## IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA

ABBOTT LABORATORIES et al.,

Petitioners

,

v

. THE SUPERIOR COURT OF ORANGE COUNTY

,

Respondent ; THE PEOPLE ex rel. TONY RACKAUCKAS, as District

Attorne y, etc., Real Party in Interest

.

S249895

Fourth Appellate District, Division One

D072577

Orange County Superior Court
30

- 201600879117

- CU

- BT

- CXC

June 25
, 2020

Justice Liu authored the opinion of the Court, in which Chief
Justice Cantil

- Sakauye and Justices Chin, Corrigan, Cuéllar, Kruger and Fujisaki * concurred.

* Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Three, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.Justice Kruger filed a concurring opinion

, in which Chief

Justice Cantil

- Sakauye and Justice Corrigan concurred.1 ABBOTT LABORATORIES v. SUPERIOR COURT

S249895

Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.

The Orange County District Attorney (District Attorney) brought this action against several pharmaceutical companies, alleging that the companies had intentionally delayed the sale of a generic version of a popular pharmaceutical drug to maximize their profit s at the expense of consumers throughout
California. The companies moved to strike references to “California” in the complaint, arguing that the District Attorney
ha s no jurisdiction to enforce California’s consumer protection laws outside the geographic boundaries of Orange County. After the trial court denied the motion to strike, the companies obtained an order from the Court of Appeal directing the trial court to grant the motion.
The People, as real party in interest and represented by
the District A ttorney, have ask ed this court to determine
whether the District Attorney’s authority to enforce California’s consumer protection laws under the auspices of the u nfair

c ompetition l aw (UCL) (Bus. & Prof. Code

, § 17200 et seq.) is limited to the county’s bo rders. W e hold it is not : T he UCL does

not preclude a district attorney , in a properly plead ed case, from including allegations of violations occurring outside as well as
within the borders of his or her county

. I. The District Attorney initiated this action by filing a complaint in the name of the People of the State of California against Abbott Laboratories, AbbVie Inc., TevaABBOTT LABORATORIES v. SUPERIOR COURT Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.

2 Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc.; Barr Pharmaceuticals, Inc; Duramed Pharmaceuticals Inc.; and Du ramed Pharmaceutical Sales Corp. (collectively

, Abbott). The complaint alleged that Abbott violated the UCL by entering into agreements to delay
the market debut of generic versions of Niaspan, a prescription drug used to treat high cholesterol. As a res ult, the District Attorney alleges

, users of Niaspan, their insurers, public health care providers

, and other government entities paid substantially higher prices for Niaspan than they would have if the generic
version had been available without improper d elay . The District Attorney sought an injunction prohibiting Abbott from further violating the UCL and an order for restitution and civil penalties, including treble penalties for violations that injured senior citizens or disabled persons. ( Bus. & Prof. Code, §§ 17203, 17206, 17206.1; Civ. Code

, § 3345 ; all undesignated statutory references are to the Business and Professions Code .)
Abbott, in turn, filed a motion to strike “ claims for restitution and civil penalties to the extent that those are not
limi ted to Orange County.” Noting that the District Attorney’s complaint makes no specific claim to penalties or restitution extending beyond the bounds of the county, Abbott asked the
trial court to strike 16 references to “California” from the complaint on the ground that a d istrict a ttorney’s enforcement authority under the UCL is limited to the geographic boundaries
of his or her county. A ccording to Abbott, the motion was intended to “focus” the case, discovery, and scope of any potential se ttlement.

The trial court denied the motion to strike, finding “premature” Abbott’s concerns about the scope of discovery and financial exposure as well as any enforcement concerns that might arise if the Attorney General were excluded from aABBOTT LABORATORIES v. SUPERIOR COURT Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.

3 negotiated st atewide settlement

. The court explained: “If there’s a settlement, I can guarantee you the Attorney General . . . is going to know about [it]. So

, we will deal with that i f and
when.

. . . There are going to be more players in any kind of
settlement u nless there’s a carve

- out. ” The court did not refer specifically to the geographic scope of the District Attorney’s authority during the hearing or in its minute order.
Abbott sought review by means of a writ petition. A
divided C ourt of A ppeal overrul ed the District Attorney’s demurrer and granted relief to Abbott, directing the trial court to vacate its order denying the motion to strike and to enter a new order striking the allegations under which the District Attorney sought statewide monetary relie f. ( Abbott Laboratories v. Superior Court (2018) 24 Cal.App.5th 1, 31 ( Abbott ) .)

T he Court of Appeal observed that “though district attorneys have plenary authority to pursue actions in the criminal arena in the State’s name [citation], their ‘authority is territorially limited’ to the confines of their county.” ( Abbott

, supra , 24 Cal.App.5th 1, 19, quoting Pitts v. County of Kern (1998) 17 Cal.4th 340, 361 ( Pitts ).) By contrast, “with respect to civil actions, a district attorney has no plen ary power.” ( Abbott

, at p. 19. ) “Rather, it is settled that a ‘district attorney has no authority to prosecute civil actions absent specific legislative
authorization.’ ” ( Id. at p. 20, quoting People v. Superior Court ( Humberto S. ) (2008) 43 Cal.4th 73 7, 753 ( Humberto S. ) .) As to whether the UCL grants such authority, the court looked to People v. Hy

- Lond Enterprises, Inc. (1979) 93 Cal.App.3d 734 ( Hy

- Lond ), which held that a d istrict a ttorney ha s no authority

to limit the powers of the Attorney Genera l or other public agencies under the guise of UCL enforcement

. ( Hy

- Lond , atABBOTT LABORATORIES v. SUPERIOR COURT Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.

4 p p

. 75 2

– 753 .) The Court of Appeal here explained it had “no difficulty applying Hy

- Lond ’s principles to bar a district attorney’s unilateral effort to seek restitution and civil penalties for UCL violations occurring outside his or her own county jurisdiction.” (

Abbott , at p. 2 5 .)
Writing in dissent, Justice Dato explain ed that Abbott had
fai led to “offer anything approaching an ‘extraordinary reason’ to justify this court’s decision to intervene at the pleading stage” in order to address “a motion to strike that does not challenge the plaintiff’s ability to plead a valid claim, but merely see ks to edit the language of the complaint in a manner that better suits the defendants’ tactical purposes.” ( Abbott, supra , 24 Cal.App.5th at p. 34 (dis. opn. of Dato, J.)

. ) Even if Abbot t had met this threshold showing, Justice Dato continue d , “the major ity opinion reaches the wrong result.” ( Id. at p. 37 (dis. opn. of Dato, J.)

. ) According to Justice Dato, i t is the court, not the plaintiff, that awards restitution

, and “there is nothing inherently problematic about the court awarding restitution to

st atewide victims of defendants’ unlawful business practice.” ( Ibid. ) “[E]ven absent a request by the District Attorney the court is empowered by section 17203 to award restitution ‘to any

person ’ adversely affected by the defendants’ unlawful conduct.

. . . This includes, potentially, residents of counties other than Orange.” ( Ibid.

, quoting § 17203, italics added b y Dato , J

. ) Similarly, Justice Dato explain ed , the court could impose civil penalties based on any violation proven in the case

, within or
outside of Orange County : “The penalties are the punishment imposed for each violation proved in a law enforcement action brought on behalf of the People of the State of California. If the violation is proved, the penalties are appropriately imposed.” ( Abbott

, at p. 38 (dis. opn. of Dato, J.)

. ) Finally, Justice DatoABBOTT LABORATORIES v. SUPERIOR COURT Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.

5 reject ed Abbott’s argument that a district attorney may not bind the Attorney General in settlement, explaining “it is we ll established that the District Attorney’s action will have no res judicata effect on a private party’s restitution claim, except to the extent that the party signs a release

. ” ( Id. at p. 37 (dis. opn. of Dato, J.)

. )

We granted the District Attorney’s pe tition for review,
which was limited to the Court of Appeal ’s decision to grant writ relief. The District Attorney did not seek review of the portion
of the Court of Appeal ’s opinion overruling the demurrer. Accordingly, we express no view on the service requirements of section 17209, as all papers filed in this court have been properly served upon the Attorney General. ( See § 17209 [requiring service of appellate briefs or petitions in UCL matters on the Attorney General within three days of filing with the court].)

II.

We review the trial court’s denial of the motion to strike for abuse of discretion. ( Cal

- Western Business Services, Inc. v. Corning Capital Group (2013) 221 Cal.App.4th 304, 309.) To the
extent th e decision rested upon a legal determination as to the scope of the District Attorney’s authority , it is a question of law subject to de novo review. ( Ibid. ; see Pitts

, supra , 17 Cal.4th at

p. 345.)

A.

T he UCL prohibits unfair competition, defined as “any unlawful, unfair, or fraudulent business act or practice. ” (§ 17200.) The statute’s “ purpose is to protect both consumers and competitors by promoting fair competition in commercial markets for goods a nd services.” ( Kasky v. Nike, Inc. (2002) 27 Cal.4th 939, 949.) “ In service of that purpose, the LegislatureABBOTT LABORATORIES v. SUPERIOR COURT Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.

6 framed the UCL’s substantive provisions in ‘ “broad, sweeping language” ’ ” (

Kwikset Corp. v. Superior Court (2011) 51 Cal.4th 310, 320 ) to reach “anything that can properly be called a business practice and that at the same time is forbidden by law ” ( Barquis v. Merchants Collection Assn. (1972) 7 Cal.3d 94, 113 )

.

“ By proscribing ‘ any unlawful ’ business practice, ‘ section 17200

“ borrows ” violations of other laws and treats them as unlawful practices ’ that the unfair competition law makes independently
actionable. ” ( C

el

- Tech Communications, Inc. v. Los Angeles Cellular Telephone Co. (1999) 20 Cal.4th 163, 180 , quoting State
Farm Fire & Cas ualty Co. v. Superior Court (1996) 45 Cal.App.4th 1093, 1103

. ) “ ‘ [T]he Legislature .

. . intended by this sweeping language to permit tribunals to enjoin on

- going wrongful business conduct in whatever context such activity might occur. ’ ” ( Cel

- Tech

, at p. 181 , quoting American Philatelic
Soc. v. Claibourne (1935) 3 Cal.2d 689, 698 .)
To that end, the Legislature has created a scheme of overlapping enforcement authority

. Section 17204 provides that actions for relief under the UCL may be prosecuted “by the Attorney General or a district attorney or by a county counsel authorized by agreement with the district attorney in actions involving violation of a county ordinance, or by a city attorney of
a ci ty having a population in excess of 750,000, or by a city attorney in a city and county or, with the consent of the district attorney, by a city prosecutor in a city having a full

- time city prosecutor in the name of the people of the State of California

up on their own complaint or upon the complaint of a board, officer, person, corporation, or association, or by a person who has suffered injury in fact and has lost money or property as a result of the unfair competition. ”ABBOTT LABORATORIES v. SUPERIOR COURT Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.

7 The UCL grants broad equitable authority to courts to remedy violations. Section 17203 provides in relevant part : “Any person who engages, has engaged, or proposes to engage in unfair competition may be enjoined in any court of competent jurisdiction. The court may make suc h orders or judgments, including the appointment of a receiver, as may be necessary to prevent the use or employment by any person of any practice which constitutes unfair competition, as defined in this chapter, or as may be necessary to restore to any pe rson in interest any money or property, real or personal, which may have been acquired by means of such unfair competition.” Such remedies are “cumulative . . . to the remedies or penalties available under all other laws of this state.” (§ 17205.)

While the UCL provides for both public and private enforcement, authorized public prosecutors have an additional
tool to enforce the state’s consumer protection laws: civil penalties. “Any person who engages, has engaged, or proposes to engage in unfair compet ition shall be liable for a civil penalty not to exceed two thousand five hundred dollars ($2,500) for each violation, which shall be assessed and recovered in a civil action brought in the name of the people of the State of California by the Attorney Gene ral, by any district attorney, by any county counsel authorized by agreement with the district attorney in actions involving violation of a county ordinance, by any city attorney of a city having a population in excess of 750,000, by any city attorney of a ny city and county, or, with the consent of the district attorney, by a city prosecutor in any city having a full

- time city prosecutor, in any court of competent jurisdiction. ” (§ 17206, subd. (a).) “The court shall impose a civil penalty for each violat ion of [the UCL] . In assessing the amount of the civil penalty, the court shall consider any one or more ofABBOTT LABORATORIES v. SUPERIOR COURT Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.

8 the relevant circumstances presented by any of the parties to the case, including, but not limited to, the following: the nature
and seriousness o f the misconduct, the number of violations, the persistence of the misconduct, the length of time over which the misconduct occurred, the willfulness of the defendant’s misconduct, and the defendant’s assets, liabilities, and net
worth. ” (§ 17206, subd. ( b).) “If the action is brought by a district attorney or county counsel, the penalty collected shall be paid to the treasurer of the county in which the judgment was entered.” (§ 17206, subd. (c); see also § 17207 [similar provisions for civil penalties against any person who intentionally violates any injunction prohibiting unfair competition] .)

B. Abbott argues that this case is controlled by our statement in Safer v. Superior Court (1975) 15 Cal.3d 230, 236 ( Safer ) that “the Legislature has manifested its concern that the district attorney exercise the power of his office only in such civil litigation as that lawmaking body has, after careful consideration, found essential.” According to Abbott

, the UCL
contains no legislative finding that statewide enforcement by district attorneys is “essential” to the purpose of the UCL.
The proceedings at issue in Safer arose when a farmworkers’ union set up picket lines around the fields of several Ventura County strawberry gr owers. ( Safer

, supra , 15 Cal.3d at p. 233.) The growers filed suit to obtain injunctive relief against the union and its members , and t he trial court issued a temporary restraining order limiting the spacing and number of pickets. The next day, the Vent ura County Sheriff arrested a number of participants in ongoing picketingABBOTT LABORATORIES v. SUPERIOR COURT Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.

9 activities, charging three with willful disobedience of a law ful
court order

, a misdemeanor offense

. Then, when the defendants appeared for jury trial, the district attorney dismiss ed the misdemeanor charges and instead served them with orders to show cause in contempt proceedings initiated under C ode of Civil Procedure section 1209. ( Safer

, at p. 234.) The net result of these maneuvers was “to convert a misdemeanor proceeding,
in which defendants had the protection of a jury trial and other statutory safeguards, into a contempt proceeding, in which defendants would be stripped of these protections.” ( Ibid. ) The defendants demurred and, alternatively, sought jury trial on the
civi l charges. The trial court denied relief.

We held that the trial court acted in excess of its jurisdiction when it permitted the district attorney to prosecute a contempt proceeding arising from private civil litigation “in which the district attorney cou ld rest his participation neither upon standing as a party nor upon statutory authorization.” ( Safer

, supra , 15 Cal.3d at p. 233.) Our analysis began with a survey of instances in which the Legislature empower ed a district attorney to bring a civil actio n. ( Id. at p p. 236

– 237 .) Observing that none of these authorization statutes “empower a district attorney to intervene at will in a civil case involving private parties in an economic dispute” ( i d. at p. 236)

, we discerned a “general mandate” on the part of the Legislature
“th at public officers not use their funds and powers to intervene in private litigation” ( i d. at p. 237)

. We held that b ecause the district attorney was not authorized to intervene in the underlying labor dispute , the trial court exceeded its jurisdiction by permitting the district attorney to institute the civil contempt proceedings . ( Id. at pp. 242

– 243.)ABBOTT LABORATORIES v. SUPERIOR COURT Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.

10 Although Safer specifically concerned “a disturbing instance” of intervention by a public prosecutor in private civil litigation ( Safer

, supra , 15 Cal.3d at p. 242)

, Abbott notes that
we have cited Safer for the general proposition that “a district attorney has no authority to prosecute civil actions absent specific legislative authorization.” ( Humberto S.

, supra , 43 Cal.4th at p. 753 & fn. 12 [citing case s] ; see Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. County of S t anislaus (1997) 16 Cal.4th 1143,
1155

– 1156 [ citing Safer to explain that if a specific provision of the Cartwright Act authoriz ing the district attorney to bring
antitrust actions on behalf of the county or its subdivisions did
not exist , the district attorney would be unable to do so].)

E ven assuming Safer establish ed a general requirement
that a district attorney may not pursue civil litigation without specific legislative authorization

, that requirement is satisfied with regard to a district attorney’s authority to bring a UCL
action . As we explained in People v. McKale (1979) 25 Cal.3d
626 , a case concerning a district attorney’s authority to prosecute violations of the Mobilehome Parks Act (Health & Saf. Code, § 18200 et seq.) under the UCL: “ W hile [ Safer ] held a district attorney may prosecute civil actions only when the Legislature has specifically authorized, specific power exists in
the instant case. The district a ttorney is expressly authorized to maintain a civil action for either injunctive relief or civil penalties for acts of unfair competition. (Bus. & Prof. Code, §§ 17204, 17206.) ” ( McKale , at p. 633.) T he question in this case
is not whether the District Attorney can bring “ unlawful ” UCL claims predicated on violations of the antitrust laws

, but whether the District Attorney can seek remedies under the UCL for conduct occurring outside of his county. Safer says nothing about the scope of remedies that may be sought.ABBOTT LABORATORIES v. SUPERIOR COURT Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.

11 As to this question, Abbott concedes that the District Attorney may seek and obtain statewide injunctive relief upon a sufficient showing before the trial court. This concession follows directly from the text of the UCL’s provision on
enforcement of injunctive relief. S ection 17207, subdivision (a) provides: “ A ny person who intentionally violates any injunction prohibiting unfair competition issued pursuant to Section 17203 shall be liable for a civil penalty not to excee d six thousand dollars ($6,000) for each violation.” S ection 17207, s ubdivision (b) then provides that such penalties “shall be assessed and recovered in a civil action brought in any county in which the
violation occurs or where the injunction was issued .” ( I talics added.) In other words, section 17207 explicitly contemplates that an injunction issued in one county may operate to prohibit
future violations in another county. “ T he purpose of such relief, in the context of a UCL action, is to protect Cal ifornia’s consumers against unfair business practices by stopping such practices in their tracks. An injunction would not serve the purpose of prevention of future harm if only those who had already been injured by the practice were entitled to that relie f.” ( In re Tobacco II Cases (2009) 46 Cal.4th 298, 320.)

There is thus no dispute as to the District Attorney’s general authority to bring UCL claims or his specific authority to pursue statewide injunctive relief . The issue here , more precisely, is whether a civil enforcement action initiated by a district attorney under the UCL may seek civil penalties for violations occurring outside of the district attorney’s county as
well as restitution on behalf of Californians who do not reside i n the county

. To answer that question, we re turn to the text and purpose of the UCL.ABBOTT LABORATORIES v. SUPERIOR COURT Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.

12 C

.

“ ‘ “[O]ur fundamental task is ‘to ascertain the intent of the lawmakers so as to effectuate the purpose of the statute.’ ” ’ [Citation.] As always, we start with the language of the statute, ‘giv[ing] the words their usual and ordinary meaning [citation], while construing them in light of the statute as a whole and the statute’s purpose

. ’ ” ( Apple Inc. v. Superior Court (2013) 56 Cal.4th 128, 135.) As t he parties an d amici curiae observe, the text of the UCL does not explicitly address the geographic scope
of a district attorney’s authority to seek civil penalties and
restitution

. But t he statute does contain several clues that bear on the question presented.
First, in addition to contemplating statewide injunctions (§ 17207), the UCL authorizes courts to “make such orders or judgments .

. . as may be necessary to restore to any person in interest any money or property .

. . which may have been acqui red by means of .

. . unfair competition” (§ 17203, italics added). Further, with regard to civil penalties, the statute says: “The court shall impose a civil penalty for each violation of [the UCL] .” (§ 17206, subd. (b), italics added.) The broad lang uage of these provisions is not qualified by any reference to geography or the identity of the plaintiff . The statute contains no geographic limitation on the scope of relief that courts may order in an enforcement action brought by a district attorney.

T h e purpose of the quoted language of section 17206 was to codify the standard set forth in People v. Superior Court ( Olson ) (1979) 96 Cal.App.3d 181, 198, for determining the number of violations and corresponding civil penalties resulting from the publica tion or broadcast of a media advertisement. (See Stats. 1992, ch. 430

, § 4
, p p. 1707

– 1708 ; Sen. Com. onABBOTT LABORATORIES v. SUPERIOR COURT Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.

13 Jud iciary

, A nalysis of Sen. Bill No. 1586 (1991

– 1992 Reg. Sess.)
as amended May 4, 1992, pp. 1

– 2 .) Although the legislative history does not include any specific consideration of the question before us, it is notable that the Olson case was brought by the Orange County District Attorney seeking injunctive relief
and civil penalties for false advertiseme nts that ran in multiple
counties and that target ed home owners in Orange County and
Riverside C ount y

. ( Olson , at p. 185 & fn. 2.) . Neither Olson nor the legislative history of the 1992 amendment to the UCL raise d any concern about the geographic scope of relief sought in an enforcement action by a district attorney.
Second, section 17206, subdivision (c) provides in part : “If the action is brought by the Attorney General, one

- half of the penalty collected shall be paid to the treasure r of the county in which the judgment was entered, and one

- half to the General
Fund. ” (See also § 17207, subd. (c) [ similarly allocated civil penalties recovered for violation of injunction prohibiting unfair competition , with one

- half to the treasurer of the county in which the judgment was entered and one

- half to the State
Treasurer ].) The Legislature’s allocation of one

- half of civil penalties in a statewide action to the county in which the judgment was entered indicates that the Legislatu re did not design the civil penalty scheme to ensure an allocation of civil penalties to counties in accordance with the number of violations in each county. Rather, penalties are awarded in large part based on the location in which judgment is entered

,

r egardless of the number of violations proven or their corresponding locations

. Third

, in making injunctions prohibiting unfair competition widely enforceable throughout the state, section 17207, subdivision (b) distinguishes between “any county inABBOTT LABORATORIES v. SUPERIOR COURT Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.

14 which th e violation occurs” and “any county . . . where the injunction was issued.” In other words, the county “where the injunction was issued” is not necessarily the county “in which
the violation [of the injunction] occurs , ” and c ivil penalties to punish viola tion of an injunction may be obtained through a civil
action file d in either type of county. ( Ibid. ) Thus, for example, if an injunction entered in Orange County is violated in Riverside County, civil penalties for that violation may be
recovered in a ci vil action brought in Orange County. By its
terms, s ection 17207 not only confirms that courts may grant statewide injunctive relief

, but also contemplates that an action brought in the county where an injunction was issued may
result in an imposition of civil penalties for violations occurring
in other counties. Moreover, section 17207 shows that t he Legislature knows how to write language limiting the award of civil penalties to the county “in which the violatio n occurs.” But
it did not enact any such limitation in section 17207 (civil penalties for violation of an injunction) or in section 17206 (civil penalties for engaging in unfair competition) based on the identity of the plaintiff . As noted, the latter pr ovision states without qualification: “ T he court shall impose a civil penalty for each violation of this chapter.” (§ 17206, subd. (b).)
A straightforward reading of the UCL’s broad language is consistent with the statute’s purpose and history. As t he p arties
note, the re is no specific indication in the voluminous legislative
record of the UCL that the Legislature intended to grant statewide enforcement authority to district attorneys or to withhold such authority from them

. But w hat the record does reveal is a clear trajectory toward greater and overlapping public enforcement at all levels of government.ABBOTT LABORATORIES v. SUPERIOR COURT Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.

15 The scope of public UCL enforcement has expanded in the
dec a des since the statute’s enactment in 1933

. (See Kraus v. Trinity Management Services, I nc. (2000) 23 Cal.4th 116, 129

– 130.) Although the statute originally provided only for injunctive relief, the Legislature granted to the Attorney General and district attorneys the authority to obtain civil penalties for violations of the UC L in 1972 . ( C ompare Stats. 1963, ch. 1606, § 1 , p. 3184 with Stats. 1972, ch. 1084, § 2
, p. 2021 .) In 1974, the same authority to seek injunctive relief and civil penalties was extended to city attorney s of jurisdictions
with a population in excess of 750,000 , despite objections that “prosecution of unfair competition cases should be a county

- wide function, rather than broken up into cities

, ” because “harmful competition will arise between the two entities

. ” ( Sen. Republican Caucus, A nalysis of Sen. Bill No. 1725 ( 1973

– 1974 Reg. Sess.) as amended Apr

. 24, 1974, p. 2 ; s ee Stats. 1974, ch. 746, § 1 , p p

. 1654

– 1655 .) The law was amended in 1988 to grant standing to the San Jose City Attorney (Stats. 1988, ch. 790 , § 1
, p p

. 2557

– 2558 ), in 1991 to grant standing to all county counsel ( Stats. 199 1, ch. 1195, § 1 , p. 5799 ), and in 1992 to grant standing to all city attorneys with the consent of the ir respective district attorney s ( Stats. 199 2 , ch. 430, § 4 , p. 1707 ; see generally Fellm eth

, California’s Unfair Competition Act: Conundrums and Confusions ( Jan. 1995) published as part of Recommendation on Unfair Competition Litigation (Nov. 1996)
26 Cal. L aw Re vi sion Com

. Rep. 227, 234 & fn. 24 )

. These amendments were generally opposed by the C alifornia District Attorneys Association (CDAA) , which argued that the Attorney General and district attorneys had the “training and experience” to best serve the public interest in the area of consumer protection and that “their effectiveness may well be jeopardizedABBOTT LABORATORIES v. SUPERIOR COURT Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.

16 or compromised through the expansion of this section.” ( Exec. Dir., Cal. District Attorneys Assn., letter to Sen. Ayala re. Sen.
Bill No. 709 (1991

– 1992 Reg. Sess.) May 10, 1991; see also
Assem. Com. on Jud iciary , Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 2440 (19 87

– 1988 Reg. Sess.) as amended June 9 , 1988, p p

. 1

– 2 [similar ] ; but

see Dept. Consumer Affairs, Enrolled Bill Rep. on Sen. Bill No. 1586 (1991

– 1992 Reg. Sess.) July 23, 1992

, p. 3 [ noting the
CDAA’s neutral position to compromise legislation sponsored by retailers].)

The sole exception to this trajectory of expanding UCL
enforcement was the 2004 enactment of Proposition 64, which
revised the UCL ’ s standing provisions for private individuals by providing that “a private person has standing to sue only if he or she ‘has suffered injury in fact and has lost money or property as a result of such unfair competition.’ ” ( Californians for Disability Rights v. Mervyn’s, LLC (2006) 39 Cal.4th 223, 227, quoting § 17204 , as amended by Prop. 64, § 2 .) Proposition 64 had no effect on suits brought b y the Attorney General, the district attorneys, or other public prosecutors.
In sum, the text of the UCL grant s broad civil enforcement authority to d istrict a ttorneys , and this broad grant of authority is consistent with the statute’s purpose and history

. W e see no indication that in an enforcement action brought by a district attorney, the Legislature intended to limit civil penalties or
restitution to the geographic bound aries of the district attorney ’s county

. III.

Abbott contends that we must read a geographic limitation into the District Attorney’s UCL enforcement authority in order to give effect to the “ hierarchical structure ofABBOTT LABORATORIES v. SUPERIOR COURT Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.

17 the prosecutorial function within California ’s executive branch ”
as set forth in the California C onstitution.
Article V, section 13 of the state C onstitution provides : “Subject to the powers and duties of the Governor, the Attorney
General shall be the chief law officer of the State. It shall be the duty of the Attorney General to see that the laws of the State are uniformly and adequately enforced. T he Attorney General shall have direct supervision over every district attorney and sheriff and over such other law enforcement officers as may be designated by law, in all matters pertaining to the duties of their

r espective offices, and may require any of said officers to make reports concerning the investigation, detection, prosecution, and punishment of crime in their respective jurisdictions as to the Attorney General may seem advisable. Whenever in the opinion of the Attorney General any law of the State is not being adequately enforced in any county, it shall be the duty of the Attorney General to prosecute any violations of law of which the superior court shall have jurisdiction, and in such cases the Attorney General shall have all the powers of a district attorney. When required by the public interest or directed by the Governor, the Attorney General shall assist any district attorney in the discharge of the duties of that office.”
This provision mentions “t he powers of a district attorney” but does not define those powers except by reference to “ the investigation, detection, prosecution, and punishment of crime in their respective jurisdictions

. ” (Cal. Const., art. V, § 13.) Elsewhere, the state Constitution requires the Legislature to provide for each county “an elected district attorney” (Cal. Const., art. XI, § 1, subd. (b)) but does not elucidate the district attorney’s powers. Rather, t he Legislature has conferred upon
d istrict attorneys both criminal and civil enforcement authorityABBOTT LABORATORIES v. SUPERIOR COURT Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.

18 as a matter of statute , declaring that “the district attorney is the public prosecutor, except as otherwise provided by law” (Gov. Code, § 26500 , 1st par. )

, and providing for certain secondary duties when he or she is “not engaged in criminal proceedings in the superior court or in civil cases on behalf of the people” ( id.

, § 26501). When a district attorney prosecutes criminal violations of state law, he or she acts in a state rather than a
l ocal capacity, and that authority is “territorially limited.” ( Pitts

, supra , 17 Cal.4th at p. 361; see People v. Eubanks (1996) 14 Cal.4th 580, 589 [district attorney of each county is vested with power to conduct prosecutions of criminal offenses “within the county”].)
In reading the language of the constitutional provisions concerning the role of the Attorney General and district attorneys , we find nothing in those provisions that constrain s the Legislature’s prerogative to structure UCL enforcement so
t hat a district attorney has authority to seek civil penalties and restitution for violations outside of his or her county . The UCL
does not undermine the Attorney General ’s constitutional role

as California’s chief law enforce ment officer . In particular, the public enforcement authority that the UCL grants to district attorneys does not constrain the Attorney General’s prerogative to intervene or take control of a civil enforcement action that, in the Attorney General’s view, does not ade quately serve the public interest. (See Cal. Const., art. V, § 13 [“Whenever in the opinion of the Attorney General any law of the State is not being adequately enforced in any county, it shall be the duty of the Attorney General to prosecute any violatio ns of law of which the superior court shall have jurisdiction, and in such cases the Attorney General shall have all the powers of a district attorney.”]; Gov. Code, § 12550 [Attorney General “has directABBOTT LABORATORIES v. SUPERIOR COURT Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.

19 supervision over the district attorneys,” and “[w]he n he deems it advisable or necessary in the public interest .

. . , he shall assist any district attorney in the discharge of his duties, and may, where he deems it necessary, take full charge of any investigation or prosecution of violations of law of whi ch the superior court has jurisdiction”].) In the UCL context, the Attorney General’s supervisory role is facilitated by the requirement that all appellate briefs or petitions in a UCL matter be served upon the Attorney Gen eral. (§ 17209.) Thus,
the ult imate locus of control and accountability for UCL actions
is the office of the Attorney Genera l

. The Attorney General, as amicus curiae, does not join
Abbott’s constitutional arguments but offers three practical concerns in support of Abbott’s position. First, the Attorney General suggests that the District Attorney’s position would present “conflicts of interest” between local prosecutors’ responsibility to statewide victims, to whom they are not poli tically accountable, and their own incentives to secure a greater share of available remedies for local constituencies. “The result,” according to the Attorney General, “could be a degradation of UCL enforcement, as local prosecutors compete
to be the fir st to settle a case and secure penalties for local use.” Second, “granting statewide enforcement authority to local prosecutors would endanger California’s ability to credibly lead the way in matters of national or international prominence” by compromisin g the Attorney General’s primary role in consumer
enforcement. Third

, the Attorney General contends

, the “widely recognized geographic limitations on district and city attorneys’ UCL authority have formed the basis for decades of interoffice cooperation ” between state and local prosecutors , and this cooperation , which is crucial to the intensive investigations andABBOTT LABORATORIES v. SUPERIOR COURT Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.

20 litigation necessary to pursue UCL claims

, would be jeopardized by a rule allowing any district attorney to pursue statewide
remedies

. The CDAA , as amicus curiae, echoes these concerns

, adding that an “assertion of statewide jurisdiction and preemptive authority .

. . should c ome

. . . only after a careful analysis by the State Legislature to resolve competing policy objectives.” (See Stop Youth Addiction, Inc. v. Lucky Stores (1998) 17 Cal.4th 553, 578.)

These concerns are not without force, and we do not take them lightly

. But two caveats are in order. First, the Attorney General’s “ conflict of interest ” c oncern appear s directed solely at civil penalties rather than restitution, as restitution is paid to
victims

, not the county, and thus does not create the same “race
to fi le” incentive

. Second, all of these concerns are presented in
the abstract. In support of his argument, the Attorney General
offer s a single example of a district attorney unilaterally pursuing statewide relief in parallel with a coalition of state and local prosecutors. As the Attorney General recounts , the District Attorney of Trinity County, represented by contingency fee counsel, sued Volkswag e n shortly after the discovery of the worldwide diesel emissions cheating scandal, even as the Attorney General was investigating the same conduct in what eventually resulted in litigation involving all 50 states as well as federal and foreign agencies. Although the Attorney General suggests that “granting statewide enforcement authority to local
prosecutor s would endanger California’s ability to credibly lead the way in matters of national or international prominence,” he reports that the district attorney in that matter dropped his case with no apparent negative effects.
In any event, we note that concerns similar to those raised by amici curiae have been conveyed to the Legislature at variousABBOTT LABORATORIES v. SUPERIOR COURT Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.

21 junctures when it considered proposals to expand local
enforcement ( a nte , at p p

. 15

– 16 ) , and t he Legislature
nevertheless chose to create a decentralized enforcement model in which a district attorney has authority to obtain statewide
relief

. Although arguments in favor of a more centralized model
are not without merit , the Legislature reasonably could have believed that an overlapping scheme of decentrali zed
enforcement has several potential advantages.
First, “ for a defendant in a state the size of California, a law enforcement action alleging a statewide unlawful business practice and seeking monetary relief creates, at least potentially, a substantial e conomic exposure. To the extent law enforcement can be Balkanized and monetary relief limited to local jurisdictions

— especially early in the litigation

— a defendant ’ s ‘ management ’ of the exposure is greatly facilitated. ” ( Abbott

, supra , 24 Cal.App.5th at p. 32 (dis. opn. of Dato, J.) .)
Second, although it is possible that a d istrict a ttorney will

pursue a settlement that undervalues the true scope of
statewide claims

, it is also possible that the alternative would be no enforcement or penal ty at all for violations outside of the district attorney’s c ounty. Indeed, t he limited enforcement resources of the Attorney General have been a significant factor in the Legislature’s repeated expansion of public enforcement authority under the UCL. Al though concerns about conflicts of interest or duplicative enforcement have been expressed each time the Legislature expanded the scope of UCL enforcement, neither the legislative record nor the briefing before us point s to any concrete or widespread probl ems. “Pursuing litigation against corporate defendants is expensive, and the Legislature was doubtless aware that both financial and political considerations may sometimes discourage a public prosecutorABBOTT LABORATORIES v. SUPERIOR COURT Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.

22 from undertaking such a case. Consistent with the U CL’s broad remedial purposes and the perceived need for vigorous enforcement, there is nothing unconstitutional about the Legislature’s decision to permit and encourage multiple public prosecutors with overlapping lines of authority on the theory
that more enforcement in this context is better than less.” ( Abbott

, supra , 24 Cal.App.5th at p. 35 (dis. opn. of Dato, J.).)
Without denying that the UCL scheme may “incentivize public prosecutors [to] act[] in their respective county’s financial
self

- interest” a t the expense of full redress for violations in other counties (

Abbott

, supra , 24 Cal.App.5th at p. 31), we are unable

to conclud e that the Legislature necessarily believed this concern outweighs the incentive that the scheme provides for district attorneys to bring enforcement actions that might otherwise not be brought at all. In the litigation before us, there is no indication at this stage that the balance of incentives is tipped toward a settlement that is motivated by a conflict of interest or is otherwise improper. I n this case, “the concern about a local district attorney binding other prosecutors to an improper or inadequate settlement is as fanciful as it is premat ure.” ( Id. at p. 35 (dis. opn. of Dato, J.). ) In any event, concerns about local “windfalls” are tempered by the UCL’s mandate that all penalties recovered by local prosecutors be used exclusively “for the enforcement of consumer protection laws.” (§ 17 206, subd. (c).)
Third, as to the Attorney General’s leadership role and the
value of interjurisdictional cooperation, the Attorney General retains authority to intervene or take over the case (Cal. Const.,

art. V, § 13; Gov. Code, § 12550), and in any e vent, the Attorney General has not identified any specific way in which the District Attorney’s conduct of this litigation has compromised suchABBOTT LABORATORIES v. SUPERIOR COURT Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.

23 values. Notably, t he trial court here appear s quite alert to the importance of the Attorney General’s role, exp laining that “[i]f there’s a settlement, I can guarantee you the Attorney General . . . is going to know about [it]. So

, we will deal with that if and
when.

. . . There are going to be more players in any kind of
settlement unless there’s a carve

- out. ”
The Court of Appeal relied on Hy

- Lond

, supra , 93 Cal.App.3d 734, in which the Attorney General moved to set aside a stipulated judgment between the Napa County District Attorney and a nursing home operator with facilities in 12 counties. ( Id. at pp. 739

– 742.) The stipulation provided for general injunctive relief and payment of civil penalties ( i d. at

pp. 741

– 742, 748

– 749) and designated the Napa County District Attorney as “ ‘the exclusive governmental agency that may enforce the provision o f this injunction’ ” ( i d. at p. 741, fn. 1). It purported to absolve the company of past wrongdoings and immunize it from future unfair competition lawsuits brought by anyone acting on behalf of the state for alleged violations of any acts covered by the injunction. It also purported to bar the state or any of its administrative agencies from taking action to suspend or revoke the company’s license based on the alleged acts referred to in the complaint. ( Id. at pp. 741, fn. 2, 749.)
Hy

- Lond held that the Attorney General had standing to
intervene and move to vacate the judgment. Unlike Abbott, t he
defendants in Hy

- Lond argued that the district attorney must
be able to act on behalf of the state in a civil enforcement action because “parties dealing with the state must be able to negotiate with confidence with the agent authorized to bring the suit, and without the fear that another agency or other state entity might overturn any agreement reached.” ( Hy

- L ond

, supra , 93 Cal.App.3d at p. 752.) While acknow ledging this concern in theABBOTT LABORATORIES v. SUPERIOR COURT Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.

24 abstract, the court in Hy

- Lond reasoned that the parties were on notice that the district attorney had no right “to surrender the powers of the Attorney General and his fellow district attorneys to commence, when appropriate, ac tions in other counties under the provisions of law.” ( Id. at p. 753.) Moreover,
the settlement in Hy

- Lond ran afoul of the general rule that “an injunction cannot be granted to prevent the execution of a public statute by officers of the law for a public benefit.” ( Ibid. ) Finding these principles dispositive, the court noted but did not examine the further argument that a contrary rule would result in an intolerable conflict of interest by “put [ting] the initiating district attorney in the position of bargaining for the recovery of civil penalties that would flow into his county’s coffers, at the expense of surrendering the rights and duties of the state to control the respondent’s activities generally through the powers of the Attorney General ” and other local and state enforcement agencies . ( Ibid. ; see id. at p. 754 [ “the powers of the district attorney ar e limited by the recognition of a possible conflict of interest” and corresponding rules of professional conduct ].)
Hy

- Lond is inapposite because it concerned a negotiated
settlement that specifically sought to limit future enforcement authority of the Att orney General and other officials

. The parties in this case have not reached any settlement; there is no judgment that purports to bind other public prosecutors or limit their enforcement authority; and the role of the Attorney General has not been compro mised or usurped. Further, the trial court said that “if [defendants] reach a settlement with the district attorney, unlike the trial court in Hy

- Lond

— and if the [Attorney General] comes in and says I want to be heard about this, you bet I’m going to le t them be heard on this

. ” This is not a case where a trial court appears poised to approve a settlementABBOTT LABORATORIES v. SUPERIOR COURT Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.

25 without affording the Attorney General an opportunity to participate.
Ultimately , the pros and cons of centralization or
decentralization in the enforcement of California’s consumer protection laws is a matter of policy for the Legislature to decide. We acknowledge amici curiae ’s concern about democratic accountability

, but it is undisput ed that the Legislature has
authorized local prosecutors to seek a statewide injunction
under the UCL

. And it is the Legislature, elected by voters across the state, that has decided to allow local prosecut ors to seek civil penalties

. The state Constitut ion does not preclude the Legislature’s choice of an overlapping scheme of public enforcement, with no geographic limitations on courts’ authority

to impose civil penalties and award restitution in actions brought by district attorneys. Of course, n othing prevents the voters from petitioning their legislators or placing an initiative on the ballot to restrict this authority for local prosecutors if they believe it is not sound policy. But w e have no authority to impose geographic limits on the broad enfor cement authority
that the text of the UCL grants to district attorneys.
The Court of Appeal, h aving reached the contrary result, suggested that a district attorney could seek civil penalties beyond the boundaries of his or her county if the Attorney
General were to provide written consent to the litigation . But just as the UCL imposes no geographical limits on a district attorney’s enforcement authority , it contain s no provision requiring the district attorney to obtain the Attorney Gene ral’s

consent to enforce the statute. The Court of Appeal cited

statutes deal ing with intercounty cooperation between district attorneys’ and city attorneys’ offices , but those statutes do not mention the Attorney General. Simply put, the UCL does notABBOTT LABORATORIES v. SUPERIOR COURT Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.

26 re quire a district attorney to obtain the Attorney General’s

consent
, written or otherwise

, before pursuing an enforcement
action under the statute.
Finally, we note that the complaint in this case specifically alleges that at least some of the violations oc curred in Orange County and that venue is therefore proper in the Orange County Superior Court. We have no occasion to address whether a district attorney could bring a UCL claim for conduct occurring entirely outside the bounds of his or her county. (Cf . § 1 7 207,
subd. (b) [ public actions to enforce violations of a UCL injunction may be brought by specified local and state officers “in any court of competent jurisdiction within his or her jurisdiction without regard to the county from which the original injunction was issued”].) At the same time

, the practical and legal concerns raised by the parties and amici curiae

, including questions regarding the preclusive effect of statewide relief obtained by an individual district attorney

, may induce the Legislature to consider amending the UCL to add procedures to minimize the risks of conflicting enforcement efforts . A basic starting point would be the provision of notice to the Attorney General and
other relevant officials in cases where a district attorney seeks a UCL remedy for violations outside the county’s borders.ABBOTT LABORATORIES v. SUPERIOR COURT Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.

27 CONCLUSION

W e reverse the judgement of the Court of Appeal and remand the matter to that court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion

.

LIU, J.

We Concur:
CANTIL

- SAKAUYE, C. J. CHIN, J. CORRIGAN, J. CUÉLLAR, J. KRUGER, J. FUJISAKI, J. *

* Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Three, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.1 ABBOTT LABORATORIES v . SUPERIOR COURT

S249895

C oncurring Opinion by Justice Kruger

I agree with the majority opinion that district attorneys exercising their authority to enforce the unfair competition law (UCL) (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 17200 et seq.) may seek civil penalties and restitution for violations occurri ng outside their counties’ borders. I write separately, however, to call attention to a gap in the statutory enforcement scheme that the Legislature may wish to fill.
As the majority opinion explains, the text and history of
the UCL indicate that when the Legislature empowered district attorneys to sue “in the name of the people of the State of
California” (Bus. & Prof. Code, §§ 17204, 17206, subd. (a)), it intended to authorize district attorneys to pursue the full suite
of remedies that are available to the state, including civil penalties and restitution for violations occurring outside county borders. But absent an effective mechanism for coordinating efforts, empowering scores of local officials to sue in the name of
the State of California will inevi tably create some practical challenges. These potential challenges are particularly acute in the context of the UCL, which provides that any civil penalties recovered by a district attorney “shall be paid to the treasurer of the county in which the judgm ent was entered.” (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 17206, subd. (c) .) As amici curiae the Attorney General and the California District Attorneys Association observe, this provision creates an incentive for district attorneys to race eachABBOTT LABORATORIES v. SUPERIOR COURT Kruger, J., concurring

2 other to the courthouse and to enter settlements that maximize their own counties’ recoveries, potentially at the expense of consumers elsewhere in the state. The amici curiae worry that the net effect may be to hamper effective statewide enforcement
of the UCL rather than enhance it.
The majority correctly notes that the UCL’s system of overlapping public enforcement authority generally has not

— to this point

— given rise to such difficulties. (Maj. opn., ante , at

p. 20.) But as a consequence of our decision today

— which has dispelled the cloud of uncertainty that had previously hung over statewide enforcement actions brought by district attorneys

— we may well see an increase in attempts to bring such actions, and an increased risk that the Attorney General’s and California
Dis trict Attorneys Association’s worries will be realized.
In other statutes with similar enforcement regimes, the Legislature has provided a roadmap for how public officials should sort out areas of overlapping responsibility from the moment a complaint is f iled. (See, e.g., Gov. Code, § 12652 [spelling out specific procedures for the Attorney General and local prosecuting authorities to follow to ensure coordination in pursuing False Claims Act violations].) Such provisions implicitly recognize that the At torney General is “the chief law officer of the State,” obligated “to see that the laws of the State are uniformly and adequately enforced,” and accorded the authority to exercise “direct supervision over every district attorney.” (Cal. Const., art. V, § 13.) They also recognize that the Attorney General’s ability to carry out these obligations depends, in the first instance, on receiving adequate notice of
relevant claims.ABBOTT LABORATORIES v. SUPERIOR COURT Kruger, J., concurring

3 The UCL lacks a comparable notification provision for trial proceedings. It does contain one for appellate matters: On appeal, the parties must serve the Attorney General with copies of their briefs and petitions. (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 17209.) The required notice ensures that the Attorney General is aware of appellate proceedings th at may generate published, binding precedent and affect future interpretations of the law. But for the surely far greater number of UCL cases that are resolved in the trial courts, the current statutory scheme contains no
mechanism to ensure notice. As t he majority opinion notes, the Attorney General has the authority “to intervene or take control of a civil enforcement action that, in the Attorney General’s view, does not adequately serve the public interest.” (Maj. opn.,

ante , at p. 18, citing Cal. Con st., art. V, § 13 and Gov. Code, § 12550.) But to exercise those constitutional powers

— or even, at a lesser level, to provide input, direction, or oversight

— the Attorney General must first be aware of the existence of the underlying action.
The Legislatur e may wish to fill this gap by requiring that district attorneys and other public prosecutors serve the Attorney General with a copy of any UCL complaint whose prayer for relief seeks monetary relief for violations occurring beyond the borders of their res pective jurisdictions. Such a requirement

— which would parallel the existing statutory requirement to serve the Attorney General with copies of each appellate brief or petition

— would go a significant way toward addressing the legitimate concerns the Attorn ey General and other district attorneys have expressed about the powers we recognize today, and toward facilitating coordination andABBOTT LABORATORIES v. SUPERIOR COURT Kruger, J., concurring

4 collaboration between different enforcing authorities in the
future.
KRUGER, J.

We Concur:
CANTIL

- SAKAUYE, C. J. CORRIGAN, J.See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court.

Name of Opinion Abbott Laboratories v. Superior Court

__________________________________________________________________________________ Unpublished Opinion Original Appeal Original Proceeding Review Granted XX 24 Cal.App.5th 1 Rehearing Granted

__________________________________________________________________________________ Opinion No. S249895 Date Filed: June 25, 2020

__________________________________________________________________________________
Court: Superior County: Orange Judge: Kim G. Dunning

__________________________________________________________________________________
Counsel:

Kirkland & Ellis

, Michael John Shipley

, Jay P. Lefkowitz

, Adam T. Humann and Yosef Mahmood for Petitioners Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc., Duramed Pharmaceuticals Sales Corp., Inc., and Barr Pharmaceuticals, Inc.

Munger, Tolles & Olson

, Jeffrey I. Weinberger

, Stuart N. Senator and Blanca F. Young for Petitioners AbbVie Inc. and Abbott Laborato ries.

Horvitz & Levy

, Jeremy Brooks Rosen

, Stanley H. Chen ; Janet Y. Galeria ; and Heather Lynn Wallace for Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America and California Chamber of Commerce as Amici Curiae on behalf of Petitioners.

No appearance for Respondent.

Tony Rackauckas and Todd Spitzer , District Attorneys, Joseph D'Agostino, Assistant District Attorney, Kelly A. Ernby, Deputy District Attorney; Robinson Calcagnie, Mark P. Robinson, Jr., and Kevin F. Calcagnie for Real Party in Interest.

Denn is J. Herrera , City Attorney (San Francisco), Yvonne R. Meré and Owen J. Clements , Deputy City Attorney s ; Michael Feuer, City Attorney (Los Angeles), Michael M. Walsh and Monica D. Castillo, Deputy City Attorneys; M ara W. Elliot, City Attorney (San Diego), Mark D. Ankcorn, and Kathryn Turner, Chief Deputy City Attorney, Kristine Lorenz, Deputy City Attorney; Richard Doyle, City Attorney (San Jose), Nora Frimann , Assistant City Attorney; James R. Williams, County Coun sel (Santa Clara), Greta S. Hansen and Danny Chou , Chief Assistant County Counsel, Laura S. Trice, Deputy County Counsel; Barbara J. Parker, City Attorney (Oakland), Maria S. Bee, Chief Assistant City Attorney, Erin B. Bernstein, Deputy City Attorney; Ali son E. Leary and Jennifer B. Henning for City Attorneys, League of California Cities and California State Association of Counties as Amici Curiae on behalf of Real Party in Interest.

Law Office of Valerie T. McGinty and Valerie T. McGinty for Consumer Attorneys of California as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Real Party in Interest.

Xavier Becerra , Attorney General, Nicklas A. Akers , Assistant Attorney General, Michele R. Van Gelderen

, Daniel A. Olivas, Hunter Landerholm, and David A. Jones, Deputy Attorneys General, forAttorney General as Amicus Curiae.

Mark Louis Zahner; and Thomas A. Papageorge for the California District Attorn eys Association as Amicus Curiae.

Jeffrey S. Rosell, District Attorney (Santa Cruz), Douglas B. Allen, Assistant District Attorney, for Santa Cruz County District Attorney as Amicus Curiae.Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for p ublication with opinion):

Kelly A. Ernby Deputy District Attorney 401 Civic Center Drive Santa Ana, CA 92701

- 4575 (714) 834

- 3600

Yvonne R. Meré Depu ty City Attorney Fox Plaza 1390 Market St., 6th Floor San Francisco, CA 94102

- 54 08 (415) 554

- 3874

Jay Lefkowitz Kirkland & Ellis LLP 601 Lexington Ave. New York, NY 10022 (212) 446

- 4800