J-S47024-20

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

MICHAEL THOMAS MATTHEWS 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 658 MDA 2020

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered October 31, 2019

In the Court of Common Pleas of Lancaster County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-36-CR-0003442-2018

BEFORE: STABILE, J., NICHOLS, J., and STRASSBURGER, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY NICHOLS, J.: FILED: FEBRUARY 23, 2022

Appellant Michael Thomas Matthews appeals from the judgment of 

sentence imposed after a jury found him guilty of arson—danger of death or 

bodily injury, aggravated arson—person present inside property, and causing 

catastrophe.1 This matter returns to this Court after we remanded for an 

amended Anders/Santiago2 brief or an advocate’s brief. Appellant has 

obtained new counsel who filed an advocate’s brief challenging (1) the 

sufficiency of the evidence concerning his convictions for causing catastrophe 

and aggravated arson—person present inside property and (2) the legality of 

the separate sentences for arson—danger of death or bodily injury and 

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* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court. 

1 18 Pa.C.S. §§ 3301(a)(1)(i), 3301(a.1)(1)(ii), and 3302(a), respectively.

2 Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967); Commonwealth v. Santiago, 

978 A.2d 349 (Pa. 2009).
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aggravated arson—person present inside property, as well as the trial court’s 

imposition of conditions concerning his imprisonment and parole.

3

 We vacate 

the judgment of sentence and remand for further proceedings consistent with 

this memorandum. 

This Court previously summarized the factual background of Appellant’s 

convictions, see Commonwealth v. Matthews, 658 MDA 2020, 2021 WL 

2772838, at *1-2 (Pa. Super. filed July 1, 2021) (unpublished mem.), which

we need not restate here as we write for the benefit of the parties. 

Procedurally, we note that on October 31, 2019, the trial court sentenced 

Appellant to serve an aggregate nine to twenty-seven years’ imprisonment 

consisting of three consecutive terms of three to nine years in the state 

correctional system. The trial court set special conditions for domestic 

violence offenders as part of its sentence.

Appellant timely appealed from the judgment of sentence, and his 

previous counsel submitted a petition to withdraw and an Anders/Santiago

brief. This Court denied the petition to withdraw and remanded for the filing 

of an amended Anders/Santiago brief or an advocate’s brief. Id. at *10. 

____________________________________________

3 Appellant’s present counsel also filed an application in this Court to compel 

the Lancaster County clerk of court to transmit a stipulation and trial exhibits 

on December 13, 2021. By December 23, 2021, this Court received the 

stipulation and all of the trial exhibits in a supplemental record. Therefore, 

we dismiss Appellant’s application to compel as moot.
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Following this Court’s remand, Appellant’s present counsel entered her 

appearance and filed an advocate’s brief raising four issues that we have 

reordered as follows:

1. Was the evidence presented by the Commonwealth insufficient 

to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that [Appellant] 

committed the offense of causing catastrophe where the 

evidence did not establish that [Appellant] intentionally or 

knowingly caused widespread injury or damage?

2. Where the fire which endangered persons was not set while 

[Appellant’s wife] was present in the house, was the evidence 

insufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that 

[Appellant] was guilty of aggravated arson?

3. Where the trial court instructed the jury that arson endangering 

persons was an element of aggravated arson, should these two 

offenses have merged for purposes of sentencing?

4. Did the trial court err in ordering, as a condition of [Appellant]’s 

state sentence, that he comply with a lengthy series of 

domestic violence conditions, where the court had no 

jurisdiction to impose these conditions, as the Pennsylvania 

Department of Corrections has exclusive authority over state 

prison conditions, and the Pennsylvania Department of 

Probation and Parole has exclusive authority over state parole 

conditions?

Appellant’s Brief at 7-8 (formatting altered).4

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4 Although present counsel elected to file an advocate’s brief, she did not seek 

leave to file a supplemental Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement. Furthermore, 

previous counsel filed a statement of her intent to file an Anders/Santiago

brief, see Pa.R.A.P. 1925(c)(4) (subsequently amended eff. Apr. 1, 2022), 

and the trial court did not file a Rule 1925(a) opinion. Although we could 

remand for the filing of a supplemental Rule 1925(b) statement and Rule 

1925(a) opinion, we decline to do so in this case because, as we discuss below, 

Appellant’s sufficiency and legality of sentence claims present pure questions 

of law. We remind counsel, however, that the failure to include issues in a 

(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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Sufficiency of the Evidence

Appellant’s first two issues challenge the sufficiency of the evidence, and 

the following principles governs our review: 

The standard we apply in reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence 

is whether viewing all the evidence admitted at trial in the light 

most favorable to the verdict winner, there is sufficient evidence 

to enable the fact-finder to find every element of the crime beyond 

a reasonable doubt. In applying the above test, we may not weigh 

the evidence and substitute our judgment for the fact-finder. In 

addition, we note that the facts and circumstances established by 

the Commonwealth need not preclude every possibility of 

innocence. Any doubts regarding a defendant’s guilt may be 

resolved by the fact-finder unless the evidence is so weak and 

inconclusive that as a matter of law no probability of fact may be 

drawn from the combined circumstances. The Commonwealth 

may sustain its burden of proof of proving every element of the 

crime beyond a reasonable doubt by means of wholly 

circumstantial evidence. Moreover, in applying the above test, 

the entire record must be evaluated and all the evidence actually 

received must be considered. Finally, the trier of fact while 

passing on the credibility of witnesses and the weight of the 

evidence produced, is free to believe all, part[,] or none of the 

evidence.

Commonwealth v. Bragg, 133 A.3d 328, 330-31 (Pa. Super. 2016) (citation 

omitted). 

Sufficiency—Causing Catastrophe

Appellant first claims that his conviction for causing a catastrophe must 

be vacated. Appellant’s Brief at 25. Appellant argues that a plain reading of 

Section 3302(a) requires the Commonwealth to prove that his conduct caused 

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Rule 1925(b) statement generally results in the waiver of the issue. See

Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(3)(iv); Commonwealth v. Hansley, 24 A.3d 410, 415 

(Pa. Super. 2011). 
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widespread damage or injury. Id. at 19-23. Appellant asserts that the 

Commonwealth failed to present evidence that widespread damage or injury 

occurred. Id. at 25. The Commonwealth agrees that relief is due. 

Commonwealth’s Brief at 6, 8. 

This Court previously outlined the relevant statutes and decisional law 

when finding this issue had arguable merit. See Matthews, 2021 WL 

2772838, at *6-9. Because the Commonwealth concedes that that Appellant’s 

conviction was not sufficiently supported by the evidence, we do not repeat 

our prior discussion. We conclude that Appellant is entitled to relief because 

the Commonwealth failed to establish that Appellant’s conduct resulted in 

widespread damage or injury and, therefore, that Appellant caused a 

catastrophe as required by Section 3302(a). See 18 Pa.C.S. § 3302(a). 

Therefore, we reverse Appellant’s conviction for causing a catastrophe.5

Sufficiency—Aggravated Arson—Person Present Inside Property

Appellant next claims that the evidence was insufficient to prove his 

aggravated arson conviction under Section 3301(a.1)(1)(ii). Appellant’s Brief 

at 33. Appellant contends that he started two fires—the first, a minor fire at 

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5 Because we vacate Appellant’s conviction for causing a catastrophe, on which 

the trial court imposed a consecutive sentence, we vacate the judgment of 

sentence as a whole and remand this matter for resentencing. See

Commonwealth v. Steele, 234 A.3d 840, 848 (Pa. Super. 2020) (indicating 

that this Court vacated an appellant’s entire sentence because the reversal of 

a conviction upset the trial court’s sentencing scheme). We note that aside 

from Appellant’s assertion that the charge of violating Section 3302(a) must 

be vacated, neither Appellant nor the Commonwealth had addressed whether 

a conviction for risking catastrophe pursuant to Section 3302(b) could stand 

as a lesser included offense. We decline to address this issue sua sponte. 
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the top of the stairs when his wife was inside the home, and the second, the 

larger fire in the upstairs bedroom, when his wife was no longer in the home. 

Id. at 32. Appellant asserts that the Commonwealth failed to establish that

the first fire “created any risk to anyone.” Id. Appellant emphasizes the 

evidence that the first fire resulted in a relatively small burn pattern 

underneath the carpet at the top of the stairs and that a first responder 

described as small and would not have impeded Appellant from exiting the 

home. Id. According to Appellant, it was only the second fire that “resulted 

in heavy smoke and significant heat, making it difficult and dangerous for 

police [and firefighters] to rescue [him.]” Id. Appellant contends that he set 

the second fire “after [his wife] left the house.” Id. (emphasis in original). 

The Commonwealth asserts that sufficient evidence supported 

Appellant’s conviction for aggravated arson—person present inside property 

because Appellant intentionally set fire to his residence when his wife was 

inside of the residence.6 Commonwealth’s Brief at 13-14. The Commonwealth 

adds that the first fire caused the smoke alarm to activate and damaged the 

floor underneath the carpet. Id. at 14. The Commonwealth notes that a fire 

investigator testified that the first fire was a “secondary point of origin of the 

fire and smoke that engulfed much of the second story of the residence and 

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6 The Commonwealth also asserts that this Court previously decided this issue 

when accepting portions of Appellant’s previous counsel’s Anders/Santiago

brief. Although we previously concluded that this claim was frivolous, we will 

address this issue in an abundance of caution due to the more developed 

arguments presented by Appellant’s current counsel and the Commonwealth.
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placed first responders in danger” and that “first responders necessarily had 

to proceed up the narrow staircase” where Appellant set the first fire. Id. The 

Commonwealth concludes that the “evidence admitted at trial when viewed in 

the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, was sufficient to establish that 

the first fire alone recklessly placed other persons in danger of death or bodily 

injury.” Id. at 14-15. 

Section 3301 defines arson in relevant part, as follows:

(a) Arson endangering persons.—

(1) A person commits a felony of the first degree if he 

intentionally starts a fire or causes an explosion, or if he aids, 

counsels, pays or agrees to pay another to cause a fire or 

explosion, whether on his own property or on that of another, 

and if:

(i) he thereby recklessly places another person in danger of 

death or bodily injury, including but not limited to a 

firefighter, police officer or other person actively engaged in 

fighting the fire . . . .

* * *

(a.1) Aggravated arson.—

(1) A person commits a felony of the first degree if he 

intentionally starts a fire or causes an explosion, or if he aids, 

counsels, pays or agrees to pay another to cause a fire or 

explosion, whether on his own property or on that of another, 

and if:

* * *

(ii) he commits an offense under this section which is graded 

as a felony when a person is present inside the property at 

the time of the offense.
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18 Pa.C.S. § 3301(a)(1)(i), (a.1)(1)(ii).

Instantly, the record reveals the following. Appellant’s wife testified that

during an argument, Appellant began burning papers at the top of the stairway 

when she was downstairs in the foyer. See N.T., Trial Vol. 1., 8/26/19, at 67-

68, 71-72. She then called 911, and then exited through the front door of the

home. Id. She did not see Appellant again, but heard a smoke alarm, and 

then heard Appellant say that her bedroom was on fire. Id. at 74, 80-81. 

Sergeant Eric Schmidt of the Ephrata Police Department responded to 

the home within minutes7 of receiving a dispatch and saw “a lot of smoke” 

and “a little bit of fire at the top of the” stairway.8 See id. at 85. Sergeant 

Schmidt attempted to go up the stairway to locate Appellant, but he only 

“went about half way or three-quarters the way up the stairs” because of the 

heavy smoke. Id. After the sergeant retreated and exited the home, 

Appellant briefly reappeared. Id. at 88-89. Sergeant Schmidt again entered 

the home with firefighters to save Appellant, who, by that point locked himself 

in an upstairs bedroom and hid inside a closet. Firefighters then went upstairs, 

attacked the fire, and ultimately rescued Appellant, who was hiding in a closet. 

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7 The transcript of Appellant’s wife’s 911 call indicates that she was on the 

phone for four minutes and fifty seconds, and she states at the end of the call 

that “[t]he police are here.” Commonwealth’s Ex. 10 at 4. The wife testified 

that Sergeant Schmidt was the first officer to arrive. N.T., Trial Vol. 1., 

8/26/19 at 72.

8 As emphasized by Appellant, Sergeant Schmidt testified that the fire or burn 

spot at the top of the stairs would not have impeded Appellant from exiting 

the home from upstairs. Id. at 100. 
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Pennsylvania State Trooper Colby Shesko testified as an expert in fire 

investigation and detection. See N.T., Trial Vol. 2, 8/27/19, at 138. Trooper 

Shesko described the burn marks at the top of the stairs as a “secondary 

ignition or secondary point of origin.” See id. at 138, 146.

Viewing this record in a light most favorable to the Commonwealth, we 

conclude that it was reasonable for the jury to determine that the first fire, 

which Appellant set when his wife was inside the home, contributed to the 

hazard first responders faced when fighting the fire and rescuing Appellant. 

Appellant’s contention that the first fire alone was minor and did not endanger 

others rests on speculation and inferences drawn in his favor. See Bragg, 

133 A.3d at 330 (reiterating that a review of the sufficiency of the evidence 

requires viewing all the evidence in a light most favorable to the 

Commonwealth). 

Further, even if the first fire did not endanger persons as Appellant 

contends, the record demonstrates that Appellant set the second fire within 

minutes after the first, and that the first fire was determined to be a secondary 

ignition point or point of origin. Under the circumstances of this case, we 

conclude that there was sufficient evidence to prove that Appellant set a fire 

while his wife was present inside the home, and that the combination of the 

first and second fires clearly endangered first responders. For these reasons, 

Appellant’s sufficiency of the evidence challenge to his conviction for 

aggravated arson—person present inside property fails. 
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Legality of Sentence

Appellant, in his third and fourth issues, asserts that the trial court 

imposed illegal sentences because the trial court should have merged the 

sentences for arson—danger of death or bodily injury and aggravated arson—

person present inside property, and it lacked the authority to impose domestic 

violence conditions to his sentence. 

The principles governing our review are well settled. “[A] challenge to 

the legality of a sentence raises a question of law. In reviewing this type of 

claim, our standard of review is de novo and our scope of review is plenary.” 

Commonwealth v. Muhammed, 219 A.3d 1207, 1211 (Pa. Super. 2019) 

(citations omitted).

Legality of Sentence—Merger

Appellant argues that his sentences for arson—danger of death or bodily 

injury and aggravated arson—person present inside property should merge 

because his aggravated arson conviction included all of the elements of his 

arson conviction. Appellant’s Brief at 27. Appellant emphasizes that the trial 

court instructed the jury that if it found Appellant guilty of arson, it had to find 

Appellant guilty of aggravated arson. Id. at 28-29. According to Appellant, 

“because the entire offense of arson endangering persons is an element of 

aggravated arson, the offenses must merge for sentencing.” Id. at 27-28.

The Commonwealth responds that Appellant committed two separate 

acts: lighting the first fire in the presence of his wife and then lighting the 

second fire in the upstairs bedroom. Commonwealth’s Brief at 9-10. The 
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Commonwealth continues that it charged “and demonstrated by the evidence 

[that Appellant] engaged in multiple, distinct criminal acts and his convictions 

for arson—danger of death or bodily injury [and] aggravated arson—person 

present insider property were not predicated upon a single criminal act.” Id.

at 10. Therefore, the Commonwealth concludes that a merger analysis of the 

elements of the offense is not required and that no relief is due. Id. at 11. 

Section 9765 of the Sentencing Code states:

No crimes shall merge for sentencing purposes unless the crimes 

arise from a single criminal act and all of the statutory elements 

of one offense are included in the statutory elements of the other 

offense. Where crimes merge for sentencing purposes, the court 

may sentence the defendant only on the higher graded offense.

42 Pa.C.S. § 9765. 

Our Supreme Court has explained that Section 9765 “prohibits merger 

unless two distinct facts are present: 1) the crimes arise from a single criminal 

act; and 2) all of the statutory elements of one of the offenses are included in 

the statutory elements of the other.” Commonwealth v. Baldwin, 985 A.2d 

830, 833 (Pa. 2009). “The preliminary consideration is whether the facts on 

which both offenses are charged constitute one solitary criminal act. If the 

offenses stem from two different criminal acts, merger analysis is not 

required.” Commonwealth v. Healey, 836 A.2d 156, 157-58 (Pa. Super. 

2003) (citation omitted). 

To determine whether there is a single criminal act, we must examine 

the crimes as charged by the Commonwealth. Commonwealth v. Jenkins, 
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96 A.3d 1055, 1060 (Pa. Super. 2014); see also Commonwealth v. 

Kimmel, 125 A.3d 1272, 1277 (Pa. Super. 2015) (en banc) (considering the 

criminal complaint, criminal information, and affidavit of probable cause, and 

concluding that the Commonwealth established the factual predicates to avoid 

merger); Commonwealth v. Martinez, 153 A.3d 1025, 1032 (Pa. Super. 

2016) (stating that because “neither the charging information nor supporting 

documents of record describe the operative facts in such a way as to 

distinguish the specific conduct underlying the offenses,” we cannot conclude 

“that the offenses were based on two discrete criminal acts for purposes of 

avoiding merger at sentencing”).

Instantly, we agree with the Commonwealth that Appellant’s argument 

concerning the trial court’s jury instruction and the elements of the crimes

lacks merit. As discussed above, the trial evidence established that Appellant 

committed separate criminal acts by setting two fires. Therefore, we agree 

with the Commonwealth that Appellant’s sentences for arson—danger of death 

or bodily injury and aggravated arson—person present inside property do not 

merge. See Kimmel, 125 A.3d at 1277; cf. Martinez, 153 A.3d at 1032. 

Accordingly, no relief is due. 

Legality of Sentence—Domestic Violence Conditions

Appellant last contends that the trial court did not have the authority to 

impose domestic violence conditions on his sentences. Appellant’s Brief at 38. 

Appellant argues that the parole conditions for his sentences are under the 

jurisdiction of the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections and the Board of 
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Probation and Parole. Id. at 35-38. The Commonwealth agrees and concedes 

that relief is due. Commonwealth’s Brief at 7, 15 (citing Commonwealth v. 

Mears, 972 A.2d 1210 (Pa. Super. 2009)). 

Initially, we note that this issue is arguably moot. As discussed 

previously, Appellant’s conviction for causing a catastrophe cannot stand, and 

because the trial court sentenced him to a consecutive sentence for that 

offense, we vacate all of the sentences, including the domestic violence 

conditions, and remand for resentencing. See Steele, 234 A.3d at 848. In 

any event, we agree with Appellant and the Commonwealth that the trial court 

lacked the statutory basis to impose conditions on Appellant’s incarceration 

and possible parole from a sentence that is within the exclusive jurisdiction of 

the Department of Corrections and the Board of Probation and Parole, 

respectively. See Mears, 972 A.2d at 1212. 

Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, we vacate Appellant’s conviction for causing 

a catastrophe, affirm Appellant’s convictions for arson—danger of death or 

bodily injury and aggravated arson—person present inside property. We 

further conclude that the trial court did not err in imposing separate sentences 

for arson—danger of death or bodily injury and aggravated arson—person 

present inside property. Lastly, given our disposition, the trial court’s 

imposition of domestic violence conditions is moot at this juncture. In sum, 

we affirm in part and reverse in part, Appellant’s convictions as discussed 
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herein and vacate the judgment of sentence and remand this matter to the 

trial court for resentencing.

Judgment of sentence vacated. Case remanded for resentencing. 

Application to compel dismissed as moot. Jurisdiction relinquished. 

Judge Strassburger did not participate in the consideration or decision 

of this case. 

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 02/23/2022