### TEXA S C OU R T OF A PPEAL S, THIR D DIST R ICT , AT AU STIN

NO. 03-0 5 -00 772 -CV

G r e go r y D ani e ls , A ppe lla nt

v. Bal c one s W oo ds C lub, Inc .; Do ugl as Huy c k; Jo hn Sc he xna yde r ; T hom as Te r r y; Bonn ie Lo c kh a r t ; a nd W il li a m D ug a t I I I , I nd iv id ua ll y a nd a s M a na g in g P a r t ne r o f B ic ke r s t a ff,

Heath, Sm iley, P ollan, Kever& Mc Daniel, L.L.P. , Appellees

F ROM THE DISTRICT CO URT OF TRAVIS COUNTY , 126TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT NO. GN50029 4 , HO NORAB LE SUZ ANNE COVINGTIO N , JUDGE PRESIDI NG

M E M O R

A N D U M O P I N I O N Gre go ry Da n i el s s u edBa l co n es W o o d s Club, Inc. (“ Ba lcones Woods Club”), Doug las Huy ck, J ohn Schexnay der, Thomas Ter ry , Bonnie L ockhar

t, and Will iam Dug at I I I , individually and
as mana g ing pa

rtner of Bic kerstaf

f, He ath, S miley , Pollan, Keve r & McDa niel, L .L .P. (“B icker staff He a th” ) f or dama g e s ari sin g out of

the ir c on du c t in

pu rsu in g an e arl ie r l aws uit that r e su lte d in Da nie ls’ s b e ingpe rm ane ntl y e njo ine d f

ro m v i o l a t i n g n e i gh b o r h o o d a s s o c i a t i o n r e s t r i c t i ve c ov e na

nts
. I n the curr ent lawsuit, on the defe ndants’ motions, the district c ourt decla red Da n i el s a vex atious litigant and or dere d him to furnish security totall i n g $100,000. Daniels fa iled to furnish the court-or dere d secur ity , and the defe ndants filed motions to dismiss
. The district cour t dismi ssed the
c a se wi th p re

jud ic e a s to a ll d e fe nd ants . D anie ls a pp e a ls the or de rs of

the dis tr ic t c ourt

de c lari nghim
a ve xati ou s li tig ant a

nd dis mis sin g his su it. We w ill a ff ir m th e dis tr ic t c ourt ’s or de rs .2 F ACTUAL AND P ROCEDURAL BACK GR OUND Ba lcones W oods Club is a neig hborhood assoc iation char g ed with enf orcingthe restric tive covena

nts of the neig hborhood in which Da niels owned a home. I n Marc h 2002, Ba lcones Woods C lub sued Danie ls (“the 2002 suit”) se eking to enjoin him from parkinghis car on his lawn in violation of those restrictive c ovenants. L ockhar t, an attorne y with B icker staff H eath, r epre sented Ba lcones Woods Club i n the 2002 suit. After a bench tr ial, the district court g rante d a per manent injunction and assessed a ttorney s’ fe es and c ost s against Daniels. Daniels appe aled, c omplaining that the district court wa s not fair a nd impartial and challeng ing the finding s of fac t and conc lusions of law suppor

ting the injunction. This Court aff irmed the district co u rt ’s orde r in Fe bruar y 2006. See D aniels v. Balcone

s W oods Club, Inc. , No. 03-03-00310-CV, 2006 Tex. App. L EXI S 957 (Tex. App.—Austin Feb. 2, 2006, pe t. denied) ( mem. op.).

I n J anuar y 20 0 4 , wh i l e the appeal of the 2002 suit was pending , Daniels sued Ba lcones Woods Club, Huy ck, one of Daniels’s ne ighbors , Ba l co n es W ood Club board member s Schexnay der a

nd Terr y , and Balcone s Woods C lub’s leg al counse l L ockhar t and Dug at and their

law firm, B icker staff H eath ( “the 2004 suit”), see king da mag es he a lleg ed re sulted from prose cution of the 20 02 su it. Da

nie ls a lle g e d that Huy c k “ purs ue d a c ampa ig n o f h ara ssm e nt” by pa rt ic ipatin g in the 2002 suit and that Huy ck, Te rry , and Schexnayder ma de false and misleading statements during pr oc e e din g s in

the 20 02 su it. Da

nie ls c la ime d th a t B a lc on e s Woods Clu b p ur su e d th e 20 02 su it ag ainst him in order to inflict “emotional and f inancial ha

rm.” Wit h respe ct to L o ck h ar t , Dug at, and B icker staff H eath, Da niels alleg ed that they made judicial c ampaig n contr i b u t i o n s for the pur pose of obtainingimproper influe nce ove r theHavingfound that, af ter amendment, Daniels’s petition failed to state a c ause of action, the 1 trial court could have dismissed the c ase w ith prejudice. See Lentwort h v. Trahan , 981 S.W .2d 720, 7 2 2 -2 3 (T ex . A p p . — H o u s t o n[ 1 s tDi s t
. ] 1 9 9 8 , n o p et
. ) ( ci t i n g Hu ble r v . Ci ty of C or pu s Ch ris ti , 56 4 S. W.2 d 816 , 823 (T e x. Civ . App .— Cor pu s Chr ist i 1978 , w ri t r e f’ d n .r .e .) ); accord Kutch v . Del Mar College , 831 S.W .2d 506 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1970, writ ref ’d n.r.e.) (disting uishing betwee n pleading s that state valid ca use of a ction and those that do not and holdingtrial court c annot dismiss case with prejudice if pleading s state valid ca use of a ction but are vague, over broad, or oth e rw ise su sc e pti ble to va lid sp e c ia l e xce pti on s)
. I t is un c le ar why the dis mis sa l of

the 20 04 su it was without prejudice
. 3 district judge , then exercised that inf luence to succe ssfully

pursue “ false a

nd completely

fabr icated
case s” ag ainst him. He further alleg ed that L ockhar t, H uy ck, Te rry , and Schexnayder e ng ag ed in a “civil conspira cy

to cause intentional emotional and finan cial harm, with malice, by abuse of proce ss.” All defe ndants in the 2004 suit filed special e x ceptions. The tr ial court s u s tained ea ch of the de fe nd ants ’ s pe c ia l e xce pti on s, fi nd ingthat Da nie ls’ s or ig ina l pe tit ion fa ile d to state a c a us e of ac tion. The court order ed that Daniels corre ct t he pleading deficie ncies by filing a n amende d or supplemental plea ding w it h in ten day s. Daniels filed a n amende d petition but failed to cure the pleadingdefe cts. Consequently , th e t ri al court, on the defenda nts’ motions, di smissed Daniels’s claims ag ainst all defe ndants. Eac h of the dismissal orders spe cifica lly stated that the dismiss al was without prejudice. 1

I n 2005, Daniels filed the instant case agai n s t t h e same defe ndants named in the 2004 suit. Daniels ag ain alleg ed that Huyck “pu rsued a campa ign of hara ssment” ag ainst him by part ici pat in g in t

he 20 02 su it. He a g a in c omp la ine d th a t L oc kh art , D ug a t, a nd B ic ke rs ta ff

He a th
u s ed t h e influence they g ained throug h judicial campa ign contributions to succe ssfully pursue a “fr audulent lawsuit” ag ainst him. Daniels also reur g ed his claim that L ockhar t, Huy ck, Te rry , and4

Schexnay der e ng ag ed in a “ civil conspirac y to fraudule ntly

and mal iciously

cause intentional emotional and fina

ncial har m.” Eac h of the de fenda

nts in the instant sui t file d m otions requesting that the district court de clar e Da

niels a vexatious lit iga

n t an d require him to furnish secur ity as a c ondition of p ro s ec u t i n g his suit. See T e x. Ci v . Pr a c . & Re m. Co d e A n n . § § 1 1
. 0 5 1

- . 0 5 5 ( We s t 2 0 0 2 )
. The district c ourt found that Daniels was a vexatious litiga nt a nd order ed him to furnish secur ity in the ag g reg ate amount of $100,000 within twenty day s. See id. § 11.055. Daniels fa iled to furnish the
secur ity by the court-or dere d deadline. I n acc ordanc e with statutory require ments, the district court dismiss ed his suit. See id. § 11.056. Daniels a ppeals fr om the order

of dismissal, complaining of the or de r f

ind inghim

a ve xati ou s li tig ant.

STA ND AR

D O F RE VI EW We reviewthe trial cour

t’s deter mination that a party

is a vexatious li tiga

nt under a n abuse of discretion standa rd. Le on ar

d v . A bb ott , 171 S.W .3d 451, 459 (Tex. App.—Austin 2005, pet. denied) . A trial c o u rt ab u s es its discretion if it acts ar bitrarily , unrea sonably , without reg ard to guiding leg al p ri n ciples, or without supporting evidenc e. K- Ma rt C or p. v . H on e y c utt , 24 S.W. 3d 35 7, 36 0 ( Te x. 20 00 ); Bocque t v. He rring , 972 S.W .2d 19, 20 (Tex. 1998). Be cause a tr ia l c ourt may e xer c ise its dis c re tio n to de c lare a pa rt y a ve xati ou s li tig ant o nly

a ft e r i t make s c e rt a in statutorily presc ribed e videntiary

finding s, we a lso review the trial court’s underlying f indings for leg al and f

actua l sufficienc y . Le on ar d , 1 7 1 S
. W
. 3 d

at 4 5 9 (c i t i n g Bocque t , 9 7 2 S
. W
. 2 d a t2 1 )
. In a leg al suffic iency

challeng e, we must determine whe ther ther e is more than a scintilla of evidenc e to support the finding
. City ofKeller v. W ilson , 168 S.W .3d 802, 827 (Tex. 2005). We review the5

ev id e n c e in th e li g h t mo s t f av o r a b le to th e c h a ll e n g e d f

in d in g , c r e d it in g f

av o r a b le e v idence if a
re a so na ble fa c t f ind e r c ou ld, and

dis re g ard ingc o nt

r a r y e vid e nc e un le ss a

re a so na ble fa c t f ind e r c ou ld not. Id . at 821-22, 827. More than a sc intill a of e vidence exis ts if the evidenc e rises to a level that would enable rea sonable a nd fair- minded people to diffe r in their conc lusions. Ford Motor Co. v. Ridgway , 135 S.W .3d 598, 601 (Tex. 2 0 04). In revie wing a fa ctual suff iciency challeng e, we consider a nd weig h all the evidenc e in the re cord, both in support of and ag ainst the finding , and set aside a finding only

if the evide nce that supports it i s so weak or ag ainst t h e gre at weig ht and preponde ranc e of the evidenc e that it is clear ly wrongand man i fe s t l y u n j ust. Dow Chem. Co.

v . F ra nc is , 46 S.W .3d 237, 242 (Tex. 2001).
DI SCU SSIO N C h a p t e r 1 1 o f t h e c i v i l p r a c t i c e an d r e m e d i e s c o d e p r o v i d e s th a t , w i th i nn i n e ty d ays of filing an orig inal answe r, a de fenda nt may move for a

n order decla ring the plaintiff a ve x atious litigant and r equiring the pl aintiff to furnish security
. Tex. Ci v. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 11.051. Th e se c ur ity

is f or the be ne fi t of the mov ingpa rt y and se rv e s a s a

n und e rt akin g by

the pla int if

f t o
assure pay

ment of the moving party ’s re asonable expenses incurre d in or i n co n n ec t ion with the litigation, including costs and attorne y s’ fe es. Id. § 11.055. On the filing of a motion under sec tion 11.051, the litigation is stay ed unti l the district court rules on the motion. The district court may deter mine that the plaintiff is a ve x atious liti g ant if the moving party demonstrates that there is not
a re a so na ble pr ob a bil ity that th e pla int if

f w ill pr e va il i n th e lit ig a tio n a nd :6 afte r a litig ation has been finally deter mined ag ainst the plaintiff, the pla int if f r e pe a te dly

re lit ig a te s o r atte mpt s to re lit ig a te , in pr op ri a pe rs on a , e ith e r: (A ) t he va lid ity of the de te rm inatio n a g a ins t the same de fe nd ant a s to whom the litigation wa s finally deter mined; or (B ) the c ause of

action, cla im, controversy , or any of the issues of f act or law de termined or c oncluded by the final de termination ag ainst the same de fenda

nt as to whom the litigation wa s finally deter mined. Id. § 11.054(2). I f the motion is gr anted, the district c ourt must order the pla intiff to fu rn i s h the
se c ur ity by a date with in i ts d isc re tio n, and if the pla int if

f f a ils to d o s o, the dis tr ic t c ourt mus t dismiss the litigation as to the movingdefe ndant. Id. §§ 11.055-.056.

By one issue on appea l, D aniels “a sks the Third Court of Appe als to determine if the Trial Judge a

bused her

discretion by

arbitra rily considering p ri or orde rs to dismiss ‘without pr e jud ic e ’ e qu iva le nt t o dis mis sa l ‘w ithpr e jud ic e ’ t o d e e m App e lla

nt a ve xati ou s li tig ant. ” I n h is brief, D aniels take s issue with two of the district c ourt’s finding s supporting the conc lusion that he is a ve xati ou s litig ant: (1 ) that pre vio us lit ig a tio n b e tw e e n h im a nd the de fe nd ants in t

he pr e se nt c a se ha s b e e n “ fi na lly

de te rm ine d” a g a ins t hi m, a nd (2 ) t hat th e pr e vio us litig a tio n invo lve d th e same
cause of ac tion, claim, controver sy or any of the issues of f

act or law at issue in the pr esent c ase. Daniels a rgues that the district cour t erre d by concludingthat t h e d i s m issal of the 2004 suit “without prejudice” was a “fina l determination” w ithin the meaning of chapter 11 of the civil p ra ct i ce an d remedies code. See id. The re cord e vidence establishes that Da niels did not perf ect a n appea l of the dismissal of the 2004 suit, and that the district-cour t judgment be came final by operation of law. Da

niels cites no authority for his contention t hat a dismiss al without prejudice is not a final deter

mination within t he mea ning of the statute. While there i s au t hority for the7

proposition that a no ns uit without pr ejudice is not a final judg ment, see, e .g. , McG owen v. Huang , 120 S.W .3d 452, 462 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2 0 0 3, pet. denied) , an orde r of dismissal that compl etely

disposes of the ca se is a fina l and appe alable judg ment. Armendaiz v. Ray , 2 1 5 S
. W
. 2 d

2 1 0 , 2 1 2 ( T e x. C i v . Ap p . — S anA n t o n i o 1 9 4 8 , n o w r it) ; s ee also Hosey v. County of Vi c tor ia , 832 S.W .2d 701, 703 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1992, no writ) (order of dismissal for
wa nt o f p ro se c uti on

wa s f ina l ju dg me nt) ; Di lm or e v . R us se ll , 519 S.W .2d 278, 280 (Tex. Civ. App.—Dallas 1 9 7 5, no writ) (judg ment of dismissal is final in sense that it disposes of pending action althoug h not adjudicatingmerits).

By arguing that the dismiss al orde r “w ithout prejudice” is not a final dete rmination of the pr ior lit ig a tio n fo r p ur po se s o f d e c lari nghim

a ve xati ou s li tig ant, Da

nie ls a sk s th is C ourt

to hold that chapter

11 require s there to ha

ve been a prior dete rmination on theme rit s of his claim. The statute, howeve r, simply

require s that the prior de termination was “ final,” not that it adjudicated the merits of t he claim. Daniels’s a ppare nt conce rn that application of chapte r 11 re sults in t he dismissal of me ri tor iou s c la ims is unw arr ante d— a pr e re qu isi te to t

he dis tr ic t c ourt ’s de te rm inatio n th a t a pa rt y is a ve xati ou s li tig ant i s it s c on c lus ion that th e re is n ot a

re a so nable pr ob a

bil ity that th e pa

rt y wi ll preva il on his cl ai m s. See Tex. Ci v. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 11.054. The district c ourt’s de te rm inatio n that Da

nie ls is a ve xati ou s li tig ant e nta ils a fi nd ingthat it

wa s n ot r e a so na

bly pr ob a ble that Daniels would pre vail in this l itigation ag ainst these def endants. Da

niels does not contend on ap p ea l t h at t h er e w as erro r i nt h i s fi n d i n g.

The e viden ce establishes not only that a fina l judgment ha d been r ender ed in the 2 0 0 2 s u i t , but also that the 2004 suit was dismissed, no appeal wa s taken ther efr om, and theAl tho ug h no t ra ise d by any dis c re te iss ue , we a dd re ss thi s argume nt be c a

use Dan iels 2 includes it in his brief. Appellate issues are to be construed rea sonably , y et liberally , so that the rig ht to appellate r eview is not lost by waiver
. See E l Paso Natural Gas v. Minc o Oi l & Gas, Inc. , 8 S.W .3d 309, 316 (Tex. 1999). Appell at e co u rt s should reac h the merits of a n appea l wheneve r rea sonably

possible. Perry v . Cohen , 272 S.W .3d 585, 587 (Tex. 2008) (per curiam). 8 judgme nt in that case is fina l. This evidence is sufficient to support the di strict court’s finding that there had bee n a fina l determination of both the 2002 suit and the 2004 suit between D aniels and one or more of

the def endants in the instant ca se. See id. § 11.054(2). D an ie ls a ls o c o mp la in s o f th e d is tr ic t c o urt’ s f

in d in g th a t t

h e r e w a s n o me an ingf

ul dif fe re nc e be tw e e n th e ple a din g s in th e 20 04 su it and

the ple a din g s in

the ins tant s uit
. After 2 compar ing the pleading s in the 2004 suit to the plea dings in this case , we c onclude that the e vidence supports the district court’s impl ied findi ng that the i nstant suit is an attempt to reliti g ate the c auses
o f ac t i o n an d i s s u es Da n i el s ra i s ed i n t h e 2 0 0 4 s u i t
. Inb o thca s es , Da n i el s co mp l ai n s o f aca mp ai gn of har assment ca

rried o u t b y

Huy ck, and a

civil conspirac y

amongL ockhar

t, Huy ck, Te rry , and Schexnay der to c ause him financ ial harm. B oth suits contai n al l ega t i o ns that L ockhar t and Bic kerstaf

f He ath exercised undue influence over the trial judg e, and that they derive d their inf

lu e nce thr ou g h jud ici al cam

pa ig n c on tr ibutio ns . T he on ly dif fe re nc e be tw e e n th e tw o s uit s th a t D anie ls identifies is “the re moval of the malicious pros ec u t i o n cl aim, and the inclusion of a dditional
e vid e nc e .” Th e e lim inatio n o f a c la im i n th e instan t ca se do e s n ot m ake the re ma ini ngc la ims differ ent from those ma de in the 2004 suit. No r d o additional alleg ations supporting a cause of action cha ng e its nature. T he evide nce suppor ts the trial court’s finding that there was no mea ningf ul dis tin c tio n b e tw e e n Da

nie ls’ s c la ims in the ins tant c a se and tho se state d in the 20 04 su it. Th e statut e9

require s only

a re peate d reliti gat i o n or attempted r elitigation of “any of the issues of f

act or law” previously

deter mined. Moreove r, a de termination of the issues ra ise d i n t h i s case would also requir e relitig ating issues of fa ct or lawalre ady decide d in the 2002 s uit. For e x ample, to demonstrate that L oc kh art and B ic ke rs ta ff He a th e xer c ise d un du e inf lue nc e ov e r the dis tr ic t ju dg e in t he 20 02 su it,
a s a lle g e d in the pr e se nt c a se , Da nie ls wo uld be re qu ir e d to sh owthat th e tr ia l c ourt in t he 20 02 su it was not fa ir or impartial. This Court has alr eady reje cted Da

niels’s claim t h at the trial cour t in t he 20 02 su it “ ma de it o bv iou s” that it fa vo re d Balcon es W oo ds Clu b a nd “ e ff e c tiv e ly eliminat ed any

possibili ty

of discover ing the complete truth be hind this m atter.” Se e Da nie ls , 20 06 Te x. Ap p. L EXI S 95 7, a t *6 -9 . We c on c lud e that th e tr ia l c ou rt did no t a c t unre a so na

bly in finding that, in bring ing the instant case, D aniels wa s repe atedly attempting to r elitigate ca uses of action or issues of

fac t or law fina lly

deter mined ag ainst him in previous lit iga tion. Theref

ore, the trial court did not abuse its discr etion in de clar ing Daniels a vexatious l itigant unde r cha pter 11 of the civil prac tice and r emedies c ode. See Te x. Civ . Pr a c . & Re m. Cod e Ann. §1 1. 05 4. We o ve rr ule Daniels’s sole issue.
CO NC LU SION

Ha vin g fo un d n o a

bu se of dis c re tio n in

the dis tr ic t c ourt ’s de te rm inatio n th a t D anie ls is a vexatious litigant pursuant to chapte r 11 of t he civil prac tice and reme dies code, we af firm the dis tr ic t c ourt ’s or de rs of

dis mis sa l.10 __________________________________________ J . Woodfin J ones, Chief Just ice Be fore Chief J ustice Jones, J ustices Patterson and Pembe rton Affir med Filed: May

19, 2009