In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________ 

Nos. 22-2683 & 22-2688 

ARTISAN AND TRUCKERS CASUALTY COMPANY, 

Plaintiff-Appellant/Cross-Appellee, 

v.

THE BURLINGTON INSURANCE COMPANY, 

Defendant-Appellee/Cross-Appellant 

and

SOUTHERN TRUSS, INC., DOUGLAS FORREST, GAYLON CRUSE, individually and doing business as CRUSE CONSTRUCTION 

COMPANY, and MARK DUCKWORTH, 

Defendants-Appellees, 

___________________________________________________

THE BURLINGTON INSURANCE COMPANY, 

Defendant/Counter/Cross-Plaintiff-Appellee/Cross-Appellant, 

v. 

ARTISAN AND TRUCKERS CASUALTY COMPANY, 

Plaintiff/Counter-Defendant-Appellant, Cross-Appellee,

v. 

SOUTHERN TRUSS, INC., DOUGLAS FORREST, GAYLON CRUISE, 

individually and doing business as Cruse Construction

Company, and MARK DUCKWORTH, 

Defendants-Appellees,
2 Nos. 22-2683 & 22-2688 

____________________ 

Appeals from the United States District Court for the

Southern District of Illinois. 

No. 3:21-cv-00497 — J. Phil Gilbert, Judge. 

____________________ 

ARGUED OCTOBER 26, 2023 — DECIDED JANUARY 8, 2024 

____________________ 

Before FLAUM, BRENNAN, and KIRSCH, Circuit Judges. 

KIRSCH, Circuit Judge. Gaylon Cruse and Mark Duckworth 

were involved in an accident at a construction site while installing roof trusses. To lift the roof trusses into place, Douglas 

Forrest operated a power crane that was permanently attached to a 2007 International 760 truck owned by Southern 

Truss. As Cruse and Duckworth stood on ladders to secure 

the trusses, Forrest prematurely released tension on a truss, 

causing it to fall and collapse onto other trusses. The trusses

then struck Cruse and Duckworth and knocked them to the 

ground. After the accident, Cruse and Duckworth sued in Illinois state court, seeking damages for bodily injury from 

Southern Truss and Forrest.

Southern Truss had a commercial auto policy issued by 

Artisan and Truckers Casualty Company and a commercial 

general liability policy issued by The Burlington Insurance 

Company. Artisan’s auto policy states that it will pay damages for bodily injury arising out of the use of an insured auto. 

The policy contains an operations exclusion (and related definitions) providing, in relevant part, that Artisan has no duty 

to defend against a lawsuit for bodily injury when (1) the injury arises out of the operation of equipment attached to a 

land vehicle, and (2) the land vehicle is used primarily to 
Nos. 22-2683 & 22-2688 3

provide mobility to a permanently attached power crane. Burlington’s general liability policy states that it will pay damages for bodily injury. In some instances, Burlington will not 

have a duty to defend under its policy. As applicable to the 

facts of this appeal, if Artisan has no duty to defend under its 

auto policy, then Burlington has a duty to defend under its 

general liability policy.

Both Artisan and Burlington denied a duty to defend in 

the underlying lawsuit. To sort out the duty to defend, Artisan sued in federal court, seeking a declaration that under its 

auto policy, it owed no duty to defend. It also sought a declaration that Burlington owed a duty to defend. Both Artisan 

and Burlington moved for judgment on the pleadings, and the 

district court denied both motions. It concluded that the declarations page of Artisan’s policy conflicted with the policy’s 

operations exclusion, creating an ambiguity that should be 

construed in favor of the insured. The court also held that Burlington had a duty to defend in addition to Artisan because 

Burlington’s duty to defend extended to some claims in the 

underlying lawsuit that Artisan’s duty to defend did not. Artisan appealed, and Burlington cross-appealed. On appeal, 

both Artisan and Burlington argue that they have no duty to 

defend under their respective policies. Artisan argues that its 

policy is unambiguous and that its operations exclusion applies, while Burlington argues that it has no duty to defend, 

in part because Artisan does have a duty to defend.

We review de novo a district court’s judgment on the 

pleadings, Hanover Ins. v. R.W. Dunteman Co., 51 F.4th 779, 785 

(7th Cir. 2022), and its construction of an insurance policy, 

Lexington Ins. v. RLI Ins., 949 F.3d 1015, 1021 (7th Cir. 2020). 

Judgment on the pleadings is proper when there is no disputed issue of material fact, and the moving party is entitled 
4 Nos. 22-2683 & 22-2688 

to judgment as a matter of law. United Here Loc. 1 v. Hyatt 

Corp., 862 F.3d 588, 595 (7th Cir. 2017). Under Illinois law, 

“[a]n insurance policy is a contract, and the general rules governing the interpretation of other types of contracts also govern the interpretation of insurance policies.” Crescent Plaza 

Hotel Owner, L.P. v. Zurich Am. Ins., 20 F.4th 303, 308 (7th Cir. 

2021) (quotation omitted). 

We must give effect to the parties’ intentions, “‘as expressed in the policy language,’” and apply the terms as written if the policy is unambiguous. Id. (quoting Thounsavath v. 

State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins., 104 N.E.3d 1239, 1244 (Ill. 2018)). 

The policy is ambiguous if its language is “subject to more 

than one reasonable interpretation, as applied to the dispute 

before the court,” id. (citation omitted), but we “‘will not 

strain to find an ambiguity where none exists,’” id. (quoting 

Founders Ins. v. Munoz, 930 N.E.2d 999, 1004 (Ill. 2010)). And

ambiguous policy language is construed against the insurer 

but only if it is ambiguous “after application of other principles or canons of interpretation and only if the ambiguity cannot otherwise be resolved.” Schuchman v. State Auto Prop. & 

Cas. Ins., 733 F.3d 231, 238 (7th Cir. 2013) (cleaned up). 

Artisan notes that the underlying lawsuit alleged negligent operation of a crane attached to a truck and that the truck 

is listed on the Artisan policy as an insured auto, but it maintains that it has no duty to defend because the operations exclusion applies. Burlington disagrees, stating that an ambiguity in the application of Artisan’s policy trumps the operations exclusion. It observes that the policy’s definition of “insured auto” includes “[a]ny auto specifically described on the 

declarations page” and that the declarations page lists the 

2007 International 760 truck with permanently attached 

equipment. Thus, in Burlington’s view, the declarations page 
Nos. 22-2683 & 22-2688 5

indicates that the policy covers the crane, conflicting with the 

operations exclusion and creating an ambiguity that should 

be resolved in favor of the insured. 

But the declarations page does not conflict with the operations exclusion. The declarations page lists the 2007 International 760 including permanently attached equipment only in 

the truck’s “Stated Amount” of $70,000, which indicates its 

current retail value. The declarations page notes that “[i]n the 

event of a total loss, the maximum amount payable is the 

lesser of the Stated Amount or Actual Cash Value, less deductible” (see the following excerpt of the declarations page).

In other words, the declarations page simply provides that if 

the truck (including the permanently attached crane) is totaled, the most that Artisan will pay for the truck plus the 

crane is $70,000. Nowhere does it suggest that Artisan will 

cover bodily injury arising out of the operation of the crane. 

The declarations page thus does not conflict with the operations exclusion, and there is no ambiguity in the application 

of Artisan’s policy.

The operations exclusion applies when the bodily injury 

arises out of the operation of equipment attached to a land 

vehicle that is used primarily to provide mobility to a permanently attached power crane. Cruse and Duckworth’s bodily 

injuries arose out of the use of a power crane permanently attached to a truck, and Burlington does not argue that the 
6 Nos. 22-2683 & 22-2688 

truck’s primary purpose was something other than providing 

mobility to the crane. The operations exclusion therefore applies, and Artisan has no duty to defend. Because Artisan has 

no duty to defend, Burlington does have a duty to defend under its policy. We thus reverse the district court’s denial of 

Artisan’s motion for judgment on the pleadings but affirm its 

denial of Burlington’s motion. 

AFFIRMED IN PART AND REVERSED IN PART