Considerations for Fusion Center and

Emergency Operations Center

Coordination

Comprehensive Preparedness Guide (CPG) 502 

May 2010

 

Preface 

Fusion centers and emergency operations centers (EOCs) should become familiar with each others’ roles 

and capabilities to facilitate successful interfacing and cooperation between them. In addition, it is 

imperative that the two develop a solid relationship in order to effectively work together to achieve their 

respective objectives. The relationships forged between these two entities will allow them to have 

continuous, meaningful contacts, which will enhance their ability to share information and intelligence 

regardless of the activation status of the EOC. Mutual trust and respect must guide interagency 

collaboration policies and protocols, allowing for effective and consistent collaboration during the steady 

state or during an emergency. 

In addition to addressing the relationship in a concept of operations (CONOPS) and standard operating 

procedures (SOPs), memorandums of understanding (MOUs) should be created, reviewed and updated to 

define roles during both periods of activation and non-activation. SOPs and MOUs also define how 

information will be shared between the two entities. Comprehensive Planning Guide (CPG) 502 focuses 

on this critical partnership and the exchange of information between these entities. 

Partnerships 

Effective prevention, protection, response and recovery efforts depend on the ability of all levels and 

sectors of government, as well as the private sector, to collect, analyze, disseminate and use homeland 

security- and crime-related information and intelligence. In support of this, the National Strategy for 

Information Sharing calls for a national information sharing capability through the establishment of a 

national integrated network of fusion centers. To facilitate the development of a national fusion center 

capability, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) Federal Emergency Management Agency 

(FEMA) National Preparedness Directorate (NPD) and the U.S. Department of Justice’s (DOJ) Bureau of 

Justice Assistance (BJA) have partnered to develop the Fusion Process Technical Assistance Program. 

This program has been developed in support of the DHS Office of Intelligence and Analysis (I&A) and in 

coordination with the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI); the Office of the Program 

Manager, Information Sharing Environment (PM-ISE); the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and 

experts from the State and local community, including the Global Justice Information Sharing Initiative 

(Global), the Criminal Intelligence Coordinating Council (CICC) and the Global Intelligence Working 

Group (GIWG). The Fusion Process Technical Assistance Program has also been developed to directly 

support the implementation of the Fusion Center Guidelines and the Baseline Capabilities for State and 

Major Urban Area Fusion Centers. 

In constructing the Fusion Center Guidelines, Global engaged diverse representation from the public and 

private sectors, melding emergency management and law enforcement expertise. Executive branch 

partners, such as the ODNI and the PM-ISE, have clarified policies and procedures that guide information 

sharing. 

The process of creating guidance for the operation of fusion centers has evolved through the development 

of the Baseline Capabilities for State and Major Urban Area Fusion Centers. This document identifies 

the baseline capabilities for fusion centers and the operational standards necessary to achieve each of the 

capabilities. The sustained Federal partnership with State and major urban area fusion centers is critical to 

the safety of the nation. The baseline capabilities recommend developing processes that govern official 

outreach with leaders and policymakers, the public sector, the media and citizens. These capabilities also 

recommend development of a plan to promote awareness of the fusion center’s purpose, mission and 

i 
Comprehensive Preparedness Guide 502 

functions (which, in turn, enhances partnership with the EOC), as well as ensure a common understanding 

of roles and responsibilities. 

Acknowledgements 

A working group of emergency managers, law enforcement agency representatives, fusion center 

representatives and emergency management and intelligence researchers developed CPG 502 in 

conjunction with DHS/FEMA and the joint DHS/DOJ Fusion Process Technical Assistance Program. The 

group and subsequent review sessions included representatives from: 

National and Federal Entities 

• CPG Working Group 

• DHS Office of Intelligence and Analysis 

• DHS FEMA National Preparedness Directorate 

• Fusion Center Management Group 

• Criminal Intelligence Coordinating Council 

• National Fusion Center Association 

Industry, Research Organizations and Universities 

• Argonne National Laboratory: Center for Integrated Emergency Preparedness 

• Booz Allen Hamilton 

• Community Research Associates, Inc. 

• IEM, Inc. 

• Lafayette Group 

ii 
Contents 

INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW .....................................................................................................1 

Purpose ................................................................................................................................................... 2 

Applicability and Scope ......................................................................................................................... 2 

Authorities .............................................................................................................................................. 2 

How to Use This Guide .......................................................................................................................... 5 

NIMS Compliance and Integration ........................................................................................................ 5 

Recommended Training ......................................................................................................................... 6 

Revision Process..................................................................................................................................... 6 

FEDERAL DEPARTMENTS INITIATIVES, ROLES AND GUIDELINES ....................................... 7 

Federal Initiatives and Roles .................................................................................................................. 7 

Fusion Center Management Group .................................................................................................. 7 

Department of Homeland Security .................................................................................................. 7 

Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Assistance ....................................................................... 8 

 ......................................................................................................................................................... 8 

Global Justice Information Sharing Initiative and the Criminal Intelligence Coordinating Council

THE ROLE OF FUSION CENTERS ....................................................................................................... 9 

The Intelligence Process ......................................................................................................................... 9 

The Fusion Process: Turning Information and Intelligence into Actionable Knowledge .................... 10 

Fusion Center Guidelines ..................................................................................................................... 11 

Baseline Capabilities for State and Major Urban Area Fusion Centers ......................................... 11 

Fusion Center Functions....................................................................................................................... 12 

THE ROLE OF THE EMERGENCY OPERATIONS CENTER ....................................................... 15 

EOC Organization and Structure .......................................................................................................... 15 

EOC Function....................................................................................................................................... 16 

Operational Exchange of Information .................................................................................................. 18 

EOC AND FUSION CENTER COORDINATION ............................................................................... 21 

Step One: Familiarization with Capabilities, Needs and Requirements ............................................... 21 

Standard Policies and Procedures .................................................................................................. 22 

Communication Tools .................................................................................................................... 23 

Databases ....................................................................................................................................... 23 

Staffing........................................................................................................................................... 24 

Training Resources ........................................................................................................................ 24 

Available and Accessible Information........................................................................................... 25 

Continuity of Operations ................................................................................................................ 26 

Step Two: Establish Partnerships ......................................................................................................... 27 

Step Three: Determine the Process ....................................................................................................... 28 

Information Exchange Procedures ................................................................................................. 28 

Steady State versus Active State .................................................................................................... 30 

Actionable Intelligence .................................................................................................................. 31 

Staffing........................................................................................................................................... 31 

Challenges...................................................................................................................................... 32 

Step Four: Training, Workshops and Exercises ................................................................................... 32 

iii 
Comprehensive Preparedness Guide 502 

Training.......................................................................................................................................... 33 

Workshops ..................................................................................................................................... 35 

Exercises ........................................................................................................................................ 36 

CASE STUDIES AND EXAMPLES....................................................................................................... 37 

Minnesota Joint Analysis Center and the Republican National Convention ........................................ 38 

Colorado Intelligence Analysis Center and the 2008 Democratic National Convention ..................... 39 

APPENDIX A: GLOSSARY AND ACRONYMS................................................................................A-1 

Glossary.............................................................................................................................................. A-1 

Acronyms ........................................................................................................................................... A-9 

APPENDIX B: DRAFT MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING ............................................... B-1 

APPENDIX C: FUSION CENTER AND EOC INTERFACE: ANALYSIS OF COORDINATION 

AND INTEGRATION BEST PRACTICES.........................................................................................C-1 

APPENDIX D: DEVELOPING PROCESSES TO ACQUIRE AND USE GEOSPATIAL 

INFORMATION TO SUPPORT ALL-HAZARDS PLANNING AND RESPONSE ......................D-1 

APPENDIX E: PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS: SAFEGUARD IOWA PARTNERSHIP’S 

CODE OF CONDUCT MANUAL FOR LIAISONS SERVING AT EMERGENCY OPERATIONS 

CENTERS................................................................................................................................................ E-1 

iv 
 

Introduction and Overview 

The fusion process is a cornerstone for the effective prevention of threats, including terrorism and other 

crimes, by State, local, tribal, and territorial governments. The term “fusion” refers to the overarching 

process of managing the flow of information and intelligence across all levels and sectors of government 

and the private sector. It goes beyond establishing an information/intelligence center or creating a 

computer network. Many fusion centers have undertaken an all-crimes and/or all-hazards approach, as 

well as the inclusion of multi-disciplinary and non-law enforcement partners in their processes. 

Ultimately, the fusion process supports the implementation of risk-based, information-driven prevention, 

protection, response and recovery programs. At the same time, it supports efforts to address immediate or 

emerging threat-related circumstances and events. 

The overall goal of the fusion process is to convert raw 

information and intelligence into actionable knowledge. 

Fusion centers are effective mechanisms for guiding this 

process. Additionally, a national network of fusion centers 

is working with Federal agencies and the intelligence 

community to accomplish the National Priorities of 

Expanded Regional Collaboration and Information 

Sharing and Collaboration as defined by DHS’s National 

Preparedness Guidelines. The National Preparedness 

Guidelines provide a capabilities-based preparedness 

process and doctrine with planning applications. The 

guidelines specifically reference the Target Capabilities 

List (TCL) as a comprehensive catalog of capabilities to 

Multiagency Coordination 

(MAC)/EOC Management: The 

capability to activate and sustain 

EOC/MAC operations, coordinate 

with other agencies and 

stakeholders, develop priorities and 

strategies to support incident 

management and continuity 

operations, manage resources and 

liaison with other entities to 

coordinates resources, and support 

executive decision making and 

coordination of information. 

perform homeland security missions, including EOC management and intelligence functions. The TCL 

helps ensure that operational planners and program managers across the nation can use common tools and 

processes when making planning, training, equipment, and other investments and can produce measurable 

results. 

EOCs and watch/warning centers, as well as other public 

safety and first responder agencies and private-sector 

entities, are essential providers of raw information, 

operational emergency management information, allhazards intelligence and other subject matter expertise. In 

addition, they are users of operational information and 

intelligence and, therefore, also “customers” of fusion 

centers. 

Coordination of EOCs and fusion centers is crucial to 

improving the safety of the public. Fusion centers, EOCs 

and other homeland security entities need to develop 

positive relationships and establish policies and protocols 

to share relevant information and intelligence during daily 

operations and during incidents. In many instances, past 

efforts to achieve this level of coordination have been met 

with a concern about how to share information based on 

its classification level. Conversely, fusion center staff 

members are often unaware of the type of information the 

Emergency Operations Center: The 

physical location at which the 

coordination of information and 

resources to support incident 

management (on-scene operations) 

activities normally takes place. An 

EOC may be a temporary facility or 

may be located in a more central or 

permanently established facility, 

perhaps at a higher level of 

organization within a jurisdiction. 

EOCs may be organized by major 

functional disciplines (e.g., fire 

services, law enforcement, medical 

services), by jurisdiction (e.g., 

Federal, State, regional, tribal, city, 

county) or by some combination 

thereof. 

1 
Comprehensive Preparedness Guide 502 

EOC staff need on a day-to-day basis or during incidents. Successful implementation of these information 

requirements necessitates willing partners (who understand each other’s needs and concerns as well as 

legal restrictions that may limit the dissemination of law enforcement, medical or other sensitive 

information) and the establishment of appropriate communication channels. Ultimately, this improved 

relationship will serve to support a more coordinated, timely and effective response to emerging incidents 

or threats, as well as the integration of law enforcement-focused prevention efforts with emergency 

management-focused efforts. 

Purpose 

This document provides State and Major Urban Area fusion center and EOC officials with guidance for 

coordination between fusion centers and EOCs. It outlines the roles of fusion centers and EOCs within the 

fusion process and provides steps by which these entities can work together to share information and 

intelligence on an ongoing basis. This guide supports the implementation of the Baseline Capabilities for 

State and Major Urban Area Fusion Centers and, likewise, assists EOCs fill their missions in both steady 

state and active state emergency operations, as supported by the CPG 601: Design and Management of 

Emergency Operations Centers. This CPG provides guidance on the broad capability requirements of an 

EOC. 

Applicability and Scope 

This guide is intended for public safety leaders, including emergency management and fusion center 

personnel. The guide recognizes that many jurisdictions across the country have already developed 

working relationships and sharing protocols and therefore does not establish any immediate requirements. 

Rather, this guide suggests that future coordination efforts take this guidance into account. 

Authorities 

The following Federal legislation, plans and strategies have been critical to the development of 

information sharing processes: 

• Public Law 110-53, Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 

• National Response Framework (NRF) 

• National Incident Management System (NIMS) 

• National Criminal Intelligence Sharing Plan 

• National Strategy for Information Sharing 

• Fusion Center Guidelines 

• Baseline Capabilities for State and Major Urban Area Fusion Centers 

• Critical Infrastructure and Key Resources (CIKR) Protection Capabilities for Fusion Centers 

• Information Sharing Environment (ISE) Implementation Plan 

• ISE Guideline 2 

• National Preparedness Guidelines 

2 
 

Introduction and Overview 

• CPG 601: Design and Management of Emergency Operations Centers 

Public Law 110-53 (also known as “Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 

2007”). This act established the Urban Area Security Initiative (UASI) to provide grants to assist highrisk metropolitan areas in preventing, preparing for, protecting against and responding to terrorist acts. 

This law also established the State Homeland Security Grant Program (HSGP) and called for funding for 

law enforcement and terrorism prevention activities, including information sharing and analysis, target 

hardening, threat recognition and terrorist interdiction. 

NRF, Emergency Support Function (ESF) 5 (Emergency Management). ESF-5 coordinates 

emergency management and response efforts. It facilitates information flow in the pre-incident phase and 

coordinates intergovernmental planning, training and exercising in order to prepare assets for deployment. 

ESF-5 activities include critical functions that support and facilitate multiagency planning and 

coordination for operations involving incidents requiring Federal coordination, including functions such 

as information collection, analysis and management. 

NRF, ESF-13 (Public Safety and Security). ESF-13 facilitates coordination of public safety and security 

among Federal, State, local, tribal, and territorial agencies to ensure that communication and coordination 

processes are consistent with stated incident management missions and objectives. ESF-13 is generally 

activated when extensive assistance is required due to inadequate or overwhelmed State, local, tribal, and 

territorial resources or when protective solutions or capabilities unique to the Federal Government are 

required, especially in pre- or post-incident situations. When activated, ESF-13 may provide protection 

and security resources, planning assistance, technology support and other technical assistance to support 

incident operations. 

NIMS. NIMS is a set of principles that provides a systematic, proactive approach for guiding government 

agencies at all levels, nongovernmental organizations and the private sector to work seamlessly to 

prevent, protect against, respond to, recover from and mitigate the effects of incidents, regardless of 

cause, size, location or complexity in order to reduce the loss of life or property and harm to the 

environment. 

National Criminal Intelligence Sharing Plan. The National Criminal Intelligence Sharing Plan was first 

published in October 2003 and revised in July 2005. The purpose of the plan is to link Federal, State, 

local, tribal, and territorial law enforcement agencies, allowing them to share intelligence information to 

prevent terrorism and crime. The plan outlines policies, standards and guidelines for developing a local 

law enforcement intelligence function and includes recommendations regarding key implementation 

issues and barriers. It also emphasizes better methods for developing and sharing critical data. The CICC 

was established to set national-level policies to implement the plan and to monitor its progress on the 

State and local levels. The CICC works with the Law Enforcement Information Strategy Initiative of DOJ 

and with the Justice Intelligence Coordinating Council to improve the flow of intelligence and 

information among all levels of law enforcement agencies. 

National Strategy for Information Sharing. This strategy adheres to the National Security Strategy and 

is closely aligned with the National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, the National Intelligence Strategy 

and the National Strategy for Homeland Security. The strategy describes the Administration’s plan to 

establish a more integrated information sharing capability, improve interagency information sharing at the 

Federal level and build information sharing between the Federal Government and non-Federal partners. 

The strategy is founded on the following guiding principles: 

• Effective information sharing comes through strong partnership among Federal, State, local, tribal, 

and territorial authorities, private-sector organizations and foreign partners and allies. 

3 
Comprehensive Preparedness Guide 502 

• A cultural awareness must be fostered to use information and knowledge from all sources to support 

counterterrorism efforts. 

• Information sharing must be integrated into all aspects of counterterrorism activity. 

• Information sharing procedures, processes and systems must draw upon and integrate existing 

technical capabilities and respect established authorities and responsibilities. 

• State and major urban area fusion centers need to be incorporated into the national information 

sharing framework. 

Fusion Center Guidelines - DOJ, in collaboration with DHS and the FBI, developed these guidelines for 

law enforcement, intelligence, public safety and private-sector communities to effectively implement 

ways to develop and operate fusion centers throughout the country. The guidelines make specific 

recommendations on law enforcement roles, governance, information technology (IT) needs and 

information security to better protect our homeland and maximize crime-fighting efforts. 

Baseline Capabilities for State and Major Urban Area Fusion Centers. As an addendum to the 

Fusion Center Guidelines, this document identifies baseline capabilities and operational standards 

necessary for fusion centers to achieve their objectives. Baseline capabilities are labeled under Fusion 

Process Capabilities and Management and Administrative Capabilities. 

CIKR Protection Capabilities for Fusion Centers. As an appendix to Global’s Baseline Capabilities 

for State and Major Urban Area Fusion Centers, this document identifies the capabilities necessary for 

State and major urban area fusion centers to establish a CIKR protection analytic capability that supports 

infrastructure security activities at the State and local levels. 

ISE Implementation Plan. Authorized under the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 

2004, the plan identifies and promotes procedures on information sharing to facilitate anti- and 

counterterrorism efforts amongst the Federal, State, local, tribal, and territorial governments and other 

ISE partners. 

ISE Guideline 2. Authorized under the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, the 

guideline develops a common framework for information sharing between and among Federal 

departments and agencies, as well as State, local, tribal, and territorial governments, law enforcement 

agencies and the private sector. It requires the development and implementation of this framework for 

“homeland security information,” “terrorism information,” and “law enforcement information.” 

National Preparedness Guidelines. Implemented under the authorization of Homeland Security 

Presidential Directive (HSPD) 8, these guidelines supersede the National Preparedness Goal and define 

how to prepare for all hazards. It organizes and synchronizes efforts across the country to strengthen the 

nation’s preparedness by reinforcing the concept that preparedness is a shared responsibility. 

CPG 601: Design and Management of Emergency Operations Centers (release date TBD). CPG 601 

is a new Federal guidance document designed to address the broad capability requirements of an EOC. It 

supersedes Civil Preparedness Guide 1-20, Emergency Operations Center Handbook, which was written 

in 1984 and revised in 1989. Civil Preparedness Guide 1-20 is rescinded. 

4 
How to Use This Guide 

Introduction and Overview 

This document is part of the joint DHS/DOJ Fusion Process Technical Assistance Program and the 

broader FEMA CPG effort and is designed to help both novice and experienced planners navigate the 

planning process. The first section addresses the applicability, authority, purpose and scope of this CPG. 

The next section outlines the roles and initiatives of Federal departments. The third and fourth sections 

detail how fusion centers and EOCs function, within the broader context of the information sharing 

environment. The fifth section describes how fusion centers and EOCs may consider coordinating with 

each other for intelligence and information sharing, and the last section provides case studies about this 

coordination. The appendices to this guide are as follows: 

• Appendix A: Glossary and Acronyms 

• Appendix B: Draft Memorandum of Understanding 

• Appendix C: Fusion Center and EOC Interface: Analysis of Coordination and Integration Best 

Practices 

• Appendix D: Developing Processes to Acquire and Use Geospatial Information to Support AllHazards Planning and Response 

• Appendix E: Public-Private Partnerships: Safeguard Iowa Partnership’s Code of Conduct Manual for 

Liaisons Serving at Emergency Operations Centers 

NIMS Compliance and Integration 

NIMS provides guidance on utilizing and integrating the Intelligence/Investigations function. The 

Intelligence/ Investigations function within the Incident Command System (ICS) provides a flexible and 

scalable framework that will allow for the integration of intelligence and investigations activities and 

information. Figure 1 delineates the places in which the information and intelligence function may be 

found within an incident command structure and allows for the Operations section to be supported by 

fusion center personnel. 

5 
 

Info. &

Intelligence Section

Info. &

Intelligence Section

Info. & Intelligence 

Branch

Info. & Intelligence

Branch Info. &

Intelligence Unit

Info. & 

Intelligence Unit

Info. & Intelligence

Officer

Info. & Intelligence

Officer

Comprehensive Preparedness Guide 502 

Based on the incident needs, the information and intelligence function may be activated as a 

fifth section, as an element within the Operations or Planning Sections or as part of the 

Command Staff. 

See NIMS for additional information. 

Operations

Section

Operations

Section Planning

Section

Planning

Section Logistics

Section

Logistics

Section

Finance/Admin.

Section

Finance/Admin.

Section Operations

Section

Operations

Section Planning

Section

Planning

Section Logistics

Section

Logistics

Section 

Finance/Admin.

Section

Finance/Admin.

Section 

Info. & 

Intelligence Section 

Operations 

Section

Operations

Section

Info. & Intelligence

Branch 

Operations 

Section

Operations

Section 

Planning

Section

Planning

Section

Resources

Unit

Resources

Unit

Demobilization

Unit

Demobilization

Unit

Situation

Unit

Situation

Unit

Documentation

Unit

Documentation

Unit

Planning

Section

Planning

Section 

Resources 

Unit 

Resources 

Unit 

Demobilization 

Unit 

Demobilization 

Unit 

Situation 

Unit 

Situation 

Unit 

Documentation

Unit 

Documentation 

Unit 

Info. & 

Intelligence Unit

Incident

Commander

Incident

Commander

Incident 

Commander 

Incident 

Commander 

Info. & Intelligence

Officer 

Figure 1: Possible Placement of the Information and Intelligence Unit within a Command 

Structure 

Although the emergency management system and fusion center network may use different methods and 

tools, both share a public safety mission. Integrating the concepts of NIMS and the ISE can contribute 

toward effective collaboration in the joint mission space. 

Recommended Training 

See EOC and Fusion Center Coordination: Step Four: Training, Workshops and Exercises. 

Revision Process 

DHS will revise this CPG as needed and issue changed pages through the publication and distribution 

system and online through a variety of sources (e.g., Disaster Assistance 

[http://www.disasterassistance.gov] and DHS Lessons Learned Information Sharing (LLIS) 

[http://www.llis.dhs.gov]). 

DHS welcomes recommendations on how to improve this CPG so it better serves the needs of the 

homeland security, law enforcement, and emergency management communities. Recommendations for 

improving this guide can be sent to NPD-Planning@dhs.gov, ATTN: PAB – CPG Initiative – 502. 

6 
 

Federal Departments 

Initiatives, Roles and 

Guidelines 

Federal Initiatives and Roles 

Fusion Center Management Group 

The Fusion Center Management Group is co-chaired by DHS Office of Intelligence and Analysis (I&A) 

and the Office of the Program Manager, Information Sharing Environment (PM-ISE). The mission of this 

group is to provide leadership, coordination and guidance in the development of—and the Federal 

government’s support to—a national integrated network of fusion centers operating at the defined 

baseline level of capability. The following are goals of the group: 

• Serve as the primary forum for coordinating Federal support in the development, support and 

sustainment of a national, integrated network of State and major urban area fusion centers operating 

at a defined baseline level of capability; 

• Promote awareness of fusion centers’ mission, purpose and value among internal and external 

stakeholders; and 

• Develop a coordinated strategy for the sustainment of fusion centers. 

Department of Homeland Security 

The Secretary of Homeland Security identified I&A as the executive agent within DHS for coordinating 

the Department’s activities with fusion centers. As a member of both the intelligence community and 

DHS, I&A provides a vital link between the intelligence community and Federal, State, local, tribal, 

territorial, and private sector entities. It works closely with the 16 Federal intelligence organizations and 

agencies, as well as local, tribal, territorial, and private-sector entities to ensure information and 

intelligence are collected, fused, analyzed and disseminated to all related partners, as necessary and 

appropriate, to provide a complete assessment of the threats across the country. It works with fusion 

centers throughout the country against threats and hazards related to a variety of issues and situations, 

including border security, radicalization and extremism, particular groups entering the United States, 

protection of CIKR and weapons of mass destruction (WMD). DHS also created a program office within 

I&A to address the concerns of State and local officials and to manage deployment of personnel and other 

resources to fusion centers. 

FEMA provides support to DHS I&A to assist with the development, implementation and operation of 

fusion centers through the joint DHS/DOJ Fusion Process Technical Assistance Program. This effort 

includes coordination of related fusion center efforts with specific DHS offices, including the DHS Office 

7 
Comprehensive Preparedness Guide 502 

of Infrastructure Protection (IP), DHS Office of Health Affairs (OHA), the U.S. Fire Administration 

(USFA) and others. FEMA also supports the development and operation of EOCs to improve emergency 

management and preparedness capabilities at the Federal, State, local, tribal, territorial, and private-sector 

level through the provision of support via the EOC Design and Management Technical Assistance service 

and by supporting NIMS compliance. The NIC provides strategic direction and a national program for 

NIMS education and awareness throughout the country. 

Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice 

Assistance 

BJA is a component of the DOJ Office of Justice Programs and supports law enforcement, corrections, 

technology and other related prevention initiatives that strengthen the nation’s criminal justice system. 

BJA has three primary components: policy, programs and planning. The Policy Office provides national 

leadership in criminal justice policy, training and technical assistance to further the administration of 

justice. It also acts as a liaison to national organizations that partner with BJA to set policy and help 

disseminate information on best and promising practices. The Programs Office coordinates and 

administers all State and local grant programs and acts as BJA’s direct line of communication to State, 

local, tribal, and territorial governments by providing assistance and coordinating resources. The Planning 

Office coordinates the planning, communications and budget formulation and execution; provides overall 

BJA-wide coordination and supports streamlining efforts. BJA also supports the management of the joint 

DHS/DOJ Fusion Process Technical Assistance Program, which supports the development, 

implementation and operation of fusion centers. 

Global Justice Information Sharing Initiative 

and the Criminal Intelligence Coordinating 

Council 

Established in May 2004, Global’s CICC is composed of members from law enforcement agencies at all 

levels of government. Members of the CICC serve as a significant voice and advocates for State, local, 

tribal, and territorial law enforcement and fusion centers, supporting their efforts to develop and share 

criminal intelligence. Because of the indispensable part that State, local, tribal, and territorial law 

enforcement play in homeland security, it is imperative that they have a voice in the development of 

policies and systems for information and intelligence sharing. The CICC is in the unique position to 

ensure these voices are heard and advises the U.S. Attorney General on the best use of criminal 

intelligence to keep the United States safe. 

8 
 

The Role of Fusion Centers 

As defined by the Fusion Center Guidelines, a fusion center is a “collaborative effort of two or more 

agencies that provide resources, expertise and information to the center with the goal of maximizing their 

ability to detect, prevent, investigate and respond to criminal and terrorist activity. The primary products 

of a fusion center are situational awareness and warnings that are supported by law enforcement 

intelligence, derived from the application of the intelligence process, where requirements for actionable 

information are generated and information is collected, integrated, evaluated, analyzed and disseminated.” 

The Intelligence Process 

The core function of a fusion center is the intelligence process. Simply stated, the intelligence process (or 

cycle) is an organized process by which information is gathered, assessed and distributed. Figure 2 

depicts the following steps in the process: planning and direction, information gathering, processing and 

collation, analysis and production, dissemination and reevaluation (feedback). Fusion centers engage in 

this process, regardless of their mission (all-crimes, terrorism or all-hazards), the disciplines or 

stakeholders they support (law enforcement, fire services, public health, etc.) or the types of information 

they receive. This process is the means by which raw information becomes a finished intelligence product 

for use in decision making and formulating policies/actions. 

Figure 2: Intelligence Process 

9 
 

 

 

Comprehensive Preparedness Guide 502 

The Fusion Process: Turning 

Information and Intelligence into 

Actionable Knowledge 

The term “fusion” refers to managing 

the flow of information and intelligence 

across levels and sectors of government 

and the private sector. It goes beyond 

establishing an intelligence center or 

creating a computer network. Fusion 

supports the implementation of riskbased, information-driven prevention, 

response and consequence management 

programs. At the same time, the fusion 

process supports efforts to address 

immediate or emerging threat-related 

circumstances and events. Data fusion 

involves the exchange of Federal and 

non-Federal information from different 

sources, including law enforcement, 

Information vs. Intelligence 

• Information: Pieces of raw, unanalyzed data or 

reports from various sources about an event, 

criminal activity or subject of interest. 

• Intelligence: The product of the collation, 

evaluation and analysis of raw information with 

respect to an identifiable person or group of 

persons in an effort to anticipate, prevent or 

monitor possible threats (i.e., criminal, terrorist or 

naturally occurring activity). 

“Intelligence is information that has been analyzed to 

determine its meaning and relevance.” 

public safety and the private sector. When combined with appropriate analyses, data fusion results in 

meaningful and actionable intelligence and information. Thus, the fusion process turns information and 

intelligence into knowledge. 

The fusion process also: 

• Allows State, local, tribal, and territorial entities to 

better forecast and identify emerging crime, public 

safety and public health trends; 

• Supports multidisciplinary, proactive, risk-based and 

community-focused problem solving; 

• Provides a continuous flow of intelligence to officials 

to assist in developing a depiction of evolving threats 

or hazards; and 

• Improves the delivery of emergency and nonemergency services. 

Actionable Intelligence 

Intelligence should: 

• Paint a picture; 

• Tell a story; 

• Guide the response; and 

• Produce knowledge upon which a 

course of action can be 

developed/recommended for 

resolution. 

10 
Fusion Center Guidelines 

The Role of Fusion Centers 

Each fusion center tailors its scope and mission to meet specific jurisdictional needs, but the Fusion 

Center Guidelines emphasize a consistent framework by which all fusion centers should operate. There 

are 18 guidelines, and each guideline discusses an expectation for fusion center operations. For example, 

all fusion centers are encouraged to leverage existing systems, databases and networks (such as DOJ’s 

Global Justice Extensible Markup Language Data Model and the National Information Exchange Model 

(NIEM) standards). Fusion centers are also expected to adhere to the National Criminal Intelligence 

Sharing Plan, develop a mission statement to identify goals and promote common terminology for all 

involved stakeholders. 

Baseline Capabilities for State and Major 

Urban Area Fusion Centers 

The Fusion Center Guidelines contain an addendum called the Baseline Capabilities for State and Major 

Urban Area Fusion Centers, which provides a series of recommended baseline capabilities and standards 

or tasks to accomplish their mission. Baseline capabilities are categorized into two sections: 

1. Fusion Process Capabilities; and 

2. Management and Administrative Capabilities. 

The Fusion Process Capabilities section focuses on the intelligence process within the fusion center while 

the Management and Administrative Capabilities section focuses on the proper management and 

functioning of the fusion center. They also provide general tenets for integrating the information 

exchange processes of fusion centers and EOCs, which will be discussed in greater detail in the EOC and 

Fusion Center Coordination section of this guide. 

Fusion Process Capabilities 

The Fusion Process Capabilities addresses the intelligence process of the fusion center including 

intelligence collection, analysis and dissemination (see Figure 2). The intelligence process is the 

foundation of the fusion process and is necessary for fusion centers to operate. The intelligence process is 

addressed in each of the following areas: 

1. Planning and Requirements Development; 

2. Information Gathering/Collection and Recognition of Indicators and Warnings; 

3. Processing and Collation of Information; 

4. Intelligence Analysis and Production; 

5. Intelligence/Information Dissemination; and 

6. Reevaluation. 

11 
Comprehensive Preparedness Guide 502 

Management and Administrative Capabilities 

The Management and Administrative Capabilities focus on proper management and functions of fusion 

centers. These capabilities create the environment in which centers can operate, assign tasks, allocate and 

manage resources and develop and enforce policy. The Management and Administrative Capabilities 

typically include the following functions: 

1. Management/Governance; 

2. Information Privacy Protections; 

3. Security; 

4. Personnel and Training; 

5. IT/Communications Infrastructure, Systems, Equipment, Facility and Physical Infrastructure; and 

6. Funding. 

Fusion Center Functions 

Fusion centers compile, analyze and disseminate criminal, homeland security and terrorist information 

and intelligence, as well as information regarding public safety, law enforcement, fire, public health, 

social services, public works, etc. This intelligence and information is both strategic (i.e., designed to 

provide guidance on general trends) as well as tactical (i.e., intended for a specific event) and is collected 

on an ongoing basis. The National Strategy for Information Sharing recognizes the sovereignty of the 

entities that own and/or are considering operating a fusion center. The missions of fusion centers vary 

based on the environment in which the center operates—some have adopted the all-crimes approach, 

whereas others have also included an all-hazards approach. The strategy supports and encourages these 

approaches, while respecting the principle that a fusion center’s mission should be defined based on 

jurisdictional needs. 

State, local, tribal, and territorial governments, as well as private-sector entities, are encouraged to work 

with both State and UASI regions to participate in fusion efforts. The public should also be engaged 

through public education programs that describe warning signs and actions that should be taken if 

suspicious activity is observed. 

It is critical to the successful coordination between EOCs and fusion centers that the fusion focus is 

expanded beyond law enforcement. In many States, fusion centers include emergency managers, fire, 

hazardous materials, public health and other disciplines in their operations or within their liaison or 

outreach efforts. Generally, these efforts to incorporate other agencies’ needs and personnel have been 

extremely successful and have enhanced the integration of the fusion centers into the entire prevention, 

protection, response and recovery mission areas. This integration also helps cement the long-term value 

and viability of the fusion centers in support of emergency management and response. 

12 
The Role of Fusion Centers 

Fusion Center Baseline Capability: All-Hazards Approach 

An all-hazards approach refers to preparedness for terrorist attacks, major disasters and 

other emergencies within the United States. Within the context of the fusion process, some 

fusion centers have defined their mission to include an all-hazards approach. While the 

application of the all-hazards approach varies, it generally means the fusion center has 

identified and prioritized types of major disasters and emergencies, beyond terrorism and 

crime that could occur within their jurisdiction. For this approach, fusion centers also gather, 

analyze and disseminate information that would assist the relevant responsible agencies 

(e.g., law enforcement, fire, public health, emergency management, critical infrastructure, 

etc.) with the prevention, protection, response or recovery efforts of those incidents. A fusion 

center can use an all-hazards approach but not address every possible hazard in its 

operations. Part of the annual risk assessment a fusion center develops (or supports 

development of) should identify which hazards a State, Territory, Tribe or region should 

prioritize within its homeland security planning process. The risk assessment can be used by 

the fusion centers to formulate their Standing Information Needs (SINs). The SINs, in turn, 

are used to guide the participants in the fusion process and their information collection 

efforts. 

13 
Comprehensive Preparedness Guide 502 

This page intentionally left blank. 

14 
 

 

The Role of the Emergency 

Operations Center 

EOCs are the physical location where multi-agency Common Operating Picture: An

response coordination occurs. Most States maintain a overview of an incident by all relevant State-level EOC configured to expand, as necessary, to parties that provides incident manage events requiring State-level assistance. EOCs help information enabling the Incident form a common operating picture of the incident, relieve Commander/Unified Command and

on-scene command of the burden of external coordination any supporting agencies and and secure additional resources. The core functions of an organizations to make effective, EOC include coordination, communication, resource consistent, and timely decisions. allocation and tracking and information collection, 

analysis and dissemination. 

EOC Organization and Structure 

Civil Preparedness Guide 1-20 was the last Federal guidance written in 1984 to address the broad 

capability requirements of an EOC. Even though it was revised in 1989, the field of emergency 

management has changed significantly since then. Civil Preparedness Guide 1-20 is rescinded and is 

superseded by CPG 601: Design and Management of Emergency Operations Centers. This new Federal 

planning guide provides information for developing a new EOC or retrofitting an existing one through 

assessment and needs analysis. 

EOCs may be permanent organizations and facilities that are staffed full time, or they may be established 

to meet short-term needs. Standing EOCs (or those activated to support larger, more complex incidents) 

are typically established in a central or permanently established facility. Such permanent facilities in a 

State or larger community are typically directed by a full-time emergency manager. EOCs may be 

organized by major discipline (fire, law enforcement, medical services, etc.), by jurisdiction (city, county, 

region, etc.), by ESF (communications, public works, engineering, transportation, resource support, etc.) 

or, more likely, by some combination thereof. 

EOCs may also be staffed by personnel—with varying levels of training and sometimes a collateral 

duty—representing multiple jurisdictions and functional disciplines and a wide variety of resources. For 

example, an EOC established in response to a bioterrorism incident would likely include a mix of law 

enforcement, emergency management, public health and medical personnel (e.g., local, State, or Federal 

public health officials and possibly representatives of health care facilities, emergency medical services, 

etc.). 

The physical size, staffing and equipping of an EOC will depend on the size of the jurisdiction, resources 

available and anticipated incident management workload. EOCs may be organized and staffed in a variety 

of ways. Regardless of its specific organizational structure, an EOC should include the following core 

functions: coordination; communications; resource allocation and tracking and information collection, 

analysis and dissemination. 

15 
Comprehensive Preparedness Guide 502 

EOC Function 

While the local incident command structure directs on-scene incident management activities and 

maintains command and control of on-scene incident operations, EOCs are activated as necessary to 

support these local efforts. Therefore, the EOC is the central location from which off-scene activities are 

coordinated. Additionally, some States may implement and leverage regional operations centers between 

the local incident command and a State-level EOC. Chief elected and appointed officials, as well as 

personnel supporting core functions, may be located at the EOC depending upon the responsibilities of 

their positions. These officials are often members of the policy group and may have primary 

responsibility for policy decisions. The key function of EOC personnel is to ensure that responders who 

are located at the scene have the resources (e.g., personnel, information, tools and equipment) they need 

for the response and to manage public information. Additionally, governmental departments (or agencies, 

bureaus, etc.) or private organizations may also have department operations centers (DOCs) that serve as 

the interface between the ongoing operations of that organization and the emergency operations it is 

supporting. The DOC may directly support the incident and receive information relative to its operations. 

In most cases, DOCs are physically represented in a combined agency EOC by authorized agents for the 

department or agency. 

Upon activation of an EOC, communication and coordination should be established between Incident 

Command and the EOC. Additionally, EOCs at all levels of government and across functional agencies 

should be capable of communicating appropriately with other EOCs, including those maintained by 

private organizations. Communications systems between EOCs must be reliable and contain built-in 

redundancies. The efficient functioning of EOCs often relies on the existence of mutual aid agreements 

and joint communications protocols among participating agencies. 

16 
 

The Role of the Emergency Operations Center 

An EOC is activated to support on-scene response during an escalating incident. Activating 

the EOC relieves the on-scene Incident Commander of the burden of external coordination 

and securing additional resources. 

• An EOC is: 

− A physical location; 

− Staffed with personnel trained for and authorized to represent an agency/discipline; 

− Equipped with mechanisms for communicating with the incident site and obtaining 

resources; 

− Managed through protocols; and 

− Used by all levels of government. 

• An EOC consists of personnel and equipment appropriate to the level of incident. 

• An EOC is used: 

− In varying ways within all levels of government and the private sector; and 

− To provide coordination, direction and support during emergencies. 

• An EOC may: 

− Facilitate Multiagency Coordination System (MACS) functions and may be needed to 

support Area Command, Incident Command or Unified Command when resource 

needs exceed local capabilities; 

− Provide for the transition into recovery; and 

− Be activated in anticipation of an event. 

• An EOC does not command the on-scene tactical level of the incident. 

EOCs should be both flexible and scalable. They will generally perform common functions during an 

incident; however, not all of the system’s functions will be performed during every incident, and 

functions may not occur in any particular order. Primary functions may include the following: 

• Situation assessment; Multiagency Coordination 

• Incident priority determination; System: The primary function 

of the MACS is to coordinate • Critical resource acquisition and allocation; activities above the field level 

and to prioritize the incident • Policy direction for relevant incident management and demands for critical or interagency activities; competing resources, thereby, • Coordination with FEMA Regional Response Coordination assisting the coordination of 

Centers (RRCCs); the operations in the field. The 

MACS consists of a • Coordination with other MACS elements; combination of elements, such 

• Coordination with elected and appointed officials; as personnel, procedures, 

protocols, business practices • Coordination of summary information; and and communications integrated 

• Public information. into a common system. 

17 
 

Comprehensive Preparedness Guide 502 

Operational Exchange of 

Information 

A primary focus of EOCs is on response and recovery efforts associated with natural and man-made 

incidents. While the purposes of an EOC and a fusion center differ greatly, it is essential for these two 

entities to work together and to understand each other’s goals and priorities, as well as where their 

missions may be similar or overlap. At a minimum, EOCs should establish close communication with 

fusion centers for the exchange of actionable information. Fusion center plans and procedures should 

include information about how the center will support the EOC prior to, during and after an event or 

incident. 

These information exchange processes should begin early in the planning phases (i.e., prior to an incident, 

by addressing the fusion center’s role in the EOP and hazard analysis development phases). During the 

hazard analysis, the jurisdiction examines hazards that likely to affect the community and risks posed by 

each hazard are then quantified. When completed, the community’s hazard analysis should form the basis 

for the entire emergency planning process and the development of an EOP. The EOP establishes the 

overall authority, roles and functions performed during emergencies, is activated to guide emergency 

response and recovery activities and designates the facility that will serve as the EOC during emergencies. 

Depending on jurisdictional responsibilities, fusion centers can play a valuable role in providing 

information and intelligence to support the completion or update of a hazard analysis and resulting EOP. 

Additionally, any information about specific incidents or events that may affect the jurisdiction—or 

would allow the jurisdiction to be better prepared—should be shared with the emergency manager and 

perhaps with the full EOC staff. EOCs can provide the fusion center with situational awareness of 

ongoing events and serve as a warning point during activation. 

18 
The Role of the Emergency Operations Center 

What Is in a Hazard Analysis? 

A hazard analysis involves examining the likely hazards that could affect a community and 

quantifying the risk posed by each hazard. Hazards are conditions or situations that have 

the potential for causing harm to people, property or the environment. Hazards can be 

classified into three categories: 

• Natural (e.g., tornadoes and earthquakes); 

• Intentional (e.g., terrorism or civil disturbance); and 

• Technological (e.g., failure of the power grid or hazardous materials spills). 

Hazard analysis itself includes three steps: 

Step 1: Identifying Hazards. Develop a list of hazards that may occur in a community. This 

list is usually based on historical data about past events. Sources of information about past 

events may include newspaper files; weather records; insurance records; accident reports; 

EOC records; fire department inspections and anecdotal information from long-time 

residents. 

Step 2: Developing Hazard Profiles. Develop a profile of each identified hazard according 

to the following characteristics: 

• Predictability (e.g., frequency and/or likelihood of occurrence, seasonal pattern, etc.); 

• Magnitude or severity of impact on the community (e.g., extent of damage expected, the 

types of damage that can be expected to the infrastructure, etc.); 

• Speed of onset (e.g., hurricanes usually provide some amount of preparation time 

before they strike while earthquakes or explosions could occur without warning); and 

• The potential for cascading effects (e.g., flooding following a hurricane or fires following 

an earthquake because of gas line ruptures). 

Step 3: Determining Risk Using a Hazard Analysis. After compiling information for each 

hazard that a community is vulnerable to, the risks associated with each hazard need to be 

assessed so that the planning team can predict and prepare for those of highest potential 

impact on people, services, facilities and structures. When assessing risk, it is important to 

keep in mind the following hierarchy of response priorities: 

1. Life safety. Conditions that could affect the health and/or safety of the population; 

2. Essential facilities. Facilities, such as fire houses, precinct houses or waste water 

treatment facilities that, if affected by the hazard, would seriously and adversely affect 

the community’s ability to respond; and 

3. CIKR. Roadways, utilities and other components of the infrastructure that, if damaged, 

would seriously and adversely affect life safety or response capability. 

19 
EOCs also need a host of other 

information, including weather, 

geospatial and remote sensing 

imagery, damage assessments, 

media reports, financial impact 

and social effects. They may need 

assistance in gathering this event- eventor incident-specific information 

for planning, response and/or 

recovery purposes. Fusion center 

personnel may also be useful in 

analyzing the information 

gathered by EOC sources, 

particularly when the EOC is in 

the active state and has a greater 

need for decision-making 

information. 

Because many EOCs have limited staffing resources, 

intelligence analysts from State or urban area fusion 

centers may be available to augment the fusion 

center/EOC interface (physically or virtually) and to 

serve as liaisons during an incident. The details of the 

augmentation of EOC staff with fusion center 

personnel should be included in the MOU between the 

two centers and should include both the steady state and the active state of EOC operations. In many operations. In many 

cases, fusion centers are co-located or located in close proximity with the EOC. EOCs might also consider 

establishing a task force of personnel assigned to serve as liaisons to the fusion center when the EOC is 

not activated so that staff can gain familiarly with fusion center activities and operations. In jurisdictions 

where a fusion liaison program is formalized, a cadre of qualified personnel may already exist. 

EOCs should plan to have a capability to access and share information with fusion centers, as well as 

other entities, and should leverage systems such as the Regional Information Sharing System (RISS), Law 

Enforcement Online (LEO) and the Homeland Security Information Network (HSIN) to support this. 

Additionally, EOC’s must ensure safeguards are enacted when information from the fusion center is 

passed. These safeguard measures may include limiting dissemination of information to appropriate 

personnel assigned to the EOC, signing non-disclosure agreements and ensuring members who have 

access to this information are vetted for U.S. citizenship and have a need to know. 

Comprehensive Preparedness Guide 502 

Steady State: Steady state is the

posture for routine, normal, day-to-day

watch operations and situational

awareness, contrasted by temporary

periods of heightened alert or real-time

response to threats or incidents.

EOCs should plan to have a capability to access and share information with fusion centers, as well as 

other entities, and should leverage systems such as the Regional Information Sharing System (RISS), Law 

Enforcement Online (LEO) and the Homeland Security Information Network (HSIN) to support this. 

Additionally, EOC’s must ensure safeguards are enacted when information from the fusion center is 

passed. These safeguard measures may include limiting dissemination of information to appropriate 

personnel assigned to the EOC, signing non-disclosure agreements and ensuring members who have 

access to this information are vetted for U.S. citizenship and have a need to know. 

Information and Intelligence Management: It is

important that the incident management organization

establishes a process for gathering, sharing and managing

incident-related information and intelligence. The following

are examples of information and intelligence used to

manage an incident:

• Risk assessments;

• Medical intelligence (i.e., surveillance); 

• Weather information;

• Geospatial data;

• Structural designs; 

• Toxic contaminant levels; and 

• Utilities and public works data.

A number of fusion centers are at various stages in developing formalized processes and 

procedures for requesting, accessing and using geospatial data to support all-hazards 

planning and response efforts. Useful geospatial data can run the gamut from before/after 

aerial photography or satellite imagery to point locations of water intakes in a flood plain to 

the locations of CIKR assets. Fusion centers should engage in thoughtful planning so that 

they are prepared to request, access and use geospatial resources efficiently. 

See Appendix D: Developing Processes to Acquire and Use Geospatial Information to 

Support All-Hazards Planning and Response for more information. 

20 
 

EOC and Fusion Center 

Coordination 

Coordinating and/or integrating EOC 

and fusion center operations require Fusion Center Baseline Capabilities:

careful planning and coordination. The I. Fusion Process Capabilities: following steps are recommended for 

this process. Within each step, the A. Planning and Requirements Development 

associated fusion center baseline 8. Coordination with Response and capability will be addressed. Recovery Officials. Fusion centers shall 

identify and coordinate with emergency Both the fusion center and the EOC managers, appropriate response and bring resources, capabilities, recovery personnel and operations centers products/reports and concerns to the to develop, implement and maintain a plan discussion. Significant planning is and procedures to ensure a common required to foster collaborative, long- understanding of roles and responsibilities term working relationships that include and to ensure that intelligence and analysis training and exercising. Open dialogue capabilities can be leveraged to support from the outset will allow both sides to emergency management operation address concerns and develop a activities, as appropriate, when events governance mechanism to maintain the require such a response. process. 

Step One: Familiarization with 

Capabilities, Needs and 

Requirements 

Prior to making agreements or developing policy, leaders for the EOC and fusion center should meet to 

discuss their respective capabilities and needs/requirements. 

Each center should prepare for the other a list outlining the capabilities they have, the products, 

assessments and reports they produce and their informational needs/requirements, standing information 

needs (SINs) and/or essential elements of information (EEIs). It is especially important that the EOC 

specify exactly what information or intelligence they need (i.e., their EEIs), why they need it and when 

they need it. This may vary between normal operating times (steady state) and as an incident builds up, 

occurs (active state) and eventually returns to steady state. If there are particular timetables established for 

EOC products, such as briefings or situation reports, the EOC should ensure the fusion center is aware of 

them. Additionally, the EOC should be able to describe the reports and products they are capable of 

developing and sharing with the fusion center, especially those relating to all-hazards or naturally 

occurring incidents. 

21 
 

Comprehensive Preparedness Guide 502 

FEMA National Response Coordination Center (NRCC) Data Elements 

FEMA has identified 26 EEIs. Additionally, incident-specific Information Collection Plans (ICPs) 

have been developed to translate EEIs into specific information requirements. 

Essential Elements of Information Information Collection Plans 

• Disaster area boundaries/access points 

• Jurisdictional boundaries 

• Social/economic/political impacts 

• Transportation system status 

• Communication system status 

• Key Federal/State facility status 

• Hazard-specific information 

• Significant weather 

• Seismic or other geophysical data 

• Critical facility status 

• Aerial reconnaissance activity status 

• Key official status 

• ESF activation/deactivation status 

• Disaster/emergency declaration status 

• ESF major issues/activities 

• Resource shortfalls 

• Limiting factors 

• Response priorities 

• Planned or upcoming activities 

• Donations 

• Earthquake 

• Epidemic-Pandemic 

• Flood 

• Generic 

• Hazardous materials 

• Hurricane 

• Nuclear plant 

• Power failure 

• Terrorist 

• Tornado 

• Tsunami 

• Volcano 

• Winter storm 

A candid dialog of each center’s needs will provide a greater understanding of the potential constraints 

that must be overcome to meet those needs. Without this dialog, it would be easy to pass unnecessary or 

unusable products or information in hopes of sharing enough of the right information. Providing an 

exchange of timely, accurate and useable information is the key to this successful interaction. 

Standard Policies and Procedures 

Understanding each other’s CONOPS and SOPs will assist the fusion centers and EOCs in formulating a 

plan to work together. Many fusion centers have created CONOPS and SOPs that incorporate the Fusion 

Center Guidelines and the Baseline Capabilities. Those should be shared with the EOC, and new SOPs 

can be developed to address the working relationships between the two. SOPs are particularly important 

to new personnel assigned to either entity during a crisis or disaster. During planning sessions, SOPs 

should be reviewed to ensure they are current. Personnel should be trained on these SOPs, and the SOPs 

should also be exercised and evaluated to ensure they are accurate and applicable. 

22 
Communication Tools 

EOC and Fusion Center Coordination 

The ability to share information and communicate across a variety of mediums before, during, and after 

an incident is essential. Therefore, EOCs and fusion centers should review current processes to identify 

how this communication will occur across all necessary classification levels. 

• Which tools are available for EOCs and fusion centers to send, receive and manage information? 

– Are the tools interoperable? 

– Do the tools have limited access rights? 

– Have the tools been exercised? 

• What real-time tools are used during an incident? 

• Does the fusion center or EOC have the capacity for online information sharing portals? How about 

email and distribution lists? 

– Can the EOC receive, store and handle classified information? 

– Does the EOC and fusion center have secure communication capabilities? 

Fusion Center Baseline Capabilities: 

II. Management and Administrative Capabilities: 

E. Information Technology / Communications Infrastructure, Systems, Equipment, 

Facility and Physical Infrastructure 

3. Communications Plan—Fusion centers shall have a plan to ensure safe, secure 

and reliable communications, including policies and audit capabilities. (Guideline 

18, Fusion Center Guidelines) 

a. Identify how fusion center partners will communicate during an incident or 

emergency. Ensure that existing communications capabilities are 

interoperable. 

b. Incorporate current communications plans utilized by law enforcement and 

emergency services. 

Databases 

What software applications and databases do fusion centers and EOCs use or have access to? Is the 

software compatible? If so, how will it be linked and for what purposes? If not, should adjustments be 

made to make it compatible? 

• CIKR databases 

– Automated Critical Asset Management System (ACAMS) 

• Geographic Information Systems (GIS) Capabilities 

• LEO 

• RISS 

• HSIN 

23 
 

Comprehensive Preparedness Guide 502 

• Homeland Security Data Network (HSDN) 

• Virtual EOC or other emergency management software applications 

• Public health alert and information sharing systems, such as the Health Alert Network (HAN), the 

Epidemic Information Exchange (Epi-X), the Public Health Information Network (PHIN) and the 

National Electronic Disease Surveillance System (NEDSS) 

• Situational awareness or watch/warning systems 

• Other classified and unclassified IT and intelligence sharing platforms 

Staffing 

Fusion center staff includes law enforcement officials, as well as intelligence, crime and/or CIKR 

analysts. Additionally, similar to EOCs, fusion centers also often have personnel with specialized 

expertise, including fire service, public health and/or emergency management and response. When 

discussing staff capabilities and needs/requirements, fusion centers and EOCs should discuss specialized 

expertise contained in their center and explore additional, potential interaction. Additionally, letters of 

agreement (LOA) or MOUs can assist in formalizing and implementing agreed upon duties. (See Step 

Two) 

Managers also need to address whether staff members require security clearances in case classified 

information needs to be shared between the fusion center and EOC. Managers should identify staff 

members who need security clearance and work through the fusion center to request the clearances 

through DHS. 

Training Resources 

• Which training tools/programs are currently being used by the EOC and fusion center? 

• What can be done to facilitate the cross-training of personnel? 

– Fusion center staff should be trained on NIMS, ICS and the operational procedures of the EOC. 

– EOC or relevant emergency management staff should be trained on fusion center and intelligence 

and information sharing protocols, such as: 

o Privacy and security policies; 

o Receiving/Handling classified and unclassified information; 

o Receiving/Handling criminal intelligence information in accordance with Title 28 Code of 

Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 23; 

o The protection of information privacy and other legal rights in the context of the information 

sharing environment1

; and 

o Receiving/handling CIKR related information, such as protected critical infrastructure 

information (PCII), sensitive security information (SSI), chemical-terrorism vulnerability 

information (CVI) and/or safeguards information (SGI). 

1 Additional resources and training on privacy and civil liberties issues in the information sharing environment are 

available at http://www.it.ojp.gov/PrivacyLiberty and http://www.ise.gov/pages/privacy-overview.aspx. 

24 
EOC and Fusion Center Coordination 

• What training needs to be developed to fill in any gaps? 

• Are exercises conducted between the centers to build relationships and interoperability? (See Step 

Four) 

• Is the State exercise calendar being reviewed for opportunities to test anticipated interactions? 

Available and Accessible Information 

Before determining what information will be shared and how it will be shared, it is essential that EOCs 

describe what information they would like to receive from the fusion center and vice versa. To identify 

these needs/requirements, the fusion center and EOC should describe their current processes, capabilities 

and what products they develop and share. Once the current landscape is described, the respective centers 

can identify what information they would like to receive and how they would like to receive it. 

Additionally, knowing a customer’s needs/requirements will help shape the products produced or identify 

gaps in information that the fusion center or EOC could fill with the creation of new products or reports. 

The EOC and anyone receiving 

information from the fusion center 

must adhere to the fusion center 

privacy policy and dissemination 

policy, as applicable. Additionally, 

prior to receiving law enforcement or 

intelligence information, EOCs must 

develop and maintain a safeguarding 

policy to ensure this information is 

handled properly, not shared with 

media or public and destroyed 

properly. EOCs should address this by 

developing their own policy or plan, 

adopting the fusion centers security 

policy or plan or via an MOU with the 

fusion center. 

Fusion centers produce a variety of 

products for their customers, including 

daily, weekly and/or monthly 

intelligence reports, special bulletins 

that describe threats or crime problems, 

crime trend reports, officer safety 

bulletins, be-on-the-lookout notices, 

tactical analytical reports and 

responses to requests for information (RFI). Unclassified reports specific to EOC operations and 

responsibilities should be shared with the EOC to improve its situational awareness and provide a 

common operating picture. The frequency of the reporting should be mutually agreed upon with the 

understanding that both parties should be involved in information sharing. These agreements may include 

how jurisdictions, law enforcement agencies and the public safety community communicate with fusion 

centers and EOCs, as well as how fusion centers communicate with the intelligence community. The 

issues that affect information sharing between the fusion center and EOC have several components—the 

first being the classification level of the information and the security classification levels held by the EOC 

participants. 

Fusion Center Baseline Capabilities: 

I. Fusion Process Capabilities: 

D. Intelligence Analysis and Production 

1. Analytic Products. Fusion centers shall 

develop, implement and maintain a 

production plan that describes the types of 

analysis and products they intend to provide 

for their customers and partners, how often 

or in what circumstances the product will be 

produced and how each product type will be 

disseminated. 

c. Identify stakeholders and customer base 

for specific product lines and request 

feedback from customers to guide future 

products. 

d. Ensure the production of value-added 

intelligence products that support the 

development of performance-driven, 

risk-based prevention, protection, 

response and consequence 

management programs. 

25 
Comprehensive Preparedness Guide 502 

Typically, most of the EOC personnel Critical Infrastructure represent assets, systems and do not hold security clearances; networks, whether physical or virtual, so vital to a therefore, the information briefed community and/or the United States that the incapacity may be limited to UNCLASSIFIED or destruction of such assets, systems or networks or FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY would have a debilitating impact on the community’s or (FOUO). Providing a primer on the country’s security, continuity of government, classification would mitigate continuity of operations, public health, public concerns of the EOC personnel consciousness or a combination of these effects. 

regarding the types of information 

they may or may not receive. A Key Resources represent publicly or privately second situation may involve an controlled resources essential to the minimal operations ongoing criminal investigation that of the economy and government. would be compromised by wide 

dissemination or unauthorized or inadvertent disclosure. Additionally, any personnel, including those 

from an EOC, who may need information from or access to law enforcement databases need to be 

properly vetted to ensure compliance with access or 28 CFR Part 23 restrictions. 28 CFR Part 23 is a 

guideline for law enforcement agencies. This regulation contains implementing standards for operating 

Federally funded multijurisdictional criminal intelligence systems. It also provides guidance in the areas 

of submission and entry of criminal intelligence information, security, inquiry, dissemination and the 

review-and-purge process. 

Ultimately, the fusion center will have to determine whether to distribute this type of information and the 

impact of any potential State, local or Federal laws and regulations, such as 28 CFR Part 23 restrictions. 

Additionally, the fusion center may be a repository for CIKR information that can be shared with the 

EOC during an incident and also leveraged by the EOC to assist with applicable response and recovery 

efforts. As intelligence analysis and infrastructure protection programs grow and evolve, they will likely 

be housed in the fusion centers. This relationship strengthens the information sharing possibilities. 

Continuity of Operations 

Continuity of Operations (COOP) planning and capabilities may be an additional area of common 

interest. Most EOCs are equipped with backup power supplies, have alternate operating sites and rely on 

well-established plans. Emergency managers may be able to assist the fusion center with development of 

appropriate COOP plans, including identification or sharing of alternate sites and communications 

capabilities to continue the essential functions of the fusion centers. This coordination between the fusion 

center and EOC can also ensure they jointly leverage any backup resources, as well as provide mutual aid 

support should an incident or failure occur. 

26 
EOC and Fusion Center Coordination 

Fusion Center Baseline Capabilities: 

II. Management and Administrative Capabilities: 

E. Information Technology/Communications Infrastructure, Systems, Equipment, 

Facility and Physical Infrastructure 

4. Contingency and Continuity-of-Operations Plans - Fusion centers shall have 

contingency and continuity-of-operations plans to ensure sustained execution of 

mission-critical processes and information technology systems during an event 

that causes these systems to fail and, if necessary, to ensure performance of 

essential functions at an alternate location during an emergency. (Guidelines 9, 

10 and 18, Fusion Center Guidelines). 

b. Develop the plans in coordination with emergency managers and other 

appropriate response and recovery officials. 

c. Clearly define personnel roles and responsibilities during emergency 

situations. 

Step Two: Establish Partnerships 

Once leaders for the EOC and fusion center understand each other’s capabilities, they should work 

together to establish agency-to-agency partnerships. Executive-level support for EOC/fusion center 

coordination or integration is essential. Some States have found it helpful to conduct meetings with the 

fusion center, law enforcement agency and emergency management agency directors to develop a 

uniform, cohesive response plan (including protocols for sharing information in response to an incident). 

Fusion centers will likely involve their governance board in this process. Regular interaction and 

relationship-building helps create a collaborative environment for the exchange of information. This 

concept is particularly true for States or jurisdictions with newly formed or less robust, fusion centers. 

The EOC and fusion center should brief 

each other on policies, procedures and Fusion Center Baseline Capabilities: 

protocols. Meetings between EOC and II. Management and Administrative Capabilities: fusion center leaders should be held at 

regular intervals to foster an ongoing A. Management/Governance 

understanding and appreciation of the 1.b.The center’s governance body should roles, responsibilities and current include representatives from the state and

endeavors undertaken by each center. local law enforcement and public safety Additionally, personnel management disciplines. This will enhance the center’s should consider the cross-training of ability to perform key baseline capabilities, personnel to ensure interagency including: familiarity with applicable processes 

and procedures (i.e., EOC staff on the i.b. Supporting emergency management, 

handling of sensitive or classified response and recovery planning 

information). This regular and routine activities based on likely threat 

interaction will help educate both scenarios and at-risk targets. 

entities and foster cooperation and is the 

most important element in developing a cooperative relationship. 

27 
Comprehensive Preparedness Guide 502 

Personnel exchanges, participation in (or creation of) liaison officer programs and development of 

working groups can help strengthen communication. Fusion center personnel who have also worked in an 

EOC will be better prepared to develop relationships with EOC staff members and anticipate EOC 

information requirements. 

Once a partnership is established, MOUs, SOPs and/or CONOPS need to be formalized to document roles 

and responsibilities. MOUs should be drafted between the fusion center and the EOC coordinating 

agency. The purpose of such a document is to clarify the roles of each entity during EOC activation. 

The Safeguard Iowa Partnership has developed a code of conduct manual to guide its 

liaisons serving in EOCs. The code of conduct manual helps to ensure that all liaisons 

understand their roles and responsibilities while at an EOC. 

See Appendix E: Public-Private Partnerships: Safeguard Iowa Partnership’s Code of 

Conduct Manual for Liaisons Serving at Emergency Operations Centers for more 

information. 

In addition to this benefit, MOUs may also be used to resolve policy conflicts between parties. However, 

jurisdictions should be aware that obtaining the appropriate signatures on an MOU can be a time 

consuming and complicated process due in part to the number of parties who have to review and approve 

the document. Competing interests, State or local laws or organizational regulations and 

misunderstandings can either slow or stop the process. MOUs may be used as a means to resolve policy 

conflicts between parties. 

Because an MOU can be extensive and define the overall relationship, as well as some of the details of 

the operation, all of the operational capabilities, roles and requirements may be addressed in the MOU. 

An example of an MOU is provided in Appendix B. 

Step Three: Determine the 

Process 

Information Exchange Procedures 

Agreements should be developed describing what information and intelligence will be shared between the 

EOC and the fusion center, as well as how this data will be shared. When a fusion center releases 

information to an EOC, the intended recipients of the information should be clearly stated (taking security 

clearances into account), along with the intended purpose of the information. As discussed in Step One, 

EOCs should provide fusion centers with a list of personnel who can be contacted about sensitive and 

classified information. In turn, fusion centers should be prepared to share pertinent information with 

EOCs on such matters as disaster intelligence or criminal activities (in a format that does not present a 

conflict for EOC staff members without a security clearance). 

28 
EOC and Fusion Center Coordination 

Information exchange procedures between the EOC and fusion center should also take into account 

existing procedures for the exchange of information between the EOC, DHS and the law enforcement 

community. For example, if emergency managers already have procedures in place for communicating 

directly with the police, fire and sheriff’s departments, how might that affect the information exchange 

process between the EOC and fusion center? 

As fusion centers may provide direct representation in the EOC—either through a fusion center liaison, 

ESF-13—the EOC should use the fusion center as its conduit to communicate with and exchange 

information with the intelligence community. Intelligence and information should flow through the fusion 

center and then be sent to the EOC. Conversely, information and intelligence products, such as situation 

reports, incident action plans and long–range, plans should be distributed to the fusion center staff to 

indicate current and future priorities and concerns of the EOC. This way, fusion analysts can be aware of 

information needs or requirements that may be pertinent to the EOC. 

Fusion Center Baseline Capabilities: 

II. Management and Administrative Capabilities 

A. Management/Governance 

3. Collaborative Environment - Fusion centers shall identify the organizations that 

represent their core (permanent) and ad hoc stakeholders and the roles and 

responsibilities of each stakeholder and develop mechanisms and processes to 

facilitate a collaborative environment with these stakeholders. (Guidelines 4 and 

5, Fusion Center Guidelines) 

b. Include the identification of entities and individuals responsible for planning, 

developing and implementing prevention, protection, response and 

consequence-management efforts at the State, local and tribal levels. 

f. Develop and implement a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) or 

Agreement (MOA) and, if needed, nondisclosure agreements (NDA) between 

the center and each stakeholder who intends to participate in or partner with 

the fusion center. 

The Fusion Liaison Officer (FLO) Program is a coordination of a network of fusion center liaison officers 

who are members of law enforcement, fire service, public health and other agencies (including public 

works, corrections and emergency management). This program has been established in several States to 

facilitate communication with fusion center stakeholders, including law enforcement and emergency 

management. FLOs coordinate information sharing activities among private-sector and CIKR partners, 

such as electric companies, oil refineries, banks and entertainment facilities. With the help of this 

network, fusion centers receive homeland security and crime-related information for assessment and 

analysis. Intelligence also flows from the national level and the fusion centers to field personnel via the 

network. The information flow to the field personnel provides the local government with the situational 

awareness information necessary to prevent, protect against or respond to events impacting their 

community. 

One advantage of the fusion center is its ability to integrate information and intelligence from various law 

enforcement and homeland security agencies, as well as State and Federal entities, analyzing and 

disseminating pertinent information back to the jurisdiction. To avoid duplication or misunderstanding, 

the EOC should also channel any collected information to the fusion center, as appropriate and defined by 

the fusion center and EOC. 

29 
Comprehensive Preparedness Guide 502 

Fusion centers should ensure EOCs receive regular briefings at the appropriate classification level, along 

with their identified customers and stakeholders. Fusion centers can post open source information on 

computerized emergency management software, and there should be a clear understanding between EOCs 

and fusion centers about how often this information will be posted and updated. The updates can be 

posted after they are vetted by the fusion center personnel to ensure that sensitive information has not 

been added to the open source information and is not compromised. Using such portals will assist the 

EOC in its coordination and planning efforts. 

Fusion Center Baseline Capabilities: 

I. Fusion Process Capability 

A. Planning and Requirements Development 

8. Coordinate with Response and Recovery Officials. Fusion Centers shall 

identify and coordinate with emergency managers and appropriate response and 

recovery personnel and operations centers to develop, implement and maintain a 

plan and procedures to ensure a common understanding of roles and 

responsibilities and to ensure intelligence and analysis capabilities can be 

leveraged to support emergency management operation activities, as appropriate, 

when events require such a response. 

a. Ensure that the center has identified its intelligence and analytical roles and 

responsibilities in accordance with the NIMS and ICS. 

Steady State versus Active State 

EOC coordinators (as well as law enforcement and other homeland security officials) should be familiar 

with the operations of the fusion centers. EOC plans and protocols should include a trigger for activating 

(or partially activating) the EOC based on intelligence received from the fusion center. 

Different information requirements are associated with a fusion center Steady State: Steady in a steady state versus an active state. On a daily basis, fusion centers state is the posture for should be prepared to provide information on potential events to the routine, normal, day-to- EOC coordinators. This is often done by including the emergency day watch operations and manager in the routine intelligence summaries (which are sometimes situational awareness, lengthy and have a small amount of relevant information buried contrasted by temporary inside). However, fusion centers should be prepared to send periods of heightened information that may be directly relevant to the jurisdiction and not alert or real-time response assume that others will have the time to digest and recognize a to threats or incidents. potential threat to the jurisdiction. This activity would include 

notification of any activation of the fusion center to a higher level, which, in turn, would trigger the 

emergency manager to monitor the situation more closely and be prepared to activate (or partially 

activate) the EOC in a forward-leaning posture or in response to an incident. 

During EOC activations, fusion centers may serve in a support function to the EOC and should plan to 

provide the EOC with intelligence briefings at agreed upon intervals or as needed and should provide 

additional information to the EOC director should the need arise between briefings. Classified 

information may be provided to the EOC director (if cleared), but the information can usually be provided 

to the EOC in an unclassified version for dissemination to the EOC general staff. 

30 
 

Actionable Intelligence 

After agency-level partnerships have been 

established, it is important for fusion center and 

EOC leadership to identify to whom and under 

which circumstances actionable intelligence can be 

shared. If clear conditions are agreed upon, in 

advance, the exchange of appropriate information 

can occur in a timely fashion. 

Staffing 

EOC and Fusion Center Coordination 

Actionable Intelligence 

Intelligence should: 

• Paint a picture; 

• Tell a story; 

• Guide the response; and 

• Produce knowledge upon which a 

course of action can be 

developed/recommended for resolution. 

The fusion process may support EOC staff and emergency management planners by strengthening the 

information collection process of the EOC planning section. While the EOC and the fusion center 

leverage information that has been gathered, it is the primary responsibility of the fusion center to analyze 

the information and disseminate intelligence to the EOC. 

Fusion center staffing varies widely from jurisdiction to jurisdiction and may include: 

• Fusion center management; 

• State, local, tribal, and/or territorial law enforcement; 

• Intelligence analysts, crime analysts, GIS analysts/planners, CIKR analysts, etc.; 

• Operational planners; 

• IT support (may also support EOC IT); 

• EOC directors or liaison; 

• Federal liaisons; 

• State or local terrorism liaison coordinators; 

• Fire services; 

• Emergency medical services (EMS); 

• Public health; and 

• Hazardous materials personnel. 

The following steps may improve the integration and/or coordination of fusion center and EOC operations 

and exchange of information, but they may not be applicable in every jurisdiction. 

• Identification of Liaisons/Representatives: There should be an identified liaison/representative 

between the fusion center and the EOC whose primary responsibility is to ensure coordination 

between the two entities. This may be a part-time or ancillary duty. The roles of this 

liaison/representative should be clearly documented and defined. 

– ESF-13 (Public Safety and Security): Consideration should be given to using fusion center 

personnel to staff the ESF-13 function during EOC activation. It will increase the ability of the 

fusion center to support the EOC with analytical capabilities and will provide reach-back 

capabilities to Federal, State and local intelligence resources. 

31 
Comprehensive Preparedness Guide 502 

• Assignment of Full-time Analysts/Personnel: Based on available resources, the EOC or responsible 

emergency management agency should consider assigning or detailing a full-time analyst to the 

fusion center. This analyst would have intimate knowledge of emergency management operations and 

serve as a subject matter expert (SME) on emergency management/response operations. The analyst’s 

responsibilities would include providing SME support to fusion center operations and analysis and 

ensuring the timely and accurate flow of information between the fusion center and EOC before, 

during and after incidents. Additionally, a fusion center should consider assigning or placing an 

intelligence officer with appropriate clearances within the EOC during activation. This will ensure the 

continuous and vital flow of information and intelligence to the EOC, as well as reach-back for 

support from the fusion center. 

• Unification or Virtual Connection of Watch Offices/Desk: The watch offices or duty desks of both 

the fusion center and EOC should consider virtually unifying to ensure that communication is 

exchanged in the most timely and accurate way possible. This would allow for the timely exchange, 

coordination and/or deconfliction of information while serving as a mechanism to formally integrate 

the fusion center’s prevention efforts with the EOC’s response efforts. This arrangement would also 

leverage finite resources/personnel. 

• Expansion of FLO Programs: Existing FLO programs should be considered as a mechanism to 

enhance communication between the fusion center and the EOC, especially if dedicated analysts or 

liaisons responsible for this interaction have not been identified. Emergency management personnel 

should be considered for inclusion in the program, if they are not yet participating. If a FLO program 

does not yet exist, the fusion center should consider implementing it in order to build relationships 

with the EOC via multidisciplinary and SME personnel (e.g. fire services, EMS, emergency 

management and public health entities). 

If fusion centers are co-located with the EOC, staffing may be shared with the EOC long-range planning 

sector, if the situation warrants. Additionally, fusion centers may be able to provide resources and support 

to the EOC, including sharing new technology as it becomes available, such as facial recognition tools. 

Challenges 

Arriving at a common understanding about what information to share and how to share it sometimes 

stands in the way of developing coordination between fusion centers and EOCs. Traditional models have 

not accounted for fusion centers and their increased ability to provide information and intelligence to the 

EOC. One way to address this challenge is through continuous efforts to familiarize the two entities with 

each other. Understanding of the chains of command, level of resource commitment and capabilities can 

only be achieved by training and exercising together. Developing common CONOPS and SOPs will also 

assist the coordination and communication even in the event of inevitable personnel changes. 

Step Four: Training, Workshops 

and Exercises 

One of the best ways to familiarize agencies with each other’s staff is to jointly attend training and 

exercises. The sections below outline training and workshop resources. 

32 
EOC and Fusion Center Coordination 

Training 

Training should be conducted to inform EOC members of the rules and regulations concerning classified 

information and the type of information they should expect to receive during briefings by the fusion 

center. A brief that describes the types of classified information, its origin and use can be offered to the 

EOC members in order to increase their understanding of what information they may or may not receive. 

Emphasis can be placed on how much information can be gleaned from open or unclassified sources. 

Training courses that are applicable for EOC/emergency management and fusion center personnel include 

the following: 

• National Response Framework: IS-800.b. This course introduces the guiding principles that all 

emergency and response partners need to prepare for and provide a unified response to all-hazards. 

The NRF “establishes a comprehensive, national, all-hazards approach to domestic incident 

response.” http://training.fema.gov/EMIWeb/IS/IS800b.asp. 

• National Incident Management System: IS-700.a. This course introduces NIMS by explaining its 

purpose, principles, key components and benefits. http://training.fema.gov/EMIWeb/IS/is700A.asp. 

• Incident Command System for Single Resources and Initial Action Incidents: IS-200.a. This course is 

designed to enable personnel to operate efficiently during an incident or event within the ICS and 

provides training on and resources for personnel who are likely to assume a supervisory position 

within the ICS. http://training.fema.gov/EMIWeb/IS/IS200A.asp. 

• NIMS Multiagency Coordination System (MACS): IS-701a. This course describes to participants the 

components of a MACS and how to establish relationships between all elements of the system. 

http://training.fema.gov/EMIWeb/IS/is701a.asp. 

• National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP): IS-860a. This course introduces the NIPP, identifies 

relevant authorities for CIKR protection efforts and related information-sharing processes. 

http://training.fema.gov/EMIWeb/IS/IS860a.asp. 

• Critical Infrastructure and Key Resources Support Annex: IS-821. This course provides an 

introduction to the CIKR Support Annex to the NRF. http://training.fema.gov/EMIWeb/IS/IS821.asp. 

• Introduction to Incident Command System: IS-100.a. This course introduces ICS and provides the 

foundation for higher level ICS training. This course describes the history, features and principles and 

organizational structure of ICS. It also explains the relationship between ICS and NIMS. 

http://training.fema.gov/EMIWeb/IS/IS100A.asp. 

• Introduction to ICS for Law Enforcement: IS-100.LEa. This course introduces ICS and provides the 

foundation for higher-level ICS training. This course describes the history, features and principles and 

organizational structure of ICS. It also explains the relationship between ICS and the NIMS. This 

course uses the same objectives and content as other ICS 100 courses with law enforcement examples 

and exercises. http://training.fema.gov/EMIWeb/IS/IS100LEA.asp. 

• Public Safety and Security Annex: IS-813. This course introduces the ESF-13 (Public Safety and 

Security) Annex. http://training.fema.gov/EMIWeb/IS/IS813.asp. 

• EOC Management and Operations: IS-775. This course describes the role, design and functions of 

EOCs and their relationships as components of a MACS. The course contains disaster-related 

examples, activities and case studies that relate to EOC’s and MACSs at the local, State and Federal 

levels of government. http://training.fema.gov/EMIWeb/IS/IS775.asp. 

33 
Comprehensive Preparedness Guide 502 

• FEMA Integrated Emergency Management Course (IEMC). IEMCs are four half-day exercise-based 

training courses that build awareness and skills needed to develop and implement policies, plans and 

procedures in an EOC. http://training.fema.gov/EMIWeb/IEMC/. 

• IEMC: EOC-Incident Management Team Interface: E947. 

http://www.training.fema.gov/EMICourses/crsdetail.asp?cid=E947&ctype=R. 

• Federal Law Enforcement Training Center (FLETC) - Anti-Terrorism Intelligence Awareness 

Training Program (AIATP). This course is an introductory awareness program designed to provide 

attendees with a working knowledge of the criminal intelligence process and applicable laws, 

guidelines, policies, tools and techniques. http://www.fletc.gov/state-and-local/tuition-free-trainingprograms/anti-terrorism-intelligence-awareness-training-program-aiatp. 

• FLETC - Introductory Intelligence Analyst Training Program (IIATP). This course provides a 

historical, legal and ethical basis for law enforcement intelligence collection, retention and 

dissemination activities in accordance with the intelligence cycle. http://www.fletc.gov/state-andlocal/tuition-free-training-programs/introductory-intelligence-analyst-training-program-iiatp. 

• Training Resources for State, Local and Tribal Fusion Centers on Privacy and Civil Liberties Issues 

in the Information Sharing Environment. Training and resources, including privacy policy templates, 

for protecting information privacy and other legal rights and civil liberties issues in the context of the 

ISE are available at http://www.it.ojp.gov/PrivacyLiberty and http://www.ise.gov/pages/privacyoverview.aspx. 

• Training on 28 CFR Part 23. 28 CFR Part 23 was issued to ensure the privacy and constitutional 

rights of individuals during the collection and exchange of criminal intelligence information. It has 

been an important part of the intelligence landscape. This training is designed to help State and local 

representatives understand the guidelines that govern the development and implementation of policies 

and systems that facilitate intelligence sharing. Training includes overview of the regulation; 

compliance requirements; storage requirements; inquiry and dissemination requirements and review 

and purge requirements. The online training may be accessed through the secure National Criminal 

Intelligence Resource Center (NCIRC.) Web site, accessible through HSIN, LEO and RISS. 

http://www.iir.com/28cfr/Overview.htm. 

• Chemical-Terrorism Vulnerability Information Authorized User Training is available online at 

http://www.dhs.gov/files/programs/gc_1181835547413.shtm. 

• Protected Critical Infrastructure Information Program Authorized User Training is available online 

at https://pciims.dhs.gov/pciims. 

34 
EOC and Fusion Center Coordination 

Fusion Center Baseline Capabilities: 

II. Management and Administrative Capabilities: 

D. Personnel and Training 

3. Training Plan. Fusion centers shall develop and document a training plan to 

ensure that personnel and partners understand the intelligence process and 

fusion center’s mission, functions, plans and procedures. The plan shall identify 

the basic training needs of all center personnel and identify specialized training 

needed to address the center’s mission and current information requirements. 

(Guidelines 12 and 13, Fusion Center Guidelines) 

b. At a minimum, all center personnel should be trained on: 

ii. Roles and responsibilities of intelligence and analytical functions in 

accordance with NIMS and ICS. 

• FLO Programs. FLO Programs, as mentioned previously, facilitate the development and coordination 

of a network of FLOs who are members of local or State law enforcement, fire services, public health 

and other agencies, such as public works, corrections and emergency management. The network of 

FLOs ensures that vital disciplines participate in the fusion process and serve as the conduit through 

which homeland security and crime-related information flows to the fusion center for assessment and 

analysis. The FLO Program Technical Assistance is also offered through the joint DHS/DOJ Fusion 

Process Technical Assistance Program to assist in developing and implementing this program. 

Emergency management stakeholders are listed as potential partners in the program and are 

encouraged to participate. 

Additional information on FLO programs is available via the Establishing a Fusion Liaison Officer 

Program: A Guide and Workbook of Planning and Development Considerations located on the LLIS 

System at www.llis.dhs.gov and NCIRC at www.ncirc.gov. 

Workshops 

Workshops should be held for fusion center and EOC staff (especially planning staff) to familiarize EOC 

staff with the capabilities of the fusion center and vice versa. The workshops should outline the concept of 

operations for how the EOC and fusion center will access each other’s capabilities. In particular, 

workshops should include a discussion of databases and how they will be used and connected during 

activation of the EOC. Workshops can also be regularly scheduled to familiarize fusion center and EOC 

staff and to provide updates on tools, capabilities or other resources leveraged in the respective centers. 

As part of the DHS/DOJ Fusion Process Technical Assistance Program, the Fusion Center Exchange 

Program supports the exchange of fusion center personnel and the associated exchange of operational best 

practices and lessons learned. The DHS/DOJ Fusion Process Technical Assistance facilitates interaction, 

information exchange activities and operations among directors and key intelligence and planning staff to 

solidify the national network of fusion centers. 

The Fusion Process Technical Assistance Program also facilitates Fusion Center Direct Interaction 

Workshops, which allows SMEs to provide for efficient and effective sharing of best practices and 

lessons learned. 

35 
Comprehensive Preparedness Guide 502 

Exercises 

Fusion centers and EOCs should 

consider regularly coordinating 

and/or conducting joint 

scenario-based tabletop and live 

training exercises to assess their 

communication capabilities and 

for the exchange of operational 

information identified in their 

SOPs and MOUs. These 

exercises should also be aimed 

at evaluating and deconflicting 

the roles and responsibilities of 

any identified personnel 

responsible for the coordination 

and/or integration of these 

efforts. The use of the exercise 

evaluation guides also provides 

a measurement tool for 

identifying gaps in training or 

roles and responsibilities and 

further ensures a level of NIMS compliance. The exercises should be Homeland Security Exercise and 

Evaluation Program (HSEEP) compliant. 

The Terrorism Prevention Exercise Program (TPEP) conducts exercises and supports activities that 

increase awareness, coordination and information sharing among homeland security and law enforcement 

officials at all levels of government. The exercises assess prevention capabilities to include intelligence 

analysis, information sharing and recognition of indicators and warnings. 

Fusion Center Baseline Capabilities: 

I. Fusion Process Capabilities: 

A. Planning and Requirements Development 

10. Exercises. Fusion centers should conduct or 

participate in another agency’s scenario-based 

tabletop and live training exercises to regularly 

assess their capabilities. 

b. Exercises should involve all relevant center 

personnel and constituents and should 

contribute to understanding the value of the 

statewide fusion process, the center’s 

collection plan, the SAR process, analytical 

products, the center’s role in the Information 

Sharing Environment and the center’s role in 

response and recovery activities in 

accordance with NIMS and ICS. 

36 
 

Case Studies and Examples 

Fusion centers play a critical role in providing planning and operations intelligence support for special 

events of various sizes. As a central repository of strategic and tactical information, fusion centers provide 

law enforcement, public safety, emergency management and other partners with information and 

intelligence to guide preparations and support tactical decision-making during a special event. The 

planning, organizational structure and processes for collecting, analyzing, deconflicting and disseminating 

information can be scaled to meet operational needs and resource constraints. 

In planning for special events, as well as National Special Security Events (NSSEs), jurisdictions will 

have to incorporate all four mission areas (prevent, protect, respond and recover) in the planning effort. 

As the fusion centers have grown and become more robust, they are able to collect information from a 

wide variety of sources and deliver finished analytical products that will help form decisions about 

resource allocations needed to address the event. 

In prevention planning, the various information collectors attached to the fusion process (which includes 

the Federal, local, tribal, territorial, and private-sector authorities) should prepare a collection plan that 

focuses on the issues surrounding the event. The input can come from the Federal Intelligence 

Community, State and local law enforcement, other public sector entities, first responders and the 

community. The prevention planning effort will provide information to the event’s stakeholders in the run 

up to the event and at the operations centers during the event. 

The planning for the Republican and Democratic conventions, as well as the Presidential Inauguration, 

illustrate how prevention concepts and processes can be incorporated into the overall planning process. 

The jurisdiction in which the event will be held begins the prevention planning process many months 

before the event. The fusion center, which incorporates a variety of State, local, tribal, territorial, and 

Federal participants, can begin the process of collecting, analyzing and disseminating information and 

intelligence. The U.S. Secret Service (USSS) is the lead Federal agency for the NSSE and makes plans to 

protect either the candidates or the President and Vice President during the events. They are an integral 

part of the planning process since the primary effort is to prevent an attack on the individuals they are 

tasked to protect. 

The fusion center analysts can use open source collection methods to assess the threat to the event. For 

example, they can gather information on groups that plan direct action against the event and grade the 

threat. This information can be passed to the command staff of the police department, FBI, USSS and 

other officials who can make decisions about resource utilization. It also allows them to make decisions 

about where to deploy resources to harden targets not previously considered. 

Also important in the prevention planning effort is input from the DHS Protective Security Advisors who 

interface with the owners of the critical infrastructure and key resources potentially affected during the 

event. The owners of the CIKR can provide threat data as well as receive appropriately vetted material to 

protect their property. 

In jurisdictions where the fusion center and the EOC are co-located, successful relationships are built on a 

series of steps that define the roles and responsibilities of the participants. The necessary components are 

enabling legislation, MOU between the parent agencies, SOPs and a genuine desire to exchange 

information. The watch offices in the EOC and fusion center have developed an information sharing 

protocol that encourages open communication. 

37 
Comprehensive Preparedness Guide 502 

The fusion center and EOC exchange analysts to ensure that the proper classification is applied to the 

information so that it can be appropriately disseminated. 

The FLO Program can be used to enhance the relationship between the fusion center and the EOC. States 

have trained emergency management, first responder and other public sector, non-law enforcement 

personnel as liaison officers. The benefit of this program is that there is a strong communication channel 

between the fusion center and the liaison’s parent agency. As more trained liaison officers are assigned to 

an EOC during activation, the bond between the fusion center and the EOC strengthens. 

Minnesota Joint Analysis Center 

and the Republican National 

Convention 

The Minnesota Joint Analysis Center (MNJAC), which is the State fusion center, provided critical 

information and intelligence support during the Republican National Convention (RNC) held in 

Minneapolis-Saint Paul, Minnesota, September 1–4, 2008. Because of the NSSE classification, the USSS 

was the lead agency, while the FBI, the Saint Paul Police Department and the MNJAC shared the 

responsibility for collecting, fusing, analyzing and disseminating all information in support of RNC 

security operations. Additional agencies assisting with event security included FEMA, U.S. Coast Guard, 

Customs and Border Protection, Transportation Security Administration, DHS I&A, Domestic Nuclear 

Detection Office, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Saint Paul Public Works and the RNC 

Host Committee. 

Approximately 45,000 delegates, alternate delegates, volunteers, members of the media and other guests 

traveled to the area. The RNC also drew a large number of protestors resulting in a public safety threat 

and a crowd control issue (law enforcement arrested 818 individuals). During the RNC, the MNJAC had 

personnel assigned to the Tactical Intelligence Center (TIC) and the intelligence operations center (IOC), 

which created an efficient flow of information to and from the centers. MNJAC staff also helped to 

maintain a current operational picture within the IOC. 

MNJAC was able to utilize the Intelligence Communications Enterprise for Information Sharing and 

Exchange (ICEFISHX) network (which is used to collect information about suspicious activity relating to 

criminal activity and infrastructure protection in Minnesota) to broadcast quickly across State boundaries 

to the other fusion centers and Federal agencies. This allowed MNJAC to obtain background information 

and criminal records concerning individuals and groups participating in protest activity. 

38 
 

Case Studies and Examples 

The following diagram2 shows how information was shared between numerous stakeholders: 

Throughout the RNC and for all accompanying activities, the collaboration and co-location of Federal, 

State and local agencies, as well as the private sector, provided a supportive environment, which resulted 

in timely exchange of information and successful management of multiple activities. Specifically, the 

MNJAC’s capability to reach out to surrounding States, the Saint Paul Police Department’s intelligence 

arm, the Minneapolis Police Department's intelligence unit and other Federal agencies provided 

significant strategic support during event planning phases, as well as during the event. 

Colorado Intelligence Analysis 

Center and the 2008 Democratic 

National Convention 

The Colorado Intelligence Analysis Center (CIAC) provided critical information and intelligence support 

during the Democratic National Convention (DNC) held in Denver, Colorado, August 25–28, 2008. The 

CIAC is a State fusion center located in a Denver suburb and managed by the Colorado State Patrol and 

co-located in the same building with the State EOC. The CIAC and the FBI shared equal management 

2

 Source: Fusion Center Spotlight, DHS/DOJ Fusion Process Technical Assistance Program and Services 2008. 

39 
 

Comprehensive Preparedness Guide 502 

responsibility for the IOC, which was responsible for collecting, fusing, analyzing, deconflicting and 

disseminating all information in support of DNC security operations. 

Prior to the DNC, regular training was not conducted between the fusion center and the EOC. In 

preparation for the DNC, the CIAC trained more than 200 TLOs from various disciplines, who either 

were assigned to different commands and control centers during activation or backfilled spots in the 

CIAC. By mutual agreement, the Denver Police Department was the primary EOC, although the State 

EOC was also activated but was in a standby mode during the event. The CIAC commander was assigned 

to the EOC and provided EOC leadership with situational awareness. The CIAC commander also 

monitored the information sent to the EOC to ensure that classified information was not compromised. 

The CIAC briefed the EOC personnel at shift changes on investigations and potential threats, which was 

valuable to EOC personnel and kept the communications channels open. 

Information pertinent to DNC security operations within the Denver metropolitan area was coordinated 

by the IOC. The CIAC, along with the DHS National Operations Center (NOC) in Washington, D.C., 

coordinated information with fusion centers around the country and other State and local law enforcement 

agencies. The CIAC also acted as the conduit for intelligence and other information to the Colorado State 

EOC. The following diagram3

 shows the information flow between the various stakeholders: 

3

 Source: Fusion Center Spotlight, DHS/DOJ Fusion Process Technical Assistance Program and Services 2008. 

40 
Case Studies and Examples 

The CIAC was primarily responsible for activities outside the DNC area of operation, including 

coordinating with the NOC and other fusion centers. It supported some IOC activities. To provide the 

IOC with an intelligence collection capability, the CIAC overlaid the Field Intelligence Team (FIT) 

concept with its existing TLO program. Comprised of a team of multiagency TLOs, FITs were 

responsible for providing real-time intelligence and information about criminal and public safety 

incidents. 

The DNC provides many examples of how a State or local fusion center can support the planning and 

execution of event security plans. The collaboration and co-location of Federal, State and local agencies 

provided a supportive environment which resulted in timely exchange of information and a successful 

management of multiple activities. The cooperation between the CIAC and the FBI in running the IOC 

provides a model for future NSSEs and other special events. 

For More Information 

Please see the Fusion Center Spotlight - Supporting Special Events: Colorado Intelligence 

Analysis Center and the 2008 Democratic National Convention located in the Fusion Center 

and EOC Integration and Coordination Workshop: Reference Documents kit for more 

information on the operations and interaction of the CIAC during the DNC. This document is 

also located on the LLIS System at www.llis.dhs.gov and the NCIRC at www.ncirc.gov. 

41 
Comprehensive Preparedness Guide 502 

This page intentionally left blank. 

42 
 

Appendix A: Glossary and 

Acronyms 

Glossary 

All-Crimes Approach 

An approach that incorporates terrorism and other high-risk threats into the existing crime-fighting 

framework, to ensure that possible precursor crimes are screened and analyzed for linkages to larger-scale 

terrorist or other crimes. This approach recognizes that there is a nexus between types of criminal activity 

(e.g., illegal drug operations, gangs, money laundering, fraud, identity theft and terrorism). Using an allcrimes approach does not imply that a fusion center must address every single crime that occurs within 

their area of responsibility. Rather, the routine risk assessment that a fusion center develops or supports 

development of should assist in prioritizing which crimes and/or hazards a State or region should address 

and, in the development of a collection plan, identify which other sources of information may be useful 

for examining possible connections with other crimes. 

All-Hazards Approach 

An approach that refers to preparedness for terrorist attacks, major disasters and other emergencies within 

the United States. (Source: HSPD-8, December 17, 2003.) Within the context of the fusion process, some 

fusion centers have defined their mission to include an all-hazards approach. While the application of this 

approach varies, in general, it means that the fusion center has identified and prioritized types of major 

disasters and emergencies, beyond terrorism and crime, that could occur within their jurisdiction. The 

fusion center also gathers, analyzes and disseminates information which would assist the relevant 

responsible agencies (e.g., law enforcement, fire, public health, emergency management, critical 

infrastructure, etc.) with the prevention, protection, response or recovery efforts of those incidents. A 

fusion center can use an all-hazards approach but not address in its operations every possible hazard. Part 

of the annual risk assessment a fusion center develops or supports development of should identify which 

hazards a State or region should prioritize within its homeland security planning process, as well as 

provide the fusion center with the prioritization needed to develop relevant SINs. 

Analysis 

That activity whereby meaning, actual or suggested, is derived through organizing and systematically 

examining diverse information and applying inductive or deductive logic for the purposes of criminal 

investigation or assessment. 

A-1 
Comprehensive Preparedness Guide 502 

Baseline Capability 

A capability provides the means to accomplish a mission or function resulting from the performance of 

one or more critical tasks, under specified conditions, to target levels of performance. A capability may be 

delivered with any combination of properly planned, organized, equipped, trained and exercised 

personnel that achieves the desired outcome (Source: National Preparedness Guidelines, p. 40). Within 

the context of this document, a baseline capability for a fusion center is a capability necessary for the 

fusion center to perform its core functions of gathering, processing, analyzing and disseminating 

terrorism, homeland security and law enforcement information. 

Classified Information/Intelligence 

A uniform system for classifying, safeguarding and declassifying national security information, including 

information relating to defense against transnational terrorism, to ensure that certain information is 

maintained in confidence in order to protect citizens, U.S. democratic institutions, U.S. homeland security 

and U.S. interactions with foreign nations and entities. 

Collation (of Information) 

A review of collected and evaluated information to determine its substantive applicability to a case or 

problem at issue and placement of useful information into a form or system that permits easy and rapid 

access and retrieval. 

Collection (of Information) 

The identification, location and recording/storing of information, typically from an original source, and 

using both human and technological means for input into the intelligence cycle for the purpose of meeting 

a defined tactical or strategic intelligence goal. 

Collection Plan 

The preliminary step toward completing an assessment of intelligence requirements to determine what 

type of information needs to be collected, alternatives for how to collect the information and a timeline 

for collecting the information. 

Coordination 

The process of interrelating work functions, responsibilities, duties, resources and initiatives directed 

toward goal attainment. 

Critical Infrastructure and Key Resource (CIKR) 

Systems, assets and networks, whether physical or virtual, so vital to the United States that the 

incapacitation or destruction of such systems and assets would have a debilitating impact on security, 

national economic security, national public health or safety or any combination of those matters. Key 

resources consists of any publicly or privately controlled resources essential to the minimal operations of 

the economy and government. 

Dissemination (of Intelligence) 

The process of effectively distributing analyzed intelligence utilizing certain protocols in the most 

appropriate format to those in need of the information to facilitate their accomplishment of organizational 

goals. 

A-2 
 

Appendix A: Glossary and Acronyms 

Emergency Operations Center (EOC) 

The physical location where the coordination of information and resources to support incident 

management (on-scene operations) activities normally takes place. An EOC may be a temporary facility 

or may be located in a more central or permanently established facility, perhaps at a higher level of 

organization within a jurisdiction. EOCs may be organized by major functional disciplines (e.g., fire, law 

enforcement and medical services), by jurisdiction (e.g., Federal, State, regional, tribal, city, county), or 

some combination thereof. 

Emergency Support Functions (ESF) 

Used by the Federal Government and many State governments as the primary mechanism at the 

operational level to organize and provide assistance. ESFs align categories of resources and provide 

strategic objectives for their use. ESFs utilize standardized resource management concepts, such as 

typing, inventorying and tracking, to facilitate the dispatch, deployment and recovery of resources before, 

during and after an incident. 

For Official Use Only (FOUO) 

A designation previously used for marking unclassified sensitive information. This designation has been 

replaced by the Controlled Unclassified Information (CUI) Framework. 

Fusion Center 

A collaborative effort of two or more agencies that provide resources, expertise and information to the 

center with the goal of maximizing the ability to detect, prevent, investigate and respond to criminal and 

terrorism activity (Fusion Center Guidelines, August 2006). Recognized as a valuable information 

sharing resource, State and major urban area fusion centers are the focus, but not exclusive points, within 

the State and local environment for the receipt and sharing of terrorism information, homeland security 

information and law enforcement information related to terrorism. 

Fusion Center Guidelines, August 2006 

A nationally recognized document developed to ensure that fusion centers are established and operated 

consistently, resulting in enhanced coordination efforts, strengthened partnerships and improved crimefighting and anti-terrorism capabilities. 

Fusion Process 

The overarching process of managing the flow of information and intelligence across levels and sectors of 

government and the private sector. It goes beyond establishing an information/intelligence center or 

creating a computer network. The fusion process supports the implementation of risk-based, informationdriven prevention, response and consequence management programs. The fusion process turns 

information and intelligence into actionable knowledge (Fusion Center Guidelines, August 2006). 

Incident 

An occurrence, natural or manmade, that requires a response to protect life or property. Incidents can, for 

example, include major disasters, emergencies, terrorist attacks, terrorist threats, civil unrest, wildland and 

urban fires, floods, hazardous materials spills, nuclear accidents, aircraft accidents, earthquakes, 

hurricanes, tornadoes, tropical storms, tsunamis, war-related disasters, public health and medical 

emergencies and other occurrences requiring an emergency response. 

 A-3 
Comprehensive Preparedness Guide 502 

Incident Command 

The ICS organizational element responsible for overall management of the incident and consisting of the 

Incident Commander (either single or unified command structure) and any assigned supporting staff. 

Information 

Pieces of raw, unanalyzed data that identify persons, evidence or events or illustrate processes that 

indicate the incidence of a criminal event or witnesses or evidence of a criminal event. 

Information Sharing Environment (ISE) 

A trusted partnership among all levels of government, the private sector and foreign partners to detect, 

prevent, preempt and mitigate the effects of terrorism against territory, people and interests of the United 

States. This partnership enables the trusted, secure and appropriate exchange of terrorism information, in 

the first instance, across the five Federal communities; to and from State, local, tribal, and territorial 

governments, foreign allies and the private sector and at all levels of security classifications. 

Information Sharing System 

An integrated and secure methodology, whether computerized or manual, designed to efficiently and 

effectively distribute critical information about offenders, crimes and/or events in order to enhance 

prevention and apprehension activities by law enforcement. 

Information System 

An organized means, whether manual or electronic, of collecting, processing, storing and retrieving 

information on individual entities for purposes of record and reference. 

Intelligence (Criminal) 

The product of the analysis of raw information related to crimes or crime patterns with respect to an 

identifiable person or group of persons in an effort to anticipate, prevent or monitor possible criminal 

activity (or investigate or prosecute). 

Intelligence Analyst 

A professional position in which the incumbent is responsible for taking the varied facts, documentation 

of circumstances, evidence, interviews and any other material related to a crime and organizing them into 

a logical and related framework for the purposes of developing a criminal case, explaining a criminal 

phenomenon, describing crime and crime trends and/or preparing materials for court and prosecution or 

arriving at an assessment of a crime problem or crime group. 

Intelligence Community 

The intelligence community is a federation of executive branch agencies and organizations that work 

separately and together to conduct intelligence activities necessary for the conduct of foreign relations and 

the protection of the national security of the United States. 

Intelligence Cycle 

Also known as fusion process. See Fusion Process. 

A-4 
 

Appendix A: Glossary and Acronyms 

Intelligence Function 

That activity within a law enforcement agency responsible for some aspect of law enforcement 

intelligence, whether collection, analysis and/or dissemination. 

Intelligence Process 

An organized process by which information is gathered, assessed and distributed in order to fulfill the 

goals of the intelligence function—it is a method of performing analytic activities and placing the analysis 

in a useable form. 

Intelligence Products 

Reports or documents that contain assessments, forecasts, associations, links and other outputs from the 

analytic process that may be disseminated for use by law enforcement agencies for the prevention of 

crimes, target hardening, apprehension of offenders and prosecution. 

Intelligence Records Guidelines 

Derived from the Federal regulation 28 CFR Part 23, these are guidelines/standards for the development 

of records management policies and procedures used by law enforcement agencies. 

Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF) 

The joint operational group, led by the FBI, that leverages the collective resources of member agencies to 

prevent, investigate, disrupt and deter terrorism threats that affect United States interests and facilitate 

information sharing among partner agencies. 

Law Enforcement Intelligence 

The end product (output) of an analytic process that collects and assesses information about crimes and/or 

criminal enterprises with the purpose of making judgments and inferences about community conditions, 

potential problems and criminal activity with the intent to pursue criminal prosecution or project crime 

trends or support informed decision making by management. 

Law Enforcement Sensitive (LES) 

Sensitive but unclassified information specifically compiled for law enforcement purposes that, if not 

protected from unauthorized access, could reasonably be expected to (1) interfere with law enforcement 

proceedings, (2) deprive a person of a right to a fair trial or impartial adjudication, (3) constitute an 

unwarranted invasion of the personal privacy of others, (4) disclose the identity of a confidential source, 

(5) disclose investigative techniques and procedures and/or 6) endanger the life or physical safety of an 

individual. 

Multiagency Coordination System (MACS) 

A system that provides the architecture to support coordination for incident prioritization, critical resource 

allocation, communications systems integration and information coordination. MACS assist agencies and 

organizations responding to an incident. The elements of a MACS include facilities, equipment, 

personnel, procedures and communications. Two of the most commonly used elements are EOCs and 

multiagency coordination groups. 

 A-5 
Comprehensive Preparedness Guide 502 

National Incident Management System (NIMS) 

A set of principles that provides a systematic, proactive approach guiding government agencies at all 

levels, nongovernmental organizations and the private sector to work seamlessly to prevent, protect 

against, respond to, recover from and mitigate the effects of incidents, regardless of cause, size, location 

or complexity, in order to reduce the loss of life or property and harm to the environment. 

National Information Exchange Model (NIEM) 

A joint technical and functional standards program initiated by DHS and DOJ that supports national-level 

interoperable information sharing. 

National Intelligence or Intelligence Related to National Security 

Defined by Section 3 of the National Security Act of 1947, as amended, as “A) information relating to the 

capabilities intentions or activities of foreign governments or elements thereof, foreign organizations, or 

foreign persons, or international terrorist activities” (known as foreign intelligence); and B) “information 

gathered and activities conducted to protect against espionage, other intelligence activities, sabotage, or 

assassinations conducted by or on behalf of foreign governments or elements thereof, foreign 

organizations, or foreign persons, or international terrorist activities (known as “counterintelligence”), 

regardless of the source from which derived and including information gathered within or outside the 

United States, that (A) pertains to more than one United States Government agency; and (B) involves (i) 

threats to the United States, its people, property, or interests’; (ii) the development, proliferation, or use of 

weapons of mass destruction; or (iii) any other matter bearing on the United States national or homeland 

security.” (50 U.S.C. § 401a) The goal of the National Intelligence effort is to provide the President and 

the National Security Council with the necessary information on which to base decisions concerning the 

conduct and development of foreign, defense and economic policy and the protection of United States 

national interests from foreign security threats. (Executive Order 12333) 

National Operations Center (NOC) 

Serves as the primary national hub for situational awareness and operations coordination across the 

Federal Government for incident management. The NOC provides the Secretary of Homeland Security 

and other principals with information necessary to make critical national-level incident management 

decisions. 

Network 

A structure of interconnecting components designed to communicate with each other and perform a 

function or functions as a unit in a specified manner. 

Office of Intelligence and Analysis (I&A) 

I&A is a component of DHS and the national Intelligence Community (IC). It ensures that information 

related to homeland security threats is collected, analyzed and disseminated to the full spectrum of 

homeland security customers in DHS, at State, local, tribal, and territorial levels, in the private sector and 

in the IC. 

Planning 

The preparation for future situations, estimating organizational demands and resources needed to attend to 

those situations and initiating strategies to respond to those situations. 

A-6 
 

Appendix A: Glossary and Acronyms 

Policy 

The principles and values that guide the performance of a duty. A policy is not a statement of what must 

be done in a particular situation. Rather, it is a statement of guiding principles that should be followed in 

activities which are directed toward the attainment of goals. 

Privacy (Information) 

The assurance that legal and constitutional restrictions on the collection, maintenance, use and disclosure 

of personally identifiable information will be adhered to by criminal justice agencies, with use of such 

information to be strictly limited to circumstances in which the legal process permits use of the personally 

identifiable information. 

Privacy (Personal) 

The assurance that legal and constitutional restrictions on the collection, maintenance, use and disclosure 

of behaviors of an individual—including his/her communications, associations and transactions—will be 

adhered to by criminal justice agencies, with the use of such information to be strictly limited to 

circumstances in which legal process authorizes surveillance and investigation. 

Privacy Act 

Legislation that allows an individual to review almost all Federal files pertaining to him/her, places 

restrictions on the disclosure of personally identifiable information, specifies that there be no secret 

records systems on individuals and compels the government to reveal its information sources. 

Procedure 

A method of performing an operation or a manner of proceeding on a course of action. It differs from 

policy in that it directs action in a particular situation to perform a specific task within the guidelines of 

policy. Both policies and procedures are goal-oriented. However, policies establish limits to action, 

whereas procedures direct responses within those limits. 

Recommendations 

Suggestions for actions to be taken based on the findings of an analysis. 

Responsibility 

Responsibility reflects how the authority of a unit or individual is used and determines whether goals 

have been accomplished and the mission fulfilled in a manner that is consistent with the defined limits of 

authority. 

 A-7 
 

Comprehensive Preparedness Guide 502 

Risk Assessment 

Risk is defined as the product of three principal variables: 1) threat (the likelihood of an attack occurring), 

2) vulnerability and 3) consequence (the relative exposure and expected impact of an attack). Risk 

assessment is the process of qualitatively or quantitatively determining the probability of an adverse event 

and the severity of its impact on an asset. It is a function of threat, vulnerability and consequence. A risk 

assessment may include scenarios in which two or more risks interact to create greater or lesser impact. A 

risk assessment provides the basis for the rank ordering of risks and for establishing priorities for 

countermeasures. 

Risk is classically represented as the product of a probability of a particular outcome and the results of 

that outcome. A statewide or regional assessment of the threats, vulnerabilities and consequences faced by 

the fusion center’s geographic area responsibility. The risk assessment is used to identify priority 

information requirements for the fusion center and to support State and urban area homeland security 

preparedness planning efforts to allocate funding, capabilities and other resources. 

In traditional criminal intelligence, a risk assessment means an analysis of a target, illegal commodity or 

victim to identify the probability of being attacked or criminally compromised and to analyze 

vulnerabilities. 

Security 

A series of procedures and measures that, when combined, provide protection of people from harm, 

information from improper disclosure or alteration and assets from theft or damage (Criminal Justice 

Commission, 1995). 

Situation Report (SitRep) 

Document that contains confirmed or verified information and explicit details (who, what, where and 

how) relating to an incident. 

Threat Assessment 

An assessment of a criminal or terrorist presence within a jurisdiction integrated with an assessment of 

potential targets of that presence and a statement of probability that the criminal or terrorist will commit 

an unlawful act. The assessment focuses on the criminal’s or terrorist’s opportunity, capability and 

willingness to fulfill the threat. 

Unified Command (UC) 

An ICS application used when more than one agency has incident jurisdiction or when incidents cross 

political jurisdictions. Agencies work together through the designated members of the UC, often the 

senior persons from agencies and/or disciplines participating in the UC, to establish a common set of 

objectives and strategies and a single incident action plan. 

Urban Area Security Initiative (UASI) 

UASI addresses the unique multi-disciplinary planning, operations, equipment, training and exercise 

needs of high-threat, high-density urban areas. 

Warning 

To notify in advance of possible harm or victimization as a result of information and intelligence gained 

concerning the probability of a crime or terrorist attack. 

A-8 
 

Acronyms 

Appendix A: Glossary and Acronyms 

ACAMS Automated Critical Asset Management System 

AIATP Anti-Terrorism Intelligence Awareness Training Program 

BJA Bureau of Justice Assistance 

CFR Code of Federal Regulations 

CIAC Colorado Intelligence Analysis Center 

CICC Criminal Intelligence Coordinating Council 

CIKR Critical Infrastructure and Key Resources 

CONOPS Concept of Operations 

COOP Continuity of Operations Plan 

CPG Comprehensive Preparedness Guide 

CVI Chemical-Terrorism Vulnerability Information 

DHS Department of Homeland Security 

DNC Democratic National Convention 

DOC Department Operations Centers 

DOJ Department of Justice 

EEIs Essential Elements of Information 

EOC Emergency Operations Center 

EOP Emergency Operations Plan 

Epi-X Epidemic Information Exchange 

ESF Emergency Support Functions 

FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation 

FEMA Federal Emergency Management Agency 

FLETC Federal Law Enforcement Training Center 

FLO Fusion Liaison Officer 

FOUO For Official Use Only 

FPC Federal Preparedness Coordinator 

GIS Geographic Information System 

GIWG Global Intelligence Working Group 

Global Global Justice Information Sharing Initiative 

HAN Health Alert Network 

HSDN Homeland Security Data Network 

HSEEP Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program 

HSGP Homeland Security Grant Program 

HSIN Homeland Security Information Network 

I&A Office of Intelligence and Analysis 

IAP Incident Action Plan 

IC Incident Command 

ICP Information Collection Plan 

ICS Incident Command System 

IEMC Integrated Emergency Management Course 

IIATP Introductory Intelligence Analyst Training Program 

IOC Intelligence Operations Center 

IP Office of Infrastructure Protection 

ISE Information Sharing Environment 

IT Information Technology 

JTTF Joint Terrorism Task Force 

LEO Law Enforcement Online 

 A-9 
Comprehensive Preparedness Guide 502 

LLIS Lessons Learned Information Sharing 

LOA Letter of Agreement 

MACS Multiagency Coordination System 

MNJAC Minnesota Joint Analysis Center 

MOU Memorandum of Understanding 

NCIRC National Criminal Intelligence Resource Center 

NEDSS National Electronic Disease Surveillance System 

NDA Non-Disclosure Agreement 

NIC National Integration Center 

NIEM National Information Exchange Model 

NIMS National Incident Management System 

NIPP National Infrastructure Protection Plan 

NOC National Operations Center 

NPD National Preparedness Directorate 

NRCC National Response Coordination Center 

NRF National Response Framework 

NSSE National Special Security Event 

ODNI Office of the Director of National Intelligence 

OHA Office of Health Affairs 

PCII Protected Critical Infrastructure Information 

PM-ISE Program Manager for the Information Sharing Environment 

RFI Request for information 

RISS Regional Information Sharing Systems 

RNC Republican National Convention 

RRCC Regional Response Coordination Center 

SGI Safeguards Information 

SINs Standing Information Needs 

SME Subject Matter Expert 

SOP Standard Operating Procedures 

SSI Sensitive Security Information 

TCL Target Capabilities List 

TPEP Terrorism Prevention Exercise Program 

UASI Urban Area Security Initiative 

UC Unified Command 

USSS United States Secret Service 

WMD Weapons of Mass Destruction 

A-10 
 

Appendix B: Draft 

Memorandum of 

Understanding 

This draft MOU is provided only as a guide to describe how the fusion center and the EOC could 

interface. It is not intended as an MOU to establish a fusion center or an EOC. Guidance on an MOU to 

operate the fusion center is available at www.iir.com/global/resourcesGuidelines.htm. 

Co-location or joint operations of the fusion center and the EOC is not done in every State; therefore, 

distinctions between co-located operations and separate operations will be addressed in this draft. In some 

cases, the centers may operate as a fusion center with combined staff or as a separate secure watch facility 

with fusion and EOC roles. 

Some parts of this draft may not apply to your jurisdiction. Your jurisdiction may need to add additional 

language to clarify issues, relationships or to obtain signatures. It is not intended to be all inclusive but, 

rather, is provided as an example for fusion centers and EOCs to begin the process of developing an 

MOU appropriate for their situation and jurisdiction. 

B-1 
Comprehensive Preparedness Guide 502 

Draft Memorandum of Understanding 

Between _____State Fusion Center and ______State Emergency 

Management Agency 

I. Purpose 

(In this section, clearly state the purpose of this MOU. Indicate that it is only to define how the 

two already established centers will interface to share information for the betterment of the State 

and the nation.) 

The purpose of this memorandum of understanding (MOU) is to establish the policies that govern 

the activities of the agencies participating in interaction between the _______ Fusion Center and 

the _______Emergency Operations Center (EOC). The guidelines established herein will serve to 

maximize cooperation and to create a formal, effective working group capable of addressing the 

effective and efficient management, classification and dissemination of criminal, homeland 

security and/or terrorism-related threat and/or hazard information in the State of _______ and the 

United States of America. 

II. Mission 

(This section should include the mission statement of the fusion center and the EOC, with short 

concise and clear statement of the purpose and roles of the centers.) 

This agreement reflects a collaborative effort between the _______ Fusion Center and _______ 

Emergency Management Agency to share strategic, operational and/or tactical homeland security, 

terrorism and/or criminal information and intelligence in support of emergency management, 

response and/or recovery operations—specifically information that has been deemed essential to 

support activities of EOCs before, during and after EOC activation for an incident, in accordance 

with essential information needs outlined below. (If the specific types of information that will be 

shared have been identified, it can be described below or in an attachment). 

III. Governance 

(Insert the composition of the Advisory Board. Consider the board composition to include the 

Head of the State Law Enforcement or Homeland Security Agency as the Chair, the State 

Coordinator of Emergency Management (Co-Chair), representatives from the Governor’s Office 

or Agency/Office of Homeland Security or Preparedness, representative(s) from the legislative 

branch, a representative from the Federal Bureau of Investigation, a representative from the 

State National Guard, a representative from the Chief’s associations representing police, fire, 

sheriff and a representative from State’s fire programs and any other organizations deemed 

appropriate to have a stake in the Fusion Center and EOC interface process. Also consider how 

these members will be selected, appointed and replaced.) 

The (Head of State Law Enforcement or Homeland Security Agency) shall be responsible for the 

operation of the Fusion Center. However, a multi-disciplined Governance/Advisory Board 

chaired by (Head of State Law Enforcement or Homeland Security Agency) or his/her designee 

will be tasked with reviewing operational processes and the effective and efficient information 

management systems and sharing of information statewide, to include the exchange of 

information between the fusion center and the EOC. 

B-2 
 

Appendix B: Draft Memorandum of Understanding 

The Advisory Board will make recommendations to the Chair regarding the development of 

policy, resolution of conflicts and ensuring compliance with the MOU. The Advisory Board will 

also review reports submitted by any Fusion Center Working Groups and make annual reports to 

the Governor. 

A multi-disciplined Fusion Center Working Group shall be established to make recommendations 

to the Advisory Board. The Working Group will be co-chaired by both Fusion Center and EOC 

onsite supervisors to report operational problems, enhancements and needs on a monthly basis to 

the Advisory Board along with a monthly activity report. 

IV. Organization Structure 

(This section will begin to define the global organizational and management structures. Keep in 

mind the purpose of the MOU is to get the decision makers to agree and commit to the global 

working relations. Some details concerning specific operations may be better suited for the 

Operations Manual or standard operating procedure (SOP) document.), 

A. The fusion center consists of a combination of supervisors and analysts from each 

participating agency. The Fusion Center hosts representatives from the (State) EOC and 

other partners on a full or part-time basis depending on threat level and crisis 

management situations. 

The Fusion Center consists of two separate functions: 1) the Watch Unit and 2) the 

Analytical Section composed of the (State) Counterterrorism Unit and the Homeland 

Security Information and Intelligence Unit. The Watch Unit will be staffed with members 

specifically trained and charged with receiving, processing and disseminating 

information, as well as requests for information (RFIs). The Analysis section will focus 

on the integration and analysis of intelligence information and will prepare reports, 

products and briefs. The (agencies/entities) will manage information systems and 

equipment for the State EOC and the Fusion Center, respectively. 

Reports, products and information that match or meet pre-determined information needs 

of the EOC will be provided to the EOC watch center as a normal course of fusion center 

business during the EOC’s steady state of operations. 

When requested in support of an EOC activation or an incident (active state), the separate 

functions of the fusion center shall provide additional support: 

1. Watch Unit will receive EOC situation reports and provide input to briefings, 

reports and presentations as needed. The information provided will assist in 

providing EOC and (State decision makers) with a more complete situational 

awareness. 

2. Analysis Section will add EOC situation reports to the overall situational 

analysis. Analysts will augment the EOC staff as part of Emergency Support 

Function (ESF) 13 (Law Enforcement) and may augment other ESFs or EOC 

operations as requested (e.g., transportation, energy, public health). Depending 

on the circumstances, this augmentation may be a buildup of additional analytical 

support within the fusion center, or it may require analysts to relocate to the EOC 

with appropriate reach back capability to the fusion center. The final decision on 

the amount of resources to augment the EOC during an active state will rest with 

the fusion center. This will take into account all fusion center activities at and 

during the time of the EOC’s activation. 

B-3 
Comprehensive Preparedness Guide 502 

B. The EOC consists of a dedicated staff to operate, maintain overall statewide situational 

awareness and be prepared to activate additional statewide resources to meet any support 

requirements of prevention, response, recovery or mitigation of any emergency. The EOC 

is operated by the ( ) State Emergency Management Agency. Full-time staff may 

include personnel from other agencies to provide a constant statewide operational picture. 

A watch center will be maintained to receive and disseminate emergency information to 

decision makers, staff and supporting agencies. 

1. Watch center will provide information to the fusion center to ensure both centers 

have a full operational picture at all times and advise the fusion center of any 

additional information requirements that result from a shift from the steady state 

to the active state. The watch center will also advise the fusion center when the 

EOC activates and make a recommendation regarding the extent the fusion center 

needs to augment the EOC. 

2. EOC sections, when activated, will communicate information needs with the 

fusion center through the EOC watch center. If fusion center augmentation is 

requested and received, direct communication between the EOC command or 

sections and the fusion center analysis section is encouraged. All situation reports 

developed in the EOC will be provided to both the fusion center watch unit and 

the analysis unit. Fusion center analysis may be added to the situation reports, 

briefings and presentations in or for the EOC as appropriate for the classification 

of the documents. The EOC will follow all fusion center classification markings 

and security protocols. (If the specific security protocols have been agreed upon, 

they can be described below or in an attachment) 

The EOC should be prepared to provide an appropriate working area for fusion center staff to 

operate when augmentation requires relocating fusion center resources to the EOC. 

This may include access to secure spaces, access to secure communications, including 

telephone and/or email and access to secure storage containers to maintain secure 

documents. 

C. Supervision 

(This section should define the chain of command for supervisors and personnel.) 

Keep in mind, the EOC, when activated, may use State agency personnel from many 

disciplines, outside resources and the private sector. An MOU between the fusion center and 

the EOC should be crafted in such a way as to outline the overall interaction between the two 

centers, without establishing a precedent that each agency will require specific agreements 

to staff the EOC. 

The MOU should focus on how the two centers share information during a steady state and 

an active state to meet both centers operational requirements and expectations of the 

decision makers. 

The fusion center manager reports to the (e.g., State Police Division Commander) who, 

through channels reports to the (Head of State Law Enforcement or Homeland Security 

Agency), to the Cabinet level position overseeing Public Safety and/or Law Enforcement 

and the Governor. The Designated Emergency Management Official assigned to the 

fusion center reports to the State Emergency Management Operations Division Director, 

B-4 
 

Info. &

Intelligence Section

Info. &

Intelligence Section

Info. & Intelligence 

Branch

Info. & Intelligence

Branch Info. &

Intelligence Unit

Info. & 

Intelligence Unit

Info. & Intelligence

Officer

Info. & Intelligence

Officer

Appendix B: Draft Memorandum of Understanding 

who through channels reports to the State Coordinator of Emergency Management, to the 

Cabinet-level position overseeing Public Safety and/or Emergency Management and the 

Governor. 

During activation of the EOC, fusion center resources used to augment the EOC will 

continue to operate within their chain of command when located within the fusion center. 

If EOC augmentation requires fusion center personnel to be relocated to the EOC, they 

shall report to and operate under the EOC structure established. This shall be no different 

than any other EOC resource operating in the EOC during activation. 

Problems and difficulties that may arise during any operation will be mutually addressed 

to the respective agency supervisors and resolved as expeditiously as possible. It is 

agreed that resolution of any and all problems at the lowest possible administrative level 

are in the best interest of the all parties. 

An organization chart outlining where fusion center personnel will be assigned during an 

EOC activation may help to clarify lines of authority. 

Based on the incident needs, the information and intelligence function may be activated as a 

fifth Section, as an element within the Operations or Planning Sections or as part of the 

Command Staff. 

D. Personnel 

(This section outlines the personnel resource commitment to support the EOC during 

steady state and active state. Inclusion of the minimum and if possible maximum, number 

of personnel to be assigned from a fusion center (and where they would report) will assist 

in accommodating the EOC’s needs.) 

The fusion center agrees to assign at least one supervisor and one analyst to augment the 

activation of the EOC. Initial augmentation will be at the fusion center. The supervisor 

will discuss the EOC’s augmentation recommendations with on-duty fusion center staff, 

taking into account other operational requirements and available resources. If the EOC 

recommends onsite augmentation, the fusion center supervisor will determine the level of 

B-5 
EOC Area At Fusion Center At EOC 

Intelligence Officer 1 Analyst 1 Supervisory-Level 

Intelligence Officer 

1 Section Chief 

Intelligence/Information Section 1 Supervisor 

1 Analyst 

1 Supervisor 

3 Analysts 

1 Administrative 

Operations Section: Intelligence/ 

Information Branch 

1 Supervisor 

1 Analyst 

1 Branch Director 

3 Analysts 

Planning Section: Intelligence/ 

Information 

1 Supervisor 

1 Analyst 

1 Team Leader 

3 Analysts 

ESF-13 Support 1 Supervisor 1 Analyst 

Comprehensive Preparedness Guide 502 

support requested and verify which EOC organizational element the fusion center 

resources will be supporting. 

(The following is an example of a staffing table which can be adjusted, as needed, based 

on the status of the EOC and the fusion centers operations.) 

E. Security Clearances and Classifications of Documents 

(This section defines who has/can be granted security clearances based on sponsoring 

Federal agency requirements and the agreement to follow the fusion center or originator 

classification of documents.) 

(Identified/All) members of the Fusion Center, regardless of their sponsoring agency, are 

required to have a SECRET (or higher) security clearance issued by a sponsoring Federal 

agency for access to national security classified information. Additionally, all members 

are required to have a (State Law Enforcement Police) background check. Personnel who 

do not have the appropriate clearances will be required to undergo a background 

investigation conducted by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and/or the 

participating agency. All signatories agree to abide by originator controlled documents 

and third party dissemination regulations 

EOC staff, including the State Coordinator, Deputy State Coordinators, Operations 

Section Chiefs, are required to have a SECRET (or higher) security clearance. Planning 

Section Chiefs and watch center supervisors are required to have a SECRET clearance 

issued by a sponsoring Federal agency for access to national security classified 

information. 

V. Records and Reports 

(This section will provide an overall understanding of the records, retention, reports and 

products of the fusion center. Again, it is important to keep in mind that the purpose of the MOU 

is not to document the details but the broad, overarching elements from which operations 

managers can work.) 

In order to achieve uniformity and consistency among the participating agencies, it is agreed that 

incoming information received at the fusion center will be captured and documented in 

accordance with existing protocols currently in use by or formulated by the fusion center. Where 

B-6 
 

Appendix B: Draft Memorandum of Understanding 

original information is developed that is allowed to be disseminated according to the existing 

protocols within the law enforcement, homeland security and intelligence communities, the 

fusion center will coordinate such dissemination. 

All classified information received or generated by the fusion center and/or the EOC shall be 

controlled solely in accordance with existing United States government policy on the 

classification and handling of classified information. The Fusion Center Working Group may 

establish policy and recommend to the Governance and/or Advisory Board a need for the 

duplication of reports on participating agency forms, accessibility of information during EOC 

activations and securing of documents at the EOC during an active state. 

Access to and use of these records will be in accordance with the Federal, State and local laws 

and the policies and procedures of the fusion center and/or the EOC. All (State Law Enforcement 

Agency) records and usage of same will be in accordance with Federal law, Department of Justice 

(DOJ) regulations, Title 28 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 23 and the agency 

regulations and policy, including but not limited to the (State Freedom of Information and 

Privacy Acts). 

The Secure Room located at the fusion center is a FBI/DHS-certified facility for handling 

national security classified information and systems up to and including the (SECRET/TOP 

SECRET) level for the fusion center. As such, the information received, stored and managed 

within that facility will be handled in accordance with (FBI/DHS) requirements. Information 

related to the State EOC will be provided to the EOC for appropriate handling under established 

EOC protocols. The recorded schedule of events (meetings, operations, systems tests, etc.) shall 

be the responsibility of the Fusion Center Administrative Assistant. 

A secure conference room will be maintained at the State EOC. This room will be secured in a 

manner to provide for work, discussions, briefings, video teleconferences, temporary storage of 

classified information up to the SECRET level. Fusion center augmented resources onsite at the 

EOC will have access to this space for working with or discussing classified information. 

Communication links with the fusion center capable of passing classified information between the 

centers will be available within this secure conference room. 

VI. VI. Physical Location and Access 

(This section provides the physical location of the fusion center, the EOC or a joint center. It 

addresses basic access to information, records or the centers themselves. Because the volume of 

information and classification of documents in the fusion center is generally going to be more 

stringent than that of the EOC, more focus may be placed on access to the fusion center. This 

focus should help assure the fusion center is cooperating with non-law enforcement agency 

partners, while maintaining the appropriate level of security for staff, facilities and products.) 

If entities are not co-located, indicate separate locations and means of communications used 

to pass information during steady state and active state of EOC operations. 

If they jointly operate a secure watch room as a means to coordinate information, indicate 

where this will occur. 

The fusion center is located at (insert location and address; consider adding latitude/longitude 

coordinates as well). The EOC is located at (insert location and address; consider adding 

latitude/longitude coordinates as well). 

B-7 
Comprehensive Preparedness Guide 502 

To ensure awareness of all fusion center operations, the senior EOC officials will be briefed upon 

request and will be authorized access to appropriate fusion center records, subject to any pertinent 

legal and/or restriction of access. The senior EOC officials and their representatives can contact 

the fusion center directly at any time to receive investigative/threat updates and to request or 

provide information. Likewise, the EOC stands ready to provide appropriate briefings and access 

to fusion center staff or other officials as necessary. 

VII. News Media and the Press 

(In this section, provide an agreement on the release of information to the media. During an EOC 

activation, the Joint Information Center (JIC) will likely manage the public information 

dissemination. An agreement here is simply to articulate who has the lead in other cases.) 

All media releases will be mutually agreed upon and jointly handled consistent with existing 

participating agency guidelines. Fusion center releases must have the prior approval of the (Head 

of State Law Enforcement or Homeland Security Agency) when the EOC is in the steady state. 

During EOC active state, all media releases will be handled by the Joint Information Center (JIC). 

Information gleaned from fusion center documents or reports should be cleared with the fusion 

center, fusion center representative or liaison working at the EOC before it is included in media 

releases. 

VIII. Amendment of Agreement 

(This section provides the tool to make changes to the MOU once the initial agreement is 

completed and signed. It may also provide the timeline for reviewing or redrafting the MOU.) 

This agreement may only be amended by the mutual consent of the participating agencies or by a 

subsequent MOU. The addition of new participating agencies to either center will not be 

considered a formal change to the MOU and therefore, will not require approval of each current 

member; however, new members to either center must comply with this MOU as a condition of 

participating in either the fusion center or the EOC. Upon termination of the understanding or 

withdrawal from the center, all equipment will be returned to the supplying agency. 

IX. Salaries and Compensation 

(This section, if necessary, provides the language to identify which agency is responsible for joint 

center personnel costs. It also clarifies costs that would be included in any requests for 

reimbursement under the Stafford Act in accordance with a presidentially declared disaster. This 

language will vary depending how the center is funded.) 

Salaries and allowable overtime of fusion center or EOC members will be paid by their respective 

agencies. Costs associated with EOC active state will be recorded and reported in accordance 

with EOC-established procedures to maximize the State’s documentation of disaster-related 

expenses and to assist in documenting eligible reimbursable expenses when Federal assistance is 

authorized. 

X. Discipline and Security 

(This section provides the overall guidelines for the operations of the fusion center. Keeping in 

mind the purpose of the MOU, this section may be global with references to the specific Concept 

of Operations or Operations Manual for details. This section is designed to provide the decision 

makers with approval for the development of the operations documents created by the operations 

managers. It is not intended as the only documentation for fusion center operations guidelines.) 

B-8 
 

Appendix B: Draft Memorandum of Understanding 

Both centers’ personnel, regardless of the sponsoring agency, will be managed and guided by the 

SOPs, including the Security Policy and Classification and Dissemination Schedule. In addition 

to any standards of conduct policy directing (State Emergency Management) personnel or any 

other fusion center participating agency, all center personnel will be subject to the (State Law 

Enforcement or Homeland Security Agency) internal investigations for any action or conduct 

affecting the security of the fusion center or the State EOC. Security breaches will be subject to 

an internal (State Law Enforcement or Homeland Security Agency) investigation or that of a 

sponsoring Federal agency. Removal from the centers and/or elimination of access will be in 

accordance with the SOPs or policy established by the Fusion Center Working Group. 

XI. Facilities Management and Access 

(This section provides the overall responsibility for facility management and security. It may 

recognize that agency personnel outside of the State Law Enforcement or Homeland Security 

Agency will have controlled but limited access to the fusion center. Likewise, access to the EOC 

may be addressed here but should not confuse the EOCs accessibility for all participants in the 

EOC. Keep in mind, not everyone in the EOC has access to the fusion center, but, as a less secure 

facility, access to the EOC may be granted to fusion center staff, particularly when they are colocated.) 

The fusion center facility will be managed by (State Law Enforcement or Homeland Security 

Agency) as agreed upon between, including overall facility security. The EOC facility will be 

managed by the State Emergency Management Agency. ID/Access cards and access control will 

be the responsibility of each center. Joint ID/Access cards should be used to provide access to 

both centers for individuals who are mutually agreed upon to have a need for such access. 

Sufficient emergency management staff with Federal security clearance and who have completed 

the necessary background investigations will have appropriate access to the secure room and 

systems, as granted by respective Federal agencies, located at the fusion center to conduct 

operations and perform system tests. Any telecommunications circuits to support emergency 

management systems (e.g., Homeland Security Information Network, Secure Video and Critical 

Infrastructure Warning Information Network connections), such as voice and facsimile circuits 

will remain the responsibility of the (State Emergency Management Agency) for maintenance and 

costs. Likewise, similar (State Law Enforcement or Homeland Security Agency) circuits, etc. will 

remain the responsibility of the (State Law Enforcement or Homeland Security Agency). 

XII. Civil Liability and Indemnification 

(This section should include the legal language determined necessary by the partnering parties to 

the MOU to cover the civil liability and indemnification for acts and omissions of personnel.) 

Under no circumstances shall a participating agency assume liability for the actions of the 

centers’ personnel who are not employed by that agency. Participating agencies shall not seek or 

be entitled to indemnification from any other participating agencies for any judgments, costs of 

litigation arising from the acts of the centers’ personnel employed by that agency. 

Each participating agency agrees to protect, indemnify and hold harmless all other participating 

agencies and their respective officers, agents and employees from and against all claims, actions 

and suits and will defend all other participating agencies and their respective officers, agents and 

employees, at its own cost and at no cost to the other participating agencies, in any suit, action or 

claim, including appeals for personal injury to or death of any person or loss or damage to 

property arising from or resulting from the activities or omissions of the said participating 

agencies under this agreement. These indemnification provisions are for the protection of the 

participating agencies and their respective officers, agents and employees and shall not establish, 

B-9 
Comprehensive Preparedness Guide 502 

of themselves, any liability to third parties. The provisions of this section shall survive the 

termination of this agreement. 

XIII. Duration 

(This section may provide the timeline which the parties have determined for reviewing the MOU 

or when it will be reviewed in its entirety. It could be included or combined with the section 

above regarding amendment of the agreement.) 

This agreement will become effective upon the date the last of the undersigned participating 

agency representatives executes the agreement by affixing his/her signature. This will remain in 

effect until such time as the either center is disbanded. Disbanded does not refer to deactivation of 

the EOC following an incident. This MOU is intended to be indefinite. Participating agencies 

may withdraw their participation at any time after a sixty-day notice to all signatories of this 

document. 

Note: A separate section above may be devoted to communication issues or it may be covered 

by operational guidelines. 

B-10 
 

Appendix C: Fusion 

Center and EOC Interface: 

Analysis of Coordination 

and Integration Best 

Practices 

C-1 

 

 

 

Arizona Counter Terrorism Information Center 

The ACTIC, which is staffed by over 200 people, is a cross-jurisdictional partnership managed by the Arizona 

Department of Public Safety (DPS) and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). The center integrates Federal, 

State, and local law enforcement as well as first responders and emergency management. A Watch Center is the 

central location for information coming in and out of the ACTIC, and a governance board led by the Arizona DPS 

oversees its operations, which includes a robust Terrorism Liaison Officer (TLO) program. The TLO program, 

created to address an all-hazards environment, has progressively been embedded in all of the prevention, protection, 

response, and recovery activities in Arizona. 

The EOCs throughout Arizona, whether at the State, local or county levels, are supported by the TLO program 

when they are activated during an incident. The examination of this interaction focused on the Arizona State EOC 

and interviews were conducted with ACTIC personnel, emergency managers, first responders, and law enforcement 

personnel from the City of Phoenix and Maricopa County. 

The Arizona State EOC is overseen by the Arizona Department of Emergency Management and is not co-located 

with the ACTIC. The TLOs thought that their participation was valuable during EOC activation. In such 

situations, the ACTIC makes all of its unclassified information available to the EOC – an arrangement that enables 

the TLOs to access various fusion center databases and analytical resources such as e-Team and the State law 

enforcement system. These resources also include record checks from databases, geospatial analysis, Department 

of Motor Vehicle photographs, and tactical analytical products. 

TLOs, which are drawn from the law enforcement, fire, EMS, public health and emergency management 

disciplines, are required to sign a non-disclosure agreement to assist in ensuring the protection of civil rights, civil 

liberties and privacy. Emergency management officials stated that the presence of a TLO in their EOC gave them 

access to appropriate data accumulated by the ACTIC, which mitigated the need to be co-located with the fusion 

center and enhanced their ability to respond to any situation. The ACTIC is currently developing Standard 

Operating Procedures (SOPs) that will guide how TLOs interact with Arizona’s EOCs during an incident. Those 

SOPs will be maintained by the ACTIC and shared with its partners. 

The ACTIC’s outreach and training programs, as well as robust analytical and investigative capabilities, have 

enhanced the relationship between the fusion center and its public and private-sector partners.1 Additionally, the 

ACTIC frequently conducts exercises and training with the State and local EOCs, and participated in the National 

Level Exercise (NLE) 2008, also known as TOPOFF, which offered the State’s entire public safety community 

exercise and training opportunities. 

Colorado Information Analysis Center 

The relationship between the CIAC and the Colorado State EOC was examined during the Democratic National 

Convention (DNC) held in August 2008. While the CIAC and the State EOC are co-located in the same building, 

the communication between them has been episodic due to the evolution of their respective roles and 

responsibilities. 

1 Additional information on the ACTIC and its TLO Program is located on the Lessons Learned Information Sharing (LLIS) System at 

www.llis.dhs.gov. 

October 2009 Page 2 
 

 

The EOC staffs a watch officer 24/7 who serves as the link between the EOC and the CIAC. The EOC watch 

office receives CIAC products, such as daily/weekly reports and any special bulletins, while the CIAC periodically 

receives reports and briefings from the EOC watch office. 

In preparation for that event, the CIAC trained more than 200 TLOs, including law enforcement, fire, EMS, 

emergency management, public health, agriculture, transportation, and military personnel. Some of those personnel 

were assigned to the various command centers activated during the DNC, and emergency management personnel 

continue to participate in the TLO program and receive the same training as law enforcement TLOs. 

The DNC was a unique and challenging event for both the CIAC and the EOC. The Denver Police Department’s 

EOC was the primary for the event, per mutual agreement. The State EOC was responsible for any emergency 

requirement outside of the City and County of Denver. The State EOC provided support to agencies participating 

in the management of the DNC that were not contracted by the Denver EOC or DNC management. The State of 

Colorado had several large events running concurrently with the DNC (The Colorado State Fair, The Taste of 

Colorado and Country Jam). These events require assistance and monitoring of the State EOC. The CIAC 

provided threat assessments to the supervision of these events, as well as members of the State EOC, in preparation 

for a possible request for assistance. 

The CIAC Director was assigned to the EOC during the DNC and provided leadership and situational awareness 

regarding the DNC intelligence and Emergency Support Function (ESF) 13 - Public Safety and Security 

coordination. The Director also vetted the information provided by the CIAC to the EOC to ensure that classified 

information and sensitive investigations were not compromised. The CIAC briefed the EOC personnel on 

investigations and potential threats during shift changes. EOC personnel thought those briefings were valuable and 

kept the channels of communication open. The EOC, as well as the other investigative and analytical operations 

centers, used WebEOC as one of the communication tools to provide FOUO information. Overall, it was noted that 

additional training and exercises would enhance communication channels and build trusted relationships.2 

Florida Fusion Center 

The FFC is operated by the Florida Department of Law Enforcement (FDLE) Office of Statewide Intelligence, and 

is a multi-disciplinary all-crimes fusion center. It is designated as the State of Florida’s primary fusion center with 

a focus on terrorism, as directed by State statute. Part of that statute codifies their relationship with the State 

Division of Emergency Management (DEM) and describes roles and responsibilities for each agency. DEM has 

responsibility for the State Operations Center (SOC). During steady state, the watch office within the SOC 

provides 24/7 monitoring of activities and events around the state, and relays any pertinent situational awareness 

information to the FFC. The FFC also has a 24/7 operational component that serves as the watch, warning and 

situational awareness element for law enforcement and public safety agencies statewide. The FFC has established 

an Intelligence Liaison Officer (ILO) program with the agencies that assign personnel to the FFC. These personnel 

are from State Departments of Health, Corrections, Financial Services, Agriculture, Highway Patrol, Environmental 

Protection, Education, Attorney General, and Alcohol, Beverage and Tobacco, as well as the Florida National 

Guard, Federal components of the FFC include DHS, U.S. Attorney’s Office, TSA and the Drug Enforcement 

Agency (DEA). A POC has also been established with the FBI, and two liaison officers from DEM are also 

assigned to the FFC. 

2 Additional information on the CIAC’s role in the DNC is located on LLIS at www.llis.dhs.gov. 

October 2009 Page 3 
The FDLE has identified specific personnel to staff the SOC during activation. This enables the FFC to maintain 

independent intelligence operations and support to the SOC during incidents. Florida has designated the law 

enforcement support function as a State of Florida ESF 16 – Law Enforcement and Security. During activation, 

ESF-16 is led by FDLE with the FFC in a support role. The FFC provides information that is used to address 

resource needs, assist in planning, and deploy prevention-related resources. Both the FFC and the SOC have 

necessary facilities to receive and store classified material up to the Secret level. In addition, the FFC has access to 

Homeland Secure Data Network (HSDN). Security protocols have been developed to address the handling and 

storage of this information, and the State security officer monitors the handling of this material, and provides 

oversight on clearance matters for both of these entities. 

The FFC and SOC have a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) in place that describes their respective roles and 

responsibilities, and each has also established MOUs with their respective participating agencies to memorialize 

their working relationships. Additionally, the FFC developed a privacy policy that has been shared and adopted by 

the SOC. The FFC and SOC have also supported the cross-training of personnel, by ensuring select DEM 

personnel receive basic ILO training from the FFC. These personnel also attend monthly intelligence meetings. 

The FFC and SOC have responded to several natural disasters and man-made events, as well as participated in a 

yearly table top exercise, which has enabled them to test their processes and procedures. Ultimately, protocols and 

personal relationships have been enhanced by these activities. 

SOC and FFC personnel noted that workshops to familiarize all partners enhance mutual understanding of what 

information is available and how it can be shared. They also noted that this coordination avoids a single point of 

failure in the event that an incident put one or the other off-line. 

Georgia Information Sharing and Analysis Center 

In 2007 the Governor of Georgia merged the Georgia Emergency Management Agency (GEMA) and the Office of 

Homeland Security (OHS), creating GEMA-OHS. This created uniform operating procedures and direction from 

leadership. The GISAC is operated by the Georgia Bureau of Investigation (GBI), but falls under GEMA-OHS. At 

the cabinet level, the Director of the GBI and the Director of GEMA-OHS both report directly to the Governor of 

Georgia. 

The GISAC is staffed with personnel from state, local and federal agencies. Currently the GISAC is manned by 

personnel from the GBI, GEMA-OHS, the Georgia State Patrol, the Georgia Department of Corrections, and 

representatives from the Georgia Chief’s of Police Association, the Georgia Sheriff’s Association and the Georgia 

Fire Chief’s Association. Federal partners working in the GISAC include U.S. Immigrations and Customs 

Enforcement and DHS. The GISAC is also co-located in the same building with the Atlanta FBI-JTTF. Briefings 

are conducted each morning between GISAC supervisors and members of the FBI JTTF. 

The SOC maintains Communications Operations (COMMO) 24/7 during steady-state operations. COMMO 

handles all after-hours calls for partner agencies and directs calls and reports for the agencies as they are received. 

COMMO operators have written protocols which are followed regarding the handling of calls and notification 

procedures. This includes the notification of GISAC on-call personnel after-hours. The SOC sends a morning brief 

to the GEMA-OHS Director and other senior officials to include GISAC supervisors. 

Communications between the GISAC and the SOC are well established and practiced, despite no formal SOPs for 

sharing information between the two entities. Both entities recognized that this was a direct result of the personal 

October 2009 Page 4 
 

 

 

 

relationships and communication between each center’s leadership. While it was noted that a SOP to codify such 

interaction may be advantageous, relationships between fusion center and EOC staff benefitted from strong 

leadership collaboration and communication. 

While no specific joint exercises or trainings between the GISAC and SOC are in place, it was noted that these 

activities may be unnecessary since the two entities coordinate and collaborate on such a regular basis. 

Additionally, whenever there is a State or regional exercise, all pertinent entities are involved. However, GEMAOHS and GISAC noted that the future development of common training scenarios, exercises, and SOPs would 

further enhance existing relationships. 

Louisiana State Analytical & Fusion Exchange 

LA-SAFE was designated as the State’s primary fusion center for gathering, processing, analyzing and 

disseminating information related to terrorism, homeland security and law enforcement. As such, it is responsible 

for monitoring threats and providing its partners and stakeholders with situational awareness on a 24/7 basis. LASAFE is located on the Department of Public Safety compound in Baton Rouge. 

The State EOC is operated by the Governor’s Office of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness 

(GOHSEP) and is located on the same compound but is not co-located with LA-SAFE. Two GOHSEP analysts are 

assigned to LA-SAFE and serve as liaisons between the two entities. The two entities normally use WebEOC to 

post and share information, and the GOHSEP analysts are also able to receive information up to the Law 

Enforcement Sensitive (LES) level. The EOC is activated during select exercises and major incidents that require 

extensive interagency communication. During those times, LA-SAFE regularly provides the following in support 

of the State EOC: 

 Updated situational assessments; 

 Situation reports (SitReps); 

 Analytical support; 

 Provision of all documents and reference materials, including Geographic Information System (GIS)3 

overlays, graphics and timelines and video teleconference capability; and, 

 Additional support as needed. 

During Hurricane Gustav, LA-SAFE supported the GOHSEP by using GIS to plan evacuation routes, identify 

assets that needed protective measures put in place, and indentify resource availability. More recently, they 

participated in the NLE 2009 exercise, which was focused on prevention and enabled the entities to familiarize 

themselves with each other’s capabilities. Ultimately, the respective roles and responsibilities that guide interaction 

between LA-SAFE and the State EOC are defined by SOPs, which are currently undergoing revision. 

Michigan Intelligence Operations Center 

The Michigan State Police (MSP) commands the MIOC, the State EOC and the MSP Watch Office, which is colocated with the MIOC. The MIOC and the State EOC are not co-located and there is no formal agreement on 

details how the two entities will interact. 

3

 See State & Local Fusion Centers: Developing Processes to Acquire and Use Geospatial Information to Support All Hazards Planning 

& Response for more information on uses of GIS. 

October 2009 Page 5 
 

 

A MSP Lieutenant is assigned to manage each entity. While the Lieutenants at the fusion center and Watch Office 

share the same Captain, the Lieutenant at the EOC reports to a different Captain who is responsible for all 

emergency management functions. All three Lieutenants work closely together and have many overlapping duties, 

and when the EOC is activated, the MIOC virtually supports the ESF-13 function. 

Additionally, each Lieutenant receives and transmits information from sources such as the DHS National 

Operations Center (NOC), DHS I&A, the FEMA Regions, and other State agencies. These three functional 

components leverage several tools to ensure thus information is shared with each other, including Homeland 

Security Information Network (HSIN), and WebEOC, which is also relied upon during partial and full activations. 

The Watch Office provides situational awareness for events across the state, such as information on road closures 

and incidents that affect the MSP, while the MIOC prepares a daily open-source briefing and other specialized 

products for the EOC and its partners. The MIOC and the EOC also conduct between six to nine joint exercises a 

year in order to test and improve their working relationships. These exercises are supplemented by training on 

NIMS, which has been provided to both entities. 

These processes and training are also well tested during actual events. For example, when the EOC was activated 

during the NCAA men’s final four basketball tournament, the MIOC developed a threat assessment prior the event 

and provided analytical assistance during the tournament. However, the MIOC and EOC noted that the strong 

communications between them would be enhanced by the development and implementation of SOPs, as well as 

through the participation in scenario-driven exercises. These exercises would serve to increase awareness of their 

respective information requirements, particularly before an event or during a steady state. 

Virginia Fusion Center 

The Virginia State Police (VSP) and Virginia Department of Emergency Management (VDEM) have a model 

relationship. The VFC and the Virginia State EOC are co-located and have developed mutually supportive policies 

and procedures. 

Virginia State legislature designated the VFC as the multi-agency fusion intelligence center for Virginia to be 

operated by VSP in cooperation with VDEM. A MOU further defines the relationship between the police 

department and the VDEM. The VFC incorporated the policies and procedures for interaction between the VFC 

and VDEM in its SOPs, which defines the roles and responsibilities of the participants.4 

A VSP First Sergeant, VDEM Special Assistant for Commonwealth Security and VSP Supervisory Analyst share 

the management responsibilities for the VFC. The VDEM provides the fusion center with analytical personnel who 

work side-by-side with VSP and other agencies’ analysts; all personnel are cross-trained, are cleared to the same 

security level, and have the same level of access to sensitive information. The watch offices for both the VFC and 

the EOC regularly exchange information. 

Analysis 

Several factors are directly linked to the success of the interaction between fusion centers and EOCs. The first is a 

spirit of cooperation and collaboration between agencies, which helps build relationships of trust such as the one 

found in Virginia. Co-location, and the constant contact it offers, may help to facilitate the development of these 

relationships, but it is not always possible given financial and physical limitations. When co-location is not an 

4

 The VFC’s MOU and other SOPS are located on LLIS at www.llis.dhs.gov. 

October 2009 Page 6 
option, the EOC and fusion center should arrange regular meetings, training events, workshops, and exercises to 

build relationships. The resulting familiarity will make for a seamless transition from steady state to activation. 

Regardless of whether the EOC and the fusion center share physical space, their interaction should be clearly 

defined, mutually agreed upon, and formalized by legislation and other documents. These include MOUs and 

SOPs, which can potentially serve as an annex to the fusion center’s CONOPS and/or the EOC’s emergency 

operation plans (EOPs) across the steady state and during activation. The SOPs between the two entities should 

address how information will be shared, with whom, and under what circumstances (e.g. daily interaction with a 

watch desk, level of interaction during an incident). They should also describe the process for the exchange and 

cross-training of agency personnel during both steady state and activation, and the interface with applicable ESFs 

during activation. 

Other relationship-building mechanisms are the Fusion Liaison Officer (FLO) or TLO programs, both of which can 

expand the fusion center’s access to the first responder and emergency management communities. Including EOC 

personnel in a FLO program will ensure strong connections and familiarity with the fusion center. 

Based upon the analysis of the previously identified fusion center and EOC relationships, the following represent 

potential solutions that should be explored, either separately or in tandem with one other, for enhanced cooperation: 

 Co-location: Co-location is an ideal way to foster strong relationships between a fusion center and EOC, 

due to the trust and understanding that develops through continuous contact and interaction. This may not 

be feasible in many jurisdictions; therefore, virtual communication and collaboration platforms should be 

explored. 

 Policy and Procedure Documentation: SOPs and MOUs should be developed to formalize the agreed 

upon relationships and any associated roles and responsibilities. These will also serve as a basis to train 

personnel. This documentation should also address access to, handling, and sharing of classified and 

unclassified information, to include personnel with clearances and access to systems used to transmit 

information and intelligence. 

 Training: Any identified liaisons/representatives should undergo extensive cross-training on fusion center 

and EOC operations to ensure they are intimately familiar with both entities. Fusion center and EOC staff 

should also have the opportunity to familiarize themselves with the operations of each center, as well as all 

of the appropriate systems or tools being leveraged. This will assist with building personal relationships 

between staff from the two entities. Additionally, joint training in security (handling, storage, 28 CFR Part 

23, etc.) and classification ([LES, For Official Use Only [FOUO], Protected Critical Infrastructure 

Information [PCII], classified, etc.) matters, as well as emergency management and incident response 

frameworks (National Incident Management System [NIMS], National Response Framework [NRF], 

Incident Command System [ICS], etc) will greatly enhance the understanding of how to appropriately 

interact and share information. 

 Exercise: Fusion centers and EOCs should regularly conduct joint scenario-based tabletop and live 

training exercises to assess their communication capabilities and the exchange of operational information 

identified in their SOPs and MOUs. These exercises should also serve to evaluate and deconflict the roles 

and responsibilities of any personnel responsible for the coordination and/or integration of these efforts. 

The SOPs should be regularly updated based upon the results of the exercises. 

October 2009 Page 7 
 Communication Systems: Fusion Centers and EOCs should examine the communication tools available 

to them and leverage those that provide the greatest connectivity and best enable the entities to share 

operational information and products, such as alerts and warnings. Discussions between the fusion center 

and the EOC should address classification levels of the systems, access, training, and limitations on what 

can and cannot be shared. Additionally, video teleconference (VTC) and secure VTC (SVTC) capabilities 

should be discussed along with alternate mechanisms for sharing sensitive or classified information (i.e., 

HSDN). 

There are also several personnel approaches that can be used to build and maintain relationships between EOCs and 

fusion centers, including: 

 Identification of Liaisons/Representatives: There should be an identified liaison/representative between 

the fusion center and the EOC whose primary responsibility is to ensure coordination between the two 

entities. This may be a part-time or ancillary duty. The roles of this liaison/representative should be 

clearly documented and defined. 

o ESF-13: Consideration should be given to using fusion center personnel to staff the ESF-13 

function during EOC activation. It will increase the ability of the fusion center to support the EOC 

with analytical capabilities and will provide reach-back capabilities to Federal, State, and local 

intelligence resources. 

 Assignment of Full-time Analysts/Personnel: Based upon available resources, the EOC or responsible 

emergency management agency should consider assigning or detailing a full-time analyst to the fusion 

center. This analyst would have intimate knowledge of emergency management operations and serve as a 

subject matter expert (SME) on emergency management/response operations. The analyst’s 

responsibilities would include providing SME support to fusion center operations and analysis and 

ensuring the timely and accurate flow of information between the fusion center and EOC before, during, 

and after incidents. 

Additionally, a fusion center should consider assigning or placing an intelligence officer with appropriate 

clearances within the EOC during activation. This will ensure the continuous and vital flow of information 

and intelligence to the EOC, as well as reach-back for support from the fusion center. 

 Unification or Virtual Connection of Watch Offices/Desk: The watch offices or duty desks of both the 

fusion center and EOC should consider virtually unifying to ensure that communication is exchanged in the 

most timely and accurate way possible. This would allow for the timely exchange, coordination, and/or 

deconfliction of information while serving as a mechanism to formally integrate the fusion center’s 

prevention efforts with the EOC’s response efforts. This arrangement would also leverage finite 

resources/personnel. 

 Expansion of FLO Programs: Existing FLO programs should be considered as a mechanism to enhance 

communication between the fusion center and the EOC, especially if dedicated analysts or liaisons 

responsible for this interaction have not been identified. Emergency management personnel should be 

considered for inclusion in the program, if they are not yet participating. If a FLO program does not yet 

exist, the fusion center should consider implementing it in order to build relationships with the EOC via 

multidisciplinary and SME personnel (e.g. fire, EMS, emergency management, and public health entities). 

October 2009 Page 8 
Comprehensive Preparedness Guide 502 

This page intentionally left blank. 

C-10 
 

Appendix D: Developing 

Processes to Acquire and 

Use Geospatial 

Information to Support 

All-Hazards Planning and 

Response 

D-1 

 

 

 

 

Baseline Geospatial Data 

Prior to submitting any request for new geospatial data, the Collection Board should first have a clear understanding 

of what baseline data is already on-hand. This includes imagery, point location (e.g. smaller CIKR assets), linear 

(e.g. rail lines and electric transmission lines), and polygon datasets (e.g. larger CIKR assets such as military bases). 

Potential data sources that can be surveyed for accuracy and completeness as part of this review include: 

• State GIS Clearinghouse 

• Classified DHS Tier lists 

• Unclassified data contained in Constellation/Automated Critical Asset Management System (C/ACAMS) 

• Unclassified data contained in the Homeland Security Infrastructure Program that is accessible via DHS 

Earth and the DHS Integrated Common Analytical Viewer 

• FEMA’s Hazards U.S. (HAZUS), software that maps and displays hazard (earthquake, hurricane winds, 

and flooding) data and the results of damage and economic loss estimates for buildings and infrastructure 

Requesting New Geospatial Data 

Once the Collection Board has a good understanding of what data is already available, they can better assess what 

gaps exist that they might want to fill in advance of a large-scale hazard event or in the midst of one. The type of 

data perhaps most often needed after a natural hazard event has occurred is post-event imagery. This data can be 

used to better assess damage to areas and the level of damage, lingering flood areas, usability of road and rail 

corridors, etc. It is important for the Collection Board to understand the various types and classifications of 

available products and what can be derived from them, , as well as how to request specific information, such as 

through I&A’s State and Local Support Request (SLSR) process or the National Response Coordination Center 

(NRCC). A good example is from the June 2008 floods in Indiana, in which classified imagery was the only type 

available in a timely fashion to meet collection requirements. However, most State & local government entities that 

needed the data did not possess clearances. As a result, the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA) was 

able to produce Unclassified-For Official Use Only (U-FOUO) linear graphics derived from the classified imagery 

to meet State & local requirements. 

One-Stop Shop Dissemination 

Just as important as understanding the full range of available information is the ability of the fusion center and other 

State & local customers to access as much data and related products on a single web-based system or platform. 

During the 2008 Midwest floods, newly acquired imagery and derived products were made available on a variety of 

systems, including the Intelink-U Intellipedia, NGA Web-based Access and Retrieval Portal, Homeland Security 

Information Network-Emergency Management, National Guard systems, as well as Homeland Secure Data 

Network e-mail. This created access and data availability issues that could be addressed substantially by staging as 

much U-FOUO data and content as possible on the Intellipedia website, which functioned very effectively and was 

identified post-event as a best practice. However, if Intelink-U/Intellipedia is to be used to its fullest capability 

during and after a large-scale hazard event, State & local stakeholders must ensure that all who require account 

access account have done so as part of the pre-event planning and coordination process. 

Recommendations 

As SLFCs reach the goals outlined in the Baseline Capabilities for State and Major Urban Area Fusion Centers, 

each will have to address the issues of acquisition, use, and further dissemination of geospatial information and 

products to a variety of customers. This entails understanding SLFC customer geospatial needs, what data is already 

available, what gaps exist, how to prioritize and task for collection or construction of datasets, and then how to 

process and package the information in a format that meets customer needs while ensuring the integrity of the 

process. As SLFCs begin to identify these requirements and scope the associated issues, they should ensure that all 

state / regional key partners are represented. The issues for consideration above provide a simple outline for the 

initial discussions among geospatial stakeholders. 

August 2009 
Comprehensive Preparedness Guide 502 

This page intentionally left blank. 

D-4 
 

Appendix E: PublicPrivate Partnerships: 

Safeguard Iowa 

Partnership’s Code of 

Conduct Manual for 

Liaisons Serving at 

Emergency Operations 

Centers 

E-1 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Public-Private Partnerships: Safeguard Iowa Partnership’s 

Code of Conduct Manual for Liaisons Serving at 

Emergency Operations Centers 

PRACTICE 

The Safeguard Iowa Partnership (SIP) has developed a code of conduct manual to guide 

its liaisons serving in emergency operations centers (EOC). The code of conduct manual 

helps to ensure that all SIP liaisons understand their roles and responsibilities while at an 

EOC. 

DESCRIPTION 

SIP is a private sector coalition dedicated to SIP partners reduce the impact of 

strengthening Iowa’s capacity to prevent, emergencies upon their communities by 

prepare for, respond to, and recover from supplementing government preparedness 

natural and man-made disasters through and response capabilities with their own 

public-private collaboration. The Iowa state resources and expertise. For more 

EOC information on SIP, please refer to Lessons (SEOC) or a county EOC may request that 

Learned Information Sharing’s Good Story, SIP deploy one or more liaisons to its facility The Safeguard Iowa Partnership. during an incident, depending on the 

magnitude of the incident. SIP liaisons serve as a conduit of information and guidance 

between the EOC and private sector organizations. During response operations, SIP liaisons 

facilitate the private sector’s donation of supplies, including water, food, ice, and clothing. 

They assist the EOC’s donations management coordinator, but SIP liaisons do not lead the 

donations operation. SIP liaisons also provide the EOC with information regarding private 

sector issues, such as operational timelines, facility locations, building access needs, 

transportation needs, relocation logistics, security issues, and recovery priorities. 

A SIP liaison at the Iowa SEOC coordinated For more information on SIP’s participation volunteer services and resource donations in the 2008 summer storm response, please during the summer storms in 2008. SIP see SIP’s after-action report, Safeguard facilitated public-private coordination, which Iowa Partnership After-Action Report, 

improved the SEOC’s overall response efforts. September 2008. 

However, at the time of the storms, SIP had 

not developed guidelines for its liaisons serving in EOCs. After the conclusion of the 

response operations, SIP decided to develop a code of conduct manual to support and guide 

its liaisons serving at EOCs during future activations. 

The SIP code of conduct manual addresses liaison qualifications and responsibilities. Before 

an individual may serve as a SIP liaison, he or she must receive training on EOC operations 

and be fully knowledgeable about incident management. Each SIP representative must: 
Each SIP liaison must be sponsored by his or her employer in order to serve at an EOC. 

Additionally, as a volunteer, each liaison must maintain responsibility for all of his or her 

own travel, lodging, and expenses. 

The code of conduct manual also specifies liaisons’ responsibilities while at an EOC during an 

activation. Once a SIP liaison arrives at an EOC, he or she must report directly to the EOC’s 

liaison officer to receive a set of operating procedures, logistical information, and 

equipment. Typically, EOCs provide liaisons with a computer, Internet access, printing 

capabilities, a landline telephone, fax machines, and office supplies. The SIP manual 

suggests, however, that each liaison also bring a personal cellular phone and charger to use 

as a back-up in case the EOC experiences communication problems. Liaisons must staff a 

full EOC shift as established by the emergency manager on duty. The SIP manual also 

requires liaisons to wear business casual attire at all times while serving at an EOC. 

LINK 

CITATIONS 

DISCLAIMER 

 Be familiar with the names and types of various private sector organizations and

functions;

 Have strong oral and written communication skills as well as problem assessment

and evaluation skills;

 Be proficient with word processing, spreadsheet, and database programs;

 Complete a series of independent study (IS) courses offered by the Federal

Emergency Management Agency’s Emergency Management Institute:

– IS 100: Incident Command System,

– IS 700: National Incident Management System,

– IS 701: Multi-Agency Coordination System, and

– IS 775: EOC Management and Operations; and

 Complete training sessions on: WebEOC is a Web-enabled crisis 

– Business Re information management software tool that source Registry, delivers real-time data to emergency – Health Alert Network, managers and responders. The software 

– Homeland Security Information enables users to share data through 

Network, and message boards, geographic information 

systems-based maps, resource catalogues, – WebEOC. and other tools. 

Safeguard Iowa Partnership 

http://www.safeguardiowa.org 

Haberl, Jami. Executive Director, Safeguard Iowa Partnership. Interview with Lessons 

Learned Information Sharing, 09 Jul 2009. 

Safeguard Iowa Partnership. Safeguard Iowa Partnership After-Action Report, September 

2008. Sep 2008. 

https://www.llis.dhs.gov/docdetails/details.do?contentID=32905 

Lessons Learned Information Sharing (LLIS.gov) is the US Department of Homeland Security/Federal 

Emergency Management Agency's national online network of lessons learned, best practices, and 

innovative ideas for the emergency response and homeland security communities. The Web site and 

its contents are provided for informational purposes only, without warranty or guarantee of any kind, 

and do not represent the official positions of the US Department of Homeland Security. For more 

information on LLIS.gov, please email feedback@llis.dhs.gov or visit www.llis.gov. 
Comprehensive Preparedness Guide 101 

D-2