alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
Before the Third Division,

September 6, 1957

No. 61192.

petition 6867-R (New York).

#### Florea & Co., Inc. *v.*United States,

Donlon, Judge:

Certain wool knit gloves, of two different styles, were purchased in Japan and shipped in three lots, which were entered at New York, respectively, on May 4, 1936, May 13, 1936, and May 26, 1936. Both styles of gloves were entered at a Japanese yen value more than $1.75 per dozen pairs, and on appraisement the Japanese yen value was reduced to a sum equivalent to less than $1.75 per dozen pairs.

At the time of these entries, there was in force a Presidential proclamation requiring that imported wool knit gloves, valued at not more than $1.75 per dozen pairs, should be appraised, for tariff purposes, on the basis of the American selling price (T. D. 48183). The American selling price of these gloves was found to be $5.50 per dozen pairs, an advance of more than 100 percent over the entered value. In consequence of this advance, additional duties were assessed under section 489 of the Tariff Act of 1930. The petition before us seeks remission of such additional duties assessed on the merchandise entered May 13, 1936, and May 26, 1936.

Earlier, the first division of this court decided, in favor of petitioner, a proceeding for remission of like duties assessed on the merchandise which was entered May 4, 1936. *Florea & Co., Inc.*v. *United States,*24 Cust. Ct. 57, C. D. 1208. Respondent moved for a rehearing in that case. Its motion was denied. *Id.*v. *Id.,*24 Cust. Ct. 411, Abstract 54178. Respondent then filed an appeal in the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals (suit 4646). The appeal was not prosecuted. It was dismissed. *United States*v. *Florea & Co., Inc.,*38 C. C. P. A. (Customs) 171.

This case did not come on for trial until 20 years after the merchandise was entered. There was considerable delay in appraisement, and then a long history of litigation in reappraisement proceedings. Thereafter, this petition for remission was adjourned from time to time while the remission petition relative to the merchandise entered May 4, 1936, was tried.

The record in the earlier petition is not before us, petitioner’s motion to incorporate it having been denied on respondent’s objection. However, the facts *418tere of record and those recited in the opinions of our colleagues of the first division in the previous petition proceeding seem undistinguishable in any important respect. If anything, there is less evidence adduced here by respondent than in the prior proceeding.

Our views are those stated by Chief Judge Oliver at the conclusion of his concurring opinion in *Florea*& *Co., Inc.*v. *United States,*24 Cust. Ct. 57, C. D. 1208, when he stated (p. 66):

> The evidence of record in this case presents an atmosphere of charge and countercharge, from which it might be said that the circumstances were peculiar and raise some doubt. After careful examination of the record and the copious notes made during the course of the trial, I am of opinion that the petition herein should be granted.

We are of opinion that this petition should be granted. Judgment will issue accordingly.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

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THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM BALANCE
SHEET AND STATEMENT OF EARNINGS.
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<PERIOD-START>                             JUL-02-2000
<PERIOD-END>                               SEP-30-2000
<CASH>                                          19,360
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                  188,288
<ALLOWANCES>                                     9,714
<INVENTORY>                                    226,109
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                               451,000
<PP&E>                                          65,578
<DEPRECIATION>                                (30,276)
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 654,383
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                          194,865
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</TABLE>
A90A0104.

#### WAUSAU INSURANCE COMPANIES v. LIGHTNIN’ TRUCK RENTAL, INC.

(392 SE2d 32)

Banke, Presiding Judge.

The appellant, Wausau Insurance Companies (“Wausau”), issued a “Business Auto Policy” to William Ray Sarratt, Inc., providing motor vehicle liability insurance coverage to that company for accidents involving its employees. During the period this policy was in force, one such employee, George Lawrence, was involved in an accident while driving a truck leased from the appellee, Lightnin’ Truck Rental, Inc. (“Lightnin’ ”), which operated as a qualified self-insurer with respect to its rental vehicles. Wausau paid out $12,180.91 to various claimants as compensation for bodily injury and/or property damage sustained as a result of the accident and then filed the present action against Lightnin’ for contribution and indemnity, based on the following language contained in its (Wausau’s) policy: “1. For any covered auto you own this policy provides primary insurance. For any covered auto you do not own, the insurance provided by this policy is excess over any other collectible insurance. ... 2. When two or more policies cover on the same basis, either excess or primary, we will pay only our share. Our share is the proportion that the limit of our policy bears to the total of the limits of all the policies covering on the same basis.”

Lightnin’ denies that it has any liability under the circumstances, relying on a provision in its rental agreement specifying that its self-insurance certificate “provides coverage . . . only if no other valid and collectable insurance whether . . . primary, excess or contingent is available to renter.” The trial court granted summary judgment to Lightnin’ and denied a motion for summary judgment filed by Wausau, concluding (1) that Lightnin’ could not be liable to Wausau for contribution and indemnity because it was not alleged to be a tortfeasor and (2) that Wausau had “the primary responsibility to provide liability insurance coverage” under OCGA § 40-9-102. That Code section provides, in pertinent part, that “[a]ny person who rents motor vehicles from a U-drive-it owner is required to provide his own insurance. ...” This appeal followed. *Held:*

*1.*“[T]he right to contribution relates only to joint tortfeasors and where the proposed . . . defendant cannot be made liable as a joint tortfeasor the . . . complaint does not state a claim.” *Southern R. Co. v. Brewer,*122 Ga. App. 292, 293 (176 SE2d 665) (1970). See generally OCGA § 51-12-32. There being no suggestion that the ap*820pellee incurred any tort liability as a result of the motor vehicle accident at issue in this case, the trial court correctly concluded that the appellant had no claim against it for contribution and indemnity.

Decided March 12, 1990.

*Swift, Currie, McGhee & Hiers, Guy R. Taylor,*for appellant.

*J. Wayne Moulton,*for appellee.

2. In view of the foregoing, we do not reach the issue of whether, because of its insured’s status as the lessee of a U-drive-it vehicle, the appellant was properly treated by the trial court as the primary carrier.

*Judgment affirmed.*

*Birdsong and Cooper, JJ., concur.*
**Exhibit 32.1**

**CERTIFICATIONPURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. 1350, AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO****SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF2002**

The undersigned, RobertK. Weiler, Chief Executive Officer of Phase Forward Incorporated (the “Company”),in connection with the Company’s Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q for theperiod ended June 30, 2007 (the “Report”), as filed with the Securities andExchange Commission on the date hereof, hereby certifies pursuant to therequirements of 18 U.S.C. 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of theSarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that

·                     theReport fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or15(d), as applicable, of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended, and

·                      the information in the Report fairly presents,in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations ofthe Company.

This certification isbeing provided pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 1350 and is not to be deemed a part of theReport, nor is it to be deemed to be “filed” for any purpose whatsoever.
|        |   | By:    |   | /s/ ROBERT K. WEILER                                                                  |
|--------|--------|--------|--------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
|   |   |   |   | Robert K. Weiler  Chief Executive Officer  Phase Forward Incorporated  August 7, 2007 |

 

 

----
September 20, 2016

Exemption No. 12149A

Regulatory Docket No. FAA–2015–1635

Ms. Kimberly Ann Oberst

Drone Survey Solutions

18870 Painted Leaf Court

Jupiter, FL 33458

Dear Ms. Oberst:

This letter is to inform you that we have granted your petition for an amendment. It explains 

the basis for our decision, describes its effect, and lists any changes to the original conditions 

and limitations.

By letter posted to the public docket on July 21, 2016, you petitioned the Federal Aviation 

Administration (FAA) on behalf of Drone Survey Solutions (hereinafter petitioner or 

operator) for an amendment to your current exemption. That exemption from §§ 61.23(a) and 

(c), 61.101(e)(4) and (5), 61.113(a), 61.315(a), 91.7(a), 91.119(c), 91.121, 91.151(a)(1), 

91.405(a), 91.407(a)(1), 91.409(a)(1) and (2), and 91.417(a) and (b) of Title 14, Code of 

Federal Regulations (14 CFR) allows the petitioner to conduct UAS operations. You 

requested an amendment to change the company name from KEO Drone Survey Systems to

Drone Survey Solutions.

1

In your petition, you indicate that there has been no change in the conditions and reasons 

relative to public interest and safety that were the basis for granting the original exemption.

The FAA has determined that good cause exists for not publishing a summary of the petition 

in the Federal Register because the requested amendment to the exemption would not set a 

precedent, and any delay in acting on this petition would be detrimental to the petitioner. 

 

1 The petitioner also requested to add aircraft. At this time, the FAA is unable to act on this request. When the 

FAA is ready to act, we will proceed accordingly and no further action will be required by the petitioner.
2

Our Decision

The FAA has determined that the justification for the issuance of Exemption No. 12149

remains valid and is in the public interest. Therefore, under the authority contained 

in 49 U.S.C. 106(f), 40113, and 44701, delegated to me by the Administrator, the operator is 

granted an amendment to change the operator name.

The operator shall add this amendment to its original exemption.

 

Conditions and Limitations

In this grant of amendment, Drone Survey Solutions is hereafter referred to as the operator.

All conditions and limitations within Grant of Exemption No. 12149 remain in effect.

Failure to comply with any of the conditions and limitations of this grant of exemption will be 

grounds for the immediate suspension or rescission of this exemption. 

This exemption terminates on July 31, 2017, unless sooner superseded or rescinded.

Sincerely,

/s/

John S. Duncan

Director, Flight Standards Service
NOT FOR PUBLICATION UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
LAMONT STERLING JOHNSON, Petitioner - Appellant,
v. ROBERT A. HOREL, Warden, Respondent - Appellee. No. 11-16197 D.C. No. 4:07-cv-04483-PJH
MEMORANDUM *

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of California Phyllis J. Hamilton, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted November 6, 2013 San Francisco, California Before: REINHARDT, NOONAN, and WATFORD, Circuit Judges. 1. Petitioner Lamont Johnson seeks habeas relief on the ground that the government destroyed material exculpatory evidence in violation of his due process rights. See Arizona v. Youngblood , 488 U.S. 51, 57–58 (1988); California v. Trombetta , 467 U.S. 479, 488–89 (1984). To prevail on this claim, Johnson 

# FILED
NOV 26 2013 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.must show that the government failed to preserve constitutionally material evidence. See Youngblood , 488 U.S. at 56–57; Trombetta , 467 U.S. at 489. Constitutionally material means that the exculpatory value of the evidence was apparent before it was destr oyed, and that the evidence was “of such a nature that the defendant would be unable to obtain comparable evidence by other reasonably available means.” Trombetta , 467 U.S. at 489. The California Court of Appeal found, as a factual matter, that Johnson had received “everything of an exculpatory nature.” We cannot say this finding was based on “an unreasonable determination of th e facts” in light of the record before the state court. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2). By the time of his second trial, Johnson had access to the press releases that th e State withheld and the witnesses who appear to have been the source of the in formation contained in the press releases. Johnson has not identified any other eviden ce that might have existed suggesting that a third person was in fact present at the murder scene. In light of the state court’s factual determination, we cannot say that it unreasonably applied Trombetta and Youngblood when it denied Johnson relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1); Harrington v. Richter , 131 S. Ct. 770, 786 (2011). 2. We also reject Johnson’s claim regarding the prosecution’s use of inconsistent factual theories in the tr ials of Johnson and his co-defendant. No Page 2 of 3Supreme Court precedent clearly establishe s that the Due Process Clause bars the government from prosecuting co-defendants under inconsistent factual theories absent evidence that the prosecutor knowingl y used false evidence or acted in bad faith. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). There is no evidence of either here. AFFIRMED.

Page 3 of 3
Before the Second Division,

August 8, 1947

No. 51862.

#### Van Raalte Co., Inc., et al. *v.*United States,

protests 758294-G, etc. (New York).

Opinion by

Kincheloe, J.

It was stipulated that the merchandise is the same in all material respects as the gloves which were the subject of *United States*v. *Julius Kayser & Co.*(33 C. C. P. A. 179, C. A. D. 333). The claim of the plaintiffs was therefore sustained.
Before the First Division,

January 31, 1947

No. 51542.

#### Protests 64336-K, etc., of Leonard Levin Co. (Providence).

Opinion by

Oliver, P. J.

It was stipulated that the beads are similar in all material respects to those the subject of *Eitinger Bead Co., Inc.*v. *United States*(17 Cust. Ct. 56, C. D. 1020). In accordance therewith the claim at 35 percent under paragraph 1503 was sustained.
No. 60658.

#### Wheeler & Miller *v.*United States,

protest 145759-K (San Francisco).

Opinion by

Lawrence, J.

In accordance with stipulation of counsel that the merchandise consists of textile machinery and parts thereof used for manufacturing or processing vegetable fibers similar in all material respects to the textile machinery and parts the subject of *The A. W. Fenton Co., Inc., et al.*v. *United*States (34 Cust. Ct. 202, C. D. 1705), the claim of the plaintiff was sustained.
**EXHIBIT 32.2**

 

CERTIFICATION OFTHE CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER OF TUESDAY MORNING CORPORATION PURSUANT TO

 18 U.S.C.§1350

 

I, Stephanie Bowman, theActing Chief Financial Officer of Tuesday Morning Corporation, hereby certifythat:

 

1.      The quarterly report on Form 10-Qof Tuesday Morning Corporation for the period ended December 31, 2008fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) ofthe Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

 

2.      The information contained inthe above-mentioned report fairly presents, in all material respects, thefinancial condition and results of operations of Tuesday Morning Corporation.

 

 
| Date: January 30,  2009 | By:    | /s/ Stephanie Bowman                      |
|------------------------------|--------|-------------------------------------------|
|                         |   | Stephanie Bowman  Chief Financial Officer |

 

----
Exhibit
      23.1





Consent
      of Independent Registered Public Accounting Firm





We
      consent to the incorporation by reference in the Registration Statement (Form
      S-8 No. 333-151391) pertaining to the 2008 Equity Incentive Compensation Plan
      of
      SouthPeak Interactive Corporation of our report dated October 3, 2008, with
      respect to the consolidated financial statements of SouthPeak Interactive
      Corporation and subsidiaries included in this Annual Report on Form 10-K fro
      the
      year ended June 30, 2008.





/s/
      Reznick Group, P.C.





Vienna,
      Virginia


October
      6, 2008
No. 56269.

protests 876611-G, etc. (New York).

#### O. Yoshizawa Co. *v.*United States

Opinion by

Ford, J.

An examination of the official records disclosing no reason which would warrant disturbing the presumptively correct classifications made by the collector, the protests were overruled.
# L_2022170EN.01001501.xml

| 28.6.2022 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | L 170/15 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

28.6.2022

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

L 170/15

---

COUNCIL IMPLEMENTING REGULATION (EU) 2022/1009

of 27 June 2022

implementing Regulation (EC) No 1183/2005 concerning restrictive measures in view of the situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo

THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,

Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

Having regard to Council Regulation (EC) No 1183/2005 of 18 July 2005 concerning restrictive measures in view of the situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (1), and in particular Article 9(2) thereof,

Having regard to the proposal from the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy,

Whereas:

| (1) | On 18 July 2005, the Council adopted Regulation (EC) No 1183/2005. |
| --- | --- |

(1)

On 18 July 2005, the Council adopted Regulation (EC) No 1183/2005.

| (2) | Following the judgment of the General Court in case T-108/21 (2), one entry should be deleted from the list of persons, entities and bodies set out in Annex Ia to Regulation (EC) No 1183/2005. |
| --- | --- |

(2)

Following the judgment of the General Court in case T-108/21 (2), one entry should be deleted from the list of persons, entities and bodies set out in Annex Ia to Regulation (EC) No 1183/2005.

| (3) | Annex Ia to Regulation (EC) No 1183/2005 should therefore be amended accordingly, |
| --- | --- |

(3)

Annex Ia to Regulation (EC) No 1183/2005 should therefore be amended accordingly,

HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION:

Article 1

Annex Ia to Regulation (EC) No 1183/2005 is amended as set out in the Annex to this Regulation.

Article 2

This Regulation shall enter into force on the day following that of its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union.

This Regulation shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States.

Done at Luxembourg, 27 June 2022.

For the Council

The President

A. PANNIER-RUNACHER

---

(1)  
  OJ L 193, 23.7.2005, p. 1.

1

(2)  Judgment of the General Court of 27 April 2022, Ferdinand Ilunga Luyoyo v. Council of the European Union, T-108/21, ECLI:EU:T:2022:253.

2

Ferdinand Ilunga Luyoyo v. Council of the European Union

---

ANNEX

The following entry is deleted from the list set out in Section A (‘Persons’) of Annex Ia to Council Regulation (EC) No 1183/2005:

| ‘3. | Ferdinand Ilunga LUYOYO’. |
| --- | --- |

‘3.

---
Exhibit 99.1





CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,


AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906


OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002





In connection with
the Quarterly Report of SWS Group, Inc. (the Company) on Form 10-Q for the period ended September 27, 2002 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report), I, Donald W. Hultgren, Chief
Executive Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:





| | 1. |  | The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and
| | -- |  | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------




| | 2. |  | The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.
| | -- |  | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------




Date: November 12, 2002



/S/ Donald W. HultgrenDonald W. Hultgren Chief Executive Officer