RECORD IMPOUNDED 

 

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY 

 APPELLATE DIVISION 

 DOCKET NO. A-3565-22 

NEW JERSEY DIVISION 

OF CHILD PROTECTION 

AND PERMANENCY, 

 Plaintiff-Respondent, 

v.

A.R., 

 Defendant-Appellant, 

and 

THE BIOLOGICAL FATHER 

OF B.R., WHOMSOEVER 

HE MAY BE, 

 Defendant. 

_____________________________

IN THE MATTER OF THE 

GUARDIANSHIP OF B.L.R., 

a minor. 

_____________________________

Submitted May 6, 2024 – Decided May 15, 2024 

Before Judges Marczyk and Chase. 

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE 

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION 

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the 

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
2 A-3565-22

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, 

Chancery Division, Family Part, Middlesex County, 

Docket No. FG-12-0046-22.

Jennifer Nicole Silletti, Public Defender, attorney for 

appellant (Catherine F. Reid, Designated Counsel, on 

the briefs). 

Matthew J. Platkin, Attorney General, attorney for 

respondent (Janet Greenberg Cohen, Assistant Attorney 

General, of counsel; Alicia Y. Bergman, Deputy 

Attorney General, on the brief). 

Jennifer Nicole Silletti, Public Defender, Law 

Guardian, attorney for minor (Meredith Alexis Pollock, 

Deputy Public Defender, of counsel; Jennifer Marie 

Sullivan, Assistant Deputy Public Defender, of counsel 

and on the brief). 

PER CURIAM 

A.R. ("Ann")1 appeals the Family Part's June 29, 2022 order terminating 

her parental rights to her biological daughter, B.L.R. ("Bea"), and granting 

guardianship to the Division of Child Protection and Permanency ("Division"). 

We affirm. 

Ann gave birth to Bea in February 2021. Bea's father is unknown. Bea 

was immediately placed in the neonatal intensive care unit ("NICU") because 

1

 We use initials and fictional names to protect the privacy interest of the child 

and the other persons involved. R. 1:38-3(d)(12). 
3 A-3565-22

she was unable to breathe on her own, required a feeding tube, and experienced 

repeated seizures. 

A hospital staff member contacted the Division alleging Ann's mental 

health struggles, specifically her schizophrenia, as well as her homelessness, 

threatened Bea's wellbeing. Ann was known to the Division because her 

involvement dates to 2012, stemming from allegations of neglect, substance 

abuse, inadequate supervision, and failure to provide for the basic needs of her 

two older children, who were both subsequently placed in the custody of their 

respective fathers. 

While still in the hospital, Ann told the Division she was not sure where 

she would go after discharge, and she was in the process of applying for housing 

and food stamps. She declined mental health services and stated she only 

sometimes took medication for her mental health. When Ann was discharged, 

she did not provide the hospital or the Division with an address or phone number 

and declined to make a follow-up appointment for herself. 

Although Bea's condition improved, hospital staff determined she needed 

to be transferred to Children's Specialized Hospital. After some difficulty 

contacting Ann, hospital staff eventually obtained verbal consent for the 

transfer, but Ann declined to come to the hospital in person to complete the 
4 A-3565-22

necessary paperwork or to see Bea. The Division attempted to visit Ann at the 

address where she reportedly had been staying. Even after police officers were 

called for assistance, Ann refused to come to the door. 

The Division continued its repeated attempts to contact Ann to inform her 

of Bea's status, obtain necessary consents, and arrange visitation, to no avail. 

The Division was first granted custody of Bea in April 2021, upon her discharge 

from the hospital, and Bea was placed in the care of unrelated resource parents, 

where she has lived since that time.

In the meantime, the Division contacted several of Ann's relatives in an 

attempt to identify a kinship placement option. Shortly after Bea was born, the 

Division contacted Ann's cousin, K.R., who stated she did not want Ann staying 

at her home, but she was willing to consider caring for Bea. When the Division 

visited K.R.'s residence in May, staff reported the apartment was dirty and 

unsuitable for Bea. The Division tried to assist K.R. with alternate housing 

arrangements and visited the home multiple times, but because the conditions 

largely remained unchanged, K.R. was eventually ruled out as a placement 

option in April 2022. 

In March 2021, the Division contacted Ann's paternal aunt, L.W., who 

initially expressed interest in being a placement option for Bea, but then 
5 A-3565-22

withdrew. The Division also spoke with M.W., L.W.'s sister and Ann's aunt, 

who lived in North Carolina. The Division initiated the paperwork so North 

Carolina authorities could evaluate her. In August, North Carolina terminated 

the evaluation process due to M.W.'s unresponsiveness. The Division also 

contacted and ruled out as placement options Ann's sister, A.R., J.R., K.R.'s 

mother, and Ann's paternal grandmother. 

In April and August 2021, Ann was incarcerated at Middlesex County 

Correctional Facility ("MCCF") for two separate offenses. Despite multiple 

visits by the Division, Ann either declined to meet with them or told the 

Division, "I want to give her up to the state," and stated there was no family 

member she wanted contacted about caring for Bea. In September 2021, Ann 

called the Division "in a highly agitated, manic state" claiming "there was a 

conspiracy against her at the jail." In later visits with the Division at MCCF, 

Ann "appeared disoriented . . . kept moving her head back-and-forth and could 

not maintain eye contact." Ann repeated her claims of a conspiracy, alleging 

prison officials were poisoning her, and stated she wanted all her children back. 

Ann was released from MCCF in January 2022, and she contacted the 

Division asking for housing and a phone, stating she was in the hospital "because 
6 A-3565-22

there is a government conspiracy happening." After that call, the Division could 

not locate Ann for over two months, despite multiple attempts. 

In March 2022, Ann contacted the Division and arranged a meeting for 

the next day, at which she told the Division she wanted housing and to get Bea 

back. She reported not being on medication and not having a steady place to 

live. The Division assisted Ann by arranging substance abuse and behavioral 

health evaluations. At the behavioral health evaluation, the provider diagnosed 

Ann with acute post-traumatic stress disorder and schizoaffective disorder, and 

suggested committing Ann to a psychiatric unit, but she refused and instead 

signed up for outpatient services. On the way back from the evaluation, Ann 

suddenly became aggressive while in a car with two Division workers, 

frightening them and requiring them to pull over and let Ann out at a gas station. 

Ann told DCPP she believed the behavioral health providers were in a 

conspiracy against her, and she stopped attending outpatient treatment. The 

Division attempted to arrange housing for Ann at a boarding house, but Ann was 

difficult to contact for follow-up or services. 

In May 2022, Ann was re-incarcerated at MCCF in connection with 

robbery and contempt charges and was placed on a psychiatric hold. Ann 

believed she was being kidnapped and feared for her life in jail, claiming the jail 
7 A-3565-22

staff was poisoning her and feeding her expired and tainted food. She later 

mailed paint chips and pieces of the desk from her cell to Division staff as 

"evidence" of her poisoning claims. 

In June 2022, the Division and Bea's resource parent brought Bea to 

supervised visitation at the jail. Ann spoke with Bea for approximately one 

minute before asking to speak with Division staff about her claims of being 

poisoned and endangered by jail staff. Ann canceled the next visit and asked 

for only Division staff to visit in the future. When Bea was brought for another 

visit in July, Ann again refused to see her. 

Since her discharge from the NICU at two months of age, Bea has been in 

the care of unrelated resource parents. They completed medical training specific 

to Bea's needs, including administering her medication and watching for 

seizures and respiratory issues. When Bea was nine months old, she was 

referred for early intervention services based on delayed motor function and was 

later diagnosed with cerebral palsy. The resource parents' home was fully 

equipped for Bea's care, and her health continued to improve as the resource 

parents took her to all scheduled appointments, intervention services, and 

therapies, which were extensive. By all reports, Bea has thrived in her resource 

parents' care. 
8 A-3565-22

The guardianship trial was held over intermittent days between April and 

June 2023. The Division presented two witnesses, Dr. Gregory Gambone, an 

expert in the field of clinical and forensic psychology, and a case supervisor 

from the Division. The case supervisor went through the history of the case, the 

Division's attempts to help Ann, and the resource parents' decision to pursue 

adoption over a Kinship Legal Guardian ("KLG") arrangement. No witness 

testified on Ann's behalf. 

Dr. Gambone testified to evaluating Ann at MCCF on two occasions. He 

testified Ann misrepresented her history of involvement with the Division to 

him. He stated Ann told him she was the target of a government conspiracy. He 

further testified to Ann's diagnoses of schizoaffective disorder with paranoid 

delusions and dependent personality disorder with antisocial features as well as 

his diagnosis of schizophrenia and dysthymic disorder. He said that left 

untreated, schizoaffective disorder would worsen and impact Ann's ability to 

parent. Ann told him she had five different psychiatric hospitalizations over the 

course of the prior two years. 

Dr. Gambone opined Bea would not experience emotional harm from 

termination of Ann's parental rights because their limited interaction meant there 

was no bond that would be affected by the termination. He opined Ann was not 
9 A-3565-22

able to provide a safe and stable home for Bea, and this inability could not be 

cured in the foreseeable future. He testified attempts to establish a parental bond 

between Ann and Bea would come at the expense of Bea's need for stability. 

The court rendered its decision on June 29, 2023. After an analysis of the 

four prongs for termination set forth in N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a) and the 

Division's obligation to satisfy each by clear and convincing evidence, the court 

concluded Ann's parental rights should be terminated, setting forth its reasoning 

in both an oral decision and a corresponding written order. 

The applicable law is clear. When terminating parental rights, the trial 

court applies the statutory best interests test, which requires consideration of 

four prongs: 

(1) The child's safety, health, or development has been 

or will continue to be endangered by the parental 

relationship; 

(2) The parent is unwilling or unable to eliminate the

harm facing the child or is unable or unwilling to

provide a safe and stable home for the child and the

delay of permanent placement will add to the harm; 

(3) The [D]ivision has made reasonable efforts to

provide services to help the parent correct the

circumstances which led to the child's placement 

outside the home and the court has considered 

alternatives to termination of parental rights; and 
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(4) Termination of parental rights will not do more 

harm than good.

[N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a).] 

The Division must prove each prong by "clear and convincing evidence." 

N.J. Div. of Child Prot. & Permanency v. D.H., 469 N.J. Super. 107, 115 (App. 

Div. 2021). These four prongs are not discrete and separate; they overlap to

inform a more general inquiry that the termination of parental rights is in a 

child's best interests. N.J. Div. of Child Prot. & Permanency v. R.L.M., 236 N.J. 

123, 145 (2018). "The question ultimately is not whether a biological mother or

father is a worthy parent, but whether a child's interest will best be served by

completely terminating the child's relationship with that parent." N.J. Div. of

Youth & Fam. Servs. v. T.S., 417 N.J. Super. 228, 249 (App. Div. 2010) (quoting 

N.J. Div. of Youth & Fam. Servs. v. E.P., 196 N.J. 88, 108 (2008)). 

As to the related first and second prongs of the statute, the trial court found 

the Division had established by lay and expert testimony that Bea's safety, 

health, and development has been and will continue to be endangered by the 

parental relationship and "is at a continuing risk of harm." 

The court then found the Division established the third prong because it 

had "made attempts over the years to engage Ann in services," but Ann's actions 

"contributed to [Bea's] prolonged stay in resource care and her incapacity to 
11 A-3565-22

provide adequate care and her inconsistent role is, in and of itself, causing harm 

to [Bea] by delaying permanency[.]" The trial court concluded efforts to provide 

services and support have failed, and "there is no realistic likelihood that . . . 

[Ann] . . . would be capable of caring for [Bea] in the near future" and Ann was 

"unwilling and/or unable to eliminate the harm facing [Bea]." The court then 

found the Division's efforts to provide services and explore alternatives to 

termination were reasonable, as required by law. 

Finally, under the statute's fourth prong, the court determined the evidence 

supported the order terminating parental rights. More specifically, the court 

held terminating the rights would not do more harm than good, "given Bea's 

right to permanency and safety." The court then granted the Division 

guardianship of Bea and terminated Ann's parental rights. 

On appeal, Ann challenges the court's findings on prongs three and four 

of the statute. The Law Guardian sides with the Division in urging we affirm 

the court's decision.

Our scope of appellate review is limited. It is well established that in Title 

30 cases we will not second-guess or substitute our judgment for that of the 

family court, provided its factual findings are "grounded in substantial and 

credible evidence in the record." N.J. Div. of Child Prot. & Permanency v.
12 A-3565-22

D.C.A., 256 N.J. 4, 19 (2023). "Deference is especially appropriate 'when the 

evidence is largely testimonial and involves questions of credibility.'" Cesare 

v. Cesare, 154 N.J. 394, 412 (1998) (quoting In re Return of Weapons to J.W.D., 

149 N.J. 108, 117 (1997)). "We accord deference to fact[-]findings of the family 

court because it has the superior ability to gauge the credibility of the witnesses 

who testify before it and because it possesses special expertise in matters related 

to the family." N.J. Div. of Youth & Fam. Servs. v. F.M., 211 N.J. 420, 448 

(2012). "[A] trial court's factual findings 'should not be disturbed unless they 

are so wholly unsupportable as to result in a denial of justice.'" N.J. Div. of 

Youth & Fam. Servs. v. P.P., 180 N.J. 494, 511 (2004) (quoting In re 

Guardianship of J.N.H., 172 N.J. 440, 472 (2002)). We owe no deference to a 

judge's legal conclusions, which are reviewed de novo. N.J. Div. of Child Prot. 

& Permanency v. A.B., 231 N.J. 354, 369 (2017). 

"Parents have a constitutionally protected right to maintain a relationship 

with their children." N.J. Div. of Youth & Fam. Servs. v. M.M., 189 N.J. 261, 

279 (2007). That right, however, "is not absolute" and is limited "by the State's 

parens patriae responsibility to protect children whose vulnerable lives or 

psychological well-being may have been harmed or may be seriously 

endangered by a neglectful or abusive parent." F.M., 211 N.J. at 447. In 
13 A-3565-22

guardianship and adoption cases, such as here, it is well-established that 

"[c]hildren have their own rights, including the right to a permanent, safe[,] and 

stable placement." N.J. Div. of Youth & Fam. Servs. v. C.S., 367 N.J. Super. 

76, 111 (App. Div. 2004). 

Ann first argues the Division did not provide her with meaningful or 

reasonable assistance because simply referring her to services would be unlikely 

to result in correction of the circumstances necessitating the Division's 

involvement in the first place, given her "mental health issues, homelessness, 

lack of interest in working with the Division, and frequent incarceration." She 

argues the Division should have instead focused its efforts on a KLG 

arrangement with either family members or Bea's resource parents. 

"Reasonable efforts" described in the first part of the third prong are 

statutorily defined as 

attempts by an agency authorized by the [D]ivision to 

assist the parents in remedying the circumstances and 

conditions that led to the placement of the child and in 

reinforcing the family structure, including, but not 

limited to: 

(1) consultation and cooperation with the parent in

developing a plan for appropriate services; 

(2) providing services that have been agreed upon, to 

the family, in order to further the goal of family 

reunification; 
14 A-3565-22

(3) informing the parent at appropriate intervals of the 

child's progress, development, and health; and 

(4) facilitating appropriate visitation. 

[N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(c).] 

"The reasonableness of the Division's efforts depends on the facts in each case." 

N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. A.G., 344 N.J. Super. 418, 435 (App. 

Div. 2001). The efforts "must by their very nature take into consideration the 

abilities and mental conditions of the parents" and may still be found reasonable 

even where "those efforts did not bear fruit." Id. at 442; see also In re 

Guardianship of D.M.H., 161 N.J. 365, 371 (1999). 

The record is replete with documentation of the Division's efforts to work 

with Ann and connect her with services, inform her of Bea's progress, and 

facilitate visitation. Ann's repeated failures to cooperate with these efforts over 

the course of months and years is equally well-documented. For example, she 

constantly refused to take medication and stopped mental health treatment every 

time it was started. 

Ann also argues the court erred in failing to consider alternatives to 

termination, as required by statute. She argues the court is "charged with 

preserving parental rights whenever possible" and recent changes to the law on 
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KLG require the court to make findings as to why KLG is not possible before 

terminating her rights. 

The 2021 amendments to the KLG statute placed KLG and adoption on 

equal footing as permanency options. L. 2021, c. 154. The amendments altered 

N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a)(2), the second prong of the best interests test, but "left 

unaltered the first, third, and fourth prongs[.]" D.C.A., 256 N.J. at 25. 

Ann's claim the court failed to consider alternatives to termination is also 

belied by the record. The court found, and the voluminous record reflects, the 

Division's exploration of alternatives to termination, specifically with respect to 

placement with a suitable relative, "on several occasions." K.L.W. reiterates, as 

the trial court stated on the record, "there is no presumption in favor of 

placement with relatives," but rather a responsibility that DCPP "at least first 

explor[e] available relative placements" before pursuing termination of parental 

rights. 419 N.J. Super. at 580. 

Such exploration, with respect to K.R., L.W., M.W., A.R., J.R., and Ann's 

paternal grandmother, is well-documented in the record. The record also reflects 

the many difficulties the Division had with obtaining information about other 

kin, including from Ann, who repeatedly, albeit at times inconsistently, opposed 

the idea of Bea being placed with any of her relatives. By the plain language of 
16 A-3565-22

the statute, the Division is charged with researching suitable placements and 

assessing interested parties, not all possible candidates. See N.J.S.A. 

30:4C-12.1(a). Nor can the court force a KLG arrangement on Bea's resource 

parents where their preference is to adopt the child. 

Ann next contends the record did not support the trial court's assessment 

of Bea's best interests under the fourth prong, because the record did not include 

any non-hearsay evidence of the resource parents' understanding of KLG or their 

willingness to adopt Bea and the Division did not produce an expert evaluation 

of Bea's secure bond with the resource parents. Defendant also challenges the 

court's reliance on Bea's right to permanency under the fourth prong of the bestinterests test. 

Evaluation of the Division's proofs under the fourth prong of N.J.S.A. 

30:4C-15.1(a)(4) "cannot require a showing that no harm will befall the child as 

a result of the severing of the biological ties." J.N.H., 172 N.J. at 478 (quoting 

K.H.O., 161 N.J. at 355). This prong can be satisfied by evidence "that the bond 

with foster parents is strong and, in comparison, the bond with the natural parent 

is not as strong[.]" N.J. Div. of Child Prot. & Permanency v. N.C.M., 438 N.J. 

Super. 356, 371 (App. Div. 2014) (quoting K.H.O., 161 N.J. at 363). The 

question is "whether, after considering and balancing the two relationships, the 
17 A-3565-22

child will suffer greater harm from the termination of ties with her natural 

parents than from permanent disruption of her relationship with her foster 

parents." K.H.O., 161 N.J. at 355. While a child's bond with the resource 

parents is an inappropriate consideration when evaluating parental fitness under 

the second prong, our Supreme Court has expressly held such evidence is 

appropriate for consideration under the fourth prong. D.C.A., 256 N.J. at 8-9. 

It is unrebutted in the record that Bea, now three years old, has thrived in 

the home of the resource parents who have cared for her since she was 

discharged from the hospital at two months of age. She has only spent a handful 

of days with Ann over the course of her young life. The Division discussed and 

explained the differences between KLG and adoption with the resource parents, 

who opted to adopt Bea. The trial court reasonably concluded — as 

recommended by the Division and the evidence marshaled by the unrebutted 

expert report — that termination of Ann's rights would not do more harm than 

good. There is substantial credible evidence to support the court's decision as 

consistent with Bea's best interests. 

To the extent we have not specifically addressed any other contentions 

raised by Ann, they lack sufficient merit to warrant discussion in this opinion. 

R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E). 
18 A-3565-22

Affirmed.