second, the district court did not err when it denied Serna’s request to vacate 

the arbitrator’s decision, because the arbitrator’s factual finding that Serna was not 

a qualified individual under the FEHA is beyond the scope of judicial review allowed 
4 

by the FAA. See Bosack, 586 F.3d at 1102 (quoting Kyocera Corp. v. Prudential–

Bache Trade Servs., Inc., 341 F.3d 987, 994 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc)). Under the 

FEHA, an employee is not entitled to relief “if the employee, because of a physical 

or mental disability, is unable to perform the employee’s essential duties even with 

reasonable accommodations.” Cal. Gov’t Code § 12940(a)(1). The arbitrator made 

a factual finding that evidence presented in Serna’s Social Security Disability 

Insurance application—in which she stated she was unable to work—showed she 

could not perform her job or any other job with or without an accommodation, and 

therefore Serna was not a qualified individual under the FEHA. Because the 

arbitrator’s determination that Serna is not a qualified individual under the FEHA

was a factual finding, it is beyond the scope of our review. See Bosack, 586 F.3d at 

1105 (the FAA does not allow review of whether an arbitrator’s factual findings “are 

supported by the evidence in the record”); Kyocera, 341 F.3d at 997. 

Nor did the arbitrator otherwise exhibit a “manifest disregard of the law,” as 

Serna argues. Collins v. D.R. Horton, Inc., 505 F.3d 874, 879 (9th Cir. 2007). This 

standard does not allow for vacatur of an arbitrator’s decision based on a simple 

error in interpreting or applying the law, and instead requires that it be “clear from 

the record that the arbitrator[] recognized the applicable law and then ignored it.” 

Biller, 668 F.3d at 665 (citation omitted); see also Lagstein v. Certain Underwriters 

at Lloyd’s, London, 607 F.3d 634, 641 (9th Cir. 2010) (citation omitted) (“Manifest 
5 

disregard of the law means something more than just an error in the law or a failure 

on the part of the arbitrators to understand or apply the law.”). Here, the arbitrator 

identified the relevant legal standards and applied them. And because he did so, we 

may not second-guess his interpretation or application of the law. Kyocera, 341 F.3d 

at 994; see also Collins, 505 F.3d at 879. 

AFFIRMED.