IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 16-30996

Summary Calendar

In the Matter of: WILLIAM DOUGLAS CARROLL and CAROLYN K. 

CARROLL,

 Debtors

WILLIAM DOUGLAS CARROLL; CAROLYN K. CARROLL; PAMELA K. 

ALONSO; CYNTHIA G. O'NEAL, 

 Appellants

v.

SAMERA L. ABIDE, 

 Appellee

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Louisiana

Before HIGGINBOTHAM, PRADO, and HAYNES, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

The bankruptcy court declared William Douglas Carroll, Carolyn K. 

Carroll, Pamela K. Alonso, and Cynthia G. O’Neal vexatious litigants and set 

forth a pre-filing injunction against them. It also sanctioned the Carrolls, 

jointly and severally, in the amount of $49,432. The district court affirmed, 

and we affirm for substantially the same reasons.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

March 13, 2017

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

 Case: 16-30996 Document: 00513908053 Page: 1 Date Filed: 03/13/2017
No. 16-30996

2

I.

Appellants in this matter are William Douglas Carroll and Carolyn K. 

Carroll (collectively, the Carrolls) and their daughters, Pamela K. Alonso and 

Cynthia G. O’Neal (collectively, the Carroll Daughters). The Carrolls filed 

their bankruptcy petition on May 21, 2008. RedPen Properties, L.L.C., whose 

membership consists solely of the Carrolls, filed its bankruptcy petition that 

same year. The trustee in both of these bankruptcy cases was Samera L. Abide, 

and the cases were substantially consolidated in 2014. 

On October 5, 2015, Abide sought relief against the Carrolls and the 

Carroll Daughters due to their conduct in the bankruptcy cases. In granting 

Abide’s motion in part, the bankruptcy court carefully laid out the troublesome 

conduct of Appellants in a thorough, twenty-two-page opinion. The bankruptcy 

court detailed a series of notable actions by Appellants that demonstrated their 

pattern of harassment, which included: seeking to frustrate the sale of a fiveacre tract of land, filings related to a movables adversary brought by the 

Carroll Daughters (“Movables Adversary”),1 orders of contempt entered 

against Appellants, attempts to frustrate the sale of the Carrolls’ residence and 

movables, and two attempts to remove Abide that were wholly unsupported by 

evidence. 

After recounting the bad faith conduct of Appellants, the bankruptcy 

court determined that “the Carrolls’ true motives [were] to harass the trustee 

 

1 In the Movables Adversary, the Carroll Daughters sought to establish their 

ownership in certain antiques and other movable property that was in the Carrolls’ 

possession at the time of the Carrolls’ bankruptcy filing. The Carroll Daughters claimed that 

this property was transferred to them in 2005. Due to concerns regarding the ability of the 

bankruptcy court to hear this claim under Stern v. Marshall, 564 U.S. 462 (2011), the district 

court withdrew the reference. The case was then heard by the district court, which, in 

granting summary judgment in favor of Abide, stated that it “seriously question[ed] the 

legality of the actions taken by [the Carroll Daughters] and the Carrolls.” We affirmed. 

Alonso v. Abide (In re RedPen Properties, L.L.C.), 568 F. App’x 338 (5th Cir. 2014).

 Case: 16-30996 Document: 00513908053 Page: 2 Date Filed: 03/13/2017
No. 16-30996

3

and thereby delay the proper administration of the estate in the hope that they 

would be able to retain their assets, or make pursuit of the assets so 

unappealing that the trustee would be compelled to settle on terms favorable 

to the [appellants].” The court specifically found that Appellants were bad 

faith filers and noted that Appellants’ failure to pay previous contempt 

sanctions ordered against them “demonstrates that monetary sanctions alone 

will not deter them.” Accordingly, the bankruptcy court “enjoin[ed] them and

anyone acting on their behalf from filing any pleading or document in this case 

or its associated cases or adversary proceedings, and from filing any future 

cases in [the Bankruptcy Court for the Middle District of Louisiana], without 

first obtaining bankruptcy court permission.” The bankruptcy court then

assessed monetary sanctions, under 11 U.S.C. § 105, in the amount of $49,432

against the Carrolls. This figure represented the attorneys’ fees incurred “in 

defending the trustee removal motions and the injunction complaint, along 

with the Carrolls’ motion for stay pending appeal.” 

The Carrolls and the Carroll Daughters appealed to the district court, 

which affirmed the bankruptcy court’s order in a similarly detailed twentyfive-page opinion. On appeal to us, the Carrolls and the Carrol Daughters 

challenge the pre-filing injunction against them, and the Carrolls additionally 

challenge the imposition of monetary sanctions.

II.

Although it is not altogether clear whether jurisdiction is proper under 

28 U.S.C. § 158, the bankruptcy court’s order is a collateral order under the 

Cohen doctrine. See Markwell v. Cty. of Bexar, 878 F.2d 899, 901 (5th Cir. 

1989); see also Chaves v. M/V Medina Star, 47 F.3d 153, 156 (5th Cir. 1995).2

 

2 We need not decide if an award of attorneys’ fees alone would constitute a collateral 

order in this context because here the bankruptcy court’s order labeled the Appellants 

 Case: 16-30996 Document: 00513908053 Page: 3 Date Filed: 03/13/2017
No. 16-30996

4

“We review the imposition of sanctions for an abuse of discretion.” 

Chaves, 47 F.3d at 156 (citation omitted). “A Bankruptcy Court does not abuse 

its discretion unless its ruling is based on an erroneous review of the law or on 

a clearly erroneous assessment of the evidence.” In re Yorkshire, LLC, 540 

F.3d 328, 331 (5th Cir. 2008) (quoting Chaves, 47 F.3d at 156). Furthermore, 

we review the facts that form the basis of the court’s decision to sanction for 

clear error. FDIC v. Maxxam, Inc., 523 F.3d 566, 576–77 (5th Cir. 2008).

III.

We begin by noting the bankruptcy court has numerous tools by which 

to sanction the conduct of individuals. “Federal courts have inherent powers 

which include the authority to sanction a party or attorney when necessary to 

achieve the orderly and expeditious disposition of their dockets.” Scaife v. 

Associated Air Ctr. Inc., 100 F.3d 406, 411 (5th Cir. 1996) (citation omitted); 

see also Citizens Bank & Tr. Co. v. Case (In re Case), 937 F.2d 1014, 1023 (5th 

Cir. 1991). “Such powers may be exercised only if essential to preserve the 

authority of the court and the sanction chosen must employ the least possible 

power adequate to the end proposed.” Nat’l Gas Pipeline Co. of Am. v. Energy 

Gathering, Inc., 86 F.3d 464, 467 (5th Cir. 1996) (quoting Anderson v. Dunn, 

19 U.S. 204, 231 (1821)). A court must make a specific finding of bad faith in 

order to impose sanctions under its inherent power. See Chaves, 47 F.3d at

156. Moreover, when sanctions are imposed under the inherent power, this 

court’s “investigation of legal and evidentiary sufficiency is particularly 

probing” and this court must “probe the record in detail to get at the underlying 

facts and ensure the legal sufficiency of their support for the district court’s 

 

vexatious litigants and enjoined them from future filings. See generally Ali v. Quarterman, 

607 F.3d 1046, 1048 (5th Cir. 2010).

 Case: 16-30996 Document: 00513908053 Page: 4 Date Filed: 03/13/2017
No. 16-30996

5

more generalized finding of ‘bad faith.’” Crowe v. Smith, 151 F.3d 217, 236 (5th 

Cir. 1998). 

Federal courts also have authority to enjoin vexatious litigants under the 

All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651. See Newby v. Enron Corp., 302 F.3d 295, 302 

(5th Cir. 2002). Moreover, under 11 U.S.C. § 105, “a bankruptcy court can 

issue any order, including a civil contempt order, necessary or appropriate to 

carry out the provisions of the bankruptcy code.” Placid Refining Co. v. 

Terrebonne Fuel and Lube, Inc. (In re Terrebonne Fuel & Lube, Inc.), 108 F.3d 

609, 613 (5th Cir. 1997). When considering whether to enjoin future filings,

the court must consider the circumstances of the case, including four factors:

(1) the party’s history of litigation, in particular 

whether he has filed vexatious, harassing, or 

duplicative lawsuits; (2) whether the party had a good 

faith basis for pursuing the litigation, or simply 

intended to harass; (3) the extent of the burden on the 

courts and other parties resulting from the party’s 

filings; and (4) the adequacy of alternative sanctions.

Baum v. Blue Moon Ventures, LLC, 513 F.3d 181, 189 (5th Cir. 2008) (quoting

Cromer v. Kraft Foods N. Am., Inc., 390 F.3d 812, 818 (4th Cir. 2004)).

With these legal principles in mind, we turn to the arguments on appeal 

and affirm for substantially the same reasons asserted by the district court.

Addressing the pre-filing injunction first, the bankruptcy court considered the 

relevant factors in issuing its pre-filing injunction. See Baum, 513 F.3d at 189. 

To the extent that appellants maintain that sanctions cannot be imposed 

against them because they are pro se litigants, they are incorrect. See

Farguson v. MBank Hous., N.A., 808 F.2d 358, 359 (5th Cir. 1986); see also 

Clark v. Mortenson, 93 F. App’x 643, 652 (5th Cir. 2004).

To the extent that Appellants challenge the bankruptcy court’s finding 

that they acted in bad faith, our probing review of the record establishes that

the finding of bad faith is well supported. As both the bankruptcy court and 

 Case: 16-30996 Document: 00513908053 Page: 5 Date Filed: 03/13/2017
No. 16-30996

6

the district court meticulously explained, Appellants have engaged in conduct 

intended to harass and delay. Appellants’ suggestion that their conduct was 

not done in bad faith is belied by their repeated attempts to litigate issues that 

have been conclusively resolved against them or that they had no standing to 

assert and by their unsupported and multiple attempts to remove Abide as the 

trustee. Although it is correct that the conduct of the Carroll Daughters was 

less pervasive than that of the Carrolls, their conduct was still in bad faith. 

Specifically, the bankruptcy court discussed the Carroll Daughters’ conduct in 

the Movables Adversary, in which the district court had to hold the Carroll 

Daughters in contempt and order them to make Abide whole as to all costs 

involved in filing her motions to compel.3 Yet, the Carroll Daughters remained 

undeterred, persisted in their unsupported filings, and eventually triggered 

another motion for contempt by failing to pay the attorneys’ fees as ordered.

At bottom, the record fully supports the bankruptcy court’s determination of 

bad faith, and Appellants have not established that any of the bankruptcy 

court’s findings were clearly erroneous.

 

3 Construing their pro se brief liberally, see Price v. Digital Equip. Corp., 846 F.2d 

1026, 1028 (5th Cir. 1988), Appellants maintain that the bankruptcy court could not sanction 

the Carroll Daughters for conduct that occurred before the district court in the Movables 

Adversary once the order of reference was withdrawn because the Movables Adversary is a 

separate proceeding. We have determined that “the inherent power does not extend to 

collateral proceedings that do not threaten the court’s own judicial authority or proceedings.” 

Positive Software Sols., Inc. v. New Century Mortg. Corp., 619 F.3d 458, 460–61 (5th Cir. 

2010) (quoting Maxxam, 523 F.3d at 593). Here, by contrast, the conduct by the Carroll 

Daughters in the district court occurred in the same bankruptcy case. See 2 COLLIER ON 

BANKRUPTCY § 301.03 (Alan N. Resnick & Henry J. Sommer eds., 16th ed. 2015) (“The term 

‘case’ . . . refers to the overall spectrum of legal action taken under one of the debtor relief 

chapters. It is the widest term functionally. The term ‘proceeding,’ by contrast, refers to any 

particular action raised or commenced within the case, including motions and adversary 

proceedings, whether such actions raise disputed or consensual matters.”). Accordingly, the 

bankruptcy court could sanction the Carroll Daughters for their conduct in the Movables 

Adversary.

 Case: 16-30996 Document: 00513908053 Page: 6 Date Filed: 03/13/2017
No. 16-30996

7

We next address the bankruptcy court’s order that the Carrolls pay 

$49,432, which represents the amount of attorneys’ fees incurred by Abide in 

responding to certain instances of the Carrolls’ bad faith conduct. “[Section 

105] has been interpreted as supporting the inherent authority of the 

bankruptcy courts to impose civil sanctions for abuses of the bankruptcy 

process.” In re Clark, 223 F.3d 859, 864 (8th Cir. 2000) (citation omitted); see 

also In re Tucker, 224 F.3d 766, 2000 WL 992448, at *3 (5th Cir. 2000)

(unpublished) (rejecting the argument that the bankruptcy court erred in 

holding that section 105 authorized the imposition of sanctions where the 

sanctioned individuals participated in an abuse of process). The Carrolls 

appear to argue that this sanction was erroneous because the estate has 

already incurred these attorneys’ fees. This argument misunderstands that 

the purpose of ordering the Carrolls to pay these fees is to prevent the estate

from bearing the costs of their vexatious conduct. Accordingly, the attorneys’ 

fees award is not erroneous.

AFFIRMED.

 Case: 16-30996 Document: 00513908053 Page: 7 Date Filed: 03/13/2017