IN THE SUPREME COURT

STATE OF NORTH DAKOTA

2021 ND 23

Daniel Joseph Stoddard, Jr., Plaintiff and Appellant

v.

Christina Jean Singer, F/K/A

Christina Jean Stoddard F/K/A

Christina Jean Ringering, Defendant and Appellee

and

State of North Dakota, Statutory Real Party in Interest

No. 20200157

Appeal from the District Court of Mountrail County, North Central Judicial 

District, the Honorable Richard L. Hagar, Judge.

AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, AND REMANDED.

Opinion of the Court by Crothers, Justice.

Bonnie P. Humphrey, Minot, ND, for plaintiff and appellant; submitted on 

brief. 

Elizabeth J. Sundby, West Fargo, ND, for defendant and appellee; submitted 

on brief.

FILED 

IN THE OFFICE OF THE 

CLERK OF SUPREME COURT 

FEBRUARY 18, 2021 

STATE OF NORTH DAKOTA
1

Stoddard v. Singer

No. 20200157

Crothers, Justice.

[¶1] Daniel Stoddard appeals from a district court order and judgment

amending the parenting plan between Stoddard and Christina Singer for their 

minor child, M.S.S. Stoddard presents 12 issues, asserting the district court 

erred in its determination a change in primary residential responsibility was 

unwarranted. Stoddard’s issues can be condensed to the four arguments we 

address below. We affirm the district court’s order and judgment finding 

Stoddard did not meet his burden of proof regarding primary residential 

responsibility, not appointing a parenting investigator, and delaying the 

emergency hearing. We reverse the district court’s order preventing Stoddard 

from proceeding on a psychological parent claim related to J.B.G.

I

[¶2] Stoddard and Singer were married on April 24, 2010, in Washington

state. The parties’ minor child, M.S.S., was born in January 2010. Singer has 

a child from a previous relationship, J.B.G., born in 2006. J.B.G. has no 

biological or legal connection with Stoddard. The parties separated in May, 

2016 while living in North Dakota. They resided in the same house until 

Stoddard returned to Washington in August, 2016. The parties were divorced 

on March 15, 2017. The divorce was by agreement of the parties, each selfrepresented. As part of the agreement, Singer received primary residential 

responsibility for M.S.S. while Stoddard received parenting time on

alternating holidays and summer vacations. 

[¶3] On May 20, 2018, Stoddard filed an expedited motion to modify and 

enforce judgment. The parties reached a temporary agreement for Stoddard’s 

summer parenting time. The district court denied any other immediate relief. 

On June 20, 2018, a schedule and order for mediation was entered. A partial 

agreement was reached during mediation regarding winter parenting time and 

some property and debt issues. On December 23, 2018, Stoddard filed an 

amended motion to amend and enforce judgment. On January 28, 2019, an 
2

order finding prima facie case and granting an evidentiary hearing was 

entered. The evidentiary hearing was held on July 18, 2019. Stoddard filed his 

closing argument on August 19, 2019, and Singer filed a letter brief on 

August 20, 2019. 

[¶4] On September 25, 2019, before the district court made a decision on the 

pending issues, Stoddard filed an emergency motion for an interim order 

placing M.S.S. in his custody. When Stoddard’s telephonic requests to schedule 

an emergency hearing were denied, he wrote letters to the court to request a 

hearing. A hearing was scheduled on the emergency motion for January 21, 

2020. During the hearing, the court interviewed J.B.G. and M.S.S. On 

February 24, 2020, the court entered an order denying Stoddard’s amended 

motion to modify and enforce judgment, as well as his emergency motion. The 

order amending the parenting plan and the amended judgment were filed on 

May 18, 2020.

II

[¶5] Stoddard argues the district court erred in finding he did not meet his 

burden of proof in seeking a change of primary residential responsibility for 

M.S.S. Stoddard asserts the court erred in: (1) failing to find abuse or neglect 

by Singer, (2) not finding Singer’s alleged failures to provide for M.S.S.’s needs

was a reason to award him primary residential responsibility, (3) failing to find 

Singer’s alcohol and marijuana use interfered with M.S.S.’s safety, (4) failing 

to find a change in residential responsibility was necessary to provide for 

M.S.S.’s special needs, (5) failing to find Singer willfully violated and interfered 

with parenting time, (6) failing to consider Singer’s alleged lack of credibility, 

and (7) failing to find a material change in circumstances existed that 

warranted a modification in parenting time. 

[¶6] A district court’s decision on whether to modify primary residential 

responsibility is a finding of fact, which will not be reversed on appeal unless 

it is clearly erroneous. Regan v. Lervold, 2014 ND 56, ¶ 15, 844 N.W.2d 576. A 

finding of fact is clearly erroneous if it is induced by an erroneous view of the 
3

law, there is no evidence to support it, or if the appellate court is convinced, on 

the entire record, a mistake has been made. Id. 

[¶7] Unless agreed to in writing or in the parenting plan, a motion for an 

order to modify primary residential responsibility may not be made earlier 

than two years after the entry of an order establishing primary residential 

responsibility. N.D.C.C. § 14-09-06.6(1). That time limitation does not apply if 

the court finds:

“a. The persistent and willful denial or interference with parenting 

time; b. The child’s present environment may endanger the child’s 

physical or emotional health or impair the child’s emotional 

development; or c. The primary residential responsibility for the 

child has changed to the other parent for longer than six months.”

N.D.C.C. § 14-09-06.6(3)(a)-(c). Under the clearly erroneous standard of 

review, this Court will not “reweigh the evidence, reassess the credibility of 

witnesses, or substitute [its] own judgment for a district court’s initial 

decision.” Vandal v. Leno, 2014 ND 45, ¶ 6, 843 N.W.2d 313. 

[¶8] Stoddard argues on several occasions the district court erred by not 

making certain findings. Although on a different basis, the Minnesota 

Supreme Court concluded a district court’s failure to make certain findings was 

not clearly erroneous. In re Disciplinary Action against Albrecht, 779 N.W.2d 

530, 538 (Minn. 2010) (explaining that in deference to a referee’s findings and 

because findings on mitigating factors require an assessment of witness 

credibility, the referee’s decision not to find additional mitigating factors was 

not clearly erroneous). 

A

[¶9] Stoddard argues Singer deprived and neglected M.S.S. to a point below 

minimum community standards, constituting domestic violence against M.S.S. 

Domestic violence is defined as “physical harm, bodily injury, sexual activity 

compelled by physical force, assault, or the infliction of fear of imminent

physical harm, bodily injury, sexual activity compelled by physical force, or 

assault, not committed in self-defense, on the complaining family or household 
4

members.” N.D.C.C. § 14-07.1-01. Stoddard asserts Singer’s use of a baby gate 

at night, M.S.S.’s alleged exposure to unsafe and unsanitary conditions, 

including feces in a bathroom, and Singer’s lack of attention to M.S.S.’s dental 

and medical needs support this contention. Stoddard asserts he addressed 

M.S.S.’s continuing medical problems, which should have contributed to a 

finding M.S.S. was deprived and neglected while in Singer’s care. 

[¶10] Despite Stoddard’s assertion, the court received evidence showing M.S.S. 

did not have access to the bathroom that was allegedly covered in feces. 

Additionally, Stoddard filed several reports with social services regarding 

alleged unsafe conditions and alleged lack of medical care for M.S.S. Each 

investigation was terminated in progress with no findings or basis for abuse or 

neglect allegations. Testimony also was presented showing Easter Seals 

approved of Singer’s use of a baby gate at night for M.S.S. Testimony also 

showed Singer was unable to promptly take care of M.S.S.’s dental problems 

because she was referred to a different dentist due to M.S.S.’s special needs.

[¶11] The district court was presented with conflicting evidence about Singer’s 

care for M.S.S. This Court will not reweigh the evidence presented. Vandal, 

2014 ND 45, ¶ 6. The district court’s lack of a finding of domestic violence was 

not clearly erroneous and we are not left with a definite and firm conviction a 

mistake was made. 

B

[¶12] Stoddard argues the district court erred by not finding Singer’s alleged 

failures to provide for M.S.S.’s safety, structure, educational needs, medical 

and dental problems were reasons to award him primary residential 

responsibility. Stoddard argues Singer continually failed to provide M.S.S. 

with a safe environment. He asserts Singer’s alcohol and marijuana use were 

ignored by the court, including that illegal substances should not be used 

around a special needs child. 

[¶13] Stoddard filed several complaints with social services regarding these

issues. The complaint investigations all were terminated in progress finding 
5

no neglect or abuse. A school paraprofessional testified M.S.S. was welldressed at school each day, with unmatted hair and clean fingernails. A social 

worker with whom Singer voluntarily engaged on a monthly basis testified she 

had no concerns about M.S.S.’s safety with Singer after thoroughly inspecting 

and touring Singer’s home. The district court noted the medical and school 

records showed that despite M.S.S.’s heightened hygienic and medical needs 

due to his sensory processing disorder, those needs were met by Singer. 

Although Singer admitted to going to the bar each Wednesday to visit with a 

friend, M.S.S. was left in the care of J.B.G., something social services found on 

more than one occasion was not a problem. Further, despite Singer’s admitted 

marijuana use, she testified she did not use around M.S.S. or J.B.G. No 

evidence was offered by Stoddard to the contrary. As the court noted, Stoddard 

presented no evidence of Singer’s association with illegal drug dealing and 

M.S.S.’s possible access to the illegal drugs. The district court not finding 

Singer failed to provide for M.S.S.’s needs was not clearly erroneous.

C

[¶14] Stoddard asserts the district court erred in failing to find Singer’s 

admitted use of alcohol and illegal drugs interfere with M.S.S.’s safety and 

well-being. No evidence was presented establishing that Singer used drugs in 

the presence of M.S.S., that M.S.S. had access to marijuana due to Singer’s use, 

or that drug use adversely affected her care for M.S.S. The court not finding 

Singer’s alcohol and marijuana use interfered with the safety of M.S.S. was not 

clearly erroneous. 

D

[¶15] Stoddard contends awarding primary residential responsibility and 

decision-making to him is necessary to provide for M.S.S.’s special needs. 

Stoddard asserts Singer’s lack of priority for M.S.S.’s care was proven by her 

refusal to communicate, to provide parenting time, and to take M.S.S. to the 

dentist or a medical care provider. Stoddard testified he believed the delay in 

seeking dental care for M.S.S. was due to Singer prioritizing her own dental 
6

care. Singer testified the reason M.S.S.’s dental care was delayed is because 

she needed to locate a dentist who would treat a child with M.S.S.’s needs. 

[¶16] Stoddard also claimed Singer interfered with his parenting rights by 

scheduling an appointment with a geneticist in Fargo rather than continuing 

care with M.S.S.’s geneticist in Washington. Stoddard alleges Singer failed to 

communicate with him when she did not give him the name of the geneticist 

in Fargo. The district court found Singer met M.S.S.’s medical needs since his 

birth, despite disagreements between Stoddard and Singer as to how M.S.S.’s 

needs should be met. The court made findings based on disputed evidence, 

which was not error. Vandal, 2014 ND 45, ¶ 6. The court’s lack of further 

findings that Singer failed to address M.S.S.’s special needs was not clearly 

erroneous. 

E

[¶17] Stoddard asserts the district court erred when it did not find Singer 

interfered with his parenting time. Stoddard claims Singer intentionally and 

willfully interfered with his parenting time by reducing electronic contact with 

M.S.S. to four days a week instead of seven. He further claims only allowing 

alternate winter breaks impedes and directly interferes with M.S.S.’s 

relationship with Stoddard. Stoddard contends the court heard testimony 

showing each of his parenting time requests were met with interference by 

Singer. 

[¶18] Each parent is allowed reasonable access to their children by written, 

telephonic, and electronic means. N.D.C.C. § 14-09-32(1)(c). Stoddard and 

Singer’s stipulated parenting plan reflects this provision of law. Stoddard 

presented no evidence establishing that access to M.S.S. via video 

communication four days a week rather than seven was an intentional 

interference with his parenting time. Singer asserts the change was made 

because daily contact proved to be too much for M.S.S., who is mostly nonverbal. While Stoddard asserts he only was allowed alternate winter breaks 

for parenting time, the parenting plan provided for M.S.S. to be with Stoddard 

each summer. Stoddard admits he received that parenting time during the 
7

summers of 2017, 2018 and 2019. While miscommunications occurred about 

when M.S.S. needed to be back with Singer at the end of summer 2018, 

Stoddard had M.S.S. until the day before school began. Overall, the district 

court had disputed evidence before it. Deference is given to the court because 

making such a finding required an assessment of witness credibility. See 

Albrecht, 779 N.W.2d 530, 538 (Minn. 2010). The court’s failure to find willful 

or intentional interference by Singer with Stoddard’s parenting time was not 

clearly erroneous. 

F

[¶19] Stoddard claims the district court erred when it did not consider Singer’s 

alleged lack of credibility and inconsistent testimony in making its 

determination that a change in primary residential responsibility was 

unwarranted. He argues the court should have reassessed Singer’s credibility

after the January 21, 2020 hearing where she allegedly admitted she was not 

candid under oath about her alcohol and drug use.

[¶20] At the January hearing, Singer was confronted with Facebook posts 

regarding alcohol use but asserted she quit drinking after a September 2019 

hospital admission for mental health problems. Singer also admitted to 

occasional marijuana use. Stoddard points out no actual instance in which 

Singer’s testimony was inconsistent. This Court has said: 

“‘In a bench trial, the [district] court is the “determiner of 

credibility issues and we do not second-guess the [district] court on 

its credibility determinations.” We do not reweigh evidence or 

reassess credibility, nor do we reexamine findings of fact made 

upon conflicting testimony. We give due regard to the [district]

court’s opportunity to assess the credibility of the witnesses, and 

the court’s choice between two permissible views of the evidence is 

not clearly erroneous.’”

Roberson v. Roberson, 2004 ND 203, ¶ 10, 688 N.W.2d 380 (quoting McDowell 

v. McDowell, 2003 ND 174, ¶ 16, 670 N.W.2d 876). The district court’s 

determination that Singer’s testimony was credible was not clearly erroneous. 
8

G

[¶21] Stoddard argues the district court erred by not finding a material change 

of circumstances exists meriting a modification of parenting time. Essentially, 

Stoddard argues that while the two-year period for modification was not met 

when the initial motion was filed, the period would have been met in March 

2019. 

[¶22] Under N.D.C.C. § 14-09-06.6, the standard the district court must apply 

to decide whether to modify parenting time depends on when the motion was 

made and not when the court ultimately decides the motion. Morton Cty. Soc. 

Serv. Bd. v. Cramer, 2010 ND 58, ¶ 17, 780 N.W.2d 688. According to that 

section: 

“The court may not modify the primary residential responsibility 

within the two-year period following the date of entry of an order 

establishing primary residential responsibility unless the court 

finds the modification is necessary to serve the best interests of the 

child and: 

a. The persistent and willful denial or interference with parenting 

time; 

b. The child’s present environment may endanger the child’s 

physical or emotional health or impair the child’s emotional 

development; or

c. The residential responsibility for the child has changed to the 

other parent for longer than six months.”

N.D.C.C. § 14-09-06.6(5) (emphasis added). If a modification is sought after the 

two-year period, a court may modify primary residential responsibility on a 

showing of a material change in circumstances of the child or party and that a 

modification is in the best interests of the child. N.D.C.C. § 14-09-06.6(6).

Stoddard was not eligible for the less stringent standard under N.D.C.C. § 14-

09-06.6(6) because he filed a motion for modification within two years of entry 

of the original order. Upon application of the less stringent standard, Stoddard 

asserts the best interest factors weigh in favor of awarding him primary 

residential responsibility. Stoddard makes a separate argument the district 

court failed to address concerns about property and debt enforcement, claiming
9

financial stability is crucial to a best interests determination when raising a 

special needs child. 

[¶23] Under N.D.C.C. § 14-09-06.6(5) the movant bears the burden of showing 

a change in primary residential responsibility is in the child’s best interests 

and the persistent and willful denial of parenting time, the child’s present 

environment endangers the child’s physical or emotional health or impairs the 

child’s emotional development, or the primary residential responsibility for the 

child has changed to the other parent for longer than six months. (Emphasis 

added.) As noted above, the district court found no persistent and willful denial 

of parenting time, and no endangerment to M.S.S.’s physical or emotional 

health or development. The court’s findings regarding denial of parenting time 

and harm to the child were not clearly erroneous and therefore we do not reach

Stoddard’s argument regarding the best interest factors. 

III

[¶24] Stoddard argues the district court erred by not considering his 

relationship with J.B.G., and by not permitting him to seek parenting time

with J.B.G. as a psychological parent.

[¶25] “It is well-settled that parents have a paramount and constitutional 

right to the custody and companionship of their children superior to that of any 

other person.” Bredeson v. Mackey, 2014 ND 25, ¶ 10, 842 N.W.2d 860 (quoting 

Hamers v. Guttormson, 2000 ND 93, ¶ 5, 610 N.W.2d 758). A parent’s right to 

custody, however, “is not absolute and exceptional circumstances may exist 

that require, for the best interest of the child, that a non-parent receive 

visitation or custody.” Bredeson, at ¶ 10. A visitation award to a non-parent 

may be made when the non-parent is a “psychological parent or when the nonparent has an established relationship with the child.” Id. at ¶ 11 (internal 

citation omitted). This Court has defined a psychological parent as “A person 

who provides a child’s daily care and who, thereby, develops a close bond and 

personal relationship with the child [and] . . . to whom the child turns for love, 

guidance, and security.” Id. 
10

[¶26] When Stoddard’s parenting time with J.B.G. was brought up during the 

first evidentiary hearing, the following exchange occurred:

“[MS. HUMPHREY]: Now you also requested visitation with JBG, 

[how] come? 

[STODDARD]: I raised JBG for seven years. I was the only father 

figure she knew of. 

THE COURT: Okay, stop right there. You’re wasting my time. Is 

JBG his child?

MS. HUMPHREY: No. 

THE COURT: Does JBG have a father figure somewhere?

MS. HUMPHREY: Him. 

THE COURT: No, I meant an actual father. A biological father. 

Does JBG have a biological father? He has not passed away? Is it 

him?

THE WITNESS: She has a biological father she has never met, 

Your Honor. 

THE COURT: That’s fine. Has his rights been terminated as a 

father? Whoever that person is whom she has never met?

MS. SUNDBY: No. 

THE COURT: Okay. Sorry, you have no claim here. Continue.”

Stoddard claimed he spent significant time with J.B.G. before the divorce and 

acted in a parental role toward her both before and after the divorce. He 

asserted the district court should have awarded him parenting time with 

J.B.G. because he is a “psychological parent.” 

[¶27] Although North Dakota recognizes the psychological parent claim, we 

have not described the threshold necessary to proceed with a claim. Several of 
11

our sister states have done so, explaining that the moving party must present 

a prima facie case before being allowed to proceed. See In re Custody of 

H.S.H.-K., 533 N.W.2d 419, 421 (Wis. 1995) (explaining a circuit court may 

only determine whether visitation is in a child’s best interests if the petitioner 

first proves all required elements of a parent-like relationship); A.F. v. D.L.P., 

771 A.2d 692, 698-701 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001) (applying the four 

prongs of the Wisconsin test).

[¶28] The prima facie case threshold is consistent with North Dakota’s 

requirement for a parent’s motion for a change in primary residential 

responsibility. See N.D.C.C. § 14-09-06.6(4) (“The court shall set a date for an 

evidentiary hearing only if a prima facie case is established.”); Dietz v. Dietz, 

2007 ND 84, ¶ 19, 733 N.W.2d 225 (“If a prima facie case is not established as 

a preliminary matter under N.D.C.C. § 14-09-06.6(4), a hearing on an interim 

order pending the proceeding for the motion to change custody is not 

necessary.”). Like a parent seeking to change primary residential 

responsibility, we conclude a non-parent seeking parenting time in addition to 

a biological or legal parent-child relationship also should be required to meet 

the prima facie threshold before being able to proceed with an evidentiary 

proceeding. 

[¶29] Stoddard moved for “visitation” with J.B.G. In addition to trying to 

present evidence as indicated above, Stoddard testified the parties had 

“agreements” regarding his involvement in J.B.G.’s life after the divorce. Prior 

to the hearing, the district court determined Stoddard established a prima 

facie case regarding decision-making and residential responsibility for M.S.S. 

The court made no similar finding regarding Stoddard’s visitation with J.B.G. 

Nothing suggests the district court intended to grant an evidentiary hearing 

on the visitation requested for J.B.G. Based on this record, the district court 

erred either in not determining whether Stoddard presented a prima facie case 

regarding J.B.G. or, if intending its order to find a prima facie case for J.B.G, 

by not allowing Stoddard to proceed with the visitation claim at the evidentiary 

hearing. We reverse and remand for the district court to determine whether 
12

Stoddard established a prima facie case warranting a hearing on his request 

for time as a psychological parent. 

IV

[¶30] Stoddard claims the district court erred by not appointing a parenting 

investigator. “In contested proceedings dealing with parental rights and 

responsibilities the court, upon the request of either party, or, upon its own 

motion, may order an investigation and report concerning parenting rights and 

responsibilities regarding the child.” N.D.C.C. § 14-09-06.3(1). “When a district 

court may do something, it is generally a matter of discretion.” Buchholz v. 

Buchholz, 1999 ND 36, ¶ 11, 590 N.W.2d 215 (emphasis in original). 

[¶31] On December 2, 2018, as part of Stoddard’s amended motion, he 

requested the district court appoint a parenting investigator. The court denied 

that request in its February 23, 2020 order. Stoddard makes no contention the 

court’s decision not to appoint a parenting investigator was an abuse of 

discretion. He presented no supporting facts to show the court erred by 

declining to appoint an investigator. The court’s decision not to appoint a 

parenting investigator was not an abuse of discretion. 

V

[¶32] Stoddard argues the district court erred by delaying, without 

explanation, the hearing under N.D.R.Ct. 8.2 for his emergency motion. 

Stoddard asserts the court’s repeated denials, without explanation, directly 

affected the well-being, emotional, and physical condition of M.S.S. as shown 

by testimony at the hearing held on January 21, 2020. 

[¶33] “If a notice of motion and motion are served to obtain an interim order, 

the court shall hold a hearing no later than 30 days from the date of filing the 

motion.” N.D.R.Ct. 8.2. However, this Court has stated: “If a prima facie case 

is not established as a preliminary matter under N.D.C.C. § 14-09-06.6(4), a 

hearing on an interim order pending the proceeding for the motion to change 

custody is not necessary.” Dietz, 2007 ND 84, ¶ 19. 
13

[¶34] Stoddard filed his emergency motion on September 25, 2019. A hearing 

on the motion was not held until January 21, 2020. The district court did find 

Stoddard established a prima facie case under his original motion for 

modification of primary residential responsibility. However, an evidentiary 

hearing was held on the original motion and the case was being reviewed by 

the court when Stoddard filed his second motion. There is nothing in the record 

suggesting the court’s reasoning for delaying the hearing. There were several 

affidavits and letters filed with the court between the second motion and 

evidentiary hearing that could have led to the eventual establishment of a 

prima facie case. Stoddard’s affidavit initially filed with the motion primarily 

took issue with Singer’s hospitalization for mental health problems and alleged 

Singer lied under oath about several items related to her mental health. In 

contrast, Stoddard’s supplemental affidavit filed January 4, 2020, alleged 

Singer denied Stoddard holiday parenting time with M.S.S. and that Singer 

was binge drinking while M.S.S. was in her care. Under the facts and 

circumstances of this case, including Stoddard filing a new motion and papers 

before the district court decided the pending motions, Stoddard has not shown 

the court erred in delaying an evidentiary hearing.

VI

[¶35] We affirm the district court’s order and judgment finding Stoddard did 

not meet his burden of proof regarding primary residential responsibility, not 

appointing a parenting investigator, and delaying the emergency hearing. We 

reverse the district court’s order preventing Stoddard from proceeding on a 

psychological parent claim related to J.B.G. and remand for proceedings 

consistent with this opinion.

[¶36] Jon J. Jensen, C.J. 

Gerald W. VandeWalle 

Daniel J. Crothers 

Lisa Fair McEvers 

Jerod E. Tufte