[Cite as State v. Armbruster , 2019-Ohio-4965.]

STATE OF OHIO ) IN THE COURT OF APPEALS )ss: NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COUNTY OF SUMMIT )

STATE OF OHIO Appellee

v. JAMIE M. ARMBRUSTER Appellant C.A. Nos. 29370 29371 29372

APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT ENTERED IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS COUNTY OF SUMMIT, OHIO CASE Nos. CR-2016-08-2979 CR-2015-03-0794 CR-2015-09-2902

DECISION AND JOURNAL ENTRY Dated: December 4, 2019

HENSAL, Judge. {¶1} Jamie Armbruster appeals from the judgment of the Summit County Court of

Common Pleas. This Court affirms.

I. {¶2} This is a consolidated appeal of three separate criminal cases: CR-2015-03-0794 (“First Case”), CR-2015-09-2902 (“ Second Case”), and CR-2016-08 -2979 (“Third Case”). In the First Case, a grand jury indicted Ms. Armbruster on counts for possession of heroin in violation of Revised Code Section 2925.11(A),(C)(6), illegal us e or possession of drug paraphernalia in violation of Section 2925.14(C)(1), and posses sing drug abuse instruments in

violation of Section 2925.12. Ms. A rmbruster moved for interve ntion in lieu of conviction (“IILC”), which the trial court granted. While in the IILC pro gram, a grand jury indicted Ms.2

Armbruster in the Second Case on the same three charges as the First Case. The trial court terminated Ms. Armbruster from the IILC program and reinstated the First Case. Ms. Armbruster then pleaded guilty to all of the charges in the Fir st and Second Cases. {¶3} The trial court sentenced Ms. Arm bruster to 24 months of commun ity control on each of the six counts, which it ordered to be served concurren tly. The trial court also indicated that, if Ms. Armbruster violat ed the conditions of her communit y control, it would impose a total of 19 months of imprisonment fo r the First and Second Case. {¶4} Less than one year later, a grand jury indicted Ms. Armbruster in the Third Case on the same three charges. Ms. Armbruster pleaded guilty to th e possession-of-heroin count, and the State dismissed the remaining two charges. The trial court sentenced her to 24 months of community control. The trial cour t advised Ms. Armbruster that if she violated the conditions of her community control, it could impose a prison term of 12 mont hs, which it would run consecutively to the 19-month se ntence from the First and Secon d Case, for a total of 31 months of imprisonment. {¶5} Ms. Armbruster later pleaded guilty to community-control violat ions in the First and Second Case. As a result, t he trial court extended her com munity control for an additional two years. Shortly thereafter, all three cases were re-assigne d to a new trial judge. After that, Ms. Armbruster pleaded guilty to community-control violations i n all three cases, and the new trial judge modified her sentence in each case to 90 days in th e Summit County Jail, to be served concurrently with each other. The trial court also extended he r community control for another

nine months. {¶6} The cases were then re-assigned to another (third) trial judge, and the State moved to set aside Ms. Armbruster’s modified sentences. In doing so, the State argued that each case3

contained a conviction of at leas t one felony of the fifth degr ee, which is punishable by 6-12 months in prison. It argued that the prior trial judge, theref ore, erred by imposing a 90-day jail term. The trial court granted the State’s motion, holding that the prior orders modifying Ms.

Armbruster’s sentences were nullities because the trial court l acked jurisdiction to modify its sentences. Ms. Armbruster has ap pealed, raising one assignment of error for this Court’s review.

II.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE STATE’S MOTION TO SET ASIDE APPELLANT’S MODIFIED SENTENCES. {¶7} In her assignment of error, Ms. Armbruster argues that the tria l court erred by granting the State’s motion to set aside her modified sentences . More specifically, she argues that the trial court properly ex ercised its discretion when it modified her sentences in all three cases and sentenced her to 90 days in jail. She also argues th at, since the trial court’s orders modifying her sentences were fina l orders, the trial court lack ed jurisdiction to later set aside those sentences. Ms. Armbruster further argues that the State should have appealed the trial

court’s orders that modified her sentences, and that its failur e to do so results in its claims being barred by res judicata and the law-of-the-case doctrine. Lastl y, she argues that any error in the trial court’s sentencing was either invited or induced by the S tate. For the reasons that follow, Ms. Armbruster’s arguments lack merit. {¶8} “Generally, Ohio trial courts lack the authority to reconsider their own valid final judgments in criminal cases.” State v. Gilbert , 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-110382, 2013-Ohio238, ¶ 5, citing State v. Raber , 134 Ohio St.3d 350, 2012-Ohio-5636, paragraph one of the syllabus. As this Court has stat ed, “[o]nce the trial court is sue[s] its sentencing judgment * * *, it los[es] jurisdiction to substantively modify that final judg ment. Any attempt to do so would be4

a nullity.” State v. Simin , 9th Dist. Summit No. 25309, 2011-Ohio-3198, ¶ 10. Exceptions exist, however, in situations involving voi d judgments or clerical err ors. Raber at ¶ 20. {¶9} Here, there is no dispute that t he trial court’s original sente ncing judgments were final orders. Then, after the cases were re-assigned to a new trial judge, the new trial judge

modified those sentences. It di d not do so based upon those se ntences being void, or to correct a clerical error. Instead, it simply disregarded the original se ntences and issued new ones. It had no jurisdiction to do so. Simin at ¶ 10. Accordingly, the judgments modifying Ms. Armbruster’ s sentences were nullities, thereby giving the trial court the in herent authority to vacate those judgments. Id. ; State v. Kirk , 9th Dist. Lorain No. 15CA010896, 2016-Ohio-6970, ¶ 8 (noting that courts have the inherent authority to recognize and vacate nullities); see Lingo v. State , 138 Ohio St.3d 427, 2014-Ohio-1052, paragraph three of the syllabus (“A court has the inherent authority to vacate its own void judgments.”); Tucker v. Dennis Baughman Co., Ltd. , 9th Dist. Summit Nos. 26620, 26635, 2014-Ohio-2040, ¶ 6 (“If a trial cour t lacks jurisdiction, any order it enters is a nullity and is void.”). Because those judgments we re nullities based upon the trial court’s lack of authority to modify its prior final orders, Ms. Armbruster’s arguments related to res judicata and the doctrines of invited error and law of the case lack merit. See State v. Banks , 10th Dist. Franklin No. 15AP-653, 2015-Ohio-5372, ¶ 14 (“Void s entences * * * are subject to correction at any time irrespective of the principles of res ju dicata or law of the case doctrine.”);

State v. Minkner , 194 Ohio App.3d 694, 2011-Ohio-3106, ¶ 25 (2d Dist.) (“Partie s to an action cannot, through invited error, c onfer jurisdiction where none e xists.”). In light of the foregoing, Ms. Armbruster’s assignme nt of error is overruled.5

III. {¶10} Ms. Armbruster’s assignment of e rror is overruled. The judgmen t of the Summit County Court of Common P leas is affirmed. Judgment affirmed.

There were reasonable grounds for this appeal. We order that a special mandate issue out of this Court, direc ting the Court of Common Pleas, County of Summit, State of Ohio, to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy of this journal entry shall constitute the mandate, pursuant to App.R. 27. Immediately upon the filing hereof , this document shall consti tute the journal entry of judgment, and it shall be file s tamped by the Clerk of the Cour t of Appeals at which time the period for review shall begin to run. App.R. 22(C). The Clerk of the Court of Appeals is instructed to mail a notice of entry of this judgment to the pa rties and to make a notation of the mailing in the docket , pursuant to App.R. 30. Costs taxed to Appellant.

JENNIFER HENSAL FOR THE COURT

TEODOSIO, P. J. SCHAFER, J. CONCUR.6

APPEARANCES: DONALD R. HICKS, Attorney at Law, for Appellant. SHERRI BEVAN WALSH, Prosecuti ng Attorney, and JACQUENETTE S. CO RGAN, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for Appellee.