IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Gilbert M. Martinez, :

Appellant :

:

v. : No. 1615 C.D. 2018

: SUBMITTED: April 12, 2019

Tax Claims Bureau, Director Stacy :

Phile, in her Individual Capacity, the :

Treasurer Dennis Adams, in his :

Individual and Official Capacity and :

Berks County Assessment Office :

OPINION NOT REPORTED

MEMORANDUM OPINION

PER CURIAM FILED: August 13, 2019

Gilbert Martinez (Taxpayer) appeals pro se from the November 1, 2018 order 

of the Court of Common Pleas of Berks County (Trial Court) which sustained the 

Preliminary Objection (PO) of the Berks County (County) Tax Claims Bureau 

(Bureau), Stacy Phile, Director of the Bureau (Bureau Director), in her individual 

capacity, County Treasurer Dennis Adams (Treasurer), in his official and individual 

capacity, and the County Assessment Office (CAO) (collectively Appellees), and 

dismissed Taxpayer’s complaint with prejudice. Taxpayer raises the following 

issues on appeal: 1) the Trial Court abused its discretion in sustaining Appellees’ PO

and dismissing Taxpayer’s complaint with prejudice; 2) the Trial Court abused its 

discretion when it failed to dispose of Taxpayer’s motions for injunctive relief and 

summary judgment; 3) the Trial Court abused its discretion in denying Taxpayer’s 

motion for recusal; 4) Appellees’ PO was untimely filed; and 5) the Trial Court’s 

opinion was untimely filed. After careful review, we affirm the Trial Court.
2

I. Background

Taxpayer is the owner of real property located at 1706 Cotton Street, Reading, 

Berks County, Pennsylvania (the Property). Original Record (O.R.), Item No. 10. 

On April 10, 2018, Taxpayer initiated a civil action naming Appellees as defendants 

and alleging they impermissibly denied his multiple requests for an exemption from 

the payment of property taxes related to the Property. O.R., Item No. 1. Taxpayer 

avers that on the basis of poverty and disability,1 he is entitled to a property tax 

exemption under Article VIII, Section 2(b)(ii) of the Pennsylvania Constitution,2

Section 301.1(b) of The Local Tax Enabling Act (LTEA),3 and Section 304(d)(1) of 

the Tax Reform Code of 1971 (TRC).4 Compl. ¶¶ 28-30, 32.

We summarize Taxpayer’s pleading as follows. In November 2015, Taxpayer 

contacted the Bureau seeking relief from the payment of unpaid property taxes owed 

as “as a result of governmental wrongdoings.” Compl. ¶ 4. The Bureau Director 

informed Taxpayer that exemptions were not permitted on the basis of disability or 

poverty. Id., ¶ 5. Taxpayer was presented with the option of paying the taxes due 

through a standard payment plan or by means of a hardship program which would 

 

1 The nature of Taxpayer’s disability is not identified in the original record filed with this 

Court.

2 Article VIII, Section 2(b)(ii) of the Pennsylvania Constitution relevantly provides that the 

General Assembly may grant tax exempt status to persons for reasons of disability or poverty. Pa. 

Const. art. VIII, § 2(b)(ii).

3 Act of December 31, 1965, P.L. 1257, as amended, 53 P.S. § 6924.301.1(b). Section 

301.1(b) of the LTEA provides that a local taxing authority may exempt any person whose income 

is less than $12,000 annually from the per capita or similar head tax, occupation tax, or earned 

income tax. 

4 Act of March 4, 1971, P.L. 6, as amended, added by the Act of March 13, 1974, P.L. 179, 

72 P.S. § 7304(d)(1). Section 304(d)(1) of the TRC provides that an individual whose annual 

income is less than $6,500 is entitled to a refund of personal income tax paid.
3

spread his payments over a 24-month period. Id., ¶ 7. As a result of the Bureau 

Director’s alleged deceptive and misleading statements with regard to Taxpayer’s 

entitlement to a tax exemption, Taxpayer was “maliciously forced” into the hardship 

program and payments made by him pursuant to that program deprived Taxpayer 

and his dependent of the “bare necessities of life.” Compl. ¶¶ 6, 8-10.

In a March 23, 2018 notice from the Bureau, Taxpayer was warned that his 

failure to pay property taxes would result in the sale of the Property without 

Taxpayer’s consent. Compl. ¶ 21. Thereafter, citing an inability to pay his property

taxes caused by “tyrannical acts” of the federal government, Taxpayer filed with the 

Bureau an application for a tax refund, tax exemption, and tax forgiveness. Compl. 

¶ 14. The Treasurer rejected this application without explanation. Id., ¶ 16.

In April 2018, Taxpayer submitted a tax exemption application to the CAO.

Compl. ¶ 24. The CAO required payment of a $100 filing fee. Id., ¶ 25. The CAO’s 

failure to waive payment of the filing fee constituted “condescending misconduct 

and discriminative practices” which prevented Taxpayer from exercising his 

appellate rights. Id., ¶¶ 26-28.

On the basis of these averments, Taxpayer asserted three separate counts for 

violations of the Pennsylvania Constitution, the LTEA, and the TRC, as well as the 
4

Sixth,5 Seventh,6 Eighth,7 Ninth,8 and Fourteenth9 Amendments to the United States 

Constitution, and Sections 8430, 8431, and 8434 of the Local Taxpayers Bill of 

Rights Act (LTBRA).

10

 Id., ¶¶ 28-32, 38-35. Additionally, Taxpayer asserted a 

cause of action against Appellees for conspiracy to violate his rights under Sections 

1981 and 1983 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Civil Rights Act)11 and 42 U.S.C. § 

2000e,12 all in contravention of 18 U.S.C. §§ 241-42.

13 Id., ¶¶ 34-37. Taxpayer 

requested total punitive damages in the amount of $300,000 and a refund of property

taxes paid in the years 2015-18. Id. ¶¶ (a)-(c), (h). Taxpayer further sought a 

 

5 U.S. Const. amend. VI. The Sixth Amendment guarantees certain rights and protections, 

such as the right to trial by jury and the assistance of counsel, to an individual charged with a 

crime. 

6 U.S. Const. amend. VII. The Seventh Amendment extends the right to trial by jury to 

federal civil actions. 

7 U.S. Const. amend. VIII. The Eighth Amendment prohibits excessive bail. 

8 U.S. Const. amend. IX. The Ninth Amendment provides that individuals have other rights 

not enumerated in the United States Constitution. 

9 U.S. Const. amend. XIV. The Fourteenth Amendment in relevant part provides that no 

state shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. 

10 53 Pa.C.S. §§ 8430, 8431, 8434. These statutory provisions generally establish the 

administrative tax appeals process and deadlines for the filing of petitions related to tax appeals. 

11 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983.

12 42 U.S.C. § 2000e contains definitions for the Equal Employment Opportunities Act

(EEOA). 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e – 2000e-17.

13 18 U.S.C. § 241 makes it an offense to conspire to injure, oppress, threaten, or intimidate 

any person in the free exercise of any rights guaranteed under the United States Constitution or the

laws of the United States. 18 U.S.C. § 242 prohibits the deprivation of such rights by anyone 

acting under color of law.
5

declaration from the Trial Court that he was exempt from the payment of property

taxes, as well as injunctive relief in the form of a stay of the scheduled upset tax sale 

of the Property, and a demand that the Trial Court “[enjoin] [Appellees] from 

continuing to violate [Taxpayer’s] rights and Local tax laws.” Id., ¶¶ (e)-(g).

Concurrent with his civil complaint, Taxpayer filed a motion for injunctive 

relief in which he alleged that, by denying his right to a property tax exemption, 

Appellees interfered with his “employment rights, right to [S]ocial Security 

disability, and right to cash assistance through the department of public welfare 

program for disabled persons.” O.R., Item No. 1 at 1. On the basis of these alleged 

acts by Appellees, and Taxpayer’s self-proclaimed poverty status, Taxpayer 

reiterated his demand that the Trial Court declare him exempt from the payment of 

property taxes and order a refund of any taxes paid in the years 2015-18. Id. at 5.

By agreement of the parties, the scheduled sale of the Property was stayed by 

order of the Trial Court dated August 23, 2018. O.R., Item No. 10. Service of 

Taxpayer’s complaint was accomplished on September 17, 2018.14 O.R., Item No. 

18, Preliminary Objection, ¶ 4. Thereafter, on October 9, 2018, Appellees filed a 

PO in the nature of a demurrer, asserting Taxpayer’s complaint was legally 

insufficient. Id., ¶13. Appellees likewise objected to Taxpayer’s motion for 

injunctive relief, arguing that Taxpayer failed to establish a right to the relief 

requested. O.R., Item No. 21 at 7. 

Taxpayer filed a “Response to Strike [Appellees’] [PO] Pursuant to Pa.R.C.P. 

[No.] 1029 and Motion for Summary Judgment as a Matter of Law” on October 18, 

2018, arguing that Appellees did not demonstrate how the complaint failed to state 

a cause of action. O.R., Item No. 20. Subsequently, on October 29, 2018, Taxpayer 

 

14 Appellees acknowledge having received notice of the complaint by “informal means” 

prior to the September 17, 2018 date of service. Preliminary Objections, ¶ 2.
6

filed a motion requesting recusal of the Trial Court judge assigned to hear his 

complaint, based on an allegation that the Trial Court judge engaged in ex parte 

communication with the Bureau Director and the County Solicitor and 

“prearranged” the stay of the Property’s scheduled upset tax sale. O.R., Item No.

23, at 4. 

The Trial Court denied the recusal motion on November 1, 2018. Appellees’ 

PO was sustained, and Taxpayer’s complaint dismissed with prejudice, the same 

day. This appeal followed.15 The Trial Court issued its opinion pursuant to 

Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) on February 5, 2019.

II. Issues

Taxpayer raises multiple issues on appeal which may be condensed as 

follows: 1) the Trial Court abused its discretion in dismissing Taxpayer’s complaint

with prejudice and failing to issue findings of fact and conclusions of law in support 

of that decision; 2) the Trial Court abused its discretion in dismissing Taxpayer’s 

complaint before addressing his motions for injunctive relief and summary 

judgment; 3) the Trial Court abused its discretion in denying Taxpayer’s motion for 

recusal; 4) Appellees’ PO should not have been granted as they were untimely filed; 

and 5) the Trial Court’s opinion filed pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) was untimely. 

III. Discussion

A. Waiver

At the outset, we must address whether Taxpayer has waived any of his 

arguments because he has either raised them for the first time on appeal or failed to 

develop them appropriately in his appellate brief. “Issues not raised in the lower 

 

15 When reviewing an order sustaining preliminary objections, our standard of review is de 

novo and scope of review is plenary. Rohner v. Atkinson, 118 A.3d 486, 489 n.4 (Pa. Cmwlth. 

2015).
7

court are waived and cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.” Pa.R.A.P. 302(a). 

Issues raised in a statement of questions presented but not otherwise addressed in 

the argument portion of an appellate brief are also waived. Singer v. Bureau of Prof’l 

and Occupational Affairs, State Bd. of Psychology, 633 A.2d 246, 247 (Pa. Cmwlth. 

1993). Pursuant to Rule 2119(a) of the Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure, 

the arguments in an appellate brief:

shall be divided into as many parts as there are questions 

to be argued; and shall have at the head of each part—in 

distinctive type or in type distinctively displayed—the 

particular point treated therein, followed by such

discussion and citation of authorities as are deemed

pertinent.

Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a) (emphasis added). A court will not consider the merits of an 

argument where the issue is not properly raised and developed in a brief and the brief

is inadequate to present a specific issue for review. Boniella v. Commonwealth, 958 

A.2d 1069, 1072 n.8 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2008). “Mere issue spotting without analysis or 

legal citation to support an assertion precludes our appellate review of [a] matter.” 

Id. (internal citations omitted). Arguments which are not appropriately developed 

are waived. City of Philadelphia v. Berman, 863 A.2d 156, 161 n.11 (Pa. Cmwlth. 

2004). 

1. Pa.R.A.P. 302(a)

Taxpayer asserts in his appellate brief that he has been deprived of the right 

to be represented by an attorney without interference of the state and that Appellees 

have committed “wanton of [sic] acts obstructing and or hindering [his] right to sue 

in court” in violation of the Sixth and Seventh Amendments to the United States 

Constitution. Taxpayer Br. at 15. While Taxpayer purported to raise the Sixth and 

Seventh Amendments in his civil complaint, he merely alleged Appellees took action 
8

in violation of his rights thereunder. Taxpayer made no supporting factual

averments that he was prevented from seeking either legal counsel or redress through 

the courts by means of a jury trial. Having failed to plead those claims before the 

trial court, pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 302(a), Taxpayer has waived them.

Also subject to waiver is Taxpayer’s lengthy argument that his complaint 

sufficiently pleaded facts to support a claim for fraudulent misrepresentation and he 

should be allowed to amend his complaint accordingly. The amendment of 

Taxpayer’s complaint was never an issue before the Trial Court; he raises it for the 

first time here.

16

 Accordingly, it is waived.

Taxpayer’s attempt to introduce a claim for civil conspiracy by means of his 

appellate brief likewise fails. While Taxpayer has correctly cited the elements of 

civil conspiracy in his appellate brief,17 he did not do so in the complaint filed with 

the Trial Court, nor did he plead facts sufficient to establish a claim for civil 

conspiracy.

18

 We conclude that issue is also waived. 

2. Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a)

With regard to the remainder of Taxpayer’s claims under the United States 

Constitution, he has not developed those arguments in his appellate brief. More 

 

16 Even had the issue been raised, Taxpayer’s argument would fail as Taxpayer’s complaint 

categorically fails to set forth either the elements of such a claim or facts to support it. 

17 The elements of a civil conspiracy claim are: 1) a combination of two or more persons 

acting with a common purpose to do an unlawful act or to do a lawful act by unlawful means or 

for an unlawful purpose; 2) an overt act done in furtherance of the common purpose; and 3) actual 

legal damage. Weaver v. Franklin Cty., 918 A.2d 194, 202 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2007).

18 In arguing the elements of civil conspiracy were sufficiently pled in his complaint, 

Taxpayer cites alleged overt acts made by “Ms. Cortes from [t]he Department of Public Welfare” 

and a legal aid attorney who stopped taking Taxpayer’s calls. Taxpayer Br. at 18. Neither 

individual is a party to this action and it is woefully unclear how their actions would be attributable 

to Appellees.
9

specifically, beyond the inclusion of a quote from his civil complaint where he cites 

the Eighth and Ninth Amendments, Taxpayer fails to discuss these issues further. 

While Taxpayer baldly asserts he has been deprived of the bare necessities of life in 

contravention of the Fourteenth Amendment, he fails to allege facts to support that 

assertion. Taxpayer cites no legal authority in furtherance of his arguments and has, 

in all other respects, failed to develop them. Consequently, they are waived and we 

shall not consider them. Boniella; Berman.

Furthermore, although Taxpayer questioned the Trial Court’s denial of his 

motions for recusal and injunctive relief in his statement of issues on appeal, he 

failed to otherwise address or develop these issues in his brief. These issues, too, 

are waived. Boniella; Singer. 

B. Preliminary Objection

We now turn to Taxpayer’s argument that the Trial Court abused its discretion 

in sustaining Appellees’ PO and dismissing his complaint with prejudice. Taxpayer 

maintains his complaint averred facts sufficient to demonstrate Appellees deprived 

him of his rights under the Pennsylvania and United States Constitutions, the LTEA, 

the TRC, the LTBRA, and the Civil Rights Act. 

Preliminary objections that assert a pleading is legally insufficient may be 

sustained only where it appears with certainty that the law will not permit recovery 

under the allegations pleaded. Twp. of Derry v. Pa. Dep’t of Labor and Indus., 940 

A.2d 1265, 1268 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2008). When reviewing preliminary objections, we 

accept as true all well-pleaded, material, and relevant facts alleged in the complaint 

and every inference that may be fairly deduced from those facts. Id. Preliminary 

objections are sustained when, under the facts as pleaded, it is clear the plaintiff will 

be unable to establish a right to relief. Rohner, 118 A.3d at 489 n.4.
10

The Trial Court’s 1925(a) opinion clearly and succinctly explains why 

Taxpayer’s complaint fails. Taxpayer’s complaint consists of disjointed factual 

statements interspersed with bare allegations of discriminating, misleading, and 

condescending behavior on the part of Appellees. We commend the Trial Court’s 

diligence and thoroughness in weeding through the complaint and distilling its 

contents into cognizable claims. For the reasons discussed below, we agree with the 

Trial Court that the constitutional and statutory authority relied on by Taxpayer does 

not entitle him to relief on any of his claims.

1. Article VIII, Section 2(b)(ii) of the Pennsylvania Constitution

Article VIII, Section 2(b)(ii) of the Pennsylvania Constitution provides that 

the General Assembly may grant tax exempt status to persons for reasons of 

disability or poverty. Pa. Const. art. VIII, § 2(b). Taxpayer supports his argument 

that “may” means “shall,” and the General Assembly is thus constrained to create 

such a tax exemption, citing legal authority that is neither recognized by, nor binding 

upon, this Court.19 As the Pennsylvania Constitution does not mandate the creation 

of a property tax exemption, the Trial Court committed no error in dismissing 

Taxpayer’s claim in that regard.

2. Section 301.1(b) of the LTEA

While the LTEA applies to a veritable laundry list of entities, that list does not 

include counties.20 Furthermore, although Section 301.1(b) of the LTEA expressly 

authorizes tax exemptions on the basis of income for the per capita or similar head 

 

19 Taxpayer argues that, when a statute directs action be taken for the sake of justice or the 

public good, the word “may” is the same as “shall,” citing “Carth. 293 Salk. 609; Skin. 370.” 

Taxpayer Br. at 9.

20 Section 301.1(a) of the LTEA permits the assessment and collection of taxes by cities of 

the second class, cities of the second class A, cities of the third class, boroughs, town, townships 

of the first and second classes, and school districts of the fourth class. 53 P.S. § 6924.301.1(a).
11

tax, occupation tax, or earned income tax, it creates no such exemption for property 

taxes. 53 P.S. § 6924.301.1(b). Accordingly, the Trial Court did not err in 

dismissing Taxpayer’s claim under Section 301.1(b) of the LTEA. 

3. Section 304(d)(1) of the TRC

Section 304(d)(1) of the TRC provides that an individual whose annual 

income is less than $6,500 is entitled to a refund of taxes paid to the Commonwealth 

“under the provisions of this article.” 72 P.S. § 7304(d)(1). This section falls under 

Article III of the TRC, relating to the imposition of personal income tax. Payment 

of Taxpayer’s property taxes are at issue, not his personal income tax. Consequently, 

we discern no error in the Trial Court’s dismissal of Taxpayer’s claim under the 

TRC.

4. LTBRA

Section 8438 of the LTBRA explicitly provides that, “[e]xcept as provided in 

section 8426 (relating to interest on overpayment), [the LTBRA] shall not apply to 

any tax on real property.” 53 Pa.C.S. § 8438. Taxpayer has not asserted a violation 

of Section 8426 of the LTBRA. Therefore, the Trial Court properly dismissed all 

claims related to alleged violations of the LTBRA. 

5. Conspiracy under 18 U.S.C. §§ 241-42

The Trial Court determined Taxpayer’s conspiracy claims must fail as the 

statutory provisions cited in Taxpayer’s complaint, 18 U.S.C. §§ 241-42, are 

criminal statutes that do not create a private right of action. Taxpayer has proffered 

no legal authority that suggests he may assert a civil claim under Sections 241 and 

242, and the Trial Court committed no error in dismissing his attempts to do so. 
12

6. Section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act

Taxpayer argues that the CAO and Bureau are amenable to suit under Section 

1983.21 To state a claim under Section 1983, Taxpayer must 1) allege a violation of 

rights secured by the United States Constitution and the laws of the United States, 

and 2) show that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under the 

color of state law. Anelli v. Arrowhead Lakes Cmty. Ass’n, Inc., 689 A.2d 357, 360

(Pa. Cmwlth. 1997). 

Taxpayer’s appellate brief focuses solely on whether Appellees may be sued 

under Section 1983. Taxpayer has not explained how Appellees’ denial of his 

request for exemption from the payment of property taxes violates any of his rights 

guaranteed by the United States Constitution or any other laws of the United States. 

As such, Taxpayer cannot state a claim under Section 1983. Accordingly, we need 

not address whether Appellees constitute persons acting under the color of state law.

C. Trial Court’s 1925(a) Opinion

Next, Taxpayer argues that the Trial Court erred in failing to issue findings of 

fact and conclusions of law to support its dismissal of Taxpayer’s complaint with 

prejudice. Taxpayer cites no legal authority to support his arguments that the Trial 

Court was required to issue such findings and conclusions or that the Trial Court’s 

failure to do so mandates reversal of the order dismissing Taxpayer’s complaint with 

prejudice. Rather, Taxpayer cites Harley Davidson Motor Co., Inc. v. Hartman, 442

A.2d 284 (Pa. Super. 1982), in which the Superior Court held that an abuse of 

 

21 Taxpayer has not argued error by the Trial Court in dismissing his 1983 claims against 

the Bureau Director and Treasurer. Also absent from Taxpayer’s appellate brief is any discussion 

relating to Section 1981 of the Civil Rights Act or the Trial Court’s dismissal of his claim, however 

cognizable, brought under the definitions section of the EEOA, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e. Consequently, 

these issues will not be addressed herein.
13

discretion occurs when a trial court dismisses a complaint without considering the 

sufficiency of the cause of action alleged therein. 

Harley Davidson is inapposite, as the preliminary objections in that case were 

sustained by the trial court on technical grounds after the plaintiff failed to file a 

brief in opposition. Furthermore, any purported failure of the Trial Court to issue 

findings of fact and conclusions of law was obviated by the filing of its 1925(a) 

opinion on February 5, 2019. 

Taxpayer further argues this Court should disregard the Trial Court’s 1925(a) 

opinion as untimely pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2)(ii), which requires a trial court 

to file its opinion within 30 days of receipt of a notice of appeal. However, Rule 

1925(a)(2)(ii) applies only to children’s fast track appeals, which involve 

dependency, termination of parental rights, adoptions, custody, or paternity. See

Pa.R.A.P. 102. As Taxpayer’s complaint does not fit within any of these categories, 

the general rule set forth in Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(1) applies. The Trial Court is merely 

required to “forthwith file of record at least a brief opinion of the reasons for the 

order.” Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(1). Consequently, Taxpayer’s argument that this Court 

should disregard or set aside the Trial Court’s 1925(a) opinion lacks merit. 

D. Timeliness of Preliminary Objections

Next, we address Taxpayer’s assertion that Appellees’ PO was untimely filed. 

Taxpayer notes that his complaint was served on Appellees on September 17, 2018, 

and Appellees had to file their PO within 20 days of that date. As Appellees filed 

their PO on October 9, 2018, 22 days later, Taxpayer maintains the PO was untimely. 

Taxpayer is correct that, with limited exceptions, every pleading subsequent 

to the complaint must be filed within 20 days after service of the preceding pleading, 

provided the preceding pleading contained a notice to defend or is endorsed with a 
14

notice to plead. Pa.R.C.P. No. 1026(a). However, Pa.R.C.P. No. 106(b) provides 

that when a filing deadline falls on a Saturday, Sunday, or a legal holiday, that day 

is to be omitted from this calculation. Twenty days from the date Taxpayer’s 

complaint was served was October 7, 2018, a Sunday. The following day was 

Columbus Day, a legal holiday.22 Consequently, as October 9, 2018 was the 

appropriate deadline, Appellees’ PO was timely.

E. Summary Judgment

Lastly, we address Taxpayer’s claim that the Trial Court abused its discretion 

when it failed to address his summary judgment motion. Taxpayer argues the Trial 

Court should have accepted Appellees’ failure to file a timely response to his 

complaint as an admission of fault and entered judgment in Taxpayer’s favor. 

Taxpayer further argues that summary judgment should be entered against 

Appellees, as they did not file an answer to his summary judgment motion. 

As discussed above, Appellees’ PO was timely filed. The Trial Court 

sustained the PO and dismissed the complaint. Moreover, pursuant to Pa.R.C.P. No. 

1028(d), even had the Trial Court overruled Appellees’ PO, Appellees would have 

had 20 days to file their answer to Taxpayer’s complaint.23 Taxpayer’s assertion that 

Appellees filed no response to his complaint is therefore baseless. 

While Taxpayer is correct that no answer was filed in response to his summary 

judgment motion, Appellees’ lack of response did not guarantee Taxpayer victory, 

as the applicable procedural rule does not mandate such an outcome. Rather,

 

22 2018 County Holidays. http://www.pacourts.us/assets/files/setting-6004/file6678.pdf?cb=6ec644 (last visited July 29, 2019).

23 Pa.R.C.P. No. 1028(d) provides that “[i]f the preliminary objections are overruled, the 

objecting party shall have the right to plead over within [20] days after notice of the order or within 

such other time as the court shall fix.”
15

“[s]ummary judgment may be entered against a party who does not respond.”

Pa.R.C.P. No. 1035.3(d) (emphasis added). Taxpayer’s summary judgment motion 

was rendered moot when the Trial Court sustained Appellees’ PO and the complaint 

was dismissed with prejudice. In general, courts will not decide moot questions. 

Pub. Def. Office of Venango Cty. v. Venango Cty. Ct. of Common Pleas, 893 A.2d 

1275, 1279 (Pa. 2006). As such, we discern no error on the part of the Trial Court 

and Taxpayer’s argument to the contrary is without merit. 

IV. Conclusion

Several of the issues raised by Taxpayer are waived because either he raised

them for the first time on appeal or he failed to develop them in his appellate brief. 

The remaining statutory and constitutional provisions cited by Taxpayer do not 

provide an exemption from the payment of his property taxes. Accordingly, we 

affirm the order of the Trial Court.

Judge Fizzano Cannon did not participate in the decision of this case.
IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Gilbert M. Martinez, :

Appellant :

:

v. : No. 1615 C.D. 2018

:

Tax Claims Bureau, Director Stacy :

Phile, in her Individual Capacity, the :

Treasurer Dennis Adams, in his :

Individual and Official Capacity and :

Berks County Assessment Office :

PER CURIAM

O R D E R

AND NOW, this 13th day of August, 2019, the November 1, 2018 order of the 

Court of Common Pleas of Berks County is hereby AFFIRMED.