SUPREME COURT OF ARIZONA 

En Banc 

 

In the Matter of ) Arizona Supreme Court 

 ) No. SB-04-0079-M 

JAMES JOSEPH HAMM, ) 

 ) O P I N I O N 

___________________ Applicant.) 

APPLICATION DENIED 

_________________________________________________________________ 

JAMES JOSEPH HAMM Tempe 

In Propria Persona 

MONROE & McDONOUGH, P.C. Tucson 

 By Lawrence McDonough 

And 

JUAN PEREZ-MEDRANO, Chair Phoenix 

Attorneys for the Committee on Character & Fitness 

CHARLES W. WIRKEN, President Phoenix 

HELEN PERRY GRIMWOOD, President-elect Phoenix 

JIM D. SMITH, First Vice President Phoenix 

DANIEL J. McAULIFFE, Second Vice President Phoenix 

EDWARD F. NOVAK, Secretary-Treasurer Phoenix 

ROBERT B. VAN WYCK, Chief Bar Counsel Phoenix 

Attorneys for Amicus Curiae 

State Bar of Arizona 

MICHAEL D. KIMERER Phoenix 

MARTY LIEBERMAN Phoenix 

AMY L. NGUYEN Phoenix 

CARLA RYAN Tucson 

ANDREW SILVERMAN Tucson 

Attorneys for Amicus Curiae 

Arizona Attorneys for Criminal Justice 

ANDREW P. THOMAS, MARICOPA COUNTY ATTORNEY Phoenix 

 By Andrew P. Thomas 

Attorney for Amicus Curiae Maricopa County Attorney’s Office 

_________________________________________________________________ 

M c G R E G O R, Chief Justice 

¶1 James Hamm petitioned this Court, pursuant to Arizona 
2

Supreme Court Rule 36(g), 17A A.R.S.,1

 to review the 

recommendation of the Committee on Character and Fitness (the 

Committee) that his application for admission to the State Bar 

of Arizona (the Bar) be denied. Having reviewed the record and 

the Committee’s report, we conclude that James Hamm has failed 

to establish the good moral character necessary to be admitted 

to the practice of law in Arizona and deny his application. 

I. 

¶2 In September 1974, James Hamm was twenty-six years old 

and living on the streets of Tucson. Although he previously had 

attended divinity school and worked as a part-time pastor, Hamm 

describes his life in 1974 as reflecting a series of personal and 

social failures. In 1973, he had separated from his wife, with 

whom he had a son. Although he had no criminal record, he 

supported himself by selling small quantities of marijuana and, 

again according to Hamm, he used marijuana and other drugs and 

abused alcohol.

¶3 On September 6, 1974, Hamm met two young men who 

identified themselves as college students from Missouri. The 

two, Willard Morley and Zane Staples, came to Tucson to buy 

twenty pounds of marijuana. Hamm agreed to sell it to them, but 

apparently was unable to acquire that quantity of marijuana. 

 

1

 References in this opinion to “Rule ___” are to the Rules 

of the Arizona Supreme Court. 
3

Rather than call off the transaction, Hamm and two accomplices, 

Garland Wells and Bill Reeser, agreed to rob Staples and Morley 

of the money intended for the purchase. On September 7, Wells 

gave Hamm a gun to use during the robbery. Later that day, Wells 

and Hamm directed Morley and Staples to drive to the outskirts of 

Tucson, purportedly to complete the drug transaction; Reeser 

followed in another vehicle. Both Wells and Hamm carried guns; 

Morley and Staples were unarmed. Hamm sat behind Morley, the 

driver, and Wells sat behind Staples. At some point, Hamm 

detected that Staples was becoming suspicious. As Morley stopped 

the car, and without making any demand on the victims for money, 

Hamm shot Morley in the back of the head, killing him. At the 

same time, Wells shot Staples. Hamm then shot Staples in the 

back as he tried to escape and shot Morley once again. Wells 

also shot Morley, then pursued Staples, whom he ultimately killed 

outside of the car. Hamm and Wells took $1400.00 from the glove 

compartment, fled the scene in the van driven by Reeser, and left 

the bodies of Morley and Staples lying in the desert. 

¶4 Hamm took his share of the money and visited his sister 

in California. At the hearing held to consider his application 

to the Bar, he told the Committee that he “was compelled to come 

back to Tucson,” despite knowing he probably would be caught. 

Police officers arrested Hamm shortly after his return. While in 

custody, he told the police that Morley and Staples were killed 
4

in a gun battle during the drug deal. Initially charged with two 

counts of first-degree murder and two counts of armed robbery, 

Hamm pled guilty to one count of first-degree murder and was 

sentenced to life in prison, with no possibility of parole for 

twenty-five years. 

¶5 Once in prison, Hamm began taking steps toward 

rehabilitation and became a model prisoner. After spending one 

year in maximum security, he applied for and received a job in a 

computer training program that allowed him to be transferred to 

medium security. Once in medium security, Hamm apparently took 

advantage of any and every educational opportunity the prison 

system had to offer. He completed certificates in yoga and 

meditation and, on his own, studied Jungian psychology. He 

helped fellow inmates learn to read and write and to take 

responsibility for their actions. He obtained a bachelor’s 

degree in applied sociology, summa cum laude, from Northern 

Arizona University through a prison study program. 

¶6 After Hamm completed six years in medium security, 

prison officials transferred him to minimum security, where he 

worked on paint and construction crews. He received a 

significant degree of freedom, which allowed him to live in a 

dormitory rather than in a cell and occasionally to drive 

unaccompanied to nearby towns. He testified that he was the only 

inmate permitted to head a work crew. Hamm reported to the 
5

Committee that he played an instrumental role on various prison 

committees, particularly the committee that developed a new 

grievance procedure within the Department of Corrections. In 

addition, he wrote grant proposals for libraries, for handicapped 

prisoners, and for obtaining greater legal assistance for 

prisoners. 

¶7 While in prison, he met and married Donna Leone. She 

and Hamm founded Middle Ground Prison Reform (Middle Ground), a 

prisoner and prisoner family advocacy organization involved in 

lobbying for laws related to the criminal justice system and 

prisons. Middle Ground also provides public education about 

those topics.

¶8 In 1989, the Governor, acting on the recommendation of 

the Arizona Board of Pardons and Parole (the Board), commuted 

Hamm’s sentence. When he had served nearly seventeen years, in 

July 1992, the Board released Hamm on parole, conditioned upon no 

use of alcohol or drugs, drug and alcohol testing, and fifteen 

hours of community service each month. In December 2001, the 

Arizona Board of Executive Clemency2

 granted Hamm’s third 

application for absolute discharge.

¶9 Between his release in August 1992 and his absolute 

discharge in December 2001, Hamm performed thousands of hours of 

 

2

 The Board of Pardons and Paroles is now the Arizona Board 

of Executive Clemency. 1993 Ariz. Sess. Laws, ch. 255, § 64. 
6

community service. He advocated for prisoners’ rights in various 

forums by writing position papers, appearing on radio programs, 

testifying in legislative hearings, and speaking at churches, 

schools, and civic organizations. He also appeared in a public 

service video encouraging children not to do drugs or join gangs. 

Hamm now works as the Director of Advocacy Services at Middle 

Ground Prison Reform. 

¶10 While on parole, Hamm graduated from the Arizona State 

University College of Law. In July 1999, Hamm passed the Arizona 

bar examination and, in 2004, filed his Character and Fitness 

Report with the Committee.

II. 

¶11 The Rules of the Supreme Court of Arizona establish the 

process through which the Committee and this Court evaluate 

applications for admission to the Bar, and prior case law 

clarifies the burden an applicant must satisfy to establish good 

moral character. We begin with a review of the rules. 

A.

¶12 Rules 34 through 37 define the requirements for 

admission to the Bar.3 The Committee may recommend an applicant 

for admission only if that applicant, in addition to meeting 

 

3

 Amendments to Rules 32 through 40 became effective December 

1, 2005. Order Amending Rules 32-40, 46, 62, 64 & 65, Rules of 

Supreme Ct., Ariz. Sup. Ct. No. R-04-0032 (June 9, 2005). In 
7

other requirements, satisfies the Committee that he or she is of 

good moral character. Rule 34(a). The applicant bears the 

burden of establishing his or her good moral character. In re 

Greenberg, 126 Ariz. 290, 292, 614 P.2d 832, 834 (1980) (citing 

In re Levine, 97 Ariz. 88, 397 P.2d 205 (1964)). In determining 

whether an applicant’s prior conduct indicates a lack of good 

moral character, the Committee must consider the following nonexhaustive list of factors: 

A. The applicant’s age, experience and general 

 level of sophistication at the time of the 

 conduct 

B. The recency of the conduct 

C. The reliability of the information concerning 

 the conduct 

D. The seriousness of the conduct 

E. Consideration given by the applicant to relevant 

 laws, rules and responsibilities at the time of 

 the conduct 

F. The factors underlying the conduct 

G. The cumulative effect of the conduct 

H. The evidence of rehabilitation 

I. The applicant’s positive social contributions 

 since the conduct 

J. The applicant’s candor in the admissions process 

K. The materiality of any omissions or 

 misrepresentations by the applicant. 

Rule 36(a)3. 

¶13 When prior conduct involves the commission of a violent 

crime, the Committee must, at a minimum, hold an informal 

hearing. Rule 36(a)4.E. If three or more Committee members who 

attended the hearing or who have read the entire record do not 

________________________ 

this opinion, we refer to the Rules effective when Hamm filed his 
8

recommend admission of an applicant, the Committee must hold a 

formal hearing to consider whether to recommend the applicant for 

admission to the Bar. Id.

¶14 If the applicant fails to convince the Committee of his 

or her good moral character, the Committee has a duty not to 

recommend that person to this Court. In re Klahr, 102 Ariz. 529, 

531, 433 P.2d 977, 979 (1967); Levine, 97 Ariz. at 91, 397 P.2d 

at 207 (“If the proof of good moral character falls short of 

convincing the Committee on Examinations and Admissions, it is 

its duty not to recommend admission.”); In re Courtney, 83 Ariz. 

231, 233, 319 P.2d 991, 993 (1957) (“In this it has no 

discretion; if the members entertain any reservations whatsoever 

as to the applicant’s good moral character, it should not make a 

favorable recommendation to this court.”). After the Committee 

submits its report, an aggrieved applicant may petition this 

Court for review. Rule 36(g). 

B.

¶15 This Court then independently determines whether the 

applicant possesses good moral character and, based upon that 

determination, grants or denies the candidate’s application. 

Although we give serious consideration to the facts as found by 

and the recommendation of the Committee, “[t]he ultimate decision 

in this difficult matter rests with the Supreme Court.” In re 

________________________ 

application for admission to the practice of law. 
9

Kiser, 107 Ariz. 326, 327, 487 P.2d 393, 394 (1971) (holding 

applicant possessed good moral character); see also Levine, 97 

Ariz. at 92, 397 P.2d at 207 (holding the Court must, “using our 

independent judgment, de novo determine whether the necessary 

qualifications have been shown”). We do not limit our 

independent review to matters of law; we have “the ultimate 

responsibility for determination of fact and law.” In re Ronwin, 

139 Ariz. 576, 579, 680 P.2d 107, 110 (1983); see also In re 

Walker, 112 Ariz. 134, 137, 539 P.2d 891, 894 (1975) (making a 

finding regarding the credibility of testimony, although in 

agreement with the Committee). 

¶16 The ultimate question in cases such as this is whether 

the applicant has established good moral character, a concept 

with which we have wrestled as we have attempted to define its 

boundaries. Greenberg, 126 Ariz. at 292, 614 P.2d at 834. As 

Hamm asserts, the rules and standards governing admission to the 

practice of law in Arizona include no per se disqualifications. 

Instead, we consider each case on its own merits. Id. In 

Walker, we described the principles on which we rely as follows: 

‘Upright character’ * * * is something more than an 

absence of bad character. * * * It means that he [an 

applicant for admission] must have conducted himself as 

a man of upright character ordinarily would, should, or 

does. Such character expresses itself not in negatives 

nor in following the line of least resistance, but 

quite often in the will to do the unpleasant thing if 

it is right, and the resolve not to do the pleasant 

thing if it is wrong. 
10

112 Ariz. at 138, 539 P.2d at 895 (alteration in original) 

(quoting In re Farmer, 131 S.E. 661, 663 (N.C. 1926)). 

¶17 We also agree with Hamm that, under the Rule applicable 

to Hamm’s application, our concern must be with the applicant’s 

present moral character. In Greenberg, we explained that “it is 

[the applicant’s] moral character as of now with which we are 

concerned.” 126 Ariz. at 292, 614 P.2d at 834; see also Rule 

36(a)3. Past misconduct, however, is not irrelevant. Rather, 

this Court must determine what past bad acts reveal about an 

applicant’s current character.

III. 

¶18 In compliance with Rule 36(a)4.E, the Committee 

conducted a formal hearing to consider Hamm’s application. The 

Committee heard testimony on May 20 and June 2, 2004. Hamm, 

representing himself, and his wife presented extensive testimony. 

In addition, the Committee heard from three licensed attorneys 

who had worked with Hamm and who recommended his admission and 

also considered letters from those opposed to and in support of 

Hamm’s application. In detailed findings, the Committee 

specifically considered the various factors set out in Rule 36(a) 

to determine Hamm’s character and fitness to be admitted to the 

Bar. In its report, the Committee stated that, in reaching its 

conclusions, it considered the following: 
11

1) Hamm’s unlawful conduct, which included the 

 commission of two violent “execution style” 

 murders and his testimony as to the facts 

 surrounding the murders. 

2) Hamm’s omissions on his Application and his 

 testimony in explaining his failure to disclose 

 all required information. 

3) Hamm’s neglect of his financial responsibilities 

 and/or violation of a longstanding child support 

 court order and his testimony as to his failure 

 to comply with the court order. 

4) Hamm’s mental or emotional instability impairing 

 his ability to perform the functions of an 

 attorney including his testimony as to any 

 diagnosis and treatment.4

¶19 After reviewing all these factors, the Committee 

concluded that Hamm had not met his burden of establishing that 

he possesses the requisite character and fitness for admission to 

the Bar and accordingly recommended that his application be 

denied. We now consider the Committee’s findings, together with 

pertinent facts. 

A. 

¶20 The serious nature of Hamm’s past criminal conduct is 

beyond dispute. Hamm acknowledges that no more serious criminal 

conduct exists than committing first-degree murder. Our society 

reserves its harshest punishment for those convicted of such 

conduct. See Tucson Rapid Transit Co. v. Rubiaz, 21 Ariz. 221, 

231, 187 P. 568, 572 (1920) (describing murder as “the most 

 

4

 The Committee was divided as to the significance of 

complaints made concerning Hamm’s alleged unauthorized practice 

of law. This Court’s decision does not rely upon those 

allegations. 
12

serious crime known to the law”). 

¶21 Hamm’s past criminal conduct and the serious nature of 

that conduct affect the burden he must meet to establish good 

moral character. He must first establish rehabilitation from 

prior criminal conduct, a requirement that adds to his burden of 

showing current good moral character. See In re Adams, 540 

S.E.2d 609, 610 (Ga. 2001) (“Where an applicant for admission to 

the bar has a criminal record, his or her burden of establishing 

present good moral character takes on the added weight of proving 

full and complete rehabilitation subsequent to 

conviction . . . .”); In re Allan S., 387 A.2d 271, 275 (Md. 

1978) (“Although a prior conviction is not conclusive of a lack 

of present good moral character, . . . it adds to his burden of 

establishing present good character by requiring convincing proof 

of his full and complete rehabilitation.”). 

¶22 The added burden becomes greater as past unlawful 

conduct becomes more serious. In In re Arrotta, we considered an 

application for reinstatement from an attorney who, eight years 

earlier, pled guilty to mail fraud and bribery. 208 Ariz. 509, 

96 P.3d 213 (2004). We noted there that “the more serious the 

misconduct that led to disbarment, the more difficult is the 

applicant’s task in showing rehabilitation.” Id. at 512 ¶ 12, 96 

P.3d at 216. An applicant for initial admission to the Bar who 

is attempting to overcome the negative implications of a serious 
13

felony on his current moral character likewise must overcome a 

greater burden for more serious crimes. We agree with the New 

Jersey Supreme Court, which recognized that “in the case of 

extremely damning past misconduct, a showing of rehabilitation 

may be virtually impossible to make.” In re Matthews, 462 A.2d 

165, 176 (N.J. 1983). Indeed, we are aware of no instance in 

which a person convicted of first-degree murder has been admitted 

to the practice of law. 

¶23 To show rehabilitation, Hamm must show that he has 

accepted responsibility for his criminal conduct. Hamm fully 

recognizes his need to make this showing. Indeed, he states that 

his rehabilitation could not have proceeded absent such 

acceptance. We recognize the Committee’s concern that Hamm has 

not yet fully accepted responsibility for the two murders. Hamm 

says he has done so, repeatedly and strongly, but some of his 

other statements indicate to the contrary. The inconsistencies 

among his various statements related to accepting responsibility 

are most evident when he discusses Staples’ murder. Although he 

told the Committee that he accepts responsibility for Staples’ 

murder, in fact he consistently assigns that responsibility to 

his accomplice. His testimony revealed almost no attention to 

the commission or aftermath of Staples’ murder. Hamm concedes 

that he has focused on his role in Morley’s murder rather than on 

his role in Staples’ murder. The difference in approach, he 
14

explains, resulted from one postcard written to him by Morley’s 

grandmother and his decision to use his connection to Morley to 

provide motivation to overcome difficulties. We have no reason 

to doubt that Hamm’s focus on Morley’s murder aided him, using 

his words, in “accomplishing things that people have been telling 

me I can’t do and we’re [Hamm and Morley] still doing it today.” 

That fact, however, does nothing to assure us that Hamm has taken 

responsibility for Staples’ murder, as he must if he is to 

establish rehabilitation. 

¶24 We also give serious consideration to the Committee’s 

finding that Hamm was not completely forthright in his testimony 

about the murders.5 Hamm has insisted in his filings with this 

Court that he did not intend to kill, but only to rob, his 

victims. The agreed facts, however, lead directly to the 

inference that Hamm intended to kill. He conspired with his 

accomplices to rob the victims; he accepted the gun provided by 

Wells and took it with him in the car with the victims; he 

testified that, although he did not intend to kill the victims, 

he was “afraid” they would be killed when he got in the car; he 

shot Morley without ever attempting a robbery and shot him a 

second time to make certain he was dead; and he also shot Staples 

 

5

 Hamm’s lack of candor on this question also impacts our 

analysis of whether he met his burden of showing present good 

moral character. See Section III, subsections B through E, 

infra. 
15

to prevent his escape. The Committee observed Hamm testify and 

was able to judge the credibility of his testimony in light of 

uncontested facts. We agree that the record shows that Hamm, 

despite his current protestations to the contrary, intended to 

kill the victims. His failure to confront the fact that these 

murders were intentional undermines his statements that he fully 

accepts responsibility for his actions. 

¶25 As did the Committee, we give substantial weight to 

Hamm’s attempts at rehabilitation. In Section I, supra, we 

described in some detail the activities Hamm has undertaken, both 

while in and since his release from prison. We are impressed 

with the sincerity and fervor of those who testified or submitted 

letters on Hamm’s behalf. Were rehabilitation the only showing 

Hamm must make to establish good moral character, we would weigh 

those factors tending to show rehabilitation against those 

tending to show a lack thereof. Under the facts of this case, 

however, we need not decide whether the facts of record establish 

rehabilitation. 

¶26 When an applicant has committed first-degree murder, a 

crime that demonstrates an extreme lack of good moral character, 

that applicant must make an extraordinary showing of present good 

moral character to establish that he or she is qualified to be 

admitted to the practice of law. Even assuming that Hamm has 

established rehabilitation, showing rehabilitation from criminal 
16

conduct does not, in itself, establish good moral character. 

Rehabilitation is a necessary, but not sufficient, ingredient of 

good moral character. An applicant must establish his current 

good moral character, independent of and in addition to, evidence 

of rehabilitation. We conclude that Hamm failed to make that 

showing. 

B. 

¶27 We share the Committee’s deep concern about Hamm’s 

longstanding failure to fulfill, or even address, his child 

support obligation to his son, born in 1969, four years before 

Hamm and his first wife separated. Not until he prepared his 

application for admission to the Bar in 2004 did Hamm make any 

effort to meet his responsibility to provide support for his son. 

During the Committee hearing, Hamm advanced several explanations 

for his failure to do so. Like the Committee, we find none of 

his explanations credible. 

¶28 Although Hamm attempts to excuse his failure to pay 

child support by pointing out that he never received a copy of a 

final divorce decree, Hamm scarcely can claim that he lacked 

awareness of his obligation. A few months after he and his wife 

separated in 1973, Hamm was arrested on a misdemeanor charge of 

failing to pay child support. On May 6, 1974, James and Karen 

Hamm’s divorce decree set Hamm’s child support payments at $75.00 

a month. Hamm made no effort to learn the extent of his 
17

financial obligation to his son from 1974, when Hamm was twentysix years old, until 2004, when he was fifty-five. During those 

nearly thirty years, he gained sophistication and attended law 

school. He must have known, and certainly should have known, 

that he had long avoided a basic parental obligation.6 

¶29 Hamm also attempted to excuse his inattention to his 

obligation by explaining that he learned, first from a private 

investigator hired by his wife in 1988, and later from his son, 

that his former wife’s new husband had adopted his son. His 

reliance on the private investigator’s 1988 report to excuse his 

failure is surprising, given the fact that his son was only 

months from the age of majority when Hamm learned of the report; 

he provides no explanation for his lack of concern prior to that 

date. 

¶30 Hamm further explained that only when he applied for 

admission to the Bar in 2004 did he discover that his son had not 

been adopted and then “calculated the child support payment [due] 

over the years.” Hamm determined that he owed $10,000.00 and, 

even though the statute of limitations barred an action to 

 

6

 Hamm also cannot attribute his failure to pay child support 

to the absence of funds. Even while in prison, Hamm earned 

“somewhere around a hundred dollars a month probably,” but used 

no portion of those earnings to discharge his obligation. 
18

recover past amounts due,7 contacted his son and set up a 

repayment schedule. 

¶31 “Behavior of such long duration cannot be considered as 

a temporary aberration . . . .” Walker, 112 Ariz. at 138, 539 

P.2d at 895; see also Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Lewis, 

426 A.2d 1138 (Pa. 1981) (holding that even when an attorney made 

belated restitution for funds taken from clients, because “[s]uch 

actions cannot be said to be consistent with high ethical 

standards of the profession, with a lawyer's fiduciary 

responsibility to his client, with a character that is beyond 

reproach, or with truth, candor and honesty,” the attorney could 

 

7

 When asked if he had taken steps to formalize his agreement 

with his son to pay back child support, Hamm replied, “No. No. 

I simply acknowledged the debt regardless whether it is a legal 

debt or not and whether it’s an enforceable debt or not.” In its 

findings, the Committee noted that Hamm “has since taken it upon 

himself to attempt to comply with his child support obligations,” 

but expressed concern that he made no admission of a legal 

obligation to pay. Whether an action to enforce Hamm’s 

obligation to his son is in fact time-barred is unclear. In Huff 

v. Huff, the Texas Supreme Court held that a ten-year statute of 

limitations under Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 5532, since 

repealed by Acts 1985, 69th Leg., ch. 959, § 9(1), eff. Sept. 1, 

1985, applied to violations of child support orders. 648 S.W.2d 

286, 287–88 (Tex. 1983) (allowing a claim based on a 1973 divorce 

decree). Because Hamm’s son turned eighteen in 1987, the tenyear statute of limitations expired in 1997. In 2002, however, 

the Texas Supreme Court held that an administrative writ, created 

by constitutional amendment in 1997, could be used to enforce a 

divorce decree issued in 1974, for which no order was obtained, 

because the administrative writ is a “new and improved 

enforcement mechanism.” In re A.D., 73 S.W.3d 244, 248 (Tex. 

2002). We need not resolve this question of Texas law, but share 

the Committee’s concern over Hamm’s failure to formally 

investigate his legal obligations to his son. 
19

not continue to practice law). Hamm’s failure to meet his 

parental obligation for nearly thirty years makes it more 

difficult for him to make the required extraordinary showing that 

he “has conducted himself as a man ordinarily would, should, or 

does.” Walker, 112 Ariz. at 138, 539 P.2d at 895. 

¶32 We also agree with the Committee that Hamm did not 

display honesty and candor in discussing his failure to pay child 

support with the Committee. Hamm testified both that his son 

told him personally that he had been adopted and that his son 

“adamantly refused” to accept interest payments on the unpaid 

child support. 

¶33 Hamm’s son testified, however, that he had never been 

adopted, that prior to his contact with Hamm he had changed his 

name himself, and that he had not told Hamm he had been adopted. 

Hamm’s son also did not report adamantly refusing interest 

payments. In response to a question from the Committee about 

interest payments, he said: 

Discussions about interest? Seems like whenever we 

were talking about it, you know, he said it was a large 

amount, and it seems like the subject of interest did 

come up. I can’t remember exactly, you know, what we 

said about it. But, you know, I didn’t push the issue 

or anything, say, well, you know, you’re going to pay 

me interest for this or what, or is there any interest. 

It wasn’t really an issue or important to me. 

¶34 We discern no reason that Hamm’s son would have been 

other than forthright about these matters, while Hamm had every 
20

reason to present himself in the best possible light.8 Like the 

Committee, we find the testimony of his son to be more credible. 

C. 

¶35 We further conclude that Hamm did not adequately 

explain his failure to disclose an incident involving him and his 

current wife, Donna, when he submitted his application to the 

Committee. 

¶36 In 1996, Hamm and Donna engaged in a physical 

altercation outside a convenience store. Donna “yelled the word 

‘kidnap’ out of the window” of the vehicle Hamm was driving, 

causing him to pull over and leave the vehicle. During their 

tussle, Donna tore Hamm’s shirt. Both called the police, who 

arrested neither Hamm nor Donna. The incident and what Donna 

describes as her “embellishments” caused such great concern to 

the Hamms, particularly because Hamm was on parole, that Donna 

submitted to a polygraph administered by a private company to 

demonstrate that Hamm had not kidnapped her. The two also 

underwent marital counseling. 

¶37 Nonetheless, when filling out his Character and Fitness 

 

8

 Rather than acknowledge any inconsistencies between his 

testimony and that of his son, Hamm lashed out at the Committee’s 

refusal to agree with Hamm’s argument, which the Committee could 

accept only if it accepted Hamm’s testimony on this issue as 

credible. Hamm accused the Committee of “totally ignor[ing] the 

content of [Hamm’s Petition] to which it supposedly was 

responding.” 

 
21

Report, Hamm failed to disclose the incident to the Committee. 

Question 25 on the report asks specifically whether the 

applicant, among other things, has been “questioned” concerning 

any felony or misdemeanor.9

 Hamm told the Committee that, in 

reading the application, he missed the word “questioned” in the 

list of encounters with law enforcement that Question 25 directs 

an applicant to report. 

¶38 Hamm’s explanation strains credulity. In Walker, this 

Court inferred that the son of an Army officer would understand 

the requirement to register for the draft. 112 Ariz. at 138, 539 

P.2d at 895. Likewise, we infer from Hamm’s knowledge of the law 

and his efforts in 1996 to document a defense for the domestic 

incident that he fully understood its importance and must have 

known that the incident would be of interest to the Committee. 

His failure to include it in his initial application further 

affects his ability to make the needed extraordinary showing of 

good moral character. 

 

9

 Question 25 asks: 

Have you either as an adult or a juvenile, ever been 

served with a criminal summons, questioned, arrested, 

taken into custody, indicted, charged with, tried for, 

pleaded guilty to or been convicted of, or ever been 

the subject of an investigation concerning the 

violation of, any felony or misdemeanor? (In answering 

this question, include all incidents, no matter how 

trivial or minor the infraction or whether guilty or 

not, whether expunged or not, whether you believe or 
22

D.

¶39 Hamm’s actions during these proceedings also raise 

questions about his fitness to practice law. The introduction to 

Hamm’s petition before this Court begins: 

The consequences of this case for Petitioner take it 

out of the ordinary realm of civil cases. If the 

Committee’s recommendation is followed, it will prevent 

him from earning a living through practicing law. This 

deprivation has consequences of the greatest import for 

Petitioner, who has invested years of study and a great 

deal of financial resources in preparing to be a lawyer 

. . . . 

This language repeats nearly verbatim the language of the United 

States Supreme Court in Konigsberg v. State Bar, 353 U.S. 252 

(1957), in which the Court wrote: 

While this is not a criminal case, its consequences for 

Konigsberg take it out of the ordinary run of civil 

cases. The Committee's action prevents him from earning 

a living by practicing law. This deprivation has grave 

consequences for a man who has spent years of study and 

a great deal of money in preparing to be a lawyer. 

Id. at 257–58. If an attorney submits work to a court that is 

not his own, his actions may violate the rules of professional 

conduct. Iowa Supreme Court Bd. of Prof’l Ethics & Conduct v. 

Lane, 642 N.W.2d 296, 299 (Iowa 2002) (“[P]lagiarism 

constitute[s], among other things, a misrepresentation to the 

court. An attorney may not engage in conduct involving 

dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation.”); see also Rule 

________________________ 

were advised that you need not disclose any such 

instance.) 
23

42, ER 8.4(c) (defining professional misconduct as including 

“engag[ing] in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or 

misrepresentation”). We are concerned about Hamm’s decision to 

quote from the Supreme Court’s opinion without attribution and 

are equally troubled by his failure to acknowledge his error. 

When the Committee’s response pointed to Hamm’s failure to 

attribute this language to Konigsberg, he avoided the serious 

questions raised and refused to confront or apologize for his 

improper actions, asserting instead: “From Petitioner’s 

perspective, any eloquence that might be found in the Petition 

does not derive from any prior case decided in any jurisdiction, 

but rather from the gradual development of his own potential 

through study, reflection, and devotion to the duty created by 

his commission of murder.” Hamm apparently either does not 

regard his actions as improper or simply refuses to take 

responsibility. In either case, his actions here do not assist 

him in making the requisite showing of good moral character.10

 

10 In addition to the matters discussed above, only four years 

have passed since James Hamm was absolutely discharged. The fact 

that Hamm has been free of supervision for this relatively short 

time weighs against his admission to the practice of law.

Greenberg, 126 Ariz. at 293, 614 P.2d at 835 (noting that 

“[r]ehabilitation is seldom accomplished in an instantaneous 

fashion” and holding that Greenberg had “not convinced [the 

Court] that he as yet evidences the requisite good moral 

character”)(emphasis added); see also In re Dortch, 860 A.2d 346, 

348 (D.C. 2004) (finding it “would be erosive of public 

confidence in the legal profession and the administration of 

justice were we to admit an applicant who is still on parole for 
24

E.

¶40 When Hamm committed first-degree murder in 1974, he 

demonstrated his extreme lack of good moral character. Although 

this Court has not adopted a per se rule excluding an applicant 

whose past includes such serious criminal misconduct, we agree 

with those jurisdictions that have held that an applicant with 

such a background must make an extraordinary showing of 

rehabilitation and present good moral character to be admitted to 

the practice of law. Perhaps such a showing is, in practical 

terms, a near impossibility. We need not decide that question 

today, however, because Hamm’s lack of candor before the 

Committee and this Court, his failure to accept full 

responsibility for his serious criminal misconduct, and his 

failure to accept or fulfill, on a timely basis, his parental 

obligation of support for his son, all show that Hamm has not met 

the stringent standard that applies to an applicant in his 

position who seeks to show his present good moral character. 

IV. 

¶41 Hamm asserts that he was denied due process of law 

because two members of the Committee may have prejudged the 

merits of his application. Both members, however, left the 

Committee proceedings when their potential bias came to light, 

________________________ 

crimes as serious as those committed by Dortch”). Because Hamm 

otherwise failed to establish good moral character, however, we 
25

and neither played any role in the Committee’s findings and 

recommendation. 

¶42 Hamm, like all applicants for membership in the Bar, is 

entitled to receive due process of law. “The fundamental 

requirement of due process is the opportunity to be heard ‘at a 

meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.’” Mathews v. 

Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976) (quoting Armstrong v. Manzo, 

380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965)). Also, “due process requires that a 

party be given a ‘fair trial in a fair tribunal.’” United States 

v. Superior Court, 144 Ariz. 265, 280, 697 P.2d 658, 673 (1985) 

(quoting In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955)). Both the 

Committee and this Court have provided Hamm ample opportunity to 

be heard through hearings and written arguments. Moreover, this 

Court, and not the Committee, made the ultimate decision on 

Hamm’s application. Hamm received a full opportunity to be heard 

before a fair tribunal. 

________________________ 

reached our decision without considering this factor. 
26

V. 

¶43 Because James Hamm has failed to meet his burden of 

proving that he is of good moral character, we deny his 

application for admission to the State Bar of Arizona. 

 __________________________________ 

 Ruth V. McGregor, Chief Justice 

 

CONCURRING: 

_________________________________ 

Michael D. Ryan, Justice 

_________________________________ 

Andrew D. Hurwitz, Justice 

_________________________________ 

W. Scott Bales, Justice 

_________________________________ 

Jefferson L. Lankford, Judge* 

* The Honorable Rebecca White Berch recused herself; pursuant 

to Article VI, Section 3 of the Arizona Constitution, the 

Honorable Jefferson L. Lankford, Judge of the Court of Appeals, 

Division One was designated to sit in her stead.