IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

DIVISION ONE

TSIGEREDA TEKLU, ) No. 82649-2-I

)

Respondent, )

)

v. )

)

DJAMSHID SETAYESH, ) PUBLISHED OPINION

)

Appellant. ) 

)

VERELLEN, J. — The general rule in Washington “subject to some 

exceptions and qualifications” is that a document that transfers an interest in land 

must contain a legal description to satisfy the statute of frauds. But one 

recognized exception to Washington’s strict legal description requirement is 

reference to an assessor’s tax parcel number. Specifically, if a document 

transferring an interest in land contains the tax parcel number and the county in 

which the property is located, that reference is sufficient to satisfy the statute of 

frauds if the tax parcel number refers a person of “ordinary intelligence” to records 

on file in the county assessor’s office or in turn to documents on record with the 

county auditor containing the complete legal description. Such a reference to the 

tax parcel number and county “furnishes the legal description of the real property 
No. 82649-2-I/2

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involved with sufficient definiteness and certainty to meet the requirements of the 

statute of frauds.”1

Here, because the purchase and sale agreement that Djamshid Setayesh 

entered into with Tsigereda Teklu contained the tax parcel number and the county 

in which the property was located, the agreement referred a person of ordinary 

intelligence to the property account summary containing the “sales history table” 

on file in the Snohomish County assessor’s office, which in turn referred such a

person to the complete legal description in the six most recent deeds to the 

property on record with the Snohomish County auditor. Here, the inclusion of the 

tax parcel number coupled with the county in which the property was located 

satisfied the legal description requirement of the statute of frauds. 

Therefore, we affirm. 

FACTS

Djamshid Setayesh owned a parcel of real property in Lynnwood, 

Washington. On October 7, 2015, Setayesh entered into a lease agreement, a 

purchase and sale agreement, and an option to purchase agreement with 

Tsigereda Teklu. The agreements provided Teklu with a five-year lease and an 

option to purchase the property “on or before October 2020.”2 

The property was identified in the purchase and sale agreement as Tax 

Parcel No. 27041700100700 (Snohomish County), 6416 180th Street SW 

 

1 Bingham v. Sherfey, 38 Wn.2d 886, 889, 234 P.2d 489 (1951).

2 Clerk’s Papers (CP) at 140, 143. 
No. 82649-2-I/3

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Lynnwood, Washington, 98037. The agreement also provided that the legal 

description was “Attached as Exhibit A,”

3 but there was no Exhibit A attached. 

On September 4, 2019, Teklu exercised the option. Setayesh refused to 

sell Teklu the property. Teklu brought an action for specific performance against 

Setayesh.

About a year later, Teklu filed a summary judgment motion. Teklu argued 

that either she was entitled to specific performance by the terms of the purchase 

and sale agreement or, in the alternative, based upon part performance. Setayesh 

responded that the purchase and sale agreement was unenforceable for failure to 

contain an adequate legal description of the property and that Teklu could not 

establish her claim of part performance as a matter of law. 

The court granted Teklu’s summary judgment motion. Setayesh filed a 

motion for reconsideration, arguing that Teklu failed to proffer adequate evidence 

to support her claim that using the tax parcel number in a county records search 

would reveal documents containing a complete legal description of the property. 

The court granted Setayesh’s motion for reconsideration and vacated its initial 

order. 

The next year, Teklu filed a second summary judgment motion, explaining 

step-by-step how a person could enter the tax parcel number into the assessor’s 

website and find the assessor’s property account summary with an abbreviated 

legal description, together with a sales history table referencing the documents on 

 

3 CP at 128. 
No. 82649-2-I/4

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file with the county auditor, including the six most recent deeds to the property 

containing a complete legal description. Setayesh filed a cross motion for 

summary judgment, again arguing that the purchase and sale agreement failed to 

comply with the legal description requirement of the statute of frauds and that 

Teklu did not establish part performance.

On April 23, 2021, in separate orders, the trial court granted Teklu’s 

summary judgment motion and denied Setayesh’s cross motion for summary 

judgment. The court concluded the purchase and sale agreement satisfied the 

statute of frauds because the tax parcel number coupled with the county in which 

the property was located constituted a sufficient legal description. The court also 

granted Teklu attorney fees and costs. 

Setayesh appeals. 

ANALYSIS

I. Statute of Frauds 

Setayesh argues that the trial court erred in granting Teklu specific 

performance of the purchase and sale agreement because the agreement did not 

contain a legal description required by the statute of frauds.

We review an order granting summary judgment de novo.4 “Summary 

judgment is proper only when there are no genuine issues of material fact and the 

 

4 Marina Condo. Homeowner’s Ass’n v. Stratford at Marina, LLC, 161 Wn. 

App. 249, 255, 254 P.3d 827 (2011) (citing Hadley v. Maxwell, 144 Wn.2d 306, 

310, 27 P.3d 600 (2001)). 
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moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”5 In reviewing an order of 

summary judgment, “we engage in the same inquiry as the trial court, considering 

the facts and all reasonable inferences from the facts in the light most favorable to 

the nonmoving party.”6

The general rule in Washington, “subject to some exceptions and 

qualifications[,] is that a document that transfers an interest in land must describe 

the land by its full legal description” to satisfy the statute of frauds.7 In Martin v. 

Seigel,

8 our Supreme Court held that a legal description must be “sufficiently 

definite” to locate the land “without recourse to oral testimony.”

9

 And in Turpen v. 

Johnson,

10 our Supreme Court further explained that a legal description is 

sufficient “if a person of ordinary intelligence and understanding can successfully 

use the description in an attempt to locate and identify the particular property 

sought to be conveyed.”11 

 

5

Id. (citing CR 56(c)). 

6

Id. (citing Right-Price Recreation, LLC v. Connells Prairie Cmty. Council, 

146 Wn.2d 370, 381, 46 P.3d 789 (2002)). 

7 18 WILLIAM B. STOEBUCK AND JOHN W. WEAVER, WASHINGTON PRACTICE:

REAL ESTATE: PROPERTY LAW § 13.3, at 78 (2004).

8 35 Wn.2d 223, 212 P.2d 107 (1949).

9

Id. at 227 (quoting Martinson v. Cruikshank, 3 Wn.2d 565, 101 P.2d 604 

(1940); see also Ecolite Mfg. Co., Inc. v. R.A. Hanson Co., Inc., 43 Wn. App. 267,

271, 716 P.2d 937 (1986). 

10 26 Wn.2d 716, 175 P.2d 495 (1946). 

11 Id. at 728-29. 
No. 82649-2-I/6

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One of the recognized exceptions to Washington’s strict legal description 

requirement is reference to the tax parcel number.

12

 Specifically, our Supreme 

Court explored the reference to the tax parcel number exception in Bingham v. 

Sherfey.

13

 

In Bingham, the sole question was whether the legal description in the 

option to purchase satisfied the statute of frauds.14 The option described the 

property as:

Tax No. 3, in Section Thirty-one, in Township Twelve, North, 

of Range Forty-two, as at present designated on the tax rolls in the 

office of the County Assessor of said county, being all of that part of 

the following described tract of land, to wit: 

Beginning at a point on the North line of Main Street in the 

City of Pomeroy, 394 feet East of the West line of Northeast quarter 

of Southwest quarter of said Section Thirty-one; thence North 5 

[degrees] West 325 feet; thence East 198 feet; thence North 937 feet 

to North line of Southwest quarter of said Section Thirty-one; thence 

West 96 feet to the county road, thence along the east line of county 

road South 29 [degrees] West 265 feet; thence South 16 [degrees] 

20́ West 248 feet; thence South 16 [degrees] 15́ West 455 feet; 

thence South 32́ West 357 feet to Main Street, thence East 284 feet 

to starting point.[15]

 

12 One recognized exception is express incorporation by reference where 

the document transferring the interest in land “expressly incorporates an attached 

exhibit.” Commentators note that there is “also a branch of incorporation by 

reference that may be called ‘judicial incorporation.’” They conclude description by

reference to a tax lot number is one form of such a “judicial incorporation.” 18 

STOEBUCK AND WEAVER, § 13.3, at 83. Although no case law or other authority 

appears to acknowledge the “judicial incorporation” classification or taxonomy in 

this setting.

13 38 Wn.2d 886, 234 P.2d 489 (1951). 

14 Id. at 887. 

15 Id. 
No. 82649-2-I/7

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Our Supreme Court held that the legal description satisfied the statute of frauds.16 

The court noted that the only information necessary to satisfy the legal description 

requirement was the first paragraph of the description which stated, “Tax No. 3,

. . . as at present designated on the tax rolls in the office of the County Assessor of 

said county.” 17 The court observed that the second paragraph attempting a metes 

and bounds description, was merely “surplusage.”18 The court reasoned that the 

description of properties by tax parcel number is “sanctioned by statute,”19 and 

case law establishes that in other proceedings, such as tax foreclosure 

proceedings, the court has accepted legal descriptions by tax parcel number.20 

 

16 Id. at 889. 

17 Id. at 888.

18 Id.

19 Id. (“REM. REV. STAT., §11137 provides: ‘The assessor shall list all real 

property according to the largest legal subdivision as near as practicable. The 

assessor shall make out in the plat and description book in numerical order a 

complete list of all lands or lots subject to taxation, . . . ; provided, that the 

assessor shall give to each tract of land where described by metes and bounds a 

number, to be designated as Tax No. ___, which said number shall be placed on 

the tax-rolls to indicate that certain piece of real property bearing such number, 

and described by metes and bounds in the plat and description book here in 

mentioned.’”). RCW 84.40.160, the current version of this same statute, continues 

to require the assessor “give to each tract of land where described by metes and 

bounds a number, to be designated as Tax No. [___], which said number shall be 

placed on the tax rolls to indicate that certain piece of real property bearing such 

number, and described by metes and bounds in the plat and description book 

herein mentioned.”

20 See Turpen, 26 Wn.2d at 728 (our Supreme Court held that the property 

was sufficiently described by its tax parcel number (“Assessor’s Tax Lot No. 22 of 

Niels Hendrichsen D.L.C.”) for the purposes of a tax foreclosure proceeding even 

though the metes and bounds description was erroneous); City of Centralia v. 

Miller, 31 Wn.2d 417, 428-30, 197 P.2d 244 (1948) (our Supreme Court held that 
No. 82649-2-I/8

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And the court upheld the rule from Martin and Turpen that a legal description is 

sufficient if a person of ordinary intelligence can locate the property without 

recourse to oral testimony or if it is referenced in another “instrument” that contains 

a sufficient description.21 Therefore, Bingham recognizes “that a reference to this 

public record [the assessor’s tax parcel number and county] furnishes the legal 

description of the real property involved with sufficient definiteness and certainty to 

meet the requirements of the statute of frauds.”22 

Further, in Washington Practice: Real Estate Transactions, Stoebuck and 

Weaver, in discussing Bingham, recognize that reference to the tax parcel number

“in effect” incorporates “the system of recorded instruments of a county auditor.”23 

Specifically, Stoebuck and Weaver note that reference to the tax parcel number “is 

truly an exception to the strict rule that the description must be found within the 

four corners of the instrument, for one has to search at least the assessor’s 

records, and perhaps also the auditor’s, to obtain the legal description.”24 We 

agree. 

Here, the property was identified in the purchase and sale agreement as 

Tax Parcel No. 27041700100700 (Snohomish County), 6416 180th Street SW 

 

the property was sufficiently described by its tax parcel number, township, and 

range in Lewis County, Washington for the purposes of a quiet title action).

21 Bingham, 38 Wn.2d at 888-89.

22 Id. at 889.

23 18 WILLIAM B. STOEBUCK AND JOHN W. WEAVER, WASHINGTON PRACTICE:

REAL ESTATE: PROPERTY LAW § 13.3, at 83 (2004).

24 Id.
No. 82649-2-I/9

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Lynnwood, Washington, 98037.25 It is undisputed that the reference to the tax 

parcel number in the purchase and sale agreement leads to the “Snohomish 

County Property Account Summary” located on the Snohomish County tax 

assessor’s website. The property account summary describes the property as 

“SEC 17 TWP 27 RGE 04RT-1B-1) N 130FT OF E 190FT OF NW 1/4 NE 1/4 

LESS RDS.”26 

The reference to the tax parcel number and to Snohomish County in the 

agreement refers a person of ordinary intelligence to the tax assessor’s records, 

here, the Snohomish County property account summary, including an abbreviated 

legal description and a sales history table. And that abbreviated legal description,

coupled with the list of documents pertaining to the six most recent sales of the 

property, refers a person of ordinary intelligence to the Snohomish County 

auditor’s official records, including the six most recent deeds each containing a 

complete legal description. Specifically, the deeds describe the property as, “THE 

NORTH 130 FEET OF THE EAST 190 FEET OF THE NORTHEAST QUARTER 

OF THE NORTHWEST QUARTER OF THE NORTHEAST QUARTER OF 

SECTION 17, TOWNSHIP 27 NORTH, RANGE 4 EAST, W.M. IN SNOHOMISH 

COUNTY, WASHINGTON, EXCEPT THE NORTH 30 FEET AND THE EAST 30 

FEET THEREOF, FOR ROAD.”27 

 

25 CP at 128.

26 CP at 74. 

27 CP at 111-23. 
No. 82649-2-I/10

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Therefore, the requirements of Martin and Turpen are satisfied by means of 

reference to the tax parcel number recognized in Bingham as an exception to the 

otherwise very strict statute of frauds requirements in Washington. Setayesh’s 

arguments in opposition confuse the law regarding Bingham and its implications. 

First, Setayesh argues that Bingham is distinguishable because the option 

to purchase in Bingham contained an incorporation by reference to the tax parcel 

number “as at present designated on the tax rolls.”28 But the verbiage “as at 

present designated on the tax rolls” is not a requirement for the reference to the 

tax parcel number exception approved in Bingham. Simply stating the correct tax 

parcel number and the county is adequate. We agree with Stoebuck and 

Weaver’s reading of Bingham that a metes and bounds description is not required 

where the tax parcel number is provided and it is clear what county is involved. 

Setayesh also contends that because the legal description in the assessor’s 

records is inconsistent with the legal description in the records on file with the 

county auditor, the reference to the tax parcel number exception does not satisfy 

the statute of frauds. Specifically, the Snohomish County property account 

summary in the assessor’s records provides that the property is the “NW 1/4 NE 

1/4,” which is different from the complete legal description in the auditor’s records,

which provides that the property is located on the “northeast quarter of the 

northwest quarter.”29

 

28 Appellant’s Br. at 13. 

29 CP at 104, 111. 
No. 82649-2-I/11

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But the assessor’s property account summary is not limited to the 

abbreviated legal description that appears to reverse “NW 1/4” and “NE 1/4.”30 

Notably, the assessor’s property account summary also includes a sales history 

table that expressly identifies six prior sales dating from 2005 to 2015, listing for 

each sale the grantor, the grantee, and the recording date of the transfer 

documents. And, as set forth in detail in the declaration of Ryan Dyer, the 

documents pertaining to those prior sales are available by entering the tax parcel 

number in the Snohomish County official records website. Such an official records 

search lists all of the officially recorded documents pertaining to the property on 

file with the Snohomish County auditor, including the six most recent deeds 

corresponding with the six most recent sales listed in the sales history table. And 

the deeds associated with those transactions contain a complete legal description 

of the property. Therefore, the discrepancy in the abbreviated legal description 

contained in the property account summary must be considered in the context of 

the sales history table included in the assessor’s property account summary. And,

in turn, the sales history table refers a person of ordinary intelligence to the 

complete legal description in the deeds associated with that sales history on file 

with the county auditor. 

Setayesh also argues that Teklu cannot rely on the public records to furnish 

a legal description because they “constitute extrinsic evidence which Martin held 

 

30 CP at 104. 
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was impermissible.”31 But the holding in Martin was more limited. In concluding 

that a street address alone was insufficient to satisfy the legal description 

requirement of the statute of frauds, our Supreme Court in Martin noted that a 

supplemental document containing a legal description does not satisfy the statute 

of frauds unless it is incorporated because otherwise “parol evidence would have 

to be resorted to.”32 But the distinction the court made in Martin is not applicable 

here because, consistent with Bingham, the reference in the purchase and sale 

agreement to the tax parcel number refers a person of ordinary intelligence to the 

assessor’s records noted in the property tax summary and in turn to the auditor’s 

documents containing a complete legal description. Such a reference to the tax 

parcel number does not implicate parol evidence as the court contemplated in 

Martin.

33

Finally, we recognize that it is necessary to document in any particular case 

how the tax parcel number can lead to specific assessor’s records and how, if 

necessary, those records may in turn refer a person to specific documents in the 

auditor’s records. Teklu adequately made such a showing here. We also confirm 

the best practice clearly remains to expressly recite the complete legal description 

in the agreement purporting to transfer the property or to expressly incorporate by 

 

31 Appellant’s Br. 15-19. 

32 Martin, 35 Wn.2d at 226-28. 

33 Because we conclude that the inclusion of the tax parcel number 

judicially incorporated the public records containing a complete legal description 

into the purchase and sale agreement, we need not address Teklu’s alternative 

claim for part performance. 
No. 82649-2-I/13

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reference an attached document containing a complete legal description. But 

under the right circumstances, a reference to a tax parcel number and county can 

satisfy the legal description requirement of the statute of frauds.

II. Attorney Fees

Setayesh argues the trial court erred by awarding attorney fees and costs to 

Teklu. The lease and the purchase and sale agreement both provide for attorney 

fees and costs to the prevailing party in litigation. Because Teklu prevailed at trial, 

she was entitled to attorney fees and costs incurred in the trial court.

Therefore, we affirm. 

WE CONCUR: