NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF ARIZONA, Appellee, 

v.

BYRON TRENELL HAMPHILL WOOTEN, Appellant. 

No. 1 CA-CR 17-0136 

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County

No. CR2016-119929-001 

The Honorable Danielle J. Viola, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Phoenix

By Joseph T. Maziarz 

Counsel for Appellee 

Maricopa County Public Defender’s Office, Phoenix

By Jeffrey L. Force

Counsel for Appellant

FILED 4-19-2018
STATE v. WOOTEN

Decision of the Court

2 

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Paul J. McMurdie delivered the decision of the Court, in which 

Presiding Judge Lawrence F. Winthrop and Judge Jennifer B. Campbell

joined.

M c M U R D I E, Judge:

¶1 Byron Trenell Hamphill Wooten appeals his 13 convictions of 

sex trafficking, Class 2 felonies, one conviction of unlawful imprisonment, 

a Class 1 misdemeanor, and the resulting sentences. Wooten’s counsel filed 

a brief in accordance with Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), and State 

v. Leon, 104 Ariz. 297 (1969), certifying that, after a diligent search of the 

record, he found no arguable question of law that was not frivolous. 

Wooten was given the opportunity to file an initial supplemental brief but 

failed to follow length and form requirements. See ARCAP 14(a); Ariz. R. 

Crim. P. 1.6(b)(E). Wooten’s brief was stricken, and he was given an 

opportunity to file a brief in accordance with length and form requirements.

Wooten then filed a conforming supplemental brief. Counsel asks this court 

to search the record for arguable issues. See Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75 

(1988); State v. Clark, 196 Ariz. 530, 537, ¶ 30 (App. 1999). After reviewing 

the record, we affirm Wooten’s convictions and sentences. 

FACTS1 AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶2 A.A. contacted Wooten, a friend from high school, after losing 

her home sometime between February and March of 2016. Wooten agreed 

to help A.A., allowed her to move into his home, and brought her to San 

Diego. Soon after moving in, Wooten instructed A.A. that she would need 

to prostitute herself to make money to assist in paying bills. 

¶3 A.A. did not wish to prostitute herself, but feared she would 

lose her place to stay if she did not. Wooten instructed A.A. on the rules of 

prostitution including whom to talk to, where to go, how to dress, and what 

to charge. Wooten created online advertisements soliciting sexual services 

 

1 We view the evidence in the light most favorable to sustaining the 

convictions and resulting sentences. See State v. Guerra, 161 Ariz. 289, 293 

(1989). 
STATE v. WOOTEN

Decision of the Court

3 

from A.A. Wooten also set the amount of money A.A. was to make each 

night and kept all the money.

¶4 Wooten first brought A.A. to Phoenix in March 2016, with the 

intention of testing the Phoenix prostitution market, and later brought A.A. 

back to Phoenix with another woman. Phoenix police made first contact 

with A.A. while she was working and told her they would assist her if she 

wanted to get out of prostitution. A.A. remained fearful of Wooten but 

accepted a detective’s contact information. The next day A.A. contacted the 

detective and told her she wanted to get out of prostitution. A.A. and the 

detective met and faked A.A.’s arrest to remove her from Wooten without 

suspicion. A.A. assisted the police in investigating Wooten, and the police 

took her to a domestic violence shelter. 

¶5 After being brought to the domestic violence shelter, A.A. 

contacted Wooten in an attempt to retrieve her belongings from him.

Wooten refused to give A.A. her belongings unless she left the shelter with 

him, and A.A. agreed. Shortly after leaving with Wooten, A.A. was able to 

contact police, and police again removed her from the situation. Wooten 

was arrested soon after. 

¶6 Wooten was indicted on 13 counts of sex trafficking and two 

counts of kidnapping. After a 10-day jury trial, Wooten was found guilty 

on 13 counts of sex trafficking, Class 2 felonies, and one count of unlawful 

imprisonment, a Class 1 misdemeanor. The jury found as aggravating 

factors that the offenses were committed in consideration for the receipt, or 

in the expectation of the receipt, of pecuniary value and the offenses caused 

physical, emotional, or financial harm to the victim for Counts 1–7 and 

Count 14. Additionally, the jury found that the offense involved the 

infliction or threatened infliction of serious physical injury and the 

defendant committed the offenses in an especially heinous, cruel, or 

depraved manner for Counts 8-13. 

¶7 The court sentenced Wooten to seven concurrent aggravated 

terms of 10 years’ imprisonment for Counts 1 through 7, with 303 days of 

presentence incarceration credit. The court sentenced Wooten to six 

concurrent aggravated terms of 18.5 years’ imprisonment for Counts 8 

through 13. The court ordered the sentences for Counts 8 through 13 to run 

consecutive to Counts 1 through 7. The court sentenced Wooten to a term 

of six-months’ imprisonment for Count 14 for unlawful imprisonment, to 

run concurrent to Counts 1 through 7. Wooten timely appealed, and we 

have jurisdiction pursuant to Arizona Revised Statutes (“A.R.S.”) sections 

12-120.01(A)(1), 13-4031, and -4033(A). 
STATE v. WOOTEN

Decision of the Court

4 

DISCUSSION

¶8 We have read and considered counsel’s brief and have 

reviewed the record for any arguable issues. See Leon, 104 Ariz. at 300. We 

find none.

¶9 In his supplemental brief, Wooten raises the following issues: 

multiplicitous charging and sentencing, violation of Wooten’s Sixth 

Amendment right to a speedy trial, multiple violations of the Arizona Rules 

of Evidence, improper or insufficient jury instructions, improper racial 

representation on the jury, sufficiency of the evidence, imposition of unduly 

harsh sentences, prosecutorial misconduct, and that the cumulative effect 

of errors at and before trial deprived Wooten of due process. 

A. The Superior Court Did Not Impose Multiplicitous Sentences. 

¶10 Wooten first argues his convictions for Counts 1 through 13 

were multiplicitous, and therefore violate double jeopardy. The Double 

Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments “protects against 

multiple punishments for the same offense.” Ohio v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 493, 

498 (1984); Lemke v. Rayes, 213 Ariz. 232, 236, ¶ 10 (App. 2006). “[I]f multiple 

violations of the same statute are based on the same conduct, there can be 

only one conviction.” State v. Jurden, 239 Ariz. 526, 529, ¶ 11 (2016). “We 

review de novo whether double jeopardy applies.” State v. Powers, 200 Ariz. 

123, 125, ¶ 5 (App. 2001). 

¶11 Wooten claims Counts 1 through 13, all convictions for sex 

trafficking, were all for a single offense despite acknowledging that each 

count alleged an offense committed at different times. There was no error. 

In closing argument, Wooten’s attorney explained to the jury the distinction 

between the dates and that the jury must find that Wooten’s “conduct was 

present on that day for that act[.] . . .” Additionally, in the jury instructions, 

the superior court specifically instructed, “[the jury] must decide each count 

separately on the evidence with the law applicable to it, uninfluenced by 

your decision on any other count.” 

¶12 To determine whether error has occurred, “we may consider 

the jury instructions as given, the evidence at trial, the parties’ theories, and 

the parties’ arguments to the jury.” State v. Felix, 237 Ariz. 280, 285, ¶ 16 

(App. 2015). We presume that jurors follow the instructions provided to 

them. State v. Payne, 233 Ariz. 484, 518, ¶ 151 (2013). The acts supporting 

Counts 1 through 13 were separate and distinct from one another, and 

Wooten’s attorney properly explained to the jury that separate acts had to 
STATE v. WOOTEN

Decision of the Court

5 

be found to convict Wooten on the respective counts. Wooten’s convictions 

and sentences were separate and distinct, and, accordingly, Wooten’s 

convictions and sentences for Counts 1 through 13 did not constitute 

multiplicitous sentences. 

B. The Superior Court Did Not Violate Wooten’s Sixth Amendment 

Right to a Speedy Trial.

¶13 Wooten contends his Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial 

was violated because his trial was continued past its initial final day. Under

Rule 8.5, the superior court may grant a continuance for either party upon 

a finding of “extraordinary circumstances . . . and that delay is 

indispensable to the interests of justice.” “When it is alleged that the 

superior court improperly granted a Rule 8 continuance ‘[w]e will not 

disturb a ruling . . . absent a clear abuse of the trial court’s 

discretion.’” Snyder v. Donato, 211 Ariz. 117, 119, ¶ 7 (App. 2005) (alteration 

in Snyder) (quoting State v. Lukezic, 143 Ariz. 60, 68 (1984)). 

[T]he trial court is the only party in a position to judge the 

inconvenience of a continuance to the litigants, counsel, 

witnesses, and the court, and further is the only party in a 

position to determine whether there are “extraordinary 

circumstances” warranting a continuance and whether 

“delay is indispens[a]ble to the interests of justice.”

State v. Hein, 138 Ariz. 360, 368 (1983) (quoting Ariz. R. Crim. P. 8.5(b)). 

¶14 Wooten’s initial last day to begin trial was set for October 9, 

2016, 150 days after Wooten’s arraignment. Wooten’s trial was continued 

three times until it finally began on December 12, 2016, 64 days after the 

initial last day. However, while the State moved to continue the trial the 

initial two times, Wooten moved to continue the trial into December.

¶15 The superior court granted both of the State’s motions to 

continue trial as “indispensable to the interests of justice” because of the 

prosecutor’s trial conflict and to accommodate Wooten’s request to 

interview out-of-state victims pretrial. The record fails to indicate the 

superior court abused its discretion by granting the State’s motions to 

continue trial.
STATE v. WOOTEN

Decision of the Court

6 

C. The Superior Court Did Not Violate Rule 404 By Admitting Jail 

Calls as Evidence.

¶16 Wooten contends that the superior court abused its discretion 

by admitting his jail calls under Arizona Rule of Evidence 404(b). Before 

trial, the State moved to introduce Wooten’s jail calls. The superior court 

held a hearing and ultimately granted the motion. 

¶17 We review a court’s admission of evidence pursuant to Rule 

404(b) for an abuse of discretion. State v. Lehr, 227 Ariz. 140, 147, ¶ 19 (2011). 

Evidence of prior acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person 

to show action in conformity with the previous conduct. Ariz. R. Evid. 

404(b). However, prior acts may be admissible if the evidence is offered for 

another proper purpose. Id. Prior to admitting such evidence, the court 

should conduct a hearing to determine its admissibility.

Before admitting prior bad act evidence, a trial court should 

determine that: (1) the evidence is proffered to show 

something other than conduct in conformity with the prior 

acts, pursuant to rule 404(b); (2) the evidence is legally and 

logically relevant under rule 402; (3) the probative value of the 

evidence substantially outweighs the risk of unfair prejudice 

under rule 403; and (4) defendant has not been denied an 

appropriate limiting instruction under rule 105. 

State v. Hyde, 186 Ariz. 252, 276 (1996). 

¶18 The State presented evidence of Wooten’s own statements in 

the form of jail calls, along with testimony from the lead detective and 

expert in the case, which included information related to the investigation 

and the statements of other witnesses and the victim. The calls 

demonstrated that Wooten continued to instruct other women on how to 

prostitute themselves and evade police detection while he was in jail. The 

State presented the jail calls to show Wooten’s knowledge, planning, and 

intent to continue his prostitution ring. The State did not present the jail 

calls to demonstrate Wooten’s character as an individual who commits sex 

trafficking offenses. Considering the testimony and evidence presented at 

the hearing, the superior court did not abuse its discretion by granting the 

State’s motion to introduce Rule 404(b) evidence.
STATE v. WOOTEN

Decision of the Court

7 

D. The Superior Court Did Not Violate the Rule Against Hearsay by 

Admitting the Jail Calls as Evidence. 

¶19 Wooten contends the superior court violated the rule against 

hearsay by allowing his jail calls into evidence. Wooten failed to object on 

this ground before or during trial. When a defendant fails to object at trial 

to the introduction of evidence, we review only for fundamental error. See

State v. Marlow, 163 Ariz. 65, 69 (1989); see also State v. Henderson, 210 Ariz. 

561, 567, ¶ 19 (2005). 

¶20 Fundamental error is “rare” and is an “error going to the 

foundation of the case, error that takes from the defendant a right essential 

to his defense, and error of such magnitude that the defendant could not 

possibly have received a fair trial.” Henderson, 210 Ariz. at 567, ¶ 19 

(quoting State v. Hunter, 142 Ariz. 88, 90 (1984)); see also State v. Morris, 215 

Ariz. 324, 337, ¶ 59 (2007). The defendant has the burden to prove error, 

that the error was fundamental, and that the error caused 

prejudice. Henderson, 210 Ariz. at 567−69, ¶¶ 19, 23−24, 26. 

¶21 Rule 801(c) defines hearsay as a statement, other than one 

made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, “offer[ed] in 

evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.” However, Rule 801(d)(2) 

provides that such statements are “not hearsay” if they were made by one 

party and offered by the opposing party. Here, Wooten’s statements in the 

jail calls were offered against him by the State. Therefore, the jail calls do 

not constitute hearsay. State v. Buccheri-Bianca, 233 Ariz. 324, 333, ¶ 33 (App. 

2013) (defendant’s recorded statement admitting guilt properly admitted as 

a statement by a party opponent).

E. The Superior Court Did Not Err by Determining the Probative 

Value of the Jail Calls Was Not Outweighed by a Danger of Unfair 

Prejudice.

¶22 Wooten contends the superior court abused its discretion by 

determining the probative value of the jail calls outweighed any unfair 

prejudice. Ariz. R. Evid. 403. Wooten claims that any indication he was 

incarcerated before the trial should have been precluded from trial. 

¶23 All relevant evidence is admissible if the law does not 

otherwise prohibit it. Ariz. R. Evid. 402; State v. Kiper, 181 Ariz. 62, 65 

(App. 1994); see also Ariz. R. Evid. 403 (although relevant, evidence may be 

excluded “if its probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of 

. . . unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, 

wasting time, or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence.”). In 
STATE v. WOOTEN

Decision of the Court

8 

conducting a Rule 403 analysis, the superior court should first “assess the 

probative value of the evidence on the issue for which it is offered.” State v. 

Gibson, 202 Ariz. 321, 324, ¶ 17 (2002). This assessment is then weighed 

against potential unfair prejudice to the opposing party. Girouard v. Skyline 

Steel, Inc., 215 Ariz. 126, 129, ¶ 11 (App. 2007). 

¶24 “Because this is a weighing of factors that cannot easily be 

quantified, substantial discretion is accorded the trial judge.” Gibson, 202 

Ariz. at 324, ¶ 17 (internal quotations omitted); see also Sprint/United Mgmt. 

Co. v. Mendelsohn, 552 U.S. 379, 387 (2008) (“[Q]uestions of relevance and 

prejudice are for the District Court to determine in the first instance.”). The

Rule 403 balancing process is a specific function of the superior court that 

this court reviews only for an abuse of discretion. Girouard, 215 Ariz. at 129, 

¶ 10; see Mendelsohn, 552 U.S. at 384 (“Under this deferential standard, 

courts of appeals uphold Rule 403 rulings unless the district court has 

abused its discretion.”). Further, in reviewing the superior court’s 

evidentiary ruling, we must view “the evidence in the light most favorable 

to the proponent, maximizing its probative value and minimizing its 

prejudicial effect.” Kiper, 181 Ariz. at 66. 

¶25 Given the testimony and evidence discussed above, the 

superior court did not abuse its discretion by determining the probative 

value of Wooten’s jail calls outweighed their potential unfair prejudicial 

affect. 

F. The Superior Court Did Not Err by Qualifying the State’s Expert 

Witness and Instructing the Jury on How to Consider Expert 

Testimony.

¶26 Wooten contends the superior court abused its discretion by 

qualifying Detective Decoufle as an expert witness. “Whether a particular 

witness possesses sufficient qualifications to qualify as an expert is . . . 

within the trial court’s discretion, and such a determination will not be 

upset on appeal in the absence of a clear abuse of discretion.” State v. Mosley, 

119 Ariz. 393, 400 (1978). 

¶27 Arizona Rule of Evidence 702(a) states “if . . . specialized 

knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to 

determine a fact in issue,” a witness “qualified as an expert by knowledge, 

skill, experience, training, or education may testify in the form of an opinion 

or otherwise.” “The test of whether a person is an expert is whether a jury 

can receive help on a particular subject from the witness.” State v. Davolt, 

207 Ariz. 191, 210, ¶¶ 70, 73–76 (2004) (a detective who had attended crime 
STATE v. WOOTEN

Decision of the Court

9 

scene management and homicide investigation classes, as well as watched 

two training videos, was qualified to testify on blood spatter analysis; 

although his training was not extensive, it was more than a lay person 

receives and was enough to permit him to testify as an expert). An expert is 

not required to have the “highest possible qualifications” to be qualified to 

testify about a particular matter; “the extent of training and experience of 

an expert goes to the weight, rather than the admissibility, of his

testimony.” Mosley, 119 Ariz. at 400. 

¶28 Decoufle, at the time of trial, had worked for the Phoenix 

Police Department for 16 years and completed detective, undercover, 

interview, and human trafficking training prior to the instant case. 

Furthermore, Decoufle was the primary or secondary detective for between 

40 and 50 investigations and holds a master’s degree in human services 

focusing on psychology. Considering Decoufle’s extensive experience and 

training, we cannot say that the superior court abused its discretion by 

qualifying her as an expert witness.2 

G. The Empaneled Jury Consisted of Wooten’s Peers. 

¶29 Wooten contends the jury empaneled for his trial did not 

consist of his peers and the practice of selecting alternate jurors through 

random draw is unacceptable as a matter of policy. To prove an equal 

protection violation associated with jury selection, 

The first step is to establish that the group is one that is a 

recognizable, distinct class, singled out for different treatment 

under the laws, as written or as applied. Next, the degree of 

underrepresentation must be proved, by comparing the 

proportion of the group in the total population to the 

proportion called to serve as grand jurors, over a significant 

period of time . . . . Finally, . . . a selection procedure that is 

susceptible of abuse or is not racially neutral supports the 

presumption of discrimination raised by the statistical 

showing. 

Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 494 (1977) (citations omitted). 

 

2 Wooten contends that because Decoufle should not have been 

qualified as an expert, the superior court’s instructions regarding expert 

witnesses were improper. Because the superior court did not abuse its 

discretion by qualifying Decoufle as an expert, this contention is moot. 
STATE v. WOOTEN

Decision of the Court

10 

¶30 Wooten has failed to establish the prima facie case of an equal 

protection violation associated with jury selection process because he failed 

to assert how Arizona law has singled out a distinct class to which he 

belongs and failed to prove the degree of underrepresentation by 

comparing the proportion of the group in the total population to the 

proportion called as jurors, “over a significant period of time.” Id. (emphasis 

added).

¶31 Additionally, Wooten contends choosing alternate jurors 

through a random drawing is unacceptable as a matter of policy. The 

process used to determine which jurors are alternates is known as simple 

random sampling, whereby “we select a group of subjects (a sample) . . . 

from a larger group (a population).” YALE UNIV. DEP’T OF STATISTICS AND 

DATA SCI., http://www.stat.yale.edu/Courses/1997-98/101/sample.htm 

(last visited Apr. 13, 2018). Every empaneled juror has an equal chance of 

being selected as an alternate (or conversely a deliberating juror). See id. 

¶32 There is no state or federal guarantee to a jury consisting of 

jurors perfectly representative of a given state or county. A simple random 

sampling to determine which jurors are alternates ensures all jurors have 

an equal probability of being chosen as an alternate. See YALE UNIV. DEP’T 

OF STATISTICS AND DATA SCI., http://www.stat.yale.edu/Courses/1997-

98/101/sample.htm. Thus, choosing jurors as alternates randomly is 

acceptable as a matter of policy. 

H. The Evidence Presented at Trial Was Sufficient to Convict. 

¶33 Wooten contends the State presented insufficient evidence at 

trial to convict him for Counts 1 through 14. We review the sufficiency of 

the evidence de novo. State v. West, 226 Ariz. 559, 562, ¶ 15 (2011). We view 

the evidence in the light most favorable to upholding the verdicts and 

resolve all conflicts in the evidence against Wooten. See State v. Girdler, 138 

Ariz. 482, 488 (1983). We do not reweigh the evidence or determine the 

credibility of witnesses. State v. Williams, 209 Ariz. 228, 231, ¶ 6 (App. 2004). 

¶34 We will not reverse unless “there is a complete absence of 

probative facts to support the conviction[s].” State v. Scott, 113 Ariz. 423, 

424–25 (1976). “To set aside a jury verdict for insufficient evidence it must 

clearly appear that upon no hypothesis whatever is there sufficient

evidence to support the conclusion reached by the jury.” State v. Arredondo, 

155 Ariz. 314, 316 (1987). Sufficient evidence may be either direct or 

circumstantial, and may support differing reasonable inferences. State v. 

Anaya, 165 Ariz. 535, 543 (App. 1990). 
STATE v. WOOTEN

Decision of the Court

11 

¶35 Here, the evidence summarized above was sufficient to 

support the jury’s verdicts. The victim, as well as multiple investigators, 

detectives, and experts all testified at trial. The jury found the testimony of 

witnesses and exhibits admitted credible and convicted Wooten of Counts 

1 through 14. There is sufficient evidence to support the conclusion reached 

by the jury. 

I. Wooten’s Sentences Were Not Unduly Harsh. 

¶36 Wooten contends there is no statutory basis to impose a $20 

probation assessment upon his release from prison. Under A.R.S. 

§ 12-114.01(A), “in addition to any other penalty, fine, fee, surcharge or 

assessment authorized by law, a person shall pay [a probation] assessment 

of twenty dollars on conviction for a criminal offense . . . .” 

¶37 Wooten further contends that his sentences should all run 

concurrently because Counts 1 through 14 were really the same crime, the 

superior court’s reason for imposing consecutive sentences was not 

supported by the record, the superior court should not have sentenced 

Wooten for repetitive offenses, and the aggravating factors found by the 

jury were not supported by the record.

¶38 “A trial court has broad discretion in sentencing and, if the

sentence imposed is within the statutory limits, we will not disturb the

sentence unless there is a clear abuse of discretion.” State v. Ward, 200 Ariz. 

387, 389, ¶ 5 (App. 2001). 

¶39 As noted above, Counts 1 through 13 were committed 

multiple times on different days. Count 14 was a wholly separate crime. 

Considering the testimony and evidence presented at trial, the superior 

court did not abuse its discretion by sentencing Wooten to seven concurrent 

aggravated terms of ten years’ imprisonment for Counts 1 through 7, six 

concurrent aggravated terms of 18.5 years’ imprisonment for Counts 8 

through 13, to run consecutively to Counts 1 through 7, and a term of sixmonths’ imprisonment for Count 14 for unlawful imprisonment, to run 

concurrent to Counts 1 through 7.3

 

3 Wooten contends the prosecutor committed prosecutorial 

misconduct by overcharging him with thirteen counts of sex trafficking. 

Because we find the evidence supports the convictions, we find the 

contention meritless.
STATE v. WOOTEN

Decision of the Court

12 

J. Wooten Was Not Deprived of a Fair Trial or Due Process of Law. 

¶40 Wooten contends the cumulative error occurring at and 

before his trial constituted fundamental error depriving him of due process 

of law. If any “incidents contributing to a finding of misconduct are 

identified, we must evaluate their cumulative effect on the trial.” State v. 

Roque, 213 Ariz. 193, 228, ¶ 155 (2006), abrogated on other grounds by State v. 

Escalante-Orozco, 241 Ariz. 254 (2017). Because we are unable to find any 

errors in the record, we reject Wooten’s contention. 

¶41 Wooten was present and represented by counsel at all stages 

of the proceedings against him. The record reflects the superior court 

afforded Wooten all his constitutional and statutory rights, and the 

proceedings were conducted in accordance with the Arizona Rules of 

Criminal Procedure. The court conducted appropriate pretrial hearings, 

and the evidence presented at trial and summarized above was sufficient 

to support the jury’s verdicts. Wooten’s sentences fall within the range 

prescribed by law, with proper credit given for presentence incarceration. 

CONCLUSION

¶42 Wooten’s convictions and sentences are affirmed. After the 

filing of this decision, defense counsel’s obligations pertaining to Wooten’s 

representation in this appeal will end after informing Wooten of the 

outcome of this appeal and his future options, unless counsel’s review 

reveals an issue appropriate for submission to the Arizona Supreme Court 

by petition for review. See State v. Shattuck, 140 Ariz. 582, 584–85 (1984).