UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

)

RICHARD K. ELLIS, )

)

Plaintiff, )

) Civil Action No. 15-0025 (EGS)

v. )

)

MARTIN J. GRUENBERG, )

)

Defendant. )

)

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Pending before the Court is Defendant Martin J. Gruenberg’s 

(“Defendant”) Motion to Dismiss or Transfer for improper venue. 

Mot. Dismiss or Transfer, Docket No. 6. Upon consideration of 

the motion, the response and reply thereto, the applicable law, 

and the entire record, the Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss is 

DENIED and Defendant’s Motion to Transfer is GRANTED.

I. Background

Plaintiff Richard K. Ellis (“Plaintiff”) alleges that he was 

sexually harassed and retaliated against by supervisors in 

violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 during 

his employment at the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation 

(“FDIC”). See Compl., Docket No. 1; See also 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e2 et seq. Defendant moves to dismiss or transfer this case to 

the Eastern District of Virginia because the majority of events

1
giving rise to Plaintiff’s allegations took place at FDIC’s 

Office of Minority and Women Inclusion (OMWI), located in 

Arlington, Virginia. Def.’s Mem. Supp., Docket No. 6 at 3. 

II. Legal Standard

A case may be dismissed or transferred if the venue chosen 

by Plaintiff is improper or inconvenient. Fed. R. Civ. P. 

12(b)(3). When considering a 12(b)(3) motion, the court must 

accept plaintiff’s well-pled factual allegations regarding venue 

as true, but need not accept as true plaintiff’s legal 

conclusions regarding venue. See Darby v. Dept. of Energy, 231 

F. Supp.2d 274, 276 (D.D.C. 2002) (citation omitted). Courts may 

dismiss or, “in the interests of justice,” transfer the case to 

any district in which the action could have been filed. See 28 

U.S.C. § 1406; see also Parker v. Sebelius, Case No. 14-440, 14-

508, 2014 WL 2921026 (D.D.C. June 27, 2014) (citing Pendleton v. 

Mukasey, 552 F. Supp.2d 14, 17 (D.D.C. 2008)). “Generally, the 

‘interest of justice’ directive allows courts to transfer cases 

to the appropriate judicial district rather than dismiss them.” 

Id. (citing Ifill v. Potter, No. 05-2320, 2006 WL 3349549, at *1 

(D.D.C. Nov. 17, 2006)). 

III. Discussion

Title VII contains a specific venue provision which 

establishes proper venue under four circumstances:

[1] in any judicial district in the State in which the 

2
unlawful employment practice is alleged to have been 

committed; [2] in the judicial district in which the 

records relevant to such practice are maintained and 

administered; or [3] in the judicial district in which 

the aggrieved person would have worked but for the 

alleged unlawful employment practice, but if the 

respondent is not found within any such district, such 

an action may be brought [4] within the judicial district 

in which the respondent has his principal office. 

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3). In his Complaint, Plaintiff alleges 

that the District of Columbia is the proper venue because 

Defendant’s main office is in the District. Compl. ¶ 3. However, 

Defendant is correct that Title VII’s fourth basis for venue is 

residual and considered only when venue is not possible under 

the first three Title VII venue provisions. Kendrick v. Potter, 

CIV.A.06 122 GK, 2007 WL 2071670, at *3 (D.D.C. July 16, 2007)

(“[C]ourts consider the fourth basis for venue, i.e. the 

location of the defendant's principal office, only when the 

defendant cannot be found within any of the districts provided 

for by the first three bases.”) (internal citations and 

quotations omitted). 

In his response brief, Plaintiff does not advocate for 

finding proper jurisdiction under the fourth basis of Title 

VII’s venue statute, but rather under the first Title VII venue 

provision. Specifically, Plaintiff argues that a “substantial 

portion” of the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred in 

the District and that the hostile work environment created by 

3
his supervisors “extended” everywhere Plaintiff worked, 

including the FDIC Headquarters in the District. Pl.’s Mem. 

Opp., Docket No. 7 at 3-4. Plaintiff notes that in 2013 he was 

assigned burdensome tasks outside the scope of his normal duties 

in retaliation for rebuffing unwanted sexual advances, and that 

many of those tasks had to be completed in the FDIC DC 

headquarters. Id. at 3, citing Compl. ¶ 24-25. However, 

Plaintiff’s Complaint includes no allegations of harassment that

occurred in the District. Indeed, the majority of alleged 

harassment incidents occurred at the FDIC OMWI offices in 

Arlington, see e.g. Compl. ¶¶ 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 17, 32 and 35, 

and others allegedly took place in Winchester, Virginia and Los 

Angeles, California. Id. at ¶¶ 21, 26.

“Venue determinations of where a claim arose are based on a 

‘commonsense appraisal’ of events having operative significance 

in the case.” Donnell v. Nat'l Guard Bureau, 568 F. Supp. 93, 94 

(D.D.C. 1983) (citation omitted). In this case, the vast 

majority of alleged unlawful interactions occurred at the FDIC 

OMWI office in Arlington, Virginia. The proper venue under the 

first Title VII basis is therefore the Eastern District of 

Virginia. 

Moreover, Plaintiff cannot establish venue in the District 

based on the second or third Title VII venue provisions: he does 

not dispute that his employment records are maintained at the 

4
FDIC Division of Administration (“DOA”) office in Arlington, 

Virginia, See Pagano Decl., Docket 6-1 at ¶ 8, and but for the 

harassment and retaliation alleged by Plaintiff, he would still 

work at the FDIC OMWI in Arlington. For all of these reasons, 

the interest of justice weigh in favor of transferring this 

matter to the Eastern District of Virginia. 

IV. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss is 

DENIED and Defendant’s Motion to Transfer is GRANTED. An 

appropriate Order accompanies this Memorandum Opinion. 

Signed: Emmet G. Sullivan

United States District Judge

December 18, 2015

5