IN THE SUPREME COURT OF 

CALIFORNIA

BRIANNA MCKEE HAGGERTY,

Plaintiff and Appellant,

v.

NANCY F. THORNTON et al.,

Defendants and Respondents.

S271483

Fourth Appellate District, Division One

D078049

San Diego County Superior Court

37-2019-00028694-PR-TR-CTL

February 8, 2024

Justice Liu authored the opinion of the Court, in which Acting 

Chief Justice Kruger and Justices Corrigan, Groban, Jenkins, 

Evans, and Poochigian

*

concurred.

* Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate 

District, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, 

section 6 of the California Constitution.
1

HAGGERTY v. THORNTON

S271483

Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.

This case concerns the methods for modifying a revocable 

trust. Section 15402 of the Probate Code states that “[u]nless 

the trust instrument provides otherwise, . . . the settlor may 

modify the trust by the procedure for revocation.” (Prob. Code, 

§ 15402; all undesignated statutory references are to this code.)

Section 15401 sets out the procedures for revocation: Trusts 

may be revoked by complying with any method provided in the 

trust instrument. (§ 15401, subd. (a)(1).) If the trust 

instrument explicitly makes that method exclusive, then the 

trust may be revoked only in that manner. (§ 15401, 

subd. (a)(2).) If not, then the trust may also be revoked by the 

statutory method — “a writing, other than a will, signed by the 

settlor or any other person holding the power of revocation and 

delivered to the trustee during the lifetime of the settlor or the 

person holding the power of revocation.” (Ibid.) 

It is undisputed that if the trust instrument is silent on 

modification, the trust may be modified in the same manner in 

which it could be revoked, either via the statutory method or via 

any revocation method provided in the trust instrument. In this 

case, we consider the circumstances under which the statutory 

method is available for modification if the trust instrument 

specifies a method for modification. We hold that under section 

15402, a trust may be modified via the section 15401 procedures 

for revocation, including the statutory method, unless the trust 

instrument provides a method of modification and explicitly 
HAGGERTY v. THORNTON

Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.

2

makes it exclusive, or otherwise expressly precludes the use of 

revocation procedures for modification.

I.

Brianna McKee Haggerty appeals an order of the probate 

court finding a trust agreement was validly amended, thereby 

excluding her from distribution. Haggerty’s aunt, Jeane M. 

Bertsch, created a trust in 2015. The trust agreement included 

a provision reserving “[t]he right by an acknowledged 

instrument in writing to revoke or amend this Agreement or any 

trust hereunder.” In 2016, Bertsch drafted an amendment 

providing for a distribution to Haggerty. The amendment was 

signed by Bertsch and notarized.

In 2018, Bertsch drafted an amendment providing that half 

of her assets would go to various beneficiaries upon her death, 

including the Union of Concerned Scientists, Patricia Galligan,

and Racquel Kolsrud, who are respondents in this case. 

Haggerty was not listed as one of the beneficiaries. The 2018 

amendment was signed by Bertsch but not notarized. Thus, the 

2018 amendment was compliant with the statutory method but 

not with the method of modification specified in the trust 

instrument. 

After Bertsch’s death, Haggerty filed a petition to 

determine the validity of the 2018 amendment. Haggerty 

argued that the amendment does not qualify as an 

“acknowledged instrument” because it was not notarized and 

therefore was not modified pursuant to the method of 

modification specified in the trust instrument. In a minute 

order, the probate court held that the 2018 amendment was 

valid.
HAGGERTY v. THORNTON

Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.

3

The Court of Appeal affirmed, holding that Bertsch’s 2018 

amendment was a valid modification pursuant to the statutory 

method. (Haggerty v. Thornton (2021) 68 Cal.App.5th 1003, 

1012 (Haggerty); see §§ 15401, subd. (a)(2), 15402.) The court 

concluded that the statutory method was available for 

modification because Bertsch’s trust agreement “does not 

distinguish between revocation and modification” and because 

“the method of revocation and modification described in the 

trust agreement is not explicitly exclusive.” (Haggerty, at 

p. 1012.)

We granted review to resolve a split of authority regarding 

the circumstances under which the statutory method is 

available for modification when a method of modification is 

specified in the trust instrument.

II.

Assembly Bill No. 2652 (1985–1986 Reg. Sess.) enacted 

sections 15401 and 15402 in 1986 as part of a general 

reorganization of trust laws recommended by the California 

Law Revision Commission (Commission). (See Huscher v. Wells 

Fargo Bank (2004) 121 Cal.App.4th 956, 960, fn. 2 (Huscher); 

Recommendation Proposing the Trust Law (Dec. 1985) 18 Cal. 

Law Revision Com. Rep. (1986) pp. 567–569 (Recommendation 

Proposing the Trust Law).) Revocation was previously governed 

by Civil Code former section 2280. (Huscher, at p. 961.) No 

statute specifically addressed modification. Rather, courts held 

that, in general, the power of revocation implied the power of 

modification, and they applied the rules governing trust 

revocation to trust modification. (Id., at p. 962, fn. 5; see Estate 

of Lindstrom (1987) 191 Cal.App.3d 375, 385, fn. 11 

[“[R]evocation and amendment are fungible. ‘The unrestricted 
HAGGERTY v. THORNTON

Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.

4

power to revoke implies a power to amend without revoking; i.e., 

it is unnecessary for the trustor to take the circuitous steps of 

complete revocation and creation of a new trust with the desired 

changes.’ ”].)

Since 1986, two separate statutory provisions have 

governed trust revocation and modification. Section 15401

governs the procedures for revocation. Under this provision, a 

revocable trust “may be revoked in whole or in part by any of the 

following methods: [¶] (1) By compliance with any method of 

revocation provided in the trust instrument. [¶] (2) By a writing, 

other than a will, signed by the settlor or any other person 

holding the power of revocation and delivered to the trustee 

during the lifetime of the settlor or the person holding the power 

of revocation.” (§ 15401, subd. (a)(1)–(2).) We will refer to the

second method as the statutory method. Section 15401 further 

provides: “If the trust instrument explicitly makes the method 

of revocation provided in the trust instrument the exclusive 

method of revocation, the trust may not be revoked pursuant to 

[the statutory method].” (§ 15401, subd. (a)(2).) 

Section 15402 governs the procedures for modification. It 

provides: “Unless the trust instrument provides otherwise, if a 

trust is revocable by the settlor, the settlor may modify the trust 

by the procedure for revocation.” (§ 15402.) “Thus, if the trust 

instrument is silent on modification, the trust may be modified 

in the same manner in which it could be revoked,” either via the 

statutory method or via the revocation method provided in the 

trust instrument. (King v. Lynch (2012) 204 Cal.App.4th 1186, 

1192 (King); accord, Diaz v. Zuniga (2023) 91 Cal.App.5th 916, 

922 (Diaz); Balistreri v. Balistreri (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 511, 

516 (Balistreri); Pena v. Dey (2019) 39 Cal.App.5th 546 (Pena).) 

But a revocable trust may not be modified “by the procedure for 
HAGGERTY v. THORNTON

Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.

5

revocation” where the trust instrument “provides otherwise.” 

(§ 15402.) This case turns on the meaning of “provides 

otherwise.” 

The Courts of Appeal have put forward three 

interpretations. One interpretation, advanced by King, is that 

“ ‘[u]nless the trust instrument provides otherwise’ indicates 

that if any modification method is specified in the trust, that 

method must be used to amend the trust.” (King, supra, 204 

Cal.App.4th at p. 1193; accord, Diaz, supra, 91 Cal.App.5th at 

p. 924 [following King]; Balistreri, supra, 75 Cal.App.5th at 

p. 518 [same]; Pena, supra, 39 Cal.App.5th at p. 552 [same]; see 

also Conservatorship of Irvine (1995) 40 Cal.App.4th 1334, 1334

(Irvine). ) A second interpretation, put forward by Huscher and 

adopted by the King dissent and by the Court of Appeal in this 

case, is that “unless the trust instrument provides otherwise” 

means “unless the trust provides a modification procedure and 

explicitly makes that method exclusive.” (Huscher, supra,

121 Cal.App.4th at p. 967; see Haggerty, supra, 68 Cal.App.5th 

at p. 1012; King, at p. 1197 (dis. opn. of Detjen, J.).) The Court 

of Appeal here also advanced a third interpretation: that 

“ ‘[u]nless the trust instrument provides otherwise’ ” also means

“unless the trust instrument distinguishes between revocation 

and modification.” (Haggerty, at p. 1011.)

A.

To resolve this issue, we begin with the text of section 

15402. As noted, the phrase “[u]nless the trust instrument 

provides otherwise” qualifies the provision that follows it, i.e., 

that the settlor of a revocable trust “may modify the trust by the 

procedure for revocation.” (§ 15402.) The most natural reading 

of this sentence is that the settlor may modify the trust using 
HAGGERTY v. THORNTON

Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.

6

any procedure for revocation unless the trust instrument says 

that the settlor may not (i.e., “provides otherwise”). This is 

supported by the plain meaning of the term “otherwise.” (See, 

e.g., Marx v. General Revenue Corp. (2013) 568 U.S. 371, 377 [“A 

statute ‘provides otherwise’ than Rule 54(d)(1) if it is ‘contrary’ 

to the Rule.”].) A trust term would be contrary to the 

authorization provided in section 15402 if it were to preclude the 

use of any of the section 15401 revocation procedures for 

modification. It could do so by specifying an exclusive method 

of modification in the trust instrument (Haggerty, supra, 68 

Cal.App.5th at p. 1012; King, 204 Cal.App.4th at p. 1196 (dis. 

opn. of Detjen, J.); Huscher, supra, 121 Cal.App.4th at p. 967) or

by otherwise precluding modification via the revocation 

procedures provided in section 15401. But a trust instrument 

that merely specifies a method of modification without limiting 

settlors to the use of that method does not preclude the use of 

the revocation procedures and therefore does not “provide[]

otherwise” from the general rule. (§ 15402.)

This interpretation is consistent with the Third 

Restatement of Trust Laws. (See Estate of Giraldin (2012) 55 

Cal.4th 1058, 1072 [“California courts have considered the 

Restatement of Trusts in interpreting California trust law.”].) 

The Restatement provides: “If the terms of the trust reserve to 

the settlor a power to . . . amend the trust exclusively by a 

particular procedure, the settlor can exercise the power only by 

substantial compliance with the method prescribed.” (Rest.3d 

Trusts, § 63, com. i.) However, if “the terms of the trust provide 

a method for . . . amendment” but “do not make that method 

exclusive, . . . the settlor’s [modification] power can be exercised 

either in the specified manner or by a method [that is available 
HAGGERTY v. THORNTON

Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.

7

when no modification method is specified in the trust 

instrument].” (Id., § 63, com. i; id., § 63, com. h.)

In this case, the Court of Appeal held that a trust 

instrument may preclude the use of revocation procedures for 

modification by “distinguish[ing] between revocation and 

modification.” (Haggerty, supra, 68 Cal.App.5th at p. 1011.) On 

this view, by treating revocation and modification differently —

such as by specifying different procedures for revocation and 

modification or by specifying a method for modification but not 

for revocation — the settlor “provides otherwise” from the 

general rule that a settlor “may modify the trust by the 

procedure for revocation.” (§ 15402.) The court reasoned that 

distinguishing between revocation and modification is 

“ ‘ “contrary” ’ ” to the general rule that the method of 

modification is the same as the method of revocation. (Haggerty, 

at p. 1011.) 

In King, the court held that a trust instrument “provides 

otherwise” from the general rule if any modification method is 

specified in the trust, regardless of whether that method is made 

exclusive. (King, supra, 204 Cal.App.4th at p. 1193; accord,

Diaz, supra, 91 Cal.App.5th at p. 924; Balistreri, supra, 75 

Cal.App.5th at p. 518; Pena, supra, 39 Cal.App.5th at p. 552.) 

“[W]hen the Legislature enacted sections 15401 and 15402, it 

differentiated between trust revocations and modifications. 

This indicates that the Legislature no longer intended the same 

rules to apply to both revocation and modification. [¶] If we were 

to . . . hold that a trust may be modified by the revocation 

procedures set forth in section 15401 unless the trust explicitly 

provides that the stated modification method is exclusive, 

section 15402 would become surplusage. Rather than enacting 

section 15402, the Legislature could have combined revocation 
HAGGERTY v. THORNTON

Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.

8

and modification into one statute. Moreover, . . . the Legislature 

knew how to limit the exclusivity of a revocation method 

provided in a trust and chose not to impose such a limitation on 

modifications in section 15402.” (King, at p. 1193.)

B.

Despite this natural reading of the word “otherwise,” 

several Courts of Appeal have interpreted section 15402 

differently. Even if the text is susceptible to more than one 

reasonable construction, legislative history supports the 

interpretation above. The Legislature intended section 15402 to 

codify the preexisting rule that the power of revocation implies 

the power of modification and to expand the availability of the 

statutory method for both revocation and modification.

Assembly Bill No. 2652 (1985–1986 Reg. Sess.) was

enacted “to effectuate recommendations of the California Law 

Revision Commission.” (Exec. Sect. John H. DeMoully, letter to 

Chief Clerk James D. Driscoll (May 2, 1986) 4 Assem. J. (1985–

1986 Reg. Sess.) p. 7308.) The Legislature thus relied on the 

intent and commentary of the Commission in passing the bill. 

(See e.g., Sen. Com. on Judiciary, Analysis of Assem. Bill No. 

2652 (1985–1986 Reg. Sess.) as amended June 10, 1986, p. 7

[describing the “[n]eed for legislation” in terms of what “[t]he 

Commission believes” (underscoring omitted)]; ibid. [“This bill 

is a result of extensive study and recommendations by the 

California [L]aw Revision Commission.”].)

In explaining its decision to recommend codifying section 

15402, the Commission said: “Under general principles the 

settlor, or other person holding the power to revoke, may modify 

as well as terminate a revocable trust. [Fn. omitted.] The 

proposed law codifies this rule and also makes clear that the 
HAGGERTY v. THORNTON

Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.

9

method of modification is the same as the method of 

termination, barring a contrary provision in the trust.” 

(Recommendation Proposing the Trust Law, supra, at p. 568; 

see also id. at p. 636 [“Power to revoke includes power to modify”

(boldface omitted)]; ibid. [“Section 15402 . . . codifies the general 

rule that a power of revocation implies the power of 

modification”].) The Commission’s commentary makes clear 

that section 15402 was enacted to codify the preexisting rule 

that the power of revocation includes the power of modification, 

and thus an available method of revocation is also an available 

method of modification unless a trust term precludes the use of 

any method of revocation for modification. (Recommendation

Proposing the Trust Law, at p. 568.) Section 15402 was not 

added, as King contends, to establish a different rule from 

section 15401. (King, supra, 204 Cal.App.4th at p. 1193.) 

Nothing in the Commission’s statements proposed treating

modification differently from revocation or changing the 

preexisting rule. In fact, all of the Commission’s statements 

about modification indicate that modification should be 

governed by the procedures for revocation unless the settlor 

makes clear an intention to establish a different rule.

King contends that if section 15402 merely incorporated 

the procedures of section 15401 for modifications, then section 

15402 would be surplusage. (King, supra, 204 Cal.App.4th at 

p. 1193.) But the Legislature had reason to accept the 

Commission’s recommendation and codify the common law rule 

that revocation procedures can be used for modification. An 

appellate court had expressed uncertainty about the legal 

underpinnings of the rule. (See Heifetz v. Bank of America

(1957) 147 Cal.App.2d 776, 781 [“ ‘Does power to revoke include 

power to amend? It has been held that it does not where the 
HAGGERTY v. THORNTON

Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.

10

only power reserved is to revoke the trust in its entirety. Where 

the terms of the trust are less explicit, the answer is more 

doubtful. The Restatement [of Trusts] (§ 331[, com.] g) is 

favorable to the view that the power to amend is included in the 

power to revoke. The authorities upon the point do not seem to 

be numerous. As a practical proposition, the principle referred 

to, if it exists, is too uncertain, too dependent on language 

furnishing only disputable evidence of intent, to provide a safe 

working rule.’ ”].) In the Commission’s reports recommending 

that the Legislature enact section 15402, it cited Heifetz, 

suggesting that the legal uncertainty Heifetz identified may 

have contributed to its decision to recommend formalizing the 

common law rule. (See, e.g., Recommendation Proposing the 

Trust Law, supra, at pp. 568, fn. 253, 636.) 

A later amendment to section 15401 underscores that the 

Legislature intended revocation procedures to govern 

modification. In 1988, in response to a proposal by the 

Commission, the Legislature enacted a change to what is now 

subdivision (c) of section 15401 relating to attorneys in fact. The 

relevant statutory provision previously stated that “[a] trust 

may not be revoked by an attorney.” (Stats. 1986, ch. 820, § 40, 

p. 2756, italics added.) The Legislature amended the statute to 

state that “[a] trust may not be modified or revoked by an 

attorney.” (Stats. 1988, ch. 113, § 19, p. 481, italics added.) In 

proposing this change, the Commission explained that its goal 

was “to make clear that the rule applicable to revocation by an 

attorney in fact applies to modification,” which “is consistent 

with the rule provided in section 15402.” (Recommendations 

Relating to Probate Law (Dec. 1987) 19 Cal. Law Revision Com. 

Rep. (1988) p. 1097.) There is no evidence that the Legislature 

intended to depart from this goal in enacting the amendment.
HAGGERTY v. THORNTON

Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.

11

It is also relevant that the Commission proposed to make 

the statutory method more readily available for modification 

and revocation. The Commission repeatedly indicated that the 

power of revocation historically has implied the power of 

modification and that the Commission’s intention was to codify 

that rule. (See, e.g., Recommendation Proposing the Trust Law, 

supra, at pp. 568, 636.) Further, the Commission expressly 

stated its goal of expanding the availability of the statutory 

method for revocation. (Id., at p. 568.) These statements 

suggest that the Commission and, in turn, the Legislature

intended to expand the availability of the statutory method not 

solely for revocation but also for modification, a process that the 

Commission viewed as implicit in the power of revocation. 

In explaining its proposal to expand the availability of the 

statutory method, the Commission said that under Civil Code 

former section 2280, “California courts generally . . . held that 

where the trust instrument prescribes a method of revocation, 

the prescribed procedure must be followed rather than the 

statutory method. [Fn. omitted.] This rule [was] defended on 

the grounds that the settlor may wish to establish a more 

complicated manner of revocation than that provided by statute 

where there is a concern about ‘future senility or future undue 

influence while in a weakened condition.’ ” (Recommendation 

Proposing the Trust Law, supra, at pp. 567–568.) However, the 

Commission pointed out, this prior “rule may be criticized as 

defeating the clear intention of the settlor who attempts to 

revoke a revocable trust by the statutory method, in 

circumstances that do not involve undue influence or a lack of 

capacity. In fact, the settlor may have forgotten about the 

method provided in the trust, or may not be aware of the caselaw rule [that prescribing another procedure in the trust 
HAGGERTY v. THORNTON

Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.

12

instrument would displace the statutory method].” (Id., at 

p. 568.) 

Taking these competing concerns into account, the 

Commission proposed section 15401, subdivision (a)(2), which 

was adopted by the Legislature to prioritize the availability of 

the statutory method while allowing settlors to bind themselves 

to more onerous procedures if they desire. The Commission 

explained, “The proposed law adopts a compromise position that 

makes available the statutory method of revoking by delivery of 

a written instrument to the trustee during the settlor’s lifetime 

except where the trust instrument explicitly makes exclusive 

the method of revocation specified in the trust. This allows a 

settlor to establish a more protective revocation scheme, but also 

honors the settlor’s intention where the intent to make the 

scheme exclusive is not expressed in the trust instrument.” 

(Recommendation Proposing the Trust Law, supra, at p. 568.) 

The Court of Appeal in this case said that a trust 

instrument precludes the use of revocation procedures for 

modification when it “distinguishes between revocation and 

modification.” (Haggerty, supra, 68 Cal.App.5th at p. 1011.) 

However, the mere fact that a trust instrument distinguishes 

between modification and revocation by authorizing certain 

procedures for revocation and other procedures for modification 

does not suffice to preclude the use of revocation procedures for 

modification. The legislative history supports the view that the 

settlor may modify the trust using any procedure for revocation 

unless the trust instrument says the settlor may not. If a trust 

were to provide that it “may only be modified by an 

acknowledged instrument in writing,” then the trust would 

preclude modification via any different method of revocation, 

including the statutory method, regardless of whether the trust 
HAGGERTY v. THORNTON

Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.

13

distinguishes between revocation and modification. But if a 

trust were to simply provide that it “may be modified by an 

acknowledged instrument in writing,” then the trust would not 

preclude modification via any method of revocation, again 

regardless of whether the trust treats modification and 

revocation differently.

In sum, legislative history supports the view that the 

statutory method is available for modification unless the trust 

instrument “provides otherwise” by expressly precluding it or by 

explicitly making a different procedure exclusive.

C.

Haggerty and amicus curiae argue that policy reasons 

support making modification more difficult than revocation. 

According to Haggerty, “[t]he Legislature had reason to make 

modification presumptively more difficult than revocation. An 

unscrupulous caretaker or counsel cannot usurp an elder’s 

assets by inducing her to revoke the trust, because intestacy 

laws would keep the estate within the family. Only if the trustor 

modified the trust and selected a different beneficiary could the 

usurper take her assets.” But, as respondents note, treating 

modification more restrictively than revocation is not 

necessarily more protective of settlors: “The [undue] influencer 

could induce the settlor to simply revoke the trust and create a 

new one, which has the same effect as modifying the trust. And 

even without either revocation or modification, an influencer 

can induce a settlor to transfer assets out of the trust and into 

the influencer’s control.” Further, the influencer may well “be a 

family member who would inherit if the trust is revoked.” 

In any event, although there are reasons why the

Legislature could have decided to treat modification more 
HAGGERTY v. THORNTON

Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.

14

restrictively, the question here is what policy choices the 

Legislature actually made, not what choices it reasonably could 

have made. As noted (ante, at pp. 11–12), the Commission 

considered the policy concern that more restrictive procedures 

for revocation and modification might better protect settlors 

from undue influence. After weighing the various policy 

considerations, it proposed a “compromise position” that 

preferences the availability of the statutory method unless the 

settlor explicitly binds himself or herself to a different rule. 

(Recommendation Proposing the Trust Law, supra, at p. 568.) 

We presume that when the Legislature adopted this proposal, it 

was mindful of existing protections against the dangers raised 

by Haggerty and amicus curiae, including the tort principles of 

undue influence and fraud. (See, e.g., Tuolumne Jobs & Small 

Business Alliance v. Superior Court (2014) 59 Cal.4th 1029, 1039 

[“ ‘The Legislature is presumed to be aware of all laws in 

existence when it passes or amends a statute.’ ”].)

Alternative policy arguments regarding whether 

modifications should be treated more restrictively than 

revocations are best directed to the Legislature, which may 

amend the trust laws if it chooses. Our task is to give effect to 

the statute as we find it. Under the statute, the procedures for 

revocation can be used for modification unless the trust 

instrument provides a method of modification and makes it 

exclusive, or otherwise expressly precludes the use of revocation 

procedures for modification. We disapprove King v. Lynch, 

supra, 204 Cal.App.4th 1186; Balistreri v. Balistreri, supra, 75 

Cal.App.5th 511; Diaz v. Zuniga, supra, 91 Cal.App.5th 916;

Pena v. Dey, supra, 39 Cal.App.5th 546; Conservatorship of 

Irvine, supra, 40 Cal.App.4th 1334; and Haggerty v. Thornton, 
HAGGERTY v. THORNTON

Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.

15

supra, 68 Cal.App.5th 1003, to the extent that they are 

inconsistent with this holding.

Finally, Haggerty argues that our decision should apply 

only prospectively and that King should control this case

because “it was the prevailing law when Ms. Bertsch devised her 

trust.” But the court below was “ ‘not bound by an opinion of 

another District Court of Appeal.’ ” (People v. Kim (2011) 193 

Cal.App.4th 836, 847.) Moreover, “ ‘judicial construction of a 

statute is an authoritative statement of what the statute meant 

before as well as after the decision of the case giving rise to that 

construction.’ ” (Vazquez v. Jan-Pro Franchising Internat., Inc. 

(2021) 10 Cal.5th 944, 951, quoting Rivers v. Roadway Express, 

Inc. (1994) 511 U.S. 298, 312–313). This rule generally applies 

absent narrow exceptions based on fairness and public policy. 

(Ferra v. Loews Hollywood Hotel, LLC (2021) 11 Cal.5th 858, 

878.) Haggerty does not argue that any of those exceptions 

apply here, and we see no reason to depart from the usual rule.
HAGGERTY v. THORNTON

Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.

16

CONCLUSION

We affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeal and 

remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this 

opinion.

LIU, J.

We Concur:

KRUGER, Acting C. J.

CORRIGAN, J.

GROBAN, J.

JENKINS, J.

EVANS, J.

POOCHIGIAN, J.*

* Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate 

District, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, 

section 6 of the California Constitution.
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who 

argued in Supreme Court.

Name of Opinion Haggerty v. Thornton

__________________________________________________________ 

Procedural Posture (see XX below)

Original Appeal

Original Proceeding

Review Granted (published) XX 68 Cal.App.5th 1003

Review Granted (unpublished) 

Rehearing Granted

__________________________________________________________ 

Opinion No. S271483

Date Filed: February 8, 2024

__________________________________________________________ 

Court: Superior

County: San Diego

Judge: Julia Craig Kelety

__________________________________________________________ 

Counsel:

Blut Law Group, Elliot S. Blut; Keiter Appellate Law and Mitchell 

Keiter for Plaintiff and Appellant.

Ragghianti Freitas and Paul B. Gruwell for Sal J. Balistreri as Amicus 

Curiae on behalf of Plaintiff and Appellant.

Artiano Shinoff, Howard A. Kipnis, Steven J. Barnes; Spero Law Office 

and Leah Spero for Defendant and Respondent Patricia Galligan.

Cross Law and Oleg Cross for Defendant and Respondent Racquel 

Kolsrud.

Higgs Fletcher & Mack, John Morris, Roland H. Achtel, Scott J. Ingold 

and Rachel M. Garrard for Defendant and Respondent Union of 

Concerned Scientists.
No appearance for Defendants and Respondents San Diego Humane 

Society, Nancy F. Thornton, Jill Bousman, George Bousman, Jack 

Hebert, Larry Guentherman, Gail Spielman and Dean Spielman.

Hartog, Baer, Zabronsky & Verriere, David W. Baer and Kevin P. 

O’Brien for Mary A. Nivala Balistreri as Amicus Curiae on behalf of 

Defendants and Respondents.
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for 

publication with opinion): 

Mitchell Keiter

Keiter Appellate Law

424 South Beverly Drive

Beverly Hills, CA 90212

(310) 553-8533, ext. 145

Leah Spero

Spero Law Office

255 Kansas Street, Suite 340

San Francisco, CA 94103

(415) 565-9600

Roland H. Achtel

Higgs Fletcher & Mack LLP

401 West A Street, Suite 2600

San Diego, CA 92101

(619) 236-1551