United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit 

Chicago, Illinois 60604 

Submitted February 6, 2019 

Decided February 6, 2019 

Before 

DANIEL A. MANION, Circuit Judge 

ILANA DIAMOND ROVNER, Circuit Judge 

MICHAEL B. BRENNAN, Circuit Judge

No. 17-2904 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v. 

TERRELL McGEE, 

 Defendant-Appellant.

 Appeal from the United States District 

Court for the Southern District of Illinois. 

No. 3:15-CR-30075-SMY-2 

Staci M. Yandle, 

Judge. 

O R D E R 

 Terrell McGee wielded a gun and, with others, robbed a grocery store and a gas 

station. His coconspirators shot bystanders during both robberies. The government 

charged McGee with two counts each of conspiracy to commit robbery, 18 U.S.C. 

§ 1951(a), robbery, id., and discharging a firearm during a crime of violence, 

id. § 924(c)(1)(A)(iii), (C)(i). McGee pleaded guilty under the terms of a plea agreement. 

The district court sentenced McGee to 300 months in prison, a term below the 

Sentencing Guidelines range of 483 to 498 months. McGee filed a notice of appeal, but 

his counsel tells us that the appeal is frivolous, and he moves to withdraw. See Anders v. 

California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967). McGee has not responded to counsel’s motion. See CIR.

R. 51(b). Counsel’s brief explains the nature of the case and addresses the issues that an 

appeal of this kind might be expected to involve. Because counsel’s analysis appears 

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION 

To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 
No. 17-2904 Page 2 

thorough, we limit our review to the topics he discusses. See United States v. Bey, 

748 F.3d 774, 776 (7th Cir. 2014). 

 Counsel first considers whether McGee could challenge the adequacy of his plea 

colloquy. Counsel should not have explored this option unless he first advised McGee 

of the risks and benefits of bringing the challenge and confirmed with McGee that he 

wants to withdraw his guilty plea. See United States v. Konczak, 683 F.3d 348, 349 

(7th Cir. 2012); United States v. Knox, 287 F.3d 667, 671 (7th Cir. 2002). Counsel does not 

say whether he did. 

Still, we agree with counsel that it would be frivolous to argue that the court 

failed to substantially comply with Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(b) when 

accepting McGee’s plea. See Konczak, 683 F.3d at 349. For example, the court ensured 

that there was an adequate factual basis of the plea and that McGee understood the 

charges against him, the trial rights he was forgoing, the terms of the plea deal, and the 

possible punishment. True, after the court pronounced McGee’s sentence, McGee said 

that he had expected a larger reduction in the Sentencing Guidelines range for 

cooperating with the government and that he “fe[lt] like that should have been further 

explained.” But McGee said at his plea hearing that he was satisfied with his counsel’s 

representation and that he had had a “sufficient chance and opportunity” to review the 

terms of the agreement with counsel. 

Relatedly, counsel discusses the court’s denial of McGee’s post-judgment motion 

to withdraw his guilty plea. Counsel correctly concludes that it would be frivolous to 

challenge that decision because a defendant may not withdraw a guilty plea in the 

district court after the sentence is imposed. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(e). 

 Counsel next contemplates challenging the procedural or substantive 

reasonableness of McGee’s sentence, and he rightly declines to do so. In his plea 

agreement, McGee waived his right to appeal his sentence unless it was longer than the 

court-determined Guidelines range; his 300-month sentence is far shorter than the low 

end of that range. Because no constitutional exceptions to the appeal waiver apply, we 

would enforce it. See United States v. Campbell, 813 F.3d 1016, 1018 (7th Cir. 2016); United 

States v. Adkins, 743 F.3d 176, 192–93 (7th Cir. 2014). Therefore, a challenge to McGee’s 

sentence would be frivolous as well. 

 Counsel raises two final matters. First, he discusses a letter that McGee sent to 

the district court after he was sentenced, in which he stated that his constitutional rights 

were being violated and that he was “being deprived of life and liberty without due 
No. 17-2904 Page 3 

process of law.” As counsel points out, McGee seems to be seeking collateral relief, 

which the plea agreement bars with limited exceptions. Second, because the 

agreement’s bar on collateral attacks does not apply to the challenge, counsel considers 

arguing that McGee received ineffective assistance of counsel. But counsel 

appropriately concludes that any claim of ineffective assistance of counsel would be 

best saved for a collateral proceeding so that McGee may develop a more thorough 

evidentiary record. Massaro v. United States, 538 U.S. 500, 508–09 (2003); Delatorre v. 

United States, 847 F.3d 837, 844–45 (7th Cir. 2017). 

 Accordingly, we GRANT counsel’s motion to withdraw and DISMISS the appeal.