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49–782 PDF 2009

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

MAY 20, 2009 

Serial No. 111–30 

Printed for the use of the Committee on the Judiciary 

( 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://judiciary.house.gov 
(II) 

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY 

JOHN CONYERS, JR., Michigan, Chairman 

HOWARD L. BERMAN, California 

RICK BOUCHER, Virginia 

JERROLD NADLER, New York 

ROBERT C. ‘‘BOBBY’’ SCOTT, Virginia 

MELVIN L. WATT, North Carolina 

ZOE LOFGREN, California 

SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas 

MAXINE WATERS, California 

WILLIAM D. DELAHUNT, Massachusetts 

ROBERT WEXLER, Florida 

STEVE COHEN, Tennessee 

HENRY C. ‘‘HANK’’ JOHNSON, JR., 

Georgia 

PEDRO PIERLUISI, Puerto Rico 

MIKE QUIGLEY, Illinois 

LUIS V. GUTIERREZ, Illinois 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

TAMMY BALDWIN, Wisconsin 

CHARLES A. GONZALEZ, Texas 

ANTHONY D. WEINER, New York 

ADAM B. SCHIFF, California 

LINDA T. SA ́ NCHEZ, California 

DEBBIE WASSERMAN SCHULTZ, Florida 

DANIEL MAFFEI, New York 

LAMAR SMITH, Texas 

F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER, JR., 

Wisconsin 

HOWARD COBLE, North Carolina 

ELTON GALLEGLY, California 

BOB GOODLATTE, Virginia 

DANIEL E. LUNGREN, California 

DARRELL E. ISSA, California 

J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia 

STEVE KING, Iowa 

TRENT FRANKS, Arizona 

LOUIE GOHMERT, Texas 

JIM JORDAN, Ohio 

TED POE, Texas 

JASON CHAFFETZ, Utah 

TOM ROONEY, Florida 

GREGG HARPER, Mississippi 

PERRY APELBAUM, Majority Staff Director and Chief Counsel 

SEAN MCLAUGHLIN, Minority Chief of Staff and General Counsel 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

MAY 20, 2009 

Page 

OPENING STATEMENTS 

The Honorable John Conyers, Jr., a Representative in Congress from the 

State of Michigan, and Chairman, Committee on the Judiciary ..................... 1 

The Honorable Lamar Smith, a Representative in Congress from the State 

of Texas, and Ranking Member, Committee on the Judiciary ......................... 2 

WITNESSES 

The Honorable Robert S. Mueller, III, Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation 

Oral Testimony ..................................................................................................... 3 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 7 

APPENDIX 

MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING RECORD

Prepared Statement of the Honorable Jerrold Nadler, a Representative in 

Congress from the State of New York, and Member, Committee on the 

Judiciary ............................................................................................................... 65 

Prepared Statement of the Honorable Maxine Waters, a Representative in 

Congress from the State of California, and Member, Committee on the 

Judiciary ............................................................................................................... 66 

Post-Hearing Questions submitted to the Honorable Robert S. Mueller, III, 

Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation ......................................................... 67 

(1) 

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION 

WEDNESDAY, MAY 20, 2009 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, 

Washington, DC. 

The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:22 a.m., in room 

2141, Rayburn House Office Building, the Honorable John Conyers, 

Jr. (Chairman of the Committee) presiding. 

Present: Representatives Conyers, Nadler, Scott, Watt, Lofgren, 

Jackson Lee, Waters, Delahunt, Wexler, Cohen, Johnson, Quigley, 

Sherman, Gonzalez, Schiff, Wasserman Schultz, Maffei, Smith, 

Sensenbrenner, Coble, Gallegly, Lungren, Issa, King, Franks, 

Gohmert, Jordan, Poe, Rooney, and Harper. 

Staff present: Robert Reed, Majority Oversight Counsel; Crystal 

Jezierski, Minority Oversight Counsel; and Renata Strause, Majority Staff Assistant. 

Mr. CONYERS. Good morning. The Committee will come to order. 

And now we would like to turn to the business of the day. 

This is the regular oversight hearing on the Federal Bureau of 

Investigation. 

We welcome FBI Director Rob Mueller to today’s hearing. The 

FBI is the anchor of the Nation’s Federal law enforcement. 

The bureau has responsibilities, as we recall, to include the ability to combat crime, conduct surveillance, initiate investigations, 

and to effectively perform its responsibility requires an internal 

strength inside its own operations. 

And I would like to just point out that the recent inspector general’s report regarding the FBI disciplinary system raised questions 

about the process within the bureau. 

We are hoping that FBI personnel who engaged in the improper 

use of exigent letters, once the IG’s upcoming report is released, 

when we find out what actually happened, we will expect a proper 

follow-through. 

We want to ensure that the FBI has the resources to combat the 

problems that have arisen out of the global financial crisis that 

started in the United States with the subprime mortgage meltdown 

and we want to make sure that FBI has the resources to investigate questionable activity. 

We know that there was mismanagement, more than likely, 

fraud, white-collar crimes, perhaps even RICO issues, that have 

contributed to this very serious economic problem now facing the 

country. 
2 

I will put the rest of my statement in the record, and turn to 

Lamar Smith, the Ranking Member of the Committee, from Texas. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Chairman, following the terrorist attacks of 9/11, the mission 

of the bureau changed dramatically from that of a traditional law 

enforcement agency to an agency tasked with investigating terrorism and national security threats. 

The bureau has undertaken significant efforts to conform to its 

new mission, to revise its investigative techniques, retrain its 

agents, and more effectively analyze and respond to intelligence information. 

America is safer today because the men and women of the bureau and other agencies work tirelessly to protect us. 

At the end of this year, the remaining temporary provisions of 

the USA PATRIOT Act are set to expire. These provisions, which 

include roving wiretap and FISA business records authority, are essential to the bureau’s ability to prevent acts of terrorism and respond to other threats to our national security. 

To ensure that there is no lapse in these vital authorities, I have 

introduced legislation to extend the expiring provisions for 10 

years. 

The threat to America from terrorists, spies and enemy nations 

will not sunset at the end of this year and neither should America’s 

antiterrorism laws. 

Despite the bureau’s efforts to keep America safe from terrorists, 

I am concerned that the new Administration’s decision to close 

Guantanamo Bay may result in some of the most dangerous terrorists being transferred to the U.S. or released into America’s communities. 

To me, bringing terrorists to the U.S. undermines the bureau’s 

efforts to prevent another terrorist attack. No good purpose is 

served by allowing known terrorists, who trained at terrorist training camps, to come to the U.S. to live among us. 

Guantanamo Bay was never meant to be another Ellis Island. 

Terrorists were detained there for a reason—to keep American’s 

safe. 

I understand that the bureau is part of the Gitmo detainee review process established by President Obama. I hope that the bureau will express its concerns to the Administration about the 

threat these terrorists pose to Americans here at home. 

While the bureau pursues its national security efforts, I know it 

will continue its law enforcement mission, including the investigation of widespread fraud associated with America’s financial crisis. 

Many factors contributed to this collapse, including predatory 

lending by corrupt lenders, mortgage fraud, and even foreclosure 

fraud. 

Another important focus of the bureau is preventing crimes 

against children, particularly Internet-based crimes involving child 

pornography or child exploitation. 

Often, the only mechanism for identifying an operator or user of 

a child pornography Web site is their Internet photo-call address. 

Currently, a law enforcement officer can request subscriber information from an Internet service provider. However, ISPs regularly 

purge these records, making it difficult, if not impossible for law 
3 

enforcement officials to apprehend the distributors and consumers 

of child pornography on the Internet. 

I have sponsored bipartisan legislation, the Internet Safety Act, 

to require ISPs to retain these records for up to 2 years. 

I am interested in knowing what are Director Mueller’s thoughts 

on the need for record retention to investigate child pornography 

and other Internet-based crimes, and I will be asking a question 

about that in a minute. 

Again, Mr. Chairman, I thank Director Mueller for joining us 

today and I look forward to hearing from him. 

I yield back the balance of my time. 

Mr. CONYERS. Thank you. 

All other Members’ statements will be included in the record at 

this point. 

We welcome, again, Robert Mueller, III, director of the FBI since 

September 4, 2001, from Princeton, Virginia Law School, the Marines, where he received combat medals, assistant United States 

attorney in San Francisco, in Boston and Washington, DC. 

He served with distinction in two law firms and called back from 

San Francisco to Washington in early 2001 to become acting deputy general, until he served—and is the director. 

We welcome you again to our humble Committee room. Your 

statement is in the record, and we urge you to make your comments as you would like us to hear them. 

Welcome, again. Good morning. 

TESTIMONY OF THE HONORABLE ROBERT S. MUELLER, III, 

DIRECTOR, FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION 

Mr. MUELLER. Thank you, Chairman Conyers, Ranking Member 

Smith, and other Members of the Committee. 

As, Chairman Conyers, you pointed out, and Congressman 

Smith, we in the FBI have undergone unprecedented transformation in recent years, from developing the intelligence capabilities necessary to address emerging terrorist and criminal threats to 

creating the administrative and technological structure necessary 

to meet our mission as a national security service. 

Today, the FBI is a stronger organization, combining better intelligence capabilities with a longstanding commitment to protect the 

American people from criminal threats. And we are also ever mindful that our mission is not just to safeguard American lives, but, 

also, to safeguard American liberties. 

Certainly, the threats currently present in the national security 

arena continue to be a grave concern. Terrorism remains our top 

priority and, as was illustrated by the Mumbai attacks, we cannot 

become complacent. 

Al Qaida, lesser known groups and homegrown terrorists will 

continue to pose a threat to the United States. 

And we in the FBI must also continue to guard our country’s 

most sensitive secrets from hostile intelligence services and remember that our Nation’s cyber infrastructure is vulnerable to compromise or disruption, be it from a terrorist, a spy or an international criminal enterprise. 
4 

But these three are by no means our priorities. While Americans 

justifiably worry about terrorism, it is crime in their communities 

that often most directly impacts their daily lives. 

Public corruption continues to be a top criminal priority. The FBI 

has 2,500 pending public corruption investigations; in the last 2 

years alone, has convicted more than 1,600 Federal, state and local 

officials. And we remain committed to ensuring that those given 

the public trust do not abuse it. 

As was pointed out, economic crime is, of course, a critical concern now more than ever. For example, the FBI’s mortgage fraud 

caseload has nearly tripled in the past 3 years from over 800 to 

over 2,400 active investigations. 

The FBI currently has more than 580 pending corporate fraud 

investigations, including cases directly related to the current financial crisis. 

In response, we have been shifting personnel within the organization, to the extent possible. We have been using new analytical 

techniques to better identify trends and violators, and we have 

been building upon existing partnerships to further leverage expertise and resources. 

For example, we created the national mortgage fraud team at 

FBI headquarters to prioritize pending investigations, provide additional tools to identify the most egregious violators, and provide 

strategic information to evaluate where additional manpower is 

needed. 

We also have established 18 mortgage fraud task forces and 50 

working groups with other government agencies across the country 

so that we may more effectively focus on these problem areas. 

While the FBI is surging resources to mortgage fraud, public corruption investigations, our expectation is that economic crimes will 

continue to skyrocket. 

The unprecedented level of financial resources committed by the 

Federal Government to combat the economic downturn will lead to 

an inevitable increase in economic crime and public corruption 

cases. 

Historically, the bureau has handled emerging criminal threats 

by transferring personnel within its criminal branch to meet the 

new threat. Since September 11, we have lost some of this elasticity. 

In response to the September 11 attacks, the FBI permanently 

moved approximately 2,000 of its criminal agents to our national 

security branch. This transfer has substantially improved our 

counterterrorism program and we have no intention from retreating from preventing another terrorist attack on American soil as 

our number one priority. 

But the logical consequence of cannibalizing our criminal resources to augment our national security efforts is that we have reduced the ability to surge resources within our criminal branch. 

Although we have begun an effort to rebuild our criminal resources back to our pre-9/11 levels, we still have a substantial way 

to go. 

As always, the FBI will set priorities to attack the most severe 

threats, but a note of realism is in order in light of the scale of the 
5 

FBI’s existing mission after September 11 and the degree of strain 

on our current resources. 

Violent crime, let me discuss this for a moment, because it, quite 

obviously, is a very serious concern. And although data indicates 

violent crime continues to decline across the country, in general, 

the citizens of many communities, especially small to midsized cities, continue to be plagued by gang violence and gun crime. 

Since 2001, our gang cases have doubled and the spread of international gangs, such as MS-13, has increased. The FBI continues 

to combat this threat through more than 200 safe streets, gang violent crime and major theft task forces across the country. 

These task forces enable us to work effectively with state, local, 

tribal and international partners to provide an immediate response 

to surges in violent crime. 

And so, too, must we continue our work with state and local 

counterparts to combat crimes against children, the most vulnerable members of our communities. 

While the FBI is committed to combating child sexual exploitation, child pornography via the Internet, trafficking and child 

prostitution, or abuse on Federal lands or Indian country, more 

must be done. 

I thank the Committee for its support of increased resources to 

the bureau in this area and would be happy to continue working 

with you to ensure our Nation’s children are protected. 

We are also deeply concerned about the high levels of violence 

along the southwest border. Gang activity, drug cartel competition 

for supremacy, murders and kidnappings plague the border in both 

the United States and Mexico. 

The impact of these crimes can even extend well beyond the border into America’s communities. And we will continue our strong 

alliance with our Mexican and domestic law enforcement partners 

to address border-related crime, especially as it relates to public 

corruption, gangs, and intelligence analysis. 

Finally, we will continue our efforts to combat health care fraud, 

mindful of estimates that more than $60 billion of our Nation’s 

health care spending each year is lost to fraud. 

In 2008, FBI investigations led to nearly 700 convictions of 

health care-related crime and we will continue partnerships with 

the national health care organizations and other Federal agencies 

to address these cases as we are able. 

I also want to spend just a moment to update you on key changes 

we have made within the FBI, both in our structure and in the way 

we do business to more effectively meet the challenges presented 

since September 11. 

We know that the FBI’s best and strongest asset is our people. 

And so we have paid attention to recruiting, training, and maintaining a workforce with the skills necessary to meet the challenges of today’s mission. 

Our hiring goals include agents, intelligence analysts, IT specialists, linguists, and professional staff. And this year, we have received more than 450,000 applications and have already extended 

5,500 job offers. 

Finally, a few words regarding improvements in the FBI’s technology. Sentinel, our Web-based case management system, is on 
6 

time and on target. The bureau currently has more than 30,000 

workstations in the FBI unclassified network, providing desktop 

Internet connectivity to employees throughout the enterprise. 

BlackBerries with internet capability have been issued to 24,000 

of our employees, and we are strengthening other information technology programs to help us operate more efficiently. 

In closing, I would like to thank this Committee for your support 

to the men and the women of the FBI, and I look forward to working with the Committee on these and other challenges facing our 

country. 

Mr. Chairman, Representative Smith, Members of the Committee, I appreciate the opportunity to be here today and look forward to answering your questions. 

Thank you, sir. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Mueller follows:] 
7 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE ROBERT S. MUELLER, III 
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Mr. CONYERS. Thanks for your opening statement. 

Could I ask Lamar Smith to begin the questioning today? 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And, Director Mueller, thank you for being here today. 

My first question is this. In general, what concerns do you have 

about releasing individuals suspected of terrorism into our communities? What dangers could they pose? 

Mr. MUELLER. Well, I am quite aware of the discussions that are 

ongoing in the Department of Justice and elsewhere in the Administration as to what should be done with the detainees in Guantanamo. 

I can speak generally, without getting into those discussions, 

that the concerns we have about individuals who may support terrorism being in the United States run from concerns about providing financing to terrorists, radicalizing others with regard to violent extremism, the potential for individuals undertaking attacks 

in the United States. 

All of those are concerns relevant to an individual who comes 

into the United States, from whatever source, who may present a 

challenge. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you. 

Recently, you have said that you support reauthorization of the 

three expiring provisions of the PATRIOT Act. 

Do you foresee any need to make any changes in those three expiring provisions? 

Mr. MUELLER. No. I previously, when questioned, testified that 

the three provisions, the first one, the business records provision, 

has been exceptionally useful for us over the period of time that it 

has been on the record books and we have used it over 230 times. 

The second provision that is sunsetting relates to roving wiretaps. We have used that over 140 times. It has been exceptionally 

useful and cut down on not only paper, but also enabled us to better facilitate our investigations. 

And, lastly, the Lone Wolf provision, while we have not used it 

with regard to an indictment, it continues to be available for that 

individual whom we lack evidence to put with a particular terrorist 

group, but does present a threat as an international terrorist. 

Each of those three provisions are important to us. And while I 

don’t believe the Department of Justice has yet weighed in with its 

letter, this is what I have testified to in the past and is my current 

opinion. 

Mr. SMITH. And you don’t foresee the need to make any changes 

in any of those provisions. 

Mr. MUELLER. Not at this juncture. 

Mr. SMITH. Okay. 

Mr. MUELLER. No, sir. 

Mr. SMITH. Do you see the need to make any changes in the 

standards for issuing national security letters? 

Mr. MUELLER. No, I do not. I know, in the past, I have had discussion with Congressman Nadler in terms of the standard for the 

issuance of national security letters and as I have said before and 

believe to this day, that national security letters enable us to obtain information on the fact of a call as opposed to the content of 

a call is absolutely essential in order to building the probable cause 
34 

we need for a warrant from the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance 

Act, and we would be badly hampered if we did not have that tool 

available to us with the current standard. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you for that answer. 

The last question is this, and this goes to—and you covered it a 

little bit in your opening statement—the need to better prosecute 

and reduce the prevalence of Internet child pornography. 

I have introduced a bill, bipartisan bill, that requires the Internet service providers to retain their records for 2 years to allow the 

law enforcement authorities to be able to go after the individuals 

who buy their trade. 

Would you support that 2-year retention of those records by the 

ISPs? 

Mr. MUELLER. Well, I would be guided by, being in the Department of Justice, by the—guided by the position taken by the Attorney General and the Department of Justice. 

On the other hand, I can say that in any investigation, particularly when it comes to child pornography or even terrorism, where 

you may identify an individual who is utilizing the Internet either 

for child pornography or either recruiting or operating a terrorist 

network recruiting or operating over the Internet, it is not just that 

which you pick up on the first day of the investigation that is essential not only to the investigation, but successful prosecution, but 

those records, historical records that may be available that enable 

you to both further the investigation and undertake the prosecution. 

Mr. SMITH. So longer record retention would be helpful. 

Mr. MUELLER. Yes. 

Mr. SMITH. Isn’t the international standard 2 years for record retention or don’t many countries use that 2-year period? 

Mr. MUELLER. I haven’t looked at it in a while, but I believe, the 

last time I looked at it, it was up to 2 years. I think the European 

Union has adopted a standard of up to 2 years. 

Mr. SMITH. Two years, okay. Thank you, Director Mueller. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. CONYERS. The Chairman of the Constitution Subcommittee, 

Jerry Nadler. 

Mr. NADLER. Thank you, Mr. Director. 

I heard your answer to Mr. Smith’s question a moment ago about 

the Guantanamo detainees being released to the United States, but 

you were referring to terrorists released to be free in the United 

States, obviously, from the context of your question. 

My question is: assuming that people at Guantanamo are released into super-maximum security prisons in the United States, 

is there any problem holding them there? 

Mr. MUELLER. Well, I hesitate to get into the specifics. It depends where the person is held, what kind of security procedures 

there are. 

Mr. NADLER. I didn’t ask that. I said do we have the capacity to 

hold dangerous people in our maximum security prisons. 

Mr. MUELLER. Yes. 

Mr. NADLER. Does their presence in our maximum security prisons present any danger to the United States? 
35 

Mr. MUELLER. Again, it depends on the circumstance. If it is a 

national security, if it is Florence or something, I think it would 

be very difficult for the person to get out and very difficult for the 

person to undertake any activity. 

However, I will caveat by saying that in gang activity around the 

country, using it as an analogy, there are individuals in our prisons 

today, as I think you and others are familiar, who operate their 

gangs from inside the walls of prison. 

So while there may not be the opportunity to escape, there may 

still be the risk, as we have seen—— 

Mr. NADLER. We have a very—— 

Mr. MUELLER [continuing]. Operating. 

Mr. NADLER. We have a number of Al Qaida prisoners convicted 

and things like Ramzi Yousef and the sheikh, what is his name, 

from the 1990’s, and planned to blow up the World Trade Center, 

planned to blow up the Holland Tunnel and so forth. 

We have those people in our prisons today, do we not? 

Mr. MUELLER. Yes. 

Mr. NADLER. Have they presented any particular danger to us? 

Mr. MUELLER. If you are talking about physical danger in terms 

of being able to escape and undertake an attack, no. 

Mr. NADLER. Thank you. 

Let me turn to the subject of national security letters. Two years 

ago, the IG for the Department of Justice issued her first report on 

the FBI’s use of NSLs from 2003 to 2005. The IG made 11 recommendations for improvements. 

In the second report, last year, the IG found that a number of 

actions have not yet been taken to implement their recommendations. 

What is the current status of the FBI’s implementation of the 

recommendations from the IG’s March 2007 report? Have they all 

been fully implemented? 

Mr. MUELLER. I would have to check on each one of those. I know 

we pursued every one of them. There may be one or two which we 

have a disagreement with, but I would have to get you the report 

card on each of those recommendations. 

Certainly, as soon as we have received those reports, we have 

started implementing those recommendations and, in many cases, 

to the extent that we have information about a procedure that 

needs to be upgraded or changed, we would make the changes in 

anticipation of the report and the recommendations. 

Mr. NADLER. Thank you. 

Now, as you know, there have been recent reports that—well, actually, these were responses to questions posed to the FBI by the— 

questions posed to the FBI General Counsel Caproni in response to 

her March 2007 appearance before this Committee. 

And in her answer, provided in January, she said, ‘‘The FBI’’— 

the questions were with respect to information collected by NSLs, 

but not relevant or being no longer relevant, whether those would 

be destroyed. 

And she writes as follows, ‘‘The FBI has legitimate investigative 

reasons for retaining information properly collected during the 

course of an authorized investigation, even if the data pertains to 
36 

individuals who are ultimately determined not relevant to that investigation.’’ 

The answer concludes, ‘‘The FBI does not support a policy that 

requires the destruction of data merely because, upon initial analysis, the person to whom it relates appears irrelevant to national 

security concerns.’’ 

Is the FBI saying by this answer that all NSL-collected information is kept indefinitely, even when the subject is not relevant to 

an FBI law enforcement purpose? 

Mr. MUELLER. I think you have to put it in the context of a 

records retention policy for all investigations, whether it be a grand 

jury subpoena, whether it be records retained as a result of an 

NSL, and the records retention policy gives us guidelines in terms 

of how long we maintain those records, even though records may 

be obtained in the course of an investigation which proved to be irrelevant to the solution. 

It can occur in a national security investigation, it could occur in 

a kidnapping investigation, a public corruption investigation in 

which we obtain, either by grand jury or administrative subpoena 

or testimony, records that only are determined to be irrelevant, but 

we keep that according to our records retention policy. 

Mr. NADLER. You keep that indefinitely? 

Mr. MUELLER. You keep that, sir, and I think it is 20-25 years. 

Mr. NADLER. So you keep for 20 or 25 years—— 

Mr. MUELLER. Twenty years, yes. 

Mr. NADLER. You keep for 20 years information about innocent 

people, private information that you have collected in the course of 

an investigation in which it turns out they had nothing to do with. 

Mr. MUELLER. We may well undertake an—an allegation may 

come in as to the involvement of a person in a mortgage fraud 

scheme. We go and investigate, find that that person is innocent, 

the allegation is false, we keep those records, yes. 

We have a records retention policy, which we have had for the 

100 years of our existence, that, in some sense, requires us to keep 

the records. 

I can tell you, from the perspective of the Freedom of Information 

Act, in terms of what we have to go through, there are substantial 

records that have been maintained according to our records retention policy, even though it may relate to persons who ultimately 

are not indicted, are not convicted of a crime for which they are 

being investigated. 

Mr. NADLER. Thank you. 

Mr. CONYERS. We now turn to our first ex-attorney general from 

the State of California, Dan Lungren. 

Mr. LUNGREN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Mueller, a number of years ago, I was in Los Angeles for a 

hearing that was, at that time, chaired by Jane Harman. It was 

a meeting of the Homeland Security Committee and it was specifically to investigate the issue of prison radicalization, at least with 

respect to California prisons, and we had testimony from people 

who had had experience in New York and I believe we may have 

had testimony from Federal officials. 

This was a concern with respect to hate groups, with respect to 

terrorist groups and so forth. 
37 

Do you share that concern? 

Mr. MUELLER. Yes. If I can broaden it somewhat, we recognize 

that there is a potential for radicalization in a number of ways, 

whether it be for gang activity, for terrorist groups, for other extremists. 

With regard specifically to terrorists, in the wake of September 

11, we have now, I think, it is over 100 joint terrorism task forces 

around the country. 

Generally, we will have persons on the task force from certainly 

the Federal prison entities, but also may well have persons representing the institutions in a particular state, to keep our fingers 

on the potential for radicalization and prisons. 

Also, having been in San Francisco, I am familiar with Pelican 

Bay, for instance, and the concerns that one has in Pelican Bay, 

not only physically being within Pelican Bay, but also the operation 

of those outside of prison. 

Mr. LUNGREN. Well, that is our highest security prison and even 

there we have difficulty ensuring that those inside the prison don’t 

direct actions outside the prison. 

Mr. MUELLER. But on the Federal side, as well as the state and 

local side, there are intelligence efforts to assure that we pick up 

on individuals who may present threats. 

Mr. LUNGREN. Does the name Lynne Stewart mean anything to 

you? 

Mr. MUELLER. Yes. 

Mr. LUNGREN. And Lynne Stewart is? 

Mr. MUELLER. I believe she was involved with a radical group— 

I am having trouble—— 

Mr. LUNGREN. Well, she was a defense attorney representing the 

blind sheikh. 

Mr. MUELLER. Ah, yes, that is—— 

Mr. LUNGREN. And I believe she has been convicted of Federal 

offenses relating to being a conveyor of information from the blind 

sheikh inside the prison setting to those outside. 

Does that refresh your recollection? 

Mr. MUELLER. Yes. 

Mr. LUNGREN. You don’t have to state an opinion on that, but to 

me, that gives reality to the concerns some have about increasing 

the number of terrorists that we have on our shores, whether they 

are in prison or out of prison. 

I want to give you a hypothetical. If, hypothetically, some who 

are currently in Guantanamo were to come here to an incarceration 

facility and then, in accordance with a Federal judge’s decision that 

they be released, they would have to be released in this country, 

because the country of origin would not take them, under those circumstances, would the FBI view those individuals as suspected terrorists or people that you would have to keep an eye on while they 

are in the United States? 

Mr. MUELLER. I am not certain it is a hypothetical, but in the 

sense that—— 

Mr. LUNGREN. Well, I am, because I am not going to presuppose 

that a Federal judge would do something like that, because we 

know they have great respect for the executive branch. Under those 

circumstances. 
38 

Mr. MUELLER. I think, generally, to the extent that persons who 

have some background in either supporting, facilitating or training 

with terrorists, it would present a concern to which we would utilize—maximize our efforts to minimize and mitigate that concern, 

whether it be by surveillances or wires or other efforts to assure 

that we have minimized that concern. 

Mr. LUNGREN. I appreciate that, because I think the American 

people ought to understand that some people held at Guantanamo 

Bay are most likely not subject to criminal prosecution. We are not 

holding them for that purpose. 

We are holding them because they are combatants in the traditional definition of combatants and under the rules of war, you 

have the right to hold them until the cessation of hostilities. 

However, we have had some Federal judges who take a different 

position. Therefore, you could have the possibility of someone coming into the United States by access to the Federal courts, making 

the argument that they are not subject to criminal prosecution, a 

Federal judge saying you could not hold them indefinitely, and, 

therefore, allowing them out, and a foreign country not receiving 

them. 

And we have limitations as to how long we can keep someone 

like that incarcerated before they must go out in the public domain. 

And so while I gave you a hypothetical, I think people ought to 

realize that is a legitimate concern that we in Congress ought to 

deal with. 

And I thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

And I thank you, Mr. Director, for your time and your service. 

Mr. CONYERS. Thank you. 

The Chair of the Crime Subcommittee, Bobby Scott of Virginia. 

Mr. SCOTT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And thank you, Mr. Director, for being with us. 

You mentioned financial crimes, health care, specifically. There 

are other, of course, financial crimes, ID theft, the securities fraud. 

We have had a lot of Ponzi schemes revealed, organized retail 

theft, which are essentially financial crimes, and, of course, the 

mortgage fraud. 

We have testimony that there are only about 250 FBI agents 

with accounting backgrounds assigned to the mortgage fraud case, 

whereas approximately 1,000 were assigned to the savings and 

loan debacle a few years ago, which was only one-third the size. 

We just recently passed legislation that would give you resources 

to hire additional agents to address financial fraud. 

Can you provide us with your capacity needs in terms of accountants so that we can address these financial crimes? 

ID theft is going on now, to a large extent, because nobody 

thinks they are going to get caught. If you do the legwork, you can 

investigate and prosecute those cases, but, basically, they are 

just—the credit card company wipes it off, there is nobody complaining, and the people continue their fraudulent activities. 

Can you give us an idea of your capacity needs to address all of 

these areas of financial misdeeds? 

Mr. MUELLER. Yes, I would be happy to do that. I will say that 

we have—you are accurate in terms of those on mortgage fraud, we 
39 

have 260 agents. We have another 100-plus agents on corporate 

fraud and another 150 on securities fraud. 

But we did have, at the height of the savings and loan crisis, almost 1,000 agents addressing this. 

We would be happy to provide that material. There was, in the 

stimulus package that came from the Senate, a bill which would 

have accorded us an additional 165 special agents to address this, 

but did not last and is not part of the legislation. 

But we will be happy to provide you with a recitation of the 

needs that we feel we—or the numbers we would need in order to 

fully address the issue. 

Mr. SCOTT. We have legislation on the way to the President that 

would authorize additional funding. So hopefully we can address 

that. 

You are familiar with the Federal Prison Industries. 

Mr. MUELLER. Yes. 

Mr. SCOTT. Do you view that as a positive program that helps reduce recidivism? 

Mr. MUELLER. Yes. 

Mr. SCOTT. Thank you. 

Backlog and DNA kit. As you know, particularly in New York 

City, there are thousands of untested DNA samples, which means 

that cases are not being prosecuted and people aren’t being caught. 

Can you give us an idea of what we need to provide you in terms 

of resources to eliminate the DNA backlog? 

Mr. MUELLER. Let me address it to you and, also, Congressman 

Schiff, I know, has asked questions in the same area. 

If I recall correctly, last week, the question put by Congressman 

Schiff to the Attorney General related to the fact that we got additional moneys, $30 million. We had made an assertion that with that $30 million, we would 

have reduced our backlog from the convicted offender program by, 

I think, January 1 or December of this year. We got the $30 million, but we did not get our budget to March. 

And so the personnel that are reflected in that $30 million, along 

with the technical equipment we need, we now have and my expectation in reducing the backlog on the convicted—putting samples 

into the convicted offender program will be June 1 of next year. 

It has been 6 months because of basically the budget delay. But 

we will have, I believe, by this time next year, by then, have additional persons, but, also, technological improvements, reduce that 

backlog. 

We do have a caseload backlog. Most of that caseload backlog relates to missing persons, and I would be happy to get you additional numbers on that backlog. 

When it comes to New York or Los Angeles or other cities where 

there is a backlog of rape kits, it generally is where the police departments utilize either private laboratories, state laboratories or 

municipal laboratories, and those—unless they are a Federal case, 

we generally do not handle them. 

Mr. SCOTT. I wanted to get in one more question before time goes 

out, and that is on the issue of torture. 

Can you tell us what participation there was by FBI agents in 

enhanced interrogation techniques that everybody in the world, 
40 

other than a few people in the last Administration, viewed as torture, what participation there was by FBI agents? 

Mr. MUELLER. We followed our protocol, which does not include 

coercion of any kind. 

Mr. SCOTT. And what does that mean in terms of your participation in what was going on? 

Mr. MUELLER. We did not participate in the—except for maybe 

an isolated incident, relatively minor, one or two, we did not participate in the use of those techniques, enhanced interrogation 

techniques. 

Mr. SCOTT. Is that because you concluded that they were illegal? 

Mr. MUELLER. I would not say that it was because it was illegal. 

I would say because we felt it was necessary to follow our own protocols. We believe that our protocols work and are effective and 

given the work that we do, our protocols were appropriate to the 

work we were asked to do. 

Mr. CONYERS. The Chair recognizes Howard Coble of North Carolina, a senior Member of Judiciary. 

Mr. COBLE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman, I had to 

go to a piracy hearing. I am sorry I am late getting here. 

Mr. Director, good to have you with us. 

Mr. Director, last week, the Attorney General testified before this 

Committee and I posed a question, as did a couple of my colleagues, regarding the organized retail crime problem. 

According to the North Carolina Retail Merchants Association, 

the FBI, in conjunction with several other law enforcement agencies, successfully apprehended and charged individuals involved in 

three alleged fencing operations in western North Carolina. 

I am told that future operations may be severely affected because 

of resources or lack of resources. 

Will the FBI continue to pursue these cases and are you able to 

comment on whether the U.S. attorney intends to prosecute the individuals in these three cases? 

Mr. MUELLER. I am not in a position to say what the U.S. attorney would do. 

In terms of resources, we are—as I have indicated previously, we 

have to prioritize and the retail fraud is down on our list of priorities. 

We try to leverage our capabilities and work closely with state 

and local law enforcement. And so quite probably, if there is a need 

in a particular jurisdiction to address a particularized threat, then 

we would participate and help our state and local law enforcement 

authorities to address it. 

I am not familiar with those three cases, be happy to get back 

to you in terms of what happened in those cases and whether or 

not it is likely that we will be participating in additional such 

cases. 

Mr. COBLE. If you could, I would appreciate that, because as you 

know, it is a problem that just plagues the retail community very 

severely. 

Mr. Director, I am told that the bureau currently operates 18 regional task forces and 47 working groups to investigate mortgage 

fraud. 
41 

Can you update the Judiciary Committee on all the bureau’s efforts to combat mortgage fraud specifically, but other types of 

fraud, as well? 

Mr. MUELLER. Well, as I believe I indicated either in my written 

remarks or my opening remarks or in response to other questions, 

we have over 2,400 mortgage fraud cases, we have 260 agents that 

are addressing those; over 580 corporate fraud cases, of which over 

40 of those relate to the subprime mortgage industry, with 113 

agents; and, over 1,300 cases of securities fraud, with 158 agents. 

We have a total of almost 530 agents working in this field. Many 

of them are accountants. They are backed up by accounting technicians, intelligence analysts and professional staff. 

As you pointed out, we have a number of task forces. We have 

18 and then another 47 working groups. We have requested additional resources in the budget submissions and our hope is to improve on that. 

I will say, over a period of time, we have been very successful 

in our investigations and prosecutions. What we have to do is 

prioritize and expedite those investigations and prosecutions to 

have the maximum deterrent effect. 

We prioritize them. We want to make certain that the most culpable are prosecuted swiftly and quickly and are serving time in 

jail. 

We have reached out to the—with the anticipation of additional 

frauds as a result of the TARP program and other programs, we 

have reached out to the inspector generals to put into place recordkeeping systems that will enable us to better investigate. 

I met with the new director of the securities commission, Mary 

Schapiro, this last week to coordinate better our works with the Securities and Exchange Commission, and my expectation is, working 

together, that we will continue our successful investigations and 

prosecutions. It is a question of resources. 

Mr. COBLE. Thank you, sir. 

Mr. Director, I assume that mortgage fraud is generally regarded 

as a Federal offense, is it not? 

Mr. MUELLER. Yes. 

Mr. COBLE. I thank you, sir. I thank you for your service and 

thank you for being with us. 

Mr. MUELLER. I will say, though, that part of our approach in addressing this is it is not only a Federal offense, but often is a state 

and local offense, and we want to make certain that if, for some 

reason, we do not take on the Federal side, that state and local law 

enforcement work closely with us and take it on the state and local 

side. 

Mr. COBLE. And I repeat, thank you for your service, for being 

here. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. 

Mr. CONYERS. Mel Watt is a senior Member of the Committee, 

Chairman of the Finance Subcommittee, and a past Chairman of 

the Congressional Black Caucus. 

Mr. WATT. Thank you, Mr. Mueller. Thank you for being here. 

I want to try to get to three different areas, if I can. 

First of all, we have had, as a very practical question that I will 

set up like this, we have had a major spike in my district offices 
42 

of complaints about mail fraud and scams on seniors that essentially involve calls from out-of-state sources saying that they have 

won some lottery or ‘‘pay me X number of dollars to go and find 

this big bucket of money for you.’’ 

And local law enforcement can’t handle that, nor can state law 

enforcement handle it, because the calls are coming from out of 

state. 

I was on the phone recently with some gentleman in San Francisco professing to be a customs officer with the Federal Reserve is 

what he represented to me. 

As a member of the Financial Services Committee, I immediately 

contacted the Federal Reserve to find out whether this person existed. He didn’t exist. He was representing, in fact, to my mother 

that she had won some big pot of money. 

My practical question is under those circumstances, what is the 

best way for me to get you all engaged when we have a specific 

complaint in our district offices? 

Mr. MUELLER. It is your local FBI office. Just pass it on to the 

local FBI office. There is a complaints agent who is there during 

the day, will take the complaint and follow up. 

What you find is—what we find in these scams, and there are 

a number of them out there and it is not just a customs officer from 

the Federal Reserve, they use the FBI and they use me, amongst 

others. 

Mr. WATT. Right. 

Mr. MUELLER. And what we try to do is accumulate them, identify the persons responsible, and then pursue them federally, if it 

all possible. 

Mr. WATT. Well, I have a name and a phone number for you, and 

I will get it to my local. 

But I am telling you that because of the allocation of resources 

that you just discussed with Representative Scott and Representative Coble, the reallocation of resources to terrorism, antiterrorism, 

which is important, a lot of these things just are not getting priority and they are on the increase. 

So I hope that you all are going to aggressively seek more agents 

to do domestic kinds of situations. 

I am not suggesting that we can fall back on our efforts to protect our citizens from the homeland security and terrorism concerns that are going on around the world or in the United States, 

for that matter, but these things are real to people every day, and, 

particularly, seniors are vulnerable to those kinds entreats. 

And if you don’t pursue them, they just proliferate and get bigger 

and bigger, and some big case needs to put some of these people 

in jail so that there will be a deterrent effect. 

Let me go on to the second issue, which is—I wasn’t going to ask 

about this, but Jerry Nadler asked you about record retention policies and it sounded to me like you are following a 100-year-old 

record retention policy that may or may not be justified. 

How aggressively have you, as the FBI director, looked at the rationale of this 100-year-old policy that you are following and evaluated whether it makes sense to keep records on people for 25 years 

who are not engaged in anything? 
43 

That increases the demands that you have to meet under the 

Freedom of Information Act. If you don’t have the files or you have 

gotten rid of them, no records there to be providing. 

How aggressively have you looked at this policy and reevaluated 

it? 

Mr. MUELLER. I have not looked at it hard. I am not sure it is 

100 years old. It is certainly many years old. 

Mr. WATT. Well, that is what you testified. That was your testimony. It wasn’t my testimony. 

Mr. MUELLER. I am walking back from maybe 100 years. It has 

been there, I believe, on the books for a long time and it may well 

be, and I would have to look at it, a combination of the rules for 

records retention that have been set by the government and archives, as well as our own internal rules. 

But I will go back and look at it, and we will get back to you 

on that particular issue. 

Mr. WATT. Thank you. 

I wanted to ask about some discrimination issues, but my time 

has expired. 

I want you all to take care of my mother, first of all. So I will 

talk to your local people about that. 

Mr. MUELLER. Well, you can give us the number, if it is your 

mother. 

Mr. WATT. That is my number one constituent. 

Mr. MUELLER. Go talk to the local person. 

Mr. WATT. I don’t get but one of those. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Secretary. 

Mr. CONYERS. The Chair recognizes Darrell Issa, who is, in addition to Judiciary Committee, the number two man on the Government Reform Committee, as well as an active participant on the Intelligence Committee. 

Mr. ISSA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. You can revise and extend, 

if you would like. 

I think I will quite while I am ahead there. 

Director Mueller, I have got a couple of questions, some of which 

go to your predecessor, some are yours. 

But the FBI is present at Gitmo, correct? 

Mr. MUELLER. Yes. 

Mr. ISSA. And has been the entire time. 

Mr. MUELLER. We have had agents rotating through, yes, for almost the entire time. 

Mr. ISSA. And the FBI has presence virtually every place we 

have an embassy in the world, correct? 

Mr. MUELLER. We have over 60 legal attache offices around the 

world. 

Mr. ISSA. Okay. Well, maybe not virtually, but all the places I 

hate to go to. 

The Administration made a determination to do this enhanced 

interrogation technique or now is commonly one of—one of the 

techniques being waterboarding. 

When were you first made aware of it and when was the FBI 

first made aware of it overall? 

Mr. MUELLER. I believe I first became aware of the use of enhanced interrogation techniques sometime in the summer of 2002 
44 

with an agent who was involved in an interrogation overseas who 

indicated that additional techniques beyond what we traditionally 

do would be used. 

We determined that it was not appropriate for him to continue 

in the conduct of that particular interrogation. 

Mr. ISSA. Was that agent, in 2002 or at the time that you became 

aware of it in 2002, was he present for that interrogation that included waterboarding or other enhanced interrogation? 

Mr. MUELLER. And I do not believe that I became aware of 

waterboarding, as such, until several years later, and I don’t believe—well, I don’t—I can’t say really what that agent knew, but 

certainly those were not the enhanced techniques that we, at that 

time, anticipated were going to be used and triggered the withdrawal of him from that particular interrogation. 

Mr. ISSA. Okay. Earlier, you mentioned that once or twice. Was 

that one of the once or twice that your organization was involved 

in techniques that would qualify as enhanced interrogation? 

Mr. MUELLER. No. 

Mr. ISSA. What were the once or twice? 

Mr. MUELLER. Can you excuse me just 1 second? 

Mr. ISSA. Certainly. 

Mr. MUELLER. The inspector general did a report and what I am 

trying to do is recall from the inspector general’s report a couple 

of instances where he said that, I think, a prisoner’s hands were 

handcuffed behind him and he was given water in a dribble. 

It was treatment that is not a treatment that we ordinarily 

would use, but it is certainly not in the category of the enhanced 

interrogation techniques that we have been talking about. 

I just wanted to be clear that the IG, in his report, had pointed 

out two instances where we could have done a better job. 

Mr. ISSA. Okay. Has the FBI ever given people large amounts of 

water and then told them to wait to go to the bathroom, that it 

wasn’t available right now? 

Mr. MUELLER. Not to my knowledge. 

Mr. ISSA. Left lights on deliberately to deny people sleep or rest? 

Mr. MUELLER. I can’t say for sure, but I have no knowledge of 

such treatment. That would go against our protocol. 

Mr. ISSA. Okay. So each and every one of those techniques that 

has now become public for enhanced interrogation would be inconsistent with what the FBI would ever allow to be done. 

Mr. MUELLER. Yes. 

Mr. ISSA. The next one is a little more serious. The speaker of 

the House has alleged that the CIA outright lied to her. 

Is lying to Congress a crime? 

Mr. MUELLER. Yes. 

Mr. ISSA. Are you investigating that allegation by the speaker of 

the House? 

Mr. MUELLER. No. 

Mr. ISSA. Why not? 

Mr. MUELLER. The process that is followed generally is that we 

have a referral—not we—the Justice Department obtains a referral 

from Congress. 
45 

The Justice Department makes a determination as to whether or 

not the referral warrants further investigation, and then we are 

called upon to conduct that investigation. 

Mr. ISSA. I am a Member of Congress. If CIA is lying to any of 

us, and I have been briefed many times by them on the Intelligence 

Committee, it puts me in a position of not being able to do my job 

properly. 

Would you say I have standing to ask you to investigate whether 

the CIA has lied to any or all of us? 

Mr. MUELLER. I am not familiar with the intricacies of the referral process that has been established in such circumstances. 

I know that generally it is triggered by a referral from Congress 

to the Justice Department and then we do the—may well be—others can be asked, but generally we are asked to do the investigation. 

Mr. ISSA. Well, then, with my remaining time, I would assert 

that I believe I should have standing, that I am in doubt as to 

whether or not, unresolved, I can believe in the briefings that I am 

receiving from the IT community, and would ask you to investigate 

it and ask you to respond as to whether you believe that my standing and my asking you to do it represents a proper referral or one 

that at least you can follow up on. 

Mr. MUELLER. We will take what you have indicated, sir, and 

pass it to the Department of Justice and then follow the directives 

of the department. 

Mr. ISSA. I will look forward to your response. Thank you. 

Mr. MUELLER. Thank you, sir. 

Mr. ISSA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. CONYERS. The Chair of the Committee on Immigration, from 

California, Zoe Lofgren. 

Ms. LOFGREN. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

It is good to see you, Director Mueller, and thank you for your 

testimony today. 

It is good news that you have continued your march forward with 

technology, but the march forward with technology also raises 

questions. And I wanted to briefly touch on the investigative data 

warehouse data mining issue that both the IG and the Electronic 

Frontier Foundation have recently discussed. 

It is my understanding that there are just shy of a billion individually identifiable pieces of information in the data warehouse, 

which, by way of comparison, I think the Library of Congress has 

about 138 million pieces in its collection. 

So it is a massive amount of data. And there may have been litigation on this. You can tell me if that is correct. But I believe that 

the FBI would be required to publish a systems of record notice 

and a privacy impact assessment related to this data warehouse, 

and that that has not been done. 

Can you tell me anything about the privacy notices and whether 

those are planned or if they haven’t been planned, why not? 

Mr. MUELLER. We try to be very careful, in terms of whenever 

we put a new system online or contemplate it, assuring that we go 

through all the steps with notification. 

If you are talking about the investigative data warehouse, it 

is—— 
46 

Ms. LOFGREN. I am. 

Mr. MUELLER [continuing]. It is a compendium of our case files, 

which has grown up since September 11 in a different format, a 

different—different servers, we have different software, and different type of relational databases. That enables us to search it 

better than the old VCS. 

I will have to check in terms of privacy notices on the data, investigative data warehouse. It has been online for a number of 

years, but it is our case file system. 

Ms. LOFGREN. Well, doesn’t it have 58 different sources of data, 

including—— 

Mr. MUELLER. It may well. 

Ms. LOFGREN [continuing]. US-VISIT and a variety—— 

Mr. MUELLER. Well, I am not certain which dataset you are talking about. The investigative data warehouse, I am thinking one 

thing. It may be that you are thinking about the records that are 

obtained by the foreign terrorist tracking task force, which looks at 

individuals coming into the country and utilizes other private companies that already have data to locate persons within the United 

States, which is different than the investigative data warehouse, 

which is where we house most of our data. 

I would have to get back to you in response to those specific 

questions, to make sure I know which database you are talking 

about. 

Ms. LOFGREN. Yes, it is the investigative data warehouse. And it 

is my understanding that it includes 58 sources, including SEVIS 

and US-VISIT and the no fly list, and a whole variety of other 

items. 

And if you want to get back to me, that is absolutely fair. But 

could I look to a particular time by which you will get back? 

Mr. MUELLER. Two weeks. 

Ms. LOFGREN. I would appreciate that very much. 

Let me move on to another subject, which is the whole—and you 

mentioned it briefly in your opening statement—the situation of 

concern at the border. 

Two years ago, I and a bipartisan group of Members went to 

Mexico City and we met with the Mexican attorney general and 

some of their law enforcement people, and they expressed extreme 

concern over what the United States was not doing in terms of the 

flow of guns from the United States to Mexico, as well as a less 

than aggressive effort, they felt, to track money laundering in the 

United States. 

I think that there has been recent attention, we are ramping up 

our efforts. But can you tell me—I don’t want you to jeopardize an 

investigation—but how many ongoing investigations do we have 

now into both the gun running issue, as well as the drug money 

laundering issue? 

Mr. MUELLER. Well, the guns flowing from North America to 

South America—— 

Ms. LOFGREN. Correct. 

Mr. MUELLER [continuing]. From the United States into Mexico 

is generally in the purview of ATF. And as you say, they have 

ramped up. We are going to get additional ATF agents to do that. 

Ms. LOFGREN. I thought there were joint task forces underway. 
47 

Mr. MUELLER. We do and we participate in task forces along the 

border and whenever there are guns involved, we bring in ATF, because they not only have the expertise, but the databases that we 

all use. 

We also, though, from our perspective, have increased personnel 

addressed to cross-border kidnappings, individuals in the United 

States who travel to Mexico, they may have family, they may have 

businesses down there, are kidnapped and the victims’ families are 

in the United States. We have ramped it up in places like San 

Diego and El Paso. 

Ms. LOFGREN. And Phoenix, I assume. 

Mr. MUELLER. Pardon? 

Ms. LOFGREN. Phoenix, as well? 

Mr. MUELLER. And Phoenix, yes, but the phenomenon there is a 

little bit different than in San Diego and El Paso. Phoenix is—they 

have a very high rate of home invasions and the like and, yes, we 

work on task forces there. 

The other step that we have taken is to combine our intelligence 

capabilities along the border along with EPIC. So that our field offices, our legal attache office in Mexico has access to the information relating to border crime immediately as opposed to coming 

back through headquarters and is linked up with EPIC, the El 

Paso Intelligence Center, to give us a much more effective view of 

what is happening along the border. 

Ms. LOFGREN. My time has expired, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you, Director. 

Mr. CONYERS. The gentleman from Iowa, Steve King, Ranking 

Member on Immigration. 

Mr. KING. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate being recognized. 

And, Director, I appreciate your testimony and I think it reflects 

the long service to this country and the significant depth of knowledge that has been built upon that experience. 

And I would—based upon that, I would ask you if you are familiar with 18 USC 47, 1001, which reads, in part, ‘‘Whoever, in any 

matter, knowingly and willfully falsifies, conceals or covers up, by 

any trick, scheme or device, a material fact, whoever makes any 

material false, fictitious or fraudulent statement or representation 

shall be imprisoned not more than 8 years.’’ That is in part. 

Do you at least have some basis of knowledge that would reflect 

that section of the—— 

Mr. MUELLER. I am familiar with 1001, yes. 

Mr. KING. And I reiterate this, because would you—would you 

view that to be at last a statute that you would review if you were 

to respond affirmatively to Mr. Issa’s request? 

Mr. MUELLER. I believe the prosecutor is looking at this. Department of Justice attorneys would look at 1001, absolutely, as a possible statute to be applied. 

Mr. KING. And with your long and deep experience, and we have, 

I think, about 15 members of the intelligence community, their 

sense of integrity in their office, when their integrity is challenged, 

can you tell us what happens to the morale if that should continue, 

if their integrity is challenged? 
48 

Mr. MUELLER. Well, I understand the import of the question and, 

generally, I will speak very generally, of course, in any institution 

in which there has been a challenge to the effectiveness, efficiency, 

integrity of the department, it does affect morale. 

Mr. KING. And if someone challenges the integrity of your agency 

or any other, is it likely that there would be people within your 

agency that would volunteer to do a briefing to that person? 

Mr. MUELLER. Well, all I know, part of my responsibility is to 

represent my agency fully and appropriately, I admit mistakes 

when the mistakes happen and move forward, and to also speak 

out when you think that your detractors are off base. 

Mr. KING. And should there be a reluctance to provide that briefing to whichever individuals would have security clearance, could 

that potentially impact negatively on our national security due to 

that lack of information and perhaps lack of appropriations and 

perhaps policy changes that might flow from that relationship that 

could be interrupted or distrusted because of the allegations? 

Mr. MUELLER. I am sorry, sir. I am not familiar with the predicate of the question in terms of briefing. 

Mr. KING. I am seeking to ask the question hypothetically, and 

so it maybe sounds a little vague and I will try to keep it hypothetical, Director, for the benefit of everyone in this room. 

But when that relationship of trust is severed, then the working 

relationship would, I think, certainly be damaged. And are you concerned that it could affect our national security? 

Mr. MUELLER. I can’t answer that hypothetical, sir. 

Mr. KING. I understand, Director, and I think that you do understand my question. 

Let me move—let me, first, join Mr. Issa in his request, if two 

are better than one. I would ask you to look into the basis that you 

have responded to Mr. Issa and I won’t ask you to respond to that 

question again to me. 

But I would like to take this down to Gitmo and ask you instead, 

of the techniques that have been used to interrogate the Gitmo detainees, are you aware that there were any techniques used there 

that were more severe than we have used in training of our own 

special forces? 

Mr. MUELLER. I don’t think I have sufficient knowledge to answer the question, sir. 

Mr. KING. Well, do you have any indication otherwise? 

Mr. MUELLER. I don’t have sufficient knowledge to answer the 

question. 

Mr. KING. Do you have any indication that the PATRIOT Act has 

violated anyone’s civil rights—been utilized to violate someone’s 

civil rights? 

Mr. MUELLER. I don’t believe so, but I must also say that without—and put in context—that when it comes to NSLs, in particular, NSLs, they were issued improperly. 

Now, I don’t want to parse words in terms of—but I don’t want 

you to think that that is not a concern of ours, was not a concern 

of ours, and I do believe it was remedied, but that was a concern, 

because it does affect civil liberties, it does affect the privacy interests of individuals. 
49 

Mr. KING. Was there anything done at Gitmo that would be 

criminal if it was done in the United States? 

Mr. MUELLER. I can’t answer that question, sir. 

Mr. KING. I thank you, Director. 

And I yield back the balance of my time. 

Ms. LOFGREN. [Presiding.] The gentleman yields back. 

I would recognize now the gentleman from Massachusetts, Mr. 

Delahunt. 

Mr. DELAHUNT. Yes, thank you. 

Welcome, Mr. Director. 

Recently, there has been considerable discussion about Guantanamo and a group of detainees that are Uighurs, Chinese Muslims. 

And there has been the use of the term ‘‘terrorist’’ as it relates to 

these Uighurs. 

And I have a concern that that is an unfair label and some have 

indicated that that label came about as a result of communist Chinese intelligence, which, I would submit, is extremely suspect given 

the history of suppression by the Chinese Communist government 

as it relates to that particular minority. 

There was a report issued in May of 2008 by the Department of 

Justice inspector general, and I am going to read an excerpt to you 

and ask you to respond. 

‘‘Another FBI agent,’’ and, again, I am reading from the IG report, ‘‘Another FBI agent stated in his survey response that several 

Uighur detainees were subjected to sleep deprivation or disruption 

while being interrogated at Camp X-Ray by Chinese officials prior 

to April 2002. 

Chinese officials visited Guantanamo and were granted access to 

these detainees for interrogation purposes. The agent stated that 

he understood that the treatment of the Uighur detainees was either carried out by Chinese interrogators or was carried out by 

U.S. military personnel at the behest of the Chinese interrogators.’’ 

Are you familiar with the report of Mr. Fine and are you familiar 

with this report emanating from an FBI agent? 

Mr. MUELLER. Now that you read the excerpt, Congressman, I 

think it was from the report that the inspector general did on the 

FBI’s interrogation or interviewing techniques. 

And I would check one thing, if I might. 

Mr. DELAHUNT. Please. 

Mr. MUELLER. It is a report, I believe, that was done on our 

interviewing/interrogation techniques. I am not familiar with the 

incident other than what is in the IG report. 

Mr. DELAHUNT. The IG report is, obviously, based on a report by 

an FBI special agent. 

Mr. MUELLER. Apparently. 

Mr. DELAHUNT. And you would not contradict that report. 

Mr. MUELLER. I have no knowledge of the incident, so I cannot 

contradict the report. 

Mr. DELAHUNT. Okay, but it is in the report and it is a statement 

by one of your agents that Chinese Communist intelligence agents 

were allowed to interview Guantanamo detainees. That is their 

statement according to the IG report, as you understand it. 
50 

Mr. MUELLER. In the IG report, the investigators for the IG must 

have talked to an agent and that is what they wrote down with regard to what the agent told them. 

Mr. DELAHUNT. Mr. Director, myself and several other Members 

of Congress would prefer to have some briefing done by the FBI regarding this particular issue, and I know I would like to have an 

opportunity to interview the FBI agent that actually wrote this report and would make that request to you, so that we can actually 

make a determination as to the status of the Uighur, because there 

was another report that was done by another FBI agent, and I 

want to read it into the record, if the Chair will indulge me for another minute. 

I am reading, again, reading from that report, ‘‘The Uighurs are 

moderate Muslims who occupy east Turkistan, which was taken 

over by the Chinese. The Uighurs would often land in Afghanistan 

in order to gather personnel opposing Chinese suppression. 

They were often inspired by Radio Free Asia. The Uighurs considered themselves to be fighting for democracy and they idolized 

the United States. Although the Uighurs are Muslim, their agenda 

did not appear to include Islamic radicalism. 

They claim to have no political connection to Islamic terrorists or 

the Taliban. However, their camp in Afghanistan was bombed and 

they fled to Pakistan. The Uighurs were captured by the Pakistanis, with half being transferred to the U.S. and half being remanded directly to the Chinese. 

It was alleged that the Uighurs who were transferred directly to 

the Chinese were immediately executed. The Uighur detainees at 

Guantanamo were convinced that they would be immediately executed if they were returned to China.’’ 

And I would also note that it is a matter of public knowledge 

that they were captured not by American soldiers. In fact, they 

were apprehended by Pakistanis, who, in turn, received a $5,000 

bounty for each of these Uighurs that were turned over to the 

Americans and, presumably, to the Red Chinese, who allegedly executed them upon their release. 

I suggest this is a very, very important issue, because questions 

are being raised, statements are being made, and I dare say we 

don’t really know the truth yet. 

And I think before we find ourselves in an embarrassing situation, and I am, again, referring to Members of Congress, that we 

ought to have a thorough review, and I think the FBI, your credibility, and, again, I think the excellent record of the FBI in terms 

of Guantanamo ought to lead this investigation and provide information. 

Ms. LOFGREN. The gentleman’s time has expired. 

I would turn now to Mr. Franks. 

Mr. FRANKS. Well, thank you, Madam Chair. 

And thank you, Director Mueller. 

I would say to you, sir, that the way you have comported yourself 

with the hearing this morning affirms the conclusion that many of 

us have held in the past that you have personified public service 

and your patriotism and your professionalism, and I appreciate you 

being here. 

Mr. MUELLER. Thank you, sir. 
51 

Mr. FRANKS. Attorney General Holder was here before our Committee last week and, in my judgment, he seemed to have a difficult time articulating what a terrorist really is, and that concerns 

me, since he is the lead law enforcement official in the country, 

charged with protecting us from terrorists. 

And I was struck to find out that someone in the Obama administration, however, seems to have no difficulty in articulating what 

a terrorist is, and that is the director of Homeland Security, secretary of homeland security, Janet Napolitano, the former governor 

of my state. 

Ms. Napolitano was the subject of controversy after the Department of Homeland Security threat assessment report, entitled 

‘‘Right Wing Extremism,’’ was made public in April of 2009. 

Now, the report indicated several factors, including the election 

of the first mixed President in the person of Barack Obama, perceived further gun control measures, illegal immigration, the economic downturn beginning in 2008, disgruntled military veterans’ 

possible vulnerability to recruitment efforts by extremist groups, as 

risk factors for right-wing extremism. 

Then it kind of went on to explain and define right-wing extremism in roughly general terms, like opposing restriction on firearms or opposing lax immigration, opposing the policies of the 

Obama administration the expansion of social programs, opposing 

continuation of free trade agreements, paranoia of foreign regimes, 

fear of communist regimes, fear of one-will governments, and bemoaning the decline of U.S. stature in the world. 

Now, Mr. Director, not to be tongue-in-cheek here too much, but 

that includes about 70 percent of my district and I am concerned, 

since this report was directed to law enforcement agencies, which 

I presume means the FBI, as well, I am concerned how the FBI 

might interpret this report. 

I mean, should my district be concerned at this point, being the 

subjects of concern on the part of the FBI as potential right-wing 

extremists? 

Mr. MUELLER. I don’t believe so at all. We open investigations 

where we have allegations that a person may be involved in violent 

extremist or illegal activity. 

That covers a number of various groups of individuals, but the 

predicate is illegal activity and, generally, it is violent extremism, 

and I don’t believe the intent of the report was to paint with such 

a broad brush. 

But I do not believe that the question is should persons be concerned about our undertaking investigations against individuals 

who are exercising, rightfully so, their first amendment privilege or 

rights under the Constitution. I do not believe so. 

We take that exceptionally seriously. When it looks like one of 

our investigative actions will implicate the first amendment, we 

have a series of reviews that have to be done to assure that the 

actions taken are appropriate to the circumstances, and I believe 

that was the intent of the piece from the Department of Homeland 

Security. 

Certainly, it is our intent in each of our investigations to assure 

that we don’t trespass on the first amendment right without the 

appropriate, adequate predication. 
52 

Mr. FRANKS. Thank you, sir. 

Let me shift gears then. We had testimony before this Committee 

regarding our terrorist surveillance program that people within the 

United States boundaries don’t really need to be fearful of surveillance. 

One of the parts of the testimony was that even if Osama Bin 

Laden was in a downtown hotel making calls, that we couldn’t— 

and we knew it was him, but we couldn’t monitor his calls without 

a warrant. 

And I think because he is here in—if he was here in the United 

States, I think that makes sense, to me. I think that comforts me 

a great deal. 

I guess my question to you, sir, is under the new Administration, 

has the practice or the policy related to terrorist surveillance 

changed to any appreciable degree and are you concerned that citizens either in the previous Administration or this Administration 

need to be concerned about their private phones being tapped here 

in this country? 

Mr. MUELLER. No. As all are well aware, the FISA statute was 

amended a year or so ago and it answered a number of the issues 

we have, particularly with regard to the interception of conversations by individuals overseas talking to other persons overseas who 

are not American citizens. And it addressed, I believe, a difficult 

issue and resolved that. 

I have seen no change in terms of the approach to the FISA statute, any difference in this Administration than I saw in the past 

Administration. 

Mr. FRANKS. Well, thank you for your service, sir. Thank you 

very much. 

Thank you, Madam Chair. 

Ms. LOFGREN. The gentleman yields back. 

I would recognize Mr. Cohen at this time. 

Mr. COHEN. Thank you, Madam Chair. 

Director, you have done, I think a marvelous job and you have 

a great reputation on the Hill, but your activities are so abundant, 

your areas of investigation, from counterterrorism, which you kept 

concentrating on, and counterintelligence to the traditional FBI 

days of criminal activities. 

Do you think that the FBI has grown so much that maybe it 

needs to have two different bureaus, one for homeland security and 

counterterrorism and counterintelligence and all these areas, our 

borders, and another for the criminal section? 

Mr. MUELLER. For approximately 2 to 3 years now, we have had 

essentially a criminal branch and a national security branch. The 

national security branch is counterterrorism and counterintelligence, and the directorate of intelligence. 

In the criminal branch, we have the criminal division, we have 

the cyber division. And I am probably missing one or two, but there 

has been that development of two branches, we call branches, not 

the bureau, as you say, for the focus on national security, on the 

one side, and the criminal programs on the other side. 

Mr. COHEN. You don’t believe that it would be beneficial possibly 

to have two different distinct offices. You think that them coming 

under one umbrella is the most efficient way to operate. 
53 

Mr. MUELLER. Absolutely, and, increasingly, in this globalized 

world, terrorism cuts across—money laundering cuts across cyber 

issues. Terrorists are funded through narcotics trafficking in Colombia and Afghanistan. 

Mr. COHEN. Let me ask you about narcotics trafficking, and I 

think I asked you about this last year. 

The war on drugs has gone on since, I think, President Nixon 

coined the term maybe and maybe since Harry Anslinger, and we 

haven’t become more successful. I mean, if it goes back to 

Anslinger, it is like 80 years and we are zero and 79 and winning. 

Do you feel we are any closer to winning the war on drugs, based 

on all of the problems with Mexico and the cartels and the fights 

over our border and the drugs being imported from Mexico, than 

we were last year? 

Mr. MUELLER. Well, whether you call it a war on drugs or some 

other term, I mean, I firmly believe that we need to do what we 

should to stem drug trafficking into the United States and drug 

usage in the United States, and I do believe there have been some 

successes, particularly when it comes to the use of drugs by children in high school or college and the like. 

There are others, ONDCP and others who are much more familiar with that than I am. 

Mr. COHEN. When you say some successes, do you have any statistics to show? Statistics actually say that more people are using, 

say, marijuana than have, because the public has a feeling about 

use of certain drugs that maybe the FBI doesn’t. 

Is there a better way that some people suggest of looking into a 

system of legalization that might be effective in stemming the tide 

of drugs from Mexico and in the border wars and the immigration 

problems from Mexico? Have you considered this as a possibility? 

Mr. MUELLER. I think anybody who looks at this problem considers it and, ultimately, when you look at it, rejects it. 

I tend to think that the use of particular drugs goes in waves. 

You will have marijuana for a period of time, then you will have 

heroin, then you will have cocaine, then you have crack cocaine, 

then you will have methamphetamine, and then you will have 

Oxycontin, and it goes in waves. 

And too many people—— 

Mr. COHEN. Let me ask you about—— 

Mr. MUELLER. I am sorry. There are too many individuals, both 

parents and others, who have lost their lives to drugs, to give a 

ready answer that it should be legalized. 

Mr. COHEN. I agree with you, sir, and there are lots of parents 

who have lost their lives to crack cocaine, methamphetamine, heroin, and they have somewhat gone in waves. 

Name me a couple of parents who have lost their lives to marijuana. 

Mr. MUELLER. Can’t. 

Mr. COHEN. Exactly, you can’t, because that hasn’t happened. 

There hasn’t been a wave, because that has been a constant thing 

in America since Harry Anslinger, because African-Americans used 

it and saw it as something that was crippling and gave it to the 

Latin Americans and put an ethnic tone to it. 
54 

When have we—don’t we—is there sometime we are going to see 

that we ought to prioritize meth, crack, cocaine and heroin, and 

deal with the drugs that the American culture is really being affected by and lives are being lost? 

Mr. MUELLER. The only thing I would say is that you talk to parents who have lost their children to drugs—— 

Mr. COHEN. Right. 

Mr. MUELLER [continuing]. And they will inevitably say that they 

started off with marijuana. 

Mr. COHEN. The probably started off with milk and then went to 

beer, and then they went to bourbon, and then they might have 

gone to marijuana. 

The gateway theory doesn’t work. It is a reality. Obviously, we 

are not going to agree there. 

Let me ask you about this. In Memphis, we have got a real serious problem with the rape crisis program. We used to have a national honored, awarded rape crisis program. It has come to light that as much as $500,000 which has been 

given to our local city of Memphis government for rape crisis reimbursements for kits and for examinations is not being reported in 

their budget. 

And I know the Federal Government pays for the treatment of 

the victims and the kits are provided through our state government, I think, through the Fed. 

What area in the FBI would look into the misuse of Federal 

funds, if there is misuse, in local governments and using moneys 

for rape victims and look into the use of our Federal funds and appropriating those to see if they have been used for the proper purposes? 

Mr. MUELLER. I think, initially, it would be up to the state and 

local law enforcement, whether it be the police departments or district attorneys to look at it. 

But we also might be involved in terms of public corruption, 

fraud and the like, depending on the seriousness of the issue. 

Mr. COHEN. Madam Chair, if I could just close. 

Would you maybe look into it with your local office in Memphis 

to see if there has been an abuse of Federal funds? And if there 

is, that is a serious wrong in these days when we use money 

for—— 

Ms. LOFGREN. The gentleman’s time has expired. 

Mr. COHEN. Thank you, Madam Chair. 

Ms. LOFGREN. Mr. Gohmert, the gentleman from Texas, is recognized for 5 minutes. 

Mr. GOHMERT. Thank you, Madam Chair. 

And, Director, it is good to see you again. 

Mr. MUELLER. And you, sir. 

Mr. GOHMERT. I am going to change gears from the milk to beer 

line of questioning. 

In the Ted Stevens case, is there any information that any FBI 

agents were aware of the withholding of exculpatory evidence that 

the judge got upset about? 

Mr. MUELLER. I think it has been made public that there was 

one agent who brought to the attention of others actions which he 

was concerned of. But because the case is in litigation—not in liti-
55 

gation, but under investigation, let me just put it that way, in 

terms of what occurred in the course of that case, under investigation by, I believe, OPR and Department of Justice, I am really constrained from saying much more about it. 

Mr. GOHMERT. Was it FBI agents who recorded conversations between Rick Renzi and his attorney that were apparently pretty 

clear they were attorney-client privileged conversations? 

Mr. MUELLER. I think I would have to disagree with you in terms 

of the context of conversations, and, again, that case is—— 

Mr. GOHMERT. But they were between an attorney and a client, 

correct? 

Mr. MUELLER. I am not certain what conversations you are talking about and because it is in litigation, I really am precluded from 

talking about. 

Mr. GOHMERT. With regard to the widely reported wiretap of conversations between Jane Harman of this congressional body and 

two Israelis, was that based—were those wiretaps based on a warrant or were they based on warrantless wiretaps out of the PATRIOT Act? 

Mr. MUELLER. I cannot speak to a particular case, but I can tell 

you that we do not intercept the content of conversations without 

a warrant from a Federal judge, whether it be from the—— 

Mr. GOHMERT. But we covered this now when we talked about 

the PATRIOT Act. And some of us were very defensive of the provision that would allow the wiretapping of suspected foreign terrorists who were calling from a foreign country, and that there would 

be times that, because they are being wiretapped in a foreign country, when they may call in to the United States, and the wiretap 

would pick up a conversation with someone in the United States. 

And testimony we have heard before indicated, though, that once 

it was realized it was someone in the United States and it was 

warrantless, based on the PATRIOT Act, then that would be minimized and no further wiretaps regarding that individual would be 

had within the United States without first getting a warrant. 

That is why I am asking the question. Could that have been— 

were the Israelis actually outside the country, which would authorize, under the PATRIOT Act, those warrantless wiretaps? 

Mr. MUELLER. I can’t get into the details of any national security 

investigations we—— 

Mr. GOHMERT. Well, somebody has gotten into them, because it 

is out in the public that Jane Harman was wiretapped. And that 

is why I am trying to figure out is this consistent with what we 

were told here in this Committee would be done with the PATRIOT 

Act or were these wiretaps within the country? 

Somebody is getting that information out. Otherwise, I wouldn’t 

know about it, other than reading the paper. 

Mr. MUELLER. All I can tell you is that interceptions by the FBI 

in the United States of individuals in the United States are conducted either under Title 3, in the case of a criminal matter, or 

under—— 

Mr. GOHMERT. But you don’t know what happened in the case of 

Jane Harman, correct? 

Mr. MUELLER. Pardon? 
56 

Mr. GOHMERT. You don’t know what happened in the case of 

Jane Harman. 

Mr. MUELLER. I am not going to say that. I am going to tell you 

I cannot talk to you about ongoing or past national security investigations. 

Mr. GOHMERT. So you think Jane Harman is a suspect? 

Mr. MUELLER. No, I am not saying that. I am telling you that 

I cannot discuss the details of the case. 

Mr. GOHMERT. Well, since I was one of those who—— 

Mr. MUELLER. And let me just say that that does not assume 

there is a case. I am saying that I cannot discuss the matter which 

you are seeking to get answers. 

Mr. GOHMERT. I was one of those who defended the provision 

that would allow warrantless wiretaps of foreign agents in foreign 

countries and who may inadvertently pick something up coming in 

this country. I want to make sure that that is not being violated. 

And I know you are concerned about past improprieties not being 

repeated and this was certainly before your watch, but in the vein 

of trying to prevent future illegal disclosures of FBI file contents, 

do you know how it was that 1,000 FBI files, approximately, came 

into the possession of the Clinton White House and what steps may 

have been done to prevent that illegality from happening again? 

I know Chuck Colson went to prison for having one in the White 

House. Do you know how that occurred? 

Mr. MUELLER. I am not familiar with that. 

Mr. GOHMERT. Does it concern you that 1,000 FBI files could 

make their way into the White House to be reviewed there? 

Mr. MUELLER. Well, I can tell you that during the time I have 

been at the bureau, we, both between—well, the bureau, but, also, 

with the Department of Justice, assure that we follow the appropriate procedures for keeping the privacy of our files. 

Mr. GOHMERT. Madam Chair, could I ask for a written response 

for one quick question? 

Ms. LOFGREN. Certainly. 

Mr. GOHMERT. Thank you. 

Director, there is information about 15 percent of terrorism 

cases, this is an IG report, the FBI failed to nominate subjects to 

a watch list. In 8 percent of closed terrorism cases, they failed to 

remove subjects from the watch list, and that the FBI removed a 

subject untimely from the watch list, 72 percent of the time it was 

untimely. 

Could you give us a report on what is being done to try to make 

that more effective? 

As somebody who has prior service members who still find themselves on the watch list inappropriately—— 

Ms. LOFGREN. I think that is a request for a written answer. 

Mr. GOHMERT. Yes, that is correct. 

Mr. MUELLER. Let me just respond. There were 16 recommendations made in that IG report and we are pursuing each one of those 

recommendations, and many of them have already been put into 

place. 

Mr. GOHMERT. Okay. If we could find that out, that would be 

great. 

Mr. MUELLER. I would be happy to get back to you on that. 
57 

Mr. GOHMERT. Thank you, Director. 

Ms. LOFGREN. The gentleman yields back. 

The gentleman from Illinois, Mr. Quigley, is recognized for 5 

minutes. 

Mr. QUIGLEY. Thank you, Madam Chairman. 

I guess good afternoon now, Director. 

Sir, if you could respond to the reports that have been listed 

here, as well, about members of the FBI and ATF not always getting along, I guess is the best way to describe it, reportedly, at 

crime scenes where FBI and ATF agents threaten to arrest each 

other or a battle over jurisdiction and key evidence. 

Mr. MUELLER. I think that was a problem, it was much more of 

a problem several years ago. I think we have done much to resolve 

those issues. 

There is overlapping jurisdiction in some areas, but I think we 

have done much to remove those barriers between the two agencies. 

When I travel around, one of the first questions I ask in an office 

is, ‘‘How are you getting along with DEA? How are you getting 

along with ATF?’’ The fact of the matter is 99 percent of the times 

in the field, the answer is, ‘‘We get along fine.’’ 

There are some cases where we will have somebody who has a 

long memory about some slight from ATF or somebody in ATF has 

a long memory about some slight from the FBI, but I do think it 

is more personality driven in isolated instances as opposed to what 

I think, some years ago, was an institutional problem. 

That does not mean that there are not areas that we still are in 

the process of resolving in terms of explosives databases and the 

like, but I think we have made substantial headway. 

I will tell you that John Pistole, our deputy, spends a great deal 

of time with his counterparts at ATF to minimize such problems. 

Mr. QUIGLEY. And I appreciate your candor. When it happens on 

a scene, such as I described, it is one thing. That lack of cooperation, if it dealt with national security type issues, would be all together another and far more important and dramatic, obviously. 

Earlier, you spoke about the cartels and the drug wars as relates 

to the Mexican border, and one of my colleagues discussed the 

issues of representatives from Mexico concerned how we were 

tracking weapons or how weapons are—most of the weapons that 

are being used in Mexico come from the United States. 

I guess I juxtaposition this with if these are assault weapons and 

we are concerned about tracking them, wouldn’t it just be a whole 

lot easier if we renewed the ban on assault weapons as was done 

previously? 

Mr. MUELLER. It might have some impact. One of the things that 

we talk about the percentage of weapons going to Mexico, large 

numbers come from the United States, but, also, the cartels, the 

Zetas and others, are not averse to buying elsewhere. 

And so I think you will also find a number of weapons, particularly military style weapons, that come into Mexico from countries 

other than the United States. 

That does not mean that we should not be doing better in terms 

of stopping the flow from the United States into Mexico, and several, I guess, discussed legislatively may have some impact on it. 
58 

Mr. QUIGLEY. Well, the manpower required, the difficulties required with tracking or trying to stop, you are judging how effective that is versus not selling assault weapons in the United 

States. 

Mr. MUELLER. I can’t give you an insight into that. I would refer 

to you my friends at ATF who may have better and more precise 

knowledge on those particular issues. 

Mr. QUIGLEY. Well, I appreciate your candor and your service. 

Thank you. 

Mr. MUELLER. Thank you, sir. 

Mr. QUIGLEY. I yield back. 

Ms. LOFGREN. The gentleman yields back. 

I recognize the gentleman from Texas, Mr. Poe, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. POE. Thank you, Madam Chairman, for your patience. 

Thank you for being here. 

I want to follow up on the weapons in Mexico. Isn’t it true that 

there have been at least 100,000 members of the military that deserted and most of them took their weapons, which many of them, 

if not all of them, are made in Belgium? The Mexican military. Are 

you familiar with that? 

Mr. MUELLER. I am familiar with the fact that there have been— 

one of the issues that the military in Mexico faces is desertions. I 

am not familiar with the numbers. 

Mr. POE. And regardless of where the weapons come from, and 

I take issue that most of them come from the United States, I 

think the statistics prove they come from all over the world. 

Would it seem to you that Mexico has the responsibility to protect their borders from illegal weapons coming in, just like we have 

the responsibility to keep drugs out of our country? 

Mr. MUELLER. Yes, yes, yes, shares responsibility and both sides 

have a shared responsibility in ensuring that contraband does not 

flow either way. 

Mr. POE. Going on to another issue. I appreciate the fact that 

you know what terrorism is. FBI has a definition of terrorism, does 

it not? 

Mr. MUELLER. Yes. 

Mr. POE. And without going into it today, I was somewhat disturbed that the Attorney General came in here and I asked him 

what he thought terrorism was and he could not give me an answer. So he is supposed to give us a written answer on that. 

But at least the FBI knows terrorism when they see it. 

Mr. MUELLER. There is a statutory definition of terrorism. 

Mr. POE. You all follow it. 

You have been to Guantanamo Bay prison. 

Mr. MUELLER. Yes. 

Mr. POE. How many times have you been there? 

Mr. MUELLER. Once. 

Mr. POE. I have been there two. And the information that Khalid 

Sheikh Mohammed provided the United States in now Justice Department secret memos that have been released to the whole world 

regarding a plot to blow up the Brooklyn Bridge, a plot to crash 

a plane into the tower in Los Angeles, ratting on a cell of 17, including Majid Khan, Hambali, Rusman ‘‘Gun Gun’’ Gunawan, he is 
59 

an interesting fellow, and Yazid Suffat, Jose Padilla, and Iman 

Farris. 

Did all that information turn out to be true, what he told us? 

Mr. MUELLER. That is a very broad question, sir, and—— 

Mr. POE. I know, because you told us a lot of things. 

Mr. MUELLER [continuing]. Individuals, I can’t—I can’t speak to 

pieces of information that were provided by those individuals. 

Mr. POE. My question is did information that KSM gave the 

United States, did that information, any of it, turn out to be true? 

Mr. MUELLER. Without looking at a particular piece of paper or 

whatever, yes, I believe so. 

Mr. POE. Do you know of any place in the United States where 

people have offered to house Gitmo detainees in the United States? 

Do you know any state, local, Federal Government that wants 

those people? 

Mr. MUELLER. I don’t, but I would not necessarily be the person 

to know that, other than what is written—what is in the newspaper. 

Mr. POE. Do you have a solution what to do with them all? 

Mr. MUELLER. I don’t. That is being discussed across the street 

and down the avenue. 

Mr. POE. All right. 

Mr. MUELLER. I think it is a very difficult—I mean, I will say 

I think everybody recognizes it is a very difficult issue and people 

are honestly wrestling with what the best resolution is, and it is 

a very difficult issue. 

Mr. POE. And my last question. You said you went to Gitmo. 

When were you there? 

Mr. MUELLER. Several years ago. I can’t recall. I would have to 

get back to you on that, if it is important. 

Mr. POE. It is all right. You don’t have to get back with me on 

it. 

Thank you very much. Yield back. 

Ms. LOFGREN. The gentleman yields back. 

We have been called for votes, but what I would like to do, if we 

can and if Members will be very concise, we have two more Members who would like to ask questions. If we can get through this, 

we can go vote and you can go off to do your work without waiting 

for us. 

So Ms. Jackson Lee is actually, since she was here earlier, is 

next, and she is recognized for 5 minutes. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Mr. Director, thank you very much. And let 

me apologize for being in a markup in another Committee, but we 

had a chance to greet each other just a few—just a day or two ago. 

I am very interested in what progress has been made in the diversity of the workforce of the FBI. I think that is crucial. 

I also want to emphasize that I have great respect for your special agent in charge, agents in charge across America. And I think 

it is important for them to be made aware that collaborating with 

the community is okay. 

We realize that the resources are to be spent on investigation, 

but say, for example, there is a child abduction and the community 

is in an uproar or a predator on the loose. And, in fact, a few years 
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ago, I called on the special agent in charge in Houston to help our 

police department find a predator, but calm a community. 

Now, the way they handled that was that they were able to use 

the FBI’s lab. At that time, we were in a flux about DNA. But 

there is some skepticism and I would appreciate if some protocol 

would be established that it is okay for SACs to come to a meeting 

where a community is to explain what the FBI does. Certainly, 

that is not their main occupation. 

So I would like to just capture that in terms of how SACs work 

in the community. 

The other aspect is to comment on the work that the FBI is 

doing as it relates to civil rights investigations, what level or what 

percentage of work involves that, and I would include hate crimes 

in that. 

Then, lastly, I would be very interested—we have had challenges 

on the watch list, which, as you well know, is said to be held by 

the FBI. That is a complicated, difficult paper list, it appears. 

I am interested in how you create or do you create terrorist profiles and what kind of underlying data you use, but, more importantly, I want to know what progress have we made with updating 

that watch list? 

And I thank the gentleman very much. 

Mr. MUELLER. Let me see if I can hit the first one in terms of 

diversity. I absolutely agree with you, the importance of diversity. 

All of our SACs are evaluated on the contributions made to diversity in their hiring, promotion, and we have made, I believe, good 

progress, but there is more progress to be made. 

I would be happy to get you the—— 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. I think that would help me, if you would. And 

I would like to work with you on outreach issues regarding that, 

please. 

Mr. MUELLER. With regard to the civil rights cases, again, I 

think that would take some time. We have an initiative to look at 

older civil rights cases, and I would like to have you briefed on 

where we are in that particular initiative and the numbers we assign to that. 

In terms of having our SACs or the office respond to a child abduction or another immediate emergency where persons’ lives are 

at danger, there is not a one that would not do it in a second. And 

every SAC is encouraged and evaluated on the outreach to the community. 

I cannot imagine, in Houston, for instance, that you would not 

have had the full support at your community meetings or otherwise 

from our personnel in Houston. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Now, it will be even better. 

Mr. MUELLER. It will, but that is wherever we are. We have got 

400 resident agencies, we have got 56 field offices. We know that 

responding to a child abduction is important to every one of us. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Thank you. And the terrorists? 

Mr. MUELLER. The terrorist screening centers, I indicated before, 

the IG report that identifies deficiencies made 16 recommendations. Many of those recommendations have already been pursued 

and the rest of them are being followed up on. 
61 

We would be happy to tell you where we are and the progress 

we have made on that. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Madam Chair, I am going to yield back, but 

I am going to ask the director if we can have a more detailed discussion. 

I sit on the Homeland Security Committee, as well, and deal 

with the watch list as relates to airports, and I would like a very 

detailed briefing, if necessary, classified, on that issue dealing with 

the watch list. 

And I thank you. On the other issues, I will take a briefing on 

the diversity and, as well, cases involving civil rights and hate 

crimes. 

Mr. MUELLER. A briefing on the terrorist screening center, I 

think it would be beneficial to have a joint briefing between ourselves and DHS. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Very good. I yield back. 

Ms. LOFGREN. The gentlelady yields back. 

The gentleman from California, Mr. Schiff, is recognized for 5 

minutes. 

Mr. SCHIFF. Thank you, Madam Chair. 

And thank you, Mr. Director, for the good work you do. 

I have three questions which I am going to just get out very 

quickly and see if you have time to respond. If not, maybe we could 

follow up later. 

But one brief commentary on some of my colleagues’ points on 

the other side of the aisle vis-a-vis Gitmo. And that is, I assume 

my colleagues on the other side of the aisle support efforts the Administration is making to get some of our allies to agree to take 

some of these detainees and detain them. 

I don’t know where my colleagues think they are going to be detained in these other countries or how we can make the case that 

Germany or France or England ought to take detainees and detain 

them if we are unwilling to detain any of them in our maximum 

security prisons. 

That is just an aside. 

My three questions are this. First, on the issue of crack cocaine, 

I know the Administration supports changing the enormous disparity between crack and powder cocaine in terms of sentencing. 

Do you, Mr. Director, favor a strict equivalence or are there some 

reasons that you feel that crack’s nature lends itself to some continued disparity or do you think the disparity should be eliminated, 

both in terms mandatory minimums and in terms of quantities? 

That is the first question. 

The second question is on the DNA issue. If I understood you correctly earlier, you anticipate that there will be no backlog in the 

offender DNA as of June of next year. 

Mr. MUELLER. Yes. 

Mr. SCHIFF. What additional resources do you need, if any, to 

make sure that there is no backlog in June of next year on case 

samples? 

And then, finally, if I could, and you may need to respond to this 

last question at a later date. When I was with the U.S. attorneys, 

I handled the Miller spy case involving an FBI agent, Richard Miller. 
62 

So I am very interested in the counterespionage and penetration 

issues. I know the IG did a follow-up report to see how many of 

its earlier recommendations in terms of performance had been implemented, and there were, I think, a few very pivotal ones that 

had not yet been implemented in terms of preventing penetration. 

One was to create a unit within the bureau focused on internal 

penetration. A second was developing a computer need-to-know system, but now that we have gone from a virtual case file system to 

Sentinel, will the Sentinel have that kind of safeguard in it and 

then will that be ready by the end of the year? 

And then, finally, in the Hanson case, he was able to walk out 

of the FBI with classified documents without any difficulty. 

Have measures been taken to be able to detect that people are 

leaving the premises with classified information? 

But if you could address the first two questions and if you get 

time on the last, great; if not, I will follow up with you at a later 

date. 

Ms. LOFGREN. There are 2 minutes left. 

Mr. MUELLER. On crack cocaine, I have not wrestled with that 

issue. I would have to defer to Justice on that. 

On the second one with regard to the resources necessary to reduce the backlog or eliminate the backlog on the case work as opposed to the convicted offender program, I would have to get back 

to you on that. 

We are making progress each day, particularly with regard to 

technological fixes, but I would have to get back to you on the specific resources. 

In terms of the third issue relating to counterespionage, we did 

establish a unit that is focused on that, which was a recommendation of the IG. 

The Sentinel program has those precautions in it to assure that 

we track and monitor everybody who is using the system and put 

out alerts if it is being—if persons are trying to get into or get access where they are not allowed to go. 

And lastly, in terms of detecting persons who are exiting the 

building, we have put into place some measures, but it is very difficult to prevent a person who has a classified paper document or 

a thumb drive from exiting a building. It is near impossible. 

So while we have put into place some provisions, I can’t tell you 

that we would be able to stop a person leaving the organization 

with a thumb drive or a classified document. 

Mr. SCHIFF. Mr. Director, thank you. You have managed to do 

that in 2 minutes, remarkable. 

Madam Chair, I yield back. 

Ms. LOFGREN. The gentleman yields back. 

We have been joined by Mr. Johnson. We do have 2-1/2 minutes 

before the vote is called. 

So we will ask Mr. Johnson to be as terse as possible, and we 

will conclude our hearing. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Thank you, Madam Chair. 

I feel abused and discriminated against, and we will talk about 

this later. 

Ms. LOFGREN. Well, we will stay for 5 minutes. 

Mr. JOHNSON. All right. I don’t think it is going to take that long. 
63 

Director Mueller, thank you for your service to the Nation and 

thank you for coming out today. 

And I have three questions, all three of them just simply requiring a yes or no answer, and then I will allow you to follow up. 

The first question is: there is a well established link between the 

drug trade and weapons. Isn’t that true? 

Mr. MUELLER. Yes. 

Mr. JOHNSON. And, also, isn’t it a fact that most of the guns that 

are in the hands of these drug cartels are basically American-made 

weaponry? 

Mr. MUELLER. The figure that is thrown around is 90 percent. I 

am not certain the basis of that and the accuracy of it, but that 

is what I have seen elsewhere. 

Mr. JOHNSON. If you heard—well, I won’t even ask that question. 

Mr. MUELLER. I have heard, yes. I mean, I will tell you, I have 

heard that, also, they have weapons, particularly weapons they 

cannot get in the United States, higher power, and explosives and 

the like elsewhere from the United States, from other governments 

in South and Central America. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Okay. And assault weapons, in particular, are the 

weapon of choice around the world for drug cartels, for street 

crimes, et cetera, et cetera. Correct? 

Mr. MUELLER. I would have to say not necessarily. I know you 

want a no or a yes, but not necessarily. It depends on where you 

are in the United States. 

There are certain areas of the United States where assault weapons have become a weapon of choice, but there are other areas in 

the United States, most of the communities in the United States, 

where that is not the case. 

Certainly, around the world, you could make the case that assault weapons are the Kalashnikovs or AK-47s or the like are the 

weapons of choice. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Yes. Well, let me ask this question, then. Given 

those facts that you have just agreed to, with the exception of the 

last one, which is qualified, as I would say, can you tell us the justification for the continued failure to address the assault weapons 

ban in terms of the gun shows, where you can buy anything open 

and notoriously, without a background check, just any kind of 

weapon whatsoever? 

Can you respond to that? 

Mr. MUELLER. I would have to defer to the Department of Justice 

on that. That is a policy issue that has—I have been through two 

Administrations and there are questions that are asked in each Administration and each time on this particular issue, I defer to the 

Department of Justice. 

It is a policy issue that the Attorney General generally opines on. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Yes, certainly, that would be appropriate. 

But I just wanted to know what—and I know that you carry out 

policies, but I do want to know. Have you discussed this issue with 

the Administration, with the President? 

Mr. MUELLER. Not with the President nor do I think I have discussed it with the Attorney General. It has not been a topic of our 

discussions to date. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Do you think it should be? 
64 

Mr. MUELLER. It probably, at some point, will come up. I am not 

certain I can opine on whether it should or should not be. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Is there any justification for gun show loophole remaining like it is, in your mind? 

Mr. MUELLER. Well, there are a number of explanations and policy arguments both for and against that. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Can you tell us, briefly, what those are? 

Mr. MUELLER. It would be hard for me to resurrect them. Clearly, those who oppose the—clearly, on one side will be those that believe that the gun shows are a loophole that allow felons and others 

to obtain weapons that they ordinarily could not have access to. 

There are others who argue that, for the most part, you have antique weapons that are appropriately both kept and sold. 

Ms. LOFGREN. The gentleman’s 5 minutes has expired. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Thank you, Madam Chair. 

Ms. LOFGREN. We will adjourn this meeting, with thanks, Mr. Director, for your testimony and your service. 

Without objection, Members will have a minimum of 5 legislative 

days to submit additional written questions to you, Mr. Director, 

which we will forward and ask that you answer promptly. 

Without objection, the record will remain open for 5 legislative 

days for the submission of other material. 

This has been a very useful hearing, I think. We look forward to 

the additional material you have agreed to send to us. 

And this hearing is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 12:23 p.m., the Committee was adjourned.] 
(65) 

A P P E N D I X 

MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING RECORD

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE JERROLD NADLER, A REPRESENTATIVE IN

CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF NEW YORK, AND MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON THE JU- DICIARY

Thank you, Chairman Conyers. And thank you, Director Mueller, for being here 

and providing your testimony. 

As you may recall, Director Mueller, I am very concerned about National Security 

Letters (NSLs) and the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s (FBI) handling of its NSL 

authority. In the past I have talked about this at hearings with you and other FBI 

officials. I am going to keep talking about this issue until the relevant statutes get 

fixed—the privacy and constitutional rights of the American people are at stake. 

NSLs allow the FBI to gain almost limitless personal information about any 

American from third parties. These requests are done in secret and without court 

approval—there is no one to check the FBI. These requests for records or other information can go to a variety of third parties, including telephone companies, internet service providers, insurance companies, travel agencies, banks, car dealerships, 

and so on. And, since the PATRIOT Act, the requests have only to be ‘‘relevant’’ to 

a counter-terrorism or counter-intelligence investigation. 

Not surprisingly, with such a low standard, the number of NSL requests exploded. 

It rose from 8,500 in 2000 to an average of about 50,000 per year between 2003 and 

2006. It is difficult to say what benefits this has yielded, because outside of general 

statements and idiosyncratic data on their use, I have not seen any hard, empirical 

evidence that this explosion in requests has had any measurable impact on counterterrorism or counter-intelligence. 

What I have seen is that between 2001 and 2008, outside of spikes in 2002 and 

2004, the number of international terrorism prosecutions stayed relatively stable. 

And, the share of international terrorism cases referred by the FBI but rejected for 

prosecution by the Department of Justice (DOJ) rose from 33 percent in 2001 to 87 

percent in 2006. More information and investigation is not leading to more prosecution. 

We also have recently seen evidence of numerous mistakes and abuses by the FBI 

in using its NSL authority. DOJ Inspector General (IG) reports in March 2007 and 

2008 showed that FBI improperly collected or retained personal information. Responses to NSLs were also lost, putting our privacy and security at risk. Another 

IG report, showing how the FBI abused its authority by issuing so-called ‘‘exigent 

letters,’’ will hopefully be released shortly. 

Not only do NSLs affect the privacy rights of Americans, but they affect the First 

Amendment rights of third parties as well. Those who are recipients of NSLs are 

generally prevented from talking about them by the government. Under the statute 

as written, recipients have the burden of bringing court challenges of these orders, 

and government assertions that such disclosures would harm national security, diplomatic relations, certain investigations, and so on are treated as conclusive. Fortunately, last December, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, in Doe v. 

Mukasey, struck down some of these ‘‘gag order’’ provisions as unconstitutional. It 

is time for Congress to fix the statute with respect to gag orders and the entire NSL 

scheme. 

Along with Reps. Delahunt, Flake, and Paul, I have re-introduced legislation, H.R. 

1800, the National Security Letters Reform Act of 2009, to address these issues. 

Among other improvements it would restore the pre-PATRIOT Act standard that 

there must be ‘‘specific and articulable facts’’ that the information requested pertains to a foreign power or agent thereof, provide NSL recipients a meaningful right 

to challenge the letter and the nondisclosure requirement, allow NSL targets to 

challenge their issuance, and require procedures so that information concerning per-
66 

sons no longer of interest is destroyed. I think this legislation is critical to restoring 

the balance between fighting terrorism and protecting our civil liberties and freedoms. 

I look forward to talking with you, Director Mueller, about NSLs and hearing 

your testimony on what I am sure will be a whole host of issues. Thanks again for 

being here. 

With that, I yield back the balance of my time. 

f 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE MAXINE WATERS, A REPRESENTATIVE IN

CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA, AND MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY

Mr. Chairman, thank you for arranging today’s oversight hearing for the Federal 

Bureau of Investigation. I’d also like to welcome Director Mueller back before the 

Committee today. 

I’d like to focus my time and questions today on three areas that I believe need 

more attention: crimes related to mortgage and financial fraud; problems of police 

misconduct; and the need to address persistent complaints of discrimination and 

double standards at the FBI. In the limited time I have today, let’s see what information you can provide now and the remainder of my questions will be submitted 

to you in writing. 

f 
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*Note: At the time of the printing of this hearing, the Committee had not received a response 

to the post-hearing questions submitted to the this witness. 

POST-HEARING QUESTIONS SUBMITTED TO THE HONORABLE ROBERT S. MUELLER, III, 

DIRECTOR, FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION* 
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