Dragnet 

A Case Study of the CLEAR System 

Case Studies in National Security Transformation 

Number 13 

Samuel Musa, Matt Keegan and Giles Kyser 

December 2007 

Sponsored by the Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense 

Forces Transformation and Resources 

 Prepared by the Center for Technology and National Security Policy 
The views expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not reflect the official policy 

or position of the National Defense University, the Department of Defense or the U.S. 

Government. All information and sources for this paper were drawn from unclassified materials. 

Dr. Samuel Musa is a Senior Research Fellow at CTNSP conducting research in counter 

improvised explosive device (IEDs) and biometrics for human terrain mapping and counter 

insurgency. He is on Intergovernmental Personnel Act (IPA) to NDU from Northwestern 

University, where he is Associate Vice President for Strategic initiatives and professor of 

Electrical and Computer Engineering. 

Matt Keegan is currently a Visiting Fellow with the Center for Technology and National 

Security Policy (CTNSP) focusing on information technology (IT) related efforts. He is a 2006 

distinguished graduate of the Industrial College of the Armed Forces (ICAF) where he was an 

Industry Fellow sponsored by the Information Technology Association of America and IBM. He 

has over 15 years experience in aerospace, defense, and IT related fields. 

Colonel Giles Kyser is a Marine Infantry Officer currently assigned as the Senior Military 

Assistant to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity 

Conflict and is a 2006 distinguished graduate of the Industrial College of the Armed Forces. He 

has an extensive operational background in both conventional and special operations and 

commanded a Marine Infantry Battalion Task Force in Iraq.

ii
“The story you are about to read is true. The names have been changed (and in some cases 

deleted) to protect the innocent.”

Introduction 

The opening narration of Dragnet, the long running TV series about two Los Angeles cops, could 

not be a more fitting way to open a case study on the Chicago Police Department’s (CPD) 

Citizen and Law Enforcement Analysis Reporting System (CLEAR) and its dramatic journey 

into the Department of Defense (DOD). The quickest way to describe CLEAR is to mention a 

quote from Ron Huberman, assistant deputy superintendent, Office of Information and Strategic 

Services at CPD "CLEAR automates everything we do in the [Chicago] police department, from 

personnel management to detailed field incident reports. It includes the entire arrest and booking 

process: taking offenders into custody, mug shots, everything. CLEAR places it all in one 

integrated platform. It's enabl[ed] us to become a completely paperless police department...All 

information will be in the hands of the officers, making them better equipped to protect our 

communities." 

This study focuses on the problem of how to enhance the situational awareness (SA) of a young 

solider or marine manning a checkpoint in Iraq and how information technology (IT) might be 

used to help him/her better understand the regional demographic, thereby increasing the number 

of “bad guys” caught. The IT in question is CLEAR, a commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) tool 

developed to assist the beat cop in the arrest and bookings process. CLEAR provides a rapid and 

accurate assessment of an individual’s information based on rudimentary biometric triggers that 

drive the correlation of data in an advanced data-mining tool. Data collected at the beat cop level 

populates a growing data universe and also drives mapping overlay capability at higher 

headquarters, which can be used to enable real-time, 24/7 force development decisions. Such 

capabilities have obvious potential for military use. 

This study uses the dramatic device of Dragnet-style presentation to describe the journey of three 

National Defense University (NDU) teammates and their trials and tribulations while attempting 

to show DOD how CLEAR could improve the SA of troops now on the battlefield. This journey 

is a case study on how or how not to try to take a COTS product into DOD. The case study will 

review each step chronologically. It will depict successes and failures as well as roadblocks 

erected and overcome. It will demonstrate the inertia of the behemoth that is the Pentagon, and 

hint at the correctness of President Eisenhower’s warnings about the military industrial complex. 

In the end, it is hoped that the reader might consider what could have been done better and how 

the DOD system might be altered in such a way that COTS technologies can be effectively and 

rapidly considered. Other concepts for consideration might be how something as complex as the 

Pentagon’s portfolio of projects might be rapidly adjusted to take advantage of COTS projects 

and eliminate redundant efforts (and the associated spending) by avoiding reinvention of the 

wheel and instead adopting/implementing proven solutions. 

The Beginning 

The story of this journey begins in a seminar room at the Industrial College of the Armed Forces 

(ICAF), late one February afternoon. In a post-class, pre-homework lull, a single student, whom 

we will call Joe (Friday), industriously gathers the evening’s reading. Entering from stage left is 

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a second student, Bill (Gannon), an Industry Fellow with 16 years in industry, 10 of them in IT, 

of which the 2 at Oracle Corporation will prove to be key. Joe tells Bill of his frustrations with 

the inability of the Marines in Iraq to develop and maintain the necessary SA to protect and 

pacify a region. The factors limiting the SA were very basic: each unit was rotating too quickly 

through a region and was never in an area long enough to develop a sense what was in place and 

what was missing, and/or to develop a human network and positive rapport with the locals, 

which are both essential elements to “catching bad guys.” 

Joe cited his months commanding a battalion in the Al Anbar province and the frequently 

repeated shifts in his area of operation (AO). Though other units might remain in one region for 

an entire tour, the number of weeks that his Marines remained in a region was at most 10—long 

enough to establish basic SA, but too short to exploit the advantages. This drove Joe’s seemingly 

rhetorical questions: How can a Marine pass SA off to another Marine? How can we shorten the 

time it takes for a Marine to gain strong SA? Even if a unit does remain in one location, how can 

we help with rapid and penetrating SA when the unit is replaced? How can we have better intel 

at checkpoints that will allow us to detain a suspect, understand what intel the source represents, 

and then exploit that intel? Joe explained that the way it is today, he could only grab someone he 

could confirm from a low-quality photo and, unless the suspect was a known bad guy, he had to 

be passed to Battalion in 18 hours, ergo no time for interrogation. By the time Battalion could 

confirm who a suspect was, all his associates likely had gone to ground, and any intel associated 

with the arrest had long since perished. What Joe thought was a rhetorical question turned out to 

be the beginning of the journey, for he was venting his frustrations to someone who happened to 

be the Industry Fellow from the IT sector and had just spent two years at Oracle. 

Motivated by Joe’s question, Bill thought back to his days at Oracle. It was the focus of his 

consideration because he remembered a series of conversations while at Oracle about Mayor 

Giuliani’s use of database technology to drive down the New York City crime rate. Bill’s theory 

was that just as database technology was being used to drive down street and organized crime in 

New York (a city of five boroughs and nearly 10 million people), it could be applied in fighting 

insurgency, which is very similar to organized crime. As Bill researched his theory, what he 

found was not the New York system, but the leading edge efforts of the CPD and their system 

named CLEAR. 

CLEAR 

The Citizen and Law Enforcement Analysis Reporting System (CLEAR) is an Oracle-based 

system developed by the CPD. It applies an Oracle database, tools, and interfaces to create a 

data-mining capability for the rapid collection and assimilation of personal data associated with 

any party an officer must research. The gathering of the data is triggered by a biometric query, 

such as fingerprints or photos, and/or through scanning standard identification, such as a driver’s 

license. Any CPD beat cop can stop an individual of interest and, using a handheld device, 

access all basic personal data1

 by typing an entry, swiping a license, snapping a photo, and/or 

taking between one and ten finger prints. With that information gathered, the officer can launch a 

query from any location in Chicago and within 3–5 minutes obtain a person’s entire record: 

ticket history; fines; outstanding warrants; aliases; physical markings, such as tattoos or scars; 

 

1

 The handheld device is 8.6" x 4.2" x 4.1" and weighs two pounds. 

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known associates; a mapping of any crimes committed, and a multitude of other essential data 

points. This is at the street cop level, all on the handheld device. 

At the Headquarters level, the data from all interactions recorded the previous day is gathered. 

CLEAR generates simple daily statistics, but also correlates more complex data points that can 

be overlaid on a map to depict where crime seems to be waxing and waning across the city. City 

maps driven by the CLEAR system enable CPD leadership to rapidly assess shifts in crime 

patterns and enables force redeployment into areas of concern. Since this system has been in 

place, organized crime, gang warfare, and even basic street crime, has dropped 30 percent within 

Chicago. If such results can be triggered by a handheld device carried by a street cop, what could 

such a system do for a soldier or Marine at a checkpoint, and for the regional command structure 

above him? 

Joe quickly saw a tool that might be of use to a lance corporal manning a checkpoint. If a young 

Marine was given a tool that would permit him to peer through the insular demographic within 

the region, might he not be able to gain game-changing SA within minutes? Would this not give 

him a fighting chance to catch “bad guys” who might otherwise sneak by using a disguise and 

false name? CLEAR looked as if it might be a potential key to enabling a squad to better control 

a region. At the battalion level and higher a system called BAT was already in place, but it 

seemed reasonable to imagine CLEAR as an extension of BAT at the squad level. The suitcasesized BAT could remain in place to help with troops once an individual was detained, but the 

handheld CLEAR could help increase the number and quality of arrests and permit rapid action 

against accomplices based on perishable intelligence. It was this thought that triggered the 

creation of a few Power Point slides, and the first briefings to Bill’s professor on the U.S. 

Military in Transformation, Dr. Hans Binnendijk, Director of the NDU Center for Technology 

and National Security Policy (CTNSP). 

As fate would have it, a third NDU traveler on this journey was part of Dr. Binnendijk’s CTNSP 

team and was researching various methods of defeating improvised explosive devices (IEDs). 

Frank Smith had arrived at CTNSP 6 months earlier as a Senior Research Fellow on a 2-year 

IPA from Northwestern University. He had extensive background in C3I systems, technology 

management, and entrepreneurship and was closely coupled to the intelligence community, 

which proved to be valuable to this effort. Furthermore, he was aware of the close involvement 

of one of the Centers at Northwestern in the evaluation of CLEAR for the CPD. 

Over the next 3 months, the NDU trio moved quickly through a series of meetings. Their first 

objective was to confirm with both the CPD and warriors returning from the desert that CLEAR 

would fit as Joe suspected. Frank gathered information from former battalion commanders on 

their experiences in Iraq. Further inquiries discovered that CPD was visiting the Federal 

Government to discuss CLEAR at a nationwide conference of police studying law enforcement 

IT solutions. Similarly, Joe made contact with his old Executive Officer (XO), Major D, who 

was returning from a second tour in Iraq. 

 Lt. Jonathan Lewin of the CPD was more than happy to divert from his conference and provide 

a demo of the CLEAR system to the CTNSP team, and Major D was equally happy to travel to 

Washington to offer his assessment. What was unique about his observations was that Major 

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DAJ D was also a former Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) agent who had worked 

undercover and also had served tours in Afghanistan leading security forces in joint operations 

with Afghan counter-narcotic police. He had an expert’s view of security operations as a law 

enforcement officer, a U.S. Marine, and an Iraq/Afghanistan war veteran. 

The meeting turned out not only to prove that the CPD system could execute as advertised, but 

completely confirmed that CLEAR would be quite applicable in Iraq and Afghanistan. Major D 

saw it as an important tool enabling the squad-level combatant to improve his/her SA and “stop 

more bad guys.” 

BAT 

One key part of the meeting was initial discussions on capability that already existed in country, 

which was BAT. BAT is a Northrop Grumman proprietary product consisting of a suitcase-size 

biometric collection station and a custom-developed proprietary database that records basic 

biometrics and personal information. Due to size and operating requirements it was used at the 

battalion level and higher, often leaving the squad with nothing but photocopied pictures taped to 

pieces of cardboard. If by chance a Marine could ID a suspect against a photo, the suspect could 

be detained and shipped to Battalion. Once at Battalion, the suspect could have his information 

gathered and sent back to the United States for review. This typically took 48 hours, largely due 

to the architecture of the system, which required the operator to select any one of 21 databases 

against which to compare the information in what is called a “push” or manual system. Though 

this would assist in identifying bad guys, the cycle time was so long that any highly perishable 

intelligence that could be gathered from a suspect had often long since expired. In order for a bad 

guy to even arrive at Battalion for entry into BAT, he had to be detained at the squad level first, 

and then transported to Battalion for input into BAT. This detention-to-information cycle 

represents a cycle time of 60–68 hour. Without a tool like CLEAR at the squad level, the weave 

of the dragnet was too large, and the bad guys could slip through and their accomplices fade 

away. 

Conversely, CLEAR applies an automated search/comparison process in a ‘transactional’ fashion 

and arrives at the same answer in 3–5 minutes. CLEAR, however, had yet to be proven in the 

desert. Two things BAT did have was the beginning of an Iraqi database, and a place in the 

operational doctrine. In theory, weaving CLEAR and BAT together might help CLEAR be more 

effective sooner, while BAT would get its reach extended to the squad level. At first glance, this 

seemed a win-win scenario. 

Several issues were quickly raised about CLEAR. The concerns included: lack of 

communications architecture to support it in theater; vulnerability of commercial 

communications in an operational environment; lack of full enrollment capability; power and 

operating temperatures of a handheld; access and security of the device; and lack of 

compatibility between law enforcement and DOD databases. The NDU team examined these 

issues and produced an issue paper to address some of the arguments. 

With this information gathered, the team’s goal changed ever so slightly. Yes, they believed it 

was important to get CLEAR into the JRAC process, but not necessarily to replace BAT. The 

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goal was to perform tests to confirm that CLEAR would work in the desert, and then see how it 

would optimally work with BAT. If CLEAR proved better than BAT on the whole, then CLEAR 

could replace BAT, if CLEAR proved to have complementary capabilities while tightening the 

net down at the squad level, then the idea was to develop a best of breed. No matter the outcome, 

the key was to provide the squad-level marine the tools he/she needed as rapidly as possible. 

CLEAR Costs 

With the support of CTNSP and the CPD2

 the NDU team continued down the path. The team 

completed a preliminary evaluation of the costs of the CLEAR system for DOD applications. It 

was estimated that it would cost roughly $3-6M for hardware and software for a CLEAR backoffice system, including a license from ORACLE (if DOD architecture resembled CPD). The 

database technical upgrade and data migration costs would depend on hardware and architecture 

(1 million records/36 hours’ run-time, 120 hours for analysis/translation of NG database, 120 

hours’ database analysts for setup and quality assurance). Furthermore, moving from proprietary 

software to COTS would reduce life-cycle costs by half over the life of the system. In addition, 

the handheld costs were estimated to be roughly $4.2M ($3,500/handheld unit x 1,200 users). 

Training costs were assumed but not estimated. 

As the NDU group journeyed forward, Frank added a new member to the team, the software 

developer and system integrator of the biometric front end, called the MV-100. Computer 

Deductions Inc. (CDI) worked with the team and the CPD to establish a small test database and 

provided an MV-100, which enabled the team to demo the actual beat cop process and 

capability. Armed with this piece of equipment and a point paper stating the problem, capability, 

and open issues, the team began marching down a list of questions to be answered, actions to be 

completed, and people to be briefed. The first misstep occurred soon after—a visit from General 

Peter Pace, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS). 

Every year, the CJCS visits NDU to brief the combined National War College and ICAF classes. 

As with all NDU speakers, there is a brief opportunity to hold short discussions with the speaker 

immediately before and after the presentation. As fate would have it CLEAR became a topic of 

the post-presentation conversation. Dr. Binnendijk led the ambush by giving the “elevator pitch.” 

General Pace’s reaction was positive, and he requested a copy of the materials be forwarded to 

his office. Before doing so, the NDU trio briefed the ICAF Commandant and Chief of Staff, 

gaining their support, then shipped the documents off to the CJCS. This was the moment when 

the snowball started to roll down the hill. Over the next few months allies and adversaries of 

BAT and CLEAR took sides and what was rapid progress to this point slowed down drastically. 

Days after the pitch to GEN Pace, a call came in from the Office of the Vice Chairman of the 

Joint Chiefs of Staff (VCJCS). The CJCS had passed the documents along, and Admiral 

Giambastiani wanted to better understand CLEAR. Two days later, the NDU trio marched off to 

meet with the Admiral’s biometric team. The briefing lasted several hours, covering all aspects 

of the system, culminating with the VCJCS team helping with two items: the creation of a list of 

 

2

 CPD offered to transfer the system to DOD while asking only for $1 million annually to continue spiral 

development for themselves and to be fed back to DOD. They asked for nothing since it was regarded as their 

original non-recurring development costs of $38 million. 

5
questions that more directly represented theater strategic issues, and a directive to better 

understand the communications network and how CLEAR would fit into the existing theater 

architecture. The VCJCS team was clear that the best course of action was to take this system to 

the Biometric Fusion Center (BFC) and to the Army G6, which were the primary leads on 

biometrics. While this did represent progress, the NDU team still felt a degree of frustration 

because it appeared DOD was getting caught in a classic trap. Instead of realizing that the 

strength of the CLEAR system was the back-end software system and database processing 

methods, DOD was becoming focused on the “bright shiny object” that was the biometric 

collection kit represented by the MV-100. Instead of being labeled as an information systems 

project that was enabled by biometrics (which would have resided with the J-6), CLEAR was 

labeled a biometric system and pushed under the Army G6 and the BFC, the same organizations 

responsible for BAT and its evaluation. 

Frustration Mounts 

The trio continued to respond to almost weekly calls from the Pentagon. Conference calls with 

the BFC led to meetings, meetings to more open items, open items to more meetings to close 

items, and the snowball grew bigger and bigger. ADM Giambastiani’s staff directed BFC to 

conduct an evaluation of CLEAR. An engineer was sent to Illinois to learn more about CLEAR. 

At this point in our drama, one would hope that Dragnet’s most famous line, “just the facts,” 

would be reflected in the BFC analysis, but that was not the case. The engineer visited not the 

CPD but the Illinois State Police, who were not on board with CLEAR and did not operate the 

system. After a very short visit, the BFC engineer returned and issued a report focused on the 

data management and its lack of application to the theater, and on potential inadequacies of the 

handheld unit, such as operating temperature ranges, battery life, and size of display. Though 

inaccurate, and based on a system he never reviewed, the report nearly killed the system for 

DOD, and certainly closed proper and formal channels of consideration. 

The Sub Plot 

As all the ups, downs, visits, calls, objectives, and achievements continued to drive the day-today roller coaster of CLEAR, a chance meeting occurred that set the stage for the future of 

CLEAR. (Chance and coincidence had truly driven CLEAR since inception.)The meeting, with 

former Assistant Secretary of Defense and former Marine Corps officer Bing West, became the 

key to CLEAR’s future within the U.S. military. 

West, now an author and informal advisor to senior officers in Iraq, had been asked by the NDU 

faculty to co-host a 3-day event to discuss the rise of China. This placed him on campus and in 

the path of Joe and Bill. (West had met the two earlier in the year for a brief conversation on 

CLEAR at the request of Dr. Binnendijk). It happened that, as Joe and Bill ambled toward lunch 

in Marshall Hall they spotted a sign for an Asian Conference and walked into the nearly empty 

conference room to find Bing West sitting behind the audio-visual desk preparing his conference 

notes. 

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West remembered both gents, particularly Joe (as they also had met in Iraq) and after a few 

pleasantries asked how the “biometric thing” was going. Joe gave him the run down, including 

the frustrations and the high points, but more importantly on how almost all open issues had been 

closed, and the system appeared even more mature than originally thought. West asked for one 

thing—a copy of all briefings and notes. He was returning to Iraq soon and thought he might 

have a chance to discuss CLEAR with various leaders up to and including GEN Casey, 

commander of all forces in Iraq. Within a day, West had all his documents, and within a month 

he had lived up to his word and briefed the desert leadership. 

The Urgent Needs Statement (UNS) 

Though stalled by the evaluation process, the NDU team continued to try to move through 

formal channels to get the CLEAR system proper consideration. Slowly, it became clear that if 

an Urgent Needs Statement (UNS) did not exist, then the desire to pursue the effort ended with 

educational briefings. If CLEAR was to be tested by DOD, a UNS was the next obstacle to clear. 

To this end, Joe and Bill returned to the ICAF Commandant’s office for assistance. The 

Commandant was happy to help, but before she would initiate a UNS, she wanted confirmation 

that senior officers in Iraq (MG Zilmer in particular) and the Pentagon (the Director of J-6) 

would support it. With these marching orders, the team set about preparing briefings and the 

UNS. 

The briefing with the Director of J-6 became a symbolic event in the journey, embodying the 

internal fight between allies and adversaries of CLEAR. The J-6 was a hard-driving Marine. His 

mission was to support the warfighter with world class IT solutions and not get bogged down in 

the political quagmires for which the Pentagon is famous. The meeting consisted of the J-6 

Marine Director, his Deputy (U.S. Army), and three Army aides of O-4, O-5, and O-6 rank. The 

meeting lasted 45 minutes. Although the Director showed significant interest, his deputy 

indicated that BAT was in place and could be expanded to encompass similar functions as 

CLEAR. He noted that there were funds available to upgrade BAT with the use of a handheld 

device called HIIDE. He was also concerned about the communication architecture. The team 

agreed that this was an open issue and stayed with their goal, noting that they wished to bring the 

technology to the attention of leadership, get constructive direction on how problems might be 

overcome, and hopefully get the system tested. At the end of the meeting, the Director gave 

orders to “get the system tested,” and the team was directed to work with an aide. 

The team returned to NDU believing they might have finally achieved their goal. The J-6 had 

directed that the system be tested, the ICAF Commandant’s UNS signature criteria had been met, 

and now a Pentagon representative would hopefully take the lead on the project. But 24 hours 

later, hope turned to frustration with a phone call from the aide. She said there was no reason for 

a test because the communication architecture in Iraq would not support CLEAR, and BAT was 

already present in the desert. Retorts from the team that they had confirmed that the 

communication architecture was, in fact, in place (Larry Wentz, a CTNSP expert recently 

returned from Afghanistan had confirmed it), and that BAT left the squad-level soldier with no 

capability had no i

mpact. 

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The UNS met a similar fate. Signed by the ICAF Commandant, it was shipped off to Iraq, where 

USMC personnel were prepared to walk it through the ranks for signature. West had made GEN 

Casey aware a UNS might be coming, but it never arrived on his desk. 

At this point, as befits a TV drama, all seemed lost. Our Dragnet trio found themselves frustrated 

by many people who said no for ambiguous reasons. Very few people said no for 

incontrovertible reasons or offered constructive criticism. The whole scenario seemed hard to 

comprehend: CPD had developed an anti-crime system for $38M; the system was adaptable to 

counter-insurgency; it would give a young Marine at a check point a view of the insular 

demographic he never had before; it could lead to detaining more “bad guys” (while decreasing 

unnecessary detentions); it could be complementary to BAT and it could better enable leadership 

to make daily force deployment decisions. Furthermore, CLEAR could be fielded within months 

and cost DOD only about $1M per year if DOD continued spiral development of the product for 

CPD as well as themselves. With Northrop Grumman about to receive millions of dollars just to 

bring BAT up to par with CLEAR, it was hard to fathom why CLEAR could not be funded, even 

as a test. What was the problem? Why was it so hard to get the system properly considered by 

DOD? 

Naval Integrations Lab 

Frank would not give up yet. He was still on the case and still determined to get CLEAR its day 

in court. He decided the Navy might be a better customer for this technology. He knew a former 

advisory board study member who was now Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy (DASN). 

He presented the capability to the Deputy for possible use in maritime interdiction operations, 

who put him in touch with the Director of Naval Integrations Lab (NaIL). 

NaIL is a new, U.S. Navy-created lab launched in 2006. Both a PMO and a Lab, NaIL has been 

chartered to find COTS products that are 60–80 percent down a maturity path and can be rapidly 

adapted to meet Navy requirements. As both a lab and a PMO, NaIL is one of the few places that 

can take a project from concept to field in funding, development, testing, documentation, and 

associated doctrine/training/logistics planning. Though unfunded until FY07, the NaIL team was 

willing to review CLEAR as a possible launch project and to that end traveled to NDU for 

briefings. One significant factor with the NaIL leadership was its depth in IT, which enabled the 

team to understand that CLEAR was not a bright, shiny MV-100 biometric device, but rather any 

of a number of biometric collectors providing data to a mature data warehouse/data mining 

system. The system understanding had the NaIL team intrigued and ready to take on the CLEAR 

project, if not for Iraqi, at least for maritime boarding operations. Once again, the NDU trio saw 

funding, a potential to get the system properly tested, and a DOD organization willing to give 

CLEAR its day in court. All this came not a moment too soon. Graduation had arrived, and the 

team’s ability to have the focused attention of all three decayed to largely just that of Frank and 

the few spare efforts that Joe and Bill could afford. 

Frank worked with a senior NaIL engineer to put together a test plan for CLEAR. In the 

meantime, the engineer examined the value added by this experiment, since the communication 

connectivity of this system already had been proven in the Navy. While it was decided that the 

NaIL program would not pursue this effort, the NaIL engineer personally convinced the new 

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Director of the BFC to reexamine CLEAR. The new Director invited Frank to Clarksburg, WV, 

where he spent a day working with the engineers to come up with a test plan for the system. The 

new Director was supportive of the concept as a complementary capability to BAT with high 

response times operating in the Non-Secure Internet Protocol Router (NIPR) world. Finally, BFC 

agreed to be a partner in an experiment. Frank had been previously introduced to the Director of 

the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) effort for Tactical Network Topology (TNT) by the Chief 

Scientist of the Office of Naval Research (ONR). The Director of TNT agreed to conduct the 

experiment as part of quarterly exercises. The stage was finally set to test the system in an 

environment supported by Special Operations Command (SOCOM). 

Theory to Practice 

To this point, a CLEAR-like system that supports the arrest-to-booking process and functions as 

a possible enabler for the troops has been portrayed mostly in a theoretical basis. This begs the 

question: Can it work in practice? This question could be answered only by the real world tests 

the NDU team had been pursing since day one. After much travail, they got their answer. 

CLEAR proved to be very effective in limited use tests. There were two such testing 

opportunities: one in theater and another in a field exercise operated by SOCOM-NPS. 

Theater Test 

As described in the February 8, 2007, Wall Street Journal article “Snake Eater,” a subset of the 

CLEAR system has seen action in Iraq, where it proved to have a direct impact on “mapping the 

human terrain,” as well as an enhanced psychological effect. Major Owen West, USMC, (and 

son of Bing West) brought an MV-100 and COPLINK loaded on a personal computer (PC) into 

the Khalidaya province, just north of Baghdad. According to his account to the Wall Street 

Journal, Major West and his joint U.S. and Iraqi force took the system on patrol and after one 

night “the town [was] abuzz.” West noted, “I think we have a chance to tip the city over now.” A 

rumor quickly spread that the Iraqi army was planting GPS chips in the insurgent’s thumbs. 

From one night of operation, not only did Major West succeed in applying the MV-100 and 

COPLINK, he incidentally effected a psychological operation that made the bad guys think that 

maybe they should find another section of the country in which to make trouble. Major West was 

able to build a database of the population in his AO. However, he was not able to identify the 

bad actors on DOD watch lists. Connectivity to DOD systems would likely provide valuable 

information on the insurgents in theater and exploit the more complete functionality of CLEAR. 

Major West rotated home in early 2007. His replacement is continuing to employ the “Snake 

Eater” subset of CLEAR. On a second front, CLEAR has been field tested with complete 

functionality. 

Field Exercise 

From February 26 to March 1 at Camp Roberts, California, the architecture of the CLEAR 

system was tested as part of the TNT exercises. The objective of the test was to assess the ability 

of a CLEAR-like system (communication architecture with a layered database) to produce 

actionable intelligence during Marine Corps Snap Vehicle Checkpoint operations. The system 

was used in multiple scenarios. First, at a checkpoint manned by special operations personnel, 

the special CDI configured MV-100 personal digital assistant (PDA) was used to take two 

9
fingerprints, a mug shot, and other demographic data. There were two options: Full Encounter or 

Fast ID. These options and configurations were the same used by Major West and his squad as 

part of a Transition Training Team with an Iraqi Brigade in Anbar province. In the Camp 

Roberts Exercise, the PDA had a limited number of records stored in the device for potential 

initial matching. If no match occurred, the data was sent to a High Mobility Multipurpose 

Wheeled Vehicle (Humvee) relay vehicle via 802.11 wireless LAN, and then transmitted to the 

Tactical Operations Center (TOC) via 802.16. The second match then took place at the server 

(laptop), which had the database of the local population. The data was then transmitted via 

virtual private network (VPN) to the BFC for access to the ABIS Emulator database resident in 

the FBI’s Clarksburg center (home of IAFIS and ABIS). The Emulator database was used as a 

test to prove capability while protecting the security of the real ABIS. The response from the 

ABIS Emulator (match or no match, plus additional data) was sent back to the server at TOC. All 

the information was then forwarded back to the PDA for action. 

The CLEAR-like system also was tested in a battlefield medical scenario and a full blue-red 

force scenario with checkpoint established at the desire of the TOC commander. Furthermore, it 

was successfully integrated to TactiComp, which was used as the relay communications from the 

vehicle to the TOC for the latter scenario during which the system continued to work very well. 

This TactiComp system is available in a number of the Humvees and is expected to be used to 

provide added capability to the HIIDE system (the PDA addition to BAT). The key point is that 

the TactiComp infrastructure is in place in the Humvee today and is a proven link for the 

CLEAR sub-system, obviating the need for additional equipment to be installed in already 

cramped vehicles. 

The response times for FAST ID from data entry at the MV-100 PDA to the ABIS Emulator and 

back ranged from 1:28–2:47 minutes. For the Full Encounter ID, the response time ranged from 

2:16–3:35 minutes. All of these measurements included the time it took to enter the data on the 

PDA, which ranged from 37 seconds for FAST ID to 85 seconds for Full Encounter ID. The 

system provided very fast response based on a single fingerprint as well as a single facial print. 

The special operations personnel took these measurements at the checkpoint and provided 

valuable feedback. 

The significant advantage of the CLEAR-like system is that it does not require Secret Internet 

Protocol Router Network (SIPR) access; therefore, it can be left with coalition partners without 

concern over security. Eventually, this system can be made complementary to the existing BAT 

system with its SIPR connectivity and database, expanding capability for U.S. forces through a 

simple connectivity integration, while retaining unclassified capability for allied forces or 

members of the law enforcement community who do not have SIPR access. This will work to 

incorporate the existing databases into one overall integrated architecture, which may be able to 

provide solutions to both a squad level soldier and beat level police officer as each attempt to 

“protect and serve.” 

The Next Steps 

Frank was finally able to receive limited funding from the Director of Research and Research 

Training Office (RRTO) in the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) to conduct additional 

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tests. The next tests are at a Maritime Interdiction Operation (MIO) exercise in San Francisco 

and a more comprehensive test of the ground environment at Camp Dawson, West Virginia. 

These tests will use theater communications capability and link CLEAR to the DOD ABIS 

system. In the meantime, the NDU team is trying to figure out how to go about introducing this 

capability to theater. The team will not rest until this system has been added to theater and is 

adopted, even though there are extensive plans and funding plus-ups to improve the capability of 

the existing system. 

Unlike Dragnet, this story does not end with “fade to black” preceded by telling comments by 

Detectives Friday and Gannon. Instead, the tale halts with the team still working through real 

world testing. As of this writing, the most encouraging news is that more “in theater” testing is 

being discussed, but the conclusion of this story remains as much a mystery to the authors as to 

the readers. For the foreseeable future, the saga continues. Will CLEAR be tied to BAT? Will the 

war fighter get a CLEAR-like system as an SA enabler? Will the BAT vendor get money to 

recreate that which already exists? Tune in next time for the continuing adventures of CLEAR 

and DOD. 

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Instructors Guide to CLEAR Case Study 

The Dragnet case study focuses on the attempt to promote a COTS concept into DOD. The key 

to the concept is that a team from NDU, through a series of chance occurrences, recognized an 

essential need of the war fighters in Iraq and discovered a strong potential solution from the 

streets of Chicago. The team’s sole intent was to present a mature idea to the Pentagon 

leadership so the concept could be reviewed and properly tested. They never intended to become 

product representatives nor to receive compensation for their efforts. The goal was to get a 

proper consideration of a cost-effective, rapidly implementable, and proven technology into the 

hands of squad members in Iraq, enabling them to more rapidly and accurately execute their 

mission. 

Over the course of the efforts, various obstacles were encountered and overcome. The potential 

for a rapidly evaluated field solution was lost, and testing continues to drag on. The essential 

takeaway from this lesson should be for the student to think about how to take a solid concept 

into DOD to support rapid and proper evaluation as opposed to getting caught in a long dragged 

out process which sub-optimizes time and dollars and does not get the war fighter a solution. 

Below are a few questions that can be used to help initiate conversation. 

Question 1: What did the NDU team do right and what did they do wrong? 

The team took a “bottoms up approach” to the problem. They determined the need and 

researched the existing community for solutions to the problem. After researching and narrowing 

the solution to one that represents a commercial-best-practice, they confirmed it would indeed fit 

into the warfighters’ needs. As to what they did right, they thoroughly reviewed the problem, the 

solution, and the fit between the two with experts from the field. 

What they did wrong was enter the rapid acquisition chain improperly. While the team originally 

saw this as a chance to recommend solutions to DOD and allow someone to drive them 

internally, the team instead got caught up “representing” and championing the product. This 

reactive strategy never permitted them the opportunity to step back and enter the JRAC or REF 

though proper channels. 

Question 2: How could the JRAC or other acquisition processes have been used to achieve the 

team’s goals? 

Reviewing UNS would dictate short-term demand, where the Joint Capabilities Integration and 

Development Process (JCID) and particularly the Joint Capabilities Document (JCD) could have 

been used to reflect longer-term demand. Closer review of current UNS, the JCIDS, and 

particularly the JCD might have helped paint a picture for possible points of entry into the 

acquisition system. Students should consider these items in concert and discuss how a COTS 

solution can most optimally enter the system 

Question 3: How can DOD efficiently replace items in the current portfolio without severely 

impacting budgets or careers? 

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Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics (ATL) Krieg noted in a 

speech to the New York financial community that he has a vast portfolio of products moving 

through the acquisitions process. Though many are well along in the process Secretary Kenneth 

J. Krieg commented that he was always open to reevaluating and replacing items in the portfolio 

if they could help meet the war fighters needs more immediately. DOD has thousands of items 

moving through its acquisition portfolio on a constant basis. Many of these items are moving 

through a minimum of 3 years as dictated by the budget cycle and associated development time 

lines. Yet, in areas driven by IT, as Moore’s law describes, more advanced products come 

available every 18 months. To exploit the new technologies while optimizing the spend against 

items in the portfolio, DOD would need a method of tracking, evaluating, and replacing items 

within the portfolio without sub-optimizing current investment. Add to this that many projects, 

such as BAT, have gained a certain level of career-based inertia similar to what the commercial 

world calls the not-invented-here syndrome. Is it possible for DOD to emulate commercial 

efforts and more rapidly re-prioritize portfolio items, or is the inertia too high and the process too 

onerous? 

Question 4: One tactic the team never applied was the use of Capitol Hill, Industry lobbyists, 

and/or the media. How might this have hurt or helped getting the CLEAR system properly 

evaluated? 

Various combinations of Capitol Hill pressure, industry lobbying, and media exposure have been 

used to help push through systems that have been delayed, stalled, or even cancelled by DOD. 

Systems as large as the V-22, as sensitive as the Trophy System, or as visible as the M-4/HK 416 

have all been stopped by DOD, but Congressional pressure, frequently in coordination with 

lobbies and in conjunction with the media, has restored these programs. These efforts are often 

initiated by the company or companies that produce the product in question with the end game of 

forcing product into DOD and “keeping jobs” in specific political districts. 

In regard to CLEAR, such action was never taken. If the team had pursued this course of action, 

the logical step would have been to engage with two of the best known firms in the United 

States: General Electric (GE) and Oracle. GE owns Cross Match Technologies, which 

manufactures the MV-100 collection device, and Oracle Corporation provides the software on 

which CLEAR runs—from the database to the developer and data-mining tools. Add to this the 

City of Chicago, which also stands to gain both high-tech jobs and spiral development funding 

from DOD, and you have three very powerful lobbies. Further motivation for these entities is 

that the system selected by DOD would have an increased chance of becoming a nation-wide 

system through the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). An example is Northrop 

Grumman’s success in taking BAT into the U.S. Postal Service and the U.S. Citizenship and 

Immigration Services (CIS). Winning a DOD contract would be just the tip of the revenue 

iceberg. 

As is evidenced by the systems mentioned above, such powerful lobbies can help break through 

parochial interests and even proper process and get attention focused on a particular product. In 

the case of the Trophy system, such pressure revealed DOD evaluation teams being composed of 

2/3 contractors and 1/3 DOD personnel. Of the contractor personnel, the majority were also 

involved with the research and development (R&D) on the competitor product being developed 

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by a U.S. provider—a massive conflict of interest. In this case, Congressional oversight 

preformed as chartered. 

With that in mind, the risks and rewards of engaging powerful lobbies, corporate America, and 

Congress need to be carefully measured against the desired strategic outcome for a product. As 

the outcome for CLEAR is still unknown, this capability could be called into play, though not by 

CTNSP. 

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