Federal Emergency Management Agency FEMA 224 1 September 1991

Seismic Vulnerability and

Impact of Disruption of

Lifelines in the

Conterminous United States

Issued in Furtherance of the Decade

for Natural Disaster Reduction

Earthquake Hazard Reduction Series 58

Federal Emergency Management Agency FEMA 24 1 September 1991
ATC-25

Seismic Vulnerability and Impact of

Disruption of Lifelines in the

Conterminous United States

by

APPLIED TECHNOLOGY COUNCIL

555 Twin Dolphin Drive, Suite 270

Redwood City, California 94065

Funded by the Federal Emergency Management Agency

Washington, D.C.

Prepared for ATC by

EQE, INC.

Charles Scawthorn, Principal-In-Charge

Mahmoud Khater, Principal Research Engineer

San Francisco, California

Principal Investigator

Christopher Rojahn

Expert Technical Advisory Group

Lloyd Cluff Le Val Lund

James D. Cooper Peter McDonough

Holly Cornell Dennis K. Ostrom

John W. Foss Gerard Pardoen*

James H. Gates Michael Reichle

Neal Hardman Anshel J. Schiff

Jeremy Isenberg J. Carl Stepp

Anne S. Kiremidjian Domenic Zigant

*ATC Board Representative
Preface

In September 1988 Applied Technology Council

(ATC), was awarded a contract by the Federal

Emergency Management Agency to assess the

seismic vulnerability and impact of disruption of

lifeline systems nationwide. The purpose of the

project is to develop a better understanding of

the impact of disruption of lifelines from

earthquakes and to assist in the identification

and prioritization of hazard mitigation measures

and policies. In addition, FEMA plans to utilize

results from the project to promote national

awareness of the importance of protecting

lifeline systems from earthquakes, and assuring

reliability and continued serviceability of

lifelines.

The project is being conducted in several

phases. Phase I, reported on herein, provides a

national overview of lifeline seismic

vulnerability and impact of disruption. Lifelines

considered include electric systems, water

systems, transportation systems, gas and liquid

fuel supply systems, and emergency service

facilities. The vulnerability estimates and

impacts developed are presented in terms of

estimated direct damage losses and indirect

economic losses. These losses are considered to

represent a first approximation because of the

assumptions and methodology utilized, because

several lifelines are not included, and because,

in some case, the available lifeline inventory

data lack critical capacity information.

Phase II, reported on in the ATC-25-1 Report,

provides a practical model methodology for the

detailed assessment of seismic vulnerability and

impact of disruption of water transmission and

distribution systems. Subsequent phases to

develop model methodologies for the seismic

assessment of other lifeline systems are also

planned.

EQE Inc., a structural and earthquake

engineering firm with experience in the seismic

evaluation of lifeline systems, served as the

project subcontractor and prepared this report.

The research and engineering work was

performed by Charles Scawthorn, Principal-inCharge, Mahmoud Khater, Principal Research

Engineer, and other EQE staff. Marvin

Feldman of Resource Decisions served as

consultant on the indirect economic loss

methodology and data.

The ATC-25 Expert Technical Advisory Group

(ETAG), comprised primarily of individuals

drawn from the technical committees of the

American Society of Civil Engineers (ASCE)

Technical Council for Lifeline Earthquake

Engineering (TCLEE), provided overall review

and guidance for the project. Members were:

Lloyd Cluff, James D. Cooper, Holly Cornell,

John W. Foss, James H. Gates, Neal Hardman,

Jeremy Isenberg, Anne S. Kiremidjian, Le Val

Lund, Peter McDonough, Dennis K Ostrom,

Gerard Pardoen (ATC Board Representative),

Michael Reichle, Anshel J. Schiff, J. Carl Stepp,

and Domenic Zigant. The affiliations and

addresses of these individuals are provided in

Appendix A.

Applied Technology Council gratefully

acknowledges the valuable assistance, support

and cooperation provided by Kenneth Sullivan,

FEMA Project Officer, and Arthur J. Zeizel and

Kupussammy Thirumalai, prior Project Officers.

Christopher Rojahn

Executive Director

ATC-25 Preface

i ATC-25 Preface
Table of Contents

Page Preface;. Number

, v

Executive Summary. ............ ..................................................... .... ............................................ xiii

1. Introduction ..... 1

1.1 Background and Purpose .... 1

1.2 Importance of the Lifeline Earthquake .Risk ............................. ..................................... 1

1.3 Project Approach .......... 3

1.4 Limitations and Constraints. .................. 3

1.5 Organization of the Report..................... . , 3

2. National Lifeline Inventory .................... 7

2.1 Introduction ........... 7

2.2 National Lifeline Inventory Data--Overview ............... , , .. f 7.............. 

2.3 Transportation Data .............. ,, 8

2.4 Energy and Fuel Data ............. . , 9

2.5 Emergency Service Facility Data ........................ ,...,....9

2.6 Water Supply Data ....................... 22

2.7 PC-Compatible Electronic Database ....................... 22

3. Development of Lifeline Vulnerability Functions ............ ............. ..... . e. .25....

3.1 Introduction ....... -.. 25

3.2 General Approach for Characterizing Earthquake Performance . . .25

3.3 Method for Obtaining Lifeline Direct Damage and Residual Capacity Functions

26

3.4 Example Direct Damage and Residual Capacity Computations . .30

3.5 Sample Lifeline Vulnerability Function ............ 3...........1........

31

3.5.1 Ports/Cargo Handling Equipment ............... , 31

4. Seismic Hazard ......... . - . ., , ,.,,...,... 35

4.1 Introduction .................. ................................................. I...............................35

4.2 Magnitude and Intensity. . 35

4.3 Earthquake Hazards ............ .... 35

4.4 Seisnii city...........................37

4.5 Regional Representative Earthquakes ............ 54.............. 54

4.6 Estimation of Seismic Intensities and Choice of Scenario Earthquakes for this

Project .. ... . , 54

5. Estimates of Direct Damage .................. . . .67 5.1 Introduction . <.................... 1 .... ... ... ........I......I. 67

5.2 General Analytical Approach for Estimating Direct Damage .... 67

5.3 Direct Damage Estimates for Site-Specific Lifelines ........................ . ... 69

5.3.1 Airports.......................-.......................................69

5.3.2 Ports and Harbors ...................... ,.,, , .. 69

5.33 Medical Care Facilities ....................... ,.., , 69

5.3.4 Police and Fire Stations ....................... .,,, . .,. .74

5.3.5 Broadcast Stations ......................................... ... 74

5.4 Direct Damage Estimates for Extended Lifeline Networks . .74

5.4.1 Railroad System ........... 78

5.4.2 Highway System .......... .. 78

5.4.3 Electric System ........... . . .. ,87

5.4.4 Water System .. .87

5.4.5 Crude Oil System .97

ATC-25 Table cl Contents Iil
5.4.6 Refined Oil System ................................ 97

5.4.7 Natural Gas System 97

5.5 Dollar Loss Resulting from Direct Damage.....................................................97...................7

5.6 Comparison with Previous Studies ...................................................... 120

6. Estimates of Indirect Economic Losses ....................................................... 125

6.1 Introduction ........................... ..... 125

6.2 General Analytical Approach for Estimating Lifeline Interruption ... 125

6.3 Residual Capacity Analysis of Site-Specific Systems . . . 126

6.3.1 Airports .................. ,....... 126

6.3.2 Ports ... . . . . .. 128

6.3.3 Medical Care Centers . . ... . 128

6.3.4 Fire Stations ......... ......... 128.........,, 128

6.3.5 Police Stations . 128

6.3.6 Broadcast Stations .12..........8

6.4 Residual Capacity Analysis of Extended Regional Networks . . .128

6.4.1 Railroad System .136

6.4.2 Highway System .136

6.4.3 Electric System ............ 136

6.4.4 Water System.136

6.4.5 Crude Oil System.136

6.4.6 Refined Oil System ............ 139

6.4.7 Natural Gas System ............. . , ,,, 139

6.4.8 Distribution Systems ............. , 139

6.5- General Analytical Approach for Estimating Indirect Economic Losses....................... 141

6.5.1 General Assumptions ............................... ........ ,., ... 141

6.5.2 Data Sources and Methodology ................................... , 142 , 

6.6 Indirect Economic Loss Estimates . . .148

7. Combined Economic Losses, Deaths, and Injuries . . .171

7.1 Introduction ...................... 171

7.2 Human Death and Injury ...................... 171

7.21 Casualties Due to Lifeline Functional Curtailment .171

7.2.2 Casualties Resulting From Lifeline Direct Damage ............................................. 172

7.3 Combined Direct and Indirect Economic Losses .............. i........................ 172

8. Hazard Mitigation Measures and Benefits...........5...................................... 175

8.1 Introduction......................................................1........................................................................ 175

8.2 Identification of Critical Lifelines .175

8.3 Measures for Reducing Vulnerability of Lifeline Systems .175

8.4 Estimated Overall Benefits of Implementing Hazard Reduction Measures .176

9. Recommendations for Further Work . . .183

9.1 Introduction.183

9.2 Lifeline Inventory .183

9.3 Lifeline Component Vulnerability .183

9.4 Seismic Hazard Data .183

9.5 Economic Analysis and Impacts Data and Methodology .183

10. References 185

Appendix A: ATC-25 Project Participants..................................................................................................... 193

Appendix B: Lifeline Vulnerability Functions .. 195

Appendix C: Residual Capacity Plots for Each Lifeline and Scenario Earthuake .305

Appendix D: Economic Analysis Data ........................... 407

Appendix E: Applied Technology Council Projects and Report Information .433

iv Table of Contents ATC-25
List of Figures

Pimrp Mirmhr

Figure 1-1

Figure 2-1

Figure 2-2

Figure 2-3

Figure 2-4

Figure 2-5

Figure 2-6

Figure 2-7

Figure 2-8

Figure 2-9

Figure 2-0

Figure 2-11

Figure 2-12

Figure 2-13

Figure 3-1

Figure 3-2

Figure 3-3

Figure 3-4

Figure 3-5

Figure 3-6

Figure 4-1

Figure 4-2

Figure 4-3

Flow chart showing main steps in project approach .................................. 4

State and Federal H1ighways ..... 10

State and Federal Hihway Bridges ...................................................................... ............. State and! Federal Highway B3ridges .............. 1

Railroad system . ................................................ .............................................. ......................... 12

Airports ............................ .... 13 Portsand rbor h .............................................

1

Ports and harbors . . . . . .._14

Electric transmission system ..... 15

Crmde pipelines....................................................................................................1 oil 

Crude oil pipelines ..... 16

Refined oil pipelines . .... ..... . 17

Natural gas pipelines ................. 18

Refineries ............................ 19

Emergency broadcast stations .................................................................................................. 20~~~~~~~~

Eniergency broadcast stationls .0...

M edica carecente s ............................................................................................................... 2

M~edical care centers ...... 21

Water aqueducts and supplies .23

NEIIRP Seismic M ap Areas ~ ~~~~~~~~~~~..................................................................................

NEHRP Seismic Map Areas .... 27

Comparison of ATC-13 Appendix C data versus regression curve .................................... 29

Comparison of ATC-13 Table 9.1 data versus regression curve ......................................... 29

Damage percent by intensity for ports/cargo handling equipment ..................................... 33

Residual capacity for ports/cargo handling equipment (NEHRP map area) .................... 34

Residual capacity for ports/cargo handling equipment (all other areas) ......... .................. 34

Earthquakes with maximum Modified Mercalli Intensities of V or abolve

in the United States and Puerto Rico through 1989 ..... .38

Regional scheme used for the discussion of the seismicity of the

conterminous United States ..... 39

Seismicity of the northeastern region of the United States and Eastern

Canada for the period 1534-1959 . . .................................................... 40

AT-5TbeofCnet 

TWtlO nfl',,, I

ATC-25 Table of Contents V
Figure 4-4 Seismicity of the Southeastern region, 1754-1970 ........................................................... 42

Figure 4-5 Effects in the epicentral area of the 1886 Charleston, South Carolina, earthquake ........ 43

Figure 4-6 Isoseismal map of the 1886 Charleston, South Carolina, earthquake .................................. 44

Figure 4-7 Seismicity of the Central Region, 1811-1976 ........................................................... 45

Figure 4-8 Isoseismal map of the December 16, 1811, earthquake ......... ................................. 46

Figure 4-9 Seismicity of the Western Mountain Region .......................................... 47

Figure 4-10 Seismicity of Oregon and Washington, 1859-1975 ........................................ 49

Figure 4-11 Seismicity of Western Nevada and California, 1811-1976 . ......................................... . 51

Figure 4-12 Faults with historic displacements in California and Nevada . ................................ 52

Figure 4-13 Isoseismal map for the January 9, 1857, earthquake on the San

Andreas Fault near Fort Tejon ................................................ 53

Figure 4-14 Map of conterminous United States showing ground condition units ................................ 56

Figure 4-15 Predicted intensity map for Cape Ann (Magnitude 7) ................................................ 58

Figure 4-16 Predicted intensity map for Charleston (Magnitude 7.5) ................................................ 59

Figure 4-17 Predicted intensity map for New Madrid (Magnitude 8) ........................ ........................ 60

Figure 4-18 Predicted intensity map for New Madrid (Magnitude 7) ................................................ 61

Figure 4-19 Predicted intensity map for Wasatch Front (Magnitude 7.5) ............................................... 62

Figure 4-20 Predicted intensity map for Puget Sound (Magnitude 7.5) .................................................;63

Figure 4-21 Predicted intensity map for Fort Tejon (Magnitude 8) ................................................ 64

Figure 4-22 Predicted intensity map for Hayward Fault (Magnitude 7.5) ................................................ 65

Figure 5-1 Damage to railroad system following Cape Ann event (M=7.0) ........................................ 79

Figure 5-2 Damage to railroad system following Charleston event (M=7.5) ....................................... 80

Figure 5-3 Damage to railroad system following Fort Tejon event (M=8.0) ....................................... 81

Figure 5-4 Damage to railroad system following Hayward event (M=7.5) ........................................... 82

Figure 5-5 Damage to railroad system following New Madrid event (M=8.0) .................................... 83

Figure 5-6 Damage to railroad system following New Madrid event (M=7.0) ..................................... 84

Figure 5-7 Damage to railroad system following Puget Sound event (M=7.5) .................................... 85

Figure 5-8 Damage to railroad system following Wasatch Front event (M=7.5) ................................ 86

Vi Table of Contents ATC-25
Figure 5-9

Figure 5-10

Figure 5-11

Figure 5-12

Figure 5-13

Figure 5-14

Figure 5-15

Figure 5-16

Figure 5-17

Figure 5-18

Figure 5-19

Figure 5-20

Figure 5-21

Figure 5-22

Figure 5-23

Figure 5-24

Figure 5-25

Figure 5-26

Figure 5-27

Figure 5-28

Figure 5-29

Figure 5-30

Figure 5-31

Figure 5-32

Damage to highways following Cape Ann event (=7.0) .................................................. 89

Damage to highways following Charleston event (M=7.5) ................................................. 90

Damage to highways following Fort Tejon event M=8.0) .... ............................................ 91

Damage to highways following Hayward event (M=7.5) ................................. .................. 92

Damage to highways. following New Madrid event (M=8.0) .............................................. 93

Damage to highways following New Madrid event (M=7) ... 94

Damage to highways following Puget Sound event ,(M=7.5) .............................................. 95

Damage to highways following Wasatch Front event (M=7.5) ........................................... 96

Damage to electric power transmission lines following Cape Ann event

(M4=7.0) .................................................... 99

Damage to electric power transmission lines following Charleston event

(=7.5) ................................................. 100

Damage to electric power transmission lines following Fort Tejon event

(M=..0) .... 101

Damage to electric power transmission lines following Hayward event

(M=7.5) .... 102

Damage to electric power transmission lines following New Madrid event

(M=8.0.............................................. ....... i103

Damage to electric power transmission lines following New Madrid event

(M=7.0 .................................................... 104

Damage to electric power transmission lines following Puget Sound event

(M=7.5) ................................................. 105

Damage to electric power transmission lines following Wasatch Front event

i(M I= 7.5,) .............................................................. .............................. 1,0

Damage to water aqueduct system following Fort Tejon event (M=8.0) ......... .............. 107

Damage to water aqueduct system following Hayward event (M=7.5) ............................ 107

Damage to crude oil system following Fort Tejon event (M:=8.0) ................................... 109

Damage to crude oil system following New Madrid event (4=8.0) ................................ 110

Damage to crude oil system following New Madrid event (4=7.0) ................................ 111

Damage to refined oil system following New Madrid event (M=8.0). ........... ,,,,,,,,,,, 112

Damage to refined oil system following New Madrid event (M=7.0) ........ ..................... 113

Damage to' natural gas system folLowing Fort Tejon event (M=8. ............................... 114

ATC-25 Table of Contents vil

ATC-25 Table of iContents vii
Figure 5-33 Damage to natural gas system following Hayward event (M=7.5) ................................. 115

Figure 5-34 Damage to natural gas system following New Madrid event (M=8.0) ..................... ....... 116

Figure 5-35 Damage to natural gas system following New Madrid event (M=7.0) ............................ 117

Figure 5-36 Damage to natural gas system following Puget Sound event (M=7.5) . 118

Figure 5-37 Damage to natural gas system following Wasatch Front event .119

Figure 6-1 Analysis example illustrating residual capacity calculation algorithm for point

source systems........................................................................................1.................................. 127

Figure 6-2 Residual capacity of Arkansas air transportation following New Madrid

event (M=8.0) .129

Figure 6-3 Residual capacity of South Carolina ports following Charleston event (M=7.5) .. 129

Figure 6-4 Residual capacity of Arkansas medical care centers following New Madrid

event (M=8.0) .130

Figure 6-5 Residual capacity of South Carolina fire stations following Charleston event

(M=7.5). ..... 130

Figure 6-6 Residual capacity of Mississippi police stations following New Madrid event

(M=8.0) .131

Figure 6-7 Residual capacity of South Carolina broadcast stations following Charleston

event (M=7.5) .131

Figure 6-8 Flow network to illustrate minimum-cut-maximum flow Theorem .133

Figure 6-9 Analysis example illustrating residual capacity calculation for crude oil

pipeline network...................................................................................................................... 134

Figure 6-10 Analysis example illustrating residual capacity calculation for highway

networks..................................................................................................................................... 135

Figure 6-11 Residual capacity of San Francisco Bay area railroad system following

Hayward event (M=7.5) .137

Figure 6-12 Residual capacity of epicentral region highways following New Madrid event

(8.O).137

Figure 6-13 Residual capacity of Mississippi electric system following New Madrid event

(=8.0).138

Figure 6-14 Residual capacity of epicentral region water system following Fort Tejon

event (M=8.0) .138

Figure 6-15 Residual capacity of crude oil delivery system from Texas to Northern

California following Fort Tejon event (M=8.0) .139

Table of Contents

-

ATC-25 Viii
Figure 6-16

Figure 6-17

Figure 6-18

.Figure 6-19

Figure 6-20

Figure 6-21

Figure 6-22

Figure 6-23

, Figure 6-24

Figure 6-25 

Figure 6-26

Figure 6-27

Figure 6-28

Residual refined oil delivery from Texas to Chicago following New Madrid

event (=M.0) .......................................................... 140

Residual capacity of natural gas delivery from Texas to Northern California

following Fort Tejon event (M=.0) .......................................................... 140

Residual Value Added as a function of crude oil lifeline residual capacity ..................... 147

Analysis Example Illustrating Economic Loss Calculation for Crude OiL Pipeline

Network .. 149_ 

Analysis Example Illustrating Economic Loss Calculation for Electric System

in State of Utah for the Wasatch Front Scenario Event ..........................I ......................... 150

Percent indirect economic loss by state (monthly GNP) resulting from damage to

various lifelines, Cape Ann event (M=7.0) .......................................................... 162

Percent indirect economic loss by state (monthly GNP) resulting from

damage to various lifelines, Charleston event (M=7.5) ..................................................... 163

Percent indirect economic loss in Southern California (monthly G-NP)

resulting from damage to various lifelines, Fort Tejon event (M=8.0) ........................... 164

Percen.t indirect economic loss in Northern California (monthly GNP)

resulting from damage to various lifelines, Hayward event .(M=7.5) ............................... 165

Percent indirect economic loss by state (monthly CNP) resulting from,

damage to various lifelines, New Madrid event (M=80 .... 166

Percent indirect economic loss by state (monthly C-NP) resulting from

damage to various lifelines, New Madrid event (M=7.0) .................................................. 167

Percent indirect economic loss in state of Washington (monthly 0NP)

resulting from damage to various lifelines, Puget Sound event (M =7.5) ........... 181.6........... 

Percent indirect economic loss in state of Utah (monthly GNP) resulting

front damage to various lifelines, Wasatch Front event (M=7-53 .................................... 169

ATC-2 Tal ofCnet

ATC-25 Table of Conlents
List of Tables

Table Number Title Page

Table 2-1 National Lifeline Inventory Electronic Database ...... .24

Table 3-1 Typical ATC-13 Damage Probability Matrix ............................. 26

Table 3-2 Weighting Factors Used to Determine Percent of Social Function and

Facility Classes Contributing to Ports/Cargo Handling Equipment ....... .................... 30

Table 4-1 Modified Mercalli Intensity Scale.......I................................................................................... 36

Table 4-2 Representative Earthquakes for Lifeline Loss Estimation . 54

Table 4-3 Geologic and Ground Condition Units, Conterminous United States .55

Table 4-4 Scenario Earthquakes ............. ...................... ....................................................57

Table S-la Damage Percent for Air Transportation Terminal for Each Scenario

Earthquake (Percent of Airports in State) . ........................... . . 70

Table 5-lb Damage Percent for Air Transportation Runways for Each Scenario

Earthquake '(Percent of Airports in State) ........................... 71

Table 5-2 Damage Percent for Ports for Selected Scenario Barthquakes (Percent of

Ports in State).......................................................................................................................... 72

Table 5-3 Damage Percent for Medical Care Facilities for Each Scenario

Earthquake (Percent of Facilities in State) .7........................... .

Table 5-4 Damage Percent for Fire Stations for Each Scenario Earthquake

(Percent of Stations in State)...................5............................................... ......... ............... 75

Table 5-5 Damage Percent for Police Stations for Each Scenario Earthquake

(Percent of Stations in State)................................................................7...............6................... 6

Table 5-6 Damage Percent for Broadcast Stations for Each Scenario Earthquake

(Percent of Stations in State) .......................... ... 77

Table 5-7 Damage to Railroad System............................7.........................................8............. ................. 78

Table 5-S Damage to Freeway/Highway System.............................................................I....................... 87

Table 5-9 Damage Percent for Highway Bridges for Each Scenario Earthquake

(Percent of Bridges in State...........................................8........8..........................8. ....... 8

Table 5-10 Damage to Electric Transmission Lines................................................................................. 97

Table 5-11 Damage Percent for Electric Transmission Substations. for Each Scenario

Earthquake (Percent of Substations in State)......9......8............. 9

AT-5Tbeo otns1

ATC-2 5 Table of Contents xi
'Table 5-12 Damage to Water Aqueduct System ................................................. 107

Table 5-13 Cost Estimates for Lifeline Components .................................................. 107 -

Table 5-14 Direct Damage Losses............................................................................................................. 121

Table 5-15 Direct Losses Due to Damage to Distribution Systems..................................................... 122

Table 6-1 Relative Importance of Industry Sections--U. S. and Santa Clara County,

California........................................... ...................................................................................... 143

Table 6-2 Importance Weights of Various Lifeline Systems on Economic Sectors .144

Table 6-3 Percent Value-Added Lost Due to Specified Percent Loss of Oil Supply

Lifeline........ ................. 145

L ~~~~~...........................................................................................................................

Table 6-4 Residual Value-Added After Loss of Capacity of Oil Supply Lifeline ... 146

Table 6-5 Indirect Economic Loss Due to Damage to the Air Transportation

Lifeline.................................................................................................................................... 152

Table 6-6 Indirect Economic Loss Due to Damage to the Water Transportation

Lifeline.....................1.5............................................................................................................. 153

Table 6-7 Indirect Economic Loss Due to Damage to the Oil System............................................. 154

Table 6-8 Indirect. Economic Loss Due to Damage to the Natural Gas System .............................. 155

Table 6-9 Indirect Economic Loss Due to Damage to the Railroad Lifeline .156

Table 6-10 Indirect Economic Loss Due to Damage to the Electric System .157

Table 6-11 Indirect Economic Loss Due to Damage to the Highway System .159

Table 6-12 Indirect Economic Losses Due to Damage to Lifeline Transmission

Systems.............................................................................................................................. 160

Table 6-13 Indirect Economic Losses Due to Damage to Lifeline Distribution

Systems ..................-........... . ............................................................. . ........... .. 161 161...................... 

Table 7-1 Total Direct Plus Indirect Dollar Losses for Each Scenario Earthquake

and Lifeline............................................................................................................................... 173

Table 8-1

Table 8-2

Table 8-3

Table 8-4

Damage Percent for Existing Electric Transmission Substations for Each

Scenario Earthquake (Percent of Substations in State) .................................................... 178

Damage Percent for Upgraded Electric Transmission Substations for Each

Scenario Earthquake (Percent of Substations in State) ..................................... ............. 179

Indirect Economic Loss Due to Damage to the Existing Electric System (Percent

M onthly GNP). . .. .......................................................................................... .... 180

Indirect Economic Loss Due to Damage to the upgraded Electric System

(Percent Monthly GNP) ................ 182

xli Table of Contents ATC-25

zil Table oi Contents ATC-25
Executive Summary

1. Introduction

Lifeline is an earthquake engineering term

denoting those systems necessary for human life

and urban function, without which large urban

regions cannot exist. Lifelines basically convey

food, water, fuel, energy, information, and other

materials necessary for human existence from

the production areas to the consuming urban

areas. Prolonged disruption of lifelines such as

the water supply or electric power for a city or

urbanized region would inevitably lead to major

economic losses, deteriorated public health, and

eventually population migration. Earthquakes

are probably the most likely natural disaster that

would lead to major lifeline disruption. With the

advent of more and more advanced technology,

the United States has increasingly become

dependent on the reliable provision of lifelinerelated commodities, such as electric power,

fuel, and water. A natural question is: What is

the potential for major disruption to these

lifelines, especially at the regional level?

The initiation of this study by the Federal

Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) is

based in part on a need to better understand the

impact of disruption of lifelines, from

earthquakes and to assist in the identification

and prioritization of hazard mitigation measures

and policies. In addition, the report is intended

to improve national awareness of the

importance of protecting lifeline systems from

earthquakes, and of assuring lifeline reliability

and continued serviceability.

The specific contractual requirements of this

project and report are:

* To assess the extent and distribution of

existing U.S. lifelines, and their associated

seismic risk; and

* To identify the most critical lifelines, and

develop a prioritized series of steps for

reduction of lifeline seismic vulnerability,

based on overall benefit.

FEMA is also sponsoring a companion study to

develop and demonstrate a model methodology

for assessing the seismic vulnerability and impact

of disruption of water transmission and

distribution systems ATC, in preparation).

In this initial study, lifelines of critical

importance at the U.S. national level have been

analyzed to estimate overall seismic vulnerability

and to identify those lifelines having the greatest

economic impact, given large, credible U. S.

earthquakes. The lifelines examined include

electric systems; water, gas, and oil pipelines;

highways and bridges; airports; railroads; ports;

and emergency service facilities. The

vulnerability estimates and impacts developed

are presented in terms of estimated direct

damage losses and indirect economic losses.

These losses are considered to represent a first

approximation because of the assumptions and

methodology utilized, because several lifelines

are not included, and because, in some cases,

the available lifeline inventory data lack critical

capacity information.

Project Approach. As summarized in the

project technical-approach flow chart (Figure

I), four basic steps were followed to estimate

lifeline damage and subsequent economic

disruption for given earthquake scenarios.

1. Development of a national lifeline inventory

database.

2. Development of seismic vulnerability

functions for each lifeline

component/system,

3. Characterization and quantification of the

seismic hazard nationwide, and

4. Development of direct damage estimates

and indirect economic loss estimates for

each scenario earthquake.

Limitations and Constraints. During

development of this report and its supporting

data, several problems were encountered that

could not be resolved because of technical

difficulties and lack of available data. For

example, telecommunication, systems, nuclear

and fossil-fuel power plants, dams, and certain

water, electric, and transportation facility types

at the regional transmission level were excluded

from consideration in this project because of the

ATC-25 Executive Summary xiii

ATC-25 . Executive Summary xiii
ATC 25

Phase I

IV

FEMA

ATC

Technical Consultant (EQE)

l

Lifeline Inventory:

- Water systems

- Electric power systems

- Transportation

- Oil and natural gas

- Emergency facilities

Sources:

FEMA's database

- National Petroleum

Council (NPC)

-EQE

Crude Oil

System

l

I I

I Vulnerability Functions

- Review Existing Models

- Develop on the basis of

Expert opinion:

- ATC 13

- ETAG

- EQE

Air Transp. Terminal

>1

.,1

0

'-4

Elapsed Time in Days

Seismic Hazard:

- Review Existing Models

- Soil Database

- Define Scenarios: - New Madrid. (M= 7 & 8)

- Charleston, (M- 7.5)

- Cape Ann (M- 7.0)

- Wasatch Front (M- 7.5)

- Paget Sound. (M- 7.5)

- Fort Tejon (M- 8.0)

- Hayward. (M= 7.5)

I

Most Critical Lifeline:

- Upgrade

I

AnalJysis:

- Direct Damage

- Residual Capacity

- Economic Loss

Economic Model

Notation: ATC-1 3: ATC-1 3 Report, Earthquake Damage Evaluation Data for California (ATC, 1985)

ETAG: Expert Technical Advisory Group (project advisory panel)

EQE: EQE Engineering (project subcontractor)

Figure 1 Flow chart showing main steps in project approach.

xlv Executive Summary ATC-25

_TA_

I

Xiv Execulive Summary ATC-25

1-
unavailability of inventory data or the need for

more in-depth studies.

Interaction effects between lifelines, secondary

economic effects (the impact of a reduced

capacity of one economic sector on a dependent

sector), and damage resulting from landslide

(due to lack of inventory data nationwide) were

also not considered in developing this report.

These limitations and others described in

Chapters 2,4, and 5 tend to underestimate the

losses presented herein; and other factors, as

described elsewhere in this report, tend to

overestimate the losses. Lack of capacity

information for most lifelines was also a definite

limitation. In the aggregate, due primarily to the

exclusion of certain systems (e.g., dams and

telecommunication systems), we believe the

estimates of losses presented in this report are,

in fact, quite conservative.

We also emphasize that this report is a

macroscopic investigation at the national level

and the results should not be used for

microscopic interpretations. The results, for

example, are not intended to be used to

evaluate any particular regional utility or

lifeline, and no specific information on such

specific facilities has been included.

2. National Lifeline Inventory

Development of the ATC-25 inventory, for all

major lifelines in the United States,. was a major

task. The project scope required that lifelines be

inventoried in sufficient detail for conducting

lifeline seismic vulnerability assessments and

impact of disruption at the national level This in

turn required that the inventory be compiled

electronically in digital form and dictated that

inclusion of lifelines at the transmission level, as

defined below, was of primary importance.

Initially, a number of government, utility, trade

and professional organizations, and individuals

were contacted in an effort to identify

nationwide databases, especially electronic

databases. In most cases, these organizations or

individuals referred the project back to FEMLA,

since they had either previously furnished the

information to FEMA, or knew that the data

had been furnished to FEMA by others. As a

result, FEMA's database (FEMA, 1987) became

a major source of data for several of the

lifelines. A significant portion of these data

consist of digitized U.S. Geological Survey

(USGS) topographical maps and/or the

National Atlas (Gerlach, no date), performed by

the U.S. Geological Survey in support of

national census requirements. With the

exception of oil and gas pipeline data provided

by the National Petroleum Council, the

inventory data generally date from about 1966,

unless later updated by FEMA. A number of

other sources were employed in various ways,

which are further discussed below.

The network inventory contained in the

database is generally at the higher transmission

levels, as opposed to lower distribution levels.

That is, inventories were generally only

com piled for networks at the bulk and/or

regional level, as opposed to lifelines at the

user-level (i.e., distribution level) within an area.

To use an analogy, the inventory contains only

the national arterial level, and neglects the

distribution or capillary system. For example, all

federal and state highways are inventoried

(Figure 2), but county and local roads are not.

The major reason for focusing on the

transmission level is that at lower levels the

systems only support local facilities. Thus, a

disruption of a local activity could not be used to

identify the overall regional importance of the

lifeline. However, disruptions at the

transmission level impact large regions. and are

therefore important for understanding the

seismic vulnerability and importance of lifelines

to the United States.

Inventory Overview. The inventory data

(Chapter 2) have been compiled into an

electronic database, which generally consists of

(i) digitized location and type of facility for

single-site lifeline facilities, and (ii) digitized

right-of-way, and very limited information on

facility attributes for network lifelines. The

inventory is only a partial inventory, in that

important information on a number of facility

attributes (e.g., number or length of spans for

highway bridges) was unavailable from FEMA

The inventory data include information for the

conterminous United States only. Lifeline data

for Alaska, Hawaii, and U. S. territories, such as

Puerto Rico, have been excluded because

lifelines in these regions would not be affected

by the scenario earthquakes (see Chapter 4)

considered in this study.

ATC-25 Executive Summary xv

ATC-25 Executive Summary xv
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The specific lifelines that have been inventoried

for the conterminous United States are:

Transportation

* Highways (489,892 km of highway

(Figure 2); 144,785 bridges)

* Railroads (270,611 km of right-of-way)

* Airports (17,161 civil and general

aviation airports)

* Ports (2,177 ports)

Energy

* Electric Power Transmission (4,551

substations; 441,981 km of transmission

lines)

* Gas and Liquid Fuel Transmission

(77,109 km of crude oil pipelines; 85,461

km of refined oil pipelines; 67,898 km of

natural gas pipelines.)

Emergency Service Facilities

* Emergency Broadcast Facilities (29,586

stations)

Hospitals ( 6,973 medical care

centers)

Water Aqueducts and Supply (3,575 km of

aqueduct; excludes aqueducts in Utah,

which were unavailable)

An important lifeline, telecommunication

systems, which would be severely impact by

earthquake-induced ground shaking, was

excluded because of the unavailability of data, as

are certain regional transmission network

facility types (e.g., railway terminals, bridges,

and tunnels; certain aqueducts; major

freeway/highway bridges; fossil-fuel power

plants; and aqueduct pumping stations). In

addition, data on nuclear reactors and dams are

excluded because it was believed that such

facilities should be the subject of special studies,

particularly because of the existing regulations

relating to seismic safety in many regions and

the expected complexity of the performance and

impact of these facility types. As. a result, the

losses provided by this study will be

underestimated to the extent that these facility

types are not included.

Also excluded from the inventory, but included

in the analysis, are distribution systems at the

local level (water, highway, and electrical

systems) and police and fire stations.. For these

facility types, the number of facilities in each 25-

km by 25-km grid cell, which is the grid size for

the seismic hazard analysis, is estimated on the

basis of proxy by population (see Chapter 2).

PC-Compatible Electronic Database. Because

the data could also serve as a valuable

framework (or starting point) for researchers

who wish to investigate lifelines at the regional

or local level, including applications. unrelated to

seismic risk, the data have been formatted for

use on IBM-PC compatible microcomputers.

The data are unrestricted and will be made

available by ATC on 18, 1.2-megabyte, floppy

diskettes, together with a simple executable

computer program for reading and displaying

the maps on a computer screen.

3. Lifeline Vulnerability Functions

The second step in the project was the

development of lifeline vulnerability functions,

which describe the expected or assumed

earthquake performance characteristics of each

lifeline as well as the time required to restore

damaged facilities to their pre-earthquake

capacity, or usability. Vulnerability functions

were developed for each lifeline inventoried, for

lifelines estimated by proxy, and for other

important lifelines not available for inclusion in

the inventory. The components. of each

vulnerability function and how they were

developed are described in Chapter 3; the

functions themselves, too lengthy to include in

the main body of the report text, are provided in

Appendix B.

The vulnerability functions developed for each

lifeline consist of the following components:

General information, which consists of

(1) a description of the structure and its

main components, (2) typical seismic

damage in qualitative terms, and (3)

seismically rsistant design characteristics

for the facility and its components in

particular. This information has been

included to define the assumed

characteristics and expected

performance of each facility and to

make the functions more widely

ATC-25 Executive Summary xvii

ATC:-25, Executive S=mary xvi
applicable (i.e., applicable for other

investigations by other researchers).

* Direct damage information, which

consists of (1) a description of its basis in

terms of structure type and quality of

construction (degree of seismic

resistance), (2) default estimates of the

quality of construction for present

conditions and corresponding motiondamage curves, (3) default estimates of

the quality of construction for upgraded

conditions, and (4) restoration curves.

These functions reflect the general consensus

among practicing structural engineers that, with

few exceptions, only California and portions of

Alaska and the Puget Sound region have had

seismic requirements incorporated into the

design of local facilities for any significant

period of time. For all other areas of the United

States, present facilities are assumed to have

seismic resistance less than or equal to

(depending on the specific facility) that of

equivalent facilities in California NEHRP Map

Area 7 (Figure 3). Three regions, representing

these differences in seismic design practices, are

defined for the United States:

a. California NEHRP Map Area 7, which we

take to be the only region of the United

States with a significant history of lifeline

seismic design for great earthquakes,

b. California NEHRP Map Areas 3-6, NonCalifornia Map Area 7 (parts of Alaska,

Nevada, Idaho, Montana, and Wyoming),

and Puget Sound NEHRP Map Area 5,

which we take to be the only regions of the

United States with a significant history of

lifeline seismic design for major (as opposed

to great) earthquakes, and

c. All other parts of the United States, which

we assume have not had a significant history

of lifeline seismic design for major

earthquakes.

The two key quantitative vulnerability-function

relationships developed under this project--

motion-damage curves and restoration curves--

define expected lifeline performance for each of

these regions and form the heart of the

quantitative vulnerability analysis. The curves

are based on the data and methodology

developed on the basis of expert opinion in the

ATC-13 project (Earthquake Damage

Evaluation Data for California, ATC 1985).

Because the ATC-13 data and methodology are

applicable for California structures only,

however, the data were revised and reformatted

to reflect differences in seismic design and

construction practices nationwide and to meet

the technical needs of the project. All

assumptions operative in ATC-13, such as

unlimited resources for repair and restoration,

also apply to these results.

The motion-damage curves developed under this

project define estimated lifeline direct damage

as a function of seismic intensity (in this case,

Modified Mercalli Intensity); direct damage is

estimated in terms of repair costs expressed as a

fraction or percentage of value. Curves are

provided for each region defined above. An

example set of motion-damage curves for

ports/cargo handling equipment is provided in

Figure 4.

The restoration curves developed for this project

define the fraction of initial capacity of the

lifeline (restored or remaining) as a function of

elapsed time since the earthquake. Again curves

are defined for each region. A sample set is

provided in Figures 5 and 6.

4. Seismic Hazard

Seismic hazard, as used in this study, is the

expectation of earthquake effects. It is usually

defined in terms of ground shaking parameters

(e.g., peak ground acceleration, Modified

Mercalli Intensity, peak ground velocity) but,

broadly speaking, can include or be defined in

terms of fault rupture, ground failure

(landslides, liquefaction), or other phenomena

(earthquake-induced fire) resulting from an

earthquake. Seismic hazard is a function of the

size, or magnitude of an earthquake, distance

from the earthquake, local soils, and other

factors, and is independent of the buildings or

other items of value that could be damaged.

The technical approach for evaluating the

seismic hazard of lifeline structures in this

project (see Chapter 4) involved identifying (1)

the most appropriate means (parameter(s)) for

describing the seismic hazard, (2) regions of

high seismic activity, (3) representative

potentially damaging, or catastrophic,

xviii Executive Summary ATC-26

Xriii EXecutive Summary ATC-25
Legend

Map Area Coeff. A.

M 7 ~0.40

fl 6 0.30

§ 5 0.20

M 4 0.1S

n 3 0.10

2 01.05

1: 0.05

Figure 3 NEHRP Selsmic Map Areas ATC 1978; BSSC, 1988.

ATC-25 Executive Summary xix

ATC-25 Executive Summary Xix
Part/Cargo Handling Equipment

VII VIII Ix

Modified Mercalli Intensity (MMI)

Figure 4 Damage percent by intensity for ports/cargo handling equipment.

5

R=10x0

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Figure 5

R- Sax

Port/Cargo Handling Equipment

28a 0.60 63 0.60- 7 2b 0.40 53 0.40 7

nUt.

V . 3, 36

DAYS: 3 68 90 128 150 188 218 240 Z70 300 338 365

Elapsed Time in Days

Residual capacity for ports/cargo handling equipment (NEHRP Map Area: California 3-5,

California 7, Non-California 7, and Puget Sound 5).

xx 

Executive Summary ATC-25

D=100V

:8

a

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cu D=58Y:

Ecus

VI x

a b

0.311 0.118

0.306 8.058

0.286 8.O2Z

0.248 0.81.3

0.168 0.807

H = b * day:

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x ExecutiveSummary ATC-25
Fort/Cargo Handling Equipment

a,? Ca CA R

53 .48

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8.286

8.243

8.168

-8.87-5

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8.E0.81 8.88?

8. 013

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R * days + a

DAYS: 38 68 98 128 158 188 218 248 27 3 338 366

Elapsed Time in Days

Figure 6 Residual capacity for ports/cargo

earthquakes within each of these regions that

could be used as scenario events for the

investigation of lifeline loss estimation and

disruption, and (4) a model for estimating the

seismic hazard for each of these scenario events.

Descriptor of Seismic Hazard for this Study.

Following a review of available parameters, for

characterizing seismic hazard, we elected to use

the Modified Mercalli Intensity (MMI) Scale

(Wood and Neumann, 1931) a commonly used

measure of seismic intensity (effects at a

particular location or site). The scale Consists of

12 categories of ground motion intensity, from I

(not felt, except by a few people) to XII (total

damage). Structural damage generally is

initiated at about MMI V for poor structures,

and about MMI VII for good structures. MMI

XI and XII are extremely rare. The MII scale is,

subjective; it is dependent on personal

interpretations and is affected, to some extent,

by the quality of construction in the affected

area. Even though it has these limitations, it is

still useful as a general description of damage,

especially at the regional level, and for this

reason was used in this study as the descriptor of

seismic hazard.

handling equipment aUl other areas)

Seismicity Overview of the United States. For

the purpose of characterizing seismicity in the

conterminous United States, several regions

maybe identified Algermissen, 1983):

1. Northeastern Region, which includes New

England, New York, and part of eastern

Canada;

2. Southeastern Region, including the central

Appalachian seismic region activity and the

area near Charleston, South Carolina;

3. Central Region, which consists of the area

between the regions just described and the

Rocky Mountains;

4. Western Mountain Region, which includes

all remaining states except those on the

Pacific coast;

5. Northwestern Region, including

Washington and Oregon; and

6. California and Western Nevada.

ATC-25 Executive Summary xxi

R=185x

Fl= 5o

R= A,/ l l l l ., i,. I I I J

ATC-25 Executive Summary xxi
The historical record indicates that each region

appears to have significant historic precedent

for a damaging earthquake of potentially

catastrophic dimensions. For purposes of

examining this potential, the earthquakes

indicated in Table 1 are representative events

for the investigation of lifeline loss estimation

and disruption.

Evernden et al. (1981) estimates that these

events represent almost the maximum

earthquake expected in each area. Review of

Algermissen et al. (1982) indicates general

agreement.

Choice of a Model for Estimating the

Distribution and Intensity of Shaking for

Scenario Earthquakes. In order to estimate the

seismic hazard (i.e., deterministic intensity) of

the scenario events over the affected area

associated with each event, a model of

earthquake magnitude, attenuation, and local

site effects is required. For the conterminous

United States, two general models were

considered: Evernden and Thomson (1985), and

Algermissen et al. (1990).

Selection of one model over the other was

difficult, but the Evernden model offered the

following advantages for this study: (i)

verification via comparison with historical

events, (ii) incorporation of local soil effects and

ready availability of a nationwide geologic

database, and (iii) ready availability of closedform attenuation relations. An important

additional attribute for this project was that the

Everden model would estimate the distribution

and intensity of seismic shaking in terms of

MMI, the shaking characterization used in the

ATC-13 study and the basic parameter for the

ATC-25 lifeline vulnerability functions.

Scenario Earthquakes. Based on the

representative earthquakes identified in Table

1, which are considered representative of all

major regions of the conterminous United

States, eight scenario events were selected for

this investigation. The eight events are indicated

in Table 2. With the exception of the Cape Ann,

Charleston, and Hayward events, all magnitudes

are reflective of the representative earthquake

for the region (as specified in Table 1). The

scenario events for Cape Ann, Charleston, and

Hayward have magnitudes one-half unit higher

than the representative event. These

Table 1 Representative Earthquakes for

Lifeline Loss Estimation

Region

Northeastern

Southeastern

Central

Western Mountain

Northwestern

Southern California

Northern California

Event

Cape Ann, 1755

Charleston, 1886

New Madrid, 181 1-

1812

Wasatch Front, no date

Puget Sound, 1949

Fort Tejon, 1857

Hayward, 1868

magnitudes are interpreted as maximum

credible for these locations.

The choice of a scenario event on the Hayward

fault for the San Francisco Bay Area, rather

than the 1906 San Francisco event, is based on

the perceived high likelihood of a magnitude 7.0

event (USGS, 1990) as well as the potential for

major damage and lifeline disruption, should

such an event occur (CDMG, 1987). Since most

lifelines approach San Francisco Bay from the

east, more of them cross the Hayward Fault

than cross the San Andreas Fault. So the

Hayward event would appear to represent as

disruptive an event, and potentially more so,

than the 1906 event, which is presently

perceived to be of low likelihood in the near

future.

The Evernden model was employed to generate

expected seismic intensity distribution in the

conterminous United States for the eight

scenario events. Shown in Figure 8 is an

example intensity distribution for the New

Madrid magnitude-8.0 scenario event.

Table 2

Region

Northeastern

Southeastern

Central

Western Mounta

Northwestern

Southern Califor

Northern Califori

Scenario Earthquakes

Event Magnitude

Cape Ann 7

Charleston 7.5

New Madrid 7 and 8

rin Wasatch Front 7.5

Puget Sound 7.5

iia Fort Tejon 8

nia Hayward 7.5

xxii Executive Summary AATC-25
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5. Estimates of Direct Damage

The analysis of seismic vulnerability of lifeline

systems and the economic impact of disruption

is based on an assessment of three factors:

* Lifeline inventory, and

* Vulnerability functions. -

In this investigation these factors are used to

quantify vulnerability and impact of disruption

in terms of (1) direct damage and (2) economic

losses resulting from direct damage and loss of

function of damaged facilities. Estimates of

direct damage to lifelines, expressed in terms of

percent replacement value and dollar loss, are

discussed in Chapter 5. Indirect economic losses

are discussed in Chapter 6.

Direct damage is defined as damage resulting

directly from ground shaking or other collateral

loss causes such as-liquefaction. For each

facility, it is expressed in terms of cost of repair

divided by replacement cost and varies from 0 to

1.0 (0% to 100%). In this project it is estimated

using (1) estimates of ground shaking intensity

provided by the seismic hazard model (from

Chapter 4), (2) inventory data specifying the

location and type of facilities affected (from

Chapter 2), and (3) vulnerability functions that

relate seismic intensity and site conditions to

expected damage (from Chapter 3 and

Appendix B).

The analysis approach to estimate direct damage

considers both damage resulting from ground

shaking as well as damage resulting from

liquefaction. Damage due to other collateral

loss causes, such as landslide and fire following

earthquake, are not included because of the

unavailability of inventory information and the

lack of available models for estimating these

losses nationwide.

The analysis approach for computing direct

damage due to ground shaking proceeded as

follows. For each earthquake scenario, MMI

levels were assigned to each 25-km grid cell in

the affected region, using the Everden MMI

model, assigned magnitude, and assigned fault

rupture location (from Chapter 4). Damage

states were then estimated for each affected

lifeline component in each grid cell, using the

motion-damage curves provided in Appendix B.

The procedure for utilizing the motion-damage

curves varied slightly by facility type, depending

on whether the lifeline was a site specific facility,

or a regional transmission (extended) network.

Site-Specific Lifelines. Direct damage to sitespecific lifelines, i.e., lifelines that consist of

individual sited or point facilities (e.g.,

hospitals), were estimated using the

methodology specified above. For airports, ports

and harbors, medical care facilities (hospitals),

and broadcast stations, the inventory data

summarized in Chapter 2 were used to define

the number and distribution of facilities. For fire

and police stations, locations were assumed to

be lumped at the center of the Standard

Metropolitan Statistical Areas, and number of

facilities affected were estimated by proxy,

assuming certain established relationships

between population and number of facilities.

For summary and comparative purposes, four

damage states are considered in this study:

* Light damage (1-10% replacement value);

* Moderate damage (10-30% replacement

value);

* Heavy damage (30-60% replacement value);

and

* Major to destroyed (60-100% replacement

value).

The total number of affected facilities and the

percentage of facilities in each damage state are

summarized for each lifeline and scenario

earthquake (see Chapter 5, Tables 5-1 through

5-6). Following is a discussion of the direct

damage impact on an example lifeline--ports

and harbors.

Ports and Harbors. Since ports and harbors are

located in the coastal regions, only those

scenario earthquakes affecting these regions will

negatively impact this facility type. As indicated

in Table 3, the most severe damages to ports

and harbors are expected for the Charleston and

Puget Sound events. For example, one hundred

percent, or 20 ports and harbors, in South

Carolina can be expected to sustain heavy

damage (30 to 60%), and 73%, or approximately

ATC-25 xxiv 

Executive Summary

- 0_,1011111L, llalall,

xxiv Executive Summary
Darnage Percent for Ports and Harbors for Selected Scenario Earthquakes (Percent of

Ports and Harbors in State)

CAPEANN (=70)

Massachuse ts Connecticut Delaware Rhode Isfand New Hampshire .34 22 10 22 9

O%

0%

0%

0%

Total Number

0%

0%

0%

0%

0%/

0%

0%

CHARLESTON (M=75)

South Carolina North Carolina

20 16

0%

0%

'0%

0%

Georgia

so

light Damage

1-10 %

Moderate

10O %

Heavy

30-60 %

Major to Destructive

60-100 %

HA YWARD

Ta bM=7N 

Total Nunxber

Light Damage

1-10 %

Moderate

10-30%

Heavy

30-60 %

Major to Destructive

60-100 %

FORT TEJONPUGETSOUND

(14=8.0) (M4=75)

California California Washington

125 125 77

4%

22%/6

0%

0%

0%

34%

0%

0%.

25%

26%

1 4%S

0%

ATC-25 Executive Summary

xxv

Table 3

100%

0%

0%

0%

0%

0%

100%

0%1f

0%

'0%

0%

0%

f0%

0%

73%

0$

ATC-25 Executive Summary
22 such facilities would be similarly affected in

Georgia. In Washington, 14% of the ports

(approximately 11) would be similarly affected.

Numerous ports and harbors in these states

would also sustain moderate damage (10 to

30%) as would approximately 22 such facilities

in California for the Hayward magnitude-7.5

event. The primary cause of such damage, of

course, is poor ground.

Extended Lifeline Networks. With the

exception of pipeline systems, direct damage to

extended network lifelines, such as highways,

railroads and other networks at the bulk and/or

regional level, was estimated using the

methodology specified above. For pipelines

direct damage was estimated using an analytical

model that estimates the probability of breaks

occurring within given lengths of pipe subjected

to given earthquake shaking intensities (Khater

et al., 1989).

Results are presented in terms of (1) the same

four damage states used for site-specific

lifelines, and (2) maps indicating the damaged

portions of each extended network for the

various scenario earthquakes (see Chapter 5).

Example results for two extended lifeline

networks follow.

Railroad System. The railroad system is a highly

redundant system, and damage to the system

due to the selected events was found to be

relatively localized to the epicentral area. Direct

damage estimates for the railroad system are

based on damage curves for track/roadbed and

exclude damage to related facility types not

included in the project inventory--railway

terminals, railway bridges and tunnels.

The direct damage data (Chapter 5, Table 5-7)

suggest that the magnitude-8 New Madrid, Fort

Tejon, and Hayward events would cause the

most extensive damage, with 2,265 km, 872 km,

and 585 km of roadbed, respectively, sustaining

damage in the 30 to 100% range. Damage in the

Charleston, Puget Sound, and magnitude-7.0

New Madrid events would also be severe, with

980,650, and 640 km of roadbed, respectively,

sustaining heavy damage (30-to-60 %). A map

showing the distribution of damage to the

railroad system for the magnitude-S New

Madrid earthquake scenario is shown in Figure

8.

Crude Oil. Direct damage to the crude oil

system as a result of the magnitude-S New

Madrid event, estimated using damage curves

for transmission pipelines and the special

probabilistic model for pipelines, is plotted in

Figure 9. This figure indicates that three

pipeline sections would be damaged due to the

magnitude-8.0 New Madrid event and suggests

that crude oil flow to the north-central section

of the United States would be disrupted.

Pipelines would also be damaged as a result of

the magnitude-7 New Madrid and magnitude-S

Fort Tejon earthquake scenarios.

Dollar Loss Estimates. Summaries of dollar loss

estimates for direct damage to site-specific

systems and extended regional lifeline networks

during the eight scenario earthquakes are

provided in Tables Sa and Sb. Estimated dollar

losses due to direct damage to local electric,

water, and highway distribution systems are

provided in Table 6.

The estimates provided in Tables 5ab and 6 are

based on the available inventory data, cost per

facility assumptions, and other models and

assumptions described throughout the report.

As a result, the accuracy of these estimates may

vary from lifeline to lifeline. Estimates for

electric systems, in particular, are believed to be

more sensitive to the lack of capacity

information than are the other lifelines.

By combining the data from Tables 5a,b and 6,

we estimate the total direct damage dollar losses

(in billions of U. S. dollars) for the eight

scenario earthquakes as follows:

Earthquake

Cape Ann

Charleston

Fort Tejon

Hayward

New Madrid, M = 8.0

New Madrid, M = 7.0

Puget Sound

Wasatch Front

Direct

Dollar Loss

( Billions, 1991$1

$4.2

$4.9

$4.9

$4.6

$11.8

$3.4

$4.4

$1.5

-~~~~~~~xctieSmayAC2 Executive Summary ATC-25
)m

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I
Direct Damage Losses to Site-Specific Lifelines ($ Millions)

Scenario

Earthquake ALrports

Cape Ann

Charleston

Fort Tejon

Hayward

New Madrid (M=8)

New Madrid (M= 7)

Puget Sound

Wasatch Front

Table 5b

$91

142

148

37

411

145

210

29

Ports Hospitals

$53

380

170

115

0

0

196

0

$490

565

1,431

1,297

1,297

396

507

205

Broadcast

Stations

$19

68

26 

1 7

91

34

49

44

Direct Damage Losses to Regional Network Lifelines $ Millions)

Scenario

Earthquake

Cape Ann

Charleston

Fort Tejon

Hayward

New Madrid (M=8)

New Madrid (M= 7)

Puget Sound

Wasatch Front

Highways Electric Railroads

$382

773

470

208

2,216

204

496

323

$1,312

1,264

.886

1,310

2,786

1,077

1,834

90

$9

156

158

115

458

108

96

31

Natural

Cas

$0

0

11

6

56

19

6

6

Refined

Oil

Crude

Oil Water

$0 $0 $0

O 0 0

0 28 140

0 0 91

28 47 0

9 19 0

0 0 18

0 0 0

Table 6

Event

Direct Damage Losses to Local Distribution Systems

Electric

$ Billion

Cape Ann

Charleston

Fort Tejon

Hayward

New Madrid (M=8.0)

New Madrid (M=7.0)

Puget Sound

Wasatch Front

$0.89

0.74

0.91

0.90

2.017

0.65

0.58

0.38

ATC-25 Executive Summary xxix

Fire

Stations

$6

9

48

.7

13

3

13

2 -~~~~

Water

$ Billion

$0.30

0.31

0.23

0.20

'0.88

0.28

0.09

0.13

Highways

S Billion

$0.60

0.50

04.23

0.25

1.40

0.44

0.28

0.26

Table 5a

ATC-25 Executive Summary xxix
6. Estimation of Indirect Economic

Effects

Earthquakes produce both direct and indirect

economic effects. The direct effects, such as

dollar loss due to fires and collapsed structures,

are obvious and dramatic. However, the indirect

effects that these disruptions have on the ability

of otherwise undamaged enterprises to conduct

business may be quite significant. Although the

concept of seismic disturbances and their effect

on lifelines has been investigated for at least two

decades, there is very little literature on indirect

economic losses.

This study provides a first approximation of the

indirect economic effects of lifeline interruption

due to earthquakes. To accomplish this the

relevant literature was surveyed. Then a

methodology was developed to relate lifeline

interruption estimates to economic effects of

lifeline interruption in each economic sector.

This required a two-step process:

1. Development of estimates of interruption of

lifelines as a result of direct damage

2. Development of estimates of economic loss

as a result of lifeline interruption

Estimates of Lifeline Interruption. Lifeline

interruption resulting from direct damage is

quantified in this investigation in residual

capacity plots that define percent of function

restored as a function of time. The curves are

estimated for each lifeline type and scenario

earthquake using (1) the time-to-restoration

curves discussed in Chapter 3 and provided in

Appendix B, (2) estimates of ground shaking

intensity provided by the seismic hazard model

(from Chapter 4), and (3) inventory data

specifying the location and type of facilities

affected (from Chapter 2).

For site-specific systems (i.e., lifelines consisting

of individual sited or point facilities, such as

airports or hospitals) the time-to-restoration

curves are used directly whereas for extended

regional networks, special analysis procedures

are used. These procedures consist of:

* connectivity analyses, and

* serviceability analyses.

Connectivity analyses measure post-earthquake

completeness, "connectedness," or "cuteness" of

links and nodes in a network. Connectivity

analyses ignore system capacities and seek only

to determine whether, or with what probability,

a path remains operational between given

sources and given destinations.

Serviceability analyses seek an additional

valuable item of information: If a path or paths

connect selected nodes following an earthquake,

what is the remaining, or residual, capacity

between these nodes? The residual capacity is

found mathematically by convolving lifeline

element capacities with lifeline completeness.

A complete serviceability analysis of the nation's

various lifeline systems, incorporating

earthquake effects, was beyond the scope of this

project. Additionally, capacity information was

generally not available for a number of the

lifelines (e.g, for the highway system, routes

were available, but not number of lanes).

Rather, for this project, a limited serviceability

analysis has been performed, based on a set of

simplifying assumptions.

The fundamental assumption has been that, on

average, all links and nodes of a lifeline have

equal capacities, so that residual capacity has

been determined as the ratio of the number of

serviceable (ie., surviving) links and nodes to the

original number of serviceable links and nodes,

for a given source/destination pair, or across some

appropriate boundary. For example, if the state

of South Carolina has 100 airports, and 30 of

these are determined to be unserviceable at

some point in time following a major

earthquake, then the air transport lifeline

residual capacity is determined to be 70% of the

initial capacity.

An example illustrating the residual capacity

plots for one lifeline and their implication is

discussed below. Included in Chapter 6 are

example residual capacity plots for all lifelines

considered. Appendix C contains all residual

capacity plots developed under this project (for

the various lifelines and scenario earthquakes).

Ports. An example residual capacity plot for

South Carolina, the worst-case situation, is

provided in Figure 10. In this example, the initial

loss is nearly 100 percent of capacity, and full

m ATC-25 Executive Summary

xx: Executive Summary
C_1

C

0

cc

0

0,

01

Elapsed Time in Days

Residual capacity of South Carolina ports following Charleston event (M=75).

capacity is not restored until about day 200.

Georgia would also experience similarly high

losses due to the Charleston event.

Massachusetts and Rhode Island would

experience the largest losses due to the Cape

Ann event.

Estimates of Indirect Economic Losses.

Economic activity within each industrial sector

was measured in terms of value added. Value

added refers to the value of shipments

(products) less the cost of materials, supplies,

contract work and fuels used in the manufacture

or cultivation of the product. The United States

Bureau of Economic Analysis publishes annual

data for value added for each industrial sector.

For simplicity, data from the 99 sectors were

collapsed into 36 sectors. Data for 1983 were

the latest available (published by BEA, 1989),

and were used in this study.

Reduction in Value Added Due to Lifeline

Interruption. Table 7 presents the percent

reduction in value added for each sector

resulting from increasingly severe crude oil

lifeline interruptions. (Similar tables are shown

for all lifelines in Appendix D.) Values are

shown for each decile of lifeline interruption

and are assumed to pertain to monthly Gross

National Product (GNP).

Indirect Economic Loss Results. Indirect

economic losses were estimated for each lifeline

system and scenario event using the residual

capacity plots provided in Appendix C and the

economic tables described above. The calculation procedure are described in Chapter 6.

Summaries of the total indirect economic losses

resulting from damage to site-specific systems.

and extended regional networks, based on 1986

GNP data, are provided in Table 8 Total

indirect economic losses resulting from damage

to local distribution systems are presented in

Table 9. We note that Table contains total loss

amounts expressed in terms of lower bound,

upper bound, and best estimate. The lower

bound represents economic loss caused by the

singular lifeline system causing the greatest loss;

the upper bound is the sum of losses caused by all systems; and the best estimate is the square

root of the sum of the squares (SRSS) of losses

ATC-25 Executive Summary

xixd

Figure 10

)

ATC-25 Executive Summary
Percent Value-Added Lost Due to Specified Percent Loss of Oil Supply

Lifeline

Lit Capacity Loss-->

1 Livestock

2 Agr. Prod.

3 AgServ For. Fish

4 Mining

5 Construction

6 Food Tobacco

7 Tektile Goods

8 Misc Text. Prod.

9 Lumber & Wood

10 Furniture

11 Pulp & Paper

12 Print & Publish

13 Chemical Drugs

14 Petrol. Relining

15 Rubber & Plastic

16 Leather Prods.

17 Glass Stone Clay

18 Prim. Metal Prod.

19 Fab. Metal Prod.

20 Mach. Exc. Elec.

21 Elec. & Electron

22 Transport Eq.

23 Instruments

24 Misc. Manufact.

25 Transp & Whse.

26 Utilities

27 Wholesale Trade

28 Retail Trade

29 F.I;R.E.

30 Pers./Prof. Serv.

31 Eating Drinking

32 Auto Serv.

33 Amuse & Rec.

34 Health Ed. Soc.

35 Govt & Govt Ind.

36 Households

TOTAL

U.S. Econ.

Value Added

(Percent)

0.45%

1.06%

0.11%

3.89%

5.52%/s

2.41%

0.37%

0.73%

0.52%

0.34%

0.87%

1.31%

1.40%

0.96%

1.03%

0.12%

0.62%

1.04%

1.64%

1.56%

2.52%

2.62%

0.68%

0.69%

3.46%

5.89%

5.63%

5.63%

16.64%

8.03%

2.12%

1.09%

0.70%

6,30/e

11.79%

0.25%

100.00%

10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%

2.63%

4.21%

4.21%

4.74%

4.74%

2.63%

2.63%

2.63%

2.63%

2.63%

2.63%

2.63%

2.63%

5.26%

2.63%

2.63%

2.63%

4.74%

2.63%

2.63%

2.63%

4.74%

2.63%

2.63%

4.74%

2.63%

2.63%

4.74%

3.16%

3.16%

4.21%

4.74%

4.74%

1.05%

1.05%

2.63%

3.25%

Avg.

7.89%

12.63%

12.63%

14.21%

14.21%

7.89%

7.89%

7.89%

7.89%

7.89%

7.89%

7.89%

7.89%

15.79%

7.89%

7.89%

7.89%

14.21%

7,89%

7.89%

7.89%

14.21%

7.89%

7.89%

14.21%

7.89%

7.89%

14.21%

9.47%

9.47%

12.63%

14.21%

14.21%

3.16%

3.16%

7.89%

9.74%

Avg.

13.16%

21.05%

21.05%

23.68%

23.68%

13.16%-

13.16%

13.16%

13.16%

13.16%

13.16%

13.16%

13.16%

26.32%

13.16%

13.16%

13.16%

23.68%

13.16%

13.16%

13.16%

23.68%

13.16%

13.16%

23.68%

13.16%

13. 16%

23.68%

15.79%

15.79%

2 1.05%

23.68%

23.68%

5.26%

5.26%

13.16%

16.23%

Avg.

18.42%

29.4 7%

29.47%

33.16%

33.16%

18.42%

18.42%

18.42%

18.42%

18.42%

18.42%

18.42%

18.42%

36.84%

18.42%

18.42%

18.42%

33.16%

18.42%

18.42%/

18.42%

33.16%

18.42%

18.42%

33.16%

18.42%

18.42%

33.16%

22.11%

22.11%

29.47%

33.16%

3.3,16%

7.37%

7.37%

18.42%

22.72%

Avg.

23.68%

37.89%

37.89%

42.63%

42.63%

23.68%

23.68%

23.68%

23.68%

23.68%

23.68%

23.68%

23.68%-

47.37%

23.68%

23.68%

23.68%

42.63%

23.68%

23.68%

23.68%

42.63%

23.68%

23.68%

42.63%

23.68%

23.68%

42.63%

28.42%

28.42%

37.89%

42.63%

42.63%

9.47%

9.47%

23.68%

29.21%

Avg.

28.95%

46.32%

46.32%

52.11%

52.11%

28.95%

28.95%

28.95%

28.95%

28.95%

28.95%

28.95%

28.95%

57.89%

28.95%

28.95%

28.95%

52.11%

28.95%

28.95%

28.95%

52.11%

28.95%

28.95%

52.11%

28.95%

28.95%

52.11%

34.74%

34.74%

46.32%

52.11%

52.11%

11.58%

11.58%

28.95%

34.21%

54.74%

54.74%

61.58%

61.58%

34.21%

34.21%

34.21%

34.21%

34.21%

34.21%

34.21%

34.21%

68.42%/e

34.21%

34.21%

34.21%

61.58%

34.21%

34.21%

34.21%

61.58%

34.21%

34.21%

61 .58%

34.21%

34.21%

61.58%

4 1.05%

41.05%

54.74%

61.58%

61.58%

13.68%

13.68%

34.21%

35.71/o 42.19%

Avg. Avg.

19.47% 44.74% 50.00%

63.16% 71.58% 80.00%

63.16% 71.58% 80,00%

71.05% 80.53% 90.00%

71.05% 80.53% 90.00%

39.4 7/ 44.74% 50.00%

39.47%/ 44.74% 50.00%

39.47% 44.74% 50.00%

39.47% 44.74% 50.00%

39.47/% 44.74% 50.00%

39.47% 44.74% 50.00%

39.47% 44.74% 50.00%

39.47% 44.74% 50.00%

78.95% 89.47% 100.00%

39.47% 44.74% 50.00%

39.47% 44.74% 50.00%

39.47% 44.74% 50.00%

71.05% 80.53% 90.00%

39.47% 44.74% 50.00%

39.47% 44.74% 50.00%

39.47% 44.74% 50.00%

71.05% 80.53% 90.00%

39.47% 44.74% 50.00%

39.47% 44.74% 50.00%

71.05% 80.53% 90.00%

39.47% 44.74% 50.00%

39.47%/ 44.74% 50.00/o

71.05% 80.53% 90.00%

47.37% 53.68% 60.00%

47.37% 53.68% 60.00%

63.16% 71.58% 80.00%

71.05% 80.53% 90.00%

71.05% 80.53% 90.00%

15.79% 17.89% 20.00%

15.79% 17.89% 20.00%

39.47% 44.74% 50.00%

48.68% 55.18% 61.67%

Avg. Avg. Total V.A

Pct. V.A.

Table 7

I

A

I

I

I

II
4'5

Di 9

Di

0.D<

CDmC9

El

Op

r. Q

ED

Si

A,:

CZ

tb'-D

Z3

L. 

k

km

:DI 9

tyl

ID0

EL

CD

th

a_
-n

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En 

(CD

r 0 

CD

-to

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CD

ED

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xVA

CD

C. c

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- - -

5
caused by each lifeline. We note also that the

SRSS procedure was used to estimate total

indirect economic losses resulting from damage

to local distribution networks (Table 9).

By combining like system data from Tables 8

and 9 in a least squares (SRSS) fashion, we

estimate the total indirect economic losses for

the eight scenario earthquakes as follows:

Earthquake

Cape Ann

Charleston

Fort Tejon

Hayward

(in Billions,

New Madrid, M = 8.0

New Madrid, M = 7.0

Puget Sound

Wasatch Front

Indirect

Loss

1991$)

$9.1

$10.2

$11.7

$11.1

$14.6

$4.9

$6.1

$3.9

Bar charts showing the indirect losses caused by

transmission lines (upper bound data) by state

90

80

70

LO 60 ,0

- 50

C) A 0 4G

X- 30

20

1 

0

for each scenario earthquake were also

developed An example plot for the magnitude3 New Madrid scenario event is provided in

Figure 11. We note that estimates of indirect

economic losses, for each state are sensitive to

the assumed location of the source zone for

large-magnitude events (e.g., had the assumed

source zone for the magnitude-S New Madrid

event been located further north, estimates of

direct damage in Missouri would have been

substantially larger).

The data provided in Figure 11 suggests

Mississippi and Arkansas would experience the

highest indirect losses due to the magnitude-S.0

New Madrid event. Similar plots for the other

scenario earthquakes (Chapter 6) indicate that

Massachusetts would experience the highest

indirect losses due to the Cape Ann event with

the electric system contributing the highest

portion; and South Carolina, Utah, Washington,

Northern and Southern California would

experience the highest indirect losses due to the

Charleston, Utah, Seattle, Hayward, and Fort

Tejon events, respectively. The electric system

contributes the highest indirect losses, among all

systems, for most of the events.

Air Trans. Crude Oil M Refined Oil

electric E3 Railroad Highway

Percent indirect economic loss by state (monthly GNP) resulting from damage to various

lifelines, New Madrid event (M=8.O). Note that the relatively low losses for Missouri

reflect the assumed location of the scenario earthquake source zone and the estimated

distribution of intensity (see Figure 7).

ATC-25 Executive Summary rcxv

Figure 1

ATC-25 Executive Summary Xx
7. Combined Economic Losses,

Deaths and Injuries

Human Death and Injury. It is generally felt

that lifeline performance and continuity of

operation is vital to human survival in the

modem, urban, world. Most observers believe

that damage to lifelines would result in human

death and injury. Analogous to direct damage

to property and indirect economic losses, human

death and injury resulting from lifeline damage

can be categorized as follows:

1. Human death and injury caused by

lifeline functional curtailment, where

persons suffer as a result of deprivation

of vital services; and

2. Human death and injury resulting from

direct damage to lifelines (e.g., occupant

injuries resulting from the collapse of an

air terminal building).

Casualties Due to Lifeline Functional

Curtailment. Without the benefit of hard data it

is difficult to estimate with high confidence the

number of casualties that will result from

curtailment of lifeline function. Our preliminary

assessment is that human death and injury due

to functional curtailment of lifelines can

generally be expected to be very low. This is a

fundamental assumption of this study, and will

probably cause some debate. Each lifeline was

considered, and this conclusion was found to

hold, based on the following assumptions: (1)

most vital installations that normally require a

lifeline service have back-up emergency

supplies, and (2) most lifelines have

considerable elasticity in demand, and the level

of service necessary for life maintenance is very

low. Examples follow:

* Electricity. Persons can survive without

power, even in the Northeast in the

winter. Most hospitals and similar

installations have emergency generators.

Those that lack emergency generators

can transfer patients to other sites.

* Water. Water for human survival is very

minimal. Humans can survive without

water for 48 or more hours, and water

for human survival can be imported if

necessary.

* Gas and Liquid Fuels. Gas and liquid

fuel systems are probably the most

critical of all lifelines, yet capacity is very

elastic, and only short-term shortages

are expected. Fuel for heating in the

Northeast in the winter can be

conserved if necessary by clustering

people in school gymnasia, national

guard armories, and so on.

* Rail, Air, and Highway Transportation.

Transportation lifelines are highly

redundant and thus very elastic;

emergency food and medicines would be

expected to be deliverable regardless of

earthquake damage.

Casualties Resulting From Lifeline Direct

Damaze. Casualties can result from direct

damage, especially catastrophic collapse, of

lifeline components. Although few deaths

occurred directly as a result of lifeline damage in

U. S. earthquakes prior to 1989, life-loss due to

lifeline failure was tragically demonstrated

during the October 17, 1989, Loma Prieta,

California, earthquake. Approximately two

thirds of the 62 deaths from this earthquake

resulted from the failure of a lifeline

component--partial collapse of the Cypress

structure, a double-decked highway viaduct in

Oakland approximately 100 km from the

earthquake source zone.

Although it can be argued that the deaths and

injuries caused by lifeline failure in the Loma

Prieta earthquake were the exception, not the

rule, the vulnerability functions developed for

this project suggest that substantial life-loss

from lifeline component failure should be

anticipated. Lifeline failures that could cause

substantial life loss or injury include bridge

failure, railroad derailment, and pipeline failure.

Unfortunately, data necessary for estimating life

loss associated with these component failures

are not readily available, precluding

development of reliable casualty estimation

methodology and data for lifeline structures.

Combined Direct and Indirect Economic

Losses. Summaries of total dollar losses from

direct damage and indirect economic losses are

combined and summarized for each scenario

earthquake and lifeline in Table 10. The total

xxv xctv SmayAC2

YXXVi Executive Summary ATC-25
Total Direct Plis Indirect Dollar Losses for Each Scenario Earthquake and

Lifeline (Billions of Dollars)

Medical

Electric Highways Water Care Ports Railroads Airport

Natural Crude

Gas oil

$11.24 $2.06 $0.91 $0.49 $0.50 $0,03 $0.58 $0.00 $0.00

$10.82 $2.05 $0,94 $0.57 $5.30 $0.18 $0.59 $0.00 $0.00

$9.68 $5.18 $5.27 $1.43 $2.65 $0.41 $1.57 $1.68 $4.38

$12.21 $2.52 $4.88 $1.30 $1.46 , $0.22 $0.44 $0.09 $0.00

$15.68 $13.19 $2.68 $1.30 $0.00 $0.71 $1.22 $0.34 $0.46

$5.17 $4.12 $0.85 $0.40 $0.00 $0.15 $0.31 $0.18 $0.13

$8.29 $1.95 $0.90 $0.51 $0.73 $0.21 $0.62 $0.21 $0.00

$2.21 $3.85 $0,40 $0.20 $0.00 $0.05 $0.11 $0.04 $0.00

r

Refined Broadcasting Fire

Oil Stations Stations Total

$0.00 $0.02 $0.01 $13.25

$0.00 $0.07 $0.01 $15.11

$0.00 $0.03 $0.05 $16.58

$0.00 $0.02 $0.01 $15.68

$0.23 $0.09 $0.01 $26.37

$0.16 $0.03 $0.00 $8.29

$0.00 $0.05 $0.01 $10.48

$0.00 $0.04 $0.00 $5.41

0

Table 10

Scenario

Cape Ann

Charleston

Fort Tejon

Hayward

New Madrid 8

Now Madrid 7

Puget Sound 

Wasatch Front

m

-

-4

(tn

R-
iosses for each scenario earthquake are as

follows:

Earthquake

Cape Ann

Charleston

Fort Tejon

Hayward

New Madrid, t'

Direct Plus

Indirect Losses

(in Billions, 1991$)

$13.3

$15.1

$16.6

$15.7

A = 8.0 $26.4

New Madrid, M = 7.0

Puget Sound

Wasatch Front

$8.3

$10.5

$5.4

8. Hazard Mitigation of Critical

Lifelines

Identification of Critical Lifelines. Based on

the combined direct and indirect economic

losses presented above and with due

consideration of the assumptions and limitations

expressed throughout this report, we offer the

following relative ranking of the criticality of

different lifelines in terms of the estimated

impact of damage and disruption:

Rank

1.

Lifeline

Electric System

Event/Location

New Madrid

(M=8.0)

Hayward

Cape Ann,

Charleston,

Fort Tejon

2. Highways New Madrid

(M=8.0)

Fort Tejon

Hayward,

New Madrid

(M=7.0)

3. Water System* Fort Tejon

4. Ports Charleston

5. Crude Oil Fort Tejon

*The ranking for the water system may be

underestimated because critical components such as

pumping stations and dams were not included in the

study.

Measures for Reducing Vulnerability of

Lifeline Systems. The seismic vulnerability of

lifeline systems, from the point of view of

fulfilling function, can be reduced through three

primary approaches:

1. Damage reduction measures. In this

approach reliability of function is enhanced

by reducing damage. This approach may

take the form of:

* Strengthening a building, bracing

equipment, or performing other

corrective retrofit measures to mitigate

shaking effects;

* Densifying the soil beneath a structure,

or placing a structure on piles, or using

other techniques to mitigate hazardous

geotechnical conditions, e.g.,

liquefaction potential,

* Other component improvements,

depending on the component and

potential earthquake impacts, e.g.,

replacement of vulnerable

systems/components with new

systems/components that will provide

improved seismic resistance.

2. Provision for system redundancy. In this

approach, reliability of function is enhanced

by providing additional and alternative links

(e.g., new highways, pipelines, other

transmission or distribution links). Because

earthquake damage is fundamentally a

random phenomena, addition of system links

will tend to increase system reliability.

3. Operational improvements. In this approach

reliability of function is enhanced by

providing emergency response planning and

the capability to rapidly and effectively

repair damage, redirect functions, or

otherwise mitigate earthquake damage

impacts on system operations and thereby

re-establish system function.

Of these measures, the most common are

component strengthening/retrofit measures,

which are discussed at length in Appendix B of

this report. The proposed measures (Appendix

B) include generic solutions, such as designing

structures to meet current seismic design or

retrofit standards of the local community, or

anchoring equipment. In addition, there are

mviii Executive Summary ATC-25

xxxviii Executive Summary ATC-25 
numerous specific measures that relate to

unique systems or components within each

lifeline. Special attention should be directed to

those systems and conditions that are of greatest

concern, such as porcelain components in

electric substations.

Following are recommended steps when

implementing a program to reduce seismic

hazards of existing lifelines:

1. Review existing descriptions of seismic

performance and rehabilitation measures for the

lifeline(s) of concern, i.e., familiarize yourself

and your organization with the overall problem.

Sources include Appendix B and Chapter 10

(References) of this report.

2. Conduct an investigation of the seismic

vulnerability and impact of disruption for the

lifeline(s) and region(s) of concern. Lifeline

seismic evaluation methodologies and other

potential resources for this purpose have been

developed by the ASCE Technical Council for

Lifeline Earthquake Engineering (see

references, Chapter 10), the Applied Technology Council (ATC, in preparation) and others.

3. Focus first on the most vulnerable lifelines,

components, and conditions (e.g., liquefaction

or landslide potential). Vulnerable components

include:

For electric systems:

Substations

* Power stations

For water systems:

* Pumping stations

* Tanks and reservoirs

* Treatment plants

Transmissions aqueducts

For highway systems

* Bridges

* Tunnels

* Roadbeds

For water transportation systems:

* Port/cargo handling equipment

* Inland waterways

For gas and liquid fuels:

* Distribution storage tanks

* Transmission pipelines

* Compressor, metering and pressure

reduction stations

4. Conduct cost-benefit studies to determine the

most cost effective measures. We note that, in

some cases, retrofit measures may not be very

cost effective. In regions where the return

period for large earthquakes is quite long, for

example, replacement over the life cycle of the

facility or component may be a reasonable

approach.

5. Implement the selected hazard reduction

measures.

9. Recommendations for Further Work

The ATC-25 project has raised a number of

questions and indicated areas in which

knowledge is inadequate or nonexistent with

respect to the impact of lifeline disruption due

to earthquake. Following are recommendations

for further research and other efforts. This list

is not meant to be all inclusive but rather an

overview of some of the more important issues

that should be pursued.

Lifeline Inventory. Organizations such as the

Federal Emergency Management Agency,

Department of Transportation. and American

Society of Civil Engineers Technical Council of

Lifeline Earthquake Engineering are

encouraged to build on the work performed in

this project, develop standards for complete

lifeline inventories, and coordinate the

acquisition of the needed additional and

updated data from various lifeline owners.

Lifeline Component Vulnerability. We

recommend a major effort to acquire data on

lifeline seismic performance and damage, and

conduct analysis towards the development of

improved component vulnerability functions.

This effort should also investigate lifeline

recovery data, and incorporate the extensive

experience realized during the 17 October 1989

Loma Prieta, California, earthquake, as well as

from other damaging earthquakes.

Seismic Hazard Data We suggest that the U. S.

Geological Survey develop, or coordinate

through the various states' Office of Geologists,

a series of digitized soils/geologic databases.

ATC-25 Execuiive Summary xxxix

ATC:-25 Executive Summary sXXfX
Economic Analysis and Impacts Data and

Methodology. We recommend further research,

especially in economic areas such as:

* Economic impacts associated with

lifeline disruption,

* Second-order economic effects (e.g.,

interaction between lifelines),

* Elasticities of demand, or substitution of

a lesser disrupted lifeline for a more

disrupted lifeline,

* Inter-regional impacts, and

* So-called "benefits," such as increased

economic activity associated with repair,

or replacement of older equipment with

new technology.

Lastly, we note that this study did not address

environmental consequences associated with

lifeline disruption, especially the potential for

oil spills from broken pipelines in the nation's

waterways following a New Madrid event.

Investigation of this issue is critically important.

Executive Summary ATC-25 XI
Introduction

1.1 Background and Purpose

Lifeline is an earthquake engineering term

denoting those systems necessary for human life

and urban function, without which large urban

regions cannot exist. Lifelines basically convey

food, water, fuel, energy, information, and other

materials necessary for human existence from

the production areas to the consuming urban

areas. Prolonged disruption of lifelines such as,

the water supply or electric power for a city or

urbanized region would inevitably lead to major

economic losses, deteriorated public health, and

eventually population migration. Earthquakes

are probably the most likely natural disaster that

would lead to major lifeline disruption. With the

advent of more and more advanced technology,

the United States has increasingly become

dependent on the reliable provision of lifelinerelated commodities, such as electric power,

fuel, and water. A natural question is: What is

the potential for major disruption to these

lifelines, especially at the regional level?

The initiation of this study by the Federal

Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) is

based in part on a need to better understand the

impact of disruption of lifelines from

earthquakes and to assist in the identification

and prioritization of hazard mitigation measures

and policies. In addition, the report is intended

to improve national awareness of the

importance of protecting lifeline systems from

earthquakes, and of assuring lifeline reliability and continued serviceability.

The specific contractual requirements of this

project and report are:

d To assess the extent and distribution of

existing U.S. lifelines, and their associated

seismic risk; and

* To identify the most critical lifelines, and

develop a prioritized series of steps for

reduction of lifeline seismic vulnerability,

based on overall benefit.

FEMA is also sponsoring a companion study to

develop and demonstrate a model methodology

for assessing the seismic vulnerability and impact of disruption of water transmission and

distribution systems (ATC, in preparation).

In this. study, lifelines of critical importance at

the U.S. national level have been analyzed to

estimate overall seismic vulnerability and to

identify those lifelines having the greatest

economic impact, given large, credible U. S.

earthquakes. The lifelines examined include

electric systems; water, gas, and oil pipelines.; highways and bridges; airports; railroads; ports;

and emergency service facilities. The

vulnerability estimates and impacts developed

are presented in terms of estimated direct

damage losses and indirect economic losses.

These losses are considered to represent a first approximation because of the assumptions and

methodoogy utilized, because several lifelines

are not included, and because, in some cases,

the available lifeline inventory data lack critical

capacity information.

1.2 Importance of the Lifeline

Earthquake Risk Problem

The critical importance and earthquake

vulnerability of lifelines were probably first

strongly emphasized in the earthquake and

ensuing fires in San Francisco in 1906. The

disaster in San Francisco, which was the worst

urban fire in history to that time, and which

continues today to be the worst earthquake disaster in U.S. history, was in large part attributable to the failure of several lifelines,

including:

* Breakage of gas distribution and service

lines, leading to numerous outbreaks of fire.

D Damage to fire stations, resulting in

inoperable apparatus and injured fire

fighters. The single worst example of this

was the fatal injury of San Francisco Fire

Chief Dennis Sullivan, effectively

"decapitating" the fire department at the

worst possible moment.

* Worst of all, literally hundreds of breaks to

the water distribution system within San

AT- : inrduto

I

1.

ATC-25 1: Introduction
Francisco, resulting in total loss of water for

fire-fighting purposes.

After that disaster and in recognition of the

absolute necessity of water following an

earthquake, the San Francisco Fire Department

built and today still operates the Auxiliary

Water Supply System (AWSS), a unique highpressure water system separate and redundant

from the domestic drinking water supply.

Following 1906, major earthquakes in the U.S.

and elsewhere continued to illustrate the prime

importance of lifelines in earthquakes. In the

1933 Long Beach Earthquake, for example,

numerous authorities at the time cited the

prompt shutdown of the municipally operated

gas system with the prevention of major fires

(e.g., NBFU, 1933; Smethurst, 1933; Binder,

1952):

Instructions had been issued and signs had

been posted near the control valves of the

gas and light public utility control stations to

the effect that, in the event of an

earthquake, these switches must be pulled

or valves closed, and this was the reason that

the gas lights were shut off in less than four

minutes after the earthquake had occurred

(Smethurst, 1933).

Broken gas services and devices caused 7 of

the 19 fires reported in Long Beach during

the night of 10 March 1933. Prompt closing

of valves, together with a major break in a

high pressure main, undoubtedly prevented

fires in numerous locations in the business

district. Preparedness for disturbance is of

very great importance in connection with

gas service (NBFU, 1933).

The 1971 San Fernando Earthquake illustrated

more than any other event the essential

interaction of lifelines and earthquakes.

Examples of lifeline effects in that relatively

modest earthquake included:

* Major damage to electrical substations,

including overturning of extra high voltage

(EHV) transformers;

* Literally hundreds of breaks in the water

distribution system;

* Major damage to a telephone central

switching office, and loss of telephone

service due to this damage as well as

saturation;

* Near-collapse of a major dam;

* Numerous breaks in the gas distribution

system, resulting in large burning gas flares

at several intersections;

* Collapse of major freeway overcrossings,

resulting in fatalities and major disruption of

traffic; and

* Major damage to emergency facilities,

including collapse and major loss of life at a

hospital, and major damage or partial

collapse at several other hospitals, including

very modern structures at one hospital.

Since the 1971 San Fernando Earthquake,

significant research into lifelines has been

conducted, too extensive to summarize herein

(see the following references for major

compilations: Kubo and Jennings, 1976; ASCETCLEE, 1977; Kubo and Shinozuka, 1981;

ASCE-TCLEE, 1981; Smith, 1981; Ariman,

1983; Cooper, 1984; Scawthorn, 1985; Eguchi,

1986; BSSC, 1987). Additionally, several design

guidelines have resulted from this research

(ASCE-TCLEE, 1983; GLFC, 1984; ATC-6,

1981; ATC-6-2, 1983), which should result in

improved future lifeline design and

performance.

Based on these efforts, it is fair to say that

substantial lifeline earthquake engineering

knowledge, data, and experience are presently

available today, for the purpose of designing or

retrofitting lifelines to withstand the effects of

earthquakes. However, because much of the

U.S. national infrastructure was constructed

prior to the research and guideline development

of the 1970s and 1980s, the United States is still

faced with the problem of existing lifelines that

are seismically vulnerable and that, if disrupted,

would result in major economic displacements,

and probable environmental damage and human

injury.

This last point was tragically demonstrated on

October 17, 1989, when the magnitude 7.1

Loma Prieta Earthquake struck the San

Francisco Bay Area, resulting in 62 deaths, more

2 1: Introduction 

ATC-25

2  1: Introduction ATC-25
than 3,700 injuries, and leaving more than

12,000 persons homeless. Approximately twothirds of the fatalities in this event were due to

the failure of a lifeline--the collapse of the

Cypress double-decked highway structure in

Oakland. Lifeline damage and disruption were

one of the most significant features of this

earthquake, the most damaging to strike the

conterminous United States since 1906. One of

the world's major bridges, the San FranciscoOakland Bay Bridge, was closed for a month due

to structural failure. Power was disrupted over a

widespread area, water systems failed in several

communities, and other lifeline problems

contributed to major disruptions.

1.3 Project Approach

This study is concerned with the seismic risk to

lifelines and provides a first approximation of

the indirect economic effects of lifeline

interruption due to earthquakes. The analysis is

first order in that uncertainties in vulnerability

functions, seismic hazard, and all other factors

were not considered. The overall objective of

the study is to quantify the extent and

distribution of lifelines in the lower 48 States, to

identify the most critical lifelines in terms of

their vulnerability and impact on the national

economy, and to develop a prioritized series of

steps for reducing seismic risk to these lifelines.

Figure 1-1 summarizes the main steps of the

approach used to develop this report. Four basic

steps were followed to estimate lifeline damage

and subsequent economic disruption for given

earthquake scenarios.

1. Development of a national lifeline inventory

database.

2. Development of seismic vulnerability

functions for each lifeline system,

3. Characterization and quantification of the

seismic hazard nationwide, and

4. Development of direct damage estimates

and indirect economic loss estimates for the

various scenario earthquakes.

1.4 Limitations and Constraints

During development of this report and its

supporting data, several problems were

encountered that could not be resolved because

of technical difficulties and lack of available

data. For example, telecommunication systems,

nuclear and fossil-fuel power plants, dams,

and certain water, electric, and transportation

facility types at the regional transmission level

were excluded from consideration in this project because of the unavailability of inventory data

or the need for more in-depth studies.

Interaction effects between lifelines, secondary

economic effects (the impact of a reduced

capacity of one economic sector on a dependent sector), and damage resulting from landslide

(due to lack of inventory data nationwide) were

also not considered in developing this report.

These limitations and others described in

Chapters 2, 4, and 5 tend to underestimate the

losses presented herein; and other factors, as

described elsewhere in this report, tend to

overestimate the losses. Lack of capacity

information for most lifelines was also a definite

limitation. In the aggregate, due primarily to the

exclusion of certain systems (e.g., dams and

telecommunication systems), we believe the

estimates of losses presented in this report are,

in fact, quite conservative.

We aso emphasize that this report is a

macroscopic investigation at the national level

and the results should not be used for

microscopic interpretations. The results, for

example, are not intended to be used to

evaluate any particular regional utilit or

lifeline, and no specific information on such

specific facilities has been included.

1.5 Organization of the Report

The organization and contents of this report have been dictated in large part by the project

approach. Following this introduction is Chapter 2, which contains a description of the inventory

data developed for and utilized in this project. Seismic vulnerability functions, in the form of

damage curves and restoration curves for all

lifelines considered, are developed and

described in Chapter 3. In Chapter 4 we discuss

the seismic hazard nationwide, identify available

seismic hazard models that could have been

used in the analysis stages of this project,

indicate the model that was selected and

describe its advantages and disadvantages, and

define the eight earthquake scenarios that

provide the basic framework for all damage and

ATC-25 1: introduction

3 ATC-25 1: Introduction
ATC 25 |

Phase I

FEMA

ATC

Technical Consultant (EQE)

Lifeline Inventory:

- Water systems

- Electric power systems

- Transportation

- Oil and natural gas

- Emergency facilities

Sources:

- FEMA's database

- National Petroleum

Council (NPC)

- EQE

Crude Oil

System

Vulnerability Functions

- Review Existing Models

- Develop on the basis of

Expert opinion:

- ATC 13

- ETAG

-EQE

Air Transp. Terminal

>9

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Elapsed Time in Days

I

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I

Most Critical Ufeline: I

- Upgrade

Analysis:

- Direct Damage

- Residual Capacity

- Economic Loss

i

Economic Mode I

I

A

Notation: ATC-1 3: ATC-1 3 Report, Earthquake Damage Evaluation Data for California (ATC, 1985)

ETAG: Expert Technical Advisory Group (project advisory panel)

EQE: EQE Engineering, Inc. (project subcontractor)

Figure 1-1 Flow chart showing main steps in project approach.

ATC-25.

1 j-ETAG

I 

Seismic Hazard:

- Review Existing Models

- Soil Database

- Define Scenarios: - New Madrid (M= 7 & 8)

- Charleston. (M- 7.5)

- Cape Ann (M- 7.0) -Wasatch Front (M- 7.5)

- Paget Sound. (M- 7.5)

- Fort Tejon (M= 8.0)

- Hayward. (M. 7.5)

I

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.

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1: Introduction 4
loss estimates presented in this report. Direct

damage estimates and estimates of indirect

economic loss are developed in Chapters 5 and

6. The direct damage and indirect economic loss

estimates are combined, summarized, and

discussed in Chapter 7 In Chapter 8 we identify the most critical lifelines, identify hazard

mitigation strategies, and discuss the potential benefits of implementing such strategies.

Chapter 9 provides brief remarks about

additionally needed research and other efforts.

References are provided in Chapter 10. The

report concludes with a series of appendices

containing names and affiliations of project participants and substantial amounts of lifeline

vulnerability assessment data too voluminous to

include in the main body of the report.

ATC-251: Introduction

S

ATC-25, 1: Introduction
National Lifeline Inventory

2.1 Introduction

Development of the ATC-25 inventory, for all

major lifelines in the United States, was a major

task. The project scope required that lifelines be

inventoried in sufficient detail for conducting

lifeline seismic vulnerability assessments and

impact of disruption at the national level. This in

turn required that the inventory be compiled

electronically in digital form and dictated that

inclusion of lifelines at the transmission level, as

defined below, was, of primary importance. At

the same time, the level of effort that could be

devoted to this task was constrained by the

budget available.

Initially, a number of government, utility, trade

and professional organizations, and individuals

were contacted in an effort to identify

nationwide databases, especially electronic

databases. In most cases, these organizations or

individuals referred the project back to FEMA,

since they had either previously furnished the

information to FEMA, or knew that the data

had been furnished to FEMA by others. As a

result, FEMA's database (FEA, 1987) became

a major source of data for several of the

lifelines. A significant portion of these data

consist of digitized U.S. Geological Survey

(USGS) topographical maps and/or the

National Atlas (Gerlach, no date), performed by

the U.S. Geological Survey in support of

national census requirements. With the

exception of oil and gas pipeline data provided

by the National Petroleum Council, the

inventory data generally date from about 1966,

unless later updated by FEMA. A number of

other sources were employed in various ways,

which are further discussed below.

The network inventory contained in the

database is generally at the higher transmission

levels, as opposed to lower distribution levels.

That is, inventories were generally only

compiled for networks. at the bulk and/or

regional level, as opposed to lifelines at the

user-level (i.e., distribution level) within an area.

To use an analogy, the inventory contains only the national arterial evel, and neglects. the

distribution or capillary system. For example, all

federal and state highways are inventoried, but

county and local roads are not. The major

reason for focusing on the transmission level is

that at lower levels the systems. only support

local facilities. Thus, a disruption of a local

activity could not be used to identify the overall

regional importance of the lifeline. However,

disruptions at the transmission level impact

large regions and are therefore important for

understanding the seismic vulnerability and

importance of lifelines to the United States. For

some lifelines, such as highways and railroads,

an additional reason for focusing on the

transmission level is the increasing redundancy

that contributes to system reliability as one

descends in the lifeline hierarchy. Lastly, even at

the transmission level, the inventory effort alone

is considerable.

The inventory data have been compiled into an

electronic database, which generally consists of

(i) digitized location and type of facility for

single-site lifeline facilities, and (ii), digitized

right-of-way, and very limited information on

facility attributes for network lifelines. The

inventory is only a partial inventory, in that

important information on a number of facility

attributes (e.g., number or length of spans for

highway bridges) was unavailable from FEMA.

2.2 National Lifeline Inventory Data--

Overview

The inventory data include information for the

conterminous United States only. Lifeline data

for Alaska, Hawaii, and U. S. territories, such as

Puerto Rico, have been excluded because

lifelines in these regions would not be affected

by the scenario earthquakes (see Chapter 4)

considered in this study.

The specific lifelines that have been inventoried

for the conterminous United States are:

Transportation

o Highways

e Railroads

Airports

* Ports and Harbors

ATC-25 2: National Lifeline Inventory 7

-

ATC-25, 2: National Lifeline Inventory 7
Energy

* Electric Power Transmission

* Gas and Liquid Fuel Transmission

Pipelines

Emergency Service Facilities

* Emergency Broadcast Facilities

* Hospitals

Water Aqueducts and Supply

An important lifeline, telecommunication

systems, which would be severely impact by

earthquake-induced ground shaking, was

excluded because of the unavailability of data, as

are certain-regional distribution network facility

types (e.g., railway terminals, bridges, and

tunnels; certain aqueducts; major

freeway/highway bridges; fossil-fuel power

plants; and aqueduct pumping stations). In

addition, data on nuclear reactors and dams are

excluded because it was believed that such

facilities should be the subject of special studies,

particularly because of the existing regulations

relating. to seismic safety in many regions and

the expected complexity of the performance and

impact of these facility types. As a result, the

losses provided by this study will be

underestimated to the extent that these facility

types are not included.

Also excluded from the inventory, but included

in the analysis, are distribution systems at the

local level (water, highway, and electrical

systems) and police and fire stations. For these

facility types, the number of facilities in each 25-

km by 25-km grid cell, which is the grid size for

the seismic hazard analysis (see Chapter 4), is

estimated on the basis of proxy by population.

Each of the above-specified lifelines has been

inventoried in terms of its nodes and/or links.

Nodes are points on the lifeline, connected by

links. Examples of nodes are highway

intersections and electric substations. Links

would be sections of highway, sections of

pipeline, or electric transmission lines.

Intermediate points between links have been

introduced in some lifelines to provide better

location information on the path of a lifeline

(i.e., to capture path curvature between nodes).

The data were compiled and reduced on a

graphical interactive lifelines seismic risk

analysis/database management computer

program named LLEQE* (LifeLine

EarthQuake Engineering). Two operations were

required: (1) reduction in the number of links

by a factor of about ten to reduce the size of the

database to a manageable size for analysis (i.e.,

minor curvatures at the local level have been

eliminated), and (2) continuity corrections so

that transmission lines between separately

digitized sections (e.g., across state boundaries)

would be continuous. The reduction effort was

substantial and utilized a significant portion of

the financial resources allocated to the

inventory task.

The inventory was generally compiled in terms

of nodes, links, and descriptive attributes, if

available. These attributes are:

1. Measures of lifeline inventory, appropriate

to the lifeline. These are, for example:

* Miles of oil pipeline, by diameter;

* Number of electric substations;

v Miles of water pipeline; and

* Number of emergency facilities, such as

hospitals, fire stations.

2. Additionally, where available, measures of

function and redundancy have been

compiled on this database. For transmission

line links, these include:

* The capacity of the lifeline and/or the

population served;

* The end points of the nodes; and

• Whether the nodes are served by other

links.

Each of the inventoried lifelines, as well as those

estimated by proxy, are discussed below.

2.3 Transportation Data

State and Federal Highway System. A

comprehensive national digitized data set on the

highway system was obtained from FEMA, as

shown in Figure 2-1. The system includes state

and federal highways, but excludes county and

local roads. It consists of 27,761 links (about

489,892 km of highways). Right-of-way

Copyright 1989 EQE Engineering, Inc.

8 2: National Lifeline Inventory ATC-25

2: Lifeline Inventory ATC-25 8
alignment is indicated, but capacity (i.e., number

of lanes) is not

Local Highway Distribution. Detailed highway

networks at the local level were not readily

available in an electronic format. Based on

statistics provided by the California Department

of Transportation, we have determined that

there is approximately 1 mile of local roadway

for every 300 persons. This would correspond to

approximately 15 feet of local roadway per

person.

Federal and State Highway Bridges. Figure 2-2

shows 144,785 bridges, which have been

obtained from FEMA's database. Bridges

included are those for state and federal

highways. Number of spans and structure types

were not available.

Railroad System. This system shown in Figure

2-3 consists of about 11,340 links (about 270,611

kin). The railroad system was provided by

FEMA in digitized form; only right-of-way was

indicated.

Airports. Locations of 17,161 civil and general

aviation airports were provided by FEMA, as

shown in Figure 2-4.

Ports and Harbors. Location information only

for about 2,177 ports was provided by FEMA, as

shown in Figure 2-5.

2.4 Energy and Fuel Data

Electric Power Generation and Transmission.

The electric system provided by FEMA included

230 kV and above and some 115 kV systems

(Figure 2-6). The inventory contains 4,551

substations, and 27,372 links, including links

used to define path curvature between nodes

(about 441,981 km of transmission lines). The

number of circuits, and their voltage or capacity,

however, are not included in the database.

While the lack of capacity information has not

been a serious limitation for this study, as

discussed elsewhere, we recommend that users

of this inventory data seek to add capacity

information before using the data to conduct

regional or local studies.

Local Electrical System Distribution. Detailed

electrical distribution networks at the local level

were not readily available in an electronic

format. It was assumed, therefore, that the

person-to-unit-length ratio for electrical

distribution systems. was the same as that for

highways. In other words, there is approximately

1 mile of electrical distribution line for every 300

persons. This would correspond to

approximately 15 feet of electric line per person.

Gas and Liquid Fuel Transmission Pipelines.

The National Petroleum Council (NPC, 1989)

furnished relatively comprehensive national

digitized data on oil and gas pipelines, including

size and material of piping. Figures 2-7, 2-8, and

2-9 picture the crude oil, refined oil, and

natural-gas pipelines, respectively. The crude oil

system includes about 77,109 Ion of pipelines.

The refined oil system consists of about 85,461

km of pipelines and natural gas system has about

67,898 km of pipelines. The database had been

developed as part of a major study on the

transportation and capacities for this inmportant

sector of the economy, and potential

catastrophic disruptions. (NPC 1989; it is

interesting to note that 'earthquake was not

considered as a possible source of disruption in

this study).

Refineries. Figure 2-10 shows 19 refineries

nationwide having capacities of 80,000 barrels or

more per day (the size considered in this study).

Locations of these refineries have been digitized

from the National Atlas (Geriach, no date).

2.5 Emergency Service Facility Data

Emergency Broadcast Facilities. The locations

of 29,586 stations were obtained from FEMA

and are shown in Figure 2-11.

Medical Care Centers. Locations of about 6,973

centers were obtained from FEMA's database

and are shown in Figure 2-12. Structural types

were not available.

Police and Fire Stations. Detailed information

was not available for these facilities. They were

estimated as, follows:

Fire Stations. Detailed nationwide fire

station inventory data were not readily

available in an electronic format. Data for

the San Francisco and Los Angeles region

fire stations were available (AIRAC, 1987)

and were correlated with jurisdictional

population to determine a relation, which

ATC-25 2: National Lifeline Inventow 9

ATC-25 2: National LifeIine Inventory 9
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permits population to be used as the proxy

measure of the number of fire stations. The

data exhibit a trend that makes population

appear to be a good basis for estimating the

number of fire stations in an area. Intuition

tells us that this would not be a linear

function, since at the lower end of the

population scale (a very small town), there

would be at least one station (perhaps a

volunteer unit) in most towns or areas. In

rural forest areas, there may be few or no

people residing in an area, but it might have

several forest fire fighting crews available. A

bilinear curve was deemed to be simple

enough to be usable in a nationwide

inventory, yet more capable of capturing the

higher presence of fire stations in the less

dense areas. The relationship developed is

that there is one fire station per every

13,000 people in a municipality of less than

100,000 people. For municipalities of more

than 100,000 people, there are 9 fire stations

plus one more for every 36,000 additional

people.

Police Stations. Detailed nationwide police

station inventory data were not readily

available in an electronic format. Data from

a limited survey of municipalities with

different attendant populations were

obtained and correlated with the

jurisdictional populations in an attempt to

determine a relation, which permits

population to be used as a proxy measure of

the number of police stations. The data did

not exhibit a strong correlation between the

number of police stations and the

jurisdictional population. There appears to

be only one police or law enforcement

station per municipality--cities with more

than one police station are few, except for

the largest cities. More than one police

station in a municipality appears to be a relic

of older days, with slower travel and

communications. The data do make possible

a stronger correlation to geography (such as

the presence of a municipality) than directly

to population, but intuition would say that

the existence of law enforcement stations in

rural areas, where the station size would be

approximately uniform (one or two officers),

would follow along population bounds. The

relationship developed is that there is

approximately one police station per every

60,000 people.

2.6 Water Supply Data

Water Transmission. Detailed information

nationwide, on water storage, transmission, and

treatment was not readily available. A variety of

sources were employed to digitize reservoir

locations and long-line transmission lines for

large urban areas, of which only a few exceed

tens of miles in length, that is, exceed our grid

size (e.g., San Francisco, Los Angeles, New

York). The inventory includes approximately

3,575 km of aqueduct, as shown in Figure 2-13.

Excluded from the inventory are aqueducts in

Utah, which were not available for inclusion in

this study. It is also possible that other

significant water transmission lines are

inadvertently omitted from this study, as the

project team had neither time nor funding to

contact all potential sources of data.

Water Distribution. Detailed water distribution

network inventory data were not readily

available in an electronic format. Data from a

survey of the largest water districts were

available (AWWA report no. 20212 "1984

Water Utility Operating Data") and were used

to correlate the quantity of piping with

population. The data exhibit an apparent

relationship between the population served by

the water district and the total number of miles

of piping in the distribution network. The values

vary between different municipalities,

apparently according to population density. New

York City is one of the most densely populated

municipalities in the United States, and the

water distribution data reflect this. Overall, the

average figure, which reflects the relationship

between quantity of piping and populations for

almost half the population of the United States,

should be a reasonable figure to apply

nationwide. The relationship we developed is

that there is approximately 1 mile of distribution

piping for every 330 persons. This would

correspond to approximately 16 feet of

distribution piping per person.

2.7 PC-Compatible Electronic

Database

The data discussed above, developed as part of

this project, form a very significant nationwide

database on infrastructure at the regional level.

Because the data could also serve as a valuable

framework (or starting point) for researchers

who wish to investigate lifelines at the regional

22 2: National Lifeline Inventory ATC-25
r

(A

to

EL

r

m

0-4

0

1

L)

'-

CD

K

'4A

CD

Cl)

CD

CoQ

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N
or local level, including applications unrelated to

seismic risk, the data have been formatted for

use on IBM-PC compatible microcomputers.

The data are unrestricted and will be made

available by ATC on 18, 1.2-megabyte, floppy

diskettes, together with a simple executable

computer program for reading and displaying

the maps on a computer screen. The disks

contain 25 files, as shown in Table 2-1. For many

of the networks, two files are presented, a .DAT

file representing an ASCII file of latitude and

longitude coordinates, and a .DEM file

representing an x/y coordinate file for screen

plotting purposes, in binary.

Table 2-1 National Lifeline Inventory Electronic Database

Contents

DEMO.EXE

HW.DEM

HW.DAT

RAILR.DEM

RAI LR.DAT

ELECTRIC. D EM

ELECTRIC.DAT

CRUDE.DEM

CRUDE.DAT

REFINED.DEM

REFINED.DAT

NGAS.DEM

NGAS.DAT

BRIDGES.DEM

BRIDGES.DAT

Al RPORTS.DEM

Al RPORTS.DAT

PORTS.DEM

PORTS.DAT

BRDSTNS.DEM

BRDSTNS.DAT

MEDCARE.DEM

MEDCARE.DAT

WATER.DEM

IAIATrr nAT

(the highway network in x/y coordinates)

(the highway network in longitude/latitude coordinates)

(the railroad network in x/y coordinates)

(the railroad network in longitude/latitude coordinates)

(the electric network in x/y coordinates)

(the electric network in longitude/latitude coordinates)

(the crude oil network in x/y coordinates)

(the crude oil network in longitude/latitude coordinates)

(the refined oil network in x/y coordinates)

(the refined oil network in longitude/latitude coordinates)

(the natural gas network in x/y coordinates)

(the natural gas network in longitude/latitude coordinates)

(the bridges in x/y coordinates)

(the bridges in longitude/latitude coordinates)

(the airports in x/y coordinates)

(the airports in longitude/latitude coordinates)

(the ports in x/y coordinates)

(the ports in longitude/latitude coordinates)

(the broadcast sta. in xly coordinates)

(the broadcast sta. in longitude/latitude coordinates)

(the hospitals in x/y coordinates)

(the hospitals in longitude/latitude coordinates)

(the water system in x/y coordinates)

(the water system in longitude/latitude coordinates)

0 A 13- W<ir~v~v'1 Tifgeline Tnvoninrv ATC-25

File No. File Name

1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

7.

8.

9.

10.

11.

12.

13.

14.

15.

16.

17.

18.

19.

20.

21.

. 22.

23.

24.

ZZ). V Vt% I R. 9%. I.Om I

I Aft
Development of Lifeline Vulnerability Functions

3.1 Introduction

Vulnerability functions are used to describe the

expected or assumed earthquake performance

characteristics of each lifeline as well as the time

required to restore damaged facilities to their

pre-earthquake capacity, or usability. Functions

have been developed for each lifeline

inventoried for this project, or estimated by

proxy (see Chapter 2). The components of each

vulnerability function and how they were

developed are described herein in Chapter 3.

The functions themselves, too lengthy to include

in this chapter, are provided in Appendix B.

The vulnerability function for each lifeline

consists of the following components:

• General information, which consists of

(1) a description of the structure and its

main components, (2) typical seismic

damage in qualitative terms, and (3)

seismically resistant design characteristics

for the facility and its components in

particular. This information has been

included to define the assumed

characteristics and expected

performance of each facility and to

make the functions more widely

applicable (i.e., applicable for other

investigations by other researchers).

* Direct damage information, which

consists of (1) a description of its, basis in

terms, of structure type and quality of

construction (degree of seismic

resistance), (2) default estimates of the

quality of construction for present

conditions, and corresponding motiondamage curves, (3) default estimates of

the quality of construction for upgraded

conditions, and (4) restoration curves. As

described below, these curves are based

on data developed under the ATC-13

project (ATC, 1985).

In the following sections we describe the general

approach and specific methodology utilized to

develop the quantitative relationships for each

vulnerability function (Direct Damage versus

Modified Mercalli intensity and Residual

Capacity versus Modified Mercalli ntensity).

Example computations are provided. In

addition, a sample of a complete vulnerability

function general information plus direct damage

information) is included as an illustrative

example.

3.2 General Approach for

Characterizing Earthquake

Performance

The lifeline facility vulnerability functions used

for this project are based on those developed on

the basis of expert opinion in the ATC-13

project (Earthquake Damage Evaluation Data

for Califomia, ATC 1985). The ATC-13 direct

damage data, presented in the form of Damage

Probability Matrices I(DPIs, Table 3-1), are

applicable for Standard construction in

California, as defined below, and may be

modified per procedures. outlined in ATC-13,

which shifts the curves. one-to-two intensity

units down for Special construction, as defined

below (i.e., - or -2), and one to two intensity

units up for Nonstandard construction, as

defined below (i.e., +1 or +2). Standard

construction is defined (in ATC-13) to include

all facilities except those designated as, Special

or Nonstandard. Special constriuction refers to

facilities that have special earthquake damage

control features. Nonstandard refers to facilities

that are more susceptible to earthquake damage

than those of Standard construction. Older

facilities designed prior to modern design code

seismic requirements or those facilities designed

after the introduction of modern code seismic

requirements but without their benefit can be

assumed to be Nonstandard. In exceptional

cases, older facilities may have had special

-attention paid to seismic forces and may qualify

as Standard construction. While Special is

defined in ATC-13 to refer to facilities that have

special earthquake damage control features, in

this study we take this to include, in some cases,

facilities designed according to the most modern

design code seismic requirements. Standard is

assumed to represent existing California

3: Development of Lifeline Vulnerability Functions

3.

ATC-25 25
Table 3-1

Central

Damage

Factor

Typical ATC-1 3 Damage Probability Matrix (ATC, 1985)

(Example for Liquid Storage Tanks, on ground)

VI

94.0

6.0

0.00

0.50

5.00

20.00

45.00

80.00

100.00

VI

2.5

92.9

4.6

ViII

0.4

30.6

69.0

***Very small probability

facilities (i.e., a composite of older nonseismically designed facilities, more recent

facilities designed to the seismic requirements of

their day, and modern facilities designed to

current seismic requirements).

With regard to regional U.S. seismic design

practice, the general consensus appears to be

that, with few exceptions, only California and

portions of Alaska and the Puget Sound region

have had seismic requirements incorporated

into the design of local facilities for any

significant period of time. For all other areas of

the United States, present facilities are assumed

to have seismic resistance less than or equal to

(depending on the specific facility) that of

equivalent facilities in California NEHRP Map

Area 7 (Figure 3-1) (ATC, 1978; BSSC, 1988).

In this regard, we have broken the United States

into three regions:

a. California NEHRP Map Area 7 (the

general focus of ATC-13), which we take to

be the only region of the United States with

a significant history of lifeline seismic design

for great earthquakes,

b. California NEHRP Map Areas 3-6, NonCalifornia Map Area 7 (parts of Alaska,

Nevada, Idaho, Montana, and Wyoming),

and Puget Sound NEHRP Map Area 5,

which we take to be the only regions of the

United States with a significant history of

lifeline seismic design for major (as opposed

to great) earthquakes, and

lX

2.1

94.6

3.3

X

25.7

69.3

5.0 

..#>U#{CU - - -SI4 ..... I. ........ Xi

2.5 0.2

58.1 27.4

39.1 69.4

0.3 3.0 :** ****** *

c. All other parts of the United States, which

we assume have not had a significant history

of lifeline seismic design for major

earthquakes.

As an example, examine on-ground liquid

storage tanks (ATC-13 Facility Class 43, Table

3-1), for which ATC-13 indicates mean damage

from ground shaking of Modified Mercalli

Intensity (MMI) IX to be 4.6% of replacement

value for Standard construction. If the

construction is modern and judged to be Special

construction, then the mean damage is indicated

to be 0.5% (corresponding to MMI VII) for the

same intensity of ground shaking. Alternatively,

if the construction is judged to be Nonstandard

(e.g., predating seismic design), then the mean

damage is indicated to be 27.9% (corresponding

to MMI XI) for the same intensity of ground

shaking.

3.3 Method for Obtaining Lifeline

Direct Damage and Residual

Capacity Functions

This section presents the calculational

algorithms employed in obtaining the

quantitative lifeline component vulnerability

functions for use in the ATC-25 project. Two

vulnerability functions are determined: (1)

direct damage to a lifeline component, in terms

of repair costs expressed as a fraction or

percentage of value, and (2) fraction of initial

capacity (restored or remaining) as a function of

elapsed time since the earthquake, for a given

ATC-25 3: Development of Lifeline Vulnerability Functions

&,f"r1;r10r1 Alfor'r-_111i lntpmitv

xi/

26
Legend

Map Area Coeff. A,

E

in

99

IM0

0

F-I

7 0.40

6 0.30

5 0.20

4 0.15

3 0.10

2 0.05

1 0.05

Figure 3-7 NEHRPSeismic Map Areas (ATC, 1978; BSSC, 988).

AT, C-25 3: Development of Lfeline Vulnerability Functions 27
MMI, herein termed restoration curves. All

assumptions operative in ATC-13, such as

unlimited resources for repair and restoration,

apply to these results.

Three main steps are involved in obtaining the

vulnerability functions for each component.

Each of these steps is described below.

STEP 1

In order to obtain a continuous relation

between seismic damage (DMG) and intensity

(MMI), a regression of the form

DMG = exp(a) MMP (3.1)

TR= 3 = exp(cl) DMG

TR0 6 = exp(c2) DMGd2

TR=1.0 = exp(c3) DMGd3

Figure 3-3 shows the form of the regression

curves we obtained.

STEP 3

The regressions obtained from the previous two

steps are used to arrive at the restoration curves.

The restoration curve for each lifeline

component, for each intensity (MMI), is

obtained by fitting a straight line through the

three points corresponding to 30%, 60%, and

100% restoration time. The regression line has

the following form:

is performed on the damage data points in

Appendix G of ATC-13. The regression

coefficients a and b are obtained for each

Facility Class (FC) corresponding to a lifeline

component. A damage curve of the form shown

in Figure 3-2 is thus obtained for each Facility

Class in ATC-13.

STEP 2

Data on time-to-restoration for different Social

Function (SF) classes, which are facility types

defined in terms of the four-digit Standard

Industrial Classifications of the U. S.

Department of Commerce, (provided in Table

9.11 of ATC-13), are used to perform the

following regression, which gives a continuous

relation between the damage state and the

corresponding restoration time for each social

function class:

TR = exp(c) DMGd (3.2)

where:

TR = restoration time, in days

DMG = Central Damage Factor (CDF)

for each damage state (DS)

c, d = regression coefficients

Regressions of the above form are performed

for each of the social function classes using the

data in ATC-13 on restoration times for 30%,

60%, and 100% restoration.

Thus,

R = f + (g) (TR) (3.3)

where:

R

TR

f, g

= % restored

= restoration time, in days

= regression coefficients

The three points used to fit a straight line by the

above regression are obtained in the manner

described below:

For a given lifeline component, the damage

corresponding to a particular MMI is assumed

to have a lognormal distribution. The time to

restoration is then obtained numerically as the

weighted average of the restoration time (given

by Equation 3.2) taken over equal intervals of

the lognormal distribution of the damage. The

weight factors are the areas of, the equal

intervals of the lognormal distribution, i. e., the

probabilities of the corresponding damage. For

example,

TR(3 0% R, MMI) =

N d

N (pix exp(cl)x DMGj(MM1)d ) (3.4)

1=1

where TR( 30 % R, MMI)) is the restoration

time to 30% restoration for a given MMI, pi is

the probability that the damage = DMGi, i.e.,

the area of the interval, i, on the lognormal

distribution of the damage, and N is the number

of intervals of the lognormal distribution.

ATC-25 3: Development of Lifeline Vulnerability Functions 28
0.7

0.8

wU

Q 0.4

0.1

:0

4 a 10 12

MMI

Figure 3-2 Comparison of ATC-1 3 Appendix G data (Statistics of Expert Responses for MotionDamage Relationships) versus regression curve.

Soo

n

z

0

I--ro

U

400

S0o

200

icc

0

0 0.2 0.4 0. O.S. I

DAMAGE

Figure 3-3 Comparison of ATC-73 Table 9.7 data (Weighted Statistics for Loss of Function Restoration

Time of Social Function Classifications) versus regression curve.

3: Development of Lifeline lnerability Functions 29

O.B

ATC-25
Similar calculations are also carried out for 60%

R and for 100% R.

Next, the weighted average of TR(30%R, MMI)

for the different social function classes

corresponding to the lifeline component is

obtained. This serves as one of the three points

for fitting the restoration curve. The other two

points are obtained by repeating the process for

60% and 100% restoration time. The regression

line given by Equation 3.3, obtained using these

three data points, is the restoration curve for the

lifeline component. An example to illustrate the

method of obtaining

(1) the direct damage curve and

(2) the restoration curves, for the

Ports/Cargo Handling Equipment

component of the Sea/Water

Transportation lifeline

is provided below.

3.4 Example Direct Damage and

Residual Capacity Computations

The following example illustrates the method of

obtaining (1) the direct damage curve, and (2)

the restoration curves, for the Ports/Cargo

Handling Equipment component of the

Sea/Water Transportation lifeline. Ports/Cargo

Handling Equipment are typically container or

general cargo cranes on piers. This component

is taken to be composed of two ATC-13 Social

Function Classes: 28a (Ports) and 28b (Cargo

Handling Equipment), and of two Facility

Classes: 63 (Waterfront Structures) and 53

(Cranes), weighted by the factors indicated in

Table 3-2.

STEP 1

Regression coefficients for seismic damage are

computed from Equation 3.1 for each Facility

Class (FC) as follows:

Facility Class

Class Factor

63 0.6

53 0.4

Rearession Coeffcient a

-20.0847

-18.2783

b

8.0976

7.2508

The damage regression curve obtained in this

manner is illustrated in Figure 3-2 for Facility

Table 3-2 Weighting Factors Used to

Determine Percent of Social

Function and Facility Classes

Contributing to Ports/Cargo

Handling Equipment

Social Function Facility

Class Factor Class Factor

28a 0.6 63 0.6

28b 0.4 53 0.4

Class 53 (Cranes). The values for the damage

are listed below, together with the ATC-13 data

(from ATC-13, Appendix G, weighted mean of

best estimate of damage factor):

MMI

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

DMC ATC-13)

0.004

0.014

0.055

0.11 7

0.253

0.406

0.535

Regr (DMC)

0.005

0.015

0.041

0.096

0.205

0.410

0.771

The damage curve for the component as a

whole is obtained by calculating, for each MMI,

the weighted average of the damage for each of

the facility classes corresponding to the

component.

DMG = ealMMIbl x factor(1) +

ea2MMIb2 x factor(2)

= 0.101x 0.6 + 0.096x 0.4

= 0.099 for MMI = IX

STEP 2

Regression coefficients for restoration time are

computed from Equation 3.2 as follows:

Restoration %

30%

60%

100%

Regression

* ocial

Function 28a

c d

6.4575 2.7162

5.4769 1.1671

6.1996 1.0445

Coefficients Social Social

Function 28b

c

4.8240

5.6373

5.8890

d

1.2514

1.1880

0.8725

The values for the time to 30% restoration, for

the Social Function Class 28b are listed below,

together with the ATC-13 data from Table 9.11:

ATC-25

3: Development of Lifeline Vulnerability Functions

' -- D:

ATC-25 30
DM0 ATC-13

0.005 ;0.2

0.05 2.3

0.2 13.3

0.45 44.4

0.8 127.0

1.0 *

*No statistics provided.

Regression

Values

0.1643

2.93

16.61

45.82

94.14

125.46

Figure 3-3 shows the curves obtained by the

above regressions, as well as the ATC-13 mean

data points.

STEP 3

-Mean restoration times for each Facility Class

(FC) are obtained from Equation 3.4 as follows:

Mean Restoration time =

N

E [pI exp(c) DMGId]

i=1

where c and d are given above for 30%, 60%,

and 100% restoration.

For MMI = XI, for example, mean restoration

times are computed as follows:

FC = 2a 79.73

FC = 28b 45.45

Mean TR

T=0.6

93.20

1107.66

211.23

177.27

66.02* 98.98 197.65

*e.g., Mean TR = 79.73 x 0.6 + 45.45 x 0.4

= 66.02

(Note: P is N where N is the number of

intervals used to divide the lognormal

distribution of the damage; N= 100 in this

example and DMGi is the corresponding

damage value for each interval, i.)

The final restoration curve for MMv = XI is the

best-fit straight line using Equation 3.3 through

the 3 points corresponding to restoration times

66.02, 98.98, and 197.65 days. n this case, the

regression equation is as follows:

R = 0.026 + 0.005 (TR)

Determination of these relations permits calculation of residual capacity of the lifeline as

a function of time. From the above equation we

see that PortslCargo Handling Equipment subjected to MMI XI will be restored to

approximately 18% of pre-earthquake capacity after 30 days, and to 48% approximately 90 days after the earthquake.

3.5 Sample Lifeline VuInerability Function

Following is a sample of a complete lifeline

vulnerability function for ports/cargo handling

equipment. Complete vulnerability functions for

all lifelines are given in Appendix B.

3.5.1 PoTsCargo HandlingEqupment

1. General

Description: In general, ports/cargo

handling equipment comprise buildings

(predominantly warehouses), waterfront

structures, cargo, handling equipment, paved

aprons, conveyors, scales, tanks, silos,

pipelines, railroad terminals, and support

services. Building type varies, with steel

frame being a common construction type.

Waterfront structures include quay walls,

sheet-pile bulkheads, and pile-supported

piers. Quay walls are essentially waterfront

masonry or caisson walls with earth fills

behind them. Piers are commonly wood or

concrete construction and often include

batter piles to resist lateral transverse loads.

Cargo handling equipment for loading and

unloading ships includes cranes for

containers, bulk loaders for bulk goods, and

pumps for fuels. Additional handling

equipment is used for transporting goods throughout port areas.

Typical Seismic Damage: By far the most

significant source of earthquake-induced

damage to port and harbor facilities has

been pore-water pressure buildup in the

saturated cohesionless soils that prevail at

these facilities. This pressure buildup can

lead to application f excessive lateral

pressures to quay walls by backfill materials,

liquefaction, and massive submarine slidliniz.

Buildings in port areas are subject to generic damage due to shaking, as well as damage

caused by loss of bearing or lateral

movement of foundation soils Past

earthquakes have caused substantial lateral

3: Development of Lifeline Vulnerability Functions 31 ATC-25
sliding, deformation, and tilting of quay walls

and sheet-pile bulkheads. Block-type quay

walls are vulnerable to earthquake-induced

sliding between layers of blocks. This

damage has often been accompanied by

extensive settlement and cracking of paved

aprons. The principal failure mode of sheetpile bulkheads has been insufficient anchor

resistance, primarily because the anchors

were installed at shallow depths, where

backfill is most susceptible to a loss of

strength due to pore-water pressure buildup

and liquefaction. Insufficient distance

between the anchor and the bulkhead wall

can also lead to failure. Pile-supported

docks typically perform well, unless soil

failures such as major submarine landslides

occur. In such cases, piers have undergone

extensive sliding and buckling and yielding

of pile supports. Batter piles have damaged

pier pile caps and decking because of their

large lateral stiffness. Cranes can be derailed

or overturned by shaking or soil failures.

Toppling cranes can damage adjacent

structures or other facilities. Misaligned

crane rails can damage wheel assemblies and

immobilize cranes. Tanks containing fuel

can rupture and spill their contents into the

water, presenting fire hazards. Pipelines

from storage tanks to docks can be ruptured

where they cross areas of structurally poor

ground in the vicinity of docks. Failure of

access roads and railway tracks can severely

limit port operations. Port facilities,

especially on the West Coast, are also

subject to tsunami hazard.

Seismically Resistant Design: At locations

where earthquakes occur relatively

frequently the current design practice is to

use seismic factors included in local building

codes for the design of port structures.

However, past earthquakes have indicated

that the seismic coefficients used for design

are of secondary importance when

compared to the potential for liquefaction

of the site soil materials. Quay wall and

sheet-pile bulkhead performance could be

enhanced by replacing weak soils with dense

soils, or designing these structures to

withstand the combination of earthquakeinduced dynamic water pressures and

pressures due to liquefied fills. Pier behavior

in earthquakes has been good primarily

because they are designed for large

horizontal berthing and live loads, and

because they are not subject to the lateral

soil pressures of the type applied to quay

walls and bulkheads. However, effects on

bearing capacity and lateral resistance of

piles due to liquefaction and induced slope

instability should also be considered.

2. Direct Damage

Basis: Damage curves for ports/cargo

handling equipment in the sea/water

transportation system are based on ATC-13

data for Facility Class 53, cranes, and

Facility Class 63, waterfront structures.

Ports/cargo handling equipment are

assumed to be a combination of 60%

waterfront structures and 40% cranes.

Standard construction is assumed to

represent typical California ports/cargo

handling equipment under present

conditions (i.e., a composite of older and

more modern ports/cargo handling

equipment). Only minimal regional variation

in construction quality is assumed, as seismic

design is performed only for selected port

structures, and soil performance is the most

critical determinant in port performance.

Present Conditions: In the absence of data

on the type of material, age, etc., the

following factors were used to modify the

mean curve for the two facility classes listed

above, under present conditions:

NEHRP Map Area

California 7

California 3-6

Non-California 7

Puget Sound 5

All other areas

MMI

Intensity

Shift

FC53 FC63

o 0

0 0

0 0

o 0+

+1 +1

The modified motion-damage curves for

ports/cargo handling facilities are shown in

Figure 3-4.

Upgraded Conditions: For areas where it

appears cost-effective to improve facilities,

assume on a preliminary basis that upgrades

result in a beneficial intensity shift of one

unit (i.e., -1), relative to the above present

conditions.

__C-_

3: Development of Lifeline Vulnerability Functions ATC-25 32
Time-to-restoration: The time-torestoration data assigned to Social Function

(SF) 28a, ports, and SF 28b, cargo handling equipment, were assumed to apply to all

ports/cargo handling equipment. Ports/cargo handling facilities were assumed to be a

D=182x

0

E

D=x

combination of 60% ports and 40% cargo handling facilities. By combining these data

with the damage curves derived using the

data for FC 53 and 63, the time-torestoration curves shown in Figures 3-5 and

3-6 were derived.

Fort/Cargo

53 RA.4

Other.

VI lII U111 Ix

Modlfied Mercalli ntensity (MMI) x

Damage percent by intensity for port/cargo handling equipment

ATC-25 3: Development oI Lifeline Vulnerability Functions 33

Figure 3-4
Port/Cargo Handling Equipment

r0a 2.60 b O.Wb

2Bb 0.40 53 0.40

a

0.311

0.306

0. 286

0.240

0.168

MM

6

7

-

9

le

b

0.118

0. 5B

0.0 Z

0.813

.00?

R =b *das a

I I I I I I I .

30 68 90 120 158 180 218 240 278 300 330 365

Elapsed Time in Days

Residual capacity for ports/cargo handling equipment (NEHRP Map Area:

California 7, Non-California 7, and Puget Sound 5).

California 3-5,

Port/Cargo Handling Equipment

130- a La C.5 ra4

I I I I I I 1 I 1

38 68 90 120 158 180 218 240 270 3 330

Elapsed Time in Days

Figure 3-6 Residual capacity for ports/cargo handling equipment (all other areas).

3: Development of Lifeline Vulnerability Functions

5

11=100

0~

Cu

-o

O R= S0z

'E

.

R= e. L

DAYS

Figure 3-5

V48 53 8.40

liHI a b

6 0.306 8.858

7 8.286 0.822

8 0.248 8.813

9 0.168 0.007

10 0.826 0.005

H = b * days 4a

R=1tex

ax r

DAYS: 365

.~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~~~~AC2

s:

.

l l l l

ATC-25

* , , , , , * , * I

I

34
4. Seismic Hazard

4.1 Introduction

Seismic hazard, as used in this study, is the

expectation of earthquake effects. It is usually

defined in terms of ground shaking parameters

(e.g., peak ground acceleration, Modified

Mercalli Intensity, peak ground velocity) but,

broadly speaking, can include or be defined in

terms of fault rupture, ground failure, or other

phenomena resulting from an earthquake.

Seismic hazard is a function of the size, or

magnitude of an earthquake, distance from the

earthquake, local soils, and other factors, and is

independent of the buildings or other items of

value that could be damaged. Estimation of

seismic hazard can be performed on a

deterministic (e.g., Evernden et al., 1981) or

probabilistic (Cornell, 1968; McGuire, 1974;

Scawthorn et al., 1978; Algermissen and Perkins,

1976; Algermissen, and Perkins, 1982) basis,

depending on the needs of the users. In either

case, the methodology follows a process

beginning with the definition of seismic sources,

based in part on historic seismicity.

The historical record of earthquakes in the

United States is relatively short--the only data

available for earthquakes prior to about 1900

are historical accounts of earthquake effects

(Coffman et al., 1982), which have been used to

estimate the distribution of intensities, and the

locations and magnitudes of earthquakes. The

record of large earthquakes in the 19th century

is reasonably well documented for the eastern

United States but not for other parts of the

country. The large 1857 Ft. Tejon event, for

example, is not well documented, when

compared with the documentation for the 1886

Charles ton, South Carolina event (Dutton,

1887). Instrumental data from stations in the

United States were not available until after 1887

(Poppe, 1979) when the first seismograph

stations in the country were established at

Berkeley and MtL Hamilton (Lick Observatory).

4.2 Magnitude and Intensity

The earthquake magnitude scale is a well-known

but typically misunderstood means of describing

the energy released during an earthquake. The

best-known scale is that developed by C. F.

Richter (Richter, 1958); and relationships

between the Richter scale and other scales have

been established. Magnitude scales are intended

to be objective, instrumentally determined

measures of the size of an earthquake, and a

number of magnitude scales have been

developed since Richter's (Aki and Richards,

1980). The most recent widely used scale is

moment magnitude, M, (Hanks and Kanimori,

1979). An increment in magnitude of one unit

(i.e., from magnitude 5.0 to 6.0), represents an

increase of approximately 32 times the amount

of energy released. Unless otherwise noted,

earthquake magnitude as used in this study

refers to surface wave magnitude, M..

While magnitude describes the size of an

earthquake, intensity describes its effects at a

particular location or site. Intensity at a site is

governed by the magnitude of an earthquake,

the distance from the site to the earthquake

epicenter or rupture surface, and local geologic

conditions. A small or moderate earthquake may

generate strong ground shaking but the areal

extent of this shaking will be substantially less

than that generated by a major earthquake. The

1931 Modified Mercalli Intensity (MMID, Scale

(Wood and Neumann, 1931, Table 4-1) is a

commonly used measure of intensity. The scale

consists of 12 categories of ground motion

intensity, from I (not felt, except by a few

people) to XII (total damage). Structural

damage generally is initiated at about MM[ VI

for poor structures, and about MM I VIII for

good structures. MMI XI and XII are extremely

rare. The MMI scale is subjective; it is

dependent on personal interpretations and is

affected, to some extent, by the quality of

construction in the affected area. Even though it

has these limitations, it is still useful as a general

description of damage, especially at the regional

level, and for this reason will be used in this

study, as the descriptor of seismic hazard.

4.3 Earthquake Hazards

Physical damage to structures and ifelines

during and after an earthquake can be produced

by ground shaking, fault rupture, landslides,

ATC-25 4: Seismic Hazard 35

ATFC-25 4: Seismic Hazard 35
Table 4-1 Modified Mercalli Intensity Scale

I. Not felt. Marginal and long-period effects of large earthquakes.

II. Felt by persons at rest, on upper floors, or favorably placed.

Ill. Felt indoors. Hanging objects swing. Vibration like passing of light trucks. Duration estimated. May not be

recognized as an earthquake.

IV. Hanging objects swing. Vibration like passing of heavy trucks; or sensation of a jolt like a ball striking the

walls. standing motor cars rock. Windows, dishes, doors rattle. Glasses clink. Crockery clashes. In the upper

range of IV wooden walls and frames creak.

V. Felt outdoors; direction estimated. Sleepers wakened. Liquids disturbed, some spilled. Small unstable

objects displaced or upset. Doors swing, close, open. Shutters, pictures move. Pendulum clocks stop, start,

change rate.

VI. Felt by all. Many frightened and run outdoors. Persons walk unsteadily. Windows, dishes, glassware broken,

knickknacks, books, etc., off shelves. Pictures off walls. Furniture moved or overturned. Weak plaster and

masonry D cracked. Small bells ring (church, school). Trees, bushes shaken (visible, or heard to rustle).

VII. Difficult to stand. Noticed by drivers of motor cars. Hanging objects quiver. Furniture broken. Damage to

masonry D, including cracks. Weak chimneys broken at roof line. Fall of plaster, loose bricks, stones, tiles,

cornices (also unbraced parapets and architectural ornaments). Some cracks in masonry C. Waves on

ponds; water turbid with mud. Small slides and caving in along sand or gravel banks. Large bells ring.

Concrete irrigation ditches damaged..

Vil. Steering of motor cars affected. Damage to masonry C; partial collapse. Some damage to masonry B; none

to masonry A. Fall of stucco and some masonry walls. Twisting, fall of chimneys, factory stacks, monuments,

towers, elevated tanks. Frame houses moved on foundations if not bolted down; loose panel walls thrown

out. Decayed piling broken off. Branches broken from trees. Changes in flow or temperature of springs and

wells. Cracks in wet ground and on steep slopes.

IX. General panic. Masonry D destroyed; masonry B seriously damaged. (General damage to foundations.)

Frame structures, if not bolted, shifted off foundations. Frames racked. Serious damage to reservoirs.

Underground pipes broken. Conspicuous cracks in ground. In alluviated areas sand and mud ejected,

earthquake fountains, sand craters.

X. Most masonry and frame structures destroyed with their foundations. Some well-built wooden structures

and bridges destroyed. Serious damage to dams, dikes, embankments. Large landslides. Water thrown on

banks to canals, rivers, lakes, etc. Sand and mud shifted horizontally on beaches and flat land. Rails bent

slightly.

Xl. Rails bent greatly. Underground pipelines completely out of service.

XII. Damage nearly total. Large rock masses displaced. Lines of sight and level distorted. Objects thrown into

the air.

Source: Richter, C.F., 1957, Elementary Seismology, W. H. Freeman Co., San Francisco, Calif.

Note: To avoid ambiguity, the quality of masonry, brick, or other material is specified by the following lettering

system. (This has no connection with the conventional classes A, B, and C construction.)

Masonry A. Good workmanship, mortar, and design; reinforced, especially laterally, and bound together by using

steel, concrete, etc.; designed to resist lateral forces.

Masonry B. Good workmanship and mortar; reinforced, but not designed to resist lateral forces.

Masonry C. Ordinary workmanship and mortar; no extreme weaknesses, like failing to tie in at corners, but

neither reinforced nor designed to resist horizontal forces.

Masonry D. Weak materials, such as adobe; poor mortar; low standards of workmanship; weak horizontally.

36 4: Seismic Hazard ATC-25~~~~~~~~

4: Seismic Hazard ATC-25 36
liquefaction, and earthquake-induced fire.

Ground shaking is the primary and best-known

hazard associated with earthquakes. It produces

scattered but widespread damage. Ground

shaking includes both horizontal and vertical

motions, can last up to several minutes during

major earthquakes, and can be destructive at

distances of even hundreds of kilometers,

depending on soil conditions. It is estimated that

such shaking causes over 90% of earthquakerelated damage to buildings.

Ground or fault rupture produces local

concentration of structural damage. Afault is a

fracture in the crust of the earth along which

blocks have moved or been displaced in relation

to each other. This displacement can be in

either a horizontal, a vertical, or an oblique

direction. Near fault lines, fault displacements

produce forces so great that the best method of

limiting damage to structures is to avoid building

in areas close to ground traces of active faults.

Secondary seismic hazards are those related to

soil instabilities. Liquefacion is the sudden loss

of shear strength that can occur when saturated,

soils that lack cohesion (sands and silts) are

strongly and repetitively vibrated. Liquefaction

typically occurs in loose sand deposits where

there is subsurface groundwater above a depth

of about 20 feet. Shallow groundwater and loose

soil are usually localized conditions, resulting

either from natural or human-made causes. As a

result, site-specific data generally are necessary

to accurately determine if liquefaction may

occur at a locationa It usually severely damages

civil engineering works and low-rise buildings.

Mid- and high-rise buildings in these soils will

tend to have pile foundations, which mitigate

the structural effects of liquefaction, or reduce

liquefaction potential, but may not completely

eliminate the threat.

Settlement or compaction of loose soils and

poorly consolidated alluvium can occur as a

result of strong seismic shaking, causing uniform

or differential settlement of building

foundations. Buildings supported on deep (pile)

foundations are more resistant to such

settlements. Substantial compaction can occur

in broad flat valley areas recently depleted of

groundwater.

Landslide is the downslope movement of masses

of earth under the force of gravity. Earthquakes

can trigger landslides in areas that are already

landslide prone. Slope gradient is often a clue to

stability. Landslides are most common on slopes

of more than 150 and can generally be

anticipated along the edges of mesas and on

slopes adjacent to drainage courses.

4.4 Seismicity

Seismicity is the space-time occurrence of

earthquakes. The historical seismicity of the

United States is shown in Figure 4-1, which

depicts the spatial distribution of earthquakes

with maximum MMIs of V or greater, known to

have occurred through 1976. For the purpose of

characterizing seismicity in the conterminous

United States, several regions may be identified

(Algermissen, 1983), as shown in Figure 4-2:

1. Northeastern Region, which includes New

England, New York, and part of eastern

Canada;

2. Southeastern Region, including the central

Appalachian seismic region activity and the

area near Charleston, South Carolina;

3. Central Region, which consists of the area

between the regions just described and the

Rocky Mountains;

4. Western Mountain Region, which includes

all remaining states except those on the

Pacific coast;

5. Northwestern Region, including

Washington and Oregon; and

6. California and Western Nevada.

We discuss each of these regions briefly largely

using information from Algerinnissen (1983) and

Coffman et al. (1982). These references can

provide a more detailed discussion.

Northeastern Region. The Northeastern Region

contains zones of relatively high seismic activity-

-earthquakes of at least magnitude 7.0 have

occurred in New England and the St. Lawrence

River Valley in Canada (Algermissen, 1983).

The historic seismicity of this region is shown in

Figure 4-3.

One of the largest earthquakes to have affected

this area was, the November IS, 1755,

ATC-25 4: Seismic Hazard 37

ATCG25 4: Seismic Hazccrd 37
0

0

Figure 4-1 Earthquakes with maximum Modified Mercalli Intensities of V or above in the United

States and Puerto Rico through 1989 (Algermissen, 1983, with some modifications).

38 4: Seismic Hazard ATC-25

38 4: Hazard ATC-25
I

3 0 0

1 1 0c 1000 900 80O

Figure 4-2 Regional scheme used for the discussion of the seismicity of the conterminous United States.

ATC-25 4: Seismic Hazard 39

L

-

-1

J

I I I I

ATC-25 4: Seismic Hazard 39
Figure 4-3 The seismicity of the northeastern region of the United States and Eastern Canada for the

period 1534-1959 (from Algermissen, 1983). The solid circles are principally

instrumentally determined epicenters, while the open circles represent earthquakes

located in using intensity data. The hachured and named areas represent concentrations

of seismicity grouped together only for the purpose of discussion in the text. The dashed

line represents the strike of the New England (Kelvin) sea mount chain offshore. Onshore,

the line has been extended to show the northwest-southwest alignment of seismicity

known as Boston-Ottawa trend.

40 4: Seismic Hazard ATC-25
earthquake east of Cape Ann, with an epicenter

located at about 42.5 N and 70.0 W, with

magnitude 60 (magnitude and epicenter

location estimated on the basis of seismic

intensity data). The shock was felt from

Chesapeake Bay to Annapolis, River, Nova

Scotia; and from Lake George, New York, to a

point at sea 200 miles east of Cape Ann, an area

of about 300,000 square miles.

Southeastern Region. The seismicity of this

region is shown in Figure 4-4. With the

exception of the Charleston, South Carolina,

earthquake, this region has a moderate level of

earthquake activity. The largest and by far the

most destructive earthquakes in this region

occurred on August 31, 1886, with their

epicenter about 15 miles northwest of

Charleston, South Carolina (32_9 N, 80.0 W).

The first shock was at 21:51, the second about 8

minutes later. An area with a radius of 800 miles.

was affected; the strongly shaken portion

extended to 100 miles.

The bending of rails and lateral displacement of

tracks due to ground displacements were very

evident in the epicentral region, though not at

Charleston. There were severe bends of the

track in places and sudden and sharp

depressions of the roadbed. At one place, there

was a sharp S-curve. At a number of locations,

the effect on culverts and other structures

demonstrated strong vertical force in action at

the time of the earthquake. Figure 4-5 shows.

the effects in the epicentral area, and Figure 4-6

shows the isoseismal map for the event

(Bollinger, 1977).

Central Region- Compared to the interior of

other continents, the central region of North

America, especially the Upper Mississippi

embayment, is one of relatively frequent smallto-moderate size earthquakes and infrequent

large events. In fact, three of the largest

earthquakes in North American history

occurred there (Hopper, 1985). These latter

events occurred in 1811-1812, near the present

town of New Madrid, Missouri. They were

powerful enough to alter the course of the

Mississippi River. Although masonry and stone

structures were damaged to distances of 250

kilometers, and chimneys destroyed to distances

of 400 kilometers, the sparse settlement of the

area prevented grave damage. The extent and

severity of ground failure and topographic

effects from these shocks have not been equaled

by any other earthquake in the conterminous

United States.

The seismicity of this region is shown in Figure

4-7. Earthquakes of small magnitude (less than

5.0) are scattered throughout the region, and

the major seismicity is associated with the rift

structure identified in the New Madrid area.

Since the 1811-1812 sequence, nine events of

estimated magnitude greater than 5.0 have

occurred through 1980, only one of which is

estimated to have been greater than magnitude

6.0 (mb 6.2, in 1895) (Algermissen, 1983).

The New Madrid Seismic Zone lies within a 40-

mile-wide, 120-mile-long portion of the

northern Mississippi embayment--a southplunging trough of sedimentary rocks. The

boundaries of this zone are at present somewhat

uncertain. The zone may extend farther to the

south than presently recognized. The epicenter

pattern in the New Madrid area shows welldefined lineations: a northeast-striking zone

that extends about 60 milesi from near Marked

Tree, Arkansas (approximately 40 miles

northwest of Memphis), to near Caruthersville,

Missouri; a north-northwest-striking zone from

southeast of Ridgely, Tennessee, to west of New

Madrid; and another northeast-striking zone

extending from west of New Madrid to near

Charleston, Missouri The first zone is less

active, but earthquakes along it have relatively

higher magnitudes. The third zone includes

frequent events of small magnitude. Note that

no identifiable surface faults or offset landforms

or drainage features have been identified.

Because seismic attenuation through frictional

damping, or dissipation of earthquake energy

with distance, is less in the eastern and central

United States than in the west, earthquakes in

this area have the potential or producing strong

ground shaking over comparatively wide areas.

The isoseismal map of the December 16, 1811,

New Madrid earthquake (Nuttli, 1981) is shown

in Figure 4-8- Algermissen and Hopper (1985)

have developed maps of hypothetical intensities

for the region, based on enveloping effects that

would result from an earthquake occurring

"anywhere from the northern to southern end of

the seismic zone."

Western Mountain Region. Important

earthquake activity in this region has, occurred in

ATC-25 4: Seismic Hazard 41

ATC-25 4: Seismic Hazard 41
85- 8o' LEGEND

Fell Reports 0

11-111 0

IV-V 0

o so " ibs VI VII 0 SCALE: LV-IX

o so 00 kU.omdtf

x W

Two or mm x eorthquakes

Seismicity of the Southeastern region, 1754-1970 (from Bollinger, 1977).

42 4: Seismic Hazard ATC-25

: Figure 4-4

I

42 4: Seismic Hazard ATC-25
330

ScO

Figure 4-5 Effects in the epicentral area of the 1886 Charleston, South Carolina, Earthquake (from Algermissen, 19,83).

ATC-25 4: Seismic Hazard 43

ATC-25 4: Seismic Hazard 43
b) Detailed map of seismic intensity.

a) Broad map, based on detailed map

(below)

Isoseismal map of the 1886

1977).

Charleston, South Carolina, Earthquake (from Bollinger,

44 4: Seismic Hazard ATC-25~~~~~~~~~~

Figure 4-6

ATC-25 44 4: Saismi.c Hazard
Figure 4-7 Seismicity of the Central Region, 1877-7976. The data are taken principally from Algermissen (983) with minor changes and additions. The stars represent earthquakes with maximum MMfs of IX or greater, triangles represent earthquakes with maximum

intensities of VI-Vffi; squares represent earthquakes with maximum intensities of V-:VI.-

ATC-25 4: Seismic Hazard 45
Figure 4-8 Isoseismal map of the December 16, 1811, earthquake (from Nuttli,

numbers give the Modified Mercalli intensities at each data point.

350

300

1979). The Arabic

46 4: Seismic Hazard ATC-25

46 4: Seismic Hazard ATC-25
Figure 4-91 Seisnicity of the Western Mountain Region (Algermissen, 983). Stars represent earthquakes with maximum intensities of X or greater; triangles represent earthquakes with maximum intensities of i-VI If; and squares represent earthquakes with maximum

intensities of V-Vt.

4: Seismic Hazard 

47

ATC-25 Hazard 47
th e ' e l o ws m n a r - e g n L i r a x esbern . to ita:na .in e icinki o ihe' t h

Idaho o der, and'& oradicdhlb aboqng the

Wasatc[a Front., asshown in Fiig ire 4-S.. Maijoir

earth'quakes oc usrred in He~ena,' Montana,:i~n

P 925 (Ms '6.),at HegemInL' er,' I i~iota:na.' , n

1959 i M7.1)' 5 nd ait Borah. Peak, Id aho [in 1983

Priobalblly the most selrious risk iiin ithe Western

.iitaiaisnIReg~osn,,.howec~ er, ,eidsts along the

lh asaxboh From :regioin of o h n uta t h

'This area, is domin'ated hy tihe "Wasat lh Fault, a

:220-mil-lng, noirth-s'ouith-itrending zoan~e

'exvtending from Ouinnisocn, Utah, n the souith to

Mala Ciyj Idhionthie Fuorth, and idirectly

threatening 'th S alitLike City area.. In this

zone, young :Rnountain'blocks haive ibeen upfif ted

'to foir m t e p r m in'e t fa i n 5 La r( h e

'Wsatch.F oant'j, wh iliarons the seas tiern

bou dacif L[. e5' it Lake an Uitah 'va'e' i

.Included in ithis zoine is the active Easit Cache

IFaulit Sysitem lociated on thie eastern side oil

' a C L ale h e . ~ t h e r e l it f a l s 's te m 'o :

linterest is th a'e'ZalyIah it one, located

:north 'of the G ewt Salt'ILak :neasr the boirdeir

wilth Idaho..lithas b esen ithe mosit acivle f' wi in

the sit'tefor I'irger-sjizbe eenits (A. aba z ans

Smith, 179).

Histioric records 'ofeairthiq uake aciviiry in Utah

date back tso 1853., slhiortly after th e:regjioin was

,setitleid Ipe:rnai'entkiy. Sinceithattime. over 1,100

felt evtents Ih.aWM occufredion a riegalr basis. Tme,

searlists ~entres srded thathIa s been sstimnaited

ito hasve -a maggmitude oil 6.0 ior greaiter was the

IBecir'Lalke Vall~ley Eartlhqualke in 1884

(es timated magnitude '6.1 'Thie :1909 'event in11

lHansel Valkey'was assigpied a matirnam init'&isity

of' .1111and a maag nitude sof 6.0, 'i nd resulted in

waveS lbcingssent 'svecirtheraiway' causcv; y ait

the:noirtlh 'end sof ithe Great Salt Lake and

'windows Ibiin brokein as fr awaey as SaklitLake

Ciii% .'Thielairgest earth; iqahkse ' o date in Utah.,

'the :193 4 Hansell ' ally 'evremnt ('l'4 6 ) sev e m f

d araged biric lb1ualdings in Kos miD jprodacesd2-

foot s arp i n thbe grow dsuarfaccs,, .6 espitly alteired

grousndmaiterfisow paitteirns, and caused

nsonsitructurahl damage 'to buiikliiig in Sajlt.Lak

City. It occurred in a spi rset p'opuLated a rea,

'otherwise greait 'daimage ccould have resulted.

Hi'stori 'earthqakedanmagec tio th e Utah V alley

areahass thus fair Ibeend ue to locallearithqalkes

'ith rraginitudes'of appro.innately' '5.0 'or le: s.,

wilth mm nmuiin mtemsifir of;lbolut' NI VIot

Foes . Damage has benm Iylmtdto uracked

waitsand chimneys, and brokevn wi~ndaw, Since

196011, theire hasbeen very litle nmomble

,earthquake atiki bit~n 'the Utah allej~

Ho11eVir, researchhas shiownthat miany Large

sevm v evenits (Ma naiti es .6 to 7-5)h

Laken pla e along the WamsaitchFront durirq the

past IOQ 00 years rS wian et al 9 0.

Wa' hington and Oregoin is slhow in Figuire

4- 10.. lo3sit o. the earthquali [a ctrvi as

'o urred in the ~wixjutyof'Plu et Sound

Alrthough ai few, geologicai' recent flaults

thioug$tt t be potenitial[Iy antivie have been

located in wesiternand central 'Washington, nio

hisitoiiseismic acit,6ty has been associated wi th

thi n .1I sie i , sit ire ior'de d se s mi dtviijimT i

Waslhingitoin] hasbeen atu ibuted ito, the

subductilon of the offishoire Juan die Fuca crustal

p late beneath itle'Noirth American cointinental

.Plate.-

;Suhdu ition zoines oc uir at o ins w ee

undertibe influence or ite toni- p Ita momenmenit,

one, pilese o t .ecearith's crust is foirced beneath

another.. Subductnion zones have been associated

wi vwery Y large 9hth earthiqualkes incl uding the 19 85

Nen do'i fly ,NtS81) and 11964.Ala1ka (M 8.3)

'events.. Subduction zoines are freiquenit~

associbated with 'volicaioikaictiiv yas well as

lear [aqu'iles~..'The resence'of thie'voicanically

a live C'asc.aderan~e s'uplpio:rts the eviden e lIbir

*an as tve Jua' n ilse.F uc rasiubs act~:ioin :z'one,.

Furither su~or~n ~ einclud es the

mouintains on the 'Olympic peniinsula hic

appecir to have Ibeen formed b debiris scra ed

off t he Juan de F uca 'plaite by'h ov ridng

Noirth Aneri'can plate.u

Available goliogic infoirraaton idicates tait

,gieait 'earthquakzes" ,ith magpiitu'des in'ess' of

8J. we oomiurred on thieJuande Fuaa

sub' actilonz.me at ILea' ei.gLbt times in ithe last

5000 years,.The [asit such eVent is ithoug~bt toD

havsie occurred abonit 300 years ago..Evidence for

Su&h anearthquake in l d s g'lgia yrecnit

su lb mn ierged i ; h l n s a o s il o e t l n

ithe ''Wa sIingt'on ciasiiii'. It is believe' thalt

Portion'sof the shingtoin ~on'st: ,ubsii'sed'by as

imush as 3 ect in tiai event.

En; adtioin: ito the! 6emit eiarthquaak'es ides iribed

abouvqe x 'ens lye buit moO e rioderaite es naicitj

'4B 

4:: Seismic Hazard 

A'. C2'5

-48 4:::Seksm1c:Mavard ATC-25
1 20v

Seismicity of Oregon and Washington, 1859-1975. The star represents an earthquake with

maximum Modified Mercalli intensity of Ix; triangles represent earthquakes with maximum

intensities of VII-VIII; and small squares represent earthquakes with maximum intensities of

V-VI (Algermissen, 1983).

ATC-25 4: Seismic Hazard 49

Figure 4-10

ATC-25 -4: Seismic Hazard 49'
has been associated with the same subduction

zone, deep beneath the Puget Sound trough

between Seattle and Olympia. In this area,

termed the Puget Trough Intercrustal Zone, tf

friction between the underlying Juan de Fuca

plate and overriding North American plate has

resulted in many mid-size events with occasion;

strong damaging shocks. Typically these events

occur at depths from 20 to 30 miles below the

surface and are therefore less damaging than

events of similar size in California, which occui

at shallower depths. Two of the largest record

earthquakes in the Pacific Northwest have

occurred in this zone. A Ms 7.1 event in 1949,

located near Olympia, caused extensive damag,

in Seattle, Tacoma, and Olympia. A 1965 (Ms

6.5) event, centered near the Seattle-Tacoma

airport, caused MMI VII and VIII damage in

both Seattle and Tacoma. A mean return peric

of approximately 30 years has been calculated

for events of this size. Great earthquakes of

magnitude 7.5 or larger are believed credible.

An earthquake in the northern Cascades in 18

had an estimated magnitude of 7.3 and a

maximum intensity of MMI IX. Earthquake

intensities of MMI VII were experienced on th

Olympic peninsula in 1891 and again in 1904.

Two moderate earthquakes in 1932 and 1945

shook the central Cascades with maximum MTV

VII.

The Vancouver-Victoria area, located in the

northern portion of Puget Sound, has had a

relatively large number of smaller earthquakes.

However, the maximum magnitudes

experienced have been much lower than those

in the southern portion of Puget Sound. Only

three earthquakes as large as magnitude 5.5

have occurred in the Vancouver-Victoria area.

The corresponding maximum intensities were

on the order of MMI VII. The estimated

maximum magnitude for the VancouverVictoria area is about 6.5.

Further north on Vancouver Island, over 200

miles from Seattle, two earthquakes of

magnitudes 7.0 and 7.4 occurred in 1918 and

1946, respectively. These events produced

maximum intensities of MMI VIII but did not

cause significant damage in Washington.

California and Western Nevada. Earthquakes

California and Western Nevada represent a hip

percentage of the seismic activity of the

conterminous United States. The majority of

these shocks occur at relatively shallow focal

depths of 10 to 15 miles and along known

rupture zones or faults. Figure 4-11 shows the

seismicity of this region, while Figure 4-12 shows

faults with historic displacements in this region.

While this area is the most seismically active

region of the conterminous United States, only

three events with magnitudes greater than Ms

8.0 have occurred in historical times. Two of

Id these events occurred on the principal fault in

this area, the San Andreas, which extends over

600 miles through California, from near the

e Salton Sea in Southern California northwest to

Cape Mendocino. The most famous of these

San Andreas events was the April 18, 1906, San

Francisco Earthquake (Ms 8.3), caused by a

id rupture of approximately 270 miles in length,

from San Juan Bautista to off Cape Mendocino.

Devastation was extremely widespread, with

enormous losses in San Francisco caused by the

ensuing conflagration (Lawson et al., 1908). The

72 other of these events, the Ft. Tejon Earthquake,

occurred on January 9, 1857, on a segment of

the San Andreas Fault between Cholame and

e south of Cajon Pass. It may be regarded as a

Southern California counterpart of the 1906

event. The isoseismal maps for these events are

RI shown in Figure 4-13. In addition to these two

great earthquakes, a number of large,

potentially damaging earthquakes have occurred

on the San Andreas Fault, including events in

1838, 1865, and, most recently, the October 17,

1989, Loma Prieta Earthquake (Ms 7.1). This

last event resulted in very significant disruption

to almost all lifelines, especially the highway and

electric power networks (Khater et al., 1990).

The third of the great historic California

earthquakes is the 1872 Owens Valley event,

resulting from approximately 150 kilometers of

faulting. The area was relatively sparsely

populated but still resulted in about 10%

fatalities in Lone Pine, because of the

predominantly adobe construction.

Another very important fault in Northern

California is the Hayward Fault, located on the

eastern side of San Francisco Bay and extending

approximately 55 miles from San Jose

northwesterly to San Pablo (Figure 4-12). The

in Hayward Fault is one of the major active

gh branches of the San Andreas Fault System, and

is particularly significant because it passes

ATC-25 so 4: Seismic Hazard
Seismicity of Western Nevada and California, 1811-1976 (Algermissen, 1983). Stars

represent earthquakes with Modified Mercalh intensities of IX or greater, triangles represent shocks with maximum intensities of VII-VIII; and small squares represent shocks wih maximum intensities of V.

4: Seismic Hazard

Figure 4-1 

ATC-25 51
Figure 4-12

120°

Faults with historic displacements in California and Nevada. The year of occurrence for

selected large earthquakes is shown (Algermissen, 1983).

ATC-25 52 

4: Seismic Hazard

I. ........ O R EGO N IDAHO t,1, - r~~~- - - - IOAHO.

/ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~I

I FL.EASANT VALLEY

j- I ",AULT SCARP

UTAH

IZONA

LOS ANG

S.N

- SURFACE RUPTURE

TWdO RECORDED RUPTURES

0 150 KILOMETERS I I 

I

I

116°

52 4: Seismic Hazard
-ELT LIMITS, 1906

400

350'

120' 1150

Isoseismal map for the January 9, 1857, earthquake on the San Andreas Fault near Fort Tejon Agermissen, 1983). Also shown, for comparison, are the felt limits for the 1906 San Francisco Earthquake.

__-2 4:SimcHzr

53

te

Figure 4-13

ATC-25 4: Seismic Hazard
directly through the heavily populated cities

such as Hayward, San Leandro, Oakland, and

Berkeley. It was the source of the Hayward

Earthquake of 1836 (estimated Ms 6.8), in

which fissures opened along the fault from San

Pablo to Mission San Jose, and ground shaking

caused havoc in the settlements of San Jose and

Monterey. In 1868 an earthquake (estimated M.

6.8) ruptured the fault the fault for 20 miles and

severely damaged every building in the village of

Hayward. More recent damaging earthquakes

occurred in 1915, 1933, and 1937. The Hayward

Fault is believed capable of producing

earthquakes as large as magnitude 7.5, and is

presently judged highly likely to rupture with a

magnitude of about 7.0 in the near future

[United States Geological Survey (USGS),

1990]; this judgment is based, among other

evidence, on the pairing of San

Andreas/Hayward events in 1838/1836 and

1865/1868. A large earthquake on this fault is of

potentially catastrophic proportions

(Steinbrugge et al., 1987).

Similar to the Hayward Fault situation in the

San Francisco Bay Area, the Los Angeles region

is threatened by a number of additional faults,

including the Newport-Inglewood, SantaMonica Raymond, Elsinore, Norwalk, and other

faults and fault zones. Significant events have

included the 1933 Long Beach event (Ms 6.3)

on the Newport-Inglewood Fault (NBFU, 1933;

Binder, 1952), the 1971 San Fernando event

(MS 6.4, San Fernando Fault), and the 1987

Whittier (M. 5.9) event.

Other significant events in California have

included the 1940 El Centro (Ms 7.1), the 1952

Kern County (Ms 7.7), and the 1983 Coalinga

(Ms 6.5) events.

4.5 Regional Representative

Earthquakes

Based on the foregoing review of conterminous

U.S. regional seismicity, each region appears to

have significant historic precedent for a

damaging earthquake of potentially catastrophic

dimensions. For purposes of examining this

potential, the earthquakes indicated in Table 4-

2 are representative events for the investigation

of lifeline loss estimation and disruption.

Evernden et al. (1981) estimates that these

events represent almost the maximum

Table 4-2 Representative Earthquakes for

Lifeline Loss Estimation

Region

Northeastern

Southeastern

Central

Western Mountain

Northwestern

Southern California

Northern California

Event

Cape Ann,1 755

Charleston, 1886

New Madrid, 1811 -

1812

Wasatch Front, no date

Puget Sound, 1949

Fort Tejon, 1857

Hayward, 1868

earthquake expected in each area. Review of

Algermissen et al. (1982) indicates general

agreement.

4.6 Estimation of Seismic Intensities

and Choice of Scenario

Earthquakes for this Project

Choice of a Model. In order to estimate the

seismic hazard (i.e., deterministic intensity) of

the scenario events over the affected area

associated with each event, a model of

earthquake magnitude, attenuation, and local

site effects is required. For the conterminous

Urifted States, two general models were

considered: Evernden and Thomson (1985), and

Algermissen et al. (1990).

Both models are applicable for the entire

conterminous United States, and each offers

many advantages but addresses two

fundamentally different users. The Algermissen

model is oriented toward probabilistic mapping

of seismic hazard, while the Evernden model is

oriented toward exploration of the effects of

deterministic events. Both models were

considered for use in this investigation.

Selection of one over the other was difficult, but

the Evernden model offered the following

advantages for this study: (1) verification via

comparison with historical events,

(ii) incorporation of local soil effects and ready

availability of a nationwide geologic database,

and (iii) ready availability of closed-form

attenuation relations. While determination of

seismic intensities is fundamental to the results

of this investigation, the choice of one of these

models over the other was not felt to be crucial

to this study, because (i) the primary purpose of

54 4: Seismic Hazard ATC-25

4: Hazard ATC-25 54
this study is not the investigation of seismic

hazards in the conterminous United States, or

comparison of these two models, but rather the

performance of selected lifelines; and (ii) both

models probably provide similar results, in the

mean (it should be noted, however, that the two

models have not been systematically compared,

to the author's knowledge).

Use of the Evernden Model. Attenuation of

ground motion away from the epicenter has

been estimated by employing Evernden's model

(Evernden et al., 1981). The model contains

several parameters whose evaluations are based

on empirical data. Only three factors in the

model are regionally dependent: the local

attenuation factor, the length of rupture, and a

parameter related to depth of earthquake focus.

The local attenuation factor changes

significantly across different regions. Its value is

about 175 in coastal California, 1.5 in eastern

California and the Mountain States, 1.25 in the

area of the Gulf and Atlantic Coastal plains

including the Mississippi Embayment, and 1.0 in

the rest of the eastern United States. Rupture

length and energy released are related by an

empirical relation, which leads to the

observation that all major earthquakes of the

Eastern United States have fault lengths of 10-

to-40 kilometers maximum. With the local

attenuation factor and rupture length

established, peak intensity at the epicenter

serves to establish the depth of focus.

The geological map of the United States

published in the NationalAtlas of the United

States ofAmerica (Gerlich, no date ) was used

for the complementary geologic base, digitized

on a 25- by 25-kilometer grid.

As noted by Evernden et al. (1981), digitization

at this resolution generally results in saturated

poor ground not constituting the dominant

ground condition in any particular grid element.

Therefore, the resulting intensities should

generally be interpreted as those on bedrock,

per Evemrden. This study generally concurs with

this point, noting however that even the 25- by

25-kilometer digitization captures poor ground

conditions in certain important locations,

especially in the Mississippi Valley and along the

eastern seaboard. As a generalization,

intensities estimated by the Evernden model can

be considered to provide lower bounds on site

intensities.

Table 4-3 Geologic and Ground Condition

Units, Conterminous United States

(per Evernden et al., 1981)

Units of Geologic Map

Sedimentary rocks

Quaternary

Upper Tertiary

Lower Tertiary

Cretaceous

Jurassic and Triassic

Upper Paleozoic

vMiddle Paleozoic

Lower Paleozoic

Younger Precambrian

Older Precambrian

Volcanic rocks

Quaternary and Tertiary

volcanic rocks

Intrusive rocks.

All ages

Ground

Condbton

Unit

Relative

Intensity

A 0.00

B -1.00

C -1.50,

D -2.00

E -2.25

F -2.50

G -2.75

H -2.75

I -2.75

i -3.00

K -3.00

L -3.00

Table 4-3 indicates, the ground condition unit

and relative intensity that correspond to the

geologic units of the geologic map. Figure 4-14

shows the conterminous United States mapped

in terms of these seismic units.

Scenario Earthquakes. Based on the

earthquakes discussed above, representative of

all major regions of the conterminous United

States, eight scenario events were selected for

this investigation. The eight events are indicated

in Table 4-4. With the exception of the Cape

Ann, Charleston, and Hayward events, all

magnitudes are reflective of the representative

earthquake for the region (as specified in Table

4-2). The scenario events for Cape Ann,

Charleston, and Hayward have magnitudes onehalf unit higher than the representative event

These magnitudes are interpreted as maximum

credible for these locations.

The choice of a scenario event on the Hayward

fault for the San Francisco Bay Area, rather

than the 1906 San Francisco event, is based on

the perceived high likelihood of a magnitude 7.0

event (USGS, 1990) as well as the potential for

major damage and lifeline disruption, should

such an event occur (CDMG, 1987). Since most

lifelines approach San Francisco Bay from the

east, more of them cross the Hayward Fault

than cross the San Andreas Fault. So the

ATC-25 4: SelsmTh Hazard 55

ATC-25 4: Seismic Hazard 55
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Table 4-4 Scenario Earthquakes

Region

Northeastern

Southeastern

Central

Western Mountain

Northwestern

Southern California

Northern California

Event

Cape Ann

Magnide

7

Charleston 7.5

New Madrid 7 and 8

Wasatch Front 7.5

Puget Sound 7.5

Fort Tejon 8

Hayward 7.5

Hayward event would appear to represent as

disruptive an event, and potentially more so,

than the 1906 event, which is presently

perceived to be of low likelihood in the near

future.

Intensity Distributions. The Evernden model

was employed to generate expected seismic

intensity distribution in the conterminous

United States for the eight scenario events.

These intensity distributions are presented in

Figures 4-15 through 4-22.

The intensity patterns for these events are seen

to be basically circular, centered at the

earthquake's epicenter. Deviations from the

circular shape are due to local geologic

conditions. Comparison of estimated intensities

with historic event isoseismals indicates general

agreement, though historical events are in some

cases smaller than the scenario event.

ATC-25 4: Seismic Hazard

57 ATC-25 4: Seismic Hazard
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-IX

-VI
Estimates of Direct Damage

5.1 Introduction

The analysis of seismic vulnerability of lifeline

systems and the economic impact of disruption

is based on an assessment of three factors.:

* Seismic hazard,

Lifeline inventory, and

* Vulnerability functions.

In this investigation these factors are used to

quantify vulnerability and impact of disruption

in terms of (1) direct damage and (2) economic

losses resulting from direct damage and loss of

function of damaged facilities. Estimates of

direct damage to lifelines, expressed in terms of

percent replacement value and dollar loss, are

discussed in this chapter. Indirect economic

losses are discussed in Chapter 6.

Direct damage is defined as damage resulting

directly from ground shaking or other collateral

loss causes such as liquefaction. For each

facility, it is expressed in terms of cost of repair

divided by replacement cost and varies from 0 to

1.0 (0% to 100%). In this project it is estimated

using (1) estimates of ground shaking intensity

provided by the seismic hazard model (from

Chapter 4), (2) inventory data specifying the

location and type of facilities affected (from

Chapter 2), and (3) vulnerability functions that

relate seismic intensity and site conditions to

expected damage (from Appendix B).

5.2 General Analytical Approach for

Estimating Direct Damage

The earthquake survival of lifelines depends on

their seismic performance characteristics. As

described in Chapter 3 and summarized in

Appendix B, the seismic performance of lifeline

components has been characterized in this study using data developed from the database of

expert opinion elicited in the ATC-13 project

(ATC, 1985). This expert opinion was based in

part on observations of lifeline components

performance in previous earthquakes as well as

estimates of expected performance based on

knowledge of seismic design procedures and

criteria. Thus, component vulnerability data for

this study is essentially empirically based, rather

than resulting from detailed analyses of each

lifeline component.

The analysis approach to estimate direct damage considers both damage resulting from ground

shaking as well as damage resulting from

liquefaction. Damage due to other collateral

loss causes, such as landslide and fire following

earthquake, are not included because of the

unavailability of inventory information and the

lack of available models for estimating these

losses nationwide.

The analysis approach for computing direct

damage due to ground shaking proceeded as

follows. For each earthquake scenario, MMI

levels were assigned to each 25-km grid cell in

the affected region, using the Everden MIMI

model, assigned magnitude, and assigned fault

rupture location (from Chapter 4). Damage

states were then estimated for each affected

lifeline component (node or link) in each grid

cell, using the motion-damage curves provided

in Appendix B. As described in the following

sections, the procedure for utilizing the motion-

-damage curves varied slightly by facility type,

depending on whether the lifeline was a site

specific facility, or a regional transmission

(extended) network.

Damage due to liquefaction was estimated using

-a two-step method, also taken from ATC-13

(ATC, 1985). First, the probability of ground

failure in each grid cell was calculated on the

basis of the soil condition and associated

liquefaction probability assessments provided in

Table 8.4 of the ATC-13 report (p. 230). Only

one soil unit (as defined by Everden) was

assumed to be liquefiable: Unit A, which was

assumed to be alluvium with water table less

than 3-meters deep. Direct damage due to

liquefaction in each Unit A grid cell was then

estimated as follows:

DMG(PG) = DMG(S) x p(GFI) x 5

(for surface facilities)

and (5.1)

ATC-25 5: Estimates ci DIrect Damage 67

5 .

ATC-25 5: Estimates of Direct Damage .67
DMG(S) x p(GFI) x 10

(for buried facilities) (5.2)

DMG(S) = Mean damage caused by

shaking

DMG(PG) = Mean damage caused by

poor ground

p(GFI) = Probability of a given

ground failure intensity,

taken directly,

noncumulatively, from

Table 8.4 (ATC-13) for a

given shaking intensity

After damages due to ground shaking and

liquefaction were established for each facility in

each affected grid cell, the total direct damage

for each facility was calculated. As suggested in

ATC-13, the total direct damage, DMG(T), was

simply the sum of damage due to shaking plus

damage due to liquefaction, with the sum always

equal to or less than 1.0 (100 %):

DMG(T) = DMG(S) + DMG(PG) (5.3)

Cautionary Note Regarding Analysis

Approach. In the scenario earthquakes it is

assumed that the damage factor is uniquely

related to the MMI zone in the manner

prescribed in ATC-13 (ATC, 1985). There may

be one or more MMI zones within each 25 km

grid cell, depending on spatial attenuation. In

either case, lifeline damage is assumed to be

uniform within each MMI zone. Experts who

supplied data to the ATC-13 project may

question application of their opinions to cases

where lifeline damage does not occur uniformly

within a grid cell or MMI zone. In the ATC-13

Questionnaiie, on which the damage factors and

loss of function statistics are based, the damage

factor is defined as damage due to ground

shaking only (see ATC-13, p. 175). This

approach probably led ATC-13 experts to

provide an adequate picture of lifeline damage

in many cases. For example, damage to pipelines

in southern San Fernando Valley as a result of

the 1971 earthquake was primarily due to

ground shaking, and was geographically

distributed in a way that it is reasonable to speak

of average damage within a given MMI zone.

Damage to pipelines in northern San Fernando

Valley was more closely spaced and more severe

due to ground rupture and to other significant

ground distortions associated with nearby fault

movement; at least some experts who provided

opinions probably considered the fact that

higher MMI is associated with such effects and

incorporated it in their response despite

instructions to consider only ground shaking. In

this case, also, it is reasonable to speak of

average damage. Thus, damage due to ground

distortion can, at least in some cases, also be

presented as uniform or average throughout a

given MMI zone. Damage statistics prepared in

this way are best applied in situations where not

only the hazard (ground shaking and ground

distortions) but also the structures of interest

(pipelines, highway bridges, electrical

substations) are distributed somewhat

uniformly. It is significant that most of the

pipeline damage statistics from San Fernando

and from other earthquakes are derived from

distribution and transmission networks, which

are relatively dense within the MMI zones

considered. The conditions that shaped ATC-13

expert opinion are most nearly approximated in

such cases (for example, a dense network of

transmission and distribution pipelines); it is

reasonable to use ATC-13 damage factors for

these situations.

However, to the extent that structures occur

sparsely in a grid cell or MMI zone, conditions

differ from those on which many expert opinions

are based. This is because fewer lifeline

components will be damaged at all if there are

fewer components to coincide with damaging

ground conditions. In the extreme case of a

single lifeline structure in a 25-km grid cell, it

may be misleading to apply statistics derived

from regions with a dense array of structures. In

at least some regions of the scenario

earthquakes, there appear to be only a few

lifeline components passing through the MMI

zones or 25-km grid cells. In instances where

trunk and transmission lines are sparse in a

MMI zone or grid.cell, application of ATC-13

statistics may be misleading because structure

and hazard coincide much less frequently than is

assumed. This possibility introduces an

additional type of uncertainty that affects the

average damage factors used in this study.

The foregoing discussion is based on intuition,

not on rigorous analytical modeling. However, if

this discussion is valid, the effect of applying

68 5: Estimates of Direct Damage ATC-25

DMG(PG) =

whtert1 5: Estimates of Direct Damage. ATC-25 68
ATC-13 statistics in this study may result in

overestimates of damage.

5.3 Direct Damage Estimates for SiteSpecific Lifelines

Direct damage to site-specific lifelines, ie.,

lifelines that consist of individual sited or point

facilities (e.g., hospitals), were estimated using

the methodology specified above. For airports,

ports and harbors, medical care facilities

(hospitals), and broadcast stations, the inventory

data summarized in Chapter 2 were used to

define the number and distribution of facilities.

For fire and police stations, locations were

assumed to be lumped at the center of the

Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas, and

number of facilities affected were estimated by

proxy, assuming the previously established

relationships, between population and number

of facilities.

For summary and comparative purposes, four

damage states are considered in this study:

* Light damage (1-10% replacementvalue);

Moderate damage (10-30% replacement

value);

* Heavy damage (30-60% replacement value);

and

* Major to destroyed (60-100% replacement

value).

The total number of affected facilities and the

percentage of facilities in each damage state are

summarized for each scenario earthquake in

Tables 5-1 through 5-6. Following is a discussion

of the direct damage impact on each site-specific

lifeline considered.

5.3.1 Airports

Direct damage summaries for civil and general

aviation airports for the various scenario

earthquakes (Tables 5-la and 5-1b) indicate that

damage to terminals is expected to be

particularly high in the magnitude-8.0 New

Madrid and Puget Sound earthquake scenarios.

For example, for the New Madrid magnitude-8.0

event, 13 % of the airports in Arkansas (23- in

total), 6% of the airports in Missouri (25 in

total), and 2% in Tennessee (4 in total) would

sustain major to destructive damage (60 to

100%) (Table 5-la). The Puget Sound

magnitude-7.5 scenario event would seriously

affect an even larger number of airport

terminals, with 12% or approximately 43

airports expected to sustain damage in this same

range (60 to 100%). In the case of the Cape Ann and Charleston events, direct damage to

terminals is also significant Direct damage to

runways, (Table 5-lb), on the other hand, is

relatively low for most scenario events; if

damage does occur, it is, usually less than 30%.

The reason for the relatively high impact on

airports in the Puget Sound event is assumed to

be due to the high concentration of airports

near the source zone and poor ground, i.e.,

liquefiable sites. For the New Madrid event, the

cause appears to be due to a combination of

poor ground, low ground-motion attenuation

with distance, and lack of seismically resistant

design construction features.

5.3.2 Ports and Harbors

Since ports and harbors are located in the

coastal regions, only those scenario earthquakes

affecting these regions will negatively impact

this facility type. As indicated in Table 5-2, the

most severe damages to ports and harbors are

expected for the Charleston and Puget Sound

events. For example, one hundred percent, or

20 ports and harbors, in South Carolina can be

expected to sustain heavy damage (30 to 60%),

and 73%, or approximately 22 such facilities

would be similarly affected in Georgia. In

Washington, 14% of the ports (approximately

11) would be similarly affected. Numerous ports

and harbors in these states would also sustain

moderate damage (10 to 30%), as would

approximately 22 such facilities in California for

the Hayward magnitude-7.5 event. The primary

cause of such damage, of course, is poor ground.

5.3.3 Medical Care Facilities

Direct damage summaries for medical care

facilities (hospitals) for the various scenario

earthquakes (Table 5-3) suggest that damage to

this facility type will be relatively high for the

Puget Sound, Charleston, New Madrid, Fort

Tejon, and Hayward scenario events. For

example, damage data for the Puget Sound and

Charleston events indicate that 15% of the

hospitals in Washington (15 in total) and 13% of

ATC-25 5: Estimates of Direct Damage 69

ATC-25 5: Estimates of Dizect Damage 69
Damage Percent for Air Transportation Terminals for Each Scenario

Earthquake (Percent of Airports in State)

Total Number

Light Damage

1-10%

Moderate

10-30 %

Heavy

30-60 %

Major to Destructive

60-100 %

Total Number

Light Damage

1-10 %

Moderate

10-30 %

Heavy

30-60 %

Major to Destructive

60- 00 %

HA YWARD

(M= 7.5)

Total Number

Light Damage

1-10 %

Moderate

10-30 %

Heavy

30-60 %

Major to Destructive

60-100 %

* Illinois

547

11%

< 1%

0%

0%

Massachusetts

149

77%

<11%

0%

4%

NEWMADRID (M=8.0)

Missouri Arkansas Tennessee Kentucky Mississippi

425 177 196 149 193

5%

0%

0%

6%

17%

21%

5%

13%

18%

13%

0%

2%

26%

3%

0%

0%

64%

19%

0%

0%

CAPEANN (M=70)

Connecticut Delaware Rhode IslandNew Hampshire

115 37 55 63

57% 65% 55% 56%

0% 0% 0% 0%

0% 0% 0% 0%

0% 0% I 0% 0%

FORT TEJON PUGETSOUND

(M=8.0) (M=7.5) NEW MADRID (M=70)

alifornia California Washington Illinois Missouri Arkansas Tennessee

869 869 364 547 425 177 196

9% 12% 15% < 1% < 1% 31% 19%

2% 14% 6% 0% 2% 12% <1%

0% <1% 6% 0% 0% 0% 0%

0% 0% 12% 0% 3% 1% 2%

CHARLESTON (M=7.5)

South Carolina North Carolina Georgia

147 309 343

33%

20%

0%

4%

WASATCH FRONT (M= 7.5)

Utah

107

24%

1%

0%

0%

15%

23%

0%

0%

Kentucky

149

7%

0%

0%

0%

Mississippi

Mississippi

193

32%

0%

0%

0%

04

Table 5-1a

gn

en

ua(D

w

0

0

CDi

Cn

28%

1%

0%

2%

Ci
Damage Percent for Air Transportation Runways for Each Scenario Earthquake

(percent of Airports in State)

NEWMADRID (M=8.0)

Illinois Missouri Arkansas Tennessee Kentucky Mississippi

Total Number 547 425 177 196 149 193

Light Damage

1-10%

Moderate

10-30 %

Heavy

30-60 %

Major to Destructive

60-10 %

<1%

0%

0%

0%

< 1%

5%

1%

6%

20%

15%

0%

0%

3%

< 1%

2%

0%

< 1%

0%

0%

0%

17%

0%

0%

0%

CAPE ANN (M-7.0)

Massachusetts Connecticut Delaware Rhode Island New Hampshire

Tdtal Number 149 115 37 55 63

Light Damage

1-10 %

Moderate

10-30 %

Heavy

30-60 %

Major to Destructive

60-100 %

<1%

4%

0%

0%

0%

0%

0%

0%

0%

0%

0%

0%

0%

0%

0%

0%

0%

0%

0%

0%

2%

3%

1%

0%

WASATCH FRONT (M=7.5)

Utal

107

5%

0%

0%

0%

HA YWARD

(M= 7.5)

California

Total Number 869

Light Damage

1-10 %

Moderate

10-30%

Heavy

30-60 %

Major to Destructive

60-100 %

4%

2%

0%

0%

FORT TEJON PUGETSOUND

(M=8,0) (M=7.S) NEW MADRID (M= 7.0)

California Washington Illinois Missouri Arkansas Tennessee Kentucky Mississippi

869 364 547 425 177 196 149 193

7%

14%

< 1%

0%

6%

16%

0%

0%

0%

0%

0%

0%

2%

3%

0%

0%

12%

1%

0%

0%

< 1%

< 2%

0%

0%

0%

0%

0%

0%

2%

0%

0%

0%

(10

Table 51 b

CHARLESTON (M=7.5)

South Carolina North Carolina Georgia

147 309 343

01

in

CD

0

1%

0%

0%

0%

1%

2%

0%

0%
Damage Percent for Ports for Selected Scenario Earthquakes (Percent of Ports

in State)

CHARLESTON (M=7.5)

South Carolina North Carolina Georgia

Total Number 20 16 30

Light Damage

1-10 %

Moderate

10-30 %

Heavy

30-60 %

Major to Destructive

60-100 %

0%

0%

100%

0%

HA YWARD

(M=7.5)

California

Total Number 125

0%

0%

0%

0%

10%

0%

73%

0%

CAPE ANN (M=70)

Massachusetts Connecticut Delaware Rhode Island New Hampshire

34 22 10 22 9

1 00%

0%

0%

0%

0%

0%

0%

0%

0%

0%

0%

0%

FORT TEJON PUGETSOUND

(M=8.0) (M=7.5)

California Washington

125 77

Light Damage

1-10 %

Moderate

10-30 %

Heavy

30-60 %

Major to Destructive

60-100%

Table 5-2

86%

0%

0%

0%

0%

00%

0%

00%

4%

22%

0%

0%

0

n:

0%

34%

0%

0%

25%

26%

14%

0%
Table 5-3 Damage Percent for Medical Care Facilities for Each Scenario Earthquake

(Percent of Facilities in State)

Light Damage

1-10 %

Moderate

10-30 %

Heavy

30-60 %

Major to Destructive

60-100 %

22%

0%

0%

0%

6%

0%

0%

3%

16%

29%

3%

7%

18%

14%

0%

<1/0

20%

<1%

0%

0%

7%

0%

0%

0%

CAPE ANN (M-70)

Massachusetts Connecticut Delaware Rhode Island New Hampshire

Total Number 167 66 13 22 40

Light Damage

1-10 %

Moderate

10-30 %

Heavy

30-60 %

Major to Destructive

60-100 %

90%

0%

0%

2%

50%

0%

0%

0%

46%

0%

0%

0%

82%

0%

0%

0%

48%

0%

0%

0%

62%

17%

0%

0%

WASATCH FRONT (M=7.5)

Utah

53

17%

51%

0%

0%

HA YWARD

(M=Z5)

California

Total Number 478

Light Damage

1-10%

Moderate

10-30%

Heavy

30-60 %

Major to Destructive

60-100 %

12%

16%

9%

0%

FORT TEJON PUGET SOUND

(M=8.0) (M=7.5)

California Washington

478 102

16%

20%

10%

0%

7%

18%

5%

10%

01

NEW MADRID (M=8.0)

Illinois Missouri Arkansas Tennessee Kentucky Indiana Mississippi

Total Number 249 171 99 167 125 102 127

CHARLESTON (M=7.5)

South North

Carolina Carolina Georgia

91 161 207

30%

7%

10%

3%

15%

2%

0%

0%

32%

1%

0%

1%
the hospitals in South Carolina (12 in total)

would sustain heavy or major-to-destructive

damage (30 to 100%). In the New Madrid.

magnitude-8.0 event, 10% of the hospitals in

Arkansas (10 in total) and 3% of the hospitals in

Missouri (5 in total) would sustain similar

damage. In California, 10% and 9%, or 48 and

43 hospitals, respectively, would sustain heavy

damage (30-to-60%) in the Fort Tejon and

Hayward scenarios. It is worth noting that

results from a separate study by Applied

Technology Council (ATC, 1991) appear to be

comparable for the magnitude-7.5 Hayward

fault scenario.

As in the case of airports, the reason for severe

damage to hospital facilities in the Puget Sound,

New Madrid, and Charleston events is assumed

to be strongly correlated with poor ground

conditions and construction practices.

5.3.4 Police and Fire Stations

As in the case of medical care facilities, direct

damage data for police and fire stations (Tables

5-4 and 5-5) suggest that damage to this facility

type will be more severe for the New Madrid,

Charleston, and Puget Sound events than for

the California, Wasatch Front, and Cape Ann

events. For example, data for the New Madrid

magnitude-8.0 event indicate that 9% of the fire

stations and 8% of the police stations in

Arkansas would sustain heavy or major-todestructive damage (30 to 100%). Thirteen and

twelve percent, respectively, of fire and police

stations in South Carolina would be similarly

damaged in the Charleston scenario event, and

15% and 8%, respectively, would be similarly

affected by the Puget Sound magnitude-7.5

scenario event.

The reason for severe damage to fire and police

stations in the Puget Sound, New Madrid, and

Charleston events is assumed to be strongly

correlated with poor ground conditions and

construction practices.

5.3.5 Broadcast Stations

Direct damage to broadcast stations for the

eight scenario earthquakes follows a slightly

different pattern than for the other site-specific

lifelines. As indicated in Table 5-6, direct

damage is relatively high for the magnitude-8

New Madrid, Charleston, and Puget Sound

events and slightly less for the Wasatch Front

and Fort Tejon events. Data for the New

Madrid magnitude-8.0 earthquake scenario

indicate that 17% of the broadcast stations in

Arkansas (approximately 78 in total) would

sustain heavy damage or major-to-destructive

damage (30 to 100%). For the Charleston event,

23% or 87 broadcast stations would be similarly

affected, and for the Puget Sound event, 14%

(122 in total) would be similarly affected.

Percentages for the Wasatch Front and Fort

Tejon equal approximately 5%, representing 54

damaged broadcast stations in Utah and 77 or

fewer in California.

5.4 Direct Damage Estimates for

Extended Lifeline Networks

This section presents direct damage estimates

for extended network lifelines, such as highways,

railroads and other networks at the bulk and/or

regional level. The inventory data provided in

Chapter 2 were used to define the location of all

npdes and links. For all systems except pipelines,

direct damage is estimated using the

methodology specified above. Results are

presented in terms of (1) the same four damage

states used for site-specific lifelines, and (2)

maps indicating the damaged portions of each

extended network for the various scenario

earthquakes.

For pipelines, direct damage is estimated (1)

using the damage curves specified in Appendix

B (in terms of breaks per kilometer), (2) a

model that estimates the probability of breaks

occurring within given lengths of pipe subjected

to given earthquake shaking intensities (Khater,

M., et al., 1989), and (3) a special procedure for

estimating damage due to liquefaction. Breaks

are assumed to occur according to a

nonhomogeneous Poisson process. The

probability Pf of having at least one break in a

line with length L is given by

N

Pf (L, MMI(x)) = 1- II Ps(lky MMIk)

k=1

(5.4)

where

Ps(lk, MMIk) = exp(- Xkx 1

k) k=1,...,N (5.5)

in which 11 is the multiplier operator; N is the

number of grid cells through which the pipeline

74 5: Estimates of Direct Damage ATC-25

74 5: Estimates of Direct Damage ATC-25
Table 5-4 Damage Percent for Fire Stations for Each Scenario Earthquake (Percent of

Stations in State)

NEWMADRID tM=8.0)

Illinois Missouri Arkansas Tennessee Kentucky Mississippi

Total Number 923 41 185 378 285 200

CHARLESTON (M=75)

South North

Carolina Carolina Georgia

275 570 490

Light Damage

1-10 %

Moderate

1 0-30 %

Heavy

30-60 %

Major to Destructive

60-100 %

HA YWARD

(M=7.5)

California

Total Number 2230

Light Damage

1-10 %

Moderate

10-30 %

Heavy

30-60 %

Major to Destructive

60-100 %

7%

3%

0%

0%

FORT TEJON PUGET SOUND

(M=8.0) (M=7.5)

California Washington

2230 361

15%

27%

0%

<1%

3%

18%

15%

0%

NEW MADRID

(M=7.0)

Missouri Arkansas Tennessee Kentucky Mississippi

410 185 378 285 200

0%

1%

1%

Q%

15%

8%

0%

0%

10%

0%

<1%

0%

< 1%

0%

0%

0%

5%

0%

0%

0%

CAPE ANN

(M7.0)

Rhodc

Massachusetts Islano

Total Number 459 69

Light Damage

1-10%

Moderate

10-30%

Heavy

30-60 %

Major to Destructive

60-100 %

S7%

0%

2%

0%

5%

0%

0/u

0%

WASATCH FRONT

(M=7.5)

I Utah

140

51%

11%

0%

0%

h

(A

4%

2%

0%

0%

2%

1%

2%

<1%

15%

1 S/9

9%

0%

18%

5%

0%

* 1%

6%

0%

0%

0%

(A

(n

0

I-%J

th

0-

R

14%

10%

0%

0%

18%

1%

13%

0%

2%

0%

0%

0%

14%

1%

1%

0%

01
Table 5-5 Damage Percent for Police Stations for Each Scenario Earthquake (Percent of

Stations in State)

Iin

Total Number

Light Damage

1-10 %

Moderate

10-30 %

Heavy

30-60 %

Major to Destructive

60-100 %

NEW MADRID (M=8.0)

ois Missouri Arkansas Tennessee Kentucky

12 102 48 98 74

4%

2%

0%

0%

2%

1%

2%

<1%

CAPEANN (M=7.0)

Rhode

Massachusetts Island

Total Number. 118 18

Light Damage

1-10 %

Moderate

10-30 %

Heavy

30-60 %

Major to Destructive

60-100%

26%

0%

2%

0%

5%

0%

0%

0%

WASATCH

FRONT

(M=7.5)

Utah

34

22%

10%

0%

0%

14%

10%

8%

0%

10%

5%

0%

<1%

FORT

HAYWARD TEJON

(M=75) (M=8.0)

California California

580 580

6% 14%

3% 8%

0% 0%

0% <1%

5%

0%

0%

0%

Mississippi

52

13%

9%

0%

0%

PUGET

SOUND

16%

1%

12%

0%

2% 13%

0% 1%

0% 1%

0%; 0%

rIDIA, A ,A flflnf t n (M=/.Z5) NtW:V wwwIJfu (=f.U)

Washington Missouri Arkansas Tennessee Kentucky Mississippi

94 102 48 98 74 52

3%

16%

8%

0%

0% 14%

1% 7%

1% 0%

0% 0%

9%

0%

<1%

0%

<1%

0%

0%

0%

CHARLESTON (M=7.5)

South Carolina North Carolina Georgia

70 132 126

(n

ta

CD

(A

0 0

0

a

0*Q

en

:0i

5%

0%

0%

0%
Table 5-6 Damage Percent for Broadcast Stations for Each scenario Earthquake (Percent

of Stations in State)

NEWMADRID (M=8.0)

Illinois Missouri Arkansas Tennessee Kentucky Indiana Mississippi

Total Number 600 524 456 587 474 407 416

CHARLESTON (M-75)

South

Carolina

377

North

Carolina Georgia

697 604

Light Damage

1-10 %

Moderate

10-30 %

Heavy

30-60 %

Major to Destructive

60-100 %

CAPE ANN (M= 7.0)

Massachusetts Connecticut Delaware Rhode IslandNew Hampshire

Total Number 274 155 42 53 112

Light Damage

1-10 %

Moderate

10-30 %

Heavy

30.60 %

Major to Destructive

60-100 %

38%

35%

0%

1%

50%

0%

0%

0%

74%

0%

0%

0%

70%

26%

0%

0%

40%

0%

0%

0%

WASATCH FRONT M=7.5)

Utah

900

10%

27%

5%

0%

HA YWARD

(M7.5)

California

Total Number 1,528

FORT TEJON PUGET SOUND

(M=8. 0) (M= 7.5)

California Washington

1,538 872

NEW MADRID

(M=.0)

Illinois Missouri Arkansas Tennessee Kentucky Mississippi

600 524 456 587 474 416

Light Damage

1-10 %

Moderate

10-30 %

Heavy

30-60 %

Major to Destructive

60-100 %

4%

8%

1%

0%

16%

4%

4%

< 1%

2% 0%

8% <1%

5% 0%

9% 0%

0

(A

8%

< 1%

0%

0%

6%

0%

0%

4%

16%

14%

12%

5%

- 6%

20%

4%

1%

16%

7%

<1%

1%

4%

0%

0%

0%

51%

16%

12%

0%

15%

240/a

5%

18%

17%

4%

1%

0%

23%

16%

1%

2%

1%

0%

1%

2%

12%

15%

4%

0%

1 3%

11%

< 1%

1%

6%

2%

1%

0%

15%

3%

0%

0%
Table 5-7 Damage to Railroad System (Length of Roadbed, Kin)

Events

Cape Ann

Charleston

Fort Tejon

Hayward

New Madrid (M=8.0)

New Madrid (M=7.0)

Puget Sound

Wasatch Front

Total System Length = 270,611 km

passes; k and MMIk are the length of the

lifeline element and the Modified Mercalli

Intensity, respectively, within grid cell k; and X k

is the mean break rate (taken from Appendix

B).

Maps are provided showing sections of pipeline

for which the probability of failure exceeds 60%

for the various scenario earthquakes. For soil

conditions where liquefaction is possible, a

break is assumed at each location where the

pipeline crosses into a liquefiable zone.

5.4.1 Railroad System

The railroad system is'a highly redundant

system, and damage to the system due to the

selected events was found to be relatively

localized to the epicentral area. Direct damage

to the railroad system for each scenario event is

summarized in Table 5-7, which lists the length

(km) of damaged railroad right-of-way within

each damage state. The damage estimates are

based on damage curves for track/roadbed and

exclude damage to related facility types not

included in the project inventory--railway

terminals, railway bridges and tunnels.

The direct damage data suggest that the

magnitude-8 New Madrid, Fort Tejon, and

Hayward events would cause the most extensive

damage, with 2,265 km, 872 km, and 585 km of

roadbed, respectively, sustaining damage in the

30 to 100% range. Damage in the Charleston,

Puget Sound, and magnitude-7.0 New Madrid

events would also be severe, with 980, 650, and

640 km of roadbed, respectively, sustaining

heavy damage (30-to-60 %). Maps showing the

distribution of damage to the railroad system for

each of the 8 events are provided in Figures 5-1

to 5-8.

5.4.2 Highway System

The highway system is also a highly redundant

system, consisting of freeways/highways and

bridges. As is in the case of the railroad system,

damage to the highway system for each scenario

event was found to be localized to the epicentral

area. Direct damage to freeways/highways,

expressed in terms of km of roadway in the

various damage states, are summarized in Table

5-8 and plotted on Figures 5-9 to 5-16 for the

eight scenario earthquakes. Bridge damage,

expressed in terms of the percent of bridges in

each damage state, is summarized in Table 5-9.

The roadway and bridge damage data are based,

respectively, on damage curves for

freeways/highways and for conventional bridges;

the estimates exclude damage to tunnels, which

are not included in the project inventory. We

note also that all bridges are assumed to be

conventional bridges because of (1) lack of

capacity/size information in the project

inventory and (2) the very small percentage of

major bridges in the overall national database.

Tables 5-8 and 5-9 indicate that direct damage is

not expected to be as severe for

freeways/highways as it is for bridges. For

78 5: Estimates (

Light

Damage

1-10%

0

890

640

988

3,000

1,198

340

770

Moderate

10-30%

0

85

340

47

670

0

0

300

Heavy

30-60%

63

980

825

445

1,780

640

650

0

Major to

Destructive

60-100%

0

0

47

140

485

0

0

0

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.
Table 5-8 Damage to Freeway/Highway System (Length of Highway, Km)

Event

Cape Ann

Charleston

Fort Tejon

Hayward

New Madrid (M=8.0)

New Madrid (M=7.0)

Puget Sound

Wasatch Front

Total System Length = 489,892 km

example, direct damage to freeways/highways is

not expected to exceed 30% at any location for

any scenario earthquake. Data for bridges

(Table 5-9), however, suggest that direct

damage will range from 30-to-00 % for various

locations affected by the Charleston, New

Madrid (magnitude-8.0), Puget Sound, and

Wasatch Front events. Bridges in Utah appear

to be at the greatest risk, with 25 percent of the

bridges (approximately 287 bridges), expected to

sustain damage in the 30-to-1io % range.

Eighteen percent of the bridges in Arkansas

(approximately 423), 16 % in Washington

(approximately 305), and eleven percent in

Tennessee (approximately 407) would sustain

similar levels of damage. The difference in

expected performance between highways and

bridges results from the difference in damage

curves for these two structure types.

5.4.3 Electric System

Direct damage estimates for the electric system

are based on curves for transmission lines and

transmission substations and exclude damage to

related facility types not included in the project

inventory--nuclear and fossil-fuel power plants,

and hydroelectric power plants (dams). Damage

data for each scenario earthquake are

summarized in Tables 5-10 and 5-11, which

provide the length of transmissions lines and

percent of substations, respectively, in each

damage state. Maps provided in Figures 5-17

through 5-24 show plots of damage to

transmission lines for the eight scenario

earthquakes.

Damage data for transmission lines (Table 5-10

and Figures 5-17 through 5-24), indicate that

damage to this facility type is expected to be

greatest for the New Madrid (magnitude 8.0)

and Fort Tejon events, in which 800 km and

1370 km, respectively, would sustain damage

ranging from 10-to-30 %

Direct damage data for transmission substations,

summarized in Table 5-11, indicate that this

facility type would be severely impacted in all

scenario events. The impacts are most severe in

the Puget Sound, magnitude-8.0 New Madrid,

Wasatch Front, Charleston, and Hayward

events. For these scenario earthquakes, 46 % of

the transmission substations in Washington, 39

Y in Arkansas, 30 % in South Carolina, 30 % in

Utah and 27 % in California would sustain

damage in the 30-to-100 % range.

5.4.4 Water System

Direct damage to those water transmission

systems for which inventory data are available

are summarized in Tables 5-12 and 5-13- These

estimates are based on damage curves for

aqueducts and exclude damage to pumping

stations and dams, which are not included in the

project inventory. The data indicate that 38 and

20 km of the aqueduct system (Table 5-12),

respectively, would sustain moderate to heavy

damage (10-to-60 %) in the Fort Tejon and

ATC-25 5: Estimates of Direct Darnag'e

87

Light

Damage

74

2,182

2,174

1,567

4,967

1,800

665

1,392

Moderate

10-30%

182

999

1,557

476

2,753

720

769

0

Heaq

30-60%

0

0

0

0

0

0

01

0D

Major to

Destructive

60-100%

0

0

0

0

01

0

0

0

ATC-25 5: Estimates of Direct Damage
Table 5-9 Damage Percent for Highway Bridges for Each Scenario Earthquake (Percent

of Bridges in State)

NEW MADRID (M=8.0)

Illinois Missouri Arkansas Tennessee Kentucky Indiana Mississippi

Total Number 4,674 4,496 2,353 3,698 2,797 3,326 3,096

Ch

South

Carolina

2,134

JARLESTON (M=7.5)

North

Carolina

3,120

Light Damage

1-10 %

Moderate

10-30 %

Heavy

30-60 %

Major to Destructive

60-100 %

10%

1%

0%

<1%

6%

0%

0%

0%

16%

12%

5%

13%

8%

9%

4%

7%

16%

3%

0%

3%

2%

0%

0%

0%

CAPE ANN (M=70)

Massachusetts Connecticut Delaware Rhode Island New Hampshire

Total Number 2,013 1,878 297 283 1,020

Light Damage

1-10%

Moderate

10-30 %

Heavy

30-60 %

Major to Destructive

60-100 %

46%

37%

0%

0%

HA YWARD

(M=7.5)

California

Total Number 7,948

Light Damage

1'10 %

Moderate

10-30 %

Heavy

4%

2%

0%

0%

30-60 %

Major to Destructive

60-100 %

45%

0%

0%

0%

21%

0%

0%

0%/0

76%

15%

0%

0%

53%

1%

0%

0%

56%

16%

0%

8%

WASATCH FRONT (M=7.5)

Utah

1,149

7%

11%

10%

15%

FORT TEJON PUGET SOUND

(M=8.0) (M=7.5)

California Washington

7,948 1,908

22%

<1%

0%

0%

8%

12%

3%

13%,

Georgia

4,193

15%

15%

6%

1%

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II.
Table 5-10 Damage to Electric Transmission Lines (Length of Line, Kn)

Event

'Cape Ann

Charleston

Fort Tejon

Hayward

New Madrid (M=8.0)

New Madrid (M= 7.0)

Puget Sound

Wasatch Front

Total System Length = 441,981 km

Hayward scenario events, respectively. Maps

provided in Figures 5-25 and 5-26 show plots of

damage to water aqueduct systems for these two

California events.

5.4.5 Cue Oil System

Direct damage to the crude oil system,

estimated using damage curves for transmission

pipelines and the special probabilistic model for

pipelines described above, are plotted in Figures

5-27 through 5-29. Data are included for only

those events for which damage to this facility

type is expected: the two New Madrid events

and the Fort Tejon earthquake. Figures 5-27

through 5-29 show pipeline section(s) damaged

due to the magnitude-S.0 New Madrid, Fort

Tejon, and magnitude-7.0 New Madrid events.

5.4.6 Refied Oil System

Direct damage to the refined oil system,

estimated using damage curves for transmission

pipelines and refineries and the special

probabilistic model for pipelines described

above, are plotted in Figures 5-30 and 5-31.

These plots indicate that one major section of

pipeline would be damaged, with probability of

60% or greater, due to the New Madrid events.

We note also that a major refinery (capacity

150,000, barrel/day) would sustain light damage

(1-to-10 %) due the Hayward event, and two

major refineries with capacities of 420,000 and

100,000 barrels/day, respectively, would sustain

light damage due to the Fort Tejon and Puget

Sound events.

5.4.7 Natural Gas System

As in the case of crude and refined oil pipelines,

direct damage to the natural gas system was

estimated using damage curves, for transmission

pipelines and the special probabilistic model for

pipelines described above. Damage to this,

facility type, plotted in Figures 5-32 through 5-

37, is expected for six of the eight scenario

earthquakes; excluded are the Charleston and

Cape Ann scenario events for which direct

damage to natural gas pipelines is estimated to

be zero. Broken pipelines shown (Figures 5-32

through 5-37) are node-to-node sections having

one or more links estimated as damaged with a

probability of 60% or greater.

5.5 Dollar Loss Resulting from Direct

Damage

The total direct damage dollar loss for the

various lifeline systems and scenario

earthquakes were calculated on the basis of the

damage statistics summarized above and

assumed replacement costs for the lifeline

facility types considered (Table 5-13). Assumed

replacement cost values are based on data

collected for various facility sizes and regions,

which were then weighted to account for the

estimated distribution of facility sizes in the

national database.

ATC-25 5: EstImates of Direct Damage 97

Light

Damage

a-10%

275

4,840

6,645

6,320

6,840

2,61 0

3,860

1,370

Moderate

10-30%

0

27

1,370

0

800

0

0

0

Heavy

30-60%

0

0

0

0

0

0

10

'0

Major to

Destructive

60-100%

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

ATC.25 S. Estimates of Direct Darna. :ge 97
Table 5-11 Damage Percent for Electric Transmission Substations for Each Scenario

Earthquake (Percent of Substations in State) ; z

NEW MADRID (M=8.0)

Illinois Missouri Arkansas Tennessee Kentucky Indiana Mississippi

Total Number 108 95 124 70 68 89 93

CHARLESTON (M=7.5)

South North

Carolina Carolina Georgia

100 76 86

Light Damage

1-10 %

Moderate

10-30%

Heavy

30-60 %

Major to Destructive

60-100 %

0%

14%

0%

0%

0% 0%

8% 22%

0% 10%

8% 29%

0%

16%

9%

6%

a 0%

24%

7%

1%

0%

2%

0%

0%

CAPE ANN (M=70)

Massachusetts Connecticut Delaware Rhode Island New Hampshire

Total Number 153 69 3 22 22

Light Damage

1-10%

Moderate

10-30%

Heavy

30-60 %

Major to Destructive

60-100 %

0%

82%

0%

5%

0%

42%

0%

0%

0%

33%

0%

0%

0%

100%

0%

,0%

0%

45%

0%

0%

0%

63%

8%

10%

WASATCH FRONT(M=7.5)

Utah

10

0%

30%

20%

10%

HA YWARD

(M7. 5)

Califomia

Total Number 205

FORT TEJON PUGETSOUND

(M=8.0) (M= 7.5)

California Washington

205 155

NEW MADRID

(M=7.0)

Illinois Missouri Arkansas Tennessee Kentucky Mississippi

108 95 124 70 68 93

"0

Light Damage

1-10 %

Moderate

10-30 %

Heavy

30-60 %

Major to Destructive

60-100 %

8%

13%

14%

13%

11%

6%

<1%

12%

0%

12%

3%

43%

0%

0%

0%

0%

0% 0%

2% 21%

0% 16%

6% 6%

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Figure 5-25 Damage to water aqueduct system following Fort Tejon event (M=8.09.

Figure 5-26 Damage to water aqueduct system following Hayward event (M=7.5).

ATC-25 5: Estimates of Direct Damacoe .107

DAMAGE

30 - 60%

10 -30%

1 -10%

- C,
Table 5-12 Damage to Water Aqueduct System (Length of Aqueduct, Kin)

Event

Fort Tejon

.Hayward

Puget Sound

Light

Damage

1-10%

350

240

60

Moderate

10-30%

36

20

0

Heavy

30-60%

2

1

0

Major to

Destructive

60-100%

0

0

0

Table 5-13 Cost Estimates for Lifeline Components

System ComRonent Cost Estimate*

Railway Tracks/Roadbeds $500,000/mile**

Highway Conventional highway bridge $1,200,000

Freeway/Highway $1,400,000/mile**

Local Roads $300,000/mile**

Air Transportation Terminals $4,000,000

Runways/Taxiways $1,000,000/runway

Sea/Water Transportation Ports/Cargo Handling Equipment $20,000,000

Electric Distribution Lines $150,000/mile**

Transmission Lines $500,000/mile**

Transmission Substations $400/person***

Water Supply Transmission Aqueducts $5,000,000/mile**

Natural Gas Transmission Aqueducts $300,000/mile**

Petroleum Fuels Transmission Pipelines $300,000/mile**

Emergency Service Medical Care Facilities $35,000,000

(assumes 85,000 square

foot average size)

Fire Stations $400,000

(assumes 5,000 square

foot average size)

Police Stations $1,000,000

(assumes 11,000 square

foot average size)

*1991 Dollars

1 mile = 1.609 km.

***in service area

108 5: Estimates of Direct Damage ATC-25
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Summaries of dollar loss estimates for direct

damage to site-specific systems and extended

regional lifeline networks during the eight

scenario earthquakes are provided in Table 5-

14. Estimated dollar losses due to direct damage

to local electric, water, and highway distribution

systems are provided in Table 5-15. We note

that damage distribution dollar loss estimates for

direct damage to local distribution systems were

estimated using cost data from Table 5-13 and

damage curves from Appendix B for electric

distribution lines, local roads, and water trunk

lines. Intensities were estimated at the center of

the Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas,

assuming the distribution systems were lumped

at these locations.

The estimates provided in Tables 5-14 and 5-15

are based on the available inventory data and

other assumptions and models described in this

report. As a result, the accuracy of these

estimates may vary from lifeline to lifeline.

Estimates for electric systems, in particular, are

believed to be more sensitive to the lack of

capacity information than are the other lifelines.

By combining the data from Tables 5-14 and 5-

15, we estimate the total direct damage dollar

losses (in billions of U. S. dollars) for the eight

scenario earthquakes as follows:

Direct

Dollar Loss

Earthquake (in Billions. 1991$)

Cape Ann

Charleston

Fort Tejon

Hayward

New Madrid, M = 8.0

New Madrid, M = 7.0

$4.2

$4.9

$4.9

$4.6

$11.8

$3.4

Puget Sound $4.4

Wasatch Front $1.5

5.6 Comparison with Previous Studies

The foregoing presents a methodology and

results for understanding the direct damage

impacts of earthquakes on U.S. lifelines. No

previous study has examined lifelines in

comparable breadth or scale, so that

comparisons are difficult. Several studies have

examined the effect of earthquakes on lifelines

for various regions, including:

* Earthquake Vulnerability Analysis of the

Charleston, South Carolina Area (Citadel,

1988),

* Earthquake Planning Scenario for a

Magnitude 7.5 Earthquake on the Hayward

Fault in the San Francisco Bay Area

(Steinbrugge et al., 1987) (representative of

several studies in California, including

others for the Newport Inglewood Fault

Zone, the San Andreas Fault in northern

and southern portions of California (e.g.,

Davis et al., 1982),

* A study of the Wasatch Front, Utah, water

and gas systems (Taylor, Wiggins, Harper

and Ward, 1986), and

A pilot study on vulnerability of crude oil

transmission systems in the New Madrid

area (Ariman, et al., 1990).

Compared to the present study, these previous

studies were typically limited in being either

confined to one or a few lifelines, qualitative

rather than quantitative, and/or geographically

localized. Nevertheless, to the extent possible,

comparison of this study's results with that of

previous studies is of value, in order to compare

each aspect of the methodology. The

Charleston, South Carolina study is recent,

probably the most comprehensive of the studies

in scope, and provides quantitative results. We

therefore next examine that study and its results,

vis-a-vis this study.

Comparison with a study on the Charleston

event. Researchers at The Citadel, the Military

College of South Carolina, estimated damage to

critical facilities and other resources in the

epicentral region, assuming a repeat of the 31

August 1886 Charleston event. The study region

comprised three counties of the Charleston,

South Carolina area: Charleston County,

Berkeley County, and Dorchester County. The

Citadel analysis and conclusions appear mAn

Earthquake Vulnerability Analysis of the

Charleston, South Carolina, Area, of July 1988.

Their methodology relied significantly upon

ATC-13 procedures, so The Citadel study and

the present study take comparable approaches

and use similar classifications for structures and

120 5: Estimates of Direct Damage ATC-25~~~~~~~

5: Estimates of Direct Damage ATC.25 120
Table 5-14 Direct Damage Losses ($ Millions)

Fire Broadcasting Medical Natural Refined Crude

Scenario Highways Electric Stations Station Care Ports Airports Railroads Gas Oil Oil Water Total

$382 $1,312

$773 $1,264

$470 $886

$208 $1,310

$2,216 $2,786

$204 $1,077

$496 $1,834

$323 $90

$6 $19 $490

$9 $68 $565

$48 $26 $1,431

$7 $17 $1,297

$13 $91 $1,297

$3 $34 $396

$13 $49 $507

$2 $44 $205

$53 $91

$380 $142

$170 $148

$115 $37

$0 $411

$0 $145

$196 $210

$0 $29

$9 $0 $0 $0 $ 2,362

$156 $0 $0 $0 $ $3,358

$158 $11 $0 $28 $140 3,517

$115 $6 $0 $0 $91 3,203

$458 $56 $28 $47 $ $7,403

$108 $19 $9 $19 $ 2,013

$96 $6 $0 $0 $18 3,425

$31 $6 $0 $0 $ 730

oh0

01

01

ena

0-

h2

ac

0

H~

Cape Ann

Charleston

Fort Tejon

Hayward

New Madrid 8

New Madrid 7

Puget Sound

Wasatch Front
Direct Losses Due to Damage to Distribution Systems

Event

Cape Ann

Charleston

Fort Tejon

Hayward

New Madrid (M=8.0)

New Madrid (M=7.0)

Puget Sound

Wasatch Front

structural damage. The Citadel researchers

studied direct damage to lifelines, as well as to

housing, schools, and other components of the

built environment in the three county area, but

they did not investigate economic impacts as the

current study does.

The following sections compare the assumptions

and conclusions of the current study with those

of The Citadel researchers. Note that the

current study provided aggregate damage for

the whole of South Carolina, and damage is not

broken out by county, as it is in The Citadel

study. Nonetheless, since the three counties

enclose the bulk of the damaged South Carolina

lifelines, the results should be comparable. The

first section compares the scenario earthquake

assumed by the two studies. The second section

compares the results of the direct damage

analyses for lifelines.

Scenario Earthquake. The Citadel researchers

employed more severe ground shaking than the

current study's use of the Evernden Model

produced for the same event. The Citadel

posted MMI IX to MMI X ground shaking

within 25 miles of the epicenter, MMI VII to

MMI VIII ground shaking within a 100 mile

outer radius, and MMI VI or less ground

shaking beyond this. This agrees well with a

broad regional isoseismal map based on the

historical record presented by Bollinger (1977).

This broad map was developed by enveloping a

detailed map also developed by Bollinger (1977)

(i.e., the broad map was developed by the

maximum MMI within a region taken from the

detailed map, and using that as the MMI value

for the broad map--both maps are presented in

Figure 4-6). The Evernden Model used in the

current study provided estimates of ground

shaking on a detailed scale similar to that of the

detailed map by Bollinger. In the Evernden

model, MMI contours were calculated on a 25

km square basis. These contours agree fairly

well with the detailed isoseismal map Bollinger

presented. As a consequence of these

interpretations of seismic intensity, differing

results of The Citadel study tend to reflect the

more conservative (i.e., higher) ground shaking

estimates by generally more severe damage

estimates.

Estimated Lifeline Damage. Both studies

evaluated direct damage to a number of

common lifeline elements. This section

compares the two studies' results for direct

damage to hospitals, fire stations, police

stations, railroads, and electric transmission

substations.

Hospitals. The Citadel researchers

inventoried 11 facilities in the three

counties, in which 14% of the entire state

population lives. They estimated a 43%

probable maximum loss to hospitals, and a

21% average expected loss. The current

study inventoried 91 health care facilities in

South Carolina, and estimated 27 facilities

would sustain light damage (damage

between 1% and 10%), 6 facilities would

sustain moderate damage (damage between

10% and 30%), 9 facilities would sustain

heavy damage (damage between 30% and

60%) and 3 facilities would sustain major to

ATC-25 122 5: Estimates of DIrect Damage

Electric

$ Billion

$0.89

0.74

0.91

0.90

2.07

0.65

0.58

0.38

Water

$ Billion

$0.30

0.31

0.23

-0.20

0.88

0.28

: 0.09

0.13

Highways

$ Billion

$0.60

0.50

0.23

0.25

1.40

0.44

0.28

0.26

Table 5-1 5

5: Estimates of Direct Damage 122
destructive damage (damage between 60%

and 100%)- These figures represent an

average gross dollar damage of 10%. Note

that this 10% figure reflects damage to all

health care facilities in South Carolina. It is

to be expected that statewide average

damage should be significantly less than

damage within the epicentral region, which

The Citadel's 21% figure reflectsAirports. The Citadel researchers

inventoried 5 facilities in the three counties.

They estimated functionality for operational

pavements such as runways and taxiways,

and for key operational vertical structures

such as control towers and terminals. For

runways and taxiways, The Citadel

researchers estimated 30% functionality

within 1 day, 60% functionality within 3

days, and full functionality within 8 days. For

vertical structures, The Citadel researchers

estimated 60% functionality within 2 days,

and full functionality within 2-1/2 weeks.

The current study inventoried 147 facilities

in South Carolina, It estimated 59%

functionality of South Carolina airports,

during the first week, 85% functionality

during the second week, and full restoration

during the tenth week. The present study

also evaluated damage to airports as

individual units, including structures and

pavements, finding 49 facilities would

sustain light damage, 29 facilities would

sustain moderate damage, and 9 facilities

would sustain major damage.

Fire Stations. The Citadel researchers

inventoried 55 facilities in the three

counties. They estimated a 71% probable

maximum loss, and a 36% expected loss. The

current study estimated 275 South Carolina

facilities; 50 are expected to sustain light

damage (1% to 10%), 3 are expected to

sustain moderate damage (10% to 30%),

and 36 are expected to sustain heavy

damage (30% to 60%). These figures

represent an average 7% damage.

e Police Stations. The Citadel researchers

inventoried 10 facilities in the three

counties. They estimated a 69% probable

maximum loss, and a 34% expected loss. The

current study estimated 70 South Carolina

facilities, and estimated that 10 would

sustain light damage (1% to 10%), 1 would

sustain moderate damage (10% to 30%),

and 8 would sustain heavy damage (30% to

60%). These figures represent an average

6% damage.

Railroadi The 'Citadel researchers

inventoried 196 miles of track in the three

counties. They estimated 1 mile of track

would sustain 1% damage or less, 145 miles

would sustain 1-to-10% damage, and 50

miles of track would sustain 10-to-30%

damage. These figures would indicate an

average 9% damage to railroad track in the

three counties. The current study

inventoried approximately 1500 miles of

track in South Carolina, and estimated 550

miles of track would sustain light damage

(1% to 10%), 52 miles would sustain

moderate damage (10-to-30%), and 600

miles would sustain heavy damage (30-to-

'60%). These figures represent an average

damage of 20% to South Carolina railroad

track following a Charleston event. (This is a

simple measure of track damage and should

not be confused with residual capacity

figures, which follow on network analyses

(see Chapter 6)). This difference may be

explained by the significant damage to

railroad track outside the three counties.

* Electric Transmission Substations. The

Citadel researchers estimated 20% of

substations in the three county area would

sustain light damage, 70% of substations,

would sustain moderate damage, and 10% of

substations would sustain heavy damage. If

one defines light damage as an average 5%

damage, moderate damage as an average

20% damage, and heavy damage as an

average 45% damage, average expected

damage to transmission substations for The

Citadel study would be 20%. The present

study inventoried 1 00 substations in South

Carolina, and estimated 43% sustain

moderate damage (10-to-30%),. 14% sustain

heavy damage (30-to-60%), and 16% sustain

major damage (60-to-100%). These figures

represent an average 28% damage to South

Carolina transmission substations following

a Charleston event. The present study

estimated average damage in excess of that

estimated by The Citadel. An explanation

can be found in that The Citadel study

considered transmission and distribution

substations, while the present study

ATC-25 5: Estimates of Direct Damage 123

ATC-25, 5: Estimates of Direct Damage 123
considered only transmission substations.

Transmission substations typically sustain

more damage than distribution substations;

also substations outside the three counties

are significantly damaged. (Note that the

average damage discussed here is a simple

measure of substation damage and should

not be confused with residual capacity 

figures, which rely on network analyses (see

Chapter 6).)

* Bridges. The Citadel researchers

inventoried 3 major bridges and 216

conventional bridges in the three counties.

They estimated "serious damage" to 10

bridges, "repairable damage" to 24 bridges,

and "settlement damage" to 51 bridges. They

defined "serious damage" as collapse of at

least one span. "Repairable damage" means

that the bridge .could be restored within

weeks, and "settlement damage" means

damage to abutments. The current study

inventoried 2134 bridges in South Carolina

and estimated 320, 320, 128, and 20 bridges,

respectively, would sustain light

damage(damage between 1 and 10%),

moderate damage (damage between 10 and

30%), heavy damage (damage between 30

and 60%), and major damage (damage

between 60 and 100%). The current study

provide an aggregate damage of about 7%

for the entire state compared to about 6%

given by the Citadel researchers study for

the three counties. This difference may be

explained by the finding that damage to

bridges outside the three counties is

expected to be significant.

Conclusion. The present study estimated

damage between 1/2 and 1/5th of that estimated

by The Citadel study in every classification

except transmission substations, railroads, and

bridges. These ratios seem reasonable. The

Citadel researchers examined damage in a

three-county epicentral region alone; while the

present study considered South Carolina as a

whole. One would expect average damage over

the entire state to be substantially lower than

average damage in the epicentral region. The

exception, transmission substations, railroads,

and bridges, were discussed above.

124 5: Estimates of Direct Damage ATC-25

5: Estimates of Direct Damage ATC-25 124
6 Estimates of Indirect Economic Losses

U

6.1 Introduction

Earthquakes produce both direct and indirect,

economic effects. The direct effects, such as

dollar loss due to fires and collapsed structures,

are obvious and dramatic. However, the indirect

effects that these disruptions have on the ability

of otherwise undamaged enterprises to conduct

business may be quite significant. Although the

concept of seismic disturbances and their effect

on lifelines has been investigated for at least two

decades, there is very little literature on indirect

economic losses (Co chrane, 1975; Rose, in

ASCE-TCLEE, 1981; Scawthom and Lofting,

1984).

This study provides a first approximation of the

indirect economic effects of lifeline interruption

due to earthquakes. To accomplish this the

relevant literature was surveyed. Then a

methodology was developed to relate lifeline

interruption estimates to economic effects of

lifeline interruption in each economic sector.

This required a two-step process:

1. Development of estimates of interruption of

lifelines as a result of direct damage

2. Development of estimates of economic loss

as a result of lifeline interruption

The general analytical approaches used to

develop these estimates, are discussed below and

illustrated with example calculations. Results

defining lifeline interruption and associated

economic loss to specific facility types are also

provided, but the bulk of this information is

given in Appendices C and D. The chapter

concludes with regional summaries of economic

effects resulting from direct damage to the

various lifelines in the eight scenario

earthquakes.

6.2 General Analytical Approach for

Estimating Lifeline Interruption

Lifeline interruption resulting from direct

damage is quantified in this investigation in

residual capacity plots, that define percent of

function restored as a function of time. The

curves are estimated for each lifeline type and

scenario earthquake using (1) the time-torestoration curves discussed in Chapter 3 and

provided in Appendix B, (2) estimates of ground

shaking intensity provided by the seismic hazard

model (from Chapter 4), and (3) inventory data

specifying the location and type of facilities

affected (from Chapter 2).

For site-specific systems (i.e., lifelines consisting

of individual sited or point facilities, such as

airports or hospitals) the time-to-restoration

curves are used directly whereas for extended

regional networks, special analysis procedures

are used. These procedures consist of:

* connectivity analyses, and

* serviceability analyses.

Connectivity analyses measure post-earthquake

completeness, "connectedness t or "cutenesst of

links and nodes in a network. Connectivity

analyses ignore system capacities and seek only

to determine whether, or with what probability,

a path remains operational between given

sources and given destinations.

Serviceability analyses seek an additional

valuable item of information: If a path or paths

connect selected nodes following, an earthquake,

what is the remaining, or residual, capacity

between these nodes? The residual capacity is

found mathematically by convolving lifeline

element capacities with lifeline completeness.

A complete serviceability analysis of the nation's

various lifeline systems, incorporating

earthquake effects, was beyond the scope of this

project. Additionally, capacity information was

generally not available for a number of the

lifelines (e.g, for the highway svstem, routes

were available, but not number of lanes).

Rather, for this project, a limited serviceability

analysis has been performed, based on a set of

sfimplifyiing assumptions.

The fundamental assumption has been that, on

average, all links and nodes, of a lifeline have

equal capacities, so that residual capacity has

ATC-25 6: Estimates of Indirect Economic Losses 125

ALTC-25S 6.: Estimates of Indirect Economic Losses 125
serviceable (ie., surviving) links and nodes to the

original number of serviceable links and nodes,

for a given source/destination pair, or across some

appropriate boundary. For example, if the state

of South Carolina has 100 airports, and 30 of

these are determined to be unserviceable at

some point in time, following a major

earthquake,. then the air transport lifeline

residual capacity is determined to be 70% of the

initial capacity.

This assumption does not consider several

important factors, including:

1. All nodes or links do not have the same

capacities;

2. Links and nodes contributing most to the

residual capacity are generally more distant

from the heavily damaged area. Thus, the

estimated lifeline residual capacity is

generally overestimated in the area closest

to the disaster area; and

3. Significant elasticity in capacity is generally

available for most lifelines.

Factors 2 and 3 tend to offset each other.

Further, factor 1 is probably acceptable for the

purposes of this project, which aims to describe

effects at the regional level.

The foregoing mode of analysis was employed

for most of the regional network lifelines. One

exception was the gas and liquid fuel

transmission pipelines, where capacities were

available and were employed, thus taking into

account factor 1 above.

6.3 Residual Capacity Analysis of SiteSpecific Systems

As indicated above, residual capacities for site

specific lifelines were estimated using the

restoration curves from Appendix B. For many

of these facilities, only locational information

was available (i.e., size or capacity information

was not available). Because of this limitation,

and because the general goal of this study was to

determine impacts at the transmission or

regional level (an approach that tends to

average out differences in facility capacities), an

assumption that all facilities of a particular class

have the same capacity was often employed.

Using the curves provided in Appendix B,

residual capacity was defined in "lifeline

interruption plots" that define restoration in

one-week-interval step functions. Initially, these

step functions were computed for each facility in

a region, and then averaged over all facilities of

the same type in the region using the following

equation:

N N

R.CJ = E (Ci x Ri) i E Ci

i=1 1=1

(6.1)

where R.C1 is the residual capacity at time step j,

Ci is the capacity of facility i, and Ri is the

restoration of facility i at time step j. If all

facilities have the same capacity, Equation 6.1

becomes

N

R.Cj = E Ri/N

i=l

(6.2)

where N is the number of facilities. This

calculation is illustrated in Example 6.1 (Figure

6-1).

Following is a discussion of results from the

residual capacity analysis of each site-specific

lifeline facility type considered in this

investigation.

6.3.1 Airports

Residual capacities for airports were calculated

assuming that all airports have the same capacity

and the functionality of airports depends 20%

on terminals and 80% on runways. The

simplifying assumption that all airports have

similar capacities is warranted due to the

analysis seeking to determine regional air

transport impacts, an approach that tends to

average out extremes in airport capacities.

Further rationales for this approach include: (1)

the large number of general and civil aviation

airports, (2) the relatively small difference in

number of runways between many airports, (3)

many runways have lengths sufficient for large

commercial aircraft, (4) under emergency

conditions, air traffic control capacity can be

rapidly and significantly increased by deploying

specialized military units, (5) airport throughput capacity is extremely elastic (under

emergency conditions small airport cargo

handling capacity can be significantly increased

126 6: Estimates of Indirect Economic Losses ATC-25

126 6: Estimates of Indirect Economic Losses ATC-25
Example 6.1

This example illustrates the residual capacity calculation algorithm for point source systems, using health care centers in Illinois as an example.

Assume that Illinois, located in "all other areas" of the NEHRP Map has four health care centers. A

scenario earthquake is estimated to result in shaking intensities at te four locations of MMI=5, 6, 7, and 8, respectively. Assume that no liquefaction hazard exists at the four sites. Estimate residual

capacity at 0 days, 7 , 14 21 , 28 , and 196 days (the latter being the point of full restoration).

Procedure. Use the time-to-restore curve (below) for health care facilities (from Appendix B), for "all

other areas" to determine the residual capacity at each health care facility.

R:18aO

R= G'.z

R=B/

DRfYS:

Health Care

3a 68 90 128 158 180 218 24 2 38O 338 365

Elapsed Time in Days

This figure indicates residual capacities as follows:

MMI

Facility 1

Facility 2

Facility 3

Facility 4

Average

Elapsed time (days)

0 7 114 21 28 196

5 100%

6 12%

7 0%

8 0%

28%

1100%

21%

5%

0%

32%

100%

31%

10%

0%

35%

100%

41%

15%

3%

40%

-- 100%

511%

20%

6%

44%

1 00%

1 00%

100%

100%

100%

The last row in the table provides the residual capacity of the example health care centers in llinois

-assuming that all facilities have the same capacity (i.e., per equation 6.4).

Figure 6-7: Analysis example illustrating residual capacity calculation agorithm for point source

systems

ATCG25 6: Estimates of Indirect Economic Losses 127
by staging cargo off-site, and apron space

restrictions can be worked around through

scheduling and staging aircraft at other

airports).

Average residual capacity values over all

airports in a given state at each time step were

calculated using Equation 6.2. An example plot

for Arkansas, one of the worst-case situations, is

provided in Figure 6-2. In this example, the

initial loss is approximately 31 percent of

capacity, and full capacity is not restored until

about day 290. Results for each state are plotted

in Appendix C for each scenario earthquake

(Figures C-1 through C-24). These data indicate

that, of all the regional scenario events, the

greatest impacts occur in the states of Arkansas,

Mississippi, and Tennessee as a result of the

New Madrid magnitude-8.0 event (Figures C-3,

C-4, C-6). The states of Washington,

Massachusetts, South Carolina, Utah, and

California would experience the largest impacts

due to the Seattle, Cape Ann, Charleston,

Utah, and Fort Tejon, scenario events,

respectively (Figures C-7, C-10, C-15, C-17, and

C-18).

6.3.2 Ports

Residual capacities of Ports for all scenario

events are presented in Figures C-25 to C-33.

An example plot for South Carolina, the worstcase situation, is provided in Figure 6-3. In this

example, the initial loss is nearly 100 percent of

capacity, and full capacity is not restored until

about day 200. Georgia would also experience

similarly high losses due to the Charleston event

(Figure C-27). Massachusetts and Rhode Island

would experience the largest losses due to the

Cape Ann event (Figures C-28 and C-29).

6.3.3 Medical Care Centers

Residual capacities of medical care centers were

calculated using Equation 6.2 and are shown in

Appendix C, Figures C-34 through C-57 for all

states affected by all scenario events. All

medical care centers were assumed to have the

same capacity. One of the worst-case situations

would occur in Arkansas for the New Madrid

magnitude-8.0 earthquake (Figure 6-4). Similar

long-term recovery periods are required in

California for the Fort Tejon event (Figure C51), South Carolina, for the Charleston event

(Figure C-41), and in Washington, for the.Puget

Sound event (Figures C-52). Note also the

initial high loss in capacity for medical care

facilities in Massachusetts for the Cape Ann

event (Figure C-44).

6.3.4 Fire Stations

Based on the assumption that fire stations have

an average capacity, residual capacities of fire

stations within the affected states were

calculated using Equation 6.2, assuming that all

fire stations are lumped at the center of

Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas

(SMSAs). Results are presented in Figures C-58

through C-81. One of the worst case situations,

which occurs in South Carolina as a result of the

Charleston scenario event, is shown in Figure

6-5.

6.3.5 Police Stations

Residual capacities of police stations were

calculated using Equation 6.2, assuming that all

police stations have the same capacity and that

stations were lumped at the center of the

SMSAs. Results are presented in Appendix C,

Figures C-82 to C-101, for all states affected by

the scenario events. These plots indicate that, as

in the case of fire stations, one of the worst-case

situations occurs in Mississippi as a result of the

New Madrid magnitude-8.0 scenario event

(Figure 6-6).

6.3.6 Broadcast Stations

Based on the assumption that all broadcast

stations have the same capacity, residual

capacities within the affected states were

calculated using Equation 6.2. For this facility

type, the worst case situation occurs in South

Carolina as a result of the Charleston event

(Figure 6-7). See Appendix C, Figures C-102 to

C-126, for plots of results for all eight scenarios

and affected states.

6.4 Residual Capacity Analysis of

Extended Regional Networks

In this investigation, residual capacity of

extended regional networks (e.g., crude and

refined oil pipelines; highways) has been

estimated through the following sequence of

operations:

128 6: Estimates of Indirect Economic Losses ATC-25
1

0

'ID

EFapsed Time in Days

Figure 6-2 Residual capacity ofArkansas air transporfationfollowingNew Madrid event (M=8.0).

6A

-

0

1'2

T)

0

Elapsed T ime in Days

Figure 6-3 Residual capacity of South Carolina portsfollowing Charleston event M= 7.5).

ATC-25 6: Estimates of Indirect Economic Losses 129
1

CCu

a

cr(n

a)

Elapsed Time in Days

Figure 6-4 Residual capacity of Arkansas medical care centers following New Madrid event (M=8. 0).

0

4-0u

4-

cjn

Elapsed Time in Days

Figure 6-5 Residual capacity of South Carolina fire stations following Charleston event (M= 7.5).

- 130 6: Estimates of Indirect Economic Losses ATC-25
I

C

el

0

Elapsed Time in Days

Figure 6-6 Residual capacity of Mississippi police stationsfollowingNew Madrid event (M=8.0).

a

co

htD

:c

, 1

01 14 28

Elapsed Time in Days

Figure 6-7 Residual capacity of South Carolina broadcast stations following Charleston event

(M= 7 ).

ATC-25 6: Estimates of Indirect Economic Losses 131
1. Maximum damage for every link in the

network was first estimated using the

procedures described in Chapter 5.

2. Connectivity analyses were then performed

to identify nodes and links that are not

connected to the source(s).

3. And finally, serviceability analyses were

performed to determine residual capacity of

the network as a whole, considering both

damaged and undamaged links and nodes.

The networks are assumed to consist of sets of

nodes and sets of links connecting these nodes.

If a link has a direction, it is called a directed

link; otherwise it is called an undirected link. A

path is a sequence of nodes and links. The links

can be directed in either direction (two-way

links) or directed in one direction (one-way

links).

Following is a flow chart showing the sequence

of operations:

- 0 | ~STOP|

Connectivity Analyses. Connectivity analyses

were performed using a technique called DepthFirst-Search, or Backtracking (Tarjan, R., 1972).

In this method, a network is connected if for

every partitioning of the nodes of the network

into subsets Y1 and Y2, there is either a link (ij) or i) between node i E Y1 and node j E Y2,

where denotes membership.

For pipeline systems (crude oil and refined oil

pipelines), pipeline sections (node-to-node)

with probability of failure (i.e., probability of

having at least one break) equal to or greater

than about 60% were assumed to be closed until

100% restored. For natural gas systems, pipeline

sections with probability of failure equal to or

greater 30% were assumed closed until 100%

restored. Bridges with more than 15% damage

were also assumed out of service until fully

restored.

Serviceability Analyses. Residual capacities

between sources and destinations were

estimated using the minimum-cut-maximumflow theorem (Ford and Fulkerson, 1962; Hu,

1969; and Harary, 1972) which is the central

theorem in network flow theory. This approach

was generalized for this project to account for

multiple-source multiple-destination problems.

The minimum-cut-maximum-flow theorem

simply searches for the cut with the minimum

capacity, i. e., the bottleneck, that completely

separates the sources from the destinations.

That is to say, the maximum flow in a network is

always equal to the capacity of the cut that

provides the minimum capacity of all cuts

separating the source(s), S, and the

destination(s), D.

A cut is defined by (Y1,Y2), where Y1 is a

subset of nodes of the network and Y2 is its

complement (i.e., the remaining subset of

nodes). A cut (Y1,Y2) is a set of links (i-j) with

either the node i Y1 and j Y2 or j Y1 and

i Y2. Therefore, a cut is a set of links the

removal of which will disconnect the network. A

cut separating the source, S, and the destination,

D, is a cut (Y1,Y2) with S sY1 and D £Y2.

The capacity of a cut (Y1,Y2), denoted by

C(Y1,Y2), is cij with i Y1 and j C Y2, where

cj is the capacity of the link (i-j). Note that in

defining a cut, we count all the arcs that are

between the set Y1 and the set Y2, but in

calculating its capacity we count only the

capacity of links from Y1 to Y2, but not the one

way links from Y2 to Y1. i.e. C(Yl,Y2) not

equal C(Y2,Y1). The cut with the minimum

capacity is called the minimum cut.

For example, consider the network in Figure 6-

8. Assume that all links are two way links, and

that the numbers next to each link represent the

capacity of that link. The set Y1 defined above

consists of nodes S and 2, while the set Y2

consists of nodes 1 and D. The cut shown in

Figure 6-8 is a minimum cut and has the

capacity C(Y1,Y2)= cSl+c2D= 2 +4 = 6, which

132 6: Estimates of Indirect Economic Losses ATC-25
Figure 6-8 Flow network to illustrate

minimum-cut-maximum flow

Theorem.

is the maximum flow that can be delivered

between the source S and the destination D.

highway and railroad systems, sources, are

defined to be the outer nodes of all links that

intersect with the smallest boundary around the

epicentral area, such that all intersected links

remain undamaged following an earthquake.

Destinations are defined to be all nodes inside

the largest boundary around the epicentral area

such that all intersected links are damaged

(intersection is assumed at the center of the

links). For damaged links, restoration of each

link is, estimated at each time step using the

appropriate restoration curve and the maximum

intensity along the link.

The residual capacity at a given destination at

any time step, t, is, defined to be the ratio

between the maximum available flow at the

destination for.the damaged system, Qt to the

maximum available flow at the destination for

the undamaged system, 0, i.e.

The maximum flow is a linear programming

problem with the objective function

Q = EXi3 (6.3)

and the constraints

Xij-Xjk =-Qifj=S

= Oifj <> SorD (6.4)

= Qifj=D,

and

0 c Xi ci for all ij (6.5)

where Q is the out flow value and X is the flow

in link (i-j). Equation 6.4 expresses conservation

of flow at every node, and Equation 6.5 states

that the link flow XiJ is always bounded by link

capacity cu.

To apply the maximum flow theorem, sources

and destinations, have to be defined. For the oil

systems and the natural gas system, nodes in

Texas, and Louisiana represent the sources,

while nodes, in Illinois, California, Seattle, Utah,

and Massachusetts represent destinations.

Source and destination are more difficult to

define for the highway and railroad systems.

These networks are highly redundant, so

damage and losses are confined to the epicentral

regions. In the residual capacity calculations for

R.C. = Qt/O (6.6)

where Ot and Q0 can be calculated using the

min-max theorem discussed above, and R.C. is

the residual capacity.

Example Calculations. Two examples are

provided (Figs 6-9 and 6-10) that demonstrate

residual capacity calculations for pipeline

networks (Example 6.2) and for non-pipeline

networks (Example 6.3).

Software Employed. The calculations of damage

state, connectivity, and residual capacity were

performed using a proprietary computer

program, LLEQE (LifeLine EarthQuake

Engineering). LLEQE employs state-of-the-art

computer graphics and was, developed to

perform four tasks: (1) to perform seismic

hazard analyses; (2) to generate lifeline damage

states consistent with the calculated site-specific

seismic intensities; (3) to perform connectivity

analyses; and (4) to estimate residual capacities

of lifeline components. Its capabilities include

the following components/functions:

Database. Database capacity can

accommodate most major lifeline systems at

the transmission level on the national scale,

including: transportation, water, electric

power generation and supply, gas and liquid

fuel supply and emergency service facilities.

ATC:-25 6: Estimates of Indirect Economic Losses 133
Example 6.2

This example illustrates the residual capacity calculation for pipelines systems (e.g., crude oil, refined

oil, or natural gas).

Consider the following crude oil pipeline network:

25 km 25 km

2 pipe #4 D =14" 4 (Destination)

0 / MMI~~~= 0.9 MMI=8.0/

pipe #1 D=8"

pipe #3 =1O'

(Source) 1 pipe#2 D=16 3

Assume that pipe number 4 is subjected to intensity MMI = 8 along 25 km of its length, and MMI = 9

along 25 km of its length. The pipe lies in the non-California 7 portion of the NEHRP map. Assume

the other pipes are unaffected and that there is no liquefaction. Find residual capacity at node 4 at the

end of 7 days

Procedure. Use the damage curves for petroleum fuel transmission pipelines (from Appendix B) to

determine mean break rate by intensity. Using the data on which this figure is based, the 25 km length

of pipe, i1, experiencing MMI = 8 has an expected mean break rate, 1, of 0.036 breaks/km. The 25

km length of pipe, 12, experiencing MMI = 9 shaking has an expected mean break rate, X2 , of 0.1 79

breaks/km. The probability of having at least one break in this pipe is given by equation 5.4, which is

- 2

Pf = - 11 Ps

i=1

= 1 - (exp(- X 1 x 11) x exp(- 2 x 12))

= 1 - (exp(-0.036 x 25) x exp(-0.1 79 x 25))

= 0.99

The diameter square of each pipe will be taken as a measure of capacity of the pipe. For the

undamaged system using the min-max theory, the maximum flow Q at the destination (i.e., node 4) is

164 (the maximum flow at node 4 equals the capacity of link number 1, i. e. 64, plus the capacity of

link number 3, i.e. 100). Since the probability of failure of pipe number 4 is greater than 60%, this

pipe will assumed to be closed until it will be fully restored. For the damaged system, at the first time

step (i. e., t=O days) pipe 4 will be closed and the maximum flow Q, at node 4 is the capacity of the

remaining system, which is 100. The residual capacity at time step t=O can be estimated using

Equation 6.6 and is given by Q1/QO = 61.0%. Using the time-to-restore curve for petroleum

transmission lines provided in Appendix B, the time to fully restore pipe sustaining MMI = 9 is 10

days. Thus, at the second time step (t = 7 days) the maximum flow at node 4 equals 1 00, and the

residual capacity at the destination is still 61 % (pipe 4 is still closed).

Figure 6-9: Analysis example illustrating residual capacity calculation for crude oil pipeline network.

134 6: Estimates of Indirect Economic Losses ATC-25
Example 6.3

This example illustrates the damage and residual capacity calculation for non-pipeline network systems

(e.g., railroad or highway system). Consider the following highway network (nodes denoted by circles,

links by boxes):

I~~~~~~

The network lies in the "All Other Areas" portion of the NEHRP map; the intensity distribution for a

given scenario earthquake is given below. Assume liquefaction does not occur and that Links 2 and 9

contain bridges. If a bridge experiences damage of 15% or more, it is assumed closed until 100%

restored. Characterize restoration at various time intervals.

Link Number

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

length, km 5 5 5 5 5 3 5 3 5 5

MM 5 6 5 7 8 7 5 a 7 4

Procedure. Using the damage curves provided in Appendix B for highways/freeways, damage to the

highway system is estimated as follows:

Link Number

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

Damage, %o6 0

8 91 10

0 0 1 3 1 0 3 1 0

Using the damage curves for conventional bridges, "other" areas (Appendix B), damage to the bridges

in Links 2 and 9 is estimated to be 10% and 30% damage, respectively.

Due to the assumption that a bridge is closed if damage exceeds 15%, the bridges in Link 9 are closed

until 100% restored, while bridges in Link 2 are not. Restoration of the network links are estimated

from the restoration curves for conventional bridges "all other areas" (Appendix B) as follows (see

following page):

Figure 6-10: Analysis example illustrating the residual capacity calculation for highway networks.

6: Estimates of Indirect Economic Losses

D3

AT C-25, 135
* Damage State. The LLEQE user can spec

breaks, generate random breaks, or both.

generate a break in a link the user simply

select "Specify Break" option and points t(

the link with a mouse. To simulate a seism

event, random breaks are generated using

Monte Carlo simulation and a

nonhomogeneous Poisson process with

mean break rate based on data from

previous earthquakes.

* Connectivity Analysis. Connectivity analys

is performed to identify disconnected

regions of damaged systems, tag them with

coded colors, and eliminate them from

subsequent system analysis. Optimum pat]

and shortest path from source to destinati,

can also be defined.

* Serviceability Analysis. Analysis to estimal

the serviceability of lifeline systems under

seismic or other events. The process

involves connectivity analysis of the systen

in simulated damage states consistent witl

site seismicity and statistical analysis of

residual capacities available in these dama

states. It can provide fragility curves to

estimate the functionality and usability of

the system.

Following are summaries of residual capacity

analytical results for extended regional lifeline

networks.

6.4.1 Railroad System

Residual capacities of the railroad system for,

scenario earthquakes were estimated using the

minimum-cut-maximum-flow theorem defined

above; sources and destinations were also

defined as above. Residual capacity plots for t

railroad system are provided in Appendix C,

Figures C-127 through C-134. An example

(typical) plot for the Hayward earthquake

scenario is provided in Figure 6-11.

6.4.2 Highway System

Residual capacities of the highway system wer

estimated using the minimum-cut-maximumflow theorem and the sources and destination

as defined above. The residual capacities are

shown in Figures C-135 to C-142. An example

plot for the epicentral regional of the

magnitude-8.0 New Madrid event, one of the

fify worst case situations, is provided in Figure 6-12.

To In this case nearly 95% of the highway system

capacity is initially lost, and full restoration of

the system is not achieved until about day 420.

tic Losses in highway system capacity are similar for

Utah, as a result of the Wasatch Front scenario.

6.4.3 Electic System

Residual capacities of the electric system were

estimated taking into account nodes only (i.e.,

;is transmission substations). The residual capacity

for each node was estimated at each time step

i using the time-to-restore curves for transmission

substations from Appendix B. Averages over all

I nodes in each state affected by the scenario

on events were calculated using Equation 6.2 and

are plotted in Figures C-143 to C-166. One of

the worst case situations occurs in Mississippi

following the magnitude-8.0 New Madrid event

(Figure 6-13). In this case, the initial loss is

approximately 75% of capacity, and full

I restoration is not achieved until about day 130.

1 Losses for Arkansas for this same event are

similar.

ge

6.4.4 Water System

Residual capacities of the water system (Figures

C-167 to C-169) were estimated using the

minimum-cut-maximum-flow theorem discussed

above. For the Hayward event the San

Francisco Bay area was assumed to be the

destination and the outside world, the source.

For the Fort Tejon event Los Angeles was

assumed to be the destina ton and the Colorado

Ill River Aqueduct (1056 hmn'), Cilifornia

Aqueduct South Coast (6923hm ), and Los

i Angeles Aqueduct (574 hm ) were assumed to

be the sources. The worst case situation occurs

he in Los Angeles as a result of the Fort Tejon

event (Figure 6-14).

6.4.5 Cnde Oil System

For the residual capacity calculations for the

crude oil system, Texas and Louisiana were

assumed to represent the source region, while

e Chicago, Southern and Northern California

represented the destinations. Residual

i capacities of the crude oil system were estimated

using the minimum-cut-maximum-flow theorem

discussed above. Links with probability of failure

greater than or equal to 60% were assumed

closed until 100% restored.

136 6: Estimales of Indirect Economic Losses ATC-25

136 6: Estimates of Indirect Economic Losses ATC-25
4 6 8

Elapsed Time

10,

In Days

-- I

12 14 16

Residual capacityofSan Francisco Ba area rairoad system followingHayward event

,(M=75).

Elapsed Time in Days

Residual capacity of eicentral region highways following New Madrid event (M=&O).

ATC-25 6: Estimates ot Indirect Economic Losses 137

:tC

-

.

Is

U

0

UUr

95T_

80-I 85-

701

6570~1

5 5 1

50-1 45-i

40 '

301

251

:20 -

0o

Figure 6-11

1

0

T0

4-

Cn qW,

C

Figure 6-12

don,_ ;

I

_ _ _

:-r

ATC-25 6: Estimates of Indirect Economic Losses 137
100-

95-_

90-1

85-

80-

75-

70

65 -

60-

r2r 1J I

50-

45-

40-

35-

30-

25-

20-u 1 4c+ e- sdTm 105Ep4 i Da 1n 147

lI Elapsed Time in Days

Residual capacity of Mississippi electric system following New Madrid event M=8.0).

20 30 40

Elapsed Time in Days

50 60 70

Figure 6-14 Residual capacity of epicentral region water system following Fort Tejon event (M=8.0).

138 6: Estimates of Indirect Economic Losses ATC-25

OQ

C

I0

0

U,

Figure 6-13

90-

.o70-

0

C

0

0

a)

Cc

60-

50-

to

- II

I

-

40-

30-

1

138 ATC-25

I

I

6: Estimates of In.direct Economic Losses
b; s~~~~

5 10

Elapsed Time in Days

Residual capacity of cnmde oil delivery system from Texas to Northern California following

Fort Tejon event M=8.O).

The residual capacities are shown in Figures C170 to C-173. One of the wonst-case situations

occurs in California as a result of the Fort Tejon

earthquake scenario (Figure 6-15). In this case

crude oil delivery capacity from Texas to

Northern California is initially reduced to less

than 10 percent, and full restoration of capacity

is not achieved until about day 14. A similar

situation occurs in this same scenario 

earthquake for crude oil delivery from Texas to

Southern California.

64.6 Refined Oil System

For the residual capacity calculations for the

refined oil system, Texas was assumed to be the

source, and Chicago was the destination.

Residual capacities were estimated using the

minimum-cut-maximum-flow theorem discused

above. Links with probability of failure greater

than or equal to 60% were assumed closed until

100% restored. The residual capacities, are

shown in Figures C-174 and C-175. Residual

capacity plots for the two New Madrid events

considered are sinilar. The plot for the New

Madrid magnitude-8.0 event is provided in

Figure 6-16.

64.7 Natural Gas System

For the residual capacity calculations for the

natural gas system, Texas and Louisiana were

considered as the sources, and Illinois,

Massachusetts, Utah, Washington, and

California represented the destinations.

Residual capacities of the natural gas system

were estimated using the minimum-cutmaximum-flow theorem discused above. The

residual capacities are shown in Figures, C-176

through C-184. An example plot for the

Hayward scenario, one of the worst case

situations, is provided in Figure 6-17. In this case

the capacity for natural gas delivery from Texas

to Northern California is reduced to zero for the

first seven days after the earthquake; full

capacity is restored at about day 14. Losses in

delivery capacity to Seattle from Texas, as a

result of the Puget Sound scenario, and to

California from Texas, as a result of the Fort

Tejon event, are similar.

6.4.8 Distribution Systems

Residual capacities of the electric, water, and

highway distribution systems were estimated

using the time-to-restore curves provided in

ATC-25 6: EstImates of Indirect Economic Losses 139

1o--

95-

90_

85-

80-

75-

70-

65-

60-

55-

50-

45-

40-

35-

30-

25-

2 0 i1

1 5

101 1_ 0-V

0

C)

0

Figure 6-15

15

-

ATC-25 6: Eslimales of Indirect Economic Losses 139'
7

Elapsed Time in Days

Residual refined oil delivery from Texas to Chicago following New Madrid event (M=8.0).

100-

95-

90-i

85 -n

80d ... 75-I

70A i 65- _ 60

- 55-i 7501

:2 45 - 40-I = 35i

- 30H

r- 25-i - 20-.

15-i

10

5 0-

-5-

0 4 6 8 10. 12

Elapsed1 Time in Days

Figure 6-17 Residual capacity of natural gas delivery from Texas to Northern California following Fort

Tejon event (M=8.O).

140 6: Estimates of Indirect Economic Losses ATC-25

100

95

90

l T~~~~~~~~ l~~~ . _~

.t

U

0

85

8C

7E

I -

i -

7C

0

Figure 6-16

14

14 16

a r,

-- .... ............. ......... ......................... ............... .... ............................

.

2

I

Wn, I

i

i

I

i

I

140 6: Estimates of Indirect Economic Losses ATC-25
Appendix B. Distribution systems were assumed

to be lumped at the center of the Standard

Metropolitan Statistical Areas (SMSAs), and

intensities were estimated at each SMSA for

every scenario event Residual capacity plots for

distribution systems have not been included in

this report. Economic losses resulting from

damage to these systems, however, are included

in the summaries provided later in this chapter.

6.5 General Analytical Approach for

Estimating Indirect Economic

Losses

In order to develop the relationship between

lifeline interruption and indirect economic

losses it was necessary to generate a set of

simplifying assumptions. The general

assumptions that apply to all lifelines are listed

below.

65.1 GeneralAssumptions

1. Duration. The interruption of the lifeline

element/system that gives rise to the

economic loss is assumed to extend over one

or more consecutive month-long tim e

periods. The functionality loss assigned to

each month is the average for that month.

2. Independence. Lifeline elements are

assumed to be independent. Interruptions in

elements of one lifeline do not produce

interruptions in other lifeline elements. That

is, we ignore lifeline interaction effects,

which are sometimes non-trivial.

3. Lifeline Functionality. The quantity under

examination here is lifeline functionality as

opposed to lifeline capacity. For example,

assume the water supply lifeline sustains a

loss of 20 percent of its capacity locally, but,.

because of redundancy and looping, water

remains fully available. The functionality

loss and consequent indirect economic loss

would both be zero. Conversely, if all water

supply and transmission facilities remain

intact, but damage to the distribution system

cuts off water to 20 percent of the industries

served, the functionality loss is 20 percent

4. Distribution of Incidence of Interruption.

Lifeline interruptions are assumed to be

prioritized as follows:

Primary: Emergency response and

human needs

Secondary: Industrial needs

(Within this class noninterruptible service

customers share the loss in

capacity equally)

Tertiary: Interruptible service

customers

5. Secondary Impacts. Ignored. The loss of

capacity in one (non-lifeline), industry would

likely reduce the productivity of other

industries, that obtain inputs from the first

industry. These reverberations, which are

typically measured using input-output

analysis, will be ignored for this first

approximation. To the extent that these

reverberations are ignored, impacts are

understated.

6. Functional Relationships. Each industrial

sector of the economy was considered

separately with respect to each lifeline. TIhe

maximum impact, which would be expected

to result from a prolonged total lifeline

failure was estimated for each lifelinelsector

pair. TIhe effect of less-than-total failure of

the lifeline was estimated using the

following assumptions:

* The first 5% interruption could be

absorbed without economic loss

Subsequent losses would result in

proportionate economic losses. Thus as

lifeline capacity falls from 95 to 0%, the

economic impact is assumed to increase

linearly from zero to the maximum

-effect for each sector/lifeline pair.

The I product of the percent loss of value

added for each sector was summed over

all sectors for each decile and lifeline.

This sum represents the value-added

weighted average of the economic

impact of the lifeline for that decile.

7. Lineant. The linearity assumption

mentioned above implies that remaining

lifeline capacity could be used productively;

limited lifeline damage would not cause a

complete cessation of economic activity in

ATC-25 6: Estimates of Indirect Economic Losses 141

ATC-25 6: Estimates of Indirect Econcmic Losses 141
the sector. This assumption may

unrealistically underestimate the effects of

lifeline interruptions in industries (such as

primary metals) that might be unable to

scale back operations or to close and restart

operations in response to reduction and

restoration of lifeline capacity.

6.5.2 Data Sources and Methodology

Value Added Data. Economic activity within

each industrial sector was measured in terms of

value added. Value added refers to the value of

shipments (products) less the cost of materials,

supplies, contract work and fuels used in the

manufacture or cultivation of the product. The

United States Bureau of Economic Analysis

publishes annual data for value added for each

industrial sector. For simplicity, data from the 99

sectors were collapsed into 36 sectors. Data for

1983 were the latest available (published by

BEA, 1989), and were used in this study.

As a first approximation, data on the national

economy were used to assess the relative

economic importance of each sector. The value

added for each of the 36 sectors of the economic

model is expressed as a percentage of the

nationwide total. These data are presented in

Table 6-1. For comparison, comparable data for

the local San Francisco Bay Area economy

(which comprises Santa Clara County and parts

of Alameda County) are shown on the same

table.

Lifeline Importance Factors. The economic

impact of each lifeline was estimated by

modifying estimates from ATC 13 (ATC, 1985).

Table 9.8 of ATC 13 presents the lifeline

importance factors for each social function. To

adapt these estimates to the present study, the

"social functions" were assigned to each

industrial sector. The importance weights

provided in ATC-13 distinguish between main

and distribution systems for each lifeline. For

the present study, the two figures were averaged

to produce an importance weight for the entire

lifeline system. Further modification of the

ATC-13 estimates were made to reflect the

difference between the importance of the

lifeline and its impact on the economy if it were

totally disrupted. These modifications, generally

in the upward direction, constitute first

approximations of economic impacts. The

maximum impact estimates by sector and lifeline

are shown in Table 6-2.

Reduction in Value Added Due to Lifeline

Interruption. Table 6-3 presents the percent

reduction in value added for each sector

resulting from increasingly severe crude oil

lifeline interruptions. (Similar tables are shown

for all lifelines inAppendix D.) Values are

shown for each decile of lifeline interruption

and are assumed to pertain to monthly Gross

National Product (GNP). As noted in the

assumptions cited above, these percentages are

linearly interpolated between the reduction in

value added when the lifeline experiences 5%

interruption (for a 5% lifeline interruption,

there is no reduction in value added) to the

reduction in value added when the lifeline

experiences 100 percent interruption (maximum

impact).

Table 6-4, also assumed to pertain to monthly

GNP, presents the remaining value added of

each sector under alternative levels of crude oil

lifeline interruption. Similar tables are shown

for all lifelines in Appendix D. These value

added estimates are calculated by finding the

percent value added of the sector within the

total economy (Table 6-1, right column) and the

percentage reductions in value added (e.g.,

Table 6-3 for oil supply). The product of these

two variables is subtracted from the

uninterrupted value-added for each decile. In

the case of oil supply and the livestock sector,

the residual valued-added after 10% of loss of

capacity = (0.45%) - ((0.45%) x (2.63%)) =

(0.45) - (.01) = 0.44% These sums thus

represent the weighted average of the sectorial

impacts of interruptions to the lifeline.

Figure 6-18 illustrates the value added weighted

average economic impacts of crude oil lifeline

interruptions (taken from totals at bottom of

Table 6-4). Similar figures are shown for all

lifelines in Appendix D. The Y-intercept reflects

the estimate of the maximum impact, due to

total disruption of the lifeline for an extended

period of time.

Further Refinements. As noted at the outset,

this brief study constitutes a first approximation

of the economic effects of lifeline interruption.

A number of explicit and implicit assumptions

were made in order to simplify the analysis.

Using these assumptions limits the accuracy of

142 6: Estimates oi Indirect Economic Losses ATC-25

142 6: Estimcrtes of Indirect Economic Losses ATC-25
Table 6-1 Relative Importance of Industry Sections--U. S. and Santa Clara County,

California

Santa Clara

& Part Alameda

Value Added

Sector (Mil $1986)

1 Livestock

2 Agr. Prod.

3 AgServ For. Fish

4 Mining

5 Construction

6 Food Tobacco

7 Textile Goods

8 Misc Text. Prod,

9 Lumber & Wood

10 Furniture

11 Pulp & Paper

12 Print & Publish

13 Chemical & Drugs

14 Petrol, Refining

15 Rubber & Plastic

16 Leather Prods,

17 Glass Stone Clay

18 Prim. Metal Prod

19 Fab. Metal Prod.

20 Mach. Exo. Elec.

21 Elec. & Electron

22 Transport Eq.

23 Instruments

24 Misc. Manufact.

25 Transp & Whse,

26 Utilities

27 Wholesale Trade

28 Retail Trade

29 F.l.R.E. (Finance, Insurance, Real Estate)

30 Pers./Prof Serv.

31 Eating Drinking

32 Auto Serv,

33 Amuse & Rec,

34 Health Ed. Soc.

35 Govt & Govt Ind.

36 Households

Inventory & Leak

TOTAL

4

78

115

92

1,973

593

10

I1

50

60

153

413

492

3

127

1

199

95

538

5,789

5603

924

1,416

113

533

1,173

4,O34

2,567

10,250

8,755

1,556

1,137

223

4,650

3,870

574

0.00%

58,174

U.S. Econ

Value Added

(Mil $1983)

0.01%

0.13%

0.20%

0.16%/

3.39%

1.02%

0.02/6

0.02%

0.09%

0.1(0

0.26%

0.71%

0.84%

0.01%

0.22%

0.00%

0.34%

0.16%

0.92%

9.95%

9.63%

1.59%

2.43%

0.19%

0.92%

2.02%

6.93%

4.41%

17.62%

15.05%

2.6r/%

1.95%

0.38%

7.99%

6.65%

0.99%

39,135

100,00%

U.S. Econ.

Value Added

Pct. of Tot.

15,227

35,567

3,705

130,577

185,326

80,810

12,515

24,397

17,319

11,378

29,253

44,053

47,144

32,332

34,579

4,119

20,758

34,951

55,094

52,384

84,697

87,942

22 807

23,080

116,193

197,676

189,178

189,178

558,851

269,683

71,217

36,761

23,385

211,503

395,936

8,442

3,397,151

Sources: Santa Clara: Dames & Moore, 1987. Regional Economics Of Water Supply Shortages in the South Bay Contractors' Service

Area U.S.: U.S. Dept. of Comm. Bureau of Econ. Analysis, 1989 Suvey of Current Business. Input Output Accounts of the

U.S. Economy, 1983 Collapsed from 99 to 36 sectors.

-I0

La

0

in

a

0

(n

0

-I

Or

0

0

0

a

0

in

(1) th

U.S. Econ.

Value Added

Pot. of Tot.

0.45%

1.06%

0.11%

3.89%

5.52%

2.41%

0.37%

0.73%

0.52%

0.34%

0.87%

1.31%

1.40%

0.96%

1.03%

0.12%

0.62%

1.04%

1.64%

1.56%

2.52%

2.62%

0.68%

0.69%

3.46%

5.89%

5.63%

5.63%

16.64%

8.03%

2.12%

1.09%

0.70%

6,30%

11.79%

0.25%

100.00%
Table 6-2 Importance Weights of Various Lifeline Systems on Economic Sectors

(Modified ATC-13 Table 9.8 (ATC, 1985))

Natural Air Water Water Waste Electric Gas Oil Highway Railways Transportation Transportation Phone

1 Livestock

2 Agr. Prod.

3 AgServ For. Fish

4 Mining

5 Construction

6 Food Tobacco

7 Textile Goods

8 Misc Text. Prod.

9 Lumber & Wood

10 Furniture

11 Pulp & Paper

12 Print & Publish

13 Chemical & Drugs

14 Petrol. Refining

15 Rubber & Plastic

16 Leather Prods.

17 Glass Stone Clay

18 Prim. Metal Prod.

19 Fab. Metal Prod.

20 Mach. Exo, Elec.

21 Elec. & Electron

22 Transport Eq.

23 Instruments

24 Misc. Manufact.

25 Transp & Whse.

26 Utilities

27 Wholesale Trade

28 Retail Trade

29 F.I.R.E.

30 Pers./Prof Serv.

31 Eating Drinking

32 Auto Serv.

33 Amuse & Rec.

34 Health Ed. Soc.

35 Govt & Govt Ind.

36 Households

TOTAL

0.45

0.70

0.45

0.15

0.50

0.70

0.70

0.70

0.50

0.50

0.60

0.30

0.80

0.50

0.50

0.50

0.50

0.90

0.80

0.60

0.90

0.60

0.90

0.60

0.20

0.40

0.20

0.20

0.20

0.20

0.80

0.10

0.80

0.40

0.25

0.40

0.51

0.20

0.50

0.50

0.10

0.20

0.70

0.70

0.70

0.50

0.50

0.80

0.30

0.80

0.50

-0.50

0.50

0.50

0.80

0.80

0.80

0.90

0.80

0.60

0.60

0.10

0.24

0.10

0.20

0.20

0.20

0.80

0.20

0.80

0.80

0.20

0.75

0.51

0.50

0.50

0.50

0.90

0.40

0.90

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

0.90

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

0.90

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

0.30

0.80

0.90

0.90

0.90

0.90

0.80

0.90

0.80

0.80

* 0.60

* 0.80

0.86

0.10 0.50

0.30 0.80

0.30 0.80

0.10 0.90

0.00 0.90

0.25 0.50

0.20 0.50

0.20 0.50

0.20 0.50

0.20 0.50

0.40 0.50

0.20 0.50

0.90 0.50

0.50 1.00

0.50 0.50

0.20 0.50

0.50 0.50

0.50 0.90

0.50 0.50

0.50 0.50

0.50 0.50

0.50 0.90

0.75 0.50

0.S0 0.50

0.00 0.90

0.40 0.50

0.10 0.50

0.20 0.90

0.20 0.60

0.20 0.60

0.40 0.80

0.05 0.90

0.40 0.90

0.20 0.20

0.20 0.20

0.35 0.50

0.32 0.62

0.50

0.80

0.80

0.35

0.40

0.80

0.75

0.75

0.90

0.75

0.80

0.75

0.80

0.90

0.75

0.75

0.75

0.80

0.80

0.80

0.75

0.80

0.80

0.75

0.80

0.40

0.70

0.55

0.45

0.45

0.50

0.55

0.50

0.55

0.30

0.40

0.67

0.40

0.40

0.40

0.35

0.05

0.20

0.20

0.20

0.40

0.20

0.45

0.20

0.20

0.40

0.20

0.20

0.20

0.50

0.45

0.45

0.20

0.45

0.05

0.20

0.30

0.00

0.15

0.20

0.10

0.10

0.05

0.00

0.05

0.05

0.10

0.00

0.22

0.10

0.10

0.10

0.10

0.00

0.20

0.20

0.20

0.20

0.20

0.10

0.20

0.20

0.00

0.20

0.20

0.20

0.10

0.10

0.20

0.30

0.30

0.40

0.20

0.30

0.00

0.20

0.20

0.20

0.20

0.40

0.00

0.40

0.10

0.20

0.00

0.18

0.40 0.20

0.40 0.20

0.40 0.20

0.20 0.10

0.20 0.10

0.20 0.15

0.20 0.15

0.20 0.15

0.20 0.15

0.20 0.15

0.30 0.10

0.20 0.15

0.20 0.15

0.80 0.10

0.20 0.15

0.20 0.15

0.20 0.15

0.20 0.15

0.30 0.10

0.30 0.10

0.20 0.15

0.30 0.10

0.10 0.30

0.20 0.15

0.30 0.30

0.00 0.30

0.20 0.50

0.00 0.50

0.00 0.60

0.00 0.40

0.00 0.40

0.00 0.40

0.00 0.40

0.00 0.15

0.00 0.20

0.00 0.20

0.19 0.22

o.

ti..

cn

(1

(a

0

0

.

0

9k

0

0

0

0

:S

rn

g9
Table 6-3 Percent Value-Added Lost Due to Specified Percent Loss of Oil Supply

Lifeline

ULL Capacity Loss-->

U.S. Econ.

Value Added 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%0

(Percent)

1 Livestock

2 Agr, Prod.

3 AgServ For. Fish

4 Mining

.5 Construction

6 Food Tobacco

7 Tektile Goods

8 Misc Text. Prod.

9 Lumber & Wood

10 Furniture

I Pulp & Paper

12 Print & Publish

13 Chemical Drugs

14 Petrol. Refining

15 Rubber & Plastic

16 Leather Prods.

17 Glass Stone Clay

18 Prim. Metal Prod.

19 Fab. Metal Prod.

20 Mach. Exc, Elec.

21 Elec. & Electron

22 Transport Eq.

23 Instruments

24 Misc. Manufact.

25 Transp & Whse,

26 Utilities

27 Wholesale Trade

28 Retail Trade

29 F.l.Fl.E.

30 Pers./Prof. Serv.

31 Eating Drinking

32 Auto Serv.

33 Amuse & Rec.

34 Health Ed. Soc.

35 Govt & Govt Ind.

36 Households

TOTAL

0.45%

1.06%

0.11%

3.89%

552%/

2.41%

0.37%

0.73%

0.52/n

0.34%

0.87%

1.31%

1.40%

0.96%

1.03%

0.12%

0.62%

1.04%

1.64%

1.56%

2.52

2.62%

0.68%

0,69%

3.46%

5.89%

5.63%

5.63%

16.64%

8.03%

2.12%

1.09%

0.70%/6

6.30%/6

11.79%

0.25%

100.00%/a

2.63%

4.21%

4.21%

4.74%

4.74%

2,63%

2.63%

2,63%

2.63%

2.63%

2.63%

2.63%

2.63%

5,26%

2,63%

2.63%

2.63%

4.74%

2.63%

2.63%

2.63%

4.74%

2.63%

2.63%

4.74%

2.63%

2.63%

4.74%

3.16%

3.16%

4.21%

4.74%

4.74%

1.05%

1.05%

2.63%

3.25%

Avg.

7.89% 13.16% 18.42%

12.63% 21.05% 29.47%

12.o3% 21.05% 29.47%

14.21% 23,68% 33.16%

14.21% 23.68% 33.16%

7,89% 13.16% 18,42%

7.89% 13.16% 18.42%

7.89% 13.16% 18.42%

7,89% 13.16% 18.42%

7.89% 13.16% 1842%

7.89% 13.16% 18.42%

7.89% 13.16% 18.42%

7.89% 13.16% 18.42%

15,79% 26.32% 36.84%

7,89% 13.16% 18.42%

7,89% 13.16% 18.42%

7.89% 13,16% 18.42%

14.21% 23.68% 33.16%

7.89% 13.16% 18.42%

7.89% 13,16% 18.42%

7.89% 13.16% 18.42%

14.21% 23.68% 33.16%

7.89% 13.16% 18.42%/o

7.89% 13.16% 18.42%

14.21% 23.68% 33.16%

7.89% 13.16% 18,42%

7.89% 13.16% 18.42%

14.21% 23.68% 33.16%

9.47% 15.79% 22.11%

9.47%k 15.79% 22.11%

12.63% 21.05% 29.47%

14.21% 23.68% 33.16%

14.21% 23.68% 33.16%

3.16% 5.26% 7.37%

3.16% 5,26% 7.37%

7,89% 13.16% 18.42%

9.74/v 16.23%

Avg. Avg.

23.68% 28.95%

37.89% 46.32%

37.89% 46.32%

42.63% 52.11%

42.63% 52.11%

23.68% 28.95%

23.68% 28.95%

23.68% 28.95%

23.68% 28.95%

23.68% 28.95%

23.68% 28.95%

23.68% 28.95%

23.68% 28.95%

4737% 57.89%

23.68% 28.95%

23.68% 28.95%

23.68% 28.95%

42,63% 52.11%

23.68% 28.95%

23.68% 28.95%

23.68% 28.95%

42.63% 52.1 1%

23.68% 28.95%

23.68% 28.95%

42.63% 52.11%

23.68% 28.95%

23.68% 28.95%

42.63% 52.11%

28.42% 34.74%

28.42% 34.74%

37.89% 46.32%

42.63% 52.11%

42.63% 52.11%

9.47%; 11.58%

9.47% 11.S8%

23,68% 28.95%

22.72% 29.21% 35.70%

Avg. Avg. Avg.

34.21%

54.74%

54.74%

61.58%

61.58%

34.21%

34.21%

34,21%

34.2 1%

34.2 1%

34,21%

34.21%

34.21%

68.42%

34.21%

34.21%

34.21%

61.58%

34.21%

34.21%

34.21%

61.58%

34.21%

34.21%

61.58%/o

34.21%

34.2 1%

61.58%

41.05%

41,05%

54.74%

61.58%

61.58%

13.68%

13.68%

34.21%

42.19%

Avg.

39.47%S/

63.16%

63.16%

71.05%

71.05%

39.47%

39.47%

39.47%

39,'47%/

39.47%

39.47%

39,47/

39.47%o

78,95%

39.47%

39.47%

39.47%

71.05%

39.47%

39.47%

39.47%

71.05%

39.47%

39.47%

71.05%/6

39.47

39.47%

71.05%/6

47.37%

47.37%

63.16%

71.05%

71 .05%

15.79%

15.79%

39.47°

48.68%

Avg.

44.74%

71.58%

71.58%

80.53%

80.53%

44.74%

44.74%

44.74%

44.74%

4474%

44.74%

44.74%

44.74%

89.47%

44.74%

44.74%

44.74%

80.53%

44.74%

44,74%

44,74%

8053%

44.74%

44.74%

80.3%

44.74%

44.74%

8Q.53%

53.68%

53.68%

71.58%

80,53%

80.53%

17.89%

17.89%

44.74%

50.00%

80.00%

80,00%

90.00 -/0

90.00%

50.00%

50.00%

50.00%

50.00%

50.00%

50.00%

S0.00%

50.00%

100.00%

50.00%/

50.00%

50.00%

90.00%

50.00%

50.00%

50.00%

90.00%

50.00%

50.00%

90.00%

50.00%

50.00%

90.00%

60.00%

60.0%

80.00%

90.00%

90.00%

20.00%

20.0Q0h

50.0Qh

55.18% 61.67%

Avg. Total V.A

Pot. V.A.

0r

(DIn

0

.

(1) a

t'I

Q

.

0

0

0

inin

IDMn
0%/ 10% 20% 30% 40% : 50% . 60% 70% 80% 90%1 100%/

9-

0.23%

0.21%

0.02%

0.39%

0.55%

1.20%

0.19%

0.36%

0.26%

0.17%/

0.44%

0.66%

0.70%

0.00%

0.51%

0.06%

0.31%

0.10%

0.82%

0.78%

1.26%

0.26%

0.34%

0.35%

2.94%

2.82%

0.56%

6.66%

3.21 %

0.42%

0.11%

0.07%

5.04%

9.43%

0.13%

41.91%

42%

0.45%

1.06%

0.110%

3.89%

5.52%

2.41%

0. 3 7%

0.73%1

0.52/o

0.34%

0. 87%

1.31%

1.40%

0.96%

1.03%

0. 12%

0.62%/

1.04%/

1.640%

1.56%

2.52%/

2.6%

0.68%

0.69%

3.46%

5.89%

5.63%:

5.63%

16.64%

8.03%

2.12%/

1.09%

0.70%/

6.30%

11.719%

0.25%

100.00%/

100%

0.44%

1 .01%

0.11%

3.70%/

5.26%

2.34%

0.36%

0.71%

0.50%

0.33%

0.8%

1.28%

1.37%

0.91%

1.00%

0.12%

0.60%

0.99%

1.60%

1.52%

2.46%

2.49%

0.66%

0.67%

3.30%.

5.73%

5.49%

5.37%

16.12%

7.78%

2.03%

1.04%

0.66%

6.23%

11.67%

0.24%

96.94%

97%

0.42%

0.93%

0.10%

3.34%

4.73%

2.22%

0.34%

0.67%

0.48%

0.31 %

0.80%

1.21%

1.29%

0.81%

0.95%

0.1 1%

0.57%

0.89%

1.51 %

1.44%

2.32%

2.25%

0.63%

0.63%

2.97%

5.42%

5.19%

4.83%

15.07%

7.27%

1.85%

0.94%

0.60%

6.10%

11.42%

0.23%

90.83%

91%

0.39%

0.84%

0.09%

2.97%

4.21%

2.,09%/

0.32%

0.63%

0.45%

0.29%

0.76%

1.14%

1.22%

0.71%

0.,89%

0.11%

0.54%

0.79%

1.42%

1.35%

2.19%

2.00%

0.59%

0.60%

2.64%

5.11%

4.89%

4.30%

14.01%

6.76%

1.67%

0.84%

0.53%

5.97%

11.17%

0.22%

84.71%

85%

0.37%

0.75%

0.08%

2.60%

3.69%

1.96%

0.30%

0.59%

0.42%

0.28%

0.71 %

1.07%

1.15%

0.610%

0.84%

0.10%

0.50%

0.70%

1.34%

1.27%

2.06%

1.75%

0.55%

0.56%

2.31%

4.80%

4.60%

3.77%

12.96%

6.26%

1.50%

0.73%

-0.47%

15.83%

10.92%

0.21 %

78.60%

79%

0.35%/

0.66%

0.07%/

2.23%

3.17%o

1.84%

0.28%

0.55%

0.39%

0.26%

0.66%

1 00/0

0.51%

0.79%

0.09/0

0.47%

6.60%/

1.25%

1.19%/

1.92%/

1.50%/

0.52%/

0. 52%0/

1.99%

4.49%

4.30%

3.23%/

5.75%

1.32%

0.63%

0.40%/

5.70%

10.67%

0.19%

72.48%

72%

0.32%

0.57%

0.06%

1.86%/

2.64%

1.71%

0.26%

0.52%

0.37%

0.24%

0.62%

0.93%

1 .000%

0.41%

0.73%

0.09%/

0.44%

0.560/%

1. 1 %o

1.1 1%

1.79%

1.25%

0.48%

0.49%

1.66%

4.18%

4.00%/

2.70%

10.86%

5.24%

1.14%

0.52%

0.33%

5.57/6

10.43%

0.18%

66.37%o

66%

0.30%/

0.48%

0.05%/

1.49%

2.1 2%

1.58%

0.25%

0.48%

0.34%

0.22%

0.57P/6

0.86%

0.92%

0. 3 0%

0.68%

0.08%

0.41%

0.40%/

1.08%

1.03%

1.66%

1.01%

0.45%/

0.45%

1.33%

3.87%

3.71%

2.16%

9.81%

4.73%

0.96%

0.42%

0.27%

5.44%

10.18%

0 1 7%/

60.25%

60%

0.27%h

0,39%h

0.oi%1

1. 13%/

1.600°0

1.46%

0.23%

0.44%

0.31%

0.21%

0.53%

0.79%.

O 50.

0.20%h

0.62%h

0.070/6

0.37P/

0.300°h

0.99%

0.94%

1.53%

0.76%

0.41%

0.42°h6

1.00°h0

3.56%/

3.41%

1.63%

8.76%

4.23%

0.78%

0.32%h

0.20%h

5.30%/

9.93%

0.15%

54.14%/

54%

0.25%

0.30%

0.03%

0.76%

1.07%

1.33%

0.21%

0.40%

0.29%/

0.19%

0.48%

0.72%

0.78%

0.10%

0.57%

0.07%

0.34%

0.20%

0.91%

0.86%

1.39%

0.51%

0.38%

0.38%

0.67%

3.25%

3.11%

1 .10%

7:71%

3.72%

0.60%

0.21%

0.14%

5.17%

9.68%

0.14%

48.02%

48%

0o

(a

0

P

:3

CL

&q

Pi

0

t:3

W

ITable 6-4 Residual Value-Added After Loss of Capacity of Oil Spply Lifeline
Oil Supply Uleline

1

0 20 40 60, 80

Percent Lifeline Availibility

Residual Value Added as a function of crude oil lifeline residual capacity

the results. However, the model's parameters could be refined to produce more accurate

results, which might also better represent

regional and local economic diversity. The

following refinements are suggested:

• Reaionalization. Data on value added

are available on a county-by-county basis

for the entire United States. This data

could be used in place of the national

data presented here to produce local

area models of county or multiplecounty areas. Such a localized model

would more accurately reflect the

impacts weighted by the local

importance of each of the industrial

sectors.

* Maximum Economic Impacts. The

estimates of the maximum impacts of

lifeline disruptions were modified from

the ATC-13 data, based on the judgment of the authors. These estimates could be

improved by research into the use of

each of the lifeline inputs within each of

the economic sectors.

* LineartV Assumption. The economic

impact of lifeline interruption was

assumed to vary linearly between no

impact at 5% interruption, to maximum

impact at 100% interruption. This

assumption could be investigated and

modified as appropriate. Some

industries, may require uninterrupted use

of lifelines in order to operate; they may be unable to operate under certain

conditions of reduced lifeline capacity.

The linearity assumption ignores these

possible threshold effects. Furthermore,

many or all industries might respond

non-linearly to interruptions. Smaller

percentage interruptions might cause a

less than proportional impact on value

added as lower valued functions or

product line are cut first, or as other

AT. 56 siae fIdrc cnmcLse 4

'a0)

10

-a

0

4'

ci

co

0.9

0.8

0.7

0.6

0.5

0.4

:0.3

0.2

0.1

0

Figure 6-18

100

ATC-25 6: Estimates of Indirect Economic Losses 147
factors of production are substituted for

the damaged lifeline. At high percent

interruptions, the response might be

more than proportional, as vital

functions cannot be maintained. Further

research into industry response to

scarcity might suggest a convex rather

than linear response function.

Interindustry Effects. The scarcity of

productive factors other than lifelines

could have major impacts on a regional

economy. These interactions were

ignored in the present study, thus

understating impacts of lifeline

interruptions. As noted in Scawthorn

and Lofting (1984), input-output

economic models could be used to solve

for these interactions. Building such a

model would be difficult because the

impacts caused by lifeline disruptions

and the non-lifeline scarcity impacts

would have to be solved simultaneously.

However, the basic modeling approach

proposed in this study is consistent with

the type of regional data necessary to

drive an input-output model.

6.6 Indirect Economic Loss Estimates

Indirect economic losses were estimated for

each lifeline system and scenario event using the

residual capacity plots provided in Appendix C

and the economic tables described above. The

calculation procedure was as follows:

1. Determine the monthly loss in capacity for

the lifeline and scenario earthquake under

consideration using the appropriate residual

capacity plot (Appendix C).

2. Determine Percent-Value-Added Lost for

each month and sector of the economy for

the lifeline under consideration, using the

estimates obtained from Step 1 above and

the Percent-Value-Added Lost Tables

provided in Appendix D (Table 6-3 is an

example). Sum the percentages for all

months in each sector to obtain the total

Value-Added-Lost in that sector during the

time period the lifeline had loss in capacity.

Multiply this sum by the percent U. S.

Economic Value Added for that sector.

3. Sum the products calculated in Step 2 for

each sector to estimate the total percentage

value added lost for all economic sectors;

multiply this percentage by the percent of U.

S. population affected and by the monthly

Gross National Product to obtain the total

indirect economic loss for the lifeline and

earthquake scenario under consideration.

The equation used to calculate indirect

economic losses (IEL) is as follows:

N1 N2

IEL = 

i= jl1

N3

Z (A) (B) (C) (D) (6.7)

k=1

where: IEL = Indirect Economic Loss

N1 = number of affected regions

N2 = number of economic sectors

N3 = number of months the lifeline

has a loss in capacity

A = percent Value-Added-Lost

per month

B = percent U. S. Economy Value

Added

C = percent of U. S. population

affected

D = monthly Gross National

Product

We note that an average value of loss of

functionality during each month of the

restoration period is used when estimating the

overall indirect economic impact (from Table 6-

3 and similar tables in Appendix D). This aspect

of the computation is illustrated in Example 6.4

(Figure 6-19), which illustrates the economic

loss calculation for a specific lifeline, economic

sector, and hypothetical earthquake. Shown in

Example 6.5 (Figure 6-20) is an example

calculation for estimating total indirect dollar

loss in all economic sectors due to damage of

the electric system in the state of Utah as a

result of the Wasatch Front scenario event.

We have also calculated values of "Percent of

Monthly Economic Loss" in each economic

sector due to interruption to each lifeline system

for each scenario earthquake using the

"Residual Capacity Plots" provided in Appendix

C and the "Percent Value Added Lost" tables

provided in Appendix D. These data are

provided in Tables 6-5 through 6-11. Values in

these tables are percentage of the monthly GNP

of each economic sector that is lost due to the

148 6: Estimates of Indirect Economic Losses ATC-25

6: Estimates of Indirect Economic Losses ATC-25 148
Figure 6-1 9. Analysis Example Illustrating

Economic Loss Calculation for

Crude Oil Pipeline Network.

scenario earthquake and resulting lifeline

interruption. In Table 6-6, for example, 141% of

the monthly GNP of livestock is lost as. a result

of damage to water transportation systems

during the Charleston earthquake scenario. The

actual dollar loss would be the product of 1.41 x

.0045 x monthly national GINP x percent of

national population affected.

Summaries of the total indirect economic losses

resulting from damage to site-specific systems

and extended regional networks, based on 1986

C&NP data, are provided in Table 6-12. Total

indirect economic losses resulting from damage

to local distribution systems, are presented in

Table 6-13. We note that Table 6-12 contains

total loss amounts expressed in terms of lower

bound, upper bound, and best estimate. The

lower bound represents economic loss caused by

the singular lifeline system causing the greatest

loss; the upper bound is the sum of losses caused

by all systems; and the best estimate is the

square root of the sum of the squares (SRSS) of

losses caused by each lifeline. We note also that

the SRSS procedure was used to estimate total

indirect economic losses resulting from damage

to local distribution networks (Table 6-13).

By combining like system data from Tables 6-12

and 6-13 in a least squares (SRSS) fashion, we

estimate the total indirect economic losses for

the eight scenario earthquakes as follows:

Earth uake

Cape Ann

Charleston

Fort Tejon

indirect

Loss

(in Billions, 1991)

$9.1

$10.2

$11.7

Hayward

New Madrid, M = 8.0

New Madrid, M = 7.0

Puget Sound

Wasatch Front

$ 11.1

$14.6

$4.9

$6.1

$3.9

Bar charts showing the indirect losses caused by

transmission lines (upper bound data) by state

for each scenario earthquake are provided in

Figures 6-21 through 6-28. We note that

estimates of indirect economic losses for each

state are sensitive to the assumed location of the

source zone for large-magnitude events (e.g.,

had the assumed source zone for the magnitudeS New Madrid event been located further north,

estimates of direct damage in Missouri would

have been substantially larger). Estimates of

direct damage (Chapter 6 are similarly affected.

The data provided in Figures 6-21 through 6-28

suggest that Massachusetts would experience

the highest indirect losses, due to the Cape Ann

event with the electric system contributing the

highest portion; Mississippi and Arkansas would

experience the highest indirect losses due to the

magnitude-8.0 New Madrid event; and South

Carolina, Utah, Washington, Northern and

Southern California would experience the

highest indirect losses due to the Charleston,

Utah, Seattle, Hayward, and Fort Tejon events,

respectively. The electric system contributes the

highest indirect losses, among all systems, for

most of the events.

ATC-25 6: Estimates of Indirect Economic Losses 149

Example 6.4

For the pipeline network described in Example

6.2 and using the residual capacity results

determined there, determine indirect economic

losses to the livestock sector for the first month.

Procedure. Immediately following the earthquake,

this network experiences a 39% loss of

functionality. Ten days later the loss of

functionality is 0%. Thus, the average loss of

functionality during the first 10 days is about 20%,

and for the first month it is 20%o/3, or 7%. From

Table 6-3, which pertains to average loss of

functionality for one month, the Value Added lost

for a 7% loss in functionality for the live stock

sector of the economy is 1.8%, i.e., 0.7 of 2.63%

corresponding to 1 0% loss of oil supply lifeline for

one month. To determine the economic losses in

dollars, this percentage would first need to be

multiplied by the percent U. S. Economy Value

Added for the livestock sector fP.45%) and then

prorated by the percent of the national

population affected. Actual economic losses in

this economic sector due to loss of functionality of

this particular pipeline would then be determined

by multiplying this prorated percentage by the

monthly gross national product

ATC-25 6: Estimates of Indirect Economfc Losses 149
Example 6.5

Using the Restoration Capacity Plot shown below for Utah electric power following the scenario

Wasatch Front event, estimate the indirect economic losses due to damage of the electric system in

the state of Utah.

1

A

C

0

to

en

ca)

Elapsed Time in Days

STEP 1:

STEP 2:

Figure 6-20.

Estimate the average loss for each month, which is as follows:

Month Percent Loss

1 45%

2 25%

3 10%

4 5%

From Table D-2, Percent Value-Added Lost Due to Specified Percent Loss of Electricity

Lifeline, extrapolate percent Value Added Lost for each sector of the economy for each

month and sum the results to obtain the estimated percent of Value Added Lost for the

entire period. For the livestock sector, this calculation is as follows:

(23.68+18.42)/2 + (13.16+7.89)/2 + 2.63 + 2.63/2 =

21.05 + 10.53 + 2.63 + 1.32 = 35.53%

Analysis Example Illustrating Economic Loss Calculation for Electric System in State of

Utah for the Wasatch Front Scenario Event.

150 6: Estimates of Indizect Economic Losses ATC-25

6: Estimates of Indirect Economic Losses ATC-25 150
Multiply the sum from Step 2 by the percent of the economy for that sector and sum the

products for all economic sectors to obtain the total Percent-Value-Added lost (for all arnn rirn eatt r eX'

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

111

12

13

14

15

16

1 7

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

29

30

31

32

33

34

35

36

Economic

Sector

Livestock

Agr. Prod.

AgServ. For. Fish

Mining

Construction

Food Tobacco

Textile Goods

Misc. Text. Prod.

Lumber & Wood

Furniture

Pulp & Paper

Print & Publish

Chemical & Drugs

Petrol. Refining

Rubber & Plastic

Leather Prods.

Glass Stone Clay

Prim. Metal Prod.

Fab. Metal Prod.

Mach. Exc. Elec.

Elec. & Electron

Transport Eq.

Instruments

Misc. Manufact.

Transp & Whse.

utilities

Wholesale Trade

Retail Trade

F.I.R.E.

Pers./Prof. Serv.

Eating Drinking

Auto Serv.

Amuse & Rec.

Health Ed. Soc.

Govt & Govt Ind.

Households

Total

(1)

U. S.

Economy

ValueAdded

percent)

0.45

1.06

0.11

3.89

5.52

2.41

0.37

0.73

0.52

0.34

0.87

1.31

1.40

0.98

1.03

0.12

0.62

1.04

1.64

1.56

2.52

2.62

0.68

0.69

3.46

5.89

5.63

5.63

16.64

8.03

2.12

1.09

0.70

6.30

11.79

0.25

,(2)

Utah

ValueAdded

Lost

(percent)

35.53

35.53

35.53

63.95

28.42

63.95

71.05

71 .05

71.05

71.05

71.05

71.05

63.95

71.05

71.05

71.05

71.05

63.95

71 .05

71 .05

71.05

71.05

71.05

71.05

21.32

56.84

63.95

63.95

63.95

63.95

56.84

63.95

56.84

56.84

42.63

56.84

(3)

Product

of

(1)x2

percent)

0.16

0.38

'0.04

2.49

1.57

1.54

0.26

0.52

0.37

0.24

0.62

'0.93

0.90

0.68

0.73

0.09

0.44

0.67

1.17

1.11

1.79

1.86

0.48

0.49

0.74

3.35

3.60

3.60

10.64

5.14

1.21

0.70

0.40

3.58

5.03

0.14

57.63

The total indirect economic loss resulting from damage to the electric system in the state

of Utah is computed as follows: = 57.63% (Utah population/U.S. population) (U.S. GNP)/12 = 57.63% (1.68/242) ($4,881/12) = $1.63 Billion

where U.S. GNP = $4,881 Billion (1986)'

Figure 6-20 (Continued)

6: Estimates of Indirect Economic Losses 151

STEP 3: - ------

---. -.. -

ATC-25
Table 6-5 Indirect Economic Loss due to Damage to the Air Transportation Lifeline

(Percent Monthly GNP)

CHARLESTON FORT PUGET NEWMADRID

NEWMADRID (M=8.0) (M=7.5) CAPEANN WASATCH HAYWARD TEJON SOUND (M=70)

U.S. Econ. South

Value Added Arkansas Tennessee Kentucky Mississippi Carolina Georgia Massachusetts Utah California California Washington Arkansas

(Percent) _

1 Livestock 0.45% 4.74% 1.58% 0.37% 3.42%/6 2.11% 1.05% 2.95% 1.79% 0.53% 1.79% 3.16% 2.11%

2 Agr. Prod. 1.06% 4.74% 1.58% 0.37% 3.42% 2.11% 1.05% 2.95% 1.79% 0.53% .1.79% 3.16% 2.11%

3 AgServ For. Fish 0.11% 4.74% 1.58% 0.37% 3.42% 2.11% 1.05% 2.95% 1.79% 0.53% 1.79% 3.16% 2.11%

4 Mining 3.89% 4.74% 1.58% 0.37% 3.42% 2.11% 1.05% 2.95% 1.79% 0.53% 1.79% 3.16% 2.11%

5 Construction 5.52% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%

6 Food Tobacco 2.41% 9.47% 3.16% 0.74% 6.84% 4.21% 2.11% 5.89% - 3.58% 1.05% 3.58% 6.32% 4.21%

7 Textile Goods 0.37% 9.47% 3.16% 0.74% 6.84% 4.21% 2.11% 5.89% 3.58% .1.05% 3.58% 6.32% 4.21%

8 Misc Text. Prod. 0.73% 9.47% 3.16% 0.74% 6.84% 4.21% 2.11% 5.89% 3.58% 1.05% 3.58% 6.32% 4.21%

9 Lumber& Wood 0.52% 9.47% 3.16% 0.74% 6.84% 4.21% 2.11% 5.89% 3.58% 1.05% 3.58% 6.32% 4.21%

10 Furniture 0.34% 9.47% 3.16% 0.74% 6.84% 4.21% 2.11% 5.89% 3.58% 1.05% 3.58% 6.32% 4.21%

11 Pulp Paper 0.87% 4.74% 1.58% 0.37% 3.42% 2.11% 1.05% 2.95% 1.79% 0.53% 1.79% 3.16% 2.11%

12 Print & Publish 1.31% 9.47% 3.16% 0.74% 6.84% 4.21% 2.11% 5.89% 3.58% 1.05% 3.58% 6.32% 4.21%

13 Chemical & Drugs 1.40% 9.47% 3.16% 0.74% 6.84% 4.21% 2.11% 5.89% 3.58% 1.05% 3.58% 6.32% 4.21%

14 Petrol. Refining 0.96% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%

15 Rubber & Plastic 1.03% 9.47% 3.16% 0.74% 6.84% 4.21% 2.11% 5.89% 3.58% 1.05% 3.58%. 6.32% 4.21%

16 Leather Prods. 0.12% 9.47% 3.16% 0.74% 6.84% 4.21% 2.11% 5.89% 3.58% 1.05% 3.58% 6.32% 4.21%

17 GlassStoneClay 0.62% 9.47% 3.16% 0.74% 6.84% 4.21% 2.11% 5.89% 3.58% 1.05% 3.58% 6.32% 4.21%

18 Prim. Metal Prod. 1.04% 4.74% 1.58% 0.37% 3.42% 2.11% 1.05% 2.95% 1.79% 0.53% 1.79% 3.16% 2.11%

19 Fab. Metal Prod. 1.64% 4.74% 1.58% 0.37% 3.42% 2.11%- 1.05% 2.95% 1.79% 0.53% 1.79% . 3.16% 2.11%

20 Mach. Exc. Elec. 1.56% 9.47% 3.16% 0.74% 6.84% 4.21% 2.11% 5.89% 3.58% 1.05% 3.58% 6.32% 4.21%

21 Elec. & Electron 2:52% 14.21% 4.74% 1.11% 10;26% 6.32% 3.16% 8.84% 5.37% 1.58% 5.37% 9.47% 6.32%

22 Transport Eq. 2.62% 14.21% 4.74% 1.11% 10.26% 6.32% 3.16% 8.84% 5.37% 1.58% 5.37% 9.47% 6.32%

23 Instruments 0.68% 18.95% 6.32% 1.47% 13.68% 8.42% 4.21% 11.79% 7.16% 2.11% 7.16% 12.63% 8.42%

24 Misc. Manufact. 0.69% 9.47% 3.16% 0.74% 6.84% 4.21% 2.11% 5.89% 3.58% 1.05% 3.58% 6.32% 4.21%

25 Transp & Whse. 3.46% 14.21% 4.74% 1.11% .10.26% 6.32% 3.16% 8.84% 5.37% 1.58% 5.37% 9.47% 6.32%

26 Utilities 5.89% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%

27 Wholesale Trade 5.63% 9.47% 3.16% 0.74% 6.84% 4.21% 2.11% 5.89% 3.58% 1.05% 3.58% 6.32% 4.21%

28 Retail Trade 5.63% 9.47% 3.16% 0.74% 6.84% 4.21% 2.11% 5.89% 3.58% 1.05% 3.58% 6.32% 4.21%

29 F.I.R.E. 16.64% 9.47% 3.16% 0.74% 6.84% 4.21% 2.11% 5.89% 3.58% 1.05% 3.58% 6.32% 4.21%

30 Pers./ProfServ. 8.03% 9.47% 3.16% 0.74% 6.84% 4.21% 2.11% 5.89% 3.58% 1.05% 3.58% 6.32% 4.21%

31 Eating Drinking 2.12% 18.95% 6.32% 1.47% 13.68% 8.42% 4.21% 11.79% 7.16% 2.11% 7.16% 12.63% 8.42%

32 Auto Serv. 1.09% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%

33 Amuse&Rec. 0.70% 18.95% 6.32% 1.47% 13.68% 8.42% 4.21% 11.79% 7.16% 2.11% 7.16% 12.63% 8.42%

34 Health Ed. Soc. 6.30% 4.74% 1.58% 0.37% 3.42% 2.11% 1.05% 2.95% 1.79% 0.53% 1.79% 3.16% 2.11%

35 Govt&GovtInd. 11.79% 9.47% 3.16% 0.74% 6.84% X 4.21% 2.11% 5.89% 3.58% 1.05% 3.58% 6.32% 4.21%

36 Households 0.25% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%

.

On

0

Iri

0

UV

0

In

0
Table 6-6 Indirect Economic Loss due to Damage to the Water Transportation Lifeline (Percent Monthly GNP)

U.S. Econ.

Value Added

(Percent)

I Livestock

2 Agr. Prod.

3 Agserv For. Fish

4 Mining

5 construction

6 Food Tobacco

7 Textile Goods

8 Misc Text, Prod.

9 Lumber & Wood

10 Furniture

11 Pulp & Paper

12 Print & Publish

13 Chemical & Drugs

14 Petrol. Refining

1S Rubber & Plastic

16 Leather Prods.

17 Glass Stone Clay

18 Prim. Metal Prod,

19 Fab. Metal Prod.

20 Mach. Exc. Elec,

21 Elec. & Electron

22 Transport Eq.

23 Instruments

24 Misc. Manufact,

25 Transp & Whse.

26 Utilities

27 Wholesale Trade

28 Retail Trade

29 F.lI.R.E.

30 Pers./Prof Serv.

31 Eating Drinking

32 Auto Serv,

33 Amuse & Rec.

34 Health Ed. Soc.

35 Govt & Govt Ind.

36 Households

0.45%

1.06%

0.11%

3.89%

5.52%

2.41%

0.37%

0.73%

0.52%

0.34%

0.87%

1.31%

1.40%

0,96%

1.03%

0.12%

0,62%

1.04%

1.64%

1.56%

2.52%

2.62%

0.68%

0.69%

3.46%

5.89%

5.63%

5.63%

16.64%

8.03%

2.12%

1.09%

0,70%

6.30%

11.79%

0.25%

C CHARLESTON

South North

Carolina Carolina Georgia

141.05%

141.05%

141.05%

70.53%

70.53%

70.53%

70.53%

70.53%

70.53%

70.53%

10S.79%

70.53%

70.53%

282.11%

70.53%

70.53%

70.53%

70.53%

10$.79%

105.79%

70.53%

105.79%

35.26%

70.53%

105.79%

0.00%

70.53%

0.00%

0.00%

0.00%

0.00%

0.00%

0.00%

0.00%

0.00%

0.00%

S.47%

5.47%

5,47%

2.74%

2.74%

2.74%

2.74%

2.74%

2.74%

2.74%

4.11%

2.74%

2.74%

10.95%

2.74%

2.74%

2.74%

2.74%

4.11%

4.11%

2.74%

4.11%

1.37%

2,74%

4.11%

0.00%

2.74%

0.00%

0.00%

0.00%

0,00%

0.00%

0.00%

0.00%

0.00%

0.00%

103. 16%

103.16%

103.16%

51.58%

51.58%

51.58%

51.58%

51.58%

51.58%

51.58%

77.37%

51.58%

51.58%

206.32%

51,58%

51 .58%

51.58%

51.58%

77.37%

77.37%

51.58%

77.37%

25.79%

51 .58%

77.37%

0.00%

51.58%

0.00%

0,00%

0.00%

0.00%

0.00%

0.00%

0,00%

0.00%

0.00%

CAPEANN

Massaohussous

14,74%

14.74%

14.74%

7.37%

7.37%

7,37%

7.37%

7.37%

7.37%

7.37%

1 1.05%

7.37%

7.37%

29.47%

7.37%

7.37%

7.37%

7.37%

i1 .05%

1 1,05%

7.37%

11.05%

3.68%

7.37%

1 105%

0.00%

7.37%

0.00%

0.00%

0.00%

0.00%

0.00%

0.00%

0.00%

0,00%

0.00%

Rholo New

Island Hampshire

12.63%

12.63%

12.63%

6.32%

6.32%

6.32%

6.32%

6.32%

6.32%

6.32%

947%

6,32%

6,32%

25.26%

6.32%

6.32%

6.32%

6.32%

9.47%

9.47%

6,32%

9.47%

3.16%

6.32%

9.47%

0.00%

6.32%

0.00%

0.00%

0.00%

0.00%

0.00%

0.00%

0.00%

000%

0.00%

1.58%

1.58%

1.58%

0.79%

0.79%

0,79%

0.79%

0.79%

0.79%

0.79%

1 .18%

0.79%

0,79%

3.16%

0.79%

0.79%

0.79%

0.79%

1.18%

1.18%

0.79%

1.18%

0.39%

0.79%

1.18%

0.00%

0.79%

0.00%

0.00%

0.00%

0.00%

0.00%

0.00%

0.00%

0.00%

0.00%

California Californi

11.58%

11.58%

11,58% 5.79%

5.79%

5,79%

5.79%

5.79%

5.79%

5,79%

8.68%

5,79%

5.79%

23.16%

5.79%

5.79%

5.79%

5.79%

8.68%

8,68%

5.79%

8.68%

2.89%

5.79%

8.68%

0.00 5.79%

0,00%

0.00% 0.00%

0.00%

0,00%

0.00%

0.00%

0,00%

0.00%

21.05%

21.05%

21 .05%

10.53%

10.53%

10.53%

10.53%

10.53%

10.53%

1 0.53%

15.79%

10.53%

10.53%

42.11%

10.53%

10.53%

10.53%

10.53%

15.79%

15.79%

10.53%

15.79%

5.26%

10.53%

15.79%

0.00%

10.53%

0,00%

0.00%

0.00%

0.00%

0.00%

0.00%

0.00%

0.00%

0.00%

PU(GET SOUND

ia Washington

27.37%

27.37%

27.37%

13.68%

13.68%

13.68%

13.68%

13.68%

13.68%

1 3.68%

20.S3%

13.68%

13.68%

54.74%

13.68%

13.68%

1S.68% 13.68%

20.53%

20.53%

13.68%

20.53%

6.84%

13.68%

20.53%

0.00%

13.68%

0.00%

0.00%

0.00%

0.00%

0.00%

0.00%

0.00%

0.00%

0.00%

9

N

CR

HAYWARD FORT TEJON

M

n

!i

7

&-I

a

a

n

0

0

El

00

(a

Nk a) 0

-

WR
Table 6-7 Indirect Economic Loss due to Damage to the Oil System (Percent

Monthly GNP)

- CRUDE OIL REFINED OIL

U.S. Econ.

Value Added

(Percent)

1 Livestock 0.45%

2 Agr. Prod. 1.06%

3 AgServ For. Fish 0.11%

4 Mining 3.89%

5 Construction 5.52%

6 Food Tobacco 2.41%

7 Textile Goods 0.37%

8 Misc Text. Prod. 0.73%

9 Lumber & Wood 0.52%

10 Furniture 0.34%

11 Pulp & Paper 0.87%

12 Print & Publish 1.31%

13 Chemical & Drugs 1.40%

14 Petrol. Refining 0.96%

15 Rubber & Plastic 1.03%

16 Leather Prods. 0.12%

17 Glass Stone Clay 0.62%

18 Prim. Metal Prod. 1.04%

19 Fab. Metal Prod. 1.64%

20 Mach. Exc. Elec, 1.56%

21 Elec. & Electron 2.52%

22 Transport Eq. 2.62%

23 Instruments 0.68%

24 Misc. Manufact. 0.69%

25 Transp & Whse. 3.46%

26 Utilities 5.89%

27 Wholesale Trade 5.63%

28 Retail Trade 5.63%

29 F.I.R.E. 16.64%

30 Pers./Prof Serv. 8.03%

31 Eating Drinking 2.12%

32 Auto Serv. 1.09%

33 Amuse & Rec. 0.70%

34 Health Ed. Soc. 6.30%

35 Govt & Govt Ind. 11.79%

36 Households 0.25%

New Madrid

(M=8.0) (M=7 O)

Chicago Chicago

Fort Tejon

(M=8.0) (M=8.0) South North

California California

New Madrid

(M=8.0) (M=7.0)

Chicago Chicago

2.63% 0.66% 7.89% 8.95% 1.32% 0.92%

4.21% 1.05% 12.63% 14.32% 2.11% 1.47%

4.21% 1.05% 12.63% 14.32% 2.11% 1.47%

4.74% 1.18% 14.21% 16.11% 2.37% 1.66%

4.74% 1.18% 14.21% 16.11% 2.37% 1.66%

2.63% 0.66% 7.89% 8.95% 1.32% 0.92%

2.63% 0.66% 7.89% 8;95% 1.32% 0.92%

2.63% 0.66% 7.89% 8.95% 1.32% 0.92%

2.63% 0.66% 7.89% 8.95% 1.32% 0.92%

2.63% 0.66% 7.89% 8.95% 1.32% 0.92%

2.63% 0.66% 7.89% 8.95% 1.32% 0.92%

2.63% 0.66% 7.89% 8.95% 1.32% 0.92%

2.63% 0.66% 7.89% 8.95% 1.32% 0.92%

5.26% 1.32% 15.79% 17.89% 2.63% 1.84%

2.63% 0.66% 7.89% 8.95% 1.32% 0.92%

2.63% 0.66% 7.89% 8.95% 1.32% 0.92%

2.63% 0.66% 7.89% 8.95% 1.32% 0.92%

4.74% 1.18% 14.21% 16.11% 2.37% 1.66%

2.63% 0.66% 7.89% 8.95% 1.32% 0.920/0

2.63% 0.66% 7.89% 8.95% 1.32% 0.92%

2.63% 0.66% 7.89% 8.95% 1.32% 0.92%

4.74% 1.18% 14.21% 16.11% 2.37% 1.66%

2.63% 0.66% 7.89% 8.95% 1.32% 0.92%

2.63% 0.66% 7.89% 8.95% 1.32% 0.92%

4.74% 1.18% 14.21% 16.11% 2.37% 1.66%

2.63% 0.66% 7.89% 8.95% 1.32% 0.92%

2.63% 0.66% 7.89% 8.95% 1.32% 0.92%

4.74% 1.18% 14.21% 16.11% 2.37% 1.66%

3.16% 0.79% 9.47% 10.74% 1.58% 1.11%

3.16% 0.79% 9.47% 10.74% 1.58% 1.11%

4.21% 1.05% 12.63% 14.32% 2.11% 1.47%

4.74% 1.18% 14.21% 16.11% 2.37% 1.66%

4.74% 1.18% 14.21% 16.11% 2.37% 1.66%

1.05% 0.26% 3.16% 3.58% 0.53% 0.37%

1.05% 0.26% 3.16% 3.58% 0.53% 0.37%

2.63% 0.66% 7.89% 8.95% 1.32% 0.92%

Cn

(A

0

0

0

(a

n- 0

C"
Table 6-8 Indirect Economic Loss due to Damage to the Natural Gas System (Percent Monthly GNP)

U.S. Econ.

Value Added

(Percent)

I Livestock

2 Agr. Prod.

3 AgServ For. Fish

4 Mining

5 Construction

6 Food Tobacco

7 Textile Goods

8 Misc Text, Prod.

9 Lumber & Wood

10 Furniture

11 Pulp & Paper

12 Print & Publish

13 Chemical & Drugs

14 Petrol. Refining

15 Rubber & Plastic

16 Leather Prods,

17 Glass Stone Clay

18 Prim. Metal Prod.

19 Fab, Metal Prod,

20 Mach. Exc. Elec.

21 Elec, & Electron

22 Transport Eq.

23 Instruments

24 Misc. Manufact.

25 Transp & Whse.

26 Utilities

27 Wholesale Trade

28 Retail Trade

29 F.lI.R.E.

30 Pers./Prof Serv.

31 Eating Drinking

;32 Auto Snrv,.

33 Amuse & Rec.

34 Health Ed. Soc.

35 Govt & Govt Ind,

36 Households

0.45%

1.06%

0.11%

3.89%

5.52%

2.41%

0.37%

0.73%

0.52%

0.34%

0.87%

13 .1%

1.40%

0.96%

1,030/

0.12%

0.62%

1.04%

1.64%

1.56%

2.52%

2.62%

0.68%

0.69%

3.46%

5.89%

5.63%

5.63%

16.64%

8.03%

2.1 2%

1.09%

0.70%

6.30%

11.79%

0.25%

NEW MADRID (M=8.0)

Texas Louisiana

to to

Chicago Northeast

0.26%

0.79%

0.79%

0.26%

0.00%

0.66%

0.53%

0.53%

0.53%

0.53%

1,05%

0.53%

2.37%

1.32%

1.32%

0.53%

1,32%

1.32%

1.32%

1.32%

1.32%

1.32%

1.97%

l.32%

0.00%

1.05%

0.26%

0.53%

0.53%

0.53%

1.05%

0.13%

1.05%

0.53%

0.53%

0.92%

0.53%

1.58%

1.58%

0.53%

0.00%

1.32%

1,05%

1.05%

1.05%

1.05%

2,11%

1.05%

4.74%

2,63%

2.63%

105%

2,63%

2.63%

2.63%

2.63%

2,63%

2.63%

3,95%

2.63%

0.00%

2.11%

0.53%

1.05%

1.05%

1.05%

2.11%

0.26%

2.11%

1.05%

1.05%

1.84%

WASATCH

Utah

0.74%

2.21%

2.21%

0,74%

0.00%

1.84%

1.47%

1.47%

1.47%

1.47%

2.95%

1.47%

6.63%

3.68%

3.68%

1.47%

3.68%

3.68%

3.68%

*3.68%

3.68%

3.68%

5.53%

3.68%

0,00%

2,95%

0.74%

1.47%

1.47%

1.47%

2.95%

0.37%

2.95%

1.47%

1.47%

2.58%

HAYWARD

Texas to Texas

North to

Carolina Washington

2.11%

6.32%/4

6.32%

2.11%

0.00%

5.26%

4.21%

4.21%

4.21%

4.21%

8.42%

4.21%

18.95%

10.53%

10.53%

4.21%

10.53%

10.53%

10.53%

10.53%

10.53%

10.53%

15.79%

10.53%

0,0%

8.42%

2.11%

4.21%

4.21%

4.21%

8.42%

1.05%

8.42%

4.21%

4.21%

7.37%

0.37%

1.1 1%

1.1 1%

0.00%

0,92%

0.74%

0.74%

0.74%

0.74%

1.47%

0.74%

3.32%

1.84%

1.84%

0.74%

1.84%

1.84%

1.84%

1.84%

1.84%

1.84%

2.76%

1.84%

0.00%

1.47%

0.37%

0.74%

0.74%

0.74%

1.47%

0.18%

1.47%

0.74%

0.74%

1.29%

FORT TEJON

Texas

to

California

California

2.1 1%

6.32%

6.32%3/

2.11%

0.00%

5.26%

4.21%

4.21%

4.21%

4.21%

8.42%

4.21%

18.95%

10.53%

10.53%

4.21%

10.53%

10.53%

10.53%

10.53%

10.53%

10.53%

15.79%

10.53%

0.00%

8.42%

2.11%

4.21%

4.21%

4.21%

8.42%

1.05%

8.42%

4.21%

4.21%

7.37%

Texas

to

Seattle

2.11%

6.32%

G.32M

2.11%

0.00%

5.26%

4.21%

4.21%

4.21%

4.21%

8.42%

4.21%

18.95%

10.53%

10.53%

4.21%

10.53%

10.53%

10.53%

10.53%

10.53%

10.53%

15.79%

10.53%

0.00%

8.42%

2.11%

4.21%

4.21%

4.21%

8.42%

1.05%

8.42%

4.21%

4.21%

7.37%/a

NEWM4DRID (Ml=Z0)

Texas Louisiana

to to

Chicago Northeast

0.21%

0.63%

0.63%

0.21%

0.00%

0.53%

0.42%

0.42%

0.42%

0.42%

0.84%

0.42%

1.89%

1.05%

1.05%

0,42%

1.05%

1.05%

1.05%

1.05%

1.05%

1.05%

1.58%

1.05%

0.00%

0,84%

0.21%

0.42%

0.42%

0.42%

0.84%

0.11%

0.84%

0.42%

0.42%

0.74%

0.26%

0.79%

0.79%

V.26%

0.00%

0.66%

0.53%

0.53%

0.53%

0.53%

1.05%

0.53%

2.37r/0

1.32% 1.32%

0.53%

1.32%

1.32%

1.32%

1.32%

1.32%

1.32%

1.97%

1.32%

0.00%

1.05%

0.26%

0.53%

0,53%

0.53%

1.05%

0.13%

1.05%

0.53%

0.53%

0.92%

:15I

9

(Ai

0%o

,w

a,

w

0

1-4

a

a.

00

01

0

0

hi

0'

Cl,
Table 6-9 Indirect Economic Loss due to Damage to the Railroad Lifeline (Percent

Monthly GNP)

U.S. Econ.

Value Added

(Percent)

1 Livestock

2 Agr. Prod.

3 AgServ For. Fish

4 Mining

5 Construction

6 Food Tobacco

7 Textile Goods

8 Misc Text. Prod.

9 Lumber & Wood

10 Furniture

11 Pulp & Paper

12 Print & Publish

13 Chemical & Drugs

14 Petrol. Refining

15 Rubber & Plastic

16 Leather Prods.

17 Glass Stone Clay

18 Prim. Metal Prod.

19 Fab. Metal Prod.

20 Mach. Exc. Elec.

21 Elec. & Electron

22 Transport Eq.

23 Instruments

24 Misc. Manufact.

25 Transp & Whse.

26 Utilities

27 Wholesale Trade

28 Retail Trade

29 F.I.R.E.

30 Pers./Prof Serv.

31 Eating Drinking

32 Auto Serv.

33 Amuse & Rec.

34 Health Ed. Soc.

35 Govt & Govt Ind.

36 Households

0.45%

1.06%

0.11%

3.89%

5.52%

2.41%

0.37%

0.73%

0.52%

0.34%

0.87%

1.31%

1.40%

0.96%

1.03%

0.12%

0.62%

1.04%

1.64%

1.56%

2.520/

2.62%

0.68%

0.69%

3.46%

5.89%

5.63%

5.63%

16.64%

8.03%

2.12%

1.09%

0.70%

6.30%

11.79%

0.25%

(M=8.0) (M7=.OJ

New Madrid Charleston Cape Ann Utah Hayward Fort Tejon Seattle : NewMadrid

4.21%

4.21%

4.21%

3.68%

0.53%

2.11%

2.11%

2.11%

4.21%

2.11%

4.74%

2.11%

2.11%

4.21%

2.11%

2.11%

2.11%

5.26%

4.74%

4.74%

2.11%

4.74%

0.53%

2.11%

3.16%

0.000/0

1.58%

2.11%

1.05%

1.05%

0.53%

0.00%

0.53%

0.53%

1.05%

0.00%/0

7.58%

7.58%

7.58%

6.63%

0.95%

3.79%

3.79%

3.79%

7.58%

3.79%

8.53%

3.79%

3.79%

7.58%

3.79%

3.79%

3.79%

9.47%

8.53%

8.53%

3.79%

8.53%

0.95%

3.79%

5.68%

0.00%

2.84%

3.79%

1.89%

1.89%

0.95%

0.00%

0.95%

0.95%

1.89%

0.00%

7.58%

7.58%

7.58%

6.63%:

0.95%

3.79%

3.79%

3.79%

7.58%

3.79%

8.53%

3.79%

3.79%

7.58%

3.79%

3.79%

3.79%

9.47%

8.53%

8.53%

3.79%

8.53%

0.95%

3.79%

5.68%

0.00%

2.84%

3.79%

1.89%

1.89%

0.95%

0.00%

0.95%

0.95%

1.89%

0.00%

3.37%

3.37/

3.37%

2.95%

0.42%

1.68%

1.68%

1.68%

3.37%

1.68%

3.79%

1.68%

1.68%

3.37%

1.68%

1.68%

1.68%

4.21%

3.79%

3.79%

1.68%

3.79%

0.42%

1.68%

2.53%

0.00%

1.26%

1.68%

0.84%

0.84%

0.42%

0.00%

0.42%

0.420/

0.84%

0.000/%

5.47%

5.47%

5.47/

4.79%

0.68%

2.74%

2.74%

2.74%

5.47%

2.74%

6.16%

2.74%

2.74%

5.47%

2.74%

2.74%

2.74%

6.84%

6.16%

6.16%

2.74%

6.16%

0.68%

2.74%

4.11%

0.00%/0

2.05%

2.74%

1.37%

1.37%

0.68%

0.00%

0.68%

0.68%

1.37%

0.00%/0

7.58%

7.58%

7.58%

6.63%

0.95%

3.79%/6

3.79%

3.79%

7.58%

3.79%

8.53%

3.79%

3.79%

7.58%

3.79%

3.79%

3.79%

9.47%

8.53%

8.53%

3.79%

8.53%

0.95%

3.79%

5.68%

0.00%

2.84%

3.79%

1.89%

1.89%

0.95%

0.00%

0.95%

0.95%

1.89%

0.00%/

7.58%

7.58%

7.58%

6.63%

0.95%

3.79%

3.79%

3.79%

7.58%

3.79%

8.53%

3.79%

3.79%

7.58%

3.79%

3.79%

3.79%

9.47%

8.53%

8.53%

3.79%

8.53%

0.95%

3.79%

5.68%

0.00%

2.84%

3.79%

1.89%

1.89%

0.95%

0.00%

0.95%

0.95%

1.89%

0.00%

3.37%

3.37%

3.37%

2.95%

0.42%

1.68%

1.68%.

1.68%

3.37%

1.68%

3.79%

1.68%

1.68%

3.37%

1.68%

1.68%

1.68%

4.21%

3.79%

3.79%

1.68%

3.79%

0.42%

1.68%

2.53%

0.00%

1.26%

1.68%

0.84%

0.84%

0.42%

0.00%

0.42%

0.42%

0.84%

0.00%

0.

0.

'ti

-..

(D

0

0

I-%

0

In

0

In

to

CD9n

n
Indirect Economic Loss due to Damage to the Electric System (Percent

Monthly CNP)

NEW MADRID (M=8.0)

CHARLESTON CAPE ANN 

US. Econ. South North

Value Added Illinois Missouri Arkansas Tennessee Kentucky Mississippi Carolina Carolina Georgia Massachusetts Connecticut Delaware (Percent) _

1 Livestock

2 Agr. Prod.

3 AgServ For. Fish

4 Mining

S Construction

6 Food Tobacco

7 Textile Goods

8 Misc Text. Prod.

9 Lumber & Wood

10 Furniture

i 1 Pulp & Paper

12 Print & Publish

13 Chemical & Drugs

14 Petrol. Refining

15 Rubber & Plastic

16 Leather Prods.

17 Glass Stone Clay

18 Prim. Metal Prod.

19 Fab, Metal Prod.

20 Mach. Exc. Elec,

21 Elec. & Electron

22 Transport Eq.

23 Instruments

24 Misc. Manufact.

25 Transp & Whse.

26 Utilities

27 Wholesale Trade

28 Retail Trade

29 F.I.R.E.

30 Pers./Prof Serv.

31 Eating Drinking

32 Auto Serv.

33 Amuse & Rec.

34 Health Ed. Soc,

35 Govt & Govt Ind.

36 Households

0.45%

1.06%

0.11%

3.89%

5,52%

2.41%

OX37%

0.78%

0.52%

0.34%

0.87%

1.31%

1.40%

0.96%

1.03%

0.12%

0.62%

1.04%

1,64%

1.56%

2.52%

2.62%

0.68%

0.69%

3,46%

5.89%

5.63%

5.63%

16.64%

8.03%

2.12%

1.09%

0.70%

6.30%

11.79%

0.25%

3.95% 6.58% 32.89% 13.16% 13.16% 44.74% 46.05% 7.89- 18.42% 44.74% 15,79% 10,53% 3.95% 6.58% 32.89% 13.16% 13.16% 44.74% 46.05% 7.89% 18.42% 44.74% 15.79% 10,53% 3.95% 6,58% 32,89% 13.16% 13.16% 44.74% 46.05% 7.89% 18.42% 44.74% 15.79% 10.53%

7.11% 11.84% 59.21% 23,68% 23.68% 80.53% 82.89% 14.21% 33.16% 80.53% .28.42% 18.95% S316% 5.26% 26.32% 10.53% 10.53% 35.79% 36.84% .6.32% 14.74% 35.79% 12.63% 8,42% 7.11% 11.84% 59.21% 23.68% 23.68% 80.53% 82,89% 14.21% 33.16% 80.53% 28.42% 18.95% 7.89% 13.16% 65.79% 26.32% 26,32% 89.47% 92.11% 15.79% 36,84% 89.47% 31.58% 21.05% 7.89% 13.16% 65.79% 26.32% 26.32% 89.47% 92.11% 15.79% 36.84% 89.47% 31.58% 21.05% 7.89% 13.16% 65.79% 26.32% 26.32% 89.47% 92.11% 15.79% 36.84% 89.47/ 311.58% 21.05% 7.89% 13.16% 65.79% 26.32% 26.32% 89.47% 92.11% 15.79% 36.84% 89.47% 31.58% 21.05%

7.89% 13.16% 65.79% 26.32% 26,32% 89,47% 92.11% 15.79% 36.84% 89.47% 31.58% 21,05% 7.89% 13.16% 65.79% 26.32% 26.32% 89.47% 92.11% 15.79% 36,84% 89.47% 31.58% 21.05% 7.11% 11.84% 59.21% 23.68% 23.68% 80.53% 82.89% 14.21% 33.16% 80.53% 28.42% 18.95% 7.89% 13.16% 65.79% 26.32% 26.32% 89.47% 92.11% 15.79% 36.84% 89.47% 31.58% 21.05%

7.89% 13.16% 65.79% 26.32% 26.32% 89.47% 92.11% 15.79% 36.84% 89.47% 31.58% 21.05% 7.89% 13.16% 65.79% 26.32% 26.32% 89.47% 92.11% 15.79% 36.84% 89.47% 31.58% 21.05%

7.89% 13.16% 65.79% 26.32% 26.32% 89.47% 92.11% 15.79% 36.84% 89.47% 31.58% 21.05% 7.11% 11.84% 59.21% 23.68% 23.68% 80.53% 82.89% 14.21% 33.16% 80.53% 28.42% 18.95%

7.89% 13.16% 65.79% 26.32% 26.32% 89.47% 92.11% 15.79% 36.84% 89.47% 31.58% 21.05% 7.89% 13.16% 65.79% 26.32% 26.32% 89.47% 92.11% 15.79% 36.84% 89.47% 31.58% 21.05%

7.89% 13.16% 65.79% 26.32% 26.32% 89.47% 92.11% 15.79% 36.84% 89.47% 31.58% 21.05% 7.89% 13.16% 65.79% 26.32% 26.32% 89.47% 92.11% 15.79% 36.84% 89.47/ 31.58% 21.05%

7.89% 13.16% 65.79% 26.32% 26.32% 89.47% 92.11% 15.79% 36.84% 89.47% 31.58% 21.05%

7.89% 13.16% 65,79% 26.32% 26.32% 8947% 92.11% 15.79% 36.84% 89.47% 31.58% 21.05%

2.37% 3.95% 19.74% 7.89% 7.89% 26.84% 27.63% 4.74% 11.05% 26.84% 9.47% 6.32%

6.32% 10.53% 52.63% 21.05% 21.05% 71.58% 73.68% 12.63% 29.47% 71.58% 25.26% 16,84% 7.11% 11.84% 59.21% 23.68% 23.68% 80.53% 82.89% 14.21% 33.16% 80.53% 28.42% 18.95% 7.11% 11.84% 59.21% 23.68% 23.68% 80.53% 82.89% 14.21% 33.16% 80.53% 28.42% 18,95% 7.11% 11.84% 59.21% 23.68% 23.68% 80.53% 82.89% 14.21% 33.16% 80.53% 28.42% 18,95% 7.11% 11.84% 59.21% 23.68% 23.68% 80.53% 82.89% 14.21% 33.16% 80.53% 28.42% 18.95%

6.32% 10.53% 52.63% 21.05% 21.05% 71.58% 73.68% 12.63% 29.47% 71.58% 25.26% 16.84% 7.11% 11.84% 59.21% 23.68% 23.68% 80.53% 82.89% 14.21% 33.16% 80.53% 28.42% 18.95%

6.32% 10.53% 52.63% 21.05% 21.05% 71.58% 73.68% 12.63%- 29.47-/ 71.58% 25.26% 16.84% 6.32% 10.53% 52.63% 21.05% 21.05% 71.58% 7S.68% 12.63% 29,47% 71.58% 25.26% 16.84% 4.74% 7.89% 39.47% 15.79% 15.79% 53.68% 55.26% 9.47% 22.11% 53.68% 18,95% 12.63% 6.32% 10.53% 52.63% 21.05% 21.05% 71.58% 73.68% 12.63% 29.47% 71.58% 25.26% 16.84%

Table 6-10

0.

t'2

En

-4,

p.

07

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a

a

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0

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-4 0)

CHARLESTON CAPE ANN
Table 6-10 Indirect Economic Loss due to Damage to the Electric System (Percent

Monthly GNP) (Continued)

CAPEANN WASATCH CALIFORNIA PUGETSOUND NEW MADRID (M=71)

U.S. Econ.

Value Added Rhode

(Percent) Island New Hampshire Utah

1 Livestock 0.45% 42.11% 14.47% 35.53%

2 Agr. Prod. 1.06% 42.11% 14.47% 35.53%

3 AgServ For. Fish 0.11% 42.11% 14.47% 35.53%

4 Mining 3.89% 75.79% 26.05% 63.95%

5 Construction 5.52% 33.68% 11.58% 28.42%

6 Food Tobacco 2.41% 75.79% 26.05% 63.95%

7 Textile Goods 0.37% 84.21% 28.95% 71.05%

8 Misc Text. Prod. 0.73% 84.21% 28.95% 71.05%

9 Lumber& Wood 0.52% 84.21% 28.95% 71.05%

10 Furniture 0.34% 84.21% 28.95% 71.05%

11 Pulp & Paper 0.87% 84.21% 28.95% 71.05%

12 Print & Publish 1.31% 84.21% 28.95% 71.05%

13 Chemical & Drugs 1.40% 75.79% 26.05% 63.95%

14 Petrol. Refining 0.96% 84.21% 28.95% 71.05%

15 Rubber& Plastic 1.03% 84.21% 28.95% 71.05%

16 Leather Prods. 0.12% 84.21% 28.95% 71.05%

17 Glass Stone Clay. 0.62% 84.21% 28.95% 71.05%

18 Prim. Metal Prod. 1.04% 75.79% 26.05% 63.95%

19 Fab. Metal Prod. 1.64% 84.21% 28.95% 71.05%

20 Mach. Exc. Elec. 1.56% 84.21% 28.95% 71.05%

21 Elec. & Electron 2.52% 84.21% 28.95% 71.05%

22 Transport Eq. 2.62% 84.21% 28.95% 71.05%

23 Instruments 0.68% 84.21% 28.95% 71.05%

24 Misc. Manufact. 0.69% 84.21% 28.95% 71.05%

25 Transp & Whse. 3.46% 25.26% 8.68% 21.32%

26 Utilities 5.89% 67.37% 23.16% 56.84%

27 Wholesale Trade 5.63% 75.79% 26.05% 63.95%

28 Retail Trade 5.63% 75.79% 26.05% 63.95%

29 F.I.R.E. 16.64% 75.79% 26.05% 63.95%

30 Pers./Prof Serv. 8.03% 75.79% 26.05% 63.95%

31 Eating Drinking 2.12% 67.37% 23.16% 56.84%

32 Auto Serv. 1.09% 75.79% 26.05% 63.95%

33 Amuse & Rec. 0.70% 67.37% 23.16% 56.84%

34 Health Ed. Soc. 6.30% 67.37% 23.16% 56.84%

35 Govt & Govt Ind. 11.79% 50.53% 17.37% 42.63%

36 Households 0.25% 67.37% 23.16% 56.84%

Hayward Fort Tejon Washington Arkansas Tennessee - Kentucky Mississippi

23.68% 13.16% 47.370% 23.68% 7.89%h 3.95% 3.95%

23.68% 13.16% 47.37% 23.68% 7.89% 3.95% 3.95%

23.68% 13.16% 47.37% 23.68% 7.89% 3.95% 3.95%

42.63% 23.68% 85.26% 42.63% 14.21% 7.11% 7.11%

18.95% 10.53% 37.89% 18.95% 6.32% 3.16% 3.16%

42.63% 23.68% 85.26% 42.63% 14.21% 7.11% 7.11%

47.37% 26.32% 94.74% 47.37% 15.79% 7.89% 7.89%

47.37% 26.32% 94.74% 47.37%- 15.79% 7.89% . 7.89%

47.37% 26.32% 94.74% 47.37% 15.79% 7.89% 7.89%

47.37% 26.32% 94.74% 47.37% 15.79% 7.89% 7.89%

47.37% 26.32% 94.74% 47.37% 15.79% 7.89% 7.89%

47.37% 26.32% 94.74% 47.37% 15.79% 7.89% 7.89%

42.63% 23.68% 85.26% 42.63% 14.21% 7.11% 7.11%

47.37% 26.32% 94.74% 47.37% 15.79% 7.89% 7.89%

47.37% 26.32% 94.74% 47.37% 15.79% 7.89% 7.89%

47.37% 26.32% 94.74% 47.37% 15.79% 7.89% 7.89%

47.37% 26.32% 94.74% 47.37% 15.79% 7.89% 7.89%

42.63% 23.68% 85.26% 42.63% 14.21% 7.11% 7.11%

47.37% 26.32% 94.74% 47.37% 15.79% 7.89% 7.89%

47.37% 26.32% 94.74% 47.37% 15.79% 7.89% 7.89%

47.37% 26.32% 94.74% 47.37% 15.79% 7.89% 7.89%

47.37% 26.32% 94.74% 47.37% 15.79% 7.89% 7.89%

47.37% 26.32% 94.74% 47.37% 15.79% 7.89% 7.89%

47.37% 26.32% 94.74% 47.37% 15.79% 7.89% 7.89%

14.21% 7.89% 28.42% 14.21% 4.74% 2.37% 2.37%

37.89% 21.05% 75.79% 37.89% 12.63% 6.32% 6.320/

42.63% 23.68% 85.26% 42.63% 14.21% 7.11% 7.11%

42.63% 23.68% 85.26% 42.63% 14.21% 7.11% 7.11%

42.63% 23.68% 85.26% 42.63% 14.21% 7.11% 7.11%

42.63% 23.68% 85.26% 42.63% 14.21% 7.11% 7.11%

37.89% 21.05% 75.79% 37.89% 12.63% 6.32%h 6.320/

42.63% 23.68% 85.26% 42.63% 14.21% 7.11% 7.11%

37.89% 21.05% 75.79% 37.89% 12.63% 6.32% 6.32%

37.89% 21.05% 75.79% 37.89% 12.63% 6.32% 6.32%

28.42% 15.79% 56.84% 28.42% 9.47% 4.74% 4.74%

37.89% 21.05% 75.79% 37.89% 12.63% 6.320/a 6.32%

NO

C"

am

.

a

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0

.

00

to

0

0

(a

0

U)

C"s
Table 6-11 Indirect Economic Loss due to Damage to the Highway System (Percent

Monthly GNP)

Charleston Cape Ann Wasatch Hayward Fon Tejon Puget Sound

I Livestock

2 Agr. Prod,

3 AgServ For. Fish

4 Mining

5 Construction

6 Food Tobacco

7 Textile Goods

8 Misc Text. Prod.

9 Lumber & Wood

10 Furniture

11 Pulp & Paper

12 Print & Publish

13 Chemical & Drugs

14 Petrol. Refining

1S Rubber & Plastic

16 Leather Prods,

17 Glass Stone Clay

18 Prim. Metal Prod.

19 Fab. Metal Prod.

20 Mach. Exa. Elec.

21 Eleo. & Electron

22 Transport Eq.

23 Instruments

24 Misc. Manufact.

25 Transp & Whse.

26 Utilities

27 Wholesale Trade

28 Retail Trade

29 F.l.R.E.

30 Pers./Prof Serv.

31 Eating Drinking

32 Auto Serv.

33 Amuse & Roo.

34 Health Ed. Soc.

35 Govt & Govt Ind.

36 Households

N-I

(1

US. Econ

Value Added

(Percent)

New Madrid

(MB.O)

New Madd

(M=7.0)

CF

fn

Eil

EL

m

0

O.

(D

In

0

n

n

6

I-I.

a

ti

a~

0l

0O

0.45%

1.06%

0.1 1%

3.89%

5.52%

2.41%

0.37%

0.73%

0.52%

0.34%

0.87%

1.31%

1.40%

0.96%

1.03%

0.12%

0,62%

1.04%

1,64%

1.56%

2.520%0

2.62%

0.68%

0.69%

3.46%

5.89%

5.63%

5.63%

16.64%

8.03%

2.12%

1.09%

0. 70%

6.30%

11.79%

0.25%

85.53%

136.84%

136.84%

59.87%

68.42%

136.84%

128.29%

128.29%

153.95%

128.29%

136.84%

128.29%

136.84%

153.95%

128.29%

128.29%

128.29%

136.84%

136.84%

136.84%

128.29%

136.84%

136.84%

128.29%

136.84%

68.42%

119.74%

94.08%

76.97%

76.97%

85.53%

94.08%

85.53%

94.08%

51.32%

68.42%

36.84%

58.95%

58.95%

25.79%

29,47%

5895%

55.26%

55.26%

66.32%

55.26%

58.95%

55.26%

58.95%

66,32%

55.26%

55.26%

55.26%

58.95%

58.95%

58.95%

55.26%

58.95%

58.95%

55.26%

58.95%

29.47%

51.58%

40.53%

33.16%

33.16%

36.84%

40.53%

36.84%

40.53%

22.11%

29.47%

78.95%

126.32%

126.32%

55.26%

63. 16%

126.32%

118.42%

118.42%

142.11%

118.42%

126.32%

118.42%

126.32%

142.11%

118.42%

118.42%

118.42%

126.32%

126.32%

126.32%

118.42%

126.32%

12632%

118.42/v

126.32%

63.16%

110.53%

86.84%

71.05%

71.05%

78.95%

86.84%

78.95%

86.84%

47.37%

63.16%

83.96%

134.34%

134.34%

58.77%

67.17%

134.34%

125.94%

125.94%

151.13%

125.94%

l34.34%

125.94%

134.34%

151.13%

125.94%

125.94%

125.94%

134.34%

134.34%

134.34%

125.94%

134.34%

134.34%

125.94%

134.34%

67.17%-o

117.54%

92.36%

75.56%

75.56%

83.96%

92.36%

83.96%

92.36%

50.38%

67.17%

42.1 1%

67.37%

67.37%

29.47%

33.68%

67.37%

63.16%

63.16%

75.79%

63.16%

67.37%

63.16%

67.37%

75.79%

63.16%

63.16%

63.16%

67.37%

G7.S7%/

67.37%

63.16%

67.37%

67.37%

63.16%

67.37%

33.68%

58.95%

46.32%

37.89%

37.89%

42.11%

46.32%

42.11%

46.32%

25.26%

33.68%

52.63%

84.21%

84.21%

36.84%

42.11%

84.21%

78.95%

78.95%

94.74%

78.95%

84.21%

78.95%

84.21%

94.74%

78.95%

78.95%

78.95%

84.21%

84.21%

84.21%

78.95%

84.21%

84.21%

78.95%

84.21%

42.11%

73.6s%

57.89%

47.370/a

47.37%

52 .63%

57.89%

52.63%

57.89%

31.58%

42.11%

60.53%

96.84%

96.84%

42.37%/6

48.42%

96.84%

90.79%

90.79%

108.950

90.79%

96.84%

90.79%

96.84%

108.95%

90.79%

90.79%

90.79%

96.84%/6

96.84%

96.84%

90.79%

96.84%

96.84%

90.79%

96.84%

48.42%

84.74%

66.58%

54.47%

54.47%

60.53%

66.58%

60.53%

66.58%

36.32%

48.42%

63.16%

101.05%

101.05%

44.21%

50.53%

101.05%

94.74%

94.74%

11368%

94.74%

101.05%

94.74°h

101.05%

113.68%

94.74%

94,74%

94.74%

101.05%

101.05%

101.05%

94.74%

101.05%

101.05%

94.74%

101.05%

50.53%

88.42%

69.47°k

56.84%

56.84%

63.16%

69.47°h

63.16%

69.47%o

37.89%

50.53%
Table 6-12 Indirect Economic Losses Due to Damage to Lifeline Transmission

Systems

Scenario Earthquakes

Cape Ann

Charleston

Fort Tejon

Hayward

Madrid, MO M=8

Madrid, MO M=7

Puget Sound

Wasatch Front

Cape Ann

Charleston

Fort Tejon

Hayward

Madrid, MO M=8

Madrid, MO M=7

Puget Sound

Wasatch Front

Natural Gas

% $Bil

0.41

0.22

0.07

0.04

0.05

0.01

$0.00

$0.00

$1.67

$0.89

$0.28

$0.16

$0.20

$0.38

$8.95

$8.75

$7.73

$9.88

$10.37

$3.42

$5.82

$3.25

$10.56 $9.00

$14.46 $10,05

$27.26 $11.56

$18.73 $1 1.01

$21.69 $14.00

$7.33 $4.76

$8.94 $6.01

$5.02 $3.64

$0.00

$0.00

1.07 $4.35

$0.00

0.10 $0.41

0.03 $0.11

$0.00

$0.00

Electric

% S Bd$

2.20 $8.95

2.15 $8.75

1.90 $7.73

2.43 $9.88

2.55 $10.37

0.81 $3.29

1.43 $5.82

0.40 $1.63

0

Cwde Oil Refined Oil

% $Bil % $il

Railroads

% $Bil

Ports

% $Bil

Air Transportation

% $Bil

0.12 $0.49

0.11 $0.45

0.35 $1.A2

0.10 $0.41

0.2 $0.81

0.04 $0.16

0.10 $0.41

0.02 $0.08

$0.00

$0.00

$0.00

$0.00

25 $0.20

4. $0.15

$0.00

$0.00

0.1

0.01

0.01

0.06

0.03

0.06

0.01

0.03

0.01

Highways

Bil % $ Bil

$0.02 0.11 N/A 0.16 $0.65

$0.02 1.21

$0.25 0.61

$0.1 1 0.33

$0.25

$0.04

$0.11 0.13

$0.02 

$0A5

$4.92

$2.48

$1.34

$0.00

$0.00

$0.53

$0.00

04

tn

OCD

C'

0

0:

0

:

t~,0

0. 

CA

0

CDCA

I-I (11

Water

% $

N/A

N/A

1.2

1

N/A

N/A

0.19

N/A

ESTIMATED TOTAL ECONOMIC

LOSSIEVENT

Scenario Earthquakes Lower Upper Best

Bound Bound Estimate

N/A

$4.88

$4.07

N/A

N/A

$0.77

N/A

0,08 $0.33

1.10 $4.47

0.50 $2.03

2.30 $9.36

0.84 $3.42

0.27 $1.10

0.80 $3.25

.:
Table 6-13

Scenario Earthquakes

Cape Ann

Charleston

Fort Tejon

Hayward

New Madrid, M=8

New Madrid, M=7

Puget Sound

Wasatch Front

Indirect Economic Losses Due to Damage to Lifeline Distribution Systems

Electric

% ~$ BiI

0.32

0.27

0.34

0.37

0.76

0.23

0.22

0.15

$1.3

$1.1

$1.4

$1.5

$3.1

$1.0

$0.9

$0.6

Water

°/% $ Bil

0.15

0.15

0.11

0.10

0.44

0.14

0.04

0.06

$.61

$.63

$.47

$.41

$1.8

$.57

$.18

$.27

Highways

% $ Bil

0.21

0.17

0.08

0.09

0.49

0.15

0.10

0.09

$0.86

$0.71

$0.33

$0.36

$2.0

$0.63

$0.40

$0.37

D.

q

1%,

UP

0%

-4

in

0l

a

I

0

I

in

9n

Fn

SRSS

$1.6

$1.4

$1.5

$1.6

$4.1

$1.3

$1.0

$1.25
Massachusetts Connecticut Delaware Rhode Island New Hampshire

.= Air Trans. E Electric

_ Railroad m Highway

Percent indirect economic loss by state (monthly GNP) resulting from damage to various

lifelines, Cape Ann event (M= 7.0).

162 6: Estimates of Indirect Economic Losses ATC-25

100

90

80

70

(A,

I)

L.

Q)

[L

60

50

40

30

20

1 0

0

M Ports

Figure 6-21

162 6: Estimates of Indirect Economic Losses ATC-25
,7

I'l

7/

7-

7-

. ,

South Carolina North Carolina

M Air Trans. = Electric

M Rilroadl M Highway

Figure 6-22. Percent indirect economic loss by state (monthly GNP) resulting from damage to various

lifelines, Charleston event fM=7.5j.

6: Estimates of Indirect Economic Losses

10 -

100 

VI

0

-j

0

a,

80 -

60-

40 -

20

0

i 1! i iii i ii 

Georgia

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-

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ATC-25 163
South. California

Crude Oil

Ports

Electric II Natural Gas

_ Railroad m Highway

Percent indirect economic loss in Southern California (monthly GNP) resulting from

damage to various lifelines, Fort Tejon event (M=8.0).

6: Estimates of Indirect Economic Losses

Cn

C,

0

qC

a)

C.)

a)

EIZ F>.M~t8A

Figure 6-23

164

-

ATC-26
7

7

/

/

7

/

7

7

North. California

Air Trans

Ports

r Electric w _ Railroad M

Natural Gas

Highway

Percent ndirect economic loss in Northern California (monthly GNP), resulting from

damage to various lifelines, Hayward event (M=7.5).

*6: Estimates of Indirect Economic Losses

.r A

40 -

35 -

0

ca)

0

30 -

25 -

20 -

15-

1 -

5-

0 -

Figure 6-24

,

'I.

ATC-25 1-65
* Illinois Missouri Arkansas Tennessee Kentucky Mississippi

= Air Trans. m Crude Oil m Refined Oil

EM Electric _ Railroad Highway

Percent indirect economic loss by state (monthly GNP) resulting from damage to various

lifelines, New Madrid event (M=8.0). Note that the relatively low losses for Missouri

reflect the assumed location of the scenario earthquake source zone and the estimated

distribution of intensity (see Figure 4-17).

6: Estimates of Indirect Economic Losses

90

80

70

,, 60

0

'J50

30

20

10

0

Figure 6-25

166 ATC-25
50

45

40

35

InU)

o 3 0

-J2 

725

C-)

(D 20

15

1 0

5

0

Illinois Missouri Arkansas Tennessee Kentucky Mississippi

W Air Trans. E Crude Oil M Refined Oil

NM Electric = Railroad M Highway

Figure 6-26 Percent indirect economic loss by state (monthly CNP resulting from damage to various

lifelines, New Madrid event M=7.0). Note that the relatively low losses for Missouri

reflect the assumed location of the scenario earthquake source zone and the estimated

distribution of intensity (see Figure 4-78).

ATC-25 6: EstImates of Indirect Economic Losses 167

ATC-25 6: Estimates of Indirect Econo.mic Losses 167
Washington 

Air Trans.

Ports

Electric E Natural Gas

_ Railroad m Highway

Percent indirect economic loss in state of Washington (monthly GNP) resulting from

damage to various lifelines, Puget Sound event (M=7.5).

6: Estimates of Indirect Economic Losses

1 40

120

100

In

0

-i80

'U 60

L

U,

0-

40

20

0

Figure 6-27

M

M

168 I . ATC-25
120

100

80

60

40

20

0

AMr Trans.

Railroad

Utah

Electric

m Highway

W Natural Gas

Figure 6-28 Percent indirect economic loss in state of Utah (monthly CNP resulting from damage to

various lifelines, Wasatch Front event (M= 7.5).

6: Estimates of Indirect Economic Losses

(A

0

-j

,

an

,n

ATC.26 169
Combined Economic Losses, Deaths, and

Injuries

7.1 Introduction

In this chapter we provide an overview of

combined economic losses, consisting of direct

and indirect economic losses, and a discussion of

deaths and injuries.

At this point it is important to reiterate the

purposes and key limitations of this study. As

previously indicated, the overall purpose is to

provide an overview of the national economic

impact resulting from the seismic vulnerability

of lifelines and the impact of their disruption.

The Federal Emergency Management Agency is

planning to use this report to emphasize the

importance of maintaining functionality of

lifelines after earthquakes and to assist in the

identification and prioritization of hazard

mitigation measures and policies.

Lifelines considered are transportation systems,

energy systems, emergency service facilities, and

water systems. Excluded from consideration

because of the unavailability of inventory data

or the need for more in-depth studies are

telecommunication systems, nuclear and fossilfuel power plants, dams, and certain highway,

electric, and water facilities at the local

distribution level.

Also excluded from consideration in the results

are interaction effects between lifelines,

secondary economic effects (the impact of a

reduced capacity of one economic sector on a

dependent sector), and damage resulting from

landslide (due to lack of inventory data

nationwide). These limitations and others

described in Chapters 2,4, and 5 tend to

underestimate losses; other limitations (e.g.,

application of ATC-13 vulnerability functions to

a relatively few structures) tend to overestimate

the losses. Lack of capacity information for

most lifelines was also a definite limitation. In

the aggregate, due primarily to the exclusion of

systems (e.g., dams and telecommunication

systems), we believe the estimates presented in

this report are, in fact, quite conservative.

This report is a macroscopic investigation at the

national level and the results, should not be used

for microscopic interpretations. The results are

not intended to be used to evaluate any

particular regional utility or lifeline and no

specific information on such specific facilities

has been included.

7.2 Human Death and Injury

It is generally felt that lifeline performance and

continuity of operation is vital to human survival

in the modem, urban, world. Most observers

believe that damage to lifelines would result in

human death and injury. Analogous to direct

damage to property and indirect economic

losses, human death and injury resulting from

lifeline damage can be categorized as follows:

1. Human death and injury caused by

lifeline functional curtailment, where

persons. suffer as a result of deprivation

of vital services; and

2. Human death and injury resulting from

direct damage to lifelines. (e.g., occupant

injuries resulting from the collapse of an

air terminal building).

Analysis and data on both of these aspects are

virtually nonexistent. Following are discussions

of these death and injury causes:

7.2.1 Casualties Due to Lifeline Functional

Curtailment

Without the benefit of hard data it is. difficult to

estimate with high confidence the number of

casualties that will result from curtailment of

lifeline function. Our preliminary assessment is

that human death and injury due to functional

curtailment of lifelines can generally be

expected to be very low. This is a fundamental

assumption of this study, and will probably cause

some debate. Each lifeline was considered, and

this conclusion was found to hold, based on the

following assumptions: (I) most vital

installations that normally require a lifeline

service have back-up emergency supplies, and

(2) most lifelines have.considerable elasticity in

demand, and the level of service necessary for

life maintenance is very low. Examples follow:

7: Combined Economic Losses, Deaths, and Injuries

7.

ATC-25 171
* Electricity. Persons can survive without

power, even in the Northeast in the

winter. Most hospitals and similar

installations have emergency generators.

Those that lack emergency generators

can transfer patients to other sites.

* Water. Water for human survival is very

minimal. Humans can survive without

water for 48 or more hours, and water

for human survival can be imported if

necessary.

* Gas and Liquid Fuels. Gas and liquid

fuel systems are probably the most

critical of all lifelines, yet capacity is very

elastic, and only short-term shortages

are expected. Fuel for heating in the

Northeast in the winter can be

conserved if necessary by clustering

people in school gymnasia, national

guard armories, and so on.

* Rail, Air, and Highwav Transportation.

Transportation lifelines are highly

redundant and thus very elastic;

emergency food and medicines would be

expected to be deliverable regardless of

earthquake damage.

7.2.2 Casualties Resulting From Lifeline Direct

Damage

Casualties can result from direct damage,

especially catastrophic collapse, of lifeline

components. Although few deaths occurred

directly as a result of lifeline damage in U. S.

earthquakes prior to 1989, life-loss due to

lifeline failure was tragically demonstrated

during the October 17, 1989, Loma Prieta,

California, earthquake. Approximately two

thirds of the 62 deaths from this earthquake

resulted from the failure of a lifeline

component--partial collapse of the Cypress

structure, a double-decked highway viaduct in

Oakland approximately 100 km from the

earthquake source zone.

Although it can be argued that the deaths and

injuries caused by lifeline failure in the Loma.

Prieta earthquake were the exception, not the

rule, the vulnerability functions developed for

this project suggest that substantial life-loss

from lifeline component failure should be

anticipated. Lifeline failures that could cause

substantial life loss or injury include bridge

failure, railroad derailment, and pipeline failure.

Unfortunately, data necessary for estimating life

loss associated with these component failures

are not readily available, precluding

development of reliable casualty estimation

methodology and data for lifeline structures.

7.3 Combined Direct and Indirect

Economic Losses

Total dollar losses from direct damage and

indirect economic losses have been taken from

Chapters 5 and 6 and are combined and

summarized herein for each scenario

earthquake and lifeline in Table 7-1. The total

losses for each scenario earthquake are as

follows:

Earthquake

Cape Ann

Charleston

Fort Tejon

Hayward

New Madrid, M = 

New Madrid, M = ,

Puget Sound

Wasatch Front

Direct Plus

Indirect Losses

(in Billions, 1991$)

$13.3

$15.1

$16.6

$15.7

3.0 $26.4

7.0 $8.3

$10.5

$5.4

172 7: Combined Economic Losses, Deaths, and Injuries ATC-25
Table 7-1 Total Direct Plus Indirect Dollar Losses for Each Scenario Earthquake and

Lifeline (Billions of Dollars)

$2.06 $0.91 $0.49 $0.50

$2.05 $0.94 $0.57 $5.30

$5.18 $5.27 $1.43 $2.65

$2.52 $4.38 $1,30 $1.46

$13.19 $2.68 $1.30 $0.00

$4.12 $0.85 $0.40 $0.00

$1.95 $0,90 $0.51 $0.73

$3.85 $0.40 $0.20 $0.00

Natural Crude

Ports Railroads Airport Gas Oil

$0.03 $0.58 $0.00 $0.00

$0.18 $0.59 $0.00 $0.00

$0.41 $1.57 $1.68 $4.38

$0.22 $0.44 $0.09 $0.00

$0.71 $1.22 $0.34 $0.46

$0.15 $0.31 $0.18 $0.13

$0.21 $0.62 $0.21 $0.00

$0.05 $0.11 $0.04 $0.00

Refined Broadcasting Fire

Oil Stations Stations Total

$0.00 $0.02 $0.01 $13.25

$0.00 $0.07 $0.01 $15.11

$0.00 $0.03 $0.05 $16.58

$0.00 $0.02 $0.01 $15.66

$0.23 $0.09 $0.01 $26.37

$0.16 $0.03 $0.00 $8.29

$0.00 $0.05 $0,01 $10.48

$0.00 $0.04 $0.00 $5.41

0

8

m

01

0

0

0

0

tvI

0

S

(n

CAh

0

UT

a

'-4

,_4

0

Medical

Scenario Electric Highways Water Care

Cape Ann

Charleston

Fort Tejon

Hayward

New Madrid 8

New Madrid 7

Puget Sound

Wasatch Front

$11.24

$10.82

$9.66

$12.21

$15.68

$5.17

$8.29

$2.21
Hazard Mitigation Measures and Benefits

81 Introduction

A primary objective of this study is to identify

the most critical lifelines and develop a

prioritized series of steps for reduction of

lifeline seismic vulnerability, based on overall

benefits. In this chapter we identify the most

critical lifelines and provide a relative ranking of

the criticality of these different lifelines in terms

of the estimated impact of damage and

economic disruption. Also included are

recommended key measures for reducing the

earthquake vulnerability of these lifeline

systems, and results from analytical

computations to illustrate the reduction in losses

if such hazard mitigation strategies are

employed.

8.2 Identification of Critical Lifelines

Based on the combined direct and indirect

economic losses presented in Chapter 7 and

with due consideration of the assumptions and

limitations expressed throughout this report, we

offer the following relative ranking of the

criticality of different lifelines in terms of the

estimated impact of damage and disruption:

Rank

1.

Lifeline

Electric System

2. Highways

Event/Location

New Madrid

(M=8.O)

Hayward

Cape Ann,

Charleston,

Fort Tejon

New Madrid

(M=8.0)

Fort Tejon

Hayward,

New Madrid

(M=7.O)

Water System* Fort Tejon

Ports

Crude Oil

Charleston

Fort Tejon

*The ranking for the water system may be

underestimated because critical components such as

pumping stations and dams were not included in the

study.

8.3 Measures for Reducing

Vulnerability of Lifeline Systems

The seismic vulnerability of lifeline systems,

from the point of view of fulfilling function, can

be reduced through three primary approaches:

1. Damage reduction measures. In this

approach reliability of function is enhanced

by reducing damage. This, approach may

take the form of:

* Strengthening a building, bracing

equipment, or performing other

corrective retrofit measures to mitigate

shaking effects;

* Densifying the soil beneath a structure,

or placing a structure on piles, or using

other techniques to mitigate hazardous,

geotechnical conditions, e.g.,.

liquefaction potential,

* Other component improvements,

depending on the component and

potential earthquake impacts, e.g.,

replacement of vulnerable

systems/components with new

systems/components that will provide

improved seismic resistance.

2. Provision for system redundancy. In this

approach, reliability of function is enhanced

by providing additional and alternative links

(e.g., new highways, pipelines, other

transmission or distribution links). Because

earthquake damage is fundamentally a

random phenomena, addition of system links

will tend to increase system reliability.

3. Operational improvements. In this

approach reliability of function is enhanced

by providing emergency response planning

and the capability to rapidly and effectively

repair damage, redirect functions, or

otherwise mitigate earthquake damage

impacts on system operations and thereby

re-establish system function.

8: Hazard Mitigation Measures and Benefits

8.

3.

4.

5.

ATC-25 175
Of these measures, the most common are

component strengthening/retrofit measures,

which are discussed at length in Appendix B of

this report. The proposed measures (Appendix

B) include generic, solutions, such as designing

structures to meet current seismic design or

retrofit standards of the local community, or

anchoring equipment. In addition, there are

numerous specific measures that relate to

unique systems or components within each

lifeline. Special attention should be directed to

those systems and conditions that are of greatest

concern, such as porcelain components in

electric substations.

Following are recommended steps when

implementing a program to reduce, seismic

hazards of existing lifelines:

1. Review existing descriptions of seismic

performance and rehabilitation measures for the

lifeline(s) of concern, i.e., familiarize yourself

and your organization with the overall problem.

Sources include Appendix B and Chapter 10

(References) of this report.

2. Conduct an investigation of the seismic

vulnerability and impact of disruption for the

lifeline(s) and region(s) of concern. Lifeline

seismic evaluation methodologies and other

potential resources for this purpose have been

developed by the ASCE Technical Council for

Lifeline Earthquake Engineering (see

references, Chapter 10), the Applied Technology Council (ATC, in preparation) and others.

3. Focus first on the most vulnerable lifelines,

components, and conditions (e.g., liquefaction

or landslide potential). Vulnerable components

include:

For electric systems:

* Substations

* Power stations

For water systems:

* Pumping stations

* Tanks and reservoirs

* Treatment plants

* Transmissions aqueducts

For highway systems

* Bridges

* Tunnels

* Roadbeds

For water transportation systems:

* Port/cargo handling equipment

* Inland waterways

For gas and liquid fuels:

* Distribution storage tanks

* Transmission pipelines

* Compressor, metering and pressure

reduction stations

4. Conduct cost-benefit studies to determine the

most cost effective measures. We note that, in

some cases, retrofit measures may not be very

cost effective. In regions where the return

period for large earthquakes is quite long, for

example, replacement over the life cycle of the

facility or component may be a reasonable,

approach.

5. Implement the selected hazard reduction

measures.

8.4 Estimated Overall Benefits of

Implementing Hazard Reduction

Measures

In order to provide an indication of the overall

benefit of implementing hazard mitigation

measures, we have computed and compare

estimated direct damage and indirect economic

losses for the existing and an upgraded extended

regional electric network, with specific focus on

the most vulnerable component for this

lifeline--substations. Estimated direct damage

and indirect economic losses for the existing

network are taken from Chapters 5 and 6,

respectively. Estimated direct damage and

indirect economic losses for the hypothetical

upgraded network have been computed using

the same techniques and data as used for the

existing network, but seismic intensities have

been shifted downward two units to reflect the

improved performance of the upgraded system.

While this is a rather simplistic approach, we

believe the results reasonably indicate the

extent of benefit provided by rehabilitation.

Direct Damage Comparisons. Percentages of

substations in the existing and upgraded system

in the various damage states are provided in

Tables 8-1 and 8-2 respectively. With the

exception of 1% of the upgraded substations in

Missouri and Tennessee that would sustain

major-to-destructive damage in the magnitude8.0 New Madrid event, none of the substations

176 8: Hazard Mitigation Measures and Benefits ATC-25

176 8: Hazard Mitigation. Measures and Benef Hs ATC-25
in other locations for this event or in other

events would sus lain damage this severe. In

contrast, 43 percent of the transmission

substations in Washington, 29 percent in

Arkansas, 16 percent in South Carolina, 13

percent in California, 10 percent in Utah, 8

percent in Missouri, and 6 percent in Tennessee

would sustain damage in this range in the

various earthquake scenarios. Trends for lower

damage states, are similar, as are trends for

transmission lines (not shown here).

Indirect Economic Loss Comparisons. Indirect

economic losses resulting from damage to the

existing and upgraded systems are provided in

Tables 8-3 and 8-4. Table 8-3 includes data for

all affected states, whereas Table 8-4 does not

include data for states for which damage to the

upgraded system was zero or insignificant. Data

for the upgraded system are based on residual

capacity plots provided in Appendix C (Figures

C-185 through C-20).

By comparing the results in Tables 8-3 and 8-4,

it is clear that indirect economic losses are

substantially reduced through seismic upgrade

measures. For example, the ratio of indirect

economic loss to the retail trade sector resulting

from damage to the existing system versus loss,

resulting from damage to the upgraded system

ranges from 2.5 to 34 for the 7 events and 8

states considered in both analyses. A

comparison of data for the other economic

sectors shows similar trends.

ATC-25 8: Hazard Mitigation Measures and Benefits 177

ATC-25 8: Hazard Mitigation Measures and Benefits 177
Damage Percent for Existing Electric Transmission Substations for Each

Scenario Earthquake (Percent of Substations in State)

NEW MADRID (M=8.0)

Illinois Missouri Arkansas Tennessee Kentucky Indiana Mississippi

Total Number 108 95 124 70 68 89 93

CHARLESTON (M=7.5)

South North

Carolina Carolina Georgia

100 76 86

Light Damage

1-10 %

Moderate

.10-30 %

Heavy

30-60 %

Major to Destructive

60-100 %

00/0

14%

0%

0/0

0% 0%

8% 22%

0% 10%

8% 29%

0%

16%

9%

6%

0%

24% .

7%

1%

CAPE ANN (M=Z0)

Massachusetts Connecticut Delaware Rhode Island New Hampshire

Total Number 153 69 3 22 22

Light Damage

1-10 %

Moderate

10-30 %

Heavy

30-60 %

Major to Destructive

60-100 %

0%

82%

0%/0

5%

0%

42%

0%

0%

0/0

33%

0%

0%

0%

100%

0%

0%

0%

45%

0%

0%/0

0%

2%

0%

0%

0%

63%

8%

10%

0%

43%

14%

16%

WASATCH FRONT(M=7.5)

Utah

10

0%

30%

20%

10%

HA YWARD

(M7.5)

California

Total Number 205

FORT TEJON PUGET SOUND

(M=8.0) (M= 7.5)

California Washington

205 155

NEW MADRID

(M=7.0)

Illinois Missouri Arkansas Tennessee Kentucky Mississippi

108 95 124 70 68 93

*Light Damage

1-10 %

Moderate

10-30 %

Heavy

30-60 %

Major to Destructive

60-100 %

8%

13%

14%

13%

11%

6%

<1%

12%

0%

12%

3%

43%

0% 0% 0%

0% 20/ 21%

0% 0% 16%

0% 6% 6%

Table 81

N

co,

(0

a

M

5n

CD

.4

CD

(1

M

CD

CD

rn

0%

20%

0%

1%

0%

33%

3%

2%

0

t6

0%/

16%

O/%

3%

16%

0%

0%/0

0%

14%

2%

0%
Table 8-2 Damage Percent for Upgraded Electric Transmission Substations for Each

Scenario Earthquake (Percent of Substations in State)

NEW MADRID (M=8.0)

Illinois Missouri Arkansas Tennessea Kentucky Indiana Mississippi

Total Number 108 95 124 70 68 89 93

CHARLESTON (M=7.5)

South North

Carolina Carolina Georgia

100 76 86

Light

0-10 %

Moderate

10-30 %

Heavy

30-60 %

Major to Destructive

60-100 %

0%

0%

0%

0/.

0%

0%

7%

1%

0%

21%

8%

0%

0%

11%

1%

1%

9%

0%

0%

0%

0%

0%

CAPE ANN (M=7.0)

Massachusetts Connecticut Delaware Rhode IslandNow Hampshire

Total Number 153 69 3 22 22

. .. _-~~~~~~~~~~~~o

Light

0-10 %

Moderate

10-30%

Heavy

30-60 %

Major to Destructive

60-100 %

0%/.

1%

5%

0%

HA YWARD

(M7.5)

California

Total Number 205

0%

0%

0%

0%

0%

0%

0%

0%

0%

0%

0%

0%

0O%

0%

%/.

0%/0

0%

10%

0%

0%

WASATCH FRONT (M=7.5)

Utah

10

0%

30%

0%

0%

FORT TEJON PUGET SOUND NEW MADRID

(M=8.0) (M= 7.5) (M4=7.0)

California Washington Illinois Missouri Arkansas Tonnossee Kentucky Mississippi

205 155 108 95 124 70 68 93

Light

0-10 %

Moderate

1 0-30 %

Heavy

30-60 %

Major to Destructive

60-100 %

0

C?'5

o

00

::

0

-

n

a

,

0%

24%

6%

0%

0%

1%

0%

0%

0%

1%

1%

a0%

1 2%

21%

0%

0%

6/.

11%

1%

0%

0%

21%

22 I%

0%

0%

0%

0%

0%

0%

3%

3%

0%

0%

6%

0%

0%

0%

1%

1%

0%

0/O

0%

0%

0%

0%

0%

0%

0%
Table 8-3 Indirect Economic Loss Due to Damage to the Existing Electric System

(Percent Monthly GNP)

NEWMADRID (M=8.0) CHARLESTON CAPEANN

U.'S. Econ. South North

Value Added Illinois Missouri Arkansas Tennessee Kentucky Mississippi Carolina Carolina Georgia Massachusetts Connecticut Delaware

(Percent)

1 Livestock 0.45% 3.95% 6.58%/6 32.89% 13.16%/a 13.16% 44.74% 46.05% 7.89% 18.42% 44.74% 15.79% 10.53%

2 Agr. Prod. 1.06% 3.95% 6.58% 32.89% 13.16% 13.16% 44.74% 46.05% 7.89% 18.420/a 44.74% 15.79% 10.53%

3 Agr For. Fish 0.11% 3.95% 6.58% 32.89% 13.16% 13.16% 44.74% 46.05% 7.89% 18.42% 44.74% 15.79% 10.53%

4 Mining 3.89% 7.11% 11.84% 59.21% 23.68% 23.68% 80.53% 82.89% 14.21% 33.16% 80.53% 28.42% 18.95%

5 Construction 5.52% 3.16% 5.26% 26.32% 10.53% 10.53% 35.79% 36.84% 6.32/ 14.74% 35.79% 12.63% 8.42%

6 Food Tobacco 2.41% 7.11% 11.84% 59.21% 23.68% 23.68% 80.53% 82.890/ 14.21% 33.16% 80.53% 28.42% 18.95%

7 Textile Goods 0.37% 7.89% 13.16% 65.79% 26.32% 26.32% 89.47% 92.11% 15.79% 36.84% 89.47% 31.58% 21.05%

8 Misc Text. Prod. 0.73% 7.89% 13.16% 65.79% 26.32% 26.32% 89.47%. 92.11% 15.79% 36.84% 89.47% 31.58% 21.05%

9 Lumber & Wood 0.52% 7.89% 13.16% 65.79% 26.32% 26.32% 89.47% 92.11% 15.79% 36.84% 89.47% 31.58% 21.05%

10 Furniture 0.34% 7.89% 13.16% 65.79% 26.32% 26.32% 89.47% 92.11% 15.79% 36.84% 89.47% 31.58% 21.05%

11 Pulp & Paper 0.87% 7.89% 13.16% 65.79% 26.32% 26.320/ 89.47% 92.11% 15.79% 36.84% 89.47% 31.58% 21.05%

12 Print & Publish 1.31% 7.89% 13,16% 65.79% 26.32% 26.32% 89.47% 92.11% 15.79% 36.84% 89.47% 31.58% 21.05%

13 Chemical & Drugs 1.40% 7.11% 11.84% 59.21% 23.68% 23.68% 80.53% 82.890/ 14.21% 33.16% 80.53% 28.42% 18.95%

14 Petrol. Refining 0,96% 7.89% 13.16% 65.79% 26.320/a 26.32% 89.47% 92.11% 15.79% 36.84% 89.47% 31.58% 21.05%

15 Rubber & Plastic 1.03% 7.89% 13.16% 65.79% 26.32% 26.32% 89.47% 92.11% 15.79% 36.84% 89.47% 31.58% 21.05%

16 Leather Prods. 0.12% 7.89% 13.16% 65.79/6 26.32% 26.32% 89.47% 92.11% 15.79% 36.84% 89.47% 31.58% 21.05%

17 Glass Stone Clay 0.62% 7.89% 13.16% 65.79% 26.32%/ 26.32% 89.47% 92.11% 15.79% 36.84% 89.47% 31.58% 21.05%

18 Prim. Metal Prod. 1.04% 7.11% 11.84% 59.21% 23.68% 23.68% 80.53% 82.89% 14.21% 33.16% 80.53% 28.420/a 18.95%

19 Fab. Metal Prod. 1.64% 7.89% 13.16% 65.79% 26.320/a 26.32% 89.470/ 92.11% 15.79% 36.84% 89.47% 31.58% 21.05%

20 Mach. Exc. Elec. 1.56% 7.89% -13.16% 65.79% 26.320/ 26.32% 89.47% 92.11% 15.79% 36.84% 89.47% 31.58% 21.05%

21 Elec. & Electron 2.52% 7.89% 13.16% 65.79% 26.32% 26.32% 89.47% 92.11% 15.79% 36.84% 89.47% 31.58% 21.05%

22 Transport Eq. 2.62% 7.89% 13.16% 65.79% 26.320/a 26.32% 89.47% 92.11% 15.79% . 36.84% 89.47% 31.58% 21.05%

23 Instruments 0.68% 7.89% 13.16% 65.79% 26.32% 26;32% 89.47% 92.11% 15.79% 36.84% 89.47% 31.58% 21.05%

24 Misc. Manufact. 0.69% 7.89% 13.16%- 65.79% 26.32% 26.32% 89.47% 92.11% 15.79% 36.84% 89.47% 31.58% 21.05%

25 Transp & Whse. 3.46% 2.37% 3.95% 19.74% 7.89%b 7.89% 26.84% 27.63% 4.74% 11.05% 26.84% 9.47% 6.32%

26 Utilities 5.89% 6.320/6 10.53% 52.63% 21.05% 21,05% 71.58% 73.68% 12.63% 29.47% 71.58% 25.26% 16.84%

27 Wholesale Trade 5.63% 7.11% 11.84% 59.21% 23.68% 23.68% 80.53% 82.890/a 14.21% 33.16% 80.53% 28.42% 18.95%

28 Retail Trade 5.63% 7.11% 11.84% 59.21% 23.68% 23.68% 80.53% 82.89% 14.21% 33.16% 80.53% 28.42% 18.95%

29 F.I.R.E. 16.64% 7.11% 11.84% 59.21% 23.68% 23.68% 80.53% 82.89% 14.21% 33.16% 80.53% 28.42% 18.95%

30 Pers./Prot Serv. 8.03% 7.11% 11.84% 59.21% 23.68% 23.68% 80.53% 82.89% 14.21% 33.16% 80.53% 28.42% 18.95%

31 Eating Drinking 2.12% 6.32% 10.53% 52.63% 21.05% 21.05% 71.58% 73.68% 12.63% 29.47% 71.58% 25.26% 16.84%

32 AutoServ. 1.09% 7.11% 11.84% 59.21% 23.68% 23.68% 80.53% 82.89% 14.21% 33.16% 80.53% 28.42% 18.95%

33. Amuse & Rec. 0.70% 6.32% 10.53% 52.63% 21.05% 21.05% 71.58% 73.68% 12.63% 29.47% 71.58% 25.26% 16.84%

34 Health Ed. Soc. 6.30% 6.32% 10.53% 52.63% 21.05% 21.05% 71.58% 73.68% 12.63% 29.47% 71.58% 25.26% 16.84%

35 Govt&GovtInd. 11.79% 4.74% 7.890/a 39.47% 15.79% 15.79% 53.68% 55.26% 9.47% 22.11% 53.68% 18.95% .12.63%

36 Households 0.25% S.32% 10.53% 52.63% 21.05% 21.05% 71.58% 73.68% 12.63% 29.47% 71.58% 25.26% 16.84%

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Table 83 Indirect Economic Loss Due to Damage to the Existing Electric System

(Percent Monthly GNP) (Continued)

CAPE ANN

U.S. Econ.

Value Added

(Percent)

1 Livestock

2 Agr. Prod.

3 AgServ For. Fish

4 Mining

5 Construction

6 Food Tobacco

7 Textile Goods

8 Misc Text. Prod.

9 Lumber Wood

10 Furniture

11 Pulp & Paper

12 Print & Publish

13 Chemical & Drugs

14 Petrol. Refining

1S Rubber & Plastic

16 Leather Prods.

17 Glass Stone Clay

18 Prim. Metal Prod.

19 Fab. Metal Prod.

20 Mach. Exc. Elec,

21 Eloe. & Electron

22 Transport Eq.

23 Instruments

24 Misc. Manufact.

25 Transp & Whse.

26 Utilities

27 Wholesale Trade

28 Retail Trade

29 F.I.R.E.

30 Pers./Prof Serv.

31 Eating Drinking

32 Auto Serv.

33 Amuse & Rec.

34 Health Ed. Soc.

35 Govt & Govt Ind,

36 Households

0.4S%

106%

0.11%

3.89%

5.52%

2.41%

0,37%

0.73%

0.52%

0.34%

O.87Q/

1.31%

1.40%

0.96%

1.03%

0.12%

0.62%

1.04%

1.64%

1.56%

2.S20/O

2.62%

0.68%

0.69%

3.46%

5.89%

5.63%

5.63%

16.64%

8.03%

2.12%

1.09%

0.70/a

6.30%

11.79%

0.25%

RShode

Island New Hampshire

42.11%

42.11%

42.11%

75.79%

33.68%

75.79%

84.21%

84.21%

84.21%

84.2 1%

84.21%

84.21%

75.79%

84.21%

84.21%

84.21%

84.21%

75.79%

84.21%

84.21%

84.21%

84.21%

84.21%

84.21%

25.26%

67.37%

75.79%

75.79%

75.79%

75.79%

67.3 7%

75.79%

67.37%

67.37%

S0.53%

67.37%

14.47%

14.47%

14.47%

26.05%

1 1.58%

26.05%

28.95%

28.95%

28.95%

28.95%

28.95%

28.95%

26.05%

28.95%

28.95%

28.95%

28.95%

26.05%

28.95%

28.95%

28.95%

28.95%

28,95%.

28.95%

8.68%

23.16%

26,05%

26.05%

26.05%

26.05%

23.16%

26.05%

23.16%

23.16%

17.37%/

23.16%

WASATCH

Utah

35.53%

35.53%

35.53%

63.95%

28,42%

63.95%

71.05%

71 .05%

71.05%

71.05%

71.05%

71.05%

63.95%

71.05%

71.05%

71 .05%

71.05%

63.95%

71.05%

71 .05%

71.05%

71.05%

71 .05%

71.05%

21,32%

56.84%

63.95%

63.95%

63.95%

63.95%

56.84%

63.95%

56.84%

56.84%

42.63%

56.84%

CALIFORNIA PUGET SOUND

Hayward

23.68%

23.68%

23.68%

42.63%

18.95%

42.63%

47.37%

47.37%

47.37%

47.37%

47.37%

47.37%

42.63%

47.37%

47.37%

47.37%

47.37%g

42.63%

47.37%,

47.37%

47.37%

47.3r7%

47.37%

47,37%

14 .2 1%

37.89%

42.63%

42.63%

42.63%

42.63%

37.89%

42.63%

37.89%

37.89%

28.42%

37.89%

Fort Thjon Washington Arkansas

13.16% 47.37% 23.68%

1.16% 47.37% 23,68%

13.16% 47.37% 23.68%

23.68% 85.26% 42.63%

10,53% 37.89% 18.95%

23.68% 85,26% 42.63%

26,32% 94.74% 47.37%

26.32% 94.74% 47.37%

26.t32 /o 94.74% 47.37%

26.32% 94.74% 47.37%

26.32% 94.74% 47.37%

26.32% 94.74% 47.37%

23.68% 85.26% 42.63%

26.32% 94,74% 47.37%

26.32% 94.74% 47,37%

26,329/o 94.74% .47.37%

26.32% 94.74% 47.37%

23.68% 85.26% 42.63%

26.32% 94.74% 4737%

26.326%a 94.74% 47.37%

26.32% 94.74% 47.3 7%

26.32%9 94.74% 47.37%

26.32% 94.74% 47.37%

26.32 LQ 94.74% 47.37%

7.89% 28.42% 14.21%

21.05% 75.79% 37.89%

23.68% 85.26% 42.63%

23.68% 85.26% 42.63%

23.68% 85.26% 42.63%

23.68% 85.26% 42.63%

21.05% 75.79% 37.89%

23.68% 85.26% 42.63%

21.05% 75.79% 37.89%

21.05% 75.79% 37.89%

15.79% 56.84% 28.42%

21.05% 75.79% 37.89%

NEWMADRID (M=7.0)

Tennessee Kentucky Mississippi

7.89%

7.89%

7.89%

14.21%

6.32%

14.21%

15,79%

15 79%

15.79%

16.79%

15,79Q/9

15.79%

14.21%

15 S79%

15.79%

15.79%

15.79%

14.21%

15.79%

15,79%

15,79%

15.79%

15.79%

15.79%

4.74%

12.63%

14.21%

14.21%

14.21%

14.21%

12.63%

14.21%

12.63%

12.63%

9.47%

12.63%

3.95%

3.95%

3.95%

7.1 1%

3.16%

7.1l1%

7.89%

7.89%

7.89%

7.89%

7.89%

7.89%

7.11%

7.89%

7.89%

7.89%

7.89%

7.11 %

7.89%

7.89%

,7.89%

7.89%

7.89%

7.89%

2.37%

6.32%

7.1 1%

7.1 1%

7.11%

7.11%

6.32%

7.1 1%

6.32%

6.32 %

4.74%

6.32%

3.96%

3,95%

7.11%

3.16%

7.11%

7.89%

7.89%

7.89%

7.89%

7.89%

7.89%

7.11%

7.89%

7.89%

7.89%

7.89%

7.11%

7.89%

7.89%

7.89%

7,89%

7.89%

7.89%

2.377%

6.32%/9

7.11%

7.11%

7.11%

7.11%

6.32/a

7.11%

6.32%

6.32%

4.74%

6.320/0

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Table 8-4 Indirect Economic Loss Due to Damage to the Upgraded Electric System

I (Percent Monthly GNP)

! , .. , _ .~~~~~~~~~

NEW MADRID(~M=8.Q)

U.S. Econ.

Value-Added

(Percent)

1 Livestock 0.45%

2 Agr. Prod. 1.06%

3 AgServ For. Fish 0.11%

4 Mining 3.89%

5 Construction 5.52%

6 Food Tobacco 2.41%

7 Textile Goods 0.37%

8 Misc Text. Prod. 0.73%

9 Lumber & Wood 0.52%

10 Furniture 0.34%

11 Pulp & Paper 0.87%

12 Print & Publish 1.31%

13 Chemical & Drugs 1.40%

14 Petrol. Refining 0.96%

15 Rubber & Plastic 1.03%

16 Leather Prods. 0.12%

17 Glass Stone Clay 0.62%

18 Prim. Metal Prod. 1.04%

19 Fab. Metal Prod. 1.64%

20 Mach. Exc. Elec. 1.56%

21 Elec. & Electron 2.52%

22 Transport Eq. 2.62%

23 Instruments 0.68%

24 Misc. Manufact. 0.69%

25 Transp & Whse. 3.46%

26 Utilities 5.89%

27 Wholesale Trade 5.63%

28 Retail Trade 5.63%

29 F.I.R.E. 16.64%

30 Pers./Prof Serv. 8.03%

31 Eating Drinking 2.12%

32 Auto Serv, 1.09%

33 Amuse & Rec. 0.70%

34 Health Ed. Soc. 6.30%

35 - Govt & Govt Ind. 11.79%

36 Households 0.25%

Arkansas Tennessee

13.16% 5.26%

13.16% 5.26%

13.16% 5.26%

23.68% 9.47%

10.53% 4.21%

23.68% D 9.47%

26.32% 10.53%

26.32% 10.53%

26.32% 10.53%

26.32% 10.53%

26.32% . 10.53%

26.32% 10.53%

23.68% 9.47%

26.32% 10.53%

26.32% . 10.53%

26.32% 10.53%

26.320/ 10.53%

23.68% 9.47%

26.32% 10.53%

26.32% 10.53%

26.32% 10.53%

26.32% 10.53%

26.32% 10.53%

26.32% 10.53%

7.89% 3.16%

21.05% 8.42%

23.68% 9.47%

23.68% 9.47%

23.68% 9.47%

23.68% 9.47%

21.05% 8.42%

23.68% 947%

21.05% 8.42%

21.05% 8.42%

15.79% 6.32%

21.05% 8.42%

CHARLESTON CAPEANN WASATCH HAYWARD FT. TEJON WASHINGTO)

S Carolina Massachusetts Utah California California Washington

15.79% 1.32% 10.53% 5.26% 2.63% 18.42%

15.79% 1.32% 10.53% 5.26% 2.63% 18.42%

15.79% 1.32% 10.53% 5.26% 2.63% 18.42%

28.42% 2.37% 18.95% 9.47% 4.74% 33.16%

12.63% 1.05% 8.42% 4.21% 2.11% 14.74%

28.42% 2.37% 18.95% 9.47% 4.74% 33.16%

31.58% : 2.63% 21.05% 10.53% 5.26% 36.84%

31.58% 2.63% 21.05% 10.53% 5.26% 36.84%

31.58% 2.63% 21.05% 10.53% 5.26% 36.84%

31.58% 2.63% 21.05% 10.53% 5.26% 36.84%

31.58% 2.63% 21.05% 10.53% 5.26% 36.84%

31.58% 2.63% 21.05% 10.53% 5.26% 36.84%

28.42% 2.37% 18.95% 9.47% 4.74% 33.16%

31.58% 2.63% 21.05% 10.53% 5.26% 36.84%

31.58% 2.63% 21.05% 10.53% 5.26% 36.84%

31.58% 2.63% 21.05% 10.53% 5.26% 36.84%

31.58% 2.63% 21.05% 10.53% 5.26% 36.84%

28.42% 2.37% 18.95% 9.47% 4.74% 33.16%

31.58% 2.63% 21.05% 10.53% 5.26% 36.84%

31.58% 2.63% 21.05% 10.53% 5.26% 36.84%

31 58% 2.63% 21.05% 10.53% 5.26% 36.84%

31.58% 2.63% 21.05% 10.53% 5.26% 36.84%

31.58% 2.63% 21.05% 10.53% 5.26% 36.84%

31.58% 2.63% 21.05% 10.53% 5.26% 36.84%

9.47% 0.79% 6.32% 3.16% 1.58% 11.05%

25.26% 2.11% 16.84% 8.42% 4.21% 29.47%

28.42/6 2.37% 18.95% 9.47% 4.74% 33.16%

28.42% 2.37% 18.95% 9.47% 4.74% 33.16%

28.42% 2.37% 18.95% 9.47% 4.74% 33.16%

28.42% 2.37% 18.95% 9.47% 4.74% 33.16%

25.26% 2.11% 16.84% 8.42% 4.21% 29.47%

28.42% 2.37% 18.95%. 9.47% 4.74% 33.16%

25.26% 2.11% 16.84% 8.42% 4.21% 29.47%

25.26% 2.11% 16.84% 8.42% 4.21% 29.47%

18.95% 1.58% 12.63% 6.32% 3.16% 22.11%

25.26% 2.11% 16.84% 8.42% 4.21% 29.47%

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Recommendations for Further Work

9.1 Introduction

The ATC-25 project has raised a number of

questions and indicated areas in which

knowledge is inadequate or nonexistent with

respect to the impact of lifeline disruption due

to earthquake. Following is a discussion of

recommendations for further research and other

efforts. This list is not meant to be all inclusive

but rather an overview of some of the more

important issues that should be pursued.

9.2 Lifeline Inventory

This project has initiated the development of a

comprehensive national lifelines inventory

database. Completion of this monumental task

will require many person-years of effort.

Organizations such as the Federal Emergency

Management Agency, Department of

Transportation, and American Society of Civil

Engineers Technical Council of Lifeline

Earthquake Engineering are encouraged to

build on the work performed in this project, develop standards for complete lifeline

inventories, and coordinate the acquisition of

the needed additional and updated data from

various lifeline owners. Capacity data in the

National Petroleum Council's oil/gas

transmission line inventory is an example of the

kind and extent of information that is needed in

lifeline inventory databases. An integral part of

any project to augment the existing ATC-25

lifeline database should be its wide availability in

the public domain.

9.3 Lifeline Component Vulnerability

This project employed lifeline component

vulnerability functions developed in the ATC-13

project (ATe, 1985) on the basis of expert

opinion obtained by surveys. While the ATC-13

expert-opinion data are extremely useful,

comprehensive information based on hard field

data would provide an improved basis for

estimating lifeline vulnerability. We recommend

a major effort to acquire data on lifeline seismic

performance and damage, and conduct analysis

towards the development of improved

component vulnerability functions. This effort

should also investigate lifeline recovery data,

and incorporate the extensive experience

realized during the 17 October 1989 Loma

Prieta, California, earthquake, as well as from

other damaging earthquakes.

9.4 Seismic Hazard Data

The project has uncovered the relative paucity of seismic hazard models and resources at the

regional/national scale. Only two models are

available, those of Evernden and Thompson

(1985) and Algermissen et al. (1990), the latter

of which does not incorporate a soils database.

While a nationally agreed upon seismic hazard

model may be desirable, this is less of a priority than the need for a digitized soils database.

That is, existing models (e.g., attenuation

relations, seismicity databases, seismotectonic

models) are sufficient for a number of sitespecific purposes, and can be expanded to

regional modeling, given an adequate soils

database. We suggest that the U. S. Geological Survey develop, or coordinate through the

various states' Office of Geologists, a series of

digitized soils/geologic databases.

9.5 Economic Analysis and Impacts Data and Methodology

This project has presented a rational

comprehensive model for the estimation of the

economic impacts due to lifeline disruption.

Many steps of the process necessarily involved

approximations and limited analyses. We

recommend further research, especially in

economic areas such as:

* Economic impacts associated with

lifeline disruption,

i Second-order economic effects (e.g., interaction between lifelines, such as the

effect of disrupted electric power on the

water supply),

* Elasticities of demand, or substitution of

a lesser disrupted lifeline (e.g., fuel oil)

for a more disrupted lifeline (e.g.,

natural gas),

ATC-25 9: Recommendations for Further Work 183

9.

ATC-25 9: Recommendations for Further Work 183
* Inter-regional impacts (e.g., economic

impacts in New York due to disruption

in California), and

* So-called "benefits," such as increased

economic activity associated with repair,

or replacement of older equipment with

new technology.

Lastly, we note that this study did not address

environmental consequences associated with

lifeline disruption, especially the potential for

oil spills from broken pipelines in the nation's

waterways following a New Madrid event.

Investigation of this issue is critically important.

184 9: Recommendations for Further Work ATC-25

9: Recommendations for Further Work ATC-25 184
1 0 References

AIRAC, 1987, "Fire Following Earthquake--

Estimates of the Conflagration Risk to

Insured Property in Greater Los Angeles

and San Francisco," All-Industry Research

Advisory Council, Oak Brook, Illinois.

Aid, K., 1982, "Strong Motion Prediction Using

Mathematical Modeling Techniques," Bull.

Seis. Soc. Anm, Vol. 72, pp. 529-541.

Aid, K., and Richards, P. G., 1980, Quantitative

Seismology, W. H. Freeman, San Francisco.

Algermissen, S.T., 1969, "Seismic Risk Studies in

the United States," In Proc. 4th World Conf

on Earthquake Engineering, Santiago, Chile,

Vol. 1, pp. 14-27.

Algernmissen, S.., and D.NL Perkins, 1976,A

Probabilistic Estimate of Maximum

Acceleration in Rock in the Contiguous

United States, U.S. Geological Survey

'Open-File Report 76-416.

Algermissen, S.T., R J. Brazee, C.W. Stover,

and L.C. Pakiser, 1977, Madinum Intensity

of the Washington Earthquake of

December 14, 1872," Report of

USGSINOAA Ad Hoc Working Group on

Intensities of Historic Earthquakes.

AIlgermissen, S.T., D.M. Perkins, P.C.

Thenhaus, S.L. Hanson, and B.L. Bender,

1982, Probabilistic Estimates of Maximum

Acceleration and Velocity in Rock in the

Contiguous United States, U.S. Geological

Survey Open-File Report 82-1033.

Algermissen, S.T., 1983, "An Introduction to the

Seismicity of the United States,"

Earthquake Engineering Research

Institute, Berkeley, Calif, 148 pp.

Algermissen, S. T. et aL, 1990, "Probabilistic

Earthquake Acceleration and Velocity for

the United States and Puerto Rico," U. S.

Geological Survey Map MF-2120.

American Society of Civil Engineers (ASCETCLEE), 1977, Conference on Crrent State

.ofKnowledge of Lifeline Earthquake

Engineering, New York, NY.

American Society of Mechanical Engineers,

1979, "National Congress on Pressure

Vessels and Piping' (3rd: 1979: San

Francisco, Calif.); "Lifeline Earthquake

Engineering--Buried Pipelines, Seismic

Risk, and Instrumentation," Presented at

the Third National Congress on Pressure

Vessels and Piping, San Francisco,

California, June 25-29, 1979, New York.

American Society of Mechanical Engineers,

1980, Symposium on Recent Advances in

Lifeline Earthquake Engineering in Japan

(San Francisco, Calif.),. "Recent Advances

in Lifeline Earthquake Engineering in

Japan,".

American Society of Civil Engineers, Technical

Council on Lifeline Earthquake

Engineering, 1980, Annotated Bibliography

on Lifeline Earthquake Engineering,

Prepared by Technical Council on Lifeline

Earthquake Engineering, American Society

of Engineers.

American Society of Civil Engineers (ASCETCLEE), 1981, "Lifeline Earthquake

Engineering: The 'Current State of

Knowledge," in Proceedings of the Second

Specialty Conference of the Technical

Council on Lifeline Earthquake Engeering,

Oakland Hyatt House, Oakland, New York,

N.Y.

American Society of Civil Engineers, 1983,

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10: References ATC -25 192
Appendix A: ATC-25 Project Participants

APPLIED TECHNOLOGY COUNCIL

Mr. Christopher Rojahn (Principal Investigator)

Applied Technology Council

555 Twin Dolphin Drive, Suite 270

Redwood City, California 94065

Dr. Gerard Pardoen (Board Contact)

Dept of Civil Engineering, 101 ICEF

University of California

Irvine, California 92717

FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY

Mr. Kenneth Sullivan '(Project Officer)

Federal Emergency Management Agency

500 C Street, S.W.

Washington, DC 20472

SUBCONTRACTOR

EQE, Inc.

Dr. Charles Scawthorn, Principal-in-Charge

Dr. Mahmoud Khater, Principal Research Engineer

595 Market Street, 18th Floor

San Francisco, California 94105

EXPERT TECHNICAL ADVISORY GROUP

Mr. Lloyd Cluff

Consulting Geologist

33 Mountain Spring

San Francisco, California

Mr. James D. Cooper

(Federal Highway Administration)

116 Nort h Johnson Road

Sterling, Virginia 22170

Mr. Holly Cornell

CH2M Hill, P.O. Box 428

Corvallis, Oregon 97339

Mr.-John W. Foss

Bell Communications Research Inc.

435 South Street, #1A334

Morristown, New Jersey 07960

Mr. James H. Gates

California Dept. of Transportation

P.0. Box 942874

Sacramento, California 94274

Mr. Neal Hardman

Cali£ Office of Statewide Health

Planning and Development

1600 9th Street

Sacramento, California 95814

Mr. Jeremy Isenberg

Weidlinger Associates

4410 El Camino Real, Suite 110

Los Altos, California 94022

Prof. Anne S. Kiremidjian

Dept. of Civil Engineering

Stanford University

Stanford, California 94305

Mr. Le Val Lund

Consulting Engineer

3245 Lowry Road

Los Angeles, California 90027

Mr. Peter McDonough

144 Whitesides Street

Layton, Utah 84041

ATC-25. Appendix A: Project Participants 193
Dr. Dennis K. Ostrom

Consulting Engineer

16430 Sultus Street

Canyon Country, Calif. 91351

Dr. Michael Reichle

Calif. Division of Mines & Geology

630 Bercut Drive

Sacramento, Calif. 95814

Dr. J. Carl Stepp

Electric Power Research Inst.

3412 Hillview Avenue

Palo Alto, Calif. 94303

Mr. Domenic Zigant

Naval Facilities Engineering Command

Code 402, P. 0. Box 727

San Bruno, California 94066

Prof. Anshel J. Schiff

Dept. of Civil Engineering

Stanford University

Stanford, California 94305

194 Appendix A: Project Participants ATC-25

194 Appendix A: Project Participants ATC-25
Appendix B: Lifeline Vulnerability Functions

Table of Contents

Page

R1 T-Ticrhwav --- ~~1 %

B 11 Itinr Rrdias.. 1IQw

B.1.2 Tunnels.............................................

B.1.3 Conventional Bridges.....................

B.1.4 Freeways/Mighways.........................

B 1 T nr-Al nsd

B.2 Railw ay...........................................................

B.2.1 Bridges...........................................

B .2.2 Tunnels..............................................

B.2.3 Tracks/Roadbeds............................

R 9 4 TerminqI Sttinns

---- -- -- -- -- ----- - - - .................. 197

.................. 200

.. 203

......... 208

......... 211

........ 215

91A

B.3 Air Transportation.

B.3.1 Terminals.

B P 2 Rnvnwavq and 7':h-iwvs. ..

......... 218

......... 218

991i

B.4 Sea/Water Transportation.........................I

B.4.1 Ports/Cargo Handling Equipment.

Rd9 ThndandL iWtwernvra

......... . M

......... 223

996

B.5 Electrical.........................................................

B.5.1 Fossil-fuel Power Plants.................

R 59 T2 vlreiertrir Pnwer P1ants

......... 229

........ 229

B.5.3 Transmission Lines ..........................

B.5A Transmission Substations................

P 5-5 Tlistrihutinn Tines

........ 235

........ 238

9.49

B.5.6 Distribution Substations .................

B.6 Water Supply.................................................

B. 6 1 Transmisinn AnneTncfq -

........ 243

......... 243

.. 2455

B.6.2 Pumping Stations .............................

B.6.3 Storage Reservoirs...........................

R 64 Trefmentf PInts

........ 248

......... 251

955

B.6.5 Terminal Reservoirs/Tanks.

B.6.6 Trunk Lines .

B.6.7 Wells.

PR 7 Saqnibty Sevwer

3.7.1 Mains .

B.7.2 Pumping Stations.

B.7.3 Treatment Plants .

B.8 Natural Gas.

B.8.1 Transmission Lines.

P R 9 Cnrnnressnr Stahtnn .

......... 260

......... 262

......... 266

........ 268.

........ 271

........ 274

........ 277

........ 277

.. n

B.8.3 Distribution Mains..

B.9 Petroleum Fuels.

B.9.1 Oil Fields.

B.9.2 Refineries.

B.9.3 Transmission Pipelines.

3.9.4 Distribution Storage Tanks.

B.10 Emergency Service.

iRfll TMelnth Cre

........ 283

......... Z 

........ 286

......... . 2

........ 291

........ 294

........ 295

.. 05

B.1,0.2 Emergency Response Services. . 0IG

AT 5Appendix B: Lifeline Vulnerability Functions

.......................................................................

.......................................................................

..... <§.6.............et..........a. .......

.........................................................................................-

.................................................................................

.................................................................................

.................................................................................

.................................................................................

.................................................................................

.................................................................................

.................................................................................

.............................................. .................................. ..................................................................................

..................................................................................

................................................................................

................................................................................

I................................................................................

I................................................................................

I....................... ........................................................

................................................................................

................................................................................

................................................................................

................................................................................

...............................................................................

................................................................................

................................................................................

................................................................................

.................................................................................

................................................................................ I

....................... a .........................................................

.................................................................................

.................................................................................

.................................................................................

.................................................................................

........................................................................................ -1 

----------------- --- I)nQ

............................... " F , sL T

-_ .-.- _ _ >';'s1Qt _ _, _ _ Llj:: _4, _ _

, u ..f

. .mr

. r A-_ILL TT J 1H LIL = L q IL T

.. fi .LJUL.LlZ 1 T ;.I L 1

_v.s _ _ - sy-lOlLA _, _ sW ,s . r .._ _

._ . so,.s v _ssv

.. . 1voX. .' i sH _ . _ _ _ a

_ . *.Kr. 1 _ s v.L.Ls:L; _ I 1Ws .

_ _ ,

.. ,.vU]UZ]L8X s .,sU >s 

. | W. JL v 1 '@u1sU \_

..............

---- ------ --

_ _ _

---

X,2

.. E

2S, .. wq

ATC-25i 195
Included in this appendix. are vulnerability

functions used to describe the expected or

assumed earthquake performance

characteristics of lifelines as well as the time

required to restore damaged facilities to their

pre-earthquake capacity, or usability. Functions

have been developed for all lifelines inventoried

for this project, for lifelines estimated by proxy,

and for other important lifelines not available

for inclusion in the project inventory. The

methodology used to calculate the quantitative

relationships for direct damage and residual

capacity are described in Chapter 3.

The vulnerability function for each lifeline

consists of the following components:

* General information, which consists of

(1) a description of the structure and its

main components, (2) typical seismic

damage in qualitative terms, and (3)

seismically resistant design characteristics

for the facility and its components in

particular. This information has been

included to define the assumed

characteristics and expected

performance of each facility and to

make the functions more widely

applicable (i.e., applicable for other

investigations by other researchers).

* Direct damage information, which

consists of (1) a description of its basis in

terms of structure type and quality of

construction (degree of seismic

resistance), (2) default estimates of the

quality of construction forpresent

conditions, (3) default estimates of the

quality of construction for upgraded

conditions, and (4) time-to-restoration

curves.

B.1 Highway

B. 1.I Major Bridges

1. General

Description: Major bridges include all

highway system bridges with individual spans

over 500 feet. Steel bridges of this type

include suspension, cable-stayed, or truss.

Reinforced concrete arch or prestressed

concrete segmental bridges are also

common. The main components include the

bridge piers and supporting foundation

(commonly piers, piles, or caissons) and the

superstructure including the bridge deck,

girders, stringers, truss members, and cables.

Approaches may consist of conventional

highway bridge construction and/or

abutments.

Typical Seismic Damage: Major bridges are

typically well- engineered structures

designed for lateral loading (seismic loading

was not typically considered until the 1970s).

In most cases, damage will be limited to

ground and structural failures at bridge

approaches. However, major ground failures

including liquefaction and submarine

landsliding could lead to significant damage

to bridge foundations and superstructures.

Earthquake-resistant Design: Seismically

resistant design practices include dynamic

analysis, which takes soil-structure

interaction into account. Foundations

should be designed and detailed to

withstand any soil failures that are expected

due to unstable site conditions.

2. Direct Damage

Basis: Damage curves for highway system

major bridges are based on ATC-13 data for

FC 30, major bridges (greater than 500-foot

spans). Standard construction is assumed to

represent typical California major bridges

under present conditions (i.e., a composite

of older non-seismically designed bridges as

well as modern bridges designed for sitespecific seismic loads).

Present Conditions: In the absence of data

on the type of construction, age, etc., the

following factors were used to modify the

mean curves, under present conditions:

NEHRP Map Area

California 7

California 3-6

Non-California 7

Puget Sound 5

All other areas

MMI

Intensity

Shift

0

+1

+1

+1

+2

The modified motion-damage curves for

major bridges are shown in Figure B-1.

196 Appendix B: Lifeline Vulnerability Functions ATC-25
Bridge

VII Vill IX

Modified Mercalli Intensity (MMI)

Figure B-1 Damage percent by intensity for major bridges.

Upgraded Conditions: For areas where it Heavy

appears cost-effective to improve facilities, and ur

assume on a preliminary basis that upgrades tunnel

result in a beneficial intensity shift of one chang4

unit (i.e., -1), relative to the above present materi

conditions.

Typia

Time-to-restoration: The time-to- experi

restoration data assigned to SF 25a, major by per

bridges for highway systems, are assumed to Iandsli

apply to all major bridges. By combining suffer

these data with the damage curves for FC grouni

30, the time-to-restoration curves shown in portal

Figures B-2 through B-4 were derived for been i

the various NEHRP Map Areas. inters(

constr

B3.2 Tunnels Dama.

limite(

1. General

Seism

Description: In general, tunnels may pass have r

through alluvium or rock, or may be of cut Conse

and cover construction. Tunnels may be design

lined or unlined, and may be at any depth provid

below the ground surface. Tunnel lengths streng

may range from less than 100 feet to several traditi

miles. Lining materials include brick and bends,

both reinforced and unreinforced concrete. constr

y timbers and wood lagging (grouted

igrouted) may also be used to support

walls and ceilings. Tunnels may

F in shape and/or construction

ial over their lengths.

ii Seismic Damage: Tunnels may

ence severe damage in areas affected

manent ground movements caused by

Ides or surface fault rupture, but rarely

significant internal damage from

I shaking alone. Landslides at tunnel

s can cause blockage. Damage has

ioted at tunnel weak spots such as

ctions; bends, or changes in shape,

uction materials, or soil conditions.

ge to lined tunnels has typically been

I to cracked lining.

ically Resistant Design: Lined tunnels

perforned better than unlined tunnels.

quently, general Seismically resistant

* practices for tunnels include

ling reinforced concrete lining;

thening areas that have been

onally weak such as intersections,

, and changes in shape and in

uction materials; and siting tunnels to

Appendix B: Lifeline Vulnerability Functions

D=1118

a

0) 

C

D=Y

I)' X

Major

ATC-25 197
Br i dge

- 5a 1.00 30

6

7

B

9

10

mlajor

t .00

a b

0.217 0.795

0.215 0.780

0.142 0.434

-0.204 0.831

-0.103 0.015

R b * days a

DAYS: 30 60 90 120 150 180 210 240

Elapsed Time in Days

Residual capacity for major bridges (NEHRP California 7).

H=100x

.5

coa

( R= ex

.c

C).

Lrp

DAYS: 30 68 90

Bridge

n-r a an -n - L34 I [lo J

/ MH~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~1

7 _

8 - 9 -1

/ ~ ~~ to -1

Ja = 

/ : R =~~~

I I I I I I

1.

Z70 300 330 365

t ajor

I"E

a

0.215

0 142

0.204

0 .103

B .248

b

0.780

8.434

0 .031

0.815

0.006

b * days a

I I I

120 150 180 210 240 270 300 330

Elapsed Time in Days

365

Residual capacity for major bridges (NEHRP Map Area 3-6, Non-California 7, and Puget

Sound 5).

Appendix B: Lifeline Vulnerability Functions

R=t00y

.5

C-)

-

(A)

C)

n- n. F I i 

Figure B-2

Figure B-3

l

19w8 ATC-25
Bridge

a b

8.142 8.43

2,ZB4 8.31

8.1EJ 0.815

.24H8 0.086

-0.421 8.B03

* ay

8E 90 128 15 186 218 248 2?8 381 330 365

Elapsed Time in Days

Figure B-4 Residual capacity for major bridges (Al other areas).

eliminate fault crossings. Slope stability at

portals should be evaluated and stabilization

undertaken if necessary.

2. Direct Damage

Basis: Damage curves for highway tunnels

are based on ATC-13 data for FC! 38,

tunnels passing through alluvium '(see

Figure B-5). Tunnels passing through

alluvium are less vulnerable than cut-andcover tunnels, and more vulnerable than

tunnels passing through rock; they were

chosen as representative of all existing

tunnels. If inventory data identify tunnels, as

cut-and-cover or passing through rock, then

use FC 40 or 39, respectively, in lieu of FC

38.

Standard construction is assumed to

represent typical California highway tunnels

under present conditions (i.e., a composite

of older and more modern tunnels). Only

minimal regional variation in construction

quality is assumed.

Present Conditions: In the absence of data

on the type of lining, age, etc., use the

following factors to modify the mean curves,

under present conditions.:

NEHRP Map Area

California 7

California 3-6

Non-California 7

Puget Sound 5

All other areas

MMI

Intensity

Shift

'0

+O

+1

Upgraded Conditions: For areas where it

appears cost-effective to improve facilities,

assume on a preliminary basis that upgrades

result in a beneficial intensity shift of one

unit (i.e., -1), relative to the above present

conditions.

Time-to-restoration: The Social Function

class time-to-restoration data assigned to SF

25b, tunnel for highway system, are assumed

to apply to all tunnels. By combining these

data with the damage curves for FC 38, the

time-to-restoration curves shown in Figures

Appendix B: Lifeline Vulnerability Functions

R= FEZ

.5

M

0

(0D5

R= x

BAYs: 30

hajor

ATC-25 199
Tunnel (Highway)

VII VIII IX

Modified Mercalli Intensity (MMI)

Figure B-5 Damage percent by intensity for I

B-6 and B-7 were derived for the various

NEHRP Map Areas.

B.1.3 Conventional Bridges

1. General

Description: Conventional bridges in the

highway system include all bridges with

spans less than 500 feet. Construction may

include simple spans (single or multiple) as

well as continuous/monolithic spans. Bridges

may be straight or skewed, fixed, moveable

(draw bridge, or rotating, etc.), or floating.

Reinforced concrete is the most common

construction material while steel, masonry,

and wood construction are common at water

crossings. Typical foundation systems

include abutments, spread footings, battered

and vertical pile groups, single-column

drilled piers, and pile bent foundations.

Bents may consist of single or multiple

columns, or a pier wall. The superstructure

typically comprises girders and deck slabs.

Fixed (translation prevented, rotation

permitted) and expansion (translation and

rotation permitted) bearings of various types

highway tunnels.

are used for girder support to accommodate

temperature and shrinkage movements.

Shear keys are typically used to resist

transverse loads at abutments. Abutment

fills are mobilized during an earthquake as

the bridge moves into the fill (longitudinal

direction), causing passive soil pressures to

occur on the abutment wall.

Typical Seismic Damage: The most

vulnerable components of a bridge include

support bearings, abutments, piers, footings,

and foundations. A common deficiency is

that unrestrained expansion joints are not

equipped to handle large relative

displacements (inadequate support length),

and simple bridge spans fall. Skewed bridges

in particular have performed poorly in past

earthquakes because they respond partly in

rotation, resulting in an unequal distribution

of forces to bearings and supports. Rocker

bearings have proven most vulnerable.

Roller bearings generally remain stable in

earthquakes, except they may become

misaligned and horizontally displaced.

Elastomeric bearing pads are relatively

stable although they have been known to

Appendix B: Lifeline Vulnerability Functions

D=108Y

,Sa D=S&;

E

CO

VI

Other

P.S.5 X

200 ATC-25
Tunnel (Highway)

2sb 1.t0 3B t.0

M III a.

6 0.344

7 0.240

8 0.204

9 0.13

1e 10.953

R * das + a

60 90 120 150 IBB 218

Elapsed Time in Days

240 Z7 38 330 365

Residual capacity for highway tunnels (NEHRP Map Area: California 3-6, California 7,

Non-California 7 and Puget Sound 5).

Tunnel (Highway)

25h, 1.B 38

MI

6

7

8

9

10

L

9.24B

0.204

B. 183

;0. 953

_0.039

11 .456

8 .212

0.189

0.819

R = * days +- a.

I 7 I I f a i i I60 90 128 150 198 210 240' 278 308 330 365

Elapsed Time in Days

Figure B-7 Residual capacity for highway tunnels (All other areas).

Appendix B: Lifeline Vulnerability Functions

-o

co

O R= SE0

._

Go

b

0.839

8.456

la.212

8.189

0.036

DAYS: 30

Figure B-6

R=1007

R= SEz

w

m

ce}I

R.= O; L L

DAYS: 30

l ; i l l l l l

I I I -

R= efl , I g ,~~~~

5; 5; 5;

2iEm

ATC-25 201
"walk out" under severe shaking. Failure of

backfill near abutments is common and can

lead to tilting, horizontal movement or

settlement of abutments, spreading and

settlement of fills, and failure of foundation

members. Abutment damage rarely leads to

bridge collapse. Liquefaction of saturated

soils in river channels and floodplains and

subsequent loss of support have caused

many bridge failures in past earthquakes.

Pounding of adjacent, simply supported

spans can cause bearing damage and

cracking of the girders and deck slab. Piers

have failed primarily because of insufficient

transverse confining steel, and inadequate

longitudinal steel splices and embedment

into the foundation. Bridge superstructures

have not exhibited any particular

weaknesses other than being dislodged from

their bearings.

Seismically Resistant Design: Bridge

behavior during an earthquake can be very

complex. Unlike buildings, which generally

are connected to a single foundation

through the diaphragm action of the base

slab, bridges have multiple supports with

varying foundation and stiffness

characteristics. In addition, longitudinal

forces are resisted by the abutments through

a combination of passive backwall pressures

and-foundation embedment when the bridge

moves toward an abutment, but by only the

abutment foundation as the bridge moves

away from an abutment. Significant

movement must occur at bearings before

girders impact abutments and bear against

them, further complicating the response. To

accurately assess the dynamic response of all

but the simplest bridges, a threedimensional dynamic analysis should be

performed. Special care is required for

design of hinges for continuous bridges.

Restraint for spans or adequate bearing

lengths to accommodate motions are the

most effective way to mitigate damage.

Damage in foundation systems is hard to

detect, so bridge foundations should be

designed to resist earthquake forces

elastically. In order to prevent damage to

piers, proper confinement, splices, and

embedment into the foundation should be

provided. Similarly, sufficient steel should be

provided in footings. Loads resisted by

bridges may be reduced through use of

energy absorption features including ductile

columns, lead-filled elastomeric bearings,

and restrainers. Foundation failure can be

prevented by ensuring sufficient bearing

capacity, proper foundation embedment,

and sufficient consolidation of soil behind

retaining structures.

2. Direct Damage

Basis: Damage curves for highway system

conventional bridges are based on ATC-13

data for FC 24, multiple simple spans, and

FC 25, continuous/monolithic bridges

(includes single-span bridges). Highway

system conventional bridges in California

located within NEHRP Map Area 7 have

either been constructed after 1971 or have

been recently analyzed or are in the process

of being seismically retrofitted, or both.

These bridges are assumed to be best

represented by a damage factor half of FC

25, continuous/monolithic (see Figure B-8).

The conventional bridges located outside

California NEHRP Map Area 7 are

assumed to be a combination of 50%

multiple simple spans (FC 24) and 50%

continuous/monolithic construction (FC 25)

(see attached figure). If inventory data

identify bridges as simple span, or

continuous/monolithic, then use the

appropriate ATC-13 data in lieu of the

above.

Standard construction is assumed to

represent typical California bridges under

- present conditions (i.e., a composite of older

and more modern bridges).

Present Conditions: In the absence of data

on the type of spans, age, or implementation

of seismic retrofit, etc., the following factors

were used to modify the mean curves, under

present conditions:

NEHRP Map Area

California 7

California 3-6

Non-California

Puget Sound 5

All other areas

MM/

Intensity

Shift

a FC24 FC25

NA NA*

+1 +1

7 +1 +1

0 +1

+3 +3

* Special case, damage half of FC 25

202 Appendix B: Lifeline Vulnerability Functions ATC-25
Conventional

a

00)

E virco

2~~~~~~~ 0e

C~~~~

Modified Mercalli Intensity (MMI)

Figure B-8 Damage percent by intensity for conventional major bridges.

Upgraded Conditions: For areas. where it

appears cost-effective to improve facilities,

assume on a preliminary basis that upgrades

result in an beneficial intensity shift of one

unit (i.e., -), relative to the above present

conditions.

Time-to-restoration: The time-torestoration data assigned to SF 25c,

conventional bridges for the highway system,

are assumed to apply to all bridges with

spans shorter than 504 feet. By combining

these data with the damage data from FC

25, the attached time-to-restoration curves

for conventional bridges within California

NEHRP Map Area 7 were derived. By

combining the time-to-restoration data for

SF 25c with the damage curves derived by

using the data for FC 24 and 25, the time-torestoration curves shown in Figures B-9

through B-11 were derived for the various

NEHRP Map Areas.

B-1.4 Freeways/Highways

1. General

Description: Freeways/highways includes

urban and rural freeways (divided arterial

highway with full control of access), divided

highways, and highways. Freeway/highway

includes roadways, embankments, signs, and

lights. Roadways include pavement, base,

and subbase. Pavement types may be either

portland cement concrete or asphaltic

concrete. Base and subbase materials

include aggregate, cement treated

aggregate, and lime-stabilized, bituminous,

and soil cement bases. Embankmrents may or

may not include retaining walls.

Typical Seismic Damage: Roadway damage

can result from failure of the roadbed or

failure of an embankment adjacent to the

road. Roadbed damage can take the form of

soil slumping under the pavement, and

settling, cracking, or heaving of pavement.

Embankment failure may occur in

combination with liquefaction, slope failure,

or failure of retaining walls. Such damage is

manifested by misalignment, cracking of the

roadway surface, local uplift or subsidence,

or buckling or blockage of the roadway.

Sloping margins of fills where compaction is

ATC-25 Appendix B: Lifeline Vulnerability Functions 203

Br i dge

ATC-25 Appendix B: Lifeline Vulnerability Functions 203
Canventiona 1

30 60 90 120 150 1B0 210 240 270 300 330 365

Elapsed Time in Days

Figure B-9 Residual capacity for conventional bridges (NEHRP California 7).

Br

Z!

idge Conventional

Sc 1.00 25 0.0

24 S

aL 

6 0.017 0 .060

7 0.00 0.830

8 0.010 0.8

f -0.:16 0.02

Rb * days a

DAYS: 30 60 90 120 150 180 210 240 270 300 330 365

Elapsed Time in Days

Figure B-10 Residual capacity for conventional bridges (NEHRP Map Area 3-6, Non-California 7, and

Puget Sound 5).

Appendix B: Lifeline Vulnerability Functions

Hz 10Hz

>1

0.

°- - R= Sex:

(n

a)

R= 

DAYS:

I1111 a b

16 0.297 0.907

7 0.272 0,759

8 0 .096 0.049

9 0 .874 0 . 021

10 -0.894 0.004

R =b *days + a

I I I I I I

H=1WZ

: ,

a)

C

(I,

Cc

R= 0e

. l l l l l l

Bridge

z= nz I i i i - T , i i i i I I

204 ATC-25
Conventicual

60 9B 12 15 180 210

Elapsed Time in Days

241 ZYS S6 Jbb

Residual capacity for conventional bridges (All other areas).

commonly poor are particularly vulnerable

to slope failure. Dropped overpass spans can

effectively halt traffic on otherwise

undamaged freeways/highways.

Seismically Resistant Design: Seismically

resistant design practices include proper

gradation and compaction of existing soils as

well as bases and subbases. Roadway cuts

and fills should be constructed as low as,

practicable and natural slopes abutting

highways should be examined for failure

potential.

2. Direct Damage

Basis: Damage curves for freeways/highways

are based on ATC-13 data for FC 48,

highways (see Figure B-12). Standard

construction is assumed to represent typical

California freeways/highways under present

conditions (i.e., a composite of older and

more modern freeways/highways). It is

assumed that no regional variation in

construction quality exists.

Present Conditions: In the absence of data

on the type of construction, age,

surrounding terrain, truck usage, etc., the

following factors were used to modify the

mean curves, under present conditions: -

NEHRP Man Area

California 7

California 3-6

Non-California 7

Puget Sound 5

All other areas

MMI

Intensity

Shift

Th- 3

01

0

Upgraded Conditions: It is not anticipated

that it will be cost-effective to upgrade

facilities for the sole purpose of improving

seismic performance, except perhaps in very

isolated areas where supporting soils and/or

adjacent embankments are unstable. The

effect on overall facility performance in

earthquakes will be minimal, and no

intensity shifts are recommended.

Time-to-restoration: The time-torestoration data assigned to SF 25d,

freeways and conventional highways, are

Appendix B: Lifeline Vulnerability Functions 205

_5

c-

_

0

-Dco

cc

R= Z

R= ex

DAYS: 31

Figure B-1 1

Bridage

-

ATC-25
Freeway/Il ighway

VII Vi: l lx

Modified Mercalli Intensity (MMI)

Figure B-1 2 Damage percent by intensity for freeways/highways.

assumed to apply to all freeways/highways.

By combining these data with the damage

curves for FC 48, the time-to-restoration

curves shown in Figure B-13 were derived.

B.1.5 Local Roads

1. General

Description: Local roads include roadways,

embankments, signs, lights, and bridges in

urban and rural areas. Localroads, on the

average, are older than freeways/highways

and are frequently not designed for truck

traffic (inferior quality). Local roads may

travel through more rugged terrain and

include steeper grades and sharper corners,

and may be paved or unpaved (gravel or

dirt), engineered, or nonengineered. Paved

roads are typically asphaltic concrete over

grade and subgrade materials. Traffic could

be blocked by damaged buildings, broken

underground water and sewer pipes,

downed power lines, etc.

Typical Seismic Damage: Roadway damage

can result from the failure of the roadbed or

failure of an embankment adjacent to the

road. Pavement damage may include

cracking, buckling, misalignment, or settling.

Failed embankments may include damaged

retaining walls, or landslides that block

roadways or result in loss of roadbed

support. Damage to bridges--including

dropped spans, settlement of abutment fills,

and damage to supporting piers--can restrict

or halt traffic, depending on the severity of

the damage.

Seismically Resistant Design: Seismically

resistant design practices are not typically

incorporated into local road design, expect

perhaps for bridges. Proper gradation and

compaction are necessary for good seismic

performance. Cuts and fills should be

constructed as low as practicable and the

stability of slopes adjacent to roads in steep

terrains should be evaluated. Seismically

resistant design practices for bridges include

providing restraint for spans and/or

adequate bearing lengths to accommodate

motions. Approach fills should be properly

compacted and graded and pier foundations

206 Appendix B: Lifeline Vulnerability Functions ATC-25

.40 4 Oa ,to I.Mi

a,

0)

E

W

VI X

206 Appendix B: Lifeline Vulnerability Functions ATC-25
'reeuag/Highuay

25& 1.0 48

nMI

h

7

8

9

to

1.08

0. 130

8 .H

E .824

e .024

b

1.393

8.171

O.V73

8.2853

0.032

R = * days a

I I I I I

68 90 126 158 188 218 240 272

Elapsed Time in Days

380 330 36

Residual capacity for major bridges (NEHRP Map Area: California 3-6, California 7, Puget

Sound, and all other areas).

- should be adequate to support bridge spans

if soil failure occurs.

2. Direct Damage

following factors were used to modify the

mean curves for the two facility classes listed

above, under present conditions:

Basis: Damage curves for highway system

local roads are based on ATC-13 data for

FC 48, highways, and FC 25,

continuous/monolithic bridge (includes

single-span,'see Figure B-14). All local roads,

were assumed to be a combination of 80%

roadways and 20% bridges. If inventory data

permit a more accurate breakdown of the

relative value of roadway and bridges, such

data should be used and the damage curves

re-derived.

Standard construction is assumed to

represent typical California local roads (i.e.,

a composite of older and more modern local

roads). It is assumed that no regional

variation in construction quality exists.

Present Conditions: In the absence of data

on the type of surrounding terrain,

construction material, age, etc., the

NEHRP Map Area

California 7

California 3-6

Non-California 7

Puget Sound 5

All other areas

MMI

Intensity

Shift

FC25 FC48

o 0

+1 0

+1 0

+1 0

+2 0

Upgraded Conditions: For areas where it

appears cost-effective to improve facilities,

assume on a preliminary basis that upgrades

result in a beneficial intensity shift of one

unit (i.e., -1), relative to the above present

conditions. In most cases. upgrades will be

limited to strengthening of bridges, and

perhaps, areas where embanluments and

adjacent slopes are most unstable.

Time-to-restoration: The time-torestoration data assigned to SF 25e, city

streets for highway systems, are assumed to

ATC-25 Appendix B: Lifeline Vulnerability Functions 207

55Žx

=100

R= 5;

DfAYS: 36

Figure B-13

R7 Oz: 4 I

ATC-25 Appendix B: Lifeline Vulnerability Functions 207
4b t.WJ

25 0.20

Other

: ' ~~~

:R/

/ : CA 3-6

< NonCA7

f~~~~.. -:

- .; ~~~~~~CA7 7

- : 1 i

Modified Mercalli Intensity (MMI)

Ix

Damage percent by intensityfor local roads.

apply to all local roads. By combining these

data with the damage curves derived using

the data for FC 25 and 48, the time-torestoration curves shown in Figures B-15

through B-17 were derived.

B.2 Railway

B.2.1 Bridges

1. General

Description: In general, railway bridges may

be steel, concrete, wood or masonry

construction, and their spans may be any

length. Included are open and ballasted

trestles, drawbridges, and fixed bridges.

Bridge components include a bridge deck,

stringers and girder, ballast, rails and ties,

truss members, piers, abutments, piles, and

caissons. Railroads sometimes share major

bridges with highways (suspension bridges),

but most railway bridges are older and

simpler than highway bridges. Bridges that

cross streams or narrow drainage passages

typically have simple-span deck plate girders

or beams. Longer spans use simple trusses

supported on piers. Only a few of the more

recently constructed bridges have

continuous structural members.

Typical Seismic Damage: The major cause

of damage to trestles is displacement of

unconsolidated sediments on which the

substructures are supported, resulting in

movement of pile-supported piers and

abutments. Resulting superstructure

damage has consisted of compressed decks

and stringers, as well as collapsed spans.

Shifting of the piers and abutments may

shear anchor bolts. Girders can also shift on

their piers. Failures of approaches or fill

material behind abutments can result in

bridge closure. Movable bridges are more

vulnerable than fixed bridges; slight

movement of piers supporting drawbridges

can result in binding so that they cannot be

opened without repairs. Movable span

railroads are subject to misalignments, and

extended closures-are required for repairs.

Seismically Resistant Design: Seismically

resistant design practice should include

proper siting considerations and details to

208 Appendix B: Lifeline Vulnerability Functions ATC-25

Local Roads

D=100v

80

a)

' D=S07.

E

(an

' D=6/.

UI

Figure B-1 4

V11l X

C ram n n[z t

208 Appendix -B: Lifeline Vulnerabilityviinations .ATC_25
L

R =b *das + a

90 128 150 188 218 Z48 Z?

Elapsed Time in Days

38 330 365

Residual capacity for local roads NEHRP California 7).

H= z 1' 3 I

DAYS' 3a 68

Local oads

- e 1.03 4d Ul.b

Zs 8.28

MII

6

7

8

.9

to

a

-0. 253

-a.242

-8.141

-W.0to

7.855

01 .464

0.103

0.843

H.O21

R = * +dys a

1 1 1 a I

I I I a E

98 128 158 188 218

Elapsed Time in Days

248 27 3 330 365

Figure B-t 6 Residual capacity for local roads (NEHRP Map Area 3-6, Non-California 7, and Puget

Sound 5).

Appendix B: Lifeline Vulnerability Functions

Local PkLds

- 25e B i .130

5 ,0.20

R= 5B7

-5

0

-3

ru

a)

R= 

a

-1. 808

-0 160

-B. 166

-B .180

-0. iii

b

'T. 125

'B. 140

B. B9

8. B2B

30 6

Figure B-1 5

R=1BWA

5

.1

;) E- soy

r

1

DAYS:

I I C 

sn. n ns

i . I I

ATC-25 209V
Local Roads -- are lf

I I I

90 120 150 180 210

Elapsed Time in Days

4ff n fa 

I I I i

240 270 300 338 365

Figure B-1 7 Residual capacity for local roads (All other areas).'

prevent foundation failure. Restraint for

spans and/or adequate bearing lengths to

accommodate motions are effective ways to

mitigate damage. Reinforced concrete piers

should be provided with proper confinement

and adequate longitudinal splices and

embedment into the foundation.

2. Direct Damage

Basis: Damage curves for railway system

bridges are based on ATC-13 data for FC.

25, continuous/monolithic bridges (see

Figure B-18). Railroad bridges tend to be

both older and simpler than highway bridges

and have survived in some areas where

highway bridges (simple-span bridges) have

collapsed. Possible reasons for this superior

performance are the lighter superstructure

weight of the railroad bridges due to the

absence of the roadway slab, the beneficial

effects of the rails tying the adjacent spans

together, and the design for other transverse

and longitudinal loads even when no seismic

design is done, Consequently, railroad

system bridge performance is assumed to be

represented by shifting the mean damage

curve for continuous/monolithic bridges by

one beneficial intensity unit.

Standard construction is assumed to

represent typical California railway bridges

under present conditions (i.e., a composite

of older and more modem bridges).

Present Conditions: In the absence of data

to the type of construction (fixed or

movable), age, type (fixed or movable) etc.,

the following factors were used to modify

the mean curves, under present conditions:

NEHRP Map Area

Caliornia 7

California 3-6

Non-California 7

Puget Sound 5

All other areas

MMI

Intensity

Shift

-1

-1

0

0

+1

Upgraded Conditions: For areas where it 

appears cost-effective to improve facilities,

assume on a preliminary basis that upgrades

result in a beneficial intensity shift of one

Appendix B: Lifeline Vulnerability Functions

R=0ofl

.5

CU ° R= 57

a

_,

R= x

f1UI.OU

25 0.28

MlII a b

6 -0.439 1.950

7 -8.345 0.441

B -0.168 0.059

9 -8.123 0.838

10 -0.091 0.017

R = b * days + a

DAYS: 30 60

210 ATC-25
a)

ra D=90M

E

VI

Other

Non-CA 7

PS3CA 

CA 7

Modified Mercalli ntensity (Mlii)

Damage percent by intensity for railway bridges.

unit (i.e., -1), relative to the above present

conditions.

Time-to-restoration: The time-torestoration data assigned to SF 26a, railway

bridges, are assumed to apply to all railway

bridges. By combining these data with the

damage curves for FC 25, the time-torestoration curves shown in Figures. B-19

through B-21 were derived.

B.2.2 Tunnels

1. General

Description: In general, tunnels may pass

through alluvium or rock, or may be of cutand-cover construction Tunnels may be

lined or unlined, and may be at any depth

below the ground surface. Tunnel lengths

may range from less than 100 feet to several

miles. Lining materials include brick,

reinforced and unreinforced concrete, and

steel. Heavy timbers and wood lagging

(grouted and ungrouted) may also be used

to support tunnel walls and ceilings. Tunnels

may change in shape and/or construction

material over their lengths.

Typical Seismic Damage: Tunnels may

experience severe damage in areas affected

by permanent ground m ovements due to

landslides or surface fault rupture, but rarely

suffer significant internal damage from

ground shaking alone. Landslides at tunnels

portals can cause blockage. Damage has

been noted at tunnel weak spots such as

intersections; bends; or changes in shape,

construction materials, or soil conditions.

Damage to lined tunnels has typically been

limited to cracked lining.

Seismically Resistant Design: Lined tunnels

have performed better than unlined tunnels.

Consequently, general Seismically resistant

design practices for tunnels, include

providing reinforced concrete lining;

strengthening areas that have been

traditionally weak such as intersections,

bends, changes in shape and in construction

materials; and siting tunnels to eliminate

fault crossings. Slope stability at portals

Appendix B: Lifeline Vulnerabiliy Functions

Bridge (Railway)

25 .O0

Figure B-1 8

X

ATCC-25 211
Bridge (Railway)

4 GO Ra4 O

30 60 90 120 150 180 210 240 Z7 308 330 365

Elapsed Time in Days 

Residual capacity for railway bridges (NEHRP California 7).

Bridge (Railway)

1.00 25

90 120 150 180 210

Elapsed Time in Days

4 01

i~ ~~ 

I'M Ir

Figure B-20 Residual capacity for railway bridges (NEHRP Map Area 3-6, Non-California 7, and Puget

Sound 5).

Appendix B: Lifeline Vulnerability Functions T

R=100;x

,.

CZ

C)

a)

Q

coa)

rc

H= 5%

-. Dd

1111 a b

7 -0.8 1.451

8 -8.189: 1.192

9 -0.878 0.069

16 -0.065 0.0Z9

R = b * days a

it 0 I I I I I II I - .

n- V.

DAYS:

Figure B-19

h=100,

: >s

a

._

co

C_

CU

0 R=Se --

a)

Er

R= e L

DAYS:

H111 a b

6 -0.208 1.451

7 -0. 9 1. i192

8 -0.078 0.069

9 -8.065 0.829

16 -8.023 0.005

H = b * days + a

3 6

30 60

| l l

, 

if I I I I I I I

1 v."u- ,

I I  I - - i

oun oqn ona ono Sf c

JOU JJU J=

ATC-25 . I - 1 I, 212.
lilf a b

- .183 1.192

7 -. 87, 8.8&9

B -E.865 8. M2

9 -E.823 E.BE5

10 -0.012 0. 04

= da9s + &

R= fly

DAYS: 3 68 98 128 158 188 218 249 Z78 30 338 365

Elapsed Time in Days

Figure B-21 Residual capacity for railway bridges (All other areas).

should be evaluated and stabilization

undertaken if necessary.

factors were used to modify the mean

curves, under present conditions:

2. Direct Damage

Basis: Damage curves for railway tunnels

are based on ATC-1¶3 data for FC 38,

tunnels passing through alluvium (see

Figure B-22). Tunnels passing through

alluvium are less vulnerable than cut-andcover tunnels, and more vulnerable than

tunnels passing through rock; they were

chosen as representative of all existing

tunnels. If inventory data identify tunnels as

cut-and-cover or passing through rock, then

use ATC-13 FC 40 or 39, respectively, in

lieu of FC 38.

Standard construction is assumed to

represent typical California railroad tunnels

under present conditions (Le., a composite

of older and more modem tunnels). Only

minimal regional variation in construction

quality is assumed.

Present Conditions: In the absence of data

to the type of lining, age, etc., the following

NFHRP Map Area

California 7

California 3-6

Non-California 7

Puget Sound 5

All other areas

mm[

Intensity

Sh ift 

0

0

0

0

1

Upgraded Conditions: For areas where it

appears cost-effective to improve facilities,

assume on a preliminary basis that upgrades.

result in a beneficial intensity shift of one

unit (i.e., -1), relative to the above present

conditions.

Time-to-restoration: The time-torestoration data assigned to SF 26b, railroad

- system tunnels, are assumed to apply to all

tunnels. By combining these data with the

damage curves for FC 38, the time-torestoration curves shown in Figures B-23

and B-24 were derived.

Appendix B: Lifeline Vulnerability Functions

R=180Z

-5

0-

Ca 0

0

-D

.0

R= SE

-

... . t

ATC-25 213
Tunnel (Railway)

)O- 4 MA4

:~~~ :

Othe

CA 7

1 1 Kl~~~~nn-r.A 7

Vill ix P.S.5 X

Modified Mercalli Intensity (MMI)

Damage percent by intensity for railway tunnels.

_ 

R=1Ovv

Ca'

a

CZ'

n

a)

cc

R= 0X

DAYS: 30 60 90 120 150 180 210 240 ZI 38 JJU zbb

Elapsed Time in Days

Residual capacity for railway tunnels (NEHRP Map Area: California 3-6, California 7,

Non-California 7, and Puget Sound 5).

214 Appendix B: Lifeline Vulnerability Functions ATC25L

D=1800

CD

0)

E

Ca 0

VI

Figure B-22

VII

38 1.00

MHI a b

6 0.344 0.839

7 i0, 248 0.456

B 0.284 0.212

9 8.183 0.109

10 0.053 8.036

R = b * days + a

Figure B-23

I

D=SOY.

My)

214 Appendix B: Lifeline Vulnerability Functions ATC-25-
Tunnel fRnilwvavI

10 38 i

MMI

2

7 8.2

B 81.

9 2.2

ie -E. 

R b *

S 

68 9U 120 158 10 218

Elapsed Time in Days

248 278 300 338 365

Figure B-24 Residual capacity for railway tunnels (All other areas).

B.23 Tracks/Roadheds

I. General

Description: In general, track/roadbed in

the railway system includes ties, rail, ballast

or roadbed, embankments, and switches.

Ties may be wood or prestressed concrete.

Rail is exclusively steel and is periodically

fastened to ties with spikes and/or steel clips.

Roadbed typically includes imported

aggregate on prepared subgrade.

Typical Seismic Damage: The most

frequent source of damage to track/roadbed

is settlement or slumping of embankinents.

Landslides can block or displace tracks.

Settlement or liquefaction of roadbeds in

alluvial areas is also a source of damage.

Only in extreme cases are rails and roadbeds

damaged by shaking alone.

Seismically Resistant Design: Seismic

design practice includes providing special

attention to the potential for failure of

slopes adjacent to the tracks; cut slopes and

fills are particularly susceptible. The

potential for track failure can be reduced by

properly grading and compacting imported

track bed materials and by keeping cuts and

fills as low as practicable. Track alignments

must be precise and the track clear of debris

for train operations.

2. Direct Damage

Basis: Damage curves for railroad system

tracks/roadbeds are based on ATC-13 data

for FC 47, railroads (see Figure B-25).

Standard construction is assumed to

represent typical California tracks/roadbeds

(i.e., a composite of older and more modern

tracks/roadbeds). Age may not be as

important a factor for tracks/roadbeds as it is

for other facilities, because the compaction

*of soils in poor grounds through usage may

improve their behavior significantly. Only

minimal regional variation in construction

quality is assumed.

Present Conditions: In the absence of data

to the type of material, age, etc., the

following factors were used to modifr the

mean curves, under present conditions:

Appendix B: Lifeline Vulnerability Functions

5 M

0

a

0

Eo

C,

C R 5;

R= x

DAYs: 30

3

P

1

3

11

I

A.TC-25 2-15
Track/Roadbed

47 i -A0

M i I IX

Modified.Mercalli Intensity (MMI)

Figure B-25 Damage percent by intensity.for.tracks/roadbeds.

MMI Desc

Intensity or snr

NEHRP Map Area Shift may I

California 7 0 from

California 3-6 0 b

Non-California 7 0 beal

Puget Sound 5 inclu

All other areas 0 well

comE

Upgraded Conditions: It is not anticipated Limit

that it will be cost-effective to retrofit termi

facilities for the sole purpose of improving

seismic performance, except perhaps in very Typil

isolated areas where the slopes and soils are termi

unstable. The effect on overall facility expel

performance in earthquakes will be minimal, dame

and no intensity shifts are recommended. crack

total

Time-to-restoration: The time-to- anch,

restoration data assigned to SF 26c, railways, expe

are assumed to apply to all tracks/roadbeds. pipin

By combining these data with the damage the s

curves for FC 47, the time-to-restoration shaki

curves shown in Figure B-26 were derived.

Seis]

B.2.4 Terninal Stations resist

all bi

1. General seisn

ription: Terminal stations may be large

WaIl. The structure housing the station

generally be any type of construction

steel frame to unreinforced masonry

ng walls. The terminal station typically

des switching and control equipment, as

is electrical and mechanical equipment

nonly found in commercial buildings.

ted lengths of rails are also included in

inal stations.

cal Seismic Damage: In general,

inal stations in railway systems may

rience generic building and equipment

age. Building damage may range from

ks in walls and frames to partial and

collapse. Unanchored or improperly

ored equipment may-slide or topple,

riencing damage or causing attached

ig and conduit to fail. Rail damage in

witching yard will occur due to severe

ing or ground failure only.

nically Resistant Design: Seismically

Lant design practice includes, performing

jilding design in accordance with

iic provisions of national or local

Appendix B: Lifeline Vulnerability Functions

ID=10v

g" D=90Y

E

0

uu/.s

VI I I

216 ATC-25
Track/Roadbed

- 26k 1.80

I

R =I * days + a

DAYS: 38 88 90 120 150 188 2101 240 278 388 338 365

Elapsed Time in Days

Residual capacity for tracks/roadbeds (NEHRP Map Area: California 3-6, California 7,

Non-California 7, Puget Sound, and all other areas).

building codes. All critical equipment should

be well-anchored. Provisions should be

made for backup emergency power for

control and building equipment essential for

continued operations..

1. Direct Damage

Basis: Damage curves for the railway system

terminal station are based on ATC-13 data

for FC 10, medium-rise reinforced masonry

shear wall buildings; FC 68, mechanical

equipment; and FC 47, railways seee Figure

B-27). FC 10 was chosen to represent a

generic building, based on review of damage

curves for all buildings. Railway terminals

were assumed to be a combination of 60%

generic buildings, 20% mechanical

equipment, and 20% railways.

roadbed/embankments within the station

and that only minimal variation exists for

mechanical equipment.

Present Conditions: In the absence of data

to the type of construction material, age,

etc., the following factors were used to

modify the mean curves for each of the

three facility classes listed above, under

present conditions:

NEHRP Map Area

California 7

California 3-6

Non-California 7

Puget Sound 5

All other areas

MM!

Intensity

Shift

FC OFC 47FC 68

0 0 0

+1 0 0

+1 0 0

+1 0 0

+2 0 +1

Standard construction is assumed to

represent typical California railway system

terminals under present conditions (i.e., a

composite of older and more modern

terminals). It is assumed that there is no

regional variation in construction quality of

Upgraded Conditions: For areas, where it

appears cost-effective to improve facilities,

assume on a preliminary basis that upgrades

result in one or two beneficial intensity

Appendix B: Lifeline Vulnerability Functions

>

4 ani :4 Il.sDU R-IF10

_

CL06

c) R= 58x

.:3_

412

in

a

0.163

El 153

0.148

8.145

a.142

b

0.S5

.s239

'M. 1

0.835

0.021

Figure B-26

| l Rz O/ l

I j I i

ATC-25 217
Terninal Station

80

a)

E

cE

0

VI VII

1

Other

Vill Ix

Modified Mercalli Intensity (MMI)

Damage percent by intensity for railway terminal stations.

shifts (i.e., -1 or -2), relative to the above

present conditions.

Time-to-restoration: The time-torestoration data assigned to SF 26d, terminal

stations for railway systems, are assumed to

apply to all terminal stations. By combining

these data with the damage curves derived

using the data for FC 10, 47, and 68, the

time-to-restoration curves shown in Figures

B-28 through B-30 were derived.

B.3 Air Transportation

B.3.1 Terminals

1. General

Description: In general, air transportation

terminals include terminal buildings, control

towers, hangars, and other miscellaneous

structures (including parking garages and

crash houses). These structures may be

constructed of virtually any building

material, although control towers are

typically reinforced concrete shear wall

buildings and hangars are either steel or

wood long-span structures. Equipment at air

terminals ranges from sophisticated control,

gate, and x-ray equipment to typical

electrical and mechanical equipment found

in commercial buildings. Airplane refueling

is accomplished by either on-site or off-site

fuel tanks and underground pipelines.

Typical Seismic Damage: Damage may

include generic building and equipment

damage. Building damage may range from

broken windows and cracks in walls and

frames to partial and total collapse.

Unanchored or improperly anchored

equipment may slide or topple, experiencing

damage or causing attached piping and

conduit to fail. The source of this damage

can be ground shaking or soil failure, as

many airports are located in low-lying

alluvial regions. Gate. equipment may

become misaligned and inoperable. Fuel

tanks and fuel lines may rupture or

experience damage, reducing or eliminating

refueling capacity. Tank damage may

include wall buckling, settlement, ruptured

piping, or loss of contents, or even collapse.

Such collapses could lead to fires and

218 Appendix B: Lifeline Vulnerability Functions ATC-25

Figure B-27

X

Appendix B: Lifeline Vulnerability Functions ATC-25 218
Termial Station - 26d LOB

ii

to 1.

HI

6 0.2

7 8.2

B E.1

3 1.1

E 0. 

R = *

68 90 128 158 182 212

Elapsed Time in Days

248 270 3 330 365

Residual capacity for railway terminal stations (NEHRP California 7).

rerminaI Station

1.82 1 1.82

MI

7

10

a

2.222

O. 141

8. I6

8 .8138

H.H&M

B * days a

92 120 152 182 218

Elapsed Time in Days

240 272 300 330 365

Residual capacity for railway terminal' stations (NEHRP Map Area 3-6, Non-California 7, and Puget Sound 5).

Appendix B: Lifeline Vulnerability Functions 219

-5

O:L

u

w

-o(n

E

DAYS: 0

Figure B-28

-U

0-

C-a w

-oU

'n

Qc

fE

R= 07

b

H. 1321

O.H19

. I H .. 21

DAYS 38

Figure B-29

60

I - - -f ; - - - 4 I - - - I 

I ' 1 1

l l

R= ;e , & , ,

b

- ---- F -j I I~~~~~~~~~

ATC-25
R=t11Bi/

._

(a

CaU)

a)

EC

U- MU

DAYS: 3 60 90

Terminal Station

120 150 IBO 210

Elapsed Time in Days

240 270 30 330 365

Figure B-30 Residual capacity for railway termii

explosions. Damage to ground access and

egress routes may seriously affect

operations. Airports in low-lying areas may

be subject to damage due to flooding or

tsunamis.

Seismically Resistant Design: Building

design should be performed in accordance

with seismic provisions of building codes.

Control-tower design should receive special

attention based on its importance and the

fact that the geometry of the tower makes it

prone to earthquake damage. Enhanced

design criteria (e.g., a higher importance

factor) may be appropriate for control

towers. All critical equipment should be

anchored. Provisions should be made for

backup emergency power for control

equipment and landing lights.

2. Direct Damage

Basis: Damage curves for air transportation

system terminals are based on ATC-13 data

for FC 10, mid-rise reinforced masonry

shear wall buildings; FC 43, on-ground liquid

storage tanks; and FC 91, long-span

nal stations (All other areas).

structures (see Figure B-31). FC 10 was

chosen to represent a generic building,

based on review of damage curves for all

buildings. Air transportation system

terminals are assumed to be a combination

of 40% generic buildings, 40% long-span

structures, and 20% on-ground liquid

storage tanks.

Standard construction is assumed to

represent typical California air terminals

under present conditions (i.e., a composite

of older and more modern terminals). Only

minimal regional variation in construction

quality of long-span structures is assumed, as

design wind and seismic loads may be

comparable.

Present Conditions: In the absence of data

on the type of construction, age, etc., the

following factors were used to modify the

mean curves for each of the three facility

classes listed above, under present

conditions:

Appendix B: Lifeline Vulnerability Functions ATC-25

10 1.00

1MI a b

6 0.141 0035

7 0.187 8.819

B 0.08 0.810

9 1.860 8.886

10 11. 52 e.005

H =b * days a

I I

-

I - . I

220

R=

1 , , ,
Terminal

91 8.4<

43 0.20

Other A/

VII Vil IX X

Modified Mercalli Intensity (MM[)

Damage percent by intensity for airport terminals.

MMI . In tensity

Shift

FC 10 FC 43 FC 91

0 0 0

+1 +1 +1

+1 +1 +1

+1 +1 +1

+2 +2 +1

Upgraded Conditions: For areas where it

appears cost-effective to improve facilities,

assume on a preliminary basis that upgrades

result in one or two beneficial intensity

shifts (i.e., -1 or -2), relative to the above

present conditions.

Time-to-restoration: The time-torestoration data assigned to SF 27a, air

transportation terminals, are assumed to

apply to all terminals. By combining these

data with the damage curves derived using

the data for FC 10; 43, and 91, the time-torestoration curves shown in Figures B-32

through B-34 were derived

B.3.2 Runwaysand Taxiways

1. General

Description: In general, runways and

taxiways in the air transportation system

include runways, taxiways, aprons, and

landing lights. Runways and taxiways

comprise pavements, grades, and subgrades.

Pavement types include portland cement

concrete and asphaltic concrete.

Typical Seismic Damage: Runway damage

is a direct function of the strength

characteristics of the underlying soils.

Airports tend to be located in low-lying

alluvial areas or along water margins subject

to soil failures. Hydraulic fills are especially

prone to failure during ground shaking.

Runways can be damaged by liquefaction,

compaction, faulting, flooding, and tsunamis.

Damage may include misalignment, uplift,

cracking, or buckling of pavement.

Seismically Resistant Design: Seismic

design practices include providing proper

- gradation and compaction of soils or

imported fills, grades, and subgradesATC-25 Appendix B: Lifeline Vulnerabilijy Functions 221

Dz=IUz

CD0,

co Dz=9tY

co

Dz=Ox

HI

Figure B-31

NEHRP Map Area

California 7

California 3-6

Non-California 7

Puget Sound 5

All other areas

ATC-25 Appendix B: Lifeline Vulnerability Functions 21
Terminal (Air Transportation)

27a 1.00 10 H.41

91 0.40

43 8.20

a b

0.010 11.262

0,848 3.864

-0.004 0.206

-8.10 0. 056

-8.012 :.013

Mi,1

6

7

B

9.

10

R = b * days + a

I I I I I I I

120 15 180 216 240

Elapsed Time in Days

270 300 338 365

Figure B-32 Residual capacity for airport terinals (NEHRP California 7).

Terminal (Air Transportation)

2, - a IL~ 

a 

M fa U 4 0 y 

A ~ 

as

91 .46

43 8.20

/MNtH a b

" 6 0.040 3.864

7 -0.004 0.206

8 -0.010 0. 056

9 -0.612 0.013

18 -0.006 0.004

- U L .1. -

I I I I 

9 60 128 156 180 210 240 276 300 338. 365

Elapsed Time in Days

* Residual capacity for airport terminals (NEHRP Map Area 3-6, Non-California 7, and

Puget Sound 5). I 

Appendix B: Lifeline Vulnerability Functions A

R=10v

0-

a(

'a

a)

cc

R= W*e - S: I8

DAYS: 30

6 r 60 90

Iflt3/.

.0C,

a

CO

0 R=

.'a

r

n- B..

DAY"

I / /

i' 

3: 30 60

Figure B-33

222

° R=

I

t 

H=1JU

n - U - "ayl, - a

, , r , . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

 ATC-25
R=20;y

coCu

C,

R= O

DAYS: 3 68 90 128 I58! 180 218 2

Elapsed Time n Days

Figure B-34 Residual capacity for airport terminals All other areas

2. Direct Damage

Basis: Damage curves for air transportation

system runways and taxiways are based on

ATC-13 data for FC 49, runways, (see Figure

B-35). Standard construction is assumed to

represent typical California runways and

taxiways under present conditions (ie., a

composite of older and more modern

runways).

Present Conditions: In the absence of data

on the type of soils, material, age, etc., the

following factors were used to modify the

mean curves, under present conditions:

HfRP Map Area

California'7

California 3-6

Non-California 7

Puget Sound 5

All other areas

Mm/

Intensity

Shift

0,

0

0

0

0

Upgraded Conditions: For areas where it

appears cost-effective to improve facilities,

assume on a preliminary basis that upgrades

40 278 308 330 365

result in a beneficial intensity shift of one

unit (e., -1), relative to the above present

conditions.

Time-to-restoration: The time-torestoration data assigned to SF 27b, runways

and taxiways, are assumed to apply for all

runways and taxiways. By combining these

data with the damage curves for FC 49, the

time-to-restoration curves shown in Figure

B-36 were derived.

B.4 Sea/Water Transportation

B.4.1 PortslCargo Handling Equipment

1. General

Description: In general, portslcargo

handling equipment comprise buildings

(predominantly warehouses), waterfront

structures, cargo handling equipment, paved

aprons, conveyors, scales, tanks, silos,

pipelines, railroad terminals, and support

services. Building type varies, with steel

frame being a common construction type. 

Waterfront structures include quay walls,

ATC-25 AppendIx 3: Lifeline Vulnerability Functions - 223

AT, C-25 Appendix B: Lifelfine Vulnerability Fu- nations 223
Runwaylaxiwa-9 Il I RS nO

VII Vill IX

Modified Mercalli Intensity (MMI) 

Damage percent by intensity for runways/taxiways.

Runwal/Tax iway

49 .1.00

MtII a b

6 0.458 0.834

7 0.435 0.413

8 H.315 0 .039

9 0.325 0.818

10 0.270 0.011

R b dags + a

60 90 120 150 180 210 240 270 300 330 365

Elapsed Time in Days,

Residual capacity for runways/taxiways (NEHRP Map Area: California 3-6, California 7,

Non-California 7, Puget Sound 5, and all other areas).

Appendix B: Lifeline Vulnerability Functions ATC-25

D100HY

ao.O

a)

M D=90:/

E

Ca :

D=0f

VI

Figure B-35

X

.

Co

:0

U) 'a) .

R= ex

DAYS 30

Figure B-36

I

224

,if, i.UU

I
sheet-pile bulkheads, and pile-supported

piers. Quay walls are essentially waterfront

masonry or caisson walls with earth fills

behind them. Piers are commonly wood or

concrete construction and often include

batter piles to resist lateral transverse loads.

Cargo handling equipment for loading and

unloading ships includes cranes for

containers, bulk loaders for bulk goods, and

pumps for fuels. Additional handling

equipment is used for transporting goods

throughout port areas.

Typical Seismic Damage: By far the most

significant source of earthquake-induced

damage to port and harbor facilities has

been pore-water pressure buildup in the

saturated cohesionless soils that prevail at

these facilities. This pressure buildup can

lead to application of excessive lateral

pressures to quay walls by backfill materials,

liquefaction, and massive submarine sliding.

Buildings in port areas are subject to generic

damage due to shaking, as well as damage

caused by loss of bearing or lateral

movement of foundation soils. Past

earthquakes have caused substantial lateral

sliding, deformation, and tilting of quay walls

and sheet-pile bulkheads. Block-type quay

walls are vulnerable to earthquake-induced

sliding between layers of blocks. This

damage has often been accompanied by

extensive settlement and cracking of paved

aprons. The principal failure mode of sheetpile bulkheads has been insufficient anchor

resistance, primarily because the anchors

were installed at shallow depths, where

backfill is most susceptible to a loss of

strength due to pore-water pressure buildup

and liquefaction. Insufficient distance

between the anchor and the bulkhead wall

can aso lead to failure. Pile-supported

docks typically perform well, unless soil

failures such as major submarine landslides

occur. In such cases, piers have undergone

extensive sliding and buckling and yielding

of pile supports. Batter piles have damaged

pier pile caps and decking because of their

large lateral stiffness. Cranes can be derailed

or overturn by shaking or soil failures.

Toppling cranes can damage adjacent

structures or other facilities. Misaligned

crane rails can damage wheel assemblies and

immobilize cranes. Tanks containing fuel

may rupture and spill their contents into the

water, presenting fire hazards. Pipelines

from storage tanks to docks may be ruptured

where they cross areas of structurally poor

ground in the vicinity of docks. Failure of

access roads and railway tracks can severely

limit port operations. Port facilities,

especially on the West Coast, are also

subject to tsunami hazard.

Seismically Resistant Design: At locations

where earthquakes occur relatively

frequently it is the current Seismically

resistant design practice to use seismic

factors included in local building codes for

the design of port structures. However, past

earthquakes have indicated that seismic

coefficients used for design are of secondary

importance compared to the potential for

liquefaction of the site soil materials. Quay

wall and sheet-pile bulkhead performance

could be enhanced by replacing weak soils

with dense soils, or designing these

structures to withstand the combination of

earthquake-induced dynamic water

pressures and pressures due to liquefied lls.

Pier behavior in earthquakes has been good

primarily because they are designed for large

horizontal berthing and live loads, and

because they are not subject to the lateral

soil pressures of the type applied to quay

walls and bulkheads. However, effects on

bearing capacity, and lateral resistance of

piles due to liquefaction and induced slope

instability should also be considered.

2. Direct Damage

Basis: Damage curves for ports/cargo

handling equipment in the sea/water

transportation system are based on ATC-13

data for FC 53, cranes, and FC 63,

waterfront structures (see figure B-37).

Ports/cargo handling equipment were

assumed to be a combination of 60%

waterfront structures and 40% cranes.

Standard construction is assumed to

represent typical California ports/cargo

handling equipment under present

conditions (ie., a composite of older and

more modern ports/cargo handling

equipment). Only minimal regional variation

in construction quality is assumed, as seismic

design is performed only for selected port

ATC-25 Appendix B: Lifeline Vulnerability Functions 225
Port/Cargo Handling Equipment

VI VIl Vll Ix

Modified Mercalli Intensity (MMI)

Damage percent by intensity for ports/cargo handling equipment.

structures, and soil performance is the most

critical determinant in port performance.

Present Conditions: In the absence of data

on the type of material, age, etc., the

following factors were used to modify the

mean curve for the two facility classes listed

above, under present conditions:

NEHRP Map Area

California 7

California 3-6

Non-California 7

Puget Sound 5

All other areas

MM!

Intensity

Shift

FC 53 FC 63

o 0

o 0

o 0

o 0

+1 +1

Upgraded Conditions: For areas where it

appears cost-effective to improve facilities,

assume on a preliminary basis that upgrades

result in a beneficial intensity shift of one

unit (i.e., -1), relative to the above present

conditions.

Time-to-restoration: The time-torestoration data assigned to SF 28a, ports,

and SF 28b, cargo handling equipment, were

assumed to apply to all ports/cargo handling

equipment. Ports/cargo handling facilities

were assumed to be a combination of 60%

ports and 40% cargo handling facilities. By

combining these data with the damage

curves derived using the data for FC 53 and

63, the time-to-restoration curves shown in

Figures B-38 and B-39 were derived.

B.4.2 Inland Waterways

1. General

Description: In general, inland waterways of

the sea/water transportation system can be

natural (rivers and bays) or human-made

(canals). The sides and/or bottoms of inland

waterways may be unlined or lined with

concrete. Portions of the waterway may be

contained through the use of quay walls,

retaining walls, riprap, or levees.

Typical Seismic Damage: Damage to inland

waterways will be greatest near ruptured

faults. Channels or inland waterways may be

blocked by earthquake-induced slumping.

226 Appendix B: Lifeline Vulnerability Functions ATC-25

D=180Y

co D=5S&

c: 0

D=ax

Figure B-37

X

Appendix B: Lifeline Vulnerability functions ATC-25 226
Port/Cargo

r 2Ba

20b

l1HI

i6

7

a

9

to

ait

a

3

I

3

3

b

8. 1183

8 813

0B 88

lays + a

38 68 90 128 15O 188 218

Elapsed Time in Days

240 27 3080 330 365

Residual capacity for ports/cargo handling equipment (NEHRP Map Area: California 3-6,

California 7, Non-Cafifornia 7, and Puget Sound 5).

Pot/Cargo Handlinq Equipment

co a a UD u Uu

53 '3.40

MIl a

6 W 306

7 0.206G

B 8.248

9 8.160

10 0826

b

8 8

O022

8.8,13

8.887

0.805

R = * days +.a

S 128 1S 188 218

Elapsed Time in Days

240 27 3 330

Figure B-39 Residual capacity for ports/cargo handling equipment All other areas).

ATC-25 Appendix B: Lifeline Vulnerability Functions 227

RE=108,

0UM

Ca

a)

o:

R= v

Figure B-38

R= SE

R= /

DAYS: 3 68 365

DRYS:

I Ir

I

ATC:-25 Appendix B: Lifeline Vulnerability.Functions 227
Inlania Uaterway

61 1.00

Other

-- ~CA 7

CA 3-6

Non-CA 7

trll VII i P

I VI[ Vill IX X

Modified Mercalli Intensity (MMI)

Figure B-40 Damage percent by intensity for inland waterways.

Quay walls, retaining walls, or levees can be Stand

damaged or collapse. Deep channels typica

dredged in soft mud are subject to prese.

earthquake-induced slides that can limit the nature

draft of ships that can pass. Channels lined water

with unreinforced concrete are susceptible variat

to damage due to differential ground

displacement. Loss of lining containment Prese

can lead to erosion of soil beneath lining. on the

Waterways can be blocked by fallen bridges follov

and are made impassable by spilled fuel or under

chemicals from tanks or facilities adjacent to

the waterway.

Seismically Resistant Design: Seismically

resistant design practices include providing C

walls of waterways with slopes appropriate C

for the embankment materials used, and/or p

designing quay walls and retaining walls to Al

restrain soils in the event of soil failure.

2. Direct Damage appeg

assurr

Basis: Damage curves for inland waterways result

in the sea/water transportation system are unit (

based on ATC-13 data for FC 61, canals condi

(see Figure B-40).

Time

restoi

ard construction is assumed to present

al California inland waterways under

nt conditions (i.e., a composite of

al as well as new and old human-made

ways). It is assumed that the regional

ion in construction quality is minimal.

nt Conditions: In the absence of data

e type of lining, age, etc., use the

wing factors to modify the mean curve,

r present conditions:

MMI

Intensity

EtHJRP Map Area Shift

alifornia 7 0

alifornia 3-6 0

on-California 7 0

uget Sound 5 0

1i other areas +1

aded Conditions: For areas where it

irs cost-effective to improve facilities,

ie on a preliminary basis that upgrades

in a beneficial intensity shift of one

i.e., -1), relative to the above present

tions.

-to-restoration: The time-toration data assigned to SF 35b, levees

Appendix B: Lifeline Vulnerability Functions

D1=100V

0

C) 0)

E

C]

D=50O

D=O/

228 ATC-25

V
Inlrn4 lJateruay

61

Km 

6

7

8

9

I'D

4 n I .fOU

aL

0. 245

E ,369

8. 95

8. 112

.0.238

b

8.127

2.810

8.899

8.054

B b * days * a

90 128 158 108 210 248

- Elapsed Time in Days

27C 388 330 365

Residual capacity for inland waterways (NEHRP Map Area: California 3-6, California 7,

Non-California 7, and Puget Sound 5).

in flood control systems, are assumed to

apply to all inland waterways. By combining

these data with the damage curves for FC

61, the time-to-restoration curves shown in

Figures B-41 and B-42 were derived.

B.5 Electrical

B.5.1 Fossil-fu el Power Plants

1. General

Description: In general, fossil-fuel power

plants can be fueled by either coal or oil.

Structures at fossil-fuel power plants are

commonly medium-rise steel braced frames.

A generation building typically comprises

turbine, boiler, and fan areas. The turbinegenerators are typically supported on

reinforced concrete pedestals that are

seismically isolated from the generation

building. Boiler feed pumps are usually

located below the turbine-generators. The

boiler area typically includes the boilers

(which are usually suspended from the

support structures), steam drums, coal silos,

conveyors, de-aerators, heaters, and

associated equipment and piping. The fan

area houses the air preheaters as well as the

forced-draft fans and related duct work.

Other components include instrumentation

and control systems, water and fuel storage

tanks, stacks, cooling towers, both

underground and above ground piping,

cable trays, switchgear and motor control

centers, fuel handling and water treatment

facilities, water intake and discharge, and

cranes. Associated switchyards step up

voltage and include transformers and circuit

breakers.

Typical Seismic Damage: Damage to steel

structures at power plants in past

earthquakes has usually been limited to

overstressed connections or buckled braces.

Turbine pedestals may pound against the

surrounding fldor of the generation building

and damage the turbine-generators. Boilers

may sway and impact the support structure,

causing damage to the expansion guides and

possibly the internal tubes of the boiler.

Structural damage to older timber cooling

Appendix B: Lifeline Vulnerability Functions

5 3

R=t8ffX

-o

U) 2 B= 07:

[)

m9

RW; Ox

DAYS: 30 60

Figure B-41

l l l l l I I 

ATC-25 229
MtIl a b

6 0.369 0.018

7 0.9S5 0.099

B 0.112 0.054

9 8.230 8.616

18 8.268 0.004

R = b * days a

LSR= 

DAYS: 30

I 1 I I i I I 1

68 90 120 158 180 218 240 Z70 300 330

Elapsed Time in Days

Residual capacity for inland waterways (All other areas).

towers may occur due to deterioration and

weakening of the structures with age. Fan

blades and gearboxes in cooling towers have

been damaged attributable to impact with

fan housing. Water and fuel tanks may

experience buckled walls, ruptured attached

piping, stretched anchor bolts, or collapse.

Piping attached to unanchored equipment

or subjected to differential movement of

anchor points or corrosion may lose its

pressure integrity. Coal conveyors can

become misaligned, and coal bins without

proper seismic design may be severely

damaged. Unrestrained batteries may topple

from racks, and equipment supported on

vibration isolators may fall off supports and

rupture attached piping. In the switchyard,

improperly anchored transformers may slide

and topple, stretching and breaking attached

electrical connections and/or ceramics.

Seismically Resistant Design: Seismically

resistant design practices include, as a

minimum, designing all structures to satisfy

the seismic requirements of the applicable

local or national building code. In addition,

well-designed seismic ties should be

provided between the boiler and the

generation building to prevent pounding; all

equipment should be anchored; sufficient

clearance and restraints on piping runs

should be provided to prevent interaction

with equipment and other piping; and piping

should be made-flexible to accommodate

relative movement of structures and

equipment to which it is attached. Generous

clearances between adjacent equipment

should be provided to prevent interaction.

Sufficient joints between the turbine

pedestal and the generation building are

required to prevent pounding. Maintenance

programs for some systems, including wood

timber cooling towers, piping transporting

corrosive materials, and steel tanks, should

be established so that these components are

not in a weakened condition when an

earthquake strikes. An emergency power

source consisting of well-braced batteries

and well-anchored emergency generators is

necessary to permit restart without power

from the outside grid. Heavy equipment and

stacks should be anchored with long bolts

anchored deep into the foundation to allow

for ductile yielding of the full anchor bolt

Appendix B: Lifeline Vulnerability Functions

Ca,

a

Ca

Ax R 5x

-Z) . z

an

W(jr

Figure B-42

365

l l l l l l i

. . . A. ._ .. A. J 4 4 q no R- 100x/ 1.

230 ATC-25
Fassi -Fuel Pouer Plamt

13 adzf

69 0.58

66 .3

'~~> Other CCA

CA 7

VIII IX

Modified Mercalli Intensity (MMI)

Figure B-43 Darnage percent by intensity for fossil-fuel power plants.

length in extreme seismic load conditions.

Expansion anchor installation procedures

should be subject to strict quality control.

2. Direct Damage

Basis: Damage curves for fossil-fuel power

plants in the electrical system are based on

ATC-13 data for FC 13, m edium-rise steel

braced-frame buildings; FC 66, electrical

equipment, and FC 68, mechanical

equipment (see Figure B-43). Fossil-fuel

power plants are assumed to be a

combination of 20% mid-rise steel bracedframe structures, 30% electrical equipment,

and 50% mechanical equipment. Over the

years power plants have been designed using

seismic provisions that equal or exceed

those used for conventional construction.

Consequently, the beneficial intensity shifts

indicated below are assumed appropriate.

Standard construction is assumed to

represent typical California fossil-fuel plants

(and geothermal power plants) under

present conditions (i.e., a composite of older

and more modern plants). Only minimal

regional variation in construction quality of

mechanical equipment is assumed, as

operational loads frequently govern over

seismic requirements.

Present Conditions: In the absence of data

on the construction type, age, etc., the

following factors were used to modify the

mean curves for each of the three facility

classes listed above, under present

conditions:

NEHRP Map Area

California 7

California 3-6

Non-California 7

Puget Sound 5

All other areas

MM

Intensity

Shift

FC 13 C 66FC 68

-1 -1 -1

10 0 0

10 0 0

0 o 0

1 1 0

Upgraded Conditions: For areas where it

appears cost-effective to improve facilities,

assume on a preliminary basis that upgrades

result in a beneficial intensity shift of one

unit (i.e., -1) relative to the above present

conditions.

Appendix B: Lifeline Vulnerability Functions

-4 no-, Li- LruiA

0-

0

DI)

VI WII

-6

X

I - - ____ I I

ATC-25 21
Fossil-Fuel Power Plant

.

Q

0

-

_0

a)

Cr

I

n_ 

-. - YS T

DAYS: 30

Z-ja H.711 13

66

66

Ml

.20

0.58

0.30

a b

7 0.871 0317

8 0.828 0.082

9 -8.805 0.836

10 -0.038 O.817

H = b days a

I I I I I

68 98 120 158 180 218 240

Elapsed Time in Days

Figure B-44 Residual capacity for fossil-fuel power plants (EHRP California 7).

Time-to-restoration: The time-torestoration data assigned to SF 29a,

electrical generating facilities, are assumed

to apply to all fossil- fuel power plants. By

combining these data with the damage

curves derived using data for FC 13, 66, and

68, the time-to-restoration curves shown in

Figures B-44 through B-46 were derived.

B.5.2 Hydroelectric Power Plants

1. General

Description: In general, hydroelectric power

plants consist of a dam and associated

equipment including water-driven turbines,

a control house and control equipment, and

a substation with transformers and other

switching equipment. The dam may be

earthfill, rockfill, or concrete and may

include canals, penstocks, spillways, conduit,

tunnels, and intake structures. Gantry

cranes are frequently located on top of the

concrete dams. Equipment inside the dam

typically includes turbines, pumps, piping,

switchgear, and emergency diesels.

Typical Seismic Damage: Hydroelectric

powerhouses and dams are more likely to be

seriously damaged by rock falls and

landslides than by ground shaking. When

slides do occur, turbines may be damaged if

rocks or soils enter the intakes. Penstocks

and canals can also be damaged by slides.

Intakes have been damaged by the

combination of inertial and hydrodynamic

forces. Most engineered dams have

performed well in past earthquakes,

although dams constructed using fills of finegrain cohesionless material have

experienced failures. Equipment in power

plants typically performs well in earthquakes

unless unanchored. In such cases the

equipment may slide or topple and

experience substantial damage.

Unrestrained batteries have toppled from

racks. Piping may impact equipment and

structures and damage insulation. Piping

attached to unrestrained equipment may

rupture due to equipment movement. The

control house may experience generic

building damage ranging from dropped

ceiling tiles and cracks in walls and frames to

partial and total collapse. Substation

232 Appendix B: Lifeline Vulnerability Functions ATC-25

2 l3 8 7 88 3 3 8

Z70 30 330 365

U- UPS no as.

232 Appendix B: Lifeline Vulnerability Functions ATC-25
Fossil-Fuel Power Plant fl Sl 712 Jf [

11

7

3g

13

0.20

0.30

a

8.071

8. BZ

-13 .BBS

-1 .830

-1.071

b

0.317

a . 'Boz

0. B36

8. B17

1.0.99

R *days + a

l l l l~~~I 

98 120 150 150 2L1. 240 278

Elapsed Time n Days

300 338 36S

Residual capacity for fossil-fuel power plants (NEHRP Map Area: California 3-6, NonCalifornia 7, and Puget Sound 5).

Fossil-Fuel Power

10.7B

Plant

13

,60

MI

6

7

9

'1

0.20

3.5a

B.30

a

M .034

B. 613

-0.021

-0.054

-M. 081

b

B. 111

B 023

MU01

.00

R b * days + a

90 120 150 I1B 210

Elapsed Time in Days

240 278 300 338 365

Figure B-46 Residual capacity for fossil-fuel power plants (All other areas).

ATC-25 Appendfx B: Lifeline Vulnerability Functions 233

_5

co

O_2

ra

( R= S07

C0

R= 0;,

DYS: 30 60

Figure B-45

.5

c-C

-o

Er a)

R= sox

R= Mx

DAYS: 30 60

315

I I . .

I I I~~~ I I I I

ATC-25 Appendix B: Lifeline Vulnerability Functions 233
Hgdraelectric Pwer Plant

Other

Vii Vill IX

Modified Mercalli Intensity (MMI)

Figure B-47 Damage percent by intensity for hydroelectric power stations.

equipment, and ceramics in particular, are other critical systems function with turbine

vulnerable to damage. Higher-voltage trip and loss of power from the outside grid.

ceramics tend to experience the most

damage. 2. Direct Damage

Seismically Resistant Design: Seismically Basis: Damage curves for hydroelectric

resistant design practices for earthfill dams power plants in the electrical system are

include providing ample freeboard, based on ATC-13 data for FC 35, concrete

mechanically compacting soils, and using dams; FC 36, earthfill or rockfill dams; and

wide cores and transition zones constructed FC 68, mechanical equipment (see Figure

of material resistant to cracking. Generally, B-47). Hydroelectric power plants are

reducing slopes of earthfill dams can reduce assumed to be a combination of 35%

vulnerability. Thorough foundation concrete dams, 35% earthfill or rockfill

exploration and treatment are important. dams, and 30% mechanical equipment. Over

Dynamic analyses can be used to determine the years power plants have been designed

the liquefaction or settlement potential of using seismic provisions that equal or exceed

embankments and foundations, and the those used for conventional construction.

cracking potential of concrete dams and Consequently, the beneficial intensity shifts

dam appurtenances. All buildings should be indicated below for mechanical equipment

designed, as a minimum, to satisfy the Bare assumed appropriate.

seismic requirements of a national or local

building code. All equipment should be Standard construction is assumed to

anchored and generous clearances between represent typical California hydroelectric

adjacent equipment provided to prevent power plants under present conditions (i.e.,

interaction. An emergency power source a composite of older and more modern

consisting of well-braced batteries and well- plants). Only minimal regional variation in

anchored emergency generators is necessary construction quality is assumed for

to ensure that control systems, lighting, and mechanical equipment, as operational loads

Appendix B: Lifeline Vulnerability Functions

D=100

E

CH 0

VI X

234 ATC-25
0 =03

. _

(a

c-Ceg

tJ R= 587

(a

_

M- In A- C.

"C,

DAYS 38 60 90 128 158 1B 218 248 278 388 330

Elapsed Time in Days

Figure B-48 Residual capacity for fossil-fuel power plants (NEHRP California 7).

frequently govern over seismic

requirements.

Present Conditions: In the absence of data

on the type of material, age, etc., the

following factors were used to modify the

mean curves for each of the three facility

classes listed above, under present

conditions:

Time-to-restoration: The time-torestoration data assigned to SF 29a,

generating facilities, and SF 30c, storage

reservoirs, are assumed to apply to all

hydroelectric power plants. By combining

these data with the damage curves derived

using the data for FC 35, 36, and 68, the

time-to-restoration curves shown in Figures

B-48 through B-50 were derived.

NEHRP Map Area

California 7

California 3-6

Non-California 7

Puget Sound 5

All other areas

MM

Intensity

Shift

FC 35 FC 36 FC 68

0 0 -1

+1 +1 0

+1 +1 0

+1 +1 0

+2 +2 0

Upgraded Conditions: For areas where it

appears cost-effective to improve facilities,

assume on a preliminary basis that upgrades

result in a beneficial intensity shift of one

unit (i.e., -), relative to the above present

conditionsB.5.3 Transmission Lines

1. General

Description: In general, transmission lines

may be underground or above ground

(supported by towers). Towers are usually

steel and carry several circuits at high

voltages (64 kV or higher). Each circuit

consists of three conductors, one for each

phase. Towers are, provided with reinforced

concrete footings and may be supported on

piles. Most transmission systems are ac, but

some long-distance lines are dc. The dc

systems require convertor stations at each

end of the line.

A -Appendix B: Lifeline Vulnerability Functions

38

a b

17? BAK42

165 -8.. lis

8 0.839

134 0.820

* days + a

365

l l

.

l 

ATC-25 235
C.

o R= y

-a

CC0)

H= B/ y

DAYS:

*.35

.30

MIl

6

7

B

9

10

a

. 77

,065

048

.34

,09

b

0. 426

0.115

0.H39

0 .020

0.008

* days a

I - i I i I I i i I

30 60 90 120 158 188 210 Z40 Z70 30 330

Elapsed Time in Days

365

Residual capacity for hydroelectric power stations (NEHRP Map Area: California 3-6,

- Non-California 7, and Puget Sound 5).

Hydroelectric Pauer Plantt

R=t1o8

Co

a

(:) *0a)

= A Y : 3 I

DAYS: 30 60

36 0.35

68 0.30

MII

6

7

B

9

to

a

0.069

08 854

8.040

0.814

-0.002

b

0.170

0.853

0. H26

0.809

0.005

R = b * days + a

I I I I I I I 

90 120 150 18 210 248 270 30 330

Elapsed Time in Days

365

Figure B-50 Residual capacity for hydroelectric power stations (All other areas).

Appendix B: Lifeline Vulnerability Functions

Figure B-49

l l l l l l l l | l a

s1 

236 ATC-25
Transmission Lines (Electrical)

S6 1.B

1IJl VIII IX

Modified Mercalli Intensity (MMI)

Damage percent by intensity for electric transmission lines.

Typical Seismic Damage: Transmission

towers and the lines they support are

principally subject to damage through

secondary effects such as landslides, and

rock falls, liquefaction, and other ground

failures. This is also true for the

underground lines. It is possible that the

conductors supported by towers can slap

against each other and bum down. Ceramics

used on transmission towers typically

perform well in earthquakes because they

are in compression rather than in tension or

bending. Fault slippage is unlikely to

damage underground lines, (unless the line

crosses the fault fracture) because

transmission lines have a thick-wall, weldedsteel pipe jacket.

Seismically Resistant Design: Seismic loads

do not generally have much influence on the

design of transmission lines and towers. The

towers are designed to, withstand heavy wind

and ice loads, as well as loads due to broken

wires. The primary Seismically resistant

concern is siting towers and conductors in

locations where soils are stable, or providing

special foundations designed to survive

effects of soil failure.

1. Direct Damage

Basis: Damage curves for transmission lines

in the electrical system are based on ATC-13

data for FC 56, major electrical transmission

line towers (over 100 feet tall, see Figure B51). Standard construction is assumed to

represent typical California transmission

lines and towers under present conditions

(i.e., a composite of older and more modern

towers). It is assumed that no regional

variation in construction quality exists, as

seismic loads are relatively unimportant in

the design of transmission towers.

Present Conditions: In the absence of data

on the type of tower, age, etc., the following

factors were used to modify the mean

curves, under present conditions:

NEHRP Map Area

California 7

California 3-6

Non-California 7

Puget Sound 5

All other areas

MMI

Intensity

Shift

0

U 

ATC-25 Appendix B: Lifeline Vulnerability Functions 237

DztIOO

S

0aCC

W

C

DwOx

VI

Figure B-51

X

ATFC-25 Appendix B: Lifeline Vulnerability Functions, 237
Transmission Lines (Electrical) .,OL I GM Ct 4 IRR

M1111 a

6 0.898

7 0.814

B -0.013

9 -0 .111

10 -0. 280

b

1.384

0.790

0.606

0,277

0. 168

H = b * days a

| I I I 

90 120 150 188 210

Elapsed Time in Days

I I I I

240 270 308 330 365

Residual capacity for electric transmission lines (NEHRP Map Area: California 3-6,

California 7, Non-California 7, and Puget Sound 5, and all other areas).

Upgraded Conditions: It is not costeffective or practical to upgrade existing

transmission towers or lines unless

supporting or adjacent soils are known to be

unstable. Therefore, no intensity shifts for

retrofitting are recommended.

Time-to-restoration: The time-torestoration data assigned to SF 29b,

transmission lines for the electrical system,

are assumed to apply to all transmission

lines and towers. By combining these data

with the damage curves for FC 56, the timeto-restoration curves shown in Figure B-52

were derived.

B.5.4 Transmission Substations

1. General

Description: Transmission substations in the

electrical system generally receive power at

high voltages (220 kV or more) and step it

down to lower voltages for distribution. The

substations generally consist of one or more

control buildings, steel towers, conductors,

ground wires, underground cables, and

extensive electrical equipment including

banks of circuit breakers, switches, wave

traps, buses, capacitors, voltage regulators,

and massive transformers. Circuit breakers

(oil or gas) protect transformers against.

power surges due to short circuits. Switches

prevent long-term interruption of the

circuits. Wave traps enable transmission of

supervisory signals through power lines.

Buses provide transmission linkage of the

many and varied components within the

substation. Capacitors are used to keep the

three phases of a transmission circuit in

proper relation to each other. Transformers

and voltage regulators serve to maintain the

predetermined voltage, or to step down or

step up from one voltage to another.

Porcelain lightning arresters are used to

protect the system from voltage spikes

caused by lightning. Long, cantilevered

porcelain components (e.g., bushings and

lightning arresters) are common on many

electrical equipment items.

Appendix B: Lifeline Vulnerability Functions

R- 100

0ia

:3.n

U)

a:

1- Ut

DAYS: 60

Figure B-52

xx

:; H

I -v -. .U - U L ._

D a.,

H= "/

238 ATC-25
Typical Seismic Damage: Control buildings

are subject to generic building damage

ranging from dropped suspended ceilings

and cracks in walls and frames to partial and

total collapse. Unanchored or improperly

anchored control equipment may slide or

topple, experiencing damage or causing

attached piping and conduit to fail. In the

yard, steel towers are typically damaged only

by soil failures. Porcelain bushings,

insulators, and lightning arresters are brittle

and vulnerable to shaking and are frequently

damaged. Transformers are large, heavy

pieces of equipment that are frequently

unanchored or inadequately anchored.

Transformers may shift, tear the attached

conduit, break bushings, damage radiators,

and spill oil. Transformers in older

substations that are mounted on rails

frequently have fallen off their rails unless

strongly anchored. Other top-heavy pieces

of electrical equipment can topple or slide

when inadequately anchored, damaging

connections. Frequently, inadequate slack in

conductors or rigid bus bars result in

porcelain damage resulting from differential

motion.

Seismically Resistant Design: Porcelain is

used extensively in ways that make it

susceptible to damage (bending and

tension). Recent developments including

gas-insulated substations and installation

details that base isolate, reinforce, or add

damping, may reduce the problem in the

future. Seismically resistant design practice

includes the use of damping devices for

porcelain; proper anchorage for equipment

(avoid the use of friction clips); provision of

conductor slack between equipment in the

substation; use of breakaway connectors to

reduce loads on porcelain bushings and

insulators; and replacement of single

cantilever-type insulator supports with those

having multiple supports. Transformer

radiators that cantilever from the body of

transformer can be braced. Adequate

spacing between equipment can reduce the

likelihood of secondary damage resulting

from adjacent equipment falling. Control

buildings and enclosed control equipment

should be designed to satisfy the seismic

requirements of the local or national

building code, as a minimum.

2. Direct Damage

Basis: Damage curves for transmission

substations for the electrical system are

based on ATC-13 data for FC 66, electrical

equipment (see Figure B-53). High-voltage

porcelain insulators, bushings, and supports

are vulnerable to damage, even when the

porcelain components have been designed

and qualified to enhanced seismic criteria.

Consequently, the detrimental intensity shift

indicated below is assumed appropriate.

Standard construction is assumed to

represent typical California transmission

substations under present conditions (e., a

composite of older non-seismically designed

substations as well as more modern

substations designed to enhanced seismic

requirements).

Present Conditions: In the absence of data

on the type of equipment, substation

voltage, age, etc., the following factors were

used to modify the mean curves, under

present conditions:

NEHRP Map Area

California 7

California 3-6

Non-California 7

Puget Sound 5

All other areas

MM!

.intensity

Shift

+1

+2

+2

+2

+3

Upgraded Conditions: For areas where it

appears cost-effective to improve facilities,

assume on a preliminary basis that upgrades

result in a beneficial intensity shift of one

unit (i.e., -1), relative to the above present

conditions.

Time-to-restoration: The time-torestoration data assigned to SF 29c,

transmission substations, are assumed to

apply to all transmission substations in

California. For transmission substations in

other areas, response planning is not as

complete, and the restoration time is

assumed to be 1.5 times longer. By

combining these data with the modified

damage curves for FC 66, the time-torestoration curves shown in Figures B-54

through B-56 were derived.

ATC-25 Appendix B: Lifeline Vulnerability Functions 239
D=108x

813

wD=Sox

E

co 0

Dlix

transnission Substation

IVI VII Vill Ix

'Modified Mercalli Intensity (MMI)

Figure B-53 Damage percent by intensity for electric transmission substations.

U- en.,. ii- LUu r.

: tf

:-5.

a

0-

co

R= sez

R= OXL

,DAYss

transnission Substation 00_ 4 aa 11 I .n - i~ 1.un nb i.nn3-

I I I I I I i

: 30 60 90 120 150 180 218 248 Z71

Elapsed Time in Days

' 300 330

x

365

Residual capacity for electric transmission substations (NEHRP California 7).

Appendix B: Lifeline Vulnerability Functions ATC-25

Mlil a b

6 0.126 0.092

7 0.101 0,030

B H.882 0.019

9 8.67 0.01O

18 8.858 0.009

R b *days a

Figure B-54

l

1

Transmission Substation

240
Transnission Substation 1 n r r I n

98 128 158 188 218

Elapsed Time in Days

240 278 308 338 365

Residual capacity for electric transmission substations NEHRP Map Area: California 3-6,

Non-California 7 and Puget Sound 5).

Transmission Substation

1.08 68

MKIl

6

7

9

1.02

Ia

8.86?

8.858

8.8

b

8.819

.012

E.289

8.887

R b * days + a

9 128 I58 188 218

Elapsed Time in Day,

I I I I

248 278 308 330 365

Figure B-56 Residual capacity for electric transmission substations (All other areas).

Appendix B: Liteline Vulnerability Functions

14=100v

.=Zz

C.

a

O R= S/z

r£~0_

Cd, 0co

rD

R= z

MM a b

6 8.101 0.03B

7 8.802 0.019

8 8.867 8.812

9 8.8;52 0.009

18 H.844 0.007

R =b days + a

DAYS: 38

Figure B-55

G8

:Cs CL

-a

EG

n- O., I

- :. 3

DAYTS: 8EI

I

l l l l l l

M= "-> .

J 1 .V[!I UU g sULI'

I I I l

A+TC-25 241
Distribution Lines

ViI U111

Modified Mercalli Intensity (MMI)

Figure B-57 Damage percent by intensity for electric distribution lines.

B.S.S Distribution Lines

1. General

Description: In general, distribution lines

may be underground or above ground

supported by towers or poles. Towers are

usually steel, and poles are usually treated

wood. Towers are provided with concrete

footings, and poles may have footings or

may be embedded directly into the ground.

Transformers on poles may be supported on

platforms or anchored directly to poles.

Distribution lines typically operate at lower

voltages (64 kV or less).

Typical Seismic Damage: Unanchored polemounted transformers may be knocked

down and some will burn. Towers and poles

are generally undamaged except by

secondary effects such as landslides,

liquefaction, and other ground failures.

Conductor lines swinging together can cause

burnouts and/or start fires. Settlement of

soils with respect to manholes can

sometimes cause underground line routed

through the manhole to fail.

Seismically Resistant Design: Seismic loads

do not generally have much influence on the

design of distribution lines and towers. The

towers are typically designed to withstand

wind loads. The primary concern is siting

towers and poles where soils are stable to

prevent foundation failures.

2. Direct Damage

Basis: Damage curves for distribution lines

in the electrical system are based on ATC-13

data for FC 55, conventional electrical

transmission line towers (less than 100 feet

tall, see Figure B-57). In general, less

conservative design criteria are used for

distribution lines than for lines in the

transmission system.

Standard construction is assumed to

represent typical California distribution

lines, towers, and poles, under present

conditions (i.e., a composite of older and

more modern lines and towers). Only

minimal regional variation in the

construction quality is assumed.

Present Conditions: In the absence of data

on the type of tower/pole or conductor, age,

Appendix B: Lifeline Vulnerability Functions

DzI100v s5 1.af0

0 =80

axCY)

E

D=O/

VI

Other

CA 7

- CA3-6

- Non-CA 7-

P.S.5

ix X

242 ATC-25
_5

a

co

(3

(/2

C,

mr

R= z

istribution Lines

!9L 1.80 55

DAYS:

I I i -

G0 98 128 158 188 210

Elapsed Time in Days

4 an

I , - I ,

248 278 380 338 365

Residual capacity for electric distribution lines (NEHRP Map Area: California 3-6,

California 7, Non-California 7, and Puget Sound 5).

etc., the following factors were used to modify

the mean curves, under present conditions:

NEHRP Map Area

California 7

California 3-6

Non-California 7

Puget Sound 5

All other areas

MMI

Intensit

Shift

0

0

0

0

+1

Upgraded Conditions: It is not costeffective or practical to upgrade existing

transmission towers, unless supporting or

adjacent soils are known to be unstable.

Therefore, no intensity shifts for upgrading

are recommended.

Time-to-restoration: The time-torestoration data assigned to SF 29d,

distribution lines, are assumed to apply to all

distribution lines. By combining these data

with the damage curves for FC 55, the timeto-restoration curves shown in Fiugres B-58

and B-59 were derived.

B.516 Distribution Substations

1. General

Description: Distribution substations in the

electrical system generally receive power at

low voltages (64 kV or less) and step it down

to lower voltages for distribution to users.

The substations generally consist of one

small control building, steel towers,

conductors, ground wires, and electrical

equipment including circuit breakers,

switches, wave traps, buses, capacitors,

voltage regulators, and transformers.

Typical Seismic Damage: Control buildings

are subject to generic building damage

ranging from cracks in walls and frames to

partial and total collapse. Unanchored or

improperly anchored control equipment

may slide or topple, experiencing damage or

causing attached conduit to fail- In the yard,

steel towers are typically damaged only by

soil failures. Porcelain bushings, insulators,

and lightning arresters are brittle and

vulnerable to shaking and are frequently

Appendix B: Lifeline Vulnerability Functions

lil a. b

S 8.448 1.375

7 0.445 e.882

8 .443 8. 59

9 8.432 8.174

10 8.393 0.08

R = 3 * Jays + a

Figure B-58

l l l l l l l

1. v.alu

ATC-25 243
R= 100

8488x

co

0-

° R= Sex

iaC5

W

(U

Rz _

H= 

1

listribution Lines

29d 1.08 55 4 a

I I I I~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

AYS: 30 68

Figure B-59 Residual capacity for electric distrit

damaged. Transformers are large, heavy

pieces of equipment that are frequently

unanchored or inadequately anchored.

Transformers may shift, tear the attached

conduit, break bushings, damage radiators,

and spill oil. Transformers in older

substations that are mounted on rails

frequently have fallen off their rails unless

strongly anchored. Other top-heavy pieces

of electrical equipment can topple or slide

when inadequately anchored, damaging

connections. Frequently, inadequate slack in

conductors or rigid bus bars result in

porcelain damage resulting from differential

motion.

Seismically Resistant Design: Porcelain in

distribution substation is susceptible to

damage but is less vulnerable than porcelain

in transmission substations by virtue of its

shorter cantilever lengths. Seismically

resistant design practices include the use of

installation details that base isolate,

reinforce, or add damping devices to the

porcelain. Proper anchorage details should

be used for all yard equipment. Breakaway

connectors for porcelain; replacement of

98 120 150 188 218 240 Z78 300 338 365

Elapsed Time in Days

)ution lines (All other areas).

single cantilever-type insulator supports

with those having multiple supports; and

provision of adequate slack in conductors

and bus bars connecting components that

may experience differential movement will

significantly reduce seismic vulnerability.

2. Direct Damage

Basis: Damage curves for distribution

substations for the electrical system are

based on ATC-13 data for FC 66, electrical

equipment (see Figure B-60). It is believed

that this facility class best approximates the

expected performance of distribution

substations.

Standard construction is assumed to

represent typical California distribution

substations under present conditions (i.e., a

composite of older non-seismically designed

substations as well as more modern

substations designed to enhanced seismic

requirements).

Present Conditions: In the absence of data

on the type of equipment, substation

Appendix B: Lifeline Vulnerability Functions A

MtlI a b

6 0.445 8.80Z

7 0.443 8.589

8 0.432 8.174

9 B.393 0.8DB

10 0.297 0.847

H = b * days a

.. "uI I I i-I I I I . . . . . . .

ATC-25  .'. I 244
Distribution Sstation

ViI VIII Ix

Modified Mercalli ntensity (MMI)

Figure B-60 Damage percent by intensity for

voltage, age, etc., the following factors were

used to modify the mean curves, under

present conditions:

Mm/

Intensity

NEHRP Map Area Shift

California 7 0

California 3-6 +1

Non-California 7 +1

Puget Sound 5 +1

All other areas +2

Upgraded Conditions: For areas where it

appears cost-effective to improve facilities,

assume on a preliminary basis that upgrades

result in a beneficial intensity shift of one

unit (i.e., -1), relative to the above present

conditions.

Time-to-restoration: The time-torestoration data assigned to SF 29e,

distribution substations, are assumed to

apply to all distribution substations in

California. For distribution substations in

other areas, response planning is not as

complete and restoration time is assumed be

1.5 times longer. By combining these data

electric distribution substations.

with the damage curves for FC 66, the timeto-restoration curves shown in Figures B-61

through B-63 were derived.

B.6 Water Supply

B.6.1 Transmission Aqueducts

1. General

Description: In general, various types of

transmission aqueducts can be used for

transporting water, depending on

topography, head availability, construction

practices, and environmental and economic

considerations. Open channels are used to

convey water under conditions of

atmospheric pressure. Flumes. are open

channels supported above ground. Channels

may be lined or unlined. Lining materials

include concrete, bituminous materials,

butyl rubber, vinyl, synthetic fabrics, or other

products to reduce the resistance to flow,

minimize seepage, and lower maintenance

costs. Flumes are usually constructed of

concrete, steel, or timber. Pipelines are built

where topographic conditions preclude the

AT-2Apni :Lfln unrblt ucin 4

Dzt0lH

E

)

a)

E

(U

C

D=O

1l X

ATC-25 Appendix B: Lifeline Vulnerability Functions 245
Distribution Substation

29e 1.00 66 1.0n

b

0.273

8.139

0.055

0.826

0.015

MITI a

6 0.0838

7 08,05

8 0.082

9 0.806

10 0.078

R = b * days + a

i I I I I I 

30 60 90 120 150 180 210 240

Elapsed Time in Days

I I

Z70 300 330 365

dual capacity for electric distribution substations (NEHRP California 7).

Distribution Substation

-2Z9e I.001 bb 1. 00-

Figure B-61 Resic

Rz!

>.

a

C_ I0

I- -=

._

a)

n- u. -

DAYS:

KH1 a

6 0.085

7 0.802

8 0.080

9 0.070

10 0.077

b

0.139

0.655

0.026

0.815

0. 11

B b * days + a

I I I i I I I

t30 60 90 120 150 180 210

Elapsed Time in Days

I 1 I I

240 270 300 330 365

Figure B-62 Residual capacity for electric distribution substations (NEHRP Map Area 3-6, NonCalifornia 7, and Puget Sound 5).

Appendix B: Lifeline Vulnerability Functions A

R=10f

a

Ca () n_ r

Ca

n

cR

a,

A y, DA.

DAYS

246 ATC-25,,,

I I I I

S A .

L

I 

. ?, /I

-

V- --

uv I

L
Distribution Sstation

tMl1I a b,

6 8 82 8 .855

7 2.80 BI26

8 8.878 .8.815

9 8.877 8.8i

10 0.876 8.888

R = lb days a

Elapsed Time in Days

Residual capacity for electric distribution substations (All other areas).

use of canals. Pipelines may be laid above-

-or below ground, or may be partly buried.

Most modern pressure conduit are built of

concrete, steel, ductile iron, or asbestos

cement. Tunnels are used where it is not

practical to lay a pipeline, such as mountain

or river crossings. They may be operated

under pressure or act as open channels.

Linings may be unreinforced concrete,

reinforced concrete, steel, or brick.

Typical Seismic Damage: Channels are

most susceptible to damage from surface

faulting and soil failures such as differential

settlement, liquefaction, or landsliding.

Unreinforced linings are more susceptible to

damage than are reinforced linings. Small

fractures in the lining can result in a

transmission aqueduct being taken out of

service, as water leaking through the lining

could erode supporting embankments or

surrounding soils and cause significant

damage. Regional uplift could result in longterm loss of function by changing the

hydraulic flow characteristics of the

aqueduct.

ATC-25 Appendix B: Lifeline

Seismically Resistant Design: Seismically

resistant design practices include providing

reinforced concrete linings for channels and

tunnels. Channels should have slopes

appropriate for embankment materials to

prevent slumping. Tunnels, should be

strengthened at intersections, bends, and

changes in shape and construction materials.

Aqueducts should be sited to eliminate or

minimize fault crossings. Aqueducts that

cross faults can be routed through pipe

buried in shallow loose fill or installed above

ground near the fault, to allow lateral and

longitudinal slippage.

1. Direct Damage

Basis: Damage curves for transmission

aqueducts of the water supply system are

based on ATC-13 data for FC 3, tunnels

passing through alluvium, and FC 61, canals

(see Figure B-64). Aqueducts are assumed

to be a-combination of 50% tunnels and

50% canals. Tunnels passing through

alluvium are less vulnerable than cut-andcover tunnels and more vulnerable than

Vulnerability Functions

-0

co

0

-DC) [I

0 

. _

Figure B-63

R= 50;x

R= 80/

DIr 60

247
Transmission Aqueduct

u tu,. I II I

61 O.so

Other

CA 7-

GA 3-6 V I)^ V 1 I V I ,XI P,-s- X

VI V11 Vill IX P.S. X

Modified Mercalli Intensity (MMI)

Figure B-64 Damage percent by intensity for transmission aqueducts.

tunnels passing through rock; they were

chosen as representative of all tunnels.

Standard construction is assumed to

represent typical California aqueducts under

present conditions (i.e., a composite of older

and more modern aqueducts). Only minimal

regional variation in construction quality of

aqueducts is assumed.

Present Conditions: In the absence of data

on the type of construction, age, etc., the

following factors were used to modify the

mean curves for the two facility classes listed

above, under present conditions:

NEHRP Map Area

California 7

California 3-6

Non-California 7

Puget Sound 5

All other areas

MM!

Intensity

Shift

FC 38

0

0

. 0

0

+1

FC 61

0

0

0

0

+1

Upgraded Conditions: For areas where it

appears cost-effective to improve facilities,

assume on a preliminary basis that upgrades

result in a beneficial intensity shift of one

unit (i.e., -1), relative to the above present

conditions.

Time-to-restoration: The time-torestoration data assigned to SF 30a,

transmission aqueducts, are assumed to

apply to all transmission aqueducts. By

combining these data with the damage

curves derived using the data from FC 38

and 61, the time-to-restoration curves shown

in Figures B-65 and B-66 were derived.

B.6.2 Pumping Stations

1. General

Description: Pumping equipment forms an

important part of the water supply system

transportation and distribution facilities. In

general, pumping stations include larger

stations adjacent to reservoirs and rivers,

and smaller stations distributed throughout

the water system intended to raise head.

Large pumping stations typically include

intake structures. Pumping stations typically

Appendix B: Lifeline Vulnerability Functions

80

a)

0)

E

0

PA-U.

248

-1-1 - - u=lnnz _

- En n.:n

ATC-25
Transnission queduct

,XI- I 0f -in

.61

a ra U.;)

9.50

MMI a

6 -1.8B1

7 -8.913

B -0.951

9 -8.922

fl -0. 40

1.718

0.599

0.545

8.354

0.142

R = ays a

I I T T I I

e ~90 12 150 186 218

Elapsed Time in Days

I i I -- -

240 27 3 330 365

Figure B-65 Residual capacity for transmission aqueducts (NEHRP Map Area: California 3-6, Californa

7, Non-California 7, and Puget Sound 5).

Thansnission Aueduct

.0

Cs

cc_ co

0 R 0

68 90 1201 158 180 218 240 278 308 330 365

Elapsed Time in Days

Figure B-66 Residual capacity for transmission aqueducts (All other areas).

ATC-25 Appendix B: Lilellne Vulnerability Functions 249

R1iB10. /

x

0

-o

1D

GU

R= 90Z

- .I

DAYS: 

> 5 5

. .11

ATC-25 Appendix B: Lifeline Vulnerability Functions 249
comprise shear-wall-type buildings, intake

structures, pump and motor units, pipes,

valves, and associated electrical and control

equipment. Requirements vary from small

units used to pump only a few gallons per

minute to large units capable of handling

several hundred cubic feet per second.

Vertical turbine (most common) and

displacement pumps are the two primary

types used. Horizontal centrifugal pumps,

air-lift and jet pumps, and hydraulic rams are

also used in special applications. Centrifugal

pumps have impellers, which impart energy

to the water. Displacement pumps are

commonly the reciprocating-type where a

piston draws water into a closed chamber

and then expels it under pressure. Pumps

may be in series or in parallel. Often an

emergency power supply comprising a

standby diesel generator, battery rack, and

diesel fuel tank is included in primary

pumping stations to operate in emergency

situations when electric power fails.

Typical Seismic Damage: Pumping stations

will suffer damage closely related to the

performance of the soils on which they are

constructed. Intake structures are typically

tower-type structures that are vulnerable to

inertial effects, and settlement and

landslides at bottoms of reservoirs and

rixcrs. Toppling of these towers allows

coarse sediment to enter the distribution

system, plugging pipelines and causing

extensive damage to pump bearings and

seals. Piping attached to heavy pump

structures is susceptible to damage caused

by differential settlement. Unanchored

electrical and control equipment may be

severely damaged. Pumps with long shafts

may suffer misalignment, and shafts may be

cracked or sheared by ground movement.

Pipe hangers may be damaged by relative

settlement of building and associated

equipment. Damage to substation

transformers can result in the loss of power.

Seismically Resistant Design: Seismically

resistant design practice includes avoiding

unstable soils in siting the pumping stations,

or providing foundations for structures and

equipment capable of resisting expected soil

failures without damage. Design of intake

structures should consider inertial forces

developed from self-mass and surrounding

water, and these structures should be built

on stable soil. Also, pumps and heavy

equipment should be provided with positive

means (anchorage) of resisting lateral

forces; base isolators should be used only

when adequate snubbers are provided.

Buildings enclosing plant equipment should

be designed with seismic provisions of local

or national building codes. The casings of

wells should be separated from the pump

house by at least 1 inch to allow for relative

movement and settlement. Pumps that are

hung from the motor at the top of the well

by a non-flexible drive shaft inside the pump

column are not recommended. Submersible

motor-driven, vertical turbine pumps do not

require the long drive shaft, and the need

for a perfectly straight well casing is

therefore eliminated. Horizontal pumps and

their motors should be mounted on a single

foundation to prevent differential

movement. Provisions for emergency power

should be made for pump stations critical to

systems operation.

1. Direct Damage

Basis: Damage curves for pumping stations

for the water system are based on ATC-13

data for FC 10, medium-rise reinforced

masonry shear wall buildings; FC 66,

electrical equipment, and FC 68, mechanical

equipment (see Figure B-67). FC 10 was

chosen to represent a generic building,

based on review of damage curves for all

buildings. Pumping stations are assumed to

be a combination of 30% generic buildings,

20% electrical equipment, and 50%

mechanical equipment.

Standard construction is assumed to

represent typical California pumping

stations for water systems under present

conditions (i.e., a composite of older and

more modern stations). Only minimal

regional variation in construction quality of

mechanical equipment is assumed, as

operational. loads frequently govern over

seismic requirements.

Present Conditions: In the absence of data

on the type of pumps, age, etc., the

following factors were used to modify the

mean curves for each of the three facility

Appendix B: Lifeline Vulnerability Functions ATC-25 250
Pumping Station (Water Supply)

60' 0.5a

66 0.20

Other

N-CA? 36

'A 5

VIII

Modified Mercalli ntensily (MMI)

Ix

Figure B-67 Damage percent by intensity for water supply pumping stations.

classes listed above, under present

conditions:

B.6.3 Storage Reservoirs

MM!

Intensity

Shift

FC I OFC 66 FC 68

o 0

+1 +1

+1 +1

*+1 +1

+2 +2

1

+1

Upgraded Conditions: For areas where it

appears cost-effective to improve facilities,

assume on a preliminary basis that upgrades

result in one or two beneficial intensity

shifts (ie., - or -2), relative to the above

present conditions.

Time-to-restoration: The time-torestoration data assigned to SF 30b,

pumping stations for water systems, are

assumed to apply to all pumping stations. By

combining these data with the damage

curves derived using the data for FC 10, 66,

and 68, the time-to-restoration curves shown

in Figures B-68 through B-70 were derived.

1. General

Description: In general, storage reservoirs

for the water system comprise earthfill,

rockfill, or concrete dams with gates,

spillways, conduit, tunnels, and intake

structures. Earthfill dams include an

impervious, core, typically a clay material,

transition zones, drains, and sand filters

adjacent to the core. Grout is frequently

provided under the impervious core in the

foundation material, and in the abutments

to prevent water penetration through cracks

and fissures in bedrock or flow through

permeable native soils. Rockfill dams

typically have concrete linings to prevent

water penetration. Concrete dam types

include gravity and arch. Roadways and/or

gantry cranes are commo nly located at the

crest of the dam.

Typical Seismic Damage: Most engineered,

mechanically compacted earthfill dams have

performed well in earthquakes. Additionally,

earthfill dams, constructed predominantly

Appendix B: Lifeline Vulnerability Functions

Dz=100/

CDcoD, 6;

(a

VI Ul" X

NEHRP Map Area

California 7

California 3-6

Non-California 7

Puget Sound 5

A1I other areas

I0 H - -

ATC-25 251
1.00 10 0.30

Go 0.so

66 0.20

M1i1 a b

6 0.223 0.165

7 0,190 8.876

8 0.142 0.036

9 0. 18 0.021

10 0.078 0.014

R = b * days a

30 60 90 120 150 180 210 248 270 388 330 365

Elapsed Time in Days

Residual capacity for water supply pumping stations (NEHRP California. 7).

Pumping Station (Wal

R= 0/. I

DAYS: 30 60

ter Supply)

10 8.30-

I I I I

120 158 180 210

Elapsed Time in Days

240 270 3 338 365

Figure B-69 Residual capacity for water supply pumping stations (NEHRP Map Area 3-6, NonCalifornia 7, and Puget Sound 5).

Appendix B: Lifeline Vulnerability Functions

R=1800

U R= so/: n

R.= S0 IIO

C

C

C

C

c

-

:

a:

Figure B-68

DAYS:

R=1

.

CO' a

CL'

_ RIrca

r 3Bb 1.00

68 8.58

66 0.20

11111 a b

6 0 .156 0.044

7 0.122 0,026

8 0.092 0.017

9 0.064 0.012

10 0.042 0.0B9

R = b days + a

l

l I l

252 ATC-25
Pumping Station (Water Supply) OCR. . 1tR R a n a SA

68 8.50

fis 8.20

MMT - ul

6

7

8

9

10

. 0.20S

0. 16

.8692

W8064

4i

08. 103

8. 044

A. 826

8.817

0.012

R b * days a

l~ l ~ ~ I 

90 128 190 188 218 240 278 308 338 365

Elapsed Time in Days

Figure B-70 Residual capacity for water supply pumping stations (All other areas).

with clayey soils have performed well. Dams

constructed of hydraulic fill using saturated,

poorly compacted, fine-grain cohesionless

material; dams constructed on natural

cohesionless deposits that are not as dense

as the embankments; and dams with

unusually steep embankments have

experienced failures in past earthquakes.

Dam embankments may respond to soil

failures by cracking (usually at the crest or

near the crest and abutments), spreading or

settling, or by slope stability failures. or zonal

separations. Liquefaction may occur in

saturated zones of cohesionless materials

that are loose or marginally compacted, such

as hydraulic fills. Both soil and rock

foundations may be damaged by fault

rupture, resulting in loss of continuity or

integrity of internal design features, (drains,

imperious zones, etc.) and water-release

features (conduit and tunnels). Earthquakeinduced landslides may block water outlet

features or spillways, Or cause waves that

overtop the dam and cause erosion. Where

cracks are opened in the embankment or

foundation, the danger of piping exists if

cracks remain open. Rockfill dams have

performed well, with some damage to

material near the crest of the dam.

Settlement of rockfill dams is also a

possibility. Concrete dams have also

performed well with little damage known.

Cracking of dams and foundation failures

are possible.

Seismically Resistant Design: Seismically

resistant design practices for earthfill dams,

include providing ample freeboard to allow

for settlement and other movements, and

using wide cores and transition zones

constructed of material resistant to cracking.

Current design typically used dynamic

analyses for all but small dams on stable

foundations. These analyses are used to

determine the liquefaction or strain

potential of embankments and foundations,

and to estimate the settlement of

embankments. Conservative crest details

include providing transition and shell zones

that extend to the crest to control any

seepage that develops through cracks, and

providing camber for static and dynamic

settlement. Conservative zoning consists of

providing confined clay cores, wide

cohesionless transitions, and free draining

shells. Reduction of embankment slopes and

elimination of embankment saturation

through linings can reduce susceptibility to

ATC-25 Appendix B: Lifeline Vulnerability Functions 253

3GO i~I to o..Ma D-4 GO1..

1

05

-CL

O'R= 907

-.. 

EC ~

DhYS: 30 60

L I I I L l l I

. . . . . . . . .

ATC-25 Appendix B: Lifeline Vulnerability Functions 253
Storage Reservoir

35 0.50-

36 a.5

Other

VI I Vi Vill Ix

Damage percent by intensity for storage reservoirs.

embankment failures. Seismically resistant

design of concrete dams includes thorough

foundation exploration and treatment, and

selection of a good geometrical

configuration. Dynamic analyses similar to

those used for earthfill dams may be used to

check designs, and to determine stresses and

cracking potential of dams and dam

appurtenances. Effective quality control is

necessary in the design and construction of

all dams. Stabilization of existing dams can

be achieved by buttressing, draining, or

reduction in reservoir storage. Potentially

liquefiable soils have been densified by

blasting, vibratory probing, adding backfill,

and driving compaction piles.

1. Direct Damage

Basis: Damage curves for storage reservoirs

in the water supply system are based on

ATC-13 data for FC 35, concrete dams, and

FC 36, earthfill or rockfill dams (see Figure

B-71). Storage reservoirs are assumed to be

a combination of 50% concrete dams and

50% earthfill or rockfill dams. If inventory

data identify dams as concrete, or earthfill or

rockfill, then the appropriate damage curves

will need to be developed (see ATC-13).

Standard construction is assumed to

represent typical California reservoirs (i.e., a

composite of older and more modern

reservoirs).

Present Conditions: In the absence of data

on the type of construction, age, etc., the

following factors were used to modify the

mean curves for each of the two facility

classes listed above, under present

conditions:

NEHRP Map Area

California 7

California 3-6

Non-California 7

Puget Sound 5

All other areas

MM/

Intensity

Shift

FC35 FC36

O o 0

0 0

+1 +1

+-1 +1

+2 +2

Upgraded Conditions: For areas where it

appears cost-effective to improve facilities,

assume on a preliminary basis that upgrades

254 Appendix B: Lifeline Vulnerability Functions ATC-25

a)

E

CZ

0a

Figure B-71

X

254 Appendix B, Lifeline Vulnerability Functions ATC-25
age fleservolr

1.a

r

au U..JU

38 8.58

li

7

8

9

to

aL

0.871

8D865

2.866 0.066

b

8.537

e . 94

e.833

8.819

= * das a

I t k I i 

90 128 158 1B 218 248 Z 78 388 330

Elapsed Time in ays

365

Residual capacity for storage reservoirs (NEHRP California 7).

result in a beneficial intensity shift of one

unit (i.e., -1), relative to the above present

conditions.

Time-to-restoration: The time-torestoration data assigned to SF 30c, storage

reservoirs for water supply systems, are

assumed to apply to all storage reservoirs.

By combining these data with the damage

curves derived using the damage data for FC

35 and 36, the time-to-restoration curves

shown in Figures B-72 through B-74 were

derived.

B.6.4 Treatment Plants

1. General

Description: Water treatment plants are

complex facilities. In general, the typical

water sources for a treatment plant are

shallow or deep wells, rivers, natural lakes,

and impounding reservoirs. Treatment

processes used depend on the raw-water

source and the quality of finished water

desired. Water from wells typically requires

the least treatment, and water from rivers

requires the most. Types of water treatment

plants include aeration, split treatment, or

chemical treatment plants. Flexibility and

room for growth are typically provided to

handle changing quality of water.

Consequently, plants commonly contain

components of different vintages and

construction types. Current pre-treatment

processes are screening, pre-sedimentation

or desilting, chemical addition, and aeration.

Components in the treatment process

include pre-sedimentation basins, aerators,

detention tanks, flocculators, clarifiers,

backwash tanks, conduit and channels, coalsand or sand filters, mixing tanks, settling

tanks, clear wells, and chemical tanks.

Processes used for flocculation include

paddle (most common in modem facilities),

diffused air, baffles (common in older

facilities), transverse or parallel shaft mixers,

vertical turbine mixers, and walking-beamtype mixers. Sedimentation basin

construction may vary from excavation in

the ground to a structure of concrete or

steel construction. Most modern

sedimentation basins are circular concrete

tanks (open or covered), equipped with

Appendix B: Lifeline Vulnerability Functions

*0

CL

co

EnCD

IC

B= S8Z

r= z.

DAYS: 0 60

Figure B-72

l l l : l j l S

INs a C14

ATC:-25 255
Storage Reservohi

- 30c, 1.00

68 98 120 150 188 218 ;

Elapsed Time in Days

40 278 300 338 365

Residual capacity for storage reservoirs (NEHRP Map Area: California 3-6, Non-California

7, and Puget Sound 5).

Storage Reservoir

DAYS: 30 68 90 120 158 188 218 Z40 270 308 330 365

Elapsed Time in Days

Residual capacity for storage reservoirs (All other areas).

256 Appendix B: Lifeline Vulnerability Functions ATC-25

co

o R= 5O

.D

a)

I~r:

R= 0;/

DAYS: 30

Figure B-73

. _

co CL

ma

2 R=_ SOV

:3

, 

C, En

.R= Ox

Figure B-74

I

1 

256 Appendix B: Lifeline Vulnerability Functions ATC-25
mechanical scrapers for sludge removal.

Depths typically vary from 8 to 12 feet and

diameters from 30 to 150 feet. Sludge

processing components include holding

tanks and clarifier thickeners. Control

equipment, pumps, piping, valves, and other

equipment are ypically housed in a control

building. Yard equipment generally includes

transformers and switchyard equipment.

Typical Seismic Damage: Structures and

equipment in water treatment plants are

vulnerable to settling of foundations,

especially when founded on fill. Differential

settlement of adjacent structures and

components supported on different

foundations is a particular problem Pipes

are vulnerable at locations where they

connect to or penetrate treatment

structures. Equipment such as pumps can be

damaged by loads imposed by piping when

differential settlement occurs. Channels and

large conduit connecting processing units

are subject to seismic damage from several

mechanisms, including differential

movement from inertial loading, differential

settlement, and increased lateral earth

pressures. Liquefaction may cause some

underground structures in areas of high

groundwater to float. Concrete basins and

tanks are subject to cracking and collapse of

walls and roofs. Pounding damage or

permanent movement may result in the

opening of expansion joints in basins.

Within basins, sloshing and wave action, as

well as shaking, can damage anchor bolts

and support members for reactors and rakes.

Building damage may range from dropped

suspended ceilings and cracks in walls and

frames to partial and total collapse.

Unanchored or improperly anchored

equipment may slide or topple, experiencing

damage or causing attached piping and

conduit to fail. Damage to substation

transformers can result in loss of power

supply.

Seismically Resistant Design: Seismically

resistant design includes providing capability

to bypass plant treatment and to provide

emergency chlorination in the event of

damage caused by an earthquake. An

emergency power system for the chlorine

injection, controls, and radios is a minimum

and if gravity flow is not possible, sufficient

emergency power to provide pumping

capacity must be available. Slopes adjacent

to the plant should be studied to ascertain

their stability, and mitigating measures

should be taken if necessary. Damage to

channels and conduit can be mitigated by

providing wall penetrations that allow for

differential settlement. Similarly, flexibility

should be provided in connections and

piping where they span across erypansion

joints or between structures on difterent

foundation types. Equipment damage can be

reduced by using cast-in-place bolts rather

than expansion anchors and using

equipment with a low center of gravity.

Equipment and piping should be protected

from falling debris. Building design should

satisfy the seismic requirements of the local

building code, as a minimum. Heavy

equipment such as sludge-processing

equipment should be located as low as

possible in the building. Horizontal tanks on

saddles should be restrained to saddles to

prevent slippage and rupture of attached

piping. Design of equipment immersed in

water (e.g., paddles, rakes, baffles) should

consider both inertial effects and those due

to sloshing of water. Design of such

equipment should also consider ease of

replacement. Vertical turbine pumps

hanging in tanks should be avoided if

possible--or designed for seismic loads, as a

minimum. Chlorine cylinders should be

strapped in place on snubbed chlorine

scales. Standard safety and shutdown

systems for gas and chemical systems should

be installed and properly maintained.

Routine checks are recommended to ensure

that valves are operable, and that stockpiles

of spare parts and tools are available. Basins

or structures founded on separate

foundation materials should have separate

foundations and should be separated by a

flexible joint. All critical piping (exclusive of

corrosive chemical systems) should be

welded steel.

2. Direct Damage

Basis: Damage curves for treatment plants

in the water supply system (see Figure B-75)

are based on ATC-13 data for C 10,

medium-rise reinforced masonry shear wall

buildings; C 41, underground liquid storage

tanks, and FC 68, mechanical equipment.

ATC-25 Appendix B: Lifeline Vulnerabilitly Functions 257
Treatment Plant (Water Supply)

Other

VI VII Viii IX

Modified Mercalli Intensity (MMI)

Damage percent by intensity for water supply treatment plants.

FC 10 was chosen to represent a generic

building, based on review of damage curves

for all buildings. Water treatment plants are

assumed to a combination of 20% generic

buildings, 30% underground storage tanks,

and 50% mechanical equipment.

Standard construction is assumed to

represent typical California treatment plants

under present conditions (i.e., a composite

of older and more modern treatment

plants). It is assumed that minimal regional

variation exists in construction quality of

underground storage tanks and mechanical

equipment. Seismic loads have little impact

on underground storage tank design, and

operational loads often govern over seismic

requirements in the design of mechanical

equipment.

Present Conditions: In the absence of data

on the type of material, age, etc., use the

following factors to modify the mean curves

for each of the three facility classes listed

above, under present conditions: 

NEHRP Map Area

California 7

California 3-6

Non-California 7

Puget Sound 5

All other areas

MM/

Intensity

Shift

FC 10FC41FC68

o 0 0

+1 0 0

+1 0 0

+1 0 0

+2 +1 +1

Upgraded Conditions: For areas where it

appears cost-effective to improve facilities,

assume on a preliminary basis that upgrades

result in a beneficial intensity shift of one

unit (i.e., -1), relative to the above present

conditions.

Time-to-restoration: The time-torestoration data assigned to SF 30d,

treatment plants in the water supply system,

are assumed to apply to all treatment plants.

By combining these data with the damage

curves derived using the data for FC 10, 41,

and 68, the time-to-restoration curves shown

in Figures B-76 through B-78 were derived.

Appendix B: Lifeline Vulnerability Functions

a)

0)

E D=S07

3

Figure B-75

X

258 ATC-25
atment Plant (Water Supply)

30d1 I.00 18 0.20

68 5.-5

41 0.3fi

7

8

18

a

8.809

* .836

0.865

8. 801

13.894

b

0.W11

0.172

.858

8. 22

8.811

R =b *days 

68 981 120 150 188 218

Elapsed Time in Days

240 2 3 38

Residuai capacity for water supply treatment plants NEHRP California 7).

:

u5

G

a

CaI

-a

Figure B-77 

B= x

b

0.404

5 891

80.838

B. 811

H.Hi

ys + 

lJAYS: 38 68 98 128 158 188 218

Elapsed Time in Days

248 270 388 338

Residual capacity for water supply treatment plants (NEHRP Map Area 3-6, NonCalifornia 7 and Puget Sound 5).

Appendix B: Lifeline Vulnerability Functions

5

H=1EB,

,S R= x

R= 13;:

DAYS: 3f

Figure B-76

35

I I I i I I : I , , ,

I

Rz=1E0

I I

ATC-25 259
Treatment Plant (Water Supply)

1.00 10 0.20

68 3.50

41 0.30

IHHI a b

6 0.051 0.091

7 0.870 0.830

8 0.085 B.01B

9 0.897 0.818

10 0.106 0. 006

B b * da9s + a

I I I 1

120 15 180 210 248

Elapsed Time in Days

I I 

270 300 330 365

Residual capacity for water supply treatment plants (All other areas).

B.6.5 Terminal ReservoirslTanks

1. General

Description: In general, terminal reservoirs

may be underground, on-ground, or

elevated storage tanks or impounding

reservoirs. Underground storage tanks are

typically reinforced or prestressed concrete

wall construction with either concrete or

wood roofs. They may be either circular or

rectangular. On-ground water supply

storage tanks are typically vertical anchored

and/or unanchored tanks supported at

ground level. Construction materials include

welded, bolted, or riveted steel; reinforced

or prestressed concrete; or wood. Tank

foundations may consist of sand or gravel, or

a concrete ring wall supporting the shell.

Elevated storage tanks consist of tanks

supported by single or multiple columns.

Most elevated tanks are steel and are

generally cylindrical or ellipsoidal in shape.

Multiple-column tanks typically have

diagonal braces, for lateral loads. Elevated

tanks are more common in areas of flat

terrain. There is large variation in tank sizes

(i.e., height and diameter), so volumes range

from thousands to millions of gallons.

Impounding reservoirs may be lined or

unlined, and with or without roofs.

Typical Seismic Damage: Failure modes for

underground tanks include damage to

concrete columns that support roofs,

sloshing damage to roofs, and cracking of

walls. In cases of liquefaction, empty tanks

can become buoyant and float upward,

rupturing attached piping. Impounding

reservoirs perform similarly to underground

tanks. At-ground tanks are subject to a

variety of damage mechanisms, including,

for steel tanks: (1) failure of weld between

base plate and wall, (2) buckling of tank wall

(elephant foot), (3) rupture of attached rigid

piping resulting from sliding or rocking of

tank, (4) implosion of tank caused by rapid

loss of contents and negative internal

pressure, (5) differential settlement, (6)

anchorage failure or tearing of tank wall, (7)

failure of roof-to-shell connection, (8)

failure of shell at bolts or rivets, and (9) total

collapse. Concrete tank failure modes

include: (1) failure of columns supporting

roofs, (2) spalling and cracking, and (3)

sliding at construction joints. Wood tanks

have not performed well in past earthquakes

and generally fail in a catastrophic manner.

Appendix B: Lifeline Vulnerability Functions

R-10 0

._

Ca

C) a)

cc

n n I A U S : 3

DAYS: 30

Figure B-78

I I

60 90

260 ATC-25

1- Uio I :

1 I I II
Elevated tanks typically fail as a result of

inadequate bracing or struts, although

column buckling or anchorage or

connection failure (clevises and gusset

plates) are common causes. If elevated tank

damage exceeds minor bracing or

connection failure, damage is usually

catastrophic- Piping and other

appurtenances attached to tanks can also

fail because of tank or pipe motion, causing

loss of contents.

Seismically Resistant Design: General

Seismically resistant design practices for

underground tanks include designing walls

for a combination of earth pressures and

seismic loads; densifyng the backfill used

behind the walls to reduce liquefaction

potential; designing columns supporting the

roof for seismic loads; tying the roof and

walls together; providing adequate

freeboard to prevent sloshing against the

roof; and recognizing the potential for

flotation and providing restraint Control of

buoyant forces can be achieved by tying the

tank to piles designed to resist uplift,

increasing the mass of the tank (e.g., provide

overburden on the roo, or providing a

positive drainage system. An annular space

that permits relative movement should be

provided where piping penetrates the wall.

Seismically resistant design practices for atground tanks include the use of flexible

piping, pressure relief valves, and wellcompacted foundations and reinforced

concrete ring walls that prevent differential

settlement. Adequate freeboard to prevent

sloshing against the roof should be

maintained. Good practices, for steel tanks

include providing positive attachment

between the roof and shell, stiffening the

bottom plate and its connection to the shell,

protecting the base plate against corrosion,

and avoiding abrupt changes in thickness

between adjacent courses. Properly detailed

ductile anchor bolts may be feasible on

smaller steel tanks. For concrete tanks,

keying and detailing to prevent sliding is

good practice. Columns supporting roofs

should be detailed to prevent brittle failures.

In areas where freeze-thaw cycles are a

problem, minimum strength requirements

that ensure durability should be met. For

wood tanks, Seismically resistant design

practices include increasing hoop capacity,

and anchoring or strapping the tank to the

foundation. Maintaining a height-todiameter ratio of between 0.3 and i07 for

tanks supported on-ground controls seismic

loading. Because the damage to elevated

tanks typically involves the supporting

structure rather than the supported vessel,

the primary Seismically resistant design

practices for elevated tanks are design of the

braces for adequate lateral loads, providing

adequate anchorage at the column bases,

connecting the tank to the frames that

support it for load transfer, and providing

flexibility in the attached piping to

accommodate expected motions. The

bracing system should be designed to yield

prior to connection failure. Rods used for

bracing should have upset threads with large

deformable washers under retaining nuts to

absorb energy.

2. Direct Damage

Basis: Damage curves for water supply

terminal reservoirs are based on ATC-13

data for FC 43, on-ground liquid storage

tanks (see Figure B-79),. On-ground storage

tanks, are less vulnerable than elevated

tanks, and more vulnerable than

underground tanks, and were chosen as

representative of existing terminal

reservoirs. If inventory data identify tanks as

underground or elevated, then use FC 41 or

45, respectively, in lieu of FC 43.

Standard construction is assumed to

represent typical California terminal

reservoirs under present conditions [i.e., a

composite of older, non-seismically designed

tanks as well as more modern tanks designed

to seismic requirements (e.g., AWWA

DI00, Appendix A)].

Present Conditions: In the absence of data

as to type of material, age etc., use the

following factors to modify the mean curves,

under present conditions:

NEHRP Map Area

California 7

California 3-6

Non-California 7

Puget Sound 5

All other areas

MMI

Intensity

Shift

0

+1

+1 ' +1

+2

ATCC:-25 Appendix B: Lifeline Vulnerability Functions 2,1
Terminal Reservoir (Storage

43 1.

Othi

WII III IX

Modified Mercalli Intensity (MMI)

Damage percent by intensity for water supply terminal reservoirs/storage tanks.

Upgraded Conditions: For areas where it

appears cost-effective to improve facilities,

assume on a preliminary basis that upgrades

result in one or two beneficial intensity

shifts (i.e., -1 or -2), relative to the above

present conditions.

Time-to-restoration: The time-torestoration data assigned to SF 30e, terminal

reservoirs for water supply, are assumed to

apply to all tanks. By combining these data

with the damage curves for FC 43, the timeto-restoration curves shown in Figures B-80

through B-82 are derived.

B.6.6 Trunk Lines

1. General

Description: In general, trunk lines may be

underground, on-ground, or supported on

elevated frames above ground. However,

most trunk lines in the water supply system

are located underground. Pipe materials

include cast iron, welded steel, riveted steel,

concrete-lined steel, asbestos cement, and

plastic. Newer trunk lines (typically 20

inches or more in diameter) are usually

welded steel or reinforced concrete and may

carry water at high pressures (several

hundred psi). Joints in steel pipes may be

welded or bell-and-spigot types. Except in

areas of freezing, backfill measured from the

pipe crown is typically between 2.5 and 4.5

feet. In addition to the pipes themselves,

trunk lines include a number of other

components. Pipelines may require gate

valves, check valves, air-inlet release valves,

drains, surge control equipment, expansion

joints, insulation joints, and manholes.

Check valves are normally located on the

upstream side of pumping equipment and at

the beginning of each rise in the pipeline to

prevent back flow. Gate valves are used to

permit portions of pipe or check valves to be

isolated. Air-release valves are needed at

the high points in the line to release trapped

gases and to vent the lines to prevent

vacuum formation. Drains are located at low

points to permit removal of sediment and

allow the conduit to be emptied. Surge tanks

or quick-opening valves provide relief for

problems of hydraulic surge.

Appendix B: Lifeline Vulnerability Functions

D=180v

80

a) 0)

ca D=507

E

a

1V

Figure B-79

X

262 ATC-25
ninal Reservoir (Storage Tank)

,o- 4 an AS 4 ra -Uc .Inju tzl J. ULJ

6

7

8

9

le

a

0.26Z

E. 264

8.253

8.236

0.802

b

1.347 0,72

.22

a.878

0.827

R =b * days + a

60 9 128 1581 1B8 218

Elapsed Time in Days

I j I T

24a 278 3 330

Residual capacity-for water supply terminal reservoirsgstorage tanks NEHRP California 7).

minal Reservoir (Storage Tank) _ _ IR 11 aR I ' 4 via - -*.I f l .L.ZJMII &

6 8.264

7 1,'258

,B . 236

9 2.282

18 - 43

.757

8.220

0.878

8,827

E.821

R =b * days + a

I I i i i R= 8 

DAYS: I I I I I I I I 68 90 128 15 113 218 240 278 388 330

Elapsed Time in Days

365

Residual capacity for water supply terminal reservoirs/storage tanks (NEHRP Map Area 3-

6, Non-California 7, and Puget Sound 5).

Appendix B: Lifeline Vulnerability Functions

L;

c

W:

n

C,

La

DAYS: 30

Figure B-80

R=128O

. _

a

C. C

0

FU

Figure B-81

R I i J ! § { { *' x l

ATC-25 23
I R=10fly

.-

(ac)

o R= S8,

:m

-a

Cn

(U)

D- AR,

nal Reservoir (Storage Tank) I M AO 4A 4 R R -

U- U. I I , I I I I I I

DAYS: 3 60 90 120 15R 180 210 240 270 300 330 365

Elapsed Time in Days

Figure B-82 Residual capacity for water supply terminal reservoirs/storage tanks (All other areas).

Typical Seismic Damage: The performance Seismically Resistant Design: Seismically

of pipelines is strongly dependent on *resistant design practices for trunk lines

whether or not the supporting or include the use of ductile pipe materials,

surrounding soil fails. Failure of a piping such as steel, ductile iron, copper, or plastic.

system resulting from inertial loads only is The performance of welded steel pipelines

rare; more typically differential settlement is dependent upon the quality of welds, with

or severe ground failure (e.g., landslide, more modern pipes generally having

liquefaction, faulting) causes damage. superior welds. Use of flexible joints (e.g.,

Regional uplift can alter the hydraulic bell-and-spigot with rubber gaskets,

characteristics of a transmission system mechanical joints, expansion joints, rubber

rendering it nonfunctional. Pipe damage is or metallic bellows, and ball joints) and

most common in soft alluvial soils or at placement of pipes in dense native or

interfaces between soft and firm soils. Types compact soil not subject to liquefaction,

of pipe damage include bending or crushing slides, or surface rupture will mitigate much

of the pipe, shearing of the pipe, of the potential damage. Special precautions

compressional buckling, soil deposits in the should be taken to reduce earthquake

pipe, circumferential and longitudinal effects at pumping plants, tanks, bay or river

cracks, and joint failure. It has frequently crossings, and fault crossings. Shut-off valves

been observed that pipelines with rigid should be installed near active fault zones so

joints fail more frequently than those with that flow can be stopped if the pipeline

flexible joints. Damage has been substantial crossing is damaged. Trunk lines at fault

at locations of local restraint such as crossings should be located in a sacrificial

penetrations to heavy subsurface structures tunnel or culvert, or lubricated, wrapped in

(including manholes), tees, and elbows. sheathing, or buried in shallow loose fill,

Water hammer induced by ground motions installed or above ground near the fault to

can cause damage by temporarily increasing allow lateral and longitudinal slippage.

pressure in pipelines. Anchors such as thrust blocks or bends

264 Appendix B: Lifeline Vulnerability Functions ATC-25

- Ie L.IJU *ta L.nU

MII a b

6 0.258 0.220

7 0.236 0,870

B 0.002 0.827

9 -8.413 8.021

10 -0.534 .017

R b * days + a

1 I I I I I I
bpk=20

IDG

E

by k=ia

m

0)

V)

bipk=O

runk Lines

VI lii VIII

Modified Mercalli Intensity (MM

Figure B-83 Damage percent by intensity for water supply trunk lines.

should be excluded within a distance of 300 (between 4

feet of a fault zone and strengthened pipe generally mc

should be used within the zone. Valve because of tL

spacing near fault zones, or in areas of assumed tha

expected soil failure should be reduced. approximate

Proper maintenance and cathodic use of one d

protection to limit corrosion, which weakens + 1).

pipes, is important for mitigating damage.

Supports for on- or above ground piping Standard coi

should provide restraint in all three represent y

orthogonal directions by using ring girders, under prese

and spacing between adjacent trunk lines of older and

should be sufficient to prevent pounding. minimal regi

Use of pressure relief valves can mitigate construction

damage caused by water hammer.

Redundancy should be built into the system Present Con

whenever possible; several smaller pipes on the type 

should be used in lieu of one large pipe. Any the followin

equipment attached to piping should be the mean cu

properly anchored.

2. Direct Damage

Basis: Damage curves for trunk lines in the

water supply system are based on ATC-13

data for FC 31, underground pipelines (see

Figure B-83). Distribution pipelines,

Ix

I13

and 20 inches in diameter) are

)re susceptible to damage

heir construction type, and it is

t their behavior can be

:d using these data through the

etrimental intensity shift (i.e.,

Instruction is assumed to

Dpical California trunk lines

ant conditions (ie., a composite

-more modern trunk lines). Only

onal variation in the

quality is assumed.

ditions: In the absence of data

)f material, diameter, age, etc.,

g factors were used to modify

rves, under present conditions:

NFHRP Map Area

California 7

California 3-6

Non-California 7

Puget Sound 5

All other areas

MM/

Intensity

Shift

0

0

0

0

+1

Appendix B: Lifeline Vulnerability Functions

.

ATC:-25 26.5
>xx

R2 100

*018

.

coQ

-F Rz So

-o

a<)

c:

U -- . I

DAYS: 30 68

Trunk Lines .

30F 1.00 31

I I1 I I I 

90 120 150 180 210 Z40

Elapsed Time in Days

Figure B-84 Residual capacity for water supply trur

California 7, Non-California 7, and Put

Upgraded Conditions: It is not costeffective or practical to upgrade existing

trunk lines in the water supply system,

except perhaps at fault crossings or in areas

of extremely unstable soils. Therefore, no

intensity shifts for retrofitting are

recommended.

Typical Seismic Damage: The time-torestoration data assigned to SF 30f, trunk

lines, are assumed to apply to all trunk lines

in the water supply system. By combining

these data with the damage curves for FC

31, the time-to-restoration curves shown in

Figures B-84 and B-85 were derived.

Distribution line restoration will take longer

based on prioritization of work. It is

assumed that restoration of distribution lines

will take approximately twice as long as

restoration of trunk lines.

I .00

27 3 338 365

ik lines (NEHRP Map Area: California 3-6,

get Sound 5).

B.6. 7 Wells

1. General

Description: The collection of groundwater

is accomplished primarily. through the

construction of wells or infiltration galleries.

A well system is generally composed of three

elements: the well housing structure, the

motor/pump, and the discharge piping. The

well system may or may not be located in a

well house.. The well contains an open

section (typically a perforated casing or

slotted metal screen) through which flow

enters and a casing through which the flow is

transported to the ground surface. Vertical

turbine pumps are often used for deep wells.

Typical Seismic Damage: Well casings will

move with the surrounding soils. This

movement can result in damage to pumps

and/or discharge lines without flexible

couplings. Additional problems include

fluctuation in production (disruption of

aquifer), bad sanding conditions due to local

soil disturbance (mostly in older wells with

Appendix B: Lifeline Vulnerability Functions

MII a b

6 0.002 0.449

7 0.883 8.449

8 8.109 0.176

9 8.880 0.212

10 0.143 0.074

R b * days + a

I 

- I use I

266 ATC-25
20

-a

C_

U

C:

DAYS: 38

Trunk Lines

S3Br 1. 31

MII

6

7

R

to

in

.f

aE . 03

B . 9

0.143

2. 179

b

B .449

E . 176

..212

0. 874

E.034

R = b * ays + a

I I l I I I

60 90 126 158I 1 216

Elapsed Time in Days

I I i i

248 272 380 338 365

Residual capacity for water supply trunk lines (All other areas).

insufficient screen design), kinked tubing,

and collapse of the casing. The well shaft

can be crushed or sheared off by ground

displacement across, the shaft or by ground

vibration. Wells may be contaminated by

inflow from nearby sewers, septic tanks, and

cesspools that are damaged by the

earthquake. Damage to substation

transformers can result in loss of power

supply.

Seismically Resistant Design: As seismic

design practices may include providing

double casing at depths below where

horizontal movement is expected.

Submersible pumps/motors have a greater

probability of remaining in service than do

pumps connected to motors at the surface

with drive shafts. Because the well casing

will respond differently than the slab of the

surrounding well house, a flexible separation

joint should be provided between the casing

and the slab. Effects of differential

movement and settlement can be mitigated

by providing a flexible joint between the

pump discharge header and the discharge

piping. Other electrical and mechanical

equipment should be provided with

adequate seismic anchorage. The wellhousing structure should be designed with

seismic provisions of local or national

building codes.

2. Direct Damage

Basis: Damage curves for wells in the water

supply system (see Figure B-&6) are based

on ATC-13 data for FC 68, mechanical

equipment. It is believed that this facility

class best approximates the expected

performance of wells, which typically

comprise a vertical pump in a shaft.

Standard construction is assumed to

represent typical California wells under

present conditions (i.e., a composite of older

and more modern wells). Only minimal

regional variation in the construction quality

is assumed.

Present Conditions: In the absence of data

on the type of pump, etc., the following

factors were used to modify the mean

curves, under present conditions:

Appendix B: Lifeline Vulnerability Functions

Figure B-85

r fRR

i

D_ a.- M= M-f n- oz.

ATC-25 27
V1

Uell

68 1.00

Other id

/ ~CA7 ,

~ CA 3 -6 - - N~on-CA 7

P.S. 

1)11 VI11 Ix X

Modified Mercalli Intensity (MMI)

Figure B-86 Damage percent by intensity for wells.

MMI

Intensity

NEHRP Map Area Shift

California 7 0

California 3-6 0

Non-California 7 0

Puget Sound 5 0

All other areas +1

Upgraded Conditions: For areas where it

appears cost-effective to improve facilities,

assume on a preliminary basis that upgrades

result in a beneficial intensity shift of one

unit (i.e., -1), relative to the above present

conditions.

Time-to-restoration: The time-torestoration data assigned to SF 30b,

pumping stations in the water supply system,

are assumed to apply to all wells. By

combining these data with the damage

curves for FC 68, the time-to-restoration

curves shown in Figures B-87 and B-88 were

derived.

B.7 Sanitary Sewer

B. 7.1 Mains

1. General

Description: In general, mains in the

sanitary sewer system are underground

pipelines that normally follow valleys or

natural streambeds. Valves and manholes

are also included in system. Pipe materials

commonly consist of cast iron, vitrified clay

concrete, asbestos cement pipe, brick, and

bituminized fiber. Pipe diameters are

generally greater than 4 inches. Joint

materials include welded bell-and spigot,

rubber gasket, lead caulking, cement

caulking, and plastic compression rings.

Bolted flange couplings are also sometimes

used. Manholes are typically provided at

changes in direction or pipe size, or where

flow is received from collecting sewers.

Wastewater pipelines are usually designed

as open channels except where lift stations

are required to overcome topographic

barriers. Sometimes the sanitary sewer

Appendix B: Lifeline Vulnerability Functions

0

a)

0)

E

(6

D=SOY

268 ATC-25
Uell

- 30h

Ii

E

IE

EB 98 i2o 158 is8 218

Elapsed Time in Days

30

a 0

17 0.2k,

39 0.89

56 0.4:

28 8.8 z

3E6 0.011

&ays a

3

248 278 38 338

Residual capacity for wells (NEHRP Map Area: California 3-6, California 7, Non-California

7, and Puget Sound 5).

WelI

IaL

_

o

-o

a) -

R= l S 3 I

DAYS: 30

1.80 68 1.00

LMI

6

7

8

9

1o8

a

8.199

80 15

8 .120

lEl. I68G

El . 62

b,

0.043

8.816

0.0L2

R = b * days + a

I t I I I I I

5Q 9l 120; 155 1BO 218

Elapsed Time in Days

240 278 38 330 365

Figure B-88 Residual capacity for wells (All other areas).

Appendix B: Lifeline Vulnerability Functions

5

C,

') R= 5Ez

;a

R= y

DAYS: 38

Figure B-87

I I L

. L

I I 

.IUD

. . . .

ATC-25. 2.69
system flow is combined with the storm

water system prior to treatment.

Typical Seismic Damage: The performance

of pipelines is strongly dependent on

whether or not the surrounding soil fails

(e.g., landslide, liquefaction, or fault

rupture). Pipe damage is most common in

soft alluvial soils or at interfaces between

soft and firm soils. Failure of piping caused

by inertial loads is uncommon. Potential

types of damage include pipe crushing and

cracking caused by shearing and

compression; joint breaking because of

excessive deflection or compression; joints

pulling open in tension; and changes in

sewer grade, causing reduced flow capacity.

Tension and compression failures at joints

because of soil movement have been

common. Flexible joints have suffered

significantly less damage than rigid joints.

Welded bell-and-spigot joints have.

performed poorly when subjected to

longitudinal stress. Cast-iron pipes with

rubber gaskets or lead-caulked joints have

accommodated movements better than

those caulked with cement, but may still pull

apart with major soil movements.

Seismically Resistant Design: Seismically

resistant design practices for mains in the

sewer system include the use of flexible

joints (e.g., butt-welded and double-welded

joints, restrained-articulated joints, and

restrained bell-and-spigot joints with ring

gaskets on a short length of pipe section),

and avoiding longitudinally stiff couplings

such as cement or lead-caulked, plain belland-spigot, and bolted flange. Placement of

mains in dense native or compact soil not

subject to liquefaction, slides, or surface

rupture will mitigate much of the potential

damage. Special precautions should be

taken to reduce earthquake effects at fault

crossings. Main lines at fault crossings can

be located in a sacrificial tunnel or culvert,

or lubricated, wrapped in sheathing, buried

in shallow loose fill, or installed above

ground near the fault to allow lateral and

longitudinal slippage. Anchors such as bends

should be excluded within a distance of 300

feet of a fault zone and strengthened pipe

should be used within the zone. Isolation

valves should be placed near fault zones or

in areas of expected soil failure. Proper

maintenance to limit corrosion of metal

pipes, which weakens pipes, is important to

mitigate damage. Any equipment attached

to piping should be properly anchored.

2. Direct Damage

Basis: Damage curves for mains in the

sanitary sewer system are based on ATC-13

data for FC 31, underground pipelines (see

Figure B-89). In general, mains in the.

sanitary sewer system are more vulnerable

than those used in other systems because of

the construction materials used. Unlike the

water supply system, larger pipes generally

operate at lower pressures and thus are of

similar construction quality to the smaller

pipes. Consequently, the above damage

curves may be used for all pipelines in the

sanitary sewer system.

Standard construction is assumed to

represent typical California mains in the

sanitary sewer system under present

conditions (i.e., a composite of older and

more modern mains). Only minimal regional

variation in the construction quality is

assumed.

Present Conditions: In the absence of data

on the type of material, diameter, age, etc.,

the following factors were used to modify

the mean curves, under present conditions:

NEHRP Map Area

California 7

California 3-6

Non-California 7

Puget Sound 5

All other areas

MMI

Intensity

Shift

+1

+1

+1

+1

+2

Upgraded Conditions: It is not costeffective or practical to upgrade existing

mains in the sewer system, except perhaps at

fault crossings or in areas of extremely

unstable soils. Therefore, no intensity shifts

for retrofitting are recommended.

Time-to-restoration: The time-torestoration data assigned to SF 31a, effluent

and main sewer lines, are assumed to apply

to all distribution lines. By combining these

data with the damage curves for FC 31, the

time-to-restoration curves shown in Figures

270 Appendix B: Lifeline Vulnerability Functions ATC-25

270 Appendix B: Lifeline Vulnerability Functions: ATC-25-
Mains/Lines

bpk=20

ID

E

a

0

a-

_CCL

bpk=8

31

VI UVI VIII IX

Modified Mercalli Intensity (MMI)

Damage percent by intensity for sanitary sewer mains/lines.

B-'90 and B-91 were derived. Collector pipe

restoration will take longer because of its

relatively lower priority. It is assumed that

restoration of collector lines will take

approximately twice as long as restoration of

the mains.

B. 7.2 Pumping Stations

1. General

Description: Pumping stations or lift

stations are typically used to transport

accumulated wastewater from a low point in

the collection system to a treatment plant.

Pumping stations consist primarily of a wet

well, which intercepts incoming flows and

permits equalization of pump loadings, and

a bank of pumps, which lift the wastewater

from the wet well. The centrifugal pump

finds widest use at pumping stations. Lift

stations are commonly located in small,

shear-waIl-type buildings.

Typical Seismic Damage: Pumping stations

will suffer damage closely related to the soil

materials on which they are constructed.

Because of their function, these stations are

typically located in low-lying areas of soft

alluvium where soil failures may occur.

Buildings housing stations may experience

generic building damage ranging from

cracking of walls and frames to collapse, and

unanchored electrical and mechanical

control equipment may topple and slide,

experiencing damage and tearing piping and

conduit connections. Piping attached to

heavy pump/motor equipment structures is

susceptible to damage caused by differential

settlement. Pumps/motors may also

experience damage as a result of differential

settlement. Damage to substation

transformers can result in a loss of power

supply.

Seismically Resistant Design: Seismically

resistant design practice includes avoiding

unstable soils whenever possible and

addressing problems of expected differential

settlement and liquefaction in the design of

foundations. Flexibility of pipelines should

be provided when pipes are attached to two

separate structures on different foundations.

Annular space should be provided at pipe

Appendix B: Lifeline Vulnerability Functions

Figure B-89

K

ATC-25 271
R=tfloy

(a

(a

t) R= 5v -

I)

a:

DAYS: 30 60

Ha ins/Lines

-1 a n n 4 o

i i i

9gY 128 150 180 210

Elapsed Time in Days

I I I~~~~~~~~~~~

Z48 270 300 330 365

Residual capacity for sanitary sewer mains/lines (NEHRP Map Area: California 3-6,

California 7, Non-California 7, and Puget Sound 5).

Hains/Lines

1 II u 1 I R R -

Mll a

6 -0.173

7 -0.244

B -0.061

9 0.829

18 B. 09?

b

0.134

0.161

0.055

8.026

0.013

R = b days a

O I i I I I I I I i

DAYS: 30 6 90 120 150 180 210 240 270 300 330 365

Elapsed Time in Days

Figure B-91 Residual capacity for sanitary sewer mains/lines (All other areas).

Appendix B: Lifeline Vulnerability Functions

titl a *b

6 -8.517 0.355

7 -0.173 0.134

B -8.244 0.161

9 -8.861 0 .855

10 0.029 H.026

R = b * days + a

Figure B-90

>o

M

0 R= 50:v ('3

-0

co

a

:

- JeI .OU -. - uu

I I I I

- illd ~.U J]L I .....

BR=

272 ATC-25
Pumping Station Sanitary Sewer)

Other

UI lUJI 'JII IX X

Modified Mercalli ntensity (MMi)

Damage percent by intensity for sanitary sewer pumping stations.

penetrations in massive structures. to

prevent pipe damage in the event of

differential settlement. All mechanical and

electrical equipment should be anchored

and equipment on isolators properly

snubbed. Buildings housing equipment

should be designed in accordance with

seismic provisions of a local or national

building code. Provisions for emergency

power should be made for pumping stations

critical to systems operation.

2. Direct Damage

Basis: Damage curves for pumping stations

for the sanitary sewer system (see Figure B92) are based on ATC-13 data for FC 10,

medium-rise reinforced masonry shear wall

buildings; FC 66, electrical equipment, and

FC 68, mechanical equipment (see attached

figure). FC 10 was chosen to represent a

generic building, based on review of damage

curves for all buildings. Pumping stations are

assumed to be a combination of 30%

generic buildings, 20% electrical equipment,

and 50% mechanical equipment. Pumping

plants in the sewage system are assumed to

be located in poor soil areas. Consequently,

the detrimental intensity shift indicated

below for mechanical and electrical

equipment is assumed appropriate.

Standard construction is assumed to

represent typical California pumping

stations for sanitary sewer systems under

present conditions (i.e., a composite of older

and more modern stations). Only minimal

regional variation in construction quality of

mechanical equipment is assumed.

Present Conditions: In the absence of data

on the type of pumps, age, etc., the

following factors were used to modify the

mean curves, for each of the threefacility

classes listed above, under present

conditions:

NEHRP Map Area

California 7

California 3-6

Non-California 7

Puget Sound 5

All other areas

MMI

intensity

Shift

FC 10FC 66FC 68

0 0 +1

+1 +1 +1

+1 +1 +1

+1 +1 +1

+2 +2 +2

Appendix B: Lifeline Vulnerability Functions

D4Ei117

.0

a

C' D=SB7

E

Ca C

Figure B-92

ATC-25 273
Pumping Station (Sanitary Sewer)

31b 1.00 1 0.30

60 0.50

166 0.20

M111

6

7

8

9

10

a

-0.146

-0.189

-0.232

-8.261

-0.280

b

0. 182

0,887

0.043

0.026

1.018

R = b * days a

B= en; "I l l i l l l li lI

DAYS: 3 68 90 120 ISO 180 210 240 27 3 330 365

Elapsed Time in Days

Residual capacity for sanitary sewer pumping stations (NEHRP California 7).

Upgraded Conditions: For areas where it

appears cost-effective to improve facilities,

assume on a preliminary basis that upgrades

result in a beneficial intensity shift of one

unit (i.e., -1), relative to the above present

conditions.

Time-to-restoration: The time-torestoration data assigned to SF 31b, booster

pumping and main sewer pumping stations,

are assumed to apply to all pumping stations

in the sanitary sewer system. By combining

these data with the damage curves derived

using the data for FC 10, 66, and 68, the

time-to-restoration curves shown in Figures

B-93 through B-95 were derived.

B.7.3 Treatment Plants

1. General

Description: Treatment plants in the

sanitary sewer system are complex facilities

which include a number of buildings

(commonly reinforced concrete) and

underground or on-ground reinforced

concrete tank structures or basins. Common

components at a treatment plant include

trickling filters, clarifiers, chlorine tanks, re274 Appendix B: Lifelinc

circulation and wastewater pumping

stations, chlorine storage and handling,

tanks, and pipelines. Concrete channels are

frequently used to convey the wastewater

from one location to another within the

complex. Within the buildings are

mechanical, electrical, and control

equipment, as well as piping and valves.

Conventional wastewater treatment consists

of preliminary processes (pumping,

screening, and grit removal), primary settling

to remove heavy solids and floatable

materials, and secondary biological aeration

to metabolize and flocculate colloidal and

dissolved organics. Waste sludge may be

stored in a tank and concentrated in a

thickener. Raw sludge can be disposed of by

anaerobic digestion and vacuum filtration,

with centrifugation and wet combustion also

currently used. Additional preliminary

treatments (flotation, flocculation, and

chemical treatment) may be required for

industrial wastes. Preliminary treatment

units vary but generally include screens to

protect pumps and prevent solids from

fouling grit-removal units and flumes.

Primary treatment typically comprises

sedimentation, which removes up to half of

the suspended solids. Secondary treatment

Vulnerability Functions ATC-25

RAHt8Wz

B= 50x

*0

M

a

0: )

-DIr0)

Figure B-93

I'/!

? Vulnerability Functions ATC-25
Pumping Station (Sanitary Sewer) Q1 L 4 00 Jfl s

Go 8.53

66 0.20

mfl

6

7

8

9

18

a

-0. 163

-0 .216

-8.24B

-8.272

-H.2RB

b

3. 131

0. 833

2.821

O. 815

R b = * days + 

I I I II- I I

68 98 128 158 18 218 248 Z78 388 330

Elapsed Time in Days

365

Residual capacity for sanitary sewer pumping stations (NEHRP Map Area: California 3-6r

Non-California 7, and Puget Sound 5.

Pumping Station (Sanitary Sewer) ,1 L 4 -R . i} - -i

G2 0.58

66 8.28

Ml a

6 -0 .2Ih

7 -2,248

8 -0. 27Z

9 -8.200

111 -. 381

b

3E. 57

B .833

H. 821

8.815

8.812

R = b * aays + a

DAYS: 30 68

I I iI

98 128 158 188 210 240 278 308 338

Elapsed Time in Days

365

Residual capacity for sanitary sewer pumping stations (All other areas).

ATC-25 Appendix B: Liteline Vulnerability Functions 275

0

co

U

r42

e0

E= 0Z

R= O/x

DAYS: 30

Figure B-94

o - iC

-

m 

B= 8ot

Figure B-95

i l l l l | | E

i l l l l

a- R I . 11 . i-- . - - I- ,

1 -i I i1 i1 I i 1

ATC-25 .Appendix B: Lifeline Vulnerability Functions 275
removes remaining organic matter using

activated-sludge processes, trickling filters,

or biological towers. Chlorination of

effluents is commonly required.

Typical Seismic Damage: Sanitary sewer

treatment plants are commonly located in

low-lying areas on soft alluvium.

Consequently, soil failure (e.g., liquefaction

or settlement) is common. Many of the

heavy structures are supported on

foundations that include piles. Differential

settlements between these structures and

structures not supported on piles will result

in damage to pipes or conduit, especially at

structure penetrations. Liquefaction may

cause some underground structures to float

in areas of high groundwater. Pumps and

other equipment can be damaged by loads

imposed by piping when differential

settlement occurs. Generic building damage

ranging from cracked walls and frames to

collapse may occur. Unanchored equipment

may slide or topple, rupturing attached

piping and conduit. Damage to substation

transformers can result in a loss of power

supply. Damage as the result of sloshing or

wave action is likely in basins that contain

rotating equipment or other moving devices.

Basin walls may crack or collapse. Pounding

damage or permanent movement may result

in the opening of expansion joints in basins.

Seismically Resistant Design: Seismically

resistant design practice includes siting

treatment plants in areas of stable soil, or

designing foundations and systems to

perform adequately in the event of expected

soil failure. Each structure should be

supported on one foundation type only if

adjacent structures have different

foundation types; structures should be

adequately separated; and piping and other

systems spanning between structures should

be provided with adequate flexibility to

accommodate relative motions. Piping

should be provided with annular space

where it penetrates heavy structures to

accommodate settlement. Buildings should

be designed in accordance with the seismic

requirements of a local or national building

code. Walls for all basins should be designed

for a combination of soil and hydrodynamic

pressures, taking into consideration the

possibility of soil failure. All backfills should

be compacted properly to avoid liquefaction.

If buoyant loading is possible, foundations

should be designed to resist such loading.

All equipment should be properly anchored,

and equipment on base isolators properly

snubbed. Arms, rakes, and other equipment

in basins should be designed for

hydrodynamic forces associated with

sloshing. Embankment stability and

considerations for buried piping should be

taken into account for sewage outfalls.

Outfall diffusers are also subjected to

hydrodynamic forces, which should be

included in design consideration.

2. Direct Damage

Basis: Damage curves for treatment plants

in the sanitary system are based on ATC-13

data for FC 10, medium-rise reinforced

masonry shear wall buildings; FC 41,

underground liquid storage tanks; and FC

68, mechanical equipment (see Figure B96). FC 10 was chosen to represent a

generic building, based on review of damage

curves for all buildings. Sanitary sewer

treatment plants are assumed to a

combination of 20% generic buildings, 30%

underground storage tanks, and 50%

mechanical equipment. Treatment plants in

the sewage system are assumed to be located

in poor soil areas. Consequently, the

detrimental intensity shift indicated below

for mechanical equipment is assumed

appropriate.

Standard construction is assumed to

represent typical California treatment plants

under present conditions (i.e., a composite

of older and more modern treatment

plants). It is assumed that minimal regional

variation exists in construction quality of

underground storage tanks and mechanical

equipment. Seismic loads have little impact

on underground storage tank design, and

operational loads often govern over seismic

requirements in the design of mechanical

equipment.

Present Conditions: In the absence of data

on the type of construction, age, etc., the

following factors were used to modify the

mean curves for each of the three facility

classes listed above, under present

conditions:

276 Appendix B: Lifeline Vulnerability Functions ATC-25
Treatment

60 8.50

41 al30

liII 14ll IX

Modified Mercalli Intensity {MMI}

Damage percent by intensity for sanitary sewer treatment plants.

MM

intensity

Shift

FC 18FC 41 FC 68

o +1 +1

+1 +1 +1

+1 +1 +1

+1 +1 +1

+2 +2 +2

Upgraded Conditions: For areas where it

appears cost-effective to improve facilities,

assume on a preliminary basis that upgrades

result in a beneficial intensity shift of one

unit, relative to the above present.

conditions.

Time-to-restoration: The time-torestoration data assigned to SF 3 ic,

treatment plants in the sanitary sewer

system, are assumed to apply to all

treatment plants- By combining these data

with the damage curves derived using data

for FC 1 41, and 68, the time-torestoration curves shown in Figures B-97

through B-99 were derived.

B.8 Natural Gas

B.8.1 Transmission Lines

1. General

Description: In general, transmission lines

in the natural-gas system are located

underground, except where they cross rivers

or gorges, or where they emerge for

connection to compressor or pumping

stations. They are virtually always welded

steel and operate at high pressures.

Transmission pipelines range between 2 and

25 inches in diameter, but most are larger

than 12 inches. Shut-off valves, which

automatically function when line pressure

drops below a certain threshold pressure,.

are frequently included.

Typical Seismic Damage: The performance

of pipelines is strongly dependent on

whether or not the supporting soil fails,

Routes are often selected along the edges of

river channels to avoid urban buildup and

street crossings and to simplify the

acquisition of real estate. Such routes have

high liquefaction potential. Failures in the

past have typically occurred at sharp vertical

Appendix B: Lifeline Vulnerability Functions

.0

E

a

D=Cx

HI

Figure B-96

X

NEHRP Map Area

California 7

California 3-6

Non-California 7

Puget Sound 5

All other areas

ATC-25 277
DAYS: 36 Go 90 120 ISO 18O 210 240 270 386 338 365

Elapsed Time in Days

Residual capacity for sanitary sewer treatment plants (NEHRP California 7).

DAYS: 36 60 90 120 ISO 186 216 240 276 300 338 365

Elapsed Time in Days

Residual capacity for sanitary sewer treatment plants (NEHRP Map Area 3-6, NonCalifornia 7, and Puget Sound 5).

278 ~~Appendix B: Lifeline Vulnerability Functions AC2

RzI6W.v

H: 0,%

H=8%

.0

CII 0

-o

'a

a)

cc

Figure B-97

0

a)

a:,

R2: a

Figure B-98

278 ATC-25
R= sox

R ox

DAYS: 3 - - 98 128 150 1BO ;218 24* 278 388 338 365

Elapsed Time in Days

Residual capacity for sanitary sewer treatment plants (All other areas).

or lateral dislocations or ruptures of the

ground. Pipes may buckle under

compressive forces, especially where they

cross ruptured faults. Damage has also

occurred as a result of axial elongations

caused by relative movement of two

horizontally adjacent soil layers. Damage

may occur because of displacements of

unanchored compressors or pumps or other

above ground structures. Several past

failures have been attributed to corrosion

combined with surges in line pressure during

the earthquake. Failures of above ground

lines have been caused by support failure,

failure of pipeline attachment to support

structure, and relatively large support

movement. Rupture of pipes and loss of

contents could lead to fire and explosions.

Seismically Resistant Design: Modern highpressure gas lines provided with proper full

penetration welds and heavy walls are very

ductile and have considerable resistance to

earthquake damage. Welded steel pipeline

performance depends on the integrity of the

welds--modern butt-welded pipelines

perform well, whereas gas lines constructed

before and during the early 19310s using

oxyacetylene and electric-arc welds do not.

Special precautions should be taken to

reduce earthquake effects at bay, river, and

fault crossings. Transmission lines at fault

crossings should be buried in shallow loose

fill or installed above ground near the fault

to allow lateral and longitudinal slippage.

Anchors such as thrust blocks or bends

should be excluded within a distance of 300

feet of a fault zone, and strengthened pipe

should be used within the zone. Valve

spacing near fault zones or in areas of

expected soil failure should be reduced.

Automatic shut-off valves should not rely on

electricity to operate. Proper maintenance

to limit corrosion, which weakens pipes, is

important to mitigate damage.

1. Direct Damage

Basis: Damage curves for transmission lines

in the natural-gas system are based on ATC13 data for FC 31, underground pipelines

(see Figure B-1lO). Transmission pipelines

are typically large-diameter, welded steel

pipes that are expected to perform in

earthquakes in a manner superior to that of

typical underground pipelines, as indicated

by the beneficial intensity shift below.

Appendix B: Lifeline Vulnerability Functions

2-,

Q

OLC

Figure B-99

ATC-25 279:
Transmission Lines (Natural Gas)

31 1.00-

VII vIII Ix

Modified Mercalli Intensity (MMI)

Lire B-100 Damage percent by intensity for natural gas transmission lines.

Standard construction is assumed to intensity shifts for

represent typical California natural-gas recommended.

transmission lines under present conditions

(i.e., a composite of older and more modern Time-to-restorati

transmission lines). Only minimal regional restoration data a

variation in the construction quality is transmission lines

assumed. all transmission lit

Present Conditions: In the absence of data

on the type of material, diameter, age, etc.,

the following factors were used to modify.

the mean curves, under present conditions:

system. By combil

damage curves fo:

restoration curves

and B-102 were d

B.8.2 Compressor Stat

* retrofitting are

on: The time-tossigned to SF 32a,

, are assumed to apply to

ries in the natural-gas

iing these data with the

r FC 31, the time-tos shown in Figures B-101

erived.

nions

NEHRP Map Area

California 7

California 3-6

Non-California 7

Puget Sound 5

All other areas

MMI

Intensity

Shift

-1

-1

-1

-1

0

Upgraded Conditions: It is not costeffective or practical to upgrade existing

natural-gas transmission lines, except

perhaps at fault crossings or in areas of

extremely unstable soils. Therefore, no

1. General

Description: In general, compressor stations

include a variety of electrical and

mechanical equipment, as well as structures

and buildings. A typical plant yard may

contain electrical equipment, heat

exchangers, horizontal gas-storage tanks on

plinths, compressors, fans, air-operated

valves, pumps, cooling towers, steel stacks

and columns, and piping. The control

equipment is usually located in a control

building. Cryogenic systems may also exist

Appendix B: Lifeline Vulnerability Functions

byk=20

a)

,

E

0

< bpk=1i

a

bpk

VI

Figi

Other

CA 7

-M 

Non-CA 7

P.S. 5 X

i.'M 0-vATC-25 280
Transmission Lines (Natural

- 32a l.1E 31

7

B

9

1

680 90 120' 150 8 218

Elapsed Time in Days

240 20 30 330 365

Figure B-1 01 Residual capacity for natural gas transmission lines (NEHRP Map Area: California 3-6,

California 7 Non-California 7, and Puget Sound 5).

R := E36e

.

rU

(a

° B= soz

-o

<D -

G

R= 

DAYS: 30

Figure B-1 02

Transmission Lines (Natural Gas) 12 o4 -g

MH I

6 h-

? -8

8 -E

9 -E

10 -0

R t

80 90 120 15 180 216 240 278 300 330 385

Elapsed Time in Days

Residual capacity for natural gas transmission lines (All other areas).

Appendix B: Lifeline Vulnerability Functions

X

5a

n-tan.. F.- Lhut.

.

L

0

0 I2 H 

' i :: W

A

30

l l l l l l l , , , , r r

Mys'.

R -

j

. . . . .

ATC-25 28.1
Compressor Station

0.30

a.50

0.20

Other,

VI V11 Vill IX

Modified Mercalli Intensity (MMI)

Figure B-1 03 Damage percent by intensity for compressor stations.

on the site. Compressors are typically used

to boost pressures in long distance

transmission lines.

Typical Seismic Damage: Damage

experienced at the site may include sliding

and toppling of unanchored equipment,

stretching of anchor bolts on stacks and

columns, damage to old timber cooling

towers, and sliding of unrestrained

horizontal tanks on plinths. Piping may

rupture because of movement of attached

unanchored equipment. Generic building

damage ranging from cracking of frames and

walls to partial or total collapse may be

experienced by the control building and

other buildings.

Seismically Resistant Design: Seismically

resistant design practices include designing

the buildings and structures in accordance

with the seismic requirements of a local or

national building code. In addition, all

equipment should be well anchored and

equipment on isolators properly snubbed.

Inspection and maintenance of timber

cooling towers and piping can mitigate

damage. Anchor bolts on stacks should be

designed to yield over a long length to

dissipate energy.

2. Direct Damage

Basis: Damage curves for compressor

stations in the natural-gas system are based

on ATC-13 data for FC 10, medium-rise

reinforced masonry shear wall buildings; FC

66, electrical equipment; and FC 68,

mechanical equipment (see Figure B-103).

Compressor stations are assumed to be a

combination of 30% generic buildings, 20%

electrical equipment, and 50% mechanical

equipment.

Standard construction is assumed to

represent typical California compressor

stations under present conditions (i.e., a

composite of older and more modern

stations). Only minimal regional variation in

construction quality of mechanical

equipment is assumed.

Present Conditions: In the absence of data

on the type of material, age, etc., the

following factors were used to modify the

mean curves for each of the three facility

Appendix B: Lifeline Vulnerability Functions

80

a)

U)

(0 D=Y

E

(0

Q

X

ATC-25 282
>>

R=iE8x

10

a

cc

R= ax7

~a

-0'L

r

Bc 8

Canpress.ar Station

b,

1.261

0. 488

B . B3

0.I803

8.092:

3 

DAYS: 3 68 90 120' 158 188 218 248 278

Elapsed Time in Days

Figure B-104 Residual capacity for compressor stations (NEHRP California 7).

classes listed above, under present conditions:

MMI

Intensity

Shift

NEHRP Mar Area

California 7

California 3-6

Non-California7

Puget Sound 5

All other areas

FC 0 FC 66 FC 68

o 0 0

+1 +1 0

+1 +1 0

+1 +1 0

+2 +1 +1

Upgraded Conditions: For areas where it

appears cost-effective to improve facilities,

assume on a preliminary basis that upgrades

result in a beneficial intensity shift of one

unit (i.e., -1), relative to the above present

conditions.

Time-to-restoration: Te time-torestoration data assigned to SF 32c,

compressor stations, high-pressure holders,

and mixer/switching terminals, are assumed

to apply to all compressor stations in the

natural-gas system. By combining these data

with the damage curves derived using the

data for C 10, 66, and 68, the time-to300 330 365

restoration curves shown in Figures B-104

through B-106 were derived.

B.&3 Distribution Mains

1. General

Description: n general, the distribution

mains in the natural-gas system are located

underground, except where they cross rivers

or gorges or where they emerge for

connection to compressor or pumping

stations. They typically are between 2 and 20

inches in diameter and may be composed of

steel, cast iron, ductile iron, or plastic.

Approximately 80% of all new distribution

piping is made of plastic. Shut-off valves,

which automatically function when line

pressure drops below a certain threshold

pressure, are frequently used

Typical Seismic Damage: The performance

of pipelines is, strongly dependent on

whether not the supporting soil fails.

Routes are often selected along the edges of

river channels to avoid urban buildup and

street crossings and to simplify the

ATC-25 Appendix B: Lifeline Vulnerability Functions 283

ATC-25 Appendix B: Lifeline Vulnerability Functions 283
Coipressor Station

R=100

.

CU

a) 

a:

R= RJ If I

I AYS: 

Figure B-1 05

60

66

M1l

6

7

8

9

0.38

0.50

0.20

a

-2.604

-2.091

-i.854

-1.693

-1.578

b

0 .709

0.239

0 .123

0.073

0 .849

R = b * days + a

L l ~ ~ I I 

38 68 90 120 150 180 210

Elapsed Time in Days

1 I I 

2 I 3 3

240 Z70 300 330

Residual capacity for compressor stations (NEHRP Map Area: California

California 7, and Puget Sound 5).

Conpressor Station

R=I100

>1

C.)

Cu

.

0 R0-

U) a)

CC

Figure B-1 06

1

R- R 

32c 1.00 10 0.3

'Rl l_ -- R I R rIR

: 3. 68 96 1. 18 18 26 2. 2

DAYS: 30: 560 90 120 150 180 210 240 Z70 300 330 365

Elapsed Time in Days

Residual capacity-for compressor stations (All other areas).

284 Appendix B: Lifeline Vulnerability Functions ATC-25

365

3-6, Non66 0.20

M"Il a b

6 -2.173 0.289

7 -1.908 0.145

8 -1.724 0.881

9 -1.592 0.052

10 -1.5i4 0 .039

R = b * days + a

I I !

I I ) f I I I

: -

Appendix B, Lifeline Vulnerability Functions ATC-25 284
Distribution lain

i1 1.0tl

R-S. S

Other

CA 7

CA 3-6 __ ~Non-C 7

VI V U111 X

Modified Mercalli Intensity {MMI)

Figure B-1 07 Damage percent by intensity for natural gas distribution mains.

acquisition of real estate. Such routes have

high liquefaction potential Pipe damage is

most common in soft alluvial soils, at

interfaces between soft and firm soils, at

locations of fault ruptures, or at sharp

vertical or lateral dislocations or ruptures of

the ground. Pipes may buckle under

compressive forces, especially where they

cross ruptured faults. Damage may occur as

a result of displacements of unanchored

compressors or pumps or other above

ground structures. Several past failures have

been attributed to corrosion combined with

surges in line pressure during the

earthquake. Rupture of pipes and loss of

contents could lead to fire, explosions, or

both.

Seismically Resistant Design: Seismically

resistant design provisions for distribution

piping are typically minimal. Consequently,

large urban distribution systems should have

suitable valving installed so that large areas

can be broken down into zones. Special

precautions should be taken to reduce

earthquake effects at bay, river, and fault

crossings. Distribution mains at fault

crossings should be buried in shallow loose

fill or installed above ground near the fault

to allow lateral and longitudinal slippage.

Anchors such as thrust blocks or bends

should be excluded within a distance of 300

feet of a fault zone and strengthened pipe

should be used within the zone. Valve

spacing near fault zones or in areas of

expected soil failure should be reduced.

Automatic shut-off valves, which operate

when pressure reduces, should not rely on

electricity to operate. Proper maintenance

to limit corrosion, which weakens pipes, is

important for mitigating damage.

2. Direct Damage

Basis: Damage curves for distribution mains

in the natural-gas system are based on ATC13 data for FC 31, underground pipelines

(see Figure B-107). Standard construction is

assumed to represent typical California

distribution mains under present conditions

(i.e., a composite of older and more modern

mains). Minimal regional variation in

construction quality is assumed.

Present Conditions: In- the absence of data

on the type of material, diameter, age, etc.,

the following factors were used to modify

the mean curves, under present conditions:

Appendix B: Lifeline Vulnerability Functions

bpk=2

to

a)

E

_

a

02toto

m>

bpk=l2

bp=0

X

o< aATC-25 285
Distribution Hains

- 3 1.00 31 1.00-

111 a

6 -0.038

-7 -0.038

8 -0.038

9 -0.030

10 -0.036

b

0.373

0.373

0.280

0.228

0.095

B = b * days + a

I I I I I I I I I H

I I I0 I 

90 120 150 1883 210 240 270 308 330

Elapsed Time in Days

365

Figure B-1 08 Residual capacity for natural gas distribution mains (NEHRP Map Area: California 3-6,

California 7, and Non-California 7).

NEHRP Map Area

California 7

California 3-6

Non-California 7

Puget Sound 5'

All other areas

MM/

Intensity

Shift

0

0

0

+1

+1

Upgraded Conditions: It is not costeffective or practical to upgrade existing

natural-gas distribution mains, except

perhaps at fault crossings or in areas of

extremely unstable soils. Therefore, no

intensity shifts for retrofitting are

recommended.

Time-to-restoration: The time-torestoration data assigned to SF 32d,

distribution feeder mains, are assumed to

apply to all distribution mains in the naturalgas system. By combining these data with the

damage curves for FC 31, the time-torestoration curves shown in Figures B-108

and B-109 were derived.

B.9 Petroleum Fuels

B. 9.1 Oil Fields

1. General

Description: In general, oil fields in the

petroleum fuels system may includes

pressure vessels, demineralizers, filters,

vertical tanks, horizontal water and oil

pumps, large heat exchangers, air

compressors, extensive piping, and airoperated valves. Additionally they may

include their own water treatment plant,

which demineralizes and filters water before

it is injected as steam into oil wells in the

area. Control houses with control

equipment may monitor production and

flow in and out of the field.

Typical Seismic Damage: Building damage

may range from cracks in walls and frames to

partial and total collapse. Unanchored or

improperly anchored equipment may slide

*or topple, experiencing damage or causing

attached piping and conduit to fail. Well

Appendix B: Lifeline Vulnerability Functions

*0

(a

I

-cn

U,

n- el- n- V -

DAYS 30 68

I-

,:

286 ATC-25
Distribution hins

32d 1,88 31

MHI

6

IS9

lo

L.

a

-e.038

-0.83

-8.038

-E. 83G

-0.33

b

8.373

0.208

0 228

E. 85

0.858

R =b *days + a

1 I I I I I

60 90 120 158 IB18 210

Efapsed lime fin Days

i I a 11

248 270 3 338 365

Figure B-1 09 Residual capacity for natural gas distribution mains (Puget Sound 5 and all other areas)'.

casings will move with the surrounding soils

and may result in damage to the oil pumps.

Reduction or increase in production may

occur after an earthquake as a result of

geological changes in the oil field.

Seismically Resistant Design: Buildings

should be designed in accordance with the

seismic provisions of a local or national

building code. All equipment should be well

anchored.

2. Direct Damage

Basis: Damage curves for oil fields in the

petroleum fuels system (see Figure B-110)

are based on ATC-13 data for FC 68,

mechanical equipment. It is believed that

this facility class best approximates the

expected performance of oil fields.

Standard construction is assumed to

represent typical California oil fields under

present conditions (i.e., a composite of older

and more modern fields). Only minimal

regional variation in the construction quality

is assumed, as shown in the intensity shift

factors below.

Present Conditions: In the absence of data

on the type of equipment, age, etc., the

following factors were used to modify the

mean curve, under present conditions:

NEHRP Map2 Area

California 7

California 3-6

Non-California 7

Puget Sound 5

All other areas

Mm/

Intensity

Shift

0

01

0

+1

Upgraded Conditions: For areas where it

appears cost-effective to improve facilities,

assume on a preliminar basis that upgrades

result in a beneficial intensity shift of one

unit (i.e., -1), relative to the above present

conditions.

Time-to-restoration: The time-torestoration data assigned to SF 1Sa is

assumed to apply to all oil fields. By

combining these data with the damage

ATC-25 AppendIx 3: Lifeline Vulnerability Functions 287

.r_5

Ca

C

n

*0

:0WI

x= n.e -

38

a

- .1.

DAYS:

ATC-25 Appendix B: Lifeline Vulnerability Functions 287
Oil Fields

Other

I VII Vill IX

Modified Mercalli Intensity (MMI)

.~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ,

_ . L . . Ir_ Al r 1. I'-

Damage percent by intensity Tor oil tields.

curves for FC 68, the time-to-restoration

curves shown in Figures B-ill and B-112

were derived.

B.9.2 Refineries

1. General

Description: The typical oil refinery is a

complex facility with many different types of

buildings, structures, and equipment. Tank

storage for the various products produced at

the refinery can consist of unanchored

vertical storage tanks supported on the

ground, horizontal pressurized storage tanks

supported on steel or concrete plinths, and

spherical tanks supported on legs.

Refineries also include a large number of

steel stacks or columns anchored to

concrete foundations. Throughout the

refinery there are extensive runs of piping,

both on the ground and elevated.

Mechanical equipment throughout the

refinery includes pumps, heat exchangers,

furnaces, motors, and generators. Electrical

equipment includes transformers,

switchgear, and motor control centers.

Control rooms house control equipment.

Timber cooling towers, refueling stations,

administrative buildings, and wharf loading

facilities are also included in some

refineries.

Typical Seismic Damage: A major concern

after any earthquake that affects a refinery

is fire. Loss of contents from any one of a

large number of tanks could lead to a fire

that could spread throughout the facility.

Similarly, toxic release and air emissions are

also serious concerns. The large cylindrical

ground-mounted steel tanks are typically the

most vulnerable components at the refinery

and can suffer tank-wall buckling, bottom

rupture, wall-to-bottom weld failure, roof

damage, settlement, or pipe failure. Piping

systems can experience flange separations,

damage to supports, rupture at connections

to unanchored equipment, and valve

damage. Mechanical equipment with

inadequate anchorage can slide or topple.

Buildings and structures can experience

generic structural damage rangingfrom

cracks in walls and frames to partial or

complete collapse. Control room panels may

Appendix B: Lifeline Vulnerability Functions

a) 0)

E

o0

08

vi

Figure B-i 10

X

28.8

: _

. . .

ATC-25
Oil Fields f_ 4 a. no -

60 90 126 156 180 210

Elapsed Time in Days

2401 2Z2 380 338 35

Figure B-1 11 Residual capacity for oil fields NEHRP Map Area: California 3-6, California 7, NonCalifornia 7, and Puget Sound 5).

n-t1,.

3 5

) R= 8z

2~

R= 6A.

Oil Fields I l. Jod 68

MM

6

7

9

to

1.08

a

0, 344

8 .286

0.223

13. 153

8.103

1. H28

H.017

8.812

H.-HI 0.818

0.8?

R b * ays a

DAYS: 38

I a I

S 98 126 150 10 6 216 

Elapsed Time in Days

I48 278 308 30 35

Figure B-1 12 Residual capacity for oil fields (All other areas).

Appendix B: Lifeline Vulnerability Functions

-5_

o R= S81x

CU

n

,a._

.co

R= 

r

b

.21

21

211

a

DlhYS: 30

C

C

a

l l l l i i

4 .Rv

r 

- 4Za.,

ATC-.25 2859
D=100;Y

c)

0)

Co DZSO7

E

co 0

Ref inery

68 0.30-

43 0.48

52 8.30

VI ViI Vill Ix

Modified Mercalli Intensity (MMI)

Figure B-1 13 Damage percent by intensity for oil refineries.

slide or topple, or experience relay

problems. Stacks or columns may stretch

anchor bolts. Horizontal tanks may slide on.

their plinths and rupture attached piping.

Brick linings in boilers may break.

Seismically Resistant Design: Seismically

resistant design practices include design of

all buildings and structures (including tanks)

for seismic requirements in a local or

national code. Storage tanks should be

provided with flexible piping, pressure relief

valves, and well-compacted foundations

resistant to differential settlement.

Retention dikes with sufficient capacity to

retain all of the oil contained in the enclosed

tanks are necessary to mitigate the danger of

catastrophic fire after an earthquake.

Embankments for such dikes should be

stable when subjected to ground shaking.

Horizontal tanks on plinths should be

restrained to prevent attached pipes from

rupturing. Long anchor bolts that are

properly embedded in foundations should

be used for heavy equipment and stacks.

Mechanical and electrical equipment should

be anchored to prevent sliding and toppling.

Maintenance and inspection programs for

cooling towers and piping should be

implemented. Supports for piping should be

designed for seismic loads. An emergency

power system should be provided for control

and emergency equipment as a minimum.

2. Direct Damage

Basis: Damage curves for refineries in the

petroleum fuels system are based on ATC13 data for FC 43, on-ground liquid storage

tanks; FC 52, steel chimneys; and FC 68,

mechanical equipment (see Figure B-1 13).

Refineries are assumed to be a combination

of 40% on-ground storage tanks, 30%

chimneys, and 30% mechanical equipment.

Standard construction is assumed to

represent typical California refineries under

present conditions (i.e., a composite of older

and more modern refineries). Only minimal

regional variation in the construction quality

of mechanical equipment is assumed, as

operational loads frequently govern over

seismic requirements.

Present Conditions: In the absence of data

on the type of construction, age, etc., the

following factors were used to modify the

mean curves for each of the three facility

290 Appendix B: Lifeline Vulnerability Functions ATC-25

Other

X

290 Appendix B: Lifeline Vulnerability Functions ATC-25
R=1Bx

.5

nLo

CU

O R= gov

cc

D- fI., A- tA

43 0.48

52 0.38

II a b

6 EA46 0.7&0

7 X,443 0.222

B 1.422 8.062

9 101.37B 89. 2

10 0.139 '0.012

R = * days + a

DAYS: 68 90 120 150 1DB 210 241 278 308 330 365

Elapsed Time in Days

Figure B-114 Residual capacity for oil refineries (NEHRP California 7).

classes listed above, under present

conditions:

NEFHRP Map Area

California 7

California 3-6

Non-California 7

Puget Sound 5

All other areas

in Figures B-114 through B- 16 were

derived

MMI

Intensity

Shift

FC 43 FC 52 FC 68

0

+1

+1

+1

+2

0

+1

+1

+1

+2

0

0

0

0

+1

Upgraded Conditions: For areas where it

appears cost-effective to improve facilities,

assume on a preliminary basis that upgrades

result in a beneficial intensity shift of one

unit (i.e., -), relative to the above present

conditions.

Time-to-restoration: The time-torestoration data assigned to SF lb,

refineries, are assumed to apply for all

refineries in the petroleum fuels system. By

combining these data with the damage

curves derived using the data for FC 43, 52,

and 68, the time-to-restoration curves shown

B.9.3 Transmission Pipelines

1. General

Description: In general, transmission lines

in the petroleum fuels system are located

underground, except where they cross rivers

or gorges, or where they emerge for

connection to compressor or pumping

stations. They are virtually always welded

steel and operate at high pressures. Shut-off

valves, which automatically function when

line pressure drops below a certain

threshold pressure, are frequently included.

Typical Seismic Damage: The performance

of pipelines is strongly dependent on

whether or not the supporting soil fails.

Routes are often selected along the edges of

river channels to avoid urban buildup and

street crossings and to simplify the

acquisition of real estate. Such routes have

high liquefaction potentials. Failures in the

past have typically occurred at sharp vertical

I~ I i I I

Appendix B: Lifeline Vulnerability Functions

AR H --la

ATC-25 291
nery

I I I I I 

30 60 90 120 150 180 210

Elapsed Time in Days

240 270 300 330 365

Figure B-1 15 Residual capacity for oil refineries (NEHRP Map Area: California 3-6, Non-California 7,

and Puget Sound 5).

Ref inery

401. LO 4 .TU 00c tO D

/ g~~~~2

Mi

6

7

, 8

9.

10 

-/ ~~~~R =-

11a

8.40

0.30

a b

0.435 0.16

0.401 0.83!

0.234 0.01:

-0.221 0.88

-0.285 0.00!

b *days a

I

3

I I I I I

AYS: 30 68 90 120 150 180 210 240 270 308 330 365

Elapsed Time in Days

Figure B-116 Residual capacity for oil refineries (All other areas).

Appendix B: Lifeline Vulnerability Functions

1.00 68 0.30

43 8.40

52 0.30

M'lI a b

6 0.446 0.468

7 0.435 0.101

B 0.401 0.835

9 0.234 0.Oi3

10 -0.221 0.009

R b * days a

I 1I* 

i3

o R Sx

-o3

4)

R= eV. I

DAYS:

R=100x

.

a

co

o R= SOZ

In

4)

Er

D

R= In-v L

I I I I I

292 -ATC-25
Transmission Pipelines (Petroleum Fuels)

J I

VII VII

Modified Mercalli Intensity (MMI)

Figure 8-117 Damage percent by intensity for petroleum fue[s transmission pipelines.

or lateral dislocations or ruptures of the

ground. Pipes, may buckle under

compressive forces, especially where they

cross ruptured faults. Damage has also

occurred because of axial elongations

caused by relative movement of two

horizontally adjacent soil layers. Damage

may occur as the result of displacements of

unanchored compressors or pumps or other

above ground structures. Several past

failures have been attributed to corrosion

combined with surges in line pressure during

the earthquake. Failures of above ground

lines have resulted from support failure,

failure of pipeline attachment to support

structure, and relatively large support

movement. Rupture of pipes and loss of

contents could lead to ignition, fire, and/or

explosions.

Seismically Resistant Design: Modern highpressure petroleum fuel lines provided with

proper full penetration welds, heavy walls,

and strong couplings are very ductile and

have considerable resistance to earthquake

damage. Welded steel pipeline performance

depends on the integrity of the welds--

modern butt-welded pipelines perform well,

whereas lines constructed before and during

the early 1930s may not. Special precautions

should be taken to reduce earthquake

effects at bay, river, and fault crossings.

Transmission lines at fault crossings should

be buried in shallow loose fill or installed

above wound near the fault to allow lateral

and longitudinal slippage. Anchors, such as

thrust blocks or bends should be excluded

within a distance of 300 feet of a fault zone,

and strengthened pipe should be used within

the zone. Valve spacing near fault zones or

in areas of expected soil failure should be

reduced. Automatic shut-off valves should

not rely on electricity to operate. Proper

maintenance to limit corrosion which

weakens pipes, is important for mitigating

damage.

2. Direct Damage

Basis: Damage curves, for transmission lines

in the petroleum fuels, system are based on

ATC-13 data for FC 31, underground

pipelines (see Figure -117). Transmission

pipelines are typically large-diameter welded

steel pipes that are expected to perform in

earthquakes in a manner superior to typical

underground pipelines, as indicated by the

beneficial intensity shift below.

Appendix B: Lifelind Vulnerability Functions

bpk=2

C)

a)

E

01

0

a. 0

-r

C)

M

tirJ-U _

VI Ix X

-1S I H Z -

km >-H

AT, C-25 23
Transmission Pipelines (Petroleum Fuels) 40_ 4 WI 11 4 Rn_ -

X

E.

Mui

7 8.144

8 0.144

9 e.116

10 e.124

a b

e .195

0 195

8. 106

e.116

R = b * days + a

I I I I I

30

I I I I I I

6 98 128 150 1 210,

Elapsed Time in Days

240 270 30 330 365

Figure B-118 Residual capacity for petroleum fuels transmission pipelines (NEHRP Map Area: California

3-6, California 7, Non-California 7, Puget Sound 5, and all other areas).

Standard construction is assumed to

represent typical California petroleum fuels

transmission lines under present conditions

(i.e., a composite of older and more modern

transmission lines). Only minimal regional

variation in the construction quality is

assumed.

Present Conditions: In the absence of data

on the type of material, diameter, age, etc.,

the following factors were used to modify

the mean curves, under present conditions:

NEHRP Map Area

California 7

California 3-6

Non-California 7

Puget Sound 5

All other areas

MM/

Intensity

Shift

-1

-1

-1

-1

-1

Upgraded Conditions: It is not costeffective or practical to upgrade existing

petroleum fuels transmission pipelines,

except perhaps at fault crossings or in areas

of extremely unstable soils. Therefore, no

intensity shifts for retrofitting are

recommended.

Time-to-restoration: The time-torestoration data assigned to SF 18c,

transmission pipelines, are assumed to apply

to all transmission pipelines in the

petroleum fuels system. By combining these

data with the damage curves for FC 31, the

time-to-restoration curves shwon in Figure

B-i 18 were derived.

B.9.4 Distribution Storage Tanks

1. General

Description: Most oil storage tanks are

unanchored, cylindrical tanks supported

directly on the ground. Older tanks have

both fixed and floating roofs, while more

modern tanks are almost exclusively

floating-roofed. Diameters range from

approximately 40 feet to more than 250 feet.

Tank height is nearly always less than the

diameter. Construction materials include

welded, bolted, or riveted steel. Tank

Appendix B: Lifeline Vulnerability Functions

E~ 2

I

R- SOY

.

a)

W

D- R%. DAYS:

DAYS:

svQ x .uU vs 1.UU

I I I 

294 ATC-25
foundations may consist of sand or gravel, or

a concrete ring wall supporting the shell.

Typical Seismic Damage: On-ground oil

storage tanks are subject to a variety of

damage mechanisms, including: (1) failure of

weld between base plate and wall, (2)

buckling of tank wall (elephant foot), (3)

rupture of attached rigid piping because of

sliding or rocking of tank, (4) implosion of

tank resulting from rapid loss of contents

and negative internal pressure, (5)

differential settlement, (6) anchorage failure

or tearing of tank wall, (7) failure of roof-toshell connection or damage to roof seals for

floating roofs (and loss of oil), (8) failure of

shell at bolts or rivets because of tensile

hoop stresses, and (9) total collapse.

Torsional rotations of floating roofs may

damage attachments such as guides, ladders,

etc.

Seismically Resistant Design: Seismically

resistant design practices for ground oil

distribution storage tanks include the use of

fledbIe piping, pressure relief valves, and

well-compacted foundations and concrete

ring walls that prevent differential

settlement. Adequate freeboard to prevent

sloshing against the roof should be

maintained. Positive attachment between

the roof and shell should be provided for fixroofedtanks. The bottom plate and its

connection to the shell should be stiffened

to resist uplift forces, and the base plate

should be protected against corrosion.

Abrupt changes in thickness between

adjacent courses should be avoided.

Properly detailed ductile anchor bolts may

be feasible on smaller steel tanks.

Maintaining a height-to-diameter ratio of

between 0.3 and 0.7 for tanks supported on

the ground controls seismic loading.

Retention dikes are needed to retain spilled

oil and prevent it from reaching ignition

sources. These dikes should have sufficient

capacity to retain all oil that could spill

within their confines. Also, all retention dike

embankments should be stable in ground

shaking.

2. Direct Damage

Basis: Damage curves for distribution

storage tanks in the petroleum fuels system

are based on ATO-13 data for FC 43, onground liquid storage tanks (see Figure B119). Standard construction is assumed to

represent typical California distribution

storage tanks under present conditions (ie.,

a composite of older, non-seismically

designed tanks as well as more modern tanks

designed to seismic requirements (e.g., API

650).

Present Conditions: In the absence of data

on the type of material, age, etc., the

following factors. were used to modify the

mean curves, under present conditions:

NEHRP Map Area

California 7

California 3-6

Non-California 7

Puget Sound 5

All other areas

MMI

Intensity

Shift

0

+1

+1

+1

+2

Upgraded Conditions: For areas where it

appears cost-effective to improve facilities,

assume on a preliminary basis that upgrades

result in one or two beneficial intensity

shifts (i.e., -1 or -2), relative to the above

present conditions.

Time-to-restoration: The time-torestoration data assigned to SF 18d,

distribution storage tanks, are assumed to

apply to all tanks. By combining these data

with the damage curves for FC 43, the timeto-restoration curves shown in Figures B120 through B-121 were derived.

B.10 Emergency Service

B.10.1 Health Care

1. General

Description: Health care facilities

(hospitals) are typically housed in one or

more buildings. Construction type varies

significantly. Smaller hospitals may contain

only limited equipment associated with

building services. Large hospitals may

contain water treatment equipment,

emergency power diesels, chillers, and

boilers, as well as sophisticated equipment

used for treating patients.

ATC-25, Appendix B: Lifeline Vulnerability Functions 25
Distribution Storage

Vi1 Vill IX

Modified Mercalli Intensity (MMI)

Figure B-1 19 Damage percent by intensity for petroleum fuelds distribution storage tanks.

,, :

R=111,/

..

Fi

Figure B-i 20

;a

.2

n

1)

D- £A .

Distribution Storage anks

l- A. I I I I I I I I I

DAYS: 30 60 90 120 150 1 210 248 Z70 300 330 365

Elapsed Time in Days

Residual capacity for petroleum fuelds distribution storage tanks (NEHRP California 7).

296 Appendix B: Lifeline Vulnerability Functions

Tanks

: D=11.' 1.00

a)

Eo D=50z 

0 I

VI X

8d 1.00 43 1.0f1

hII a b

6 0.408 0.110

7 0.403 0.891

8 0.3U30 H.041

9 8.352 0.020

10 0.258 0.009

R b * days + a

Other

CA 36

Non CA 7

lid

I I

41,

296- ATC-25
ribution Storage Tanks

4a lt Af 1 O1

68 so 128 158 188 218;

Elapsed Time in Days

Z48 278 388 33 35

Figure B-1 21 Residual capacity for petroleum fueldsc distribution storage tanks (NEHRP Map Area:

California 3-6, Non-California 7, and Puget Sound 5).

Distribution Storage anks

1.88 43 1.0

ml

6

7

9

1

a

8.388

O .258

8.142

80.860

b

8.841

0.828

. 809

8. BO

.00,

R b * days + a

I I I I I I 

9B 128 158 188 218

Elapsed Time in Days

24 278 3881 330 35

Figure B-1 22 ResiduaE capacity for petroleum fuelds distribution storage tanks (AlI other areas).

Appendix B: Lifeline Vulnerability Functions

>

R=tlx

.6,

C1Ca

-0

Ln

a

CC

R= E0x

"ml a b

6 0.403 0.091

7 0113 :80 0.841

8 352 0.828

9 0.258 8.889

10 8.142 0.006

R = * days a

Rz I I I I 07 I

DAYS: 3D

5=1808

'U

a

a

0 R= 96c

£/2

. ) - CE

R urrvD.- 

DAYS: 38 G

I i I I

I I ,, 

ATC-25 297

_
D= A08V

80

0)o

CU D=SO;.

E

Ca 0

UI

Health Care

Vil ViII Ix

Modified Mercalli Intensity (MMI)

Figure B-1 23 Damage percent by intensity for health care facilities.

Typical Seismic Damage: Buildings may

experience generic building damage ranging

from cracks in walls and frames to partial

and total collapse. Unanchored or

improperly anchored equipment may slide

or topple. Equipment supported on isolation

mounts with no snubbers may fall off the

mounts and rupture attached piping and

conduits. Unrestrained batteries on racks

may fall, rendering the emergency power

systems inoperable. Suspended ceilings may

fall and impede operations. Equipment

necessary for treating patients may be

damaged, especially if it is supported on

carts or on wheels, or is top-heavy.

Equipment that requires precise alignment

is also susceptible to damage. In garages,

structural damage may result in ambulances

being unavailable when they are needed.

Seismically Resistant Design: As essential

facilities, hospital should be designed to

remain operational in the event of a major

earthquake. Typically this involves using

larger design forces and meeting more

restrictive design requirements than those

required by building codes for the building

design. However, equipment and

nonstructural items also require special

attention if the hospital is to remain

functional. All critical equipment should be

anchored. Equipment on isolators should be

snubbed. The emergency power system

should be closely scrutinized, and the

emergency diesel-generator system should

be maintained and tested frequently.

Equipment used to treat patients should be

stored and restrained properly. Medicine in

cabinets should be stored in a manner that

prevents it from falling to the floor.

2. Direct Damage

Basis: Damage curves for health care

facilities are based on ATC-13 data for FC

10, medium-rise reinforced masonry shear

wall buildings (see Figure B-123). FC 10 was

chosen to represent a generic building,

based on review of damage curves for all

buildings.

Standard construction is assumed to

represent typical California health care

facilities under present conditions (i.e., a

298 Appendix B: Lifeline VulnerabilIty Functions ATC-25

10

X

298 Appendix B: Lifeline Vulnerability Functions ATC-25
4 Dt- I.0J

a b

8.1?1 0. i~i

-0.801

-El.878

O. O25

0.Hi4

8.8e7

EMs

* days + a

DAYS: 38 60 98 126 150 180 218 240 27 3 330 365

Elapsed Time in Days

Figure B-124 Residual capacity for health care facilities (NEHRP California 7).

composite of older and more modern health

care). It is assumed that such facilities were

designed using enhanced seismic

requirements and that the beneficial

intensity shifts, indicated below are

appropriate.

Present Conditions: In the absence of data

on the type of construction, age, etc., the

following factors were used to modify the

mean curves, under present conditions:

NEHRP Map Area

California 7

California 3-6

Non-California 7

Puget Sound 5

All other areas

Mm/

Intensity

Shift

-1

0

0

0

Upgraded Conditions: For areas, where it

appears cost-effective to improve facilities,

assume on a preliminary basis that upgrades

result in one or two beneficial intensity

shifts (i.e., -1 or -2), relative to the above

present conditions.

Time-to-restoration: The time-torestoration data assigned to SF 8, health

care services, are assumed to apply to all

health care facilities. By combining these

data with the damage curves for FC 10, the

time-to-restoration curves shown in Figures

B-124 through B-126 were derived.

B. 0.2 Emergency Response Services

1. General

Description: Emergency response services

include fire and police stations. Both fire

and police stations may be housed in low- to

medium-rise structures of virtually any type

of construction. In many urban areas these

structures are old and were built prior to the

adoption of earthquake design codes.

Firehouses typically include garages to

house engines, sleeping quarters, kitchens,

utility rooms, and communications rooms.

Some stations have hose towers used to dry

hoses after use. Police stations typically

include a dispatch center, detention area,

and squad room.

Appendix B: Lifeline Vulnerability Functions

Health Care

R=1010x

3

C

-i

C

a

) R= SOz

C

1) :5

R= l l i l

ATC-25 299
Health Care

98 120 10 180 210 Z40 270 300 330 365

Elapsed Time in Days

Figure B-1 25 1

.5(U

Cl

I 0

-cz

(ni)

Figure B-i 26 

Residual capacity for health care facilities (NEHRP Map Area: California 3-6, NonCalifornia 7, and Puget Sound 5).

Health Care

R=

jl: . W . I I I I .I I I I i

DAYS: 30 60 98 128 158 180 210 240 278 308 330 365

Elapsed Time in Days

Residual capacity for health care facilities (All other areas).

Appendix B: Lifeline Vulnerability Functions

R=100v

R= 5e

0CU

C)

-o(I)

a)

cc

MrII a b

76 0.171 0.025

7 0.116 0.014

8 -0.001 0. 00?

9 -0.878 0.005

10 -0.165 0.004

R = b * days a

/ I I I I

DAYS 30 6e

. 300 ATC-25

.S

. .

, .

OX !

n_
Emergency Response Seruice

WI VIll Ix

Modified Mercalli Intensity (MM])

Damage percent by intensity for emergency response service facilities.

Typical Seismic Damage: Buildings housing

fire and police stations may experience

generic building damage ranging from

cracking of frames and walls to partial or

total collapse. Fire stations may be more

susceptible to damage than most buildings

because of the presence of the large garage

door openings and the hose towers, which

interrupt the continuity of the roof

diaphragm and frequently have

discontinuous shear walls or frames.

Significant damage to a fire station could

lead to loss of use of engines housed within

them. UJnanchored communications

equipment in both stations could severely

hinder operations immediately after an

earthquake.

Seismically Resistant Design: Both fire and

police stations are critical buildings that

should remain operational after a major

earthquake. Accordingly, these facilities

should be designed to meet the seismic

requirements for critical buildings of a

national or local building code. Geometric

irregularities that will result in poor seismic

performance should be avoided (e.g.,

separate hose towers should be provided).

Communications equipment should be

properly restrained and provided with

backup emergency power. All equipment,

especially boilers, should be well anchored.

Engines and patrol cars should be stored in

areas that are expected to escape serious

damage.

2. Direct Damage

Basis: Damage curves for emergency

response service are based on ATC-13 data

for FC 10, medium-rise reinforced masonry

shear wall buildings (see Figure B-127). FC

10 was chosen to represent a generic

building, based on review of damage curves

for all buildings. Although more modern

facilities may be designed to enhanced

seismic design criteria, many old police and

fire stations are still in use. Consequently,

no intensity shifts from typical FC 10

performance are assumed.

Standard construction is assumed to

represent typical emergency response

facilities under present conditions (Le., a

Appendix B: Lifeline Vulnerability Functions3

C5

0)

VI

Figure B-127

x

ATC-25 3!0 
R=1O0Y

.H .

ea(aC,

Ca

o R= So.

C

:3

a)

m =e

Emergency Response Service

DAYS: 3 68 90 128 150 180 210 248 270 3 338 365

I Elapsed Time in Days

Figure B-128 Residual capacity for emergency response service facilities (NEHRP California 7).

composite of older and more modern police

and fire stations).

Present Conditions: In the absence of data

on the type of construction, age, etc., the

following factors were used to modify the

mean curves, under present conditions:

NEHRP Map Area

California 7

California 3-6

Non-California 7

Puget Sound 5

All other areas

MM/

Intensity

Shift

0,

+1

+1

+1

+2

Upgraded Conditions: For areas where it

appears cost-effective to improve facilities,

assume on a preliminary basis that upgrades

result in one or two beneficial intensity

shifts (i.e., -1 or -2), relative to the above

present conditions.

Time-to-restoration: The time-torestoration data assigned to SF 23,

emergency response services, are assumed

to apply to all emergency response service

facilities. By combining these data with the

damage curves for FC 10, the time-torestoration curves shown in Figures B-128

through B-130 were derived.

302 Appendix B: Lifeline Vulnerability Functions ATC-25
Emergenc Response Seruice

"Ml a b

6 - .1B5 O. O854

7 -0.84 0,.022

8 -1,023 8.214

9 -8.B B 8. 1009

10 8.815 0.887

R = b, * days +- a

68 98 128 1S 188 218 248 278 3 33 35

Elapsed Time in Days

Figure B-1 29 Residual capacity for emergency response service facilities (NEHRP Map Area: California

3-6, Non-California 7, and Puget Sound 5).

R=I8%

.)

7

:3

:0

DAYS: 38 68

bergency Response Serviice

98 128 158 188 218

Elapsed Time in Days

I I i I

248 278 3081 33 35

Figure B-130 Residual capacity for emergency response service facilities (All other areas).

Appendix B: Lifeline Vulnerability Functions

-5

0

CO

:3

.0

nI a b,

6 -0.048 8 .822

7 -8823 0,i84

B -8.BB2 ,8009

9 El15 0.087

ID 0. 025 0. 808,

R =bt * days + a

3

R= 

OM: 30

1.00 10 1.00.

R= I 1

ATCC-25 303
Appendix C: Residual Capacity Plots for Each

Lifeline and Scenario Earthquake

Table of Contents

Air Transportation ................

Ports.........................................

Medical Care Centers............

Fire Stations.............................

Police Stations .......................I

Broadcast Stations . ............

PRaidrnnd. .

Highways ................................. I

Electric System........................

Water System .... ..... . .

friFIdp Cil P;nielineC

Refined Oil Pipelines ............

Natural Gas Pipelines.....

Upgraded Electric System.....

Page

.............. 306

......... 318

.............. 322

... . 334

.............. 346

.............. 356

1 6 0

.............. 373

.............. 377

.............. 389

lion

.............. 392

... 393

.39...........8 39

Appendix C: Residual Capacity Plots

I..............................................................................................................I

............................................................................................................... I

................................................................................................................

..............................................................................................................

I................ . .......... . ......................................... . ..................................... I

...............................................................................................................

.......................................... . ........................................................... I.........

...............................................................................................................

I................................................................................................. . ............

I..................................................... . ........................................................

I...............................................................................................................

...............................................................................................................

ATC-25 305

_

R q a

.. Jo W

J.\ u;uuL - .

As W%9 mu v 1(wk_
OR

0

.

0

4-' cc

Elapsed Time in Days

Figure C-1 Residual capacity of Illinois air transportation following New Madrid event (M=8).

1

Elapsed Time in Days

Figure C-2 Residual capacity of Missouri air transportation following New Madrid event (M=8).

306 Appendix C: Residual Capacity Plots ATC-25

0~

0

C,

Q) ir

306 Appendix C: Residual Capacity Plots ATC-25
C

0

0

CD, 0

Elapsed Time in Days

Figure C-3 Residual capacity of Arkansas air transportation following New Madrid event (M=8).

Elapsed Time in Days

Residual capacity of Tennessee air transportation following New Madrid event (M=8).

ATC-25 Appendix C: Residual Capacity Plots 307

1

C

0

0

CD, EC

Figure C-4

ATC:-25 Appendix C: Residual Capacity Plots 3017
7 14

Elapsed Time in Days

Figure C-5 Residual capacity of Kentucky air transportation following New Madrid event (M=8).

112 1

Elapsed Time in Days

Figure C-6 Residual capacity of Mississippi air transportation following New Madrid event (M=8).

Appendix C: Residual Capacity Plots ATC-25

95-

0

I0

4-

.Er

90-

85-

80

0 28

I 1

.2

a

n nn-. . \ :1

) _

-7e - _ |

. . .

309

I UV-.

_ I I

1
0 7 14 a : 0 1 4f 00 CC lU it 0 'Ili] d 1U*

Elapsed Time in Days

Figure C-7 Residual capacity of South Carolina air transportation following Charleston event

(M=7.5).

7 14

Elapsed Time in Days

28

Residual capacity of North Carolina air transportation following Charleston event

(M=7.5).

ATC-25 Appendfx C: Residual Capacity Plots 309~~~~~~

95-

85-

80-

75-

70-

65-

60-

0-

.4-

C

uu,

01

C:

C) 90-

85-

'0

Figure C-8

l

hn4 P. - S

. .

^4 ^1 1 .- - -- ^- -- I - I - I. -1 -- I I

1 An_

II

d'LInon

AT C-25 Appendix C: Residual Capacity Plots 309

i
100

- 95-

0

.2

en

W

0:

90-

85-

80-

75.-

0 7 1 4 21 28 35 42

Elapsed Time in Days

49 56 63

Figure C-9: Residual capacity of Georgia air transportation following Charleston event (M=7.5).

100

95

90-

85-

at 80-

O 75-

0 E70-

-2 65-

CC 60-

55-

50-

45-

40 . , . . . . .. . S 

0 7 14 21 28 35 42 49 tO Oj U I o 'i.

Elapsed Time in Days

Figure C-1 0 Residual capacity of Massachusetts air transportation following Cape Ann event (M=7.0).

310 Appendix C: Residual Capacity Plots ATC-25

- r- |

f

I

I I I -I-  -.- .I- ..- .-.- -I- -.- A

310 Appendix C: Residual Ca acity Plots ATCI-25
0

c:0o

V)

en

oX

Elapsed Time in Days

Figure C-i1 Residual capacity of Connecticut air transportation following Cape Ann event (M=7.0).

7 14

Elapsed Time in Dayts

Figure C-12 Residual capacity of Delaware air transportation following Cape Ann event (M=7.0).

ATC-25 Appendix C: Residual Capacity Plots 311

9:.

gog 85-

.° 80-

o 75-

c 70-

60-

=e

U

311

Inn ]111N

in ,-

ATC-25 Appendix C: Residual Capacity Plots
0

0

Figure C-1 3

Elapsed Time in Days

Residual capacity of Rhode Island air transportation following Cape Ann event (M=7.O).

I Mn

95-

90-

0

Cu

0

._

cc01)

85-

80-

75-

70-

65-

60

0 14

Elapsed Time in Days

Figure C-1 4 Residual capacity of New Hampshire air transportation following Cape Ann event

(M=7.0).

312 Appendix C: Residual Capacity Plots ATC-25

ATC-25 312 Appendix C: Residual Capacity Plots
Figure C-1 5

Elapsed Time in Days

Residual capacity of Utah air transportation following Wasatch Front event M=7.5).

I 1I

95-

90-

7 14 21 28

Elapsed Time in Days

35 42

Residual capacity of California air transportation following Hayward event (M=7.5)!.

ATC-25 Appendix C: Residual Capacity Plots 313

1

C

0

0

0

CD

a)

Figure C-1 6

49

85-

1

.no ,.W

1 1

To

ATC-25 AppendixC: Residual Capacity Plots 313
0

0

U,

a,

EC

Elapsed Time in Days

Residual capacity of California air transportation following Fort Tejon event (M=8.0).

0

0

Figure C-i 8

Elapsed Time in Days

Residual capacity of Washington air transportation following Puget Sound event (M=7.5)..

Appendix C: Residual Capacity Plots ATC-25

Figure C-1 7

314 -
14

Elapsed Time in Days

Figure C-19 Residual capacity of Illinois air transportation following New Madrid event (M=7.0).

UU.

95-

l i 

7 14 21 35 42 49 56

Elapsed Time in Days

63 70 77 84

Residual capacity of Missouri air transportation following New Madrid event (M=7.0).

ATC-25 Appendix C: Residual Capacity Plots 315

100

-

C

0

c

0

HE0

Cc

Figure C-20

zir 'l

l

1

I

0

A

ATC-25 Appendix C: Residual Capacity Plots 315
0 14 28 42 56 70 84 98

Elapsed Time in Days

112 126 14U

Figure C-21 Residual capacity of Arkansas air transportation following New Madrid event (M= 7.0).

7 14 21

Elapsed Time in

28 42

Days

Residual capacity of Tennessee air transportation following New Madrid event (M=7.0).

Appendix C: Residual Capacity Plots ATC-25

100

95-

90-

85-

80-

75-

70-

0

Oa)

100

I0

0

.o

CDIa

95-

90-

85-

0

Figure C-22

-

-

-

KS,-

, _

I

n r -

v

316
I I 7 14

Elapsed Time in Days

Residual capacity of Kentucky air transportation following New Madrid event (M =7.0).

100-

95-

01

0

Co

cc

90-

85-

80-

75-

C

Figure C-24 Residt

7 14

Elapsed Time in Days

jai capacity of Mississippi air transportation following New Madrid event (M=7.iO).

ATC-25 Appendix C: Residual Capacity Plots 317

100

C

90-

0

Figure C-23

21

21

fi

ATFC-25 Appendix C: Residual Capacity Plots 317
1

0A

.r-2

Figure C-25

Elapsed Time in Days

Residual capacity of South Carolina ports following Charleston event (M=7.5).

90-

0.4-n

a: cc

80-

70-

60-

50-

40-

30

0 7 14

Elapsed Time in Days

Figure C-26 Residual capacity of North Carolina ports following Charleston event (M=7.5).

318 Appendix C: Residual Capacity Plots ATC-25

21

. 1 r

-

Appendix C: Residual Capacity Plots ATC-25 318A
0

0

0

a:

Figure C-27

0

Figure C-28

Elapsed Time in Days

Residual capacity of Georgia ports following Charleston event M=7.5).

Elapsed Time in Days

Residual capacity of Massachusetts ports following Cape Ann event (M=7.0).

ATC-25 Appendix C: Residual Capacity Plots 319

)o

ATC:-25 Appendix C: Residual Capacity Plots 319
1

0

0

CC)

Figure C-29

R

a

0

.E

0

CC,

C)

Residual capacity of Rhode Island ports following Cape Ann event (M=7.0).

Elapsed Time in Days

a cof C C A n e. (

Residual capacity of Connecticut ports following Cape Ann event (M=7.0).

Appendix C: Residual Capacity Plots C

Figure C-30

320 AM-26
0

0

00

c)

c2

Elapsed Time in Days

Residual capacity of California ports following Hayward event (M=7.5).

Elapsed Time in Days

Residual capacity of California ports following Fort Tejon event M=8.O).

ATC-25 Appendix C: Residual Capacity Plots 321

Figure C-31

I0

0

0

4 -

0

ad

Figure C-32

ATC-25, Appendix C. Residual Capacity Plots 321
1

: g~~~~-

c

0

0

4-

a:

Elapsed Time in Days

Figure C-33 Residual capacity of Washington ports following Puget Sound event (M=7.5).

1

11C

0

.I

0

Elapsed Time in Days

Figure C-34 Residual capacity of Illinois medical care centers following New Madrid event (M=8.0).

322 Appendix C: Residual Capacity Plots ATC-25

322 Appendix C: Residual Capacity Plots ATC-25
42 63 84 105 126 147 168 189

Elapsed Time in Days

210 231 252 273

Residual capacity of Missouri medical care centers following New Madrid event (M=8.0).

Elapsed Time in Days

Figure C-36 Residual capacity of Arkansas medical care centers following New Madrid event (M=8O0).

ATC-25 Appendix C: Residual Capacity Plots 323

1 UU7

95- C

0

Q,

0 21 234

Figure C-35

C:

0

0

co~

a,

- - l l -

i

i

-

! I or)

ATC-25 Appendix C: Residual Capacity Plots 323
1

u

-

a

0

irCi a)

Figure C-37 Residual capacity of Tennessee medical care centers following New Madrid event

(M=8.0).

- I I I

U 7 14 21 28 35 42

Elapsed Time in Days

49 56 63

Figure C-38 Residual capacity of Indiana medical care centers following New Madrid event (M=8.0).

324 Appendix C: Residual Capacity Plots ATC-25

I it IC

.2

.0-

z, a)

95-

90-

70

-

324 Appendix C: Residual Capacity Plots ATC-25

I
0

C, .2

Figure C-39

Zl

0

-0

TU

0,

F e Figure C-39

Residual capacity of Kentucky medical care centers following New Madrid event

(M=8.:O).

Elapsed Time in Days

Residual capacity of Mississippi medical care centers following New Madrid event

(M=8.O).

ATC-25 Appendix C: Residual Capacity Plots 325

.

1

ATC-25 Appendix C: Residual Capacity Plotr, 325
0

0

.4

a)-

55

Elapsed Time in Days

Residual capacity of South Carolina medical care centers following Charleston event

(M= 7.5).

i

0

0

a,

Elapsed Time in Days

C-42 Residual capacity of North Carolina medical care centers following Charleston event

(M =7.5).

326 Appendix C: Residual Capacity Plots ATC-25

Figure C-41

Figure

326 Appendix C: Residual Capacity Plots ATC-25
I 5

95

90-

85-

80-

75-

70-

U 14 2 42 56 70 84 8 112 126 140' 14 168 182

Elapsed Time in Days

Figure C-43 Residual capacity of Georgia medical care centers following Charleston event (M=7.5),.

1

0c:

0

.

An

a:

0 14 28 42 56 70 84 98 112126140154 168182196 2

Elapsed Time in Days

10

Figure C-44 Residual capacity of Massachusetts medical care centers following Cape Ann event

(M=7.0).

ATC-25 Appendix C: Residual Capacity Plots 327

C

.2

0

To

cc

d no

i

i

I

I

I 

AT, C-25, Appendix Q Residual Capacity Plots 327
0

0

op

o2

W

v)

GC

Figure C-45 Residual capacity of Connecticut medical care centers following Cape Ann event

(M=7.0).

.2

._

0-

C

a)

Figure C-46 Residual capacity of Delaware medical care centers following Cape Ann event (M=7.0).

328 Appendix C: Residual Capacity PlotsA  ATC-25
a,

r

Elapsed Time in Days

F u i g r e C -4 7~ ~ ~

C

4

Figure C-48

Residual capacity of Rhode Island medical care centers following Cape Ann event

(M=7.0).

.0

D

D

I)

Elapsed Time in Days

Residual capacity of New Hampshire medical care centers following Cape Ann event

(M=7.0).

ATC-25 Appendix C: Residual Capacity Plots 329 ATS Appendix C: Residual Capacity Plots 329
4- U,

c)

Elapsed Time in Days

Figure C-49 Residual capacity of Utah medical care centers following Wasatch Front (M=7.5).

100

95-

0

0

cc

90-

85-

80-

U Zd 56 84 112 140 168 196 224 22 280 308 336 364

Elapsed Time in Days

Figure C-50 Residual capacity of California medical care centers following Hayward event M=7.5).

330 Appendix C: Residual Capacity Plots ATC-25

-F-j

r ,

A AX PP - . . I . - . I . - . -- I . -I - -- I - --- I - -I - - - - - - - -,

330 Appendix C: Residual Capacity Plots ATC-25
C

0

CZ0

Figure C-51

0

s:0

0

.F 

Figure C-52

Elapsed Time in Days

Residual capacity of California medical care centers following Fort Tejon event M=8.0).

Elapsed Time in Days

Residual capacity of Washington medical care centers following Puget Sound event

(M=7.5).

ATC-25 Appendix C: Residual Capacity Plots 331

ATC-25 Appendix C: Residual Capacity Plots 331;
0O

C:

0

05

a,

0 14 28 42 56 70 84 98 112 126 140 154

Elapsed Time in Days

168 182 196 2

Figure C-53 Residual capacity of Missouri medical care centers following New Madrid event (M=7.0).

1 UU

95.

90-

85-

80-

75-

70-

65-

U 21 42 r I I I I I I I T 63 84 105 126 147 168 189 210 231

Elapsed Time in Days

Figure C-54 Residual capacity of Arkansas medical care centers following New Madrid event (M=7.0).

332 Appendix C: Residual Capacity Plots ATC-25

0

C

0

0

a,

252

nn- . I t]t]-

_.-.- -

- Al & JV

on_ : H11 W - -I rI

332 Appendix C: Residual Capacity Plots ATC-25
1

C

.2

Fn

Figure C-55

Elapsed Time in Days

Residual capacity of Tennessee medical care centers following New Madrid event

(M=7.0).

7 1 4 21 28 35 42 49

Elapsed Time in Days

56 63 70

Figure C-56 Residual capacity of Kentucky medical care centers following New Madrid event

(M =7.0).

ATC-25 Appendix C: Resiual 'Capacity Plots 33

C: 0

M

rjr

U 7

nor Or z A UV~

noCal.ZV 

AT, C-25 Appendix C: ResidualCa =ity Plols 333

- 'I
95-

90-

85-

80

0 14 28 42 56 70 84

Elapsed Time in Days

98 1i2 12b 14U

Residual capacity of Mississippi medical care centers following New Madrid event

(M=7.0).

Elapsed Time in Days

Figure C-58 Residual capacity of Illinois fire stations following New Madrid event (M=7.0).

334 Appendix C: Residual Capacity Plots ATC-25

100

H--

a0

0Cc,

Cn

a:

Figure C-57

1

a)

a: 

-

334 Appendix C: Residual Capacity Plots ATC 25
100

0

T0

95-

0 14 2B 42 bt Pu 04 wv

Elapsed Time in Days

112 126 140

Figure C-59 Residual capacity of Missouri fire stations following New Madrid event (M=8.0).

0

0

Qf)

rr

Elapsed Time in Days

Figure C-60 Residual capacity of Arkansas fire stations following New Madrid event (M=8..0).

ATC-25 Appendbc C: Residual Capacity Plots 335

-

I

- I r- - .i- -- -I- -.. I

ATC-25 Appendix C: Residual Capacity Plots 335
*0

.0

C,

u,

cc)

Elapsed Time in Days

Figure C-61 Residual capacity of Tennessee fire stations following New Madrid event (M=8.0).

14 21 28 35 42 49 56

Elapsed Time in Days

63 70 77

Figure C-62 Residual capacity of Indiana fire stations following New Madrid event (M=8.0).

* ~ ~ f ~~ ~ ~ 7 ~ ~~ - I . . . I I I .I . i ; .~ - I i

Appendix C: Residual Capacity Plots

I %JW

95-

90-

85-

0

0

c' cc

0 7

&

84

1

One 1 [](}

80-

T - , _

. l

336 4 ATC-25
7 14 21 28 35

Elapsed Time in Days

Residual capacity of Kentucky fire stations following New Madrid event M=8.O).

1

0A

0

.4- 0

Figure C-64 I

Eapsed Time in Days

Residual capacity of Mississippi fire stations following New Madrid event (M=8.O).

ATC-25 Appendix C: Residual Capacity Plots 337

95- 0

0

Figure C-63

42 49 56 wry, _ r s l -

:Su -

I

ATC-25 Appendix C: Residuca Ccipacity Plots 337
0

0 INa)

EC

Elapsed Time in Days

Figure C-65

C

.20

0

u,

Residual capacity of South Carolina fire stations following Charleston event (M=7.5).

Residual capacity of North Carolina fire stations following Charleston event (M= 7.5).

338 Appendix C: Residual Capacity Plots ATC-25

Figure C-66

338 Appendix C: Residual Capacity Plots ATC-25
C

0

0

W

.9-

in

Elapsed Time in Days

Figure C-67 Residual capacity of Georgia fire stations following Charleston event (M=7.5).

I

0

C

0

52 0

a,

Elapsed Time in Days

Figure C-68 Residual capacity of Massachusetts, fire stations following Cape Ann event (M=7.0).

ATC-25 Appendix C: Residual Capacity Plots 339

I

i

ATC-25 Appendix C: Residual Capacity Plots 339
1

0

0

cIr

Elapsed Time in Days

Residual capacity of Connecticut fire stations following Cape Ann event (M=7.0).

100-

95-

90-

85-

C 80- 0

E575-

,5 70-

65-

60-

55-

50-

0 21 42 63 84 105 126

Elapsed Time in Days

147 168 189

Figure C-70 Residual capacity of Delaware fire stations following Cape Ann event (M=7.0).

Appendix C: Residual Capacity Plots

Figure C-69

2 

-1U

- -

l {

340 ATC-25

I " 4.
C

0

0

+1

3:

Elapsed Time in Days

Figure C-71 Residual capacity of Rhode Island fire stations following Cape Ann event (M=7.O).

*

C0

.To

Figure C-72 Residual capacity of New Hampshire fire'stations following Cape Ann event (M=7.0).

ATC-25 Appendix C: Residual Capacity Plots 341

ATCC-25 Appendix C: ResidualICapacity Plots 341
0

.2

0

a)

Elapsed Time in Days

Figure C-73 Residual capacity of Utah fire stations following Wasatch

100

95-

0A

: X 0 ~90~

,o)

85-

V 0) 7 14 21 28 35 42 49 56 63 70 77

Elapsed Time in Days

Front event (M=7.5).

84 91 98

Figure C-74 Residual capacity of California fire stations following Hayward event (M=7.5).

Appendix C: Residual Capacity Plots

-

l

-i--ij

342 ATC-25  i, 4

_

I

I- l _!--7
C1-

aC

0

-0

0

Elapsed Time in Days

Figure C-75

0

0

CD

a:

Residual capacity of California fire stations following Fort Tejon event (M=8.0).

Elapsed Time in Days

Figure C-76 Residual capacity of Washington fire stations following Puget Sound event (M=7.5).

ATC-25 Appendix C: Residual Capacity Picts 343

ATC-25 Appendix C: Residual Cap=ffy Plots. 3
100

I

0

.-

W,, a) 1=

0 14 28 42 56 70

Elapsed Time in

Figure C-77 Residual capacity of Missouri fire stations following New Madrid event (M=7.0).

Elapsed Time in Days

Figure C-78 Residual capacity of Arkansas fire stations following New Madrid event (M=7.0).

344 Appendix C: Residual Capacity Plots ATC-25

84

Days

98 112 126

0

.2

0

an

:)

2

: T

z ; S l | .Hn i7_P . . Al .

344 Appendix C: Residual Capacity Plots ATC-25
1

0

Fo

Figure C-79 R

63 70 77

Elapsed Time in Days

Residual capacity of Tennessee fire stations following New Madrid event (M= 7.0).

95-

7 14 21 28 35 42

Elapsed Time in Days

49 56 63

Residual capacity of Kentucky fire stations following New Madrid event (M=7.0).

ATC-25 AppendAz C: Residual Capacity Plots 345

100

.,0

0

co

Q)

ic

90

Figure C-80

r lI

I

I

I

r

ATC-25 AppendiX Q ResidUal Capacity Plots 345
1

: z~~~C .2

0

.0

Cie a)

Figure C-81

Elapsed Time in Days

Residual capacity of Mississippi fire stations following New Madrid event (M=7.0).

100

0

C:

0

,

a,

cc

U

Figure C-82

7

Elapsed Time in Days:

Residual capacity of Illinois police stations following New Madrid event (M=8.0).

Appendix C: Residual Capacity Plots C

14

-

I

S5. _-

1

346 ATC-25
0

0

wc

Elapsed Time in Days

Figure C-83 Residual capacity of Arkansas police stations following New Madrid event (M=8.O).

I:

.MC

-

0

Elapsed Time in Days

Figure C-84 Residual capacity of Tennessee police stations following New Madrid event (M=8.O).

ATC-25 Appendix C: Residual Capacity Plots 347

AT:CE25 AppendixC: Residual Capacity Plots 347
Residual capacity of Kentucky police stations following New Madrid event (M=8.0).

Elapsed Time in Days

Figure C-86 Residual capacity of Mississippi police stations following New Madrid event (M=8.0).

348 Appendix C: Residual Capacity Plots

C

0

0

a)

a:

Figure C-85

C

0

0

a:

1

348 ATC-25
C

.4-

C,

Elapsed Time in Days

Figure C-87

C

-I

.4

I

Figure C-88

Residual capacity of South Carolina police stations following Charleston event (M=7.5).

10

I)

Elapsed Time in Days

Residual capacity of North Carolina police stations following Charleston event (M=7.5).

ATC-25 Appendix C: Residual Capacity Plots 349

ATC-25 Appendix C: Residual Capacity Plots 349
1

0 I~~~~~~T C

. I En0

Q)

Elapsed Time in Days

Figure C-89 Residual capacity of Georgia police stations following Charleston event (M=7.5)

01Cu

0

a)

cc

Elapsed Time in Days .

Residual capacity of Massachusetts police stations following Cape Ann event (M=7.0);

350 Appendix C: Residual Capacity PlotsC

Figure C-90

5)

ATC-25:
0'

I0)

Figure C-91

1

"I

C0

4-

Residual capacity of Connecticut police stations following Cape Ann event (M=7.0)..

Elapsed Time in Days

Figure C-92 Residual capacity of Delaware police stations following Cape Ann event (M=7.0).

ATC-25 Appendix CResidual Capacity Plots 351

,g

ATC-25 Appendix C. Residual:Capaclty Plots 351
0

0

--

cc

Figure C-93 F

0

0

.!

al)

cc

Residual capacity of Rhode Island police stations following Cape Ann event (M=7.0).

Figure C-94 Residual capacity of New Hampshire police stations following Cape Ann event (M=7.0).''

Appendix C: Residual Capacity Plots ::

362 ATC-25 
1

0

.'-4w

G2

Elapsed Time in Days

Figure C-95

C

C

4-

cc

Figure C-96

Residual capacity of Utah police stations following Wasatch Front event ~(tM=7.5).

Elapsed Time in Days

Residual capacity of California police stations following Hayward event (M=7.5).

ATC-25 Appendix C: Residual Capacity Plots 353

I

i

11i.

ATC-25 Ain-pendix C: Residual Capacity Plots 353
IUU95-

90-

85-

C 80- 0

I 75- 0

*i 70- )

a:65-

60-

55-

0 7 14 -1 | I ; I I

21 28 35 42 49 56

Elapsed Time in Days

63 70 77 84

Residual capacity of California police stations following Fort Tejon event (M=8.0).

I I I I 11 

,8 35 42 49 56 63 70 77

Elapsed Time in Days

_7 _7 -

84 91 98 105

Figure C-98 Residual capacity of Washington police stations following Puget Sound event (M=7.5).

354 Appendix C: Residual Capacity Plots ATC-25

Figure C-97

100-

95-

C- 0

.9-

0

.-

C)

-1- _ .

Aon:rtJ -

. _

354 . ATC-25

-- - -- - I

v 7_ I T I

_ _

Appendix C: Residual Capacity Plots
1

0

0

4-

a:

Elapsed Time in Days

Figure C-99

10

010

Residual capacity of Arkansas police stations following New Madrid event (M=7.0)..

Elapsed Time in Days

Figure C-100 Residual capacity of Tennessee police stations following New Madrid event (M=7.0).

ATC-25 Appendix C: Residual Capacity Plots 355

ATC-25 Appendix C: Residual Cqpacity Plots 35
95-

90-

0 14 28 I 1

42 56

Elapsed

70 84

Time in Days

98 112 126

Figure C-101 Residual capacity of Mississippi police stations following New Madrid event (M= 7.0).

1

0

CD,

Elapsed Time in Days

Figure C-102 Residual capacity of Illinois broadcast stations following New Madrid event (M=8.0).

356 Appendix C: Residual Capacity Plots ATC-25

100

0

0

.

cc

1 40

\ - - -

oc;- _- OD-

-F,

_ w Aft - He

356 Appendix C, Residual Ca.pacity' Plots ATC-25
42 63 84 105

Elapsed Time in Days

126 147

Figure C-103 Residual capacity of Missouri broadcast stations following New Madrid event (M=8.0).

1

0

1o

0

W

a)

CE

Elapsed Time in Days

Figure C-104 Residual capacity of Arkansas broadcast stations following New Madrid event (M=8.0,).

ATC-25 Appendix C: Residual Capacity Plots

100-

0-1-

C)

C:

95-

90-

U v1 I b

 I

Q -

I

357
1

0

a

I 2

.2

Elapsed Time in Days

Figure C-105 Resid

100-

95-

0 90-

C

1X 85-

4-

cc, 80-

75-

70-

ual capacity of Tennessee broadcast stations following New Madrid event (M=8.0).

. I l I I I I I I I I 

0 7 14 21 28 35 42 49 56 63 70 77 84 91 98 105

Elapsed Time in Days

Figure C-106 Residual capacity of Kentucky broadcast stations following New Madrid event (M=8.0).

358 38Appendix C: Residual Capacity Plots ATC-25

r--I
0-

0

Ca

cc

95-

U 7 14 21 28 35

Elapsed Time in Days

42 49 56

Figure C-107 Residual capacity of Indiana broadcast stations following New Madrid event (M=8.0).

1

0

0

aE

aQ

Elapsed Time in Days

Figure C-108 Residual capacity of Mississippi broadcast stations following New Madrid event (M=8.0).

ATC-25 Appendix C: esidual Capacity Plots 359

1 t^^ 1 []Q] l wwl

ATC-25 Appendix C., Residual Capacity Plots 359

I

F

I

r
100_

95-

90-

85-

80:

75-

70 

65-

60 

55-

50 

45-

40 E

35-

0 14 28 42 56 70 84 98 112 126 140 154 168 182 196

Elapsed Time in Days

Figure C-109 Residual capacity of South Carolina broadcast stations following Charleston event

(M=7.5).

14 21 28 35 42 49 56

Elapsed Time in Days

63 70 77

Figure C-110 Residual capacity of North Carolina broadcast stations following Charleston event

(M=7.5).

360 Appendix C: Residual Capacity Plots ATC-25~~~~~~~~~~

a

0

0

(,

100

95

0

.0

Cua 0

4)

cc

90-

85-

80-

75

C 7 8

.

84

Appendix C: Residual Capacity Plots i 360 ATC-25
1

0

0

F C

Figure C-1 1 1

0

Elapsed Time in Days

Residual capacity of Georgia broadcast stations following Charleston event (M=7.5).

I

-

0

O

ma)

aC

Elapsed Time in Days

Figure C-1 12 Residual capacity of Florida broadcast stations following Charleston event (M=7.5).

ATC-25 Appendix C: Residual Capacity Plots 361
14 21 2b 35 42 49 b

Elapsed Time in Days

70 77 84

Figure C-113 Residual capacity of Massachusetts broadcast stations following Cape Ann event (M=7.0).

aI

C

.2

at

cm

Figure C-114 Residual capacity of Connecticut broadcast stations following Cape Ann event (M=7.0).

362 Appendix C: Residual Capacity Plots ATC-25

4 Pff

--- I- 95-

90-

85-

80-

R 75-

C 70-

.2 65-

1 60-

°2 55-

0 50-

C 45-

40-

35-

30-

25-

91

I tJ[3

vw

L I -I. -I -I- -I- .I- .I- -I362 Appendix C: Residual Capacity Plots ATC-25
0

0

.2

In

a:

Elapsed Time in Days

Figure C-115 Residual capacity of Delaware broadcast stations following Cape Ann event (M=7.O.

0

0

0

.o

£D

ir

- Elapsed Time in Days

Figure C-1 16 Residual capacity of Rhode Island broadcast stations, following Cape Ann event (M=7.0).

Appendix C. Residual Capacity Plots

1

ATC-25 3
0

0

a)

Figure C-1 1 7

01

Cu

0enZi

Residual capacity of New Hampshire broadcast stations following Cape Ann event

(M= 7.0).

Elapsed Time in Days

Figure C-1 18 Residual capacity of Utah broadcast stations following Wasatch

364 Appendix C: Residual Capacity Plots

Front event (M=7.5).

ATC-25
C

0

0

to

Figure C-11 9

U,C,

<n

0

0r

Elapsed Time in Days

Residual capacity of California broadcast stations following Hayward event (P=75).

Elapsed Time in Days

Figure C-120 Residual capacity of California broadcast stations following Fort Tejon event (M=8.0).

ATC-25 Appendix C: Residual Capacity Plots 365

ATC:-25 Appendix -C: Residual Capacity Plots 365
1

.2

0

U,

0F

.Figure C-1 21

.E0

In

cc

Elapsed Time in Days

Residual capacity of Washington broadcast stations following Puget Sound event (M=7.5).

95-

an

Figure C-1 22

0, 14 28 42 56 70 84 98 112 126

Elapsed Time in Days

Residual capacity of Missouri broadcast stations following New Madrid event (M=7.0).

366 Appendix C: Residual Capacity Plots ATC-25

I '+1U

,.V

A.

366 Appendix C: Residual Capacity Plots ATC.25
C

0

0

MQw

Elapsed Time in Days

Figure C-123 Residual capacity of Arkansas broadcast stations following New Madrid event (M=7.).

1

0

0u

0

a)

CC

Elapsed Time in Days

Figure C-124 Residual capacity of Tennessee broadcast stations following New Madrid event (M=7.0).

ATC-25 Appendix C: Residual Capacity P]ots 367

ATC-25, Appendix Q Residual Capacity Plots 367
7 14 21 28 35 42

Elapsed Time in

I I I

49 56 63 70

Days

Figure C-125 Residual capacity of -~ Kentucky broadcast stations following New Madrid. event (M=7.0). ~ .

i . , I I1

14 21 28 35

Elapsed Time in

I . 42 49 

Days

Figure C -126 Residual capacity of Mississippi broadcast stations following New Madrid event (M=7.0).

. ~ , S.L. A

Appendix C: Residual Capacity Plots

0

.X0

.X)

95-

0 77

100

95-

90-

0

CE

._

0

a)

85-

80-

U 7 56 63

1 I nn- tkJ

un- _-

_ . . I I I

:dUa

I

I IATC,25 I . - 368
1

a

M

1

-Z

on

Elapsed Time in Days

Figure C-127 Residual capacity of railroad system serving epicentral region following New Madrid event

(M=8.0).

-14 *f%

l4 6 i 1

Elapsed Timge in Day-s

.6ii

9o

851

80~

m;-

70-i

615-

60

551

50-,

45 

40i

35j

301

25d

20

10-

5-1

,O 12 14 16

Figure C-128 Residual capacity of railroad system serving Charleston, South Carolina following

Charleston event (M=7.5).

ATC-25 Appendix C: Residual Capacity Plot. 369~~~~~~

,uz

ATC-25 Appendix Q Residual Capacity Plots - 369
I i 1 

2 4 6 8 10

Elapsed Time i Days

12 14 16

Figure C-129 Residual capacity of railroad system serving Cape Ann region following Cape Ann event

(M=7.0).

100-

90-

80-

70-

60-

>E

I'd

1-

.,i

D=

50-

40-

30-

20-

a 4 6

Elapsed Time in Days

10

Figure C-130 Residual capacity of railroad system serving Salt Lake City following Wasatch Front event

(M =7.5).

370 Appendix C: Residual Capacity Plots ATC-25

1

~._

r?

1007

951

90

85-

80-

75-

70

65-

60-

55-

50

45-

401

351

30

25 

20-i

151

10;..

5-

0o

I

t n- I . . .

r I U- i :

, I:

370 Appendix C: Residual Capacity Plots ATC-25
75-

s-

-,J 70

Oj 6o 

I 551

z 501 M 45 -i

,2 404

35-1

30 j

9RZi

0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16

ELapsed Time in Days

Figure C-131 Residual capacity of railroad system serving San Francisco County" Alameda County, and

Contra Costa County following Hayward event (M=7.5').

inn.

90

85

so-

:1- 75-

_, 701 - 65-I

60-

n . _ _ I

.E 55j

,.. 45d-

- 40X -n 354

n_ 301

25 -1

20

15

10 

O :2 4 6 8 1 0

Elapsed Time in Days

12 14 16

Figure C-132 Residual capacity of railroad system serving California following Fort Tejon event

(M=8.O).

ATC-25 Appendix C: Residual Capacity Plots 371

I -

,

A QIIIP nn,_

344- 

_

C)

_

ATC-i25 Appendix C: Residual Capacity Plots, 371L
IJ W95

90

85

80

° 75

.. 70

D 65

I 60 t 55

50

1 45

1 401 n 351

301

25-

0. 2 4 6 8 10 12

Elapsed Time in Davs

14 16

Figure C-133 Residual capacity of railroad system serving Seattle following Puget Sound event (M=7.5).

100-

951

901

85-

80-

0 75-

>` 701

Z 65-

a 60-

U 55j

_d 50-

e 45

2 40-4

ID 351

30H

25-

201

15-

. A.

I2 I 4 6 8

Elapsed Time in Days

10 1 2

Figure C-134 Residual capacity of railroad system serving epicentral region following New Madrid event

(M=7.0).,

372 Appezidlz C: Residual Capacity Plots ATC-25

C

CT

2

.xn^. I

- l

l

1nAppendix C: Residual Capacity Plots ATC-25, 372
E

0

0

en

az

Figure C-1 35 Residual capacity of epicentral region highways following New Madrid event (=8.0).

1

0

0.4--

C, Q)

21 

Elapsed Time in Days

Figure C-136 Residual capacity of epicentral region highways following Charleston event (M=7.5).

ATC-25 Appendix C: Residual Capacity Plots 373

ATC-25 Appendix C, Residual Capacity Plots 3
14 21 28 35 42 49 56 63 70 77 84 91

Elapsed Time in Days

Figure C-137 Re

O

Cu

0

0

Figure C-138 RE

,sidual capacity of epicentral region highways following Cape Ann event (M=7.0).

Elapseu I it III Lay

esidual capacity of epicentral region highways following Wasatch Front event (M=7.5).

374 Appendix C: Residual Capacity Plots ATC-25

100

95

90

0

1o0

0

98 1051 2

I

I I

I

374
C

4-

C

Figure C-139

0111

C

0

M

.2

0

a) in

Figure C-1 40

*Elapsed Time in Days

Residual capacity of epicentral region highways following Hayward event (M=7.5).

1:IcLJdpsu UI El 1U u ys

Residual capacity of epicentral region highways folowing Fort Tejon event (M=8.o)

ATC-25 Appendix CResidual Capacity Plots 375

I11

i

1

ATC:-25. Appendix C: Residual Capacity Plots 376 
01~

0

U al I4 e- O'1 lUQ u | l I1 'J -,

Elapsed Time in Days

210 231 252 273

Figure C-1 41 Residual capacity of epicentral region highways following Puget Sound event (M= 7.5).

100-

95-

90-

85-

80-

75-

o 70-

a 65-

° 60-

55-

0 50- a)

cZ 45-

40-

35-

30-

25-

20-

1 A - I I I I I I I I I

0 28 56 84 112 140 168 196 224 252 280

Elapsed Time in Days

Ud 33b 34 JUZ 42U 448

Figure C-1 42 Residual capacity of epicentral region highways following New Madrid event (M=7.0)

376 Appendix C: Residual Capacity Plots ATC-25

-I

I I I t I

A- -- A 4^= -a IA7 1AQ 1JQQ ---- r- - I I

.j

. Ia _1 I I AI- AA Id -I AA IAM .I

AP pendix C: Residual CapacitY Plats ATC-25 376
0 C

0

0

'I,-

Elapsed Time in Days

Figure C-l 43

0

C

0

0

w

To

ct

rr

Residual capacity of Illinois electric power following New Madrid event (M=8.0).

Elapsed Time in Days

Figure C-144 Residual capacity of Missouri electric power following New Madrid event (M=8.O)

ATC-25 Appendix C: Residual Capacity Plois 377

ATC-25 Appendix C: Residual Capacity Plots 3771P
C

0

CZ0

a)

c:

Elapsed Time in Days

C-1 45 Residual capacity of Arkansas electric power following New Madrid event (M=8.0).

100-

95-

* 90-

0.2

*i 85-

0

fn

rr 80-

75-

IuU 14 28 42 56 70 84

Elapsed Time in Days

Figure C-146 Residual capacity of Tennessee electric power following New Madrid event (M=8.0)

S A- --- - - -2L . '- .AebL- -LLLLAL JI -L 4.L 0 1

Figure

98 112 1 ,

.9 -

l

l

. . .

. .

.

\

JLjJPWIIUL& %.. AWAALLA& a A-,. 3761
c

Q T

1

Elapsed me in Days

Figure C-147 Residual capacity of Kentucky electric power following New Madrid event (M=8.0).

0

0

0

a

Elapsed Time n Days

Figure C-148 Residual capacity of indiana electric power following New Madrid event (M=8.0)

ATC-25 Appendix C: Residual Cpacity Plots 379

ATC-25 Apppendix C: ResidualCapacity Plots 379
1

A

C

0

U)

Elapsed Time in Days

Figure C-149 Residual capacity of Mississippi electric power following New Madrid event (M=8.0).

100

95-

90-

85-

80-

75-

o 70-

65-

60-

CD 55-

50-

45-

40

35-

0 14 28 42 56 70 84 98 1 12 126 140 154

Elapsed Time in Days

Figure C-1 50 Residual capacity of South Carolina electric power following Charleston event (M=7.5).

380 Appendix C: Residual Capacity Plots ATC-25
95-

-0

-0

a)

90-

85-

0o75-

U t 14 21 2e 35 4Z 4Y Or 04 IU I 1 04

Elapsed Time in Days

Figure C-151 Residual capacity of North Carolina electric power following Charleston event (M=7.5).

a

0

0

CZ

1001

95:

so 

85 

80 A

75-

70]

65 L

60 ! I I I I 

0 7 14 1 28 35 42 49 56 63 70 77 84 1 98

Elapsed Time in Days

Figure C-152 Residual capacity of Georgia electric power following Charleston event (M=7.5).

ATC-25 Appendix C: Residual Capacity Plots 381

I

l

I

I I I I

ATC-25 Appendix C: Residual Capacity Plots 381
0

0

a)

cc

Elapsed Time in Days

Figure C-153 Residual capacity of Massachusetts electric power following Cape Ann event (M=7.0).

.O

0

C,, T2

of

(D

95-

90-

85-

80-

75-

70-

65-

60

C 7 I I I14 21 28 35

Elapsed Time in Days

42 49 56

Figure C-i 54 Residual capacity of Connecticut electric power following Cape Ann event (M=7.0).

382 Appendix C: Residual Capacity Plots AC2 ATC-25

: ::

-:- -- - T

I

.
1

C

.2

0

Elapsed Time n Days

Figure C-l 55 Residual capacity of Delaware electric power following Cape Ann event (M=7.0).

C

0

1%

0o

Elapsed Time in Days

Figure C-156 Residual capacity of Rhode Island electric power following Cape Ann event (M=7.0).

ATC-25 Appendix C: Residual Capacity Plots 383

.
0

0

0

a)

cc

Figure C-1 57 Residual capacity of New Hampshire electric power following Cape Ann event (M=7.0).

20 40 60 80 iOO 120

Elapsed Time in Days

Figure C-158 Residual capacity of Utah electric power following Wasatch Front event (M=7.5).

Appendix C: Residual Capacity Plots T

l Ii I

90-

04o

0

TC,

80-

70-

60-

50-

0 14U

an I , :

mu

384

... V--- -.. -.- .. - -- j -

, 

.. 4

ATC-25
- o

C 

0

a:

Elapsed Time n Days

Figure C-159 Residual capacity of California electric power following Hayward event (M=7.5).

.21-

0

.4-

lapsed Time n Days

Figure C-1 60 Residual capacity of !California electric power following Fort Tejon event (M=8.0).

ATC-25 Appendix C: Residual Capacity Plots 385

ATC:-25 Appendix C., Residual Capacity Plots 385
80

Cu

0

Figure C-1 61

0

0

. -

Iri

Figure C-i 62

Elapsed Time in Days

Residual capacity of Washington electric power following Puget Sound event (M=7.5).

1

Elapsed Time in Days

Residual capacity of Missouri electric power following New Madrid event (M=7.0).

386 Appendix C: Residual Capacity Plots ATC-25

386 Appendix C, Residual Capacity Plots ATC-25
c

an

a)EC

Elapsed Time in Days

Figure C-I 63 Residual capacity of Arkansas electric power following New Madrid event (M=7.0).

1001

95 1

C

0

0

4.

so )7 14 21 28 35 42 49 6 d3 77 84 1 ds 15

Elapsed Time in Days

Figure C-164 Residual capacity of Tennessee electric- power following New Madrid event (M=7.0).

ATC-25 Appendix C: Residual Cavacitv Plots 387
----- I---------I------------ I 

U 1 14 1 2U 35 4z 49 00

Elapsed Time in Days

63 70 77

Figure C-165 Residual capacity of Kentucky electric power following New Madrid event (M=7.0).

0ca r0.1-

C')

Elapsed Time in Days

Figure C-166 Residual capacity of Mississippi electric power following New Madrid event (M=7.0).

388 Appendix C: Residual Capacity Plots ATC-25

I Uu95-

0

E0

a)

CC 90-

85-

84

1 An

--

Ort

... UV

388 IAppendix C: Residual Capacity Plots ATC-25
I

.0?

0

rJr

Elapsed Time in Days

Figure C-167

C

. .

0

'n)

rr

Residual capacity of epicentral region water system following Fort Tejon event M=8.0).

Eiapsed I ime In Days

Figure C-168 Residual capacity of San Francisco Bay area water system following Hayward event

(M 7.5).. 

ATC-25, Appendix C: Residual Capacity Plots 389'
MI

IA:

o

0

10

Elapsed Time in Days

20

Figure C-169 Residual capacity of epicentral region water system following Puget Sound event

(M=7.5).

>E

-)

.

c::

100-

95-

90-

85-

80-

75-

70-

65-

60-

55-

50-

45-

0 7 14

Elapsed Time in Days

Figure C-1 70 Residual capacity of crude oil delivery from Texas and Louisiana to Chicago following

New Madrid event (M=8.0).

390 Appendix C: Residual Capacity Plots ATC-25

-

f5i

_

--- ll

390 Appendix C: Residual Capacity Plots ATC-25
X0

U

'U

100-.

954

85

80-j

7 0 -i

65-

60-

551

50-

45-

401

35 J

301

250

15

10

4 21

Elapsed Time in Days

Figure C-1 71 Residual capacity of crude oil delivery from Texas to Southern California following Fort

TeJon event (M=8.0).

E.

95-

go85-

80-

75-

70-

65-

60-

55-

50-

45-

40-

35-

30-

25-

20-

15-

10-

5 10

Elapsed Time in Days

15

Figure C-1 72 Residual capacity of crude oil delivery from Texas to Northern California following Fort

Tejon event (M=8.0).

ATC-25 Appendix C: Residual Capacity Plots 391

l

I l

ATC-25 Appendix C: Residual Capacity Plots 1
'U

O

'U

. (1

0.

ad

CJ

Elapsed Time in Days

Figure C-1 73 Residual capacity of crude oil delivery from Texas and Louisiana to Chicago following

New Madrid event (M=7.0).-

1 UU

95.

0

90- -63

m 85-

xa 80-

aj 75 

70-

65 I

0 7 14

Elapsed Time in Days

Figure C-1 74 Residual capacity of refined oil delivery from Texas to Chicago following New Madrid

event (M=8.0).

392 Appendix C: Residual Capacity Plots ATC-25
I 1c i

95-

U

._

23

-

._

90-

85-

80-

75-

0 7 14

Elapsed Time in Days

Figure C-1 75 Residual capacity of refined oil delivery from Texas to Chicago following New Madrid

event M= 7.0).

N

>f.

0:

"J

, .

Al

.~

Elapsed Time in Days

Figure C-I 76 Residual capacity of natural gas delivery from Texas and Louisiana to Chicago following

New Madrid event (M=8.0).

ATC-25 Appendix C: Residual Capacity Plots 393

-7.

I -

C.;1 a

4

AT:C-25 Appendix C: Residual Capacity Plots 393
2 .4 6

Elapsed Time in Days

10

Figure C-1 77 Residual capacity of natural gas delivery from Texas and Louisiana to northeast region

following New Madrid event (M=8.0).

i i ;

2 4 6 8 10

Elapsed Time in Days

i

I

!

7 ~ ~ Ii ~ ~~~~~~~ 

12 14 16~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

Figure C-1 78 Residual capacity of natural gas delivery from Texas to Northern California following

Hayward event (M=7.5).

394 Appendix C: Residual Capacity Plots ATC-25

100

95.

90.

0

t

j

k1d

kIj

U

7z

72A

aj

1-1

85-

80-

75-

70-

65-

60-

55-

50-

45

40

0o

100-

951

901

8 5 -1

80-

75 

70 

65+

60-

55-

50-

45 - 40 - 35 - 30 A

25-

20-

15+

10

5-

tO+

6 I

0o

IIn

t

.*... .... ..... !. . . . .. . . ... . .. . ... . . . .. I . ..

-in , .

I i

1;

I i I . . I I * !

394 Appendix C, Residual Capacity Plots ATC-25
6

Time in D s

Figure C-1 79 Residual capacity of natural gas delivery from Texas to Washington following Hayward

event (M=7.5).

100TF

95

90+'

85-i

80-S

re 75. 70-.

> 65-

-6i 6 1

-C 551

.E Sol

z 45-

:., 40-5

- o1

*X 3 0 1,

*Z 25 

20-

15-

10I

J6 14

ElaPsed Time in Days

Figure C-180 Residual capacity of natural gas delivery in Utah following Wasatch Front event (M=7.5).

ATC-2 Appedix C Resdual apaciy Plos 39

100.

95-

on!Q

85-

80-

75-

70-

65-

60-

55

50

~4 ;-:.

U 4

EIa I-sed

a 10

-

- i -, I

I

i

I 7

7

Z

::I_

_r,

-

ATC-25 Appendix C: Residual Capacity Plots 35
'2

U

a) n"

Elapsed Time in Days

Figure C-1 81 

(a

-

:'_

._

73

:5

Residual capacity of natural gas delivery from Texas to California following Fort Tejon

event (M=8.0).

Elapsed Time in Days

Figure C-1 82 Residual capacity of natural gas delivery from Texas to Seattle following Puget Sound

event (M=7.5).

396 Appendix C: Residual Capacity Plots ATC-25

396- Appendix C: Residual Capacity Plots ATC-25
95-

go85-

80-

75-

70-

is 2 4

Elapsed Time in Days

6

Figure C-183 Residual capacity of natural gas delivery from Texas and Louisiana to Chicago folowing

New Madrid event (M=7.0).

4 no

95-

9o85-

80-

75-

70-

65-

60

U 2 4

Elapsed Time in DaYs

6 a

Figure C-1 84 Residual capacity of natural gas delivery from Texas and Louisiana to northeast region

following New Madrid event (M=7.0).

ATC-25 Appendix C: Residual Capacity Plots 397

Ibb_11~-

1 no ltil] I VU

'

n

Q

-71

5

E

71

'7

ATC-25 Appendix C: Residual Capacity Plots 3,97
0

0

cc~

Elapsed Time in Days

Figure C-1 85

0)

0

. )

Residual capacity of Missouri upgraded electric system following New Madrid event.

(M=8.0).

Figure C-186 Residual capacity of Arkansas upgraded electric system following New Madrid event

(M =8.0).

398 Appendix C: Residual Capacity Plots ATC-25
7 14 21 28 35 42 49 56 63

Elapsed Time in Days

70 77 84 91

Figure C-187 Residual capacity of Tennessee upgraded electric system following New Madrid event

(M-8.0). 

1

1o

0

.9-

3C

Figure C-I 88

Elapsed Time in Days

Residual capacity of Kentucky upgraded electric system following New Madrid event

(M =8.0).

Appendix C: Residual Capacity Plots

100

0

Ia)

95-

90-

85

0

l

I

l

AT:C-25 399'
0

0

ax,

a)

Elapsed Time in Days

Figure C-189 Residual capacity of Mississippi upgraded electric system following New Madrid event

(M =8.O).

1 UU

95-

0t2

a)

cm

90-

85-

80-

75-

0 7 14 21 28 35 42 49 56 63 70 77 84

Elapsed Time in Days

91

Figure C-1 90 Residual capacity of South Carolina upgraded electric system following Charleston event

I (M = 7.5). I I .r 

400 Appendix : Residual Capacity Plots - ATC-25

4 An,\

7^Iv I 1
14

Elapsed Time in Days

Fgire C-1 91 Residual capacity of North Carolina upgraded electric system following Charleston event

(M=7.5).

. - I 7 14 21 28

Elapsed Time in Days

35 42

Figure C-1 92 Residual capacity of Georgia upgraded electric system following Charleston event

(M=7.5).

ATC-25 Appendix C: Residual 'Cpaclty Plots 401

O0'

0-

U .1

97-

96-

21 25

*l nn

99-

C

0

0

a:

98-

97-

96-

U

11 on, . . i. .

11 ELI

Us -

._- fig I -

_

4-9

AiTC-25 Appendix Q Residual Capacity Mots 401

i

i

i
100

99

98

97

C 96

. 95

In 94

a)

93

92

91

90

6

I I I i I . . I .

7 14 21 28 35 42 49 56 63 70

Elapsed Time in Days

77

Figure C-1 93 Residual capacity of Massachusetts upgraded electric system following Cape Ann event 

(M=7.0).

21 28 35 42 49 56

Elapsed Time in Days

63 70 77 84

Figure C-1 94 Residual capacity of Utah upgraded electric system following Wasatch Front event

(M= 7.5).

Appendix C: Residual Capacity Plots, .

1 0(

5:

3 

I I I Y I I I; 

C:

0

a)

9C

8C,

7C

0 7 14

I

7E

402 ATC-25
0

.2a

0

c)

3:

C,

Figure C-196 I

Elapsed Time in Days

Residual capacity of California upgraded electric system following Hayward event

(M =7.5).

Elapsed Time in Days

Residual capacity of California upgraded electric system following Fort Tejon event

'M=8.0).

ATC-25 Appendix C: Residual Capacity Plots 403

1

ATC-25 Appendix C: Residual Capacity Plots .403
0

.

0

cc

a)

Elapsed Time in Days

Figure C-197 Residual capacity of Washington upgraded electric system following Puget Sound event

4 nn

cna)

0, Or 95-

U 7 14 21 28 35 42 49 56 63

Elapsed Time in Days

70

Figure C-1 98 Residual capacity of Missouri upgraded electric system following New Madrid event

(M=7.0).

404 Appendix C: Residual Capacity Plots ATC-25

I

I-

.

1 .[.IU I VV

.q, ..

404 Appendix Q Residual Capacity Plots ATC-26

i

I
100

0

Lo

EC

a)

rr

95-

9C

0 7 14 21 28 35

Elapsed Time in Days

42 49 E 

Figure C-199 Residual capacity of Arkansas upgraded electric system following New Madrid event

(M=7.0).

TO

0

0

a)

Elapsed Time in Days

Figure C-200 Residual capacity of Tennessee upgraded electric system following New Madrid event

(M=7.0I1.

ATC-25 Appendix C: Residual Capacity Plots 405~~~~~~~~

I--

E

i -

II

AT.C-25 Appendix-C, ResidualCapacity Plots 405
Appendix D: Economic Analysis Data

Table of Contents

Pane

Percent Value Added Lost Due to Specified Percent Loss Tables ........................ ...................... 408

Table D.1 Water Supply ................................................................................................................ 408

Table D.2 Electric .409

Table D.3 Oil Sup ply.410

Table D.4 Natural Gas Supply .411

Table D.5 Highways .412

Table D.6 Railroads .413

Table D.7 Sanitary Sewer .414

Table D.8 Air Transportation .415

Table D.9 Ports.416

Table D.10 Telephone .417

Residual Value Added After Loss of Capacity Tables .............................................. 418

Table D.11 Water Supply .............................................. 418

Table D.12 Electric .............................................. 419

Tslh1l fl 12 fl iar .,-1-

Table D.14

Table D.A15

Table D.16

Table D.17

Table D.18

Table D.19

Table D.20

Residual Value Addc

Figure D.1

Figure D.2

Figure D.3

Figure D.4

Figure D.5

Figure D.6

Figure D.7

Figure D.8

Figure D.9

Natural Gas Supply .............................. 421 Highways ............................... 422

Railroads ........................... 423

Sanitary Sewi..er.424........................... 424

Air Transportation ............................... 425

Ports .............................. 426

Telephone .............................. 427

-d as a Function of Lifeline Capacity Figures .............................. 428

Oil Supply .............................. 428

Natural Gas Supply .............................. 428

Telephone .............................. 429

Air Transportation .............................. 429

Water Supply . 430

Electric ........ 430

U;nTio~ro AO 1 -6lblWayU1 ............................................................

Railroads............................................................

Sanitary Sew er .................................................. 431

432

ATC-25 Appendix D: Economic Analysis Data 407

.............................................................

.............................................................

I............................................................

ATC-25 Appendix D: Economic Analysis Data 407
Table D-1 ' Percent Value-Added Lost Due to Specified Percent Loss of Water Supply Lifeline

U.S. Econ.

LIL Capacity Loss--> Value Added

(Percent),

1 Livestock 0.45%

2 Agr. Prod. 1.06%

3 AgServ For. Fish 0.11%

4 Mining 3.89%

5 Construction 5.52%

6 Food Tobacco 2.41%

7 Textile Goods 0.37%

8 Misc Text. Prod. 0.73%

9 Lumber & Wood 0.52%

10 Furniture 0.34%

11 Pulp & Paper 0.87%

12 Print & Publish 1.31%

13 Chemical & Drugs 1.40%

14 Petrol. Refining 0.96%

15 Rubber & Plastic 1.03%

16 Leather Prods. 0.12%

17 Glass Stone Clay 0.62%

18 Prim. Metal Prod. 1.04%

19 Fab. Metal Prod. 1.64%

20 Mach. Exc. Elec. 1.56%

21 Elec. & Electron 2.52%

22 Transport Eq. 2.62%

23 Instruments 0.68%

24 Misc. Manufact. 0.69%

25 Transp & Whse. 3.46%

26 Utilities 5.89%

27 Wholesale Trade 5.63%

28 Retail Trade 5.63%

29 F.I.R.E. 16.64%

30 Pers/Prof. Serv. 8.03%

31 Eating Drinking 2.12%

32 Auto Serv. 1.09%

33 Amuse & Rec. 0.70%

34 Health Ed. Soc. 6.30%

35 Govt & Govt Ind. 11.79%

36 Households 0.25%

TOTAL 100.00%

10% 20% 1 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%

3.68% 

2.37% 7.11% 11.84% 16.58% 21.32% 26.05% 30.79% 35.53% 40.26% 45.00% 11.05% 18.42% 25.79% 33.16% 40.53% 47.89% 55.26% 62.63% 70.00%

0.79% 

2.37% 7.11% 

2.37% 

11.84% 16.58% 21.32% 26.05% 30.79% 35.53% 40.26% 45.00%

2.63% 7.89% 

3.95% 5.53% 7.11% 8.68% 10.26% 11.84% 13.42% 15.00%

3.68% 11.05% 

13.16% 18.42% 23.68% 28.95% 34.21% 39.47% 44.74% 50.00%

3.68%/6 11.05% 

18.42% 25.79% 33.16% 40.53% 47.89% 55.26% 62.63% 70.00%

3.68% 11.05% 

18.42% 

18.42% 

25.79% 33.16% 40.53% 47.89% 55.26% 62.63% 70.00%

2.63% 7.89% 

25.79% 33.16% 40.53% 47.89% 55.26% 62.63% 70.00%

2.63% 7.89% 

13.16% 18.42% 23.68% 28.95% 34.21% 39.47% 44.74% 50.00%

3.16% 9.47% 

13.16% 18.42% 23.68% 28.95% 34.21% 39.47% 44.74% 50.00% 15.79% 22.11% 28.42% 34.74% 41.05% 47.37% 53.68% 60.00%

4.21% 

1.58% 

12.63% 

4.74% 7.89% 11.05% 14.21% 17.37% 20.53% 23.68% 26.84% 30.00%

2.63% 7.89% 

21.05% 29.47% 37.89% 46.32% 54.74% 63.16% 71.58% 80.00%

2.63% 7.89% 

13.16% 

13.16% 

18.42% 23.68% 28.95% 34.21% 39.47% 44.74% 50.00%

2.63% 

18.42% 23.68% 28.95% 34.21% 39.47% 44.74% 50.00%

2.63% 

7.89% 

7.89% 

13.16% 18.42% 23.68% 28.95% 34.21% 39.47% 44.74% 50.00%

4.74% 

13.16% 18.42% 23.68% 28.95% 34.21% 39.47% 44.74% 50.00%

4.21% 

14.21% 

12.63% 21.05% 

23.68% 33.16% 42.63% 52.11% 61.58% 71.05% 80.53% 90.00%

3.16% 9.47% 

29.47% 37.89% 46.32% 54.74% 63.16% 71.58% 80.00%

4.74% 14.21% 

15.79% 22.11% 28.42% 34.74% 41.05% 47.37% 53.68% 60.00%

3.16% 9.47% 

23.68% 33.16% 42.63% 52.11% 61.58% 71.05% 80.53% 90.00%

4.74% 14.21% 

15.79% 22.11% 28.42% 34.74% 41.05% 47.37% 53.68% 60.00%

3.16% 

23.68% 33.16% 42.63% 52.11% 61.58% 71.05% 80.53% 90.00%

1.05% 3.16% 

9.47% 15.79% 22.11% 28.42% 34.74% 41.05% 47.37% 53.68% 60.00%

2.11% 6.32% 

5.26% 7.37% 9.47% 11.58% 13.68% 15.79% 17.89% 20.00%

1.05% 3.16% 

10.53% 14.74% 18.95% 23.16% 27.37% 31.58% 35.79% 40.00%

1.05% 

5.26% 7.37% 9.47% 11.58% 13.68% 15.79% 17.89% 20.00%

1.05% 

3.16% 

3.16% 

5.26% 7.37% 9.47% 11.58% 13.68% 15.79% 17.89% 20.00%

1.05% 3.16% 

5.26% 7.37% 9.47% 11.58% 13.68% 15.79% 17.89% 20.00%

4.21% 12.63% 

5.26% 7.37% 9.47% 11.58% 13.68% 15.79% 17.89% 20.00%

0.53% 1.58% 

21.05% 29.47% 37.89% 46.32% 54.74% 63.16% 71.58% 80.00%

4.21% 12.63% 

2.63% 3.68% 4.74% 5.79% 6.84% 7.89% 8.95% 10.00%

2.11% 6.32% 

21.05% 29.47% 37.89% 46.32% 54.74% 63.16% 71.58% 80.00%

1.32% 3.95% 

10.53% 14.74% 18.95% 23.16% 27.37% 31.58% 35.79% 40.00%

2.11% 6.32% 

6.58% 9.21% 11.84% 14.47% 17.11% 19.74% 22.37% 25.00% 10.53% 14.74% 18.95% 23.16% 27.37% 31.58% 35.79% 40.00%

2.70% 

Avg. 

8.11% 13.52% 18.93% 24.34% 29.75% 35.16% 40.57% 45.98% 51.39% Avg. Avg. Avg. Avg. Avg. Avg. Avg. Avg. Total V.A

Pct. V.A.

0

l:

'K

1z

0

0

0

0 

o

n

Entj

0
Table D-2 Percent Value-Added Lost Due to Specified Percent Loss of Electric Lifeline

U.S. Econ. -- UL Capacity Loss--> Value Added 10%

(Percent)

20% 30% 40% 50% 60%

1 Livestock

2 Agr. Prod.

3 AgServ For. Fish

4 Mining

S Construction

6 Food Tobacco

7 Textile Goods

8 Misc Text, Prod.

9 Lumber & Wood

10 Furniture

11 Pulp & Paper

12 Print & Publish

13 Chemical-& Drugs

14 Petrol. Refining

15 Rubber & Plastic

16 Loather Prods.

17 Glass Stone Clay

18 Prim, Metal Prod,

19 Fab. Metal Prod.

20 Mach. Exo. Elec,

21 Elec. & Electron

22 Transport Eq.

23 Instruments

24 Misc. Manufact.

25 Transp & Whse.

26 Utilities

27 Wholesale Trade

28 Retail Trade

29 F.l.fl.E.

30 Pers./Prof. Serv.

31 Eating Drinking

32 Auto Serv.

33 Amuse & Rec.

34 Health Ed. Soo.

35 Govt & Govt Ind.

36 Households

TOTAL

0.45%

1.06%

0.1 1%

3.89%/

5.52%

2.41%

0.37%

0.73%

0.52%

0.34%

0.87%

1.31%

1.40%

0.96%

1.03%

0.12%

0.62%

1.04%

1.64%

1.56%

2.52%

2.62%

0.68%

0.69%

3.46%

5,89%

5.63%

5,63%

16.64%

8.03%

2.12%

1.09%

0.70%

6.30%

11.79%

0.26%

100.00%

2.63% 7.89%

2.63% 7.89%

2,63% 7.89%

4.74% 14.21%

2.11% 6.32%

4.74% 14.21%

5.26% 15.79%

5.26% 15.79%

526% 15.79%

5.26% 15,79%

5.26% 15.79%

5.26% 15.79%

4.74% 14.21%

5.26% 15.79%

5.26% 15.79%

5.26% 15,79%

5.26% 15.79%

4.74% 14.21%

5.26% 15.79%

5.26% 15.79%

5.26% 15.79%

5.26% 15.79%

5.26% 15.79%

5.26% 15.79%

1.58% 4.74%

4.21% 12.63%

4.74% 14.21%

4.74% 14.21%

4.74% 14.21%

4.74% 14.21%

4.21% 12.63%

4.74% 14.21%

4.21% 12.63%

4.21% 12.63%

3.16% 9.47%

4.21% 12.63%

4,52%

Avg.

13.55%

Avg.

13.16%

13.16%

13.16%

23.68%

10.53%

23.68%

26.32%

26.32%

26.32%

26.32%

26.32%

26.32%

23.68%

26.32%

26.32%

26.32°%

26.32%

23.68%

26.32%

26.32%

26.32%

26.32%

26.32%

26.32%

7.89%

21.05%

23.68%

23.68%

23.68%

23.68%

21.05%

23.68%

21.05%

21.05%

15,79%

21.05%

22.59%

Avg.

18.42% 23.68% 28.95%

18.42% 23.68% 28.95%

18.42% 23.68% 28.95%

33.16% 42.63% 52.11%

14.74% 18.95% 23.16%

33.16% 42.63% 52.11%

36.84% 47.37% 57.89%

36.84% 47.37% 57,89%

36.84% 47.37% 57.89%

36.84% 47.37% 57.89%

36.84% 47.37% 57.89%

36.84% 47.37% 57.89%

33.16% 42.63% 52.11%

36.84% 47.37% 57.89%

36.84% 47.37% 57.89%

36.84% 47.37% 57,89%

36.84% 47.37% 57.89%

33.16% 42.63% 52.11%

36.84% 47.37% 57.89%

36.84% 47.37% 57.89%

36.84% 47.37% 57.89%

36.84% 4737% 57.89%

36.84% 47.37% 57.89%

36.84% 4737% 57.89%

11.05% 14.21% 17.37%

29.47% 37.89% 46,32%

33.16% 42.63% 52.11%

33.16% 42.63% 52.11 %

33.16% 42.63% 52.11%

33.16% 42.63% 52.11%

29.47% 37.89% 46.32%

33.16% 42.63% 52.11%

29.47% 37,89% 46.320%

29.47% 37.89% 46.32%

22.1 1% 28.42% 34.74%

29.47% 37.89% 46.32%

34.21%

34.21%

34.21%

61.58%

27.37%

61.58%

68.42%

68.42%

68,42%

68.42%

68,42%

68.42%

61 .8%

68.42%

68.42%

68.42%

68.42%

61.58%

68.42%

68.42%

68.42%

68.42%

68.42%

68.42%

20.53%

54.74%

61 .58%

61.58%

61.58%

61.58%

54.74%

61.58%

54.74%

S4.74%

41.05%

54.74%

31.62% 40.66% 49.69% 58.73%

Avg. Avg. Avg. Avg.

80% 100%

39.47% 44.74% 50.00%

39,47% 44.74% 50.00%

39.47%/a 44.74% 50.00%

71.05% 80.53% 90,00%

31.58% 35.79% 40.00%

71.05% 80.53% 90.00%

78.95% 89.47% 100.00%

78.95% 89.47% 100.00%

78.95% 89.47% 100.00%

78.95% 89.47% 100.00%

78.95% 89.47% 100.00%

78.95% 89.47% 100.00%

71.05% 80.53% 90 .00%

78.95% 89.47% 100.00%

78.95% 89.47% 100.00%

78.95% 89,47% 100.00%

78.95% 89.47% 100.00%

71.05% 80,53% 90.00%

78.95% 89.47% 100.00%

78.95% 89.47% 100.00%

78.95% 89.47% 100.00%

78.95% 89,47% 100.00%

78.95% 89.47% 100.00%

78.95% 89.47% 100.00%

23.68% 26.84% 30.00%

63.16% 71.58% 80.00%

71.05% 80.53% 90.00%

71.05% 80.53% 90.00%

71.05% 80.53% 90.00%

71.05% 80.53% 90.00%

63.16% 71.58% 80.00%

71.05% 80.53% 90,00%

63,16% 71.58% 80.00%

63.16% 71.58% 80.00%

47.37% 53,68% 60.00%

63.16% 71 .58% 80.00%

67.76% 76.80% 85,83%

Avg. Avg. Total V.A

Pot. V.A.

ID'

t'-3

70%

'0

0

CL

t

a

0

in

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C

BO% 90% 100%
Table D-3 Percent Value-Added Lost Due to Specified Percent Loss of Oil Supply Lifeline

U.S. Econ.

ULL Capacity Loss--> Value Added

(Percent)

1 Livestock 0.45%

2 Agr. Prod. 1.06%

3 AgServ For. Fish 0.11%

4 Mining 3.89%

5 Construction 5.52%

6 Food Tobacco 2.41%

7 Textile Goods 0.37%

8 Misc Text. Prod. 0.73%

9 Lumber & Wood 0.52%

10 Furniture 0.34%

11 Pulp & Paper 0.87%

12 Print & Publish 1.31%

13 Chemical Drugs 1.40%

14 Petrol. Refining 0.96%

15 Rubber & Plastic 1.03%

16 Leather Prods. 0.12%

17 Glass Stone Clay 0.62%

18 Prim. Metal Prod. 1.04%

19 Fab. Metal Prod. 1.64%

20 Mach. Exc. Elec. 1.56%

21 Elec. & Electron 2.52%

22 Transport Eq. 2.62%

23 Instruments 0.68%

24 Misc. Manufact. 0.69%

25 Transp & Whse. 3.46%

26 Utilities 5.89%

27 Wholesale Trade 5.63%

28 Retail Trade 5.63%

29 F.I.R.E. 16.64%

30 Pers./Prof. Serv. 8.03%

31 Eating Drinking 2.12%

32 Auto Serv. 1.09%

33 Amuse & Rec. 0.70%

34 Health Ed. Soc. 6.30%

35 Govt & Govt Ind. 11.79%

36 Households 0.25%

TOTAL 100.00%

10% 20% 3001% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%

2.63% 7.89% 13.16% 18.42%. 23.68% 28.95% 34.21% 39.47% 44.74% 50.00% 4.21% 12.63% 21.05% 29.47% 37.89% 46.32% 54.74% 63.16% 71.58% 80.00% 4.21% 12.63% 21.05% 29.47% 37.89% 46.32% 54.74% 63.16% 71.58% 80.00% 4.74% 14.21% 23.68% 33.16% 42.63% 52.11% 61.58% 71.05% 80.53% 90.00% 4.74% 14.21% 23.68% 33.16% 42.63% 52.11% 61.58% 71.05% 80.53% 90.00% 2.63% 7.89% 13.16% 18.42% 23.68% 28.95% 34.21% 39.47% 44.74% 50.00% 2.63% 7.89% 13.16% 18.42% 23.68% 28.95% 34.21% 39.47% 44.74% 50.00% 2.63% 7.89% 13.16% 18.42% 23.68% 28.95% 34.21% 39.47% /44.74% 50.00% 2.63% 7.89% 13.16% 18.42% 23.68% 28.95% 34.21% 39.47% 44.74% 50.00% 2.63% 7.89% 13.16% 18.42% 23.68% 28.95% 34.21% 39.47% 44.74% 50.00% 2.63% 7.89% 13.16% 18.42% 23.68% 28.95% 34.21% 39.47% 44.74% 50.00% 2.63% 7.89% 13.16% 18.42% 23.68% 28.95% 34.21% 39.47% 44.74% 50.00% 2.63% 7.89% 13.16% 18.42% 23.68% 28.95% 34.21% 39.47% 44.74% 50.00% 5.26%. 15.79% 26.32% 36.84% 47.37% 57.89% 68.42% 78.95% 89.47% 100.00% 2.63% 7.89% 13.16% 18.42% 23.68% 28.95% 34.21% 39.47% 44.74% 50.00% 2.63% 7.89% 13.16% 18.42% 23.68% 28.95% 34.21% 39.47% 44.74% 50.00% 2.63% 7.89% 13.16% 18.42% 23.68% 28.95% 34.21% 39.47% 44.74% 50.00%

4.74% 14.21% 23.68% 33.16% 42.63% 52.11% 61.58% 71.05% 80.53% 90.00% 2.63% 7.89% 13.16% 18.42% 23.68% 28.95% 34.21% 39.47% 44.74% 50.00%

2.63% 7.89% 13.16% 18.42% 23.68% 28.95% 34.21% 39.47% 44.74% 50.00% 2.63% 7.89% 13.16% 18.42% 23.68% 28.95% 34.21% 39.47% 44.74% 50.00% 4.74% 14.21% 23.68% 33.16% 42.63% 52.11% 61.58% 71.05% 80.53% 90.00% 2.63% 7.89% 13.16% 18.42% 23.68% 28.95% 34.21% 39.47% 44.74% 50.00% 2.63% 7.89% 13.16% 18.42% 23.68% 28.95% 34.21% 39.47% 44.74% 50.00% 4.74% 14.21% 23.68% 33.16% 42.63% 52.11% 61.58% 71.05% 80.53% 90.00% 2.63% 7.89% 13.16% 18.42% 23.68% 28.95% 34.21% 39.47% 44.74% 50.00% 2.63% 7.89% 13.16% 18.42% 23.68% 28.95% 34.21% 39.47% 44.74% 50.00% 4.74% 14.21% 23.68% 33.16% 42.63% 52.11% 61.58% 71.05% 80.53% 90.00% 3.16% 9.47% 15.79% 22.11% 28.42% 34.74% 41.05% 47.37% 53.68% 60.00% 3.16% 9.47% 15.79% 22.11% 28.42% 34.74% 41.05% 47.37% 53.68% 60.00% 4.21% 12.63% 21.05% 29.47% 37.89% 46.32% 54.74% 63.16% 71.58% 80.00% 4.74% 14.21% 23:68% 33.16% 42.63% 52.11% 61.58% 71.05% 80.53% 90.00% 4.74% 14.21% 23.68% 33.16% 42.63% 52.11% 61.58% 71.05% 80.53% 90.00%

1.05% 3.16% 5.26% 7.37% 9.47% 11.58% 13.68% 15.79% 17.89% 20.00% 1.05% 3.16% 5.26% 7.37% 9.47% 11.58% 13.68% 15.79% 17.89% 20.00% 2.63% 7.89% 13.16% 18.42% 23.68% 28.95% 34.21% 39.47% 44.74% 50.00%

3.25% 9.74% 16.23% 22.72% 29.21% 35.70% 42.19% 48.68% 55.18% 61.67% Avg. Avg. Avg. Avg. Avg. Avg. Avg. Avg. Avg. Total V.A

Pct. V.A.

ofd

CD

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Table D-4 Percent Value-Added Lost Due to Specified Percent Loss of Natural Gas

Supply Lifeline

10% 20% 30% 40% 50%

60% 70% 80% 00% 100%

1 Livestock

2 Agr. Prod.

3 AgServ For. Fish

4 Mining

S Construction

6 Food Tobacco

7 Textile Goods

8 Misc Text. Prod.

9 Lumber& Wood

10 Furniture

11 Pulp & Paper

12 Print & Publish

13 Chemical & Drugs

14 Petrol. Refining

1 Rubber & Plastic

16 Leather Prods,

17 Glass Stone Clay

18 Prim. Metal Prod.

19 Fab. Metal Prod.

20 Mach. Exc. Elec.

21 Elec. & Eectron

22 Transport Eq.

23 Instruments

24 Misc. Manufact.

25 Transp & Whse.

26 Utilities

27 Wholesale Trade

28 Retail Trade

29 F.l.R.E.

30 Pers./Prof Serv.

S1 Eating Drinking

32 Auto Serv.

33 Amuse & Rea.

34 Health Ed. Soo.

35 Govt & Govt Ind.

36 Households

TOTAL

0.45%

1.06%

0.1 1%

3.89%

5.52%

2.41%

0.37%

0.73%

0.S2%

0.34%

0.87%

1.31%

1.40%

0.96%

1.03%

0.12%

0.62%

1,04%

1.64%

1,56%

2.52%

2.62%

0.68%

0.69%

3.46%

5.89%

5.63%

5.63%

16.64%

8.03%

2.12%

1.09%

0.70%

6.30%

11.79%

0.25%

100.00%

0,53%

1.58%

1.58%

0.53%

0.00%

1.32%

1.05%

1.05%

1.05%

1.05%

2.11%

1.05%

4.74%

2.63%

2.63%

1.05%

2.63%

2.63%

2,63%

263%

2.63%

2.63%

3.95%

2.63%

0.00%

2.11%

0.53%

1.05%

1.05%

1.05%

2.11%

0.26%

2.11%

1.05%

1.05%

1.84%

1.68%

Avg.

1.S8%

4.74%

4.74%

1.58%

O.00%

3.95%

3.16%

3.16%

3.16%

3.16%

6.32%

3.16%

14.21%

7.89%

7.89%

3.16%

7.89%

7.89%

7.89%

7.89%

7.89%

7.89%

11.84%

7.89%

0.00%

6.32%

1.58%

3.16%

3.16%

3.16%

6,32%

0.79%

6.32%

3.16%

3.16%

5.53%

5.04%

Avg.

2.63%

7.89%

7.89%

2,63%

0.00%

6,58%

5.26%

5.26%

5.26%

5.26%

10.53%

5.26%

23.68%

13.16%

13.16%

5.26%

13.16%

13.16%

13,16%

13.16%

13,16%

13.16%

19.74%

13.16%

0,00%

10.53%

2.63%

5.26%

5.26%

5.26%

10.53%

1.32%

10.53%

6.26%

5.26%

9.21%

3.68%

1 1.05%

11.05%

3.68%

0.00%

9.21%

7.37%

7.37%

7.37%

7.37%

14.74%

7.37%

33.16%

18.42%

18.42%

7.37%

18,42%

18.42%

18.42%

18.42%

18,42%

18.42%

27.63%

18.42%

0.00%

14.74%

3.68%

7,37%

7.37%

7.37%

14.74%

1.84%

14.74%

7.37%

7.37%

12.89%

4.74%

14.2 1%

14.21%

4.74%

0.00%

11.84%

9.47%

9.47%

9.47%

9.47%

18.95%

9.47%

42.63%

23.68%

23.68%

9.47%

23.68%

23.68%

23.68%

23.68%

23.68%

23.65%

35.53%

23.68%

0.00%

18.95%

4,74%

9.47%

9.47%

9.47%6

18.95%

2.37%

18,95%

9.4 7%

9.47%

16.58%

8,41% 11.77% 15.13%

Avg. Avg. Avg.

5.79%

17.37%

17.37%

5.79%

0.00%

14.47%

11.58%

11.58%

11.58%

1.58%

23.16%

1 1.58%

52.11%

28.95%

28.95%

1 1.58%

28.95%

28.95%

28.95%

28.95%

28.95%

28.95%

43.42%

28.95%

0.00%

23.16%

5.79%

11.58%

11.58%

11.58%

23.16%

2.89%

23.16%

11.58%

11.58%

20.26%

18.49%

Avg.

6.84%

20.53%

20.53%

6.84%

0.00%

17.1 1%

13.68%

13.68%

13.68%

13.68%

27.37%

13.68%

611.58%

34.21%

34.21%

13.68%

34.21 i%

34.21%

34.21%

34.21%

34.21%

34.21%

51.32%

34.21%

0.00%

27.37%

6.84%

13.68%

13.68%

1 3.68%

27.37%

3.42%

27.37%

13.68%

13.68%

23.95%

7.89%

23,68%

23.68%

7,89%

0.00%

19.74%

15,79%

15.79%

1 5.79%

15.79%

31 ,58%

15.79%

71 .05%

39,47%

39.47%

15.79%

39.47%

39.47%

39.47%

39.47%

39.47%

39.47%

59.21%

39.47%

0.00%

31 .58%

7,89%

15.79%

15.79%

15.79%

31 .58%

3.95%

31 .58%

15,79%

15.79%

27,6S%

21.86% 25,22%

Avg. Avg.

8.95% 10.00%

26.84% 30.00%

26.84% 30.00%

8.95% 10.00%

0.00% 0.00%

22.37% 25.00%

17.89% 20.00%

17.89% 20.00%

17.59% 20.00%

17.89% 20.00%

35.79% 40,00%

17.89% 20.00%

80.53% 90.00%

44.74% 50.00%

44.74% 50.00%

17,89% 20.00%

44.74% 50.00%

44.74% 50.00%

44.74% 50.00%

44.74% 50.00%

44.74% 50.00%

44.74% 50.00%

67.11% 75,00%

44.74% 50.00%

0.00% 0.00%

35.79% 40.00%

8.95% 10.00%

17.89% 20.00%

17.89% 20.00%

17.89% 20.00%

35.79% 40.00%

4.47% S.00%

35.79% 40.00%

17.89% 20.00%

17.89% 20.00%

31.32% 35.00%

28.58% 31.94%

Avg. Total V.A

Pot. V.A.

:Dd 9~

I',

LIL Capacity Loss-->

U.S. Eon.

Value Added

(Percent)

ad

(D

0

0

0

Pn.

g

tn

IM4h'-

a

60% 705% B0% 90D/, 100%
Table D-5 Percent Value-Added Lost Due to Specified Percent Loss of Highways Lifeline

U.S. Econ.

LIL Capacity Loss-> Value Added

(Percent)

1 Livestock 0.45%

2 Agr. Prod/ 1.06%

3 AgServ For. Fish 0.11%

4 Mining 3.89%

5 Construction 5.52%

6 Food Tobacco 2.41%

7 Textile Goods 0.37%

8 Misc Text. Prod. 0.73%

9 Lumber & Wood 0.52%

10 Furniture 0.34%

11 Pulp & Paper 0.87%

12 Print & Publish 1.31%

13 Chemical & Drugs 1.40%

14 Petrol. Refining 0.96%

15 Rubber & Plastic 1.03%

16 Leather Prods. 0.12%

17 Glass Stone Clay 0.62%

18 Prim. Metal Prod. 1.04%

19 Fab. Metal Prod. 1.64%

20 Mach. Exc. Elec. 1.56%

21 Elec. & Electron 2.52%

22 Transport Eq. 2.62%

23 Instruments 0.68%

24 Misc. Manufact. 0.69%

25 Transp & Whse. 3.46%

26 Utilities 5.89%

27 Wholesale Trade 5.63%

28 Retail Trade 5.63%

29 F.I.R.E. 16.64%

30 Pers./Prof. Serv. 8.03%

31 Eating Drinking 2.12%

32 Auto Serv. 1.09%

33 Amuse & Rec. 0.70%

34 Health Ed. Soc. 6.30%

35 Govt & Govt Ind. 11.79%

36 Households 0.25%

TOTAL 100.00%

10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%

2.63% 7.89% 13.16% 18.42% 23.68% 28.95% 34.21%

4.21% 12.63% 21.05% 29.47% 37.89% 46.32% 54.74%

4.21% 12.63% 21.05% 29.47% 37.89% 46.32% 54.74%

1.84% 5.53% 9.21% 12.89% 16.58% 20.26% 23.95%

2.11% 6.32% 10.53% 14.74% 18.95% 23.16% 27.37%

4.21% 12.63% 21.05% 29.47% 37.89% 46.32% 54.74%

3.95% 11.84% 19.74% 27.63% 35.53% 43.42% 51.32%

3.95% 11.84% 19.74% 27.63% 35.53% 43.42% 51.32%

4.74% 14.21% 23.68% 33.16% 42.63% 52.11% 61.58%

3.95% 11.84% 19.74% 27.63% 35.53% 43.42% 51.32%

4.21% 12.63% 21.05% 29.47% 37.89% 46.32% 54.74%

3.95% 11.84% 19.74% 27.63% 35.53% 43.42% 51.32%

4.21% 12.63% 21.05% 29.47% 37.89% 46.32% 54.74%

4.74% 14.21% 23.68% 33.16% 42.63% 52.11% 61.58%

3.95% 11.84% 19.74% 27.63% 35.53% 43.42% 51.32%

3.95% 11.84% 19.74% 27.63% 35.53% 43.42% 51.32%

3.95% 11.84% 19.74% 27.63% 35.53% 43.42% 51.32%

4.21% 12;63% 21.05% 29.47% 37.89% 46.32% 54.74%

4.21% 12.63% 21.05% 29.47% 37.89% 46.32% 54.74%

4.21% 12.63% 21.05% 29.47% 37.89% 46.32% 54.74%

3.95% 11.84% 19.74% 27.63% 35.53% 43.42% 51.32%

4.21% 12.63% 21.05% 29.47% 37.89% 46.32% 54.74%

4.21% 12.63% 21.05% 29.47% 37.89% 46.32% 54.74%

3.95% 11.84% 19.74% 27.63% 35.53% 43.42% 51.32%

4.21% 12.63% 21.05% 29.47% 37.89% 46.32% 54.74%

2.11% 6.32% 10.53% 14.74% 18.95% 23.16% 27.37%

3.68% 11.05% 18.42% 25.79% 33.16%. 40.53% 47.89%

2.89% 8.68% 14.47% 20.26% 26.05% 31.84% 37.63%

2.37% 7.11% 11.84% 16.58% 21.32% 26.05% 30.79%

2.37% 7.11% 11.84% -16.58% 21.32% 26.05% 30.79%

2.63% 7.89% 13.16% 18.42% 23.68% 28.95% 34.21%

2.89% 8.68% 14.47% 20.26% 26.05% 31.84% 37.63%

2.63% 7.89% 13.16% 18.42% 23.68% 28.95% 34.21%

2.89% 8.68% 14.47% 20.26% 26.05% 31.84% 37.63%

1.58% 4.74% 7.89% 11.05% 14.21% 17.37% 20.53%

2.11% 6.32% 10.53% 14.74% 18.95% 23.16% 27.37%

3.50% 10.50% 17.51% 24.51% 31.51% 38.52/ . 45.52%

Avg. Avg. Avg. Avg. Avg. Avg. Avg.

Ic, he

V

la

(D

i

0

I:.

(A

a.

39.47%

63.16%

63.16%

27.63%

31.58%

63.16%

59.21%

59.21%

71.05%

59.21%

63.16%

59.21%

63.16%

71.05%

59.21%

59.21%

59.21%

63.16%

63.16%

63.16%

59.21%

63.16%

63.16%

59.21%

63.16%

31.58%

55.26%

43.42%

35.53%

35.53%

39.47%

43.42%

39.47%

43.42%

23.68%

31.58%

52.52%

Avg.

44.74%

71.58%

71.58%

31.32%

35.79%

71 .58%

67.11%

67.11%

80.53%

67.11%

71.58%

67.11%

71.58%

80.53%

67.11%

67.11%

67.11%

71.58%

71.58%

71.58%

67.11%

71.58%

71.58%

67.11%

71.58%

35.79%

62.63%

49.21%

40.26%

40.26%

44.74%

49.21%

44.74%

49.21%

26.84%

35.79%

59.52%

Avg.

50.00%

80.00%

80.00%

35.00%

40.00%

80.00%

75.00%

75.00%

90.00%

75.00%

80.00%

75.00%

80.00%

90.00%

75.00%

75.00%

75.00%

80.00%

80.00%

80.00%

75.00%

80.00%

80.00%

75.00%

80.00%

40.00%

70.00%

55.00%

45.00%

45.00%

50.00%

55.00%

50.00%

55.00%

30.00%

40.00%

66.53%

Total V.A

Pot; V.A.
Table D-6 Percent Value-Added Lost Due to Specified Percent Loss of Railroads Lifeline

U.S. Econ. IL Capacity Loss--> Value Added 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% (Percent)

1 Livestock 0.45% 2.11% 6.32% 10.53% 14.74% 18.95% 23.16% 27.37% 31.58% 35.79% 40.00% 2 Agr. Prod. 1.06% 2.11% 632% 10.53% 18.95% 23.16% 27.37% 31.58% 35.79% 40.00% 3 AgServ For. Fish 0.11% 2.11% 6.32% 10.53% 14.74% 18.95% 23.16% 27.37%A. 31.58% 35.79% 40.00% 4 Mining 3.89% 1.84% .53% 9.21% 12.89% 16.58% 20,26% 23.95% 27.63% 31.32% 3.00% 5 Construction 5.52% 0.26% 0.79% 1.32% 1.84% 2.37% 2.89% 3.42% 3.95% 4.47% 5.00% 6 Food Tobacco 2,41% 1.05% 3.16% 5.26% 7.37% 9.47% 11.8% 13.68% 15.79% 17.89% 20.00% 7 Textile Goods 0.37% 1.05% 3.16% 5.26% 7.37% 9.47% 11.58% 13.68% 15.79% 17.89% 20.00% 8 Misc Text. Prod. 0.73% 1.05% 3.16% 5;26% 7.37°/v 9.47% 11.58% 13.68% 15.79% 17.89% 20.00% 9 Lumber & Wood 0.52% 2.11% 6.32% 10,53% 14.74% 18.95% 23.16% 27.37% 31.58% 35.79% 40.00% 10 Furniture 0.34% 1.05% 3.16% 5,26% 7.37% 9.47% 11.58% 13.68% 15.79% 17.89% 20.00% 11 Pulp & Paper 0.87% 2.37% 7.11% 11.84% 16.58% 21.32% 26.05% 30.79% 35.53% 40.26% 45.00% 12 

13 

Print& Publish 1.31% 1.05% 3.16% 5.26% 7.37% 9.47% 11.58% 13.68% 15.79% 17.89% 20.00% Chemical 1.40% 105% 3.16% 5.26% 7.37% 9.47% 11.58% 13.68% 15.79% 17,89% 20.00% 14 Petrol; Refining 0.9% 2.11% 6.32% 10.53% 14.74% 18.95% 23.16% 27.37% 31.58% 35.79% 40.00% 15 Rubber & Plastio 1.03% 105% 3.16% 5.26% 7,37% 9.47% 1158% 13.68% 15.79% 17.89% 20.00% 16 Leather Prods. 0.12% 1.05% 3.16% 5.26% 7.37% 9.47% 11.58% 13.68% 15.79%/o 17.89% 20.00% 17 Glass Stone Clay 0.62% 1.05% 3,16% 5.26% 7,37% 9.47% 11,58% 13.68% 15.79% 17.89% 20.00% 18 Prim. Metal Prod. 1.04% 2.63% 7.89% 13.16% 18.42% 23.68% 28,95% 34.21% 39.47% 44.74% 50.00% 19 Fab. Metal Prod. 1.64% 2.37% 7.11% 11.84% 16,58% 21.32% 26.05% 30.79% 35.53% 40.26% 45.00% 20 Mach. Exo. Elec. 1.56% 2.37% 7.11% 11.84% 16.58% 21.32% 26.05% 30.79% 35.53% 40.26% 4500% 21 1Ele. & Electron 2.52% 1.05% 3.16% 5.26% 7,37% 9.47% 11.58% 13.68% 15,79% 17.89% 20.00% 22 Transport Eq. 2.62% 2.37% 7.11% 11.84% 16.58% 21.32% 26.05/o 30.79% 35.53% 40.26% 4500% 23 Instruments 0.68% 0.26% 0.79% 1,32% 1.84% 2.37% 2.89% 3.42% 3,95% 4,47% 5.00% 24 Misc. Manufact. 0.69% 1.05% 3.16% 5.26% 7,37% 9.47% 11.58% 13.68% 1579% 17.89% 2000% 25 Transp & Whse, 346% 1.58% 4.74% 7.89% 11.05% 14.21% 17.37% 20.53% 23.68% 26.84% 30.00% 26 Utilities 5.89% 0.00% 0.Q0% 0.00% 0.Q0% 0.00% 000% 000% 0.00% 0.00% 000% 27 Wholesale Trade 5.63% 0.79% 237% 395% 5,53% 7.11% 8.68% 10.26% 11.84% 13.42% 15.00% 28 Retail Trade 563% 1.05% 3.16% 5.26% 7.37% 9.47% 11.58% 13.68% 15.79% 17.89% 20.00% 29 F.I.RE. 16.64% 0.53% 1.58% 2.63% 3.68% 4.74% 5.79% 6,84% 7.89% 8.95% 10.00% 30 Pers./Prof. Serv. 8,03% 0.53% 1.58% 2.63% 3.68% 4.74% 5.79% 6.84% 7.89% 8.95% 10.00% 31 Eating Drinking 2.12% 0.26% 0.79% 1.32% 1.84% 2.37% 2,89% 3.42% 3.95% 4.47% 5.00% 32 Auto Serv. 1.09% 0.00% 000% 0,00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 33 Amuse & Rea. 0.70% 0.26% 0.79% 1.32% 1.84% 2,37% 2.89% 3.42% 3.95% 4.47% 500% 34 Health Ed, Soc, 6.30% 0.26% 0.79% 1.32% 1.84% 237% 2.89% 3.42% 395% 4.47% 5.00% 35 Govt & Govt Ind. 11.79% 0.53% 1.58% 2.63% 3.68% 474% 5.79% 6.84% 7.89% 8,95% 10.00% 36 Households 0.25% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 000% O0% 0.00% 0.00% 000% 0.00% 0.00%

TOTAL 100.00% 1.18% 3.53% 5.88% 8.24% 10.59% 12.95% 15,30% 17.65% 20.01% 22.36%

Avg. Avg. Avg. Avg. Avg. Avg. Avg. Avg. Avg. Total V.A

Pot. V.A.

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Table D-7 Percent Value-Added Lost Due to Specified Percent Loss of Sanitary Sewer

Lifeline

UL Capacity Loss->

1 Livestock

2 Agr. Prod.

3 AgServ For. Fish

4 Mining

5 Construction

6 Food Tobacco

7 Textile Goods

8 Misc Text Prod.

9 Lumber & Wood

10 Fumiture

11 Pulp Paper

12 Print & Publish

13 Chemical & Drugs

14 Petrol. Refining

15 Rubber & Plastic

16 Leather Prods.

17 Glass Stone Clay

18 Prim. Metal Prod.

19 Fab. Metal Prod.

20 Mach. Exc. Elec.

21 Elec. & Electron

22 Transport Eq.

23 Instruments

24 Misc. Manufact.

25 Transp & Whse.

26 Utilities

27 Wholesale Trade

28 Retail Trade

29 F.I.R.E.

30 PerslProf Serv.

31 Eating Drinking

32 Auto Serv.

33 Amuse & Rec.

34 Health Ed. Soc.

35 Govt & Govt Ind.

36 Households

TOTAL

US. Econ.

Value Added

(Percent)

10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100/o

0.45% -1.05% -1.05% -1 05% -1.05% -1.05% -1.05% -1.05% -1.05% -1.05% -1.05%

1.06% -2.63% -2.63% -2.63% -2.63% -2.63% -2.63% -2.63% -2.63% -2.63% -2.63%

0.11% -2.63% -2.63% -2.63% -2.63% -2.63% -2.63% -2.63% -2.63% -2.63% -2.63%

3.89% -0.53% -0.53% -0.53% -0.53% -0-53% -0.53% -0.53% -0.53% -0.53% -0.53%

5.52% -1.05% -1.05% -1 05% -1.05% -1.05% -1.05% -1.05% -1.05% -1.05% -1.05%

2.41% -3.68% -3.68% -3.68% -3.68% -3.68% -3-68% -3.68% -3.68% -3.68% -3.68%

0.37% -3.68% -3.68% -3.68% -3.68% -368% -3.68% -3.68% -3.68% -3-68% -3.68%

0.73% -3.68% -3.68% -3.68% -3.68% -3.68% -3.68% -3.68% -3.68% -3.68% -3.68%

0.52% -2.63% -2.63% -2.63% -2.63% -2.63% -2.63% -2.63% -2.63% -2.63% -2.63%

0.34% -2.63% -2.63% -2.63% -2.63% -2.63% -2.63% -2.63% -2.63% -2.63% -2.63%

0.87% -4.21% -4.21% -4.21% -4.21% -4.21% -4.21% -4.21% -4.21% -4.21% -4.21%

1.31% -1.58% -1.58% -1.58% -1.58% -1.58% -1.58% -1.58% -1.58% -1.58% -1.58%

1.40% -4.21% -4.21% -4.21% -4.21% -4.21% -4.21% -4.21% -4.21% -4.21% -4.21%

0.96% -2.63% -2.63% -2.63% -2.63% -2.63% -2.63% -2.63% -2.63% -2.63% -2.63%

1.03% -2.63% -2.63% -2.63% -2.63% -2.63% -2.63% -2.63% -2.63% -2.63% -2.63%

0.12% -2.63% -2.63% -2.63% -2.63% -2.63% -2.63% -2.63% -2.63% -2.63% -2.63%

0.62% -2.63% -2.63% -2.63% -2.63% -2.63% -2.63% -2.63% -2.63% -2.63% -2.63%

1.04% -4.21% -4.21% -4.21% -4.21% -4.21% -4.21% -4.21% -4.21% -4.21% -4.21%

1.64% -4.21% -4.21% -4.21% -4.21% -4.21% -4.21% -4.21% -4.21% -4.21% -4.21%

1.56% -4.21% -4.21% -4.21% -4.21% -4.21% -4.21% -4.21% 4.21% -4.21% -4.21%

2.52% -4.74% -4.74% -474% -4.74% -4.74% -4.74% -4.74% -4.74% -4.74% -4.74%

2.62% -4.21% -4.21% -4.21% -4.21% -4.21% -4.21% -4.21% -4.21% -4.21% -4.21%

0.68% -3.16% -3.16% -3.16% -3.16% -3.16% -3.16% -3.16% -3.16% -3.16% -3.16%

0.69% -3.16% -3.16% -3.16% -3.16% -3.16% -3.16% -3.16% -3.16% -3.16% -3.16%

3.46% -0.53% -0.53% -0.53% -0.53% -0.53% -0.53% -0.53% -0.53% -0.53% -0.53%

5.89% -1.26% -1.26% -1.26% -1.26% -1.26% -1.26% -1.26% -1.26% -1.26% -1.26%

5.63% -0.53% -0.53% -0.53% -0.53% -0.53% -0.53% -0.53% -0.53% -0.53% -0.53%

5.63% -1.05% -1.05% -1.05% -1.05% -1.05% -1.05% -1.05% -1.05% -1.05% -1.05%

16.64% -1.05% -1.05% -1.05% -1.05% -1.05% -1.05% -1.05% -1.05% -1.05% -1.05%

8.03% -1.05% -1.05% -1.05% -1.05% -1.05% -1.05% -1.05% -1.05% -1.05% -1.05%

2.12% -4.21% -4.21% -4.21% -4.21% 4.21% -4.21% -4.21% -4.21% 4.21% 4.21%

1.09% -1.05% -1.05% -1.05% -1.05% -1.05% -1.05% -1.05% -1.05% -1.05% -1.05%

0.70% -4.21% -4.21% 4.21% 4.21% 4.21% -4.21% -4.21% 4.21% -4.21% -4.21%

6.30% 4.21% 4.21% -4.21% -4.21% -4.21% 4.21% 4.21% 4.21% 4.21% 4.21%

11.79% -1.05% -1.05% -1.05% -1.05% -1.05% -1.05% -1.05% -1.05% -1.05% -1.05%

0.25% -3.95% -3.95% -3.95% -3.95% -3.95% -3.95% -3.95% -3.95% -3.95% -3.95%

100.00% -2.69% -2.69% -2.69% -2.69% -2.69% -2.69% -2.69% -2.69% -2.69% / -2.69%

Avg. Avg. Avg. Avg. Avg. Avg. Avg. Avg. Avg. Total V.A

Pct V.A.

I-A

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Table D-8 Percent Value-Added Lost Due to Specified Percent Loss of Air Transportation Lifeline

U.S. Econ.

L/L Capacity Loss-> Value Addac

(Percent)

1 Livestock 0.4%

2 Agr. Prod. 1.06%

3 AgSev For. Fish 0.11%

4 Mining 3.89%

5 Construction 5.52%

6 Food Tobacoo 2.41%

7 Textile Goods 0.37%

8 Miso Text. Prod. 0.73%

9 Lumber & Wood 0.52%

10 Furniture 0.34%

11 Pulp & Paper 0.87%

12 Print & Publish 1.31%

13 Chemical & Drugs 1.40%

14 Patrol. Refining 0.9660

15 Rubber& Plastic 1.03%

16 Leather Prods. 0.12%

17 Glass Stone Clay 0.62%

I1 Prim. Metal Prod. 1.04%

19 Fab. Metal Prod. 1.64%

20 Mach. Exc. Elec. 1.56%

21 Elec. & Electron 2.52%

22 Transport Eq. 2.62%

23 Instruments 0.68%

24 Misc. Manufact. 0.69%

25 Transp & Whse. 3.46%

26 Utilities 5.89%

27 Wholesale Trade 5.631%

28 Retail Trade 5.63%

29 F.l.R.E. 16.64%

30 Pers./Prof Sev. 8.03%

31 Eating Drinking 2.12%

32 Auto Serv. 1.096

33 Amuse & Rec. 0.70%

34 Health Ed. Soo. 6.30°h

35 Govt & Govt. lnd. 11.79%

36 Households 0.251%

TOTAL 100.00%

10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%

0.53% 1.58% 2.63% 3.68% 4.74% 5.79% 6.84% 7.89% 8.95% 10.00% 0.53% 1.58% 2.63% 3.6 8% 4.74% 5.79%/a 6.84% 7.89% 8.95% 10.00% 0.53% 1.58% 2.63% 3.68% 4.74% 5.79% 6.84% 7.89% 8.95% 1.00% 0.53%/o 1.S8% 2.63% 3.68% 4.74% 5.79 6.84% 7.89% 8.95% 10.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 1.05%/0 3.16% 5.26% 7.37% 9.47% 11.58% 13.68% 15.79% 17.89% 20.00% 1.05% 3.16% 5.26% 7.37% 9.47% 11.58% 13.68% 15.79% 17.89% 20.00% 1.05% 3.16% 5.26% 7.37% 9.47% 11.58% 13.68% 15.79% 17.89% 20.00% 1.05% 3.16% 5.26% 7.37% 9.47% 11.58% 13.68% 15.79% .17.89% 20.00% 1.05% 3.16% 5.26% 7.37% 9.47% 11.58% 13.68%/6 15.79% 17.89% 20.00% 0.3% 1.58% 2.63% 3.68% 4.74% 5.79% 6.84% 7.89% 8.95% 10.00% 1.05/s 3.160% 5.26% 7.37% 9.47% 11.58% 13.68% 15.79% 17.89% 20.00% 1.05% 3.16% 5.26%/6 7.37% 9.47% 11.58% 13.68% 15.79% 17.89% 20.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%0 0.00% 0.00% 1.05% 3.16% 5.26% 7.37%/6 9.47% 11.58% 13.68% 15.79% 17.89% 20.00% 1.05% A.16% 5.26% 7.37% 9.47% 11.58%8/o 13,68% 15.79% 17.89% 20.00% 1.05% 3.16% 5.26% 7.37% 9.47% 11.58% 13.68% 1.79% 17.89% 20.00% 0.53% 1.58% 2.63% 3.68% 4.74% 5.79% 6.84% 7.89% 8.9S% 10.00% 0.53% 1.58% 2.63% 3.68% 4.74% 5.79% 6.84% 7.89% 8.95% 10.00% 1.05% 3.16% 5.26% 7.37% 9.47% 11.58% 13.68% 15.79% 17.89% 20.00% 1.58% 4.74% 7.89% 11.05% 14.21% 17.37% 20.53% 23.68% 26.84% 30.00% 1.58% 4.74% 7.89% 11.05% 14.21% 1 7.37%S 20.53% 23.68%/ 26.84% 30.00% 2.11% 6.32% 10.53% 14.74% 18.95% 23.16% 27.37% 31.58% 35.79% 40.00% 1.05% 3.16% 5.26% 7.37% 9.47% 11.58% 13.68% 15.79% 17.89% 20.00% 1.58% 4.74% 7.89% 1 1.05% 14.21% 17.37% 20.53% 23.68% 26.84% 30.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% O.OOo 0.00%o 0.00% 1.05% 3.16% 5.26% 7.37% 9.47% 11.58% 13.68% 15.79% 17.89% 20.00% 1.05% 3.16% 5.26% 7.37% 9.47% 11.58% 13.68% 15.79% 17.89% 20.00%/6 1.05% 3.16% 5.26% 7.370/ 9.47% 11.58% 13.68% 15.79% 17.89% 20.00% 1.05% 3.16% 5.26% 7.3PXQ 9.47%/ 11.58% 13.68% 15.79% 17.89% 20.00% 2.11% 6.32D 10.53% . 14.74% 18.95% 23.16% 27.37% 31.58% 35.79% 40.00%

0.00% 

2.11% 

0.00% 

6.32% 

0.00% 0.006X 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 10.53% 14.74% 18.95% 23.16% 27.37% 31,58% 35.79% 40.00% 0.53% 1.58% 2.63% 3.68% 4.74% 5.79% 6.84% 7.89% 8.95% 10.00% 1.05% 3.16% 5.26% 7.37% 9.47% 11.58% 13.68% 15.79% 17.89% 20.00%o 0.00% 0.00%0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0,00% 0.00% 0,00/ 0.00/

0.92% 2.76% 4.61% 6.45% 8.29% 10.13% 11.97% 13.82%/h 15.66% 17.50% Avg. Avg. Avg. Avg. Avg. Avg. Avg. Avg. Avg. Total V.A

Pct V.A.

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Table D-9 Percent Value-Added Lost Due to Specified Percent Loss of Water

Transportation Lifeline (Ports)

L/L Capacity Loss-->

1 Livestock

2 Agr. Prod.

3 AgServ For. Fish

4 Mining

5 Construction

6 Food Tobacco

7 Textile Goods

8 Misc Text. Prod.

9 Lumber & Wood

10 Furniture

11 Pulp & Paper

12 Print & Publish

13 Chemical & Drugs

14 Petrol. Refining

15 Rubber & Plastic

16 Leather Prods.

17 Glass Stone Clay

18 Prim. Metal Prod.

19 Fab. Metal Prod.

20 Mach. Exc. Elec.

21 Elec. & Electron

22 Transport Eq.

23 Instruments

24 Misc. Manufact.

25 Transp & Whse.

26 Utilities

27 Wholesale Trade

28 Retail Trade

29 F.l.R.E.

30 Pers./Prof. Serv.

31 Eating Drinking

32 Auto Serv.

33 Amuse & Rec.

34 Health Ed. Soc.

35 Govt & Govt Ind.

36 Households

TOTAL

U.S. Econ.

Value Added

(Percent)

0.45%

1.06%

0.11%

3.89%

5.52%

2.41%

0.37%

0.73%

0.52%

0.34%

0.87%

1.31%

1.40%

0.96%

1.03%

0.12%

0.62%

1.04%

1.64%

1.56%

2.52%

2.62%

0.68%.

0.69%

3.46%

5.89%

5.63%

5.63%

16.64%

8.03%

2.12%

1.09%

0.70%

6.30%

11.79%

0.25%

100.00%

10% 20%

2.11%

2.11%

2.11%

1.05%

1.05%

1.05%

1.05%

1.05%

1.05%

1.05%

1.58%

1.05%

1.05%

4.21%

1.05%

1.05%,

1.05%

1.05%

1.58%

1.58%

1.05%

1.58%

0.53%

1.05%

1.58%

0.00%

1.05%

0.00%

0.00%

0.00%

0.00%

0.00%

0.00%

0.00%

0.00%

0.00%

0.99%

Avg.

6.32%

6.32%

6.32%

3.16%

3.16%

3.16%

3.16%

3.16%

3.16%

3.16%

4.74%

3.16%

3.16%

12.63%

3.16%

3.16%

3.16%

3.16%

4.74%

4.74%

3.16%

4.74%

1.58%

3.16%

4.74%

0.00%

3.16%

0.00%

0.00%

0.00%

0.00%

0.00%

0.00%

0.00%

0.00%

0.00%

30% 40%

10.53%

1.53%

10.53%

5.26%

5.26%

5.26%

5.26%

5.26%

5.26%

5.26%

7.89%

5.26%

5.26%

21.05%

5.26%

5.26%

5.260/

5.26%

7.89%

7.89%

5.26%

7.89%

2.63%

5.26%

7.89%

0.00%

5.26%

0.00%

0.00%

0.00%

0.00/0

0.00%

0.00%

0.00%

0.00%

0.00%

2.98% 4.97%

Avg. Avg.

14.74%

14.74%

14.74%

7.37%

7.37%

7.37%

7.37%

7.37%

7.37%

7.37%

11.05%

7.37%

7.37%

29.47%

7.37%

7.37%

7.37%

7.37%

11.05%

11,05%

7.37% 

11.05%

3.68%

7.37%

11.05%

0.00%

7.37%

0.00%

0.00%

0.00%

0.00%

0.00%

0.00%

0.00%

0.00%

0.00%

6.96%

Avg.

50% 60%

18.95%

18.95%

18.95%

9.47%

9.47%

9.47%

9.47%

9.47%

9.47%

9.47%

14.21%

9.47%

947%

37.89%

9.47%

9.47%

9.47%

9.47%0

14.21%

14.21%

9.47%

14.21%

4.74%

9.47%

14.21%

0.00%

9.47%

0.00%

0.00%

0.00%

0.00%

0.00%

0.00%

0.00%

0.00%

0.00%

23.16%

23.16%

23.16%

11.58%

11.58%

11.58%

11.58%

11.58%

11.58%

11.58%

17.37%

11.58%

11.58%

46.32%

11.58%

11.58%

11.58%

11.58%

17.37%

17.37%

11.58%

17,37%

5.79%

11.58%:

17.37%

0.00%

11.58%

0.00%

0.00%

0.00%

0.00%

0.00%

0.00%

0.00%

0.00%

0.00%

70%

27.37%

27.37%

27.37%

13.68%

13.68%

13.68%

13.68%

13.68%

13.68%

13.68%

20.53%

13.68%

13.68%

54.74%

13.68%

13.68%

13.68%

13.68%

20.53%

20.53%

13.68%

20.53%

6.84%

13.68%

20.53%

0.00%

13.68%

0.00%

0.00%

0.00%

0.00%

0.00%

0.00%

0.00%

0.00%

0.00%

-80% - 90% 100%

31,.58%

31.58%

31.58%

15.79%

15.79%

15.79%

15.79%

15.79%

15.79%

15.79%

23.68/6

15.79%

15.79%

63.16%

15.79%

15.79%

15.79%

15.79%

23.68%

23.68%

15.79%

23.68%

7.89%

15.79%

23.68%

0.00%

15.79%

0.00%

0.00%

0.00%

0.00%

0.00%

0.00%

0.00%

0.00%

0.00%

8.95% 10.94% 12.92% 14.91%

Avg. . Avg. Avg. Avg.

35.79%

35.79%

35.79%

17.89%

17.89%

17.89%

17.89%

17.89%

17.89%

17.89%

26.84%

17.89%

17.89%

71.58%

17.89%

17.89%

17.89%

17.89%

26.84%

26.84%

17.89%

26.84%

8.95%

17.89%

26.84%

0.00%

17.89%

0.00%

0.00%

0.00%

0.00%

0.00%

0.00%

0.00%

0.00%

0.00%

40.00%

40.00%

40.00%

20.00%

20.00%

20.00%

20.00%

20.00%

20.00%

20.00%

30.00%

20.00%

20.00%

80.00%

20.00%

20.00%

20.00%

20.00%

30.00%

30.00%

20.00%

30.00%

1 0.00%

20.00%

30.00%

0.00%

20.00%

0.00% -

0.00%

0.00%

0.00%

0.00%

0.00%

0.00%

0.00%

0.00%

P-I

0.

'01

'a0

Up

M

C):

00

n

rn

0

I-11 0r4

CA

16.90% 18.89%

Avg. Total V.A

Pct. V.A.
Table D-10 Percent Value-Added Lost Due to Specified Percent Loss of Telephone Lifeline

I/L Clapacity Loss-->

1 Livestock

2 Agr. Prod.

3 AgServ For. Fish

4 Mining

5 Construction

6 Food Tobacco

7 Textile Goods

8 Miso Text, Prod.

9 Lumber & Wood

10 Furniture

11 Pulp & Paper

12 Print & Publish

13 Chemical & Drugs

14 Petrol. Refining

15 Rubber & Plastic

16 Leather Prods.

17 Glass Stone Clay

18 Prim. Metal Prod.

19 Fab. Metal Prod.

20 Mach. Exc. Elec.

21 Elec. & Electron

22 Transport Eq.

23 Instruments

24 Misc. Manufact,

25 Transp & Whse

26 Utilities

27 Wholesale Trade

28 Retail Trade

29 F.I.R.E.

30 Pers./Prof. serv. 31 Eating Drinking

32 Auto Serv.

33 Amuse & Rec.

34 Health Ed. Soo.

35 Govt & Govt Ind.

36 Households

TOTAL

U.S. Loon.

Value Added

(Percent)

0.45/s

1.06%

0,11%

3.89%

5.52%

2.41%

0.37%

0.73%

0,52%

0.34%

0.87%

1.31%

1.40%

0.96%

1.03%

0.12%

0.62%

1.04%

1.64%

1.56%

2.52%

2.62%

0.68%

0.69%

3.46%

5.89%

5.63%

5.63%

16.64%

8.03%

2.12%

1.09%

0.70%

6.30%

11.79%

0.25%

1 00.000

10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%

1.0S%

1.05%/

1.05%

0.53%

0.53%

0.79%

0.79%

0.79%

0.79%

0.79%

0.53%

0.79%

0.79%

0,53%

0.79%

0.79%

0.79%

0.79%

0.53%

0.53%

0.79%

0.53%

1,58%

0.79%

1.58%

1.58%

2.63%

2.63%

3.16%

2.11%

2.11%

2.11%

2.11%

0.79%

1.05%

1.05%

1.15%

Avg.

3.16%

3.16%

3.16%

1.58%

1.58%

2.37%

2.37%

2.37%

2.37%

2.37%

1.58%

2.37%

2.37%

1.58%

2.37%

2.37%

2.37%

2.37%

1.S8%

1.58%

2.37%

1.58%

4.74%

2.37%

4.74%

4.74%

7.89%

7.89%

9.47%

6.32%

6.32%

6.32%

6.32%

2.37%

3.16%

3.16%

3.46%

Avg.

5.26% 7.37% 9.47% 11.58%

5.26% 7.37% 9.47% 11.58%

5.26% 7.37%/ 9.47% 11.58%

2.63% 3.68% 4.74% 5.79%

2.63% 3.68% 4.74% 5.79%

3.95% 5.53% 7.11% 8.68%

3.95% 5.53% 7.11% 8.68%

3,95% 5.53% 7.11% 8.68% 3.95% 553% 7.11% 8.68%

3.95% 5.53% 7.11% 8.68%

2.63% 3.68% 4.74% 5.79%

3.95% S.53% 7.11% 8.68%

3.95% 5.53% 7.11% 8.68%

2.63% 3.68% 4.74% 5.79%

3.95% 5.53% 7.11% 8.68%

3.95% 5.53% 7.11% 8.68%

3.95% 5.53% 7.11% 8.68% 395% 5.53% 7.11% 8.68%

2.63% 3.68% 4.74% 5.79%

2.63% 3.68% 4.74% 6.79%

3,95% 5.53% 7.11% 8.68%

2.63% 3.68% 4.74% 5.79%

7.89% 1105% 14.21% 17.37%

3.95% 5.53% 7.11% 8.68%

7.89% 11.05% 14.21% 17.37%

7.89% 11.05% 14.21% 17.37%

13.16% 18.42% 23.68% 28.95%

13.16% 18.42% 23.68% 28.95%

1S.79% 22.11% 28.42% 34.74%

10.53% 14.74% 18.95% 23.16%

10.63% 14.74% 18.95% 23.16%

10.53% 14.74% 18.95% 23.16%

10.S3% 14.74% 18.95% 23.16%

3.95% 5.53% 7.11% 8.68%

5.26% 7.37% 9.47% 11.58%

5.26% 7.37% 9.47% 11.58%

5.77% 8.08% 10.39% 12.70%

Avg. Avg. Avg. Avg.

Ch*

CI'

4'

la

M

q

tq

0Ii

0

a3.

Q

N13.68%

13.68%

13.68%

6.84%

6.84%

10.26%

10.26%

10.26%

10.26%

10.26%

6.84%

10.26%

10.26%

6.84%

10.26%

10.26%

10.26%

10.26%

6.84%

6.84%

1Q.26% 6.84%

20.53%

10.26%

20.53%

20.53%

34.21%

34.21%

41.05%

27.37%

27.37%

27.37%

27.37%

10.26%

1 3.68%

13.68%

15.01%

Avg.

15.79%

15.79%

15.79%

7.89%

7.89%

11.84%

11.84%

11.84%

11.84%

11.84%

7.89%

11.84%

11.84%

7.89%

11.84%

11.84%

11.84%

11.84%

7.89%

7.89%

11.84%

7.89%

23.68%

11.84%

23.68%

23.68%

39.47%

39.47%

47.37%

31 .58%

31.58%

31.58%

31.58%

11.84%

15.79%

15.79%

17.320/6

Avg.

17.89%

17.89%

17.89%

8.95%

8,95%

13.42%

13.42%

13.42%

13.42%

13.42%

8.95%

13.420/a

13.420%

8.95%

13.42%

13.42%

13.42%

13.42%

8.95%

8.95%

13.42%

8.95%

26.84%

13.42%

26.84%

26.84%

44.74%

44.74%

53.68%

35.79%

35.79%

35.79%

35.79%

13.42%

17.89%

17.89%

19.63%

Avg.

20.00%

20.00%

20.00%

10.00%

10.00%

15 .00%

15.00%

1 5.00%

15.00%

15.00%

10.00%

15.00%

15.00%

1 0.00%

15.00%

15.00%

15,00%

1 5.00%

10,00%

10.00%

15.00%

1 .00%

30.00%

15.00%

30.00%

30.00%

50.00%

50.00%

60.00%

40.00%

40.00%

40.00%

40.00%

15,00%

20.00%

20.00%

21.94%

Total V.A

Pct. V.A.
0% 0 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% : 80% 90%: 100%

0.45%

1.06%

0.11%

3.89%

5.52%

2.41%.

0.37%

0.730%

0.52%

0.34%

0.87%

1.31%

1.40%

0.96%

1.03%

0. 12%

0.62%

1 .4%/

1.64%

1.56%

2.52%

2.2%

0.68%

0.69%

3.46%

5.89%

5.63%

5.63%

16.64%

8.03%

2.12%

1.09%

0.70%

6.30%/

11.79%

0.25%

100.00%/

100%/

0.44%

1.02%

0.11%

3.86%

5.37%

2.32%

0.36%

0.70%

0.50%

0.33%

0.84%/

1.29%

1.34%

0.94%

1.00%

0.12%

0.60%

0.99%

1.57%

1.51%

2.40%

2.54%

0.65%

0.67%

3.42%

5.76%

5.57%

5.57%

16.47%

7.95%

2.03%

1.09%

0.67%

6.17%

1 1.64%

0.25%

98.06%

98%

0.31%

0.55%/

0.08%

3.49%

3.63%

1.25%

0.19%

0.38%

0.34%

0.22%/

0.51%

1.04%

0.64%/

0.63%

0.68%

0.,08%

0.41%

0.40%

0.74%

0.92%/

0.97%/

1.54%

0.26%

0.'41%

2.99%

4. 2 8%

4.86%

4.86%

14.36%

0.96%

1.02%

0.32%

4.57%

9.77%

0.18%

74.79%

75%

0.29%

0.47%/

0.07%

3,43%/

3 .S4%

1.08%

0. 17%/

0.33%

0.31%

0.21%

0.46%

1 .00%

0.52%

0.58%

0.62%

0.07%

0.37%

0.30%

0.60%

0.,82%

0.73%

1.38%

0.20%

0.36%

2.91%

4.03%

4.74%

4.74%

14.01%

6.76%

0.78%

1.01%

0.26%

4.31%

9.46%

0.17%

70.91%

71%

0.27%

0.40%

0.07%

3.37%

3.05%

0.90%

0.14%

0.27%

0.29%

0.19%

0.40%

0.96%

0.,40%

0.53%

0.57%

0.07%

0.34%

0.20%

0.47%

0.72%

0.49%

1.21 %

0.13%

0.32%

2.84%/

3.78%

4.63%

4.63%

13.66%

6.59%

0.60%

1 .00%

0.20%

4.04%

9.15%

0.16%

67.04%

67%

0.25%

0.32%

0.06%

3.31%/

2.76%

0.72%

0.1 1%

0.22%

0.26%

0. 17%

0.35%

0.92%

0.28%

0.48%

0.51%

0.06%

0.31%

0.10%

0.33%

0.62%

0.25%

1.05%

0.07%

0.27%

2.77%

3.53%

4.51%

4.51%

13.31%

6.42%

0.42%

0.99%

0.14%/

3.78%

8.84%

0.15%

63.16%

63%/

0.42%

0.94%

0.10%

3.80%

5.08%

2.14%/

0.33%

0.65%

0.48%

0.31 %

0.79%

1.25%

1.23%

0.89%

0.95%

0.11%

0.57%

0.89%

1.43%

1.41%

2.16%

2.37%

0.58%

0.62%

3.35%

5.51 %

5.46%

5.46%

16.12%

7.78%

1.85%

1.08%

0.61%

5.90%

11.33%

0.24%

94.18%

94%

0.40%

0.86%

0.10%

3.74%

4.79%

1.96%

0.30%

0.59%

0.45%

0.29%

0.73%

1.21%

1.1 1%

0.84%

0.89%

0.1 1%

0.54%

0.79%

1.30%

1.31%

1.92%

2.21%

0.52%

0.58%

3.28%

5.27%

5.34%

5.34%

15.77%

7.61%

1.67%

1.07%

0.55%

5.64%

11.02%

0.22%

90.30%

90%

0.38%

0.79%

0.09%

3.67%/

4.50%

1.79%

0.28%

0.54%

0.42%

0.28%

0.68%

1.17% 

0.99%

0.79%

0.84%

0.10%

0.50%

0.70%

1.16%

1.22%

1.69%

2.04%

0.45%

0.54%

3.21 %

5.02%

5.'22%

5.22%

15.42%

7.44%

1.50%

1.05%

0.49%

5.37%

10.70%

0.21%

86.43%

86%

0.36%

0.71%

0.09%

3.61%

4.21%

1.61%

0.25%

0,49%/

0.39%

0.26%

0.62%/

1.13%

0.87%

0.73% :

0.79%

0.09%

0.47%

0.60%

1.02%

1.12%

1.45%

1.87%

0.39%

0.49%

3.13%

4.77%/

5.10%

5.10%

15.07%

7.27%

1.32%/

1.04%

0.43%

5.110%

10.39%

0.20%

82.55%

83%

0.34%

0.63%

0.,08%

3.55%

3.92%

1.43%

0.2%

0.43%

0.37%

0.24%

0.57%

.1.08%

0.75%

0.68%

0.,73%

0.09%

0.44%

0.50%/

0.88%

1.02%

1.21%

1.71%

0.33%

0.45%

3.06%

4.52%

4.98%

4.98%

14.72%

7.10%

1.14%

1.03%

0.37%

4.84%

10.08%

0.19%/

78.67%

79%

l

(D

R

en

Table D- 1 Residual Value-Added After Loss of Capacity--Water Supply Lifeline
Table Di 2 Residual Value-Added After Loss of Capacity--Electric Lifeline

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%

0.45%

1.06%

0.11%

3.89%

5.52%

2.41%

0.37%

0,73%

0.52%

0.34%

0.87%

1.31%

1.40%

0.96%

1.03%

0.12%

0.62%

1.04%

1.64%

1.56%

2.52%

2.62%

0.68%

0.69%

3.46%

5.89%

5.63%

5.63%

16.64%

8.03%

2.12%

1.09%

0.70%

6.30%

11.79%

0.25%

100.00%

100%

0.44%

1.03%

0.11%

3.70%

5.40%

2.29%

0.35%

0,69%

0.49%

0.32%

0.83%

1.24%

1.34%

0.91%

0.98%

0.12%

0.59%

0.99%

1.55%

1.48%

2.39%

2.48%

0.64%

0.65%

3.41 %

5.64%

5.37%

5.37%

15.85%

7.65%

2.03%

1.04%

0.67%

6.03%

11.42%

0.24%

95.73%

96%

0.42%

0.98%

0.10%

3.34%

5.17%

2.06%

0.31%

0.61%

0.43%

0.29%

0.73%

1.10%

1.20%

0.81%

0.87%

0.10%

0.52%

0.89%

1.38%

2.12%

2.21%

O.57%

0.58%

3.30%

5.14%

4.83%

4.83%

14.28%

6.89%

1.85%

0.94%

0.61%

5,50%

10.67%

0.22%

87.19%

87%

0,39%/

0.92%

0.10%

2.97%

4.94%

1.84%

0.27%

0.54%

0.38%

0.25%

0.64%

0.97%

1.07%

0.71%

0.76%

0.09%

0.46%

0.79%

1.21%

1.15%

1.86%

1.93%

0.50%

0.51%

3.19%

4.65%

4.30%

4.30%

12.70%

6,13%

1.67%

0.84%

0.55%

4.97%

9.93%

0.20%

78.66%

79%

037%

0.86%

0,09%

2.60%

4.71%

1.61%

0.24%

0.46%

0.33%

0.21%

0.55%

0.83%

0,94%

0.61%

0.65%

0.08%

0.39%

0.7Q%

1.04%

0.99%

1.59%

1.65%

0.43%

0.43%

3.08%

4.15%

3.77%

3.77%

11.12%

5.37%

1.50%

0,73%

0.49%

4.44%

9.18%

0.18%

70.12%

70%

0.35%

0.81%

0.08%

2.23%

4.4 7%

1.38%

0.20%

0.38%

0.27%

0.18%

0.46%

0,69%

0.81%

0.51%

0,54%

0.06%

0.33%

0,60%

0.86%

0.82%

1.33%

1.38%

0,36%

0.36%

2.97%

3.66%

3.23%

3.23%

9,55%

4.61%

1.32%

0.63%

0.43%

3.91%

8.44%

0.16%

61 .58%

62%

0.32%

0.75%

0.08%

1.86%

4.24%

1.15%

0,16%

0.31%

0.22%

0.14%

0.37%

0.55%

0.67%

0.41%

0,43%

0.05%/

0.26%

0.50%

0.69%

0.66%

1,06%

1.10%

0.29%

0.29%

2.86%

3.16%

2.70%

2.70%

7.97%

3.85%

1.14%

0.52%

0.37%

3.38%

7.70%

0.13%

53.04%

53%

0.30%

0.70%

0.07%

1.49%

4.01%

0.92%

0.12%

0.23%

0.16%

0,11%

0.28%

0.41%

0.54%

0.30%

0.33%

0,04%

0.20%

0.40%

0.52%

0.49%

0.80%

0.83%

0.21%

0.22%

2.75%

2.66%

2.16%

2.16%

6.39%

3.09%

0.96%

0.42%

0.32%

2.85%

6.95%

0.11%

44.50%

45%

0.27%

0.64%

0.07/9

1.13%

3.78%

0.70%

0.08%

0.15%

0.1 1%

0.07%

0.18%

0.28%

0.41%

0.20%

0.22%

O.03%

0.13%

0.30%

0.35%

0.33%

0.53%

0.55%

0.14%

0.14%

2.64%

2.17%

1.63%

1.63%

4.82%

2.32%

0.78%

0.32%

0.26%o

2.32°%

6.21%

0,09%

3.97%

36%

0.25%

0.59%

0.06%

0.76%

3.54%

0.47%

0.04%

0.08%

0.05%

0.04%

0.09%

0.14%

0.27%

0.10%

0.1 1%

0.01%

0.07%

0.20%

0.17%

0.16%

0.27%

0.28%

0,07%

0.07%

2.53%

1.67%

1,10%

1.10%

3.24%

1.56%

0.60%

0.21%

0.20%

1.79%

5.46%

0.07%

27.43%

27%

0.23%

0.53%

0.06%

0.39%

3.31%

0.24%

0.00%

0.00%

0.00%

0.00%

0,00%

0.00%

0.14%

0.00%

0.00%

0.00%

0.00%

0.10%

0,00%

0.00%

0.00%

0.00%

0,00%

0.00%

2.42%

1.18%

0.56%

0.56%

1.66%

0.80%

0.42%

0.11%

0.14%

1.26%

4.72%

0.05%

18.89%

19%

th3

C,'

!.I,

'00

4iw

CB00
Table D-1 3 Residual Value-Added After Loss of Capacity--Oil Supply Lifeline

0% 10% 20% 30%

0.45%

1.06%

0.11%

3.89%

5.52%

2.41%

0.37%

0.73%

0.52%

0.34%

0.87%

1.31%

1.40%

0.96%

1.03%

0.12%

0.62%

1.04%

1.64%

1.56%

2.52%

2.62%

0.68%

0.69%

3.46%

5.89%

5.63%

5.63%

16.64%

8.03%

2.12%

1.090%

0.70%

6.30%

11.79%

0.25%

100.00%

100%

0.44%

1.01%

0.11%

3.70%

5.26%

2.34%

0.36%

0.71%

0.50%

0.33%

0.85%

1.28%

1.37%

0.91%

1.00%

0.12%

0.60%

0.99%

1.60%

1.52%

2.46%

2.49%

0.66%

0.67%

3.30%

5.73%

5.49%

5.37%

16.12%

7.78%

2.03%

1.04%

0.66%

6.23%

11.67%

0.24%

96.94%

97%

0.42%

0.93%

0.10%

3.34%

4.73%

2.22%

0.34%

0.67%

0.48%

0.31%

0.80%

1.21%

1.29%

0.81%

0.95%

0.11%

0.57%

0.89%

1.51%

1.44%

2.32%

2.25%

0.63%

0.63%

2.97%

5.42%

5.19%

4.83%

15.07%

7.27%

1.85%

0.94%

0.60%

6.10%

11.42%

0.23%

90.83%

91%

0.39%

0.84%

0.09%

2.97%

4.21%

2.09%

0.32%

0.63%

0.45%

0.29%

0.76%

1.14%

1.22%

0.71%

0.89%

0.11%

0.54%

0.79%

1.42%

1.35%

2.19%

2.00%

0.59%

0.60%

2.64%

5.11%

4.89%

4.30%

14.01%

6.76%

1.67%

0.84%

0.53%

5.97%

11.17%

0.22%

84.71%

85%

40% 50%

0.37% 0.35%

0.75% 0.66%

0.08% 0.07%

2.60% 2.23%

3.69% 3.17%

1.96% 1.84%

0.30% 0.28%

0.59% 0.55%

0.42% 0.39%

0.28% 0.26%

0.71% 0.66%

1.07% 1.00%

1.15% 1.07%

0.61% 0.51%

0.84% 0.79%

0.10% 0.09%

0.50% 0.47%

0.70% 0.60% 

1.34% 1.25%

1.27% 1.19%

2.06% 1.92%

1.75% 1.50%

0.55% 0.52%

0.56% 0.52%

2.31% 1.99%

4.80% 4.49%

4.60% 4.30%

3.77% 3.23%

12.96% 11.91%

6.26% 5.75%

1.50% 1.32%

0.73% 0.63%

0.47% 0.40%

5.83% 5.70%

10.92% 10.67%

0.21% 0.19%

78.60% 72.48%

79% 72%

60% 70% 80% 90%

0.32%

0.57%

0.06%

1.86%

2.64%

1.71%

0.26%

0.52%

0.37%

0.24%

0.62%

0.93%

1.00%

0.41%

0.73%

0.09%

0.44%

0.50%

1.17%

1.11%

1.79%

1.25%

0.48%

0.49%

1.66%

4.18%

4.00%

2.70%

10.86%

5.24%

1.14%

0.52%

0.33%

5.57%

10.43%

0.18%

66.37%

66%

0.30% 0.27%

0.48% 0.39%

0.05% 0.04%

1.49% 1.13%

2.12% 1.60%

1.58% 1.46%

0.25% 0.23%

0.48% 0.44%

0.34% 0.31%

0.22% 0.21%

0.57% 0.53%

0.86% 0.79%

0.92% 0.85%

0.30% 0.20%

0.68% 0.62%

0.08% 0.07%

0.41% 0.37%

0.40% 0.30%

1.08% 0.99%

1.03% 0.94%

1.66% 1.53%

1.01% 0.76%

.0.45% 0.41%

0.45% 0.42%

1.33% 1.00%

3.87% 3.56%

3.71% 3.41%

2.16% 1.63%

9.81% 8.76%

4.73% 4.23%

0.96% 0.78%

0.42% 0.32%

0.27% 0.20%

5.44% 5.30%

10.18% 9.93%

0.17% 0.15%

60.25% 54.14%

60% .54%

0

(.O00

I.is

An

Ca

9j

a,

U'

0.25%

0.30%

0.03%

0.76%

1.07%

1.33%

0.21%

0.40%

0.29%

0.19%

0.48%

0.72%

0.78%

0.10%

0.57%

0.07%

0.34%

0.20%

0.91%

0.86%

1.39%

0.51%

0.38%

0.38%

0.67%

3.25%

3.11%

1.10%

7.71%

3.72%

0.60%

0.21%

0.14%

5.17%

9.68%

0.14%

48.02%

48%

100%

0.23%

0.21%

0.02%

0.39%

0.55%

1.20%

0.19%

0.36%

0.26%

0.17%

0.44%

0.66%

0.70%

0.00%

0.51%

0.06%

0.31%

0.10%

0.82%

0.78%

1.26%

0.26%

0.34%

0.34%

0.35%

2.94%

2.82%

0.56%

6.66%

3.21%

0.42%

0.11%

0.07%

5.04%

9.43%

0.13%

41.91%

42%
Table D-14 Residual Value-Added After Loss of Capacity--Natural Gas Lifeline

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%

A/ OI A A~o V . ..

1 .06%

0.11%

3.89%

5.52%

2.4 1%

0.37%

0,73%

0.52%

0,34%

0.87%

131%

1.40%

0.96%

1.03%

0.12%

0.62%

1,04%

164%

1.56%

2.52%

2.62%

0.68%

0.69%

3.46%

5.89%

5.63%

5.63%

16.64%

8.03%

2.12%

1.09%

0.70%

6,30%

11.79%

0.25%

100.00%

100%

V." -to

1.04%

0.11%

3.87%

5.52%

2.37%

0.37%

0.72%

0.51%

0.34%

0.85%

130%

1.34%

0.94%

1.00%

0.12%

0.60%

1.01%

1.60%

1.52%

2.46%

2.55%

0.65%

0.67%

3.46%

5.76%

5.60%

5,57%

16.47%

7.95%

2.08%

1.09%

0.68%

6.23%

11.67%

0.25%

98,72%

99%

V. 4 -/

1.01%

0.11%

3.83%

5.52%

2.31%

0.36%

0.70%

0.E0%

0.33%

0.82%

1.27%

120%

0.89%

0.95%

0.12%

0.57%

0.96%

1.51%

1.44%

2.32%

2.41%

0.60%

0.63%

3,46%

5.51%

5,54%

5.46%

16.12%

7.78%

1.99/g

1.09%

0.65%

6.10%

11.42%

0.24%

96. 15%

96%

U.44%

0.98%

0.10%

3,79%

5.52%

2.25%

0.35%

0,69%

0.49%

0.32%

0.78%

1.24%

1.07%

0.84%

0.89%

0.12%

0.54%

0,90%

1.42%

1.35%

2.19%

2.27%

0.55%

0.60%

3.46%

5.27%

5.49%

5.34%

15.77%

7.61%

1.90%

1.08%

0,62%

5,97%

11.17%

0.23%

93.58%

94%

0.44%

0.94%

0.10%

3.75%

5,52%

2.18%

0.35%

0.67%

0.48%

0.31%

0,74%

1.22%

0.94%

0.79%

0.84%

0.11%

0.50%

0.85%

1.34%

1.27%

2.06%

2.14%

0.49%

0.56%

3.46%

5.02%

5,43%

5.22%

15.42%

7.44%

1.81%

1.07%

0.59%

5.83%

10.92%

0.22%

91 .01%

91%

0.43%

0.91%

0.09%

3.70%

5.52%

2.12%

0.34%

0.66%

0.47%

0.31%

0.71%

1.19%

0.81%

0.73%

0.79%

0.11%

0.47%

0.79%

1.25%

1.19%

1.92%

2.00%

0.44%

0.52%

3.46%

4.77%

5.37%

5.10%

15.07%

7.27%

1.72%

1.07%

0.56%

5.70%

10.67%

0.21%

88,45%

88%

0.43%

0.88%

0.09%

3.66%

5.52%

2.06%

0.33%

0.64%

0.46%

0.30%

0.67%

1.16%

0.67%

0.68%

0,73%

0.11%

0.44%

0.74%

1.17%

1.1 1%

1.79%

1.86%

0.38%

0.49%

3.46%

4.52%

5.31%

4.98%

14.72%

7.10%

1.63%

1.06%

0.54%

5.57%

10.43%

0.20%

85,88%

86%

0.42%

0.84%

0.09%

3.62%

5.52%

1.99%

0.32%

0.63%

0.45%

0.29%

0.63%

1.13%

0.54%

0.63%

0.68%

0.11%

0.41%

0.68%

1.08%

1.03%

1.66%

1.72%

0.33%

0.45%

3.46%

4.28%

5.25%

4.86%

14.36%

6.93%

1.54%

1.06%

0.51%

5,44%

10.18%

0.19%

83.31%

83%

0.42%

0.81%

0,08%

3.58%

5.52%

1.93%

0.31%

0.61%

0.43%

0.29%

0,60%

1.10%

0.41%

0.58%

0.62%

0.10%

0.37%

0.63%

0.99%

0.94%

1.53%

1.59%

0.28%

0.42%

3.46%

4.03%

6.19%

4.74%

14.01%

6.76%

1.45%

1.05%

0.48%

5.30%

9,93%

0.18%

80.74%

81%

0.41%

0.77%

0.08%

3.54%

5.52%

1.87%

0.31%

0.60%

0.42%

0.28%

0.56%

1.08%

0.27%

0,53%

0.57%

0.10%

0.34%

0.68%

0.91%

0.86%

139%M

1.45%

0,22%

0.38%

3.46%

3.78%

5.13%

4.63%

1 .66%

6.59%

1.36%

1.05%

0.45% 

5.17%

9.68%

0.17%

78.17%

78%

0.41%

0.74%

0.08%

3.50%

5.52%

1.80%

0.30%

0.58%

0.41%

0.27%

0,52%

1.05%

0.14%

0.48%

0.51%

0.10%

0.31%

0.52%

0.82%

0.78%

1.26%

1.3 1%

0.17%

0.34%

3.46%

353Q%

5.07%

4.51%

13.31%

6.42%

1.27%

1.04%

0.42%

5.04%

9.43%

0.16%

75.61%

76%

:b. 0:

laIU

tqj p00

pa

in.A

I 
Table D-15 Residual Value-Added After Loss of Capacity--Highways Lifeline

60% 70% 80%

0.32% 0.30%

0.57% 0.48%

0.06% 0.05%

3.10°h 2.96%

4.24% 4.01%

1.29% 1.09°h

0.21% 0.18%

0.41% 0.35%

0.25% 0.20%

0.19% 0.16%

0.47 0.39°h

0.74% 0.64%

0.75% 0.64%

0.46% 0.37%

0.58% 0.50°h

0.07% 0.06%

0.35% 0.30°h

0.56% 0.47

0.88% 0.74%

0.84% 0.71%

1.43% 1.23%

1.41% 1.19%

0.36% 0.31%

0.39% 0.33%

1.86% 1.57%

4.52% 4.28%

3.35% 2.94%

3.84%. 3.51%

12.31% 11.52°h

5.94% 5.56%

1.51% 1.40°h

0.75% 0.68%

0.49% 0.46%

4.29°h 3.93%

9.74% 9.37%

0.19% 0.18%

68.73% 63.04%

69% 63%

9o0;' innqo

0.45% /

1.06%

0.11%

3.89%

5.52%

2.41%

0.37%

0.73%

0.52%

0.34%

0.87%

1 31%

1.40%

0.96%

1.03%

0.12%

0.62%

1.04%

1.64%

1.56%

2.52%

2.62%

0.68%

0.69%

3.46%

5.89%

5.63%

5.63%

16.64%

8.03%

2.12%

1.09%

0.70%

6.30%

11.79%

0.25%

100.00%

100%

10%

0.44%

1.01%

0.11%

3.82%

5.40%

2.31%

0.36%

0.70%

0.49%

0.33%

0.83%

1.26%

1.34%

0.92%

0:99%

0.12%

0.59%

1.00%

1.57%

1.49%

2.42%

2.51%

0.65%

0.66%

3.31%

5.76%

5.43%

5.47%

16.25%

7.84%

2.06%

1.06%

0.68%

6.12%

11.60%

0.25%

97.16%

97%

I 

CD

0. o

-3.

;an

I-0

'.3in

20%

0.42%

0.93%

0.10%

3.67%

5.17%

2.10%

0.33%

0.64%

0.44%

0.30%

0.76%

1.16%

1.23%

0.83%

0.91%

0.11%

0.54%

0.91%

1.43%

1.36%

2.22%

2.29%

0.59%

0.61%

3.02%

5.51%

5.01%

5.14%

15.46%

7.46%

1.95%

1.00%

0.64%

5.75%

11.23%

0.24%

91.47%

91%

30%

0.39%

0.84%

0.09%

3.53%

4.94%

1.90%

0.30%

0.58%

0.39%

0.27%

0.69%

1.05%

1.11%

0.73%

0.83%

0.10%

0.50%

0.82%

1.30%

1.23%

2.02%

2.07%

0.54%

0.55%

2.73%

5.27%

4.60%

4.82%

14.67%

7.08%

1.84%

0.94%

0.60%

5.39%

10.86%

0.22%

85.79%

86%

40%

0.37%

0.75%

0.08%

3.39%

4.71%

1.70%

0.27%

0.53%

0.34%

0.25%

0.61%

0.95%

0.99%

0.64%

0.75%

0.09%

0.45%

0.73%

1.16%

1.10%

1.83%

1.85%

0.48%

0.50%

2.44%

5.02%

4.18%

4.49%

13.88%

6.70%

1.73%

0.87%

0.57%

5.02%

10.49%

0.21%

80.10%

' 80%

. 50%

0.35%

0.66%

0.07O

3.24%

4.47

1 A9°h

0.24%

0.47

0.30°h

0.22%

0.54%

0.85%

0.87

0.55%

0.66%

0.08%

0.40%

0.65%

1.02%

0.97

1.63%

1.63%

0.42%

0.44%

2.15%

4.77%

3.77°h

4.1Po

13.09%

6.32%

1.62°h

0.81%

0.53%

4.66%

10.12°h

0.20%

74.41%

74%

0.27%

0.39%

0.04%

2.81%

3.78%

0.89%

0.15%

0.30°h

0.15%

0.14%

0.32°h

0.54%

0.52°h

0.28%

0.42%

0.05%

0.25%

0.38%

0.60%

0.57%

1.03%

0.96%

0.25%

0.28%

1.27%

4.03%

2.52°h

3.19%

10.73%

5.18%

1.28%

0.62%

0.42%

3.56%

9.00%/0

0.17

57.36%

57%

0.25%

0.30%

0.03%

2.67%

3.54%

0.68%

0.12%

0.24%

0.10%

0.11%

0.25%

0.43%

0.40%

0.19%

0.34%

0.04%

0.20%

0.30%

0.47%

0.44%

0.83%

0.74%

0.19%

0.23%

0.98%

3.78%

2.11%

2.86%

9.94%

4.80%

1.17%

0.56%

0.38%

3.20%

8.63%

0.16%

51.67%

52%

0.23%

0.21%

0.02%

2.53%

3.31%

0.48%

0.09%

0.18%

0.05%

0.08%

0.17%

0.33%

0.28%

0.10%

0.26%

0.03%

0.15%

0.21%

0.33%

0.31%

0.63%

0.52%

0.14%

0.17%

0.69%

3.53%

1.69%

2.54%

9.15%

4.42%

1.06%

0.49%

0.35%

2.83%

8.25%

0.15%

45.98%

46%
Table D-16 Residual value-Added After Loss of Capacity--Railroads Lifeline

20%

0.42%

0.99%

0.10%

3.67%

5.48%

2.33%

0.36%

0.70%

0.48%

0.33%

0.81%

1.27%

1.36%

0.90%

1.00%

0.12%

0.60%

0.96%

1.52%

1.45%

2.44%D/

2.43%

0.67%

0.67%

3.30%

5.89%

5.50%

5.46%

16.38%

7.90%

2.10%

1.09%

0.69%

6.25%

11.60%

0.25%

97.50%

97%0

30%

0.41%

0.95%

0.10%

3.53%

5.45%

2.28%

0.35%

0.69%

0.46%

0.32%

0.770%

1.24%

1.33%

0.86%

0.98%

0.12%

0.59%

0.90%

1.45%

1.38%

2.39%

2.31%

0.67%

0.65%

3.19%

5.89%

5.41%

5.34%

16.20%

7.82%

2.09%

1.09%

0.69%

6.22%

11,48%

0.25%

95.83%

96%/

40%

0.39%

0.90%

0.09%/

3.39%/

5.42%

2.23%

0.35%

0.67%

0.44%

0.31%

0.73%

1.22%

1.30%

0.82%

0.95%

0.11%

0.57%

0.85%

1.37%

1.30%

2.34%

2.18%

0.67%

0.64%

3.08%

5.89%

5.32%

5.22%

16.03%

7.74%

2.08%

1.09%

0.68%

6.18%

11.36%/

0.25%

94.16%

94%

s0%

0.37%

0.86%

0.09%/

3.24%

5.39%

2.1i8%/

0.34%

0.66%

0.42%/

0.31%

0.69%

1.19%

1.27%

0.78%/

0.93%

0.11%

0.58%/

0.79%

1.29%

1.23%

2.28%

2.06%

0.66%/

0.62%/

2.97%/

5.839%/

5.23%

5.10%/

15.85%

7.65%/

2.07No

1.09%

0.68%/

6.1I5%/

11.23%

0.25%/

92.49%/

92%

60%

0.35%/

0.81%

0.08%/

3.10%/

5.36%

2.130%

0.33%

0.64%

0.40%

0.30%

0.64%

1.16%/

1.24%

0.74%/

0.91%

0.11%

0.55%/

0.74%

1.2 1%

1.15%/

2.23%/

1.94%

0.66%

0.6 1%

2.86%

5.890%

5.14%

4.98%

15.68%

7.57%

2.06%/

1.09%/

0.68%

6. i10%

11.11%

0.25%/

90.82%/

91%

70%

0. 33%0/

0.77%

0.08%/

2.96%

5.33%

2.08%

0. 32%0/

0.63%/

0.37%/

0.29%

0.60%/

1.13%

0.70%

0.89%/

0.11%/

0.53%

0.68%/

1.14%

1.08%

2.1 8%

1.81%

0.66%

0.59%

2.75%/

5.89%

5.06%

4.86%

15S. 5 0%

7.48%

2.05%/

1.09%/

0.67%

6.08%/

10,98%

0.25%/

89.15%/

89%

80%

0.31%

0. 72%

0.08%/

2.81%

5.30%/

2,03%/

0.31%

0.61%

0.35%/

0.29%/

0.56%

0.87%

0.10%/

0.52%/

0. 63%

1.06%/

1.01%

2.12%/

1.69%/

0.65%/

0.58%

2.64%/

5.89%

4.97%/

4.74%/

15.33%/

7.40%

2.04%/

1.09%

0.67%/

6.05%/

10.86%/c

0.25%

87.48%/

87%/

90%1 1 0 M '00a

I*U

cri a

CA)

0%

0.45%

1.06%

0.11%

3.89%

5.52%/

2.4 1%

0.37%/

0.73%

0.52%

0.34%

0.87%

1.31%

1.40%

0.96%

1.03%

0.12%

0.62%

I.04%

1.64%/

1.56%

2.52%/

2.62%/

0.68%/

0.69%

3.46%

5.89%

5.63%

5.63%

16.64%

8.03%

2.12%

1.09%

0.70%

6.30%

11.79%

0.25%

100.(00%0

100%

10%

0.44%

1.04%

0.11%

3.82%

5.50%

2.38%

0.37%

0.72%

0.50%

0.34%

0.85%

1.30%

1.39%

0.94%

1.02%

0.12%

0.61%

1.01%

1.60%

1.52%

2.50%

2.56%

0.68%

0.68%

3.41%

5.89%

5.59%

5.57%

16.55%

7.99%

2.12%

1.09%

0.69%

6.28%

11.73%

0.25%

99.17%

99%

0.29%

0.68%

0.07%

2.67%

5.27%

1.98%

0.31%

0.60%

0.33%

0.28%

0.52%

1.08%

1.15%

0.62%

0.85%

0.10%

0.51%

0.58%

0.98%

0.93%

2.07%

1.56%/

0.65%/

0.56%

2.53%

5.89%

4.88%

4.63%

15.15%

7.31%

2.03%

1.09%

0.67%

6.02%

10.74%

0.25%

85.81%

86%

0. 27%/

0.64%

0.07%

2.53%

5.24%

1.93%

0.30%

0.58%

0.3 1%

0.27%/

0.48%

1.05%

1.12%

0.58%

0.82%

0.10%

0.49%

0.52%

0.90%

0.86%

2.02%

1.44%

0.65%

0.55%

2.42%

5.89%

4,79%

4.51%

14.98%

7.23%

2.01%

1.09%

0.66%

5.98%

10.61%

0.25%

84.14%

84%
0%, 1 1k. 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90%  100%

&I W

46

0.45%

1.06%

0.11%

3. 89%

5.52%

2.41%

0.37%

0.73%

0.52%

0.34%

0. 8 No

1.31%

1.40%

0.96%

1.030/0

0.12%

0.62%

1.04%

1.56%

2.52%

2.62%

0.68%

0.69%

3.46%

5.89%

5.63%

5.63%

16.64%

8.03%

2.12%

1.09%

0.70%

6.30%

11.79%

0.25%

100.00%

100%

0.46%

1.09%

0.11%

3.91%

5.58%

2.50%

0;39%

0.75%

0.53%

U5%

0.91%

1.33%

1;46%

0.99%

1.061/o

0.13%

0.63%

1,08%

1.71%

1.63%

2,64%

2.73%

0.70%

0.71%

3.48%

5.96%

5'66%

5.69%

16.82%

8.12%

2.21%

1.11%

0.73%

6.56%

11.91%

0.26%

101.88%

102%

0.46%

t09%

0.11%

3,91%

5.58%

2.50%_

0,39%

0.75%

0.53%

0.35%

0.91%

1-33%

0.99%

1.06%

0.13%

0.63%

t08%

1.71%

1.63%

2.64%

2.73%

0.70%

0.71%

3.48%

5.96%

5.66%

5.69%

1&82%

8.12%

2.21%

1.11%

0.73%

6.56%

11.91%

0.26%

101.88%

102%

OA6%

1.09%

0.11%

3.91%

5.58%

2.50%

0.39%

0.75%

0.53%

0.35%

0.91%

1.33%

1.46%

0.99%

1.06./.

0,13%

0.63%

1 M%

1.71%

1'63%

2.64%

2.73%

0.70%

0.71%

3.48%

5.96%

5.66%

5.69%

16.82%

8.12%

2.21%

1.11%

0.73%

6.56%

11.91%

0.26%

101.88%

102%

0.46%

1.09%

0.11%

3.91%

5.58%

2.50%

0.39%

0.75%

0.53%

0.35%

0.91%

1.33%

1.46%

0.99%

1.06%

0.13%

0,63%

1.08%

1.71%

1.63%

2.649/.

2.73%

0.70%

0.71%

3.48%

5.96%

5.66%

5.69%

16,82%

8.12%

2.21%

1.11%

0.73%

6.56%

11.91%

0.26%

101.88%

102%

0.46%

1.09%

O 1%

3.91%

5.58%

2.50%

0.39%

0.75%

0.53%

0.35%

0.91%

1.33%

1.46%

0.99%

1.06%

0.13%

0.63%

1.08%

1.71%

1.63%

2.64%

2.73%

0.70%

0.71%

3.48%

5.96%

5.66%

5.69%

16.829/o

8.12%

2.21%

1.11%

0.73%

6.56%

11.91%

0.26%

101.88%

102%

0.46%

1.09%

0.11%

3.91%

5.58%

2.50%

0.39%

0.75%

0.53%

0.35%

0.91%

1,33%

1.46%

0.99%

1.06%

0.13%

0.63%

1.08%

1.71%

1,63%,

2.64%

0.70%

0.71%

3,48%

5.96%

5.66%

6.69%

16.82%

8.12%

2.21%

.1.11%

0.73%

6.56%

11.91%

0.26%

101.88%

102%

0.46%

1.09%

0.11%

3.91%

5.58%

2.50%

0.39%

0.75%

0.53%

0.35%

0.91%

1.33%

1.46%

0.99%

1.06%

0.13%

0.63%,

1.08%

1.71%

1.63%

2.64%

2.73%

0.70%

0.71%

3.48%

5.96%

5.66%

5.69%

16.82%

8.12%

2.21%

1.11%,

0. 7 3 O/o:

6.56%

11.91%

0.26%

101.88%

102%

0.46%

1.09%

0.11%

3.91%

5.58%

2.50%

0.39%

0.75%

0.53%

0.35%

0.91%

1.33%

1.46%

0.99%

1.06%

0.13%

0.63%

1.08%

1.71%

1.63%

2.64%

2.73%

0.70%

0.71%

3.48%

&96%

5.66%

5.69%

16.82%

8.12%

2.21%

1.11%

0.73%

6.56%

11.91%

0.26%

101.88%

109%

0.46%

1.09%

0.11%

3.91% u8%

2.50%

om39%

0.75/.

0,53%

0.35%

O. 9 i o/.

1,33%

1,46%

0.99%

1.06%

0. 13%

0.63%

1.08%

1.71%

1.63%

2'64%

2.73%

0.70%

0.71%

3.48%

5.66%

5.69%

16.82%

8.12%

2.21%

1.11%

0.73%

6,56%

11.91%

0.26%

101.88%

102%

0,46%

1.09%

0.11%

3.91%

5.58%

2.50%

0.39%

0.75%

0.53%

0,35%

0.91%

1.33%

1.46%

0.99%

1.06%

0.13%

0.63%

1.08%

1.71%

1.63%

2.64%

2.73%

0.70%

0.71%

3.48%

5.96%

5.66%

5.69%

16.82%

8.12%

2.21%

1.11%

0'73%

6.56%

11.91%

0.26%

101.88%

102%

Table D-I 7 Residual Value-Added After Loss of Capacity--Sanitary Sewer Lifeline
Table D-1 8 Residual Value-Added After Loss of Capacity--Air Transportation Lifeline

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% D80% 90% N0%

n AC OIn A,., U. 070

1.05%

0.11%

3.87%

5.52%

2.38%

0.37%

0.72%

0.S1%

0.34%

0,87%

1.30%

1.39%

0.96%

1.02%

0.12%

0.61%

1.04%

1.63%

1.54%

2.48%

2.58%

0.66%

0.68%

3.41%

5.89%

5.57%

5.57%

16.47%

7.95%

2.08%

1.09%

0,68%

6.27%

11.67%

0.25%

99.09%

99%

U.4b%/6

1 .04%

0.1 1%

3.830%

5.52%

2.33%

0.36%

0.70%

0.50%/o

0.33%

0.86%

1.27%

1.36%

0.96%/

1.00%

0.12%

0.60%

1.02%

1.61%

1.51%

2,40%

2.49%

0.64%

0.67%

3.30%

5.89%

5.46%

5.46%

16.12%

7.78%

1.99%

1,09%

0.65%

6.20%

11.42%

0.25%

97,27%

97%

0.44%

1.03%

0.11%

3.79%

5.52%

2.28%

0.35%

0.69%

0,49%

0.32%

0.85%

1.24%

1.33%

0.96%

0.98%

0.12%

0.59%

1.01%

1.60%

1.48%

2.32%

2.41%

0.61%

0.65%

3.19%

5,89%

5.34%

5,34%

15.77.%

7.61%

1.90%

1.09%

0.62%

6,13%

11.17%

0.25%

95.45%

95%

0.44%

1.02%

0.11%

3.75%

5.52%

2.23%

0.35%

0.67%

0.48%

0.31%

0.84%

1.22%

1.30%

0,96%

0.95%

0.11%

0.57%

1.00%

1.58%

1.45%

2.24%

2.33%

0.58%

0.64%

3.08%

5.89%

5.22%

5.229%

1S.42%

7.44%

1.81%

1.09%

0.59%

6.07%

10.92%

0.25%

93,63%

94%

0.43%

1.01%

0.11%

3,70%

5.52%

2.18%

0,34%

0,66%

0.4 7%

0.31%

0.83%

1.19%

1.27%/n

0.96%

0.93%

0.11%

0.56%

0,99%

1.56%

1.41%

2.16%

2.25%

0.55%

0.62%

2.97%

5.89%

5.10%

5.10%

1S.07%

7.27%

1.72%

1.09%

0.56%

6,00%

10Q.67%

0.25%

91.81%

92%

0.43%

1.00%

0.10%

3.66%

5.52%

2.13%

0,33%

0,64%

0.46%

0.30%

0.82%

1.16%

1.24%

0.96%

0.91%

0.11%

0,55%

0.98%

1.55%

1.38%

2,08%

2.16%

0,52%

0.61%

2.86%

5.89%

4.98%

4.98%

14.72%

7.10%

1.63%

1.09%

0.54%

S.93%

10.43%

0.25%

90.00%

90%

0.42%

0.990/%

0.10%

3.62/0

5,52%

2.08%

0.32%

0.63%

0,45%

0.29%

0.81%

1.13%

1.21%

0.96%

0.89%

0,11%

0.53%

0.97%

1.53%

1.35%

2.00%

2.08%

0.49%

0.59%

2.75%

5.89/1

4,86%

4.86%

14.36%

6,93%

1.54%

1,09%

0.51%

5,87%

10.18%

0.25%

88.18%

88%

0.42%

0.98%

0.10%

3.58%

5.52%

2.03%

0.31%

0,61%

0.43%

0.29%

0.80%

1.10%

1.18%

0.96%

0.87%

0.10%

0.52%

0.96%

1 .1%

1.31%

1.92%

2.00%

0,46%

0.58%

2.64%

5.89%

4.74%

4.74%

14.01%

6.76%

1.45%

1.09%

0.48%

S.80%

9.93%

0.2S%

86.36%

86%

0.41%

0.96%

0.10%

3,54%

5.52%

1.98%

0.31%

0.60%

0.42%

0.28%

0. 79%

1.08%

1.15%

0.96%

0.85%

0.10%

0.51%

0.95%

1.49%

1.28%

1.85%

1.92%

0.44%

0.56%

2.53%

5.89%

4,63%

4.63%

13.66%

6.59%

1.36%

1.09%

0,45%

5.73%

9.68%

0.25%

84.54%

85%

0.41%

0.95%

0.10%

3.50%

5.52%

1.93%

0.30%

0.68%

0.41%

0.27%

0.78%

1.05%

1.12%

0.96%

0.82%

0.10%

0.49%

0,94%

1.48%

1,25%

1.77%

1.83%

0,41%

0.55%

2.42%

5.89%

4.51%

4.51%

13.31%

6.42%

1.27%

1.09%

0.42%

5.67%

9.43%

0.25%

82.72%

83%

9

(A

(D

I,a. 

0

0

Q

i

in

n

Fa

a

Ebb

-j,'J JQ

1.06i%

0.11%

3,89%

5.52%

2.41%

0,37%

0.73%

0.52%

0.34%

0.87%

1.S1%

1.40%

0,96%

1.03%

0.12%

0.62%

1.04%

1.64%

1.56%

2.62%

2.62%

0.68%

0.69%

3.46%

5.89%

5.63°/b

5.63%

16.64%

5.03%

2.12%

1.09%

0,70%

6.30%

11.79%

0.25%

100.00%

100%
Table D-19 Residual Value-Added After Loss of Capacity--Water Transportation Lifeline

(Ports)

0%° 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%

0.45% 

1.06% 

0.44% 

1.04% 0.99% 

0.42% 0.41% 0.39% 0.37% 0.35% 0.33% 0.31% -0.29% 0.27% 0.95% 0.90% 0.86% 0.81% 0.77% 0.72% 0.68% 0.64%

3.89% 0.11% 3.85% 0.11% 

3.77% 0.10% 

3.68% 

0.10% 0.09% 0.09% 0.08% 0.08% 0.08% 0.07% 0.07%

5.52% 5.46% 5.34% 

3.60% 3.52% 3.44% 3.36% 3.27% 3.19% 3.11%

2.41% 2.38% 2.33% 

5.23% 5.11% 5.00% 4.88% 4.76% 4.65% 4.53% 4.42% 2.28% 2.23% 2.18% 2.13% 2.08% 2.03% 1.98% 1.93%

0.73% 

0.37% 

0.72% 

0.37% 

0.70% 

0.36% 0.35% 

0.69% 

0.35% 0.34% 0.33% 0.32% 0.31% 0.31% 0.30%

0.52% 0.51% 0.50% 0.49% 

0.67% 0.66% 0.64% 0.63% 0.61% 0.60% 0.58% 0.48% 0.47% 0.46% 0.45% 043% 0.42% 0.41%

0.87% 

0.34% 0.34% 

0.86% 

0.33% 

0.83% 

0.32% 0.31% 0.31% 0.30% 0.29% 0.29% 0.28% 0.27%

1.31% 1.30% 1.27% 

0.80% 0.77% 0.75% 0.72% 0.69% 0.66% 0.64% 0.61%

1.40% 1.39% 

1.24% 1.22% 1.19% 1.16% 1.13% 1.10% 1.08% 1.05%

0.96% 0.92% 0.84% 

1.36% 1.33% 1.30% 1.27% 1.24% 1.21% 1.18% 1.15% 1.12% 0.76% 0.68% 0.60% 0.520o 0.44% 0.35% 0.27% 0.19%

0.12% 

1.03% 

0.12% 

1.02% 

0.12% 

1.00% 0.98% 0.95% 0.93% 0.91% 0.89% 0.87% 0.85% 0.82%

0.62% 0.61% 0.60% 

0.12% 0.11% 0.11% 0.11% 0.11% 0.10% 0.10% 0.10%

1.04% 1.03% 1.01% 

0.59% 0.57% 0.56% 0.55% 0.53% 0.52% 0.51% 0.49%

1.64% 1.61% 1.56% 

0.99% 0.96% 0.94% 0.92% 0.90% 0.88% 0.85% 0.83%

1.56% 1.54% 1.49% 

1.51% 1.46% 1.41% 1.36% 1.30% 1.25% 1.20% 1.15%

2.52% 2.50% 2.44% 

1.44% 1.39% 1.34% 1.29% 1.24% 1.19% 1.14% 1.09%

2.62% 2.58% 2.49% 

2.39% 

2.41% 

2.34% 2.28% 2.23% 2.18% 2.12% 2.07% 2.02% 0.68% 0.68%192183 2.33% 2.25% 2.16% 2.08% 2.00% 1.92% 1.83%

0.69% 

0.69% 

0.68% 

0.68% 

0.67% 

0.67% 0.66% 

0.65% 0.65% 

0.64% 0.65% 

0.62% 0.64% 

0.61% 0.59% 

0.63% 0.63% 0.62% 0.61% 0.58% 0.56% 0.55%

5.89% 

3.46% 

5.89% 

3.41% 3.30% 

5.89% 5.89% 

3.19% 3.08% 2.97% 2.86% 2.75% 2.64% 2.53% 2.42%

5.63% 5.57% 5.46% 5.34% 

5.89% 5.89% 5.89% 5.89% 5.89% 5.89% 5.89%

5.63% 5.63% 

5.22% 5.10% 4.98% 4.86% 4.74% 4.63% 4.51%

16.64% 

5.63% 5.63% 5.63% 5.63% 5.63% 5.63% 5.63% .63% 5%

8.03% 

16.64% 

8.03% 

16.64% 

8.03% 

16.64% 

8.03% 

16.64% 

8.03% 

16.64% 16.64% 16.64% 16.64% 16.64% 16.64% 8.03% 8.03% 8.03% 8.03% 8.03% 8.03%

1.09% 

2.12% 

1.09% 

2.12% 2.12% 

1.09% 

2.12% 2.12% 2.12% 2.12% 2.12% 2.12% 2.12% 2.12%

0.70% 0.70% 0.70% 0.70% 

1.09% 1.09% 1.09% 1.09% 1.09% 1.09% 1.09% 1.09% 0.70% 0.70% 0.70% 0.70% 0.70%

11.79% 

6.30% \ 

11.79% 

6.30% 

11.79% 

6.30% -

11.79% 

6.30% 6.30% 6.30% 6.30% 6.30% 6.30% 6.30% 6.30%

0.25% 0.25% 0.25% 

11.79% 11.79% 11.79% 11.79% 11.79% 11.79% 11.79% 0.25% 0.25% 0.25% 0.25% 0.25% 0.25% 0.25%

100.00% 

100% 

99.47% 

99% 

98.40% 

98% 

97.33% 96.26% 95.19% 94.12% 93.05% 91.98% 90.91% 89.84% 97% 96% 95% 94% 93% 92% 91% 90%

:~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~2 91:o/

.'

la

0

In

p

en

CL

0

0

0

(n
Table D-20 Residual Value-Added After Loss of Capacity--Telephone Lifeline

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%

0.45%

1.06%

0.11%

3.89%

5.52%

2.41%

0.370%

0.73%

0.52%

0.34%

0.87%/

1.31%

1.40%

0.96%

1.03%

0.12%

0.62%/

1.04%

1.64%

1.56%

2.52%

2.62%

0.68%

0.69%

3.46

5.89%

5.63%/

5.63%

16.64%

8.03%

2.12%

1.09%

0.70%

6.30%o

11.79%

0.25%

100.00%/

100%

0.45%

1.05%

0.11%

3.87%

5.49%

2.39%

0.37%

0. 72%

0.51%

0.34%

0.87%

1.30%

1.39%

0.96%

1.02%

0.12%

0.61%

1.03%

1.63%

1.55%

2.50%

2.61%

0.6 7 %

0.68%

3.41%

5.79%

5,49%

5.49%

16.12%

7.86%

2.08%

1.07%

0.68%

6.25%

11.67%

0.25%

98.38%

98%

0.44%

3.83%

5.43%

2.35%

0.36%

0.71%

0.50%

0.33%

0.86%

1.28%

1.37%

0.95%

1.0 1%

0.12%

0.60%

1.02%

1.61%

1.54%

2.46%

2.58%

0O.65%

0,67%

3.30%

5.61%

5.19%

5.19%

15.07%

7.52%

1.99%

1.03%

0.6%

6.15%

11.42%

0.24%

95. 14%

95%

0.43%

1.00%

0.10%

3.79%

5.37%

2.31%

0.36%

0.70%

0.50%

0.33%

0.85%

1.26%

1.35%

0.94%

0.99%

0.12%

0.59%

1.00%

1.60%

1.52%

2.42%

2.55%

0.6%

0.66%

3,19%

5.42%

4.89%

4.89%

14.01%

7.19%

1.90%

0.98%

0.62%

6.05%

11.17%

0.24%

91 .91%

92%

0.42%

0.98%

0.10%

3.75%

5.32%

2.27%

0.35%

0.69%

0.49%

0.32%

0.84%

1,24%

1.33%

0.93%

0,97%

0.12%

0.58%

0.98%

1.58%

1.50%

2.38%

2.52%

0.60%

0.65%

3.08%

5.24%

4.60%

4.60%

12.96%

6,85%

1.81%

0.93%

0.59%

5.95%

10.92%

0.23%

88,67%

89%

0.41%

0.96%

0.10%

3.70%

5.26%

2.24%

0.35%

0.67%/

0.4%

0.31%

0.8%

1.22%

1.30%

0.92%

0.96%

0.11%

0.57%

0.97%/

1.56%

1.49%

2.34%

2.49%

0.58%

0.64%

2.97%/

5.05%

4.30%

4.30%

11.91%

6.51%

1.72%/

0.89%

0.56%

5.85%

10.67%

0.23%

85.43%

85%

0.40%1

0.94%

0,10%

3.66%

5.20%

2.20%

0.34%

0.66%

0. 47%/

0.31%

0.82%

1.20%

1.28%

0.91%

0.94%

0.11%

0.56%

0.95%

1.5%

1.47%/

2.30%

2.47%

0.56%

0.63%

2.86%

4.86%

4.00%

4.00%

1086

6.17%

1.63%

0.84%

0.54%

5.75%

10.43%

0.22%

82,20%

82%

0.39%

0,91%

0.10%

3.62%/

5.14%

2.16%

0.33%

0.65%

0.46%

0.30%

0.81%

1.18%

1.26%

0.9%

0.92%

0.11%

0,55%

0.93%/

1,53%

1.45%

2.26%

2.44%

0,54%

0.62%

2.75%

4.68%

3.71%

3.71%O/

9.81%

5.83%

1.54%

0.80%

0.51%

5.65%

10.18%

0.22%

78.96%

79%/

0.38%

0.89%

0.09%

3.58%

5.08%

2.12%

0.33%

0.64%

0.45%

0.30%

0.80%

1.16%

1.24%

0.89%

0.91%

0.11%

0.54%

0.92%

1.5 1%

1.44%

2.22%/

2.41%

0.52%

0.61%

2.64%

4.49%

3.4 1%

3,41%

8.76%

5.49%

1,45%

0.75%/

0.48%

5.55%

9.93%

0.21%

75.72%

78%

0.37%

0.87%/

0.09%

3.54%

5.03%

2.06%

0.32%

0.63%

0.45%

0.29%

0.79%

1.14%

1.22%

0.88%

0.89%

0.11%

0.54%

0.90%

1.49%

1.42%

2.18%

2.38%

0.50%

0.60%

2.53%

4.31%

7.71%

5.16%

1.36%

0.70%

0.45%

5.45%

9.68%

-0.21%

72.48%

72%

0.36%

0.85%

0.09%

3.50%

4.97%

2.05%

0.32%

0.62%

0.44%

0.29%

0.78%

0.87%

0.88%

0.10%

0.53%

0.88%

1.48%

1,40%

2.14%

2.36%

0.48%

0.58%

2.42%

4.12%

2.82%

2.82%

6.66%

4.82%

1.27%

0.66%

0.42%

5.35%

9.43%

0.20%

69.25%

69%

s96

co'

:00

til 00aCI
ID

a,

.

E

Percent Ufeline Availibility

Figure D-1 Residual Value Added as a Function of Oil Supply Lifeline Residual Capacity.

Natural Gas Supply Ufeline

0.9 -

0.8 -

0.7 -

i: 0.6 -

0.5-

M

C

0

C

S 0.4 -

0.3 -

0.2 -

0.1 -

0 -

.- --- M

-.- a

0* 20 40 60

,_ ..

80 100

Percent Ufeline Availibilily

Figure D-2 Residual Value Added as a Function of Natural Gas Supply Lifeline Residual Capacity.

428 Appendix D: Economic Analysis Data ATC-25

_ . __ 

. .

I

428 Appendix D: Economic Analysis Data ATC-25
1 -

O. -

0.7 -

-j0

V

' 0. - a

0.5-

0

; 0.4 - E

0.3 -

0.2 -

0.1 -

0 -

Telephone Lifeline

.- U --

--- EIt--- 

a-U-- - ,--

I

I

I -. 1 I - --r-T- -F0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8

Percent Lifeline Availibifity

Figure D-3 Residual Value Added as a Function of Telephone Lifeline Residual Capacity.

Air Transport Lifeline

0.94

0.8 -

0.7

o c. 04.61

0.5

CL 0.4-

E

03

0.2 J.

0 -1 I I I . - --

0 0.2 0.4 0.6 08

Percent Lifeline Availibility

Figure D-4 Residual Value Added as a Function of Air Transportation Lifeline Residual Capacity.

ATC-25 Appendix D: Economic Analysis Data 429
Water Supply Ufeline -

0.9 

0.8 

0.7 - -

0.6-

1

-3 0.5 - a

o

a 0.4

E

0.3 -

0.2 

-0.10

0 20 40 60 80 101

Percent Ufeline Availibility

Residual Value Added as a Function of Water Supply Lifeline Residual Capacity.

.Electricity Supply Ufeline

I~~~~~~~~~~~.

0.9

0.8 -U

0.7

0.6-

0.5

0.4

0.3 -

0.2 -.

o. j

O0 

0 20 40 60 80

Percent Ufeline Availibility

Residual Value Added as a Function of Electric Lifeline Residual Capacity.

100

Appendix D: Economic Analysis DataA

Figure D-5

0

w

a,

0. Es

E

Figure D-6

430

-0-- =-. il --- M-- --

'MI

I

I

i :

i

0

ATC-25
1 -

V.9 -

C.Z -

0.7 -

0.5- C.6 -

G

D; .5 -

0.2 -

0.1 -

Highways Lifeline

U

IMUWU-.

------ U-'

. - - I - I I ft I

C 20 40 130 so

Percent Ufeline Availibiilly

Figure D-7 Residual Value Added as a Function of Highway Lifeline Residual Capacity.

Railroad UfLeine 1 -

0.9 

0. -1

0.7 -

0. -

0.4 -

0.3 -

C.2'

C1'

-I

-UM

U.- -07- ---

4_ -- 7 _ - j-i I r-I I 1 I i 

0 20 40 60 80

Percent Ufeline Avaifibility

Residual Value Added as a Function of Railroad Lifeline Residual Capacity.

ATC-25 Appendix D: Economic Analysis Data 431

- I - ~ . - . ,-. , 

1C4

a

'a

z

-

j

CF

Figure D-8S

- -

-

l

nU; -

.1. 1

ATC'25 Appendix D: Economic Analysis Data 431
_0

11O

U:

0

EB

0.9 -

0.8 -

0.7 -

0.6 -

0.5 -

0.4 -

0.3

0.2 -

0.1 --

- Waste Water Lifeline

__- . _--

UI.-

-U

aU--

I I oI I - I I 

0 20 40 60 . 80 i .1

Percent Lifeline Availibility

Figure D-9 Residual Value Added as a Function of Sanitary Sewer Lifeline Residual Capacity.

432 Appendix D: Economic Analysis Data ATC-25

00

1 _

1

11

O_ _ _ _ _ .. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _,_Z _

I

I

u -

432 Appendix D: Economic Analysis Data ATC-25
Applied Technology Council

Projects and Report Information

One of the primary purposes of Applied

Technology Council is to develop resource

documents that translate and summarize useful

information to practicing engineers. This

includes the development of guidelines and

manuals, as well as the development of research

recommendations for specific areas determined

by the profession. ATC is not a code

development organization, although several of

the ATC project reports serve as resource

documents for the development of codes,

standards and specifications.

Applied Technology Council conducts projects

that meet the following criteria:

1. The primary audience or benefactor is

the design practitioner in structural

engineenng.

2. A cross section or consensus of

engineering opinion is required to be

obtained and presented by a neutral

source.

3. ATC is requested to conduct the project

by the project sponsor.

A brief description of several major completed

projects and reports, is given in the following

section. Funding for projects is obtained from

government agencies and tax-deductible

contributions from the private sector.

ATC-1: This project resulted in five papers

which were published as part of Building

Practices for Disaster Mitigation, Building

Science Series, 46, proceedings of a workshop

sponsored by the National Science Foundation

(NS$) and the National Bureau of Standards

(NBS). Available through the National

Technical Information Service (NTiS), 5285

Port Royal Road, Springfield, VA 22151, as

NTIS report No. COM-73-50188.

ATC-2: The report, An Evaluation of a

Response Spectm Approach to Seismic Design

of Buildings, was funded by NSF and NBS and

was conducted as part of the Cooperative

Federal Program in Building Practices for

Disaster Mitigation. Available through the

ATC office. (270 Pages)

Abstract: This study evaluated the

applicability and cost of the response

spectrum approach to seismic analysis and

design that was proposed by various

segments of the engineering profession.

Specific building designs, design

procedures and parameter values were

evaluated for future application. Eleven

existing buildings of varying dimensions

were redesigned according to the

procedures.

ATC-3: The report, Tentative Provisionsfor the

Development of Seismic Regulations for

Buildings (ATC-3-06),i was funded by NSF and

NBS. The second printing of this report, which

included proposed amendments, is available

through the ATC office. (505 pages plus

proposed amendments)

Abstract: The tentative provisions in this

document represent the result of a

concerted effort by a multi-disciplinary

team of 85 nationally recognized experts

in earthquake engineering. The project

involved representation from all sections

of the United States and had wide review

by affected building industry and

regulatory groups. The provisions

embodied several new concepts that were

significant departures, from existing

seismic design provisions. The second

printing of this document contains

proposed amendments prepared by a joint

committee of the Building Seismic Safety

Council (BSSC) and the NBS; the

proposed amendments were published

separately by BSSC and NBS in 1982.

ATC-3-2: The project, Comparative Test

Designs of Buildings Using ATC-3-06 Tentative

Provisions, was funded by NSF. The project

consisted of a study to develop and plan a

program for making comparative test designs of

the ATC-3-06 Tentative Provisions. The project

report was written to be used by the Building

ATC-25 Appendix E: ATC Information 433

Appendix E:

ATC-25 Appendix E: ATC Information 43
Seismic Safety Council in its refinement of the

ATC-3-06 Tentative Provisions.

ATC-3-4: The report, Redesign of Three

Multistory Buildings: A Comparison UsingATC3-06 and 1982 Uniform Building Code Design

Provisions, was published under a grant from

NSF. Available through the ATC office. (112

pages)

Abstract: This report evaluates the cost

and technical impact of using the 1978

ATC-3-06 report, Tentative Provisions for

the Development of Seismic Regulations

for Buildings, as amended by a joint

committee of the Building Seismic Safety

Council and the National Bureau of

Standards in 1982. The evaluations are

based on studies of three existing

California buildings redesigned in

accordance with the ATC-3-06 Tentative

Provisions and the 1982 Uniform Building

Code. Included in the report are

recommendations to code implementing

bodies.

ATC-3-5: This project, Assistance for First

Phase of ATC-3-06 Trial Design Program Being

Conducted by the Building Seismic Safety

Council, was funded by the Buildings Seismic

Safety Council and provided the services of the

ATC Senior Consultant and other ATC

personnel to assist the BSSC in the conduct of

the first phase of its Trial Design Program. The

first phase provided for trial designs conducted

for buildings in Los Angeles, Seattle, Phoenix,

and Memphis.

ATC-3-6: This project, Assistance for Second

Phase of ATC-3-06 Trial Design Program Being

Conducted by the Building Seismic Safety

Council, was funded by the Building Seismic

Safety Council and provided the services of the

ATC Senior Consultant and other ATC

personnel to assist the BSSC in the conduct of

the second phase of its Trial Design Program.

The second phase provided for trial designs

conducted for buildings in New York, Chicago,

St. Louis, Charleston, and Fort Worth.

ATC-4: The report, A Methodology for Seismic

Design and Construction of Single-Family

Dwellings, was published under a contract with

the Department of Housing and Urban

Development (HUD). Available through the

ATC office. (576 pages)

Abstract: This report presents the results

of an in-depth effort to develop design

and construction details for single-family

residences that minimize the potential

economic loss and life-loss risk associated

with earthquakes. The report: (1)

discussed the ways structures behave

when subjected to seismic forces, (2) sets

forth suggested design criteria for

conventional layouts of dwellings

constructed with conventional materials,

(3) presents construction details that do

not require the designer to perform

analytical calculations, (4) suggests

procedures for efficient plan-checking,

and (5) present recommendations

including details and schedules for use in

the field by construction personnel and

building inspectors.

ATC-4-1: The report, The Home Builders Guide

for Earthquake Design, was published under a

contract with HUD. Available through the

ATC office. (57 pages)

Abstract: This report is a 57-page

abridged version of the ATC-4 report.

The concise, easily understood text of the

Guide is supplemented with illustrations

and 46 construction details. The details

are provided to ensure that houses

contain structural features which are

properly. positioned, dimensioned and

constructed to resist earthquake forces. A

brief description is included on how

earthquake forces impact on houses and

some precautionary constraints are given

with respect to site selection and

architectural designs.

ATC-5: The report, Guidelines for Seismic

Design and Construction of Single-Story Masonry

Dwellings in Seismic Zone 2, was developed

under a contract with HUD. Available through

the ATC office. (38 pages)

Abstract: The report offers a concise

methodology for the earthquake design

and construction of single-story masonry

dwellings in Seismic Zone 2 of the United

States, as defined by the 1973 Uniform

434 Appendix E: ATC Informcxllon ATC-25

434 Appendix E: ATC Information ATC-25
Building Code. The guidelines are based

in part on shaking table tests of masonry

construction conducted at the University

of California at Berkeley Earthquake

Engineering Research Center. The

report is written in simple language and

includes basic house plans, wall

evaluations, detail drawings, and material

specifications.

ATC-6: The report, Seismic Design Guidelines

for Highway Bridges, was published under a

contract with the Federal Highway

Administration (FHWA). Available through

the ATC office. (210 pages)

Abstract: The Guidelines are the

recommendations of a team of sixteen

nationally recognized experts that

included consulting engineers, academics,

state and federal agency representatives

from throughout the United States. The

Guidelines embody several new concepts

that are significant departures from

existing design provisions. An extensive

commentary and an example

demonstrating the use of the Guidelines

are included. A draft of the Guidelines

was used to seismically redesign 21 bridges

and a summary of the redesigns is also

included.

ATC-6-1: The report, Proceedings of a

Workshop on Earthquake Resistance of Highway

Bridges, was published under a grant from NS F.

Available through the ATC office. (625 pages)

Abstract: The report includes 23 state-ofthe-art and state-of-practice papers on

earthquake resistance of highway bridges.

Seven of the twenty-three papers were

authored by participants from Japan, New

Zealand and Portugal. The Proceedings

also contain recommendations for future

research that were developed by the 45

workshop participants.

ATC-6-2: The report, Seismic Retrofitting

Guidelines for Highway Bridges, was, published

under a contract with FHWA. Available

through the ATC office. (220 pages)

Abstract: The Guidelines are the

recommendations of a team of thirteen

nationally recognized experts that

included consulting engineers, academics,

state highway engineers, and federal

agency representatives. The Guidelines,

applicable for use in all parts of the U.S.,

include a preliminary screening

procedure, methods for evaluating an

existing bridge in detail, and potential

retrofitting measures for the most

common seismic deficiencies. Also

included are special design requirements

for various retrofitting measures.

ATC-7: The report, Guidelines for the Design of

Horizontal Wood Diaphragms, was published

under a grant from NSF. Available through the

ATC office. (190 pages)

Abstract: Guidelines are presented for

designing roof and floor systems so these

can function as horizontal diaphragms in a

lateral force resisting system. Analytical

procedures, connection details and design

examples are included in the Guidelines.

ATC-7-1: The report, Proceedings of a

Workshop of Design of Horizontal Wood

Diaphragms, was published under a grant from

NSF. Available through the ATC office. (302

pages)

Abstract: The report includes seven

papers on state-of-the-practice and two

papers on recent research. Also included

are recommendations for future research

that were developed by the 35

participants.

ATC-8: This report, Proceedings of a Workshop

on the Design of Prefabricated Concrete Buildings

for Earthquake Loads, was funded by NSF.

Available through the ATC office. (400 pages)

Abstract: The report includes eighteen

state-of-the-art papers and six summary

papers. Also included are

recommendations for future research that

were developed by the 43 workshop

participants.

ATC-9: The report, An Evaluation of the

Imperial County Senwices Building Earthquake

Response and Associated Damage, was published

ATC-25 Appendix E: ATC Information 435

ATUC-25 Appendix E: ATC Information 435
under a grant from NSF. Available through the

ATC office. (231 pages)

Abstract: The report presents the results

of an in-depth evaluation of the Imperial

County Services Building, a 6-story

reinforced concrete frame and shear wall

building severely damaged by the October

15, 1979 Imperial Valley, California,

earthquake. The report contains a review

and evaluation of earthquake damage to

the buildings; a review and evaluation of

the seismic design; a comparison of the

requirements of various building codes as

they relate to the building; and

conclusions and recommendations

pertaining to future building code

provisions and future research needs.

ATC-10: This report, An Investigation of the

Correlation Between Earthquake Ground Motion

and Building Performance, was funded by the

U.S. Geological Survey (USGS). Available

through the ATC office. (114 pages)

Abstract: The report contains an in-depth

analytical evaluation of the ultimate or

limit capacity of selected representative

building framing types, a discussion of the

factors affecting the seismic performance

of buildings, and a summary and

comparison of seismic design and seismic

risk parameters currently in widespread

use.

ATC-10-1: This report, CiticalAspects of

Earthquake Ground Motion and Building

Damage Potential, was co-funded by the USGS

and the NSF. Available through the ATC

office. (259 pages)

Abstract: This document contains 19

state-of-the-art papers on ground motion,

structural response, and structural design

issues presented by prominent engineers

and earth scientists in an ATC seminar.

The main theme of the papers is to

identify the critical aspects of ground

motion and building performance that

currently are not being considered in

building design. The report also contains

conclusions and recommendations of

working groups convened after the

Seminar.

ATC-11: The report, Seismic Resistance of

Reinforced Concrete Shear Walls and Frame

Joints: Implications of Recent Research for

Design Engineers, was published under a grant

from NSF. Available through the ATC office.

(184 pages)

Abstract: This document presents the

results of an in-depth review and synthesis

of research reports pertaining to cyclic

loading of reinforced concrete shear walls

and cyclic loading of joint reinforced

concrete frames. More than 125 research

reports published since 1971 are reviewed

and evaluated in this report. The

preparation of the report included a

consensus process involving numerous

experienced design professionals from

throughout the United States. The report

contains reviews of current and past

design practices, summaries of research

developments, and in-depth discussions of

design implications of recent research

results.

ATC-12: This report, Comparison of United

States and New Zealand Seismic Design Practices

for Highway Bridges, was published under a grant

from NSF. Available through the ATC office.

(270 pages)

Abstract: The report contains summaries

of all aspects and innovative design

procedures used in New Zealand as well

as comparison of United States and New

Zealand design practice. Also included

are research recommendations developed

at a 3-day workshop in New Zealand

attended by 16 U.S. and 35 New Zealand

bridge design engineers and researchers.

ATC-12-1: This report, Proceedings of Second

Joint U.S.-New Zealand Workshop on Seismic

Resistance of Highway Bridges, was published

under a grant from NSF. Available through the

ATC office. (272 pages)

Abstract: This report contains written

versions of the papers presented at this

1985 Workshop as well as a list and

prioritization of workshop

recommendations. Included are

summaries of research projects currently

being conducted in both countries as well

436 Appendix E: ATC Information ATC-25

Appendix E: ATC Information ATC-25 436 ; I . L
as state-of-the-practice papers on various

aspects of design practice. Topics

discussed include bridge design

philosophy and loadings; design of

columns, footings, piles, abutments and

retaining structures; geotechnical aspects

of foundation design; seismic analysis

techniques; seismic retrofitting; case

studies using base isolation; strong-motion

data acquisition and interpretation; and

testing of bridge components and bridge

systems.

ATC-13: The report, Earthquake Damage

Evaluation Data for California, was developed

under a contract with the Federal Emergency

Management Agency (FEMA). Available

through the ATC office. (492 pages)

Abstract: This report presents expertopinion earthquake damage and loss

estimates. for existing industrial,

commercial, residential utility and

transportation facilities in California.

Included are damage probability matrices

for 78 classes of structures and estimates

of time required to restore damaged

facilities to pre-earthquake usability. The

report also describes the inventory

information essential for estimating

economic losses and the methodology

used to develop the required data.

ATC-14: The report, Evaluating the Seismic

Resistance of Existing Buildings, was developed

under a grant from the NSF. Available through

the ATC office. (370 pages)

Abstract: This report, written for

practicing structural engineers, describes a

methodology for performing preliminary

and-etailed building seismic evaluations.

The report contains a state-of-practice

review; seismic loading criteria; data

collection procedures; a detailed

description of the building classification

system; preliminary and detailed analysis

procedures; and example case studies,

including non-structural considerations.

ATC-15: This report, Comparison of Seismic

Design Practices in the United States and Japan,

was published under a grant from NSF.

Available through the ATC office. (317 pages)

ATC-25 Appendix E:

Abstract: The report contains detailed

technical papers describing current design

practices in the United States and Japan

as well as recommendations emanating

from a joint U.S.-Japan workshop held in

Hawaii in March, 1984. Included are

detailed descriptions of new seismic

design methods for buildings in Japan and

case studies of the design of specific

buildings (in both countries). The report

also contains an overview of the history

and objectives of the Japan Structural

Consultants Association.

ATC-15-1: The report, Proceedings of Second

U. S.-Japan Workshop o n Improvement of

Building Seismic Design and Construction

Practices, was, published under a grant from

NSF. Available through the ATC office. (412

pages)

Abstract: This report contains 23

technical papers presented at this San

Francisco workshop in August, 1986, by

practitioners and researchers from the

U.S. and Japan. Included are state-ofthe-practice papers and case studies. of

actual building designs and information

on regulatory, contractual, and licensing

issues.

ATC-15-2: The report, Proceedings of Third

U S.-Japan Workshop on Improvement of

Building Structural Design and Construction

Practices, was published jointly by TAC and the

Japan Structural Consultants, Association.

Available through the ATC office.

Abstract: This report contains 21

technical papers presented at this Tokyo,

Japan, workshop in July, 1988, by

practitioners and researchers from the

U.S., Japan, China, and New Zealand.

Included are state-of-the-practice papers,

on various topics, including braced steel

frame buildings, beam-column joints in

reinforced concrete buildings, summaries.

of comparative U. S. and Japanese design,

and base isolation and passive energy

dissipation devices.

ATC-16: This project, Development of a 5-Year

Plan for Reducing the Earthquake Hazards

Posed by Existing Nonfederal Buildings, was

ATC Information 

437

ATC Information 437
funded by FEMA and was conducted by a joint

venture of ATC, the Building Seismic Safety

Council and the Earthquake Engineering

Research Institute. The project involved a

workshop in Phoenix, Arizona, where

approximately 50 earthquake specialists met to

identify the major tasks and goals for reducing

the earthquake hazards posed by existing

nonfederal buildings nationwide. The plan was

developed on the basis of nine issue papers

presented at the workshop and workshop

working group discussions. The Workshop

Proceedings and Five-Year Plan are available

through the Federal Emergency Management

Agency, 500 "C" Street, S.W., Washington, DC

20472.

ATC-17: This report , Proceedings of a Seminar

and Workshop on Base Isolation and Passive

Energy Dissipation, was published under a grant

from NSF. Available through the ATC office.

(478 pages)

Abstract: The report contains 42 papers

describing the state-of-the-art and stateof-the-practice in base-isolation and

passive energy-dissipation technology.

Included are papers describing case

studies in the United States, applications

and developments worldwide, recent

innovations in technology development,

and structural and ground motion issues.

Also included is a proposed 5-year

research agenda that addresses the

following specific issues: (1) strong

ground motion; (2) design criteria; (3)

materials, quality control, and long-term

reliability; (4) life cycle cost methodology;

and (5) system response.

ATC-20: The report, Procedures for

Postearthquake Safety Evaluation of Buildings,

was developed under a contract from the

California Office of Emergency Services (OES),

California Office of Statewide Health Planning

and Development (OSHPD) and FEMA.

Available through the ATC office (152 pages)

Abstract: This report provides

procedures and guidelines for making onthe-spot evaluations and decisions

regarding continued use and occupancy of

earthquake damaged buildings. Written

specifically for volunteer structural

engineers and building inspectors, the

report includes rapid and detailed

evaluation procedures for inspecting

buildings and posting them as "inspected"

(apparently safe), "limited entry" or

"unsafe". Also included are special

procedures for evaluation of essential

buildings (e.g., hospitals), and evaluation

procedures for nonstructural elements,

and geotechnical hazards.

ATC-20-1: The report, Field Manual:

Postearthquake Safety Evaluation of Buildings,

was developed under a contract from OES and

OSHPD. Available through the ATC office

(114 pages)

Abstract: This report, a companion Field

Manual for the ATC-20 report,

summarizes the postearthquake safety

evaluation procedures in brief concise

format designed for ease of use in the

field.

ATC-21: The report, Rapid Visual Screening of

Buildings for Potential Seismic Hazards: A

Handbook, was developed under a contract

from FEMA. Available through the ATC

office. (185 pages)

Abstract: This report describes a rapid

visual screening procedure for identifying

those buildings that might pose serious

risk of loss of life and injury, or of severe

curtailment of community services, in case

of a damaging earthquake. The screening

procedure utilizes a methodology based

on a "sidewalk survey" approach that

involves identification of the primary

structural load resisting system and

building materials, and assignment of a

basic structural hazards score and

performance modification factors based

on observed defects. Application of the

methodology identifies those buildings

that are potentially hazardous and should

be analyzed in more detail by a

professional engineer experienced in

seismic design.

ATC-21-1: The report, Rapid Visual Screening

of Buildings for Potential Seismic Hazards:

Supporting Documentation, was developed

438 Appendix E: ATC Information ATC-25, T i
under a contract from FEMA. Available

through the ATC office. (137 pages)

Abstract: Included in this report are (1) a

review and evaluation of existing

procedures; (2) a listing of attributes

considered ideal for a rapid visual

screening procedures; and (3) a technical

discussion of the recommended rapid

visual screening procedure that is

documented in the ATC-21 report.

ATC-21-2: The report, Earthquake Damaged

Buildings: An Overview of Heavy Debris and

Victim Extrication, was developed under a

contract from FEMA. Available through the

ATC office. (95 pages)

Abstract: Included in this report, a

companion volume to the ATC-21 and

ATC-21-1 reports, is state-of-the-art

information on (1) the identification of

those buildings that might collapse and

trap victims in debris or generate debris of

such a size that its handling would require

special or heavy lifting equipment; (2)

guidance in identifying these types of

buildings, on the basis of their major

exterior features, and (3), the types and

life capacities of equipment required to

remove the heavy portion of the debris

that might result from the collapse of such

buildings.

ATC-22: The report, A Handbookfor Seismic

Evaluation of Existing Buildings (Preliminary),

was developed under a contract from FEMA.

Available through the ATC office. (169 pages)

Abstract: This handbook provides

methodology for seismic evaluation of

existing buildings of different tpes and

occupancies in areas of different

seismicity throughout the United States.

The methodology, which has been field

tested in several programs nationwide,

utilizes the information and procedures

developed fog and documented in the

ATC-14 report. The handbook includes

checklists, diagrams, and sketches

desigpqd to assist the user.

ATC-22-1: The report, Seismic Evaluation of

Exising Buildings: Supporting Documentation,

was developed under a contact from FEMA.

Available througW the ATC office. (160 pages)

Abstract: Includ in this report, a

companion volume t the ATC-22 report,

are (1) a review and evaluation of existing

buildings seismic evaluation

methodologies; (2) results from field tests

of the ATC-14 methodology; and (3)

summaries of evaluations of ATC-14

conducted by the National Center for

Earthquake Engineering Research (State

University of New York at Buffalo) and

the City of San Francisco.

*U.S. GOVE?ŽTENT PRINTING OFFMCE:1998-61a-146/90604

ATC-25 Appendix E: ATC Jnlormalion 439

ATC-25 Aplendix E: ATC Information 439