A CASE STUDY IN SECURITY SECTOR REFORM:

LEARNING FROM SECURITY SECTOR REFORM/

BUILDING IN AFGHANISTAN

(OCTOBER 2002-SEPTEMBER 2003)

Jason C. Howk

November 2009

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FOREWORD

This PKSOI Paper is designed to further the U.S. and 

other interested international governments’ understanding 

of how Security Sector Reform (SSR) was conducted in 

Afghanistan from 2002 to 2003. This was America’s first 

attempt at conducting formalized SSR, so it offers readers 

an opportunity to learn whom the United States saw as 

key actors in the process, what institutions were slated for 

reform, and how well the United States and its partners met 

the typical challenges of SSR. 

The author rightly points out the synergy that was lost 

because of a lack of coordination and understanding between 

government officials and nongovernmental organizations 

like aid groups, academia, and think tanks. This deficiency 

became one of my focal points as I started to build my team 

in Afghanistan.

The lessons learned from this endeavor were useful 

to me as I developed my strategy for helping the Afghans 

make their country a secure and stable state. The author’s 

experience revealed many pitfalls in security sector building 

and international team-building that we are trying to avoid 

today. 

Finally, this paper provides a case study to help explain 

the SSR concepts that were recently formalized in U.S. Army 

Field Manual 3.07, Stability Operations Doctrine. It provides 

insights into how the military interacts with host-nation 

governments, the United Nations, the State Department, 

and national embassies to solve today’s complex problems.

STANLEY A. MCCHRYSTAL

General, U.S. Army

Commander,

United States Forces-Afghanistan/

International Security Assistance Force,

Afghanistan
iv

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

JASON C. HOWK, a U.S. Army captain, is currently 

Aide de Camp to General Stanley McChrystal in 

Afghanistan. He has served in the U.S. Army since 1991. 

Previously, he was Aide de Camp to then-Major General 

Karl W. Eikenberry during his first tour in Afghanistan. 

Captain Howk has held leadership positions from Fire 

Team through Company Commander in the Parachute 

Infantry and Engineers Corps. He has worked on 

Joint, NATO, Coalition, and Inter-Service staffs from 

Battalion to four-star levels. He conducted this research 

as a student at the Naval Postgraduate School under 

the guidance of Professor Thomas Bruneau of the 

National Security Affairs Department, while studying 

to become a Middle East Foreign Area Officer. 
v

SUMMARY

Security sector reform (SSR) is that set of policies, 

plans, programs, and activities that a government 

undertakes to improve the way it provides safety, 

security, and justice. This is a complex and involved 

task against which Captain Howk evaluates the early 

international effort to rebuild effective governance 

in Afghanistan. The purpose of this case study is to 

document the lessons learned through the development 

and execution of the SSR program in Afghanistan, 

with special emphasis from 2002 through 2003. The 

author has a unique and enviable position from which 

to observe the inner workings of the highest level 

commands in Afghanistan—first as an Aide de Camp 

to then Major General Karl Eikenberry during his first 

tour in Afghanistan and as the current Aide de Camp 

to General Stanley McChrystal. 

This paper is not only a case study, but in effect is 

a primer on SSR. It critically evaluates the underlying 

theories of SSR and discusses how SSR should work 

in an operational environment. The paper concludes 

by reexamining the development of the strategy and 

implementation of the SSR effort in Afghanistan. By 

2002 it was clear that SSR was an important focus, and 

it was recognized to be essential for the successful 

development of economic and governance institutions 

in Afghanistan. 

The paper uses the four major elements of the 

security sector as outlined by D. Hendrickson and A. 

Karkoszka to focus on seven key objectives. To narrow 

the scope of the paper, the author details the role of 

four typical actors involved in SSR: donor nations; 

recipient state of Afghanistan; multilateral participants 

such as the United Nations (UN), SSR experts, and 
vi

nongovernmental organizations; and regional security 

cooperation entities such as the North Atlantic Treaty 

Organization and the Association of Southeast Asian 

Nations. 

The paper provides an insider’s view of the preparation accomplished by the leadership team prior to 

entering Afghanistan, and then it provides a critical 

assessment of the SSR activities that were conducted. 

The paper incorporates an assessment by General 

Eikenberry in which he assesses the implementation of 

the SSR Strategy in 2002-03. 

The author concludes with several lessons learned 

in communication, staffing, interagency issues, leadership, and implementation, noting several rules of 

thumb and best practices. 

Captain Howk recommends that SSR be the 

single, primary duty for a senior leader so that it 

does not decline in scope and emphasis, and that 

planners determine the refined mission objectives and 

goals for such a position should it be reinstated. He 

further recommends that the United States create an 

SSR coordinator on the National Security Council to 

integrate and synchronize all agencies and departments. 

Finally, he recommends that we consider former UN 

Secretary General Lakhdar Brahimi’s advice that lead 

nations remain patient. Afghanistan must be mentored 

and given every opportunity to succeed.
1

A CASE STUDY IN SECURITY SECTOR REFORM:

LEARNING FROM SECURITY SECTOR REFORM/

BUILDING IN AFGHANISTAN

(OCTOBER 2002-SEPTEMBER 2003)*

All photos courtesy of author.

Figure 1. Afghan Tribesmen at a Buzkashi Match.

Security Sector Reform in Afghanistan is a lot like a 

Buzkashi match, lots of motivated people running 

around trying to grab the calf, then a ferocious scrum 

to determine whom to chase next . . . it seems to have 

no end, exhausts all the horses, leaves the riders bruised 

and broken, and it’s hard to tell who’s actually winning; 

but the players will never forget it.1

INTRODUCTION

The goal of this paper is to answer three questions 

about Security Sector Reform (SSR) by studying the 

____________

*I am indebted to Lieutenant General Karl Eikenberry, the many members 

of the U.S. Security Coordinator’s Staff, the Office of Military CooperationAfghanistan, the SSR forum, and the international SSR community who 

assisted me in recalling and organizing these lessons before they were 

lost to time. All errors are the author’s alone.
2

case of Afghanistan from 2002 to 2003. First, how was 

SSR conducted in Afghanistan—what was the forum, 

who were the actors, and what was the strategy? 

Second, what did SSR mean in Afghanistan—what 

institutions were slated for reform, what were the goals, 

and how well were nations prepared to achieve them? 

Finally, how well did the SSR strategy and team meet 

the typical challenges for SSR as outlined by David 

Hendrickson and A. Karkoszka? What goals were met, 

what issues were avoided or solved, and what lessons 

can be gleaned for future use?2

The purpose of this paper is to document the lessons 

learned through the development and execution of an 

SSR program. Some of the positive findings of this 

work should help guide future SSR leaders, while 

the explanation of unsuccessful decisions and polices 

should prepare future planners for the difficulties of 

SSR. This paper is not meant to correct the record or 

cast blame on any actors, but rather to describe the 

actual facts of the SSR process between 2002 and 2003. 

The lessons and history described here are specific to 

how SSR was conducted and should be useful to future 

leaders called upon to conduct it.

The articles, books, and studies written about 

Afghanistan and SSR have pointed out how the Bonn 

agreement of 2001 set forth key pillars that would 

enhance Afghan sovereignty and development. 

They also showed how many of the critical pillars 

have needed improvement over the 7 years since the 

international intervention in Afghanistan. But the 

literature largely fails to describe the actual process of 

SSR in Afghanistan, namely, how it developed after 

the October 2002 introduction of a SSR coordinator and

what its goals, accomplishments, and shortcomings 

were. The primary reason for this omission is twofold: 
3

authors did not know about or chose not to write 

about the monthly SSR meetings that started in the 

fall of 2002. These same authors do not reference the 

role of the U.S. Security Coordinator (USSC) who was 

sent to Afghanistan in October 2002 to develop and 

coordinate an Afghan SSR strategy that would enable 

the international community to address the concerns 

being heard by the U.S. Administration from the Afghan government, the coalition military commanders, 

and the international community.3

In hindsight, it was a loss for the Afghan people 

and the world that many SSR experts/authors from 

numerous nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), 

international governmental organizations (IGOs), 

and think tanks spent so much time assessing and 

critiquing the SSR pillars in Afghanistan and yet never 

effectively integrated themselves into the Afghanistan 

SSR working group to share their expertise and present 

their concerns for address. But one of the most critical 

oversights was the International SSR working group’s 

failure to invite these experts into the formal SSR 

process, incorporate their wisdom into the strategic 

plan, and give them an official seat at the table each 

month to discuss their issues. This omission might be 

one of the most important lessons from the SSR process 

in Afghanistan. 

This paper begins with a discussion of the international understanding of SSR, the U.S. definition of 

SSR in Afghanistan, and how SSR’s performance was 

envisioned. Next, it will highlight the development 

of the SSR strategy, and how that strategy was 

implemented, with special attention to the positive 

measures and the many areas that could have been 

improved. Additionally, it will evaluate the SSR 

campaign, relying principally upon an SSR article that 
4

explains most of what was known about SSR in 2002. 

This will show that the SSR strategy was fairly sound, 

but that execution was difficult. Finally, it will offer 

some lessons learned by the SSR team and some areas 

that should be explored in greater detail.

SECURITY SECTOR REFORM IN 2002

By 2002, when the endeavor to rebuild the security 

structure in Afghanistan became a major focus for the 

coalition, SSR was commonly (but not unanimously) 

defined as a long-term enterprise that “aims to improve 

governance, thereby reducing the risk of state weakness 

or state failure.”4

 Moreover, it was believed to have 

never been successfully and fully implemented in any 

country.5 It was also clear that SSR was directly tied 

to successful economic and governance development. 

Most nations willing to conduct conflict prevention 

and state building missions understood this linkage in 

2002.6 Hendrickson and Karkoszka (2002) discuss the 

new reality that such security entities as militias and 

private armies bring to situations, and further refine 

what the typical security sector includes. Although 

private militias may not be legally authorized by a 

state, they need to be dealt with in the broader picture 

of reforming the other traditional security elements. 

For the purposes of this paper, I will use the the four 

major elements of the security sector as outlined by 

Hendrickson and Karkoszka: (1) armed forces of all 

persuasions that are authorized by law to use force on 

behalf of the government, (2) the elected and appointed 

civilians that are responsible for both the management 

of security forces and the oversight of their activities, 

(3) the institutions that enforce laws and deliver justice 

to the citizens according to official legislation, and (4) 
5

the nonstatutory security forces such as militias and 

private armies.7

Some of the key objectives traditionally focused on 

during the SSR process that will be useful in assessing 

the Afghanistan case include (1) professionalizing 

all the security forces, (2) developing the capacity of 

civil servants to “manage and oversee the security 

sector,”8

 (3) creating an environment that protects 

human rights, (4) nurturing a civil society that has the 

capability of surveilling the security sector and pressing 

for change or giving advice to the civil authorities on 

matters related to the security sector, (5) establishing 

transparency in security matters so the citizens can 

have a basic understanding of the issue, (6) ensuring 

that the security sector operates within national and 

international legal frameworks, and (7) convincing 

regional actors that share the problems of the troubled 

nation to support the reforms (see Table 1).9

Table 1. Traditional SSR Objectives.

Professionalize security forces

Develop capacity in the civil servants

Create an environment that protects human rights

Ensure the civil society can observe, press for change, 

and give advice about the security sector

Establish transparency in security matters and aid citizens 

to gain a basic understanding of them

Ensure the security sector operates within national and 

international legal frameworks

Convince regional actors to support the SSR process.
6

For this paper, I have chosen to detail the role of 

four of the typical actors involved in SSR. First are 

the donor nations that choose to take on a role in 

SSR. Second is the recipient state itself, in this case 

the Afghans. Third are the multilateral players whose 

focuses are traditionally towards development; these 

can be United Nations (UN) elements, SSR experts, or 

NGOs. The fourth element consists of regional security 

cooperation entities like the North Atlantic Treaty 

Organization (NATO) or the Association of Southeast 

Asian Nations (ASEAN). (See Table 2.) An explanation 

of the role of some of the key actors follows.10

Table 2. Typical Actors within the SSR Process.

The main donor state actors included the USSC, 

the Chief of the Office of Military CooperationAfghanistan (OMC-A), the Commander of Coalition 

Joint Task Force 180 (CJTF-180), and the main donor 

nation Ambassadors to Afghanistan. The Afghan 

government actors included the President and nearly 

his entire cabinet. The primary multilateral actor was 

the UN Special Representative of the Secretary General 

(SRSG), who worked closely with the USSC. He was 

assisted by numerous UN agency leaders specializing 

Main donor nations/Lead Nations

Recipient State

Multilateral Players

Regional Security Cooperation Establishments
7

in various SSR pillars (see Table 3). Finally, the regional 

security cooperation actor was NATO, represented 

by the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) 

commander. 

Table 3. Five Security Sector Reform Lead Nations 

and Pillars Determined by the Bonn Process.

The U.S. SSR Concept and What It Meant for 

Afghanistan.

11

In the summer of 2002 after 8 months of military 

action in Afghanistan, U.S. Secretary of Defense 

Donald Rumsfeld, wanting a senior military officer 

to assess and better coordinate the SSR process in 

Afghanistan, selected then-Major General Karl W. 

Eikenberry, an officer with Infantry (up to Assistant 

Division Commander level) and Foreign Area Officer 

experience (up to the one-star level), from the Army 

Staff to become the first USSC for Afghanistan. 

General Eikenberry was tasked to assemble a team 

from the U.S. Government, the Afghan Government, 

and international community actors that could better 

tackle the SSR process. There was a personal interest on 

Germany Police Reform

Italy Judicial Reform

Japan (UN) Disarmament, Demobilization, and 

Reintegration (DDR)

United Kingdom CounterNarcotics

United States Military Reform: Afghan National Army 

(ANA) and Ministry of Defense (MoD)
8

the part of the Defense Secretary to create and fill this 

position as reflected by his conducting the interviews 

for the job himself.12 At this point, the U.S. SSR concept 

was far from solidified; in fact, the concept of an SSR 

working group within the U.S. Government was not 

formalized until about 2004.13 Before he departed for 

Afghanistan, an additional portfolio titled Chief of the 

Office of Military Cooperation-Afghanistan (OMC-A) 

was added to General Eikenberry’s duty description. 

Though the OMC-A billet was being filled at the time 

by a U.S. brigadier general, discussion among the Joint 

Staff, Central Command (CENTCOM), and the Office 

of Secretary of Defense (OSD) had determined that 

the USSC should be dual-hatted as the Chief of the 

OMC-A.

Although the dire situation on the ground in 

Afghanistan after decades of war and civil strife actually 

made the term building more adequate than reform, the 

Department of Defense (DoD) chose to call the mission 

Security Sector Reform (SSR). The devastation of human 

capital, infrastructure, and societal institutions above 

the tribal structure all added to the herculean task the 

United States and the Coalition were undertaking.

The position of USSC was unique and possibly 

unprecedented; thus many agencies, departments, and 

bureaucrats wanted to have input into the duties and 

limits of this job. This was understandable, given the 

number of agencies the person would be coordinating 

with and the traditional non-DoD agency areas that 

the coordinator would be operating in. After several 

months, OSD, the Joint Staff, CENTCOM, CJTF-180, 

the State Department, and the U.S. Embassy Kabul 

reached an acceptable understanding for the Terms 

of Reference in which the USSC would operate. The 

understanding embraced the following initial essential 

tasks and objectives.14
9

The primary task for the USSC was to accelerate the 

development of a Security Sector Reform working group that 

would include the five lead nations, the Afghan government, 

and the UN. Additionally he would ensure that all SSR 

programs were compatible with and supportive of the Afghan 

government’s goals and objectives. A secondary task was 

to advise the State and Defense Departments on all matters 

involved with the Security Sector Reform process through 

the USCENTCOM and U.S. Embassy Kabul. 

The major objectives included establishment of the 

SSR forum, expansion of the organizational SSR capacities 

of lead nation embassies in Kabul (identifying their needs 

and coordinating for assistance), facilitating the acceleration 

of SSR work in the provinces, and synchronization of the 

Afghan National Army (ANA) building program and Afghan 

DDR plans to ensure they were politically and logistically 

feasible.15 While no clear criteria for success were given 

at this time, it was hoped by OSD and USCENTCOM 

that near-term gains would be made by developing a 

better understanding of the current state of the Security 

Sector on the ground and executing recommendations 

on ways to accelerate security from the USSC.16

Preparing for an SSR Mission.

One of the dilemmas in preparing for this mission 

was that in 2002 there was no U.S. Government model 

or doctrine that detailed the SSR process. In preparation 

for the deployment, the USSC relied on four distinct 

sources of information: 

1. The Bonn frameworks that stipulated how the 

Afghan government would function and delineated 

which of the G-8 nations would be responsible for each 

of the five primary security pillars. 

2. The basic military officer problem-solving 

method: identify and assess the issues and then create 
10

a plan to solve them. This method was used to execute 

the plan, assess the execution, and periodically make 

changes when necessary.

3. Civilian experts that had been observing that 

region of the world for years, including journalists and 

authors such as Barnett Rubin, Ahmed Rashid, and 

Carlotta Gall, to name a few. These civilians would 

have access to the USSC once he arrived in Kabul, 

maintaining a continuous dialogue during his tour. 

4. Numerous U.S. Government agency updates and 

reports on the situation. 

When asked how he would describe the initial 

planning and execution of the SSR process, General 

Eikenberry replied:

Overall it might be termed exploratory learning because 

the many uncertainties of the Afghanistan mission 

added to the steepness of the learning curve. They 

included: (1) Lack of doctrine for nation building on this 

level of destruction. (2) Lack of cooperative agreements 

among the lead nations as to the scope of their efforts 

and willingness to cooperate. (3) The unprecedented 

nature of building a security sector in a nation that is 

so damaged from 30 years civil war and humanitarian 

disaster.17

The Security Coordinator developed four initial 

short-term goals to be executed upon arrival in Kabul. 

The first goal was to take stock of the situation on the 

ground, to include the environment, the infrastructure, 

the institutions, and the human capital. The next goal 

was to meet with the SSR actors from all sides—military, civilian, Afghan, and Coalition. The third goal 

was to establish relationships with necessary players 

within the SSR realm and beyond to include all relevant 

government officials. The final goal was to identify 
11

the key stakeholders in the process and evaluate their 

capabilities.

Before he left the United States, General Eikenberry 

ran into two additional obstacles as he tried to define 

a clear initial strategy for Afghanistan’s SSR project. 

First, the key stakeholders (the UN, United States, 

European partners, and Afghans) did not have a clear 

understanding of the Afghanistan crisis; and second, it 

was unclear what resources and expertise each nation 

was bringing to the table or what level of commitment 

they were willing to give to this project. Literally 

building a nation was not a challenge to be taken 

lightly. The SSR strategy would remain imprecise 

until these two uncertainties were resolved. Until an 

assessment was made, the basic strategy would follow 

the four main steps outlined in Table 4.

Table 4. Initial SSR Strategy.

On the Ground in Afghanistan: An Assessment.

After General Eikenberry arrived in Kabul, an 

assessment of the initial strategy revealed who the 

key actors were, how prepared each element of the 

1. Assess and identify the key actors. 

2. Establish a mechanism for information sharing and network 

building.

3. Go beyond information sharing to coordination of Security 

Sector areas.

4. Begin collaboration on tasks so as to create synergy in the 

SSR process.

(The underlying theory of this strategy was to build the Afghan 

capacity at each stage.)
12

SSR process was, and how to proceed. The assessment 

ended with the selection of the SSR Forum participants 

and a newly agreed-upon SSR strategy.

Among the key players most directly involved 

in the SSR forum, UN Special Representative of the 

Secretary General (SRSG) Lakhdar Brahimi was 

chosen to head the forum, working side by side with 

General Eikenberry on all SSR issues. His presence 

lent credibility, coherence, counsel, and leadership to 

the SSR Forum. His years of experience and expertise 

in SSR-related matters and ability to strengthen 

institutions were critical to motivating other actors 

to step forward and take risks to make real change in 

Afghanistan. SSR daily operations were managed by 

General Eikenberry, the USSC, who determined the 

needs of SSR and provided strategic guidance and 

advice to all members of the forum through frequent 

bilateral and multilateral meetings. He additionally 

filled the role of Chief of the Office of Military 

Cooperation-Afghanistan (OMC-A), which made him 

the leader of the organization tasked with building the 

ANA and reforming the Afghan Ministry of Defense 

and the government agencies providing oversight of 

the military.

Beyond the SSR leadership were the five lead 

nations’ representatives to Afghanistan: for Germany, 

Ambassador Eberle and Deputy Chief of Mission 

(DCM) Schlaudraff; for the United States, Ambassador 

Finn, Special Ambassador Taylor, and later Chargé 

d’Affaires David Sedney; for the United Kingdom 

(UK), Ambassador Nash; for Japan, Ambassador 

Komano and DCM Miyahara; and for Italy, Ambassador 

Giorgi. The forum also included numerous defense 

attachés, political officers, and security sector project 

officers and members. Two other critical members 
13

of the SSR team from the UN included Mr. Sultan 

Aziz from the United Nations Assistance Mission in 

Afghanistan (UNAMA), who was working on DDR 

with the Japanese, and Mr. Jean Arnault, the Deputy 

to Special Representative Brahimi and a key counsel 

to the USSC. Finally, from the Coalition were the 

International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) team 

which was normally represented by the Commander 

or Deputy Commander and their Political Advisors, 

and the Commanders of Combined Joint Task Force 

(CJTF)-180, Lieutenant Generals Dan McNeill and John 

Vines.

Figure 2. SSR Senior Working Group at the British 

Embassy Summer 2003.

(Left to Right: German Representative, U.S. Chargé 

d’ Affaires Sedney, Afghan NSA Dr. Rassoul, 

Japanese Ambassador Komano, UNSRSG Brahimi, 

USSC MG Eikenberry, British Ambassador Nash, 

Italian Ambassador Giorgi, ISAF Commander LTG 

Gliemeroth.)
14

The primary Afghan asset on behalf of the SSR 

forum was President Karzai, who was crucial to two of 

the pillars, the development of the ANA and launching 

DDR. The future of each of these pillars depended on 

the other; additionally, their success played a critical 

political role because the President could not truly 

consolidate his administration and secure his citizens 

until DDR occurred. Although President Karzai did 

not attend the forums, his support of the process was 

invaluable because he led the Afghan buy-in into the 

concept of SSR. Afghan National Security Advisor 

Dr. Rassoul and President Karzai’s Chief of Staff Said

Jawad were the two critical actors who stayed abreast 

of SSR issues. Though not in attendance at all forums, 

they were always briefed on the latest actions and 

helped the SSR team select appropriate Afghan 

representatives to attend the SSR forums. Finally, 

key actors included the five Afghans who headed 

the Security Pillars being reformed. These members 

changed over time and did not always attend the 

formal SSR Forum, but they were the key interlocutors 

with the lead nation SSR experts, usually meeting on at 

least a weekly basis to address the reform issues.18

A quick assessment of the current SSR activities 

revealed a divergence in preparedness, manpower, 

and resources among the countries.

1. While the United States had no organized SSR 

effort, its initial strategy for building the ANA and 

reforming the MoD was in place and was being swiftly 

executed by a very small but resourceful team of 

personnel tasked with a massive effort and given few 

resources. 

2. Japan had good political leadership and linkages 

to the UN agencies helping to execute the DDR process 
15

and had a committed aid package, but was handicapped 

by the small size of its staff.

3. Germany had a very narrow training-centric 

vision of what its role was going to be in reforming 

the police and very few personnel committed to the 

endeavor.

4. The UK was inadequately resourced to execute 

its counternarcotics role, mainly due to a lack of 

manpower.

5. Italy was the least prepared in terms of resources, 

vision for success, and personnel committed to the 

judicial sector reforms.

Simply put, no country was really ready for the 

mission it had signed up for. Only two of the five 

lead nations had developed adequate, detailed longterm visions for success—the U.S. team building the 

ANA and the Japanese/UN team performing DDR. 

The following roadmap (Table 5) is an example of the 

type of broad vision for reform that would have been 

helpful to the SSR process if possessed by the other lead 

nations. This vision provided the kind of focus needed 

to sustain the U.S. reform effort for at least a year. 

After self-examination, the SSR forum members 

realized that the initial overall long-term plan for SSR 

in Afghanistan was feasible in the abstract, but that 

they lacked resources and would be able to take the 

effort only so far based on their current capabilities. 

The nations contacted their governments for more 

resources to alleviate the limitations. Some states were 

more successful than others in changing their vision 

for SSR and in gaining the appropriate resources to 

execute their plans. The final SSR strategy was created
16

Table 5. U.S. Afghan Army Building and MoD 

Reform Plan October 2002.

 after assessing the new assets the nations had pledged 

towards the mission and acknowledging the lack of 

resources that they would have to live with. The final 

strategy is outlined in Table 6.

Carrying out SSR.

To explain how the SSR process was executed, 

specific events that were conducted to support the 

strategy are analyzed. The reader will gain a better idea 

Task: The Chief of the Office of Military CooperationAfghanistan (OMC-A) will plan and direct U.S./Coalition 

efforts to reform the MoD and field the Afghan National Army 

(ANA) Central Corps by June 2004 and solicit international 

donations for the Afghan Armed Forces.

Major Objectives:

• Ensure activation of Central Corps HQ and its 3 Brigades 

by 1 Oct 2003

• Develop and begin implementation of Afghan MoD/General 

Staff reform plan

• Establish ANA institutional support systems including 

officer and NCO schools, ANA training and doctrine 

directorate, and garrison support elements

• Design and build OMC-A structure consisting of U.S./

Coalition military, contractor, and Afghan civilian and 

military personnel capable of managing the ANA building 

program as it increases in scope and complexity

• Increase international and Afghan domestic support for 

and confidence in ANA through the maintenance of quality 

within the force and the conduct of effective information 

operations. 
17

Table 6. Final SSR Strategy.

of what is required of a SSR coordinator by looking at 

a description of the typical daily, weekly, and monthly

events that the USSC participated in and what areas 

consumed most of his time. Finally, a discussion of 

some of the surprising and disappointing activities 

and issues that the USSC encountered in his duties 

will raise awareness of the pitfalls that exist in wartorn regions.

In general, SSR forums were conducted in the 

following manner. The host of the meeting was 

chosen 1 month prior to the event and was responsible 

for developing the program for that meeting and 

coordinating and preparing the attendees. The senior 

SSR leaders would all be in attendance, along with 

selected Afghan representatives associated with that 

month’s topic. Additionally, all the staff and special 

guests would be present for the discussion. The USSC 

would make the opening remarks to refocus the team 

and then hand it over to the UN Special Representative 

of the Secretary General (SRSG) for the UN perspective 

on events. After the leadership finished the opening 

1. Establish a forum that at first provides a conduit for 

information sharing about SSR issues and later becomes a 

vehicle for collaboration among the key actors.

2. Build a network of interested actors that would proactively 

manage and solve the issues in their areas of interest.

3. Build the Afghan government capacity.

4. Develop strategic plans among and agreed upon by all actors 

so as to identify and fix problems by leveraging the resources 

from their nations or the international community.
18

remarks, each stakeholder would give an update on 

his particular area, and the floor would be opened for 

specially slated topics. Some of the areas discussed 

in the meetings included the introduction of new 

military concepts like the Provincial Reconstruction 

Teams and the role of Afghan actors in various SSR 

areas. One of the items often highlighted was the need 

for synchronized planning and execution of reforms. 

Another key element of the meeting was deciding the 

next major step to be taken with members’ Afghan 

counterparts. Finally, these meetings allowed for 

discussions of recent setbacks to coordinate surging 

resources for getting back on track, meeting obstacles 

that needed to be overcome, or speeding up the reform 

of one sector to relieve pressure on another.

These forums occurred monthly, which seemed to 

be the right frequency to allow recognizable progress 

to be made and a sufficient number of new problems 

to arise that required attention. These monthly 

meetings were not the only occasions that SSR team 

members met, but they were the only scheduled times 

for the entire extended group to gather. Bilateral and 

multilateral meetings frequently occurred to follow 

up on initial plans or handle emergency issues. The 

meetings contributed to the success of all four elements 

of the SSR strategy, although it was weakest in helping 

to build Afghan government capacity.19

Bilateral and multilateral meetings on SSR subjects 

were another key event for the success of the program. 

A model for how the security sector reform multilateral 

meetings could work was the synchronization between 

the Army and Police standing up, on one hand, and the 

militias standing down, on the other (see Table 3). This 

effort was always synchronized to ensure that the lead 

nations developed timelines and plans that balanced 
19

their demobilization events with security forces 

recruiting events. The Japanese, UN, Germans, and 

Americans met continuously and came to agreements 

about the timing of the militia drawdowns throughout 

the year. Because of a lack of resources and an unclear 

method for coordinating the acquisition of their 

resources, not all lead nations were coordinated in this 

manner. The nations did well based on the resources 

at hand, but resources were inadequate by all accounts 

because of the immense size of the problem. These 

events also supported the SSR strategy (Table 6) but 

were least successful in fulfilling the fourth element 

(developing mutual strategic plans) since getting more 

resources from any state was nearly always an issue.

What started as a chance for the USSC to meet with 

the Afghan citizens on the street and assess in person 

the needs of the people turned into one of the most 

useful events for building the Afghan government 

capacity. The Afghan National Army recruiting/

awareness trips outside of Kabul to the provinces were 

one of the most critical events every week. There were 

a few different goals for these trips. Among these goals 

were evaluating security forces, spreading awareness 

of the Afghan National Army and Police, meeting with 

governors, and talking to tribal leaders. The members on 

the trips changed weekly, but generally they consisted 

of the USSC, various Afghan ministers, Afghan military 

personnel, lead nation embassy personnel, at least one 

lead nation Ambassador, U.S. personnel involved with 

ANA or SSR tasks, UN representatives, and IGO/NGO 

representatives.

Another purpose for these trips was to show the 

people of Afghanistan that there really was a new 

government, and that it was ethnically mixed and 

interested in their issues. Still another purpose was to 
20

explain and display the new security institutions to the 

provinces, while promoting ANA or Police recruiting. 

Additionally, it gave the Afghan people an opportunity 

to put a face with their new national government 

leaders’ names. Also, it allowed provincial leaders 

to talk shop with the central government, which was 

often impossible because of poor communication 

and transport. Finally, the trips allowed the Afghan 

ministers to see their tasks and responsibilities outside 

of Kabul and to let them be seen by their people and 

understand that, as national leaders, they now served 

all the people of Afghanistan and not just one ethnic 

group or region.

General Eikenberry recalled that one of the best 

examples of how he knew success had been achieved 

through these weekly trips was the locals’ change of 

focus from him to the Afghans. He noted that on the 

early trips the entire traveling party would follow 

him around and observe his interactions. Later, 

they followed his lead, yet were still quite unsure of 

themselves, mostly talking among themselves and not 

really engaging the locals. In still later trips, however, 

he often found himself standing alone, except for his 

security detail, as the Afghan members were immersed 

in crowds of people, interacting with them, answering 

questions about their ministries, and giving little 

speeches. Once the general saw this new dynamic, 

he knew the Afghan officials were developing one of 

the requisite skills for leaders in a representative and 

accountable state.20

 A series of events was launched in March 2003 that 

would require the total involvement of the Afghan 

government leaders and the international community 

in highlighting and working through all the securityrelated issues still simmering in the country. The first 

was a trip to the United States for the two primary 
21

leaders of the Intelligence Service (NDS) and the 

two key leaders of the MoD to engage with their 

counterparts in the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) 

and the Pentagon and to observe the training of cadets, 

noncommissioned officers (NCOs), special forces, 

infantry soldiers, and officers at numerous American 

bases. This visit helped to impress upon the leaders 

the level of responsibility they had laid claim to as 

Kabul was retaken when the Taliban retreated. It also 

underscored the need for them to be responsible actors 

on the national stage and support the international 

community in its efforts to reform the security sector.

The next such event, a truce, occurred in April 

2003 when the Afghan Ministry of Defense and 

the Commander of CJTF-180 co-hosted a working 

conference for senior military leaders. This meeting 

allowed for the open discussion of the Afghan national 

security situation, particularly the relations between the 

reforming MoD and General Staff and the commanders/

warlords from throughout the country. Discussions 

ranged from the building of the Afghan National Army 

(ANA) to the role that DDR would play in developing 

this new security force. As can be imagined, discussions 

were lively, but after 2 days the assembled group came 

to an understanding about what was going to happen. 

That does not mean that all were necessarily happy or 

supportive of the arrangement, but they understood it. 

The second day of the conference included a visit to 

the Kabul Military Training Center where the Afghan, 

French, British, and American trainers spent a few 

hours explaining and demonstrating the tasks and 

skills the Afghan Army was learning. The visit ended 

with an opportunity for the commanders/warlords 

to share lunch with new ANA soldiers in the dining 

facility and spend time asking the troops questions 

and assessing for themselves the capabilities of the new 
22

Army. The commanders were quite surprised to see a 

force that was ethnically integrated down to the squad 

level. The conference definitely helped the Afghans to 

gain skills in negotiation and public speaking and also 

subtly showed off to the commanders the new Army 

supported by the coalition that was at the disposal of 

the central government. Particularly, it allowed them 

to compare the ANA with the regional militias still 

under their control. This helped to increase acceptance 

of the SSR strategy by Afghans outside the official 

government channels, but as history shows it did not 

heal all wounds and end all disputes.

Figure 3. Senior Commanders of the Northern 

Alliance tour the Kabul Military Training Center 

where the New Afghan Army was being built, April 

21, 2003.

(Left to Right: Hazrat Ali, Atiqula Bariyali, Ismail 

Khan, Atta Mohammad Atta, and Daud Khan)

The conference agenda included discussions on the 

national vision and strategy, the current status of the 

reform effort, shaping the Afghan forces, the principles 

of organizing the military, training and equipping the 

ANA, the support systems of the military, and a way 

forward.21 This conference served many purposes, but 
23

it was particularly critical in pursuading Minister of 

Defense Fahim Khan to support both the Coalition and 

President Karzai’s plan to remove all the non-ANA 

military personnel (Northern Alliance fighters) from 

the Presidential Palace barracks (thus removing the 

Alliance fighters from close proximity to a planned 

ANA brigade). Shortly after this conference, the 

Defense Minister gave in to these demands, paving the 

way for a peaceful transition between the Northern 

Alliance troops and the ANA after months of effort.22

This is just one example of the painfully slow yet 

persistent approach that was necessary to communicate 

peacefully with the Northern Alliance leaders in an 

attempt to avoid another civil war or deadly uprising 

that might sideline the entire SSR process. 

Figure 4. A moment that would have been 

unthinkable one year before as “once” bitter 

enemies discuss the future of Afghanistan’s security 

forces in a seemly manner, April 2003.

In July 2003 the Afghan government and UNAMA, 

supported and resourced by the USSC, hosted the 

Afghan SSR Symposium. It represented an opportunity 
24

for the President and his Cabinet to gather together all 

the members of the Provincial and Central Government 

and discuss the path forward for Afghanistan, to 

include how the SSR process could and would aid 

the development of the country. This event clearly 

reinforced all the elements of the SSR strategy and was 

seen by the majority of the attendees as a success. The 

format consisted of a series of roundtable discussions 

co-led by members of the Afghan government and 

international organizations. The entire event was 

filmed and aired on television for the Afghan people, 

allowing them to observe their government in action 

with pens and paper instead of Kalashnikovs. The SSR 

Forum and Afghan government were pleased with the 

outcome of the symposium, the final event of a long 

drawn-out maneuver, despite the fact that turning 

the discussion points into action would prove to be 

difficult in the coming months. Such events, however 

modest in their immediate successes, were moving 

Afghanistan in the right direction and would be useful 

models for later practitioners of SSR.

Figure 5. President Karzai flanked by the Afghan 

and International team that participated in the SSR 

Symposium, July 2003.
25

As the head of the effort to reform the Afghan 

military, the USSC enhanced the process through 

three key weekly and monthly events. First were his 

weekly information exchange and negotiating sessions 

with the Deputy Minister of Defense Atiqulla Baryalai. 

This Afghan leader was critical to MoD reform and 

building the ANA and DDR. These efforts were closely 

entwined, often requiring movement in one area to 

allow progress in another. These sessions, which could 

often last over 4 hours, yielded many concessions 

from the Northern Alliance factions of the government 

regarding decreased military capability among 

the militias, thus paving the way for better overall 

security. These events were also essential for showing 

by example how business needed to be conducted in 

the new MoD, thereby building Afghan government 

capacity.

Second was his attendance at all graduations and 

special events related to security forces training. Third 

was his faithful monitoring and observation of the 

training of security forces not only in Kabul, but also in 

the provinces where they were conducting real world 

operations. These latter two techniques allowed the 

USSC to evaluate the capabilities of the forces and to 

ensure participation of the Afghan government leaders 

in these activities by his own presence. The techniques 

provided valuable leverage, since the Afghans would 

never want to be found lacking compared to an 

American. 

Bilateral and multilateral meetings with various 

members of the Afghan and international team 

consumed the majority of the USSC’s time. These ranged from late-night discussions with cabinet members 

who had concerns with the actions of a particular 

warlord, to in-depth planning and advisory sessions 
26

with President Karzai and the UN SRSG. Some of the 

most useful meetings for determining the direction of 

the SSR process were with UN SRSG Lakhdar Brahimi. 

He was an excellent source of expertise and common 

sense, rapidly boiling down problems and devising 

workable solutions for the international community. 

These meetings clearly supported the SSR strategy 

except as related to building Afghan capacity. Separate 

meetings with the UN SRSG and President Karzai 

enabled the SSR leadership to learn what the Afghan 

people wanted and needed from the international 

community. These meetings also allowed the SSR 

leaders to evaluate President Karzai’s competence as 

he grew into his role of national leader. These and 

numerous other meetings with President Karzai’s 

Cabinet and staff helped the SSR leaders determine 

the growth of the Afghan government’s capacity for 

governing and ascertaining when they could increase 

expectations.

Finally, the interaction between all the Afghan 

leaders, regardless of their portfolio, and the SSR 

forum members allowed the international community 

to ensure an Afghan embrace of the SSR process and 

make certain that its objectives were reinforcing the 

goals of the other nonsecurity sectors in country. The 

meetings included Afghans from all departments—

finance, reconstruction, tribal relations, information 

and culture, health care, rural development, and 

communications.23

It may be useful to view the SSR coordinator’s 

agenda longitudinally in his meetings with Afghan and 

international actors. Such a view will provide a rough 

idea about the issues that seemed to rise to the top and 

require action or discussion. Analysis of 4 months of 

USSC meetings and events (over 500) suggests that 80 
27

percent of them were focused on meetings with the U.S. 

Ambassador, SRSG Brahimi, and other UN officials; on 

meeting with the leaders involved with reforming the 

ANA and MoD; on discussions with USCENTCOM, 

OSD, the Joint Staff, Deputy Minister Defense Baryalai, 

Afghan Chief of Staff General Delawar, the CJTF-180 

commander, the ISAF commander (police reforms, 

counternarcotics activities), the DDR (judicial reform), 

and Afghan ministers not involved with SSR. Within 

that 80 percent, the majority of the SSR coordinator’s 

time revolved around meetings with the U.S. Country 

Team or the U.S. Ambassador; observing the ANA 

or meeting with their trainers; meeting with key 

Afghans and international leaders in informal settings; 

negotiating with the Afghan Ministry of Defense 

interlocutor; and communicating with U.S. Defense 

and State department leaders. 

The remaining 20 percent of the events focused 

on executive level leaders from the United States and 

Afghanistan, the leaders of other nations assisting in 

building the ANA, Afghans at the provincial and tribal 

level, militia commanders, other leaders from the 

Afghan government, and international Afghan experts. 

These meetings were generally designed to move the 

SSR process forward by resolving conflicts among the 

various actors and also by improving the capabilities 

of the Afghan government through mentoring. Table 

7 describes an agenda of a typical 3-day meeting 

reflecting the diversity of players involved in the SSR 

process and beyond.
28

Day 1

0800 Meeting with U.S. State Department Political Officer, 

U.S. Embassy

0830 Country Team Meeting, U.S. Embassy

0900 Meeting with BG Mulamaki, UN, subject DDR

0930 Update on ANA from ANA Design Team 

1030 Pre-meeting for President Karzai, with U.S. and Japanese 

Ambassadors, U.S. Embassy

1100 Meeting with President Karzai, Palace

1400 Meeting with Deputy Min Def Baryalai, MoD

1600 Observe Officer training with French Ambassador, 

KMTC

1800 Dinner with Tribal elders, ANA recruiting

2200 Send out updates

Day 2

0700 Emails and phone calls

0830 Country Team meeting, U.S. Embassy

0900 Discussions with Afghan officers in Brigade Staff officer 

program

1030 Meeting with Afghan Generals, MG Karemi and BG 

Khan, subject MoD Reform

1130 Discussions with French ISAF component, reference 

ANA training support opportunities

1300 Graduation speaker, Presidents Protective Service 

Special Agents

1400 Meeting with Minister of Finance, Finance Ministry

1730 Meeting with Afghan National Security Advisor, NSC 

building

1900 Dinner with Commander British Forces, reference ANA 

NCO training

2200 Send out updates 
29

Table 7. Typical 3-Day USSC Meeting Agenda.

Two final areas should be discussed to explain the 

SSR strategy adequately. First, there were unexpected 

positive events that should be replicated by future SSR 

practitioners. Unexpected positive events included 

the following: nations such as France and others 

stepped up to assist in reforming the military, even 

though they did not sign up as a lead nation during 

the Bonn process; many smaller nations or states that 

could not send large numbers of troops were very 

helpful to the production of a quality military force, 

e.g., the French who were placed in charge of training 

the ANA officers; nations that participated in the 

ISAF mission continued to step forward and assist 

in specific tasks and skills training of the ANA, e.g., 

medicine and mine detection; and ex-Warsaw Pact 

officers that were assigned to the ANA design team 

volunteered to assist in transforming the old Soviet 

Day 3

0830 Country Team meeting, U.S. Embassy

0900 Meeting with PRT political officer from Mazar- e-Sharif

0930 ANA update brief from coalition trainers

1100 Meeting with Barnett Rubin, various Afghanistan 

topics

1230 Background update with Financial Times reporter

1530 Meeting with Deputy Min of Def Baryalai, ANA-MoDDDR

1930 Dinner with key leaders of Afghan Security Forces, 

Ambassador Residence

2300 Send out updates
30

tanks and inexperienced ANA tank troopers into an 

armored fighting force. These types of serendipitously 

offered skills and capabilities are often overlooked, but 

should be capitalized on because they save precious 

time and resources, especially considering the leadtime required in obtaining the additional expertise and 

manpower through official U.S. channels.

Second are the frustrating issues that were associated 

with SSR in Afghanistan but are difficult to avoid when 

conducting this type of mission. The most frustrating 

impediments were, at worst, interference from Afghanistan’s nearest neighbors, and, at best, their nonsupport. 

Such impediments are likely typical in all areas where 

SSR is undertaken. The distraction from the SSR 

mission occasioned by such discussions with large 

neighbor nations regarding their unhelpful actions 

in Afghanistan is clearly trying but unfortunately 

expected. Such states have to live in the neighborhood 

and will be interacting with Afghanistan long after the 

international community leaves. They therefore have 

their own ideas about Afghanistan’s future.24

Assessing SSR in Afghanistan 2002-03.

This section employs the challenges and objectives 

commonly associated with SSR, as highlighted by 

Hendrickson and Karkoszka (2002), to evaluate the 

efforts in Afghanistan. Most of the analysis is based 

on the author’s personal observations and attendance 

at meetings when these areas were being discussed. 

Additional analysis comes from the judgments of other 

participants.

One of the first points that Hendrickson and 

Karkoszka (2002) make is that states cannot become 

democratic and functional without a competent 

security authority operating under oversight by civilian 
31

authority.25 It can surely be said that all members of 

the SSR team understood this concept and worked 

to create the proper oversight by civilians as they 

developed expertise in the security sector. This is not 

to say that the oversight was free of corruption or could 

exercise sufficient power over the security forces, but 

it was a pillar of the process. Clearly more effort must 

be put into this area to yield success. Another point 

they highlight is that earlier intervention forces often 

ended up supplanting the local security forces with the 

donor nation’s own military and failed to prepare the 

state’s security entities for the future when the outside 

actors would depart.26 This self-defeating process was 

clearly not the intended model that the international 

community used for Afghanistan. The ANA and Police 

force were built and trained immediately and fielded 

with Coalition forces as soon as they were capable of 

operating as a unit. Within 1 year, the ANA forces were 

earning high praise for their endurance and tenacity in 

battle from the U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF) 

operating with them. The SSR forum also placed a 

high premium on creating forces that the Afghan 

government could safely control and continuously 

afford.

Hendrickson and Karkoszka (2002) here describe 

three key elements of the shift from the old intervention 

models to SSR:

1. The realignment of security forces’ focus from 

state protection to the protection of the citizens in that 

country, which means the civilian government must 

be involved in the policy of security.

2. The correct choice of security forces selected by 

the government to carry out the security policies.

3. Civilian government whose interests are 

ultimately served by the chosen security policies.27
32

These three factors, crucial to successful SSR, were 

adhered to through the use of the Coalition forces 

to protect the state’s sovereignty so that the Afghan 

troops could focus internally on helping the coalition 

secure the citizens. There were many discussions about 

limiting the size of the army, focusing more efforts on 

building police, and ensuring that President Karzai 

was involved in security decisions, so as to guarantee 

that the best interests of the nation were placed above 

any factional groups.28 The authors felt that the SSR 

agenda is the next logical step in resolving security 

issues because it extends beyond the traditional focus 

of civilian-military (CIVMIL) relations by pursuing 

actual reform of security elements that will make or 

break a nation’s recovery.29 This new paradigm for 

simple CIVMIL relations was replaced with a reform 

agenda that included all security sector areas and 

any government body that could enhance security. In 

this case, SSR was extended to include updates and 

discussions with almost every ministry and deliberately 

planned meetings with Afghan leaders at all levels of 

government.

Their next observation really hits home as one 

looks back at this endeavor. SSR was still not defined 

by international consensus nor had the objectives and 

priorities been agreed upon. At this stage, most of the 

international actors were still working to understand 

the complexities of SSR. They lacked the required 

policies and institutions to conduct SSR in an integrated 

manner.30 It is clear that although some states had a 

fairly good grasp of the process, others were learning 

as they went along, i.e., writing policy and developing 

institutions through trial and error. Results would 
33

have been much better if a clear international model 

had been available, understood, and accepted by the 

actors. However, despite not having a consensus on 

what SSR involved or a clear doctrine to follow, the 

actors worked as a very effective team and followed 

the U.S.-devised strategy very closely, thus increasing 

efficiency and developing synergy.

The list below rank-orders the short-term objectives 

of SSR as outlined by Hendrickson and Karkoszka, 

showing which ones were pursued earliest. Although 

there was focus on all of these objectives, some were 

more immediately doable than others: 

1. Make security forces effective.

2. Improve management of security expenditures.

3. Demobilize and reintegrate unneeded security 

personnel.

4. Replace the military with a police force to provide 

internal state security.

5. Remove military members from their political 

roles.31

While all of these goals were determined to be worth 

striving for, they are not all easily pursued at the same 

time, and some can take years to achieve.

Additionally, Hendrickson and Karkoszka provide 

seven basic governance objectives that should be part 

of SSR; these were highlighted in the introduction. 

The international actors found that pursuing all of 

these objectives was worthy of the SSR team’s time. 

Although success in accomplishing many of the 

objectives relied on host countries capabilities, they 

should be cornerstones of the process. 

1. Professionalizing security forces was a 

straightforward task so far as the Afghan army was 

concerned. However, the process was not as easy with 
34

the police forces already in existence. Their bad habits 

had become ingrained, and corruption was endemic. 

2. Promoting capacity building among civilians for 

providing policy and leadership supervision over the 

security sector was essential. This was a more difficult 

issue because these civilians had factional leanings 

that had to be overcome. Additionally, development 

was slow due to their level of participation in the SSR 

process. For example, the judicial sector reform team 

had a hard time getting the minister and the attorney 

general to cooperate because of their personal, not 

professional, relationship. 

3. Instilling respect for human rights was difficult 

due to the unspeakable level of violence and the 

numerous atrocities that the Afghans had endured and 

perpetrated. This is an area that most felt would take a 

generation to correct. 

4. Nurturing civil society into developing capabilities, such as monitoring the security sector and promoting change and providing input to the government on 

security issues, was especially challenging because the 

government was still forming and a legislative body 

was not in place. This is one area in which the Afghans’ 

tribal culture proved useful, because the elders from 

throughout the country had no qualms about voicing 

their opinions and questioning security leaders. These 

nurturing changes were slow to come due to the 

factional nature of the government, but the mechanisms 

were created to allow for this in the future.

5. Making basic information about security policy 

known to the populace was a critical element of the 

SSR team’s public information plan. Whenever Afghan 

leaders and international actors traveled in the country, 

they spread the news about the new security reforms. 

The USSC made this a weekly event involving all 
35

members of the SSR team. Finally, the security sector 

events and team members were open to the public and 

news media except for especially sensitive meetings.

6. Ensuring that security sector elements are 

operating within national and international law was 

another straightforward task, but it was very difficult 

to do with the limited manpower of some of the lead 

nations and the high level of corruption found in so 

many of the existing ministries.

7. Involving regional players in security issues so as 

to obtain an integrated approach was difficult to achieve in practice and probably should have been pushed 

more aggressively in the process. Though seemingly 

based on common sense, pursuing this objective can 

be a very dangerous endeavor because most regional 

neighbors have certain objectives that conflict with 

those of the nation undergoing reform. Afghanistan’s 

history clearly shows a pattern of regional neighbors 

interfering in its internal affairs for reasons other 

than to assist the Afghan people.32 Hendrickson and 

Karkoszka (2002) seem to offer a clarification of this 

objective later in their article, noting that to truly 

integrate a SSR program, the neighboring states that 

have strategic interests in the recipient nation should 

be viewed separately from other donors to ensure they 

are not executing a hidden and harmful agenda.33

One of the concerns Hendrickson and Karkoszka 

(2002) expressed was the possibility that subsequent 

effects of September 11, 2001 (9/11) might cause future 

interventions to return to the old model in which U.S. 

goals and security of the state would take precedence 

over the protection of the citizens.34 Although the initial 

military intervention has sometimes been labeled 

heavy-handed, from a very early stage the welfare 
36

of innocent Afghan people was elevated to the top of 

the Coalition’s priority list. Within the SSR team, the 

members clearly placed the welfare and safety of the 

Afghans above U.S. military objectives, and there was 

little need to worry about the security of the Afghan 

state because of the overwhelming power of the U.S.-

led Coalition.

The SSR team faced many of the challenges outlined 

by Hendrickson and Karkoszka (2002) and made 

attempts to overcome them.35 On one hand, a lack of 

a shared definition of the SSR process made it hard to 

evaluate progress, but the SSR team’s basic strategy 

helped to define their purpose. On the other hand, the 

lack of detailed individual reform area strategies with 

clear end states made assessment of their current status 

more difficult. The international support of the Afghan 

SSR intervention may have been better than a purely 

ad hoc or seat-of-the-pants approach,36 but they still 

were not very well resourced. Most would agree that 

by the year 2002, the international agencies still had not 

developed the tools needed to assess the effectiveness 

of SSR policy, but they certainly played a crucial part 

in advising and assisting the leaders of the SSR team 

in its drive toward successful ends. Hendrickson and 

Karkoszka (2002) observe that the issue of receptivity 

among recipient states arises because there is fear that 

international actors are pushing western concepts 

on them. This was clearly the feeling among some of 

the Afghans, while others were receptive to change 

and were not as particular about which culture it was 

derived from. The SSR team understood the importance 

of the buy-in from the Afghans and made it a key 

element of their endeavor. Some of the SSR process may 

indeed have been handicapped by the donor states’ 

emphasis on imposing western concepts and norms on 

the Afghans, while other reformers tried to ensure that 
37

the Afghan culture and way of doing business must be 

sensitively accommodated when reforming. Building 

the ANA presents a clear example of the latter, where 

over five nations were involved in the training. In the 

end, the Afghans were allowed to modify the training 

to meet their values and institutional history. The 

ANA had to be the Afghan’s institution, not that of the 

Western builders.

Hendrickson and Karkoszka (2002) also included 

a section describing the special difficulties for SSR 

programs in unfavorable environments, such as wartorn countries just emerging from long civil wars. 

This section seems applicable to the present case. 

Hendrickson and Karkoszka (2002) noted that the 

hardest place to conduct SSR is in a conflict-ridden area, 

because the urgency for reforms can force a timetable 

on the reformers. But the need for a functioning security 

force may preclude the very reforms that are so sorely 

needed. The SSR leadership had to guard against 

requests to speed things up because they felt that, in 

the long run, durable reform of high quality would be 

more useful to Afghanistan than immediate reform 

that proved transient. Unfortunately, the immediate 

need for police forces often outweighed the desire to 

train them correctly, and this caused problems for the 

Afghans. 

Hendrickson and Karkoszka (2002) point out that 

governments may be reluctant to take on reforms 

because of weakness and lack of wherewithal. This 

was recognized by the SSR team and became one of 

the larger hurdles to overcome in the reform process, 

especially in the sectors that were heavily factionalized. 

In such sectors, reform could translate to loss of power 

by one or another group. Often a lower priority was 

given to national ownership of the reform, building 
38

civilian capacity, and developing a strategic planning 

capability because of the dangers and uncertainties 

in a war zone. To ensure it was done right the first 

time, the SSR team held to the high priority to have 

the Afghans take ownership of the process. That being 

said, it was recognized by all members that they could 

have done a better job of persuading the Afghans to 

take ownership earlier in the process. It would be hard 

to say that things would have gone any smoother if 

the Afghans were involved sooner, because at the early 

stages the international community was still trying to 

figure out their objectives. Thus it might not be helpful 

for the recipient country to have the early turmoil of 

SSR strategy building as a model.

Two final points that were raised by Hendrickson 

and Karkoszka (2002) bear discussion here. First, a 

higher priority needs to be given to bringing together 

the conflicting internal factions to address common 

SSR issues and persuade them all to accept the concept. 

This was recognized fairly early by the SSR team, and 

many of the key events throughout the year were 

geared towards this objective. The series of conferences 

ending in the Afghan SSR Symposium present an 

excellent example.37 Second, a point prophetically 

made by Hendrickson and Karkoszka (2002) was 

that other perspectives, like those of NGOs and SSR 

experts, are often absent from the SSR discussion and 

therefore are not integrated into the SSR policy.38 As 

noted in the introduction, this was one of the measures 

that probably could have had a huge beneficial effect 

on the coordination between development and aid 

organizations and the SSR team. The points made 

by Hendrickson and Karkoszka would form a useful 

checklist for planners of SSR operations and would 

serve as an assessment tool to check the status of 
39

the program once under way. The Afghan SSR team 

made many strides towards addressing some of the 

objectives and challenges facing it but clearly fell short 

on others.

Grading the SSR Strategy.

After reviewing many of the assessments of SSR in 

Afghanistan, we find that the pillars of the program have 

been evaluated many times over.39 What better way to 

grade the SSR process than to ask the architect of the 

plan what he thought of their efforts in implementing 

it? General Eikenberry made the following assessment 

after serving in Afghanistan as the commander of the 

Coalition forces in 2005 and working at NATO as the 

Deputy Chairman of the NATO Military Committee. 

His advice to me in writing this paper was to make 

sure that you do not exclude treatment of our faults, 

because the paper will not be useful if it says simply, 

“We did great, but everyone else screwed things up.”40

Table 8 highlights the final assessment of the SSR 

strategy based on what the SSR team originally set out 

to do in October 2002.

Table 8. Grading Implementation of the SSR 

Strategy, 2002-03.

1. Establish a forum that initially provides a conduit for 

information sharing about SSR issues but later becomes a 

vehicle for collaboration among the key actors. Grade: A- to 

B+

2. Build a network of interested actors that would proactively 

manage and solve the issues in their areas of interest. Grade: 

B+ to A3. Build the Afghan government capacity. Grade: C4. Develop consensus-based strategic plans that identify and fix 

problems by leveraging the resources from all actors’ nations 

or the international community. Grade: D
40

Thoughts for Improvement in SSR.

Based upon the analysis of the SSR process in 

Afghanistan as well as the collective thoughts of 

people who have executed SSR in one of the most 

difficult environments in the world, many lessons have 

emerged.

Communication:

• The chain of command for the USSC was a bit 

murky partly because of the novelty of having 

a Security Coordinator. In the U.S. model, we 

traditionally have had field commanders and 

diplomats, whereas in 2002 we had a hybrid 

position that fell in the middle.

• The USSC received excellent basic guidance 

from the senior operational commander: Be 

transparent in all endeavors and coordinate 

with all appropriate parties so no one was 

surprised. Specifically, he laid down the 

requirements that (1) the ANA be ethnically 

integrated down to the squad level and that only 

he would make a decision to break that rule; (2) 

all recommendations and requests for resources 

from DoD would go through him to ensure 

that all resource requests were synchronized; 

and (3) that with regard to all Coalition actions, 

it be made clear and distinct to the Afghan 

government as to the role of the CJTF-180, 

on one hand, and the roles of the dual-hatted 

USSC/OMC-A on the other. These basic rules 

made things run very smoothly and should be 

modified very little for future operations.

• The chain of command should be clarified 

back to Washington, DC (or any capital), and 
41

the reporting process for requests of non-DoD 

specific assets. It should be more specific about 

who needs to know what is not working and 

how those issues can be fixed rapidly. The role 

that the U.S. Ambassador plays if he is not the 

USSC should also be clarified. Responsibility 

for solutions for nonmilitary issues of security 

should be made clear. The Security Coordinator 

may or may not be the right person to 

communicate these issues directly with the 

Administration. All OMC-A (ANA building) 

tasks, are a DoD function, so the DoD chain of 

command should be used. With USSC (SSR) 

tasks, it is not as clear because one is coordinating the efforts of other nations. So when a 

problem with a nation’s efforts surfaces that it 

cannot or will not resolve, the issue arises as 

to where the problem is referred—the United 

States, that country’s national government, or 

the UN?

• Not all nations have a clear mandate or the ability 

to reinforce their efforts. For example, when the 

United States realized it needed more resources 

to build the ANA and reform the MoD, it 

requested and received the increased resources 

it asked for, but it was not the same for other 

states. For initial SSR planning conferences, 

(1) nations must develop a clear channel to 

communicate to their government what they 

need (including all instruments of national 

power), and (2) initial international plans need 

to be more specific as to how a state is going to 

fulfill its role if it signs on as a lead nation in 

the SSR process (end state sought and means of 

transport to theater should be in writing).
42

• Fortunately for the SSR team, some public 

incidents and failures helped to speed resources 

to Afghanistan, but overall the assistance and 

priority given to the enterprise by all states 

and the UN were inadequate to the task. It may 

never be known whether the SSR team was 

not asking the right people for help or whether 

donor governments were not listening, but it is 

clear that the resources were not received.

Staffing: 

• Experts in SSR and related skill sets should be 

assembled before departure so they can plan as 

a team before hitting the ground. It is not useful 

to have an ad hoc staff that gets replacements 

by luck of the draw. For example, the OMC-A 

consisted of eight people when the USSC arrived, 

and most members of the original team did not 

know each other before arriving in Afghanistan. 

The leadership did not select future additions 

to the team, and new members often had to 

be returned home and replaced with more 

qualified people. This process wasted time and 

caused continuity issues between the Afghans 

and Coalition.

• The staff and units involved with SSR need to 

be large and diverse enough to complete the 

mission. Specifically, it is advisable to ensure 

that key SSR staff members possess experience 

in stability and reconstruction or nation 

building. For example, Lieutenant Colonel 

Mark Thomas from the British Army was an 

engineer officer with this type of background 

and was particularly invaluable in the effort. 

It would also be advisable to have SSR staff 
43

members with backgrounds in the particular 

pillars that are being reformed, in this case, rule 

of law, development of security forces, ministry 

of defense, and counternarcotics. But as useful 

as these types of skill set are to the team, 

building one’s own parallel SSR team that may 

start interfering in the pillars assigned to other 

nations is to be avoided. Each team’s role is to 

assist the SSR coordinator in making strategic 

analysis and recommending future policies 

within the areas of responsibility assigned to 

the team.

Interagency Issues:

• There is a need for a better mechanism to 

ensure coordination and unity of effort among 

the disparate government agencies, both in the 

recipient country and back in the donor nation 

capitals.

Leadership:

• Whether the SSR coordinator should be a civilian 

or military leader is irrelevant in the long run. 

The true test of who should fill this role comes 

down to the questions: Does the candidate have 

the skills and attributes needed to fulfill the job 

description? Can he or she plan strategically? 

Does he or she have leadership skills? Is he or 

she a problem-solver?

Implementation:

• From the beginning, SSR forum meetings 

should include the recipient nation actors so 

as to increase their sense of ownership in the 

process more quickly. Also it is ill-advised to 
44

hold a first meeting without a solid plan and 

having conducted rehearsals to ensure that the 

recipient nations attendees are not turned off by 

the lack of organization.

• The true collaboration point among international SSR teams should be arrived at immediately, 

and more emphasis placed on the capacity 

building of the recipient government and key 

actors. If recipient government positions are set, 

then immediately involve the person in that job 

during the lead nation role assignment planning 

(in this case the Bonn process) to ensure that 

nations understand the issues and the key 

players are involved before they sign up for it.

• A more defined agreement should be reached 

on what the lead nations’ responsibilities are 

and how they intend to shoulder them. This 

will allow better coordination between those 

nations, particularly in complementing each 

other in dealing with the overlapping nature of 

SSR pillars. Such coordination will also enhance 

the ability of nations to impact other lead nations. 

Examples are the close ties between DDR, 

ANA, and Police building efforts, or the need 

to tie the rule of law reform to prison reform, 

each of which responsibility was assigned to 

a different team. More specific questions need 

to be answered during the planning process 

such as: Who has the responsibility to reform 

prisons? Should it be the lead nation for police 

building or justice reform? Such decisions will 

require more analysis before a lead nation signs 

on to an endeavor, but it would help ensure that 

the right people are sent into the country and 

that the coordinating parties know who they 
45

will need to work with on issues that cut across 

functional boundaries.

• The NGO/IGO/functional area experts should 

be formally involved in the SSR process. A 

board of SSR advisors should be created that 

can offer policy ideas and surge to assist the 

lead nations that are struggling with manpower 

or other resource constraints. Such SSR experts 

need to step forward forcefully with solutions 

even if the SSR coordinator does not call 

upon them and invite them to take part. The 

coordinator himself is likely under-resourced 

and short on time, so he cannot possibly know 

who all the experts are and what type of parallel 

subject matter resources exist. Likewise, the SSR 

leadership needs to make room for these assets 

at the table and treat them as team members, 

not visitors. This involvement should take place 

not only in the recipient country but in each 

donor nation so that experts can solve problems 

on both ends.

RULES OF THUMB AND BEST PRACTICES

1. Ensure close coordination between the separate 

pillars of SSR, e.g., the DDR drawdown and the ANA/

Police stand-up.

2. Employ the format and scheduling (monthly) of 

SSR meetings (see Appendix E). 

3. Be prepared and anticipate when to begin 

moments of intense lobbying to get some of the host 

nation actors to buy in to the process (e.g., the U.S. team 

spent 3 weeks pushing MoD reforms using marathonlong meetings and multiple approaches to wear 

down the Afghan resistance to the new policy, thus 
46

reaching an early agreement with the MoD regarding 

restructuring and reforms.

4. Use dinners and lunches to squeeze in more 

meetings and mentoring time in the work day. Many 

critical issues were ironed out between Afghan 

government and tribal leaders over meals late at night 

when they were not influenced by their followers. 

They could speak more freely and discuss options that 

they could not mention in front of their subordinates 

or superiors. In just 3 months, over 40 working meals 

that lasted late into the night yielded very useful 

information and agreements. Topics of discussion 

ranged from getting rural recruits to Afghan Army 

and Police recruiting centers in the provinces to the 

equitable promotion of officers within the MoD. 

RECOMMENDATIONS AND AREAS IN NEED OF 

RESEARCH

It seems that the position of USSC was not continued 

as a single primary duty position in Afghanistan after 

2003. Accordingly, the number of formal SSR events 

dwindled as a result of this decreased emphasis.41 If 

this continues to be the case, it would seem to signal 

the importance of having a senior leader with SSR as a 

sole-responsibility portfolio to ensure that the process 

does not decline in scope and emphasis. It would also 

be useful for planners to determine what the refined 

mission objectives and goals would be for this position 

if it was reinstated in Afghanistan today. Finally, if 

the United States is going to continue to lead SSR 

missions in the future, it might be useful to create the 

position of SSR coordinator on the NSC to integrate 

and synchronize all agencies and departments. This 

would fulfill the requirements and needs of the Security Coordinators in all the nations where the United 
47

States is conducting SSR. The USSC’s in each country 

could report their needs directly to the NSC after 

discussions with the Ambassador and/or military 

commander of that nation to ensure that the State and 

Defense departments are not surprised by any requests 

that would need to be filled by them in support of the 

SSR mission. Contemplating such a change would 

lead to a further topic of study: how would that chain 

of command work, or is it time to reform our entire 

national security structure if SSR is going to be a key 

mission of the U.S. Government in the future.

FINAL THOUGHTS

Is this a model for the future? It appears that this 

model, with modifications as outlined above, would 

prove to be successful in similar endeavors. While not 

achieving a glowing record of success, the strategy 

and implementation set the Afghan nation on a path 

towards better governance and security. The 2008 

NATO report, Progress in Afghanistan, shows that many 

of the initiatives started by this forum have continued 

and are coming to fruition.42 It is instructive to keep 

in mind a passage that Hendrickson and Karkoszka 

provided in their insightful article: “In war-torn states, 

a clear national vision to reform is not possible . . . 

attempting SSR may actually mobilize an opposition 

against change . . . this makes security sector reform a 

long-term endeavor.”43

Hopefully this paper has described the formal SSR 

process that was enacted in Afghanistan and pointed 

out its key successes and critical failings. Future SSR 

leaders will need to understand the pitfalls and models 

that the United States has already experienced and 

tested.
48

The efforts of SSR from fall 2002 through fall 2003 

may have been summed up best by the UN SRSG Mr. 

Lakhdar Brahimi during the fifth SSR meeting. That 

day his opening statement emphasized that SSR was 

the key to the future of Afghanistan. He emphasized 

to the lead nations the need to remain patient because 

of the level of devastation attending the starting point 

for this process. He reminded the participants that 

eventually the Afghan counterparts would take more 

of a lead role and that instant progress was not a hope 

that any nation’s government should be holding. 

Most significantly, he pointed out that the SSR 

work being done by this international team was “as 

good as he had seen anywhere else in the world,”44

but he followed that compliment with a warning that 

this was still not enough to get the Afghan capacity 

up to par and succeed in the long run. Everyone must 

dig deeper, he reminded the group, and must always 

bring the Afghans along every step of the way.45

Special Representative Brahimi closed his remarks 

by emphasizing that the inclusion of Afghans in the 

SSR meetings and policies had been part of the strategy 

from the genesis of the team, and that it must remain 

on the agenda in the future.

Even after successful implementation and sharing 

of SSR ideas, the real test for the state is how well the 

next generation of leaders of security sectors continue 

to adhere to the reforms. It is here that one will see 

whether the required norms and values continue in the 

new methods, or whether the leaders fall back on the 

previous mentality and practices.46
49

APPENDIX A

SSR PLAYERS AND THEIR ROLES

Head of the SSR Forum, the United Nations Special 

Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG) 

Lakhdar Brahimi, UNAMA

United States Security Coordinator (USSC), Major 

General Eikenberry, day-to-day control of SSR and 

Military Reform operations

Ambassador Eberle and DCM Schlaudraff of Germany, 

Brigadier General Wolf, Head German Police 

Project, Police Reform

Ambassador Finn and Ambassador Taylor of the 

United States, Military Reform and Reconstruction, 

respectively

Ambassador Nash of the United Kingdom, Counter 

Narcotics and ANA Building

Ambassador Komano and DCM Miyahara of Japan, 

Colonel Ando, Military Advisor, DDR

Ambassador Domenico Giorgi of Italy, Judicial 

Reform

Ambassador Guinhut of France, ANA Building

Mrs. Frederique de Man, Chargé-Netherlands

Mr. Sultan Aziz from UNAMA, DDR

Mr. Jean Arnault the Deputy to Special Representative 

Brahimi, SSR and UN operations, UNAMA

ISAF Commanders or Deputy Commanders and their 

Political Advisors, Security of Kabul

President Karzai, Afghan buy-in of all SSR operations

National Security Advisor Dr. Rassoul 

President’s Chief of Staff Said Jawad

Vice President and Minister of Defense Marshall Fahim, 

Military Reform

Deputy Minister of Defense Atiqulla Baryalai, Military 

Reform and DDR
50

Ministers of Interior Wardak and Jalali, Police reform

Minister of Justice Karimi, Judicial Reform

Mr. Robin Barnwell, UNAMA-Political Officer

Mr. Adam Boulokos, Deputy UNODC

Mr. Mark Clayton, 1st Secretary CN-UK

Mrs. Annett Guenther and Mr. Adriaan Kooiymans, 

ISAF Political Advisors

Brigadier General Olli-Matti Multamaki, Senior 

Military Advisor-Finland

Lieutenant Colonel Ulrich Stahnke, Military AdvisorGermany

Lieutenant Colonel Gerard Hughes, Lieutenant 

Colonel Mark Thomas, Lieutenant Colonel Henry 

Eagan, and Lieutenant Colonel Tucker Mansager, 

U.S. Security Assistants to the USSC.
51

APPENDIX B

KEY TERMS AND DEFINITIONS

ANA Afghan National Army, created to replace 

the militia/warlord system and existing 

Army skeleton, one of the five SSR 

pillars

ANP Afghan National Police, one of the five SSR 

pillars

CJTF180 Combined Joint Task Force-180, operational 

command headquarters for coalition 

forces headed by an American threestar General

CN Counter-Narcotics, one of the five SSR 

pillars

DDR Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration, program intended to increase security by carefully managing 

the drawdown of existing unsanctioned 

security forces, one of the five SSR 

pillars

GoA Government of Afghanistan

ISAF International Security Assistance Force, 

NATO force initially sent to provide 

security for Kabul the capital of 

Afghanistan

MoD Ministry of Defense

MoI Ministry of the Interior

NA Northern Alliance, loose confederation of 

warriors who fought the Taliban and 

al-Qaeda before and then alongside the 

U.S. led Coalition invasion.
52

OMC-A Office of Military Cooperation - Afghanistan, agency headed by Major General 

Eikenberry responsible for building 

the Afghan National Military and 

reforming the Afghan Ministry of 

Defense 

SSR Security Sector Reform

SRSG Special Representative of the Secretary 

General, UN Secretary General’s Envoy 

to Afghanistan

USSC United States Security Coordinator, the 

other title MG Eikenberry held, responsible for the expedited development of the SSR process
53

APPENDIX C

DUTIES AND OBJECTIVES FOR USSC AND 

CHIEF OF THE OMC-A

Description of overall task per duty title:

1. USSC: Expedite the development of Security Sector 

Reform (SSR) within Afghanistan by synchronizing 

relevant efforts of the United Nations and those of 

the Geneva-designated SSR lead nations for law 

enforcement (Germany), justice (Italy), counternarcotics 

(UK), Demobilization, Disarmament, and Reintegration 

(Japan and UN), and the Armed Forces (United States). 

Ensure SSR programs are consistent with Government 

of Afghanistan policy goals and objectives.

2. Chief of the Office of Military CooperationAfghanistan (OMC-A): Plan and direct U.S./Coalition 

efforts to reform the MoD and field the Afghan 

National Army (ANA) Central Corps by June 2004. 

Solicit international donations for building the Afghan 

Armed Forces.

3. As both USSC and Chief of the Office of Military 

Cooperation: Advise the U.S. Ambassador, CJTF-180, 

USCENTCOM, and the Department of Defense on 

security sector and ANA Issues. 

Major Objectives:

1. USSC:

Establish SSR forum in Kabul with participation 

of UNAMA, the 5 lead SSR nations, and the 

government of Afghanistan
54

Promote expansion of organizational SSR capacities 

of lead nation embassies in Kabul

Facilitate acceleration of SSR work in the provinces

Coordinate transfer of Border Police training 

responsibility from the United States to another 

appropriate lead nation

Develop complementary ANA building and Afghan 

DDR plans that are politically and logistically 

feasible.

2. Chief of the Office of Military Cooperation:

Ensure activation of Central Corps HQ and its 3 

Brigades by October 1, 2003

Develop and begin implementation of Afghan 

MoD/General Staff reform plan

Establish ANA institutional support systems 

including officer and NCO schools, ANA 

training and doctrine directorate, and garrison 

support elements

Design and build OMC-A structure consisting 

of U.S./Coalition military, contractor, and 

Afghan civilian and military personnel capable 

of managing the ANA building program as it 

increases in scope and complexity

Increase international and Afghan domestic 

support for and confidence in ANA through the 

maintenance of quality within the force and the 

conduct of effective information operations.
55

APPENDIX D

ORGANIZATIONS INVOLVED WITH SSR AND/

OR AFGHANISTAN

Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit (AREU), 

Kabul. www.areu.org.af/

The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 

London, UK. www.iiss.org/

Global Facilitation Network for SSR (gff ssr), University 

of Birmingham, UK. www.ssrnetwork.net

Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 

Development, Development Co-operation Directorate 

(OECD DAC) Handbook on Security System Reform 

(SSR), Paris, France. www.oecd.org/document/6/0,3343,en

_2649_33721_37417926_1_1_1_1,00.html

International Peace Institute (Academy), UN, New 

York. www.ipacademy.org/our-work/state-building, www.

ipacademy.org/publications/books-occasional-papers

United States Institute of Peace (USIP), Washington, 

DC. www.usip.org

NATO, Brussels, Belgium. www.nato.int/issues/

afghanistan/index.html

Bonn International Center for Conversion (BICC), 

Bonn, Germany. www.bicc.de/ssr_gtz/index.php

Human Rights Watch, New York and worldwide 

locations. hrw.org/doc/?t=asia&c=afghan
56

The Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of 

Armed Forces (DCAF), Geneva, Switzerland, and 

Brussels, Belgium. www.dcaf.ch/ “One of the world’s 

leading institutions in the areas of security sector 

reform (SSR) and security sector governance (SSG).”

USAID Conflict Management, Washington, DC. www.

usaid.gov/our_work/cross-cutting_programs/conflict/

focus_areas/security.html 

UN Partnership for Effective Peacekeeping, (PEP). 

www.effectivepeacekeeping.org/

The Stabilisation Unit, UK Government. www.

stabilisationunit.gov.uk/index.html

Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and 

Stabilization, Department of State, Washington, DC. 

www.state.gov/s/crs/

International Crisis Group. www.crisisgroup.org/home/

index.cfm?id=3946

Henry L. Stimson Center, Washington, DC. www.

stimson.org

Peace Studies Journal, UK. www.peacestudiesjournal.org

Department for International Development, UK. www.

dfid.gov.uk/

Conflict, Security, and Development Group, Kings 

College, London, UK. www.kcl.ac.uk/schools/sspp/ws/

groupresearch/int/csdg/
57

Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute, U.S. 

Army War College, Carlisle, PA. https://pksoi.army.mil/

Centre for Security Sector Management, Cranfield 

University, UK. www.ssronline.org/

Clingendael Security and Conflict Programme (CSCP) 

Conflict Research Unit, Netherlands. www.clingendael.

nl/cru/

Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense 

for Stability Operations Capabilities, Pentagon. 

www.defenselink.mil/policy/sections/policy_offices/solic/

stabilityOps/index.html

The Center for Stabilization and Reconstruction 

Studies, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA. 

www.csrs-nps.org/

The Center for Civil-Military Relations, Naval 

Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA. www.ccmr.org/
58

APPENDIX E

EXAMPLE MEETING NOTES (EDITED) OF AN 

SSR FORUM47

MINUTES

5th SECURITY SECTOR REFORM MEETING

Monday 17 February 2003, 1000-1200, Japanese 

Embassy Conference Room

Attendees

1. Col (Military Advisor-Japan)

2. Mr A (UNAMA-DSRSG)

3. Mr. A (UNAMA-DDR)

4. Mr. B (UNAMA-Political Officer)

5. BG B (ISAF Dep Cdr)

6. Mr B (UNAMA-SRSG)

7. Mr. B (Dep UNODC)

8. Mr. C (1st Sec CN-UK)

9. MG E (Security Coord-U.S.)

10. Amb G (Ambassador-Italy)

11. Mrs. G (ISAF Political Advisor)

12. Amb K (Amb-Japan)

13. Mr. K (ISAF PolAd)

14. Mrs. M (Chargé-Netherlands)

15. Mr. M (DCM-Japan)

16. BG M (Senior Military Advisor-Finland)

17. Amb N (Amb-UK)

18. Mr. S (DCM-Germany)

19. Lt Col S (MilAd-GE)

20. Amb T (Donor Asst-U.S.)

21. Lt Col T (U.S. Security Asst)

22. BG W (Head German Police Project)

th
59

Purpose: Meeting hosted by Japanese Embassy 

intended to address issues, progress, and 

strategies related to ANA building, counternarcotics, law enforcement, DDR, and judicial 

reform. 

Introductory Remarks: 

USSC welcomes attendees of the 5th meeting, 

recognizing special guests and accomplishments. 

Chairman stated that this was a focused group with 

an overarching strategy and dialogue that were 

now well established. Although these sessions 

had become very productive, we would keep to 

the planned 2-hour duration. 

Pointed out that as yet there had been little positive 

routine engagement with the Afghans in the 

security sector reform (SSR) area, and this would 

need to be discussed later in the meeting. 

SSR should be looked at on a holistic basis as all 

lanes interrelate. For example, the imminent 

implementation of DDR will prove to be a 

catalyst for the ANA, Police, CN, and the 

Judiciary sectors. All will be required to support 

the DDR process as it rolls out across the country 

on a phased basis.

UNAMA Perspective:

Mr. Brahimi, SRSG-UNAMA, stated that SSR was 

key to the future of Afghanistan. He made the 

point that the nation needed to be built up from 
60

scratch and that as a consequence, it was essential 

to remain patient above all else. The work would 

be done by counterparts—eventually, but one 

should not expect instant progress. 

He added that although the SSR work done here by 

the international community (IC) was as good 

as he had seen anywhere else in the world, this 

on its own was not enough. 

We must strive to bring Afghans with us in our 

efforts; in short, we should make the Afghans 

help themselves. This was a key point, and he 

was pleased to see it included on the agenda. 

From the very genesis of these meetings, Afghan 

inclusion had always been envisaged. 

Comments on recent successful Afghan leaders, 

felt that we should continue to develop such 

people. 

Mr. Brahimi thanked certain attendees for their 

patient and determined approach in pushing 

DDR forward over the last few weeks 

particularly. He stressed that if the DDR process 

proved to be successful, it would represent a 

giant leap forward for both SSR and also for the 

future of Afghanistan. 

Lead Nations Update:

U.S. (ANA) 

• MG Eikenberry highlighted the theme of MoD 

reform recently discussed with Marshall Fahim. 
61

Afghan MoD reform had two aspects—structural 

and political. Political reform is critically 

important because it will also contribute to 

increased confidence in the impartiality of the 

MoD, and thereby facilitate both DDR and ANA 

recruiting. 

• Mr. Brahimi agreed with the significance of 

MoD reform and suggested that engagement 

with Fahim be continued into the future on a 

more regular basis and on broader issues. On a 

different subject, institution building remained 

very important for Afghanistan and so reform 

of the MoD, when it happened, would greatly 

help this process. “A Kabul Government for all 

Afghans” was the message to be pursued.

• MG Eikenberry outlined deployments of ANA 

forces to the provinces, currently Bamian and 

Orgun. Although these missions represented 

good tactical level successes, there was also a 

strategic/political level benefit. The deployments 

sent the message that the Government of 

Afghanistan (GoA) was now able to project 

military power beyond Kabul and perhaps at 

the same time, persuade some of the undecided 

factional groups to enter the DDR process and 

behave in an appropriate manner or eventually 

risk exclusion from a reconstituted Nation. 

Increasing emphasis now needed to be placed 

on reassuring Afghans of the good intentions of 

the GoA by using an “effects based” approach, 

to include more extensive media activities to 

generate confidence and trust. There were not 

enough ANA to garrison every major town, so 

a realistic alternative had to be thought out and 

implemented.
62

• DCM Schlaudraff informed the meeting that 

he had recently visited Mazar-e Sharif. While 

there, key individuals had stated that they 

were aware of the new ANA but had no details 

about how to join, etc. MG Eikenberry agreed 

that this was an area which might benefit from 

further development, while explaining that 

U.S./Coalition had started to take Governors to 

KMTC to show them the ANA training regime 

and give them the opportunity to speak to 

their soldiers. This appeared to be a promising 

initiative and other opinion formers were very 

welcome to visit ANA training to see it for 

themselves.

Italy (Judicial)

• Amb. Giorgi reported that he had already met 

with Minister Jalali and had found him to be very 

cooperative and helpful. He was now confident 

that there were several areas within the judicial 

sector which could be readily advanced with his 

assistance. Amb. Giorgi reported that there had 

been limited development of the Judicial Sector 

“Master Plan” since the last meeting as many 

key members of the Judicial Commission had 

been absent from the country and were only 

now arriving back.

• Amb. Georgi made the following additional 

observations:

 o Mr. Brahimi’s help was requested to alert 

President Karzai to the urgent requirement 

to identify a suitable government building 

to house the Judicial Commission, consisting 

of some 12 members plus secretariat. The 
63

present building was too small and was 

unworkable.

 o Italy was currently deploying 1,000 troops 

as part of CJTF-180 to operate in the area of 

Khowst. To assist them in their mission, a 

number of projects were being identified to 

benefit the local people and generate good 

will. The support provided will be both 

bilateral and multilateral in nature with the 

full involvement of the GOA. In addition, 

Italy was contributing two personnel to the 

Gardez PRT who would also be directly 

involved in related operations. Amb. Giorgi 

planned to hold a meeting soon to discuss 

this work in greater detail with interested 

parties.

 o Amb Georgi expects his Judiciary Team to be 

augmented by six MFA and MoJ personnel 

by the end of the month, including one 

prominent senior-level judicial expert who 

will travel between Rome and Kabul.

Germany (Law Enforcement)

• DCM Schlaudraff stated that he would cover 

four areas, starting with MoIreform, which had 

now been stalled for some months reportedly 

awaiting President Karzai’s approval. The old 

plan for structural reform had actually been 

further revised under Minister Jalali and was 

much improved. It was worth noting that 

police represented only one of many important 

divisions in the new structure. The intention 

now was to widen the German remit, and an 

advisor will be sent to look at broader MoI reform 

aspects. Some infrastructure related work in the 
64

MoI will also be undertaken. Other nations had 

also provided assistance, for example, UK DFID 

had provided a budget advisor to assist the 

MoI with this important task. The DCM asked 

UNAMA to note at this stage, that MoI would 

be technically responsible for elections in the 

future and would therefore benefit from any 

experience or exposure to the process that could 

be given to them as the preparations for June 04 

were ramped up. Mr. Brahimi then pointed out 

that a National Committee would be appointed 

to supervise the elections and that a team of 

experts would soon be arriving to consider all 

aspects of this and provide advice.

• The second point concerned the requirement 

for a Presidential decree on the police, along 

the same lines as the earlier Bonn decree for 

the ANA. A first draft had been produced and 

commented on. Thirdly, in order to get police 

into the provinces quickly, Minister Jalali wanted 

to create a Highway Patrol to cover the major 

roads in Afghanistan. The DCM felt that this 

would be both a visible and relevant mission. 

The next step would be to create a commission 

to look at this under Secretary of State Halal 

and the necessary planning to achieve this was 

already underway.

• Fourth point concerned the Border Police (BP) 

situation. MG Eikenberry set the scene regarding 

the recent Norwegian fact finding visit which 

had been successful. Important follow-up 

meetings were scheduled to take place in Oslo 

on 18 Feb which would involve U.S., Germany, 

UK, France, Italy and other Nordic nations. This 
65

was an encouraging response and the political 

decision would be forthcoming from Oslo in due 

course. Walter Wolf then gave a quick summary 

of the recent BP Working group meeting and 

noted that roles and missions and a definition of 

BP had been achieved. Afghan ownership was 

being established with future meetings planned 

to consider structures of BP and then training 

aspects. Significant progress was being made in 

this area that was encouraging after a lackluster 

start.

• Of more general interest was the planned visit 

of the German Minister of the Interior in March. 

This was now the target date for the decree to 

be issued on the police and for MoI structural 

reforms to have been announced. Tied in 

with this as well, would be the next Police 

Commanders Seminar in Kabul. The most 

significant police training currently awaited in 

Afghanistan would be the U.S.-led patrolmen 

courses for 7,000 individuals.

• MG Eikenberry asked about the drive for a 

nationally representative MoI, like the MoD 

reform issue. In his reply the DCM suggested 

that the Minister had picked the more difficult 

individuals to change first and had therefore 

experienced difficulties. It is hoped that this 

would be addressed in the future.

U.S./Coalition CJTF-180 (Provincial Reconstruction 

Teams and Information Work)

• COL Purdy spoke about emerging lessons from 

PRT’s, beginning with the caveat that it was still 

“early days” within the life of the PRT concept 

and that these points had not been staffed fully. 
66

As such, they more accurately represented his 

own observations:

 o Vital to select the right individuals for the 

key posts. Induction and orientation was 

also very important as were close links with 

organizations operating in the same areas 

such as the UNAMA field teams and others.

 o Establishing the PRT takes time. There was 

an expectation management aspect to all of 

this so that instant results were not assumed. 

Progress would be gradual.

 o Important to clearly differentiate between 

combat elements and the PRT proper. 

This would become clearer with time and 

experience.

 o There is presently no clear mechanism to 

link province to central government. This 

needs to be addressed. Governor to Minister 

level is working well however.

 o PRT is partly there to gather and share 

information. There is therefore a requirement 

for a government information management 

system to be set up. National input is key to 

the value of PRT in this respect.

 o Engagement with local militias and police is 

developing slowly in the provinces. This will 

evolve and improve gradually over time.

• Mr. Brahimi said he was watching the progress 

of the PRT’s with interest and he endorsed the 

need to pick the best people for the PRT task as 

he felt that first impressions with local leaders 

would be very important. Amb. Taylor made 

the point that Minister Jalali had also suggested 

sending senior government representatives 

to join PRTs to provide a physical central 

government presence on the ground.
67

• COL Wood then spoke as the Director of 

Information Operations CJTF-180. He stated that 

his mission was to help GoA get key messages 

to the Afghan people by the most appropriate 

means. To accomplish this, he had two mobile 

broadcast systems which could cover the 

majority of the country as well as a newspaper 

product printed in English, Dari, and Pashtun. 

Some 50,000 copies were distributed every two 

weeks. A recent initiative had also seen the 

distribution of 50,000 hand-cranked radios that 

would allow more of the populace to listen to 

important radio messages. COL Wood stated 

that he worked closely with the Ministry of 

Information and Culture and Afghan Radio 

and TV. In this way, it was possible to transmit 

interviews with GoA officials for example, from 

Kabul, then transmit them across the country 

using in-place resources. The longer term intent 

was to help produce a flourishing free media 

eventually while contributing to the SSR process 

in any way possible in the shorter term.

• CAPT Weizer from ISAF then spoke about 

the benefits of Radio Sada-e Azadi (Voice of 

Freedom) which had been operational for some 

seven months and had the potential to reach 

three million Afghans, broadcasting 24 hours 

a day in a variety of languages. In addition to 

educational and entertainment based content, 

the station would transmit GoA or ISAF 

policy information, including public safety 

and security notices. This could range from a 

warning about children carrying toy weapons 

to the promotion of the ANA as a national force 

for good. Liaison between ISAF assets and the 
68

CJTF-180 teams had already been established 

and the coordinated creation of joint products 

was ongoing, to include the print media.

ISAF (Initial Mission Assessment)

• BG Bertholee introduced himself as Deputy 

Cdr ISAF III and explained that LTG van Heyst 

would attend future meetings. He handed out 

a presentation explaining the commander’s 

mission and his intent. He added that full 

operational capability would be achieved on 5 

March—having taken over from ISAF II on 10 

February. The five main lines of operation were 

described briefly as follows:

 o Ensure a safe environment.

 o Reconstitute Afghan authorities.

 o Improve the capability of Afghan police and 

armed forces.

 o Operate KIA and maintain ALOC.

 o Force protection measures and improved 

situational awareness.

• The new focus for the ISAF III deployment would 

be a clearer division and increased coordination 

between ISAF and KMNB activities, a greater 

emphasis on civil-military cooperation and an 

enhanced liaison structure with respect to CJTF180, the Afghan authorities together with their 

military and police assets, and also NGO’s. 

BG Bertholee suggested that the unit emblem 

with the motto “Together we are strong” was 

particularly applicable to the situation in 

Afghanistan.
69

• Mr. Brahimi welcomed the ISAF III 

representatives and stated that he looked 

forward to working with them in the future. 

MG Eikenberry made the observation that with 

the arrival of the DDR process in the Spring/

Summer, and the approach of the Constitutional 

Loya Jirga and elections, DDR in Kabul would 

need to be addressed in due course. ISAF III 

would be required to play a key role in preparing 

the conditions for this and for implementation 

aspects also.

Japan (DDR):

• Amb. Komano stated the Japanese wish to achieve two main objectives from the forthcoming 

Tokyo Conference to be attended by President 

Karzai. The first was to encourage further 

donors to come forward from the international 

community (IC) by highlighting unequivocal 

Afghan support and commitment to the DDR 

process. The second was to use the conference 

as a springboard for the rapid implementation 

of DDR. Although considerable progress had 

recently been made in this area, much still 

remained to be achieved in a short timeframe. 

Amb. Komano stressed the importance of 

putting the DDR process into perspective in 

terms of broader SSR aims. This holistic approach 

was not well understood by the Afghan side. 

President Karzai and Marshall Fahim were both 

now clear on this. Ambassador Komano then 

outlined the following tasks which he believed 

the GoA needed to accomplish before the Tokyo 

Conference:
70

 o The Four Defense Commission subcommissions needed to announce full details 

regarding membership, Terms of Reference, 

etc., and progress of their work.

 o An Advisory Committee must be established 

in accordance with the President’s 

earlier decree which would encourage 

further support from the IC, and provide 

transparency.

 o The Defense Commission should meet 

before President’s departure to endorse subcommission's work and receive progress 

reports to date. They would have the 

opportunity to also discuss and endorse 

the major policy issues to be announced 

by the President in Tokyo. There was also 

a need to formally introduce the Advisory 

Committee.

 o The time frame for the process needed to be 

outlined. It is proposed that Karzai deliver 

a speech on 21 March (Islamic New Year) 

announcing a start date for DDR and when 

it should finish—hopefully after one year, in 

time for the June 2004 elections, though the 

Afghan New Beginning Program (ANBP), 

the re-integration program itself, would go 

on for 3 years.

 o DDR implementation would have to be 

sequenced, with a phase 1 plan clearly laid out 

and targeted on an area with a good chance 

of success. Any power vacuum created by 

DDR must be filled, possibly by deployment 

of the ANA, but police and judiciary would 

also be important in this regard.
71

• Amb. Komano believed it was important to 

make explicit the eligibility criteria for DDR. 

This would produce a realistic target figure. 

Not everyone with a gun, for example, would 

qualify. The aim of DDR was to dissolve active 

duty security forces, which included factional 

armies. The target figure would be discussed 

in detail, together with other sensitive issues 

in the days leading up to 21 March speech by 

the President, when detailed implementation 

aspects would also be announced. Progress over 

recent weeks had been hampered by the lack 

of key leaders being available in Afghanistan. 

Amb. Komano stressed that donor nations 

also needed to adopt a coordinated funding 

approach to DDR. As a final comment, Amb. 

Komano mentioned that the Japanese Embassy 

was being reinforced with two DDR experts to 

assist them in their task. These were welcome 

and necessary additions.

UK (Counternarcotics)

• Amb. Nash reported briefly on four areas. The 

first was President Karzai’s ongoing poppy 

eradication program in five key provinces. 

The UK had received mixed reports of the 

results, and intended to send out teams with 

UNODC to evaluate these claims and make an 

independent assessment. The second related 

area was development support, as international 

experience has shown that without strong 

development support for at least 3 years, poppy 

eradication is not sustainable. President Karzai 

was aware of this and had asked the UK and 
72

others to proceed with the rapid development 

of alternative livelihood work. Following on 

from this, a major success has recently been 

achieved with the assistance of donors/

UNAMA/UNODC in that new funding for this 

area has been found ($10-20 million) as well 

as the reprioritization of existing government 

programs.

• Amb. Nash then talked through a diagram which 

set out the CN law enforcement structures of 

the state. This work would become the basis of 

a government decree. It was important to note 

that the NSC would have no law enforcement 

operational role, but rather an overarching 

and strategic coordination function. The final 

point he covered concerned wider international 

involvement in the CN work. The intention was 

to convene a meeting in the near future to discuss 

wider CN involvement to include all interested 

parties. The Chinese, the Iranians, and possibly 

the Russians would also wish to attend such 

a gathering. As a footnote, the Ambassador 

added that the core group addressing CN issues 

consisted of CND, UNODC, INL, UK, and 

German Police Project.

Security and Rule of Law Consultative Groups

Amb. Taylor reiterated that the purpose of the 

consultative group structure was threefold, to put 

Afghan ministers in charge, to help coordinate assistance within a sector, and to assist with the preparation 

of a budget. The consultative group mechanism was 

designed to assist ministers to pull together donors in 

a coordinated fashion. The budget was currently being 
73

prepared and was due to be presented on 17 March 

at the donor’s conference, possibly in Brussels. There 

would be a premeeting in Kabul the week before at 

which Ministers would present their plans for initial 

scrutiny. This process puts the GoA in charge and links 

in with earlier points made about Afghan ownership 

by Mr. Brahimi. Amb. Taylor urged SSR group 

participants to use the CG structure for these purposes 

and to call the first meetings in the near future.

Strategies for Afghan Involvement in SSR

• MG Eikenberry expressed the view that Afghan 

involvement in the SSR process remained an 

important challenge to be resolved, as stated 

earlier in the meeting. Bringing the relevant 

Afghan SSR leaders together was crucial to 

educating them about the interdependence of 

SSR issues and forcing them to address these 

matters in a collective fashion. The matter was 

not assisted by frequent overseas travel by 

Afghan leaders, which now had to be curtailed 

as it represented a brake on progress. Once the 

leader had left, the lack of an effective Deputy 

meant that nothing could be taken forward. Mr. 

Brahimi agreed with this point and pleaded 

with lead nations to stop extending so many 

invites to Afghan leaders, and to instead hold 

conferences in Kabul rather than their own 

capitals. MG Eikenberry suggested that there 

were two possible routes to achieve progress 

with respect to broader SSR dialogue with the 

Karzai Administration. One was the higher 

level approach to the President through the 

offices of Mr. Brahimi together with lead nation 
74

Ambassadors; another was use of an organization like the NSC to join with an expanded group 

to include the lead nation reps and then report 

back to the President. Amb. Nash commented 

that he had examined the latter option and 

believed that it was potentially too complex 

to orchestrate. A better solution might be for 

Dr. Rassoul to attend this meeting and then 

report back to the President. Amb. Nash felt 

that the NSC had to be involved in the process 

somehow. This option was discussed and the 

final outcome was that Dr. Rassoul would be 

invited to the next meeting, but that he would 

not be a regular attendee. This would be done 

on a trial basis, as part of what Mr. Brahimi had 

described as an “ad hoc” approach to Afghan 

engagement in SSR.

• In closing the meeting, MG Eikenberry suggested that it might be worth setting up a 

meeting with the President, the five lead nation 

Ambassadors, and Mr. Brahimi in order to 

discuss the need to keep leaders in Afghanistan 

at this sensitive and important time for the 

development of SSR. Mr. Brahimi agreed.

Lead Nation Reviews of Policy and Information Theme 

Papers:

There was no time to cover this item.

Date of Next Meeting: German Ambassador offered to 

host the next meeting on 12 March 2003, 10am-12pm, 

German Embassy Conference Room. The tentative 

agenda is as follows:

• Tokyo DDR Conference Readout (Japan).

• Defense Commission Sub-Commission Updates 

(UNAMA, Japan, and U.S.).
75

• Preparation for President’s 21 March Address 

on DDR Implementation (UNAMA and Japan).

• Norwegian Border Police Decision and Outcome 

of Structures Working Group (Norway, U.S., 

and Germany).

• Master Plan & Unified Framework Update 

(Italy)

• ADF Conference and SSR Related Issues (U.S. - 

Amb. Taylor)

• MoI Structures & Police Decree Update and 

Plans for Expansion into Provinces (Germany)

• Briefing on U.S. INL Police Training and 

Communications/ID Card Scheme (U.S.).

• Discussion of Policy and Information Theme 

Papers (UNAMA and Lead Nations, with each 

Lead Nation focusing on its particular security 

sector area. Suggested format and example [U.S. 

paper submitted at 26 Jan 2003 SSR meeting] 

attached below.

*NOTE: Dr. Zalmay Rassoul, National Security 

Advisor, will be invited to attend this meeting.
76

SOURCES

A Working Conference for Senior Military Leaders. Shaping 

the Future of Afghanistan-the Military Dimension. 

Kabul, Afghanistan: 2003.

Brzoska, Michael, Marc von Boehmken, Igor 

Grebenshikov, Ana Kantor, and Cornelia Michaels. 

Short Assessment: SSR in Afghanistan. Germany: Bonn 

International Center for Conversion, 2005, www.

bicc.de/ssr_gtz/pdf/afghanistan.pdf (accessed April 

12, 2008).

Cottey, Andrew. “Afghanistan and the New Dynamics 

of Intervention: Counter-Terrorism and Nation 

Building.” In SIPRI Yearbook 2003, pp. 181-194. 

Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003.

Eikenberry, Karl. Answers to SSR Questionnaire, Edited 

by Jason Howk (Via email April 19, 2008).

____________. Interview about SSR in Afghanistan 2002-

2003, conducted by Jason Howk at NATO HQs, 

Brussels, Belgium, May 23, 2008.

Hendrickson, D. and Karkoszka, A., ‘The challenges 

of security sector reform’, SIPRI Yearbook 2002: 

Armaments, Disarmament and International Security 

(Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2002), pp. 175–

201. An excellent primer about SSR thoughtfully 

written and on the mark in most areas.

Howk, Jason. Notes and Observations from November 

2002-September 2003 as Aide De Camp to USSC.
77

____________. Rights Watch. “Backgrounder: 

Afghanistan’s Bonn Agreement One Year Later, 

A Catalog of Missed Opportunities.” Human 

Rights Watch News. www.hrw.org/backgrounder/

asia/afghanistan/bonn1yr-bck.htm (accessed April 12, 

2008).

Jalali, Ali. “Rebuilding Afghanistan’s National Army.” 

Parameters, Autumn 2002, pp. 72-86.

NATO. Progress in Afghanistan, Bucharest Summit 

2-4 April 2008. Brussels, Belgium: NATO Public 

Diplomacy Division, 2008.

Rashid, Ahmed. Descent Into Chaos, New York, Viking, 

2008.

Sedra, Mark. “Confronting Afghanistan’s Security 

Dilemma.” e conference, June 4-11, 2003, www.bicc.de/

publications/briefs/brief28/content.php (accessed April 

12, 2008).

Thier, J. Alexander. “Afghanistan.” In Twenty-First 

Century Peace Operations, William Durch, ed., 

Washington, DC: USIP, 2006, pp. 467-572.

____________. “The Politics of Peace-Building, Year 

One: From Bonn to Kabul.” Antonio Donini, Norah 

Niland, and Karin Wermester, eds., Nation Building 

Unraveled, pp. 39-60. Bloomfield, CT: Kumarian 

Press, 2004.

Thomas, Mark. “5th SSR Meeting notes.” Japanese 

Embassy, Kabul, Afghanistan, February 17, 2003.
78

USAID. Answers to American SSR Development Questions, 

Jason Howk, ed. (via Emails with a senior USAID SSR 

team member, April 9, 2008).

Most helpful sources for understanding SSR (not 

specific to Afghanistan).

Ball, Nicole. “Spreading Good Practices in SSR: Policy 

Options for the British Government,” London, UK: 

Saferworld, 1998.

Chuter, David, “Understanding SSR,” Journal of 

Security Sector Management, Vol. 4, No. 2, University 

of Cranfield, Shrivenham, UK, April 2006.

Global Facilitation Network for SSR (gfn.ssr), A 

Beginner’s Guide to SSR (SSR), University of 

Birmingham, UK, 2007.

Hänggi, Heiner, “Conceptualising SSR and 

Reconstruction,” Chapter from SSR DCAF 

Yearbook, 2004.

Hendrickson, D. and Karkoszka, A., “The challenges 

of security sector reform,” SIPRI Yearbook 2002: 

Armaments, Disarmament and International Security, 

Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2002, pp. 175–

201. 

Wulf, Herbert, ed., BICC Brief 15, “SSR,” Bonn, 

Germany, 2000.
79

ENDNOTES

1. Inspired by one of Lieutenant General Dan K. McNeill’s 

comments about Buzkashi to the USSC Staff and OMC-A team, 

when he served as Commander of CJTF-180.

2. D. Hendrickson and A. Karkoszka, “The Challenges 

of Security Sector Reform,” SIPRI Yearbook 2002: Armaments, 

Disarmament and International Security, Oxford, UK: Oxford 

University Press, 2002, pp. 175–201. The major framework of the 

present monograph is based on their thoughtful article. It should 

be required reading for all students and practitioners of SSR. 

Unfortunately the SSR forum in Afghanistan was unaware of this 

gem as they learned by trial and error from 2002 to 2003. 

3. Michael Brzoska et al., Short Assessment: Security Sector 

Reform in Afghanistan, Bonn, Germany: Bonn International Center 

for Conversion,2005, www.bicc.de/ssr_gtz/pdf/afghanistan.pdf, 

accessed April 12, 2008; Andrew Cottey, “Afghanistan and the 

New Dynamics of Intervention: Counter-Terrorism and Nation 

Building” In SIPRI Yearbook 2003, Oxford, UK: Oxford University 

Press, 2003, pp. 181-194; Human Rights Watch, “Backgrounder: 

Afghanistan’s Bonn Agreement One Year Later, A Catalog of 

Missed Opportunities,” Human Rights Watch News, www.hrw.

org/backgrounder/asia/afghanistan/bonn1yr-bck.htm, accessed April 

12, 2008; Mark Sedra, “Confronting Afghanistan’s Security 

Dilemma,” e conference, June 4-11, 2003, www.bicc.de/publications/

briefs/brief28/content.php, accessed April 12, 2008; J. Alexander 

Thier, “Afghanistan” In Twenty-First Century Peace Operations, 

William Durch, ed., Washington, DC: United States Institute for 

Peace (USIP), 2006, pp. 467-572; J. Alexander Thier, “The Politics 

of Peace-Building, Year One: From Bonn to Kabul” In Nation 

Building Unraveled, Antonio Donini, Norah Niland, and Karin 

Wermester, eds., Bloomfield, CT: Kumarian Press, 2004, pp. 39-60; 

Ahmed Rashid, Descent Into Chaos: The United States and the Failure 

of Nation Building in Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Central Asia, New 

York, Viking, 2008, pp. 171-218. 

4. Hendrickson and Karkoszka, pp. 182-185.

5. Ibid.

6. Ibid, p. 183.
80

7. Ibid, p. 179.

8. Ibid., p. 181.

9. Ibid.

10. Ibid, p. 186.

11. For a detailed listing of the SSR working group actors, see 

Appendix A.

12. Karl Eikenberry, Interview about SSR in Afghanistan 2002-

2003, conducted by Jason Howk at NATO HQs, Brussels, Belgium, 

May 23, 2008.

13. U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), 

Answers to American SSR Development Questions, Jason Howk, ed., 

via Emails with a senior USAID SSR team member, April 9, 2008. 

This USAID SSR expert explained that SSR was not formalized in 

the U.S. Government until 2004.

14. Karl Eikenberry, Answers to SSR Questionnaire, Jason 

Howk, ed., Via email, April 19, 2008.

15. The tasks and objectives came primarily from the USSC’s 

Officer Evaluation Report Support Form, the summary of which 

can be found in Appendix C.

16. Ibid.

17. Eikenberry, Interview about SSR in Afghanistan 2002-2003.

18. For a detailed listing of the SSR forum and working group 

members, see appendix A.

19. Mark Thomas, “5th Security Sector Reform Meeting,” 

Japanese Embassy, Kabul, Afghanistan, February 17, 2003. For a 

detailed description of the SSR Forum’s agenda, see Appendix E. 

Used with permission of Colonel Mark Thomas, British Armed 

Forces.
81

20. Eikenberry, Interview about SSR in Afghanistan 2002-2003.

21. From the conference agenda for A Working Conference for 

Senior Military Leaders, Kabul, Afghanistan, 2003.

22. Jason Howk, Notes and Observations, April 24, 2003.

23. Jason Howk, “U.S. Security Coordinator Calendar,” 

Microsoft Outlook Calendar, Kabul, Afghanistan, 2002-03.

24. Author’s personal observations while attending meetings 

at the Embassies of many of Afghans regional neighbors.

25. Hendrickson and Karkoszka, p. 175.

26. Ibid.

27. Ibid.

28. Howk, Notes and Observations.

29. Hendrickson and Karkoszka, pp. 175-176.

30. Ibid., p. 176.

31. Ibid., pp. 180-181.

32. Ibid., p. 181.

33. Ibid., p. 199.

34. Ibid., pp. 187-188.

35. Ibid., p. 194.

36. Ibid.

37. Ibid., p. 196.

38. Ibid., p. 200.

39. Brzoska et al.; Cottey, pp. 181-194; Human Rights Watch, 
82

p. 12; Ali Jalali, “Rebuilding Afghanistan’s National Army,” 

Parameters, Autumn 2002, pp. 72-86; NATO, Progress in Afghanistan, 

Bucharest Summit 2-4 April 2008, Brussels: NATO Public Diplomacy 

Division, 2008, www.nato.int; Sedra; Thier, Afghanistan, pp. 467-

572; Thier, The Politics of Peace-Building, Year Onel, pp. 39-60.

40. Eikenberry, Interview about SSR in Afghanistan 2002-2003.

41. Decreased emphasis on SSR by U.S. leaders from the notes 

and recollections of a senior officer closely associated with SSR 

who stayed behind after MG Eikenberry’s departure. Although 

an Afghan observer of the inner workings of government recalls 

that the SSR group was later split into two separate forums. One 

forum, the Policy Action group (PAG), was led by President 

Karzai, and a second forum, Strategy Action Group (SAG), was 

led by the NSA, Dr. Rassoul. The key participants in both meetings 

were expanded to include the Ministers of Defense, Interior, 

Communication, Education, Culture and Information, the Chief 

NDS, NATO Commander, European Union Representative, 

and the Commander CSTC-A, Combined Security Transition 

Command-Afghanistan, the replacement of OMC-A. This switch 

to Afghan leadership and involvement would actually indicate 

that the initial SSR strategy met more success than it was believed 

to have met. 

42. NATO, Progress in Afghanistan, pp. 1-20.

43. Hendrickson and Karkoszka, p. 182.

44. Thomas.

45. Ibid.

46. Based on a passage from Hendrickson and Karkoszka, p. 

194.

47. Thomas.