Filed 3/21/14

CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FOUR

FLAVIO RAMOS et al.,

 Plaintiffs and Appellants,

v.

BRENNTAG SPECIALTIES, INC., et 

al.,

 Defendants and Respondents.

 B248038

 (Los Angeles County

 Super. Ct. No. BC449958)

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, 

Amy D. Hogue, Judge. Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded with 

directions.

Metzger Law Group, Raphael Metzger and Kenneth A. Holdren; Simon 

Greenstone Panatier Bartlett and Brian P. Barrow for Plaintiffs and Appellants.

Lynberg & Watkins, Ruth Segal and Rosemary Do for Defendant and 

Respondent Porter Warner Industries.

W. Eric Blumhardt, Tiffany J. Gates and Archer Norris; Kevin L. Place for 

Defendants and Respondents P-G Industries, Inc. and The Pryor-Giggey 

Company.

Snider, Diehl & Rasmussen, Stephen C. Snider and Trenton M. Diehl for 

Defendant and Respondent J.R. Simplot Company.
2

Gordon & Rees, Roger Mansukhani and Brandon D. Saxon for Defendant 

and Respondent Laguna Clay Company.

Schaffer, Lax, McNaughton & Chen, Jill A. Franklin and Yaron F. Dunkel 

for Defendant and Respondent Scott Sales Co.

Chuck Birkett Tsoong, Stephen S. Chuck, Tiffany M. Birkett and Victoria J. 

Tsoong for Defendant and Respondent Resource Building Materials.

Gordon & Rees, P. Gerhardt Zacher and Matthew P. Nugent for Defendants 

and Respondents Alcoa Inc. and Schorr Metals, Inc.

Bates Winter & Cameron, David L. Winter and Christopher R. Robyn for 

Defendant and Respondent Southwire Company.

K & L Gates and Michele Barnes for Defendant and Respondent Alcoa Inc.

McGuire Woods and Diane Flannery for Defendant and Respondent 

Century Kentucky, Inc.

Koletsky, Mancini, Feldman & Morrow and Susan L. Caldwell for 

Defendant and Respondent TST, Inc.

Hurrell Cantrall, Thomas C. Hurrell and Melinda Cantrall for Defendants 

and Respondents, United States Gypsum Co. and Westside Building Material 

Corp.

__________________________________________

In the underlying action, appellants Flavio Ramos and his wife asserted 

claims against respondents for negligence, negligence per se, strict liability, and 

loss of consortium, alleging that Ramos’s exposure to their products during his 
3

employment at a metal foundry caused his pulmonary fibrosis.1 Respondents

demurrered to the claims on the ground that they failed under the component parts 

doctrine, as applied in Maxton v. Western States Metals (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 

81 (Maxton). Relying on Maxton, the trial court sustained respondents’ demurrer 

without leave to amend and thereafter entered a judgment of dismissal.

With the exception of appellants’ claim for negligence per se, we conclude 

that the complaint states viable claims, and we respectfully disagree with the 

holding in Maxton. As we explain, the component parts doctrine does not shield a 

product supplier from liability when a party alleges that he suffered direct injury 

from using the supplier’s product as the supplier specifically intended. We 

therefore affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand with directions to the trial 

court to enter a new order overruling respondents’ demurrers to appellants’ claims, 

with the exception of the claim for negligence per se. 

RELEVANT PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On November 19, 2010, appellants initiated the underlying action. Their 

second amended complaint (SAC) contained claims against respondents for

negligence, negligence per se, strict liability based on a failure to warn and design 

defects, fraudulent concealment, breach of implied warranties, and loss of 

consortium. 

The SAC alleged that from 1972 to 1978 and from 1981 to 2009, Ramos

worked as a mold maker, machine operator, and laborer for Supreme Casting & 

Pattern, Inc. (Supreme), which manufactured metal parts through “a foundry and 

 

1 Although both Flavio Ramos and his wife are appellants in this action, our 

references to Ramos refer to Flavio.
4

fabrication process.”2 While employed by Supreme, Ramos worked “with and 

around” metals, plaster and minerals that respondents supplied to Supreme. 

Respondents Alcoa Inc., Schorr Metals, Inc., Southwire Company, Century 

Kentucky, Inc. and TST, Inc. (metal suppliers) provided metal products, which 

were melted in furnaces to form metal castings. The casting process used molds 

created from plaster, sand, limestone and marble supplied by the remaining 

respondents, United States Gypsum Co., Westside Building Material Co., Porter 

Warner Industries, LLC., Resource Building Materials, P-G Industries, Inc., The 

Pryor-Giggey Company, J.R. Simplot Company, Laguna Clay Company, and Scott 

Sales Co. (mold material suppliers).

3 According to the SAC, Ramos developed 

interstitial pulmonary fibrosis as the result of his exposure to, inter alia, fumes 

from the molten metal and dust from the plaster, sand, limestone and marble. 

Respondents sought judgment on the pleadings regarding the SAC, 

contending that appellants’ claims failed under Maxton, which addressed similar 

claims under circumstances resembling those alleged in the SAC.4 There, the 

plaintiff asserted claims for negligence, negligence per se, strict liability, 

fraudulent concealment, and breach of implied warranties against several 

defendants who had supplied metal products to his employer. (Maxton, supra, 203 

 

2 The SAC also alleged that from 1979 to 1980, Ramos performed similar duties 

while employed by a different metal parts manufacturer. 

3 The SAC alleges that those respondents provided the following materials: United 

States Gypsum Co. (plaster), Westside Building Material Co. (plaster), Porter Warner 

Industries, LLC. (plaster and zircon sand), P-G Industries, Inc. (plaster and zircon sand), 

The Pryor-Giggey Company (plaster and zircon sand), J.R. Simplot Company (silica 

sand), Laguna Clay Company, (limestone), Scott Sales Co. (limestone), Brenntag 

Specialties, Inc. (limestone), and Resource Building Materials (limestone and marble). 

4 After Alcoa Inc. filed the motion for judgment on the pleadings based on Maxton, 

several of the other respondents joined in the motion. 
5

Cal.App.4th at pp. 85-86.) The operative complaint alleged that the plaintiff, 

while employed as a laborer, “‘worked with and around’” those metal products, 

which were cut, ground, sandblasted, welded, and brazed during his employer’s

manufacturing process. (Id. at p. 86.) The complaint further alleged that the 

suppliers failed to disclose the hazards of their products to the plaintiff, who 

developed interstitial pulmonary fibrosis due to his exposure to metallic fumes and 

dust from the products. (Ibid.) 

The suppliers filed demurrers and a motion for judgment on the pleadings, 

asserting that the plaintiffs’ claims failed under the so-called “component parts 

doctrine.” (Maxton, supra, 203 Cal.App.4th at p. 88.) The trial court agreed, and 

ruled in the suppliers’ favor without affording the plaintiff leave to amend his 

complaint. (Id. at p. 95.) In affirming the judgment of dismissal, the appellate 

court placed special emphasis on the discussion of the component parts doctrine in 

Artiglio v. General Electric. Co. (1998) 61 Cal.App.4th 830, 838-839 (Artiglio). 

The appellate court concluded that the doctrine, as set forth in Artiglio, shielded 

the suppliers from liability to the plaintiff arising from the use of their metal 

products in the manufacturing process. (Maxton, supra, at pp. 88-95 & fn. 3.) 

In the instant action, the trial court granted judgment on the pleadings 

regarding the SAC with leave to amend, and advised appellants that to state causes 

of action, they must “plead around . . . Artiglio,” as interpreted in Maxton. After 

appellants filed their third amended complaint, respondents asserted demurrers 

based on Maxton, which the court sustained with leave to amend. When 

appellants filed their fourth amended complaint (FAC), respondents again 

demurred on the basis of Maxton. The court sustained the demurrers without leave 

to amend, and entered a joint judgment of dismissal in favor of respondents. This 

appeal followed. 
6

DISCUSSION

Appellants maintain the trial court erred in sustaining the demurrers to the

FAC. Their principal contention is that the injuries alleged in the FAC fall outside 

the component parts doctrine. They assert that the doctrine, when applicable,

relieves a supplier of component parts from liability for injuries arising from an 

end product into which the supplier’s parts have been integrated. Because the 

FAC alleges that Ramos’s injuries resulted from the direct and intended use of 

respondents’ products, and not from injuries resulting from the use of any end 

product, appellants argue the component parts doctrine does not shield

respondents from liability. We agree.5 

A. Standards of Review

“Because a demurrer both tests the legal sufficiency of the complaint and 

involves the trial court’s discretion, an appellate court employs two separate 

standards of review on appeal. [Citation.] . . . Appellate courts first review the 

complaint de novo to determine whether . . . the complaint alleges facts sufficient 

to state a cause of action under any legal theory, [citation], or in other words, to 

 

5 Appellants raise two other contentions: (1) that the component parts doctrine is an 

affirmative defense; and (2) that the FAC successfully “‘plead[ed] around’” the specific 

elements of the defense, as stated in Artiglio. Generally, a demurrer predicated on an 

affirmative defense is properly sustained only when “the face of the complaint discloses 

that the action is necessarily barred by the defense.” (Casterson v. Superior Court (2002) 

101 Cal.App.4th 177, 183.) As explained below (see pt. C.4 & C.5., post), we conclude 

that under the facts alleged in the FAC, the component parts doctrine is inapplicable to 

the types of claims asserted in the FAC, and thus does not shield respondents from 

liability for Ramos’s injuries. Accordingly, it is unnecessary to resolve whether the 

doctrine constitutes an affirmative defense. For similar reasons, it is unnecessary to 

determine whether the FAC adequately pleaded around the doctrine, as set forth in 

Artiglio. 
7

determine whether . . . the trial court erroneously sustained the demurrer as a 

matter of law. [Citation.]” (Cantu v. Resolution Trust Corp. (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 

857, 879, fn. deleted (Cantu).) “Second, if a trial court sustains a demurrer

without leave to amend, appellate courts determine whether . . . the plaintiff could 

amend the complaint to state a cause of action. [Citation.]” (Id. at p. 879, fn. 9.)

Under the first standard of review, “we examine the complaint’s factual 

allegations to determine whether they state a cause of action on any available legal 

theory. [Citation.] We treat the demurrer as admitting all material facts which 

were properly pleaded. [Citation.] However, we will not assume the truth of 

contentions, deductions, or conclusions of fact or law [citation], and we may 

disregard any allegations that are contrary to the law or to a fact of which judicial

notice may be taken. [Citation.]” (Ellenberger v. Espinosa (1994) 30 Cal.App.4th 

943, 947.) In reviewing an order sustaining a demurrer, we will affirm the order 

on any ground raised in the demurrer, regardless of whether the trial court relied 

on it; moreover, we will consider new theories offered on appeal to support the 

ruling. (B & P Development Corp. v. City of Saratoga (1986) 185 Cal.App.3d 

949, 959.) 

Under the second standard of review, the burden falls upon the plaintiff to 

show what facts he or she could plead to cure the existing defects in the complaint.

(Cantu, supra, 4 Cal.App.4th at p. 890.) “To meet this burden, a plaintiff must 

submit a proposed amended complaint or, on appeal, enumerate the facts and 

demonstrate how those facts establish a cause of action.” (Ibid.)

Here, appellants neither offer nor suggest factual amendments to the FAC. 

Our inquiry is thus focused primarily on a question of law, namely, whether the 

facts as alleged in the FAC necessarily invoke the application of the component 

parts doctrine. 
8

B. Governing Principles

We begin by discussing the principles governing tort claims involving 

defective products, giving special attention to their application when a worker 

alleges injuries from products supplied to his or her employer for use by the 

employer’s workers.

 

1. Liability For Product Defects

Generally, a plaintiff may seek recovery in a “products liability” case either 

on a theory of strict liability or on a theory of negligence. (Merrill v. Navegar, 

Inc. (2001) 26 Cal.4th 465, 478.) Under either theory, the plaintiff must prove that 

a defect in the product caused injury. (Ibid.) In addition, to establish a negligence

theory, a plaintiff must prove that the defect in the product was due to the 

defendant’s negligence. (Ibid.) Generally, recovery is permitted for three kinds of 

defects: manufacturing defects, design defects, and warning defects, that is, 

inadequate warnings or failures to warn. (Anderson v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas 

Corp. (1991) 53 Cal.3d 987, 995; Merrill v. Navegar, Inc., supra, 26 Cal.4th at 

p. 479; Powell v. Standard Brands Paint Co. (1985) 166 Cal.App.3d 357, 363-

364.) 

Here, the FAC contains strict liability claims for warning and design 

defects. The “defective warning” claim alleges that respondents failed to warn 

Ramos of “scientifically known and knowable” hazards related to his use of their 

products. “Generally speaking, manufacturers have a duty to warn consumers 

about the hazards inherent in their products. [Citation.] The requirement’s 

purpose is to inform consumers about a product’s hazards and faults of which they 

are unaware, so that they can refrain from using the product altogether or evade 

the danger by careful use.” (Johnson v. American Standard, Inc. (2008) 43 
9

Cal.4th 56, 64.) A product that is otherwise flawless in its design and manufacture 

“‘may nevertheless possess such risk to the user without a suitable warning that it 

becomes “defective” simply by the absence of a warning.’” (Finn v. G. D. Searle 

& Co. (1984) 35 Cal.3d 691, 699.) 

The “design defect” claim relies on the so-called “consumer expectation[s]” 

test for defects. Under that test, a product is defective in design if it “fail[s] to 

perform as safely as an ordinary consumer would expect.” (Soule v. General 

Motors Corp. (1994) 8 Cal.4th 548, 562.) Because that test does not require the 

possibility of an alternative safer “design” for a product, raw asbestos has been

determined to have a defective design under the test. (Garza v. Asbestos Corp., 

Ltd. (2008) 161 Cal.App.4th 651, 658-662; Arena v. Owens Corning Fiberglas 

Corp. (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 1178, 1185-1186 (Arena).)6 

The FAC also contains claims for negligence and negligence per se. In 

connection with the former, the FAC alleges primarily that respondents 

negligently failed to warn Ramos of the “scientifically known and knowable 

hazards” of their products. Generally, “a manufacturer or a supplier of a product 

is required to give warnings of any dangerous propensities in the product, or in its 

use, of which he knows, or should know, and which the user of the product would 

 

6 As explained in Arena, “[t]o the extent that the term ‘design’ merely means a 

preconceived plan, even raw asbestos has a design, in that the miner’s subjective plan of 

blasting it out of the ground, pounding and separating the fibers, and marketing them for 

various uses, constitutes a design. . . . [W]hen that design violates minimum safety 

assumptions, it is defective. [Citation.] Whether or not the defendant is able to design 

the product in a different way is irrelevant . . . . [Citation.]” (Arena, supra, 63 

Cal.App.4th at p. 1186, fn. deleted.)
10

not ordinarily discover.” (Groll v. Shell Oil Co. (1983) 148 Cal.App.3d 444, 448

(Groll).)7 

Regarding the claim for negligence per se, we observe that ordinarily, 

“‘[t]he doctrine of negligence per se is not a separate cause of action, but creates 

an evidentiary presumption that affects the standard of care in a cause of action for 

negligence.’ [Citation.] [¶] The doctrine of negligence per se does not provide a 

private right of action for violation of a statute. [Citation.]” (Johnson v. 

Honeywell Internat., Inc. (2009) 179 Cal.App.4th 549, 555, quoting Millard v. 

Biosources, Inc. (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 1338, 1353, fn. 2.) Under the doctrine, 

“the plaintiff ‘borrows’ statutes to prove duty of care and standard of care.” 

(Johnson v. Honeywel Internat., Inc., supra, at p. 558.)8 Nonetheless, the term 

“‘negligence per se’” has occasionally been applied when a statute establishes a 

special duty of care beyond that underlying common law negligence. (Connell v. 

 

7 Section 388 of the Restatement Second of Torts states: “One who supplies directly 

or through a third person a chattel for another to use is subject to liability to those whom 

the supplier should expect to use the chattel with the consent of the other or to be 

endangered by its probable use, for physical harm caused by the use of the chattel in the 

manner for which and by a person for whose use it is supplied, if the supplier [¶] (a) 

knows or has reason to know that the chattel is or is likely to be dangerous for the use for 

which it is supplied, and [¶] (b) has no reason to believe that those for whose use the 

chattel is supplied will realize its dangerous condition, and [¶] (c) fails to exercise 

reasonable care to inform them of its dangerous condition or of the facts which make it 

likely to be dangerous.”

8 Evidence Code section 669 provides that a presumption of negligence is 

established when a defendant “(1) . . . violated a statute, ordinance, or regulation of a 

public entity; [¶] (2) [t]he violation proximately caused death or injury to person or 

property; [¶] (3) [t]he death or injury resulted from an occurrence of the nature which the 

statute, ordinance, or regulation was designed to prevent; and [¶] (4) [t]he person 

suffering the death or the injury to his person or property was one of the class of persons 

for whose protection the statute, ordinance, or regulation was adopted.” (Evid. Code, 

subd. (a)(1)(2)(3).)
11

Harris (1913) 23 Cal.App. 537, 541; see 4 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (5th ed. 2008) 

Pleading, § 583, p. 710 [discussing cases].) 

In connection with the negligence per se claim, the FAC alleges that 

respondents violated Labor Code section 6390.5, which requires manufacturers 

and distributors to provide labels on their products in compliance with attendant 

regulations (see Cal. Code Regs., tit. 8, § 5194). (Johnson v. Honeywell Internat.,

Inc., supra, 179 Cal.App.4th at p. 556.) Those regulations oblige manufacturers 

and distributors to specify hazards related to the products on the labels or in 

material safety data sheets provided to employers; in addition, the regulations 

require employers to educate their employees regarding those hazards. (Ibid.) 

2. Doctrines Limiting Liability

 Under three distinct but potentially overlapping doctrines, courts have limited a 

supplier’s liability for injury arising from certain uses or applications of its 

product. Two of these doctrines -- often called the “bulk supplier” and 

“sophisticated buyer” rules -- focus on whether the product, before causing injury, 

passed to, or through, a party who knew (or should have known) of the product’s 

hazards. (Artiglio, supra, 61 Cal.App.4th at pp. 838-839; see Taylor v. Am.

Chemistry Council (1st Cir. 2009) 576 F.3d 16, 24-25.) The first doctrine is 

ordinarily invoked when a supplier, upon selling a product in bulk to an 

intermediary who passes it on, warns the intermediary of the product’s hazards. 

(Taylor v. Am. Chemistry Council, supra, 576 F.3d at pp. 25-26.) In contrast, the 

second doctrine is ordinarily invoked when the supplier provides the product to a 

purchaser -- either an intermediary or an end user -- who knows (or should know) 

of the hazards, regardless of any warning to the purchaser. (See ibid.) Although 

conceptually distinct, the two rules are sometimes combined under the term,
12

“‘bulk sales/sophisticated purchaser doctrine[].’” (See Artiglio, supra, 61 

Cal.App.4th at pp. 838-839.) 

The third doctrine is known as the “component part[s]” or, where 

applicable, “raw materials” doctrine. (Artiglio, supra, 61 Cal.App.4th at p. 839; 

Springmeyer v. Ford Motor Co. (1998) 60 Cal.App.4th 1541, 1550-1554.) Under 

that doctrine, suppliers of component parts or raw materials integrated into an 

“end product” are ordinarily not liable for defects in the end product, provided that 

their own parts or materials were nondefective, and they did not exercise control 

over the end product. (Artiglio, supra, at pp. 839-840; Bay Summit Community 

Assn. v. Shell Oil Co. (1996) 51 Cal.App.4th 762, 772.) The doctrine is reflected 

in section 5 of the Restatement Third of Torts, Products Liability, which states that

a component part supplier is subject to liability for harm caused by the end product 

only when the component itself has a defect that results in injury, or the supplier

plays a material role in integrating the component into the end product whose 

defects cause injury. (Rest.3d Torts, Products Liability, § 5.)9

The application of the component parts doctrine was examined in Artiglio. 

There, the plaintiffs asserted negligence claims against a silicone supplier, alleging 

that they had been injured by silicone breast implants made by a manufacturer who

had obtained silicone from the supplier. (Artiglio, supra, 61 Cal.App.4th at 

pp. 833-834.) The plaintiffs contended the supplier knew or should have known 

 

9 Section 5 of the Restatement Third of Torts, Products Liability, states in pertinent 

part: “One engaged in the business of selling or otherwise distributing product 

components who sells or distributes a component is subject to liability for harm to 

persons or property caused by a product into which the component is integrated if: [¶] (a) 

the component is defective in itself, . . . and the defect causes the harm; or [¶] (b)(1) the 

seller or distributor of the component substantially participates in the integration of the 

component into the design of the product; and [¶] (2) the integration of the component 

causes the product to be defective . . . and (3) the defect in the product causes the harm.”
13

that its silicone materials were not appropriate for use in medical devices, yet it 

failed to warn the manufacturer. (Id. at p. 835.) 

The appellate court affirmed the trial court’s grant of summary judgment to 

the supplier. (Artiglio, supra, 61 Cal.App.4th at p. 841.) Following a survey of 

authorities regarding the “‘bulk sales/sophisticated purchaser’” and component 

parts doctrines, the appellate court stated: “[C]omponent and raw material 

suppliers are not liable to ultimate consumers when the goods or material they 

supply are not inherently dangerous, they sell goods or material in bulk to a 

sophisticated buyer, the material is substantially changed during the 

manufacturing process and the supplier has a limited role in developing and 

designing the end product. When these factors exist, the social cost of imposing a 

duty to the ultimate consumers far exceeds any additional protection provided to 

consumers.” (Id. at p. 839.)

Applying those factors to the evidence before it, the appellate court 

concluded that summary judgment was proper. (Artiglio, supra, 61 Cal.App.4th at 

pp. 840-841.) In so concluding, the court observed that the silicone materials were 

not inherently dangerous, as they became potentially unsafe only when used in 

medical devices; that the implant manufacturers were “highly sophisticated

buyers”; that the silicone materials were substantially transformed during the 

manufacturing process; and that the supplier had no role in designing the implants. 

(Id. at pp. 840-841.) 

3. Injuries From Product’s Use By Worker 

We turn to decisions predating Maxton that addressed product liability 

claims by workers alleging that they suffered injury from products used in their 

work. Applications of the principles we have discussed are found in Wright v. 
14

Stang Manufacturing Co. (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 1218, 1222 (Wright), TellezCordova v. Campbell-Hausfeld/Scott Fetzger Co. (2004) 129 Cal.App.4th 577

(Tellez-Cordova); Schwoerer v. Union Oil Co. (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 103 

(Schwoerer), and a decision of the Minnesota Supreme Court, Gray v. Badger 

Mining Corp. (Minn. 2004) 676 N.W.2d 268 (Gray). 

In Wright, the defendant manufactured a water cannon that had been 

mounted on a fire engine owned and operated by a public fire department. 

(Wright, supra, 54 Cal.App.4th at p. 1222.) When the plaintiff, a public 

firefighter, used the water cannon, it broke loose from its mount, threw him to the 

ground and fell on him, causing injury. (Ibid.) The defendant obtained summary 

judgment on the plaintiff’s products liability claims on the theory that the cannon’s 

mount, rather than the cannon itself, was defective. (Id. at pp. 1222-1223.) The 

appellate court reversed, concluding there were triable issues whether the cannon 

suffered from a design defect because it was incompatible with a sufficiently 

strong mounting system; in addition, the court determined there were triable issues 

whether the defendant had failed to warn about a potential mismatch between the 

cannon’s water pressure and the strength of its mount. (Id. at pp. 1230-1236.) In 

so concluding, the court rejected the defendant’s contention that it was exempt 

from liability as a “component part manufacturer[],” reasoning, inter alia, that the 

specific hazards arising from the cannon’s installation for its intended use were 

sufficiently obvious to the defendant to trigger a duty to warn. (Id. at pp. 1234, 

1235-1236.) 

In Tellez-Cordova, the plaintiff asserted strict liability claims based on 

warning and design defects against manufacturers of grinding tools the plaintiff 

had used. The plaintiff’s complaint alleged that he had suffered injury as the 

result of exposure to toxic dust released from abrasive discs powered by the tools. 
15

(Tellez-Cordova, supra, 129 Cal.App.4th at pp. 579-580.) The defendants 

successfully demurred to the complaint on the basis of the component parts 

doctrine. (Id. at p. 581.) In reversing, the appellate court noted that the complaint 

alleged that the tools were specifically designed to be used with the abrasive discs 

for the purpose of grinding metals, and that toxic dust was created when the tools 

were used for the purpose intended by their manufacturers. (Id. at pp. 582-583.)

In Schwoerer, the plaintiff worked as a mechanic on a boring machine 

cutting an underground tunnel. (Schwoerer, supra, 14 Cal.App.4th at p. 109.) 

While in the tunnel, he used a solvent his employer had purchased and provided. 

(Ibid.) Through intermediary suppliers, the employer received the manufacturer’s 

material safety data sheet warning that exposure to the solvent could cause skin 

and respiratory irritation, but the employer did not pass those warnings along to 

the plaintiff. (Id. at p. 109.) Because the plaintiff’s job responsibilities required 

him to dip machine parts into the solvent, he frequently worked “up to his elbows” 

in it, yet his employer provided no protective clothing. (Id. at p. 109.) After the 

plaintiff suffered permanent liver damage, he asserted products liability claims

against the manufacturer and intermediary suppliers, who secured summary 

judgment in their favor on the theory that their warnings to the employer that the 

solvent could cause skin and respiratory irritation insulated them from liability for 

the plaintiff’s injuries. (Id. at p. 106.) 

The appellate court reversed, concluding that the warnings were insufficient 

to apprise the plaintiff of the injuries he actually suffered. (Schwoerer, supra, 14 

Cal.App.4th at pp. 112-114.) Focusing on whether the warnings given provided 

sufficient notice of the solvent’s potential for causing liver damage, the court 

determined they did not: “[P]laintiff claims his liver was irreparably damaged, an 

injury different in kind from and significantly greater than any consequence of 
16

dermal exposure against which the [material safety data sheet] warned.” (Id. at pp.

110-114.)10

Particularly instructive is Gray. There, a foundry worker asserted product 

liability claims based on a failure to warn against a silica sand supplier, alleging 

that he contracted silicosis due to exposure to the supplier’s sand, which he had 

used in making casting molds in the foundry. (Gray, supra, 676 N.W.2d. at pp. 

271-272.) After an appellate court determined that the worker’s claims failed 

because the foundry was a sophisticated purchaser of sand, the Minnesota 

Supreme Court reversed, concluding that there were triable issues regarding the 

application of “bulk sales” and “sophisticated purchaser” doctrines. (See id. at pp. 

275-280.) Regarding these doctrines, the court noted that the supplier had 

provided only inadequate warnings regarding the hazards of its sand to the 

foundry, and that there was no evidence the supplier had reason to believe the 

foundry would provide adequate warnings to its workers. (Ibid.) 

The court also rejected application of the component parts doctrine, stating: 

“Although sand is a raw material and is not inherently dangerous, it is nevertheless 

dangerous when used in a foundry process. [The supplier] specifically develops 

sand for foundry use and has conceded that it understands the manner in which 

silica is used in the foundry process. More importantly, the sand is not used as a 

component of a finished product, and it is the sand -- not the finished product --

that is dangerous to foundry workers.” (Gray, supra, 676 N.W.2d at p. 281.) 

 

10 Although the plaintiff in Schwoerer asserted only a “warning defect” strict liability 

claim against the manufacturer, the appellate court determined that its conclusion was 

also applicable to a “warning defect” negligence claim. (Schwoerer, supra, 14 

Cal.App.4th at p. 106, fn. 2.)
17

C. Analysis

We next examine whether respondents’ demurrers to the FAC were properly 

sustained. As explained below, with the exception of the claim for negligence per 

se, we conclude the FAC states tenable claims (see pts C.1, C.2 & C.3. post).

1. Strict Liability and Negligence Claims

The FAC adequately pleads strict liability and negligence claims predicated 

on warning and design defects.11 Regarding the warning defect claims, the FAC 

alleges that respondents’ products were specialized materials used as respondents 

specifically intended in Supreme’s manufacturing process.

12 The FAC further 

alleges that respondents’ metal products were “inherently dangerous” in 

themselves when melted during the casting process, as they released metallic 

toxins known to cause interstitial pulmonary fibrosis. The FAC also alleges that 

respondents’ plaster, sand, limestone and marble were “inherently dangerous,” as

they released silica dust and other known causes of interstitial pulmonary fibrosis 

 

11 As explained in Bockrath v. Aldrich Chemical Co. (1999) 21 Cal.4th 71, 78-84, 

when a worker asserts that he suffered personal injuries due to exposure to toxins 

contained in products with which he worked, the complaint must allege facts establishing 

the supplier’s breach of duties regarding those products and the causation of the worker’s 

injuries. 

12 The FAC alleges that the metal suppliers’ products were “specialized metal alloys 

manufactured and sold . . . for specialized applications,” and were “melted as specifically 

designed and intended by [the metal suppliers] in furnaces during foundry operations 

. . . .” The FAC contains similar allegations regarding the products from the mold 

material suppliers, namely, the plaster, sand, limestone and marble used to create the 

casting molds. According to the FAC, the plaster was “specifically designed and 

intended” by the plaster suppliers “for the purpose of making plaster molds of the type 

used in casting operations,” and the other materials were “sold and supplied by [their 

suppliers] for the specialized purpose of being used to create molds for the casting of 

metals.” 
18

when Ramos scooped them out of bags, poured them into containers, and handled 

them in other ways. 

According to the FAC, although state and federal regulations identified the 

products or their constituents as hazardous, respondents provided no warnings to 

Ramos.

13 In addition, respondents failed to comply with their statutory duty to 

provide appropriate material safety data sheets to his employer, Supreme. The 

FAC further asserts that Supreme was not a sophisticated purchaser, as it was “a 

small unsophisticated company with a relatively small number of employees,”

none of whom were aware of the hazards of working with respondents’ products. 

In our view, the allegations are sufficient to state “defective warning” 

claims. The allegations establish a duty to warn, as they assert (1) that 

respondents knew, or should have known, of hazards arising from their products 

when used as intended in the metal casting process, and (2) that users such as 

Ramos were unlikely to discover those hazards on their own. Because the FAC 

otherwise alleges that Ramos suffered injury from exposure to those hazards, the 

“defective warning” claims are adequately pleaded. 

We reach the same conclusion regarding the strict liability claim predicated 

on a defective design. That claim invokes the “consumer expectations” test for 

defects, alleging that respondents’ products “failed to perform as safely as an 

ordinary user would expect when used in an intended or reasonably foreseeable 

 

13 The FAC alleges that federal and state regulations describe metal ingots intended 

for melting as dangerous materials, and identify certain metals contained in the metal 

suppliers’ products as hazardous (including aluminum, chromium, copper, iron, 

manganese, molybdenum, and titanium). The FAC further asserts that those metals can 

cause interstitial pulmonary fibrosis. The FAC also contains materially similar 

allegations regarding constituents of the plaster, sand, limestone and marble. 
19

manner . . . .” Because the test does not require plaintiffs to identify an alternative 

safer “design” for the products, we see no fatal defect in the claim. 

 

2. Negligence Per Se Claim

In contrast, the FAC states no independent claim for negligence per se. As 

noted above (see pt. B.1., ante), that claim is predicated on allegations that 

respondents violated Labor Code section 6390.5 and its attendant regulations. 

However, that statute affords workers no private right of action for such violations 

against a supplier of injurious products to their employer. (See Johnson v. 

Honeywell Internat. Inc., supra, 179 Cal.App.4th at p. 556.) Accordingly, 

although appellants may rely on evidence of those violations to prove their 

negligence claim (Elsner v. Uveges (2004) 34 Cal.4th 915, 935-936), the 

demurrers to the negligence per se claim were properly sustained. (Das v. Bank of 

America, N.A. (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 727, 737-740.) 

3. Other Claims

We further conclude that the FAC’s remaining claims for fraudulent 

concealment, breach of implied warranties, and loss of consortium are adequately 

pleaded. Generally, to state a fraudulent concealment claim against a product 

supplier, an employee may allege that the supplier, in providing the product to the 

employer, intentionally withheld information regarding the product’s injurious 

hazards. (Jones v. ConocoPhillips (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 1187, 1198-1201.)

The FAC alleges those facts, which are also sufficient to establish a claim for 

breach of implied warranties. (Id. at pp. 1201-1202.) Finally, because the FAC 

adequately pleads Ramos’s personal injury claims and alleges that appellants are 
20

married, the FAC is sufficient to support his wife’s claim for loss of consortium.

(Vanhooser v. Superior Court (2012) 206 Cal.App.4th 921, 927-928.)

14

4. Maxton

In sustaining respondents’ demurrers without leave to amend, the trial court 

understandably concluded that the claims in the FAC failed under Maxton. 

However, to the extent Maxton can be read to conclude that the component parts 

doctrine, as set forth in Artiglio, is ordinarily applicable to the type of claim 

asserted in the FAC, we disagree with its rationale. For the reasons explained 

below, neither the component parts doctrine nor its underlying rationale supports 

such application to the facts alleged here.

The California Supreme Court, numerous appellate courts, and the 

Restatement Third of Torts have recognized that the component parts doctrine 

applies to harm caused by “finished product[s]” into which the supplier’s product 

has been incorporated. (O’Neil v. Crane Co. (2012) 53 Cal.4th 335, 355; Taylor v. 

Elliot Turbomachinery Co., Inc (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 564, 584 (Taylor) 

[discussing cases].) Section 5 of the Restatement Third of Torts, Products 

Liability, addresses liability for harm “caused by a product into which the 

component is integrated . . . .” As noted in Gray, on its face, the component parts 

doctrine does not target claims by a party alleging that he suffered a direct injury 

 

14 On appeal, Resource Building Materials contends that appellants’ claims against it 

fail because the FAC contains no allegation that Ramos was exposed to any limestone or 

sand products that it supplied. We disagree. The FAC provides a list, “by named 

defendant,” of sand and limestone products, . . . to which . . . Ramos[] was exposed, or 

which caused [him] to be exposed to toxic metallic and inorganic fumes, vapors, and 

dusts during the course of [his] employment, and which caused [his] toxic injuries and 

occupational diseases.” Resource Building Materials is among those named defendants.
21

from using a product as the supplier specifically intended. (Gray, supra, 676 

N.W.2d at p. 281.) 

In contrast, Artiglio addressed claims against a supplier of a material for 

injuries caused by the finished product into which the material was integrated. 

(Artiglio, supra, 61 Cal.App.4th at pp. 833-834.) Artiglio’s statement of the 

component parts doctrine underscores its circumscribed application: 

“[C]omponent and raw material suppliers are not liable to ultimate consumers 

when the goods or material they supply are not inherently dangerous, they sell 

goods or material in bulk to a sophisticated buyer, the material is substantially 

changed during the manufacturing process and the supplier has a limited role in 

developing and designing the end product.” (Id. at p. 839, italics added.)

Although the doctrine may be invoked when a worker suffers injury while 

engaged in employment that incorporates or uses a supplier’s component part, its 

application has ordinarily been restricted to situations in which the injuries were 

attributable to an item over which the supplier lacked material control, such as the 

employer’s manufacturing system itself (viewed as the “finished product”), or to 

some other element of the system, rather than to the supplier’s component part. 

(See Taylor, supra, 171 Cal.App.4th at pp. 584-586.) Here, in contrast, the FAC 

alleges a direct injury from the intended use of respondents’ products -- not from 

any finished product, manufacturing system into which the products were 

integrated, or apparatus built to the employer’s specifications.15 

 

15 Respondents contend that a “myriad” of cases have applied the component parts 

doctrine to claims resembling those in the FAC. We conclude that none of those cases 

supports application of the doctrine to the claims asserted in the FAC. 

In several of the cases, the pertinent injuries arose from a finished product sold to 

the public that contained the defendant’s product as a component, or from another 

component of the finished product not provided by the defendant. In each case, the 

(Fn. continued on next page.)
22

 

appellate court concluded that the defendant was not liable for the injuries because it 

lacked material control over the finished product. (Lee v. Electric Motor Division (1985) 

169 Cal.App.3d 375, 381-387 [supplier of “ordinary, off-the-shelf” electric motors not 

liable for injuries from meat grinding machine lacking emergency brake because supplier 

had no role in machine’s design and manufacture]; Wiler v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co.

(1979) 95 Cal.App.3d 621, 627-629 [supplier of tires lacking valves not liable for injuries 

arising from defective valve, as intermediate manufacturer attached valve to tire before 

providing it to injured party]; Walker v. Stauffer Chemical Corp. (1971) 19 Cal.App.3d 

669, 672 [supplier of acid not liable for injuries from drain cleanser containing acid as 

component, as acid was substantially changed during the process of making the cleanser, 

over which supplier had no control].)

Similarly, in all but one of the cases, a worker alleged injuries from the employer’s 

manufacturing system that incorporated the defendant’s product, or from an item used in 

combination with that product, and the appellate court determined that the defendant 

lacked material control regarding the particular hazard that caused the injuries. (Taylor, 

supra, 171 Cal.App.4th at pp. 577-586 [worker’s injuries arose from asbestos-laden 

gaskets and packing, rather than from defendant’s valves used with the gaskets and 

packing]; Gray v. R.L. Best Co. (N.Y. App. Div. 2010) 910 N.Y.S.2d 307, 309 [78 

A.D.3d 1346] [worker injured by accidental operation of employer’s aluminum extrusion 

press while replacing part supplied by defendant]; Ranger Conveying & Supply Co. v. 

Davis (Tex.App. 2007) 254 S.W.3d 471, 475-485 [worker injured when bale fell from 

employer’s truck onto conveyor belt owned by employer and provided by defendant]; 

Brocken v. Entergy Gulf States, Inc. (Tex.App. 2006) 197 S.W.3d 429, 435-438 [worker 

received shock from employer’s electrical system that incorporated defendant’s circuit 

breaker, which was rendered ineffective by employer’s error in designing system]; 

Toshiba Intern. Corp. v. Henry (Tex.App. 2004) 152 S.W.3d 774, 777-786 [worker 

injured by accidental operation of aluminum “scrap winder” into which defendant’s part 

had been incorporated]; Temple v. Wean United, Inc. (1977) 50 Ohio St.2d 317, 323-329 

[364 N.E.2d 267, 270-274] [plaintiff injured by accidental operation of punch press into 

which defendant’s “on-off” buttons had been incorporated].)

In the remaining case, a worker alleged that he suffered injuries from hot materials 

from a “quench tank” supplied by the defendant after the tank had been integrated into the 

employer’s manufacturing system. (Zaza v. Marquess and Nell, Inc. (1996) 144 N.J. 34, 

42 [675 A.2d 620, 624].) The appellate court concluded that the component parts 

doctrine shielded the defendant from liability, reasoning that the defendant built the tank 

according to the employer’s specifications, and that the tank was defective only because 

the employer integrated it into the manufacturing system without suitable safety 

mechanisms. (144 N.J. at pp. 47-65 [675 A.2d at pp. 626-636].) Here, in contrast, the 

(Fn. continued on next page.)
23

Apart from falling outside the letter of the component parts doctrine, the 

injuries alleged in the FAC also fall outside the doctrine’s rationale. The 

Restatement Third of Torts, Products Liability, explains that rationale in the 

following terms: “As a general rule, component sellers should not be liable when 

the component itself is not defective . . . . If the component is not itself defective, 

it would be unjust and inefficient to impose liability solely on the ground that the 

manufacturer of the integrated product utilizes the component in a manner that 

renders the integrated product defective. Imposing liability would require the 

component seller to scrutinize another’s product which the component seller has 

no role in developing. This would require the component seller to develop 

sufficient sophistication to review the decisions of the business entity that is 

already charged with responsibility for the integrated product.” (Rest.3d Torts,

Products Liability, § 5, com. a, p. 131, italics added.) Here, the FAC alleges that 

Ramos suffered injuries not from a defective “integrated product” that 

incorporated respondents’ products, but from those products themselves, which he 

used as respondents intended in the course of Supreme’s manufacturing process. 

Furthermore, application of the component parts doctrine, as set forth in 

Artiglio, is ill-suited to the assessment of the FAC’s claims. To begin, an inquiry 

into whether the supplier’s product was “inherently dangerous” -- the first factor 

specified in Artiglio -- presupposes that the product was potentially a component 

of multiple end products, and focuses on whether the supplier’s product was 

foreseeably dangerous in all those uses. Thus, in Artiglio, the appellate court 

determined that the manufacturer’s silicone was not inherently dangerous because 

it had been safely incorporated into many nonmedical devices, and became 

 

FAC alleges that respondents did not design their products in accordance with Supreme’s 

(Fn. continued on next page.)
24

potentially dangerous only when used in breast implants. (Artiglio, supra, 61 

Cal.App.4th at p. 840.) That type of inquiry, however, is inappropriate when a 

worker alleges that he suffered injury by using a product as intended by its

supplier. As explained above (see pt. B.1 & B.3, ante), in suitable circumstances, 

a supplier must warn workers of hazards they will encounter when the supplier’s 

product is put to the use intended or specified by the supplier.

16 

The second Artiglio factor, namely, whether the supplier sold in bulk to a 

sophisticated purchaser, focuses attention on whether the purchaser knew, or 

should have known, that the supplier’s products were hazardous when put to the 

purchaser’s use. (Artiglio, supra, 61 Cal.App.4th at p. 830.) In Maxton, the 

appellate court found that some of the plaintiff’s claims failed solely because his 

employer, who had bought many types of metal over a lengthy period, was 

necessarily a sophisticated purchaser. (Maxton, supra, 203 Cal.App.4th at pp. 93, 

94-95.) Relying on Maxton, respondents argue that because the FAC alleges that 

Supreme had operated a foundry for a lengthy period, it must be regarded, as a 

matter of law, as a sophisticated purchaser.

We are doubtful that the allegation of lengthy use, standing alone, is 

sufficient to establish Supreme’s status as a sophisticated purchaser as a matter of 

law. Even if it were, however, this factor omits a consideration crucial to the 

application of the sophisticated purchaser doctrine to the facts alleged here. As 

this court recently explained, when a worker asserts defective warning claims 

 

specifications, and that Supreme was unaware of the products’ hazards.

16 We granted a request from the Council for Education and Research on Toxics and

several other parties to submit a brief as amici curiae addressing the proper application of 

the first Artiglio factor. Because we conclude that the component parts doctrine is 

inapplicable to the claims alleged in the FAC, it is unnecessary to examine their 

contentions.
25

against a product supplier, the employer’s status as a sophisticated purchaser does 

not shield the supplier from liability as a matter of law; the supplier must also 

show that it had some reason to believe the worker knew, or should have known, 

of the product’s hazards. (Pfeifer v. John Crane, Inc. (2013 ) 220 Cal.App.4th 

1270, 1298-1299 (Pfeifer).) That showing may be made in numerous ways, 

including the presentation of evidence that the specific dangers were so readily 

apparent to the employer that it would be expected to protect its workers. (Ibid.) 

No such facts are alleged in the FAC.17

The third Artiglio factor, namely, whether the supplier’s product “is 

substantially changed during the manufacturing process,” is reasonably viewed as 

limiting a supplier’s liability only for injuries arising from an end product into 

 

17 Pointing to Johnson v. American Standard, Inc., supra, 43 Cal.4th 56, respondents 

suggest that an employer’s status as a sophisticated purchaser, by itself, shields a supplier 

from liability. As we explained in Pfeifer, Johnson supports the contrary position. 

(Pfeifer, supra, 220 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1296-1297.) 

In a related contention, respondents observe that several out-of-state courts, 

applying the sophisticated purchaser doctrine, have found suppliers of sand and similar 

materials to employers not liable for injuries to employees engaged in making end 

products. However, in each case, evidence in the record established that the employer 

had full knowledge of the hazards, or that the hazards were apparent to the employer. 

(Bates v. E.D. Bullard Co. (La.Ct.App. 2011) 76 So.3d 111, 113, 114 [evidence showed 

that hazards from silica sand to workers engaged in sandblasting were “‘common 

knowledge’”]; Bergfeld v. Unimin Corp. (8th Cir. 2003) 319 F.3d 350, 354 [foundry 

knew that excessive exposure to silica dust was hazardous]; Cowart v. Avondale 

Industries, Inc. (La.Ct.App. 2001) 792 So.2d 73, 76-77 [sand supplier provided adequate 

warnings of hazards to foundry]; Phillips v. A.P. Green Refractories Company

(Pa.Super.Ct. 1993) 630 A.2d 874, 883 [foundry had full knowledge of dangers of silica 

dust]; Smith v. Walter C. Best, Inc. (W.D. Pa. 1990) 756 F.Supp. 878, 886-889 [same]; 

Ryntz v. Afrimet Indussa, Inc. (6th Cir. 1989) 887 F.2d 1087 [employer had full 

knowledge of dangers of cobalt dust]; Beale v. Hardy (4th Cir. 1985) 769 F.2d 213, 214-

215 [foundry had extensive knowledge of dangers from silica dust and appropriate safety 

measures].) Not only does the FAC contain no admission of such knowledge, it asserts 

that Ramos’s employer was unaware of the hazards of respondents’ products. 
26

which the supplier’s product has been integrated. In contrast, when a supplier’s 

product itself has a specific intended use, the supplier ordinarily must provide 

warnings regarding hazards likely to be encountered in that use, even when the 

intended use involves the product’s transformation or destruction (Groll, supra, 

148 Cal.App.3d at pp. 446-448 [manufacturer’s data sheet adequately warned that 

lantern and stove fuel should be kept away from source of sparks]; Proctor & 

Gamble Co. v. Superior Court (1954) 124 Cal.App.2d 157, 159, 162 [warning 

required that use of detergent could caused dermatitis]), or its deployment at some 

stage of a construction or manufacturing process (Crane v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.

(1963) 218 Cal.App.2d 855, 857-859 [warning required that fluid for preparing 

surfaces for painting was combustible]). 

The fourth Artiglio factor -- whether the supplier has control over the end 

product -- is also ordinarily pertinent only to injuries arising from an end product 

into which the supplier’s product has been incorporated. When, as in the FAC, a 

worker alleges that he suffered injuries directly from the supplier’s product, but 

not from his employer’s end product, the supplier’s lack of control over the design 

and development of the end product is irrelevant to the rationale underlying the 

component parts doctrine, and thus to the supplier’s liability. In sum, insofar as 

Maxton determined that the component parts doctrine is applicable to claims of the 

type alleged in the FAC, we respectfully disagree. 

5. Respondents’ Other Contentions 

Respondents also raise other contentions related to Maxton and the trial 

court’s application of that decision. Their principal contention is that the products 

they supplied to Supreme were necessarily defect-free because they constituted 

versatile raw materials that were safe when they left respondents’ control. They 
27

place special emphasis on comment c to section 5 of the Restatement Third of 

Torts, which is quoted in Maxton and other cases upon which they rely. (Maxton, 

supra, 203 Cal.App.4th at p. 90; Arena, supra, 63 Cal.App.4th at p. 1191.)

Comment c addresses sand, gravel and other materials when they take the 

form of “basic raw material[s],” and sets forth limitations on their suppliers’ 

liability for design and warning defects when they are integrated into end 

products. The comment states that such basic raw materials generally do not 

suffer from design defects, and that their suppliers ordinarily are not required to 

provide warnings regarding the end products, as that would oblige the suppliers 

“to develop expertise regarding a multitude of different end products.” (Rest.3d 

Torts, Products Liability, § 5, com. c., p. 134.)18 

In our view, comment c is inapplicable to the claims asserted in the FAC, as 

the comment is intended to illuminate section 5, which concerns the liability of a 

component part supplier “for harm to persons . . . caused by a product into which 

the component is integrated . . . .” (Rest.3d Torts, Products Liability, § 5, italics 

added.) No such injury is alleged in the FAC. Furthermore, the FAC does not 

allege that respondents’ products were sold to Supreme in the form of “basic” raw 

 

18 Comment c states: “Product components include raw materials. . . . Regarding the 

seller’s exposure to liability for defective design, a basic raw material such as sand, 

gravel, or kerosene cannot be defectively designed. Inappropriate decisions regarding the 

use of such materials are not attributable to the supplier of the raw materials but rather to 

the fabricator that puts them to improper use. The manufacturer of the integrated product 

has a significant comparative advantage regarding selection of materials to be used. 

Accordingly, raw-materials sellers are not subject to liability for harm caused by defective 

design of the end-product. The same considerations apply to failure-to-warn claims 

against sellers of raw materials. To impose a duty to warn would require the seller to 

develop expertise regarding a multitude of different end-products and to investigate the 

actual use of raw materials by manufacturers over whom the supplier has no control. 

Courts uniformly refuse to impose such an onerous duty to warn.” (Rest.3d Torts,

Products Liability, § 5, com. c., p. 134.)
28

materials. On the contrary, the FAC alleges that the products were specialized 

materials that respondents sold for use in the metal casting manufacturing process,

and that the products posed known hazards to Ramos when used as intended. 

Respondents’ contention that their products were defect-free would require us to 

reject the FAC’s factual allegations, which we decline to do.

19 

Relying on the “sham pleading” doctrine, respondents contend that certain 

allegations in the FAC must be disregarded. Under that doctrine, a court may set 

aside amendments that omit harmful allegations in the original complaint or add 

allegations inconsistent with the harmful allegations. (State of California ex rel.

Metz v. CCC Information Services, Inc. (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 402, 412.) As the 

mold material suppliers note, appellants’ initial complaints alleged that Ramos

suffered injuries when exposed to dust from their products while transporting the

products, mixing them together to form molds, and breaking the molds to remove 

the metal casting. The FAC omitted that broad factual allegation, and substituted 

allegations that Ramos’s injuries were due to his exposure to dust from the 

products when he scooped them out of bags, poured them into containers, and 

handled them in other ways, independent of any melting, cutting, or other activity 

 

19 For similar reasons, respondents’ reliance on In re TMJ Implants Products 

Liability Litigation (8th Cir. 1996) 97 F.3d 1050 is misplaced. There, the plaintiffs 

suffered injuries from medical jaw implants, and asserted products liability claims against 

businesses that supplied materials to the implant manufacturer. (Id. at pp. 1052-1053.) In 

discussing the application of the component parts doctrine, the Eighth Circuit remarked: 

“Suppliers of versatile materials like chains, valves, sand, gravel, etc., cannot be expected 

to become experts in the infinite number of finished products that might conceivably 

incorporate their multi-use raw materials or components.” (Id. at p. 1057.) As explained 

above, that remark is inapplicable to the FAC, which does not allege injuries resulting 

from a finished product into which respondents’ materials were incorporated, but from 

the direct use of those materials as their manufacturers intended.
29

that transformed them. The mold material suppliers maintain that those 

amendments constitute “sham” allegations. We disagree.

The “sham pleading” doctrine is inapplicable because the original 

allegations were not, in fact, harmful to appellants’ claims, and there is an 

adequate explanation for the amendments (Deveny v. Entropin, Inc. (2006) 139 

Cal.App.4th 408, 426-427). For the reasons discussed above (see B.3 & C.4., 

ante), a product supplier may be required to provide adequate warnings to a 

worker using its products as the supplier specifically intended, even though that 

use involves the product’s transformation or its combination with products from 

other suppliers. Appellants’ initial allegations were thus not harmful to their 

claims.

20 

The record further discloses that appellants amended those allegations only 

because the trial court, in applying Maxton, advised them that their claims would

fail if Ramos’s exposure to dust occurred “in the course of a process that 

substantially changed [the product].” In response to that advice, appellants made 

the amendments described above. Under the circumstances, we conclude that 

 

20 The mold material suppliers suggest that because appellants alleged that their 

products were integrated into molds, the products must be viewed as component parts of 

the molds, for purposes of the component parts doctrine. We disagree. The FAC alleges 

that the mold material suppliers sold or provided their products for a specific use or 

purpose, namely, the creation and employment of molds during the metal casting process. 

The component parts doctrine does not shield a supplier from liability when the supplier 

provides its product for a specific use in a manufacturing process, the hazards of which 

are created by the use of product as intended by the supplier. (See Tellez-Cordova, supra, 

129 Cal.App.4th at pp. 579-584 [manufacturer of grinding tools specifically designed to 

be combined with abrasive disks was obliged to warn users that grinding process 

produced toxic dust].) 
30

there was no “sham pleading.” In sum, with the exception of the claim for 

negligence per se, the FAC stated causes of action not subject to demurrer.

21 

 

21 In a related contention, the metal suppliers suggest that the FAC contains 

inconsistent allegations, noting that it describes their products as “specialized metal alloys 

manufactured and sold . . . for specialized applications,” and also states that the products 

were “not designed to [Supreme’s] exact specifications.” We see no inconsistency, as a 

supplier may sell a specialized product intended for a particular manufacturing process 

without first obtaining specifications for the product’s design from one of its buyers.
31

DISPOSITION

The judgment of dismissal is affirmed solely with respect to the claim for 

negligence per se in the FAC, and reversed with respect to the other claims in the 

FAC. The matter is remanded to the trial court with directions to vacate the orders 

sustaining respondents’ demurrers to the FAC without leave to amend, and to 

enter a new order overruling the demurrers to the claims in the FAC, with the 

exception of the claim for negligence per se, to which the demurrers were properly 

sustained without leave to amend. Appellants are awarded their costs on appeal.

CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION.

MANELLA, J.

We concur:

EPSTEIN, P. J.

EDMON, J.*

*Judge of the Los Angeles Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, 

section 6 of the California Constitution.