In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________

No. 14-3204

JONATHAN ARNOLD,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

LETICIA VILLARREAL,

Defendant-Appellee.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.

No. 09 C 7399 — Amy J. St. Eve, Judge.

____________________

ARGUED MARCH 29, 2016 — DECIDED APRIL 6, 2017

____________________

Before FLAUM, EASTERBROOK, and SYKES, Circuit Judges.

SYKES, Circuit Judge. In the fall of 2004, Jonathan Arnold 

and Leticia Villarreal exchanged marriage vows in California 

in a ceremony solemnized by a priest and a rabbi. But they

failed to file their marriage license with the county recorder

within 10 days of the ceremony as required by California 

law. Shortly before the license expired, the county recorder
2 No. 14-3204

sent a letter informing them that the license had not yet been 

filed and reminding them that they needed to file it to 

complete the legal process. The couple did nothing and the 

license expired unfiled.

Although they were not legally married, the couple remained together for about three years, had a child, and 

purchased a condo in California. By the summer of 2007,

their relationship had deteriorated, and they separately filed 

for divorce—she in California, he in Illinois. The divorce 

proceedings were terminated when they stipulated that they 

were never married.

Arnold then sued Villarreal in federal court in Chicago

on various fraud theories. He claimed that she tricked him 

into believing the two were legally married to induce him to

give her gifts, including the California condo. The district 

court entered summary judgment for Villarreal, characterizing the suit as “frivolous.” Frivolous is an apt description.

First, the undisputed facts show that Villarreal told Arnold 

early on that she suspected they weren’t legally married. 

Indeed, she insisted that they get a new marriage license and 

do the whole thing over. They obtained a new license but 

did nothing further.

Second, even if we accept that at some point along the 

way Villarreal lulled Arnold with reassurances that they 

were legally married, Arnold was not justified in relying on 

her representations. He knew, because the county recorder 

had told them in writing, that the marriage license had not 

been filed as required by California law. Accordingly, we 

affirm the district court’s judgment. We also grant 

Villarreal’s motion for sanctions against Arnold for filing a 

frivolous appeal.
No. 14-3204 3

I. Background

Arnold and Villarreal met in 2003. In January 2004

Arnold proposed marriage and Villarreal accepted. On 

October 1, 2004, the couple applied for and received a marriage license from the Los Angeles County recorder’s office. 

The license was valid through December 30, 2004. On 

November 21 they held a wedding ceremony in the picturesque resort town of Dana Point. Father Erwin Castro, one of

two clergymen who participated in the ceremony (the other 

was a rabbi), signed the couple’s marriage license but failed 

to complete and file it. He did not fill in the date and location of the ceremony; he did not obtain a witness’s signature;

and he failed to perform his statutory duty to return the 

completed license to the county recorder within 10 days of 

the ceremony. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 359(e) (requiring the 

person solemnizing the marriage to return the license to the 

county recorder “within 10 days after the ceremony”).

Arnold accuses Villarreal of taking the marriage license 

away from Castro. Villarreal disputes this, but the key fact is 

undisputed: the completed marriage license was never filed

with the recorder’s office.

On December 27 the couple received a letter from the recorder’s office informing them that their license had not yet 

been returned for filing and would expire on December 30. 

The letter urged them to immediately address the matter

and reminded them that filing a completed license was 

essential to protect their “marital and property rights.” The

couple took no action in response to the letter.

In mid-2005 as the couple anticipated the birth of their 

first child, Villarreal grew uneasy about the validity of their 

marriage and told Arnold that she thought their failure to 
4 No. 14-3204

file the marriage license meant that they weren’t legally 

married. Arnold dismissed her concerns. Nevertheless, in an 

attempt to appease her, Arnold agreed to a do-over. In 

August 2005 they applied for and received another marriage 

license. Remarkably, they again failed to follow through, and 

a completed marriage license was never filed.

Villarreal gave birth to their baby on August 21, 2005. 

About eight months later Arnold signed a power of attorney

in favor of Villarreal, which she used to obtain financing and 

purchase a California condominium in both their names. The 

loan and purchase documents refer to the pair as a married 

couple. Arnold later transferred his interest in the condo to 

Villarreal. He claims he gave her the condo—as well as other 

gifts—only because he believed they were married.

After nearly three years, the couple’s relationship began 

to disintegrate and they separated. In the summer of 2007, 

they filed separate divorce petitions—Arnold in Illinois and 

Villarreal in California. They eventually stipulated that they 

were never legally married, and the divorce proceedings 

were terminated.1

Apparently unwilling to leave the matter there, Arnold 

sued Villarreal in federal court in Illinois alleging various 

fraud claims and seeking compensatory damages totaling 

about $1 million and another $1 million in punitive damages. He accused Villarreal of tricking him into giving her his 

property by misrepresenting that they were lawfully married. Villarreal moved for summary judgment, initially 

taking the position that Arnold’s fraud suit failed because he 

 1 The California court retained jurisdiction over the parties’ dispute 

concerning custody of their child.
No. 14-3204 5

wasn’t deceived about anything: they really were validly 

married under California law. The district judge stayed the 

case while Villarreal returned to California state court to try 

to undo her stipulation. The state court refused to vacate its 

judgment.

Once the California court had spoken, the district judge

lifted the stay, and Villarreal again moved for summary 

judgment. This time she argued that Arnold’s fraud suit 

failed because he could not have justifiably relied on any 

misrepresentations she might have made about the legal 

validity of their marriage. Arnold responded on the merits 

and also sought time for additional discovery under 

Rule 56(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

Judge John Grady, the district judge initially assigned to 

the case, granted Villarreal’s motion and denied Arnold’s 

Rule 56(d) request. The judge rejected Arnold’s argument 

that he justifiably relied on Villarreal’s representations as 

both “preposterous” on its face and utterly belied by the 

undisputed record evidence. The judge also held that “[n]o 

amount of discovery would remedy the flaws in Arnold’s 

frivolous theory.”

Arnold moved to alter the judgment under Rule 59(e) of 

the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. He argued that the 

court had failed to consider all of the relevant evidence in 

the record. Meanwhile, in anticipation of Judge Grady’s 

retirement, the case was administratively transferred to 

Judge Amy St. Eve. She denied the Rule 59(e) motion, agreeing with Judge Grady that “[t]he undisputed facts amply 

demonstrate that Arnold’s claims are frivolous.”
6 No. 14-3204

Although his claims had been deemed frivolous by not 

one but two district judges, Arnold nevertheless filed this 

appeal. Villarreal responded on the merits and moved for 

sanctions against Arnold for filing a frivolous appeal.

II. Discussion

The parties agree that California law applies to Arnold’s 

claims, so to the extent that the appeal entails a dispute 

about the law, our task is to predict how the Supreme Court 

of California would resolve it.2 See BMD Contractors, Inc. v. 

Fid. & Deposit Co. of Md., 679 F.3d 643, 648 (7th Cir. 2012).

As relevant here, Arnold invokes three different provisions of California law: California Civil Code sections 1709 

(fraudulent deceit), 1572 (actual fraud), and 1573 (constructive fraud). We do not need to analyze these claims separately. Each one requires Arnold to prove that he justifiably 

relied on Villarreal’s misrepresentations regarding the 

validity of their marriage. Conroy v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 

203 P.3d 1127, 1135 (Cal. 2009) (fraudulent deceit); Chi. Title 

Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 220 Cal. Rptr. 507, 513 (Cal. Ct. 

App. 1985) (actual fraud and constructive fraud). Given the 

undisputed facts, Arnold cannot prevail on this common 

element of his fraud claims.

 

2 Subject-matter jurisdiction is secure under 28 U.S.C. § 1332 because 

(1) Arnold and Villarreal are citizens of different states and (2) the 

“domestic relations” exception to diversity jurisdiction doesn’t apply. 

Arnold brings fraud claims; the case doesn’t fall within the domesticrelations exception just because his factual allegations touch on the 

subject of marriage. See Friedlander v. Friedlander, 149 F.3d 739, 740–41 

(7th Cir. 1998).
No. 14-3204 7

We begin, however, by noting the distinct possibility that 

Arnold’s claims are categorically barred as a matter of law. 

California courts follow the general rule that one may never 

justifiably rely on a representation of law (as opposed to a 

representation of fact) because the law is equally accessible 

to all. See Cicone v. URS Corp., 227 Cal. Rptr. 887, 891 (Cal. Ct. 

App. 1986); 5 WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CAL. LAW (10TH), TORTS

§ 779 (2005); accord Lyon Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Ill. Paper & Copier 

Co., 732 F.3d 755, 765 (7th Cir. 2013) (explaining the rationales commonly given for the rule). The misrepresentations

alleged here appear to be legal in nature: Arnold claims that 

Villarreal misled him about the legal status of their relationship and the legal consequences of their failure to file their 

marriage license with the county recorder.

The general rule is subject to a “fiduciary relationship” 

exception, however, and the exception might apply here. 

37 AM. JUR. 2D Fraud and Deceit § 103 (2016). Arnold and 

Villarreal did not have a literal fiduciary relationship, but 

California courts appear to have extended the fiduciary 

exception to a broader category of “confidential relationships.” Cicone, 227 Cal. Rptr. at 891; Bank of Am. v. Sanchez, 

38 P.2d 787, 789 (Cal. Ct. App. 1934) (stating that the exception “has been extended to every possible case in which a 

fiduciary relation exists as a fact[,] ... [including] moral, 

social, domestic, or merely personal [relationships]”). And 

there is some indication that Arnold and Villarreal’s relationship would be considered “confidential” in the sense 

meant by California law. See Spellens v. Spellens, 305 P.2d 628,

643 (Cal. Ct. App. 1956) (holding that a jury could reasonably find that parties who were engaged to be married occupied “a confidential relationship”), vacated on other grounds,
8 No. 14-3204

Spellens v. Spellens, 317 P.2d 613 (Cal. 1957); Mathewson v. 

Naylor, 64 P.2d 979 (Cal. Ct. App. 1937) (same).

We’re hesitant to go further down this road. The parties 

haven’t briefed this possible legal barrier to Arnold’s claims, 

and the California cases on this doctrine are fairly old. 

Ultimately, we have no need to predict how the California 

Supreme Court would construe the “confidential relationship” exception on these facts. Arnold’s fraud claims clearly 

fail for a different reason.

California law holds that a plaintiff cannot justifiably rely 

on a misrepresentation when his own conduct is manifestly 

unreasonable “in the light of his own intelligence and information.” All. Mortg. Co. v. Rothwell, 900 P.2d 601, 609 (Cal. 

1995) (en banc) (quotation marks omitted). Whether the 

plaintiff has acted so unreasonably that recovery should be 

denied is normally a jury question, but it “may be decided as 

a matter of law if reasonable minds can come to only one 

conclusion based on the facts.” Id. (quotation marks omitted).

It’s undisputed that Arnold knew the marriage license 

was never filed with the recorder’s office as required by state 

law. He received the recorder’s letter to that effect and did 

nothing to rectify the problem. Moreover, as the birth of 

their child approached, Villarreal told Arnold that she was 

worried that they weren’t legally married, so they restarted 

the process by applying for a new marriage license. The 

county recorder issued the new license, but the couple did 

nothing to follow through and it too expired. On these facts 

Arnold’s claim that he justifiably relied on Villarreal’s later 

affirmations of the validity of their marriage is manifestly 
No. 14-3204 9

unreasonable.3 Judge Grady properly entered summary 

judgment for Villarreal.

For the same reason, Judge Grady’s rejection of Arnold’s 

Rule 56(d) motion for additional discovery was eminently 

sound. A district judge may delay consideration of a 

summary-judgment motion and order additional discovery 

if the requesting party demonstrates that “it cannot present 

facts essential to justify its opposition.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56(d). 

We review these orders deferentially, for abuse of discretion

only. Sterk v. Redbox Automated Retail, LLC, 770 F.3d 618, 622–

23 (7th Cir. 2014).

Judge Grady was clearly right to deny Arnold’s 

Rule 56(d) motion. As the judge aptly put it, “[n]o amount of 

discovery would remedy the flaws in Arnold’s frivolous 

theory.” The undisputed evidence already in the record 

established beyond question that any reliance by Arnold

was manifestly unreasonable based on what he knew about 

his own failure to ensure that the marriage license was 

properly completed and timely filed. 

Finally, Villarreal has moved for sanctions under Rule 38 

of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, which authorizes us to award “just damages and single or double costs” 

against an appellant for filing a frivolous appeal. An appeal 

is frivolous “when the result is obvious or when the appel-

 

3 Arnold harps on two entirely irrelevant facts: (1) Villarreal held herself 

out as his wife when she purchased the California condo; and (2) she 

argued in her first summary-judgment motion that they were legally 

married. That Villarreal may have kept innocent third parties in the dark 

(e.g., the seller of the condo, the mortgage lender, the court) does not 

bear on the question whether Arnold’s alleged reliance was justified 

given what he himself knew.
10 No. 14-3204

lant’s argument is wholly without merit.” Harris N.A. v. 

Hershey, 711 F.3d 794, 802 (7th Cir. 2013) (quotation marks 

omitted). That describes this appeal.

Rule 38 sanctions are discretionary, not mandatory. Id.

But Arnold’s appeal is precisely the kind for which an award 

of sanctions is most appropriate. He filed it after two district 

judges had characterized his suit as frivolous. There is no

theory of justifiable reliance that could overcome the undisputed fact that he knew his marriage license was never 

properly completed and filed as required by California law. 

Arnold’s appeal simply rehashes his allegation that Villarreal assured him that the marriage was legally valid and 

repeats bromides about the court’s obligation to draw all 

inferences in his favor. He appears to think that catching 

Villarreal in a lie is enough to entitle him to relief. It is not. 

Arnold has utterly failed to confront what two district 

judges recognized: that his fraud claims are not merely 

meritless but are frivolous. We are left with the distinct 

impression that he prosecuted this appeal simply to harass 

Villarreal. As Judge Grady drily noted, the courts “are not a 

proper venue for petty score-settling.”

Accordingly, Villarreal may submit, within 28 days, an

affidavit and supporting papers specifying the damages she 

incurred in this frivolous appeal. Arnold’s response is due 

within 28 days of Villarreal’s submission.

AFFIRMED; RULE 38 SANCTIONS ORDERED.