Texa s Pipelin e Associatio n

Thur e Canno n Presiden t October 29,201 4 Via http://www.regulations.gov OSWE RDocket EPA Docket

Cente r Mai l Code 2822-1 T Environmental Protectio n Agenc y 120 0 Pennsylvani aAvenue , N.W . Washington , D.C . 2046 0 Re : Docket

No . EPA-HQ-OEM-2014-0328 ; Reques t fo r Informatio n regardin g Ris k Management

Program s unde r

Sectio n 112(r)(7 ) o f

th e Clea n Ai r Ac t Dea r Si r o r Madam : Th e Texa s Pipelin e Associatio n ("TPA" ) submit s th e followin g respons e to th e Reques t fo r Informatio n ("RFI" ) issue d b y EP A concernin g EPA' s Ris k Managemen t

Program s ("RMP") , publishe d a

t 7 9 Fed . Reg . 4460 4 (Jul y 31 , 2014) . TPA i s a n organizatio n compose d o f 4 8 member s wh o gather , process , treat , an d transpor t natural ga s an d hazardou s liquid s material s throug h intrastate pipeline s i n Texas . TPA' s member s coul d b e affecte db y polic y decision s an d rule s promulgate d a s aresul t o f EPA' s collectio n o f

informatio n i n thi s RF I becaus e TP A member s ow n an d operate facilitie s that ar e subjec t

t o th e RM P regulations . TP A ha s structure d it s respons e a s follows . First , w e addres s certai n overarchin g issue s that relate generall y t o th e RFI . Second , w e provid e our response s t o certai n specifi c issue s se t fort h i n th e RFI . 1 . Overarchin g comment s relate d to th e RFI . TP A member s plac e th e highes t priority o n ensurin g that thei r facilitie s ar e ru n i n a manne r that protect s huma n safety an d th e environment ; th e Pipelin e an d Hazardou s Material s Safet y Administratio n ("PHMSA" ) ha s commende d th e natural ga s pipelin e industr y fo r it s stron g safety record an d ha s note d that pipeline s are apractical an d saf e mean s o f

transportin g natural ga s an d other

energ y resources. 1 Thi s admirabl e record ha s i n larg e part bee n achieve d throug h th e applicatio n o f soun d engineerin g judgmen t t o th e particula

r desig n an d operatio n o f specifi c plant

an d pipelin e sites . Th e us e o f suc h judgment , exercise d b y personne l wh o are Se e http://opsweb.phmsa.dot.gov/pipelineforum/facts-and-stats/pipeline-101 / (las t visite dOctobe

r 27 , 2014) . 60 4 Wes t 14t h Street , Austin , Texa s 7870 1 phone : (512)478-287 1 fax:(512)473-847 6 Email : thure.cannon@texaspipelines.co m

### expert s i n thei r field s an dfamilia r

wit h compan y processe s an dequipment , ha s prove n t o b e effectiv e i n maintainin g hig h standard s o f safety an denvironmental protection . Prescriptiv e federa l regulation s migh t hav e th e unintende deffec t o f shiftin g resource s awa

y fro meffort s t o exercis e site-specifi c engineerin g judgmen t towardmerel y makin g sure tha t afedera l checklis t

i s complie dwith . Accordingly , EP A shoul densure tha t an y propose dRM P regulation s woul dno t impai r o r interfer e wit

h th e exercis e o f

curren t safety practice s a

t plant an dpipelin e sites . Moreover , man y o f

th e issue s raise db y th e RF I are alread y addresse db y existin g statutes , rules , an dregulatory program s administere db y variou s federal , state , o r loca l agencie s and/o r are th e subjec t

o f compan y practices . EP A shoul dtak e care no t t o adop t redundan t

o r possibl y conflictin g policies . 2 . Responses to specifi c item s liste d i n th e RFI . I n th e discussio n that

follows , TP A identifie s th e specifi c reques t fo r informatio n t o whic h i t i s respondin g an dprovide s it s response . a . Defin e an d Requir e Evaluatio n o f Update s to Applicabl e Recognize d an d Generall y Accepte d Goo d Engineerin g Practice s ("RAGAGEP" ) (7 9 Fed . Reg . 44617) . EP A request s commen t

o n whethe r

addin g adefinitio n fo r

RAGAGE P woul dimprov e understandin g o f

RM P requirement s an dpreven t accidental releases . W e d o no t believ e that there i s an y meri t

t o th e ide ao f

addin g aforma l definitio n o f RAGAGE P t o th e RM P rules . Indeed , i t i s difficul t

t o conceiv e o f

aforma l definition fo r

RAGAGE P that

woul damoun t

t o anythin g mor e tha n th e us e o f th e word s "recognize d an dgenerall y applicabl e goo dengineerin g practices. " I n essence , th e termi s self-definin g fo r eac h industry subjec t

t o th e RM P rules . Moreover , apractic e o r

procedure that

constitute s a"bes t

practice " i n th e oi l refiner y industry o r

aplastic s plan t

may no t b e a"bes t

practice " i n th e midstrea

mpipelin e industry o r

ga s processin g industry . Eve n withi n th e sam e industr y segment , RAGAGE P wil l var y fro mon e piec e o f equipmen t

t o another . I t

i s difficul t

t o conceiv e ho w aformalize dunifor mdefinitio n o f RAGAGE P coul dhav e an y real meaning , give n th e vas t difference s betwee n appropriat e practice s fro mindustr

y t o industry , no t

t o mentio n th e probabl e nee dt o constantl y update an y suc h regulator

y definitio n du e t o continuou s technological developments . I n addition , th e us e o f

industry-specifi c bes t

practice s i s already commo n practice . TP A member s routinel y updat e processe s an dequipmen t to ensure tha

t "best practices " are employed , withou t th e nee dfo r

additional regulator

y provisions . Us e o f

suc h practice s i s base d o n engineerin g judgmen t

applie dt o th e particula r facilit y at

issue . A regulator

y definitio n o f RAGAGE P woul dru n th e ris k o f causin g owner s an doperator s to abando n th e us e o f goo d engineerin g judgment , applie do n acase-specifi c basis , i n favo r o f simpl y ensurin g tha t

federall y define dRAGAGE P were employed . Finally , enforcemen t

o f an y ne w regulatory definitio n o f RAGAGE P woul db e difficul t at best . An y ne w definitio n o f RAGAGE P woul dundoubtedl y b e vagu e i n order t o cover th e breadt h o f industrie s an dequipmen t a t variou s plant s o r

sites , leadin g to seriou s question s a s towhethe r

aparticula

r company i n aparticula r situatio n at

aparticula

r facility wa s o r

wa s no t employin g RAGAGEP . Enforcemen t of RAGAGE P woul db e burdensom e a t best . I t i s difficul t t o imagin e ho w federal enforcemen t authoritie s coul dconsistentl y an d fairl y enforc e a requiremen t

tha t a n owner o r operato r emplo y an d properl y evaluate update s to RAGAGE P a s i t wa s applie dt o th e owne r o r operator' s specifi c industry an dequipment . I t i s equall y difficul t

t o imagin e asituatio n i n whic h i t wa s appropriat e fo r

afedera l regulator

y authorit y t o substitut e it s judgmen t a s t o what

i s an di s no t

RAGAGE P at

aparticula

r facilit y fo r

that o f th e engineer s wh o hav e grea t experienc e an dfamiliarit y with th e equipmen t an dprocedure s a

t issue . b . Requir e Owner s an d Operators to Manag e Organizationa l Change s (7 9 Fed . Reg . 44618) . EP A note s that

whil e federa l rule s already requir e employer s t o establis h an d implemen t procedure s to manag e change s involvin g equipment , technology , raw materials , an d processin g conditions , n o simila

r rule s explicitl y requir e employer s t o follo w management-of-chang e procedure s regardin g organizational change s suc h a s change s i n management structure , budge t cuts , o r personnel changes . 7 9 Fed . Reg . 4461 8 (Jul y 31 , 2014) . Accordingly EP A seek s inpu t o n whether

th e RM P rules ' managemen t o f chang e provision s shoul db e expande dto includ e managemen t

o f organizational changes . TP A doe s no t

believ e that

an y suc h additional rule s are necessary . I n our experience , companie s already take step s t o ensure that organizational change s d o no t adversel y impac t safet y o r environmental protectio n a t covere dfacilities . Thi s i s t o b e expected , sinc e companie s hav e every incentiv e to ensure tha t organizational change s are properl y manage ds o that thei r operation s continuousl y ru n i n asaf e an denvironmentall y soun dmanner . Company personne l wh o hav e extensiv e experienc e wit h their ow n particula

r operation s are i n th e bes t positio n to develo p practice s an d procedure s to manag e change s i n personne l o r organizational structur e an d t o ensure that

suc h change s are properl y managed . Federa l micromanagemen t

i n thi s are ai s no t neede d an dwoul dno t

b e helpful . I f EP A i s incline dt o develo p ne w rule s i n thi s area , w e woul durg e EP A t o surve y th e rule s o f other agencie s that

already exis t

t o ensur e that

an y ne w rule s are trul y necessar y an d woul dno t

b e duplicativ e o f

regulation s that

alread y exist . W e note , fo r example , that

PHM S A already ha s rule s i n plac e ensurin g that there are n o lapse s i n th e qualification s o f personne l wh o operat e pipeline s transportin g natura l ga s an d hazardou s liquid s an d that change s impactin g contro l room s ar

e properl y managed . Se e 4 9 CFRPar t 19 2 Subpar

t N ; 4 9 CFRPar

t 195 Subpar

t G ; 4 9 CFR§ 192.631 ; 4 9 CFR§ 195.446 . Creatio n o f unnecessar

y o r duplicativ e rule s woul d simpl y increas e th e burde n o n owner s an doperator s withou t enhancin g th e safety o r environmental protection s that currentl y exis t

throug h existin g regulation s an d establishe d industry practices .

c . Requir e Third-Party Complianc e Audit s (7 9 Fed . Reg . 44618) . EPA ha s raise dth e issu e o f require dus e o f

third-part

y complianc e auditors . 7 9 Fed . Reg . 4461 8 (Jul y 31 , 2014) . TP A doe s no t believ e that

EP A shoul drequir e th e us e o f third-party complianc e auditors . Existin g regulation s (see, e.g., 4 0 CF R§ 68.58(b) ) alread y requir e that complianc e audit s b e conducte db y a t leas t on e individua l wh o i s knowledgeabl e i n th e process .In-hous e audi t personne l are th e bes t

choic e fo r

th e conduc t

o f require daudit s becaus e the y are th e mos t knowledgeabl e concernin g th e day-to-da y processe s at

compan y facilities . A third

party audito r

wil l never

b e a s knowledgeabl e o f

th e proces s a

t agive n facilit y a s thos e directl y involve d wit

h th e proces s o n aday-to-da y basis . Typically , employer s complemen t th e us e o f plan t personne l wit

h other compan y personne l wh o are familiar wit h th e company' s processe s a t th e facilit y bein g audite do r simila r facilitie s bu t

fro moutsid e o f

th e facilit y o r

proces s bein g audite d i n order

t o assure objectivity . Whil e objectivity can als o b e accomplishe dthroug h th e us e o f third-party auditors , ther e i s n o evidenc e that mandatin g th e us e o f

third-party auditor s wil l enhanc e environmental protectio n o r reduc e worker

injuries . I n fact , requirin g th e us e o f third-part y auditor s coul dactuall y create condition s that reduc e protectio n o f

th e environment , o r

decreas e th e safety o f

plan t employees . Give n th e numbe r o f differen t facilitie s an d processe s subjec t t o th e RM P standard , athird-part y audito r requiremen t

woul dlikel y resul t

i n ashortag e o f

qualifie dauditor s leadin g t o th e us e o f external auditor s wh o are no t

a s qualifie dcompan y personne l wh o hav e a n intimat e knowledg e o f th e processe s a s wel l a s man y year s o f experienc e i n th e process . Th e existin g requiremen t to us e a t leas t on e perso n wit

h knowledg e o f

th e proces s fro moutsid e o f th e facilit y o r

proces s bein g audite d assure s objectivity an d ha s no t bee n show n t o b e adeficiency . EP A raise s th e issu e o f

whether us e o f athird-party audito r

migh t increas e th e credibilit

y o f audits . 7 9 Fed . Reg . 4461 9 (Jul y 31 , 2014) . W e believ e that th e credibility o f

an audi t woul d no t b e enhance db y th e potential us e o f less-knowledgeabl e personne l suc h a s third-party auditors ; rather , th e audit' s credibility woul db e diminishe dbecaus e i t woul drarel y b e th e cas e that athird-part

y audito r woul db e a s knowledgeabl e a s an in-hous e employee . Th e onl y possibl e advantag e to b e gaine dthroug h th e us e o f athird-party audito r

i s th e appearanc e o f enhance d objectivit

y du e t o independenc e fro mth e audite dcompany , bu t there i s n o indicatio n tha t in-hous e audi t

personne l hav e faile dt o conduc t thorough , objectiv e audits . Moreover , an y benefi t gaine dthroug h asuppose dincreas e i n objectivity woul db e fa r outweighe db y th e decrease d knowledg e an d experienc e o f th e third-party audito r

vs . in-hous e personnel . Indeed , ther e i s n o indicatio n that ane w "cottag e industry " o f third-party auditor s coul db e counte do n t o maintai n an y standard s o f expertis e o r

reliability concernin g th e manne r i n whic h the y conducte d thei r audits . Unles s an dunti l EP A can demonstrate that th e curren t

practic e o f

usin g exper

t in

hous e personne l ha s failed , an dthat ther e woul db e some way t o ensure that third-party auditor s were qualifie dan dcompetent unde r recognize dstandard s o f

performance , EP A shoul dno t create ane w rul e that

woul drequire us e o f

third-party auditors . EP A als o ask s whethe r

th e rule s shoul dimpos e atimefram e fo r addressin g th e finding s containe d i n a

n audi t report . 7 9 Fed . Reg . 4461 9 (Jul y 31 , 2014) . TP A believe s that mandatin g respons e time s t o deficiencie s discovere di n th e audi t proces s woul db e inappropriate . Th e RM P rule s appl y t o man y differen t industries , an dth e tim e neede dt o respon dt o adeficienc y i n on e industry coul db e drasticall y differen t tha n th e tim e require di n anothe r industry . Eve n withi n a singl e industry , th e require drespons e tim e coul dvary fro mon e facility t o another dependin g o n th e siz e o f

th e facilit y o r

th e complexit

y o f th e proces s a

t agive n facility . Her

e again , w e se e n o evidenc e that

th e curren t

situation , whereb y experience dpersonne l are allowe dt o exercis e engineerin g judgmen t

base do n th e particular

circumstance s present

at th e particula

r facilit y at issue , ha s bee n deficien t

suc h tha t ne w federal rule s are needed .Finally , EP A ha s raise d th e issu e o f requirin g aful l complianc e audi t afte r an inciden t

o r "near-miss. " 7 9 Fed . Reg . 4461 9 (Jul y 31 , 2014) . W e believ e that EPA shoul d no t

creat e additiona l requirement s regardin g th e conduc t o f aful l complianc e audi t

afte r anear-mis s o r

an incident. 2 Ther

e i s n o nee d fo r

aful l audi t

where an inciden t

o r near-mis s wa s limite d t o a discrete piec e o f

equipmen t

o r process . An y audi t

followin g suc h a

n inciden t

shoul d b e limite d to th e particula

r piec e o f equipmen t

o r proces s involved . d . Emergenc y Drill s to Testa Source' s Emergenc y Respons e Progra m o r Pla n (7 9 Fed . Reg . 44622) ; Complianc e with Emergenc y Respons e Progra m Requirement s i n Coordinatio n With Local Responder s (7 9 Fed . Reg . 44625) . EP A i s seekin g informatio n o n whethe r i t shoul d develo p rule s t o requir e facilitie s t o perfor mdrill s a s part

o f thei r emergenc y respons e programs , an d als o o n whether EP A shoul d revis e it s rule s relate d t o facilities ' complianc e wit h emergenc y respons e programrequirement s an d coordinatio n wit

h loca l responders . Thes e informatio n request s are state d separatel y i n EPA' s Federal Register

notice , se e 7 9 Fed . Reg . 4462 2 an d 4462 5 (Jul y 31 , 2014) , bu t becaus e th e issue s are related , w e are addressin g bot h request s together

i n th e followin g response . T o begi n with , w e note that TPA' s member s al l operate facilitie s subjec t t o some exten t t o th e jurisdictio n o f

PFfMS A and/o r

stat e agencie s exercisin g authority delegate d b y PHMSA . Th e regulation s promulgate d b y PHMS A alread y requir e communicatio n an d coordinatio n wit h local emergenc y respons e personnel . Fo r example , 4 9 CF R§ 192.61 5 require s pipelin e operator s t o establis h writte n procedure s t o minimiz e th e hazard resultin g fro maga s pipelin e emergency , includin g establishin g an d maintainin g adequate mean s o f communicatio n wit

h appropriate fire , police , an d other

publi c official s an d notifyin g appropriat e fire , police , an d other publi c official s o f ga s pipelin e emergencie s an d coordinatin g wit h the mo n bot

h planne d response s an d actua l response s durin g an emergency . I n addition , th e Railroa d Commissio n o f Texa s require s pipelin e owner s an d operator s t o liaiso n annuall y with fire , police , an d other emergenc y responder s to ensure proper coordinatio n an d respons e i n th e event o f a n emergency . Se e 1 6 TA G § 8.235 . Befor e imposin g an y ne w requirement s fo r communicatio n an d coordinatio n with loca l emergenc y respons e personnel , EP A shoul d surve y existin g stat e an d federa l regulatory requirements , no t

onl y impose d b y PHMS A bu t als o b y EPA , OSHA , an d th e Chemical Facility Anti-Terroris mStandards . Afte r that survey , i f

EP A believe s that

an y additional communicatio n o r coordinatio n i s needed , i t coul d propos e ne w requirement s t o fil l an y identifie d gap s withou t unnecessaril y duplicatin g existin g communicatio n an d coordinatio n requirements . TP A believe s tha t EP A wil l fin d th e existin g requirement s t o b e sufficient. 3

2 Se e additiona

l discussio n a

t Sectio n 2(f

) infra regardin g th e inadvisabilit y o f attachin g regulator

y consequence s to adeterminatio n that a"nea r miss " ha doccurred . 3 EP A seek s inpu t

o n whether

th e emergenc y respons e provision s i n Subpar t E o f th e RM P regulatio n nee dto b e revise dto stat e more explicitly tha

t owners/operator s mus t

comply wit

h th e emergenc y respons e progra

mrequirement s unles s loca l publi c responder s wil l respon dto release s o f regulate d substance s a

t th e facility . 7 9 Fed . Reg . 4462 5 (Jul y 31 , 2014) . TPA believe s that n o revisio n i s necessar

y becaus e 4 0 CFR§ 68.9 0 alread y make s thi s clear .Similarly , ther e i s n o nee d fo r EP A t o clarif

y o r issu e requirement s regardin g wha t i s necessar y fo r facilitie s t o adequatel y coordinate thei r emergenc y respons e plan s with community emergenc y respons e plans . Th e effort s tha t ar e necessar

y fo r afacilit y t o coordinate respons e plan s wit

h communit

y responder s wil l vary give n th e particula r circumstance s o f

th e facility an d th e loca

l community . I t

i s highl y unlikel y that

meaningfu l rule s coul d b e develope d that woul d properl y addres s al l o f thes e varyin g circumstances . Ne w regulation s i n thi s are a woul d no t

improv e emergenc y respons e plannin g bu t instead coul d hav e th e opposite effect . Rathe r than helping , afederal command-and-contro l regulator y structur e coul d replac e loca l experienc e an d goo d judgmen t with arbitrary requirement s that di d no t fi t th e particular circumstance s at

agive n facilit y o r

i n agive n local community . e . Automate d Detectio n an d Monitorin g fo r Release s o f Regulate d Substances (79 Fed . Reg . 44623) . EP A raise s th e issu e o f

whethe r ne w rule s shoul d b e develope d t o requir e facilitie s t o instal l automate d detectio n an d monitorin g device s to detec t releases . 7 9 Fed . Reg . 4462 3 (Jul y 31 , 2014) . A s EPA notes , th e nee d fo r an d appropriat e deploymen t o f automate d detectio n an d monitorin g system s i s highl y site-specific . Thi s bein g so , i t woul d b e inappropriat e fo r EP A t o promulgat e arul e requirin g th e us e o f suc h system s acros s th e board . I n addition , EP A alread y ha s i n plac e arobus t

se t o f requirements , includin g rule s involvin g th e us e o f detectio n methodologie s t o provid e earl y warnin g o f releases , a s part

o f it s comprehensiv e Proces s Hazard Analysi s requirements . Se e 4 0 CF R§ 68.67 ; se e also 4 9 CF R§ 192.61 3 (pipelin e operator s shal l hav e aprocedure i n plac e fo r continuin g surveillanc e o f facilitie s t o determin e an d tak e appropriate actio n concerning , inter alia, unusua l operatin g an d maintenanc e conditions) . Furthermore , PHMS A already ha s propose d rulemaking s unde r consideratio n relate d t o lea k detectio n system s fo r

hazardou s liquid s pipeline s an d t o th e us e o f automati c an d remote controlle d valve s o n natura l ga s an d hazardou s liquid s pipelines , pursuan t t o th e mandate s o f

th e Pipelin e Safety , Regulatory Certainty , an d Jo b Creatio n Ac t o f 2011 . Ther e i s n o nee d fo r ne w federa l rule s requirin g th e us e o f automate d detectio n an d monitorin g system s i n al l case s unti l thes e ongoin g federa l initiative s are completed . T o mov e forwar d with ne w EP A rule s a t thi s tim e woul d violate on e o f th e ke y goal s o f

Executiv e Order

1356 3 (Jan . 18 , 2011) , i.e., to reduc e redundant , inconsistent , o r overlappin g regulatory requirements , an d o f Executiv e Order 1365 0 (Aug . 1 , 2013) , whic h direct s agencie s i n th e federa l chemical safety an d securit y workin g grou p to "identif y an d recommen d possibl e change s to streamlin e an d otherwis e improv e dat acollectio n .. . includin g opportunitie s t o lesse n th e reportin g burde n o n regulate d industries " an d t o "minimiz e th e duplicativ e collectio n o f informatio n whil e ensurin g that pertinen t informatio n i s share d wit h al l ke y entities." 4

4 Any suc h rul e tha

t might b e develope db y EPA shoul dleav e i t to th e owner

o r operato r o f aparticula

r facilit y to se t th e appropriate detectio n threshold , a s oppose dto havin g th e threshol dse t b y federal regulation . Company personne l are i n th e bes t positio n to kno w what

i s th e appropriate detectio n threshol dfo r

their individual facilitie s an dprocesses ; aone-size-fits-al l requiremen t i n thi s are awoul d no t b e appropriate , becaus e alea k o f acertai n leve l might

no t b e a n issu e fo r

som e facilitie s handlin g certai n substance s bu t

coul db e aseriou s issu e a t adifferen t

typ e o f facilit y handlin g adifferen t

typ e o f substance .Moreover , there i s n o indicatio n that owner s an doperator s are currentl y failin g t o emplo y detectio n an d monitorin g system s where appropriate . A s EPA acknowledges , facilitie s alread y hav e appropriat e incentive s t o deplo y suc h system s where the y are warrante dan d cost effective . Th e us e o f

automate ddetectio n an dmonitorin g system s i s commo n i n th e natural ga s pipelin e industry , obviatin g th e nee dfo r prescriptiv e regulatory requirement s i n thi s area . Fo r example , owner s an d operator s i n th e natural ga s pipelin e industry commonl y emplo y device s suc h a s detector s an dfir e eye s t o constantl y monito r storag e an dcompressio n facilities . Ga s detector s wil l soun dan alarmthat alert s bot

h onsite an doffsit e personne l o f apossibl e issue , an dthes e device s wil l automaticall y shu t th e facilit y dow n either

immediatel y o r

i f ther e i s no t

a timel y response . Similarly , fir e eye s automaticall y shu t dow n afacilit y i f

aflam e i s detected . Some o f thes e detectio n system s are require db y exitin g regulation s o f other federa l agencies . See, e.g., 4 9 CF

R§ 192.736 . I t

i s commo n practic e fo r

companie s i n th e natural ga s industr y t o emplo y proces s monitors , whic h are designe dto preven t accidents , no t

jus t detec t releases . EP A ask s whethe r

a n automate dmechanis mt o notif y loca l responder s an dth e surroundin g publi c o f

an inciden t

shoul db e apar

t o f an y require ddetectio n an d monitorin g system . 7 9 Fed . Reg . 4462 4 (Jul y 31 , 2014) . W e woul durg e EPA no t to create any suc h requirement . Th e mos t

important

reaso n wh y automati c notificatio n o f responder s an d th e publi c i s no t

advisabl e i s that

i t present s th e proble mo f fals e alarm s that

woul dunnecessaril y rais e concerns . It

i s appropriat

e tha t initia l notification s b e limite dt o company personnel , wh o are bes t traine dan d bes t

abl e t o respon dt o condition s a t individua l facilitie s and , importantly , t o asses s whethe r

th e alarmi s "real " o r

"false" . Exper

t huma n assessment

o f initia l notification s i s essential t o determin e whethe r areal threat

i s presente do r

not . Onc e tha

t assessment

i s made , additional notificatio n o f third-partie s suc h a s responder s an d th e publi c ca n b e mad e b y compan y personne l i f

thi s i s warranted . I n thos e situation s where areleas e o r inciden t coul d pos e aris k

t o th e publi c i n th e immediat e vicinity o f afacility , existin g regulation s requir e th e us e o f visua l and/o r auditor y alarm s whic h see

mto b e sufficien t

to minimiz e or

eliminat e any reasonabl e ris k

to th e public . Finally , EP A ask s whethe r ther e may b e specifi c issue s that shoul db e considere d regardin g monitorin g a

t unmanne do r

remote facilities . 7 9 Fed . Reg . 4462 4 (Jul y 31 , 2014) . Suc h issue s d o exist . Th e mos t obviou s i s that

remote facilitie s ma

y no t hav e areliabl e sourc e o f electricity . Withou t

areliabl e an dcontinuou s sourc e o f electricity , continuou s monitorin g i s no t possible . Any rule s develope d b y EPA i n thi s are ashoul dtak e thi s facto r

into account . f . Inciden tInvestigatio n an d Acciden tHistor y Requirement s (7 9 Fed . Reg . 44626) . EP A request s inpu t

o n th e issu e o f

whethe r it s rule s shoul drequire owner s an d operator s to investigate "nea

r misses " an d determin e th e roo t cause s o f

accidents , "nea

r misses, " an d proces s upsets . 7 9 Fed . Reg . 44626 . TPA' s initial respons e i s that th e concep t

o f a"nea r miss " i s inherentl y vagu e an d shoul d no t for mth e basi s fo r

an y require dactio n unde r federal regulations . Wha t on e compan y may characteriz e a s a"nea

r miss " ma

y b e characterize da s somethin g other than anea

r mis s b y another company . I f

federa l regulatory consequence s were attache dt o acompany' s assessmen to f

an inciden t

a s anea r miss , ther e woul d b e anatura l incentiv e fo r acompan y t o conclud e tha t th e inciden t

di d no t meet th e vaguel y define d term"nea r miss. " I n term s o f

apossibl e federal requirement fo r root-caus e analysis , w e believ e tha t there i s n o nee d fo r

EP A t o broade n inciden t investigatio n an d acciden t histor y requirement s t o includ e regulatory requirement s t o investigate o r determin e th e roo t

caus e o f nea r misse s o r

accidents . Performanc e o f

root-caus e analysi s o f

incident s i s already commo n industr y practice , an d i n Texas , th e Texa s Commissio n o n Environmenta l Quality ("TCEQ" ) rule s requir e that th e owner o r operato r o f afacilit y a

t whic h a n emissio n event

o r exces s opacit

y even t occurre d mus t

repor t t o TCE Q explainin g th e bes t know n caus e o f

th e event . Operators ' investigatio n o f incident s pursuan t t o TCEQ' s requiremen t generall y include s th e conduc t o f aroot-caus e analysis. 5 Similarly , th e pipelin e safety regulation s o f PHMS A requir e ful l investigatio n an d analysi s o f incident s t o determin e caus e an d minimiz e th e possibilit y o f arecurrence . Se e 4 9 CFR§ 192.617 . W e are no t

awar e of , an d EP A ha s no t

identified , an y deficiencie s i n th e method s currentl y use d b y companie s t o engag e i n accident investigatio n o r

root-caus e analysis , an d a s such , agenc y promulgatio n o f guidanc e o r

regulation s that

woul d prescrib e th e method s tha t companie s woul d hav e t o us e t o conduc t aroot-caus e analysi s are unnecessary . EPA' s promulgatio n o f

prescriptiv e requirement s i n thi s are acoul d interfer e wit h companies ' us e o f investigativ e practice s tailore d specificall y t o thei r ow n individua l facilities , becaus e suc h requirement s coul d caus e companie s t o shif t thei r focu s awa

y fro mindividualize d investigativ e technique s an d toward simpl y ensurin g tha t regulatory requirement s wer e satisfied . Companie s us e variou s methodologie s t o thoroughl y investigate abroad rang e o f incidents . Thos e methodologie s use d i n any particula r incident are thos e deeme d b y th e companie s to b e appropriate fo r

th e typ e an d severit

y o f th e inciden t

a t issue . Companie s kno w bes t ho w t o identif y th e systemi c caus e o f an inciden t

a t thei r particula

r facility an d can bes t

tailo r thei r investigation s t o th e particula r system s an d processe s i n plac e a t an individua l facility , withou t bein g require d t o follo w generalize d requirement s promulgate d b y th e federal government that may no t b e suite d t o th e individua l facilit y a t issue . Simpl y put , companie s i n th e pipelin e industry plac e extrem e importanc e o n maintainin g saf e an denvironmentall y responsibl e operations , bot h fo r worker s an dfo r

local communities . Companie s routinel y investigat e processe s an d prio r incident s t o ensure tha t

facilitie s ar e ru n i n a saf e manner . W e se e n o nee d fo r federa l rule s that

woul d b e base d o n th e incorrec t assumptio n that accident s an d near-misse s are no t currentl y bein g take n seriousl y b y industry. 6

5 I n addition , TCE Q rule s require that th e owner/operato r

o f afacility a

t whic h a n "emissio n event " o r "exces s opacit

y event " occurre dmus t

provid e arepor

t to TCE Q containin g inter alia a n identificatio n o f th e bes t know n caus e o f

th e event . Se e 3 0 Tex . Admin . Code § § 101.201(a)(2)(H) ; (a)(3)(C) ; (b)(l)(J) ; (b)(2)(J) ; (e)(9) . An "emissio n event " i s any upset event or unschedule dmaintenance , startup , or shutdow n activit

y fro macommo n caus e that result s i n unauthorize demission s o f air contaminants ; a

n "exces s opacit

y event " occur s whe n a

n opacit y readin g i s equa

l or exceed s 1 5 additiona

l percentag e point s abov e a

n applicabl e opacit

y limit . Se e id

. § § 101.1(28) , (32) . 6 W e woul dals o note that

federal requirement s alread y exis t i n thi s area . Fo r

example , 4 9 CFR§ 192.61 7 require s pipeline operator s to establis h procedure s fo r analyzin g accident s an dfailure s i n orde r to determin e th e cause s o f

afailur e an dto minimiz e th e possibilit y o f arecurrence . 8

### Finally , EP A seek s inpu t o n whethe r

aspecifi c tim e fram e fo r th e completio n o f

inciden t investigation s woul dbenefi t overal l safet

y a t covere dfacilities . 7 9 Fed . Reg . 4462 7 (Jul y 31 , 2014) . W e d o no t

believ e that

specifi c reportin g timeframe s shoul db e create db y federa l rule . Requirin g specifi c time frame s fo r reportin g woul db e inappropriat e because , i n agiven situation , i t

may tak e alon g perio do f

tim e t o full y determin e th e caus e o f aparticula

r incident . I t i s fa r better t o ge t th e righ t answe r than t o ge t

apartia l answer

b y an arbitrary deadline . There i s n o on e timefram e that

woul dfi t al l o f th e individua l situation s i n al l o f th e industrie s covere d b y an RMP . EPA' s focu s shoul db e o n allowin g companie s t o determin e t o rea l caus e o f

an incident , rathe r

tha n o n forcin g companie s t o come u p wit h some answer , whic h may no t tel l th e whol e story , b y agive n date .

g . Th e "Safet

y Case " Regulatory Model (7 9 Fed . Reg . 44632) . EP A seek s inpu t

o n whether

i t woul db e appropriate to implemen t th e "safet

y case " regulatory mode l fo r

assurin g tha t

risk s a t facilitie s are a s lo w a s reasonabl y practicable . 7 9 Fed . Reg . 4463 2 (Jul y 31 , 2014) . W e d o no t believ e tha

t there i s any reaso n to implemen t th e safety cas e approac h a

t thi s time . Th e safety cas e mode l require s companie s t o adop t asystemati c hazardmanagement framework , whic h involve s identificatio n o f majo r hazard s an ddevelopmen t o f plan s fo r

ho w suc h hazard s wil l b e managed . A s TPA understand s th e concep t o f th e safety case , i t

i s intende d t o b e develope di n aholisti c manne r considerin g al l risk s withi n aparticula r syste mo r

process , no t jus t asubse t o f th e tota l risks . Th e safety cas e represent s an argumen t mad e t o regulators , whic h demonstrate s th e proces s that th e compan y ha s gon e throug h t o identif y hazard s an dt o asses s risks , a s wel l a s th e reasonin g that le dth e compan y to choos e on e contro l ove r another . Th e regulator

y authority ha s th e optio n o f acceptin g o r

rejectin g th e argument , i.e., th e "safet y case. " Th e regulate dentity mus t specif y th e safety procedure s an dstandard s tha t th e compan y intend s t o adopt ; an dwhere apropose dplan i s deeme db y th e regulato r t o b e inadequate , th e regulato r ma y requir e th e adoptio n o f more stringen t

standards . Safet

y cas e regulatio n doe s no t fre e th e regulate dentity fro mprescriptiv e requirements ; t o th e contrary , th e safet y cas e require s that technical standard s b e specifie ds o that regulatory authoritie s can enforc e thos e standards . Se e generally Andre w Hopkins , "Explainin g 'Safety Case,' " Workin g Paper 8 7 (Apri l 2012) , available a t

http://www.csb.gov/assets/17 7 AVorkingPaper_87.pdf . Unles s thi s proces s evaluate s al l risk s withi n asyste mo r process , ther e i s asignifican t possibilit y that th e safet y cas e wil l no t resul t i n th e optimu msafety result . Institutio n o f

th e safety cas e approac h woul drepresen t afundamenta l departur e fro m curren t practic e an dfro mth e existin g regulatory scheme fo r chemical proces s safety i n th e Unite dStates , a s EP

A itself acknowledges . 7 9 Fed . Reg . 4463 2 (July 31 , 2014) . If such a fundamenta l chang e i s to b e made , there shoul db e apressin g reaso n why i t i s necessary , an di t shoul db e don e i n acomprehensiv e manner . W e d o no t believ e that

there i s an y reaso n t o believ e that

curren t environmenta l o r

safety rule s ar e deficien t

suc h tha t afundamenta l chang e i n federa l regulator

y structur e woul db e appropriate . W e believ e th e curren t RMP , proces s safety management , an dpipelin e safety program s ar e sufficien t t o protec t

worke r safet y an d surroundin g communities , an dw e are no t aware o f

an y indicatio n that

thos e program s areineffectiv e or i n need o f

supplementation . Thi s i s a n are awhere federal agencie s shoul d focu s thei r effort s o n enforcin g an d implementin g regulation s currentl y i n forc e an d coordinatin g thei r respectiv e regulator

y programs , rathe r

than implementin g ane w an d more burdensom e analytical approach . Implementin g asafety cas e mode l i n on e are ao f federa l regulatio n withou t coordinatio n wit

h al l other

applicabl e federa l regulator y program s woul d increas e th e paperwor k an d reportin g burde n o f

covere d facilitie s bu t

woul d no t

necessaril y reduc e risk s t o employees , th e surroundin g community , o r th e environment . I n TPA' s view , n o ne w rule s o r analytica l approache s are calle d for , includin g implementatio n o f th e safet y cas e approach. 7 Finally , w e note th e agenc y manpowe r issue s that

woul d b e raise d b y widesprea d implementatio n o f

th e safet y cas e approach . Suc h an approac h woul d requir e th e individualize d involvemen t

o f regulator y personnel , wh o woul d b e calle d upo n t o analyz e th e cas e bein g mad e b y th e company , critiqu e it , respon d t o it , an d the n re-asses s i t i n on e o r

more subsequen t iterations , unti l th e cas e ha d finall y bee n satisfactoril y mad e b y th e regulate d entity an d approve d b y th e regulatory authority . Th e amoun t o f tim e tha t thi s woul d take , whe n sprea d acros s newl y proffere dsafet

y case s b y multipl e industrie s acros s th e country , woul d b e enormous . W e recal l EPA' s concern s ove

r regulator y paralysi s that

forme d th e basi s fo r

EPA' s decisio n t o alte r

Clea n Ai r Ac t permittin g threshold s i n th e greenhous e ga s tailorin g rule . See, e.g. , 7 5 Fed . Reg . 3157 8 (Jun e 3 , 2010) . Thos e sam e concern s woul d b e implicate d i n large-scal e adoptio n o f th e safety cas e approach . h . Updatin g th e lis to f regulate d substance s (7 9 Fed . Reg . 44607) . Th e RFI suggest s tha

t EPA ma

y b e considerin g th e listin g o f additiona

l toxi c an d flammabl e substance s to th e RM P lis t o f covere d substances . 7 9 Fed . Reg . 4460 7 (Jul y 31 , 2014) . EP A ask s commenter s t o provid e reference s t o acute toxicity studies , source s o f flammabilit

y information , o r

summary result s o f

studie s an d informatio n that certai n substance s meet applicabl e listin g criteria . Thi s approac h i s adeparture fro mtraditional rulemakin g procedures , whereb y EP A ha s firs t identifie d aspecifi c hazard o r regulator

y ga p an d the n ha s issue d aproposa

l (includin g abasi s fo r

findin g ahazard ) fo r

publi c comment . Here , EP A shift s thi s burde n t o th e regulate d community . EP A shoul d firs t determin e that

ther e i s aspecifi c shortcomin g wit

h th e RM P rule s befor e embarkin g o n amajo r rulemaking . Currently , EP A ha s no t provide d an y basi s fo r

wh y th e rule s shoul d b e revise d i n thi s area . 3 . Conclusion . Ensurin g th e saf

e an d environmentall y responsibl e operatio n o f ou r facilitie s i s th e to p priorit y fo r th e member s o f

TPA . W e appreciate EPA' s effort s t o ensure tha t federa l regulation s pertainin g t o thes e issue s are kep t up t o date . A s discusse d herein , however , w e d o no t se e th e nee d fo r additional regulator

y burden s i n thes e areas. 8 W e urg e EP A t o make sure that an y rule s

7 I f asafel y cas e approac h were eve r adopte db y EPA , i t

certainl y shoul db e limite dto onl y asmal l subset o f industr y representin g th e mos t

high-ris k facilities , handlin g larg e quantitie s o f extremel y hazardou s substances . 8 Whil e Executiv e Orde

r 1365 0 (Aug . 1 , 2013 ) specificall y directe dth e Secretar y o f Labo r t o issu e a n RFI relate d to modernizatio n o f th e PS M program , th e Executiv e Orde r doe s no t contai n any comparabl e 1 0tha

t i t ma y develop i n th e RM P contex t are trul y necessar

y an d that

suc h rule s d o no t

hav e th e effec t o f forcin g owner s an d operator s t o substitut e rot e regulator

y complianc e fo r

th e exercis e o f individualize d engineerin g judgmen t applie d t o th e particula r circumstance s present

a t specifi c facilities . W e appreciate th e opportunit y t o provid e thes e comments .

Youts-trai v

Thur e Canno n Presiden t

directio n to EPA . Rather , Sectio n 6(c ) o f th e Executiv e Orde

r direct s EPA only to determin e whether th e RM P rule s shoul db e expande dto addres s additiona l regulate dsubstance s an dtype s o f hazards . Thi s wa s no t adirectio n to expan dth e entire program , especially into area s already regulate db y OSHA . 1 1