### IN THE COURT OF CRIMI NAL AP PEALS OF TENNES SEE AT KNOXVI LLE Jul y 25, 200 6 S es sio n STA TE OF TEN NES SEE v. CLIF FOR D WA YN E MO RR IS Direc t Appeal from the Cr im inal Cou rt for Unicoi County

No. 5400 Lynn W. Brown , Judge

No. E2005-01957-CC A-R3- CD F iled October 30, 2006

Th e Pe tit ion er, Cl if

fo rdWayne Mo rris, ple d g uil ty to atte mpt e d d iss e min a tio n o f a c or dle ss telephone tr ansmission, a Class A misdemeanor. The trial court sentence d the Def endant to ele ven mon ths a nd tw e nty -n ine da y s with a thi rt y da y pe ri od of inc arc e ratio n to be se rv e d p ri or to r e le a se on pr ob a tio n. On app e a l, the De fe nd a nt c on te nd s that the tr ia l c ou rt e rr e d wh e n it se nte nc e d h im. After thoroug hly revie wing the re cord a nd the applica ble authorities, we reve rse the judg ment of the trial court. Te nn. R . A pp. P . 3 App e al a s o f Rig ht ; J udgm e nt of t he Cr im ina l C our t R e ve r se d and Rem anded R OB E R T W. W EDEMEYER , J ., delivere d the opi nion of t he court, in which D AVI D G. H AYES , and J.C. M C L I N J J ., joined. Ol e n G . H a y ne s, Jr., John so n Ci ty , T e nn e sse e , f or the app e lla nt C lif

fo rdWayne Mo rris. Pa ul G . Su mme rs , A tto rn e y Ge ne ra l a ndRe po rt e r; Jenn if e r L . Bl e ds oe , Ass ist a nt Att or ne y Ge ne ra l; Joe C. Cru mle y , J r. , Dis tr ic t Atto rn e y Ge ne ra l; Me la nie Gw inn , Ass ist a nt D ist ri c t A tto rn e y

Ge ne ra l, for the A ppellee, State of Tenne ssee. OP IN ION

I. F acts

This case arises from the Defenda nt’s conviction for dissemination of a cordle ss telephoneT hi s t y pe of pl ea i s na med af

t er N ort h Car ol i na v. Al f ord, 400 U
. S. 25 (197 0), i n w hi ch t he U ni t ed St at es 1 Supre me C our t di s cus s ed t he r i gh t of an ac cus ed t o pl ead gui l t y i n hi s b es t i nt er es t whi l e p r ot es t i ng hi s ac t ual i nn ocenc e.

-2- transmission, a Class A misdemeanor. A Gra nd J ury orig inally

i n d i ct ed t h e De fenda nt for i n t en t i o n al l y , wi t h o u tt h e c o n s en to f a tl ea s to n e p ar t y t o t h e c o m m u n i ca t i o n , d i s s em i n at i n g a transmission between a cordle ss te lephone and a landline telephonewhen suc h dissemination was not authorized by

a court order, a

Class E felony

in violation of TennesseeCode Annotated se ction 39-13-604( b)(2) . The Def endant enter ed an Alford or best intere st plea to attempted dissemination 1 of a c ordles s t el ephone tr ansmission, a Class A misdemeanor. The following evidenc e wa s prese nted when the Def

endant e ntere d his plea: the Defenda nt testified t hat he did not fee l that he was g uiltyof attempted dissemination of a cordle ss te lephone transmission but stated that he de cided to enter a g uiltyplea r ather

than risk being tried for a g reater off

ense a nd rec eiving a har sher sentenc e. The Def

endant testified that he used a scanne r and that he rec orded a phone conve rsation betwee n Nanc y Bog art, the Chairman of the Unicoi County School Boa

rd, and D enise B rown, the Direc tor of S chools in Unicoi C ounty . He e x plained that, during this phone conver sation, the two women thre atene d to harm Mark Stevens, the editor of t he Erwin Record. The De fenda nt testified that he sent the r ecor ding of the phone c onversation to S tevens at the Erwin Rec ord. When asked if h e w o u ld ap o lo g iz e to th e tw o in d iv id u a ls e n g a g e d in th e c o n v e r s a ti o n th a t h e r e c o r ded, the Def endant sa id, “I

owe the Court a n apolog y and [the Assistant District Attorney General] may

be
a n a po log y , b ut I

do n’ t – I do n’ t f e e l li ke I ow e – I thi nk the y ow e – ma y be ow e the Un ic oi C ou nty people an d m e an apology .” The trial court a cce pted the De fenda nt’s Alford plea to attempted dissemination of a cor dless telephone c onversation.-3-

At th e De fendant’s sentenc ing he aring , the trial court determined tha t the Def endant’ s
cr i m i n al b ehavior

was re levant for

sentenc ing pur

poses eve n though the Def endant ha d never
rec eived a

conviction for this beha vior.

De nis e B ro wn , o ne of

the wo me n ta

pe re c or de d, re a d th e fo llo wi ng state me nt:
[The Defe ndant] has quite a history of har assing the community with te lephones a nd tape r ecor ders. As f

ar ba ck as the ear ly

90' s, [t he De fend ant] has made a habit of c a lli ng a nd tapin g te le ph on e c on ve rs a tio ns of c o- wo rk e rs , f

ri e nd s, pu bli c of

fi c ia ls and other s . . . . I n 1997, Way ne Morris was cha rg ed and ple ad g uiltyto hara ssing tw o f or me r f e ma le wo rk e rs wi th the te le ph on e . T he se la die s haddo ne no thi ng to h im

. . . . I n 2002, [t he De fenda nt] was c harg ed with telephone hara ssment for har assing my husband and me. He would hang up if my husband answe red the phone and say vulga r, deg rading things if I

answe red . . . .
On cr oss-examination, Brown a cknowledg ed that, during her phone conver sation with Bog art, she threa tened to beat up Stevens and that she sa id, “I ’m serious.” She acknow ledg ed that som eone w ho hear d this conversa tion might think that she planned to phy sically harm Stevens.

Nanc y Bog art testified tha t her position with the school board wa s up for re -ele ction when the De fe nd a nt r e c or de d h e r p ho ne con versatio n w ith B ro wn . Sh e e xpla ine d th a t, d ur ing thi s
conver sation, she indicated that she would ac company Br own whil e Brown be at up Stevens. She t es t i fi ed t h at s h e d i d n o t re al l y ex p ec t Br o wn t o b ea t u p S t ev en s an d t h at Br o wn d o es n o tev en we i gh one hundre d pounds. On cross- examination, Bog art testified tha t, at the time of her rec orded phone
conver sation, she thoug ht that Brow n might appr oach Steve ns and talk to him. She ac knowledg ed that someone who listened to he r conve rsation with B rown could rea sonably believe that Brow n was-4-

serious. B og art a cknowledg ed that she filed a civil c omplaint a g ainst the Def endant asking for one hundred thousand dollar s in compensatory damag es.

Ma y be lle Du nc a n M or

ri s, the De fe nd a nt’ s wif

e , re c a lle d tha t her hu sb a nd wa s c ha rg e d w ith using the telephone to harass the B rowns. She testified that L ee B rown, De nise Br own’s husband, telephoned he r and c alled her various name s. She said that she hung up the telephone , L ee B rown called her back, and the Def endant did not allow her to answe r the tele phone anymore on a ccount of the ho rribl e thi ng s th a t L e e B ro wn sa id. Mo rris s a id tha t L e e B ro wn us e d th e te le ph on e to h ara ss them until 10:00 p.m . and continued to ha rass them the nex t day
. She said that L ee B rown c ontinued this behavior for

a month, and then she and the Def endant had a sy stem put on their telephone that blocked L ee B rown’s te lephone c alls.

On cr oss-examination, Morris testified t h at s h e reported L ee B rown’s phone calls to the telephone de partment but could not re cal l i f s h e re ported these phone ca lls to t he Sheriff ’s Depa rtment. On redirect ex amination, Morris t estified that she advised Deputy J immyErwin that sh e ha d r e c e i v e d h ar a s s i n g p h o n e c a l l s f r o m L e e B r o w n . S h e d i d n o t k n o w i f D e p u t y Er wi n investigated h er acc usations ag ainst L ee B rown but did know that he inve stiga ted the B rown’s
acc usations ag ainst her husba nd.

Whe n s e nte nc ing the De fe nd a nt the tr ia l cou rt app lie d the fo llo wi ng e nh a nc e me nt f a c tor s: (1 ) tha t “ [t]he de fe nd a nt h a s a pr e vio us his tory

of c ri min a l c onvic tio ns or

c ri min a l be ha vio r i n addition to those nece ssary to establish the appropriate ra ng e,” T ennesse e C ode Annotate d § 40-35--5-

114(2) ( 2003); and (2) that the “of fense involved more than one victim,” Tenne ssee Code A nnotated § 40-35-114( 3). The trial court stated:

[T] he court finds that there are in f act two enhanc ement fac tors as provided by law. One of them is fairly

insignifica nt, a nd for that matter the court re ally will not attach much weig ht to the criminal beha vior that has bee n testified t o and some sort of hara ssing phone call. B ut it probably was more rele vant t o show the bitterness a nd bad fe eling s that have g one on betwe en these parties for y ear s, and on this proof we do n’ t kn ow wh y . It do e sn ’t ma tte r. B ut the c ou rt

a lso fi nd s th a t th e off

e ns e a lso inv olv e d mo re tha n one vic tim
. B oth Ms. B ro wn a nd Ms. B og art are vic tim s in thi s case . . . . Mitigating fac tors, y ou are corr ect that his criminal conduct neither cause d or threatened se rious bodily injury . But dissem i n at i n g a tape , in the scheme of things, that, in the c ourt’s opinion is insi g nifica n t i n mitigation. And ther e is no strong p r o v o c a ti o n . . . . T h e n e xt i s s u e is p r o b a ti o n , a lth o u g h s o me o f th e m ha ve a lr e a dy be e n a dd re sse d. Th e fi rs t fa c tor are c ir c ums ta nc e s o f the of fe ns e . T ha t is a fa ct o r t h at we i gh s aga i n s tp ro b at i o n . I t i s a f el o n y t h at h e c o m m i t t ed , ev en t h o u gh he ha s bee n co nv ic te d of a misd e me a no r. An d the re ’s jus t no excu se fo r w ha t he did . . . . The ne x t fac tor to be consider ed unde r the law is his present condition, and un de r the Cr imi na l Sent e nc ing Re fo rm Ac t, h is p ote nti a l f

or re ha bil itatio n. An d th is is where he has ma ssive problems beca use in the more than thirty y ear s in w hich I ’ve been pr acticing and obser ving c rim i n al courts, this court has ne ver se en as u n r e p e n t a n t , u n r e m o r s e f

u l , r e f u s e d t o m ak e a n y ap o l o g y t o t h e v i c t i m , n o to n l y s a ys he did n’ t do a nythi ng wr on g , b ut tha t th e c iti zen s o f U nic oi C ou nt y ou ght to apolog ize to him f

or his c ommissi on of what is a felony
. This is a fa ctor that, in the court’s opinion, would carr y s u fficient weig ht to just plain deny probation, which would mean he’d ser ve six (6) months in jail . . . . He doesn’ t acknowle dg e that he did any thing wr ong . He sa y s that the sy stem oug ht to apologize to him for what he a c tua lly didwa s in c omm iss ion of a fe lon y , ha s no apo log y , no c on c e rn fo r the pa in and suffering that he infli cted on these people, for whatever all this bit terne ss goe s back to . . . . And this is a fa ctor t h at ca rr i es a m assi ve amount of w eig ht. I ’ve never seen a ny one as unr emorsef ul, unr ep entant and r efusing to acknowle dg e that something the y

did was just pretty

low down and dirty

. . . . Th e trial cou rt se nte nc e d th e De fe nd a nt t o e le ve n mo nth s a ndtw e nty -n ine da y s, a t f if ty perc ent, with a thirty

day period of inc arc eration to be s er v ed p ri or to rele ase on pr obation. The De fe nd a nt n ow app e a ls, c on ten di ng that th e tr ia l c ou rt ’s jud g me nt tha t th e De fe nd a nt s e rv e thi rt y-6-

day s in incarc eration is contrary to the sentenc ing g uidelines.

II. Ana lys is
On appea l the Def

endant contends that the trial court improperly applied the principles of the Se nte nc ing Re fo rm

Ac t. S pe c if

ic a lly , th e De fe nd a nt c on te nd s th a t th e tr ia l c ou rt e rr e d w he n it
se nte nc e d him by c on sid e ri ng ina pp ro pr ia te e nh a nc e me nt fa c tor s, by fa ili ng to co ns ide r a pp ro pr ia te mitigating fac tors, and by ref using to g rant him full probation. The State asserts tha t the trial court proper ly sentenc ed the De fenda nt.

Whe n a de fe nd a nt c ha lle ng e s th e le ng th a nd ma nn e r of se rv ic e of a se nte nc e , it

is the du ty of t his court to conduct a de novo revie w of the record with a presumption that “the de terminations made by the court from which the a ppea l i s t ak en are corr ect.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 40- 35-401(d) (2003). This pr esumption is “conditioned upon the af firmative showing in the rec ord that the trial
c ou rt c on sid e re d th e se nte nc ing pr inc ipl e s a nda ll r e le va nt fa c ts a ndc ir c ums ta nc e s. ” Sta te v. Ros s, 49 S. W. 3 d 8 3 3 , 8 4 7 ( T e n n . 2 0 0 1 ) ; S tate v . Pe ttu s , 9 8 6 S. W. 2 d 5 4 0 , 5 4 3 ( T e n n . 1 9 9 9 ) ; S tate v. Ashby , 823 S.W .2d 166, 169 (Tenn. 1991) . The pre sumption does not apply to the leg al conc lusions
rea ched by

the trial court in sentenc ing a defe ndant or to the de terminations made by the trial court that are predic ated upon unc ontroverte d fac ts. St ate v. De an, 76 S.W .3d 352, 377 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2001); State v. Butler , 900 S.W .2d 305, 311 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994) ; State v. Smi th 891 S.W .2d 922, 929 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994)
.

I n conducting a de novo revie w of a sentence, we m ust consider: (a ) any evidenc e re ceive d-7-

at the trial a nd/or sentenc ing he aring ; (b) the pr esente nce r eport; (c ) the princ iples of sentenc ing; ( d) the arg uments of counsel rela tive to sentencing alternatives; (e) the nature and cha rac teristics of the of fe ns e ; ( f) a ny

mit ig a tin g or

e nh a nc e me nt f

a c tor s; ( g ) a ny

state me nts ma de by the de fe nd a nt o n h is or her own beha lf; and (h) the def endant’ s potential or lack of potential for r ehabilitation or trea tment. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-210 (2003); State v. Tay lor, 63 S.W .3d 400, 411 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2001). The pa rty challeng ing a

sentenc e imposed by

the trial cou rt h as the burde n of establishing that the sentenc e is err oneous. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40- 35-401 (2003) , Sentencing Com m. C mts .

In t h e c a s e u n d e r

s u b m i s s i o n , t h e D e f

e n d a n t w a s c o n v i c t e d o f a C l a s s A m i s d e m e a n o r . In misdemeanor se ntencing , the sentenc e imposed must be specific and consistent with the purpose s and princ iples of the Criminal Sentencing Reform Act of 1989. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40- 35-302(b) ( 2 0 0 3 )
. T h e mi s d e me a n a n t, u n li k e th e f e lo n , is n o t e n ti tl e d to th e p r e s u mp ti o n of a minimum sentenc e. State v. Crea sy , 885 S.W .2d 829, 832 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994). Howeve r, in determining the p e r c e n ta g e o f th e s e n te n c e to b e s e r v e d in a c tu a l c o n f in e me n t, th e tria l c o u r t mu s t consider enhanc ement and mitig ating fac tors, as we ll as the purposes and p ri n ci p l es o f the Criminal S e n t e n c i n g R e f

o r mA c t o f 1 9 8 9 , a n d t h e t r i a l c o u r t s h o u l d n o t i m p o s e s u c h p e r c e n t a g e s ar b i t r ar i l y. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40- 35-302(d) . A lack of s p ecific finding s within the recor d is no basis for h o l d i n g t h e t r i a l c o u r ti n e rr o r . S t a t e v . R u s s e l l , 1 0 S
. W
. 3 d 2 7 0 , 2 7 8 ( T e n n . C r i m . A p p . 1 9 9 9 )
. In sentenc ing the misdemeanor de fenda nt, the trial court sha ll fix a per centa g e of the sentenc e that the de fe nd a nt m us t se rv e in c on fi ne me nt b e fo re be ing e lig ibl e fo r r e le a se int o r e ha bil itativ e pr og ra ms. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40- 35-302(d) ; State v. Troutman, 979 S.W.2d 271, 273 (Tenn. 1998).-8- A. Application of

Enh ancem ent and Mitigating Fac tors

The De fenda nt contends that the trial c ourt err ed whe n it enhance d the Def endant’ s sentence due to the De fenda nt’s prior criminal behavior a nd b ec au s e t h e off ense impac ted more tha n one vic tim
. Th e De fe nd a nt a lso c on te nd s that the tr ia l c ou rt e rr e d by fa ili ng to c on side r app rop ri ate mit ig a tin g fa c tor s a

pp lic able to the De fe nd a nt’ s c a se . T he Sta te c on te nd s th a t the tr ia l cou rt pr op e rl y considere d enhanc ement and mitig ating fac tors when it sentenc ed the Def endant. In our view, the trial court e rre d when it a

pplied enhanc ement fac tor (3), that the offe nse involved more tha n one (1) victim. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40- 35-114(3)
.

E n h an ce m ent fa ctors must be “a ppropriate for the of

fense ” and “ not alrea dy

an esse ntial element of

the offe nse.” Te nn. Code Ann. § 40-35- 114. The obvious purpose of these limitations is t o exclude enhanc ement fa ctors which are not releva nt to the offense and those based on fac ts w hich are used to prove the offe nse. F acts whic h establish the elements of the offe nse cha rg ed may not also be the ba sis of

a n e nh a nc e me nt f

a c tor inc re a sin g pu nis hme nt. Th e legi sl a tur e , in det erm in ing thera ng e s o f p un ish me nt w ith in the c la ssi fi c a tio ns of of fe ns e s, nece ssarily

took into account the c ulpabilityinhere nt in each of fense
. State v. J ones, 883 S.W .2d 597, 601 (Tenn. 1994) , superce ded by statute on other grounds as stated in State v. Carico, 968 S.W.2d 280, 288 (Tenn. 1998). Sente nce e nh an ce m en t fac tors can not be ba se d o n f a c ts w hic h a

re us e d to pr ov e the of

fe ns e or fa c ts wh ic h e sta

bli sh the of

fe ns e c ha rg e d. Sta te v. Poole, 945 S.W .2d 93, 95-6 (Te nn. 1997).-9-

I n the ca se under

su bmission, t he trial c ourt err ed whe n it applied enhanc ement fa ctor (3) to the Def endant’ s sentenc e beca

use that fac tor involved an element of the off ense. The Def

endant pled g uiltyto attempting to violate Te nnessee Code Annotated se ction 39-13-604( b)(2 ), which state s that: “A per son commits an offense who intentional l y d i s s emi nates a communication transmitted betwee n two (2) c ordless telepho n es or a cordle ss telephone a nd a landline tele phone if such dissemination is not authorized by a court order
. ” Disseminating a communication betwe en two te le ph on e s is a n a c tiv ity that by its va ry nat ure in volve s mo re tha n o ne vic tim . B e c a us e disseminating a

communication that occurs between two people serve s as the basis for the offe nse, tw o v ic tim s a

re a uto ma tic a lly

inv olv e d in the of

fe ns e , a nd e nh a nc e me nt fa c tor (3 ) i s n ot a

pp lic able in this case.

Th e tr ia l applied enhanc ement fa ctor (2) to the Def endant’ s sentence beca

use it found that the De fe nd a nt ha s a pr e vio us his tory of c ri min a l c on vic tio ns or c ri min a l be ha vio r i n a dd iti on to tho se
nece ssary to e s ta

b li s h th e ap p r o p r iate r a n g e . T h e r e c o r d r e f le c ts th a t th e D e f

e n d a n t h a s a

p r ior conviction that was e x pung ed and that Brow n testi fi ed about pr evious instances in whic h the Def endant “ hara ssed” pe ople while using the telephone . Although the trial court attributed very lit tle we ig ht t o th is e nh a nc e me nt f a c tor , w e c on c lud e that th e tr ia l c ou rt c or re c tly c on sid e re d th is fac tor.

B. Denial of P robation

The De fenda nt contends that the trial c ourt err ed whe n it refuse d to g rant him full probation.-10-

A def endant is elig ible for alternative sentenc ing if the sentenc e ac tually imposed is eight y ear s or l ess. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-303( a) ( 2003). Althoug h probation must be consider ed, “the defe ndant is not automatically entitled to probation as a matter of law .” Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35- 303(b). In determining whe ther to g rant or de ny probation, the trial co u rt m ay co n s ider the following : the circumstances of the offense; t he def endant’ s criminal re cord; ba ckg round and soc ial h i s t o r y; t h e d e f

e n d a n t ’ s p h ys i c a l a n d m e n t a l h e a l t h ; t h e d e t e rr e n te f f e c to n o t h e r

c r i m i n a l a c t i v i t y;
a ndthe lik e lih oo d th a t pr ob a tio n is in the be st inte re sts of bo th t he pu bli c a ndthe de fe nd a nt. Sta te v. Parker , 932 S.W .2d 945, 958 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1996) . The De fenda n t b ea rs t he burde n of establishing suitability

for pr obation. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-303( b); Ashby , 823 S.W .2d at 169. Se nte nc e s in vo lvi ng c on fi ne me nt s ho uldbe ba se d u po n th e fo llo wi ng c on sid e ratio ns : (A) Confine ment is nece ssary to protect socie ty by restra ining a

defe ndant who has a lon g his tory

of c ri min a l c on du c t; (B ) Confinement is ne cessa ry to a void de prec iating the seriousne ss of the off ense or c on fi ne me nt i s p art ic ula

rl y su ite d to pr ov ide a n e ff

e c tiv e de te rr e nc e to o the rs lik e ly to commit si milar offe nses; or (C) Mea sures less restrictive than c onfinement ha ve fr equently or re cently

been app lie d u ns uc c e ssf

ull y to the de fe nd a nt.
Tenn. Code Ann. § 40- 35-103 (2003) . Additionally , the pri n ci p les of sente ncing ref lect that the
se nte nc e sh ou ld b e no g re a te r tha n that de se rv e d fo r the of fe ns e c omm itt e d a ndsh ou ld b e the le a st
sever e mea sure ne cessa

ry to achieve the purposes f or which the sent en ce is imposed. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35- 103(2),( 4). The c ourt should also consider the defe ndant’s potential for reha bilitation or tre atment in de termining the appropriate sente nce. See id. § 40-35-103(5) . The Ac t g oe s f urthe r a ndlis ts the ty

pe of e vid e nc e that tria l cou rt s shou ld co ns ide r w he n impo sin g se nte nc e s.-11-

Se e Te nn . Co de An n. § 4 0- 35 -2 10 (b ). Se c tio n 2 10 (b ) s ta te s th a t:
(b) To determine the specific sentenc e and the appropriate combination of se ntencing al t er n ati v es t h at s h al lb e i m

p o s ed o n t h e d ef en d an t , t h e c o u rt s h al lconsi d er

t h e f o l l o wi n g: (1 ) T h e e v i d en ce , i f a n y , re ce i v ed at t h e t ri al an d t h e s en t en ci n g h ea ri n g; (2 ) T he pr e se nte nc e re po rt ; (3 ) T he pr inc ipl e s o f s e nte nc ing a ndarg ume nts a s to se nte nc ing a lte rn a tiv e s; (4) The nature and cha

rac teristics of the c riminal conduct involved; (5) Evide nce a nd information offe red b y t he parties on the enha nceme nt and mitigation fa ctors in §§ 40-35-114 and 40-35-114; and (6) Any statement the de fenda nt wishes to ma ke in the defe ndant’s own be half a bout s en t en ci n g.
The trial c ourt reta ins the authority to place the defe ndant on proba tion either immediately or af ter a time of pe riodic or c ontinuous confinement. See T enn. Code Ann. § 40- 35-210(b)
.

I n the case under submissi on, the re cord de monstrates that the trial c ourt improperly appplied one of the t wo enhanceme nt fac tors that it considered. Further, w e re spectfully disag ree with the tr ia l c ou rt ’s de c isi on to attribu te g re a t w e ig ht t o th e De fe nd a nt’ s f a ilu re to ap olo g ize to the vic tim s. I n our view, the Def

endant’ s statements do not ref lect the callousness that the trial court attributed to his words. The De fenda nt may have r efuse d to apolog ize to the victims in order to pr otect himself ag ainst the pending civil suit aga inst him . The trial c ourt misu n d er s tood the Def endant’ s response , attributing to him hostili ty towards the U nicoi Countycommunity and the c riminal justice sy stem itself, which may

not have be en intended by the Def endant. The Def

endant a cknowledg ed that he ow e d th e c ou rt

a ndma y be the As sista nt D ist

ri c t A tto rn e y

apo log ie s, bu t st a te d th a t he fe lt that Bog art a nd Br own owed him and the people of Uni co i Countyan apolog y , presumably for threa tening Stevens.-12-

Un de r the se c ir c ums tances, th e De fe nd a nt’ s u nw ill ing ne ss t o a po log ize is a

fa c tor of lit tle conseque nce in the pr obation determination. As previously discussed, t he De fenda nt stated that he did n o t b elieve that he was g uiltyof the c rime cha rg ed but pled g uiltyto attempted dissemination of a c or dle ss te le ph on e tr a ns mis sio n in ord e r to a vo id h ars h s e nte nc ing . T he De fe nd a nt’ s r e fu sa l to
apo log ize to the vic tim s a nd his a sse rt ion of inn oc e nc e du ri ng his be st i nte re sts ple a c oll oq uy sh ou ld not be used to pre suppose, as the tria l court did, that the Def endant lac ks potential for re habilitation. See State v. Willi am B laine Campbell, No. E1999- 02208-CCA-R3-CD, 2000 WL 1449875, at *3 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Knoxvi lle, Sept. 29, 2000) (que stioning the propriety of using the def

endant’ s
assertion of innocenc e at the time of entering an Alford plea as a ba sis for denying pr obation), perm. app. denied

(T e nn . A pr . 2 4, 20 01 ). Th e tr ia l c ou rt c on tin ua lly state d th a t th e De fe nd a nt’ s f a ilu re to apolog ize to the victim s ignif icantly aff ecte d its decision to sentence the Def endant to thirty

day s of incar cer ation. I n our view, the nature and the c ircumstance s of t he offense are not sufficient to deny
a se nte nc e of

tot a l pro ba tio n. Th e De fe nd a nt co mmi tte d a non -v iol e nt of fe ns e a nd state d tha t he did so in order to wa

rn Mar ks about the threats b ei n g made a g ainst him in t he re corde d conver sation. Furthermore , the re cord before this Court does not ref lect the De fenda nt’s possession of a c riminal history evincing a cle ar disre g ard f or the law s and morals of society , and it does not ref lect a f ailure of past ef forts at re habi l itation. I n our view, a fter c onsidering the totality of circ umstances in the
case under submission, the Def endant ha s sufficiently

established suitabilityfor f ull probation.

Th e fo llo wi ng re a so nin g state d in Sta te v. As hb y , 8 23 S.W. 2d16 6, 17 1 ( Te nn . 1 99 1) is helpful to understa nding the case under submission:-13-

I t is no t th e po lic y

or pu rp os e of

thi s Co urt to pla c e tr ia l ju dg e s in a jud ic ia l st

ra ig htja c ke t in this or any

oth e r a re a , a ndwe are a lw a y s r e luc ta nt t o in te rf e re wi th the ir traditional discre tionary

power s. Howeve r, ours is the task of af fording a mea ningf

ul re vie w; a ndwh e re the e ff e c t o f su sta ini ng thede nia l of a pr ob a tio n w ou ld b e to de fe a t th e pu bli c po lic y

of the state by

pla c ing it wi thi n th e po we r o f a tr ia l ju dg e to deny probation on a basis outside statutory criteria, and without valid re asons, we a re left wit h n o ch o i ce but to intervene a nd act in furthera nce of the leg islative intent embra ced in the sta tutes relating to probation.
Ba sed on our r eview, we conclude that a sentenc e of full probation will se rve the ends of justice a nd is in the best interest of the D efe ndant and the public.

III. Conclusi on

For the re asons stated a

bove, we conclude d that t h e t rial court erre d when it denied the Def endant a sentenc e of f

ull probation. We theref

ore reverse the judgme nt of the trial court and
s e n t e n c e t h e D e f

e n d a n t t o e l e v e n m o n t h s a n d t w e n t y- n i n e d a ys on probation with the same te rms and conditions of probation as imposed by the trial court. We rema nd this case to the c riminal court for Un ic oi Cou nt y

f o r t h e e n t r y o f a j u d g m e n to f

c o n v i c t i o n a n d s e n t e n c e i n a c c o r d a n c e w i t h t h is opinion
.

________________________________ ROBERT W. WEDEMEYER, J UDGE-14-