#30498-aff in pt, vacate, & rem in pt-SRJ

2024 S.D. 59

IN THE SUPREME COURT

OF THE

STATE OF SOUTH DAKOTA

* * * *

EDWARD HOFFMAN, individually and

as administrator of the Estate of his

Mother Theresa Hoffman, Plaintiff and Appellant,

v.

MARCUS HOLLOW HORN and

EUNICE HOLLOW HORN, individually

and as Husband and Wife, Defendants, Counterclaimants, 

Third-Party Complainants, and 

Appellees,

v.

KIM HOFFMAN, PHYLLIS MILLER,

and ANY PERSONS CLAIMING

INTEREST IN LOT 15, BLOCK 3, DEWEY

COUNTY, EAGLE BUTTE, SOUTH

DAKOTA, Third-Party Defendants.

* * * *

APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF

THE FOURTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT

DEWEY COUNTY, SOUTH DAKOTA

* * * *

THE HONORABLE MICHELLE K. COMER

Judge

* * * *

CONSIDERED ON BRIEFS

JUNE 4, 2024

OPINION FILED 09/18/24
* * * *

THOMAS J. VAN NORMAN

Eagle Butte, South Dakota Attorney for plaintiff and 

appellant.

TERRA M. LARSON

CASH ANDERSON of

May, Adam, Gerdes and

Thompson

Pierre, South Dakota Attorneys for defendants and 

appellees.
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JENSEN, Chief Justice

[¶1.] In 1999, Marcus and Eunice Hollow Horn purchased a mobile home 

situated on a lot in Eagle Butte, South Dakota. The Hollow Horns began paying 

rent to the purported owner of the lot, Oliver Leblanc. Several years later, Phyllis 

Miller claimed ownership of the lot and offered to sell it to Eunice. Eunice agreed to 

purchase the lot and received a quit claim deed from Phyllis. Years later, Edward 

Hoffman, the administrator of the Estate of Theresa Hoffman, claimed that his 

mother Theresa had owned the lot. He filed this quiet title action against the 

Hollow Horns in his personal capacity and on behalf of Theresa’s Estate. The 

Hollow Horns counterclaimed, alleging ownership of the lot by adverse possession 

pursuant to SDCL 15-3-15 and alternatively, SDCL 15-3-1. The circuit court denied 

Edward’s claims and quieted title to the lot in favor of the Hollow Horns based upon 

both theories of adverse possession. Edward appeals. We affirm in part, vacate the 

circuit court’s entry of judgement on the alternative claim for adverse possession 

under SDCL 15-3-1, and remand for the circuit court to dismiss the claim as moot.

Factual and Procedural Background

[¶2.] The property at issue is legally described as Lot 15, Block 3 in the city 

of Eagle Butte, South Dakota (the Lot). The Lot is fee land located within Dewey 

County, on the Cheyenne River Indian Reservation.1 In 1984, Theresa Hoffman 

1. Neither party has challenged the state court’s subject matter jurisdiction over 

the dispute. Our own research confirms the state court’s jurisdiction over the 

dispute. In County of Yakima v. Confederated Tribes and Bands of Yakima 

Indian Nation, the United States Supreme Court recognized that states have 

plenary jurisdiction over fee land within Indian Country that was previously 

transferred by the United States by patent in fee, upon the expiration of the 

(continued . . .)
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received a warranty deed to the Lot, and recorded the deed with the Dewey County 

Register of Deeds. Four years later, Theresa obtained a $3,500 loan from Phyllis 

Miller and gave Phyllis a mortgage on the Lot to secure the loan. The mortgage was 

recorded with the Dewey County Register of Deeds in October 1988.

[¶3.] Theresa defaulted on the loan with Phyllis. Although the mortgage 

was never foreclosed, Theresa abandoned the Lot and ceased living there. Theresa’s 

estranged brother, Oliver Leblanc, learned that Theresa abandoned the Lot and 

began holding himself out as the owner. Shortly thereafter, Kevin Finley moved a 

mobile home onto the Lot and began paying rent to Oliver.

[¶4.] In August 1999, the Hollow Horns purchased the mobile home located 

on the Lot from Kevin. Kevin informed the Hollow Horns that Oliver was the owner 

of the Lot and that he had been paying Oliver rent. Based on this information, the 

Hollow Horns began paying Oliver rent for the Lot.

[¶5.] In 2003, Phyllis learned that Oliver was holding himself out as the 

owner of the Lot and was charging the Hollow Horns rent for its use. Phyllis and 

________________________

(. . . continued)

twenty-five year trust period after the fee land was transferred. 502 U.S. 

251, 264, 112 S. Ct. 683, 691, 116 L. Ed. 2d 687 (1992); See also 25 U.S.C.A. 

§ 349 (West 1906) (“At the expiration of the trust period and when the lands 

have been conveyed to the Indians by patent in fee . . . then each and every 

allottee shall have the benefit of and be subject to the laws, both civil and 

criminal, of the State or Territory in which they may reside[.]”). This Court 

has similarly held that “[a]s a general rule . . . ‘the tribe has no authority 

itself, by way of tribal ordinance or actions in the tribal courts, to regulate 

the use of fee land.’” McGuire v. Aberle, 2013 S.D. 5, ¶ 5, 826 N.W.2d 353, 

355 (citation omitted). Thus, “once tribal land is converted into fee simple, 

the tribe loses plenary jurisdiction over it.” Id. (citation omitted). The record 

shows the Lot was patented in fee in 1910 under the authority of federal law 

as it existed at the time, and that more than twenty-five years have passed 

since its conveyance.
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her husband approached the Hollow Horns and claimed that Phyllis owned the Lot. 

Phyllis informed Eunice that she received ownership of the Lot after Theresa had 

defaulted on her loan. To support her claim of ownership, Phyllis provided Eunice 

with various documents including the mortgage that Theresa had given her, two 

different tax deeds from the years 1998 and 1999 that listed Phyllis as the Lot 

owner, and a handwritten letter from a tribal court judge, outlining that Phyllis and 

her husband had the right to repossess the Lot due to Theresa’s default on the 

mortgage loan.

[¶6.] After being confronted with this information, Oliver was unable to 

provide any documentation showing that he was the owner of the Lot or that he had 

the authority to charge the Hollow Horns rent. At that time, Oliver abandoned his 

claim of ownership to the Lot and did not request rent again.

[¶7.] Phyllis offered to sell the Lot to Eunice for the amount due on 

Theresa’s outstanding loan. Relying upon the documents offered by Phyllis, Eunice 

agreed to purchase the Lot. To finance the purchase, Eunice received a loan from a 

bank which was secured by a mortgage on the Lot. Eunice paid off the loan the 

same year. Phyllis quit claimed the Lot to Eunice in January 2003.

[¶8.] The Hollow Horns have continuously lived on the Lot since purchasing 

it from Phyllis. They replaced the original mobile home with a new double wide 

mobile home and have made various improvements to the Lot including the 

addition of permanent sheds, an extended deck and patio, as well as a picket fence 

that lines the boundaries of the Lot. In addition to the improvements, Eunice began 

paying property taxes on the Lot in 2004 and continued paying the taxes on the Lot 
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through 2013. During this time, Eunice personally paid all of the Lot’s property 

taxes or asked family members to deliver the tax payments on her behalf, using her 

personal funds.

[¶9.] While living on the Lot, Eunice worked as a nurse at Indian Health 

Services (IHS) in Eagle Butte. On several occasions, Theresa was a patient at IHS 

and would often make small talk with Eunice that centered around the Lot. At one 

point, Eunice told Theresa that before she met Phyllis, Oliver had been claiming 

ownership of the Lot and was charging her rent. Theresa reportedly responded by 

stating that Oliver “should not have done that.” Theresa also acknowledged that 

the Hollow Horns had purchased the Lot and commented on how nice the changes 

to the Lot looked. Theresa never questioned Eunice’s possession of the Lot nor did 

Theresa ever claim an ownership interest in the Lot during these conversations 

with Eunice.

[¶10.] Theresa died in 2014. Shortly after her death, Edward and his sister 

Kim Hoffman opened a probate proceeding in the Cheyenne River Sioux Tribal 

Court. Edward and Kim were assigned as co-representatives of Theresa’s Estate. 

Kim paid the second half of the property taxes on the Lot in 2014.2

[¶11.] Neither Kim nor Edward communicated with the Hollow Horns about 

the Lot until November 2018 when Edward served the Hollow Horns with a notice 

to quit. Thereafter, Edward filed an eviction action against the Hollow Horns in 

2. After 2014, the record shows that Eunice paid all the property taxes on the 

Lot, except for 2016 and 2017, which Edward paid.
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tribal court.3 The Hollow Horns responded to Edward’s eviction action pro se. As 

part of their response, the Hollow Horns submitted a copy of the quit claim deed 

that Eunice received from Phyllis. The deed had been altered, and rather than only 

including Eunice’s name as the grantee, Marcus’s name was handwritten above 

Eunice’s name. Eunice later filed an affidavit of possession with the Dewey County 

Register of Deeds Office along with the altered quit claim deed seeking to remove 

Theresa’s name from the Lot’s tax notice forms.

[¶12.] On September 5, 2019, Edward filed the current action in his personal 

capacity and on behalf of Theresa’s Estate. The complaint sought to quiet title to 

the Lot, and alternatively, sought declaratory and injunctive relief declaring that 

the Hollow Horns lacked any ownership or possessory interest in the Lot. The 

complaint also alleged that the Hollow Horns committed “misrepresentation and/or 

fraud” by adding Marcus’s name to the quit claim deed. In the alternative to the 

misrepresentation claim, the complaint alleged that the Hollow Horns committed 

slander of title by adding Marcus’s name to the quit claim deed and filing it with the 

Dewey County Register of Deeds. The complaint also alleged that Eunice was liable 

for breach of fiduciary duty or “abuse of position of trust/fiduciary” by taking 

advantage of her position as Theresa’s nurse to interfere with Theresa’s ownership 

interest in the Lot.

[¶13.] The Hollow Horns filed an answer, counterclaim, and third-party 

complaint alleging that Eunice is the legal title owner to the Lot pursuant to SDCL 

3. The tribal court stayed the eviction action pending the completion of this 

case.
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15-3-15. In addition to the counterclaim against Edward, the Hollow Horns filed a 

third-party complaint, naming Kim Hoffman, Phyllis Miller, and any persons 

claiming an interest in the Lot.4

[¶14.] A two-day bench trial was held in August 2023. Edward, Eunice, and 

Marcus were the only witnesses to testify. At the conclusion of trial, the court found 

in favor of the Hollow Horns on their claims for adverse possession and entered 

written findings of fact and conclusions of law.5 The court concluded that Eunice 

had satisfied all the elements for adverse possession under SDCL 15-3-15. 

Additionally, the court concluded that the Hollow Horns satisfied each element of 

adverse possession under the twenty-year statute in SDCL 15-3-1 by “tacking” the 

time that the Hollow Horns and Oliver claimed possession and ownership of the 

Lot, beginning in 1999. The court entered a final judgment awarding both Eunice 

and Marcus fee title in the Lot.

[¶15.] On appeal, Edward raises the following issues which we restate as 

follows:6

4. The Hollow Horns subsequently dismissed their claims against Phyllis after 

the parties reached a private settlement agreement.

5. The court granted the Hollow Horns’ motion for judgment as a matter of law 

on Edward’s claims of fraud and breach of fiduciary duty, which Edward has 

not appealed.

6. Edward also claims that the circuit court erred by considering the Hollow 

Horns’ adverse possession claim before considering “prima facie” proof that 

Theresa was the lawful owner of the Lot. On the contrary, the court received 

evidence and considered the claims of both parties during the two-day bench 

trial and entered findings and conclusions determining that the Hollow 

Horns’ claims for adverse possession defeated any claim of ownership in the 

Lot by Theresa. Edward also argues that the circuit court did not apply a 

(continued . . .)
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1. Whether the circuit court erred when it awarded Eunice 

title to the Lot under SDCL 15-3-15.

2. Whether the circuit court abused its discretion when it 

admitted out-of-court statements made by Theresa and 

Oliver.

3. Whether the circuit court erred in concluding that the 

Hollow Horns met all the elements for adverse possession 

under SDCL 15-3-1.

Analysis and Decision

1. Adverse possession under SDCL 15-3-15.

[¶16.] “Proof of the individual elements of adverse possession present 

questions of fact for the circuit court, while the ultimate conclusion of whether they 

are sufficient to constitute adverse possession is a question of law.” Gangle v. Spiry, 

2018 S.D. 55, ¶ 11, 916 N.W.2d 119, 123 (quoting Underhill v. Mattson, 2016 S.D.

69, ¶ 9, 886 N.W.2d 348, 352). “Therefore, we review a circuit court’s factual 

findings for clear error and its legal conclusions de novo.” Id. (quoting Underhill, 

2016 S.D. 69, ¶ 9, 886 N.W.2d at 352).

[¶17.] SDCL 15-3-15 creates a shortened ten-year period for obtaining title 

through adverse possession when real property taxes have been continuously paid:

________________________

(. . . continued)

clear and convincing standard of proof for the Hollow Horns’ adverse 

possession claims. See Titus v. Chapman, 2004 S.D. 106, ¶ 28, 687 N.W.2d 

918, 926 (requiring proof by clear and convincing evidence for a claim of 

adverse possession). While the court did not explicitly identify the standard 

of proof, this Court has routinely stated that when the “trial court [does] not 

specifically enunciate the standard of proof it used to decide [a] case[,] [t]here 

is a rebuttable presumption that the trial court applied the appropriate 

standard of proof.” Matter of Estate of Fiksdal, 388 N.W.2d 133, 134 (S.D. 

1986) (citation omitted). Edward has not rebutted this presumption by 

showing how the court applied the wrong standard of proof or that any of the 

court’s findings are not supported by clear and convincing evidence.
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Every person in the actual possession of lands or tenements 

under claim and color of title made in good faith, and who shall 

have continued for ten successive years in such possession, and 

shall also during said time have paid all taxes legally assessed 

on such lands or tenements, shall be held and adjudged to be the 

legal owner of said lands or tenements to the extent and 

according to the purport of his paper title. All persons holding 

under such possession by purchase, devise, or descent before 

said ten years shall have expired, and who shall have continued 

such possession and payment of taxes as aforesaid so as to 

complete said term of ten years of such possession and payment 

of taxes, shall be entitled to the benefit of this section.

“We have condensed this statute into three textual elements: ‘(1) claim and color of 

title made in good faith, (2) ten successive years in possession, and (3) payment of 

all taxes legally assessed.’” Healy Ranch P’ship v. Mines, 2022 S.D. 44, ¶ 48, 978 

N.W.2d 768, 781 (quoting Ashby v. Oolman, 2008 S.D. 26, ¶ 12, 748 N.W.2d 132,

135). Adverse possession under SDCL 15-3-15 does not have a hostility 

requirement. Mohnen v. Estate of Mohnen, 2024 S.D. 35, ¶ 20, 9 N.W.3d 481, 486–

87.

[¶18.] Edward challenges only the circuit court’s finding that Eunice received 

color of title in good faith under SDCL 15-3-15. In support, he argues that Eunice 

was not a good faith purchaser because she never checked title records before 

completing the purchase to confirm that Phyllis was the owner of the Lot. 

According to Edward, this evidence supports a finding that Eunice was not a good 

faith purchaser because “[s]he had actual notice that Theresa Hoffman had an 

interest in the land and obtained documents from Phyllis Miller with Theresa’s 

name as [the] record owner.” He also claims that after Eunice obtained possession 

of the defective deed, she “forged” the deed by writing in Marcus’s name and 

asserted a joint ownership interest in the Lot during the tribal court proceedings. 
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According to him, these actions are further evidence that she did not possess the 

deed in good faith.

[¶19.] Eunice cites Sioux City Boat Club v. Mulhall, 79 S.D. 668, 117 N.W.2d 

92, 96 (1962), to argue that “[g]ood or bad faith is assessed at execution of the 

instrument purporting color of title.” She contends that the facts available to the 

court surrounding the time the deed was executed support its finding that she 

purchased the Lot and received a deed from Phyllis in good faith. Prior to the 

purchase, Eunice claims that Phyllis provided documentation supporting her claim 

of ownership and that Oliver’s abandonment of any ownership interest in the Lot 

further “aided in Eunice’s belief that [Phyllis] was the true owner of the [Lot] and 

possessed the right to transfer title.” She also argues that the bank’s willingness to 

finance the purchase of the Lot further supports the court’s finding that she 

purchased the Lot in good faith.

[¶20.] “Bad faith is never presumed; one who challenges the good faith of the 

occupant in this type of case must overcome the presumption of good faith.” Andree 

v. Andree, 291 N.W.2d 788, 791 (S.D. 1980) (citations omitted); see also 2 C.J.S. 

Adverse Possession § 297 (“The presumption of good faith obtains until rebutted by 

proof to the contrary.”). “What constitutes good faith is a question for the trier of 

fact.” Id. (citing Armstrong v. Cities Serv. Gas Co., 502 P.2d 672, 683 (Kan. 1972)). 

“The notion of good faith is defined as an ‘honest belief[.]’” Healy Ranch P’ship, 

2022 S.D. 44, ¶ 63, 978 N.W.2d at 784 (quoting Parker v. Vinson, 11 S.D. 381, 77 

N.W. 1023, 1024 (1899)).
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[¶21.] The good faith element must exist, however, not just at the time of 

execution, but throughout the entire statutory period. “[T]he elements and 

requisites of title are color of title to the real property, possession under claim and 

color of title made in good faith for the required time and payment of all taxes for 

ten successive years. If these requisites exist at the end of the statutory period, title 

is acquired.” Sioux City Boat Club, 79 S.D. at 675, 117 N.W.2d at 95–96 (emphasis 

added) (citations omitted).

[¶22.] Eunice had been paying Oliver rent for almost four years when she 

was approached by Phyllis, who claimed to be the owner of the Lot and provided 

documentation to support her claim of title. Any potential concerns about the 

legitimacy of Phyllis’s ownership were further dispelled when Oliver was unable to 

provide any documentation confirming his ownership of the Lot. Based upon these 

facts, Eunice paid Phyllis the asking price for the Lot and received a quit claim 

deed. These facts were sufficient for the court to find that “Eunice had a good faith 

belief and confidence that she was receiving proper title” to the Lot.

[¶23.] More importantly, Edward failed to present evidence rebutting the 

presumption that Eunice acted in good faith during the ten-year statutory period. 

Edward claims that Eunice’s failure to further inquire into Phyllis’s claimed 

ownership is evidence of bad faith. However, he cites no authority to support such a 

claim and our review of the court’s findings is limited to “whether on the entire 

evidence [we are] left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been 

committed.” Andree, 291 N.W.2d at 791 (citation omitted). Although it is true that 

the documents Eunice received included Theresa’s name, they were accompanied by 
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a reasonable explanation that Theresa had forfeited her ownership interest in the 

Lot due to her default on the mortgage. These documents further informed Eunice’s 

belief that Phyllis was the owner of the Lot, rather than put her on notice that she 

was purchasing a defective deed.

[¶24.] Nonetheless, Edward also contends that the presumption of good faith 

was rebutted by evidence that every year “since 2001 or 2003” Eunice received a 

property tax notice that also listed Theresa as an owner of the Lot. However, the 

tax notice forms, without more, do not overcome the presumption of Eunice’s good 

faith. Eunice was aware that Theresa was the owner of the Lot before she defaulted 

on the mortgage loan she received from Phyllis. Additionally, when Eunice inquired 

into why Theresa’s name was on the tax forms, she was told by the Dewey County 

Register of Deeds that all she needed to do was fill out various paperwork to 

formally remove Theresa from the notice forms.

[¶25.] Edward also asserts that the alteration of Eunice’s quit claim deed and 

the fraud upon the court, to add Marcus’s name to the deed, rebuts a presumption of 

good faith on the part of Eunice. However, there is no evidence that Eunice altered 

the deed or that it was done to bolster Eunice’s claim for adverse possession under 

SDCL 15-3-15. Further, the circuit court found that “there is no evidence that the 

copy of the deed submitted to the tribal court in 2018, with Marcus Hollow Horn’s 

name written in, existed at the time of execution of the deed” and there are no facts 

in the record to show that the alterations occurred at any time during the relevant 

ten-year timeframe. At trial, the Hollow Horns testified that they did not recall 

when or why Marcus wrote his name on the deed. Finally, the circuit court found 
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that their testimony was “credible [and] that they did not add Marcus’s name to 

commit a fraud upon the tribal court [in 2018].” “The trial court [was] in a better 

position to judge the credibility of witnesses . . .” and in the absence of evidence 

suggesting that Eunice acted in bad faith, the presumption of good faith has not 

been rebutted. Ducheneaux v. Miller, 488 N.W.2d 902, 916 (S.D. 1992).

[¶26.] In the end, Edward had the burden to show that Eunice did not obtain 

or possess the Lot in good faith. See Healy Ranch P’ship., 2022 S.D. 44, ¶ 63, 978 

N.W.2d at 784 (citation omitted). Edward has not presented any evidence to 

support a claim that Eunice purchased or possessed the Lot in bad faith. 

Furthermore, the evidence in the record overwhelmingly supports the court’s 

finding that Eunice possessed the Lot in good faith throughout the ten-year period. 

These facts, along with Edward’s inability to point to any facts suggesting Eunice 

came into or possessed the Lot in bad faith, lead us to conclude that Edward failed 

to overcome the presumption of Eunice’s good faith and that the circuit court 

properly granted a judgment quieting title to the Lot in favor of Eunice under SDCL 

15-3-15.

2. Out-of-court statements offered for non-hearsay 

purposes.

[¶27.] Edward argues that the court erred by admitting various out-of-court 

statements made by Theresa to Eunice while Theresa was a patient at IHS.7 

Additionally, Edward argues that Eunice improperly testified to out-of-court 

statements made by Oliver regarding his ownership interest in the Lot. More 

7. Edward’s brief does not individually analyze each out-of-court statement that 

he asserts should not have been admitted. Instead, he provides an extensive 

list of citations to the trial transcript.
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specifically, Edward asserts that these statements were only admissible under the 

exception for statements of a decedent under SDCL 19-19-804(b)(5) and that the 

circuit court was required to make findings before admitting each statement, 

including the fact that “the statement was made by decedent, and that it was in 

good faith, and on decedent’s personal knowledge.” Because these findings were not 

made by the court, Edward argues that each statement should have been precluded 

from admission. Furthermore, with respect to the statements made by Oliver, 

Edward argues that SDCL 19-19-804(b)(5) does not encompass his statements 

because he is not a party in the suit. See SDCL 19-19-804(b)(5).

[¶28.] In response, the Hollow Horns argue that the out-of-court statements 

identified in Edward’s brief are not hearsay because they were not offered to prove 

the truth of the matter asserted and were admitted for their effect on Eunice’s good 

faith belief that she was the owner of the Lot. Alternatively, the Hollow Horns 

suggest that any statements that were improperly admitted was harmless error 

because they were not “dispositive as to the circuit court’s determination of Eunice’s 

good faith in the matter[,]” and that Edward has failed to show how the admission 

of these statements unduly prejudiced his case.

[¶29.] A “trial court’s evidentiary rulings are presumed correct and will not 

be overturned absent a clear abuse of discretion. An abuse of discretion refers to a 

discretion exercised to an end or purpose not justified by, and clearly against reason 

and evidence.” St. John v. Peterson, 2011 S.D. 58, ¶ 10, 804 N.W.2d 71, 74 (quoting 

Mousseau v. Schwartz, 2008 S.D. 86, ¶ 10, 756 N.W.2d 345, 350). “An evidentiary 

ruling will not be overturned unless error is demonstrated and shown to be 
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prejudicial error.” Id. (quoting Novak v. McEldowney, 2002 S.D. 162, ¶ 7, 655

N.W.2d 909, 912). Although the ‘“admission of evidence in violation of a rule of 

evidence is an error of law that constitutes an abuse of discretion,’ admitting 

evidence on an incorrect ground will be affirmed if the evidence was admissible on a 

different ground.” Johnson v. O’Farrell, 2010 S.D. 68, ¶ 12, 787 N.W.2d 307, 312 

(citations omitted). This Court will affirm even when the proper grounds for 

admission were not raised by the parties at trial. Id. (citing Robeson v. State, 403

A.2d 1221, 1223 (Md. 1979)).

[¶30.] There is no dispute that the circuit court did not make any findings 

necessary to apply the exception for statements of a decedent in SDCL 19-19-

804(b)(5). Thus, the only remaining question is whether the statements were not 

offered for the truth of the matter asserted as claimed by the Hollow Horns. “To 

constitute hearsay, the statement must be an out-of-court assertion ‘offered in 

evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.’” State v. Whitfield, 2015 S.D. 

17, ¶ 13, 862 N.W.2d 133, 138 (quoting SDCL 19-16-1(3) (Rule 801(a)-(c))). “[A] 

statement is not hearsay if it is offered for a purpose other than to prove the truth of 

the matter asserted.” Id. (citing State v. Graham, 2012 S.D. 42, ¶ 28, 815 N.W.2d

293, 305). The circuit court has discretion to determine whether a particular 

statement is made for the truth of the matter asserted. However, the circuit court 

did not specifically consider whether each statement Edward objected to was offered 

for the truth of the matter asserted, nor did the court indicate any intention to limit 

the purpose of these statements as suggested by Eunice. A review of the offered 

statements made by Theresa and Oliver suggests that at least some of the 
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statements may have been offered for the truth of what Theresa or Oliver stated 

and may have been inadmissible hearsay.

[¶31.] However, even if it was error to admit these prior statements by 

Theresa and Oliver, the circuit court’s findings do not suggest that it relied upon 

any of these statements to find that Eunice acted in good faith during the relevant 

ten-year period. Furthermore, Edward has not identified how he was prejudiced by 

the admission of any statement he alleges was improperly admitted, and we are 

unable to find the same. From our review of the record, the statements made by 

Theresa and Oliver were not a critical component to the court’s finding of good faith 

and there was sufficient evidence outside of these statements to support the court’s 

conclusion that Eunice was a good faith possessor of the Lot throughout the tenyear timeframe required by SDCL 15-3-15. “Error is prejudicial if it most likely has 

had some effect on the verdict and harmed the substantial rights of the moving 

party.” Voorhees Cattle Co., LLP v. Dakota Feeding Co., LLC, 2015 S.D. 68, ¶ 17, 

868 N.W.2d 399, 408. The abundance of evidence outside of the potentially 

inadmissible testimony offered by Eunice, along with Edward’s inability to 

articulate how the statements’ admission in all probability affected the outcome of 

his case, do not lead us to a conclusion that any erroneous admission of the out-ofcourt statements was prejudicial.

3. Adverse possession claims by Eunice and Marcus.

[¶32.] After granting title to the Lot in favor of Eunice on her claim for 

adverse possession under SDCL 15-3-15, the circuit court also found in favor of the 

Hollow Horns’ alternative claim for adverse possession under SDCL 15-3-1. The 
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court then entered a judgment in favor of the Hollow Horns quieting title to the Lot 

in their names. However, by operation of law, title to the Lot had already vested in 

Eunice at the end of 2013, pursuant to SDCL 15-3-15, after she had continuously 

possessed and paid taxes on the property under color of title for a period of ten 

years.8 See Underhill, 2016 S.D. 69, ¶ 16, 886 N.W.2d at 354 (“[A]dverse possession 

occurs by operation of law and does not require an action to commence it, nor to 

continue it.”).

[¶33.] Because title had already vested to Eunice by the end of 2013, and 

before any joint claim for adverse possession had vested in the Hollow Horns, the 

circuit court’s confirmation of Eunice’s adverse possession claim under SDCL 15-3-

15, and our affirmance of that decision renders moot the Hollow Horns’ alternative 

claim for adverse possession under SDCL 15-3-1. See Netter v. Netter, 2019 S.D. 60, 

¶ 9, 935 N.W.2d 789, 791 (“[A] case is moot when ‘there has been a change of 

circumstances or the occurrence of an event by which the actual controversy ceases 

and it becomes impossible for the [court] to grant effectual relief.’”). Therefore, we 

decline to address the court’s entry of judgment on the Hollow Horns’ adverse 

possession claim under SDCL 15-3-1, vacate the portion of the circuit court’s 

judgment quieting title in favor of the Hollow Horns, and remand for the circuit 

8. In contrast, the Hollow Horns’ joint claim for adverse possession under the 

twenty-year statute in SDCL 15-3-1 could not have vested by 2013 based 

upon the circuit court’s uncontested finding that Theresa had “abandoned the 

property and no longer claimed ownership of the property in the mid-to-late 

1990s.” The court also found that Finley did not begin possessing the Lot and 

renting from Oliver until the “mid-to-late 1990s.” Thus, even if the Hollow 

Horns could tack their adverse possession claim with Finley and Oliver, the 

Hollow Horns’ adverse possession claim under SDCL 15-3-1 could not have 

vested prior to 2013.
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court to dismiss the Hollow Horns’ alternative claim for adverse possession. See Id.

¶ 10, 935 N.W.2d at 791 (When a claim has become moot, “the appropriate 

resolution is to vacate any ruling by the lower court and ‘remand with instructions 

to dismiss.’”).

Conclusion

[¶34.] We affirm the circuit court’s entry of judgment quieting title in favor of 

Eunice pursuant to SDCL 15-3-15. The alternative claim for adverse possession by 

Marcus and Eunice was rendered moot by the circuit court’s ruling on Eunice’s 

claim and we vacate the portion of the court’s judgement quieting title in favor of 

the Hollow Horns and remand for the circuit court to dismiss the Hollow Horns’ 

alternative claim for adverse possession under SDCL 15-3-1.

[¶35.] KERN, SALTER, DEVANEY, and MYREN, Justices, concur.