* This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the

doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and col lateral estoppel. This court generally disfavors the citation of orders and judg ments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under the terms and condi tions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3. ** After examining the briefs and the appellate rec ord, this three-judge panel has determined unanimously that oral argumentwould not be of material assistance in the determination of this appeal. Se e Fed. R. App. P. 34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The cause is therefore ordered sub mitted without oral argument.

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Filed 12/10/96 TENTH CIRCUIT

ELDON HAYS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. RALPH WADLEIGH; OTERO COUNTY COURT, STATE OF COLORADO, John Doe and Jane Doe One Through Ten, Defendants-Appellees. No. 96-1217 No. 96-1303 (D.C. No. C.A. 96-Z-798) (D. Colo.)

ORDER AND JUDGMENT *

Before BRORBY , EBEL , and HENRY , Circuit Judges. **
Plaintiff-appellant Eldon Hays brought this 42 U.S. C. § 1983 action against employees of Otero County Court, claiming that his constitutional rights were violated when he was denied access to public court records. The district court- 2 -

dismissed the complaint because it was filed in vio lation of a court order barring Hays from filing pro se actions without prior leave of court. The court also denied his right to appeal in forma pauperis pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) because it found that the appeal was not taken in g ood faith. Hays appeals the dismissal of his complaint and asks this court to g rant him leave to proceed in forma pauperis

. Plaintiff is no stranger to the federal courts. C iting plaintiff's abuse of the judicial process, the district court issued orders in three prior actions requiring that Hays receive permission before bringing subseq uent pro se actions. We have approved similar restrictions on litigants with a h istory of bringing abusive actions. See, e.g. , Ketchum v. Cruz , 961 F.2d 916, 920 (10th Cir. 1992). Hays brought the current action pro se and without prior approval of the court. Thus, the district court did not err in dismissing the ac tion. The bar order was called to the district court's attention in defendant Wadleigh's Advisement to the Court filed on April 2 9, 1996. Hays contends that the dismissal was improper because he was never served with a copy of the Advisement and because he never had an opportunity to respond to it. We reject these contentions. Defendant submitted proof, in the form of an affidavit of service, that plaintiff was served with a copy of t he Advisement. Moreover, the- 3 -

district court could have properly dismissed the co mplaint sua sponte and without prior notice to the plaintiff upon learning that it s bar order had been violated. Title 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) provides: "An appeal may not be taken in forma pauperis if the trial court certifies in writing th at it is not taken in good faith." The district court so certified in this case and it s certificate is entitled to weight. Coppedge v. United States , 369 U.S. 438, 446 (1962). Good faith requires th at the plaintiff's argument on appeal must not be friv olous. Id . at 445. "Frivolous" has been defined as involving inarguable legal conc lusions. Neitzke v. Williams , 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). In filing a pro se action without prior court approval, plaintiff violated the court's bar order and the re sulting dismissal of plaintiff's action was clearly proper. Plaintiff's appeal of t his issue is frivolous. We thus deny plaintiff's motion to proceed in forma pauperi s . For the reasons set out above, we AFFIRM the distri ct court's order dismissing plaintiff's complaint, and we DENY plaintiff leave to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal.

ENTERED FOR THE COURT David M. Ebel Circuit Judge