# In the Missouri Court of Appeals Western District
C.G. SEWING , Appellant , v. SCOTTISH RITE OF KANSAS CITY, et al. , Respondents

. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) WD 82320

F ILED : September 3, 2019 

### APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF JACKSON COUNTY

T HE 

### H ONORABLE 

### M ARCO 

### R OLDAN 

### , J UDGE 

### B EFORE 

### D IVISION 

### T WO 

### : L ISA 

### W HITE 

### H ARDWICK 

### , P RESIDING 

### J UDGE 

### , T HOMAS 

### H. N EWTON AND 

### M ARK 

### D. P FEIFFER 

### , J UDGES C.G. Sewing appeal s the circuit court’s entry of summary judgment in favor of Scottish Rite of Kansas City, Scottish Rite Temple Association of Kansas City, Missouri, Michael D. Wheeler, and R obert L. Harman (collectively, “Respondents”) on her petition for damages alleging violations of the Missouri Human Rights Act (“MHRA”). The court granted summary judgment on the basis that Respondents did not employ six or more employees and therefore were not an “employer ” for the purposes of the MHRA. For

re asons explained herein, w e dismiss the appeal on jurisdictional grounds for lack of a final judgment.
F ACTUAL AND P ROCEDURAL H ISTORY Sewing filed a petition for damages alleging that Respond ents and the Orient of
Missouri

- Scottish Rite ( “the Orient” ) had engaged in sexual haras sment, sex or gender2

discrimination, and retaliation in violation of the MHRA. Respondents moved for summary judgment, alleging that because they did not employ more than six employees, they were not subject to the provisions of the MHRA. After Sewing fi led suggestions in o pposition, the circuit court entered an “Order Granting Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment” on October 24, 2017. The order expressly grant ed judgment as a matter of law in favor of Respondents on all of Sewing’s claim s

. Three mo nths later, on January 23, 2018, Sewing filed a motion to amend the order, requesting that the circuit court reconsider and deny Respondent s ’ motion for summary judgment and reopen the discovery period. Sewing asserted that her motion was timely because t he court had not yet entered a final judgment. Respondents
argue d that the c ourt’s order dated October 24, 2017 , was, in fact, a final judgment pursuant to Rule 74.01(a) and that any motion to amend was untimely based on the thirty

- day filing period for post

- judgment motions in Rule 78.04. Ten months later, the circuit court denied Sewing’s motion to amend but agre ed to retitle the previous order of October 24, 2017 , as a “Judgment” to comport with Rule 74.01. The judgment was entered on October 19, 2018. Sewing appeals.
A NALYSIS During oral arguments before this court, Sewing asserted, for the first time, that a final judgment did not exist in this case because her claims against the Orient were not disposed of by the court’s entry of summary judgment in favor of Respondents

. W e must address this contention as a threshold matter because “ appellate jurisdiction

c annot be conferred by waiver, acquiescence, or even express consent.” Boone v.
Boone , 438 S.W.3d 494, 497 (Mo. App. 2014).3

“In Missouri, the right to appeal is statutory.” Marquez v. Marquez , 136 S.W.3d 574, 578 (Mo. App. 2004). “ A final judgment is a p rerequisite to appellate review. ” Ndegwa v. KSSO, LLC , 371 S.W.3d 798, 801 (Mo. banc 2012). “ Generally, a judgment is final if it disposes of all the issues with respect to all parties and leaves nothing for future determination. ” ABB, Inc. v. Securitas Sec. Servs. USA, Inc. , 390 S.W.3d 196, 200 (Mo. App. 2012). Here, Sewing’s action was instituted against five parties. The record demonstrates that judgment was entered in favor of four of the five parties . Rule 74.01(b) makes an exception to the general rule by allowing a circuit court to enter an appealable order on few er than all claims and parties if it makes “an express determination that there is not just reason for delay.” Where, as here, the circuit court
does no t make such determination, an order that “adjudicates fewer than all the claims or the rights and liabilities of fewer than all the parties shall not terminate the action as to any of the claims or parties[.]” Rule 74.01(b). Respondents argue that the O rient has never been a viable legal entity capable of service or suit and therefore was not a party to this action

. The parties agree that the Orient was never served , but the record is otherwise unclear as to the legal status of the Orient. Consequently , we cannot conclude that the Orient is not a party to this action.
“F or there to be a final judgment there must be a disposition of claims against all parties, even those unserved. ” LCA Lea sing Corp. v. Bolivar Prof’l Pharmacy, Inc. , 901 S.W.2d 342 , 343 (Mo. App. 1995). Accordingly , the circuit court was required to adjudicate Sewing’s claims against the Orient in order to issue a final , appealable4

judgment in this matter. Id ; see also Rule 74.01

. The appeal is dismissed because we lack jurisdiction t o entertain Sewing’s claims. C ONCLUSION We dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction

.

/s / 

# Lisa White Hardwick L ISA W HITE H ARDWICK , J UDGE A LL C ONCUR

.