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ADVANCE SHEET HEADNOTE

January 29, 2018

2018 CO 7

No. 17SC149, Campaign Integrity Watchdog v. Alliance for a Safe and Independent 

Woodmen Hills—Election Law—Constitutional Law—Political Speech

The supreme court holds that a political committee must report payments to a 

law firm for its legal defense as contributions, but not as expenditures. “[E]xpenditures 

. . . and obligations” under section 1-45-108(1)(a)(I), C.R.S. (2017), are limited to 

payments and obligations for expressly advocating the election or defeat of a candidate; 

payments for legal defense are not for express electoral advocacy. But payments to a 

third-party law firm for a political committee’s legal defense count as reportable 

contributions because they are payments “made to a third party for the benefit of any . . 

. political committee,” Colo. Const. art. XXVIII, § 2(5)(a)(II).

The court reverses the Administrative Law Judge’s determination that the 

contribution-reporting requirement is unconstitutional as applied to Alliance. Under 

Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 61–68 (1976), for political committees like Alliance whose 

major purpose is influencing elections, the governmental interests in political 

transparency and preventing corruption justify the First Amendment burdens of 

reporting and disclosure. It makes little difference that the payments here were made 

post-election and for legal defense; elections are cyclical and money is fungible. 
The Supreme Court of the State of Colorado

2 East 14th Avenue • Denver, Colorado 80203

2018 CO 7

Supreme Court Case No. 17SC149

C.A.R. 50 Certiorari to the Colorado Court of Appeals

Court of Appeals Case No. 16CA280

Office of Administrative Courts Case No. OS 2015-0014

Honorable Robert N. Spencer, Administrative Law Judge

Petitioner:

Campaign Integrity Watchdog,

v.

Respondents:

Alliance for a Safe and Independent Woodmen Hills; and Colorado Secretary of State.

Order Affirmed in Part and Reversed in Part

en banc

January 29, 2018

Authorized Representative of Petitioner:

Matthew Arnold

Denver, Colorado

Attorneys for Respondent Alliance for a Safe and Independent Woodmen Hills:

Hale Westfall, LLP

Ryan R. Call

Allan B. Hale

Richard A. Westfall

Peter J. Krumholz

Denver, Colorado

Attorneys for Respondent Colorado Secretary of State:

Cynthia H. Coffman, Attorney General

Matthew D. Grove, Assistant Solicitor General

Grant T. Sullivan, Assistant Solicitor General

Denver, Colorado

JUSTICE HOOD delivered the Opinion of the Court.
2

¶1 Alliance for a Safe and Independent Woodmen Hills bought ads and 

social-media coverage in an election. Campaign Integrity Watchdog filed a complaint 

with the Colorado Secretary of State against Alliance, alleging that Alliance failed to 

comply with Colorado’s campaign-finance laws requiring political committees to report 

contributions and expenditures. An Administrative Law Judge, or ALJ, ultimately 

ordered Alliance to pay fines and register as a political committee. 

¶2 Alliance appealed the campaign-finance decision and defended itself in a related 

defamation suit, racking up hundreds of dollars in court costs and thousands in legal 

fees. Alliance didn’t report those legal expenses. So, Watchdog filed another 

campaign-finance complaint, asserting that Alliance had received contributions to pay 

the legal expenses and should have reported both the contributions and the spending. 

¶3 The ALJ concluded that the legal expenses were not reportable as expenditures 

but were reportable as contributions. Nonetheless, it ruled that the 

contribution-reporting requirement was unconstitutional as applied to Alliance for its 

post-election legal expenses. Watchdog appealed the ALJ’s determinations regarding 

the reporting requirements, and the court of appeals asked us to take the appeal directly 

under C.A.R. 50. We accepted jurisdiction, in part because this case is related to another 

that we decide today: Campaign Integrity Watchdog v. Coloradans for a Better Future, 

2018 CO XXX, ___ P.3d ___.

¶4 We affirm the ALJ’s decision that the legal expenses were not expenditures but 

were contributions under Colorado law. First, section 1-45-108(1)(a)(I), C.R.S. (2017),

requires political committees to report spending only for express advocacy for the 
3

election or defeat of a candidate, and legal expenses do not constitute such express 

advocacy. Second, because a payment to a third party for a political committee’s legal 

defense is a payment “for the benefit” of the political committee, it counts as a 

contribution under article XXVIII, § 2(5)(a)(II).

¶5 However, we reverse the ALJ’s determination that the reporting requirement is 

unconstitutional as applied to Alliance for its legal expenses. The Supreme Court of the 

United States has consistently upheld disclosure and reporting requirements for 

political committees that exist primarily to influence elections. It makes no difference 

here that the contributions were not used to directly influence an election—any 

contribution to a political committee that has the major purpose of influencing an 

election is deemed to be campaign related and thus justifies the burden of disclosure 

and reporting.

¶6 Accordingly, we affirm the ALJ’s decision in part and reverse in part. 

I. Facts and Procedural History

¶7 Alliance for a Safe and Independent Woodmen Hills (“Alliance”) was 

incorporated in the run-up to a 2014 Woodmen Hills Metropolitan District Board of 

Directors’ election. Alliance raised funds and then sent postcards and established a 

Facebook page, all undermining one of the board candidates, Ron Pace. Campaign

Integrity Watchdog (“Watchdog”), Ron Pace, and another Woodmen Hills resident filed 

complaints about Alliance with the Colorado Secretary of State (the “Secretary”) under 

article XXVIII, section 9(2)(a) of the Colorado Constitution. Watchdog alleged, among 

other things, that Alliance should have but failed to (1) register as a political committee 
4

and (2) report certain contributions and expenditures. As required, the Secretary 

referred the complaints to the Office of Administrative Courts, where they were 

consolidated.

¶8 An Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) held a hearing and then decided that 

Alliance had violated the Fair Campaign Practices Act, §§ 1-45-101 to -118, C.R.S. (2017) 

(“FCPA”), by failing to (1) register as a political committee and (2) file contribution and 

expenditure reports. The ALJ fined Alliance $9650 and ordered it to register and file the 

missing reports. Alliance filed a notice of appeal and several motions, but eventually 

withdrew its appeal.

¶9 Meanwhile, Mr. Pace had also sued Alliance and other defendants for 

defamation and negligence based on Alliance’s campaign efforts. After several months 

of litigation, the district court granted Alliance’s motion to dismiss the suit and 

awarded Alliance attorney fees. Alliance submitted a bill of fees and costs claiming 

about $42,000 in attorney fees, supported by a law firm’s billing statements showing 

charges and payments for defending the defamation case. The source of the payments 

had been redacted from the copies of the statements submitted.

¶10 Next, Watchdog filed the complaint at issue here, arguing Alliance (1) should 

have but failed to report its legal expenses for appealing the first ALJ decision and for 

defending the defamation case as contributions, (2) should have but failed to report 

those same expenses as expenditures or disbursements, and (3) had exceeded the 

contribution limit for political committees. The complaint was referred to an ALJ, and

the Secretary intervened to submit a brief in support of Alliance.
5

¶11 First, the ALJ considered whether Alliance was required to report the legal 

expenses as a contribution. Watchdog pointed out that the constitution counts as a 

contribution “[a]ny payment made to a third party for the benefit of any . . . political 

committee,” Colo. Const. art. XXVIII, § 2(5)(a)(II), and it argued that payments to the 

court and the law firm as part of Alliance’s legal defense fit the plain language of the 

definition. Warning of constitutional problems, Alliance and the Secretary asked the 

ALJ to construe the provision narrowly to include only payments made for the purpose 

for which the political committee was formed—influencing elections. They argued that 

post-election legal expenses do not serve that purpose.

¶12 The ALJ concluded that the provision was not susceptible of Alliance’s narrow 

construction and held that the definition applied to the legal expenses, but it ruled for 

Alliance all the same. It held that requiring Alliance to report post-election legal 

expenses as contributions would violate Alliance’s First Amendment rights under the 

United States Constitution. For the same reason, the ALJ concluded that a contribution 

cap was unconstitutional as applied to Alliance’s post-election legal expenses. 

Therefore, Alliance was not required to report the legal expenses as a contribution.

¶13 Nor, the ALJ held, was Alliance required to report the legal expenses as 

expenditures. The constitution defines “expenditure” narrowly as spending “for the 

purpose of expressly advocating the election or defeat of a candidate.” Colo. Const. art. 

XXVIII, § 2(8)(a) (emphasis added). And, as the ALJ noted, express advocacy under 

section 2(8)(a) has a still narrower meaning: “speech that explicitly advocates for the 

election or defeat of a candidate through the use of the ‘magic words’ set out in 
6

[Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 44 n.52 (1976)]

1 or substantially similar synonyms.” Colo. 

Ethics Watch v. Senate Majority Fund, LLC, 2012 CO 12, ¶ 41, 269 P.3d 1248, 1259. The 

ALJ concluded that Alliance’s spending for legal expenses after the election “was clearly 

not for the purpose of expressly advocating the election or defeat of a candidate.” 

¶14 Watchdog appealed the ALJ’s determinations regarding the reporting 

requirements,

2 and the court of appeals asked us to accept the case directly under 

C.A.R. 50. We accepted jurisdiction, in part because this case is related to another case 

for which we had already granted certiorari, Campaign Integrity Watchdog v. 

Coloradans for a Better Future, 2018 CO XXX. Both involved the question of whether 

legal services constitute a “contribution” under Colorado’s campaign-finance laws. 

II. Analysis

¶15 We begin with the standard of review and principles of interpretation. Next, we 

describe Colorado’s campaign-finance-law scheme and how a registered political 

 

1 This famous footnote in Buckley provided the following examples of express advocacy 

that have since been labeled the “magic words”: “‘vote for,’ ‘elect,’ ‘support,’ ‘cast your 

ballot for,’ ‘Smith for Congress,’ ‘vote against,’ ‘defeat,’ ‘reject.’” 424 U.S. at 44 n.52.

2 Watchdog did not appeal the ALJ’s determination that the contribution cap is 

unconstitutional as applied to Alliance, so we do not consider that issue. Watchdog 

raises one other issue that we will not consider at length—whether the ALJ erred by 

failing “to address substantiated allegations of perjury.” It is the province of the 

executive branch, not the judicial branch, to prosecute crimes like perjury. People v. 

Dist. Court, 632 P.2d 1022, 1024 (Colo. 1981). Assuming, without deciding, that 

imposing sanctions for courtroom perjury may fall within the court’s broad discretion 

to cite contempt, see People v. Aleem, 149 P.3d 765, 781 (Colo. 2007), we perceive no 

abuse of discretion here. 
7

committee like Alliance fits into it. We then turn to whether Alliance’s legal expenses 

counted either as expenditures or contributions. 

¶16 First, we determine that Alliance was not required to report its legal expenses as 

spending. Political committees are required to report “expenditures made, and 

obligations entered into.” “Expenditures” means only express advocacy, and 

“obligations” here means obligations to make expenditures. A payment for legal 

expenses is not a payment for express advocacy.

¶17 Second, we agree with the ALJ that the payments to courts and attorneys for 

Alliance’s legal defense were payments “to a third party for the benefit of” Alliance and 

were therefore contributions under Colorado Constitution article XXVIII, § 2(5)(a)(II). 

We conclude that the text cannot bear the narrower construction urged by Alliance.

¶18 Finally, we conclude that the ALJ erred by determining the reporting 

requirement is unconstitutional as applied to Alliance for its legal expenses. Any 

contribution to a political committee like Alliance, whose major purpose is to influence 

elections, is deemed to be campaign related and thus justifies the burden of reporting 

and disclosure.

A. Standard of Review and Principles of Interpretation

¶19 We review questions of constitutional and statutory interpretation de novo. 

Gessler v. Colo. Common Cause, 2014 CO 44, ¶ 7, 327 P.3d 232, 235. 

¶20 In construing statutes and citizen initiatives, we attempt to give effect to the 

General Assembly’s and the electorate’s intent, respectively. See Teague v. People, 2017 

CO 66, ¶ 8, 395 P.3d 782, 784 (statute); People v. Lente, 2017 CO 74, ¶ 16, 406 P.3d 829,
8

832 (citizen initiative). We read words and phrases in context, § 2-4-101, C.R.S. (2017), 

according them their plain and ordinary meanings, Teague, ¶ 8, 395 P.3d at 784; Lente, 

¶ 16, 829 P.3d at 832. If the language is clear, we apply it as written. Teague, ¶ 8, 395 

P.3d at 784; Lente, ¶ 16, 829 P.3d at 832.

B. Overview of Colorado Campaign-Finance Laws Applicable Here

¶21 Three primary sources provide campaign-finance law in Colorado. Article 

XXVIII of the Colorado Constitution, a citizen initiative, limits and requires reporting of 

some political contributions and spending, and it enables private enforcement of 

campaign-finance law. The FCPA covers more of the same ground. Finally, the 

Secretary promulgates additional campaign-finance rules. Dep’t of State, 8 Colo. Code 

Regs. 1505-6 (Dec. 15, 2017). 

¶22 We will treat Alliance as a “political committee” because that is how it is 

registered and its status is not at issue in this case. “‘Political committee’ means any 

person, other than a natural person . . . that [has] accepted or made contributions or 

expenditures in excess of $200 to support or oppose the nomination or election of one or 

more candidates.” Colo. Const. art. XXVIII, § 2(12)(a). Alliance and the Secretary point 

out that there is no evidence that Alliance coordinated with a candidate, and Colorado’s 

campaign-finance laws suggest committees that make only independent expenditures 

and do not coordinate with a candidate should not be treated as political committees. 

See § 1-45-103.7(2.5), C.R.S. (2017) (“An independent expenditure committee shall not 

be treated as a political committee and, therefore, shall not be subject to the 

requirements of section 3(5) of article XXVIII of the state constitution.”); Dep’t of State, 
9

8 Colo. Code Regs. 1505-6(1.7) (Dec. 15, 2017) (“An Independent expenditure committee 

differs from a political committee in that an independent expenditure committee may 

not directly contribute to a candidate committee or political party and may not 

coordinate its campaign-related expenditures with a candidate, candidate committee, or 

political party.”). But because Alliance was adjudicated to be a political committee in 

the first campaign-finance proceeding, and because it did not challenge that 

classification either on appeal in the first proceeding or at any stage of this proceeding, 

its classification as a political committee is not at issue now.

3

¶23 Both the state constitution and the FCPA impose requirements on political 

committees. The constitution limits the amount of contributions a political committee 

can receive in a house-of-representatives election cycle. Colo. Const. art. XXVIII, § 3(5). 

The FCPA requires political committees to file reports disclosing expenditures and 

contributions. § 1-45-108, C.R.S. (2017). 

C. Alliance Was Not Required to Report Spending on Legal Services

¶24 Under the FCPA, “all . . . political committees . . . shall report . . . expenditures 

made, and obligations entered into by the committee.” § 1-45-108(1)(a)(I). 

 

3 In its motion to dismiss the complaint in this proceeding, Alliance included a footnote 

expressing “reservation” about its classification as a political committee, but went on to 

describe the issue as “not relevant to this Motion” and “beyond the scope of the present 

Complaint.” Alliance included a similar footnote expressing the same “reservation[]” in 

its briefing on appeal, but acknowledging that the issue “may be res judicata.” The 

Secretary, likewise, included a footnote noting the issue but acknowledging that it “may 

be res judicata.” Because Alliance effectively abandoned the issue, we need not address 

whether Alliance would have been precluded from raising it in this proceeding.
10

¶25 The ALJ correctly determined that Alliance’s spending on legal expenses did not 

qualify as an “expenditure” under campaign-finance law. The meaning of expenditure 

is limited to spending for “expressly advocating” the election or defeat of a candidate, 

Colo. Const. art. XXVIII, § 2(8)(a), and express advocacy is limited further still to 

advocacy by use of Buckley’s “magic words” or substantially similar synonyms, Colo. 

Ethics Watch, ¶ 41, 269 P.3d at 1259; see Buckley, 424 U.S. at 44 n.52. Money spent for 

legal expenses is not spent for expressly advocating the election or defeat of a candidate 

and therefore is not an expenditure. 

¶26 That’s as far as the ALJ went, but Watchdog argues that more analysis is 

necessary because the FCPA requires reporting of more than just “expenditures.” 

Political committees must report “expenditures made, and obligations entered into by 

the committee.” § 1-45-108(1)(a)(I) (emphasis added). Watchdog argues that the phrase 

“obligations entered into” extends beyond express advocacy and sweeps in any time a 

committee agrees to incur debt, such as when Alliance commissioned legal services. 

¶27 For two reasons, we conclude that the phrase “obligations entered into” as used 

in section 1-45-108(1)(a)(I) includes only obligations entered into for making 

expenditures. First, we avoid absurd interpretations. See Pineda-Liberato v. People, 

2017 CO 95, ¶ 22, 403 P.3d 160, 164. And it would be absurd to require reporting of all 

obligations to spend money regardless of purpose yet to require reporting of money 

actually spent only for a single narrow purpose—express advocacy. Second, the FCPA 

ties the meaning of obligation to expenditures when it expressly defines “obligating” to

mean an agreement to make, or indirect provision of, an “independent expenditure.” 
11

See § 1-45-103(12.7), C.R.S. (2017) (defining “obligating”). Although this definition does

not necessarily apply to all of a political committee’s obligations, some of which might 

be coordinated with a candidate and therefore not “independent,” the definition 

reinforces our understanding that the legislature intended to treat obligations no more 

broadly than it did actual spending. 

¶28 Watchdog contends that we should defer to a rule promulgated in 2015 by the 

Secretary that suggests a different result. At the time Watchdog filed the complaint in 

this case, the Secretary had promulgated a rule interpreting the statutory phrase 

“expenditures made, and obligations entered into” as meaning “all committee-related 

disbursements.” Dep’t of State, 8 Colo. Code Regs. 1505-6(1.6) (Dec. 15, 2015).4 Under 

this rule, argues Watchdog, payments for legal services qualify as “expenditures made, 

and obligations entered into.”

¶29 The 2015 rule does not alter our result. To the extent the rule can be read to 

extend beyond expenditures and obligations for expenditures, such a reading conflicts

with the statute’s text as we have interpreted it, and it is therefore void. See

§ 24-4-103(8)(a), C.R.S. (2017) (“Any rule . . . which conflicts with a statute shall be 

void.”); Hanlen v. Gessler, 2014 CO 24, ¶ 35, 333 P.3d 41, 49 (“[T]he Secretary lacks 

authority to promulgate rules that conflict with statutory provisions.”).

 

4 The rule defining “expenditures made, and obligations entered into” has since been 

rescinded. Dep’t of State, 8 Colo. Code Regs. 1505-6(1) (Dec. 15, 2017) (omitting 

definition of “expenditures made, and obligations entered into”). 
12

¶30 We affirm the ALJ’s determination that Alliance was not required to report the 

legal expenses as an expenditure or obligation. Next we consider whether the FCPA 

required Alliance to report them as a contribution.

D. Money Paid to Third Parties for Alliance’s Legal Defense 

Was a Contribution Under the FCPA

¶31 In addition to expenditures, the FCPA requires political committees to report 

“their contributions received.” § 1-45-108(1)(a)(I). Under the FCPA, “‘[c]ontribution’ 

shall have the same meaning as set forth in section 2(5) of article XXVIII of the state 

constitution.” § 1-45-103(6)(a), C.R.S. (2017). The constitutional definition of 

“contribution” includes “[a]ny payment made to a third party for the benefit of any 

. . . political committee.” Colo. Const. art. XXVIII, § 2(5)(a)(II).

¶32 The parties dispute whether payments to a law firm to defend Alliance in a tort 

suit count as a reportable contribution under article XXVIII, section 2(5)(a)(II). 

Watchdog argues, and the ALJ held, that the payments to the law firm—a third 

party—for Alliance’s legal defense—a benefit—unavoidably fall within section 

2(5)(a)(II). The ALJ then went on to hold the provision unconstitutional as applied to 

Alliance. Alliance and the Secretary contend we should construe the provision 

narrowly to avoid the constitutional problem. They ask us to look to the purposes of 

article XXVIII, the campaign-finance amendment, and to construe the provision to mean 

“any payment made to a third party for the benefit of any . . . political committee” for 

the purpose of influencing an election. If we accept that interpretation, they ask us to 
13

go a step further and hold that Alliance’s post-election legal expenses were not made 

for the purpose of influencing an election.

¶33 We agree with the ALJ that the text of section 2(5)(a)(II) cannot bear the narrow 

purpose limitation Alliance asks us to give it. Although subpart (II) uses words of 

purpose to limit the payments to third parties that count as contributions, the ones it 

uses are broad: “for the benefit . . . of any political committee.” Id. (emphasis added). 

And a comparison to neighboring subparts demonstrates that this broad language was 

deliberate. Subpart (IV) expressly contains the narrow purpose limitation that Alliance 

would have us read into subpart (II): “Anything of value given, directly or indirectly, 

to a candidate for the purpose of promoting the candidate’s nomination, retention, 

recall, or election.” Colo. Const. art. XXVIII, § 2(5)(a)(IV) (emphasis added). So, where 

one of the subparts applies only to a narrower set of purposes, it says so. Subpart (II) 

broadly says that it applies to payments “for the benefit” of political committees, and 

we must infer from context that it means what it says. 

¶34 Applying the plain language of section 2(5)(a)(II) to the record here, we conclude 

that Alliance’s post-election legal expenses were contributions. Because the law firm 

that defended Alliance and the court of appeals were both third parties in relation to 

Alliance, the payments of filing fees to the court and of legal fees to the law firm were 

“payment[s] made to a third party,” Colo. Const. art. XXVIII, § 2(5)(a)(II). And the 

payments were “for the benefit,” id., of Alliance because they furthered Alliance’s legal 

defense. 
14

¶35 Because the payments of Alliance’s legal expenses were “contribution[s]” to 

Alliance under section 2(5)(a)(II), Alliance was required to report them as contributions 

under section 1-45-108(1)(A)(I). 

¶36 The ALJ reached this same conclusion, but then proceeded to hold that the 

reporting requirement was unconstitutional as applied to Alliance’s post-election legal 

expenses. We turn now to the as-applied constitutional question. 

E. The Contribution Reporting Requirement Is Not 

Unconstitutional as Applied to Alliance for Legal Expenses

¶37 Although the ALJ recognized that Buckley upheld reporting and disclosure 

requirements for political committees, it determined that the governmental interests

justifying the constitutional burdens of reporting in Buckley applied with less force to 

Alliance’s post-election legal expenses. It reasoned that such “contributions” were too 

far removed from electoral advocacy to be of legitimate interest to the government or 

the electorate. It therefore held the reporting requirements unconstitutional as applied 

to Alliance.

¶38 Requiring reporting and disclosure for campaign activities burdens the First 

Amendment freedom of association and, to a lesser degree, the freedom of speech. See

Buckley, 424 U.S. at 64; Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 

366–67 (2010). The burden on speech is limited because reporting and disclosure 

requirements “impose no ceiling on campaign-related activities,” Citizens United, 558 

U.S. at 366 (quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 64), and “do not prevent anyone from 
15

speaking,” id. (quoting McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 540 U.S. 93, 201 (2003), 

overruled on other grounds by Citizens United).

¶39 Because they burden these constitutional freedoms, campaign-finance reporting 

and disclosure requirements must survive “exacting scrutiny.” Buckley, 424 U.S. at 64. 

That standard “requires a ‘substantial relation’ between the disclosure requirement and 

a ‘sufficiently important’ governmental interest.” Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 366–67 

(quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 64, 66). 

¶40 Applying such scrutiny, the Court in Buckley upheld reporting and disclosure 

requirements for political committees very similar to those at issue here. See Buckley, 

424 U.S. at 61–68. The Court recognized that disclosure and reporting requirements 

might deter some people from contributing and might expose contributors to 

harassment or retaliation, id. at 68, but it decided those burdens were justified by three 

governmental interests, id. at 66–68. First, disclosure provides valuable information by 

showing the electorate where political money comes from and how it is spent. Id. at 

66–67. “The sources of a candidate’s financial support also alert the voter to the 

interests to which a candidate is most likely to be responsive and thus facilitate 

predictions of future performance in office.” Id. at 67. Second, disclosure prevents 

corruption and the appearance of corruption by exposing to light those who would 

attempt to purchase legislative favors. Id. Third, reporting requirements help gather 

the data necessary to detect violations of contribution caps. Id. at 67–68. As for the 

relation between these governmental interests and the reporting requirements, the 

Court explained that disclosure and reporting requirements are the “least restrictive 
16

means of curbing the evils of campaign ignorance and corruption that Congress found 

to exist.” Id. at 68. 

¶41 The same rationale carried the day more than thirty years later in Citizens 

United, when the Court once again upheld disclosure and reporting requirements for 

independent electioneering groups. 558 U.S. at 367–70. The Court went so far as to say 

that the informational interest alone justified the requirement that independent groups 

disclose their electioneering activities. Id. at 369.5 

¶42 The ALJ decided that the contribution here—payment for post-election legal 

expenses—was too far removed from campaign spending to be controlled by Buckley

and Citizens United. It reasoned that none of Buckley’s three governmental interests 

applied to “contributions that are not intended to influence an election.”

¶43 But, as Buckley explained, the activities of a political committee whose major 

purpose is to influence elections “are, by definition, campaign related.” 424 U.S. at 79. 

The ALJ found that Alliance was formed for the purpose of influencing the outcome of 

the Woodmen Hills election, and Alliance does not dispute that characterization. Under 

Buckley’s logic, then, because Alliance’s major purpose is to influence an election,6 any 

contribution to Alliance is campaign related. 

 

5 The Citizens United Court left room for an as-applied challenge based on a showing 

that there is a “reasonable probability that the group’s members would face threats, 

harassment, or reprisals if their names were disclosed.” 558 U.S. at 370. But Alliance 

has made no such showing here.

6 The ALJ concluded that Buckley’s “by definition” rationale couldn’t apply to Alliance 

because Colorado law defines “political committee” more broadly than the “major 

purpose” definition at issue in Buckley. But Alliance fits Buckley’s major-purpose 
17

¶44 It makes little difference that the contribution at issue here (1) occurred 

post-election and (2) did not directly serve to influence a campaign. As Watchdog 

points out, elections are cyclical and money is fungible. Although one election may 

have passed, more will come. Cf. id. at 67 (“This exposure [by required disclosure] may 

discourage those who would use money for improper purposes either before or after 

the election.” (emphasis added)). Further, the interests identified in Buckley apply to 

any contribution to a group that primarily serves to influence elections, even a 

contribution earmarked for non-campaign purposes like legal expenses. The electorate 

benefits from knowing “the interests to which a candidate is most likely to be 

responsive,” id., and one could reasonably infer that the candidate Alliance supported 

would be responsive to the contributor that defended Alliance to the tune of $42,000. 

Further, disclosure of the contribution might deter the candidate from being overly 

responsive to the contributor, and would help the electorate detect any such corruption 

that occurred. See id.

¶45 We conclude that the reporting requirements of section 1-45-108(1)(a)(I) are not 

unconstitutional as applied to Alliance.

III. Conclusion

¶46 We affirm the ALJ’s determinations that Alliance’s post-election legal expenses 

(1) were not reportable expenditures but (2) did qualify as “contribution[s]” under 

 

definition, and that is enough here. Whether the Colorado definition extends to other 

organizations that don’t have the major purpose of influencing elections might matter 

in a facial challenge but is irrelevant as applied here to Alliance.
18

article XXVIII, section 2(5)(a)(II) of the Colorado Constitution. We reverse the ALJ’s 

determination that the FCPA’s reporting requirements are unconstitutional as applied 

to Alliance for its “contribution” of payments for post-election legal expenses. We 

remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.