NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff

- Appellee,

v. PETRICA HAMZA, AKA Hamza Petrica,

Defendant

- Appellant. No. 18

- 50419
D.C. No. 2:18

- cr - 00438

- DSF

- 1

MEMORANDUM *

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California Dale S. Fischer, District Judge, Presiding Submitted August 10, 2020 * * Pasadena, California Before: CALLAHAN and BUMATAY, Circuit Judges, and M. WATSON, ** * District Judge.
Defendant

- Appellant Petrica Hamza challenges his conviction under the stowaway statute, 18 U.S.C. § 2199, on legal sufficiency grounds. At trial, the

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36

- 3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

*** The Honorable Michael H. Watson, United States District Judge for the Southern District of Ohio, sitting by designation. 

# FILED

AUG 13 2020
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS2

Government presented evidence that a ticketless Hamza us ed another passenger’s boarding pass and his own passport to pass through two airport security checkpoint s and board a United Airlines flight from London to Los Angeles

. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291

. Revi ewing th e evidence in the light most favorable to the Government, we hold that there was sufficient evidence to permit a rational juror to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that Ham z a boarded the transatlantic flight without United Airlines’ consent

. See United States v.
Nevils , 598 F.3d 1158, 1163

– 64 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc) . We therefore affirm. 1

1. Contrary to Hamza’s contention, the fact that U nited Airlines personnel waived Hamza through security checkpoints and onto the plane even though he presented another passenger’s boarding pass does not prove that he had
United Airlines’ consent to board the flight. The jury could (and apparently did)
infer from th e evidence that these United employees acted inattentiv ely in failing
to stop Hamza from boarding the plane , rather than by design or intention or pursuant to their employer’s direction

. 2 Similarly, the jury had the opportunity to

assess Hamza ’s argument s that he “did not misrepresent any information in

1 Bec ause the parties are familiar with the facts, we do not discuss them in further detail here.

2 The district court instructed the jury that “consent” means “a voluntary agreement, approval, or permission regarding some act or purpose,” and that “[v]oluntary means done by design or intention.” Hamza does not allege that these definitions , taken from Black’s Law Dictionary, were erroneous.3

obta ining consent to board the plane” and that he “honestly presented” another passenger’s boarding pass as his own

. The jury rejected these arguments. W e may

not second

- guess the jury’s judgment absent a showing that “ mere speculation, rather than reasonable inference, supports the government’s case.” Nevils , 598
F.3d at 1167 ; see United States v. Alarcon

- Simi , 300 F.3d 1172, 1176 (9th Cir. 2002) (noting that “it is the exclusive function of the jury to determine the

c redibility of witnesses, resolve evidentiary conflicts, and draw reasonable inferences from proven facts” (quoting United States v. Rojas , 554 F.2d 938, 943 (9th Cir. 1977) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)))

. Here, the jury’s interpretation of the evidence was reasonable.
2. Hamza waived his argument, raised for the first time on appeal, that “there was insufficient evidence that he intended to board the plane without United
Airlines’ consent.” See United States v. Graf , 610 F.3d 1148, 116 6 (9th Cir. 2010) (“[W] hen a Rule 29 motion is made on a specific ground, other grounds not raised
are waived .” (citing United States v. Quintana

– Torres, 235 F.3d 1197, 1199 (9th
Cir. 2000) )). But even absent waiver , Hamza has not shown that raising the

a rgument below would have “affected the outcome of the district court proceedings.” United States v. Olano , 507 U.S. 725, 734 (1993). First, we do not think the district court would have adopted Hamza’s interpretation of 18 U.S.C. § 2199, which runs count er to its plain text. Second , even if the jury had been4

instructed that the statute requires an intent to board without the airlines’ consent,

Hamza “has not pointed to evidence so supportive of innocence that no rational trier of fact could find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” Nevils , 598 F.3d at 1169 (citing Jackson v. Virginia , 443 U.S. 307, 317 (1979)).
AFFIRMED.