IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Gilbert M. Martinez, :

Appellant :

: v. : No. 1615 C.D. 2018
: SUBMITTED: April 12, 2019 Tax Claims Bureau, Director Stacy : Phile, in her Individual Capacity, the : Treasurer Dennis Adams, in his : Individual and Official Capacity and : Berks County Assessment Office :

OPINION NOT REPORTED

MEMORANDUM OPINION PER CURIAM FILED: August 13, 2019

Gilbert Martinez (Taxpayer) appeals pro se from the November 1, 2018 order of the Court of Common Pleas of Berks County (Trial Court) which sustained the Preliminary O bjection (PO ) of the Berks County (County) Tax Claims Bureau (Bureau), Stacy Phile, Director of the Bureau (Bureau Director) , in her individual capaci ty , County Treasurer Dennis Adams (Treasurer) , in his official and individual capacity , and the County Assessment Office (CAO) (collectively Appellees), and dismissed Taxpayer’s complaint with prejudice. Taxpayer raises the following
issues on appeal : 1) the Trial Court abused its discretion in sustaining Appellees’ P O and dismissing Taxpayer’s complaint with prejudice ; 2) the Trial Court abused its
discretion when it failed to dispose of Taxpayer’s motions for injunctive relief and summary judgment; 3) th e Trial Court abused its discretion in denying Taxpayer’s motion for recusal; 4) Appellees’ PO was un timely filed ; and 5) the Trial Court’s opinion was un timely filed

. After careful review, we affirm the Trial Court

.2 I. Background Taxpayer is the owner of real property located at 1706 Cotton Street, Reading, Berks County, Pennsylvania (the Property)

. Original Record ( O .R.), Item No. 10.
O n April 10 , 2018, Taxpayer initiated a civil action naming Appellees as defendan ts and allegin g th ey impermissibly denied his multiple request s for an exemption from the payment of property taxes related to the Property

. O .R., Item No. 1. Taxpayer

avers that o n the basis of poverty and disability, 1 he is entitled to a property tax exemption under Article VIII , Section 2(b) (ii) of the Pennsylvania Constitution, 2 Section 301.1(b) of T he Local Tax Enabling Act ( LTEA ), 3 and Section 304(d)(1) of the Tax Reform Code of 1971 (T RC ). 4 Compl. ¶¶ 28

- 30, 32

. We summarize Taxpayer’s pleadi ng as follows. In November 2015, Taxpayer contacted the Bureau seeking relief from the payment of unpaid property taxes owed as “as a resul t of governmental wrongdoing s

. ” Compl. ¶ 4 . The Bureau Director informed Taxpayer that exemptions were not permitted on the basis of disability or poverty

. Id. , ¶ 5. Taxpayer was presented with the option o f pay ing the taxes due through a standard payment plan or by means of a hardship program which would

1 The nature of Taxpayer’s disability is not identified in the o rigina l record filed with this Court.

2 Article VIII , Section 2(b) (ii) of the Pennsylvania Constitution relevantly provides that the General Assembly may grant tax exempt status to persons for reasons of disa bility or poverty. Pa. Const. a rt. VIII, § 2(b) (ii)

.

3 Act of December 31, 1965, P.L. 1257, as amended , 53 P.S. § 69 24 .3 01 .1(b) . Section 301.1(b) of the LTEA provides that a local taxing authority may exempt any person whose income is less than $12,000 annually from the per capita or similar head tax, occupation tax, or earned income tax.

4 Act of March 4, 1971, P.L . 6, as amended , added by the Act of March 13, 1974, P.L. 179, 72 P.S. § 7304(d)(1). Section 304(d)(1) of the TRC provides that an individual whose annual income is less than $6,500 is entitled to a refund of personal income tax paid.3

spread his payments over a 24

- month period. Id. , ¶ 7

. As a result of the Bureau Director’s alleged deceptive and misleading statements with regard to Taxpayer’s entitlement to a tax exemption, Taxpayer was “maliciously forced” into the hardship

program and payments made by him pursuant to that program depr ived Taxpayer and his dependent of the “bare necessities of life.” Compl. ¶¶ 6, 8

- 10

. In a March 23, 2018 notice from the Bureau, Taxpayer was warned that his failure to pay property taxes would result in the sale of the Property without Taxpayer’s consent. Compl. ¶ 21

. Thereafter, citing an in ability to pay his property

taxes caused by “tyrannical acts” of the federal government, Taxpayer filed with the Bureau an application for a tax refund, tax exemption, and tax forgiveness. Compl. ¶ 14. The Treasurer rejected this application without explanation. Id. , ¶ 16

. In April 2018, Taxpayer submitted a tax exemption application to the CAO. Compl. ¶ 24. T he CAO required payment of a $100 filing fee. Id. , ¶ 25. The CAO’s failure to waive payment of the filing fee constituted “condescending misconduct and discriminative practices” which prevented Taxpayer from exercising his appellate rights. Id. , ¶¶ 26

- 28.
On the basis of the se averments , Taxpayer assert ed three separate counts for
violation s of th e Pennsylvania Constitution, the LTEA, and the TRC , as well as the4

Sixth, 5 Seventh, 6 Eighth, 7 Ninth, 8 and Fourteenth 9 Amendments to the United States
Constitution , and Sections 8430, 8431, and 8434 of the Local Taxpayer s Bill of Rights Act (L T B RA)

. 10 Id

. , ¶¶ 28

- 32, 38

- 35. Additionally, Taxpayer asserted a cause of action against Appellees for conspiracy to violate his rights under Section s 1981 and 1983 of th e Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Civil Rights Act) 11 and 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, 12 all in contravention of 18 U.S.C. §§ 241

- 42

. 13 Id. , ¶¶ 34

- 37

. Taxpayer requested total punitive damages in the amount of $300,000 and a refund of property taxes paid in the years 2015

- 18. Id. ¶¶ (a)

- (c), (h). Taxpayer further sought a

5 U.S. Const. amend. VI. The Sixth Amendment guarantees certain rights and protections, such as the right to trial by jury and the assistance of counsel, to an individual charged with a crime

.

6 U.S. Const. amend. VII. The Seventh Amendment extends the right to trial by jury to federal civil actions.

7 U.S. Const. amend. VIII. The Eighth Amendment prohibits excessive bail.

8 U.S. Const. amend. IX. The Ninth Amendment provides that individuals have other rights not enumerated in the United States Constitution.

9 U.S. Const. a mend. XIV. The Fourteenth Amendment in relevant part provides that no state shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law.

10 53 Pa.C.S. §§ 8430, 8431, 8434. These statutory provisions generally establish the administrative tax appeals process and deadlines for the filing of petitions related to tax appeals.

11 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983.

12 42 U.S.C. § 2000e contains definition s for the Equal Employment Opportunities Act (EEOA) . 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e

– 2000e

- 17

.

13 18 U.S.C. § 241 makes it an offense to conspire to injure, oppress, threaten, or intimidate any person in the free exercise of any rights guaranteed under the United St ates Constitution or the law s of the United States . 18 U.S.C. § 242 prohibits the deprivation of such rights by anyone acting under color of law.5

declaration from the Trial Court that he was exempt from the payment of property

taxes , as well as injunctive relief in the form of a stay of the scheduled upset tax sale
of the Property , and a demand that the Trial Court “[enjoin] [Appellees] from continuing to violate [Taxpayer’s] rights and Local tax laws

. ” Id. , ¶¶ (e )

- (g). Concurrent with his civil complaint, Taxpayer filed a motion for injunctive relief in which he alleged that, by denying his right to a property tax exemption, Appellees interfered with his “employment rights, right to [S]ocial Security disability, and right to cash assistance through the department of public welfare program for disabled persons.” O.R. , Item No. 1 at 1 . On the basis of these alleged acts by App ellees, and Taxpayer’s self

- proclaimed poverty status, Taxpayer reiterated his demand that the Trial Court declare him exempt from the payment of property taxes and order a refund of any taxes paid in the years 2015

- 18. Id. at 5

. By agreement of the part ies, the scheduled sale of the Property was stayed by order of the Trial Court dated August 23, 2018. O.R. , Item No. 10. Service of Taxpayer’s complaint was accomplished on September 17, 2018. 14 O.R., Item No. 18, Preliminary Objection , ¶ 4

. Thereafter , on October 9, 2018, Appellees filed a PO in the nature of a demurrer, asserting Taxpayer’s complaint was legally
insufficient. Id. , ¶13

. Appellees likewise objected to Taxpayer’ s motion for injunctive relief, arguing that Taxpayer failed to establish a right to the relief requested. O.R. , Item No. 21 at 7

. Taxpayer filed a “ Response to Strike [Appellees’] [PO] Pursuant to Pa.R.C .P. [No.] 1029 and Motion for Summary Judgment a s a Matter of Law ” on October 18,
2018 , arguing that Appellees did not demonstrate how the complaint failed to state
a cause of action

. O.R. , Item No. 20. Subsequently, on October 29, 2018, Taxpayer

14 Appellees acknowledge having received notice of the complaint by “informal means” prior to the September 17 , 2018 date of service. Preliminary Objections, ¶ 2.6

filed a motion requesting recusal of the Trial Court ju dge assigned to hear his complaint , based on an allegation that the Trial Court judge engaged in ex parte
communication with the Bureau Director and the County Solicitor and “prearranged” the stay of the Property’s scheduled upset tax sale. O.R., Item No. 23, a t 4

. The Trial Court denied the recusal motion on November 1, 2018. Appellees’
PO was sustained, and Taxpayer’s complaint dismissed with prejudice, th e same day. This appeal followed. 15 The Trial Court issued its opinion pursuant to
Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) on February 5, 2019.
II. Issues Taxpayer raises multiple iss ues on appeal which may be condense d as
follows : 1) the Trial Court abused its discretion in dismissing Taxpayer’s complaint with prejudice and failing to issue findings of fact and conc lusions of law in support
of that decision ; 2 ) the Trial Court abused its discretion in dismissing Taxpayer’s complaint before addressing his motion s for injunctive relief and summary judgment ; 3 ) the Trial Court abused its discretion in denying Taxpayer’s motion for
recusal ; 4) Appellees ’ PO should not have been granted as they were untimely filed ; and 5) the Trial Court’s opinion filed pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925 (a) was untimely

. III. Discussion
A. Waiver At the outset, we must address whether Taxpayer has waived any of his arguments because he has either raised them for the first time on appeal or failed to develop them appropriately in his appellate brief. “Issues not raised in the lower

15 When reviewing an order sustaining preliminary objections, our standard of review is de

novo and scope of review is plenary. Rohner v. Atkinson , 118 A.3d 486, 489 n.4 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2015).7

court are waived and cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.” Pa.R.A.P. 302(a).
Issues raised in a statement of questions presented but not otherwise addressed in the argument portion of an appellate brief are also waived. Singer v. Bureau of Prof’l and Occupati onal Affairs, State Bd. of Psychology , 633 A.2d 246, 247 (Pa. Cmwlth.
1993 ). Pursuant to Rule 2119(a) of the Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure, the arguments in an appellate brief:

shall be divided into as many parts as there are questions to be a rgued; and shall have at the head of each part

— in distinctive type or in type distinctively displayed

— the particular point treated therein, followed by such discussion and citation of authorities as are deemed pertinent. Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a) (emphasis added). A court will not consider the merits of an argument where the issue is not properly raised and developed in a brief and the brief
is inadequate to present a specific issue for review. Boniella v. Commonwealth , 958
A.2d 1069, 1072 n.8 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2008). “Mere issue spotting without analysis or legal citation to support an assertion precludes our appellate review of [ a ] matter.”
Id. (internal citations omitted). Arguments which are not appropriately developed
are waive d. City of Philadelphia v. Berman, 863 A.2d 156, 161 n.11 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2004)

. 1. Pa.R.A.P. 302(a) Taxpayer asserts in his appellate brief that he has been deprived of the right to be represented by an attorney without interference of the state and that Appellees
have committed “wanton of [sic] acts obstructing and or hindering [his] right to sue in court” in violation of the Sixth and Seventh Amendments to the United States Constitution. Taxpayer Br. at 15. While Taxp ayer purported to raise the Sixth and
Seventh Amendments in his civil complaint, he merely alleged Appellees took action8

in violation of his rights there under. Taxpayer made no supporting factual
averments that he was prevented from seeking either legal c ounsel or redress through
the courts by means of a jury trial

. Having failed to pl ead those claims before the
trial court , pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 302(a), Taxpayer has waived them

. Also subject to waiver is Taxpayer ’s lengthy argument that his complaint

su fficiently pleaded facts to support a claim for fraudulent misrepresentation and he should be allowed to amend his complaint accordingly. The amendment of Taxpayer’s complaint was never an issue before the Trial Court ; he r aise s it for the
first time here

. 16 Accordingly, it is waived. Taxpayer’s attempt to introduce a claim for civil conspiracy by means of his appellate brief likewise fail s

. While Taxpayer has correctly cited the elements of civil conspiracy in his appellate brief, 17 he did not do so in the complaint filed with the Trial Court, nor did he plead facts sufficient to establish a claim for civil conspiracy

. 18 We conclude that issue is also waived

. 2. Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a) With regard to the remainder of Taxpayer’s claims under the United States Constitution, he has not developed those arguments in his appellate brief. More

16 Even had t he issue been raised, Taxpayer’s argument would fa il as Taxpayer’s complaint categorically fails to set forth either the elements of such a claim or facts to support it.

17 The elements of a civil conspiracy claim are: 1) a combination of two or more persons acting with a common purpose to do an unlawful act or to do a lawful act by unlawful means or for an unlawful pu rpose; 2) an overt act done in furthera nce of the common purpose; and 3) actual legal damage. Weaver v . Franklin Cty. , 918 A.2d 194, 202 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2007).

18 In arguing the elements of civil conspiracy were sufficiently pled in his complaint, Taxpayer cites alleged overt acts made by “Ms. Cortes from [t]he Department of Public Welfare” and a legal aid at torney who stopped taking Taxpayer’s calls. Taxpayer Br. at 18. Neither individual is a party to this action and it is woefully unclear how their actions would be attributable to Appellees.9

specifically, beyond the inclusion of a quote from his civil complaint where he cites the Eighth and Ninth Amendments, Taxpayer fails to discuss these issues further

. While Taxpayer baldly asserts he has been deprived of the bare necessities of life in contravention of the Fourteenth Amendment, he fails to allege facts to support that
assertion. Taxpayer cites no legal authority in furtherance of his arguments and has,
in all other respects, failed to develop them. Consequently, they are waived and we
shall not consider them

. Boniella ; Berman. Furthermore, although Taxpayer questioned the Trial Court’s denial of his
motions for recusal and injunctive relief in his statement of issues on appeal, he failed to otherwise address or develop these issues in his brief. Th e se issues, too,
are waived. Boniella ; Singer.
B. Preliminary Objection
We now turn to Taxpayer’s argument that the Trial Co urt abused its discretion
in sustaining Appellees’ PO and dismissing his complaint with prejudice. Taxpayer maintains his complaint averred facts sufficient to demonstrate Appellees deprived him of his rights under the Pennsylvania and United States Const itutions, the LTEA, the TRC, the LTBRA, and the Civil Rights Act. Preliminary objections that assert a pleading is legally insufficient may be
sustained only where it appears with certainty that the law will not permit recovery under the allegations pl eaded. Twp. of Derry v. Pa. Dep’t of Labor and Indus. , 940 A.2d 1265, 1268 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2008). When reviewing preliminary objections, we accept as true all well

- pleaded, material, and relevant facts alleged in the complaint and every inference that may b e fairly deduced from those facts. Id. Preliminary objections are sustained when, under the facts as pleaded, it is clear the plaintiff will be unable to establish a right to relief. Rohner , 118 A.3d at 489 n.4.10

The Trial Court’s 1925(a) opinion clearl y and succinctly explains why Taxpayer’s complaint fails. Taxpayer’s complaint consists of disjointed factual statements interspersed with bare allegations of discriminating, misleading, and condescending behavior on the part of Appellees . We commend the Trial Court’s diligence and thoroughness in weeding through the complaint and distill ing its contents into cognizable claims. For the reasons discussed below, w e agree with the
Trial Court that the constitutional and statutory authority relied on by Taxpayer does

not entitle him to relief on any of his claims

. 1. Article VI I I, Section 2(b)(ii) of the Pennsylvania Constitution
Article VI I I, Section 2(b)(ii) of the Pennsylvania Constitution provides that the General Assembly may grant tax exempt status to persons for reasons of
disa bility or poverty. Pa. Const. a rt. VIII, § 2(b). Taxpayer supports hi s argument that “may” means “shall,” and the Gene ral Assembly is thus constrained to create such a tax exemption, citing legal authority that is neither recognized by , nor binding

upon , this Court. 19 As the Pennsylvania Constitution does not mandate the creation of a property tax exemption, the Trial Cou rt committed no error in dismissing Taxpayer’s claim in that regard.
2. Section 301.1(b) of the LTEA While the LTEA applies to a veritable laundry list of entities, that list does not
include counties. 20 Furthermore, although Section 301.1(b) of the LTEA expressly
authorizes tax exemptions on the basis of income for the per capita or similar head

19 Taxpayer argues that , when a statute directs action be taken fo r the sake of justice or the public good, the word “ may ” is the same as “ shall, ” citing “Carth. 293 Salk. 609; Skin. 370.” Taxpayer Br. at 9.

20 Section 301.1(a) of the LTEA permits the assessment and collection of taxes by cities of the second class, cit ies of the second class A, cities of the third class, boroughs, town, townships of the first and second class es , and school districts of the fourth class. 53 P.S. § 6924.301.1(a).11

tax, occupation tax, or earned income tax , it creates no such exemption for property

taxes . 53 P.S. § 6924.301.1(b). Accordingly , the Trial Court did not err in dismissing Taxpayer’s claim under Section 301.1(b) of the LTEA.
3. Section 304(d)(1) of the TRC
Section 304 (d)(1) of the TRC provides that an individual whose annual income is less than $6,500 is entitled to a refund of t axes paid to the Commonwealth “under the provisions of this article. ” 72 P.S. § 7304(d)(1). This s ection falls under Article III of the TRC, relating to the imposition of personal income tax. Payment
of Taxpayer’s property taxes are at issue, not his pe rsonal income tax. Consequently,
we discern no error in the Trial Court ’s dismissal of Taxpayer’s claim under the
TRC.
4. LTBRA Section 8438 of the LTBRA explicitly provides that, “[e]xcept as provided in
section 8426 (relating to interest on overpaymen t), [the LTBRA] shall not apply to any tax on real property.” 53 Pa.C.S. § 8438. Taxpayer has not asserted a violation
of Section 8426 of the LTBRA

. T herefore , the Trial Court properly dismissed all
claims relat ed to alleged violations of the LTBRA

.

5. Con spiracy under 18 U.S.C. §§ 241

- 42 The Trial Court determined Taxpayer’s conspiracy claims must fail as the statutory provisions cited in Taxpayer’s complaint, 18 U.S.C. §§ 241

- 42, are criminal statutes that do not create a pr ivate right of action. Taxpayer has proffered

no legal authority that suggests he may assert a civil claim under Sections 241 and
242 , and the Trial Court committed no error in dismissing his attempts to do so

.12 6. Section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act Taxpayer argues that the CAO and Bureau are amenable to suit under Section
1983. 21 To state a claim under Section 1983, Taxpayer must 1) allege a violation of rights secured by the United States Constitution and the laws of the United States, and 2) show that the alleged depri vation was committed by a person acting under the
color of state law. Anelli v. Arrowhead Lakes C mty. Ass ’ n, Inc. , 689 A.2d 357 , 360 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1997)

. Taxpayer ’s appellate brief focuses solely on whether Appellees may be sued
under Section 1983. Taxpayer has not explained how Appellees’ denial of his request for exemption from the payment of property taxes violates any of his rights guaranteed by the United States Constitution or any other laws of the United States

. As such, Taxpayer cannot state a claim under Section 1983

. Accordingly, we need not address whether Appellees constitute persons acting under the color of state law.
C. Trial Court’s 1925(a) O pinion
Next , Taxpayer argu es that the Trial Court erred in failing to issue findings of
fact and conclusions of law to support its dismissal of Taxpayer’s complaint with prejudice. Taxpayer cites no legal authority to support his arguments that the Trial Court was required to issue such findings and conclusions or that the Trial Court’s
failure to do so mandates reversal of the order dismissing Taxpayer’s complaint with prejudice

. Rather, Taxpayer cites Harley Davidson Motor Co., Inc. v. Hartman , 44 2 A.2d 284 (Pa. Super

. 1982), in which the Superior Court held that an a buse of

21 Taxpayer has not argued error by the Trial Court in dismissing his 1983 c laims agains t the Bureau Director and Treasurer. Also absent from Taxpayer’s appellate brief is any discussion relating to Section 1981 of the Civil Rights Act or the Trial Court’s dismissal of his claim, however cognizable, brought under the definitions section of the EEOA, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e. Consequently, these issues will not be addressed herein.13

discretion occurs when a trial court dismisses a complaint without considering the sufficiency of the cause of action alleged therein. Harley Davidson is inapposite, as the preliminary objections in that case were sustained by the trial court on technical grounds after the plaintiff failed to file a brief in opposition. Furthermore, any purported failure of the Trial Court to issue findings of fact and conclusions of law was obviated by the filing of its 1925(a) opinion on February 5, 2019

. T axpayer further argues this Court should disregard the Trial Court’s 1925(a) opinion as untimely pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2)(ii), which requires a trial court to file its opinion within 30 days of receipt of a notice of appeal

. H owever, Rule 1925(a)(2 )(ii) applies only to c hildren’s fast track appeals, which involve dependency, termination of parental rights, adoptions, custody, or paternity. See Pa.R.A.P. 102. As Taxpayer’s complaint does not fit within any of these categories,
th e general rule set forth in Pa. R.A.P. 1925(a)(1) applies

. T he Trial Court is merely required to “forthwith file of record at least a brief opinion of the reasons for the order.” Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(1). Consequently, Taxpayer’s argument that this Court should disregard or se t aside the Trial Court’s 1925(a) opinion lacks merit.

D. Timeliness of Preliminary Objections Next, we address Taxpayer’s assertion that Appellees’ PO was untimely filed. Taxpayer notes that his complaint was served on Appellees on September 17, 201 8, and Appellees had to file their PO within 20 days of that date. As Appellees filed
their PO on October 9, 2018, 22 days later, Taxpayer maintains the PO was untimely. Taxpayer is correct that, with limited exceptions, every pleading subsequent
to th e complaint must be filed within 20 days after service of the preceding pleading , provided the preceding pleading contained a notice to defend or is endorsed with a14

notice to plead . Pa.R.C.P. No. 1026(a). However, Pa.R.C.P. No. 106(b) provides
that when a filing deadline falls on a Saturday, Sunday, or a legal holiday, that day
is to be omitted from th is calculation. Twenty days from the date Taxpayer’s complaint was served was October 7, 2018, a Sunday. The following day was Columbus Day, a legal holid ay. 22 Consequently, as October 9, 2018 was the appropriate deadline, Appellees’ PO was timely.
E. Summary Judgment
Lastl y , we address Taxpayer’s claim that the Trial Court abused its discretion when it failed to address his summary judgment motion. Taxpa yer argues the Trial Court should have accepted Appellees’ failure to file a timely response to his complaint as an admission of fault and entered judgment in Taxpayer’s favor. Taxpayer further argues that summary judgment should be entered against Appell ees , as they did not file an answer to his summary judgment motion.
As discussed above , Appellees’ PO was timely filed. The Trial Court
sustained the PO and dismissed the complaint. Moreover, p ursuant to Pa.R.C.P. No. 1028(d), even had the Trial Court overruled Appellees’ PO , Appellees would have had 20 days to file their answer to Taxpayer’s complaint. 23 Taxpayer’s assertion that Appellees filed no response to his complaint is therefore baseless. While Taxpayer is correct that no an swer was filed in response to his summary judgment motion, Appellees’ lack of response did not guarantee Taxpayer victory , as the applicable procedural rule does not mandate such an outcome. Rather,

22 2018 County Holidays. http://www.pacourts.us/assets/files/setting

- 6004/file

6678.pdf?cb=6ec644 (last visited July 29, 2019).

23 Pa.R.C.P. No. 1028(d) provides that “[i]f the preliminary objections are overruled, the objecting party shall have the right to plead over within [20] days after notice of the order or within such other time as the court shall fix.”15

“[s]ummary judgment may be entered against a party who d oes not respond

. ” Pa.R.C.P. No. 1035.3(d) (emphasis added). Taxpayer’s summary judgment motion

was rendered moot when the Trial Court sustained Appellees’ PO and the complaint was dismissed with prejudice. In general, courts will not decide moot question s. Pub. Def. Office of Venango Cty. v . Venango Cty. Ct. of Common Pleas , 893 A.2d
1275 , 1279 (Pa. 2006). A s such, we discern no error on the part of the Trial Court
and Taxpayer’s argument t o the contrary is without merit.
IV. Conclusion Several of the issues raised by Taxpayer are waived because either he r aised
them for the first time on appeal or he failed to develop th e m in his appellate brief

. The remaining statutory and constitutional provisions cited by Taxpayer do not provide an e xemption from the payment of his property taxes. Accordingly, we
affirm the order of the Trial Court.

Judge Fizzano Cannon did not participate in the decision of this case.IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Gilbert M. Martinez, :

Appellant :

: v. : No. 1615 C.D. 2018
: Tax Claims Bureau, Director Stacy : Phile, in her Individual Capacity, the : Treasurer Dennis Adams, in his : Individual and Official Capacity and : Berks County Assessment Office :

PER CURIAM O R D E R

AND NOW, this 13 th day of August , 20 19, the November 1, 2018 order of the Court of Common Pleas of Berks County is hereby AFFIRMED

.