J-A27031-22

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

MICHAEL L. STRUNK 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 160 MDA 2022

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered December 1, 2021

In the Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-22-CR-0000106-2020

BEFORE: DUBOW, J., McLAUGHLIN, J., and COLINS, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY COLINS, J.: FILED: JANUARY 6, 2023

Appellant, Michael L. Strunk, appeals from the aggregate judgment of 

sentence of 17 years to 35 years’ incarceration imposed by the Court of 

Common Pleas of Dauphin County following his conviction by a jury of two 

counts of sexual assault, one count of aggravated indecent assault, three 

counts of indecent assault, one count of unlawful contact with a minor, and 

one count of corruption of minors.1 For the reasons set forth below, we affirm. 

Appellant was charged with the above offenses for committing three 

separate assaults on a girl who was 16 and 17 years old at the time (Victim). 

Appellant, who was Victim’s mother’s paramour, was living with Victim and 

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* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

1 18 Pa.C.S. §§ 3124.1, 3125(1), 3126(a)(1), 6318(a), and 6301(a)(1)(ii), 

respectively.
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Victim’s mother at the time. The charges were tried to a jury from July 22 to 

23, 2021.

At trial, Victim testified that in February 2019, approximately a week 

before her 17th birthday, Appellant fondled her breast under her shirt, pulled 

down her pants and underwear, and had sexual intercourse with her when she 

had fallen asleep on the living room couch after she got home from work. N.T. 

Trial, 7/22/21, at 55-64. Victim woke up when Appellant was fondling her 

breast, but said nothing to Appellant during this attack and pretended to be 

asleep. Id. at 61. Victim testified that slightly more than a month later, on 

April 3, 2019, when she was medicated after having her wisdom teeth and 

other teeth removed, Appellant fondled her breast, pulled down her pants, 

and repeatedly put his fingers in her vagina. Id. at 65-71, 109. Victim 

testified that she was crying and tried to scream and fight him off but that she 

couldn’t because of the effects of the pain medication that she was on and 

because her mouth was full of gauze. Id. at 69-71. Victim testified that a 

few days after this second assault, Appellant came into her bedroom after she 

had gone to bed, took her pajama pants off, and inserted his penis in her 

vagina. Id. at 71-76, 112. Victim testified that she pretended to be asleep 

and that the assault stopped when her mother walked into the bedroom and 

got angry at Appellant and Appellant left the room with her mother. Id. at 76-

78, 117-19. Victim testified that she did not want the assaults reported to the 

police because she was afraid that she and her mother would become 
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homeless and she did not want to have to testify. Id. at 78-79. Victim 

testified that the assaults were not reported to the police and instead, she and 

her mother installed a lock on Victim’s bedroom door, and that after the lock 

was installed, Victim woke up on several occasions to the sound of Appellant 

trying to pick the lock. Id. at 79-80. Victim testified that she had herself 

committed for psychiatric treatment shortly after the third assault because 

she was suicidal. Id. at 80, 91-92. Several months later, Victim spoke about 

being assaulted to an adult who had taken care of her in the past when Victim’s 

mother was in drug treatment and that adult reported that Victim had been 

sexually assaulted. Id. at 27-29, 96-97.

Victim’s mother testified that she walked into Victim’s bedroom and 

found Appellant naked from the waist down in bed with Victim, who was also 

naked from the waist down. N.T. Trial, 7/22/21, at 146-48. Victim’s mother 

testified that Victim appeared to be asleep. Id. at 148. Victim’s mother 

testified that she had smoked PCP that night and was ashamed and afraid and 

that she did not make Appellant leave the house or call the police. Id. at 145, 

148-51, 169-73. A Children and Youth Services worker testified that she 

spoke to Appellant in October 2019 after the sexual abuse report was received 

and that Appellant denied that he had any sexual contact with Victim. Id. at 

182-85. A police detective who interviewed Appellant twice testified that in 

an October 2019 interview, Appellant denied that he had any sexual contact 

with Victim. N.T. Trial, 7/23/21, at 209-10. The detective testified that after 
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Appellant was arrested in November 2019, he asked to speak to her again and 

after being given Miranda2 warnings, Appellant gave a videotaped statement. 

Id. at 211-13. In that videotaped statement, which was played to the jury, 

Appellant admitted sexual contact with Victim, but claimed that he mistook 

Victim for Victim’s mother in the first assault and that the second and third 

incidents were consensual. Id. at 212-14, 218, 227, 242-43. Appellant did 

not testify or call any witnesses in his defense. Id. at 235-39. 

On July 23, 2021, the jury convicted Appellant of all of the above 

charges. N.T. Trial, 7/23/21, at 296-98. Following the verdict, the trial court 

directed that the probation department prepare a pre-sentence investigation 

report and ordered that Appellant be assessed by the Sexual Offenders 

Assessment Board (SOAB) to determine if he should be classified as a Sexually 

Violent Predator (SVP) under the Sexual Offender Registration and Notification 

Act (SORNA), 42 Pa.C.S. § 9799.10, et seq. N.T. Trial, 7/23/21, at 300; Trial 

Court Order, 7/26/21. 

On December 1, 2021, the trial court held a hearing on whether 

Appellant should be classified as an SVP and to sentence Appellant. At this 

hearing, the trial court heard testimony from the SOAB evaluator who 

assessed Appellant. N.T. SVP & Sentencing Hearing at 5-21. No other 

witnesses testified on the issue of whether Appellant should be classified as 

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2 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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an SVP. Id. at 21. Following the SOAB evaluator’s testimony, the trial court 

found that Appellant was an SVP. Id. at 21-22. The trial court then imposed 

consecutive sentences of 5 to 10 years’ incarceration for each of the sexual 

assault and aggravated indecent assault convictions, a concurrent sentence of 

5 to 10 years’ incarceration for the unlawful contact with a minor conviction, 

and a consecutive sentence 2 to 5 years’ incarceration for corruption of 

minors, resulting on an aggregate sentence of 17 years to 35 years’ 

incarceration. Id. at 36-41; Sentencing Order.3 

Appellant filed a timely post-sentence motion in which he sought a new 

trial on the ground that the verdict was against the weight of the evidence 

and moved for modification of his sentence on the ground that the imposition 

of consecutive sentences was excessive and unreasonable. Post-Sentence 

Motion at 2-3. By order entered December 30, 2021, the trial court denied 

Appellant’s post-sentence motion in its entirety. Trial Court Order, 12/30/21. 

This timely appeal followed.

Appellant presents the following four issues for our review:

I. Whether the evidence was insufficient to convict Mr. Strunk of 

unlawful contact with a minor, where the complainant testified 

that the sole verbal contact was in the first incident after any 

criminal offense was completed?

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3 The trial court imposed no sentence for the three indecent assault convictions 

on the grounds that those charges merged with the sexual assault and 

aggravated indecent assault convictions. N.T. SVP & Sentencing Hearing at 

37-39; Sentencing Order at 1-2.
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II. Whether the evidence at trial shocks the consci[ence] where 

the evidence produced clearly showed a mother finding her

daughter in an alleged sexual assault and her daughter did not cry

out for help, speak to her afterw[a]rds to characterize it as an 

assault, nor were the police called.

III. Whether the evidence failed to sufficiently show, by clear and 

convincing evidence, that M[r]. Strunk should be an SVP where 

the sole deciding factor appeared to be his number of offenses 

with the same victim.

IV. Whether the aggregate sentence of 17.54-35 years was clearly 

unreasonable, so manifestly excessive as to constitute an abuse 

of discretion and inconsistent with the protection of the public, 

gravity of offenses, and defendant's rehabilitative needs?

Appellant’s Brief at 11-12 (suggested answers omitted). None of these issues 

merits relief.

Appellant argues that the evidence at trial was insufficient to convict 

him of unlawful contact with a minor because there was no evidence that he 

communicated with Victim to accomplish any of the sexual assaults. Our 

standard of review in a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence is wellsettled:

The standard we apply in reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence 

is whether viewing all the evidence admitted at trial in the light 

most favorable to the verdict winner, there is sufficient evidence 

to enable the fact-finder to find every element of the crime beyond 

a reasonable doubt. In applying the above test, we may not weigh 

the evidence and substitute our judgment for the fact-finder. In 

addition, we note that the facts and circumstances established by 

the Commonwealth need not preclude every possibility of 

innocence. Any doubts regarding a defendant’s guilt may be 

resolved by the fact-finder unless the evidence is so weak and 

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4 Contrary to Appellant’s assertions, as explained above, his aggregate 

minimum sentence is 17 years’ incarceration, not 171/2 years’ incarceration.
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inconclusive that as a matter of law no probability of fact may be 

drawn from the combined circumstances. The Commonwealth 

may sustain its burden of proving every element of the crime 

beyond a reasonable doubt by means of wholly circumstantial 

evidence.

Commonwealth v. Antidormi, 84 A.3d 736, 756 (Pa. Super. 2014) (quoting 

Commonwealth v. Estepp, 17 A.3d 939 (Pa. Super. 2011)).

The Crimes Code provides that a person commits the crime of unlawful 

contact with a minor

if he is intentionally in contact with a minor, or a law enforcement 

officer acting in the performance of his duties who has assumed 

the identity of a minor, for the purpose of engaging in an activity 

prohibited under any of the following, and either the person 

initiating the contact or the person being contacted is within this 

Commonwealth:

(1) Any of the offenses enumerated in Chapter 31 (relating to 

sexual offenses).

18 Pa.C.S. § 6318(a). The statute defines the contact required as an element 

of this offense as:

Direct or indirect contact or communication by any means, 

method or device, including contact or communication in person 

or through an agent or agency, through any print medium, the 

mails, a common carrier or communication common carrier, any 

electronic communication system and any telecommunications, 

wire, computer or radio communications device or system.

18 Pa.C.S. § 6318(c). 

The element of contact requires proof that the defendant engaged in 

some verbal or nonverbal communication with the minor for purposes of 

sexual contact beyond physically approaching the minor and the physical 

contact of the sexual act itself. Commonwealth v. Davis, 225 A.3d 582,
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587 (Pa. Super. 2019); Commonwealth v. Leatherby, 116 A.3d 73, 79-81

(Pa. Super. 2015). 

Even though the statute is titled “unlawful contact with a minor,” 

it is best understood as “unlawful communication with a minor.” 

By its plain terms, the statute prohibits the act of communicating 

with a minor for enumerated sexual purposes.

Commonwealth v. Rose, 960 A.2d 149, 152-53 (Pa. Super. 2008). 

This element of communication is sufficiently proven to support an 

unlawful contact with a minor conviction where there is evidence that the 

defendant engaged in nonverbal communication with the minor to bring about 

the sexual contact or evidence that he engaged in physical contact with the 

minor separate from the sex crime itself to facilitate the sex crime. 

Leatherby, 116 A.3d at 80-81 (not responding to minor’s knock on door so 

that she would enter and find him naked constituted nonverbal communication 

sufficient to support unlawful contact with minor conviction); 

Commonwealth v. Velez, 51 A.3d 260, 267 (Pa. Super. 2012) (evidence 

that minor was naked from the waist down and had her knees up was sufficient 

to prove verbal or nonverbal communication to cause minor to be in that 

position and state of undress); Commonwealth v. Copeland, No. 2452 EDA 

2021, at 6-9 (Pa. Super. August 31, 2022) (unpublished memorandum)

(defendant’s positioning minor on her stomach and removing her clothes was 

sufficient communication to support unlawful contact with minor conviction). 

Evidence that the defendant came to the minor and engaged in sexual contact, 

however, is insufficient by itself to support an unlawful contact with a minor 
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conviction. Leatherby, 116 A.3d at 80 (vacating unlawful contact with a 

minor conviction as to minor who testified only that defendant came into her 

room and touched her breasts and rear end without saying anything); 

Commonwealth v. Letham, No. 1259 WDA 2020, at 5-7 (Pa. Super. January 

13, 2022) (unpublished memorandum) (vacating unlawful contact with a 

minor conviction where evidence with respect to assault on that minor was 

that defendant came into a room where she was standing and grabbed her 

breasts without saying anything). 

Appellant is correct that there was no evidence that Appellant verbally 

communicated anything to Victim or gave her nonverbal signals to bring about 

the sexual contact. Victim did not recall Appellant saying anything to her 

before or during any of the assaults and did not testify that he said anything 

sexual or related to the assaults during the intervening weeks and days 

between the assaults. N.T. Trial, 7/22/21, at 60-64, 66, 70, 105-07, 109, 114-

17. Victim testified that immediately after the first assault, Appellant 

whispered something in her ear and that she could not remember what he 

said, but that it was not a threat or a request that she not tell her mother. 

Id. at 64, 106. 

Victim, however, testified that Appellant removed or pulled down her 

clothing in order to commit the sexual assaults and aggravated indecent 

assault. Id. at 60-62, 68-69, 75-76, 117. That evidence that Appellant 

engaged in physical contact with Victim beyond the assaults themselves to 
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facilitate his sexual contact with Victim is sufficient to prove the element of 

communication. Velez, 51 A.3d at 267; Copeland, No. 2452 EDA 2021, at 

6-9. Because communication is the only element of unlawful contact with a 

minor that Appellant contends that the Commonwealth failed to prove and 

Appellant’s acts of removing or pulling down Victim’s clothing to facilitate his 

assaults were sufficient to satisfy that element, Appellant’s claim of 

insufficiency of the evidence fails. 

Appellant’s contention that he is entitled to a new trial on weight of the 

evidence grounds is also without merit. A new trial may be granted on the 

ground that the verdict is against the weight of the evidence only where the 

evidence at trial was so weak or the verdict was so contrary to the evidence

that the verdict shocks the trial court’s sense of justice. Commonwealth v. 

Jacoby, 170 A.3d 1065, 1080 (Pa. 2017); Commonwealth v. Gilliam, 249 

A.3d 257, 269-70 (Pa. Super. 2021); Antidormi, 84 A.3d at 758. Review of 

the denial of a weight of the evidence motion for a new trial is limited to 

determining whether the trial court abused its discretion in concluding that 

the verdict was not against the weight of the evidence. Commonwealth v. 

Clemons, 200 A.3d 441, 463-64 (Pa. 2019); Commonwealth v. 

Delmonico, 251 A.3d 829, 837 (Pa. Super. 2021). “One of the least 

assailable reasons for granting or denying a new trial is the lower court’s 

conviction that the verdict was or was not against the weight of the evidence.” 
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Antidormi, 84 A.3d at 758 (quoting Commonwealth v. Clay, 64 A.3d 1049 

(Pa. 2013)) (brackets omitted).

Appellant’s only argument that the verdict is against the weight of the 

evidence is that the testimony of Victim and her mother was not credible 

because they did not make Appellant leave the home or report the crimes to 

the police. The trial court did not discuss the evidence at trial in its order 

denying Appellant’s post-sentence motion and did not issue any other opinion. 

Trial Court Order, 12/30/21; Trial Court Order, 1/25/22. It is clear, however, 

that the trial court concluded that the verdict did not shock its sense of justice, 

as it specifically rejected Appellant’s claim that he was entitled to new trial, 

which was based on the claim that the testimony against him was incredible, 

Trial Court Order, 12/30/21; Post-Sentence Motion at 2-3, and its statements 

at sentencing show that it found Victim’s testimony credible. N.T. SVP & 

Sentencing Hearing at 33-35. This conclusion of the trial court that the verdict 

was not against the weight of the evidence was not an abuse of discretion. 

The fact that a sexual assault victim remains in contact with her attacker after 

the assaults and does not immediately report the crime does not require a 

jury to find the victim’s testimony incredible or require a conclusion a verdict 

based on the victim’s testimony is shocking or against the weight of the 

evidence. Commonwealth v. Izurieta, 171 A.3d 803, 809 (Pa. Super. 

2017). 
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Appellant’s remaining two issues, his challenges to his SVP designation 

and sentence, likewise are not grounds for relief. A defendant may be 

determined to be an SVP if he has been convicted of a sexually violent offense 

and, following an assessment by an SOAB evaluator, the Commonwealth 

proves by clear and convincing evidence at an SVP hearing that the defendant 

suffers from a mental abnormality or personality disorder that makes him

likely to engage in predatory sexually violent offenses. 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9799.12, 

9799.24; Commonwealth v. Hollingshead, 111 A.3d 186, 189 (Pa. Super. 

2015). All five of the offenses of which Appellant was convicted are defined 

by SORNA as sexually violent offenses on which an SVP determination can be 

based. 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9799.12, 9799.14(b)(6), (8), (c)(5), (d)(5), (7). 

To prove the element of mental abnormality or personality disorder, “the 

evidence must show that the defendant suffers from a congenital or acquired 

condition that affects the emotional or volitional capacity of the person in a 

manner that predisposes that person to the commission of criminal sexual acts 

to a degree that makes the person a menace to the health and safety of other 

persons.” Hollingshead, 111 A.3d at 189-90 (quoting Commonwealth v. 

Stephens, 74 A.3d 1034 (Pa. Super. 2013)). In addition, it must be shown 

that the defendant’s conduct was predatory. Hollingshead, 111 A.3d at 190. 

Predatory conduct is defined as an “act directed at a stranger or at a person 

with whom a relationship has been initiated, established, maintained or 
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promoted, in whole or in part, in order to facilitate or support victimization.” 

42 Pa.C.S. § 9799.12. 

In performing an SVP assessment, the evaluator must consider all of the 

following 15 factors:

(1) Facts of the current offense, including:

(i) Whether the offense involved multiple victims.

(ii) Whether the individual exceeded the means necessary 

to achieve the offense.

(iii) The nature of the sexual contact with the victim.

(iv) Relationship of the individual to the victim.

(v) Age of the victim.

(vi) Whether the offense included a display of unusual 

cruelty by the individual during the commission of the crime.

(vii) The mental capacity of the victim.

(2) Prior offense history, including:

(i) The individual’s prior criminal record.

(ii) Whether the individual completed any prior sentences.

(iii) Whether the individual participated in available 

programs for sexual offenders.

(3) Characteristics of the individual, including:

(i) Age.

(ii) Use of illegal drugs.

(iii) Any mental illness, mental disability or mental 

abnormality.

(iv) Behavioral characteristics that contribute to the 

individual’s conduct.

(4) Factors that are supported in a sexual offender assessment 

field as criteria reasonably related to the risk of reoffense.
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42 Pa.C.S. § 9799.24(b); see also Hollingshead, 111 A.3d at 190. An 

expert testifying in support of an SVP designation must opine on whether the 

defendant has a propensity to reoffend, but the risk of reoffending is only a 

factor that the expert must consider in making the SVP assessment, not a 

separate requirement for SVP designation. Hollingshead, 111 A.3d at 190. 

In evaluating the sufficiency of the evidence to support an SVP designation, 

this Court may not reweigh the factors that are relevant to whether the 

defendant is an SVP and must limit its review to whether the factors on which 

the SVP determination is based are supported by sufficient evidence. 

Commonwealth v. Meals, 912 A.2d 213, 220-25 (Pa. 2006). 

The trial court’s SVP determination here was based on the testimony of 

the SOAB evaluator, who was the only witness at the SVP hearing. The SOAB 

evaluator testified that he considered all of the 15 factors and opined that the 

nature of the sexual conduct (penetrative assaults), Victim’s mental capacity 

at the time of the assaults (that she was asleep or on pain medications), 

Appellant’s criminal history (consisting of non-sexual assaults, drug crimes 

and other non-sexual offenses), Appellant’s drug use, the fact that he 

committed multiple assaults on Victim, his age, Victim’s age, and the family 

relationship supported the conclusion that Appellant suffered from antisocial 

personality disorder, engaged in predatory behavior, and had a propensity to 

commit sex crimes. N.T. SVP & Sentencing Hearing at 7-12, 16-21. The SOAB 

evaluator opined based on these factors that Appellant met the criteria to be 
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classified as an SVP. Id. at 13-14. This testimony is sufficient to support the 

trial court’s determination that Appellant was an SVP. Commonwealth v. 

Lippincott, 208 A.3d 143 (Pa. Super. 2019) (en banc), relied on by Appellant 

does not hold that such evidence is insufficient. Rather, this Court vacated 

the defendant’s SVP designation in Lippincott on the ground that the trial 

court applied the wrong burden of proof (an issue on which it was itself 

subsequently overruled by Commonwealth v. Butler, 226 A.3d 972 (Pa. 

2020)), not on insufficiency of the evidence. 208 A.3d at 154. 

Appellant argues that the evidence was insufficient to support an SVP 

designation because there were not multiple victims and that repeated sexual 

abuse of a single victim cannot support an SVP determination. That, however, 

is not the law. Contrary to Appellant’s contention, a defendant may properly 

be found to be an SVP where his only sex crimes are against a single victim.

Stephens, 74 A.3d at 1035-36, 1039-42 (affirming SVP designation of 

defendant who committed numerous acts of indecent assault and aggravated

indecent assault on a single child victim over a two-year period);

Commonwealth v. Pagan, No. 781 MDA 2020, at 4-8 (Pa. Super. December 

10, 2020) (unpublished memorandum) (affirming SVP designation of 

defendant whose only sex crime was multiple indecent assaults against the 

same child). 

Appellant’s final issue is a challenge to the discretionary aspects of his 

sentence. Challenges to the discretionary aspects of a sentence are not 
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appealable as of right and may be considered only where the following 

requirements are satisfied: 1) the appellant has preserved the issue in the 

trial court at sentencing or in a motion for reconsideration or modification of 

sentence; 2) the appellant has included in his brief a concise statement of the 

reasons for allowance of appeal of the discretionary aspects of his sentence in 

accordance with Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f), and 3) the challenge to the sentence raises 

a substantial question that the sentence is not appropriate under the 

Sentencing Code. Commonwealth v. Dempster, 187 A.3d 266, 272 (Pa. 

Super. 2018) (en banc); Commonwealth v. Corley, 31 A.3d 293, 295-96

(Pa. Super. 2011).

Appellant has satisfied these three requirements. Appellant filed a 

timely post-sentence motion for reconsideration of his sentence in which he 

argued that the aggregate sentence that the trial court imposed was excessive 

and unreasonable and has included a Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f) statement in his brief. 

Post-Sentence Motion at 3; Appellant’s Brief at 24-28. Appellant has also 

raised a substantial question that the sentence is not appropriate under the 

Sentencing Code. A substantial question exists where the appellant advances 

a colorable argument that the sentencing judge’s actions were inconsistent 

with a specific provision of the Sentencing Code or were contrary to the 

fundamental norms of the sentencing process. Commonwealth v. 

DiClaudio, 210 A.3d 1070, 1075 (Pa. Super. 2019); Antidormi, 84 A.3d at 

759. Appellant asserts that his aggregate sentence of 17 to 35 years’ 
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incarceration, due to imposition of consecutive sentences, is excessive and 

that the trial court considered only the seriousness of the crimes and not his 

mitigating evidence or rehabilitative needs. A claim that a sentence was 

excessive coupled with claim that trial court did not consider defendant’s 

rehabilitative needs presents a substantial question. Commonwealth v. 

Caldwell, 117 A.3d 763, 770 (Pa. Super. 2015) (en banc). 

Appellant’s challenge to his sentence, however, fails on the merits. Our 

review of this issue is governed by the following standards:

Sentencing is a matter vested in the sound discretion of the 

sentencing judge, and a sentence will not be disturbed on appeal 

absent a manifest abuse of discretion. In this context, an abuse 

of discretion is not shown merely by an error in judgment. Rather, 

the appellant must establish, by reference to the record, that the 

sentencing court ignored or misapplied the law, exercised its 

judgment for reasons of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill will, or 

arrived at a manifestly unreasonable decision.

Caldwell, 117 A.3d at 770 (quoting Commonwealth v. Raven, 97 A.3d 

1244 (Pa. Super. 2014)).

The record here shows that the trial court had reviewed and considered 

a pre-sentence investigation report before imposing sentence on Appellant. 

N.T. SVP & Sentencing Hearing at 33. Appellant concedes that the sentences 

that the trial court imposed were within the standard range of the sentencing 

guidelines. Appellant’s Brief at 46. Where the trial court has reviewed a presentence investigation report prior to sentencing the defendant, this Court

presumes that the trial court was aware of and weighed the relevant 

information regarding the defendant’s character and mitigating factors.
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Commonwealth v. Radecki, 180 A.3d 441, 471 (Pa. Super. 2018); 

Commonwealth v. Griffin, 65 A.3d 932, 937 (Pa. Super. 2013); 

Commonwealth v. Moury, 992 A.2d 162, 171 (Pa. Super. 2010). This Court 

therefore will not consider a standard range sentence imposed with the benefit 

of a pre-sentence investigation report excessive or an abuse of the trial court’s 

sentencing discretion. Radecki, 180 A.3d at 471; Corley, 31 A.3d at 298;

Moury, 992 A.2d at 171. 

The fact that the trial court imposed consecutive sentences for four of 

Appellant’s five crimes does not change this. A trial court has discretion to 

impose consecutive, rather than concurrent, sentences for crimes committed 

in the same course of criminal conduct and imposition of consecutive

sentences can be found to be unreasonable in only the most extreme 

circumstances. Commonwealth v. Brown, 249 A.3d 1206, 1212 (Pa. Super. 

2021); Radecki, 180 A.3d at 469-70; Moury, 992 A.2d at 171-72. 

Here, Appellant committed three separate assaults on Victim days and 

weeks apart. Appellant is not entitled to a “volume discount” for those 

separate crimes. Brown, 249 A.3d at 1216; Radecki, 180 A.3d at 470-71;

Caldwell, 117 A.3d at 772. While his aggregate sentence is lengthy, it is not 

of the extreme length that rises to the level of an abuse of discretion. 

Compare Brown, 249 A.3d at 1209-10, 1216-17 (sentence of 16 to 32 years

for three firearms convictions was not abuse of discretion); Caldwell, 117 

A.3d at 767, 770-72 (sentence of 31 to 62 years for aggravated assault, 
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robbery, theft, and firearms convictions was not abuse of discretion); 

Commonwealth v. Dodge, 77 A.3d 1263, 1267-68, 1274-78 (Pa. Super. 

2013) (aggregate sentence of 40 years, 7 months to 81 years and 2 months 

incarceration for 2 burglary convictions and over 30 convictions for receiving 

stolen property and other non-violent crimes was within trial court’s 

discretion); with Commonwealth v. Coulverson, 34 A.3d 135, 138-39, 

146-50 (Pa. Super. 2011) (maximum sentence of 80 or 90 years for a single 

episode of sexual assaults and robbery, a second robbery, and multiple 

burglaries and thefts was abuse of discretion); Commonwealth v. Dodge, 

957 A.2d 1198, 1199, 1201-02 (Pa. Super. 2008) (sentence of 581/2 to 124 

years’ incarceration for 2 burglary convictions and over 30 convictions for 

receiving stolen property and other non-violent crimes was abuse of 

discretion); Commonwealth v. Whitman, 880 A.2d 1250, 1251-52, 1254 

(Pa. Super. 2005), rev’d on other issue, 918 A.2d 111 (Pa. 2007) (sentence 

of 39 to 78 years’ incarceration for multiple nonviolent burglaries and other

property crimes was abuse of discretion); Commonwealth v. Bauer, 604 

A.2d 1098, 1101-02 (Pa. Super. 1992), rev’d on other grounds, 618 A.2d 

396 (Pa. 1993) (sentence of 271⁄2 to 55 years’ incarceration for multiple drug 

sales was abuse of discretion); Commonwealth v. Simpson, 510 A.2d 760, 

761, 763-64 (Pa. Super. 1986) (sentence of 30 to 60 years’ incarceration for 

multiple robberies was abuse of discretion). 
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For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that all of the issues raised by 

Appellant in this appeal lack merit. We therefore affirm Appellant’s judgment 

of sentence.

Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 01/06/2023