# L_2022167EN.01005801.xml

| 24.6.2022 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | L 167/58 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

24.6.2022

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

L 167/58

---

COMMISSION IMPLEMENTING REGULATION (EU) 2022/978

of 23 June 2022

amending Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/159 imposing a definitive safeguard measure on imports of certain steel products

THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION,

Having regard to Regulation (EU) 2015/478 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 2015 on common rules for imports (1) and in particular Articles 16 and 20 thereof,

Having regard to Regulation (EU) 2015/755 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2015 on common rules for imports from certain third countries (2), and in particular Articles 13 and 16 thereof,

Whereas:

1.   BACKGROUND

BACKGROUND

| (1) | By Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/159 (3), the European Commission imposed a definitive safeguard measure on certain steel products (‘the safeguard measure’), which consists of tariff-rate quotas (‘TRQs’) with respect to certain steel products (‘the product concerned’) encompassing 26 steel product categories, set at levels preserving traditional trade flows on a per-product-category basis. A 25 % tariff duty applies only if the quantitative thresholds of these TRQs are exceeded. The safeguard measure was imposed for an initial period of three years, that is to say, until 30 June 2021 (‘the Definitive Regulation’). |
| --- | --- |

(1)

By Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/159 (3), the European Commission imposed a definitive safeguard measure on certain steel products (‘the safeguard measure’), which consists of tariff-rate quotas (‘TRQs’) with respect to certain steel products (‘the product concerned’) encompassing 26 steel product categories, set at levels preserving traditional trade flows on a per-product-category basis. A 25 % tariff duty applies only if the quantitative thresholds of these TRQs are exceeded. The safeguard measure was imposed for an initial period of three years, that is to say, until 30 June 2021 (‘the Definitive Regulation’).

3

| (2) | By Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2021/1029 (4) (‘the Prolongation Regulation’), the Commission prolonged the safeguard measure until 30 June 2024. |
| --- | --- |

(2)

By Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2021/1029 (4) (‘the Prolongation Regulation’), the Commission prolonged the safeguard measure until 30 June 2024.

4

| (3) | In recital (161) of the Definitive Regulation, the Commission committed to “carry out an assessment of the situation on a regular basis, and consider a review at least at the end of each year of imposition of measures”. In this spirit, the Commission conducted two functioning review investigations in 2019 and 2020 respectively. |
| --- | --- |

(3)

In recital (161) of the Definitive Regulation, the Commission committed to “carry out an assessment of the situation on a regular basis, and consider a review at least at the end of each year of imposition of measures”. In this spirit, the Commission conducted two functioning review investigations in 2019 and 2020 respectively.

| (4) | In recital (85) of the Prolongation Regulation, the Commission stated “in order to keep in the meantime the operation of the safeguard adapted to market evolution and in line with the interest of all stakeholders, the Commission will undertake a functioning review, like those conducted in 2019 and 2020. Such functioning review will be initiated sufficiently in advance to introduce any needed changes from 1 July 2022, after the first year of prolongation”. |
| --- | --- |

(4)

In recital (85) of the Prolongation Regulation, the Commission stated “in order to keep in the meantime the operation of the safeguard adapted to market evolution and in line with the interest of all stakeholders, the Commission will undertake a functioning review, like those conducted in 2019 and 2020. Such functioning review will be initiated sufficiently in advance to introduce any needed changes from 1 July 2022, after the first year of prolongation”.

| (5) | Accordingly, the Commission initiated a functioning review investigation by means of a Notice of Initiation (‘NOI’) published in the Official Journal of the European Union on 17 December 2021 (5) inviting interested parties to make their views known and submit evidence concerning in particular the following grounds of review:






  (a) | Allocation and management of quotas; |
| --- | --- | --- |

(5)

Accordingly, the Commission initiated a functioning review investigation by means of a Notice of Initiation (‘NOI’) published in the Official Journal of the European Union on 17 December 2021 (5) inviting interested parties to make their views known and submit evidence concerning in particular the following grounds of review:

Official Journal of the European Union

5

(a)

Allocation and management of quotas;

| (b) | Crowding out of traditional trade flows; |
| --- | --- |

(b)

Crowding out of traditional trade flows;

| (c) | Update of the list of developing countries subject to the measure; |
| --- | --- |

(c)

Update of the list of developing countries subject to the measure;

| (d) | Level of liberalisation; |
| --- | --- |

(d)

Level of liberalisation;

| (e) | Impact on the measure due to the changes in the US Section 232 measure. |
| --- | --- |

(e)

Impact on the measure due to the changes in the US Section 232 measure.

2.   PROCEDURE

PROCEDURE

| (6) | Due process took place under a two-stage written procedure, where parties first submitted their comments and supporting evidence, and subsequently, had the opportunity to rebut other parties’ initial submissions. Overall, the Commission received more than one hundred submissions and rebuttals. |
| --- | --- |

(6)

Due process took place under a two-stage written procedure, where parties first submitted their comments and supporting evidence, and subsequently, had the opportunity to rebut other parties’ initial submissions. Overall, the Commission received more than one hundred submissions and rebuttals.

| (7) | While the functioning review investigation was ongoing and before its conclusion, a series amendments to the safeguard measure took place. In March 2022, by Regulation (EU) 2022/428 (6) the EU imposed an import ban on certain steel products from Russia and Belarus (7) as part of the fourth sanctions package in response to the Russian invasion of Ukraine. To avoid any potential shortage of supply in the Union steel market resulting from this ban, by Regulation (EU) 2022/434 (8), the Commission amended the safeguard measure by redistributing the country-specific quotas of Russia and Belarus proportionally among other supplying countries in each product category affected. |
| --- | --- |

(7)

While the functioning review investigation was ongoing and before its conclusion, a series amendments to the safeguard measure took place. In March 2022, by Regulation (EU) 2022/428 (6) the EU imposed an import ban on certain steel products from Russia and Belarus (7) as part of the fourth sanctions package in response to the Russian invasion of Ukraine. To avoid any potential shortage of supply in the Union steel market resulting from this ban, by Regulation (EU) 2022/434 (8), the Commission amended the safeguard measure by redistributing the country-specific quotas of Russia and Belarus proportionally among other supplying countries in each product category affected.

6

7

8

| (8) | In addition, by Regulation (EU) 2022/664 (9) the Commission made South Africa and other Southern African Development Community (SADC) Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) countries subject to the safeguard measure as of 1 May 2022 following the expiry of the exemption they had been benefitting from under a bilateral EPA. |
| --- | --- |

(8)

In addition, by Regulation (EU) 2022/664 (9) the Commission made South Africa and other Southern African Development Community (SADC) Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) countries subject to the safeguard measure as of 1 May 2022 following the expiry of the exemption they had been benefitting from under a bilateral EPA.

9

| (9) | Lastly, the Commission suspended temporarily the application of the safeguard measure vis-a-vis Ukraine (10). The effect of this suspension is that as long as it remains in place, imports from Ukraine are not accounted for in any quota, either country-specific or residual (11). Similarly, the volumes of imports by Ukraine during the reference period of the original investigation (2015-2017) (12) are not accounted for the calculation of the residual quotas. |
| --- | --- |

(9)

Lastly, the Commission suspended temporarily the application of the safeguard measure vis-a-vis Ukraine (10). The effect of this suspension is that as long as it remains in place, imports from Ukraine are not accounted for in any quota, either country-specific or residual (11). Similarly, the volumes of imports by Ukraine during the reference period of the original investigation (2015-2017) (12) are not accounted for the calculation of the residual quotas.

10

11

12

3.   FINDINGS OF THE INVESTIGATION

FINDINGS OF THE INVESTIGATION

| (10) | Following an in-depth analysis of all the submissions received and the data available to it, the Commission arrived at the following conclusions. These conclusions are organized in the following sub-sections, as per the structure in the NOI. |
| --- | --- |

(10)

Following an in-depth analysis of all the submissions received and the data available to it, the Commission arrived at the following conclusions. These conclusions are organized in the following sub-sections, as per the structure in the NOI.

3.1.   Allocation and management of quotas

Allocation and management of quotas

Comments from interested parties

Comments from interested parties

| (11) | Some interested parties (certain third countries and users) requested to replace the quarterly administration of quotas by a yearly administration, while others (Union industry) requested to introduce a monthly administration. Some parties (Union industry) also requested to limit the carry-over of unused quotas to 4%, while others (certain third countries and users) requested to redistribute the share of certain unused country-specific quotas (‘CSQ’). In addition, other parties (certain third countries and users) requested to remove the system of CSQ and have the quotas administered globally instead. Lastly, other interested parties requested to remove the quotas of certain countries and to redistribute these quotas among other origins, and that certain countries exporting under the residual quota be allocated a CSQ. |
| --- | --- |

(11)

Some interested parties (certain third countries and users) requested to replace the quarterly administration of quotas by a yearly administration, while others (Union industry) requested to introduce a monthly administration. Some parties (Union industry) also requested to limit the carry-over of unused quotas to 4%, while others (certain third countries and users) requested to redistribute the share of certain unused country-specific quotas (‘CSQ’). In addition, other parties (certain third countries and users) requested to remove the system of CSQ and have the quotas administered globally instead. Lastly, other interested parties requested to remove the quotas of certain countries and to redistribute these quotas among other origins, and that certain countries exporting under the residual quota be allocated a CSQ.

Assessment

Assessment

| (12) | The quotas, whether country-specific or residual, were allocated based on the export performance in the reference period of the original investigation (13). The system of quarterly administration of quotas has proven to be effective in bringing about stability to the Union market, avoiding sudden surges of imports that would destabilise the market (14) and ensuring an orderly and predictable flow of imports throughout the year. This system also allows that traditional trade flows in terms of volumes and origins are permitted without any additional duty. |
| --- | --- |

(12)

The quotas, whether country-specific or residual, were allocated based on the export performance in the reference period of the original investigation (13). The system of quarterly administration of quotas has proven to be effective in bringing about stability to the Union market, avoiding sudden surges of imports that would destabilise the market (14) and ensuring an orderly and predictable flow of imports throughout the year. This system also allows that traditional trade flows in terms of volumes and origins are permitted without any additional duty.

13

14

| (13) | This system strikes a balance among the opposing interests at stake. First, it works to the benefit of the Union industry because it avoids a flood of imports in a short period with the ensuing negative effects on the market. Second, it is also beneficial for certain third countries and certain Union users, which would otherwise be unduly crowded out from the market by other larger suppliers and would not be able to supply Union users, which would be in turn prevented from buying the material they need from these specific origins. Lastly, it allows larger exporting countries to exceed their traditional trade flows in most product categories by accessing the residual quota in the last quarter of a period when the incumbent suppliers were not able to fully use the quotas. |
| --- | --- |

(13)

This system strikes a balance among the opposing interests at stake. First, it works to the benefit of the Union industry because it avoids a flood of imports in a short period with the ensuing negative effects on the market. Second, it is also beneficial for certain third countries and certain Union users, which would otherwise be unduly crowded out from the market by other larger suppliers and would not be able to supply Union users, which would be in turn prevented from buying the material they need from these specific origins. Lastly, it allows larger exporting countries to exceed their traditional trade flows in most product categories by accessing the residual quota in the last quarter of a period when the incumbent suppliers were not able to fully use the quotas.

| (14) | Accepting any of the claims brought forward by interested parties, as summarised in recital (11), would upset this balance and would risk undermining the effectiveness of the measure. Furthermore, in their submissions, parties have not proven by any evidence how the current system would not be appropriate and how the different adjustments they proposed would be in the overall Union interest (and not just in their individual interest) and compatible with the logic and a proper functioning of the measure. |
| --- | --- |

(14)

Accepting any of the claims brought forward by interested parties, as summarised in recital (11), would upset this balance and would risk undermining the effectiveness of the measure. Furthermore, in their submissions, parties have not proven by any evidence how the current system would not be appropriate and how the different adjustments they proposed would be in the overall Union interest (and not just in their individual interest) and compatible with the logic and a proper functioning of the measure.

| (15) | For these reasons, the Commission considered that maintaining the current system of quota administration (quarterly administration and a combination of country-specific and residual quota), preserving the carry-over of unused quotas and the access to the residual quota in Q4 continues to be appropriate, and that is fair vis-a-vis all interested parties. |
| --- | --- |

(15)

For these reasons, the Commission considered that maintaining the current system of quota administration (quarterly administration and a combination of country-specific and residual quota), preserving the carry-over of unused quotas and the access to the residual quota in Q4 continues to be appropriate, and that is fair vis-a-vis all interested parties.

vis-a-vis

3.1.1.   Adjustment to product categories 7 and 17

Adjustment to product categories 7 and 17

| (16) | While the current system of quota allocation and administration is appropriate, the Commission nevertheless considered that it requires some technical adjustments to improve its functioning in light of changed circumstances. These concern product categories 7 (quarto plates) and 17 (angles, shapes and sections). |
| --- | --- |

(16)

While the current system of quota allocation and administration is appropriate, the Commission nevertheless considered that it requires some technical adjustments to improve its functioning in light of changed circumstances. These concern product categories 7 (quarto plates) and 17 (angles, shapes and sections).

| (17) | In these two product categories, Ukraine has been historically an important exporter (15) (representing around 33% of total quotas in each of these categories) and it has consistently used its quotas at rather high levels. However, the Commission observed (16) that since the unprovoked and unjustified military aggression of Russia against Ukraine, there have been virtually no imports of these two categories from Ukraine into the Union. This suggests that Ukraine is currently unable to produce and/or export these product categories in any meaningful volumes to the Union market. Under these circumstances, and having analysed the quota use by other exporting countries subject to the measure, the Commission considered that there would be a risk of potential shortage of supply for Union users in these categories if it did not take any action. |
| --- | --- |

(17)

In these two product categories, Ukraine has been historically an important exporter (15) (representing around 33% of total quotas in each of these categories) and it has consistently used its quotas at rather high levels. However, the Commission observed (16) that since the unprovoked and unjustified military aggression of Russia against Ukraine, there have been virtually no imports of these two categories from Ukraine into the Union. This suggests that Ukraine is currently unable to produce and/or export these product categories in any meaningful volumes to the Union market. Under these circumstances, and having analysed the quota use by other exporting countries subject to the measure, the Commission considered that there would be a risk of potential shortage of supply for Union users in these categories if it did not take any action.

15

16

| (18) | For this reason, in the Union interest, the Commission considered it necessary to globalise the administration of the quotas that remain under the measure (17) in categories 7 and 17. In other words, the existing country specific quotas will be removed in order to make instead a single quota available for all origins, hence substantially increasing the flexibility for users to import the steel they may need from any source available within the quota volume in these categories. |
| --- | --- |

(18)

For this reason, in the Union interest, the Commission considered it necessary to globalise the administration of the quotas that remain under the measure (17) in categories 7 and 17. In other words, the existing country specific quotas will be removed in order to make instead a single quota available for all origins, hence substantially increasing the flexibility for users to import the steel they may need from any source available within the quota volume in these categories.

17

| (19) | The Commission concluded that given the past track of import volumes (quota use) and origins, this adjustment does not risk undermining the effectiveness of the measure vis-a-vis Union producers and it is unlikely that any crowding out would take place and traditional trade flows will be preserved. This adjustment will be reassessed in view of the development of trade flows in these categories and of the suspension of the application of the safeguard vis-a-vis Ukraine, or if undue crowding out effects are identified. |
| --- | --- |

(19)

The Commission concluded that given the past track of import volumes (quota use) and origins, this adjustment does not risk undermining the effectiveness of the measure vis-a-vis Union producers and it is unlikely that any crowding out would take place and traditional trade flows will be preserved. This adjustment will be reassessed in view of the development of trade flows in these categories and of the suspension of the application of the safeguard vis-a-vis Ukraine, or if undue crowding out effects are identified.

vis-a-vis

vis-a-vis

3.2.   Crowding out of traditional trade flows

Crowding out of traditional trade flows

| (20) | In the definitive measure, the Commission introduced a mechanism whereby countries having exhausted their CSQ could also access (free-of-duty until its exhaustion) the residual quota initially available in the last quarter (April-June) of every annual period of the measure. |
| --- | --- |

(20)

In the definitive measure, the Commission introduced a mechanism whereby countries having exhausted their CSQ could also access (free-of-duty until its exhaustion) the residual quota initially available in the last quarter (April-June) of every annual period of the measure.

| (21) | The Commission justified this mechanism in the interest of Union importers and users as this would not only ensure the maintenance of traditional trade flows but also avoid that, as the case may be, parts of the residual tariff-rate quota would remain unused. |
| --- | --- |

(21)

The Commission justified this mechanism in the interest of Union importers and users as this would not only ensure the maintenance of traditional trade flows but also avoid that, as the case may be, parts of the residual tariff-rate quota would remain unused.

| (22) | Under the first functioning review in 2019, the Commission observed that in two product categories, countries benefiting from a country-specific TRQ had used almost exclusively the full amount of the residual quota in Q4 in a matter of two days. As a result, historical – smaller – suppliers could not export free-of-duty during the last quarter of a period. This negatively affected traditional trade flows in terms of origin to the detriment of certain third countries and certain Union users. To offset this unintended negative effect, the Commission introduced a cap of 30% per country accessing the residual quota Q4 in Category 13 (Rebars) and Category 16 (Wire rod). |
| --- | --- |

(22)

Under the first functioning review in 2019, the Commission observed that in two product categories, countries benefiting from a country-specific TRQ had used almost exclusively the full amount of the residual quota in Q4 in a matter of two days. As a result, historical – smaller – suppliers could not export free-of-duty during the last quarter of a period. This negatively affected traditional trade flows in terms of origin to the detriment of certain third countries and certain Union users. To offset this unintended negative effect, the Commission introduced a cap of 30% per country accessing the residual quota Q4 in Category 13 (Rebars) and Category 16 (Wire rod).

| (23) | Under the second functioning review in 2020, and after identifying more cases of crowding out in several product categories, the Commission devised a system whereby the access to Q4 would depend on the import trends observed and actual use of the residual quota by the smaller suppliers that are the natural beneficiaries of this section of the TRQ (18). |
| --- | --- |

(23)

Under the second functioning review in 2020, and after identifying more cases of crowding out in several product categories, the Commission devised a system whereby the access to Q4 would depend on the import trends observed and actual use of the residual quota by the smaller suppliers that are the natural beneficiaries of this section of the TRQ (18).

18

| (24) | In order to minimize the displacement of traditional origins in the residual quota, while continue allowing additional access in those categories where it is necessary to ensure the maximum use of the quota, the Commission created a system whereby each product category would fall within one of the following three different groups, corresponding to three different access scenarios. This system fulfils one the key principles and objectives of the safeguard measure, namely to ensure that traditional trade flows in terms of origins are preserved. |
| --- | --- |

(24)

In order to minimize the displacement of traditional origins in the residual quota, while continue allowing additional access in those categories where it is necessary to ensure the maximum use of the quota, the Commission created a system whereby each product category would fall within one of the following three different groups, corresponding to three different access scenarios. This system fulfils one the key principles and objectives of the safeguard measure, namely to ensure that traditional trade flows in terms of origins are preserved.

| (25) | These three regimes currently in place are:






  — | No access – where incumbent suppliers under the residual were able to use the residual quotas by themselves, and crowding out effects had been identified; |
| --- | --- | --- |

(25)

These three regimes currently in place are:

—

No access – where incumbent suppliers under the residual were able to use the residual quotas by themselves, and crowding out effects had been identified;

| — | Limited access – where incumbent suppliers were able to use only part of the residual quota available to them, and additional origins were needed, in limited amounts, to exhaust quotas; |
| --- | --- |

—

Limited access – where incumbent suppliers were able to use only part of the residual quota available to them, and additional origins were needed, in limited amounts, to exhaust quotas;

| — | No limitation – in those categories where the residual quotas were not highly used and no crowding out effects were identified. |
| --- | --- |

—

No limitation – in those categories where the residual quotas were not highly used and no crowding out effects were identified.

Comments from interested parties

Comments from interested parties

| (26) | Some interested parties (some third countries and users) requested that access to the residual quota in Q4 be completely removed. Others requested that certain changes be made specific to certain product categories, while others (including some third countries and users, as well as the Union industry) requested the prohibition to larger exporting countries in a given category to access the residual quota altogether or to implement a more restrictive approach. |
| --- | --- |

(26)

Some interested parties (some third countries and users) requested that access to the residual quota in Q4 be completely removed. Others requested that certain changes be made specific to certain product categories, while others (including some third countries and users, as well as the Union industry) requested the prohibition to larger exporting countries in a given category to access the residual quota altogether or to implement a more restrictive approach.

Assessment

Assessment

| (27) | The Commission considered, having examined the submissions received and the functioning of the measure, that the current system continued to be the most appropriate insofar as it ensured that users maximise their chances of using up the residual quota, but also that traditional trade flows in terms of origins are respected (which is equally in the interest of users). The system of allowing access to the residual quota was the rule in all product categories but four. |
| --- | --- |

(27)

The Commission considered, having examined the submissions received and the functioning of the measure, that the current system continued to be the most appropriate insofar as it ensured that users maximise their chances of using up the residual quota, but also that traditional trade flows in terms of origins are respected (which is equally in the interest of users). The system of allowing access to the residual quota was the rule in all product categories but four.

| (28) | Accepting the requests from interested parties would amount to either preventing certain users from increasing their imports free of duty where there may be demand for it in the Union market, or it would prevent other Union users from purchasing products from certain origins also necessary for the Union market due to crowding out effects. At the same time, the system ensures that the additional volumes that some countries may export under this system remain within the boundaries that ensure that they do not undermine the effectiveness of the measure as far as Union producers are concerned. Therefore, the current system is the most suitable in the overall Union interest. |
| --- | --- |

(28)

Accepting the requests from interested parties would amount to either preventing certain users from increasing their imports free of duty where there may be demand for it in the Union market, or it would prevent other Union users from purchasing products from certain origins also necessary for the Union market due to crowding out effects. At the same time, the system ensures that the additional volumes that some countries may export under this system remain within the boundaries that ensure that they do not undermine the effectiveness of the measure as far as Union producers are concerned. Therefore, the current system is the most suitable in the overall Union interest.

Adjustment

Adjustment

| (29) | In the ongoing review, the Commission assessed whether crowding out effects had taken place. To do so the Commission, based on the same type of analysis undertaken in the second review, updated the different regimes based on the data available since then. This means that the Commission analysed import data and quota use per origin and category from 1 April 2020 until 31 March 2022. |
| --- | --- |

(29)

In the ongoing review, the Commission assessed whether crowding out effects had taken place. To do so the Commission, based on the same type of analysis undertaken in the second review, updated the different regimes based on the data available since then. This means that the Commission analysed import data and quota use per origin and category from 1 April 2020 until 31 March 2022.

| (30) | On the basis of the same methodology applied in the second functioning review, but with updated data, the access regimes per product category are updated as follows (for specific volumes see Annex II):






  — | No access: 5, 9, 21 |
| --- | --- | --- |

(30)

On the basis of the same methodology applied in the second functioning review, but with updated data, the access regimes per product category are updated as follows (for specific volumes see Annex II):

—

No access: 5, 9, 21

| — | Limited access: 12, 13, 14, 16, 20, 27 |
| --- | --- |

—

Limited access: 12, 13, 14, 16, 20, 27

| — | No limitation: 2, 3A, 3B, 4A, 6, 10, 15, 18, 19, 22, 24, 25B, 26, 28. |
| --- | --- |

—

No limitation: 2, 3A, 3B, 4A, 6, 10, 15, 18, 19, 22, 24, 25B, 26, 28.

| (31) | In line with the principles applied in the previous functioning review, the following categories will be subject to a special regime:






  — | 1 and 4B. |
| --- | --- | --- |

(31)

In line with the principles applied in the previous functioning review, the following categories will be subject to a special regime:

—

1 and 4B.

| (32) | In the case of categories 7, 8, 17 and 25A, they will be administered globally. Therefore, the possibility to access Q4 is not applicable, as there are no countries exporting under a country-specific quota. |
| --- | --- |

(32)

In the case of categories 7, 8, 17 and 25A, they will be administered globally. Therefore, the possibility to access Q4 is not applicable, as there are no countries exporting under a country-specific quota.

| (33) | For categories 1 and 4B, the current regime whereby access is granted in Q4 with a 30% cap per exporting country continues to be deemed appropriate in order to ensure sufficient variety of sources of supply while avoiding crowding out effects through an excessive flow of additional imports beyond traditional trade flows. |
| --- | --- |

(33)

For categories 1 and 4B, the current regime whereby access is granted in Q4 with a 30% cap per exporting country continues to be deemed appropriate in order to ensure sufficient variety of sources of supply while avoiding crowding out effects through an excessive flow of additional imports beyond traditional trade flows.

| (34) | Overall, by this feature the measure would continue allowing access to the residual quota in Q4 in the large majority of product categories (in all but three categories). |
| --- | --- |

(34)

Overall, by this feature the measure would continue allowing access to the residual quota in Q4 in the large majority of product categories (in all but three categories).

3.3.   Update of the list of developing countries subject to the measure

Update of the list of developing countries subject to the measure

| (35) | Any developing country member of the WTO was excluded from the application of the definitive measure, as long as its share of imports remains below 3% of the total imports for each product category. The Commission committed to monitoring the development of imports after the adoption of the measure and to reviewing the list of excluded countries on a regular basis. |
| --- | --- |

(35)

Any developing country member of the WTO was excluded from the application of the definitive measure, as long as its share of imports remains below 3% of the total imports for each product category. The Commission committed to monitoring the development of imports after the adoption of the measure and to reviewing the list of excluded countries on a regular basis.

| (36) | The last update took place in the framework of the review investigation following to the Withdrawal Agreement between the Union and the United Kingdom (‘UK’), as of 1 January 2021, and it remained unchanged since 1 January 2021. Thus, to adapt the list of developing countries subject to, and excluded from, the measure the Commission re-run the calculations based on the most recently available consolidated import data, i.e. year 2021 import statistics (19). |
| --- | --- |

(36)

The last update took place in the framework of the review investigation following to the Withdrawal Agreement between the Union and the United Kingdom (‘UK’), as of 1 January 2021, and it remained unchanged since 1 January 2021. Thus, to adapt the list of developing countries subject to, and excluded from, the measure the Commission re-run the calculations based on the most recently available consolidated import data, i.e. year 2021 import statistics (19).

19

Adjustment

Adjustment

| (37) | The changes resulting from this update are the following (The updated table is available in Annex I).






  — | All developing countries are included in category 4A, because the sum of all imports in 2021 that were below 3% is higher than 9%; |
| --- | --- | --- |

(37)

The changes resulting from this update are the following (The updated table is available in Annex I).

—

All developing countries are included in category 4A, because the sum of all imports in 2021 that were below 3% is higher than 9%;

| — | Brazil is excluded in categories 2 and 3A and included in category 6; |
| --- | --- |

—

Brazil is excluded in categories 2 and 3A and included in category 6;

| — | China is excluded in category 25A and included in categories 2, 3A, 9 and 14; |
| --- | --- |

—

China is excluded in category 25A and included in categories 2, 3A, 9 and 14;

| — | Egypt is included in category 1 and 24; |
| --- | --- |

—

Egypt is included in category 1 and 24;

| — | India is excluded in category 3B and included in category 8; |
| --- | --- |

—

India is excluded in category 3B and included in category 8;

| — | Kazakhstan is included in category 19 and 24; |
| --- | --- |

—

Kazakhstan is included in category 19 and 24;

| — | Malaysia is excluded in category 9; |
| --- | --- |

—

Malaysia is excluded in category 9;

| — | Moldova is included in category 12; |
| --- | --- |

—

Moldova is included in category 12;

| — | North Macedonia is excluded in category 5; |
| --- | --- |

—

North Macedonia is excluded in category 5;

| — | Thailand is excluded in category 9; |
| --- | --- |

—

Thailand is excluded in category 9;

| — | Turkey is included in category 8; |
| --- | --- |

—

Turkey is included in category 8;

| — | Ukraine is included in categories 1, 4B and 26 (20); |
| --- | --- |

—

Ukraine is included in categories 1, 4B and 26 (20);

20

| — | United Arab Emirates are included in category 16; |
| --- | --- |

—

United Arab Emirates are included in category 16;

| — | Vietnam is excluded in category 2 and included in categories 1, 3A, 3B, 4B. |
| --- | --- |

—

Vietnam is excluded in category 2 and included in categories 1, 3A, 3B, 4B.

3.4.   Level of Liberalisation

Level of Liberalisation

| (38) | The current liberalisation rate of the safeguard was set at an annual rate of 3%. The Commission assessed in this investigation whether this level of liberalisation continued to be appropriate. |
| --- | --- |

(38)

The current liberalisation rate of the safeguard was set at an annual rate of 3%. The Commission assessed in this investigation whether this level of liberalisation continued to be appropriate.

Comments from interested parties

Comments from interested parties

| (39) | Some interested parties (notably exporting producers and Union users) requested that the Commission increased the level of liberalisation beyond 3% (many of them requested a liberalisation rate of 5%), while the Union industry requested that the liberalisation pace was reduced to 1% instead. |
| --- | --- |

(39)

Some interested parties (notably exporting producers and Union users) requested that the Commission increased the level of liberalisation beyond 3% (many of them requested a liberalisation rate of 5%), while the Union industry requested that the liberalisation pace was reduced to 1% instead.

Assessment

Assessment

| (40) | The safeguard instrument is intended to be of a temporary nature. As of 1 July 2022, the measure will enter into its fifth year of application. The objective of liberalisation (which is a legal obligation under WTO (21) and EU (22) rules) is to progressively allow more import competition into the market while the domestic industry is adjusting to the increased level of imports. This is to avoid a measure that would not incentivise adjustments for domestic industry while it is in place, and which would create problems of competitiveness when the domestic industry will be exposed to greater foreign competition in a post-safeguard measure scenario. |
| --- | --- |

(40)

The safeguard instrument is intended to be of a temporary nature. As of 1 July 2022, the measure will enter into its fifth year of application. The objective of liberalisation (which is a legal obligation under WTO (21) and EU (22) rules) is to progressively allow more import competition into the market while the domestic industry is adjusting to the increased level of imports. This is to avoid a measure that would not incentivise adjustments for domestic industry while it is in place, and which would create problems of competitiveness when the domestic industry will be exposed to greater foreign competition in a post-safeguard measure scenario.

21

22

| (41) | With this logic in mind, the Commission considered that at this point in time (after four years of measure) a slightly higher level of liberalisation year-on-year should be envisaged in order to encourage the domestic industry to continue its adjustments, while being mindful not to undermine the effectiveness of the measure. |
| --- | --- |

(41)

With this logic in mind, the Commission considered that at this point in time (after four years of measure) a slightly higher level of liberalisation year-on-year should be envisaged in order to encourage the domestic industry to continue its adjustments, while being mindful not to undermine the effectiveness of the measure.

Adjustment

Adjustment

| (42) | The Commission considered that setting the yearly level of liberalisation at 4% as of 1 July 2022 would be appropriate. |
| --- | --- |

(42)

The Commission considered that setting the yearly level of liberalisation at 4% as of 1 July 2022 would be appropriate.

| (43) | This increase should also contribute to alleviating any tension for Union users in certain product categories, in a context characterised by a high degree of uncertainty in the market. On the other hand, the limited additional increase would not pose a threat to the Union industry and would not undermine the effectiveness of the measure. |
| --- | --- |

(43)

This increase should also contribute to alleviating any tension for Union users in certain product categories, in a context characterised by a high degree of uncertainty in the market. On the other hand, the limited additional increase would not pose a threat to the Union industry and would not undermine the effectiveness of the measure.

3.5.   Impact of changes to the US Section 232 measure

Impact of changes to the US Section 232 measure

| (44) | In March 2018, the US imposed a 25% duty on imports of certain steel products under the US Section 232 measure. The measure currently remains in place although certain changes have taken place. In this review investigation, the Commission has assessed these changes in order to determine whether they have any impact on the EU safeguard measure, in particular as regards the risk of trade diversion into the Union market. |
| --- | --- |

(44)

In March 2018, the US imposed a 25% duty on imports of certain steel products under the US Section 232 measure. The measure currently remains in place although certain changes have taken place. In this review investigation, the Commission has assessed these changes in order to determine whether they have any impact on the EU safeguard measure, in particular as regards the risk of trade diversion into the Union market.

Comments from interested parties

Comments from interested parties

| (45) | The requests received in this respect can be split into three types. Under the first two, certain users and third countries claimed that the risk of trade diversion is small (-er) because of the different adjustments to the Section 232 measure. Then, some parties claimed that because of the TRQs allocated to Union exporters, the Union industry would divert sales to the US market at the expense of domestic sales creating a shortage domestically. |
| --- | --- |

(45)

The requests received in this respect can be split into three types. Under the first two, certain users and third countries claimed that the risk of trade diversion is small (-er) because of the different adjustments to the Section 232 measure. Then, some parties claimed that because of the TRQs allocated to Union exporters, the Union industry would divert sales to the US market at the expense of domestic sales creating a shortage domestically.

| (46) | On the other hand, the Union steel industry asserted that the risk of trade diversion remains and EU’s improved access to the US market will not affect their ability to supply to the domestic (Union) market. |
| --- | --- |

(46)

On the other hand, the Union steel industry asserted that the risk of trade diversion remains and EU’s improved access to the US market will not affect their ability to supply to the domestic (Union) market.

Assessment

Assessment

Changes vis-a-vis the EU

Changes vis-a-vis the EU

| (47) | In October 2021, the US decided to subject EU imports under the Section 232 measure to a TRQ system. Under this new regime, the EU would be able to export free-of-duty up to a certain level (based on historical export volumes) (23), and only when this level is exhausted, the 25% duty would become applicable. This action aimed to improve the EU exporters’ position in the US market, which until then were subject to a 25% duty on every tonne exported. This new system is applicable as of 1 January 2022. |
| --- | --- |

(47)

In October 2021, the US decided to subject EU imports under the Section 232 measure to a TRQ system. Under this new regime, the EU would be able to export free-of-duty up to a certain level (based on historical export volumes) (23), and only when this level is exhausted, the 25% duty would become applicable. This action aimed to improve the EU exporters’ position in the US market, which until then were subject to a 25% duty on every tonne exported. This new system is applicable as of 1 January 2022.

23

| (48) | Some interested parties claimed that because prices in the US are usually higher than in the Union, EU producers would have an incentive to export to the US at the expense of domestic sales, thereby risking creating a shortage in the Union market in some categories. |
| --- | --- |

(48)

Some interested parties claimed that because prices in the US are usually higher than in the Union, EU producers would have an incentive to export to the US at the expense of domestic sales, thereby risking creating a shortage in the Union market in some categories.

| (49) | For a number of reasons, the Commission considered that these claims should be rejected. In the first place, the notion of trade diversion into the Union market cannot encompass the limitation of exports to the US of the EU industry itself. In other words, the Union industry can never be at risk of trade diversion of its own sales. This defies the logic of trade diversion. Therefore, the fact that the EU may be able to improve its presence in the US market is neutral with respect to the risk of trade diversion from exporting countries to the Union market. |
| --- | --- |

(49)

For a number of reasons, the Commission considered that these claims should be rejected. In the first place, the notion of trade diversion into the Union market cannot encompass the limitation of exports to the US of the EU industry itself. In other words, the Union industry can never be at risk of trade diversion of its own sales. This defies the logic of trade diversion. Therefore, the fact that the EU may be able to improve its presence in the US market is neutral with respect to the risk of trade diversion from exporting countries to the Union market.

| (50) | Second, the claims that the Union industry would use up its TRQs at the expense (mainly or even exclusively) of domestic sales is not substantiated by evidence. These claims did not consider that, also theoretically, the Union industry could increase its production volume (24), thus not sacrificing domestic sales and creating additional revenue through increased export sales to the US, and that it could also redirect volumes to the US from exports to other markets that may be less attractive for a number of reasons, including price levels (25). |
| --- | --- |

(50)

Second, the claims that the Union industry would use up its TRQs at the expense (mainly or even exclusively) of domestic sales is not substantiated by evidence. These claims did not consider that, also theoretically, the Union industry could increase its production volume (24), thus not sacrificing domestic sales and creating additional revenue through increased export sales to the US, and that it could also redirect volumes to the US from exports to other markets that may be less attractive for a number of reasons, including price levels (25).

24

25

| (51) | Irrespective of all these theoretical possibilities, the reality has shown that in the first quarter since the entry into force of the TRQ system, the EU has been far from using up its quotas. In fact, over the first quarter it only used around 42% of the quota (26). |
| --- | --- |

(51)

Irrespective of all these theoretical possibilities, the reality has shown that in the first quarter since the entry into force of the TRQ system, the EU has been far from using up its quotas. In fact, over the first quarter it only used around 42% of the quota (26).

26

| (52) | Therefore, the key assumption made by some interested parties, and the premise underpinning their argumentation, namely that the EU exporting producers would be able to use up all of its quotas in the US, has proven to be wrong in the first place. |
| --- | --- |

(52)

Therefore, the key assumption made by some interested parties, and the premise underpinning their argumentation, namely that the EU exporting producers would be able to use up all of its quotas in the US, has proven to be wrong in the first place.

| (53) | The Commission concluded that the fact that the EU is subject to a TRQ system under the US Section 232 measures does not have any impact on the functioning of the safeguard measure with respect to the risk of trade diversion. Nor has any party demonstrated to any extent that exporting under a TRQ regime under Section 232 would as such create a risk of shortage of supply in the Union market. |
| --- | --- |

(53)

The Commission concluded that the fact that the EU is subject to a TRQ system under the US Section 232 measures does not have any impact on the functioning of the safeguard measure with respect to the risk of trade diversion. Nor has any party demonstrated to any extent that exporting under a TRQ regime under Section 232 would as such create a risk of shortage of supply in the Union market.

Changes vis-a-vis some third countries (excluding the EU)

Changes vis-a-vis some third countries (excluding the EU)

| (54) | With regards to the claims pertaining to changes to the US Section 232 vis-a-vis other third countries, the data available to the Commission showed that the following changes to the US Section 232 measure had taken place:






  — | Since March 2018, Australia is exempted from the measure. |
| --- | --- | --- |

(54)

With regards to the claims pertaining to changes to the US Section 232 vis-a-vis other third countries, the data available to the Commission showed that the following changes to the US Section 232 measure had taken place:

vis-a-vis

—

Since March 2018, Australia is exempted from the measure.

| — | Since May 2018, Korea, Argentina and Brazil are subject to absolute quotas (out of which no exports are permitted). |
| --- | --- |

—

Since May 2018, Korea, Argentina and Brazil are subject to absolute quotas (out of which no exports are permitted).

| — | Since May 2019, Mexico and Canada announced separate agreements with the U.S., which led to a lifting of the measure for the two countries. The agreements are subject to a monitoring mechanism. |
| --- | --- |

—

Since May 2019, Mexico and Canada announced separate agreements with the U.S., which led to a lifting of the measure for the two countries. The agreements are subject to a monitoring mechanism.

| — | As of 1 April 2022, the U.S. established tariff rate quotas (‘TRQs’) for Japan. A certain amount of in-quota imports are exempted from the measure, while out of quota imports are subject to the additional 25% duty. |
| --- | --- |

—

As of 1 April 2022, the U.S. established tariff rate quotas (‘TRQs’) for Japan. A certain amount of in-quota imports are exempted from the measure, while out of quota imports are subject to the additional 25% duty.

| — | In March 2022, the U.S. announced its intention to establish a TRQ for UK whereby certain amount of in-quota imports will be exempted from the measure, while out of quota imports will remain subject to the additional 25% duty. The TRQ for UK was scheduled to enter into force as of 1 June 2022. |
| --- | --- |

—

In March 2022, the U.S. announced its intention to establish a TRQ for UK whereby certain amount of in-quota imports will be exempted from the measure, while out of quota imports will remain subject to the additional 25% duty. The TRQ for UK was scheduled to enter into force as of 1 June 2022.

| (55) | The investigation concluded that these adjustments to the US Section 232 have in overall terms little impact on the functioning and rationale of our safeguard measure for a number of reasons. First, to put these changes into perspective, most of these countries barely export currently any steel to the Union (if at all) (27), and they are not historical suppliers either (28). Amongst the few countries with more meaningful export volumes to the Union, namely UK, Japan and Korea, the three of them continue to be subject to the US Section 232 measure, i.e. they are constrained to export free-of-duty to the US market. In fact, Korea is allowed to export only under a quota (quantitative restriction), without the possibility to export beyond that volume, and the UK and Japan are subject to a TRQ out of which a 25% duty applies. In addition, having a TRQ in place does not necessarily mean that these countries will be able to use effectively the volumes allocated to it, as shown by the example of the TRQ allocated to the EU. Lastly, most of the origins representing the bulk of imports to the Union continue to be subject to a 25% duty on their exports to the US. |
| --- | --- |

(55)

The investigation concluded that these adjustments to the US Section 232 have in overall terms little impact on the functioning and rationale of our safeguard measure for a number of reasons. First, to put these changes into perspective, most of these countries barely export currently any steel to the Union (if at all) (27), and they are not historical suppliers either (28). Amongst the few countries with more meaningful export volumes to the Union, namely UK, Japan and Korea, the three of them continue to be subject to the US Section 232 measure, i.e. they are constrained to export free-of-duty to the US market. In fact, Korea is allowed to export only under a quota (quantitative restriction), without the possibility to export beyond that volume, and the UK and Japan are subject to a TRQ out of which a 25% duty applies. In addition, having a TRQ in place does not necessarily mean that these countries will be able to use effectively the volumes allocated to it, as shown by the example of the TRQ allocated to the EU. Lastly, most of the origins representing the bulk of imports to the Union continue to be subject to a 25% duty on their exports to the US.

27

28

| (56) | In this respect, the risk of trade diversion stems, primarily, from the main steel supplying countries to the Union, which have (in some cases rather large) spare capacities and thus are able to increase quickly (29) their presence in the Union market (30), which as demonstrated in previous investigations is an attractive market in terms of prices and size. (31) |
| --- | --- |

(56)

In this respect, the risk of trade diversion stems, primarily, from the main steel supplying countries to the Union, which have (in some cases rather large) spare capacities and thus are able to increase quickly (29) their presence in the Union market (30), which as demonstrated in previous investigations is an attractive market in terms of prices and size. (31)

29

30

31

| (57) | In addition, parties have not shown (or even mentioned) in their submissions how the findings made by the Commission in previous investigations (32) would have changed substantially. Notably the global overcapacity in the steel sector that continues to persist (33), the substantial reduction of imports into the US market as compared to the period prior to the imposition of the US Section 232 measure (34) or the lack of substitute markets for the lost volumes (35), among others. |
| --- | --- |

(57)

In addition, parties have not shown (or even mentioned) in their submissions how the findings made by the Commission in previous investigations (32) would have changed substantially. Notably the global overcapacity in the steel sector that continues to persist (33), the substantial reduction of imports into the US market as compared to the period prior to the imposition of the US Section 232 measure (34) or the lack of substitute markets for the lost volumes (35), among others.

32

33

34

35

| (58) | In any event, the improvement in the access to the US market from certain third countries shown in recital (54) would, if anything, make it even more difficult to the rest of countries to export to the US market as they are comparatively in a worse competitive position by having to pay a 25% duty. In fact, the pace of reduction of imports of the countries not subject to any preferential access under the US Section 232 measure was substantially higher than the average (36). Therefore, the adjustments to the US measure could even further increase the likelihood of trade diversion from those third countries not benefitting from any kind of preferential treatment under the Section 232 measure, some of which are in turn the countries more liable to cause a surge in imports to the Union market. |
| --- | --- |

(58)

In any event, the improvement in the access to the US market from certain third countries shown in recital (54) would, if anything, make it even more difficult to the rest of countries to export to the US market as they are comparatively in a worse competitive position by having to pay a 25% duty. In fact, the pace of reduction of imports of the countries not subject to any preferential access under the US Section 232 measure was substantially higher than the average (36). Therefore, the adjustments to the US measure could even further increase the likelihood of trade diversion from those third countries not benefitting from any kind of preferential treatment under the Section 232 measure, some of which are in turn the countries more liable to cause a surge in imports to the Union market.

36

Conclusion

Conclusion

| (59) | For the reasons set out in this subsection, the Commission concluded that the changes to the US Section 232 measure do not affect the functioning of the EU steel safeguard and do not alter the basis underpinning its assessment regarding the risk of trade diversion. |
| --- | --- |

(59)

For the reasons set out in this subsection, the Commission concluded that the changes to the US Section 232 measure do not affect the functioning of the EU steel safeguard and do not alter the basis underpinning its assessment regarding the risk of trade diversion.

4.   COMMENTS FROM INTERESTED PARTIES

COMMENTS FROM INTERESTED PARTIES

| (60) | In addition to the issues addressed in Section 3, interested parties made other claims that are addressed in this section. |
| --- | --- |

(60)

In addition to the issues addressed in Section 3, interested parties made other claims that are addressed in this section.

4.1.   Claims to terminate or suspend the measure due to steel price developments in the Union

Claims to terminate or suspend the measure due to steel price developments in the Union

| (61) | In the course of the investigation and after the written stage of the proceeding finished, several interested parties reached out to the Commission spontaneously claiming that the safeguard measure should be suspended or terminated due to an increase of steel prices in the Union. These parties argued that terminating or suspending the safeguard would be the solution to bring steel prices to lower levels. |
| --- | --- |

(61)

In the course of the investigation and after the written stage of the proceeding finished, several interested parties reached out to the Commission spontaneously claiming that the safeguard measure should be suspended or terminated due to an increase of steel prices in the Union. These parties argued that terminating or suspending the safeguard would be the solution to bring steel prices to lower levels.

| (62) | In the first place, the scope of the review did not include a potential termination or suspension of the measure. Therefore, the type of evidence gathered and the analysis undertaken during the investigation was not of the same kind that a potential termination of a safeguard measure would have required. Thus, the termination of the safeguard measure was out of the scope of the present review. |
| --- | --- |

(62)

In the first place, the scope of the review did not include a potential termination or suspension of the measure. Therefore, the type of evidence gathered and the analysis undertaken during the investigation was not of the same kind that a potential termination of a safeguard measure would have required. Thus, the termination of the safeguard measure was out of the scope of the present review.

| (63) | Nevertheless, and for the sake of completeness, the Commission considered it appropriate to put these claims into context and to provide a factual analysis of recent market developments in the present regulation. In this regard, the Commission established that the evolution of steel prices in the Union showed an upwards trend in the early months of 2022, peaking just following the unprovoked and unjustified military aggression of Russia against Ukraine, and that they showed signs of a continuous decline (with a 21% decrease as compared to the peak reached in 2022 (37)) as of end-April 2022 (38). |
| --- | --- |

(63)

Nevertheless, and for the sake of completeness, the Commission considered it appropriate to put these claims into context and to provide a factual analysis of recent market developments in the present regulation. In this regard, the Commission established that the evolution of steel prices in the Union showed an upwards trend in the early months of 2022, peaking just following the unprovoked and unjustified military aggression of Russia against Ukraine, and that they showed signs of a continuous decline (with a 21% decrease as compared to the peak reached in 2022 (37)) as of end-April 2022 (38).

37

38

| (64) | This trend in prices took place in an overall inflationary context, affecting also steelmaking raw materials and energy. In its Short Range Outlook (39)for 2022 and 2023, the World Steel Association (WSA) noted that the unprovoked and unjustified military aggression of Russia against Ukraine will increase further the inflationary pressure, on the one hand, via higher energy and raw materials prices for steel production and, on the other hand, via continued supply chain disruptions. This was further confirmed by the most recent information available on steelmaking raw materials’ price evolution (including energy) from sources such as the OECD (40), World Bank (41) and S&P Platts (42), showing a price surge and an overall upwards trend with levels substantially higher than in previous periods. |
| --- | --- |

(64)

This trend in prices took place in an overall inflationary context, affecting also steelmaking raw materials and energy. In its Short Range Outlook (39)for 2022 and 2023, the World Steel Association (WSA) noted that the unprovoked and unjustified military aggression of Russia against Ukraine will increase further the inflationary pressure, on the one hand, via higher energy and raw materials prices for steel production and, on the other hand, via continued supply chain disruptions. This was further confirmed by the most recent information available on steelmaking raw materials’ price evolution (including energy) from sources such as the OECD (40), World Bank (41) and S&P Platts (42), showing a price surge and an overall upwards trend with levels substantially higher than in previous periods.

39

40

41

42

| (65) | The Commission’s own statistical assessment (43)also confirmed that the price trends in the main steel market worldwide had shown a similar trend to that of the Union, and thus, the price trend observed in the Union market was fully consistent with that prevailing in the main markets across the world. Against this background, the Commission concluded that in any event, the safeguard measure could not have been the cause behind the evolution of prices in the Union. |
| --- | --- |

(65)

The Commission’s own statistical assessment (43)also confirmed that the price trends in the main steel market worldwide had shown a similar trend to that of the Union, and thus, the price trend observed in the Union market was fully consistent with that prevailing in the main markets across the world. Against this background, the Commission concluded that in any event, the safeguard measure could not have been the cause behind the evolution of prices in the Union.

43

4.2.   Alleged shortage of steel in the Union

Alleged shortage of steel in the Union

| (66) | Some interested parties claimed that there was a shortage of steel in the Union market and that the steel safeguard measure was aggravating it as certain quotas were exhausted. Thus, in the context of increased steel prices, they claimed that the measure should be suspended or terminated. |
| --- | --- |

(66)

Some interested parties claimed that there was a shortage of steel in the Union market and that the steel safeguard measure was aggravating it as certain quotas were exhausted. Thus, in the context of increased steel prices, they claimed that the measure should be suspended or terminated.

| (67) | The Commission noted that the TRQ use in the first three quarters of the fourth year of the measure (1 July 2021 – 31 March 2022) was at 77%, i.e. more than 5.6 million tonnes of quota remained unused, as shown in the table below. Thus, showing that Union users had generally the possibility to further increase the imports of free-of-duty steel during each period. While this did not preclude that there may have been more tensions in the quota use in certain categories as compared to others, the majority of product categories have had free-of-duty quota available in every quarter.

  Table 1


  Evolution of TRQ use in the first three quarters of year 4
   (44) |
| --- | --- |

(67)

The Commission noted that the TRQ use in the first three quarters of the fourth year of the measure (1 July 2021 – 31 March 2022) was at 77%, i.e. more than 5.6 million tonnes of quota remained unused, as shown in the table below. Thus, showing that Union users had generally the possibility to further increase the imports of free-of-duty steel during each period. While this did not preclude that there may have been more tensions in the quota use in certain categories as compared to others, the majority of product categories have had free-of-duty quota available in every quarter.

Table 1

Table 1

Evolution of TRQ use in the first three quarters of year 4
   (44)

Evolution of TRQ use in the first three quarters of year 4

44

Image 1

| (68) | The Commission also observed that the level of imports in 2021 was very close to the peak of imports reached 2018 (45). In addition, the World Steel Association (WSA) Short Range Outlook (46) for 2022 and 2023 highlighted the uncertainty in the economic outlook. The steel market outlook for 2022 has weakened notably as a result of the war and steel demand is expected to grow by 0.4% in 2022 and by 2.2% in 2023. |
| --- | --- |

(68)

The Commission also observed that the level of imports in 2021 was very close to the peak of imports reached 2018 (45). In addition, the World Steel Association (WSA) Short Range Outlook (46) for 2022 and 2023 highlighted the uncertainty in the economic outlook. The steel market outlook for 2022 has weakened notably as a result of the war and steel demand is expected to grow by 0.4% in 2022 and by 2.2% in 2023.

45

46

| (69) | Against this background, and considering that the level of quotas will be increased further by 4% as of 1 July 2022, as explained in Section 3.4, the Commission considered that any of the alleged pressure in certain segments of the market should in any event be alleviated, while preserving the effectiveness of the measure. |
| --- | --- |

(69)

Against this background, and considering that the level of quotas will be increased further by 4% as of 1 July 2022, as explained in Section 3.4, the Commission considered that any of the alleged pressure in certain segments of the market should in any event be alleviated, while preserving the effectiveness of the measure.

4.3.   Claims to suspend the measure due to the impact of the import ban on imports from Russia and Belarus on certain users

Claims to suspend the measure due to the impact of the import ban on imports from Russia and Belarus on certain users

| (70) | Some interested parties argued that the import ban on Russia and Belarus was affecting substantially their ability to import, claiming that the Commission should terminate the measure on these grounds. |
| --- | --- |

(70)

Some interested parties argued that the import ban on Russia and Belarus was affecting substantially their ability to import, claiming that the Commission should terminate the measure on these grounds.

| (71) | In this regard the Commission observed that the instability caused by the unprovoked and unjustified military aggression of Russia against Ukraine and by the ensuing sanctions on steel imposed by the EU are unavoidable factors present in the market and to which all stakeholders need to adjust progressively. |
| --- | --- |

(71)

In this regard the Commission observed that the instability caused by the unprovoked and unjustified military aggression of Russia against Ukraine and by the ensuing sanctions on steel imposed by the EU are unavoidable factors present in the market and to which all stakeholders need to adjust progressively.

| (72) | The Commission nevertheless took immediate action under the safeguard measure to minimise as much as possible the collateral damage of the import ban by redistributing the quotas effective since April 2022. This adjustment to the measure will alleviate largely the disturbances caused to certain users by the import ban on Russia and Belarus, by allowing them to access those free-of-duty volumes from other origins. However, inevitably it will necessarily take some time for Union users to adapt to this situation and switch to suppliers of other origin (47). In particular, the Commission acknowledged that in some instances, certain users would require a virtually complete change of suppliers, as their dependence on Russian and/or Belarussian steel imports was very high. However, the existence of these sanctions in the field of steel cannot by themselves question the validity or necessity of the safeguard measure. |
| --- | --- |

(72)

The Commission nevertheless took immediate action under the safeguard measure to minimise as much as possible the collateral damage of the import ban by redistributing the quotas effective since April 2022. This adjustment to the measure will alleviate largely the disturbances caused to certain users by the import ban on Russia and Belarus, by allowing them to access those free-of-duty volumes from other origins. However, inevitably it will necessarily take some time for Union users to adapt to this situation and switch to suppliers of other origin (47). In particular, the Commission acknowledged that in some instances, certain users would require a virtually complete change of suppliers, as their dependence on Russian and/or Belarussian steel imports was very high. However, the existence of these sanctions in the field of steel cannot by themselves question the validity or necessity of the safeguard measure.

47

4.4.   Requests to redistribute quotas from Ukraine

Requests to redistribute quotas from Ukraine

| (73) | Some interested parties requested the Commission to redistribute the country-specific quotas allocated to Ukraine because due to the unprovoked and unjustified military aggression of Russia against Ukraine, Ukraine would not be in a position to export to the Union in meaningful volumes. Some of these parties suggested the Commission to follow the same approach used when redistributing the quotas from Russia and Belarus. |
| --- | --- |

(73)

Some interested parties requested the Commission to redistribute the country-specific quotas allocated to Ukraine because due to the unprovoked and unjustified military aggression of Russia against Ukraine, Ukraine would not be in a position to export to the Union in meaningful volumes. Some of these parties suggested the Commission to follow the same approach used when redistributing the quotas from Russia and Belarus.

| (74) | The Commission’s analysis of Ukraine’s quota use prior to the suspension of the safeguard regulation as explained in recital (9) showed that in the majority of product categories where it had a country-specific quota, it had continued making use of the quotas. For those categories where it did not record exports, the Commission globalized the quotas from all other origins subject to the measure in each of those product categories, as explained in Section 3.1.1 above. The Commission recalled that quotas that would belong Ukraine (in the absence of a suspension), would not be available as long as the suspension of the measure vis-a-vis this country remains in place. |
| --- | --- |

(74)

The Commission’s analysis of Ukraine’s quota use prior to the suspension of the safeguard regulation as explained in recital (9) showed that in the majority of product categories where it had a country-specific quota, it had continued making use of the quotas. For those categories where it did not record exports, the Commission globalized the quotas from all other origins subject to the measure in each of those product categories, as explained in Section 3.1.1 above. The Commission recalled that quotas that would belong Ukraine (in the absence of a suspension), would not be available as long as the suspension of the measure vis-a-vis this country remains in place.

vis-a-vis

4.5.   Requests for differential treatment among certain product categories

Requests for differential treatment among certain product categories

| (75) | Several interested parties made requests pertaining to specific product categories (these categories varied depending on the party making the request). These requests included the exclusion of a given product category from the measure, a differential treatment of a given origin within a certain product category, and the application of different level of liberalisation depending on the product category. |
| --- | --- |

(75)

Several interested parties made requests pertaining to specific product categories (these categories varied depending on the party making the request). These requests included the exclusion of a given product category from the measure, a differential treatment of a given origin within a certain product category, and the application of different level of liberalisation depending on the product category.

| (76) | As the Commission explained in previous regulations, the scope of the measure concerns a single product, namely certain steel products. As such, the Commission cannot treat the product categories comprising the product concerned as if they were individually a product concerned in themselves. The Commission, in the management and quota administration, and where it was in the Union interest, adjusted the measure to ensure that the objectives of the safeguard could be met. However, the Commission cannot change the basic architecture of the measure, e.g. definition of the product scope, to accommodate requests from interested parties that would lead to a discriminatory treatment vis-a-vis other product categories and interested parties, and more importantly, would be inconsistent with the design of the measure and the product scope defined by the Definitive Regulation. |
| --- | --- |

(76)

As the Commission explained in previous regulations, the scope of the measure concerns a single product, namely certain steel products. As such, the Commission cannot treat the product categories comprising the product concerned as if they were individually a product concerned in themselves. The Commission, in the management and quota administration, and where it was in the Union interest, adjusted the measure to ensure that the objectives of the safeguard could be met. However, the Commission cannot change the basic architecture of the measure, e.g. definition of the product scope, to accommodate requests from interested parties that would lead to a discriminatory treatment vis-a-vis other product categories and interested parties, and more importantly, would be inconsistent with the design of the measure and the product scope defined by the Definitive Regulation.

vis-a-vis

4.6.   Requests to remove the safeguard in those categories subject to anti-dumping and/or countervailing measures

Requests to remove the safeguard in those categories subject to anti-dumping and/or countervailing measures

| (77) | Some interested parties claimed that the Commission lifted the safeguard measure for those product categories that are subject to anti-dumping and/or countervailing duties as, they claimed, they would grant the Union industry sufficient protection. |
| --- | --- |

(77)

Some interested parties claimed that the Commission lifted the safeguard measure for those product categories that are subject to anti-dumping and/or countervailing duties as, they claimed, they would grant the Union industry sufficient protection.

| (78) | The Commission recalled that the rationale and objective of the safeguard instrument and that of other trade defence instruments is different, as they do not address the same issues. While safeguards deal with increase imports being the result of unforeseen developments, anti-dumping and countervailing instruments deal with unfair trading practices. One can consider a situation where a country is found to be dumping in a given product category at a point in time, and that later on, a surge of imports resulting from unforeseen developments nevertheless takes place from a combination of origins. In addition, the scope of both instruments in terms of the origins covered is usually substantially different, as so are the types of investigations conducted, including procedural rules. Applying both instruments on a given product category simultaneously is thus fully compatible under both WTO and EU rules (48). |
| --- | --- |

(78)

The Commission recalled that the rationale and objective of the safeguard instrument and that of other trade defence instruments is different, as they do not address the same issues. While safeguards deal with increase imports being the result of unforeseen developments, anti-dumping and countervailing instruments deal with unfair trading practices. One can consider a situation where a country is found to be dumping in a given product category at a point in time, and that later on, a surge of imports resulting from unforeseen developments nevertheless takes place from a combination of origins. In addition, the scope of both instruments in terms of the origins covered is usually substantially different, as so are the types of investigations conducted, including procedural rules. Applying both instruments on a given product category simultaneously is thus fully compatible under both WTO and EU rules (48).

48

4.7.   Request to increase UK TRQs to include Great Britain-Northern Ireland trade

Request to increase UK TRQs to include Great Britain-Northern Ireland trade

| (79) | Some interested parties argued that the quotas allocated to the UK should increase to take into account the historical trade between Great Britain and Northern Ireland. |
| --- | --- |

(79)

Some interested parties argued that the quotas allocated to the UK should increase to take into account the historical trade between Great Britain and Northern Ireland.

| (80) | In this respect, the Commission recalled that the Protocol on Ireland/Northern Ireland (‘the Protocol’) (49) is the relevant legal act governing the status of Northern Ireland vis-a-vis EU trade and customs rules. Therefore, and in line with the provisions of the Protocol, sales of steel into Northern Ireland (whether from Great Britain or any other third country) were not counted as historical imports into the Union and hence were not part of the quota calculation (50). This approach ensured that the EU implementing legislation in the field of safeguards remains fully consistent with the Protocol. Therefore, this claim was rejected. |
| --- | --- |

(80)

In this respect, the Commission recalled that the Protocol on Ireland/Northern Ireland (‘the Protocol’) (49) is the relevant legal act governing the status of Northern Ireland vis-a-vis EU trade and customs rules. Therefore, and in line with the provisions of the Protocol, sales of steel into Northern Ireland (whether from Great Britain or any other third country) were not counted as historical imports into the Union and hence were not part of the quota calculation (50). This approach ensured that the EU implementing legislation in the field of safeguards remains fully consistent with the Protocol. Therefore, this claim was rejected.

49

vis-a-vis

50

4.8.   Claims on alleged circumvention

Claims on alleged circumvention

| (81) | Some parties pointed to possible cases of circumvention of the measure. In particular, some parties pointed to alleged circumvention from Russia in categories 12 and 13, and in general, in category 28. |
| --- | --- |

(81)

Some parties pointed to possible cases of circumvention of the measure. In particular, some parties pointed to alleged circumvention from Russia in categories 12 and 13, and in general, in category 28.

| (82) | In this respect, the Commission notes that Russia is currently subject to an import ban. Thus, any attempts to circumvent the current measures are monitored by the EU and national customs authorities. |
| --- | --- |

(82)

In this respect, the Commission notes that Russia is currently subject to an import ban. Thus, any attempts to circumvent the current measures are monitored by the EU and national customs authorities.

| (83) | Finally, the Commission notes that the present review amending the ongoing safeguard measure also complies with the obligations arising from the bilateral Agreements signed with certain third countries. |
| --- | --- |

(83)

Finally, the Commission notes that the present review amending the ongoing safeguard measure also complies with the obligations arising from the bilateral Agreements signed with certain third countries.

| (84) | The measures provided for in this Regulation are in accordance with the opinion of the Committee on Safeguards established under Article 3(3) of Regulation (EU) 2015/478 and Article 22(3) of Regulation (EU) 2015/755 respectively, |
| --- | --- |

(84)

The measures provided for in this Regulation are in accordance with the opinion of the Committee on Safeguards established under Article 3(3) of Regulation (EU) 2015/478 and Article 22(3) of Regulation (EU) 2015/755 respectively,

HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION:

Article 1

Regulation (EU) 2019/159 is amended as follows:

| (1) | paragraph 5 of Article 1 is amended as follows:

  ‘5.   Where the relevant tariff-rate quota under paragraph 2 is exhausted for one specific country, imports from that country for some product categories can be made under the remaining part of the tariff-rate quota for the same product category. This provision shall only apply during the last quarter of each year of application of the definitive tariff-rate quota. For product categories 5, 9, and 21 no further access to the remaining part of the tariff-rate quota will be allowed. For product categories 12, 13, 14, 16, 20 and 27 only access to a specific volume within the tariff-rate quota volume initially available in the last quarter, will be allowed. In product categories 1 and 4B no exporting country shall be allowed to use, on its own, more than 30 % of the residual tariff-rate quota volume initially available in the last quarter of each year of application of measures. For product categories 2, 3A, 3B, 4A, 6, 10, 15, 18, 19, 22, 24, 25B, 26 and 28 the access will be allowed over the total tariff-rate quota volume initially available in the last quarter in the respective product categories’; |
| --- | --- |

(1)

paragraph 5 of Article 1 is amended as follows:

‘5.   Where the relevant tariff-rate quota under paragraph 2 is exhausted for one specific country, imports from that country for some product categories can be made under the remaining part of the tariff-rate quota for the same product category. This provision shall only apply during the last quarter of each year of application of the definitive tariff-rate quota. For product categories 5, 9, and 21 no further access to the remaining part of the tariff-rate quota will be allowed. For product categories 12, 13, 14, 16, 20 and 27 only access to a specific volume within the tariff-rate quota volume initially available in the last quarter, will be allowed. In product categories 1 and 4B no exporting country shall be allowed to use, on its own, more than 30 % of the residual tariff-rate quota volume initially available in the last quarter of each year of application of measures. For product categories 2, 3A, 3B, 4A, 6, 10, 15, 18, 19, 22, 24, 25B, 26 and 28 the access will be allowed over the total tariff-rate quota volume initially available in the last quarter in the respective product categories’;

| (2) | point III.2 in Annex III is replaced by the text of Annex I to this Regulation; |
| --- | --- |

(2)

point III.2 in Annex III is replaced by the text of Annex I to this Regulation;

| (3) | Annex IV is replaced by the text of Annex II to this Regulation. |
| --- | --- |

(3)

Annex IV is replaced by the text of Annex II to this Regulation.

Article 2

This Regulation shall enter into force on the day following that of its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union.

It shall apply as of 1 July 2022.

This Regulation shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States.

Done at Brussels, 23 June 2022.

For the Commission

The President

Ursula VON DER LEYEN

---

(1)  
  OJ L 83, 27.3.2015, p. 16.

1

(2)  
  OJ L 123, 19.5.2015, p. 33.

2

(3)  Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/159 of 31 January 2019 imposing definitive safeguard measures against imports of certain steel products, (OJ L 31, 1.2.2019, p. 27).

3

(4)  Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2021/1029 of 24 June 2021 amending Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/159 to prolong the safeguard measure on imports of certain steel products (OJ L 225 I, 25.6.2021, p. 1).

4

(5)  Notice of Initiation concerning a review of the safeguard measure applicable to imports of certain steel products (2021/C 509/10) (OJ C 509, 17.12.2021, p. 12).

5

(6)  Council Regulation (EU) 2022/428 of 15 March 2022 amending Regulation (EU) No 833/2014 concerning restrictive measures in view of Russia's actions destabilising the situation in Ukraine (OJ L 87 I, 15.3.2022, p. 13).

6

(7)  For Belarus all steel products were subject to the import ban (i.e. all those subject to the safeguard measure were thus included), while for Russia the ban applied only to those steel products subject to the steel safeguard measure.

7

(8)  Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2022/434 of 15 March 2022 amending Regulation (EU) 2019/159 imposing a definitive safeguard measure against imports of certain steel products (OJ L 88, 16.3.2022, p. 181).

8

(9)  Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2022/664 of 21 April 2022 amending Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/159 imposing a definitive safeguard measure against imports of certain steel products (OJ L 121, 22.4.2022, p. 12).

9

(10)  Regulation (EU) 2022/870 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 May 2022 on temporary trade-liberalisation measures supplementing trade concessions applicable to Ukrainian products under the Association Agreement between the European Union and the European Atomic Energy Community and their Member States, of the one part, and Ukraine, of the other part (OJ L 152, 3.6.2022, p. 103).

10

(11)  For this reason, even if in certain categories Ukraine appears listed in the Annex, those country-specific quotas having an order number linked to them are not applicable.

11

(12)  Including the subsequent increases on account of liberalisation.

12

(13)  See recital (33) of Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2020/894 of 29 June 2020 amending Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/159 imposing definitive safeguard measures against imports of certain steel products (OJ L 206, 30.6.2020, p. 27): “Lastly, the Commission also notes that the reference period used to calculate the TRQs constitutes one of the pillars in the design of the measures set ab initio by the definitive Regulation, and that the scope of the Review does not cover the substantial modification of the basic structure of the measures”.

13

(14)  
  Ibid at Section 3.2.1.

14

Ibid

(15)  Category 7 is also affected by the import ban on a historically important supplier: Russia.

15

(16)  Source: Tariff Quota Consultation, accessible at:

16

https://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/dds2/taric/quota_consultation.jsp

(17)  Quotas corresponding to Ukraine are not part of the safeguard measure, and hence, not available to any other country as long as the temporary suspension referred to in recital (9) remains in place.

17

(18)  See Section 3.2.3 of Implementing Regulation (EU) 2020/894.

18

(19)  Source: Eurostat.

19

(20)  This will not apply as long as the safeguard measure is suspended vis-a-vis Ukraine.

20

vis-a-vis

(21)  Article 7.4 of the WTO Agreement on Safeguards.

21

(22)  Article 19(4) of Regulation (EU) 2015/478.

22

(23)  The level of TRQ allocated to the EU is around 3.3 million tonnes per year, which amounts to around 2.5% of Union industry’s average volume of domestic sales in the Union market (years 2018-2019).

23

(24)  Both the Definitive and the Prolongation Regulations showed that in overall terms the Union industry had certain additional capacity available.

24

(25)  Several interested parties argued that the US tends to have generally the highest level of prices.

25

(26)  US Report on TRQ consumption.

26

(27)  In 2021, the import share of Canada, Mexico, Brazil, Australia and Argentina in the Union market was 0.9%.

27

(28)  The combined share of imports into the Union from Canada, Mexico, Brazil, Australia and Argentina in the period 2013-2021 was 2.25% of total imports (and reaching a peak of only 3.7% in 2016).

28

(29)  In past functioning reviews it was shown that certain countries were able to substantially and rapidly increase their presence in the Union market, e.g. with very quick exhaustions of quotas, including additional quotas in Q4.

29

(30)  It is relevant to point out that the largest exporting countries to the Union have consistently claimed (including in the submissions of this review) that the existing quotas would be severely constraining their ability to export to the Union, thus suggesting that they would be able to increase their presence in the Union market in the absence of a safeguard measure.

30

(31)  See Section 3.1.2.g of Prolongation Regulation for a more detailed assessment. In terms of volumes, the Union market continues to be the main steel importing market worldwide. See OECD’s Steel Market Developments – Q2 2022, (DSTI/SC(2022)1), table 8.

31

OECD’s Steel Market Developments – Q2 2022

(32)  See, for instance, the Commission’s findings in Section 3.1.2 and 3.1.3 of the Prolongation Regulation.

32

(33)  See, for instance, the Chair’s Statement at the 91st Session of the OECD Steel Committee (29-31 March 2022): “excess capacity, which stood at 544 million tonnes in 2021 and has remained at persistently elevated levels since 2018, highlighting the need for further capacity reductions in the relevant jurisdictions”. Accessible at: 91st Session of the OECD Steel Committee - Chair's Statement - OECD;

33

See also OECD’s Latest Developments in Steelmaking Capacity, p.4 and 6 (DSTI/SC(2022)3: “Global excess capacity in steel continues to grow. Global crude steelmaking capacity increased by 6.0 million metric tonnes (mmt), or 0.2%, to 2 454,3 mmt in 2021”;

OECD’s Latest Developments in Steelmaking Capacity, p.4 and 6

See also G7’s Trade Ministers’ Joint Communiqué of 21 October 2021: “We reaffirmed the importance of the Global Forum on Steel Excess Capacity (GFSEC) as a forum that can help address the issue of global steel excess capacity in a multilateral framework. We will continue to support and work with the OECD to build on their excellent work undertaken to date, including a continued focus on the analysis of the incidence and magnitude of market-distorting practices and the impacts these may have on issues such as creating and maintaining overcapacity”; available at: https://www.g7uk.org/g7-trade-ministers-communique-2/

(34)  Imports into the US in 2021 were in overall terms 21% lower than in the year 2017, i.e. pre-US Section 232 measure.

34

(35)  Volumes of exports lost, inter alia, to US and Union markets, as well as to other third markets. For more details see Section 3.1.2 of Prolongation Regulation.

35

(36)  The reduction of imports among countries with relevant exports to the Union which are not benefitting from any preferential treatment under the US Section 232 measure, including inter alia China, India, Russia, Taiwan, Turkey, Ukraine and the UK was of -48% as opposed to an overall reduction in imports of -21% (see footnote 34). Source: United States International Trade Commission - https://dataweb.usitc.gov

36

(37)  Taking Hot-Rolled Flat price in the Union as a reference (comparing the peak reached in mid-March with data in mid-May 2022).

37

(38)  Source: S&P Platts Global and Steel Business Briefing (SBB) (available upon subscription).

38

For evidence from publicly available sources on the evolution of prices in the Union, see, inter alia: MEPS International - https://mepsinternational.com/gb/en/news/buying-panic-subsides-in-european-steel-market (20 April 2022); EUROMETAL -Lower import offers, poor demand drags down EU HRC prices - EUROMETAL (2 May 2022); Metal Bulletin - https://www.metalbulletin.com/Article/5097739/HRC-prices-across-Europe-continue-to-slide- on-weak-demand.html (10 May 2022) and https://www.metalbulletin.com/Article/5098015/hot-rolled-coil/European-HRC-buyers-continue-to-be-held-back-by-sufficient-stocks-weak-demand.html (12 May 2022)

(39)  See WorldSteel Association, Short Range Outlook, April 2022, available at: worldsteel Short Range Outlook April 2022 - worldsteel.org

39

(40)  See OECD’s Economic and Social Impacts and Policy Implications of the War in Ukraine, 29 March 2022, pages 7 and 8, available at: https://www.oecd.org/industry/ind/Item_3.1_Economic_and_financial_market_Impacts.pdf

40

See also 91st Session of the OECD Steel Committee - Chair's Statement, available at: https://www.oecd.org/sti/ind/91-oecd-steel-chair-statement.htm;
  “Increased stress on global supply chains, including semiconductor chip shortages, rising energy costs and the prospects for higher interest rates due to accelerating inflation were dampening industrial activity and global demand for steel. (...) The impacts are being felt directly as a significant negative supply shock on steel and raw materials from Russia and Ukraine, affecting the European steel industry in particular, leading to surging steel and raw material prices. The global steel industry is also suffering from indirect impacts such as higher energy and production costs as well as a slowdown in global economic growth that will dampen steel demand considerably going forward.”

“Increased stress on global supply chains, including semiconductor chip shortages, rising energy costs and the prospects for higher interest rates due to accelerating inflation were dampening industrial activity and global demand for steel. (...) The impacts are being felt directly as a significant negative supply shock on steel and raw materials from Russia and Ukraine, affecting the European steel industry in particular, leading to surging steel and raw material prices. The global steel industry is also suffering from indirect impacts such as higher energy and production costs as well as a slowdown in global economic growth that will dampen steel demand considerably going forward.”

(41)  See World Bank’s Commodity Prices, May 2022, at: CMO-Pink-Sheet-May-2022.pdf (worldbank.org)

41

(42)  See price evolution of steel products at S&P Platts Global, April 2022 Global Market Outlook (available upon subscription).

42

(43)  Source: Global Trade Atlas – analysis focused on the comparison (year 2021 v. 2019) of the level of export prices by some of the main steel-producing worldwide for the categories subject to the EU steel safeguard measure. The analysis showed the following evolution of export prices from some of the main steel-producing countries in the world of the product subject to the EU Safeguard measure: China (+43%), India (+32%), Japan (+14%), Russia (+28%), South Korea (+27%), Turkey (+43%), and the UK (+21%).

43

(44)  Source: https://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/dds2/taric/quota_consultation.jsp

44

(45)  The volume of imports in 2021 was only 1.5% lower than that in 2018.

45

(46)  See World Steel Short Range Outlook, accessible at: worldsteel Short Range Outlook of 14 April 2022 - worldsteel.org

46

(47)  In this respect, Article 3.g of Regulation (EU) 2022/428 allowed to continue importing from Russia and Belarus, under the residual quota, as long as contracts concluded before 16 March 2022, or ancillary contracts necessary for the execution of such contracts, were executed by 17 June 2022.

47

(48)  In this respect, the Commission recalled that Regulation (EU) 2015/477 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 2015 on measures that the Union may take in relation to the combined effect of anti-dumping or anti-subsidy measures with safeguard measures (OJ L 83, 27.3.2015, p. 11), properly deals with the interaction of safeguard and anti-dumping and countervailing measures. See also judgment of 20 October 2021, Novolipetsk Steel PAO v. Commission, T-790/19, ECLI:EU:T:2021:706.

48

Novolipetsk Steel PAO v. Commission

(49)  Agreement on the withdrawal of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland from the European Union and the European Atomic Energy Community (‘Withdrawal Agreement’), OJ L 63, 31.1.2020, p. 7.

49

(50)  See Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2020/2037 of 10 December 2020 amending Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/159 imposing a definitive safeguard measure against imports of certain steel products (OJ L 416, 11.12.2020, p. 32).

50

---

ANNEX I

“III.2 —   List of product categories originating in developing countries to which the definitive measures apply

| List of product categories originating in developing countries to which the definitive measures apply |
| --- |
| Country / Product group | 1 | 2 | 3A | 3B | 4A | 4B | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 | 12 | 13 | 14 | 15 | 16 | 17 | 18 | 19 | 20 | 21 | 22 | 24 | 25A | 25B | 26 | 27 | 28 |
| Brazil | | | | | X | | | X | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | X | | | | | |
| China | | X | X | X | X | X | | X | | X | X | X | X | | X | X | | | X | X | | X | X | X | | X | X | X | X |
| Egypt | X | | | | X | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | X | | | | | |
| India | X | X | | | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | | | X | X | | | | | X | | X | X | | | X | | |
| Indonesia | | | | | X | | | | X | X | X | | | | | | | | | | | | | X | | | | | |
| Kazakhstan | | | | | X | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | X | | | | X | | | | | |
| Moldova | | | | | X | | | | | | | | X | X | | | X | | | | | | | X | | | | | |
| North Macedonia | | | | | X | | | | X | | | | X | | | | | | | | X | X | | X | | | | | |
| South Africa | | | | | X | | | | | X | X | X | | | | | | | | | | | | X | | | | | |
| Tunisia | | | | | X | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | X | | | | | |
| Turkey | X | X | | | X | X | X | X | | X | X | | X | X | | | X | X | | X | X | X | | X | | X | X | X | X |
| Ukraine | X | X | | | X | X | | | X | | | | | X | X | | X | X | | | X | X | X | X | | | X | X | X” |
| United Arab Emirates | | | | | X | | | | | | | | | | | | X | X | X | | X | | | X | | | | | |
| Vietnam | X | | X | X | X | X | X | | | | X | | | | | | | | | | | | | X | | | | | |
| All other developing countries | | | | | X | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | X | | | | | |

List of product categories originating in developing countries to which the definitive measures apply

Country / Product group

1

2

3A

3B

4A

4B

5

6

7

8

9

10

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

24

25A

25B

26

27

28

Brazil

X

X

X

China

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

Egypt

X

X

X

India

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

Indonesia

X

X

X

X

X

Kazakhstan

X

X

X

Moldova

X

X

X

X

X

North Macedonia

X

X

X

X

X

X

South Africa

X

X

X

X

X

Tunisia

X

X

Turkey

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

Ukraine

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X”

United Arab Emirates

X

X

X

X

X

X

Vietnam

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

All other developing countries

X

X

---

ANNEX II

“ANNEX IV

IV.1 –   Volumes of tariff–rate quotas

| Product Number | Product category | CN Codes | Allocation by country (Where Applicable) | Year 5 | Year 6 | Additional duty rate | Order numbers |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| From 1.7.2022 to 30.9.2022 | From 1.10.2022 to 31.12.2022 | From 1.1.2023 to 31.3.2023 | From 1.4.2023 to 30.6.2023 | From 1.7.2023 to 30.9.2023 | From 1.10.2023 to 31.12.2023 | From 1.1.2024 to 31.3.2024 | From 1.4.2024 to 30.6.2024 |
| Volume of tariff quota (net tonnes) | Volume of tariff quota (net tonnes) |
| 1 | Non Alloy and Other Alloy Hot Rolled Sheets and Strips | 7208 10 00 , 7208 25 00 , 7208 26 00 , 7208 27 00 , 7208 36 00 , 7208 37 00 , 7208 38 00 , 7208 39 00 , 7208 40 00 , 7208 52 10 , 7208 52 99 , 7208 53 10 , 7208 53 90 , 7208 54 00 , 7211 13 00 , 7211 14 00 , 7211 19 00 , 7212 60 00 , 7225 19 10 , 7225 30 10 , 7225 30 30 , 7225 30 90 , 7225 40 15 , 7225 40 90 , 7226 19 10 , 7226 91 20 , 7226 91 91 , 7226 91 99 | Russian Federation | not applicable | not applicable | not applicable | not applicable | not applicable | not applicable | not applicable | not applicable | 25 % | 09.8966 |
| Turkey | 452 373,88 | 452 373,88 | 442 539,66 | 447 456,77 | 469 183,40 | 469 183,40 | 464 083,58 | 464 083,58 | 25 % | 09.8967 |
| India | 287 227,31 | 287 227,31 | 280 983,24 | 284 105,28 | 297 900,24 | 297 900,24 | 294 662,20 | 294 662,20 | 25 % | 09.8968 |
| Korea, Republic of | 179 365,46 | 179 365,46 | 175 466,21 | 177 415,83 | 186 030,40 | 186 030,40 | 184 008,33 | 184 008,33 | 25 % | 09.8969 |
| United Kingdom | 150 045,49 | 150 045,49 | 146 783,63 | 148 414,56 | 155 620,95 | 155 620,95 | 153 929,42 | 153 929,42 | 25 % | 09.8976 |
| Serbia | 159 231,56 | 159 231,56 | 155 770,01 | 157 500,79 | 165 148,37 | 165 148,37 | 163 353,27 | 163 353,27 | 25 % | 09.8970 |
| Other countries | 900 290,25 | 900 290,25 | 880 718,72 | 890 504,48 | 933 743,65 | 933 743,65 | 923 594,27 | 923 594,27 | 25 % | (1) |
| 2 | Non Alloy and Other Alloy Cold Rolled Sheets | 7209 15 00 , 7209 16 90 , 7209 17 90 , 7209 18 91 , 7209 25 00 , 7209 26 90 , 7209 27 90 , 7209 28 90 , 7209 90 20 , 7209 90 80 , 7211 23 20 , 7211 23 30 , 7211 23 80 , 7211 29 00 , 7211 90 20 , 7211 90 80 , 7225 50 20 , 7225 50 80 , 7226 20 00 , 7226 92 00 | India | 156 974,80 | 156 974,80 | 153 562,31 | 155 268,55 | 162 807,74 | 162 807,74 | 161 038,10 | 161 038,10 | 25 % | 09.8801 |
| Korea, Republic of | 91 042,24 | 91 042,24 | 89 063,06 | 90 052,65 | 94 425,23 | 94 425,23 | 93 398,87 | 93 398,87 | 25 % | 09.8802 |
| United Kingdom | 84 142,99 | 84 142,99 | 82 313,80 | 83 228,39 | 87 269,62 | 87 269,62 | 86 321,03 | 86 321,03 | 25 % | 09.8977 |
| Ukraine | 69 898,31 | 69 898,31 | 68 378,78 | 69 138,54 | 72 495,62 | 72 495,62 | 71 707,62 | 71 707,62 | 25 % | 09.8803 |
| Serbia | 39 631,71 | 39 631,71 | 38 770,15 | 39 200,93 | 41 104,37 | 41 104,37 | 40 657,58 | 40 657,58 | 25 % | 09.8805 |
| Other countries | 321 824,43 | 321 824,43 | 314 828,25 | 318 326,34 | 333 782,94 | 333 782,94 | 330 154,85 | 330 154,85 | 25 % | (2) |
| 3.A | Electrical Sheets (other than GOES) | 7209 16 10 , 7209 17 10 , 7209 18 10 , 7209 26 10 , 7209 27 10 , 7209 28 10 | Russian Federation | not applicable | not applicable | not applicable | not applicable | not applicable | not applicable | not applicable | not applicable | 25 % | 09.8808 |
| United Kingdom | 532,59 | 532,59 | 521,01 | 526,80 | 552,38 | 552,38 | 546,38 | 546,38 | 25 % | 09.8978 |
| Iran, Islamic Republic of | 159,72 | 159,72 | 156,25 | 157,98 | 165,65 | 165,65 | 163,85 | 163,85 | 25 % | 09.8809 |
| Korea, Republic of | 244,60 | 244,60 | 239,29 | 241,94 | 253,69 | 253,69 | 250,93 | 250,93 | 25 % | 09.8806 |
| Other countries | 817,65 | 817,65 | 799,87 | 808,76 | 848,03 | 848,03 | 838,81 | 838,81 | 25 % | (3) |
| 3.B | 7225 19 90 , 7226 19 80 | Russian Federation | not applicable | not applicable | not applicable | not applicable | not applicable | not applicable | not applicable | not applicable | 25 % | 09.8811 |
| Korea, Republic of | 33 860,21 | 33 860,21 | 33 124,12 | 33 492,16 | 35 118,40 | 35 118,40 | 34 736,68 | 34 736,68 | 25 % | 09.8812 |
| China | 29 777,29 | 29 777,29 | 29 129,96 | 29 453,62 | 30 883,77 | 30 883,77 | 30 548,08 | 30 548,08 | 25 % | 09.8813 |
| Taiwan | 23 288,87 | 23 288,87 | 22 782,59 | 23 035,73 | 24 154,25 | 24 154,25 | 23 891,70 | 23 891,70 | 25 % | 09.8814 |
| Other countries | 8 303,99 | 8 303,99 | 8 123,47 | 8 213,73 | 8 612,56 | 8 612,56 | 8 518,94 | 8 518,94 | 25 % | (4) |
| 4.A | Metallic Coated Sheets | TARIC Codes: 7210410020 , 7210410030 , 7210490020 , 7210490030 , 7210610020 , 7210610030 , 7210690020 , 7210690030 , 7212300020 , 7212300030 , 7212 50 20 , 7212506120 , 7212506130 , 7212506920 , 7212506930 , 7225920020 , 7225920030 , 7225990011 , 7225990022 , 7225990023 , 7225990041 , 7225990045 , 7225990091 , 7225990092 , 7225990093 , 7226993010 , 7226993030 , 7226997011 , 7226997013 , 7226997091 , 7226997093 , 7226997094 | Korea (Republic of) | 36 115,37 | 36 115,37 | 35 330,25 | 35 722,81 | 37 457,36 | 37 457,36 | 37 050,22 | 37 050,22 | 25 % | 09.8816 |
| India | 51 623,89 | 51 623,89 | 50 501,64 | 51 062,77 | 53 542,16 | 53 542,16 | 52 960,18 | 52 960,18 | 25 % | 09.8817 |
| United Kingdom | 34 028,35 | 34 028,35 | 33 288,60 | 33 658,47 | 35 292,79 | 35 292,79 | 34 909,17 | 34 909,17 | 25 % | 09.8979 |
| Other countries | 454 338,51 | 454 338,51 | 444 461,58 | 449 400,05 | 471 221,03 | 471 221,03 | 466 099,06 | 466 099,06 | 25 % | (5) |
| 4.B | CN Codes: 7210 20 00 , 7210 30 00 , 7210 90 80 , 7212 20 00 , 7212 50 30 , 7212 50 40 , 7212 50 90 , 7225 91 00 , 7226 99 10 TARIC codes: 7210410080 , 7210490080 , 7210610080 , 7210690080 , 7212300080 , 7212506180 , 7212506980 , 7225920080 , 7225990025 , 7225990095 , 7226993090 , 7226997019 , 7226997096 | China | 123 409,30 | 123 409,30 | 120 726,49 | 122 067,90 | 127 995,00 | 127 995,00 | 126 603,75 | 126 603,75 | 25 % | 09.8821 |
| Korea (Republic of) | 160 163,83 | 160 163,83 | 156 682,01 | 158 422,92 | 166 115,27 | 166 115,27 | 164 309,67 | 164 309,67 | 25 % | 09.8822 |
| India | 73 708,96 | 73 708,96 | 72 106,59 | 72 907,78 | 76 447,88 | 76 447,88 | 75 616,92 | 75 616,92 | 25 % | 09.8823 |
| United Kingdom | 34 028,35 | 34 028,35 | 33 288,60 | 33 658,47 | 35 292,79 | 35 292,79 | 34 909,17 | 34 909,17 | 25 % | 09.8980 |
| Other countries | 100 848,08 | 100 848,08 | 98 655,73 | 99 751,91 | 104 595,44 | 104 595,44 | 103 458,53 | 103 458,53 | 25 % | (6) |
| 5 | Organic Coated Sheets | 7210 70 80 , 7212 40 80 | India | 75 642,86 | 75 642,86 | 73 998,45 | 74 820,66 | 78 453,64 | 78 453,64 | 77 600,88 | 77 600,88 | 25 % | 09.8826 |
| Korea, Republic of | 68 363,40 | 68 363,40 | 66 877,24 | 67 620,32 | 70 903,68 | 70 903,68 | 70 132,99 | 70 132,99 | 25 % | 09.8827 |
| United Kingdom | 33 563,94 | 33 563,94 | 32 834,29 | 33 199,12 | 34 811,13 | 34 811,13 | 34 432,75 | 34 432,75 | 25 % | 09.8981 |
| Taiwan | 21 910,16 | 21 910,16 | 21 433,85 | 21 672,00 | 22 724,31 | 22 724,31 | 22 477,30 | 22 477,30 | 25 % | 09.8828 |
| Turkey | 15 126,78 | 15 126,78 | 14 797,94 | 14 962,36 | 15 688,87 | 15 688,87 | 15 518,34 | 15 518,34 | 25 % | 09.8829 |
| Other countries | 41 252,54 | 41 252,54 | 40 355,75 | 40 804,14 | 42 785,42 | 42 785,42 | 42 320,36 | 42 320,36 | 25 % | (7) |
| 6 | Tin Mill products | 7209 18 99 , 7210 11 00 , 7210 12 20 , 7210 12 80 , 7210 50 00 , 7210 70 10 , 7210 90 40 , 7212 10 10 , 7212 10 90 , 7212 40 20 | China | 106 758,00 | 106 758,00 | 104 437,17 | 105 597,58 | 110 724,96 | 110 724,96 | 109 521,43 | 109 521,43 | 25 % | 09.8831 |
| United Kingdom | 38 940,37 | 38 940,37 | 38 093,84 | 38 517,11 | 40 387,34 | 40 387,34 | 39 948,34 | 39 948,34 | 25 % | 09.8982 |
| Serbia | 21 429,38 | 21 429,38 | 20 963,53 | 21 196,46 | 22 225,67 | 22 225,67 | 21 984,08 | 21 984,08 | 25 % | 09.8832 |
| Korea, Republic of | 15 501,05 | 15 501,05 | 15 164,07 | 15 332,56 | 16 077,04 | 16 077,04 | 15 902,29 | 15 902,29 | 25 % | 09.8833 |
| Taiwan | 12 887,99 | 12 887,99 | 12 607,82 | 12 747,90 | 13 366,89 | 13 366,89 | 13 221,60 | 13 221,60 | 25 % | 09.8834 |
| Other countries | 35 715,05 | 35 715,05 | 34 938,63 | 35 326,84 | 37 042,16 | 37 042,16 | 36 639,53 | 36 639,53 | 25 % | (8) |
| 7 | Non Alloy and Other Alloy Quarto Plates | 7208 51 20 , 7208 51 91 , 7208 51 98 , 7208 52 91 , 7208 90 20 , 7208 90 80 , 7210 90 30 , 7225 40 12 , 7225 40 40 , 7225 40 60 , 7225 99 00 | Ukraine | 270 017,57 | 270 017,57 | 264 147,62 | 267 082,59 | 280 051,01 | 280 051,01 | 277 006,97 | 277 006,97 | 25 % | 09.8836 |
| Other countries | 554 571,27 | 554 571,27 | 542 515,37 | 548 543,32 | 575 178,29 | 575 178,29 | 568 926,35 | 568 926,35 | 25 % | (9) |
| 8 | Stainless Hot Rolled Sheets and Strips | 7219 11 00 , 7219 12 10 , 7219 12 90 , 7219 13 10 , 7219 13 90 , 7219 14 10 , 7219 14 90 , 7219 22 10 , 7219 22 90 , 7219 23 00 , 7219 24 00 , 7220 11 00 , 7220 12 00 | Other countries | 105 581,29 | 105 581,29 | 103 286,04 | 104 433,67 | 109 504,53 | 109 504,53 | 108 314,26 | 108 314,26 | 25 % | (10) |
| 9 | Stainless Cold Rolled Sheets and Strips | 7219 31 00 , 7219 32 10 , 7219 32 90 , 7219 33 10 , 7219 33 90 , 7219 34 10 , 7219 34 90 , 7219 35 10 , 7219 35 90 , 7219 90 20 , 7219 90 80 , 7220 20 21 , 7220 20 29 , 7220 20 41 , 7220 20 49 , 7220 20 81 , 7220 20 89 , 7220 90 20 , 7220 90 80 | Korea, Republic of | 47 773,95 | 47 773,95 | 46 735,39 | 47 254,67 | 49 549,16 | 49 549,16 | 49 010,58 | 49 010,58 | 25 % | 09.8846 |
| Taiwan | 44 302,39 | 44 302,39 | 43 339,29 | 43 820,84 | 45 948,59 | 45 948,59 | 45 449,15 | 45 449,15 | 25 % | 09.8847 |
| India | 29 610,23 | 29 610,23 | 28 966,53 | 29 288,38 | 30 710,50 | 30 710,50 | 30 376,69 | 30 376,69 | 25 % | 09.8848 |
| South Africa | 25 765,68 | 25 765,68 | 25 205,56 | 25 485,62 | 26 723,10 | 26 723,10 | 26 432,63 | 26 432,63 | 25 % | 09.8853 |
| United States | 24 090,93 | 24 090,93 | 23 567,21 | 23 829,07 | 24 986,11 | 24 986,11 | 24 714,52 | 24 714,52 | 25 % | 09.8849 |
| Turkey | 20 046,66 | 20 046,66 | 19 610,86 | 19 828,76 | 20 791,56 | 20 791,56 | 20 565,57 | 20 565,57 | 25 % | 09.8850 |
| Malaysia | 12 700,45 | 12 700,45 | 12 424,35 | 12 562,40 | 13 172,38 | 13 172,38 | 13 029,20 | 13 029,20 | 25 % | 09.8851 |
| Other countries | 50 944,84 | 50 944,84 | 49 837,34 | 50 391,09 | 52 837,87 | 52 837,87 | 52 263,55 | 52 263,55 | 25 % | (11) |
| 10 | Stainless Hot Rolled Quarto Plates | 7219 21 10 , 7219 21 90 | China | 4 731,30 | 4 731,30 | 4 628,44 | 4 679,87 | 4 907,10 | 4 907,10 | 4 853,77 | 4 853,77 | 25 % | 09.8856 |
| India | 2 007,05 | 2 007,05 | 1 963,42 | 1 985,24 | 2 081,63 | 2 081,63 | 2 059,01 | 2 059,01 | 25 % | 09.8857 |
| South Africa | 1 374,32 | 1 374,32 | 1 344,44 | 1 359,38 | 1 425,39 | 1 425,39 | 1 409,89 | 1 409,89 | 25 % | 09.8859 |
| United Kingdom | 827,96 | 827,96 | 809,96 | 818,96 | 858,73 | 858,73 | 849,39 | 849,39 | 25 % | 09.8984 |
| Taiwan | 764,41 | 764,41 | 747,79 | 756,10 | 792,81 | 792,81 | 784,19 | 784,19 | 25 % | 09.8858 |
| Other countries | 1 002,95 | 1 002,95 | 981,14 | 992,04 | 1 040,21 | 1 040,21 | 1 028,91 | 1 028,91 | 25 % | (12) |
| 12 | Non Alloy and Other Alloy Merchant Bars and Light Sections | 7214 30 00 , 7214 91 10 , 7214 91 90 , 7214 99 31 , 7214 99 39 , 7214 99 50 , 7214 99 71 , 7214 99 79 , 7214 99 95 , 7215 90 00 , 7216 10 00 , 7216 21 00 , 7216 22 00 , 7216 40 10 , 7216 40 90 , 7216 50 10 , 7216 50 91 , 7216 50 99 , 7216 99 00 , 7228 10 20 , 7228 20 10 , 7228 20 91 , 7228 30 20 , 7228 30 41 , 7228 30 49 , 7228 30 61 , 7228 30 69 , 7228 30 70 , 7228 30 89 , 7228 60 20 , 7228 60 80 , 7228 70 10 , 7228 70 90 , 7228 80 00 | China | 135 003,41 | 135 003,41 | 132 068,55 | 133 535,98 | 140 019,93 | 140 019,93 | 138 497,97 | 138 497,97 | 25 % | 09.8861 |
| United Kingdom | 112 785,82 | 112 785,82 | 110 333,95 | 111 559,89 | 116 976,77 | 116 976,77 | 115 705,28 | 115 705,28 | 25 % | 09.8985 |
| Turkey | 101 999,52 | 101 999,52 | 99 782,14 | 100 890,83 | 105 789,67 | 105 789,67 | 104 639,78 | 104 639,78 | 25 % | 09.8862 |
| Russian Federation | not applicable | not applicable | not applicable | not applicable | not applicable | not applicable | not applicable | not applicable | 25 % | 09.8863 |
| Switzerland | 65 555,05 | 65 555,05 | 64 129,94 | 64 842,50 | 67 990,98 | 67 990,98 | 67 251,94 | 67 251,94 | 25 % | 09.8864 |
| Belarus | not applicable | not applicable | not applicable | not applicable | not applicable | not applicable | not applicable | not applicable | 25 % | 09.8865 |
| Other countries | 58 414,15 | 58 414,15 | 57 144,27 | 57 779,21 | 60 584,73 | 60 584,73 | 59 926,20 | 59 926,20 | 25 % | (13) |
| 13 | Rebars | 7214 20 00 , 7214 99 10 | Turkey | 90 856,92 | 90 856,92 | 88 881,77 | 89 869,35 | 94 233,03 | 94 233,03 | 93 208,76 | 93 208,76 | 25 % | 09.8866 |
| Russian Federation | not applicable | not applicable | not applicable | not applicable | not applicable | not applicable | not applicable | not applicable | 25 % | 09.8867 |
| Ukraine | 42 298,50 | 42 298,50 | 41 378,96 | 41 838,73 | 43 870,24 | 43 870,24 | 43 393,39 | 43 393,39 | 25 % | 09.8868 |
| Bosnia and Herzegovina | 32 685,87 | 32 685,87 | 31 975,31 | 32 330,59 | 33 900,43 | 33 900,43 | 33 531,95 | 33 531,95 | 25 % | 09.8869 |
| Moldova, Republic of | 27 318,01 | 27 318,01 | 26 724,14 | 27 021,07 | 28 333,10 | 28 333,10 | 28 025,13 | 28 025,13 | 25 % | 09.8870 |
| Other countries | 132 668,90 | 132 668,90 | 129 784,79 | 131 226,85 | 137 598,67 | 137 598,67 | 136 103,03 | 136 103,03 | 25 % | (14) |
| 14 | Stainless Bars and Light Sections | 7222 11 11 , 7222 11 19 , 7222 11 81 , 7222 11 89 , 7222 19 10 , 7222 19 90 , 7222 20 11 , 7222 20 19 , 7222 20 21 , 7222 20 29 , 7222 20 31 , 7222 20 39 , 7222 20 81 , 7222 20 89 , 7222 30 51 , 7222 30 91 , 7222 30 97 , 7222 40 10 , 7222 40 50 , 7222 40 90 | India | 30 542,92 | 30 542,92 | 29 878,94 | 30 210,93 | 31 677,84 | 31 677,84 | 31 333,52 | 31 333,52 | 25 % | 09.8871 |
| United Kingdom | 4 463,47 | 4 463,47 | 4 366,44 | 4 414,96 | 4 629,33 | 4 629,33 | 4 579,01 | 4 579,01 | 25 % | 09.8986 |
| Switzerland | 4 393,46 | 4 393,46 | 4 297,95 | 4 345,71 | 4 556,72 | 4 556,72 | 4 507,19 | 4 507,19 | 25 % | 09.8872 |
| Ukraine | 3 393,31 | 3 393,31 | 3 319,54 | 3 356,42 | 3 519,40 | 3 519,40 | 3 481,14 | 3 481,14 | 25 % | 09.8873 |
| Other countries | 4 956,51 | 4 956,51 | 4 848,76 | 4 902,63 | 5 140,68 | 5 140,68 | 5 084,81 | 5 084,81 | 25 % | (15) |
| 15 | Stainless Wire Rod | 7221 00 10 , 7221 00 90 | India | 7 103,74 | 7 103,74 | 6 949,31 | 7 026,53 | 7 367,70 | 7 367,70 | 7 287,62 | 7 287,62 | 25 % | 09.8876 |
| Taiwan | 4 580,21 | 4 580,21 | 4 480,64 | 4 530,43 | 4 750,40 | 4 750,40 | 4 698,77 | 4 698,77 | 25 % | 09.8877 |
| United Kingdom | 3 679,69 | 3 679,69 | 3 599,69 | 3 639,69 | 3 816,42 | 3 816,42 | 3 774,93 | 3 774,93 | 25 % | 09.8987 |
| Korea, Republic of | 2 286,74 | 2 286,74 | 2 237,03 | 2 261,88 | 2 371,71 | 2 371,71 | 2 345,93 | 2 345,93 | 25 % | 09.8878 |
| China | 1 548,74 | 1 548,74 | 1 515,07 | 1 531,90 | 1 606,28 | 1 606,28 | 1 588,83 | 1 588,83 | 25 % | 09.8879 |
| Japan | 1 536,99 | 1 536,99 | 1 503,57 | 1 520,28 | 1 594,10 | 1 594,10 | 1 576,77 | 1 576,77 | 25 % | 09.8880 |
| Other countries | 773,87 | 773,87 | 757,04 | 765,46 | 802,62 | 802,62 | 793,90 | 793,90 | 25 % | (16) |
| 16 | Non Alloy and Other Alloy Wire Rod | 7213 10 00 , 7213 20 00 , 7213 91 10 , 7213 91 20 , 7213 91 41 , 7213 91 49 , 7213 91 70 , 7213 91 90 , 7213 99 10 , 7213 99 90 , 7227 10 00 , 7227 20 00 , 7227 90 10 , 7227 90 50 , 7227 90 95 | United Kingdom | 176 384,36 | 176 384,36 | 172 549,92 | 174 467,14 | 182 938,53 | 182 938,53 | 180 950,07 | 180 950,07 | 25 % | 09.8988 |
| Ukraine | 118 599,40 | 118 599,40 | 116 021,16 | 117 310,28 | 123 006,38 | 123 006,38 | 121 669,35 | 121 669,35 | 25 % | 09.8881 |
| Switzerland | 130 373,45 | 130 373,45 | 127 539,25 | 128 956,35 | 135 217,93 | 135 217,93 | 133 748,17 | 133 748,17 | 25 % | 09.8882 |
| Russian Federation | not applicable | not applicable | not applicable | not applicable | not applicable | not applicable | not applicable | not applicable | 25 % | 09.8883 |
| Turkey | 113 300,38 | 113 300,38 | 110 837,33 | 112 068,85 | 117 510,45 | 117 510,45 | 116 233,16 | 116 233,16 | 25 % | 09.8884 |
| Belarus | not applicable | not applicable | not applicable | not applicable | not applicable | not applicable | not applicable | not applicable | 25 % | 09.8885 |
| Moldova, Republic of | 66 581,74 | 66 581,74 | 65 134,31 | 65 858,02 | 69 055,81 | 69 055,81 | 68 305,20 | 68 305,20 | 25 % | 09.8886 |
| Other countries | 116 864,97 | 116 864,97 | 114 324,43 | 115 594,70 | 121 207,50 | 121 207,50 | 119 890,02 | 119 890,02 | 25 % | (17) |
| 17 | Angles, Shapes and Sections of Iron or Non Alloy Steel | 7216 31 10 , 7216 31 90 , 7216 32 11 , 7216 32 19 , 7216 32 91 , 7216 32 99 , 7216 33 10 , 7216 33 90 | Ukraine | 30 113,25 | 30 113,25 | 29 458,61 | 29 785,93 | 31 232,21 | 31 232,21 | 30 892,73 | 30 892,73 | 25 % | 09.8891 |
| Other countries | 64 947,85 | 64 947,85 | 63 535,94 | 64 241,90 | 67 361,21 | 67 361,21 | 66 629,03 | 66 629,03 | 25 % | (18) |
| 18 | Sheet Piling | 7301 10 00 | China | 6 736,44 | 6 736,44 | 6 590,00 | 6 663,22 | 6 986,76 | 6 986,76 | 6 910,82 | 6 910,82 | 25 % | 09.8901 |
| United Arab Emirates | 3 333,90 | 3 333,90 | 3 261,43 | 3 297,67 | 3 457,79 | 3 457,79 | 3 420,20 | 3 420,20 | 25 % | 09.8902 |
| United Kingdom | 864,55 | 864,55 | 845,76 | 855,16 | 896,68 | 896,68 | 886,93 | 886,93 | 25 % | 09.8990 |
| Other countries | 274,44 | 274,44 | 268,47 | 271,45 | 284,63 | 284,63 | 281,54 | 281,54 | 25 % | (19) |
| 19 | Railway Material | 7302 10 22 , 7302 10 28 , 7302 10 40 , 7302 10 50 , 7302 40 00 | United Kingdom | 4 916,90 | 4 916,90 | 4 810,01 | 4 863,46 | 5 099,61 | 5 099,61 | 5 044,18 | 5 044,18 | 25 % | 09.8991 |
| Russian Federation | not applicable | not applicable | not applicable | not applicable | not applicable | not applicable | not applicable | not applicable | 25 % | 09.8906 |
| Turkey | 1 498,14 | 1 498,14 | 1 465,57 | 1 481,86 | 1 553,81 | 1 553,81 | 1 536,92 | 1 536,92 | 25 % | 09.8908 |
| China | 1 449,19 | 1 449,19 | 1 417,68 | 1 433,44 | 1 503,04 | 1 503,04 | 1 486,70 | 1 486,70 | 25 % | 09.8907 |
| Other countries | 759,42 | 759,42 | 742,91 | 751,17 | 787,64 | 787,64 | 779,08 | 779,08 | 25 % | (20) |
| 20 | Gas pipes | 7306 30 41 , 7306 30 49 , 7306 30 72 , 7306 30 77 | Turkey | 47 578,14 | 47 578,14 | 46 543,83 | 47 060,99 | 49 346,07 | 49 346,07 | 48 809,70 | 48 809,70 | 25 % | 09.8911 |
| India | 18 309,56 | 18 309,56 | 17 911,53 | 18 110,55 | 18 989,92 | 18 989,92 | 18 783,51 | 18 783,51 | 25 % | 09.8912 |
| North Macedonia | 6 762,54 | 6 762,54 | 6 615,53 | 6 689,04 | 7 013,83 | 7 013,83 | 6 937,59 | 6 937,59 | 25 % | 09.8913 |
| United Kingdom | 6 432,95 | 6 432,95 | 6 293,10 | 6 363,03 | 6 671,99 | 6 671,99 | 6 599,47 | 6 599,47 | 25 % | 09.8992 |
| Other countries | 10 690,62 | 10 690,62 | 10 458,21 | 10 574,41 | 11 087,86 | 11 087,86 | 10 967,34 | 10 967,34 | 25 % | (21) |
| 21 | Hollow sections | 7306 61 10 , 7306 61 92 , 7306 61 99 | Turkey | 94 689,32 | 94 689,32 | 92 630,86 | 93 660,09 | 98 207,83 | 98 207,83 | 97 140,35 | 97 140,35 | 25 % | 09.8916 |
| United Kingdom | 50 502,05 | 50 502,05 | 49 404,18 | 49 953,11 | 52 378,63 | 52 378,63 | 51 809,29 | 51 809,29 | 25 % | 09.8993 |
| Russian Federation | not applicable | not applicable | not applicable | not applicable | not applicable | not applicable | not applicable | not applicable | 25 % | 09.8917 |
| North Macedonia | 27 955,71 | 27 955,71 | 27 347,98 | 27 651,85 | 28 994,51 | 28 994,51 | 28 679,35 | 28 679,35 | 25 % | 09.8918 |
| Ukraine | 20 676,33 | 20 676,33 | 20 226,85 | 20 451,59 | 21 444,63 | 21 444,63 | 21 211,54 | 21 211,54 | 25 % | 09.8919 |
| Switzerland | 15 453,34 | 15 453,34 | 15 117,40 | 15 285,37 | 16 027,57 | 16 027,57 | 15 853,35 | 15 853,35 | 25 % | 09.8920 |
| Belarus | not applicable | not applicable | not applicable | not applicable | not applicable | not applicable | not applicable | not applicable | 25 % | 09.8921 |
| Other countries | 19 871,64 | 19 871,64 | 19 439,65 | 19 655,65 | 20 610,04 | 20 610,04 | 20 386,02 | 20 386,02 | 25 % | (22) |
| 22 | Seamless Stainless Tubes and Pipes | 7304 11 00 , 7304 22 00 , 7304 24 00 , 7304 41 00 , 7304 49 83 , 7304 49 85 , 7304 49 89 | India | 5 659,79 | 5 659,79 | 5 536,75 | 5 598,27 | 5 870,10 | 5 870,10 | 5 806,30 | 5 806,30 | 25 % | 09.8926 |
| Ukraine | 3 543,95 | 3 543,95 | 3 466,91 | 3 505,43 | 3 675,64 | 3 675,64 | 3 635,69 | 3 635,69 | 25 % | 09.8927 |
| United Kingdom | 1 798,90 | 1 798,90 | 1 759,80 | 1 779,35 | 1 865,75 | 1 865,75 | 1 845,47 | 1 845,47 | 25 % | 09.8994 |
| Korea, Republic of | 1 114,07 | 1 114,07 | 1 089,85 | 1 101,96 | 1 155,47 | 1 155,47 | 1 142,91 | 1 142,91 | 25 % | 09.8928 |
| Japan | 1 036,03 | 1 036,03 | 1 013,51 | 1 024,77 | 1 074,53 | 1 074,53 | 1 062,85 | 1 062,85 | 25 % | 09.8929 |
| China | 888,89 | 888,89 | 869,57 | 879,23 | 921,92 | 921,92 | 911,90 | 911,90 | 25 % | 09.8931 |
| Other countries | 2 586,28 | 2 586,28 | 2 530,05 | 2 558,16 | 2 682,38 | 2 682,38 | 2 653,22 | 2 653,22 | 25 % | (23) |
| 24 | Other Seamless Tubes | 7304 19 10 , 7304 19 30 , 7304 19 90 , 7304 23 00 , 7304 29 10 , 7304 29 30 , 7304 29 90 , 7304 31 20 , 7304 31 80 , 7304 39 50 , 7304 39 82 , 7304 39 83 , 7304 39 88 , 7304 51 81 , 7304 51 89 , 7304 59 82 , 7304 59 83 , 7304 59 89 , 7304 90 00 | China | 36 946,09 | 36 946,09 | 36 142,92 | 36 544,50 | 38 318,95 | 38 318,95 | 37 902,44 | 37 902,44 | 25 % | 09.8936 |
| Ukraine | 30 880,76 | 30 880,76 | 30 209,44 | 30 545,10 | 32 028,25 | 32 028,25 | 31 680,11 | 31 680,11 | 25 % | 09.8937 |
| Belarus | not applicable | not applicable | not applicable | not applicable | not applicable | not applicable | not applicable | not applicable | 25 % | 09.8938 |
| United Kingdom | 11 268,07 | 11 268,07 | 11 023,11 | 11 145,59 | 11 686,77 | 11 686,77 | 11 559,74 | 11 559,74 | 25 % | 09.8995 |
| United States | 8 110,65 | 8 110,65 | 7 934,33 | 8 022,49 | 8 412,03 | 8 412,03 | 8 320,60 | 8 320,60 | 25 % | 09.8940 |
| Other countries | 43 742,37 | 43 742,37 | 42 791,45 | 43 266,91 | 45 367,77 | 45 367,77 | 44 874,64 | 44 874,64 | 25 % | (24) |
| 25.A | Large welded tubes | 7305 11 00 , 7305 12 00 | Other countries | 115 747,59 | 115 747,59 | 113 231,34 | 114 489,47 | 120 048,60 | 120 048,60 | 118 743,72 | 118 743,72 | 25 % | (25) |
| 25.B | Large welded tubes | 7305 19 00 , 7305 20 00 , 7305 31 00 , 7305 39 00 , 7305 90 00 | Turkey | 14 371,47 | 14 371,47 | 14 059,05 | 14 215,26 | 14 905,49 | 14 905,49 | 14 743,48 | 14 743,48 | 25 % | 09.8971 |
| China | 8 134,62 | 8 134,62 | 7 957,78 | 8 046,20 | 8 436,89 | 8 436,89 | 8 345,18 | 8 345,18 | 25 % | 09.8972 |
| Russian Federation | not applicable | not applicable | not applicable | not applicable | not applicable | not applicable | not applicable | not applicable | 25 % | 09.8973 |
| United Kingdom | 5 903,81 | 5 903,81 | 5 775,46 | 5 839,64 | 6 123,18 | 6 123,18 | 6 056,63 | 6 056,63 | 25 % | 09.8996 |
| Korea, Republic of | 2 781,17 | 2 781,17 | 2 720,71 | 2 750,94 | 2 884,52 | 2 884,52 | 2 853,16 | 2 853,16 | 25 % | 09.8974 |
| Other countries | 6 251,05 | 6 251,05 | 6 115,16 | 6 183,11 | 6 483,33 | 6 483,33 | 6 412,86 | 6 412,86 | 25 % | (26) |
| 26 | Other Welded Pipes | 7306 11 00 , 7306 19 00 7306 21 00 , 7306 29 00 , 7306 30 12 , 7306 30 18 , 7306 30 80 , 7306 40 20 , 7306 40 80 , 7306 50 21 , 7306 50 29 , 7306 50 80 , 7306 69 10 , 7306 69 90 , 7306 90 00 | Switzerland | 46 275,35 | 46 275,35 | 45 269,36 | 45 772,35 | 47 994,87 | 47 994,87 | 47 473,18 | 47 473,18 | 25 % | 09.8946 |
| Turkey | 36 650,08 | 36 650,08 | 35 853,34 | 36 251,71 | 38 011,94 | 38 011,94 | 37 598,77 | 37 598,77 | 25 % | 09.8947 |
| United Kingdom | 11 192,00 | 11 192,00 | 10 948,70 | 11 070,35 | 11 607,88 | 11 607,88 | 11 481,71 | 11 481,71 | 25 % | 09.8997 |
| Taiwan | 8 671,66 | 8 671,66 | 8 483,14 | 8 577,40 | 8 993,88 | 8 993,88 | 8 896,12 | 8 896,12 | 25 % | 09.8950 |
| China | 7 769,95 | 7 769,95 | 7 601,04 | 7 685,50 | 8 058,67 | 8 058,67 | 7 971,08 | 7 971,08 | 25 % | 09.8949 |
| Russian Federation | not applicable | not applicable | not applicable | not applicable | not applicable | not applicable | not applicable | not applicable | 25 % | 09.8952 |
| Other countries | 19 298,91 | 19 298,91 | 18 879,37 | 19 089,14 | 20 016,03 | 20 016,03 | 19 798,47 | 19 798,47 | 25 % | (27) |
| 27 | Non-alloy and other alloy cold finished bars | 7215 10 00 , 7215 50 11 , 7215 50 19 , 7215 50 80 , 7228 10 90 , 7228 20 99 , 7228 50 20 , 7228 50 40 , 7228 50 61 , 7228 50 69 , 7228 50 80 | Russian Federation | not applicable | not applicable | not applicable | not applicable | not applicable | not applicable | not applicable | not applicable | 25 % | 09.8956 |
| Switzerland | 40 584,14 | 40 584,14 | 39 701,88 | 40 143,01 | 42 092,18 | 42 092,18 | 41 634,66 | 41 634,66 | 25 % | 09.8957 |
| United Kingdom | 24 483,32 | 24 483,32 | 23 951,08 | 24 217,20 | 25 393,08 | 25 393,08 | 25 117,07 | 25 117,07 | 25 % | 09.8998 |
| China | 25 900,31 | 25 900,31 | 25 337,26 | 25 618,79 | 26 862,73 | 26 862,73 | 26 570,74 | 26 570,74 | 25 % | 09.8958 |
| Ukraine | 29 232,30 | 29 232,30 | 28 596,82 | 28 914,56 | 30 318,53 | 30 318,53 | 29 988,98 | 29 988,98 | 25 % | 09.8959 |
| Other countries | 30 366,43 | 30 366,43 | 29 706,29 | 30 036,36 | 31 494,80 | 31 494,80 | 31 152,46 | 31 152,46 | 25 % | (28) |
| 28 | Non Alloy Wire | 7217 10 10 , 7217 10 31 , 7217 10 39 , 7217 10 50 , 7217 10 90 , 7217 20 10 , 7217 20 30 , 7217 20 50 , 7217 20 90 , 7217 30 41 , 7217 30 49 , 7217 30 50 , 7217 30 90 , 7217 90 20 , 7217 90 50 , 7217 90 90 | Belarus | not applicable | not applicable | not applicable | not applicable | not applicable | not applicable | not applicable | not applicable | 25 % | 09.8961 |
| China | 75 996,55 | 75 996,55 | 74 344,45 | 75 170,50 | 78 820,47 | 78 820,47 | 77 963,72 | 77 963,72 | 25 % | 09.8962 |
| Russian Federation | not applicable | not applicable | not applicable | not applicable | not applicable | not applicable | not applicable | not applicable | 25 % | 09.8963 |
| Turkey | 49 453,52 | 49 453,52 | 48 378,45 | 48 915,98 | 51 291,14 | 51 291,14 | 50 733,63 | 50 733,63 | 25 % | 09.8964 |
| Ukraine | 37 294,60 | 37 294,60 | 36 483,85 | 36 889,22 | 38 680,41 | 38 680,41 | 38 259,97 | 38 259,97 | 25 % | 09.8965 |
| Other countries | 47 545,89 | 47 545,89 | 46 512,29 | 47 029,09 | 49 312,63 | 49 312,63 | 48 776,62 | 48 776,62 | 25 % | (29) |

Product Number

Product category

CN Codes

Allocation by country (Where Applicable)

Year 5

Year 6

Additional duty rate

Order numbers

From 1.7.2022 to 30.9.2022

From 1.10.2022 to 31.12.2022

From 1.1.2023 to 31.3.2023

From 1.4.2023 to 30.6.2023

From 1.7.2023 to 30.9.2023

From 1.10.2023 to 31.12.2023

From 1.1.2024 to 31.3.2024

From 1.4.2024 to 30.6.2024

Volume of tariff quota (net tonnes)

Volume of tariff quota (net tonnes)

1

Non Alloy and Other Alloy Hot Rolled Sheets and Strips

7208 10 00 , 7208 25 00 , 7208 26 00 , 7208 27 00 , 7208 36 00 , 7208 37 00 , 7208 38 00 , 7208 39 00 , 7208 40 00 , 7208 52 10 , 7208 52 99 , 7208 53 10 , 7208 53 90 , 7208 54 00 , 7211 13 00 , 7211 14 00 , 7211 19 00 , 7212 60 00 , 7225 19 10 , 7225 30 10 , 7225 30 30 , 7225 30 90 , 7225 40 15 , 7225 40 90 , 7226 19 10 , 7226 91 20 , 7226 91 91 , 7226 91 99

Russian Federation

not applicable

not applicable

not applicable

not applicable

not applicable

not applicable

not applicable

not applicable

25 %

09.8966

Turkey

452 373,88

452 373,88

442 539,66

447 456,77

469 183,40

469 183,40

464 083,58

464 083,58

25 %

09.8967

India

287 227,31

287 227,31

280 983,24

284 105,28

297 900,24

297 900,24

294 662,20

294 662,20

25 %

09.8968

Korea, Republic of

179 365,46

179 365,46

175 466,21

177 415,83

186 030,40

186 030,40

184 008,33

184 008,33

25 %

09.8969

United Kingdom

150 045,49

150 045,49

146 783,63

148 414,56

155 620,95

155 620,95

153 929,42

153 929,42

25 %

09.8976

Serbia

159 231,56

159 231,56

155 770,01

157 500,79

165 148,37

165 148,37

163 353,27

163 353,27

25 %

09.8970

Other countries

900 290,25

900 290,25

880 718,72

890 504,48

933 743,65

933 743,65

923 594,27

923 594,27

25 %

(1)

2

Non Alloy and Other Alloy Cold Rolled Sheets

7209 15 00 , 7209 16 90 , 7209 17 90 , 7209 18 91 , 7209 25 00 , 7209 26 90 , 7209 27 90 , 7209 28 90 , 7209 90 20 , 7209 90 80 , 7211 23 20 , 7211 23 30 , 7211 23 80 , 7211 29 00 , 7211 90 20 , 7211 90 80 , 7225 50 20 , 7225 50 80 , 7226 20 00 , 7226 92 00

India

156 974,80

156 974,80

153 562,31

155 268,55

162 807,74

162 807,74

161 038,10

161 038,10

25 %

09.8801

Korea, Republic of

91 042,24

91 042,24

89 063,06

90 052,65

94 425,23

94 425,23

93 398,87

93 398,87

25 %

09.8802

United Kingdom

84 142,99

84 142,99

82 313,80

83 228,39

87 269,62

87 269,62

86 321,03

86 321,03

25 %

09.8977

Ukraine

69 898,31

69 898,31

68 378,78

69 138,54

72 495,62

72 495,62

71 707,62

71 707,62

25 %

09.8803

Serbia

39 631,71

39 631,71

38 770,15

39 200,93

41 104,37

41 104,37

40 657,58

40 657,58

25 %

09.8805

Other countries

321 824,43

321 824,43

314 828,25

318 326,34

333 782,94

333 782,94

330 154,85

330 154,85

25 %

(2)

3.A

Electrical Sheets (other than GOES)

7209 16 10 , 7209 17 10 , 7209 18 10 , 7209 26 10 , 7209 27 10 , 7209 28 10

Russian Federation

not applicable

not applicable

not applicable

not applicable

not applicable

not applicable

not applicable

not applicable

25 %

09.8808

United Kingdom

532,59

532,59

521,01

526,80

552,38

552,38

546,38

546,38

25 %

09.8978

Iran, Islamic Republic of

159,72

159,72

156,25

157,98

165,65

165,65

163,85

163,85

25 %

09.8809

Korea, Republic of

244,60

244,60

239,29

241,94

253,69

253,69

250,93

250,93

25 %

09.8806

Other countries

817,65

817,65

799,87

808,76

848,03

848,03

838,81

838,81

25 %

(3)

3.B

7225 19 90 , 7226 19 80

Russian Federation

not applicable

not applicable

not applicable

not applicable

not applicable

not applicable

not applicable

not applicable

25 %

09.8811

Korea, Republic of

33 860,21

33 860,21

33 124,12

33 492,16

35 118,40

35 118,40

34 736,68

34 736,68

25 %

09.8812

China

29 777,29

29 777,29

29 129,96

29 453,62

30 883,77

30 883,77

30 548,08

30 548,08

25 %

09.8813

Taiwan

23 288,87

23 288,87

22 782,59

23 035,73

24 154,25

24 154,25

23 891,70

23 891,70

25 %

09.8814

Other countries

8 303,99

8 303,99

8 123,47

8 213,73

8 612,56

8 612,56

8 518,94

8 518,94

25 %

(4)

4.A

Metallic Coated Sheets

TARIC Codes: 7210410020 , 7210410030 , 7210490020 , 7210490030 , 7210610020 , 7210610030 , 7210690020 , 7210690030 , 7212300020 , 7212300030 , 7212 50 20 , 7212506120 , 7212506130 , 7212506920 , 7212506930 , 7225920020 , 7225920030 , 7225990011 , 7225990022 , 7225990023 , 7225990041 , 7225990045 , 7225990091 , 7225990092 , 7225990093 , 7226993010 , 7226993030 , 7226997011 , 7226997013 , 7226997091 , 7226997093 , 7226997094

Korea (Republic of)

36 115,37

36 115,37

35 330,25

35 722,81

37 457,36

37 457,36

37 050,22

37 050,22

25 %

09.8816

India

51 623,89

51 623,89

50 501,64

51 062,77

53 542,16

53 542,16

52 960,18

52 960,18

25 %

09.8817

United Kingdom

34 028,35

34 028,35

33 288,60

33 658,47

35 292,79

35 292,79

34 909,17

34 909,17

25 %

09.8979

Other countries

454 338,51

454 338,51

444 461,58

449 400,05

471 221,03

471 221,03

466 099,06

466 099,06

25 %

(5)

4.B

CN Codes: 7210 20 00 , 7210 30 00 , 7210 90 80 , 7212 20 00 , 7212 50 30 , 7212 50 40 , 7212 50 90 , 7225 91 00 , 7226 99 10 TARIC codes: 7210410080 , 7210490080 , 7210610080 , 7210690080 , 7212300080 , 7212506180 , 7212506980 , 7225920080 , 7225990025 , 7225990095 , 7226993090 , 7226997019 , 7226997096

China

123 409,30

123 409,30

120 726,49

122 067,90

127 995,00

127 995,00

126 603,75

126 603,75

25 %

09.8821

Korea (Republic of)

160 163,83

160 163,83

156 682,01

158 422,92

166 115,27

166 115,27

164 309,67

164 309,67

25 %

09.8822

India

73 708,96

73 708,96

72 106,59

72 907,78

76 447,88

76 447,88

75 616,92

75 616,92

25 %

09.8823

United Kingdom

34 028,35

34 028,35

33 288,60

33 658,47

35 292,79

35 292,79

34 909,17

34 909,17

25 %

09.8980

Other countries

100 848,08

100 848,08

98 655,73

99 751,91

104 595,44

104 595,44

103 458,53

103 458,53

25 %

(6)

5

Organic Coated Sheets

7210 70 80 , 7212 40 80

India

75 642,86

75 642,86

73 998,45

74 820,66

78 453,64

78 453,64

77 600,88

77 600,88

25 %

09.8826

Korea, Republic of

68 363,40

68 363,40

66 877,24

67 620,32

70 903,68

70 903,68

70 132,99

70 132,99

25 %

09.8827

United Kingdom

33 563,94

33 563,94

32 834,29

33 199,12

34 811,13

34 811,13

34 432,75

34 432,75

25 %

09.8981

Taiwan

21 910,16

21 910,16

21 433,85

21 672,00

22 724,31

22 724,31

22 477,30

22 477,30

25 %

09.8828

Turkey

15 126,78

15 126,78

14 797,94

14 962,36

15 688,87

15 688,87

15 518,34

15 518,34

25 %

09.8829

Other countries

41 252,54

41 252,54

40 355,75

40 804,14

42 785,42

42 785,42

42 320,36

42 320,36

25 %

(7)

6

Tin Mill products

7209 18 99 , 7210 11 00 , 7210 12 20 , 7210 12 80 , 7210 50 00 , 7210 70 10 , 7210 90 40 , 7212 10 10 , 7212 10 90 , 7212 40 20

China

106 758,00

106 758,00

104 437,17

105 597,58

110 724,96

110 724,96

109 521,43

109 521,43

25 %

09.8831

United Kingdom

38 940,37

38 940,37

38 093,84

38 517,11

40 387,34

40 387,34

39 948,34

39 948,34

25 %

09.8982

Serbia

21 429,38

21 429,38

20 963,53

21 196,46

22 225,67

22 225,67

21 984,08

21 984,08

25 %

09.8832

Korea, Republic of

15 501,05

15 501,05

15 164,07

15 332,56

16 077,04

16 077,04

15 902,29

15 902,29

25 %

09.8833

Taiwan

12 887,99

12 887,99

12 607,82

12 747,90

13 366,89

13 366,89

13 221,60

13 221,60

25 %

09.8834

Other countries

35 715,05

35 715,05

34 938,63

35 326,84

37 042,16

37 042,16

36 639,53

36 639,53

25 %

(8)

7

Non Alloy and Other Alloy Quarto Plates

7208 51 20 , 7208 51 91 , 7208 51 98 , 7208 52 91 , 7208 90 20 , 7208 90 80 , 7210 90 30 , 7225 40 12 , 7225 40 40 , 7225 40 60 , 7225 99 00

Ukraine

270 017,57

270 017,57

264 147,62

267 082,59

280 051,01

280 051,01

277 006,97

277 006,97

25 %

09.8836

Other countries

554 571,27

554 571,27

542 515,37

548 543,32

575 178,29

575 178,29

568 926,35

568 926,35

25 %

(9)

8

Stainless Hot Rolled Sheets and Strips

7219 11 00 , 7219 12 10 , 7219 12 90 , 7219 13 10 , 7219 13 90 , 7219 14 10 , 7219 14 90 , 7219 22 10 , 7219 22 90 , 7219 23 00 , 7219 24 00 , 7220 11 00 , 7220 12 00

Other countries

105 581,29

105 581,29

103 286,04

104 433,67

109 504,53

109 504,53

108 314,26

108 314,26

25 %

(10)

9

Stainless Cold Rolled Sheets and Strips

7219 31 00 , 7219 32 10 , 7219 32 90 , 7219 33 10 , 7219 33 90 , 7219 34 10 , 7219 34 90 , 7219 35 10 , 7219 35 90 , 7219 90 20 , 7219 90 80 , 7220 20 21 , 7220 20 29 , 7220 20 41 , 7220 20 49 , 7220 20 81 , 7220 20 89 , 7220 90 20 , 7220 90 80

Korea, Republic of

47 773,95

47 773,95

46 735,39

47 254,67

49 549,16

49 549,16

49 010,58

49 010,58

25 %

09.8846

Taiwan

44 302,39

44 302,39

43 339,29

43 820,84

45 948,59

45 948,59

45 449,15

45 449,15

25 %

09.8847

India

29 610,23

29 610,23

28 966,53

29 288,38

30 710,50

30 710,50

30 376,69

30 376,69

25 %

09.8848

South Africa

25 765,68

25 765,68

25 205,56

25 485,62

26 723,10

26 723,10

26 432,63

26 432,63

25 %

09.8853

United States

24 090,93

24 090,93

23 567,21

23 829,07

24 986,11

24 986,11

24 714,52

24 714,52

25 %

09.8849

Turkey

20 046,66

20 046,66

19 610,86

19 828,76

20 791,56

20 791,56

20 565,57

20 565,57

25 %

09.8850

Malaysia

12 700,45

12 700,45

12 424,35

12 562,40

13 172,38

13 172,38

13 029,20

13 029,20

25 %

09.8851

Other countries

50 944,84

50 944,84

49 837,34

50 391,09

52 837,87

52 837,87

52 263,55

52 263,55

25 %

(11)

10

Stainless Hot Rolled Quarto Plates

7219 21 10 , 7219 21 90

China

4 731,30

4 731,30

4 628,44

4 679,87

4 907,10

4 907,10

4 853,77

4 853,77

25 %

09.8856

India

2 007,05

2 007,05

1 963,42

1 985,24

2 081,63

2 081,63

2 059,01

2 059,01

25 %

09.8857

South Africa

1 374,32

1 374,32

1 344,44

1 359,38

1 425,39

1 425,39

1 409,89

1 409,89

25 %

09.8859

United Kingdom

827,96

827,96

809,96

818,96

858,73

858,73

849,39

849,39

25 %

09.8984

Taiwan

764,41

764,41

747,79

756,10

792,81

792,81

784,19

784,19

25 %

09.8858

Other countries

1 002,95

1 002,95

981,14

992,04

1 040,21

1 040,21

1 028,91

1 028,91

25 %

(12)

12

Non Alloy and Other Alloy Merchant Bars and Light Sections

7214 30 00 , 7214 91 10 , 7214 91 90 , 7214 99 31 , 7214 99 39 , 7214 99 50 , 7214 99 71 , 7214 99 79 , 7214 99 95 , 7215 90 00 , 7216 10 00 , 7216 21 00 , 7216 22 00 , 7216 40 10 , 7216 40 90 , 7216 50 10 , 7216 50 91 , 7216 50 99 , 7216 99 00 , 7228 10 20 , 7228 20 10 , 7228 20 91 , 7228 30 20 , 7228 30 41 , 7228 30 49 , 7228 30 61 , 7228 30 69 , 7228 30 70 , 7228 30 89 , 7228 60 20 , 7228 60 80 , 7228 70 10 , 7228 70 90 , 7228 80 00

China

135 003,41

135 003,41

132 068,55

133 535,98

140 019,93

140 019,93

138 497,97

138 497,97

25 %

09.8861

United Kingdom

112 785,82

112 785,82

110 333,95

111 559,89

116 976,77

116 976,77

115 705,28

115 705,28

25 %

09.8985

Turkey

101 999,52

101 999,52

99 782,14

100 890,83

105 789,67

105 789,67

104 639,78

104 639,78

25 %

09.8862

Russian Federation

not applicable

not applicable

not applicable

not applicable

not applicable

not applicable

not applicable

not applicable

25 %

09.8863

Switzerland

65 555,05

65 555,05

64 129,94

64 842,50

67 990,98

67 990,98

67 251,94

67 251,94

25 %

09.8864

Belarus

not applicable

not applicable

not applicable

not applicable

not applicable

not applicable

not applicable

not applicable

25 %

09.8865

Other countries

58 414,15

58 414,15

57 144,27

57 779,21

60 584,73

60 584,73

59 926,20

59 926,20

25 %

(13)

13

Rebars

7214 20 00 , 7214 99 10

Turkey

90 856,92

90 856,92

88 881,77

89 869,35

94 233,03

94 233,03

93 208,76

93 208,76

25 %

09.8866

Russian Federation

not applicable

not applicable

not applicable

not applicable

not applicable

not applicable

not applicable

not applicable

25 %

09.8867

Ukraine

42 298,50

42 298,50

41 378,96

41 838,73

43 870,24

43 870,24

43 393,39

43 393,39

25 %

09.8868

Bosnia and Herzegovina

32 685,87

32 685,87

31 975,31

32 330,59

33 900,43

33 900,43

33 531,95

33 531,95

25 %

09.8869

Moldova, Republic of

27 318,01

27 318,01

26 724,14

27 021,07

28 333,10

28 333,10

28 025,13

28 025,13

25 %

09.8870

Other countries

132 668,90

132 668,90

129 784,79

131 226,85

137 598,67

137 598,67

136 103,03

136 103,03

25 %

(14)

14

Stainless Bars and Light Sections

7222 11 11 , 7222 11 19 , 7222 11 81 , 7222 11 89 , 7222 19 10 , 7222 19 90 , 7222 20 11 , 7222 20 19 , 7222 20 21 , 7222 20 29 , 7222 20 31 , 7222 20 39 , 7222 20 81 , 7222 20 89 , 7222 30 51 , 7222 30 91 , 7222 30 97 , 7222 40 10 , 7222 40 50 , 7222 40 90

India

30 542,92

30 542,92

29 878,94

30 210,93

31 677,84

31 677,84

31 333,52

31 333,52

25 %

09.8871

United Kingdom

4 463,47

4 463,47

4 366,44

4 414,96

4 629,33

4 629,33

4 579,01

4 579,01

25 %

09.8986

Switzerland

4 393,46

4 393,46

4 297,95

4 345,71

4 556,72

4 556,72

4 507,19

4 507,19

25 %

09.8872

Ukraine

3 393,31

3 393,31

3 319,54

3 356,42

3 519,40

3 519,40

3 481,14

3 481,14

25 %

09.8873

Other countries

4 956,51

4 956,51

4 848,76

4 902,63

5 140,68

5 140,68

5 084,81

5 084,81

25 %

(15)

15

Stainless Wire Rod

7221 00 10 , 7221 00 90

India

7 103,74

7 103,74

6 949,31

7 026,53

7 367,70

7 367,70

7 287,62

7 287,62

25 %

09.8876

Taiwan

4 580,21

4 580,21

4 480,64

4 530,43

4 750,40

4 750,40

4 698,77

4 698,77

25 %

09.8877

United Kingdom

3 679,69

3 679,69

3 599,69

3 639,69

3 816,42

3 816,42

3 774,93

3 774,93

25 %

09.8987

Korea, Republic of

2 286,74

2 286,74

2 237,03

2 261,88

2 371,71

2 371,71

2 345,93

2 345,93

25 %

09.8878

China

1 548,74

1 548,74

1 515,07

1 531,90

1 606,28

1 606,28

1 588,83

1 588,83

25 %

09.8879

Japan

1 536,99

1 536,99

1 503,57

1 520,28

1 594,10

1 594,10

1 576,77

1 576,77

25 %

09.8880

Other countries

773,87

773,87

757,04

765,46

802,62

802,62

793,90

793,90

25 %

(16)

16

Non Alloy and Other Alloy Wire Rod

7213 10 00 , 7213 20 00 , 7213 91 10 , 7213 91 20 , 7213 91 41 , 7213 91 49 , 7213 91 70 , 7213 91 90 , 7213 99 10 , 7213 99 90 , 7227 10 00 , 7227 20 00 , 7227 90 10 , 7227 90 50 , 7227 90 95

United Kingdom

176 384,36

176 384,36

172 549,92

174 467,14

182 938,53

182 938,53

180 950,07

180 950,07

25 %

09.8988

Ukraine

118 599,40

118 599,40

116 021,16

117 310,28

123 006,38

123 006,38

121 669,35

121 669,35

25 %

09.8881

Switzerland

130 373,45

130 373,45

127 539,25

128 956,35

135 217,93

135 217,93

133 748,17

133 748,17

25 %

09.8882

Russian Federation

not applicable

not applicable

not applicable

not applicable

not applicable

not applicable

not applicable

not applicable

25 %

09.8883

Turkey

113 300,38

113 300,38

110 837,33

112 068,85

117 510,45

117 510,45

116 233,16

116 233,16

25 %

09.8884

Belarus

not applicable

not applicable

not applicable

not applicable

not applicable

not applicable

not applicable

not applicable

25 %

09.8885

Moldova, Republic of

66 581,74

66 581,74

65 134,31

65 858,02

69 055,81

69 055,81

68 305,20

68 305,20

25 %

09.8886

Other countries

116 864,97

116 864,97

114 324,43

115 594,70

121 207,50

121 207,50

119 890,02

119 890,02

25 %

(17)

17

Angles, Shapes and Sections of Iron or Non Alloy Steel

7216 31 10 , 7216 31 90 , 7216 32 11 , 7216 32 19 , 7216 32 91 , 7216 32 99 , 7216 33 10 , 7216 33 90

Ukraine

30 113,25

30 113,25

29 458,61

29 785,93

31 232,21

31 232,21

30 892,73

30 892,73

25 %

09.8891

Other countries

64 947,85

64 947,85

63 535,94

64 241,90

67 361,21

67 361,21

66 629,03

66 629,03

25 %

(18)

18

Sheet Piling

7301 10 00

China

6 736,44

6 736,44

6 590,00

6 663,22

6 986,76

6 986,76

6 910,82

6 910,82

25 %

09.8901

United Arab Emirates

3 333,90

3 333,90

3 261,43

3 297,67

3 457,79

3 457,79

3 420,20

3 420,20

25 %

09.8902

United Kingdom

864,55

864,55

845,76

855,16

896,68

896,68

886,93

886,93

25 %

09.8990

Other countries

274,44

274,44

268,47

271,45

284,63

284,63

281,54

281,54

25 %

(19)

19

Railway Material

7302 10 22 , 7302 10 28 , 7302 10 40 , 7302 10 50 , 7302 40 00

United Kingdom

4 916,90

4 916,90

4 810,01

4 863,46

5 099,61

5 099,61

5 044,18

5 044,18

25 %

09.8991

Russian Federation

not applicable

not applicable

not applicable

not applicable

not applicable

not applicable

not applicable

not applicable

25 %

09.8906

Turkey

1 498,14

1 498,14

1 465,57

1 481,86

1 553,81

1 553,81

1 536,92

1 536,92

25 %

09.8908

China

1 449,19

1 449,19

1 417,68

1 433,44

1 503,04

1 503,04

1 486,70

1 486,70

25 %

09.8907

Other countries

759,42

759,42

742,91

751,17

787,64

787,64

779,08

779,08

25 %

(20)

20

Gas pipes

7306 30 41 , 7306 30 49 , 7306 30 72 , 7306 30 77

Turkey

47 578,14

47 578,14

46 543,83

47 060,99

49 346,07

49 346,07

48 809,70

48 809,70

25 %

09.8911

India

18 309,56

18 309,56

17 911,53

18 110,55

18 989,92

18 989,92

18 783,51

18 783,51

25 %

09.8912

North Macedonia

6 762,54

6 762,54

6 615,53

6 689,04

7 013,83

7 013,83

6 937,59

6 937,59

25 %

09.8913

United Kingdom

6 432,95

6 432,95

6 293,10

6 363,03

6 671,99

6 671,99

6 599,47

6 599,47

25 %

09.8992

Other countries

10 690,62

10 690,62

10 458,21

10 574,41

11 087,86

11 087,86

10 967,34

10 967,34

25 %

(21)

21

Hollow sections

7306 61 10 , 7306 61 92 , 7306 61 99

Turkey

94 689,32

94 689,32

92 630,86

93 660,09

98 207,83

98 207,83

97 140,35

97 140,35

25 %

09.8916

United Kingdom

50 502,05

50 502,05

49 404,18

49 953,11

52 378,63

52 378,63

51 809,29

51 809,29

25 %

09.8993

Russian Federation

not applicable

not applicable

not applicable

not applicable

not applicable

not applicable

not applicable

not applicable

25 %

09.8917

North Macedonia

27 955,71

27 955,71

27 347,98

27 651,85

28 994,51

28 994,51

28 679,35

28 679,35

25 %

09.8918

Ukraine

20 676,33

20 676,33

20 226,85

20 451,59

21 444,63

21 444,63

21 211,54

21 211,54

25 %

09.8919

Switzerland

15 453,34

15 453,34

15 117,40

15 285,37

16 027,57

16 027,57

15 853,35

15 853,35

25 %

09.8920

Belarus

not applicable

not applicable

not applicable

not applicable

not applicable

not applicable

not applicable

not applicable

25 %

09.8921

Other countries

19 871,64

19 871,64

19 439,65

19 655,65

20 610,04

20 610,04

20 386,02

20 386,02

25 %

(22)

22

Seamless Stainless Tubes and Pipes

7304 11 00 , 7304 22 00 , 7304 24 00 , 7304 41 00 , 7304 49 83 , 7304 49 85 , 7304 49 89

India

5 659,79

5 659,79

5 536,75

5 598,27

5 870,10

5 870,10

5 806,30

5 806,30

25 %

09.8926

Ukraine

3 543,95

3 543,95

3 466,91

3 505,43

3 675,64

3 675,64

3 635,69

3 635,69

25 %

09.8927

United Kingdom

1 798,90

1 798,90

1 759,80

1 779,35

1 865,75

1 865,75

1 845,47

1 845,47

25 %

09.8994

Korea, Republic of

1 114,07

1 114,07

1 089,85

1 101,96

1 155,47

1 155,47

1 142,91

1 142,91

25 %

09.8928

Japan

1 036,03

1 036,03

1 013,51

1 024,77

1 074,53

1 074,53

1 062,85

1 062,85

25 %

09.8929

China

888,89

888,89

869,57

879,23

921,92

921,92

911,90

911,90

25 %

09.8931

Other countries

2 586,28

2 586,28

2 530,05

2 558,16

2 682,38

2 682,38

2 653,22

2 653,22

25 %

(23)

24

Other Seamless Tubes

7304 19 10 , 7304 19 30 , 7304 19 90 , 7304 23 00 , 7304 29 10 , 7304 29 30 , 7304 29 90 , 7304 31 20 , 7304 31 80 , 7304 39 50 , 7304 39 82 , 7304 39 83 , 7304 39 88 , 7304 51 81 , 7304 51 89 , 7304 59 82 , 7304 59 83 , 7304 59 89 , 7304 90 00

China

36 946,09

36 946,09

36 142,92

36 544,50

38 318,95

38 318,95

37 902,44

37 902,44

25 %

09.8936

Ukraine

30 880,76

30 880,76

30 209,44

30 545,10

32 028,25

32 028,25

31 680,11

31 680,11

25 %

09.8937

Belarus

not applicable

not applicable

not applicable

not applicable

not applicable

not applicable

not applicable

not applicable

25 %

09.8938

United Kingdom

11 268,07

11 268,07

11 023,11

11 145,59

11 686,77

11 686,77

11 559,74

11 559,74

25 %

09.8995

United States

8 110,65

8 110,65

7 934,33

8 022,49

8 412,03

8 412,03

8 320,60

8 320,60

25 %

09.8940

Other countries

43 742,37

43 742,37

42 791,45

43 266,91

45 367,77

45 367,77

44 874,64

44 874,64

25 %

(24)

25.A

Large welded tubes

7305 11 00 , 7305 12 00

Other countries

115 747,59

115 747,59

113 231,34

114 489,47

120 048,60

120 048,60

118 743,72

118 743,72

25 %

(25)

25.B

Large welded tubes

7305 19 00 , 7305 20 00 , 7305 31 00 , 7305 39 00 , 7305 90 00

Turkey

14 371,47

14 371,47

14 059,05

14 215,26

14 905,49

14 905,49

14 743,48

14 743,48

25 %

09.8971

China

8 134,62

8 134,62

7 957,78

8 046,20

8 436,89

8 436,89

8 345,18

8 345,18

25 %

09.8972

Russian Federation

not applicable

not applicable

not applicable

not applicable

not applicable

not applicable

not applicable

not applicable

25 %

09.8973

United Kingdom

5 903,81

5 903,81

5 775,46

5 839,64

6 123,18

6 123,18

6 056,63

6 056,63

25 %

09.8996

Korea, Republic of

2 781,17

2 781,17

2 720,71

2 750,94

2 884,52

2 884,52

2 853,16

2 853,16

25 %

09.8974

Other countries

6 251,05

6 251,05

6 115,16

6 183,11

6 483,33

6 483,33

6 412,86

6 412,86

25 %

(26)

26

Other Welded Pipes

7306 11 00 , 7306 19 00 7306 21 00 , 7306 29 00 , 7306 30 12 , 7306 30 18 , 7306 30 80 , 7306 40 20 , 7306 40 80 , 7306 50 21 , 7306 50 29 , 7306 50 80 , 7306 69 10 , 7306 69 90 , 7306 90 00

Switzerland

46 275,35

46 275,35

45 269,36

45 772,35

47 994,87

47 994,87

47 473,18

47 473,18

25 %

09.8946

Turkey

36 650,08

36 650,08

35 853,34

36 251,71

38 011,94

38 011,94

37 598,77

37 598,77

25 %

09.8947

United Kingdom

11 192,00

11 192,00

10 948,70

11 070,35

11 607,88

11 607,88

11 481,71

11 481,71

25 %

09.8997

Taiwan

8 671,66

8 671,66

8 483,14

8 577,40

8 993,88

8 993,88

8 896,12

8 896,12

25 %

09.8950

China

7 769,95

7 769,95

7 601,04

7 685,50

8 058,67

8 058,67

7 971,08

7 971,08

25 %

09.8949

Russian Federation

not applicable

not applicable

not applicable

not applicable

not applicable

not applicable

not applicable

not applicable

25 %

09.8952

Other countries

19 298,91

19 298,91

18 879,37

19 089,14

20 016,03

20 016,03

19 798,47

19 798,47

25 %

(27)

27

Non-alloy and other alloy cold finished bars

7215 10 00 , 7215 50 11 , 7215 50 19 , 7215 50 80 , 7228 10 90 , 7228 20 99 , 7228 50 20 , 7228 50 40 , 7228 50 61 , 7228 50 69 , 7228 50 80

Russian Federation

not applicable

not applicable

not applicable

not applicable

not applicable

not applicable

not applicable

not applicable

25 %

09.8956

Switzerland

40 584,14

40 584,14

39 701,88

40 143,01

42 092,18

42 092,18

41 634,66

41 634,66

25 %

09.8957

United Kingdom

24 483,32

24 483,32

23 951,08

24 217,20

25 393,08

25 393,08

25 117,07

25 117,07

25 %

09.8998

China

25 900,31

25 900,31

25 337,26

25 618,79

26 862,73

26 862,73

26 570,74

26 570,74

25 %

09.8958

Ukraine

29 232,30

29 232,30

28 596,82

28 914,56

30 318,53

30 318,53

29 988,98

29 988,98

25 %

09.8959

Other countries

30 366,43

30 366,43

29 706,29

30 036,36

31 494,80

31 494,80

31 152,46

31 152,46

25 %

(28)

28

Non Alloy Wire

7217 10 10 , 7217 10 31 , 7217 10 39 , 7217 10 50 , 7217 10 90 , 7217 20 10 , 7217 20 30 , 7217 20 50 , 7217 20 90 , 7217 30 41 , 7217 30 49 , 7217 30 50 , 7217 30 90 , 7217 90 20 , 7217 90 50 , 7217 90 90

Belarus

not applicable

not applicable

not applicable

not applicable

not applicable

not applicable

not applicable

not applicable

25 %

09.8961

China

75 996,55

75 996,55

74 344,45

75 170,50

78 820,47

78 820,47

77 963,72

77 963,72

25 %

09.8962

Russian Federation

not applicable

not applicable

not applicable

not applicable

not applicable

not applicable

not applicable

not applicable

25 %

09.8963

Turkey

49 453,52

49 453,52

48 378,45

48 915,98

51 291,14

51 291,14

50 733,63

50 733,63

25 %

09.8964

Ukraine

37 294,60

37 294,60

36 483,85

36 889,22

38 680,41

38 680,41

38 259,97

38 259,97

25 %

09.8965

Other countries

47 545,89

47 545,89

46 512,29

47 029,09

49 312,63

49 312,63

48 776,62

48 776,62

25 %

(29)

IV.2 –   Volumes of global and residual tariff–rate quotas per trimester

| Product Number | Allocation by country (Where Applicable) | Year 2 | Year 3 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| From 1.7.2022 to 30.9.2022 | From 1.10.2022 to 31.12.2022 | From 1.1.2023 to 31.3.2023 | From 1.4.2023 to 30.6.2023 | From 1.7.2023 to 30.9.2023 | From 1.10.2023 to 31.12.2023 | From 1.1.2024 to 31.3.2024 | From 1.4.2024 to 30.6.2024 |
| Volume of tariff quota (net tonnes) | Volume of tariff quota (net tonnes) | Volume of tariff quota (net tonnes) | Volume of tariff quota (net tonnes) | Volume of tariff quota (net tonnes) | Volume of tariff quota (net tonnes) | Volume of tariff quota (net tonnes) | Volume of tariff quota (net tonnes) |
| 1 | Other countries | 900 290,25 | 900 290,25 | 880 718,72 | 890 504,48 | 933 743,65 | 933 743,65 | 923 594,27 | 923 594,27 |
| 2 | Other countries | 321 824,43 | 321 824,43 | 314 828,25 | 318 326,34 | 333 782,94 | 333 782,94 | 330 154,85 | 330 154,85 |
| 3A | Other countries | 817,65 | 817,65 | 799,87 | 808,76 | 848,03 | 848,03 | 838,81 | 838,81 |
| 3B | Other countries | 8 303,99 | 8 303,99 | 8 123,47 | 8 213,73 | 8 612,56 | 8 612,56 | 8 518,94 | 8 518,94 |
| 4A | Other countries | 454 338,51 | 454 338,51 | 444 461,58 | 449 400,05 | 471 221,03 | 471 221,03 | 466 099,06 | 466 099,06 |
| 4B | Other countries | 100 848,08 | 100 848,08 | 98 655,73 | 99 751,91 | 104 595,44 | 104 595,44 | 103 458,53 | 103 458,53 |
| 5 | Other countries | 41 252,54 | 41 252,54 | 40 355,75 | 40 804,14 | 42 785,42 | 42 785,42 | 42 320,36 | 42 320,36 |
| 6 | Other countries | 35 715,05 | 35 715,05 | 34 938,63 | 35 326,84 | 37 042,16 | 37 042,16 | 36 639,53 | 36 639,53 |
| 7 | Other countries | 554 571,27 | 554 571,27 | 542 515,37 | 548 543,32 | 575 178,29 | 575 178,29 | 568 926,35 | 568 926,35 |
| 8 | Other countries | 105 581,29 | 105 581,29 | 103 286,04 | 104 433,67 | 109 504,53 | 109 504,53 | 108 314,26 | 108 314,26 |
| 9 | Other countries | 50 944,84 | 50 944,84 | 49 837,34 | 50 391,09 | 52 837,87 | 52 837,87 | 52 263,55 | 52 263,55 |
| 10 | Other countries | 1 002,95 | 1 002,95 | 981,14 | 992,04 | 1 040,21 | 1 040,21 | 1 028,91 | 1 028,91 |
| 12 | Other countries | 58 414,15 | 58 414,15 | 57 144,27 | 57 779,21 | 60 584,73 | 60 584,73 | 59 926,20 | 59 926,20 |
| 13 | Other countries | 132 668,90 | 132 668,90 | 129 784,79 | 131 226,85 | 137 598,67 | 137 598,67 | 136 103,03 | 136 103,03 |
| 14 | Other countries | 4 956,51 | 4 956,51 | 4 848,76 | 4 902,63 | 5 140,68 | 5 140,68 | 5 084,81 | 5 084,81 |
| 15 | Other countries | 773,87 | 773,87 | 757,04 | 765,46 | 802,62 | 802,62 | 793,90 | 793,90 |
| 16 | Other countries | 116 864,97 | 116 864,97 | 114 324,43 | 115 594,70 | 121 207,50 | 121 207,50 | 119 890,02 | 119 890,02 |
| 17 | Other countries | 64 947,85 | 64 947,85 | 63 535,94 | 64 241,90 | 67 361,21 | 67 361,21 | 66 629,03 | 66 629,03 |
| 18 | Other countries | 274,44 | 274,44 | 268,47 | 271,45 | 284,63 | 284,63 | 281,54 | 281,54 |
| 19 | Other countries | 759,42 | 759,42 | 742,91 | 751,17 | 787,64 | 787,64 | 779,08 | 779,08 |
| 20 | Other countries | 10 690,62 | 10 690,62 | 10 458,21 | 10 574,41 | 11 087,86 | 11 087,86 | 10 967,34 | 10 967,34 |
| 21 | Other countries | 19 871,64 | 19 871,64 | 19 439,65 | 19 655,65 | 20 610,04 | 20 610,04 | 20 386,02 | 20 386,02 |
| 22 | Other countries | 2 586,28 | 2 586,28 | 2 530,05 | 2 558,16 | 2 682,38 | 2 682,38 | 2 653,22 | 2 653,22 |
| 24 | Other countries | 43 742,37 | 43 742,37 | 42 791,45 | 43 266,91 | 45 367,77 | 45 367,77 | 44 874,64 | 44 874,64 |
| 25A | Other countries | 115 747,59 | 115 747,59 | 113 231,34 | 114 489,47 | 120 048,60 | 120 048,60 | 118 743,72 | 118 743,72 |
| 25B | Other countries | 6 251,05 | 6 251,05 | 6 115,16 | 6 183,11 | 6 483,33 | 6 483,33 | 6 412,86 | 6 412,86 |
| 26 | Other countries | 19 298,91 | 19 298,91 | 18 879,37 | 19 089,14 | 20 016,03 | 20 016,03 | 19 798,47 | 19 798,47 |
| 27 | Other countries | 30 366,43 | 30 366,43 | 29 706,29 | 30 036,36 | 31 494,80 | 31 494,80 | 31 152,46 | 31 152,46 |
| 28 | Other countries | 47 545,89 | 47 545,89 | 46 512,29 | 47 029,09 | 49 312,63 | 49 312,63 | 48 776,62 | 48 776,62 |

Product Number

Allocation by country (Where Applicable)

Year 2

Year 3

From 1.7.2022 to 30.9.2022

From 1.10.2022 to 31.12.2022

From 1.1.2023 to 31.3.2023

From 1.4.2023 to 30.6.2023

From 1.7.2023 to 30.9.2023

From 1.10.2023 to 31.12.2023

From 1.1.2024 to 31.3.2024

From 1.4.2024 to 30.6.2024

Volume of tariff quota (net tonnes)

Volume of tariff quota (net tonnes)

Volume of tariff quota (net tonnes)

Volume of tariff quota (net tonnes)

Volume of tariff quota (net tonnes)

Volume of tariff quota (net tonnes)

Volume of tariff quota (net tonnes)

Volume of tariff quota (net tonnes)

1

Other countries

900 290,25

900 290,25

880 718,72

890 504,48

933 743,65

933 743,65

923 594,27

923 594,27

2

Other countries

321 824,43

321 824,43

314 828,25

318 326,34

333 782,94

333 782,94

330 154,85

330 154,85

3A

Other countries

817,65

817,65

799,87

808,76

848,03

848,03

838,81

838,81

3B

Other countries

8 303,99

8 303,99

8 123,47

8 213,73

8 612,56

8 612,56

8 518,94

8 518,94

4A

Other countries

454 338,51

454 338,51

444 461,58

449 400,05

471 221,03

471 221,03

466 099,06

466 099,06

4B

Other countries

100 848,08

100 848,08

98 655,73

99 751,91

104 595,44

104 595,44

103 458,53

103 458,53

5

Other countries

41 252,54

41 252,54

40 355,75

40 804,14

42 785,42

42 785,42

42 320,36

42 320,36

6

Other countries

35 715,05

35 715,05

34 938,63

35 326,84

37 042,16

37 042,16

36 639,53

36 639,53

7

Other countries

554 571,27

554 571,27

542 515,37

548 543,32

575 178,29

575 178,29

568 926,35

568 926,35

8

Other countries

105 581,29

105 581,29

103 286,04

104 433,67

109 504,53

109 504,53

108 314,26

108 314,26

9

Other countries

50 944,84

50 944,84

49 837,34

50 391,09

52 837,87

52 837,87

52 263,55

52 263,55

10

Other countries

1 002,95

1 002,95

981,14

992,04

1 040,21

1 040,21

1 028,91

1 028,91

12

Other countries

58 414,15

58 414,15

57 144,27

57 779,21

60 584,73

60 584,73

59 926,20

59 926,20

13

Other countries

132 668,90

132 668,90

129 784,79

131 226,85

137 598,67

137 598,67

136 103,03

136 103,03

14

Other countries

4 956,51

4 956,51

4 848,76

4 902,63

5 140,68

5 140,68

5 084,81

5 084,81

15

Other countries

773,87

773,87

757,04

765,46

802,62

802,62

793,90

793,90

16

Other countries

116 864,97

116 864,97

114 324,43

115 594,70

121 207,50

121 207,50

119 890,02

119 890,02

17

Other countries

64 947,85

64 947,85

63 535,94

64 241,90

67 361,21

67 361,21

66 629,03

66 629,03

18

Other countries

274,44

274,44

268,47

271,45

284,63

284,63

281,54

281,54

19

Other countries

759,42

759,42

742,91

751,17

787,64

787,64

779,08

779,08

20

Other countries

10 690,62

10 690,62

10 458,21

10 574,41

11 087,86

11 087,86

10 967,34

10 967,34

21

Other countries

19 871,64

19 871,64

19 439,65

19 655,65

20 610,04

20 610,04

20 386,02

20 386,02

22

Other countries

2 586,28

2 586,28

2 530,05

2 558,16

2 682,38

2 682,38

2 653,22

2 653,22

24

Other countries

43 742,37

43 742,37

42 791,45

43 266,91

45 367,77

45 367,77

44 874,64

44 874,64

25A

Other countries

115 747,59

115 747,59

113 231,34

114 489,47

120 048,60

120 048,60

118 743,72

118 743,72

25B

Other countries

6 251,05

6 251,05

6 115,16

6 183,11

6 483,33

6 483,33

6 412,86

6 412,86

26

Other countries

19 298,91

19 298,91

18 879,37

19 089,14

20 016,03

20 016,03

19 798,47

19 798,47

27

Other countries

30 366,43

30 366,43

29 706,29

30 036,36

31 494,80

31 494,80

31 152,46

31 152,46

28

Other countries

47 545,89

47 545,89

46 512,29

47 029,09

49 312,63

49 312,63

48 776,62

48 776,62

IV.3 –   Maximum volume of residual quota accessible in last quarters to countries with a country specific quota

| Product category | New alocated quota in tonnes |
| --- | --- |
| From 1.4.2023 to 30.6.2023 | From 1.4.2024 to 30.6.2024 |
| 1 | Special regime | Special regime |
| 2 | 318 326,34 | 330 154,85 |
| 3.A | 808,76 | 838,81 |
| 3.B | 8 213,73 | 8 518,94 |
| 4.A | 449 400,05 | 466 099,06 |
| 4.B | Special regime | Special regime |
| 5 | No access to the residual quota in Q4 | No access to the residual quota in Q4 |
| 6 | 35 326,84 | 36 639,53 |
| 7 | Not applicable | Not applicable |
| 8 | Not applicable | Not applicable |
| 9 | No access to the residual quota in Q4 | No access to the residual quota in Q4 |
| 10 | 992,04 | 1 028,91 |
| 12 | 22 671,97 | 23 514,42 |
| 13 | 53 215,94 | 55 193,36 |
| 14 | 3 652,73 | 3 788,46 |
| 15 | 765,46 | 793,90 |
| 16 | 18 138,68 | 18 812,69 |
| 17 | Not applicable | Not applicable |
| 18 | 271,45 | 281,54 |
| 19 | 751,17 | 779,08 |
| 20 | 960,89 | 996,60 |
| 21 | No access to the residual quota in Q4 | No access to the residual quota in Q4 |
| 22 | 2 558,16 | 2 653,22 |
| 24 | 43 266,91 | 44 874,64 |
| 25.A | Not applicable | Not applicable |
| 25.B | 6 183,11 | 6 412,86 |
| 26 | 19 089,14 | 19 798,47 |
| 27 | 4 699,24 | 4 873,85 |
| 28 | 47 029,09 | 48 776,62 |

Product category

New alocated quota in tonnes

From 1.4.2023 to 30.6.2023

From 1.4.2024 to 30.6.2024

1

Special regime

Special regime

2

318 326,34

330 154,85

3.A

808,76

838,81

3.B

8 213,73

8 518,94

4.A

449 400,05

466 099,06

4.B

Special regime

Special regime

5

No access to the residual quota in Q4

No access to the residual quota in Q4

6

35 326,84

36 639,53

7

Not applicable

Not applicable

8

Not applicable

Not applicable

9

No access to the residual quota in Q4

No access to the residual quota in Q4

10

992,04

1 028,91

12

22 671,97

23 514,42

13

53 215,94

55 193,36

14

3 652,73

3 788,46

15

765,46

793,90

16

18 138,68

18 812,69

17

Not applicable

Not applicable

18

271,45

281,54

19

751,17

779,08

20

960,89

996,60

21

No access to the residual quota in Q4

No access to the residual quota in Q4

22

2 558,16

2 653,22

24

43 266,91

44 874,64

25.A

Not applicable

Not applicable

25.B

6 183,11

6 412,86

26

19 089,14

19 798,47

27

4 699,24

4 873,85

28

47 029,09

48 776,62

---

(1)  From 1.7 to 31.3: 09.8601

1

From 1.4 to 30.6: 09.8602

From 1.4 to 30.6: For Turkey*: 09.8572, for India*: 09.8573, for Korea (Republic of)*: 09.8574, for Serbia*: 09.8575 and for United Kingdom*: 09.8599 *In case of exhaustion of their specific quotas in accordance with

Article 1.5

(2)  From 1.7 to 31.3: 09.8603

2

From 1.4 to 30.6: 09.8604

From 1.4 to 30.6: For India*, Korea (Republic of)*, Ukraine*, Brazil*, Serbia* and United Kingdom*: 09.8567 *In case of exhaustion of their specific quotas in accordance with Article 1.5

(3)  From 1.7 to 31.3: 09.8605

3

From 1.4 to 30.6: 09.8606

From 1.4 to 30.6: For Korea (Republic of)*, Iran (Islamic republic of)* and United Kingdom*: 09.8568 *In case of exhaustion of their specific quotas in accordance with Article 1.5

(4)  From 1.7 to 31.3: 09.8607

4

From 1.4 to 30.6: 09.8608

09.8816From 1.4 to 30.6: For Korea (Republic of)*, China* and Taiwan*: 09.8569 *In case of exhaustion of their specific quotas in accordance with Article 1.5

(5)  From 1.7 to 31.3: 09.8609

5

From 1.4 to 30.6: 09.8610

From 1.4 to 30.6: For India*, Korea (Republic of)* and United Kingdom*: 09.8570 *In case of exhaustion of their specific quotas in accordance with Article 1.5

(6)  From 1.7 to 31.3: 09.8611

6

From 1.4 to 30.6: 09.8612

From 1.4 to 30.6: For China*: 09.8581, for Korea (Republic of)*: 09.8582, for India*: 09.8583, for United Kingdom*: 09.8584 *In case of exhaustion of their specific quotas in accordance with Article 1.5

(7)  From 1.7 to 31.3: 09.8613

7

From 1.4 to 30.6: 09.8614

(8)  From 1.7 to 31.3: 09.8615

8

From 1.4 to 30.6: 09.8616

From 1.4 to 30.6: For China*, Korea (Republic of)*, Taiwan*, Serbia* and United Kingdom*: 09.8576 *In case of exhaustion of their specific quotas in accordance with Article 1.5

(9)  From 1.7 to 31.3: 09.8617

9

From 1.4 to 30.6: 09.8618

(10)  From 1.7 to 31.3: 09.8619

10

From 1.4 to 30.6: 09.8620

(11)  From 1.7 to 31.3: 09.8621

11

From 1.4 to 30.6: 09.8622

From 1.4 to 30.6: For Korea (Republic of)*, Taiwan*, India*, South Africa*, United States of America*, Turkey* and Malaysia*: 09.8578 *In case of exhaustion of their specific quotas in accordance with Article 1.5

(12)  From 1.7 to 31.3: 09.8623

12

From 1.4 to 30.6: 09.8624

From 1.4 to 30.6: For China*, India*, South Africa*, Taiwan* and United Kingdom*: 09.8591 *In case of exhaustion of their specific quotas in accordance with Article 1.5

(13)  From 1.7 to 31.3: 09.8625

13

From 1.4 to 30.6: 09.8626

From 1.4 to 30.6: For China*, Turkey* , Switzerland* and United Kingdom*: 09.8592 *In case of exhaustion of their specific quotas in accordance with Article 1.5

(14)  From 1.7 to 31.3: 09.8627

14

From 1.4 to 30.6: 09.8628

From 1.4 to 30.6: For Turkey*, Ukraine*, Bosnia and Herzegovina* and Moldova*: 09.8593*In case of exhaustion of their specific quotas in accordance with Article 1.5

(15)  From 1.7 to 31.3: 09.8629

15

From 1.4 to 30.6: 09.8630

From 1.4 to 30.6: For India*, Switzerland*, Ukraine* and United Kingdom*: 09.8594 *In case of exhaustion of their specific quotas in accordance with Article 1.5

(16)  From 1.7 to 31.3: 09.8631 09.8907

16

From 1.4 to 30.6: 09.8632

From 1.4 to 30.6: For India*, Taiwan*, Korea (Republic of)*, China*, Japan* and United Kingdom*: 09.8595 *In case of exhaustion of their specific quotas in accordance with Article 1.5

(17)  From 1.7 to 31.3: 09.8633

17

From 1.4 to 30.6: 09.8634

From 1.4 to 30.6: For Ukraine*, Switzerland*, Turkey*, Moldaova* and United Kingdom*: 09.8558 *In case of exhaustion of their specific quotas in accordance with Article 1.5

(18)  From 1.7 to 31.3: 09.8635

18

From 1.4 to 30.6: 09.8636

(19)  From 1.7 to 31.3: 09.8637

19

From 1.4 to 30.6: 09.8638

From 1.4 to 30.6: For China*, United Arab Emirates* and United Kingdom*: 09.8580 *In case of exhaustion of their specific quotas in accordance with Article 1.5

(20)  From 1.7 to 31.3: 09.8639

20

From 1.4 to 30.6: 09.8640

From 1.4 to 30.6: For China*, Turkey* and United Kingdom*: 09.8585 *In case of exhaustion of their specific quotas in accordance with Article 1.5

(21)  From 1.7 to 31.3: 09.8641

21

From 1.4 to 30.6: 09.8642

(22)  From 1.7 to 31.3: 09.8643

22

From 1.4 to 30.6: 09.8644

(23)  From 1.7 to 31.3: 09.8645

23

From 1.4 to 30.6: 09.8646

From 1.4 to 30.6: For India*, Ukraine*, Korea (Republic of)*, Japan*, China* and United Kingdom*: 09.8597 *In case of exhaustion of their specific quotas in accordance with Article 1.5

(24)  From 1.7 to 31.3: 09.8647

24

From 1.4 to 30.6: 09.8648

From 1.4 to 30.6: For China*, Ukraine*, United States of America* and United Kingdom*: 09.8586 *In case of exhaustion of their specific quotas in accordance with Article 1.5

(25)  From 1.7 to 31.3: 09.8657

25

From 1.4 to 30.6: 09.8658

(26)  From 1.7 to 31.3: 09.8659

26

From 1.4 to 30.6: 09.8660

From 1.4 to 30.6: For Turkey*, China*, Korea (Republic of)* and United Kingdom*: 09.8587 *In case of exhaustion of their specific quotas in accordance with Article 1.5

(27)  From 1.7 to 31.3: 09.8651

27

From 1.4 to 30.6: 09.8652

From 1.4 to 30.6: For Switzerland*, Turkey*, Taiwan*, China * and United Kingdom*: 09.8588 *In case of exhaustion of their specific quotas in accordance with Article 1.5

(28)  From 1.7 to 31.3: 09.8653

28

From 1.4 to 30.6: 09.8654

From 1.4 to 30.6: For Switzerland*, China *, Ukraine* and United Kingdom*: 09.8539 *In case of exhaustion of their specific quotas in accordance with Article 1.5

(29)  From 1.7 to 31.3: 09.8655

29

From 1.4 to 30.6: 09.8656

From 1.4 to 30.6: For Turkey*, Ukraine* and China *: 09.8598 *In case of exhaustion of their specific quotas in accordance with Article 1.5

---