COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Judges Fr ank, Humphreys and Seni or Judge Bumgardner Argued by teleconference

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA MEMORANDUM OPINION * BY v. Record No. 1463-07-2 JUDGE ROBERT P. FRANK NOVEMBER 28, 2007 RICHARD PHILLIPS

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF CHESTERFIELD COUNTY William R. Shelton, Judge Eugene Murphy, Senior Assist ant Attorney Gene ral (Robert F. McDonnell, Attorney General, on briefs), for appellant. (Angela D. Whitley for appellee).
The Commonwealth, appellant, ap peals, pursuant to Co de § 19.2-398, the trial court’s order dismissing an indictment against Richard Phillips fo r a violation of Phillips’ Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial. Fo r the reasons stated, we affirm this appeal.
BACKGROUND Phillips was indicted for aggr avated sexual battery on Sept ember 16, 2002. On December 11, 2006 the Commonwealth moved to nolle prosse that indictment and on January 16, 2007 the Commonwealth re-indicted Phillips for aggravated sexual battery and obtained a new indictment for object sexual penetration. In a letter opinion dated June 8, 2007, the trial court found a Sixth Amendment speedy trial violation and dismissed both indictments by order en tered June 11, 2007. The issue before this C ourt is limited to whether the trial court erred in dismissing the new indictment for object sexual penetration.

* Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opin ion is not designated for publication.- 2 - The Commonwealth argues the trial court e rred by dismissing the indictment for object sexual penetration because, unlike the charge for aggravated sexual battery, this indictment was first issued in January 2007. However, the Commonwealth did not pr esent this specific argument to the trial court. At Phillips’ hear ing on his motion to dismiss, the Commonwealth addressed only the 2002 indictment for aggravated sexual battery, the nolle prosse of that indictment, and the effect of the nolle prosse on speedy trial issues. It is clear, therefore, that, despite having had the opportunity to do so, th e Commonwealth did not raise below the claim now argued on appeal. Rule 5A:18 provides in pertinent part that “[n]o ruling of the trial court . . . will be considered as a basis for reversal unless the ob jection was stated toge ther with the grounds therefor at the time of the ruling, except for good cause shown or to enable the Court of Appeals to attain the ends of justice.” Under this rule, a specific argument must be made to the trial court at the appropriate time, or the allegation of error will not be considered on appeal. A general ar gument or an abstract reference to the law is not sufficient to preserve an issue. Making one specific argument on an issue does not preserve a separate legal point on the same issue for review. Edwards v. Commonwealth , 41 Va. App. 752, 760, 589 S.E.2d 444, 448 (2003) ( en banc ) (citations omitted). Thus, “though taking the same general position as in the trial court, an appellant may not rely on reasons which could have been but were not raised for the benefit of the lower court.” West Alexandria Properties, Inc. v. Fi rst Va. Mortgage & Real Estate Inv.
Trust , 221 Va. 134, 138, 267 S.E.2d 149, 151 (1980). The main purpose of this rule is to ensure that the trial court and opposing party are given the opportunity to intelligently address, examine, and resolve issues in the trial court, thus avoiding unnecessary appeals and reversals. Lee v. Lee , 12 Va. App. 512, 514, 404 S.E.2d 736, 739 (1991) ( en banc ).- 3 - Although Rule 5A:18 allows exceptions for good cau se or to meet the ends of justice, appellant does not argue that we should invoke th ese exceptions. See Redman v. Commonwealth , 25 Va. App. 215, 221, 487 S.E.2d 269, 272 (1997). We will not consider such an argument sua sponte

. Edwards , 41 Va. App. at 761, 589 S.E.2d at 448. We hold, therefore, that the Commonwealth is barred by Rule 5A:18 from raising this claim for the first time on appeal. Acco rdingly, appellant’s appeal is affirmed. Affirmed.