(Slip Opinion) OCTOBER TERM, 2020 1 

Syllabus 

NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is 

being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued. 

The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been 

prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. 

See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337. 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

Syllabus 

BP P. L. C. ET AL. v. MAYOR AND CITY COUNCIL OF 

BALTIMORE 

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR 

THE FOURTH CIRCUIT 

No. 19–1189. Argued January 19, 2021—Decided May 17, 2021 

Baltimore’s Mayor and City Council (collectively City) sued various energy companies in Maryland state court alleging that the companies 

concealed the environmental impacts of the fossil fuels they promoted. 

The defendant companies removed the case to federal court invoking a 

number of grounds for federal jurisdiction, including the federal officer 

removal statute, 28 U. S. C. §1442. The City argued that none of the 

defendants’ various grounds for removal justified retaining federal jurisdiction, and the district court agreed, issuing an order remanding 

the case back to state court. Although an order remanding a case to 

state court is ordinarily unreviewable on appeal, Congress has determined that appellate review is available for those orders “remanding 

a case to the State court from which it was removed pursuant to section 

1442 or 1443 of [Title 28].” §1447(d). The Fourth Circuit read this 

provision to authorize appellate review only for the part of a remand 

order deciding the §1442 or §1443 removal ground. It therefore held 

that it lacked jurisdiction to review the district court’s rejection of the 

defendants’ other removal grounds. 

Held: The Fourth Circuit erred in holding that it lacked jurisdiction to 

consider all of the defendants’ grounds for removal under §1447(d). 

Pp. 4–14. 

(a) The ordinary meaning of §1447(d)’s text permits appellate review 

of the district court’s entire remand order when a defendant relies on 

§1442 or §1443 as a ground for removal. The relevant portion of 

§1447(d) provides that “an order remanding a case to the State court 

from which it was removed pursuant to section 1442 or 1443 of this 

title shall be reviewable by appeal.” The “order remanding a case” here 

rejected all of the defendants’ grounds for removal because (subject to 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

2 BP P.L.C. v. MAYOR AND CITY COUNCIL OF BALTIMORE 

Syllabus 

exceptions not applicable here) the district court was not at liberty to 

remove the City’s case from its docket until it determined that it lacked 

any authority to entertain the suit. See, e.g., Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. 

Cohill, 484 U. S. 343, 356; see also Sprint Communications, Inc. v. Jacobs, 571 U. S. 69, 72 (“[C]ourts are obliged to decide cases within the 

scope of federal jurisdiction” assigned to them). And this case was removed “pursuant to” §1442 because the defendants relied on §1442 as 

a ground for removal when satisfying the requirements of §1446. It 

makes no difference that the defendants removed the case “pursuant 

to” multiple federal statutes. The general removal statute contemplates this possibility when it speaks of actions “removed solely under” 

the diversity jurisdiction statute. §1446(b)(2)(A) (emphasis added). 

And §1447(d) contains no comparable language limiting appellate review to cases removed solely under §1442 or §1443. The parties’ dueling observations that Congress knows how to authorize appellate 

courts to review every issue in a remand order, see, e.g., 18 U. S. C. 

§3595(c)(1), and that Congress also knows how to limit appellate review to particular “questions” rather than the whole “order,” see, e.g., 

28 U. S. C. §1295(a)(7), confirms the wisdom of focusing on the language Congress did employ. The City’s novel contention that the defendants never really removed the case pursuant to §1442 because no 

federal court here held that the statute indeed authorized removal is 

mistaken and has never been adopted by any court. Pp. 4–8. 

(b) The Court’s most analogous precedent, Yamaha Motor Corp., 

U. S. A. v. Calhoun, 516 U. S. 199, resolves any remaining doubt about 

the best reading of §1447(d). That case involved a dispute about the 

meaning of §1292(b)—a statute allowing a district court to certify “an 

order” to the court of appeals if it “involves a controlling question of 

law.” The Court held that the statute’s grant of appellate review for 

the “order,” meant the entire order was reviewable, not just the part 

of the order containing the “controlling question of law.” Id., at 205. 

The City suggests that the statute’s use of the word “involves” shows 

that the reviewable issues on appeal can be broader than the certified 

question. But nothing in Yamaha turned on the presence of the word 

“involves.” Instead, as here, the Court focused on the statute’s use of 

the word “order.” The Court’s decisions in Murdock v. Memphis, 20 

Wall. 590, and United States v. Keitel, 211 U. S. 370, do not support 

the City because both decisions were driven by concerns unique to 

their statutory contexts; their reasoning is not easily generalizable to 

other jurisdictional statutes; and neither comes nearly as close to the 

mark as Yamaha. The Court’s decisions in Carlsbad Technology, Inc. 

v. HIF Bio, Inc., 556 U. S. 635, and Thermtron Products, Inc. v. Hermansdorfer, 423 U. S. 336—which permitted rather than foreclosed appellate review of certain remand orders—similarly do not help the 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Cite as: 593 U. S. ____ (2021) 3 

Syllabus 

City’s cause because they say nothing about the part of §1447(d) at 

issue today. Finally, the City argues that, when Congress amended 

§1447(d) to add the exception for federal officer removal under §1442 

to the existing exception for civil rights cases under §1443, Congress 

ratified lower court decisions that had read the prior version of 

§1447(d) as permitting review only of the part of the remand order addressing §1443’s civil rights removal ground. It is most unlikely that 

a smattering of lower court opinions could ever represent a “broad and 

unquestioned” judicial consensus that Congress must have been aware 

of and is presumed to have endorsed. Jama v. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, 543 U. S. 335, 349. And it certainly cannot do so 

where, as here, “the text and structure of the statute are to the contrary.” Id., at 352. Pp. 8–12. 

(c) The City’s policy arguments do not alter the result because “even 

the most formidable” policy arguments cannot “overcome” a clear statutory directive, Kloeckner v. Solis, 568 U. S. 41, 56, n. 4. While the 

City argues that allowing exceptions to the bar on appellate review of 

remand orders will impair judicial efficiency, that is the balance that 

Congress struck for cases removed pursuant to §1442 or §1443. And 

allowing full appellate review may actually help expedite some cases. 

The City’s contention that the Court’s reading of §1447(d) will invite 

defendants to frivolously add §1442 or §1443 to their other grounds for 

removal has already been addressed by other statutes and rules, such 

as §1447(c), which permits a district court to order a party to pay the 

costs and expenses of removal, and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 

11(b)–(c), which authorizes courts to sanction frivolous arguments. 

The Court declines to consider the merits of the defendants’ removal 

grounds and remands for the Fourth Circuit to consider those matters 

in the first instance. Pp. 12–14. 

952 F. 3d 452, vacated and remanded. 

GORSUCH, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS, 

C. J., and THOMAS, BREYER, KAGAN, KAVANAUGH, and BARRETT, JJ., 

joined. SOTOMAYOR, J., filed a dissenting opinion. ALITO, J., took no part 

in the consideration or decision of the case. 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

_________________ 

_________________ 

Cite as: 593 U. S. ____ (2021) 1 

Opinion of the Court 

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the 

preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to 

notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order that 

corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press. 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

No. 19–1189 

BP P.L.C., ET AL., PETITIONERS v. MAYOR AND CITY 

COUNCIL OF BALTIMORE 

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 

APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT 

[May 17, 2021] 

JUSTICE GORSUCH delivered the opinion of the Court. 

This case began when Baltimore’s mayor and city council 

sued various energy companies for promoting fossil fuels 

while allegedly concealing their environmental impacts. 

But the merits of that claim have nothing to do with this 

appeal. The only question before us is one of civil procedure: Does 28 U. S. C. §1447(d) permit a court of appeals 

to review any issue in a district court order remanding a 

case to state court where the defendant premised removal 

in part on the federal officer removal statute, §1442, or the 

civil rights removal statute, §1443? 

I 

Three years ago, Baltimore’s mayor and city council (we 

refer to them collectively as the City) filed suit in Maryland 

state court. The City’s complaint included a number of 

state-law causes of action, but most centered on the defendants’ alleged failure to warn about the dangers of their 

products—and the injuries the City says it suffered as a result. 

Soon after the City filed suit, the defendants removed the 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

2 BP P.L.C. v. MAYOR AND CITY COUNCIL OF BALTIMORE 

Opinion of the Court 

case to federal court. In support of their action, the defendants invoked a variety of federal statutes. Most relevant for 

our purposes, they pointed to a provision that promises a 

federal forum for any action against an “officer (or any person acting under that officer) of the United States or of any 

agency thereof, in an official or individual capacity, for or 

relating to any act under color of such office.” 28 U. S. C. 

§1442(a)(1). 

This statute authorized the removal of the City’s suit, the 

defendants said, because some of their challenged exploration, drilling, and production operations took place at the 

federal government’s behest. The companies also identified 

a number of other statutes that they believed independently supported removal: the federal-question statute, 

28 U. S. C. §1331; the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, 

92 Stat. 657, 43 U. S. C. §1349(b); the admiralty jurisdiction 

statute, 28 U. S. C. §1333; and the bankruptcy removal 

statute, 28 U. S. C. §1452. 

Once the case arrived in federal court, the City filed a 

motion seeking to have it remanded back to state court. 

The City argued that none of the companies’ grounds for 

removal justified retaining federal jurisdiction. In an extensive order, the district court reviewed each of the defendants’ cited bases for removal before ultimately agreeing 

with the City and remanding the case to state court. 

Normally that would have ended the matter. Since at 

least 1949, federal appellate courts have generally lacked 

the power to review a district court order remanding a case 

to state court. See Act of May 24, 1949, §84, 63 Stat. 102. 

But like most rules, this one has accrued exceptions with 

time. In the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Congress created an 

exception allowing appellate review for cases “‘removed 

pursuant to’” 28 U. S. C. §1443, a provision that guarantees 

a federal forum for certain federal civil rights claims. See 

§901, 78 Stat. 266. So before a civil rights case is returned 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

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to state court, a federal court of appeals usually can intervene to test the soundness of the district court’s remand order. 

In 2011, Congress added a similar exception for suits 

against federal officers or agencies removed pursuant to 28 

U. S. C. §1442. See Removal Clarification Act, §2, 125 Stat. 

545–546. Here, too, Congress has deemed it appropriate to 

allow appellate review before a district court may remand 

a case to state court. All told, then, the law as it stands 

today provides that “[a]n order remanding a case to the 

State court from which it was removed is not reviewable on 

appeal or otherwise, except that an order remanding a case 

to the State court from which it was removed pursuant to 

section 1442 or 1443 of this title shall be reviewable by appeal or otherwise.” 28 U. S. C. §1447(d). 

After the district court ordered the City’s case remanded 

to state court, the defendants sought to appeal—and this 

much everyone seemed to agree they were free to do. After 

all, the defendants had relied on the federal officer removal 

statute found in §1442 when they removed the case to federal court—and the current version of §1447(d) permits an 

appeal in just these circumstances. The real trouble began 

only when it came to the scope of the defendants’ appeal. 

The Fourth Circuit read §1447(d) as authorizing it to review 

only the part of the district court’s remand order discussing 

§1442. As a result, the court of appeals refused to consider 

whether the district court may have erred when it rejected 

the defendants’ other grounds for removal. Finding (only) 

the district court’s §1442 analysis sound, the Fourth Circuit 

proceeded to affirm. 952 F. 3d 452 (2020). 

This ruling highlighted a circuit split. The Seventh Circuit, for example, has reasoned that §1447(d) extends appellate review to the whole of an “ ‘order remanding a case 

to the State court from which it was removed pursuant to 

section 1442 or 1443.’ ” See Lu Junhong v. Boeing Co., 792 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

4 BP P.L.C. v. MAYOR AND CITY COUNCIL OF BALTIMORE 

Opinion of the Court 

F. 3d 805, 811 (2015). On that reading of the statute, appellate review is not confined to a defendant’s removal arguments under the federal officer and civil rights removal 

statutes. Instead, a court of appeals may review the merits 

of all theories for removal that a district court has rejected. 

Because the courts of appeals disagree over the scope of 

their appellate authority under §1447(d), we agreed to take 

this case to resolve the question. 591 U. S. ___ (2020). 

II 

A 

When called on to interpret a statute, this Court generally seeks to discern and apply the ordinary meaning of its 

terms at the time of their adoption. Niz-Chavez v. Garland, 

593 U. S. ___, ___ (2021) (slip op., at 4). Here, the relevant 

portion of §1447(d) provides that “an order remanding a 

case to the State court from which it was removed pursuant 

to section 1442 or 1443 of this title shall be reviewable by 

appeal.” 

To our minds, the first telling clue lies in the statute’s use 

of the term “order.” Whether we look to the time of 

§1447(d)’s adoption or amendment, a judicial “order” meant 

then what it means today: a “written direction or command 

delivered by . . . a court or judge.”1 So an “order remanding 

a case” was (and is) a formal command from a district court 

returning the case to state court. In this case, the district 

court’s remand order rejected all of the defendants’ grounds 

for removal. For good reason too. Normally, federal jurisdiction is not optional; subject to exceptions not relevant 

here, “courts are obliged to decide cases within the scope of 

federal jurisdiction” assigned to them. Sprint Communications, Inc. v. Jacobs, 571 U. S. 69, 72 (2013). So the district 

—————— 1Black’s Law Dictionary 1322 (11th ed. 2019); see also id., at 1206 (9th 

ed. 2009); id., at 1247 (rev. 4th ed. 1968) (“Every direction of a court or 

judge made or entered in writing, and not included in a judgment”); id., 

at 1247 (4th ed. 1951) (same); id., at 1298 (3d ed. 1933) (same). 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

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court wasn’t at liberty to remove the City’s case from its 

docket until it determined that it lacked any authority to 

entertain the suit. See, e.g., Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U. S. 343, 356 (1988). From this it would seem to 

follow that, when a district court’s removal order rejects all 

of the defendants’ grounds for removal, §1447(d) authorizes 

a court of appeals to review each and every one of them. 

After all, the statute allows courts of appeals to examine 

the whole of a district court’s “order,” not just some of its 

parts or pieces. 

Of course, §1447(d) extends appellate review only to some 

orders—those remanding a “case . . . removed pursuant to 

section 1442 or 1443.” But it’s hard to see how that qualification changes the calculus. To remove a case, a defendant 

must comply with 28 U. S. C. §1446. Essentially, that statute requires the defendant to provide affected parties and 

courts with a notice stating its grounds for removal. 

§§1446(a), (d). The combination of these actions “effect[s] 

the removal.” §1446(d). To remove a case “pursuant to” 

§1442 or §1443, then, just means that a defendant’s notice 

of removal must assert the case is removable “in accordance 

with or by reason of ” one of those provisions.2 Here, everyone admits the defendants’ notice of removal did just that 

by citing §1442 as one of its grounds for removal. Once that 

happened and the district court ordered the case remanded 

to state court, the whole of its order became reviewable on 

appeal. 

Nor does it matter if (as here) a defendant removes a case 

“pursuant to” multiple federal statutes. Often enough, parties act pursuant to a variety of legal authorities. A crimi-

—————— 2Black’s Law Dictionary, at 1401 (rev. 4th ed. 1968); id., at 1401 (4th 

ed. 1951); see also SAS Institute, Inc. v. Iancu, 584 U. S. ___, ___ (2018) 

(slip op., at 7) (“in accordance with”); Black’s Law Dictionary, at 1493 

(11th ed. 2019) (“[i]n compliance with; in accordance with; under”; “[a]s 

authorized by”). 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

6 BP P.L.C. v. MAYOR AND CITY COUNCIL OF BALTIMORE 

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nal defendant may suggest he is eligible for sentencing relief pursuant to multiple provisions. E.g., Pepper v. United 

States, 562 U. S. 476, 481, n. 1 (2011). A civil litigant might 

file a complaint pursuant to more than one statute. E.g., 

Rimini Street, Inc. v. Oracle USA, Inc., 586 U. S. ___, ___ 

(2019) (slip op., at 2). Likewise, a party may assert multiple 

grounds for removing a case to federal court—as the defendants did here. Indeed, the general removal statute contemplates just this possibility when, in contrast, it speaks of 

actions “removed solely under” the diversity jurisdiction 

statute. §1446(b)(2)(A) (emphasis added). Yet, the particular provision at issue before us does not contain any comparable language like that limiting appellate review solely 

to issues under §1442 or §1443. Instead and again, 

§1447(d) permits appellate review of the district court’s remand order—without any further qualification. 

B 

How does the City reply? It suggests that exceptions to 

statutory rules should be construed narrowly—and that our 

reading of §1447(d)’s exception to its general rule against 

appellate review is too permissive. 

We disagree. As a preliminary matter, the factual premise underlying the City’s argument is surely contestable. 

One might just as easily conceive of §1447(d)’s usual rule 

barring appellate review as itself an exception to the even 

more general rule that final district court orders are appealable under 28 U. S. C. §1291. More fundamentally, the 

City’s legal premise is also in error. This Court has “‘no 

license to give statutory exemptions anything but a fair 

reading.’ ” Food Marketing Institute v. Argus Leader Media, 

588 U. S. ___, ___ (2019) (slip op., at 11) (brackets omitted). 

Exceptions and exemptions are no less part of Congress’s 

work than its rules and standards—and all are worthy of a 

court’s respect. That a law might temper its pursuit of one 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

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goal by accommodating others can come as no surprise. Often legislation becomes possible only because of such compromises. Often lawmakers tread in areas fraught with 

competing social demands where everyone agrees trade-offs 

are required. Whatever the reason for a legislative compromise, we have no right to place our thumbs on one side of 

the scale or the other. Henson v. Santander Consumer USA 

Inc., 582 U. S. ___, ___ (2017) (slip op., at 9). 

Alternatively, the City suggests that, if Congress had 

wanted appellate courts to review every issue in a remand 

order, it would have said as much. Sometimes, the City observes, Congress does exactly that, expressly directing 

courts to resolve “all” legal issues in certain cases. See Brief 

for Respondent 21 (citing 18 U. S. C. §3595(c)(1); 5 U. S. C. 

§1508; 38 U. S. C. §7104(a); and 33 U. S. C. §1320(f )). But 

the defendants remind us that Congress also knows how to 

limit appellate review to particular “questions” rather than 

the whole of a district court’s “order”; sometimes it does just 

that too. See Brief for Petitioners 18 (citing 28 U. S. C. 

§1295(a)(7); 38 U. S. C. §7292(b)(1); 42 U. S. C. §8514(a)(2); 

52 U. S. C. §30110; 28 U. S. C. §1254(2); 50 U. S. C. 

§1803(j)). In the end, all of the parties’ fencing about language Congress didn’t use persuades us of only one thing— 

that we are best served by focusing on the language it did 

employ. 

All of which leaves the City to offer a different argument 

from a new direction. Now, the City contends, the defendants never really removed this case pursuant to §1442. On 

this account, a case is not “removed pursuant to section 

1442 or 1443” until a federal court (district or appellate) 

holds that one of these statutes authorizes removal. Because that never happened here, the City reasons, the defendants were not entitled to any appellate review. But this 

argument isn’t only novel—the City didn’t pursue it below 

and no court of appeals has adopted it. It is also mistaken. 

As we’ve seen, it is generally a defendant’s actions under 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

8 BP P.L.C. v. MAYOR AND CITY COUNCIL OF BALTIMORE 

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§1446 that “effect the removal.” Once a defendant complies 

with §1446, a state court may not proceed “further unless 

and until the case is remanded.” 28 U. S. C. §1446(d). 

That’s why normally it’s the plaintiff who must seek judicial 

intervention if it wishes to have the matter remanded to 

state court—just as the City did here. 

III 

A 

To the extent any doubt remains about how best to read 

§1447(d), we believe our most analogous precedent resolves 

it. In Yamaha Motor Corp., U. S. A. v. Calhoun, 516 U. S. 

199, 204 (1996), this Court faced a dispute about the meaning of 28 U. S. C. §1292(b). That statute allows a district 

court to certify “an order” to the court of appeals if it “involves a controlling question of law as to which there is substantial ground for difference of opinion,” and if “an immediate appeal from the order may materially advance the 

ultimate termination of the litigation.” In Yamaha, the 

Court asked the parties to address whether §1292(b) authorizes appellate courts to review any question contained 

in the district court’s order—or whether it allows those 

courts to address only the “controlling question of law” the 

district court certified for further review. 

The answer there is telling here. The Court held that, 

“[a]s the text of §1292(b) indicates, appellate jurisdiction 

applies to the order certified to the court of appeals, and is 

not tied to the particular question formulated by the district 

court.” 516 U. S., at 205. Although appellate courts “may 

not reach beyond the certified order to address other orders 

made in the case,” they “may address any issue fairly included within the certified order because it is the order that 

is appealable, and not the controlling question identified by 

the district court.” Ibid. (internal quotation marks omitted). Exactly the same might be said of our case: “[B]ecause 

it is the [district court’s removal] order that is appealable,” 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

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a court of appeals “may address any issue fairly included 

within” it. Ibid. (internal quotation marks omitted). 

The City seeks to distinguish Yamaha but we don’t see 

how we fairly might. The City observes that §1292(b) allows an appeal from an order that “involves” a controlling 

question of law. By using the word “involves,” the City submits, Congress sought to make plain that the reviewable 

issues on appeal can be broader than the certified controlling question of law. And, the City stresses, the word “involves” does not appear in §1447(d). But that is beside the 

point. Nothing in Yamaha turned on the presence of the 

word “involves” in §1292(b). Instead, the Court’s reasoning 

centered on the statute’s use of the word “order.” By allowing appellate courts to review a district court’s “order,” the 

Court explained, Congress had allowed review of any issue 

fairly encompassed within it. That reasoning applies with 

no less force here. 

B 

If Yamaha does much to undermine its argument, the 

City seeks to draw support from other of this Court’s cases. 

Principally, it points to Murdock v. Memphis, 20 Wall. 590 

(1875), and United States v. Keitel, 211 U. S. 370 (1908). 

But both decisions were driven by concerns unique to their 

statutory contexts; their reasoning is not easily generalizable to other jurisdictional statutes; and neither comes 

nearly as close to the mark as Yahama. 

Start with Murdock. That case involved 28 U. S. C. 

§1257, a statute permitting this Court to review certain 

state court “judgments or decrees.” Concerned with the 

constitutional implications of allowing federal courts to review questions of state law, the Court in Murdock construed 

the statute as authorizing this Court to examine only issues 

of federal law contained within state court judgments and 

decrees. See 20 Wall., at 630–632. Along the way, the 

Court took pains to reserve the question whether Congress 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

10 BP P.L.C. v. MAYOR AND CITY COUNCIL OF BALTIMORE 

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could ever authorize this Court to review matters of state 

law already definitively resolved by state courts. Id., at 

633. By contrast, no comparable concern with the Constitution’s federal structure exists here. At some level, of 

course, removal practices implicate questions of comity between federal and state authorities. But today we are 

asked to decide only whether a federal court of appeals may 

review one or many federal law rulings issued by an inferior 

federal court. That comparatively humble question lies nowhere near Murdock’s bounds. 

Keitel involved the now-repealed Criminal Appeals Act. 

That law authorized the government to appeal adverse 

criminal “decision[s] or judgment[s]” based on certain enumerated grounds, such as the invalidity of a federal statute. 

See ch. 2564, 34 Stat. 1246. For its part, the Court held 

that this language allowed the government to appeal only 

the statutorily enumerated questions. 211 U. S., at 398– 

399. Like Murdock, the Court in Keitel rested heavily on 

the statute’s context in reaching its conclusion. A new entitlement allowing the government to appeal an adverse 

criminal judgment was, in the Court’s view, “exceptional.” 

211 U. S., at 399. Meanwhile, here again, nothing in our 

case implicates that concern. 

Closer to home, the City directs our attention to Carlsbad 

Technology, Inc. v. HIF Bio, Inc., 556 U. S. 635, 638 (2009), 

and Thermtron Products, Inc. v. Hermansdorfer, 423 U. S. 

336, 345–346 (1976). Those cases addressed the first clause 

of §1447(d), which generally bars appellate review of remand orders. Carlsbad and Thermtron held this bar applies only to remand orders premised on a lack of subject 

matter jurisdiction or a defect in removal procedure; other 

remand orders remain appealable. See Carlsbad, 556 U. S., 

at 638. The Court said this conclusion was necessary to 

make sense of §1447(d)’s interaction with §1447(c). See id., 

at 638. 

None of this, however, helps the City’s cause. Some have 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

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questioned Carlsbad and Thermtron. See, e.g., 556 U. S., 

at 642 (Stevens, J., concurring); id., at 642–643 (Scalia, J., 

concurring); Kakarala v. Wells Fargo Bank, N. A., 578 U. S. 

914 (2016) (THOMAS, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari). But even taken on their own terms, both decisions 

permitted rather than foreclosed appellate review of certain 

remand orders. And the fact that this Court deemed certain 

orders appealable under the statute’s first clause simply 

does not settle, one way or another, the scope of appellate 

review under the statute’s second clause. 

Having exhausted our cases, the City seeks support in 

lower court decisions. It draws our attention to 2011 when 

Congress amended §1447(d) to authorize appellate review 

of remand orders in cases removed under the federal officer 

statute. By that time, the City says, a number of courts of 

appeals had already interpreted the prior version of 

§1447(d) that allowed appeals from remand orders in cases 

removed under the Civil Rights Act. And many of those 

courts had read §1447(d) as permitting them to review only 

the part of a remand order addressing the civil rights removal ground. From this fact, the City reasons, it follows 

that Congress implicitly ratified and endorsed parallel limits on appellate review when it adopted its 2011 amendments. 

Again, we do not see it. It seems most unlikely to us that 

a smattering of lower court opinions could ever represent 

the sort of “judicial consensus so broad and unquestioned 

that we must presume Congress knew of and endorsed it.” 

Jama v. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, 543 U. S. 

335, 349 (2005). And it certainly cannot do so where, as 

here, “the text and structure of the statute are to the contrary.” Id., at 352. This Court bears no “warrant to ignore 

clear statutory language on the ground that other courts 

have done so.” Milner v. Department of Navy, 562 U. S. 562, 

576 (2011). Our duty is to follow the law as we find it, not 

to follow rotely whatever lower courts once might have said 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

12 BP P.L.C. v. MAYOR AND CITY COUNCIL OF BALTIMORE 

Opinion of the Court 

about it. 

Separately, the City worries that our interpretation 

might upset lower court decisions on a different question. 

The City points out that, when a district court remands a 

case, it may require the defendant to pay certain of the 

plaintiff ’s fees and costs. See 28 U. S. C. §1447(c). While 

§1447(d) generally precludes appellate review of remand orders, many lower courts have suggested that these §1447(c) 

fee and cost awards are nonetheless reviewable on appeal. 

The City contends that our reading of §1447(d) could put an 

end to all that. It could, the City reasons, because if an “order remanding a case” really means the whole order, then 

the statute may bar appellate review of fee and cost awards 

contained within those orders. That much, however, does 

not necessarily follow. Often enough fee and cost awards 

are treated as collateral to the merits and independently 

appealable. See, e.g., Budinich v. Becton Dickinson & Co., 

486 U. S. 196, 200 (1988). In any event, the question is not 

presented in this case and we do not purport to resolve it. 

IV 

The City concludes by asking us to consider the policy 

consequences that follow from giving the text its ordinary 

meaning. Barring appellate review of remand orders, the 

City says, serves the worthy goal of allowing the parties to 

get on with litigating the merits of their cases in state court. 

Meanwhile, the City submits, allowing exceptions to this 

rule promises only to impair that efficiency interest. 

The difficulties with this argument are by now familiar. 

As this Court has explained, “even the most formidable” 

policy arguments cannot “overcome” a clear statutory directive. Kloeckner v. Solis, 568 U. S. 41, 56, n. 4 (2012). Besides, everyone agrees that the statute tempers its obvious 

concern with efficiency when it comes to cases removed pursuant to §1442 or §1443. For that subset of cases, Congress 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Cite as: 593 U. S. ____ (2021) 13 

Opinion of the Court 

has expressed a heightened concern for accuracy, authorized appellate review, and accepted the delay it can entail. 

The fact that the law as written allows appellate courts to 

examine all (and not just some) removal grounds in these 

cases perhaps just demonstrates, as Judge Easterbrook has 

suggested, a congressional judgment that the “marginal delay from adding . . . extra issue[s] to a case where the time 

for briefing, argument, and decision has already been accepted is likely to be small.” See Lu Junhong, 792 F. 3d, at 

813. 

In fact, allowing a fuller form of appellate review may actually help expedite some appeals. Suppose a court of appeals finds the §1442 or §1443 issue a difficult and close 

one, but believes removal is clearly and easily warranted on 

another basis. Allowing the court to address that easier 

question and avoid harder ones may facilitate a prompter 

resolution of the proceeding for all involved. At the least, a 

rational Congress could have thought that considerations 

like these warranted allowing a court of appeals the power 

to review the whole of a district court’s remand order rather 

than just certain select aspects of it. 

That leaves the City to argue about different consequences. It warns that our interpretation will invite gamesmanship: Defendants may frivolously add §1442 or §1443 

to their other grounds for removal, all with an eye to ensuring appellate review down the line if the case is remanded. 

But the answers here too are familiar. Once more, this 

Court’s task is to discern and apply the law’s plain meaning 

as faithfully as we can, not “to assess the consequences of 

each approach and adopt the one that produces the least 

mischief.” Lewis v. Chicago, 560 U. S. 205, 217 (2010). 

Nor is it as if Congress has been blind to the City’s concerns. As the City itself acknowledges, thanks to §1447(c) 

a district court may order a defendant to pay the plaintiff ’s 

costs and expenses (including attorney’s fees) if it frivolously removes a case from state court. Additionally, the 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

14 BP P.L.C. v. MAYOR AND CITY COUNCIL OF BALTIMORE 

Opinion of the Court 

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allow courts to sanction 

frivolous arguments made in virtually any context. 

Rules 11(b)–(c). Congress, thus, has already addressed the 

City’s concerns in other statutes and rules—just not in 

§1447(d). To the extent that experience may prove these 

other measures insufficient, Congress is of course free to revise its work anytime. But that forum, not this one, is the 

proper place for such lawmaking. 

* 

The Fourth Circuit erred in holding that it was powerless 

to consider all of the defendants’ grounds for removal under 

§1447(d). In light of that error, the defendants ask us to 

consider some of those additional grounds ourselves. That 

task, however, does not implicate the circuit split that we 

took this case to resolve and we believe the wiser course is 

to leave these matters for the Fourth Circuit to resolve in 

the first instance. See Brownback v. King, 592 U. S. ___, 

___, n. 4 (2021) (slip op., at 5, n. 4). The judgment of the 

Fourth Circuit is vacated, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 

So ordered. 

JUSTICE ALITO took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. 
_________________ 

_________________ 

Cite as: 593 U. S. ____ (2021) 1 

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

No. 19–1189 

BP P.L.C., ET AL., PETITIONERS v. MAYOR AND CITY 

COUNCIL OF BALTIMORE 

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 

APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT 

[May 17, 2021] 

JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR, dissenting. 

Civil defendants in state court may remove a case to federal district court by asserting one or more bases for federal 

jurisdiction. If the district court concludes that the case 

was improperly removed, it issues an order remanding the

case back to state court. For more than a century, the rule

has been that such remand orders are generally not subject 

to appellate review. See In re Pennsylvania Co., 137 U. S. 

451, 453–454 (1890). This rule, codified at 28 U. S. C. 

§1447(d), “reflects Congress’s longstanding policy of not 

permitting interruption of the litigation of the merits of a 

removed case by prolonged litigation of questions of jurisdiction of the district court to which the cause is removed.” 

Powerex Corp. v. Reliant Energy Services, Inc., 551 U. S. 

224, 238 (2007) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Originally, there were no exceptions to §1447(d)’s bar on

appellate review. See §1447(d) (1946 ed., Supp. III). Then, 

as part of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Congress created 

appellate jurisdiction over “‘order[s] remanding a case to 

the State court from which it was removed pursuant to section 1443,’” the civil rights removal statute. §901, 78 Stat.

266, 28 U. S. C. §1447(d) (1964 ed.). In 2011, Congress extended this exception to cases removed pursuant to §1442,

the federal officer removal statute. See §1447(d) (2012 ed.). 
 

2 BP P.L.C. v. MAYOR AND CITY COUNCIL OF BALTIMORE 

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting 

The Court today holds that a defendant who invokes either §1442 or §1443 when removing a case to federal court 

is entitled to appellate review of not just those grounds, but 

also any other grounds for removal the defendant asserts. 

I disagree. That interpretation lets defendants sidestep

§1447(d)’s bar on appellate review by shoehorning a §1442

or §1443 argument into their case for removal. In other 

words, it lets the exception swallow the rule. Furthermore, 

when Congress amended §1447(d) to permit appellate review of decisions under §1442, every Court of Appeals to 

have addressed the question interpreted §1447(d) to permit

appellate review of arguments under §1443 only, not of 

other arguments for removal addressed in the same order. 

If Congress wanted to disturb that consensus, it would have

said so. I respectfully dissent. 

I 

Section 1447(d) permits appellate review of “an order remanding a case to the State court from which it was removed pursuant to section 1442 or 1443.” Everyone agrees

how this provision operates in two scenarios. First, if a defendant removes a suit to federal court without invoking either §1442 or §1443, appellate courts may not review the

district court’s remand order. Second, if a defendant removes a suit solely under §1442 or §1443, appellate review 

is available for the remand order addressing that single

ground for removal. 

But what if a defendant removes a case to federal court 

on multiple grounds, only one of which is §1442 or §1443? 

Section 1447(d) does not speak clearly to that scenario. In 

some statutes, Congress takes care to specify when it 

means “this and only this ground.” See, e.g., §1446(b)(2)(A) 

(addressing civil actions “removed solely under section

1441(a)”). Other times, Congress makes clear that reliance

on a certain ground even “in part” will suffice. See, e.g., 
Cite as: 593 U. S. ____ (2021) 3 

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting 

§1295(a)(2) (providing for jurisdiction in the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit over certain district court decisions “if the jurisdiction of that court was based, in whole 

or in part, on section 1346 of this title”). Section 1447(d) 

contains neither kind of clarifying language, leaving uncertain how the provision applies to cases that are not removed 

under §1442 or §1443 alone. See Board of Cty. Comm’rs of 

Boulder Cty. v. Suncor Energy (U. S. A.) Inc., 965 F. 3d 792, 

805 (CA10 2020) (Section 1447(d) “does not expressly contemplate the situation in which removal is done pursuant 

to one of these sections and other grounds” (internal quotation marks omitted)).

There are three possible ways forward. The first possibility is that §1447(d) permits appellate review of any asserted basis for removal so long as the suit was removed in 

part pursuant to §1442 or §1443. That is the interpretation

urged by petitioners and adopted by the Court today. See 

ante, at 5–6. The problem with this interpretation is that 

it stretches the exception in §1447(d) too far. It allows defendants to bootstrap their entire case for removal into the 

court of appeals simply by tacking on an argument under 

§1442 or §1443. Indeed, under this interpretation, a defendant could formally abandon its argument under §1442 

or §1443 and seek an appeal exclusively of other grounds 

for removal. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 34–36, 40–41. That bizarre outcome, inexplicable in light of the manifest objective of limiting the exceptions in §1447(d), cautions heavily 

against this interpretation. 

Another possibility is that a suit removed pursuant to

multiple grounds is not a suit removed pursuant to §1442

or §1443 at all, meaning no appellate review whatsoever is 

available under §1447(d). For good reason, no one advocates this interpretation. Such a rule would certainly avoid 

prolonged disputes about whether a case belongs in state or

federal court, but only by denying appellate review for

claims of jurisdiction under the federal-officer and civil-
 

4 BP P.L.C. v. MAYOR AND CITY COUNCIL OF BALTIMORE 

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting 

rights removal statutes. That result is hard to square with

Congress’ express directive that such claims get a second 

look. 

The third possibility is that §1447(d) allows appellate review of a defendant’s assertion of removal jurisdiction under the federal-officer or civil-rights removal statute alone. 

Any other grounds for removal would remain subject to

§1447(d)’s bar on appellate review. This interpretation best

accords with “Congress’s longstanding policy of not permitting interruption of the litigation of the merits of a removed 

case” with lengthy jurisdictional disputes, Powerex Corp., 

551 U. S., at 238 (internal quotation marks omitted), while 

still allowing review of the two grounds Congress carved out 

for special treatment. It also follows this Court’s usual policy of construing both statutory exceptions and procedures

for removal narrowly. See Maracich v. Spears, 570 U. S. 

48, 60 (2013) (Statutory exceptions are to be “narrowly [construed] in order to preserve the primary operation of the 

provision” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Syngenta 

Crop Protection, Inc. v. Henson, 537 U. S. 28, 32 (2002) 

(“[S]tatutory procedures for removal are to be strictly construed” out of respect for state sovereignty).

Over the course of several decades, eight Courts of Appeals (every one to consider the question) adopted this third

view of §1447(d).* See, e.g., Patel v. Del Taco, Inc., 446 F. 3d 

996, 998 (CA9 2006); Alabama v. Conley, 245 F. 3d 1292, 

1293, n. 1 (CA11 2001) (per curiam); Thornton v. Holloway, 

70 F. 3d 522, 524 (CA8 1995); State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. 

Co. v. Baasch, 644 F. 2d 94, 96–97 (CA2 1981) (per curiam); 

Detroit Police Lieutenants and Sergeants Assn. v. Detroit, 

—————— 

*The Tenth Circuit had also reached this conclusion prior to Congress

amending §1447(d), albeit in an unpublished opinion. See Sanchez v. 

Onuska, 2 F. 3d 1160 (Table), 1993 WL 307897, *1 (1993) (per curiam).

The Tenth Circuit has since reaffirmed that holding in a published opinion. See Board of Cty. Comm’rs of Boulder Cty. v. Suncor Energy (U. S. A.) 

Inc., 965 F. 3d 792, 802, n. 6 (2020). 
 

 

Cite as: 593 U. S. ____ (2021) 5 

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting 

597 F. 2d 566, 567–568 (CA6 1979) (per curiam); Noel v. 

McCain, 538 F. 2d 633, 635 (CA4 1976); Robertson v. Ball, 

534 F. 2d 63, 65–66 (CA5 1976) (per curiam); Pennsylvania 

ex rel. Gittman v. Gittman, 451 F. 2d 155, 156–157 (CA3 

1971) (per curiam).

Congress legislated against the backdrop of this consensus when, in 2011, it amended §1447(d) to extend its

appellate-review exception, which previously applied to 

§1443 alone, to cover §1442 as well. Critically, Congress did

not amend the remainder of the provision. Instead, it 

simply added the words “1442 or.” See Removal Clarification Act, 125 Stat. 546. Had Congress disagreed with the

settled interpretation of §1447(d), it presumably would 

have done something about it. 

The Court dismisses the possibility of congressional ratification by characterizing an unbroken line of decisions

from two-thirds of the Courts of Appeals spanning nearly

half a century as “a smattering of lower court opinions.” 

Ante, at 11. I would not assume that so many decisions

reaching the same conclusion over such a long period were

beneath Congress’ notice. “‘If a word or phrase has been 

given a uniform interpretation by inferior courts, a later

version of that act perpetuating the wording is presumed to 

carry forward that interpretation.’” Texas Dept. of Housing 

and Community Affairs v. Inclusive Communities Project, 

Inc., 576 U. S. 519, 536 (2015) (quoting A. Scalia & B. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 322 

(2012); ellipses omitted). That Congress did not disturb the 

prevailing interpretation of §1447(d) is a compelling reason 

this Court should not either. 

II 

The Court sees things differently. In its view, it “does 

[not] matter” whether “a defendant removes a case ‘pursuant to’ multiple federal statutes” or just one. Ante, at 5. 
 

 

 

 

6 BP P.L.C. v. MAYOR AND CITY COUNCIL OF BALTIMORE 

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting 

Either way, §1447(d) grants the court of appeals jurisdiction over the “order” remanding the case back to state court.

According to the Court, once the court of appeals takes jurisdiction over an order, it necessarily takes jurisdiction 

over all grounds for removal encompassed within it.

In support of this theory, the Court looks to Yamaha Motor Corp., U. S. A. v. Calhoun, 516 U. S. 199 (1996). That 

case concerned 28 U. S. C. §1292(b), a distinct statute that

permits appellate review of an interlocutory “order not otherwise appealable” if the district court certifies that the order “involves a controlling question of law as to which there 

is substantial ground for difference of opinion.” §1292(b).

Looking to “the text of §1292(b),” the Yamaha Court determined that, having taken jurisdiction over a §1292(b) order,

a court of appeals may reach any issue fairly encompassed

within it. 516 U. S., at 205. In the Court’s view today, 

Yamaha means that appellate review of a remand order under §1447(d) must likewise be plenary. 

Yamaha does not do the work the Court says it does. Section 1292(b) provides that an interlocutory order is appealable if it merely “involves” a certified issue. There was thus 

no question in Yamaha that §1292(b) accounts for certified 

orders that address multiple issues, some of which are not 

“controlling question[s] of law as to which there is substantial ground for difference of opinion.” §1292(b). Section 

1447(d) lacks comparable language about what happens 

when a party removes a case on multiple grounds. That is 

precisely what makes it ambiguous.

The Court is left with the premise that appellate jurisdiction over an order (as with a judgment, decree, or sentence)

usually means jurisdiction over all legal issues addressed 

within it. Ante, at 5–6. I agree that this premise will often

hold true. But not always, as the Court itself recognizes. 

See ante, at 9–10 (discussing Murdock v. Memphis, 20 Wall. 

590 (1875), and United States v. Keitel, 211 U. S. 370 
Cite as: 593 U. S. ____ (2021) 7 

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting 

(1908)). Context matters. To recap, in 1964, Congress created a limited exception for claims of removal under §1443 

to what had long been an absolute prohibition on appellate

review of remand orders. After nearly half a century of

courts interpreting that exception narrowly, Congress extended the exception to §1442 without otherwise amending

§1447(d). Section 1447(d) only unambiguously permits appellate review over remand orders that are based solely on

one of those two grounds. Granting defendants appellate

review of other grounds of removal whenever they tack on 

an argument under §1442 or §1443 would allow the exception to trump the rule. In these circumstances, the Court 

should seek an interpretation of §1447(d) that not only respects its carveout for arguments under §1442 and §1443

but also preserves its general bar on appellate review. 

III 

Unfortunately, I fear today’s decision will reward defendants for raising strained theories of removal under §1442 or 

§1443 by allowing them to circumvent the bar on appellate 

review entirely. Look no further than this case. In 2018, 

the Mayor and City Council of Baltimore sued petitioners 

for allegedly concealing the connection between fossil fuels

and climate change. Petitioners listed eight grounds for removal to federal court, including §1442. But petitioners 

now ask only for a ruling that removal was proper under 

§1441(a) (i.e., federal-question jurisdiction). Had petitioners relied solely on §1441(a) before the District Court, as 

they do now, no one disputes their argument would be unreviewable on appeal.

Not to worry, petitioners assure us: The threat of sanctions will sufficiently deter gamesmanship. While sanctions help ward off egregious misconduct, they are no failsafe. See, e.g., Martin v. Franklin Capital Corp., 546 U. S. 

132, 141 (2005) (“Absent unusual circumstances, courts 

may award attorney’s fees under §1447(c) only where the 
 

8 BP P.L.C. v. MAYOR AND CITY COUNCIL OF BALTIMORE 

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting 

removing party lacked an objectively reasonable basis for 

seeking removal”). A federal-officer claim can be so weak it 

is not worth pursuing on appeal, but not so meritless as to 

warrant sanctions. Again, look to this case. Petitioners no 

longer advance their argument under §1442, calling it only

“substantial.” Brief for Petitioners 35. Yet that argument

somehow opens a back door to appellate review that would 

otherwise be closed to them. Meanwhile, Baltimore, which 

has already waited nearly three years to begin litigation on

the merits, is consigned to waiting once more. 

* * * 

Section 1447(d) places “broad restrictions on the power of

federal appellate courts to review district court orders remanding removed cases to state court.” Things Remembered, Inc. v. Petrarca, 516 U. S. 124, 127 (1995). After today’s decision, defendants can sidestep these restrictions by

making near-frivolous arguments for removal under §1442

or §1443. Congress, of course, can amend §1447(d) to make 

even clearer that appellate review of a district court remand

order extends to only §1442 or §1443. Because I believe 

§1447 already bears that meaning, I respectfully dissent.