FOU RTH DIVI SI ON October 17, 2013

2013 I LApp (1st) 110334 No. 1-11-0334 In re A PPL I CATI ON OF THE ) Appea l from the PARK DI STRI CT OF LA GRANGE, ABO DY ) Circuit Court of POL I TI C AND CORPORATE ORGANI Z ED AND ) Cook County

. EXI STI NG UND ER THE LAWS OF THE STATE OF ) I L L I NOI S, TO SEL LA PARCELOF L AND L ESS ) THAN TH REE ACRES I N AREA, ) ) (The Par k District of L a Gr ang e, ) ) Petitioner-Appellee , ) ) v. ) No. 09 CH 09421 ) The L a Gr ang e F riends of the Parks, ) Honora ble ) Susan Fox Gill is, Respondent-Appe llant). ) J udg e Presiding

. PRES I DI NG JUS TI CE HOWSE delivered the judg ment of the c ourt, with opinion. J ustices McB ride a

nd Taylor conc urre d in the judgme nt and opinion.

OP INION ¶ 1 Gordon Park is a

n approximately

17-ac re pa

rk nea r the interse ction of L a Gr ang e Road and Og den Ave nue in L a Gr ang e, I llinois . On Marc h 3, 2009 petitioner the pa rk district of L a Gra ng e (Par k District) filed a

n application to the cir cuit court of Cook County under the Park Commi ssioners L and Sale Ac t (Act) ( 70 I L CS 1235/ 1 et seq . (West 2008)) to sell two parc els of land in Gordon Park. Re spondent the L a Gr ang e F riends of the Parks (Obje ctor) f iled an objection pursuant to the Ac t. Followinga trial on the a pplication, on October

8, 2010 the circ uit1-11-0334

court grante d the application. For the f ollowing r easons, we aff

irm. ¶ 2 BA CKGROUND ¶ 3 1. Procedur al History ¶ 4 The Park D istrict filed an a pplication for sa le of land unde r sec tion 1 of the Act (70 IL CS 1235/1 (West 2008)). The a pplication stated that the boa rd of c ommissi oners of

the Park District (B oard) deter

mined by resolution that proper

ty comprising2.82 acr es, commonly ref err ed to as Parce l 2 and Parc el 3 of Gor don Park in L a Gr ang e, I llinois (collec tively , Parce l 2 and Parc el 3

are ref err ed to as West Gordon Park) , are no longe r nee ded, nec essar y , or usef ul for the pur

poses of the Park D istrict and that the B oard f ound the sale of

the prope rty

to be in the public intere st. The B oard is not a pa

rty to these proc eeding s. The B oard’ s resolution states that the land wa s previously

used by the Park District for

various maintena

nce a ctivities that were transfe rre d to its main rec reation center

and off ices. ¶ 5 The Park D istrict stated it had neg otiated the sale of the land to Atlantic Rea lty Partners, Inc. (A RP), and that the sale w as conting ent on the trial c ourt’s appr oval of the sa le. ARP is not a par ty to these proc eeding s. The application lis ted re asons the par cels a re “ unnece ssary” and listed the benef

its of the sale of the land. The be nefits included a list of proposed uses of the proce eds of the sa le. The a pplication stated that in addition to the Boa rd’s leg islative deter mination in it s resolution makingfinding s of fa ct and a uthorizi ngthe sale of

the prope rty , the voters of

the par k district approve d the sale in a ref ere ndum in the November 4, 2008 g ener al elec tion. ¶ 6 In September 2007 the Park District had f iled a petition for sa le of land no long er ne eded
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for pa rk purpose s. The trial c ourt found that the Septembe r 2007 application encompassed a

vacated portion of Shawmut Avenue in L a Gr ang e (he reina fter va cate d Shawmut Avenue) that the park district owned

and which is a

ppurtena nt to the land at issue in this case. The inclusion of vac ated Shawmut Ave nue took the total amount of land e mbrac ed in the application above three acr es and, the ref

ore, the court lac ked jurisdiction under the Act. The Park District stated that in November

2008 it ex chang ed vac ated Shawmut Ave nue for land owned by

the Villag e of L a Gr ang e (V illage ) pursua nt to an ag ree ment for tra nsfer s of prope rty

by the Park District to the Villag e (e x chang e agree ment). The Par k District transfe rre d vaca ted Shawmut Avenue to the Villag e by

war ranty deed, a nd the Villag e bec ame sole owner be fore the Park District filed the Marc h 2009 application. The Villag e dedic ated va cate d Shawmut Avenue f or use a s a public rig ht of way

and grante d the Park District a temporar y ease ment to remove a

maintenanc e shed that encr oache s on vaca

ted Shawmut Avenue and to per form envir onmental testingand

reme diation. ¶ 7 The e x chang e agree ment contains a r ever ter c lause. The reve rter c lause a cknowledg es that pursuant to a villag e ordina nce va cate d Shawmut Avenue is to be c onstructed a s a public roadw ay owned by

the Villag e, and the Villag e’s tra nsfer proper ty is to be develope d as par t of a

renovated Gordon Par

k, “if the D evelope r [ARP ], bui lds a proposed r edeve lopment.” The

reve rter c lause provide s that the proper ties will rever

t to their orig inal owner s if ARP “has not (1) posted perf

ormanc e sec urity

with the Villag e in a f

orm satisfac tory

to the Villag e and ( 2)

commence d ear

thmoving ac tivity

for the Re development by Dec ember

31, 2009, or some later date c erta in to which the Park District a nd the Villag e may

ag ree in writing.” The Park D istrict
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and the Villag e agree d to ext end the time limit to J anuar y 31, 2010, and agree d to a sec ond extension t o Dec ember

31, 2010. Subsequently , the Park District a nd the Villag e executed a first amende d exchang e agree ment extending the time limit to December 31, 2012 and re moving the ref ere nce to ARP as the de veloper

. ¶ 8 On April 3, 2009 Objec tor filed an a ppear ance as objec tors to the application. ¶ 9 On J une 22, 2009, in sepa rate proce eding s not involved with thi s appea l, the circ uit court of Cook County

enter ed an or der f

inding that a

n auction of the proper

ty that was the subjec t of the September

2007 application (the land at issue her e) is void and without leg al ef fec t and enjoining the Park District and A RP from carr ying out a ny sale of the proper

ty . This court dismiss ed the a

ppeal of that judgme nt as moot beca use the Park D istrict is no longer attempting to sell the subject prope rty pursuant to the re fer endum. ¶ 10 On September

10, 2009 Objector

filed its response to the a pplication. On September 14, 2009, the trial cour

t permitted Objec tor to eng ag e in discover y . ¶ 11 On Marc h 31, 2010 the Park District a nd Objector

eac h filed a motion for summar y judgme nt. On April 26, 2010, Objec tor filed a motion to strike af fidavits attache d to the Park District’s motion for summary judgme nt, a motion to dis miss pursuant to section 2-619(a )(9) of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 I L CS 5/ 2-619(a )(9) (West 2010)), and a notice of c onstitut ional challeng e. Objec tor’s motion to dism iss argues the Ac t is unconstitut ional in that it viol ates the separ ation of powe rs clause of the I llinois Constitution. On J une 4, 2010, the tria l court ente red an orde r on the pa

rties’ c ross-motions for summary judgme nt and Objec tor’s motion to dism iss on constitutional grounds. The court made the followingfinding s: (1) the burde n of proof is on
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the Park District; (2) the Park District ha s the burden to pr ove its decision was not a rbitrar y and capr icious; (3) the Ac t is constitut ional; (4) the motion to dismi ss is denied; and (5) the cr ossmotions for summary

judgme nt are denied. ¶ 12 On J une 9, 2010, Objec tor filed a motion for a n order to cer tify a question pursua

nt to I llinois Supreme Court Rule 308 (I ll. S. C t. R. 308 (eff. F eb. 26, 2010)) . On J une 10, 2010 the trial court grante d the motion and order ed Objec tor to provide the c ourt with its comments on the proposed que stions contained in the cour t’s proposed or der. O n J une 29, 2010, the c ourt enter ed an orde r vac atingthe J une 10, 2010 orde r and de nying O bjector’ s motion t o cer tify question. The c ourt resc inded its earlier order and set the ma

tter for trial beg inning on July

23, 2010. ¶ 13 On J uly

20, 2010, Objector

filed a notice of motion for cla rifica tion. The motion states that its purpose is to obtain a statement of the r eleva nt law for this matter, the curr ent posture, and guidance on how the cour t intends to procee d in the are a of ( 1) the scope of authority g rante d to a par k district, (2) how statue s are to be construe d, and (3) constitutionalit y of these statutes. On J uly 26, 2010, the Park District filed its re sponse to Objector ’s motion for clar ification and on August 2, 2010, Objector r eplied. On August 27, 2010, the trial court e ntere d an orde r on Objector ’s motion to clarify . The c ourt found that (1) the Park District be ars the bur den of pr oof and shall pre sent its evidence first; and (2) the cour t shall apply

the ar bitrary and ca pricious standard. T he cour

t’s order set the matter f

or trial beg inning on Oc tober 5, 2010. ¶ 14 On September

23, 2010, the Park District filed a motion for leave to file an amended application under

the Act. The motion st ated that the B oard’ s resolution determined that it was in the public interest to sell the land pursua nt to the terms of a sa les contra ct in place with ARP,
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but that due to chang es in rea l estate va lues, the B oard de termined to modify the terms of sa le. The B oard a dopted a ne w re solution t o modify the terms to sell Parce l 2 and Parc el 3 for $2,985,000 or the avera g e of thre e valuations of the proper ty from thre e diffe rent Membe r of the Appra isal Institut e (MAI ) appr aisals and in-kind ser vices re lated to the sale of the prope rty and/or the improvement a

nd development of

Gordon Park, to be ag ree d upon and ac cepte d by the Boa rd. The Par

k District soug ht to amend the application to specifically state the modified ter

ms of the propose d sale. The Boa rd’s sec ond resolution “re -adopts the f indings of f

act c ontained in [t he first re solution,] and make s the leg islative determination that said finding s of fa ct support the adoption of the minimum terms of sale se t forth in *** this Resolut ion.” The r esolution also specific ally

found that “It is the leg islative determination of the Boa rd *** that the sale of the Property *** will be for the public inter est” a nd “ther e is a rational relationship betwee n the proposed sa le *** and the g ener ation of re venue to support the pr oposed improvements for Gordon Park de scribed in [the orig inal resolution].” ¶ 15 On Octobe r 5, 2010, Objec tor moved to dismiss t he ame nded applica tion. The motion to dismiss argued that the Par k District was see king to se ll more than three acr es bec ause va cate d Shawmut Avenue is involved in and ne cessa ry to the transac tion to sell P arc el 2 and Par cel 3. On Octobe r 5, 2010, the trial c ourt enter ed an or der on O bjector’ s motion t o dismiss . The c ourt found that “the land which [the Park District] is applying to se ll under its amended a pplication is less than 3 ac res.” The c ourt found that it has jurisdiction over the a mended a pplication and denied the motion to dismiss . The same day the cour t entere d a sepa

rate order g rantingthe Park District’s motion for leave to file an amended a pplication and grante d the Park District lea ve to
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file the amended a

pplication instanter
. ¶ 16 On Octobe r 8, 2010, followinga trial, the tria l court ente red a written orde r authorizing the Park District to sell all or pa rt of 2.88 ac res of

land commonly

known as Parc els 2 and 3 in Gordon Park at a price to be established by calc ulating the aver ag e of thre e MAI appra isals. On November

8, 2010 Objector

filed a posttrial motion to vacate judg ment. On Dec ember 22, 2010, the Park District filed a

response to Objector’ s posttrial moti on, and on January 18, 2011, Objector filed a r eply . On J anuar

y 20, 2011, the trial cour

t denied Objec tor’s posttrial motion with prejudice . In the same or der, the court grante d the Park District’s motion to strike an

answe r and obje ction to the Park District’s amended a pplication, which Objec tor filed af ter the court e ntere d the judg ment. ¶ 17 On J anuar

y 25, 2011, Objector

filed a notice of appe al. The notice of appe al spec ified the followingorder s: (1) the June 4, 2010 finding that the Act is constitutional, and the ar bitrary and capr icious standard a

pplies, and deny

ing O bjector’ s motion for summary judgme nt; (2) the June 29, 2010 order

reve rsingthe J une 10, 2010 orde r g rantinginterlocutory appea l; (3) the August 27, 2010 order

denying O bjector’ s motion t o clar ify ; (4) the Oc tober 8, 2010, judg ment authorizing the sa le of the la nd; and (5) the J anuar

y 20, 2011 order

denying O bjector’ s posttrial motion to vacate

. 1 ¶ 18 2. Evidence at Trial ¶ 19 The pa

rties adduc ed the f

ollowing e vidence at the trial on the Par k District’s application
Also on J anuar

y 25, 2011, Object o r fi l ed a motion to stay the judgme nt pending appea l 1 without bond pursuant to I llinois Supreme Court Rule 305 (I ll. S. Ct. R. 305 (ef f. J uly 1, 2004)). On J anuar y 28, 2011, the trial cour

t denied the motion.

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pertinent to the re solution of this appea l. ¶ 20 A. Park District ¶ 21 Don Robertson, a me mber of the board of the Amer ican Youth Socc er O rg anization (AYSO) te stified he plans whic h players play on which fie lds in L a Gr ang e base d on play er a g e and the size of the f

ield. AYSO forme rly

play ed g ames in the a

rea of the pa rk occ upying the northwest cor

ner–which is included in the land at issue in this case–but stopped. He stopped using West Gordon Par

k beca use the land slopes to the e ast, there is a tree in the are a that collects be es, pre sentinga proble m for the young er soc cer play ers who use d that portion of the park. The most severe problem for the youngand inexperienc ed socc er pla y ers who pla

y ed ther e was the se vere slope of the pr operty . The a rea s in the easter

n portion of Gordon Par

k could

acc ommodate a f

ield for young er pla

y ers, who make up the major ity of childre n in his progr am. Robertson testified he doe s not use the “main” portion of Gordon Par k–which is not included in the proposed sa le and is at times re fer red to a s East Gordon Par k–beca use it holds water, which might re sult in t he ca

ncellation of g ames. The easte rn portion of Gor don Park will not

acc ommodate full-sized socce r field. He testified that havinga full-sized socce r field at Gordon Park would bene fit his prog ram. Rober tson testified the west ar ea c ould be used for other

rec reational activities. ¶ 22 Thomas Cushing, pr esident of the L a Gr ang e L ittle L eague, testified Gor don East was used for ladies’ softba ll within t he past year on a re duced ba sis. I n April 2009 18 of the f irst 24 ladies’ softba ll games schedule d at Gordon Par k wer e ra ined out on the same nights ga mes wer e beingplay ed at other

parks in the a

rea . The south base ball fields re tain water and would be
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unplay able f

or up to five da

y s after a ra in. In 2010 Cushing pulled one boy s’ base ball league’s g ames fr om Gordon East, a s well as 96 out of 125 ladie s’ softball g ames. Gor don Park has no perma nent bleac hers, no pe rmane nt bathroom, and no c oncession stand. Cushingdoes not know what is ca using the south fields in Gordon East to g ather water
. ¶ 23 J im Far

nan, who wa s president of the L a Gr ang e L ittle L eague in 2007 and 2008, testified the fields in East Gor don Park we re unr eliable be cause they would flood afte r ra in. Other fie lds would be bac k in use two or thre e day s after rain, but Gordon Par

k would still be shut down, resultingin canc elling or

resc hedulingg ames. The fields have very littl e shade and some tea ms’ manag ers br oug ht tarps to cover dug outs to provide shade. The parkinglots are a long distanc e from the ba ll fields, and there is no running w ater and no wa

ter founta ins. Far

nan agree d West Gordon Park c ould be used for various re cre ational ac tiviti es like F risbee or bocce ball. His children did not use the pla yg round in West Gordon Park bec ause it wa s out of sight of the ball fields. Fa rnan te stified rain-outs ha ppen ofte n in Gordon East a nd more fr equently

than at other parks. He first noticed proble ms with the fields in Gordon Park in 2006. ¶ 24 Kate G ronan ha s worked a s a marke ting c onsultant for the Park D istrict, workingwith it to draft ne ws rele ases a

nd to prepa

re infor mation about the proposed sa le. Grona n founded a political action committee (PAC) to enc ourag e citizens to vote in favor of the re fer endum to sell the land in Gordon Par

k. That PAC’s primary

source of funds wa s private c ontributions by ARP. Grona n has lived in L a Gr ang e for 19 y ear s and testified that West Gordon Park w as “not that usual a plac e to g o.” She primar ily went to Gordon Par

k for spe cific e vents. Be tween 1997 a nd 1998 Grona

n arr ang ed play

g roups at loca l playg rounds but never used West Gordon Park, but in
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the ar ea in whic h she lives, Gordon Par k would not be a “ natura l destination.” Grona n has attended c ommunity

events in the e astern por

tion of the park. ¶ 25 Richard Aa

ronson is the preside nt of ARP. ARP was sele cted through a compe titive bid proce ss to develop a mixed use community at the cor ner of L a Gr ang e Road a

nd Og den in L a Gra ng e. ARP’s orig inal bid was to purcha se only the forme r YMCA site, which is adja cent a nd to the south of the Park District’s pr operty in West Gordon Park. But discussions with the Villag e lea d to the incorporation of “surplus prope rty” belong ing to the Par k District. The Park District informed ARP what “ surplus proper ty ” it had at the site of

the proposed de velopment, and the pa

rties enter ed a pur chase ag ree ment in 2006 for a pur chase price of $4.5 million dol lars and ser vices re lated to the re novation of the e astern por tion of Gordon Park. A aronson testified ARP would be purcha sing Par cel 2 a nd Parce l 3 and not vaca

ted Shawmut Avenue

. ¶ 26 ARP never c ompleted the purc hase. A aronson testified A RP l ater made a revised proposal for

$2,985,000 and ser

vices re lated to the re development of the ea stern portion of Gordon Park. A RP never re ache d a fina l ag ree ment with the Park District to purcha se the subjec t proper ty and has no bindingag ree ment to build the proposed deve lopment. ARP i s still interested in buy

ing the proper

ty , if the Park District c an sell it. ¶ 27 Br adley

Be lcaster is a member of

the B oard. Par cel 2 c ontains an unused maintena nce shed and a

small play

are a. The rest of Par cel 2 is pave d are a. Parc el 3 consists of tree s, g rass, and a sma ll ga zebo, and two tennis courts. The ag ree d to price of $4,555,866 included coordinating with ARP’s deve lopment work to bringutilit ies into Gordon Park and reeng ineer ing the park f

or storm wate r dra inag e. Coordinatingthe work in this manner would
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result in saving s to the Park District from having to c omplete that work inde pendently . The Park District was una

ble to complete the sa le bec ause it wa s unable to deliver title. The Boa

rd

rec eived ARP’s re vised proposal by letter da ted Octobe r 14, 2009. The B oard a g ree d to acc ept the re vised proposal a fter disc ussing issues re g arding ear nest money

and the e numeration of the additional service s. Be lcaster testified the zoning f

or ARP’s projec t had expired. The Par k District has had no discussions with ARP since Octobe r 2009. ¶ 28 Robert Metzge r testified that he was a Park District commissioner in L a Gr ang e for eig ht y ear s, endingin J une 2010. The Park District had discussions as to why to sell the subject proper ty . When the decision wa s made, Parc el 2 was mostly consumed by

a vac ant maintenanc e fac ility . The Park D istrict had purc hased a rec reation center

and one- third of that new f acility was used a s a larg er ma intenance fac ility . Metzge r desc ribed Parc el 3 as “ not part of the *** main part of the park.” Duringsocce r sea son Parce l 3 was used a s a ver y small soccer

field for very small children. The playg round wa s “cha lleng ing” beca use it was out of sig ht. The Park District discussed whe ther Parc el 2 and Par cel 3 we re use ful and ne cessa ry . Metzge r testified Parce l 2 “was a

n easy one bec ause of

the fa ct that the maintena nce f acility sat on there and clea rly that no longe r wa s *** there.” As to Parce l 3, Metzger testified, it “was r eally

not very useful for any particula r bene fit.” Parc el 3 had no sig nificant use othe r than a s a socc er f ield, but there is a playg round on Parc el 3. The la st tim e Metzg er w as on Parc el 3, a year befor e his testimony , the playg round wa s surrounded by a fe nce be cause it was in disrepair. T he Park District did not attempt to repair it bec ause it wa s attempting to sell that land. Also, maintena nce of the subjec t property

“wa s more cha lleng ing be cause of the a cce ss to it and the ability to
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maintain it at the same leve l that we have the re st of the par ks.” ¶ 29 Metzge r testified that the pr imary rea son for the de cision to sell Parcel 3 wa s that it provided ve ry

limit ed utility

beca use it was not used for

active pr og rammingand “w as not used very much for ina ctive programming .” The sale of Par cel 3 would not re sult in any reduc tion to the Park District’s pr og rams and w ould benef it the rest of Gor don Park bec ause pr ocee ds of the sale we re to be used to rede sign a nd rede velop the re st of the par k. There was a

plan to rede velop the re mainder of the par k, but the Park District lac ked the f unds to do them without t he sale. Metzg er a g ree d Parce l 3 could be used to “ toss the ball around” and ac tiviti es one c ould do other than or g anized sports. ¶ 30 Metzge r also testified that the pr operty the Park District re ceive d under the exchang e ag ree ment was primar ily

used for parkingat the par

k even be fore the exchang e, but the Park District did not own the proper ty . Metzge r testified that a s far as he kne w the YMCA has pulled out of the projec t. I f the maintena nce buildingon Parce l 2 were remove d the land could be returne d to parkland at a cost. A c ost of $40,000 to return Par cel 2 to usable parkla nd would be a “pre tty g ood deal” but not necessa rily the optimal use of those funds or the optimal use of the land. He te stified there is a tremendous ne ed for active r ecr eation spac e in L a Gr ang e. ¶ 31 Constantine Bissias is the Park District’s e x ecutive dir ector . He wa s formerly park fore man and in that ca

pacity was in cha

rg e of e quipment and cr ews. The cre ws could not mow Parce l 3 on rainy

day s beca

use of the slope of the land a nd due to fe nces on the north and south sides. He a lso testified that the ball fields on the e ast side of Gor don Park have a proble m holding water. B issias was involved in the purc hase of the new r ecr eation ce nter. The Park
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District issued a bond to purc hase a nd renovate the prope rty

but had to use ca

pitol funds to complete the building . The B oard pla nned to use proc eeds f

rom the sale of

the maintenanc e fac ility on Parce l 2 to replenish ca pitol funds. The Park District held no r ecr eation programs on Parce l 2 or Parce l 3, but holds hundreds of re cre ation sessions annually . In the past two y ear s, two festivals have occur

red in Gor don Park, duringwhich the f lat portion of West Gordon Park was only used for overf low parking

. ¶ 32 The B oard discusse d whether Parce l 2 and Parc el 3 wer e usef ul and nec essar

y and conclude d they

wer e not bec ause of

their location, lack of use, pr oblems with maintenance , beca use the play

g round had be en vanda liz ed and the cost of re pair wa s esca lating, a nd the fa ct the prope rty

was hidden. The play

g round is behind the maintena nce she d. A picnic pavilion si ts on the prope rty . In the last five year s only “a c ouple” of

permits have be en issued to use the pavilion. ¶ 33 The Park D istrict held public meeting s to obtain public input as to what improvements it would like to see to Gordon Par k. Planned improvements to the ea st side of Gordon Par k include a full-sized socce r and f

ootball field, turningtwo rema ining softba ll fields to util ize a conce ssion stand are a, a c oncession stand with bathroom, a splash pad, skate spot, passive are a, band she lter, lighted paths with ex erc ise stations, a sled hill, and butterfly g arde n. The plan a lso involved addingdraina g e to solve the water proble m. The cost of the planned r enovations excee d $5 milli on. The Park D istrict planned to use a combination of g rants and its ca pitol fund to pay

for the re novation, and as f

unds beca me ava ilable. B issias testified that the renovations would make Gordon Park mor e usable for a ctivity in passive ar eas a

nd improve vehic ular a cce ss. The we st
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side of Gor don Park is within walking distanc e of r esidents of two multiple-story buildings adjac ent to the prope rty

and anothe r re sidential are a. ¶ 34 Prior to Bissias bec oming supe rintendent, the Par k District spent $90,000 on a dra inag e sy stem and $75,000 to renovate the fie lds at Gordon Park. The re ha s never been a n investigation into fix ing the draina g e sy stem curr ently in place. Under the exchang e agree ment, the Park District incre ased its land and c ould add an a dditional parkinglot at Gordon Park if ne cessa ry . The Park D istrict has alre ady reque sted bids for the f

irst phase of r enovations in the ea stern portion of Gordon Par

k but does not have the funds to complete the pr oject. The Park District has re ceive d a g rant to pay for some of

those renovations. ¶ 35 J eff

rey Br aun owns the a

rchitec ture fir

m Cody Br aun and A ssociates (Cody ). Cody evaluated Parc el 2 and Par cel 3. Portions of Parc el 3 have a 4% to 7% slope . The we stern portion of the par

k is hidden from the main portion. Gor don Park is in a “bowl” and the lowe st part of the bowl is the cente r of the c urre nt ball field configuration. The f our existi ngball diamonds overlap, ma

king it diffic ult to have simultaneous g ames. The park ha s no pathway sy stem or re strooms. Bra un stated the pa

rk is curr ently

under- utiliz ed. Cody

cre ated a plan to rede sign G ordon Park that include s a larg e passive a rea , and to addr ess the re cre ational nee ds of seniors and pr ovide ar eas f or childre n--includinga play are a and skate spot. The plan include s
cre atinga sled hill likely

to have a 20% slope. The new de sign w ould have storm sew ers a round the per imeter, ra

ther than the exis ting storm sew er down the ce nter. ¶ 36 Ply

mouth Pl ace is a hig h rise building at the west end of Parce l 3. Nothing in the rede sign w ould preve nt pedestrians f rom the buildings on the w est end of Par cel 3 f rom enter ing
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the par k by foot. The c urre nt plan calls for reta ining one of the four

tennis courts cur

rently in Gordon Park, but ther e have been disc ussions about havingtwo tennis courts. The pa ssive are as in the rede signe d park w ould not accommodate “pick up” g ames of f ootball or baseba ll or socce r, but they would acc ommodate Fr isbee or othe r nonorg anized sporting a ctivities. Bra un testified the weste rn ar ea is not conduc ive to active spor ts but admitt ed the a

rea could be use d to play

pick up g ames, horse shoes, or boc ce ba ll. Under the A RP proposal, an are a that is curr ently only used for pa rkingwould become a through street. He agree d it is m ore e x pensive to desig n a par k with

more a ctive spac e than pa ssive space

. ¶ 37 Timothy

Kelpas w as a Par

k District commissioner in 2005 and 2009, and ha s volunteere d extensively

in L a Gr ang e. He has cha ired the Par k District Senior Innovation Task F orce committee and r ecr eation committee. Par cel 2 a nd Parce l 3 are discontinuous with the main portion of Gordon Par

k. I ts visibi lity

is “extremely

obstructed.” Kelpas te stified that the basis of the Park District’s discussions on whe ther Parc el 2 and Par cel 3 we re use ful or nec essar y was that “ther e wa s an under

utiliz ed piec e of *** pr operty that could be utilized in order to serve the needs of the taxpay ers a

nd Park District ** to incre ase its level of service .” The re is on Parc el 2 a fe nced in stora g e yard “ filled with *** junk.” The Par k District runs no programs on Parc el 2 or Parc el 3 except socc er g ames for very y oungplay ers. Ke lpas testified that the sale of the proper ty would not result in any

decr ease in prog rams or a ctivities. The Park District ne eds the money from the sa le of Parc el 2 and Par cel 3 f or the Gor don Park re development plan to be executed. Ke lpas once called police reg ardingpersons drinkingfrom two keg s of bee r in the park. Police dr ove into the par k from the e astern most edg e of West Gordon Par k and drove
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down the slope in West Gordon Park. ¶ 38 B. O bjector ¶ 39 Edwar d Kram testified he is the mana g er f or the F riends of the Park. He jogs in Gor don Park. Kra

m had see n org anized y outh socce r in West Gordon Park within the last y ear to two y ear s. I t was not AYSO socc er. The YMCA utiliz ed West Gordon Park f or its day camp a nd Kram observed the day

camp se tting up picnic supplies a nd children on the playg round. Kra m play ed tennis in Gordon Par k as a youth but has not play ed ther e re cently beca use the c ourts are “in terr ible disrepair .” He testified the par k had made no improvements and the c ourts have deter iorated since 2007. I f the buildingon Parce l 2 were remove d it would be possible to do some sleddingin that are a. ¶ 40 Roy

Cinqueg rani is the g ener al manag er of Haltz Const ruction, which is in the business of demolition and restora tion. He testified the c ost of removingthe metal structur e on Parc el 2, the conc rete benea

th the metal building, a

nd the brick buildingwould total $31,857. He testified he would be w illing to take the building s down for the Park District for that price

. ¶ 41 Cheryl Ciecko-Goe thals was a Par k District commissioner from 2000 to 2004. During her te nure the ball fields at Gor don Park we re highly used. ¶ 42 Steven B latz testi fied for Objector . He is a pr ofessional landsc aper and testified that the slopes in West Gordon Park are more diff icult to mow. He also testified that “ if you train your people c orre ctly , they

are no more diff

icult than the ea st end of Gor don Park if they know what they ’re doing.” Blatz di d not state that it would take the same amount of time to mow flat land than land with a slope like in West Gordon Park, but sa id it would be “close.”
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¶ 43 The trial c ourt made a n oral findingthat the Park District sustained its burde n of proof and ente red a

written orde r g rantingthe application. ¶ 44 ANALYSI S ¶ 45 Objector

asser ts, as “pre liminary

matters” that the Park District has no inher ent power s beca use it is a non-home-r

ule g overnme nt entity

and, ther efor e, only

has the powe rs deleg ated to it by the leg islature. Objec tor argues that the Ac t does not g ive the Park D istrict the authority to deter mine whether

the sale of

park la nd is in the public interest, there fore the Park District’s resolution, findingthat the sale of the land is in the public interest, is void. We disag ree . ¶ 46 Every

park district ha s the power to “pass all nec essar

y ordinanc es, rules a

nd regulations for the pr oper ma

nag ement and c onduct of the business of the boar d and district and to esta blish by ordinanc e all nee dful rules a nd reg ulations for the g overnme nt and protec tion of parks, boulevar ds and drivew ay s and other pr operty under its jurisdiction, and to eff ect the obje cts for which such districts ar e for med.” 70 I L CS 1205/ 8-1(d) (West 2008). The que stion, however, is what is the leg al ef

fec t of the re solution as it pertains to an application under the Act. ¶ 47 Objector

also argues the Ac t does not g ive the Park D istrict authority to sell park land, but only the power

to reque st leave to sell par k land. Objec tor argues the Park D istrict does not have authority to sell the land bec ause ( 1) under the re fer endum proc edure , the public dec ides whethe r to sell park land, a

nd (2) unde r the a

pplication proce dure, the court de cides whe ther to sell par k land. We find this argument inapposite bec ause the Park District does have the a uthority under the Act to apply

for lea ve to sell the par

k land at issue and, f

or the re asons that follow, the trial court prope rly

g rante d the application to sell t he land.
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¶ 48 1. Trial Court’s Jurisdi ction ¶ 49 “We re view de novo whether a trial c ourt’s orde r fa lls withi n the authority the leg islature has g rante d.” In re Keri B. , 327 I ll. App. 3d 1068, 1070 (2002). Objec tor argues that the contra ct to sell Parce l 2 and Parc el 3, tog ether with the exchang e agree ment reg ardingvacated Shawmut Avenue, “ is one transa ction involving all thre e par cels” and, ther efor e, the “applica tion” is to sell more than three acr es, and the trial court is without jurisdiction. Objector argues that transf

er of any one of the parc els is continge nt upon the transfe r of a ll. Accor ding to Objector , the Act doe s not permit dividing par k land into smaller par cels a nd selling the m to separ ate pa

rties. The Par

k District responds va cate d Shawmut Avenue is not par t of the ame nded application. Va cate d Shawmut Avenue c ould not be part of the amende d application bec ause the Park District does not own it. The Par k District argues that the fa ct the ARP contrac t and the

reve rter c lause in the e x chang e agree ment are both tied to the sale of Par cel 2 a nd Parce l 3 does not make vac ated Shawmut Ave nue par t of the cur

rent a pplication to sell Parcel 2 a nd Parce l 3. ¶ 50 We do not ag ree with Objector that the exchang e agree ment and application for sale evince a sing le transa ction. The purpose of the a pplication is to decide whe ther the Par k District may sell Parce l 2 and/or Parc el 3. The tria l court’s orde r would only decide the Park District’s ability to sell those parc els. Any order will not, of its own authority , result in a tra nsfer of

vacated Shawmut Avenue . The fa ct that the deve lopment, or failure to develop, Parc el 2 and Parce l 3 is a fac t that may or may not trigg er a

n event in a se parate transa ction does not bring

vacated Shawmut Avenue within the scope of the application. ¶ 51 Objector ’s ar gument does implicitly raise a question of statutory

construction. The
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question prese nted is whether the Act pe rmits a park district to sell or tra nsfer parc els of prope rty in one “pa

rk” in sepa

rate transac tions. The construction of a statute is a question of law that is revie wed de novo

. Hall v. Henn , 208 I ll. 2d 325, 330 (2003) (“ courts should consider the statute in its entirety , keepingin mind the subject it addresses a nd the leg islature’s a

ppare nt objective in

enac ting it. [Ci tation.] The be st indication of leg islative intent is the statutory languag e, g iven its plain and ordinary

meaning .”). We find the A ct does pe rmit transfer s of par cels within one “par k” in sepa rate transac tions. ¶ 52 The Ac t provides, in pertinent pa rt, as follows: “Any board of park c ommissi oners having the control or supervision of any

public park *** a

nd havingany pieceor parcel of land not excee ding 3 a cre s in area , which shall no long er be neede d or dee med nec essar y or usef ul for the pur

pose of sa id park *** may apply to the Circuit Court of the county in which such pieceor parcel

of land is situated, by

petition in writing for

leave to sell the same. *** Af

ter he aringall persons intere sted, if said court shall dee m the g rantingof said application to be for the public interest, it shall direct that the pr operty mentioned in said application, or any part thereof , be sold and c onveyed by the said board of park c ommissi oners f

or the use of

said park, boule vard, drivewa y or hig hway , upon such terms a nd conditions as the said court may think proper.” (Emphase s added.) 70 I L CS 1235/ 1

191-11-0334 (West 2008).

¶ 53 The Ac t provides for the sale of “ any piece or par cel” within a public park. N othing in the languag e of the Act prohibits a par k district from multiple transactions or makingmultipl e applications with respe ct to land within a sing le par k. The languag e of the statute direc tly ref utes Objector ’s ar gument that the Act doe s not permit dividing par k land into smaller par cels a nd selling the m to separa

te par ties. The Ac t expressly

permits an application to sell any piece of land that does not excee d three acr es. Even upon a pplication to sell a piece of land, the tria l court ha s the authority

to authorize the sale of

only “any part” of the piec e of la

nd descr ibed in the application. Objector ha s provided no author ity to support its i mplicit conclusion that the leg islature intended to limit a park district’s a uthority under the Act by

examining eve ry transac tion with respect to a sing le par k in the ag g reg ate to dete rmine if the tria l court has jurisdiction over a pe nding a pplication. The Ac t contains no limit ation on the fre quency or number of a

pplications a par

k district may

file, and the plain languag e of the Act demonstrates the leg islature’s intent that sepa rate transac tions may

arise w ith reg ard to a

single public park. ¶ 54 The Park D istrict exercised a va lid ex chang e of va cate d Shawmut Avenue w ith the Villag e. The n, in a sepa

rate transac tion, the Park District applied to the c ircuit court to sell Parce l 2 and Parc el 3 under the Act. The re is no g enuine dispute that Parc el 2 and Par cel 3 do not exceed thre e ac res. The re is nothingin the Act to sug g est the leg islature did not intend to permit just this ty

pe of se ries of tra

nsactions. Objec tor ca lls the Park District’s conduc t the ty pe of subterf ug e mea nt to circumvent the r equire ments of the statute that our supr eme c ourt reje cted
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in In re Pe tition of

the Village of Kildeer to Annex Certain Territory , 124 I ll. 2d 533, 547 (1988). In re Pe tition of

the Village of Kildeer

is disti nguishable and its re asoningcommands a diff ere nt result in this case. ¶ 55 In In re Pe tition of the Village of Kildeer , our supre me cour t wrote that “ [i ]tis ax iomatic that a par ty cannot c ircumvent the pur pose of the statute by

doing indire ctly

what he c annot do direc tly .” In re Pe tition of the Village of Kildeer , 124 I ll. 2d at 547. There , the issue of statutory interpre tation was whe ther sec tion 7-1-2 of the Municipa l Code (I ll. Rev. St at. 1985, ch. 24, ¶ 7- 1-2) “ permits a municipality to car ve out a pa

rce l of land of less than 10 a cre s from a tra ct of land g reater than 10 a cre s.” Section 7-1- 2 provided, in per tinent part, as f

ollows: “no tract of

land in excess of 10 ac res in ar ea ma y be included in the or dinance s of a municipality initiating the proce eding s.” I ll. Rev. St at. 1985, ch. 24, ¶ 7-1-2. The Villag e of K ildeer pe titioned to annex parc els of land of

less than 10 ac res unde r 3 sepa rate petitions, but each 10-a cre trac t was “c arve d out of trac ts of land in excess of 10 ac res.” In re Pe tition of the Village of Kildeer , 124 I ll. 2d at 545-46. Our supr eme c ourt held that the statute “ prohibits a municipality from ca rvinga par cel of less than 10 a cre s from a tra ct g reater than 10 a cre s.” Id . at 547. B eca use the ordina

nces at issue wer e an attempt at annexation from a tra ct g reater than 10 a cre s the ordinanc es we re invalid. Id

. ¶ 56 Howeve r, the languag e of se ction 7-1-2 of the Municipal Code in In re Pe tition of the Village of Kil deer

and the languag e of the Act at issue in this case differ on the ver

y point of depar ture for our supre me cour

t’s findingthe Villag e of K ildeer’ s ordinance s to be invalid. Our supreme c ourt found that under the Municipal Code, the a nnexation ordinance c ould not redef ine
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the size of the par cel to be a nnexed. “The loc ation and the bounda ries of the trac t which the municipality

seeks to anne x must be determined by a sourc e indepe ndent of the a nnexation ordinanc e itself. The ordinanc e ca n only attempt to annex an alre ady exis ting tra ct of land. The ordinanc e does not c reate a tra ct of land.” In re Pe tition of the Village of Kildeer , 124 I ll. 2d at 547. This is because the leg islature “spe cifica lly used the singular for

m of the word ‘ trac t’ and the plural for

m of the word ‘ ordinanc e.’ The ref ore, the leg islature cle arly intended that a municipality

may not annex a trac t of land which e x cee ds 10 acr es, no matter how many ordinanc es it adopts to annex that tract of land.” (Emphasis omitted.) Id . at 546-47. ¶ 57 Our supre me cour t interprete d the re levant lang uag e of the Municipal Code, not

nece ssarily

as a limitation on the siz e of the annexation, but a limit ation on the size of the par cel to which the Municipal Code e x tended. In re Pe tition of the Village of Kildeer , 124 I ll. 2d at 547 (“se rious prac tical difficulties would re sult if a municipality wer e allowe d to annex less than 10

acr es out of a tr act greater than 10 a cre s”). In this case, the A ct does not conta in a similar restric tion. Under the A ct, the B oard ma y petition for leave to sell “any piece or par cel of

land not exceedingthree acr es” in “ any public park.” 70 I L CS 1235/ 1 (West 2008). Thus, under the plain languag e of the Act, since the B oard ma y petition to sell “any” par cel unde r three acr es, as opposed to “a

parc el” unde r three acr es, it is clear that the leg islature intended to a llow the Park District to apply

to sell more than one pa

rce l of less than three acr es in one pa rk. Thus, there is no violation in enteringmultipl e tra nsactions to sell parc els of less than thre e ac res unde r In re Petition of the Village of K ildeer

. ¶ 58 Moreove r, In re Pe tition of the Village of Kildeer

is further distinguishable bec ause in
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that case the cour

t found that the ordinanc es indirec tly violated the statutory

scheme under the Municipal Code. The V illage of Kildee r passe d three ordinanc es under a sing le statute specific ally

for the pur

pose of c ircumventingits li mitations. In re Pe tition of the Village of Kildeer , 124 I ll. 2d at 542. The same c annot be sa id here beca use the tra

nsfer of vac ated Shawmut Avenue did not occ ur under the Act. The Park District did not sell vacated Shawmut Avenue . There fore , we c annot find an attempt to circumvent any statutory scheme that the sale of more tha

n 3 acr es of pa

rk land must be subjec t to refe rendum. ¶ 59 We find that the Boa rd’s a pplication expressly

soug ht leave to se ll a parc el of land le ss than 3 ac res a

nd further find that no dec ision on the application would result in transfe rringmore than 3 ac res of

park la nd to anyone. Ac cording ly , we f ind the trial court ha d jurisdiction to hear the application. ¶ 60 2. Constitutionality of the Ac t ¶ 61 “[T] he author ity

to determine public inter est is vested in the leg islature and c annot permissibly

be dele g ated to the judiciar y .” Fields Jee

p-Eagle, I

nc. v. Chrysle r Corp. , 163 I ll. 2d 462, 478-79 (1995) . Objector argues the Ac t violates the separ ation of powe rs clause of the I llinois Constit ution of 1970 beca use it require s the circ uit court to make a leg islative deter mination of the public interest.

“[W ]hen assessing the constitutional validity of a le g islative act, we must beg in with the presumption of its constitut ionality

. [C itation.] The burde n of re butting this presumption is on the party challeng ing the validity

of the statute a

nd any doubts must be
231-11-0334 resolved in f avor of findingthe law va lid. [ Citation.] This burden is particular ly

heavy wher e, as he re, a

fac ial challeng e is raise d. A fac ial challeng e to a leg islative act is the most difficult cha lleng e to mount successfully

beca use the c halleng er must establish that under no c ircumstance s would the cha lleng ed ac t be valid. [C itation.] The fa ct that the statute mig ht operate unconstitutionally

under some c onceiva

ble set of c ircumstance s is insufficient to re nder it wholly invalid. As we [have] said *** fac ial invalidation is, manifestly , strongmedicine that ha s been employ ed by

the cour t sparing ly

and only as a la st resort.” (Interna l quotation marks omitted.) Hope Clinic for W omen, Ltd. v. Flores , 2013 I L112673, ¶ 33. ¶ 62 In Fields Jee

p-Eagle, I

nc. , our supre me cour

t found that “through *** the [Motor Vehicle Fr anchise ] Act [ Fr anchise Act], the Gene ral Asse mbly has impermissibly

deleg ated f

or judicial examination matters which ar e for leg islative or administrative dete rmination.” Fields Jee p-Eagle, I

nc. v. Chrysle r Corp. , 163 I ll. 2d at 479. The F ranc hise Act oblig ated the tr ial court to determine if the re is g ood cause for pe rmitting the e stablishment of a motor vehicle fra nchise. Id . at 465. In deter

mining whe ther g ood cause had bee n established, the c ourt was r equire d to consider “ ‘all per

tinent circumstanc es,’ ” which may include but ar e not limited to eleven

enumer ated “ g ood cause ” fa ctors, includingwhether the proposed de aler ship establishment or reloc ation would be in the public intere st and welfa re. Id . at 465 (quoting815 I L CS 710/ 12(c)
241-11-0334

(West 1992)). ¶ 63 Objector

argues that the Ac t simi larly deleg ates leg islative authority to the trial court a

nd, there fore , is unconstituti onal. We disag ree . Fields Jee p-Eagle, I

nc. , found the F ranc hise Act unconstitutional, in part, beca use under the statute “the court’s r

uling is dete rminative of *** whether a business may

become licensed” and business licensing is a nonjudicial function. Fields Jee p-Eagle, I

nc. , 163 I ll. 2d at 474-75. The Fields Jee p-Eagle I nc. court a lso found problematic the fac t that the Fr anchise Act re quired the c ourt to eng ag e in independe nt fac t finding“rather than the application of a ny fix ed standa

rds or rule s of law to a se t of fac ts.” Id . at 476. “The independe nt determination of what fac ts are pe rtinent and the a ssessment of those fac ts as they

bear upon [t he issue] *** are not f unctions which cour

ts are g ener ally

equipped to perf orm ***.” Id . at 477. Fina lly , our supre me cour t found that the F ranc hise Act impermissibly deleg ated to individual judge s “the task of independe ntly

decidingwhat the public inter est is in

eac h case *** based upon whateve r fa ctors the judg es consider pertinent, in addition to the competingpublic and private intere sts ex presse d in the [Franc hise Act].” Id . at 478. ¶ 64 The Ac t in this case does not suffe r the same infirmities noted by our supre me cour

t in Fields Jee p-Eagle, I

nc. and does not violate the separ ation of powe rs clause of the I llinois Constit ution. I n this case, the tr ial court’s r uling on the Par

k District’s application does not have the ef fec t of makinga business licensingdeter mination. Nor is the trial court r equire d to make an indepe ndent deter

mination of what fa cts are pertinent. The pertinent fa cts under the Act ar e those that would establish that the subject land is no long er ne eded, ne cessa ry , or usef

ul for the purpose of

the par k in which it is located. The A ct does not g ive the cour t the task of
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independe ntly

decidingwhat the public inter est is in the case of an a pplication under the Act. ¶ 65 In Fields Jee

p-Eagle, I

nc. , our supre me cour

t was conc erne d with the fac t the Fr anchise Act pre sented the tria l court with “statutory purposes a

nd g oals [which] are consistent with neither e ach othe r nor with var ious of the competinginterests expressed in [the Fra nchise Ac t.] ” Id . at 478. The F ranc hise Act c ontained no cle ar state ment of the public intere st, but inst ead prese nted matters f

or consider ation that wer e “subje ctive and/or specula tive in nature a

nd involve competingpublic and private intere sts.” Id . at 476. Her e, ther e ar e no compe ting inter ests expressed in the Ac t and, unlike Fields Jee p-Eagle, I

nc. , the Act doe s not enumerate public policies that are direc tly

competingwith the fac tors the cour t must consider. Fields Jee p-Eagle, Inc. , 163 I ll. 2d at 477-78. Rather, the Act make s allowanc es for disag ree ment as to the ultimate conclusion on any

individual factor. ¶ 66 “[I ]n determining the intent of the leg islature, the c ourt may proper ly consider not only the languag e of the statute, but also the re ason and ne cessity for the la w, the evils soug ht to be

reme died, and the pur

pose to be a chieve d.” In re De tention of Li eberm an , 201 I ll. 2d 300, 308 (2002). The Act conta ins a clea r statement of

only one public intere st. The public intere st expressed in the languag e and pur pose of the statute is in whether the subje ct land is nee ded,

nece ssary , or usef

ul for the pur

pose of the pa

rk and if the sale of the land would be f or the use of the par k, which, base d on the languag e of the Act, we construe to include all of the pa rks under the B oard’ s “control or

supervision.” Ag ain, the constitutional conce rns that led our supr eme court to dec lare the Fr anchise Act violative of the separ ation power s clause a re not pre sent here

. The c ourt, in an application under the Ac t, may apply fix ed standa

rds (ne eded, ne cessa

ry , useful)
261-11-0334

to a set of f

acts whic h, if found to exist , would allow the cour t to gr ant the application. See Fields Jee p-Eagle, I

nc. , 163 I ll. 2d at 476. ¶ 67 Nor do we find that the trial cour t is charg ed with independe ntly and orig inally deter mining whe ther pa

rk land should be sold. Fields Jee p-Eagle, I

nc. , 163 I ll. 2d at 472. “[T] he powe r of the c ourt to determine if administrative finding s and orde rs ar e lawf

ul and have support in the evidenc e is not a power to hear new e vidence or re weigh the evidenc e adduc ed befor e the a dminist rative a g ency and, thus, does not transgress constitutional principles. Statutes providing for such proc edure

mere ly authorize the cour

t to ex erc ise what is alre ady a par t of its function.” Id . at 471 (c iting W est End Savings &Loan Ass’n v. Smith , 16 I ll. 2d 523, 525-26 (1959)). ¶ 68 This rule applies whe re “ authority has bee n confe rre d upon administrative ag encie s to perf orm functions of a

n executive nature .” W

est End Savings &Loan Ass’n , 16 I ll. 2d at 525. A court may not “deter

mine and dec ide matters of an executive or

leg islative char acte r.” W est End Savings &Loan Ass’n , 16 I ll. 2d at 526. We find that the Act conf ers a uthority on the Park District, not the trial court, to make the initial determination that park la nd is no longe r nee ded,

nece ssary , or usef

ul and that its sale would be f or the public intere st. That deter mination is evidenc ed by

the application to sell under the Act. In this case, the a pplication is also supported by the B oard’ s resolution. The dete rmination by the Park District is not presc ribed to be in a ny particula r for m, thus Objector’s a

rguments that the ref

ere ndum is void i s not an issue. The c ourt
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in this case re ceive d evidenc e that the Par k District “dee med” Par cel 2 a nd Parce l 3 no longe r
nece ssary or usef ul. It was that dete rmination the court r eviewe d. The c ourt did not make the deter mination in the first instance. To so construe the statue would re nder the openingclause of the statute, desc ribingthe finding s require d of the boa rd of pa rk commissioners bef

ore a n application “ma

y” be f iled, meaning less. See 70 I L CS 1235/ 1 (West 2008). “Ea ch wor d, clause , and sente nce of

the statute must be g iven a r easona ble meaning , if possible, and should not be rende red supe rfluous or mea ningle ss.” Cushing v. Greyhound Lines, Inc

. , 2012 I LApp (1st) 100768, ¶ 97. Thus, we find that the Ac t does not violate the Separ ation of Powers c lause. ¶ 69 3. Trial Court’s Judgment ¶ 70 Objector

argues the trial c ourt made thre e spec ific er rors in the c onduct of the tria l of this matter, e ach of

which we shall addre ss in turn. ¶ 71 A. Standard of Proof ¶ 72 Objector

argues that the trial c ourt applied the wrongstandard of proof. Obje ctor a g ree s the Park District, a s the proponent of the application, did have the burde n of proof . Howeve r, rathe r than be ing r equire d to prove that its resolution approvingthe sale a nd findingit to be in the public interest wa s not arbitrar y and ca pricious, the Park D istrict should have bee n require d to prove the sale of the land was in the public inter est by a pre pondera

nce of the evidenc e. Objec tor argues the c ourt’s application of the arbitra ry and ca pricious standar d was e rrone ous beca use that standard a

pplies to challeng es to ordinanc es, which this was not. Ac cordingto Objector, the Act “neither require s nor authorizes the Park D istrict to make a de termination as to whethe r the sale of par k land is in the Publi c Intere st. This determination is deleg ated to the Court.”
281-11-0334

¶ 73 First, we have a lrea dy reje cted Obje ctor’s a

rgument the Act de leg ates this responsibility to the trial court. Sec ond, Objector cites no authority

for its argument that the Park District ha s the burde n under the Act to prove that the sale of park la nd is in the public interest by a preponde ranc e of the evidenc e. The trial court a lso adopted the viewthat its role was to re view a leg islative decision by

the Park District. In its ruling on the motion to clarify , the cour t stated: “He re, while the par

k district has ena cted a

resolution, this is not a statute. Howeve r, it is an action take n by the par k district under its leg islative function. Thus, this Court reviews the leg islative action of the pa rk district under a

uthority of the state statute. As pre viously

noted, the standa

rd of r eview in suc h a ca se is arbitrar y and ca pricious.” ¶ 74 We ag ree with the trial court. Spec ifically , we c onstrue the lang uag e in the Ac t “which shall no longe r be *** deem ed nece ssary

or usef ul for the pur

pose of sa id park” (empha sis added) (70 I L CS 1235/ 1 (West 2008)) to re fer to a deter mination by the Park

District that park la

nd is no longe r nec essar

y or usef ul, before application is made. G iving the la nguag e of the statute its ordinary meaning , the Act a

uthorizes an application to the cour t to for leave to sell

land the Park District has dee med no long er ne eded, ne cessa ry , or usef

ul. The statute does not grant lea ve to apply to deem the land is no long er ne cessa ry or usef ul. The leg islature committed the deter mination of whether

park la nd is neede d, nece ssary , or usef ul to the Park District. As previously

stated, the sale is for the public intere st, as expressed in the languag e of the Act, if the sale would be for the use of the pa rk.
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¶ 75 Where a

function is committed to a leg islative body , “it is neither the pr ovince nor the duty of cour ts to int erf

ere with the discretion with which suc h bodies are vested, unless the leg islative action *** is shown to be ar bitrary , capr icious, or unre lated to public hea lth, safety and mora ls.” W

echte r v. Board of Appeals , 3 I ll. 2d 13, 16 (1954). B eca use the c ourt is revie winga leg islative determination that par k land is no longe r nec essar y or usef ul and its sale would benef

it the park, the standa

rd it must apply

is well-def

ined. “L eg islative decisions made by municipalities are subje ct to revie w only for a rbitrariness as a matter of substantive due proce ss.” (Interna l quotation marks omitted.) Dunlap v. Village of Schaumburg , 394 I ll. App. 3d 629, 640 (2009). A le g islative action is shown to be ar bitrary , capr icious or unre lated to the public health, saf

ety and mora ls if the action bea rs no re al and substantial re lation to the public health, saf

ety , morals, comfor

t and g ener al welf

are . There fore , “such de cisions will be upheld if they repr esent a

rational mea

ns to acc omplish a leg itimate purpose, as longas a f undamental constitutional right is not impli cate d.” Dunlap , 394 I ll. App. 3d at 640. ¶ 76 Ba sed on the for eg oing, w e hold that the trial c ourt held the B oard to the c orre ct standar d of proof . As more f

ully discussed below, the trial court c orre ctly found that the Park D istrict’s deter mination that the land was not nee ded or use ful, and sellingthe land would bene fit the park, was not ar

bitrary or ca pricious. ¶ 77 B. Evide ntiary Rulings ¶ 78 Objector

argues the trial c ourt err ed in admitting c erta in evidence . Specifica lly , Objector argues the trial c ourt err ed in admitting e vidence of potential uses of pr ocee ds of the sale of the land bec ause “ financ ial benef its do not m eet the Public Intere st require ment.” Objec tor argues

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the evidenc e wa s irrele vant and pr ejudicial. “T he dec ision to admitor exclude evide nce r ests within the sound discretion of the tria l court, and that decision will not be disturbed absent a n abuse of that discretion. [Cit ation.] Even when evide nce is re levant, a tr ial court may exclude it, if the pre judicial eff

ect of the evidenc e substantially outweig hs its probative value. [Citation.] Prejudice is undue te ndency to sugg est a de cision on an improper basis.” (I

nterna l quotation marks omitted.) Hatchett v. W 2X, Inc. , 2013 I LApp (1st) 121758, ¶ 20. ¶ 79 Objector

relies on People e

x rel. Sc ott v. Chicago Park District , 66 I ll. 2d 65, 80-81 (1976), a nd argues that the public trust doctrine applies to proper ty set aside f

or the use of

the public at larg e, and Scott

stands for the pr oposition t hat financ ial benef its from the sale of

land which is for public use are not sufficient re asons to sell it. ¶ 80 Scott

is inapposite beca

use its holding is limit ed to application of the public trust doctrine to submerg ed land. Scott , 66 I ll. 2d at 77 (“It can be seen that the State holds tit le to submerg ed land, as is involved her e, in trust for the pe ople, and that in g ener al the g overnme ntal power s over the se lands will not be re linquished. [ Citation.] It is withi n this ge nera l frame work that we

are called upon to de cide whe ther the le g islative g rant he re w as valid.”) . Reg ardle ss, nothing in Scott would lead us to find that the sa le at issue violated the public tr ust doctrine, or that the admission of evidenc e of the Boa rd’s planne d use of the pr ocee ds of the sale was e rrone ous. To the contra ry , under Scott

the trial cour

t appropriately

considere d how the funds f rom the sale would be used. ¶ 81 A re linquishm ent of land which was a vailable f or the use of

the public may

violate the public trust doctrine whe re the primary purpose of

the transa ction is to benefit a pr ivate intere st.
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Scott , 66 I ll. 2d at 77-78. The Scott court found the argument that a public purpose would be

serve d by the transf

er involved the rein, be cause the transf er w ould result in “commer cial development” and “boost the e conomy ,” unper suasive. Id . at 80. Howe ver, nothingin the languag e of Scott

sug g ests that relinquishing suc h proper ty to provide a f

inancial be nefit to the public would be inappr opriate. The Scott court’s c oncer

n was not with whethe r pec uniary interests we re involved, but whe ther the pe cuniar y benef it to the public was only

incidental or “too indirec t, intangible a nd elusive to satisfy

the re quirement of a

public purpose.” Id . at 80-81 (“In order to preser ve mea ning a nd vitality

in the public trust doctrine *** the public pur pose to be ser ved ca nnot be only

incidental and r emote. The claimed be nefit her e to the public throug h additional employ

ment and ec onomic improvement is too indirect, intang ible and elusive to satisfy the re quirement of a

public purpose.” ). ¶ 82 Scott

cited with appr oval People e x rel. Molone

y v. Kirk, 162 I ll. 138 (1896), as a n example of the cour

t upholding a grant of subme rg ed land ( ag ain, the topic to which Scott is expressly limit ed) to private individuals. Scott , 66 I ll. 2d at 81. The Scott court found that in Moloney , the bene fit to the private interest was incide ntal to the public purpose. Id . In Moloney , the sale of

the submerg ed land wa s authorized to defra y the costs of c onstructingan extension to L ake Shore Drive. The court he ld “that it was not illeg al for the leg islature to authorize the sale of the re claimed land to de fra y the cost of the improve ment.” Scott , 66 I ll. 2d at 76 (citing Moloney , 162 I ll. at 151). ¶ 83 Although Moloney involved an express grant of a uthority to appropriate prope rty

for the purpose of

defr aying a

cost ( Moloney , 162 I ll. at 141-42), we find that under the public trust

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doctrine the planned use of funds fr om the sale of pa rk land is re levant to the dete rmination of whether the sale w ould be for the public interest, whe n considere d in light of the othe r fa ctors listed in the Act as to when suc h sale is in the public intere st ( i.e. , that the land is no long er neede d or usef

ul and the proc eeds w ould be used for the use of the park)

. Scott , 66 I ll. 2d at 73-74 (“ The c ontrol of the State for the purposes of

the trust can ne ver be lost, exc ept as to such parc els as ar e used in promotingthe intere sts of the public there in, or ca n be disposed of w ithout any substantial impairment of the public intere st in the lands and wate rs re maining.” ) (Empha sis added a nd internal quotation marks omitted.) ¶ 84 Fur

ther, the A ct direc ts that if the trial court de termines that the grantingof the application is for the public interest it shall direct that the pr operty be sold “for

the use of sa id park.” 70 I L CS 1235/ 1 (West 2008). Thus, evidenc e of the use of the pr ocee ds is releva nt under the plain languag e of the Act. The Park District’s e vidence with reg ard to usingthe funds fr om the sale f or re novations to Gordon Park wa s directly related to the purposes of the Act a nd, there fore , admissible. ¶ 85 C. Sufficiency of the Evidenc e ¶ 86 Objector

argues the Park D istrict failed to prove that the sale of the par k land is in the public interest bec ause of conflictingtestimony

and insuffic ient evidenc e as to (1) the value of Parce l 2 and Parc el 3 to the public re lative to (2) the bur den of ma intaining those pa rce ls and the problems they

cre ate. The Park District re sponds its evidence w as suffic ient to show that Parce l 2 and Parc el 3 lack utility and ar e no long er ne eded or nece ssary . The Park D istrict also argues it prese nted a further

rational ba sis for the propose d sale in that it plans to use the proc eeds of the
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sale to re develop Gor don Park and r eplenish its capital fund. The Park District notes that the evidenc e wa s that the planned improve ments resulted fr om public meeting s to determine what the public would like to see in a rede veloped Gor don Park. ¶ 87 We must first determine the a ppropriate standard of

revie w. “[T] he dete rmination of the appr opriate standa rd of r eview tur

ns primarily upon the ty

pe of que stion or issue presente d for r eview. *** When we re view a lowe r tribunal’s f actua l determinations, those deter

minations will not be re verse d on appea l unless they are contra ry to the manifest we ight of the evidenc e. A f

actua l finding is contrar y to the manifest we ight of the evidenc e whe n, upon a revie w of a ll the evidence in the light most favor able to the preva iling par

ty , the opposite conc lusion is clearly appar ent or the fac t finder’ s finding is pa lpably err oneous and wholly

unwar rante d, is clear ly the re sult of passion or prejudice , or appe ars to be arbitra ry and unsubstantiated by

the evidenc e.” U.S. Steel Corp. v. Illinois Poll ution Cont rol Board , 384 I ll. App. 3d 457, 461 (2008). ¶ 88 Be cause the deter mination of whether

to gr ant an a

pplication under the Act is based on a fac tual deter

mination of whether

the land at issue is nee ded, nec essar y or usef ul and its sale would be for

the public intere st, we will apply the manife st-weig ht-of-the -evide nce sta ndard of revie w. In rulingin favor of the Park District, the tria l court found, in per tinent part, as f

ollows: “The testimony

at trial showed that the baseba ll diamonds
341-11-0334 [i n East Gordon Par k] are fr equently

underw ater , the tennis courts

are no longe r in g reat repa ir, the play lot is closed and there are no bathroom fa cilities other than one Porta toilet, lim ited lighting , no walkingor runningpaths on the larg er pa rt of Gor don Park. As to the 2.88 ac res, ther e ar e no ame nities other than as pr eviously mentioned. Testimony

was that sig ht lines from the re mainder of the par k are very limit ed, func tionality

of these two pa

rce ls, Parcel 2 and 3 ar e ver

y limit ed, socc er w as playable only for the sma llest children. The league choose s not–the AYSO league choose s not to use the spac e bec ause of

topogr aphica l limi tations. There was testimony

from one jog g er that he runs in this

are a, fr om another that it was inappropriate. That a ppear s to be a matter of pe rsonal pre fer ence or per haps individual abilities. Howeve r, fr om all the testimony it appear s that this parce l of proper ty is ge nera lly

useful only

for pa ssive or for

casua l pick-up ty pe ac tiviti es. Indeed, it appe ars a ppropriate for ve ry

minimal usag e and is totally

lacking in utili ty or saf ety for many , many

park district activities. The ver y lack of visibil ity makes this an ar ea of

conce rn for

park usa g e. I t appea rs that the par

k district is seekingto sell this parcel and has ma de a de termination that the sale w ould be a hig hest and
351-11-0334 best use of its re source s; in other words, that it would maxi miz e the bene fit to the public by selling this clea

rly underutilized and underutilizable small parce l so that it can maxi miz e its more usable space .” ¶ 89 Viewingall of the e vidence in the light most favor able to the Par k District, the pre vailing party in this case, we cannot sa y that the opposite conc lusion is clearly appar ent, the trial c ourt’s finding s are palpably

err oneous, or that the judg ment is the result of passion or pr ejudice a nd not substantiated by

the evidenc e. ¶ 90 The findingthat the par k land is no longe r nee ded, nec essar y , or usef ul for purpose s of the par k is not ag ainst the manifest we ight of the evidenc e. The Park District pre sented ample evidenc e that the land at issue provided little value to the public. The Par k District no longe r uses the maintena

nce building s that occupy Parce l 2. There was some e vidence of the use of the tennis courts and use of West Gordon Park by very y outhful socce r players. How ever , the Park District prese nted evidenc e that a te nnis court in Gordon Park w ould remain available a fter the sale of the land, as would fa cilities for youngsocce r players. Reg ardle ss, only a portion of the exis ting tennis c ourts are actua lly on the subject prope rty . Thus, any plan to reduc e the e x isting number of te nnis courts would not nece ssarily be pre vented by

denying the application. Simi larly , the var ious unorg anized rec reational activities that could occ ur on the subjec t property could also occ ur in the re mainder of the par k. Objector

prese nted sca

nt evidence of the public actua lly using Par cel 2 or

Parce l 3 for any

of its hy pothetically

possible rec reational activities. There fore , the opposite conc lusion, that the land is“nece ssary” for purposes of the park, is not
361-11-0334

clea rly appar ent. ¶ 91 The e vidence did not actually conflict on the diff

iculties in maintaining this portion of the park. O bjector’ s witness only testified that with proper training , mowing Par cel 2 a nd Parce l 3 would not be more diff

icult than mowing f

lat park la nd. There was no e vidence that the par ties who ac tually

mow the land have that training . Fur ther, ther e wa s undisputed evidence that mowing this sec tion of the park r equire d more time than other simil arly siz ed portions of the pa

rk that are flat. ¶ 92 Objector

only provided e vidence of limited uses by a small perc entag e of the public, which ca nnot lead us to conc lude that the trial c ourt’s finding s that the land is no longe r nee ded,

nece ssary or usef ul is wholly

unwar rante d. Objector s prese nted evidenc e that the subjec t proper ty could be put to better

use with an outlay

of funds. The fac t that the land could be ma de useful for purposes of the park only proves that the la

nd is not curre ntly

useful for

purposes of the par k. ¶ 93 The findingthat the sale is for the public intere st is not aga inst the manifest weight of the evidenc e. The benef

its to t he public ar e not incidental, indire ct, intang ible or elusive. Obje ctor provided no c ontrary

evidenc e to the Park D istrict’s evidenc e that the pr oposed re novations to Gordon Park r esulted fr om public meeting s and re flec t the public will. The reve nue g ener ated will allow the Park District to enha nce se rvice s to the public and improve public f acilities by providingamenities the public wa nts. Although it has solicited bids to beg in the renovation, the Park District pre sented e vidence that it cannot complete the renovations withoutselling the land. As demonstrate d, the sale of the land will not result in a sig nificant diminution is t he public’s use

371-11-0334

and enjoy ment of Gordon Par

k, if any at all. Ther efor e, the sa le of the la nd bear s a re al and substantial relation to the g ener al welf are , and is a rational means to ac complish a leg itimate purpose. ¶ 94 CONCLUSI ON ¶ 95 The trial c ourt had jurisdiction to hear the application because the application embrac ed less than 3 ac res of

park la nd. The Ac t is constitut ional and does not violate the Separa tion of Powers cla

use of the I llinois Constit ution. The court a pplied the cor

rec t standard of

proof to the application, committed no er rors in re ceivingevidenc e at the tr ial on the application, and the court’s de cision on the application is notag ainst the manifest we ight of the evidenc e. The Park District’s dec ision that the land was no long er ne eded, use ful, or nec essar y and that its sale would be for the public intere st was not arbitra ry and ca pricious. The judgment of the trial c ourt is,

acc ording ly , aff

irmed. ¶ 96 Affir

med.

38