SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-3760-14T2

MATTHEW KEEFE,

Plaintiff-Appellant/

Cross-Respondent,

v.

XAVIER FERNANDEZ, CHRISTINA A.

IMPELLETIERE, FEDERICO FARIA,

JIMMY D'S BLUES SALOON, ANA 

MAYERS, STATE OF NEW JERSEY, 

NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT OF

TRANSPORTATION, COUNTY OF BERGEN,

BOROUGH OF TETERBORO, BOROUGH

OF MOONACHIE, TOWNSHIP OF SOUTH

HACKENSACK, NEW JERSEY MEADOWLANDS

COMMISSION, TAIS HERNANDEZ, and

AMY CHARTOFF,

Defendants,

and

BOROUGH OF RIDGEFIELD, RIDGEFIELD

FIRE DEPARTMENT, TRUSTEES OF

RIDGEFIELD LADDER COMPANY NO. 1, 

GARY CHARTOFF, and ANDREW CHARTOFF,

Defendants-Respondents,

and

MELISSA CHARTOFF,

Defendant-Respondent/

Cross-Appellant.

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." 

Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the 

parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R.1:36-3.
2 A-3760-14T2

Argued February 1, 2017 – Decided

Before Judges Alvarez and Manahan.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New 

Jersey, Law Division, Bergen County, Docket 

No. L-2250-11.

Rosemarie Arnold argued the cause for 

appellant/cross-respondent (Law Offices of 

Rosemarie Arnold, attorneys; Ms. Arnold and 

Paige R. Butler, on the briefs).

Ian C. Doris argued the cause for respondents 

Borough of Ridgefield, Ridgefield Fire 

Department, Trustees of Ridgefield Ladder 

Company No. 1, Gary Chartoff, and Andrew 

Chartoff (Keenan & Doris, LLC, attorneys; 

Thomas A. Keenan, of counsel; Bernadette M. 

Peslak, on the brief).

Anthony J. Accardi argued the cause for 

respondent/cross-appellant (Accardi & Mirda, 

P.C., attorneys; Mr. Accardi, of counsel and 

on the brief).

PER CURIAM

Plaintiff Matthew Keefe appeals from a jury verdict finding 

no cause of action against the only remaining defendant, Melissa 

Chartoff (Chartoff), in his personal injury action against 

multiple parties. He also appeals the court's earlier ruling 

granting summary judgment to defendants Gary and Andrew Chartoff.1 

Chartoff cross-appeals the court's partial denial of an earlier 

 

1 We will refer to them as Gary and Andrew in order to avoid 

confusion with Chartoff, since the three are family members who 

share the same last name. We collectively refer to Chartoff, 

Gary, and Andrew as "the Chartoffs."

June 30, 2017
3 A-3760-14T2

motion for summary judgment. That decision left intact for trial

the fifth count of Keefe's third amended complaint. We now affirm.

Briefly, Keefe was severely injured when he was struck by a 

drunken driver. The extent and nature of his injuries are not in 

dispute. The responsible driver, Xavier Fernandez, allegedly 

became intoxicated while attending a baby shower at a fire hall.

The issue in dispute is whether Chartoff's contributions to 

the baby shower arrangements caused her to fall within the purview 

of the social host statute, N.J.S.A. 2A:15-5.5 to -5.8. The same 

question arises as to Gary and Andrew with regard to the motion 

for summary judgment. 

Chartoff, Maggie Ramirez, and Thais Hernandez were close 

friends. Ramirez and her husband Federico Faria were expecting, 

and Faria wanted to organize a baby shower, consisting of a large 

number of his friends and members of his family. He asked Chartoff 

to arrange the use of the Ridgefield Fire Department social hall 

through her father, Gary, who is a fireman and member of Ridgefield 

Hose Company No. 1. Chartoff was also responsible for printing 

the shower invitations, which were distributed by Faria mainly 

through his barber shop. She also carried decorations to the hall 

before the party. Faria employed the services of a bartender and 

a disc jockey for the party. 
4 A-3760-14T2

Chartoff's brother Andrew, also a fireman, represented the 

Ridgefield Hose Company No. 1 during the party —— which meant he 

was responsible for cleanup afterwards and was required to be 

present during the party to ensure the premises were not damaged. 

The Chartoffs had nothing to do with making up the guest 

list, distributing invitations, selecting food or drink, or any 

other aspect of hosting the event. Chartoff testified that she 

was acquainted with no more than ten people at the shower, 

including her mother and the parents-to-be. Neither she nor anyone 

in her family were acquainted with Fernandez, and neither Chartoff

nor Gary recalled seeing him during the party.

The trial took place over twenty-one days, ending on January 

14, 2015. During her summation, which the trial judge interrupted 

four times, Keefe's attorney attacked the truthfulness of the 

defense witnesses, including the Chartoffs, and counsel. As the 

trial judge described it, Keefe's attorney said that "the defense 

case was set up[,]" and that Chartoff's attorney attempted to 

confuse or mislead the jury. 

Keefe's attorney objected on the record, before 

deliberations, to the instruction the judge proposed to give the 

jury about her summation. The basis for Keefe's attorney's 

objection was twofold, that Chartoff's counsel had attacked her 

during his summation, and that although an instruction regarding 
5 A-3760-14T2

inappropriate comments by both attorneys might be warranted, she 

should not be singled out for criticism. Keefe's counsel was also 

concerned that the instruction the judge fashioned would 

completely undermine the theory of the case she had argued to the 

jury: that the Chartoffs, Faria, and Ramirez had concocted a 

false narrative so Chartoff could avoid any legal liability. 

Nonetheless, the judge gave the instruction. The events following 

summation and the instruction are set forth in detail in the 

relevant sections.

After the jury returned its no cause of action decision, the 

judge denied Keefe's motion for judgment notwithstanding the 

verdict. See R. 2:10-1. Keefe raises the following points for 

our consideration:

POINT I

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING SUMMARY 

JUDGMENT TO ANDREW AND GARY CHARTOFF AS AGENTS 

OF THE RIDGEFIELD HOSE COMPANY NUMBER ONE, 

INC. IN THE FACE OF FACT ISSUES AS TO WHETHER 

THEY WERE SOCIAL HOSTS WITHIN THE MEANING OF 

N.J.S.A. 2A:15-5.5.

POINT II

THE SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF ANDREW AND 

GARY MANIFESTLY DISTORTED THE TRIAL TO 

PLAINTIFF'S DETRIMENT.

POINT III

THE JURY VERDICT IN FAVOR OF MELISSA CHARTOFF 

WAS AGAINST THE WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE AND 

RESULTED IN A MISCARRIAGE OF JUSTICE, 

COMPELLING A JNOV OR A NEW TRIAL.
6 A-3760-14T2

A. Melissa Admitted at Trial that she 

Expressly Invited People to the Baby 

Shower by, inter alia, Designing, 

Printing and Putting Labels on the 

Invitations, as well as Sending

Invitations.

B. Melissa's Conduct Amounted to an Implied 

Invitation.

POINT IV

THE TRIAL COURT'S DECISION TO PERMIT NON-PARTY 

FARIA TO APPEAR ON THE JURY VERDICT SHEET FOR 

PURPOSES OF APPORTIONMENT OF FAULT, WAS AN 

ERROR THAT LED TO AN UNJUST VERDICT.

POINT V

THE TRIAL JUDGE ERRED BY CONTINUOUSLY 

INTERRUPTING PLAINTIFF'S SUMMATION AND THEN 

GIVING AN INSTRUCTION SUA SPONTE TO THE JURY 

AS PART OF ITS CHARGE THAT IMPORTANT ARGUMENTS 

IN THE SUMMATION SHOULD BE DISREGARDED, 

DESPITE THE LACK OF OBJECTION BY DEFENSE 

COUNSEL. THIS RULING DEMEANED COUNSEL AND 

QUESTIONED HER CREDIBILITY AND SEVERELY 

UNDERMINED THE ENTIRE PRESENTATION OF 

PLAINTIFF'S CASE.

A. Summation.

B. Plaintiff's Counsel's Comments during 

Summation were Completely Legitimate 

Based Upon the Evidence at Trial.

Chartoff's cross-appeal states:

IN THE EVENT THE APPELLATE COURT VACATES THE 

JURY VERDICT AND REMANDS FOR A NEW TRIAL, THEN 

MELISSA CHARTOFF APPEALS THE DENIAL OF HER 

MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON THE 5TH COUNT 

OF THE THIRD-AMENDED COMPLAINT.

A. Standard of Review.
7 A-3760-14T2

B. Melissa Chartoff did not "provide" 

alcoholic beverages to Xavier N. 

Fernandez; as such, Melissa Chartoff 

cannot be held liable for Plaintiff's 

injuries under N.J.S.A. 2A:15-5.5, et 

seq.

C. Judge Steele erred as a matter of law in 

denying Melissa Chartoff's motion, which 

error warrants the reversal of her order 

and the grant of summary judgment in 

Melissa Chartoff's favor.

I.

A.

We review a grant of summary judgment de novo, meaning we 

apply the same standard that governed the trial court. Henry v. 

N.J. Dep't of Human Servs., 204 N.J. 320, 330 (2010) (citing 

Busciglio v. Della Fave, 366 N.J. Super. 135, 139 (App. Div. 

2004)). Summary judgment must be granted if "the pleadings, 

depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, 

together with affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine 

issue as to any material fact challenged, and that the moving 

party is entitled to a judgment or order as a matter of law." R.

4:46-2(c); see Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 142 N.J.

520, 529-30 (1995). 

In conducting this review, we interpret the facts, and any 

inferences therefrom, in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. See Lippman v. Ethicon, Inc., 222 N.J. 362, 367 
8 A-3760-14T2

(2015) (citing Brill, supra, 142 N.J. at 523, 540). If there is 

a genuine issue as to any material fact, summary judgment should 

be denied. R. 4:46-2(c); Brill, supra, 142 N.J. at 540.

B.

Pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2A:15-5.6, an injured party:

may recover damages from a social host only 

if: 

(1) The social host willfully and knowingly 

provided alcoholic beverages either: 

(a) To a person who was visibly 

intoxicated in the social host’s 

presence; or

(b) To a person who was visibly 

intoxicated under circumstances 

manifesting reckless disregard of 

the consequences as affecting the 

life or property of another; and

(2) The social host provided alcoholic 

beverages to the visibly intoxicated person 

under circumstances which created an 

unreasonable risk of foreseeable harm to the 

life or property of another, and the social 

host failed to exercise reasonable care and 

diligence to avoid the foreseeable risk; and

(3) The injury arose out of an accident caused 

by the negligent operation of a vehicle by the 

visibly intoxicated person who was provided 

alcoholic beverages by a social host.

[N.J.S.A. 2A:15-5.6.] 

Keefe objects to the grant of summary judgment, contending

that there was a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether 
9 A-3760-14T2

or not Andrew and Gary invited guests to the premises, and whether 

they were social hosts within the meaning of the statute. In 

rendering his decision, the judge found that Gary and Andrew did 

not invite any guests to the shower and were otherwise uninvolved 

in the arrangements or giving of the party. He also found that 

Andrew was present during the event solely to ensure the premises 

were not damaged, and as a representative of the fire company. 

Accordingly, neither man was a social host within the meaning of 

the statute. 

A social host is defined as:

a person who, by express or implied 

invitation, invites another person onto an 

unlicensed premises for purposes of 

hospitality and who is not the holder of a 

liquor license for the premises and is not 

required to hold a liquor license for the 

premises . . . , and who legally provides 

alcoholic beverages to another person who has 

attained the legal age to purchase and consume 

alcoholic beverages. 

[N.J.S.A. 2A:15-5.5.]

Gary's involvement was limited to approving the use of the 

premises. The record is bare of any suggestion that Gary had any 

other involvement. Nothing in the record suggests that he even

knew that alcohol would be served. Thus, he could not be found 

to have "legally provide[d] alcoholic beverages to another 

person[.]" 
10 A-3760-14T2

Like his father, Andrew had nothing to do with planning or 

preparation for the party. His mere presence at the hall does not 

make him a person who "provided" alcohol to the guests. As a 

matter of law based on uncontroverted facts, neither was a social 

host. Summary judgment was properly granted.

C.

Little needs to be said about Keefe's claim that the grant

of summary judgment to Gary and Andrew "manifestly distorted the 

trial to [Keefe's] detriment[.]" Undoubtedly, the case would have 

been stronger had Keefe been able to establish that the baby shower

was a "joint Chartoff family event[.]" That would have required 

entirely different circumstances than those we see in the record, 

however. Hence, the grant of summary judgment to Gary and Andrew 

did not in any way prejudice plaintiff's presentation. The point 

is so lacking in merit as to not warrant further discussion in a 

written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E). 

II.

A.

We should not reverse a trial court's denial of a motion for

judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV) unless it "clearly 

appears that there was a miscarriage of justice under the law." 

R. 2:10-1. In reaching a decision, we focus "on whether the 

evidence submitted to the jury, and any legitimate inferences 
11 A-3760-14T2

which can be drawn from that evidence, support the jury verdict." 

Wade v. Kessler Institute, 343 N.J. Super. 338, 354 (App. Div. 

2001) (citing Sons of Thunder, Inc. v. Borden, Inc., 148 N.J. 396, 

415 (1997)). In performing this review, we "must accept as true 

all evidence supporting the position of the party defending against 

the motion and must accord that party the benefit of all legitimate 

inferences which can be [deduced from the evidence]." Besler v. 

Board of Educ. of West Windsor-Plainsboro Regional School Dist., 

201 N.J. 544, 572 (2010) (alteration in original) (quoting Lewis 

v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 155 N.J. 544, 567 (1998)). The jury's factual 

determinations should only be disturbed if the reviewing court 

finds that the jury could not have reasonably reached its verdict 

on the evidence presented at trial. Sons of Thunder, supra, 148 

N.J. at 415.

A trial judge "shall grant" a motion for a new trial "if, 

having given due regard to the opportunity of the jury to pass 

upon the credibility of the witnesses, it clearly and convincingly 

appears that there was a miscarriage of justice under the law." 

R. 4:49-1(a). We review a trial court order denying a new trial 

under essentially the same standard as that applied by the trial 

court. Hill v. N.J. Dept. of Corr., 342 N.J. Super. 273, 302 

(App. Div. 2001) (citing R. 2:10-1). "This standard applies 

whether the motion is based upon a contention that the verdict was 
12 A-3760-14T2

against the weight of the evidence, or is based upon a contention 

that the judge's initial trial rulings resulted in prejudice to a 

party." Ibid. (citing Crawn v. Campo, 136 N.J. 494, 510-12 

(1994)). If there was legal error during the trial, we also accord 

deference to the trial judge's evaluation of the prejudice that 

resulted, and whether that prejudice contributed to an unjust 

result. Ibid. (citing Crawn, supra, 136 N.J. at 512).

B.

We simply cannot agree with Keefe that the denial of his 

motion for JNOV was a miscarriage of justice under the law. There 

was no proof that Chartoff did anything more than print invitations 

and help in securing the hall. Chartoff had nothing to do with 

the creation of the guest list, the provision of food, or the 

provision of drinks. Of the 100 or so partygoers, she knew about 

ten of them. To the best of her knowledge, Chartoff never saw the 

driver. She did not provide anyone with alcohol at the event. 

Accepting Chartoff's evidence as true, and giving her the benefit 

of all favorable inferences, it does not appear that the jury 

reached an unjust result. There was no evidence to support finding 

Chartoff a social host. 

Nor was the verdict a miscarriage of justice. A motion for 

a new trial "should be granted only where to do otherwise would 

result in a miscarriage of justice shocking to the conscience of 
13 A-3760-14T2

the court." Risko v. Thompson Muller Auto. Grp., Inc., 206 N.J.

506, 521 (2011). There was no proof that Chartoff was a social 

host or that she provided the driver with alcohol. The jury's 

verdict was reasonable in light of the evidence.

III.

A.

The jury is entitled to clear and correct charges, and their

absence may constitute plain error. Wade v. Kessler Inst., 172 

N.J. 327, 341 (2002). However, we will not disturb a jury's 

verdict "where the charge, considered as a whole, adequately

conveys the law and is unlikely to confuse or mislead the jury, 

even though part of the charge, standing alone, might be 

incorrect." Ibid. (quoting Fischer v. Canario, 143 N.J. 235, 254 

(1996)). See also, Sons of Thunder, supra, 148 N.J. at 418. The 

same standard of review applies to jury interrogatories and verdict 

sheets. Ibid. 

The four-page verdict sheet asked in the first question:

1. Has plaintiff Matthew Keefe proven by a 

preponderance of the evidence that 

Melissa Chartoff was a social host, as

defined by law, by either expressly or 

impliedly inviting another person or 

persons to the party on January 22, 2011?

Yes________ No √ Vote 8-0

If you answered "yes" to this question, 

then proceed to answer question #2; if 
14 A-3760-14T2

you answered "no" to this question, then 

stop your deliberations, proceed no 

further and return your verdict.

The jury decided that Chartoff was not a social host, and 

therefore stopped deliberations after the first question. The 

argument raised by Keefe that the driver should not have been

included on the later questions is essentially moot as the jury 

never reached those questions. 

Nonetheless, we briefly reiterate well-established legal 

principles. The court was required to include Faria under the 

Comparative Negligence Act, N.J.S.A. 2A:15-5.1 to -5.8. "[T]he 

trier of fact must allocate the percentage of fault among the 

settling and non-settling defendants to enable the court to 

calculate the percentage attributable to the non-settlers." 

Brodsky v. Grinnell Haulers, Inc., 181 N.J. 102, 112-113 (2004) 

(citing Young v. Latta, 123 N.J. 584, 592 (1991)).

It is well established that a defendant who is not protected 

by statutory immunity, but was dismissed from the case on some 

other grounds, "remains a 'party' to the case for the purpose of 

determining the non-settling defendant's percentage of fault." 

Town of Kearny, supra, 214 N.J. at 100 (quoting Brodsky, supra, 

181 N.J. at 113); see also R. 4:7-5(c); Verni ex rel. Burstein v. 

Harry M. Stevens, Inc., 387 N.J. Super. 160, 205, 215 (App. Div. 

2006) (reversing grant of motions for summary judgment filed by 
15 A-3760-14T2

personal injury plaintiff on behalf of settling defendants in 

order to bar allocation of fault to settling defendants), certif. 

denied, 189 N.J. 429 (2007). 

Likewise, it does not matter that defendants failed to 

properly serve their cross-claim for contribution against Faria. 

In Young v. Latta, supra, 123 N.J. at 586, the Court held this 

credit "is available in every case in which there are multiple 

defendants, whether or not a cross-claim for contribution has been 

filed."

Accordingly, mention of Faria had no impact on the jury's

verdict because they never reached the pages of the verdict sheet 

that mention him, much less the question. In any event, the 

judge's decision to include him was correct on the law.

IV.

Finally, we address Keefe's contention that the judge erred 

by interrupting her summation and giving the jury instruction

regarding her summation comments. We note that despite identifying 

the interruptions, Keefe does not explain how they might have

affected jury deliberations, the jury's perception of his counsel, 

or the final verdict. The interruptions, as enumerated by Keefe, 

were: (1) the court interrupted counsel to only comment on the 

evidence not to testify; (2) the court criticized counsel's 

operation of the power point presentation containing slides of 
16 A-3760-14T2

trial testimony; (3) the court interrupted counsel and gave a 

curative instruction regarding a comment made by Keefe's attorney

as to the nonappearance of a nonparty witness; (4) the court 

interrupted counsel, instructing her not to use the names of jurors 

when giving hypotheticals. Having considered the entirety of the 

trial record, we conclude these interruptions do not have the 

potential to have led the jury to an unfair result.

At the close of Keefe's counsel's summation, Chartoff's 

attorney moved for a mistrial because of Keefe's attorney's closing 

comments regarding the alleged conspiracy to protect Chartoff from 

liability, and the alleged dishonesty of the witnesses. Although 

she denied the motion, the judge informed counsel that she intended 

to draft an instruction advising the jury to ignore the statements. 

She later read the instruction, and allowed Keefe's attorney to 

fully place her objections to it on the record. The instruction 

reads:

The lawyers are here as advocates for 

their clients. In their opening statements 

and their summations they have given you and 

their views of the evidence and their 

arguments in favor of their client's position. 

While you may consider their comments, nothing 

that the attorneys say is evidence. And their 

summations or their comments are not binding 

on you, any comment from counsel.

And now jurors, I do have an additional 

instruction that I wish to give you, that is 

not in the submission. At this time I address 
17 A-3760-14T2

something with you, the jury, that involves 

comment of counsel in the summations that you 

heard yesterday, and in particular with regard 

to plaintiff's counsel's summation which you 

heard yesterday afternoon. In that summation, 

you may have heard or remember comment of 

plaintiff counsel stating more than once, "the 

defense case was setup from the beginning to 

mislead you" or words to that effect. You may 

have heard or remember other similar or 

related comment or argument of plaintiff 

counsel in what she characterized as defense 

counsel's attempt to confuse you, mislead you, 

or to present a rouse to you in the defense 

case.

You are instructed that this argument by 

plaintiff counsel has no rightful place in 

proper commentary on the evidence before you. 

In summations counsel are permitted to argue 

and comment on the evidence presented and to 

comment on the credibility of the witnesses 

presented. These comments by plaintiff 

counsel were improper and as such you are 

instructed to disregard argument or comment 

that suggested to you that the defense is 

trying to mislead you or rouse you with the 

evidence.

The point is . . . that you are to 

consider argument of counsel that does comment 

on the evidence, and does comment on the 

credibility of the testimony presented. 

Nothing that the attorneys say is evidence, 

either one. And finally, as I've instructed 

to you previously nothing that either attorney 

has said is binding upon you.

After reviewing Keefe's summation, we find the instruction 

was warranted. Impugning the trustworthiness of defense counsel 

and the character of the defense witnesses and Chartoff herself
18 A-3760-14T2

when there was no basis in the record to do so required action by 

the court. 

"In general, we afford counsel broad latitude in closing 

arguments." Tartaglia v. UBS PaineWebber, Inc., 197 N.J. 81, 128 

(2008) (citing Bender v. Adelson, 187 N.J. 411, 431 (2006)). 

However, "it is improper for an attorney to make derisive 

statements about parties, their counsel, or their witnesses." 

Szczecina v. PV Holding Corp., 414 N.J. Super. 173, 178 (App. Div. 

2010); see also Henker v. Preybylowski, 216 N.J. Super. 513, 518-

520 (App. Div. 1987) (noting that the cumulative effect of 

inappropriate comments by plaintiff's counsel, including remarks 

on motives and trustworthiness of defense counsel, "probably" 

entitled defendant to a new trial); Rodd v. Raritan Radiologic 

Associates, P.A., 373 N.J. Super. 154, 171 (App. Div. 2004) 

(citations omitted) ("attorneys . . . may not use disparaging 

language to discredit the opposing party, or witness, . . . or 

accuse a party's attorney of wanting the jury to evaluate the 

evidence unfairly, of trying to deceive the jury, or of 

deliberately distorting the evidence."); Tabor v. O'Grady, 59 N.J. 

Super. 330, 340-341 (App. Div. 1960) (holding plaintiffs' counsel 

"far exceeded the bounds of proper comment and argument" by casting 

"unjustified aspersions on defense counsel's motives" and by 

describing the defense as "'replete with misleading red herrings' 
19 A-3760-14T2

and . . . based on trickery, shameful conduct, and the pulling of 

'stunts'"). 

We cannot agree with Keefe's counsel's characterization of 

the trial record. The attacks on Chartoff's attorney and the 

defense testimony exceeded the bounds of legitimate disagreement. 

Counsel was clearly using disparaging language with the intent of 

raising a suspicion in the juror's minds that some unspecified 

conspiracy was at play to protect Chartoff from liability. That 

suggestion was not supported by the trial record, exceeded the 

bounds of proper commentary, and made the issuance of a jury 

instruction necessary. We also disagree that Chartoff's 

attorney's summation justified the response. 

The judge's instruction was prefaced by the standard model 

jury charge language regarding the role of attorneys. And although 

the judge told the jury that the argument that Chartoff's counsel 

was attempting to mislead them had no "rightful place in proper 

commentary on the evidence[,]" she went on to discuss the 

difference between argument and evidence. The judge reiterated 

that nothing "either" attorney said in summation is evidence. The

judge ended with "nothing that either attorney has said is binding 

upon you." 

The instruction was necessitated by Keefe's counsel's 

summation. It underscored that the arguments made by the attorneys 
20 A-3760-14T2

are distinct and separate from the evidence, and that only the 

jury's independent assessment of that evidence determined the 

verdict, not the opinion of the judge or attorneys, or any comments 

they may have made. 

V.

Finally, we do not address Chartoff's cross-appeal. It is

unnecessary in light of our decision to affirm the jury's verdict.

Affirmed.