NO. 07-11-00124-CR NO. 07-11-00125-CR IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS AT AMARILLO PANEL A JANUARY 24, 2012

__________________ ____________ THE STATE OF TEXAS, APPELLANT V. JOSHUA THOMAS COTTER, APPELLEE

__________________ _______________ FROM THE 181 ST DISTRICT COURT OF POTTER COUNTY; NOS. 60,378-B & 60,379- B; HONORABLE JO HN BOARD, JUDGE

__________________ _____________ Before CAMPBELL and HANCOCK and PIRTLE, JJ.

OPINION
Appellant, the State of Texas, appeals the trial co urt’s order suppressing evidence obtained pursuant to a search warran t. In support, the Stat e asserts the trial court erred in its determinati on that the supporting affidavi t lacked sufficient information to establish probable cause that evidence of a crime would be found at the location to be searched. We reverse and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.2 Background

On October 22, 2009, an indictment was returned in Cause No. 60,378-B alleging that, on or about Febr uary 24, 2009, Appellee, Joshua Thomas Cotter, being a person who was seventeen years of age or older , with intent to arouse or gratify his sexual desire, intentio nally communicated over the internet in a sexu ally explicit manner with a child younger than seventeen years of age, to-wit: A.S., 1 by asking her to participate in the lewd exhibition of her geni tals, or anus, or any portion of her breast below the top of the areola. 2
On May 12, 2010, an indictment was retu rned in Cause No. 60,379-B alleging that, on or about February 24, 2010, 3 Appellee, intentionally and knowingly possessed visual material containing an image, to wit: an image transmi tted to a computer or other video screen by telephone line, cable, satellit e transmission, or other method, which visually depicted, and which Appellee knew visually depi cted a child who was younger than eighteen years of age at the time the image of the child wa s made, engaging in sexual conduct, to-wit: the lewd exhibition of any portion of the female breast below the top of the areola. 4

Prior to trial, in both cases, Appellee f iled a motion seeking to suppress evidence seized in connection with the ex ecution of a search warra nt issued on September 1,

1 We will use the victim's initials to protect her identity. See, e.g., Tex. R. App. P. 9.8.

2 See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 33.021 (West 2011).

3 The date of the offense in the indictment’s caption i ndicates that the offense occurred on February 24, 2009. No issue has been raised by the parties regarding this discrepancy.

4 See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 43.26 (West 2011).3 2009. Both motions asserted the search warrant in ques tion was illegally issued because information contained in the supporting affidavit was both stale and insufficient to establish probable cause for th e issuance of the warrant.
The search warrant was based upon the a ffidavit of John Blais, an investigator with the 47 th Judicial District Attorney ’s Office. In that affidavi t, Officer Blais averred that he was assigned to the Internet Crimes Against Children Ta sk Force (ICAC Task Force) and that he had served as a police officer fo r nine and one-half y ears, eight years with the Amarillo Police Departm ent and a year and one-half with the District Attorney’s Office. He also averred that he had received spec ialized training from the ICAC Task Force in the areas of investigative techni ques and undercover chat, and also attended multiple seminars on the inte rnet and child pornography. According to his affidavit, Officer Blais believed Appellee was concealing at his residence located at 3216 North Bolton Street, Amarillo, Texas, "implements or instruments us ed in the commission of a crime, specifically: images of child pornogr aphy found on a computer hard disk or hard drive, constituting evidence of offenses of Possession and/or Promotion of Child Pornography."
In support of this belief, Officer Blais represented he had received, via the Amarillo Police Department, 5 information that, on February 24, 2009, A.S., a minor, was contacted by a then unide ntified person using MSN me ssenger with the screen name pimpinainteasy2009@live.com . That individual showed A. S. a video of herself showing

5 Officer Blais's affidavit further aver red that the Amarillo Police Departm ent received this information from the Naval Criminal Investigative Service (NCIS) at the naval base located in Kitsap, Washington.4 her breasts. 6 After showing her the video, t he unidentified person threatened to post the video on the internet, show it to her fr iends, and post it on her parents’ My Space account if she didn’t "strip for him." A. S. refused, ended the ch at session, and reported the incident to NCIS.
On February 25, 2009, NCIS sent a "pre servation request" to MSN pertaining to the account with the screen name of pimpinainteasy2009@live.com . On April 9, 2009, a search warrant was issued to Microsoft On line Services in Redmond, Washington, for records pertaining to that screen name. Microsoft responded with user information in Texas and an internet prot ocol address of 74.196.4.45. 7 The historical information for that screen name also gave an additional IP address of 74.196.40.66, which was registered to Suddenlink Communications in Ty ler, Texas. On April 15, 2009, A.S. reported to NCIS that pimpinainteasy2009@live.com had again contacted her and threatened not to delete her video unless she stripped for him on her web cam. Once again, A.S. refused.
On May 21, 2009, a search warrant was issued to Suddenlink Communications for records pertaining to t he IP addresses associated with pimpinainteasy2009- @live.com . The return showed that the subscri ber information associated with the IP addresses in question belonged to Appellee at 3216 North Bolton St reet in Amarillo, Texas. The activation date for th e account was September 19, 2008.

6 A.S. admitted making this video in November 2008 (when she was fifteen years old) but had no idea how the individual identified as pimpinainteasy2009@live.com obtained a copy of the video.

7 An internet protocol address, commonly referred to as an IP address, is a numerical label, consisting of four numbers separated by periods, uniquely assigned to every device (e.g. computer, printer, cell phone) participating in a computer network that uses the internet protocol for communication. United States v. Vázquez-Rivera , 2011 U.S.App. LEXIS 25554, at 4-5 (1 st Cir. Dec. 22, 2011) (citing In re Pharmatrak, Inc. , 329 F.3d 9, 13 n.1 (1st Cir. 2003)).5 On August 31, 2009, Officer Blais drove by the address prov ided by Suddenlink and observed two vehicles—one registered to Angela Cotter, the other registered to Joshua Cotter, with both individuals giving the North Bolton Street address as their residence. Officer Blais further averred that, based upon his trai ning and experience, evidence stored by means of electronic m edia was retrievable even after it was purportedly "erased or delet ed" and that "individuals engaged in the possession, distribution, delivery, sale and/or manufacture of child po rnography conceal and secret away the contraband and other evi dence of their illegal activi ty in their residence(s) .

. . . " Based upon this information, on September 1, 2009, a district court judge issued a search warrant authorizing a search of the North Bolton Street address. The warrant was executed the same day, whereupon offi cers seized a computer and numerous items including various images of pornographic material depi cting children and a video of A.S. exposing her breasts . Following a suppression hearing on March 1, 2011, the trial court granted Appellee’s motion to suppress and this appeal followed.

Standard of Review
A search warrant may not legally issue unless it is based on probable cause. U.S. Const. amend. IV; Tex. Co nst. art. I, § 9; Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 1.06 (West 2005). An appellate court normally revi ews a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress by using a bifurcated standard of review, giving almost total deference to the historical facts found by t he trial court and reviewing de novo the trial court's application of the law. Amador v. State, 221 S.W.3d 666, 673 (Tex.Cri m.App. 2007). However, when assessing the sufficiency of an affidavit for a search warrant, the reviewing court is limited to the four co rners of the affidavit. Hankins v. State, 132 S.W.3d 380, 3886 (Tex.Crim.App. 2004). Accordin gly, when we review the magi strate's decision to issue a warrant, we apply a highly deferentia l standard because of the constitutional preference for searches to be conducted pursuant to a warrant as opposed to a warrantless search. Swearingen v. State, 143 S.W.3d 808, 810-11 (Tex.Crim.App. 2004) (citing Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 234-37, 103 S. Ct. 2317, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983)). As long as the issu ing magistrate had a substantia l basis for concluding that probable cause existed, we wi ll uphold that magistrate's pr obable cause determination. State v. McLain , 337 S.W.3d 268, 271 (T ex.Crim.App. 2011).
The task of the issuing magistrate is si mply to make a practical, common-sense decision whether, given all the circumstances set forth in the affidavit, including reasonable inferences that ma y be drawn therefrom and the “veracity” and “basis of knowledge” of persons supplying information, there is a "fair probability" that contraband or evidence of a crime will be fo und at the specif ied location. Rodriguez v. State , 232 S.W.3d 55, 60 (Tex.Crim.App. 2007); Ramos v. State, 934 S.W.2d 358, 363 (Tex.Crim.App. 1996); Wise v. State, 223 S.W.3d 548, 556, (Tex.App.—Amarillo 2007, pet. ref’d) (citing Illinois v. Gates , 462 U.S. 213, 238, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983)). Warrants should not be invalidated through “hyper-technical” interpretation of their supporting affidavits. McLain , 337 S.W.3d at 271; Wise , 223 S.W.3d at 238 (citing Gates , 462 U.S. at 236). Whether the facts alleged in a probable cause affidavit sufficiently support a search warrant is de termined by examining the totality of the circumstances. Gates , 462 U.S. at 230-31.
When reviewing a probable cause determinat ion, the issue is not whether there are other facts that could hav e, or even should have, been in cluded in the affidavit; we7 focus on the combined logical force of facts t hat are contained within the four corners of the affidavit, not those that are omitted from the affidavit . Rodriguez, 232 S.W.3d at 62. The only issue is whether the fa cts that actually were in the affidavit, combined with all reasonable inferences that might flow from those facts, are sufficient to establish probable cause. See id. at 64 ("We must defer to the [i ssuing] magistrate's finding of probable cause if the affidavit demonstrates a substantial basis for his conclusion.")

Probable Cause Affidavit Officer Blais’s affidavit alleges tha t, in February 2009, a person with the screen name of pimpinainteasy2009@live.com sent pornographic video images of a child over the internet to the person depicted in the video, namely A.S., accompanied by an attempt to extort sexu al conduct from A.S. in return for not disclosing the pornographic video images to her family and friends. Two months later, in Ap ril 2009, a person using the same screen name again cont acted A.S. threatening not to delete the pornographic video unless A.S. stripped for him on her web cam. IP addresses associated with the screen name were subsequently traced to Appellee and his home address in Amarillo, Texas, through search warrants issued to Microsoft Online Services and Suddenlink. 8 Appellee’s activation date fo r the Suddenlink account and screen name was prior to the date A.S. received an y communication from pimpinainteasy2009@live.com . On August 31, 2009, Officer Blais investig ated the address provided by Suddenlink, discovered a car parked at that address which was regi stered to Appellee, t hereby inferentially confirming that Appellee currently resided at that address.

8 Web page and internet providers such as Microsoft and Suddenlink have a vested interest in protecting their users from viewing materials that violate local, state, national, and international law. See Dawes v. State, No. 05-08-00651-CR, 2009 Tex. App. LEXIS 2364, at *13-14 (Tex.App.—Dallas April 3, 2009, no pet.) (not designated for publication). Information fr om such sources carries an indicia of reliability . Id.8 Considering the totality of the circumstances, we conclude the issuing magistrate could have reasonably inferred fr om the facts set forth in the affidavit the following: Suddenlink provided internet access to A ppellee at his residence located at 3216 North Bolton Street, Amarillo, Texas; computing devices connecting to the internet through that access were assigned specific IP addr esses; those IP addresses were associated with the screen name pimpinainteasy2009@live.com ; and, someone using that screen name possessed images depicti ng child pornography. Theref ore, we further hold the issuing magistrate could hav e reasonably conclu ded a probability ex isted that child pornography would be found at Appellee's residence. See State v. Moore , 2007 Tex.App. LEXIS 9628, at *1 5 (Tex.App.--Dallas Dec. 11, 2007, pet. ref'd) (not designated for publication).
Appellee relies heavily on Taylor v. State , 54 S.W.3d 21 (Tex.App.—Amarillo 2001, no pet.) in asserting the affidavit is deficient. Upon comparison, however, the circumstances of Taylor are distinguishable from the facts of this case. In Taylor , there was no specific evidence that the individua l who was the subject of the search was registered to the screen name used to send the pornographic image at the time of its transmission. 54 S.W.3d at 26. Rather, the affiant’s repres entation was that the screen name “somehow c[ame] back to [the individual].” Id. Here, we have evidence from two reliable entities, Microsoft On line Services and Suddenlink, t hat Appellee is the internet subscriber associated with t he IP addresses which are a ssociated with the screen name responsible for the transmi ssion of the pornographic video and requests that A.S. strip for him on her web cam. In addition, Appe llee’s internet subscr iption with Suddenlink commenced prior to the two transmissions to A.S. and it was verified by law9 enforcement as belongi ng to Appellee shortly after the transmissions. More importantly, there was no evidence in Taylor that the appellant retai ned or collected child pornography; id. , whereas, here, there was evidenc e that the por nographic video in question was being retained by the sender, indi cating a reasonable pr obability that the video could still be found in the residence occupied by the sender. Further, unlike Taylor where there was the transmission of a single pornographic photograph over the internet, here the transmission of the por nographic video, coupled with the sexually related demands made upon A.S., in two separ ate instances, creates an inference that the sender had the propens ities of a pedophile and was likel y to maintain that media on premises subject to his control. See State v. Duncan , 72 S.W.2d 803, 808 (Tex.App.-- Fort Worth 2002, pet. ref'd) (distinguishing Taylor on the basis of the suspected party's tendency to collect or possess child pornography).

Stale Information
We also agree with Appellant ’s assertion that inform ation contained in Officer Blais’s affidavit was not stale. To inva lidate a warrant, the facts relied upon in the probable cause affidavit must not have become “s tale” by the time the warrant is issued; Kennedy v. State, 338 S.W.3d 84, 93 (Tex.App.—Austi n 2011, no pet.), and the “proper method to determine whether th e facts supporting a search warrant have become stale is to examine, in light of t he type of criminal activity invo lved, the time elapsing between the occurrence of the events set out in the a ffidavit and the time the search warrant was issued.” Crider v. State, No. PD-0592-10, 2011 Tex. App. LEXIS 1594, at *8 (Tex.Crim.App. Nov. 16, 2011) (quoting McKissick v. State, 209 S.W.3d 205, 214 (Tex.App.—Houston [1 st Dist.] 2006, pe t. ref’d)).10 Although the passage of time is one factor that should be considered when determining if the information in an affidavit is stale, the amount of time passed is less significant if the affidavit contains facts s howing “activity of a pr otracted and continuous nature, i.e., a course of conduct.” Kennedy , 338 S.W.3d at 93 (citing McKissick , 209 S.W.3d at 214). Further, a determination r egarding whether the information in an affidavit is stale should also involve consid eration of the type of property to be seized and the probability that the property has been co nsumed or relocated. Kennedy , 338 S.W.3d at 93 (citing Bradley, 966 S.W.2d at 875).
Although approximately four months passed between the last communication to A.S. and the issuance of the search warrant in question, the property the subject of the search, a pornographic video transmi tted over the internet via digital media, is the type of item that is customarily uploaded onto the internet and/or downloaded and stored on a personal computer, and such property is often retrievable even after it had been purportedly erased from that computer. McKissick, 209 S.W.3d at 215. Furthermore, that type of property is not transient in nature such as drugs which are consumable. Id. The communications to A.S. we re of a continuing nature and essentially the same in content, i.e., a threat to publish the pornographi c video over the inte rnet if she did not sexually perform for him using a web cam. In addition, A. S. was told that the video would not be deleted until she stripped on the web vi a her web cam, which she never did. Considering the affidavit as a whole and the reasonable inferences it supports, we conclude the issuing magistrate had a subs tantial basis to find t hat a fair probability existed that the evidence sought would continue to be on or be recoverable from11 Appellee’s computer and that t hat computer would be readily accessible to Appellee at his residence. Accordingly, the information contained in Officer Blais’s affidavit was not stale. Consequently, we hold there is a substantial basis to support the issuing magistrate's conclusion that a “fair probabili ty” existed that evidence of a criminal offense would be found at Appellee’s reside nce and we sustain Appellant's issue.

Conclusion Having sustained the State’s issue, we re verse the trial court’s written order of March 9, 2011, granting Appellee’s motion to suppress, and we remand the case to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Patrick A. Pirtle Justice Publish.