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S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N

C O U R T O F A P P E A L S

UNPUBLISHED

In re ELAM/HALL/JOURNEY/WALKER, 

Minors.

July 13, 2017

No. 336140

Wayne Circuit Court

Family Division

LC No. 16-522772-NA

Before: GADOLA, P.J., and METER and FORT HOOD, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

Respondent appeals as of right the order terminating her parental rights to her minor 

children, NAE, ZTE, ZZH, AMJ, AZJ, MMJ, RTJ, and AJW (the minor children). Her rights 

were terminated under MCL 712A.19b(3)(b)(ii) (parent had the opportunity to prevent sexual 

abuse of a child or sibling of that child but did not do so and there is a reasonable likelihood of 

future abuse), MCL 712A.19b(3)(g) (failure to provide proper care or custody), and MCL 

712A.19b(3)(j) (reasonable likelihood, based on conduct or capacity of parent, that child will be 

harmed if returned home). We affirm. 

Petitioner, the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS), filed a petition to 

terminate respondent’s parental rights after AMJ discovered respondent’s brother, Edward Lo 

Journey, sexually assaulting AZJ in respondent’s home on May 25, 2016. Years prior, Journey 

resided in respondent’s basement, and respondent removed Journey from her home at the 

recommendation of Children’s Protective Services (CPS), because Journey allegedly sexually 

abused either his daughter or stepdaughter. However, even after respondent removed Journey 

from her home, she continued to allow Journey access to the minor children. Additionally, after 

the incident on May 25, 2016, AZJ disclosed during a sexual assault examination that Journey 

had been molesting her for years, and that she had told respondent and another adult family 

member about the abuse but respondent and the other family member did not believe her claims. 

Respondent argues that the trial court erred when it found clear and convincing evidence 

to terminate her parental rights pursuant to MCL 712A.19b(3)(b)(ii), MCL 712A.19b(3)(g) and 

MCL 712A.19b(3)(j), and that the trial court erred when it found that termination of respondent’s 

parental rights was in the best interests of the minor children. We disagree. 

“This Court reviews for clear error a trial court’s factual findings and ultimate 

determinations on the statutory grounds for termination.” In re White, 303 Mich App 701, 709; 

846 NW2d 61 (2014). This Court reviews for clear error a trial court’s “determination regarding 

the children’s best interests.” Id. at 713. “A finding is clearly erroneous if ‘the reviewing court 
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on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.’ 

” In re Gonzales/Martinez, 310 Mich App 426, 430-431; 871 NW2d 868 (2015), quoting In re 

JK, 468 Mich 202, 209-210; 661 NW2d 216 (2003). 

Petitioner has the “burden to establish by clear and convincing evidence the existence of 

a ground for termination.” Gonzales/Martinez, 310 Mich App at 431, citing JK, 468 Mich at 

210. “To terminate parental rights, a trial court must find by clear and convincing evidence that 

at least one statutory ground under MCL 712A.19b(3) has been established.” In re Moss, 301 

Mich App 76, 80; 836 NW2d 182 (2013); citing In re Trejo Minors, 462 Mich 341, 355; 612 

NW2d 407 (2000). “Evidence of how a parent treats one child is evidence of how he or she may 

treat the other children.” In re Hudson, 294 Mich App 261, 266; 817 NW2d 115 (2011), citing 

In re AH, 245 Mich App 77, 84; 627 NW2d 33 (2001). 

A trial court may terminate parental rights under MCL 712A.19b(3)(b)(ii) if it finds, by 

clear and convincing evidence, that:

(b) The child or a sibling of the child has suffered physical injury or physical or 

sexual abuse under 1 or more of the following circumstances:

* * *

(ii) The parent who had the opportunity to prevent the physical injury or 

physical or sexual abuse failed to do so and the court finds that there is a 

reasonable likelihood that the child will suffer injury or abuse in the 

foreseeable future if placed in the parent’s home.

On appeal, respondent argues that she first learned that Journey was sexually abusing 

AZJ on May 25, 2016, and while respondent was aware of earlier sexual abuse allegations made 

against Journey, her only mistake was to allow Journey to continue to have access to the minor 

children. AZJ was sexually assaulted by Journey in respondent’s home on May 25, 2016. AZJ 

testified that Journey began molesting her either five or six years prior. According to 

respondent, she first learned of Journey’s sexual abuse of AZJ on May 25, 2016. AZJ also 

testified that she never told respondent about the earlier sexual abuse she suffered at the hands of 

Journey, however, Danelle Foster, a sexual assault advocate for Wayne County Sexual Assault 

Forensic Examiner’s Program (SAFE), testified that AZJ disclosed to her during a sexual assault 

examination that AZJ had previously told respondent and an aunt that Journey sexually abused 

her and that they did not believe AZJ’s claims. 

Additionally, respondent herself admitted that she knew of the “first allegation” made 

against Journey after CPS visited her home in “probably 2013.” At that time, Journey was being 

investigated for allegedly sexually abusing either his daughter or stepdaughter. During the 

investigation, Journey was living in respondent’s home, and CPS recommended that respondent 

remove Journey from her home. Respondent removed Journey from her home, but she continued 

to allow Journey to interact with the minor children, as Journey was allowed to visit respondent’s 

home and attend family events. She failed to instruct the minor children to avoid Journey 

because CPS never instructed her to do so, and because the first sexual abuse allegations made 
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against Journey did not result in Journey being sent to jail. Journey was even permitted to pick 

up and transport the minor children throughout the community. 

Respondent also acted curiously when she spoke with Wanda Woods, a CPS supervisor,

and Foster after the incident on May 25, 2016. She disclosed to Woods that Journey “help[ed] 

[respondent] around the home with bills and various things.” Further, Anthony Walker, the legal 

father of AMJ, RTJ, and AJW, was also present during respondent’s conversation with Woods, 

and Woods testified that Walker “felt attacked” by “[respondent’s] family” because he “had 

contacted the police and [respondent’s] family was upset and said he should not have called the 

police.” Woods characterized this as one of many unusual and “inappropriate” things that she 

noticed about respondent during her interaction with respondent. When respondent spoke with 

Foster after AZJ’s sexual assault examination, respondent was distraught because Journey had 

been “paying [her family’s] bills financially[.]” Additionally, Foster offered to help respondent 

find financial assistance so she would not be dependent on Journey, however, respondent never 

followed up with the resources that Foster offered her, which greatly concerned Foster. 

The trial court found that respondent “was well aware that [Journey] was a danger to her 

children,” because AZJ had previously informed respondent about the sexual abuse perpetrated 

by Journey and CPS informed respondent that Journey had to move out of respondent’s home. 

The trial court also found that respondent continued to allow Journey access to the minor 

children, and that, as a result, AZJ had suffered years of sexual abuse. With regard to the other 

minor children, the trial court found that respondent’s failure to protect AZJ from sexual abuse 

was evidence of respondent’s inability to protect her other children from harm. 

Thus, when considering the record evidence presented in the trial court that respondent 

was aware of the serious sexual abuse allegations against Journey preceding his sexual assault of 

AZJ on May 25, 2016, and the evidence that AZJ had indeed disclosed to respondent that 

Journey had been sexually abusing her, the trial court did not clearly err when it reached these 

findings. Respondent could have prevented AZJ’s sexual abuse by preventing Journey from 

accessing the minor children after she first learned that AZJ had been molested by Journey or 

when she removed Journey from her own home. Further, considering the disregard respondent 

showed for the safety of the minor children, there was a reasonable likelihood that the minor 

children would suffer injury or abuse in the foreseeable future if they were placed in 

respondent’s home. Therefore, the trial court properly terminated respondent’s parental rights 

under MCL 712A.19b(3)(b)(ii). 

A trial court may terminate parental rights under MCL 712A.19b(3)(g) if it finds, by clear 

and convincing evidence, that “[t]he parent, without regard to intent, fails to provide proper care 

or custody for the child and there is no reasonable expectation that the parent will be able to 

provide proper care and custody within a reasonable time considering the child’s age.” MCL 

712A.19b(3)(g). Termination under MCL 712A.19b(3)(g) is permissible when evidence 

establishes that a respondent either causes intentional injuries to a minor child or when a 

respondent fails to safeguard a minor child from injury. See In re VanDalen, 293 Mich App 120, 

141; 809 NW2d 412 (2011) (holding that termination of parental rights was proper under both 

MCL 712A.19b(3)(g) and MCL 712A.19b(3)(j) even in the absence of determinative evidence of 

the identity of the abuser of minor children, because the evidence showed that the respondents 
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either intentionally inflicted injuries on their minor children or failed to safeguard them from 

injury). 

The trial court did not err when it found that clear and convincing evidence established 

that respondent failed to provide proper care or custody for the minor children. The record 

evidence reflected that respondent permitted Journey access to the minor children even though 

she knew that there were sexual abuse allegations against him, and that AZJ had claimed that 

Journey molested her. Ultimately, respondent could have prevented AZJ from being sexually 

assaulted by Journey if she had not permitted Journey access to the minor children. Given 

respondent’s past failure to safeguard AZJ from sexual abuse, there is no reasonable expectation 

that respondent will be able to provide proper care or custody to the minor children considering 

the ages of the minor children. On appeal, respondent only contends that the trial court’s 

decision to terminate respondent’s parental rights under MCL 712A.19b(3)(g) was not supported 

by clear and convincing evidence. However, as discussed above, respondent failed to protect 

AZJ from what the record demonstrated was repeated sexual abuse. Additionally, “[e]vidence of 

how a parent treats one child is evidence of how he or she may treat the other children.” 

Hudson, 294 Mich App at 266, citing AH, 245 Mich App at 84. 

The trial court also did not clearly err when it terminated respondent’s parental rights 

under MCL 712A.19b(3)(j), which provides that a parent’s rights may be terminated if “[t]here is 

a reasonable likelihood, based on the conduct or capacity of the child’s parent, that the child will 

be harmed if he or she is returned to the home of the parent.” MCL 712A.19b(3)(j). “Evidence 

of how a parent treats one child is evidence of how he or she may treat the other children.” 

Hudson, 294 Mich App at 266, citing AH, 245 Mich App at 84. 

Petitioner presented clear and convincing evidence that there was a reasonable likelihood 

the minor children would be harmed if they were returned to respondent’s home. Respondent 

knew that Journey posed a risk to the minor children based on AZJ’s disclosure that Journey had 

molested her, and the allegations that Journey had sexually abused his daughter or stepdaughter. 

Yet respondent allowed Journey to visit her home, and even transport the minor children without 

other adult supervision. Given respondent’s knowledge about the risk Journey posed to the 

minor children and her decision to permit Journey continued access to the minor children, there 

is a reasonable likelihood that the minor children will be harmed if returned to respondent’s 

home. 

On appeal, respondent contends that the minor children will not be harmed if they are 

returned to her home because, while she failed to “more aggressively protect” the minor children 

after learning about the allegations against Journey, any harm is unlikely because Journey is 

currently imprisoned as a result of the May 25, 2016 incident with AZJ. However, there is a 

reasonable likelihood that the minor children will be harmed when considering respondent’s 

previous failure to protect the minor children from harm, regardless of the fact that Journey is 

currently imprisoned, as there is a reasonable likelihood that respondent would fail to protect the 

minor children from Journey upon his release from prison, or another abuser in the foreseeable 

future. 

“Even if the trial court finds that the Department has established a ground for termination 

by clear and convincing evidence, it cannot terminate the parent’s parental rights unless it also 
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finds by a preponderance of the evidence that termination is in the best interests of the children.” 

Gonzales/Martinez, 310 Mich App at 434, citing MCL 712A.19b(5); and Moss, 301 Mich App at 

90. “ ‘[T]he child’s bond to the parent, the parent’s parenting ability, the child’s need for 

permanency, stability, and finality, and the advantages of a foster home over the parent’s home,’

are all factors for the court to consider when deciding whether termination is in the best interests 

of the child.” Gonzales/Martinez, 310 Mich App at 434, quoting White, 303 Mich App at 713

(alteration in original). “With respect to the trial court’s best-interest determination, we place 

our focus on the child rather than the parent.” In re Schadler, 315 Mich App 406, 411; 890

NW2d 676 (2016), citing Moss, 301 Mich App at 87.

The trial court terminated respondent’s parental rights on the basis of its well-founded 

concern that the minor children would not be protected by respondent in the future. The trial 

court also found that respondent was financially dependent on Journey, and that after the May 

25, 2016 incident, respondent seemed more concerned about losing the financial assistance from 

Journey than keeping Journey, a sexual predator, away from the minor children. Further, during 

trial, the trial court noted that the majority of the minor children were placed with their 

respective fathers, and that their respective fathers would protect the minor children from danger 

and harm. While the trial court acknowledged that AZJ requested that respondent’s parental 

rights not be terminated, and that the minor children loved respondent, the trial court focused on 

the need to protect the minor children from danger.

The evidence petitioner presented supported the trial court’s findings and best-interest 

determination. The record evidence established that respondent knew that Journey allegedly 

sexually abused his daughter or stepdaughter, and that AZJ claimed that Journey molested her. 

Despite this knowledge, respondent allowed Journey to visit her home, access her minor children 

and even transport the minor children throughout the community. Ultimately, Journey was 

caught sexually assaulting AZJ by AMJ on May 25, 2016. The trial court properly focused on 

the best interests of the minor children, as they would be at substantial risk given respondent’s 

prior failure to protect the minor children from Journey. 

Affirmed. 

/s/ Michael F. Gadola 

/s/ Patrick M. Meter 

/s/ Karen M. Fort Hood