MAINE	SUPREME	JUDICIAL	COURT Reporter	of	Decisions Decision: 20 2 1 ME 39 Docket: SRP

- 20

- 307 Argued : June	3,	2021 Decided: July	22,	2021 Panel: MEAD, GORMAN,	JABAR , HUMPHREY,	HORTON , and CONNORS , JJ.

STATE	OF	MAINE

v. DUST A N	J.	BENTLEY

HORTON ,	J. [¶1] Dustan	 J.	 Bentley appeals from a	 sentence	 of	 forty	 years	 of imprisonment	 entered	 by	 the trial c ourt (York	 County, Douglas,	 J. ) after Bentley’s guilty	 plea	 to	 murder, 17

- A	 M.R.S.	 § 201(1)(A) (2021)

. Because Bentley has	not	identified	any misapplication	of	principle or	abuse	of	discretion
in either the	court’s	sentencing	analysis or	its	exercise of	its	sentencing power , we	affirm	the	sentence.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Facts [¶ 2 ] The	following	undisputed	facts	are	drawn	from	the	State’s	summary of	the	evidence	that	it	would	have	presented	had	the	matter	proceeded	to	trial.
See M.R.U.	Crim.	P.	11(b)(3),	(e) ; State	v.	Lord ,	2019	ME	82,	¶	3,	208	A.3d	781

.2 [¶ 3 ] On	 March	 18,	 2019,	 at	 approximately 10 :30	 p.m., several	 Old Orchard Beach	police	officers	were	dispatched	to	the home shared	by Bentley, age	thirty,	and	the	victim,	age	sixty

- five .		The	dispatch	was	in	response	to	a	call from	 Bentley’s	 mother, who cl aimed	 that	 Bentley	 had	 called	 her	 roughly forty

- five	minutes	 earl ier and	 told	 her	 that	 he had stabbed	 his	 roommate	 to death.		Upon arriving at the	apartment building , one	officer saw a car	backed	up to	the	door	of	Bentley’s	apartment	with	its	trunk	door	open	and	the	trunk	lined with	 a	 shower	 curtain.	 	 The	 officers found Bentley	 in	 the	 doorway	 of	 the apartment with	one	end	of	a ratchet	strap	tied around	him.		T he	other end	of the	strap	w as	tied	around the	victim’s	body

. [¶ 4 ] According	to	an	autopsy conducted the	next	day ,	the	victim	suffered twenty
- five	 to	 thirty	 sharp	 knife	wounds.	 	 The	medical	 examiner	 also	 found evidence	of	blunt	force	trauma	to	the	victim’s	head,	neck,	and	torso.		Th e	victim suffered	 breaks	 or	 fractures	 to	 his	 nose,	 neck	 bone,	 hyoid	 bone,	 sternum, several	 ribs,	 and	 fingers	 on	 both	 hands. In	 addition ,	 the	 medical	 examiner found	hemorrhaging	in	the	front	of	the	victim’s	neck	caused	by	a	USB	cord	that Bentley	used	to	st rangle	the	victim.		The	medical	examiner	determined	that	the death	was	caused	by	 the	multiple	blunt	 force	 traumas,	 the	stab	wounds,	and strangulation.3 B. Procedural	History [¶ 5 ] A	 grand	 jury	 indicted	 Bentley	 on	 one	 count	 of intentional	 or knowing	 murder	 i n	 violation	 of	 17

- A	 M.R.S.	 §	 201 (1)(A)

. The	 court	 held	 a hearing	pursuant	to M.R.U.	Crim.	P.	11 at	which	Bentley	pleaded	guilty	to	the charge

. Following	 its	 offer	 of	 proof,	 t he	 State	 informed	 the	 court that , in exchange	 for	 Bentley’s	 guilty	 plea,	 the	 State	 would	 recommend	 a	 sentence between	the	statutory	minimum	of	twenty

- five	years	and	a	cap	of	forty	years	of imprisonment.	 	 The	 court	 accepted	 the	 plea	 and found	 Bentley guilty	 of intentional	or	knowing	murder

. [¶ 6 ] At Bentley’s	 sentencing hearing, t he	 State	 recommended	 a	 basic sentence	of	fifty	years	with	the	final	sentence	of	forty	years	in	accordance	with the	cap	agreed	upon	by	the	parties	in	the	plea.		Bentley	requested	that	the	court set	a	basic	sentence of	twenty

- five	years	and	a	final	sentence	of	twenty

- eight years.	 	 Following	 both	 parties’	 presentations,	 the	 court	 made	 oral	 findings regarding	Bentley’s	commission	of	the	offense. The	court	also	stated	that	it	was “supposed	to	consider	in	setting	a	basic sentence	other	comparable	cases.” [¶ 7 ] The	court	cited as	guides three	different	murder	cases ,	all	of	which involved	 sentences	 entered	 after	 trials .	 	 Based	 on	 its	 findings	 and	 the comparable	cases,	the	court set the	basic	sentence at fifty	to	fifty

- five	years	of4 imprisonment.		The	court	then	weigh ed the	aggravating	and	mitigating	factors specific	 to	 the	 circumstances	 of	 the	 case

. It concluded	 that	 the	 mitigating factors

— in particular ,	 that Bentley t ook responsibility	 for	 his	 actions by pleading	guilty

— outweighed	the	aggravating	factors	and therefore supported

a sentence	shorter	than the	basic	sentence. The	court	set	the	final	sentence	at forty	years	of	imprisonment. [¶ 8 ] Bentley	 filed	an	application	 for	leave	 to	appeal	 the	sentence

. See 15 M.R.S.	§	2151 (2021); M.R.	App.	P.	20 .		The	Sentence	Review	Panel	granted Bentley’s	 request. Se e M.R.	 App.	 P.	 20(g); State	 v.	 Bentley ,	 No. SRP

- 20

- 307 (Me. Sent.	Rev.	Panel	Dec. 22,	2020 )

. II.		DISCUSSION [¶ 9 ] Bentley	argues	that the	trial	court	erred by considering	sentences imposed	 in comparable	 cases in imposing	 a sentence	 of forty years of imprisonment. Specifically,	he cites	to State	v.	Diana ,	2014	ME	45,	89	A.3d	132, for	the	proposition	that	the	court	denied	Bentley “an	individualized	sentence” by	relying	on	comparable	cases	to	determine	an	appropriate	sentence

.5 A. Sentencing	Procedure [¶1 0 ] In	a	murder	case,	the	sentencing court	employs	a	two

- step	process. 17

- A M.R.S.	§ 1252

- C (20 18 ); 1 State	v.	Gaston ,	2021	ME	25,	¶	33, 250 A.3d 137

. In	the	first	step,	“the	court	determines	the	basic	term	of	imprisonment	based on	an	objective	consideration	of	 the	particular nature	and	seriousness	of	 the
crime

. ” Gaston , 2021	ME	25,	¶	33, 250 A.3d 137 (quotation	marks omitted)

. In the	second	 step ,	“t he	court	determines	 the	maximum	period	of	incarceration based	on	all	other	relevant	sentencing	factors,	both	aggravating	and	mitigating, appropriate	 to	 that	 case, including	 the	 character	 of	 the	 offender	 and	 the offender ’ s criminal	 history,	 the	 effect	 of	 the	 offense	 on	 the	 victim [,] and	 the protection	of	 the	public	interest

. ” Id. (quotation	marks	omitted). We review the	determination	of	the	basic	sentence (1) de	novo	for	misapplication	of	legal principles , 15	 M.R.S.	 § 2155 (2021) ; State	 v.	 Hayden ,	 2014	 ME	 31, ¶ 17,
86 A.3d 1221 , and (2) for “ an	abuse	of	the	court’s	sentencing	power , ” State	v. Nichols ,	2013	ME	71,	¶	13,	72 A.3d	503. [¶1 1 ] The	Legislature	has	articulated	the	goals	of	sentencing , which	are, in	 part,	 to create consistency among	 sentences	 for	 similar	 offenses while

1 Title 17

- A	M.R.S.	§ 1252

- C (2018) has	since	been	repealed	and	replaced , but	both	versions	of	the sentencing	 statute	 set	 out	 the	 same	 steps.	 P.L.	 2019,	 ch. 113,	 §§	 A

- 1,	 A

- 2	 (emergency,	 effective May 16, 2019)	(codified	at	17

- A	M.R.S.	§	1602	(202 1 )).6 encouraging individualization of	each	sentence	based	on	circumstances	specific to	the	case	and	the	defendant. See 17

- A	M.R.S.	§	1151 (5),	(6) (2018)

. 2 The steps in	the sentencing	process	guide the co urt in	furthering	both	the	goal	of	systemic consistency	in	sentencing	and	 the goal	of	imposing	a	sentence	 that	considers the	defendant	as	a n	individual human	being. See 17

- A	§ 1602(1),	(2) ; Nichols , 2013	 ME	 71,	 ¶ 14 ,	 72	 A.3d	 503

. Recognizing	 the	 challeng e	 a	 court	 faces	 in reconciling	 these	 disparate	 sentencing	 goals ,	 we	 afford	 the	 court significant leeway	in	what factors it	may	consider and	the	weight any	given factor	is	due when	determining	a	sentence. See State	v.	Hamel ,	2013	ME	16,	¶	8,	60	A.3d	783 ( “ [ T ] he	selection	for	appropriate	emphasis	among	the [] disparate	purposes [of sentencing	 goals] rests	 in	 the	 discretion	 of	 the	 court. ” ( quotation	 marks omitted))

. B. Consideration	of	Comparable Cases [¶1 2 ] Bentley	bases	his	claim	of	legal	error	on	the	court ’s	statement	that it	“ is	supposed	to	consider in	setting	a	basic	sentence	other	comparable	cases.”
H e	argues	that	reliance	on comparable cases	constitutes	a	misreading	of	case law, see	Diana , 2014	ME	45, ¶	41, 89 A.3d	132 ,	and	that	the	facts	of	the	cases	on

2 Title	17

- A	M.R.S.	§	1151	(2018)	has	also	been	repealed	and	replaced. See P.L.	2019,	ch.	113, § A

- 1,	(emergency,	effective	May 16, 2019)	(codified	at	17

- A	M.R .S.	§ 1501 (2021) .		Both	versions	of the	statute	set	out	the	same	sentencing	goals.7 which	the	court	relied	in	determining	the	basic	sentence	were	so	different	from the	facts	here	that	he	was	denied	an	individualized	sentence. He points	out that all of	 those	 cases	 involved	 sentences	 imposed	 following c onviction s entered after	trial s . [¶1 3 ] Bentley’s	 first	 argument	 is based	 on a	 misinterpretation	 of	 our precedent	 regarding the use	 of	 comparable	 cases	 at	 sentencing. “ [I] t	 is permissible for	 the	sentencing	court	 to	consider	comparable	sentences	at	 the first	 step	 if	 appropriate ,	 [although]	 neither	 the	 statute	 nor our case	 law mandate	it .” Nichols ,	2013	ME	71,	¶	20,	72	A.3d	503 (emphasis	added)

. Indeed,

t rial	 courts	 have	 “wide	 discretion in	 determining	 the	 sources	 and	 types	 of information	to	consider	when	imposing	a	sentence.” Reese ,	2010	ME 30,	¶	28, 991	A.2d	806

. Relying	on	comparable	cases	is	undoubtedly	consistent	with	our precedent	 and	 the	 goals	 of	 sentencing	 laid	 out	 by	 the	 Legisla ture. See	 id. ; 17

- A M.R.S.	§ 1501

. [¶1 4 ] Contrary	to	Bentley’s assertions,	the	court’s	statement	that	it	was “supposed	to	consider”	comparable	cases	does	not in	itself	justify	vacating	the sentence,	in	light	of the	permissive	nature	of our instructions	for	trial	courts	in
Diana , 2014 ME	 45, ¶	 41, 89	 A.3d	 1 32 , and	 in Nichols , 2013 ME	 71, ¶ 20,
72 A.3d 503

. Although	 the	 court	 was	 not	 required	 to	 consider	 comparable8
cases, s ee Diana , 2014 ME 45, ¶	41, 89 A.3d	132 , the	court	correctly	appl ied sentencing	 principles	 at	 both steps of	 the sentencing analysis. The	 court carefully	 considered	 both	 objective	 and	 subjective	 factors	 and imposed a sentence	 consistent	 with	 the	 cap	 agreed	 upon	 by	 the	 parties	 in	 the	 plea agreement. See Gaston , 2021	ME	25, ¶	33, 250 A.3d 137

. [¶1 5 ] Bentley’s	argument	that	the	court should	not	have relied in	the	first step	of	the	sentencing	analysis upon cases	where	sentences	were	imposed	after a	 trial is	 unconvincing. The	 court	 began the	 first	 step of	 the	 analysis	 by discussing	 the	 details	 specific	 to	 this	 murder	 that	 spoke	 to	 its	 “nature	 and seriousness.” Id. (quotation	 marks	 omitted )

. Those	 details	 included the

“ significant	disparity	in height,	 age,	weight	and	physical	 vitality	between	 the
victi m	and [Bentley]” ; the	“savage”	nature	of	Bentley’s	attack	on	the	victim ; and Bentley’s	 attempt	 to	 conceal	 the	 crime	 from	 the	 police

. It	 was	 only	 after considering	 these	specific	 factors	 that	 the	court	discussed	comparable	cases. This	 discussion	 is	 not	 evidence	 that	 the	 court	 deprived	 Bentley	 of	 an individualized	 sentence.	 	 Rather,	 the purpose	 of	 the court ’s	 analysis was	 to
p lac e Bent ley’s crime,	as	it	was	committed,	at	a	point	on	the “ continuum for	the type	 of	criminal	conduct	involved

. ” See State	v.	Schofield ,	2006	ME	101,	¶ 9,
904 A.2d	409 (quotation	marks	omitted)

.9 [¶1 6 ] T he	 first	 step in	 sentencing emphasizes	 the	 goal	 of	 consistency more	than	the	second	step,	which focuses on	individualization	of	the	sentence, based	 on ,	 among	 other	 factors, the defendant’s unique	 life history and the impact	of	the	crime	on	the victim

. See	id. ¶¶	9,	13. It	follows	t hat , at the	first step , a sentencing court may consider	comparable	cases	when engaging	in an objective	consideration	of	the “ nature	and	seriousness ” of	the	crime for	which the sentence	is	being	imposed

. Nichols ,	2013	ME	71, ¶ ¶ 12, 14, 20,	72	A.3d	503 (quo tation	 marks	 omitted)

. The purpose	 of	 the comparison	 is	 to assign the
crime a	 basic	 sentence considering the range of sentences that	 have	 been imposed in cases	 involving	 similar	 crimes	 committed	 under	 similar
circumstances

. See 17

- A	M.R.S.	§	1602(1)(A). Although	 the comparison	may take	into	account whether a	comparable	sentence	resulted	from	a	plea	or	a	trial, that	 the	comparable	sentences	were	imposed	after	 trial	did	not	preclude	 the court	 from	 considering	 them	 in	 determining	 a	 basic	 sentence	 for	 Bentle y’s crime	within	 the	 sentencing	 range	 for	murder	 of	 twenty

- five	 years	 to	life	in prison. [¶1 7 ] At	the	second	step	of	the	sentencing	process,	the court weighed	the individualized	aggravating	and	mitigating	factors	in	detail	when	it	determined the	maximum	s entence. See Schofield ,	2006	ME	101,	¶ 13 ,	904	A.2d	409

. In	fact,10 the court imposed	 a	 sentence	 shorter	 than its	 basic	 sentence	 based	 on	 its review	of	Bentley’s	background	and	choice	to	plead	guilty	rather	than	subject the	 victim’s	 family	 to a trial.	 	 Bentley’s	 argument	 that	 he	 was	 denied	 an individualized	sentence	is	simply	not	reflected	anywhere	in	the	record.		At	no point	did	the	court depart from	sentencing	principles	or	abuse	its	discretion	in coming	to	or	issuing	its	sentence. See Diana , 2014 ME 45, ¶	37, 89	A.3d	132

. The	entry	is: Sentence affirmed.

Joseph	 Mekonis,	 Esq. (orally) ,	 Law	 Office	 of	 Joseph	 Mekonis,	 P.A.,	 Saco,	 for appellant	Dustan	J.	Bentley Aaron	 M.	 Frey,	 Attorney	 General,	 and	 Donald	W.	 Macomber,	 Asst.	 Atty.	 Gen. (orally), Office	of	the	Attorney	General,	Augusta,	for	appellee	State	of	Maine

York	County	Unified	Criminal	Docket	docket	number	CR

- 2019

- 213 F OR C LERK R EF E R E NCE O NLY