In the

Court of Appeals

Second Appellate District of Texas

at Fort Worth

___________________________

No. 02-23-00265-CR

___________________________

On Appeal from the 432nd District Court

Tarrant County, Texas

Trial Court No. 1561061

Before Sudderth, C.J.; Womack and Walker, JJ.

Memorandum Opinion by Justice Womack

LUCIOUS NEWHOUSE III, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS
2

MEMORANDUM OPINION

I. INTRODUCTION

A jury convicted Appellant Lucious Newhouse III of murder and assessed his 

punishment at life in prison. On appeal, Newhouse challenges only his sentence, 

arguing in one issue that the trial court erred by admitting evidence related to the

shooting death of a woman other than the complainant in the punishment phase of 

his trial. Because the trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting this

evidence, we affirm.

II. BACKGROUND

Newhouse does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his 

murder conviction, nor does he raise any error affecting his conviction. However, 

because the nature of the offense for which he was convicted relates to his appellate 

issue concerning the extraneous-offense evidence, a brief factual background is 

necessary.

A. 2004 Homicide (The Extraneous Offense)

On the morning of March 17, 2004, Fort Worth police found the body of a 

black female wrapped in two different comforters lying in the weeds and grass at

Gateway Park. The body had several gunshot wounds, including a head wound. The 

police learned that the deceased, Janet,1 had been in a relationship with Newhouse for 

1To protect their identities, we will refer to both women using aliases. See, e.g.,

Upchurch v. State, 656 S.W.3d 170, 174 n.1 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2022, no pet.). 
3

some time and shared two children with him. They spoke to Newhouse, who

admitted that he had had sex with Janet the night before the murder and that “she had 

left around 3:30[ or] 4:00 . . . in the morning.” Police found that admission to be

significant because her body was found less than three hours later. Newhouse also 

told the police that he had never seen the blankets2that were wrapped around Janet’s 

body, but the police learned that they had belonged to Newhouse and that they were

once in his house. When the police searched Newhouse’s house, they found “a large 

smear of blood” on the wooden floor and extensive blood spatter and stains 

throughout the interior of the house. Months later, they learned that Newhouse had 

been ticketed the day after Janet’s death for illegally dumping a mattress in a privately 

owned dumpster. 

The police never arrested Newhouse, but they did arrest his brother. The 

grand jury that heard the brother’s case declined to indict him, and the case went cold. 

B. 2018 Homicide (The Charged Offense)

On September 2, 2018, the Hopkins County Sheriff’s Office and the Sulphur 

Springs Police Department responded to a 911 call about a possible car crash on the

outskirts of Sulphur Springs, Texas. Newhouse was at the scene along with the 911 

caller.3 Sergeant Mike Russell, the first officer at the scene, observed that Newhouse’s

2The terms “comforters” and “blankets” are used interchangeably in the record. 

3Newhouse and the man who called 911 did not appear to know each other. 

The 911 caller had observed Newhouse lying in the road and stopped to check on
4

vehicle was nose-down in a creek; “it looked as if someone had driven it off into the 

creek.” Newhouse claimed that he had been there all night and that he needed a tow 

truck. Another officer—a deputy—arrived at the scene and approached Newhouse’s 

vehicle while Sergeant Russell was talking to Newhouse. The deputy saw blood on 

the trunk and on the back bumper, and there were two removable blinking emergency 

lights on the roof of the car. More personnel arrived at the scene, including a state 

trooper, who followed the vehicle’s tire tracks and found the body of a black female

with clothing, soaked in what appeared to be blood, wrapped around her head.4

There were also miscellaneous articles of clothing around her body. Sergeant Russell 

contacted more law enforcement personnel, including a Texas Ranger, who

unwrapped the clothing around the deceased woman’s head, revealing that she had 

been shot in the head. Using her fingerprints, the Southwestern Institute of Forensic 

Sciences (SWIFS)5 was later able to identify her as a woman named Renee. 

him. He decided to call the police when he saw Newhouse’s car in a field.

4The crime scene was an open pasture with a creek running through it. The 

state trooper testified that it had appeared to him “that [Newhouse] would have 

pulled the vehicle up to a point, the body would have been placed and the vehicle 

continued, as far as looking at the tracks.” The deputy explained that “the weeds that 

were really tall in the creek bottom were hiding [the creek]. So when driving up to it, 

you wouldn’t know that . . . there was a depression there[,] and the vehicle entered it 

nose first.”

5SWIFS is also known as the Dallas County Medical Examiner’s Office.
5

While investigating and after learning that Newhouse and his vehicle were

connected to Fort Worth, the Texas Ranger and the Sulphur Springs police contacted 

the Fort Worth Police Department, who then obtained a search warrant for 

Newhouse’s house.6 There, they found “quite a bit of blood” in one of the 

bedrooms. There were also a couple of shell casings in that room, and there was a

black purse on the bed. Inside the purse was a wallet that contained multiple forms of 

identification belonging to Renee.

The Texas Department of Public Safety’s Crime Laboratory processed 

Newhouse’s vehicle and found two shovels, a pickaxe, a pair of gloves, and green 

rope in the trunk. Swabs of the reddish-brown stains on the car tested presumptive 

positive for blood, and a subsequent DNA analysis identified the DNA profile from 

the swab of the vehicle’s exterior near the trunk as originating from Renee. 

The autopsy on Renee revealed that she had a total of three gunshot wounds.

Two bullets were recovered from her body, both .32 caliber—the same caliber as the 

shell casings that had been found in Newhouse’s bedroom. In December 2018, a 

grand jury indicted Newhouse for Renee’s murder.

C. The Trial

At trial, a medical examiner for SWIFS opined that Renee’s death was caused 

by gunshot wounds and that the manner of death was homicide. Detective Thomas 

6This was the same house that the Fort Worth police had searched in 2004 after 

Janet’s body was found. 
6

O’Brien with the Fort Worth Police Department testified that Renee and Newhouse 

had been in a dating relationship “for months.”

7

Newhouse took the stand in his own defense. When asked if he had had a 

relationship with Renee, he responded, “Kind of.” He admitted that he had shot 

Renee but claimed that he had done so in self-defense. He testified that he had been

asleep in bed when he was awakened by Renee “fussing at” him, wanting his money.

According to Newhouse, after he told her no, she pulled a gun on him. He testified 

that he had feared for his life and had reached for his gun that was under the bed with 

his money. Newhouse claimed that he had “shot to wound” Renee, although he 

knew that he was shooting her in the head.

He remembered wrapping up her body and clothes, dragging her body to the 

front door of his house, loading her body in the trunk of his car, and driving to 

“somewhere far” away. He testified that he had not called the police because he was 

“frightened” and “scared” that he might go to jail. He admitted to driving into an 

open field, taking Renee’s body out of his trunk, laying her body on the ground, and 

then trying to drive back to Fort Worth before getting stuck in a ditch.

The jury found Newhouse guilty of the offense of murder as charged in the 

indictment. At the trial on punishment, the trial court allowed the State to put on 

7The State also called several other witnesses at the trial on the merits. We limit 

our summation of the trial testimony to that which is pertinent to Newhouse’s 

appellate issue. 
7

evidence of Janet’s 2004 murder over Newhouse’s objection that such evidence was 

“highly prejudicial.”8 As punishment witnesses, the State called a detective who had 

investigated Janet’s homicide in 2004; a former crime lab employee who testified that

the DNA profile obtained from Janet’s vaginal swab was the same as the DNA profile 

from Newhouse; Renee’s mother;

9

and one of Janet’s daughters. The jury assessed his 

punishment at confinement for life.

III. DISCUSSION

In his sole appellate issue, Newhouse argues that the trial court erred by

admitting the evidence related to Janet’s death in the punishment phase of his trial

because “[t]he probative value of the evidence was substantially outweighed by the 

danger of unfair prejudice and/or misleading the jury.” The State counters that the 

trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting the complained-of evidence 

because “the similarities between the two murders were striking and [because] 

extraneous offenses proven beyond a reasonable doubt are relevant for the jury in 

considering the appropriate punishment for [Newhouse], allowing the probative value 

to outweigh any unfair prejudice.”

8The trial court interpreted the grounds for this objection as Texas Rules of 

Evidence 403 and 404(b).

9Renee’s mother did not testify about Janet’s death. She testified that she did 

not even know Newhouse.
8

A. Applicable Law and Standard of Review

At the punishment phase of trial, evidence may be offered “as to any matter the

[trial] court deems relevant to sentencing.” Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 37.07, 

§ 3(a)(1). “Determining what is relevant [at the punishment stage] should be a 

question of what is helpful to the jury in determining the appropriate sentence for a 

particular defendant in a particular case.” Rogers v. State, 991 S.W.2d 263, 265 (Tex. 

Crim. App. 1999). But a trial court “may exclude relevant evidence if its probative 

value is substantially outweighed by a danger of one or more of the following: unfair 

prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, or needlessly 

presenting cumulative evidence.” Tex. R. Evid. 403.

In analyzing a Rule 403 objection, the trial court must engage in a balancing 

process.10 Upchurch, 656 S.W.3d at 178. In conducting a Rule 403 balancing test, a 

court must consider (1) the inherent probative force of the proffered item of evidence 

along with (2) the proponent’s need for that evidence and balance those factors 

against (3) any tendency of the evidence to suggest decision on an improper basis, 

(4) any tendency of the evidence to confuse or distract the jury from the main issues, 

(5) any tendency that a jury that has not been equipped to evaluate the probative force 

of the evidence would give it undue weight, and (6) the likelihood that presentation of 

the evidence will consume an inordinate amount of time or merely repeat evidence 

10Here, the trial court conducted a balancing test on the record, and Newhouse 

does not allege otherwise. 
9

already admitted. Id.; see Gigliobianco v. State, 210 S.W.3d 637, 641–42 (Tex. Crim. 

App. 2006). 

We review the trial court’s admission of evidence over a Rule 403 objection for 

an abuse of discretion. Perez v. State, 562 S.W.3d 676, 689 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 

2018, pet. ref’d). If the trial court’s evidentiary ruling is correct under any applicable 

theory of law, then it will not be disturbed. Johnson v. State, 490 S.W.3d 895, 908 (Tex. 

Crim. App. 2016). In reviewing a trial court’s determination of the admissibility of 

extraneous-offense evidence, we recognize the trial court’s superior position to gauge 

the impact of the evidence and, accordingly, will reverse “rarely and only after a clear 

abuse of discretion.” Lumsden v. State, 564 S.W.3d 858, 877 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 

2018, pet. ref’d). As long as the trial court’s ruling is within the “zone of reasonable 

disagreement,” there is no abuse of discretion, and the trial court’s ruling will be 

upheld. De La Paz v. State, 279 S.W.3d 336, 343–44 (Tex. Crim. App. 

2009) (quoting Montgomery v. State, 810 S.W.2d 372, 391 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991) (op. 

on reh’g)). “A trial court judge is given considerable latitude with regard to 

evidentiary rulings.” Fowler v. State, 544 S.W.3d 844, 848 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018).

B. Analysis

As to the first Gigliobianco factor—the inherent probative force of the proffered 

evidence—Newhouse contends that the probative value of the extraneous-offense 

evidence was “low” because “law enforcement admitted the only physical evidence 

tying Newhouse to the death of [Janet] was his DNA[,] and law enforcement lacked 
10

additional evidence to show [that he] committed the offense.” The record does not 

support this contention. In addition to the presence of Newhouse’s DNA on Janet’s 

murdered body, the State also put on evidence that the comforters or blankets that

were wrapped around her body belonged to him. The police also found blood inside

Newhouse’s home and learned that he and his brother had been caught trying to 

dispose of a mattress the day after Janet’s death. As the detective who testified to 

these facts explained, “when you fit all the puzzle pieces together, it paints a pretty

damning picture.” Consequently, we conclude that this factor weighs in favor of the 

admission of the complained-of evidence. 

As to the second Gigliobianco factor—the proponent’s need for the evidence—

Newhouse contends that the State did not need this evidence because he had already 

been convicted of murder in the trial on the merits. This contention misses the point 

that, “except as otherwise provided by statute or rule, a jury is entitled to have before 

it ‘all possible relevant information about the individual defendant whose fate it must 

determine.’” Shuffield v. State, 189 S.W.3d 782, 793 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006) (quoting 

Sells v. State, 121 S.W.3d 748, 766 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003)). And in this case, the State 

needed the evidence linking Newhouse to Janet’s death because it was the only 

evidence that tended to show his involvement in a crime strikingly similar to Renee’s 

murder. See Jimenez v. State, No. 13-19-00162-CR, 2020 WL 7251868, at *5 (Tex. 

App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg Dec. 10, 2020, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated
11

for publication) (reasoning that “the State’s need for the [extraneous] evidence was 

great because there was no other evidence that tied [the defendant] to the other 

[crimes], which was a major part of the State’s case on punishment”).

Our sister court in Austin has analyzed this issue in a similar case. In Harris v. 

State, the trial court allowed the State to introduce evidence that the defendant in a 

murder trial had attacked a person other than the decedent with a box cutter.

572 S.W.3d 325, 332 (Tex. App.—Austin 2019, no pet.). On appeal, the defendant 

contended that the trial court erred by overruling his objection to the evidence about 

the extraneous bad act during his punishment trial because it was “unduly prejudicial” 

and violated Rule 403. Id. at 337. In affirming the conviction, the court of appeals 

reasoned that “the charged offense and the extraneous bad act . . . were similar in 

several ways” and that “the extraneous bad act had probative value because it showed 

[the defendant]’s pattern of conduct. . . . Further, given the high probative value of 

this evidence and the broad punishment range, the State’s need for this evidence was 

high.” Id. Here, similar to Harris, Newhouse faced a broad range of punishment: five 

to ninety-nine years or life in prison. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. §§ 12.32(a) 

(imprisonment range for first-degree felony), 19.02(c) (classifying murder as a firstdegree felony). The reasoning from Harris applies to this case, and the second 

Gigliobianco factor weighs in favor of the admission of the complained-of evidence.

As to the third through fifth Gigliobianco factors—any tendency of the evidence 

to suggest a decision on an improper basis, any tendency of the evidence to confuse 
12

or distract the jury, and any tendency that a jury that has not been equipped to 

evaluate the probative force of the evidence would give it undue weight—the Harris

court’s analysis also persuades us that these factors weigh in favor of admitting the 

evidence of Janet’s murder at Newhouse’s punishment trial. “Given that the 

extraneous bad act established a pattern of conduct, and that a defendant’s character 

and criminal history are legitimate concerns in sentencing, consideration by a jury of 

the extraneous bad act would not suggest decision on an improper basis or distract 

from the main issue.” Id. And here, like in Harris, the trial court gave the jury a 

limiting instruction,11 which “minimized any risk that the jury would have considered 

the extraneous bad act for an improper purpose or given it undue weight.” Id. at 338; 

see Taylor v. State, 332 S.W.3d 483, 492 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011) (noting that jury is 

presumed to have understood and followed trial court’s jury-charge instructions 

absent evidence to the contrary); see also Lane v. State, 933 S.W.2d 504, 520 (Tex. Crim. 

11The applicable instruction in the trial court’s charge to the jury at punishment 

read:

You are instructed that if there is any evidence before you in this case of

extraneous crimes or bad acts, before you may consider such evidence, if 

any, you must be convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the 

Defendant committed extraneous crimes or bad acts, if he did. If you 

believe beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the 

extraneous crimes or bad acts, you may consider them in assessing the 

defendant’s punishment. 

This is substantively identical to the limiting instruction in Harris. See 

572 S.W.3d at 337–38 n.5.
13

App. 1996) (noting that impermissible inference of character conformity can be 

minimized through limiting instruction). We therefore reject Newhouse’s appellate 

contentions that the dangers of unfair prejudice and misleading the jury were “high” 

and that “the jury was not equipped to evaluate the probative force of the evidence.” 

Finally, as to the sixth Gigliobianco factor—the likelihood that presentation of 

the evidence will consume an inordinate amount of time or merely repeat evidence 

already admitted—the State had proffered the extraneous evidence to the trial court 

outside the presence of the jury. The trial court could have reasonably determined 

that the presentation of the evidence about the extraneous bad act would not 

consume an inordinate amount of time or merely repeat evidence already admitted.

See Harris, 572 S.W.3d at 334–35. And, in fact, the testimony of the three witnesses 

who were called to present this extraneous evidence to the jury comprised only half of 

one volume in the thirteen-volume reporter’s record of Newhouse’s trial—validating 

such a determination by the trial court. This factor, like the others, weighs in favor of 

the admission of the complained-of evidence. 

Newhouse also complains that the evidence “was used to incite and inflame in 

the juror’s minds thoughts of a serial killer.” But this is “precisely the type of 

evidence deemed relevant to the determination of sentencing by the Legislature.” 

Rodriguez v. State, 345 S.W.3d 504, 509 (Tex. App.—Waco 2011, pet. ref’d) (quoting 

Bain v. State, 115 S.W.3d 47, 50 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2003, pet. ref’d)); see Sanders v. 

State, 422 S.W.3d 809, 815 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2014, pet. ref’d) (“[A]lthough the 
14

effect of the evidence on the jury may have been indelible, it was not irrational, given 

that the [L]egislature has expressly permitted evidence of unadjudicated extraneous 

crimes and bad acts to allow juries to tailor appropriate punishments.”); Fowler v. State, 

126 S.W.3d 307, 311 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2004, no pet.) (“Evidence of defendant’s 

prior assaults certainly had a tendency to cause a jury to increase his punishment. But 

that was its legitimate purpose.”). 

Rule 403 favors the admission of relevant evidence and carries a presumption 

that relevant evidence is more probative than prejudicial. Jones v. State, 944 S.W.2d 

642, 652 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996). Newhouse had the burden to overcome this 

presumption by demonstrating that the probative value of the evidence was 

substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice or other factors. See

Upchurch, 656 S.W.3d at 178; Wells v. State, 558 S.W.3d 661, 669 (Tex. App.—Fort 

Worth 2017, pet. ref’d). Because he did not meet that burden, we hold that the trial 

court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the evidence related to Janet’s death in 

the punishment phase of Newhouse’s trial over his Rule 403 objection. Balancing all 

six of the Gigliobianco factors, the trial court’s determination that the probative value of 

the complained-of evidence was not substantially outweighed by the risk of “unfair 

prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, or needlessly 

presenting cumulative evidence,” see Tex. R. Evid. 403, was within the zone of 

reasonable disagreement. We overrule Newhouse’s sole issue.
15

IV. CONCLUSION

Having overruled Newhouse’s only issue, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

/s/ Dana Womack

Dana Womack

Justice

Do Not Publish

Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b)

Delivered: August 15, 2024