### FI LED U.S. COURT O F APP EALS ELEVENTH CIRCUIT J une 13 , 2 005 THO MAS K. KAH N CL ERK [PUBLIS H]
IN THE UN ITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FO R T HE EL EV EN TH CIRC UI T

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ N o. 05- 1030 7 Non-A rgum ent Calendar

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ D. C. Docket N o. 04-02637 CV -P- S AME RIT AS VA RIA BL E L IFE INSURANCE COM PANY, Pl ai nti ff -Appe llant,
ve rs us SUSAN L. ROACH, De fendant-Appellee.

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ __ A ppe al f ro m the U nit ed

S ta te s D istri ct

Co urt f o r t h e N o rt h e rn D i s t r i c to f

A l ab a ma

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ _ (J un e 13, 200 5)
Be fo re CA RN E S, MA RC U S an d F A Y , Ci rc uit Jud ge s. PE R CU RIA M:2

T his is anappe al of

adis tr ic t c ourt’ s di sm iss al of a de cl ar at or y j udgm en t a ct ion in f av or of apa ra lle l st at e co urt a ct ion
. It a lso m ar ks o ur f ir st o ppor tun ity to dis cu ss the ci rc um stanc es unde r w hic h a fed er al dis tr ic t cour t shoul d dec lin e to e xe rc ise it s dis cr et ionto ac ce pt j ur isd ic tio n of suc h a cont ro ve rs y . T he dis tr ic t cour t bel owf ound tha t the de cl ar at or

y j udgm en t a ct iona m ount ed to unne ce ssary

a nd ina ppr opr ia te interfer ence w ith the parallel state cou rt ac t i o n, w hich will resolve the entire
co ntr ove rs y , a nd g rante d adis m iss al
. W e ag re e, f ind ing tha t the dis tr ic t cour t did no t ab us e it s d is cret io n, an d a ffi rm th e d eci si on be lo w. I. In M arch 20 02, Brooke Roach ( “ Mr. Roach”) m et w ith David Guttery (“ G utt er y ”) , a n a ge nt o f Acacia N at ion al L if e In sur an ce ( “ A ca ci a” ), w hic h is affiliated w ith Am eritas V ariable L ife Insurance Com pany (“A m eritas”)
. On that date, he applied for a life insurance policy to replace an existing life insurance policy he ha d w itha nothe r ins ur an ce c ar ri er . Mr
. Ro ac h a lso a ssi gne d to A ca ci a al l of his be ne fi ts, int er es ts, a nd r igh ts u nde r his e xis tin g in su ran ce polic y . A ca ci a subs equently

issued to Mr. Roach a newlife insurance policy (t h e “ Po l icy ”) that included a sui cide provi s i o n . The suicide provision provided th at if the insured
co m m itt ed sui ci de w ith in tw o y ears a ft er the Po li cy da te , the ins ur an ce c om pa ny
w oul d on ly

pa y “ th e pr em ium s r ec ei ve d, le ss any pa rt ia l su rr en de rs a ndI n dispute is the effe ctive date of the Policy
. 1 3 ind eb te dne ss. ” I n N ove m be r 2002 , A m er ita s a ssu m ed a ll ri ght s, obl iga tio ns, a nd li ab il it ie s u nd er t he Po li cy . Mr
. Ro ac h di ed

( of a n a ppa re nt s uic ide ) on M ar ch 23, 200 4. On Apr il 13, 2004 , D ef

en da nt- A ppe lle e Su sa n Roa ch( “ Mr s. Ro ac h” ), the be ne fi ci ar y of the P o l i c y, f i l e dac l a i m wi t h Ame r i t a s t o r e c o v e r d e a t h b e n e f

i t s u n d e r t h e P o l i c y. T he re af te r, on S ep te m

be r 1, 200 4, A m er ita s br ough t a div er sity a ct ionunder the Federa l De clara tory

Judgm ent Ac t, 28 U .S .C. § 2201 , e t seq. ( the “ De clara tory Judg m en t A ct ”) , in the dis tr ict co ur t, s ee kin g ade cl ar at ionof the r igh ts and oblig ations of the parties und er the P olicy (the “ declara tory

action”). 1 Su bse que ntl y , on O ct obe r 12, 2004 , Mr s. Ro ac h f ile d asta te c ourt a ct ion against Am eritas, Guttery , and Nowlin & A ssociates, Inc. (“ NA I”), the agency

that
em plo y ed G utt er y ( the “ sta te c ourt a ct ion ”)
. The sta te c ourt a ct iona sse rt s c la im s f or br ea ch of

the ins ur an ce c ontra ct

a nd n eg lig en t su

pe rv isi on and hi ri ng a ga ins t A mer i t a s ; a n dc l a i ms f

o r n e g l i g e n c e a g a i n s t G u t t e ry a n d N A I
. Al s o , t h a ts a me d a y, Mr s. Ro ac h f

ile d w iththe dis tr ic t c ourt a m oti on t o di sm iss the de cl ar at or y a ct ionin favor of the par allel state court ac tion. The district court ultim ately determ ined that the sta te c ourt a ct ionw as the m or e ap pr opr ia te f or um in w hic h to he ar

the c om ple te
co ntr ove rs y

a nd g rante d M rs . Ro ac h’ s m oti on t o di sm iss
. T his appe al f oll ow ed
.This Circuit has repe atedly cited Ke rn for

its elaboration of the abuse of discretion 2 standard. See United States v. Drur y , 396 F.3d 1303, 1315 ( 11 Cir. 2005); Cooper v. Southern th Co., 390 F.3d 695, 712 (11 Cir. 2004); United States v. Fr azier, 387 F .3d 1244, 1259 (11 Cir. th th 2004) (e n banc) ; Macklin v. Singleta ry , 24 F.3d 1307, 1311 ( 11 Cir. 1994); I n re Rasbur y , 24 th F.3d 159 ( 11 Cir. 1994).

th 4 II. W e re vie w the dis tr ic t cour t’ s dism iss al of the de cl ar at or y j udgm en t ac tio n f

or ab use of dis cr et ion
. W ilt on v . S ev enF al ls C o. , 515 U
. S. 277 , 289 -9 0, 115 S
. Ct
. 213 7 (1995). “ [W ] hen we s ay t h at a d ecision is di scretionary , or that a district court has dis c r e t i o n t o g r a n to r

d e n y am o t i o n , w e d o n o tm e a n t h a tt h e d i s t r i c tc o u rtm a y do whatever pleases it. The phrase m eans instead that the court has a range of c hoice,
an d th at its de ci sio n wi ll not be dis tur be d as long as it stay s w ith in tha t r an ge a nd i s not inf lue nc ed by an y m ist ak e of la w . ” K er n v. T X O Pr od. Co rp . , 738 F
. 2d 9 68, 970 (8 Cir. 1984 ). Sp ec i fi cally , an abuse of discretion “ can occur in three principal th 2

w ay s: [1 ] w he n a rel ev an t fa ct or tha t shoul d have be engiv ensig nif ic an t w ei ght

is not considered; [2] when an i rrele vant or im proper fac tor is consid ered and giv en signi ficant w ei g ht; and [3] when all proper f actors, and no im

proper ones, ar e
co nsi de re d, but

the c ourt, in w ei ghi ng those f ac tor s, c om

m its ac le ar

e rr or of j udgm en t. ” I d. T hus, w he n e m plo y ing a n a

buse of dis cr et ionstanda rd , w e w ill le av e undi sturbed a district court’ s ruling unless we find that the dis trict court has m ade a cl ear er ro r of j udgm en t, or

ha s a ppl ie d th e w ro ng l eg al standa rd
.Centennial L ife Ins. v Poston, 88 F.3d 255, 257 (4 Cir. 1996) (citation omitted). th 3 This Circuit has not previously espoused a

specific set of cr iteria to be a pplied in case s 4 such as this one – whe re a district court is fac ed with a de clar atory action broug ht in feder al cour t 5 T he D ec la ra tor

y Judg m en t A ct is “ an en ab lin g A ct , w hic h c onf er s adis cr et ion
on c o u rt s r a t h e r t h a n a n ab s o l u t e r i g h t up o n t h e l i t i g a n t
. ” W i l t o n , 5 1 5 U
. S. a t 28 7 (c ita tio ns o m itt ed ). It onl y giv es the fe de ra l cour ts com pe te nc e to m ak e a de cl ar at ion of rights; it do es not im

pose a duty to do so. Brillhart v. Exce ss Ins. Co. of A m erica , 3 1 6 U
. S
. 4 9 1 , 4 9 4 , 6 2 S
. C t
. 1 1 7 3 ( 1 9 4 2 )
. I n f a c t , i n c a s e s s u c h a s t h i s , t h e S up r e me Court has expressed that “ it would be uneconom ical as we ll as vexatious for a federa l
cour t to pr oc ee d inade cl ar at or y j udgm en t su it w he re a nothe r sui t i s pe ndi ng i n a
s t a t e c o u rtp r e s e n t i n g t h e s a me i s s u e s , n o t g o v e rn e d b y f e d e r a l l a w , b e t w e e n t h e s a me parties.” Id. at 495. The Suprem e Court has war ned that “ [g] ratuitous in terfe rence
w iththe or de rl y

a nd c om pr eh en siv e dis posi tio n of a sta te c ourt l iti ga tio n sh oul d be
av oi de d.” Id. Th is warn in g s ho ul d b e h eed ed
. Guided by

these general principles expressed bythe Suprem e Court, as w ell as

“ the sa m e co nsi de ra tio ns o f fe de ra lis m , e ff ic ie nc y , a nd c om ity

tha t tra dit ion al ly inf orm af ed er al c ourt’ s di sc re tiona ry de ci sio n w he the r to a bst ai n f ro m e xe rc isi ng juri sd ic ti on ov er s ta te -la w cla im s i n t he face of p aral le l l it ig at io n i n t he st at e co ur ts ,” 3

w e pr ovi de the f

oll ow ing f

ac tor s f or c onsi de ra tio n to ai d dis tr ic t co urts in b al an ci ng sta te a nd f

ed er al int er es ts. 4on the basis of diver sity and a subse quent par allel lawsuit on the merits is instit uted in state cour t. Othe r c ir c uit s, mos t no ta

bly the F ourt h a nd Sixth C ir c uit s, have a lr e a dy e xplor e d th is q

ue sti on in detail, and have set for

th cer tain fac tors, which we adopt as guideposts for the district cour ts. These f actor s arise f

rom a va riety of sourc es. See Scottsdale I ns. Co. v. Roum ph, 211 F.3d 964, 968 (6 Cir. 2000); Centennial L ife Ins., 88 F.3d at 257; 12 Moore’s F eder al Prac tice, § 57.42

th (3d ed. 2005)
. 6 (1 ) the str en gth of

the sta te ’ s in te rest inha vin g th e iss ue s r ai se d inthe fe de ra l de cl ar at or

y a ct ionde ci de d inthe sta te c ourts; (2 ) w he the r the j udgm en t in the f ed er al de cl ar at or

y a ct ionw oul d se ttl e t h e c o n t r o v e r s y; (3 ) w he the r the fe de ra l dec la ra tor y ac tio n wou ld ser

ve ause fu l pu rp ose in clarify ing th e legal re lations at iss ue; (4 ) w he the r the de cl ar at or y r em edy is be ing use d m er el y

f or the pur pose of “ procedural fe n cing” – that is, to provid e an ar ena for a rac e for r es j udi ca taor

to ac hieve af

ed er al he ar ing in a ca se oth er w ise not rem ovable; (5 ) w he the r the use of

ade cl ar at or

y a ct ionw oul d in crea se the f ri ct ion be tw ee n ou r fed era l and s ta te c ourts and i m pr ope rl y e nc ro ac h onsta te j ur isd ic tio n; (6) w hether there is an a lternative re m ed y that is better or m ore effe ctive; (7) w hether the underly ing fa ctual issues are im portant to an inform ed resolution of the case; (8 ) w he the r the sta te tr ia l c ourt i s inabe tte r posi tio n to e va lua te tho se fa ct ua l i ssu es than is the f

ed er al c our

t; an d (9 ) w he the r the re is a cl ose ne xus be tw ee n th e und erl y ing f ac tua l and legal issues and st ate lawand/or pub lic policy , or whether fed er al co m m on or statuto ry

law dictates a r esolutio n of the declara tory jud gm en t ac ti on . O ur li st i s ne ith er

absol ute nor

is any on e fa ct or

c ontro lli ng; the se a re m er el y gui de post s inf

urthe ran ce of the S upr em e Co urt’ s a dm oni tio ns i n B ri llh ar t and W il to n. H ere, t he di st ric t co ur t wei gh edsev eral di ffer en t fa ct or s b efo re ab st ai ning f ro mAm e ri ta s p la c e s g re a t e mph a sis on the iss ue of

the dis tr ic t c ourt ’s a

bil ity to a pp ro pr iate ly 5 exercise suppleme ntal jurisdiction over the non-dive rse third-pa rty litigants. I t argues that the d e te r mi n a ti o nw h e th e r

th e c o u rt a

b u s e d it s d is c r e ti o nh in g e s o nth e o u tc o me o f th is is s u e . We dis a g re e . T he state c ourt

a c tio n in c lud e s a ll the pa rt ie s to the dis pu te , w hic h is c on tr oll e d b y state law. The re is no nee d for a fede ral district cour

t to reac h out for expanded jurisdiction eve n wer e it permissible. 7 the de cl ar at or

y a ct ionin favor of the sta te co urt ac tio n. Fi rs t, the dis tr ic t co urt f ound that while it had before it only an incom plete set of parties and claim s, the state court
ac tio n e nc om

pa sse d th e co m

ple te c ontro ve rs y . N ei the r A m er ita s, as pla int if f, nor the dis tr ic t c ourt, c oul d c om pe l M rs . Ro ac h to li tig at e he r thi rd -p ar ty c la im s inthe de cl ar at or

y a ct ion , w hic h w oul d be the onl y w ay in w hic h t he di st ri ct

c ourt c oul d
m irr orth e st at e co ur t ac ti on . Se co nd, the dis tr ic t cour

t e xpr es se d c onc er

n a bout it s a bil ity to ap pr opr ia te ly
ex er ci se sup ple m en ta l j ur isd ic tio n ov er the non -d ive rs e thi rd -p ar ty li tig an ts i f Mr s. Roach w ere to seek to join them
. The district court noted that the questio n is an open
one in the E le venth Ci rc uit a nd the S upr em e Co urt, a nd tha t a lth ough it w oul d be inc lin ed to ru le tha t su ch aj oin de r w oul d not de str oy div er sity j ur isd ic tio n, the iss ue
wa s m oot because Mrs. R oach had not attem pted such a joinder. 5 Fi na lly , the dis tr ic t c ourt c onc lud ed tha t t o a llo w the d ecl aratory a ct ionto pr oc ee d w oul d a m ount to the unn ec es sa ry

a nd i na ppropr ia te “ [g ] ra tui tou s int er fe re nc e” w iththe m or e en co m pa ssi ng and cur

re ntl y pe ndi ng s ta te c ourt a ct ion that was c ontem

plated by the Suprem e Court in Brillhart and W ilton
. W e agre e.8

A m er ita s c ont en ds tha t the dis tr ic t c ourt a buse d its d isc re tio n by not
co nsi de ri ng the va ri ous fa ct or s e num er at ed by our sis te r ci rc uit s in sim ilar sit ua tio ns. T o th e co ntr ar

y , it appe ar s to us tha t the dis tr ic t cour t gave appr opr ia te c onsi de ra tio n t o t h e p r i ma ry f

a c t o r s e x i s t i n g h e r e , i n c l u d i n g t h e t r a d i t i o n a l c o n c e p t s o f f e d e r a l i s m,
e f f i c i e n c y, a n dc o mi t y. Under an abuse of discretion stand ard, we will lea ve un d i s turbed a district
co urt’ s r uli ng u nle ss w e fi nd tha t the dis tr ic t cour t has m ad e a cle ar er

ro r of j udgm en t, or has applied the wr ong legal standard, and we f ind no such errors her e. Moreover, dis tr ic t c ourts h ave “ subs ta nti al la tit ude in de ci din g w he the r to s ta y or dis m iss a declara tory

j udgm ent suit in light o f pen d i n g s t ate procee ding s.” W ilton , 515 U. S. at 286
. “ Inthe de cl ar at or

y j udgm en t c ont ex t, the nor m al pr inc ipl e tha t f

ed er al c ourts shou ld a dj udi ca te c la im s w ith in the ir juris dic tio n y ie lds to co nsi de ra tio ns o f pr ac tic al ity

a nd w ise j udgm en t. ” I d. W e, a s th e re vie w ing c ourt, “ m ust be m ind fu l tha t the dis tr ic t c ourts are c los er to the fa ct s and the pa rt ie s, a nd tha t no t e ve ry thi ng tha t is im porta nt ab out a la w sui t co m es thr ough on the pr int ed pa ge . ” K er n, 738 F
. 2d at 970
. H er e, the dis tr ic t co urt ad equa te ly co nsi de re d “ w he the r the c la im s of a ll the p ar t i es i n i n t er es t[c o u l d ] sa t i s fa ct o ri l y b e a d ju d i ca t ed i n [t h e d ec l ar at o ry ac t i o n ],
w he the r ne ce ssary

pa rt ie s ha ve be enj oin ed , [and] w he the r suc h part ie s a re a m en ab le to pro ces s i n [t he de cl arat or y act io n].” Bri ll ha rt, 3 16 U.S. at 4 95
.9

Inour vie w , the dis tr ic t c ourt a ct ed w el l- w ith in the range of

it s di sc re tio n by he ed ing the S upr em e Cou rt ’ s adm oni tio ns in Br ill ha rt an d righ tly ab sta ini ng fr om the de cl ar at or

y ac tio n in favor of the pa ra lle l sta te co urt ac tio n. T he re fo re, w e fi nd no ab use of dis cr et iona nd a ff

irm the dis tr ic t c ourt’ s di sm iss al
. AFFIR MED.