9

Commission for

Environmental Cooperation

of North America

North American

Environmental

Law and Policy

N • A • E • L • P
For more information about this or other publications from the CEC,

contact:

Commission for Environmental Cooperation of North America

393, rue St-Jacques Ouest, bureau 200

Montréal (Québec) Canada H2Y 1N9

Tel.: (514) 350-4300

Fax: (514) 350-4314

E-mail: info@ccemtl.org

http://www.cec.org

ISBN: 2-89451-610-X

© Commission for Environmental Cooperation of North America, 2002

ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.

Legal Deposit - Bibliothèque nationale du Québec, 2002

Legal Deposit - Bibliothèque nationale du Canada, 2002

Disponible en français – ISBN: 2-89451-609-6

Disponible en español – ISBN: 2-89451-611-8

This publication was prepared by the Secretariat of the Commission for

Environmental Cooperation of North America (CEC). The views contained herein do not necessarily reflect the views of the governments of

Canada, Mexico, or the United States of America.
PROFILE

In North America, we share a rich environmental heritage that

includes air, oceans and rivers, mountains and forests. Together, these

elements form the basis of a complex network of ecosystems that

sustains our livelihoods and well-being. If these ecosystems are to

continue to be a source of life and prosperity, they must be protected.

Doing so is a responsibility shared by Canada, Mexico, and the United

States.

The Commission for Environmental Cooperation of North America (CEC) is an international organization created by Canada, Mexico,

and the United States under the North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation (NAAEC) to address regional environmental

concerns, help prevent potential trade and environmental conflicts, and

promote the effective enforcement of environmental law. The Agreement complements the environmental provisions of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).

The CEC accomplishes its work through the combined efforts of its

three principal components: the Council, the Secretariat and the Joint

Public Advisory Committee (JPAC). The Council is the governing body

of the CEC and is composed of the highest-level environmental authorities from each of the three countries. The Secretariat implements the

annual work program and provides administrative, technical and operational support to the Council. The Joint Public Advisory Committee is

composed of 15 citizens, five from each of the three countries, and

advises the Council on any matter within the scope of the Agreement.

MISSION

The CEC facilitates cooperation and public participation to foster

conservation, protection and enhancement of the North American environment for the benefit of present and future generations, in the context

of increasing economic, trade and social links among Canada, Mexico

and the United States.

VII
NORTH AMERICAN ENVIRONMENTAL

LAW AND POLICY SERIES

Produced by the CEC, the North American Environmental Law

and Policy series presents some of the most salient recent trends and

developments in environmental law and policy in Canada, Mexico and

the United States, including official documents related to the novel citizen submission procedure empowering individuals from the NAFTA

countries to allege that a Party to the agreement is failing to effectively

enforce its environmental laws.

VIII NORTH AMERICAN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY
TABLE OF CONTENTS

Preface. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . XI

Secretariat Determinations under Articles 14 and 15 of

the North American Agreement on Environmental

Cooperation—August 1997 Through June 2002 . . . . . . 1

SEM-97-002 Rio Magdalena . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

SEM-98-003 Great Lakes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35

SEM-98-004 BC Mining . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67

SEM-98-005 Cytrar I . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101

SEM-99-002 Migratory Birds . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123

SEM-00-004 BC Logging. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 155

SEM-00-005 Molymex II . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 183

SEM-00-006 Tarahumara . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 215

SEM-01-001 Cytrar II . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 235

SEM-01-002 AAA Packaging . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 259

SEM-01-003 Dermet . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 267

SEM-02-001 Ontario Logging . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 279

IX
SEM-02-002 Mexico City Airport. . . . . . . . . . . . 291

SEM-02-003 Pulp & Paper. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 303

X NORTH AMERICAN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY
PREFACE

When Canada, Mexico and the United States (the Parties) entered

into the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) in 1994,

they also concluded the North American Agreement on Environmental

Cooperation (NAAEC or Agreement). The NAAEC supports the environmental goals and objectives of NAFTA and recognizes the importance of public participation in the conservation, protection and

enhancement of the environment. The citizen submission process under

NAAEC Articles 14 and 15 is an innovative mechanism allowing the

public to take part in the pursuit of NAAEC’s goals. This volume of the

North American Environmental Law and Policy (NAELP) series, which

follows previous volumes devoted to the citizen submission process,

provides an update on the CEC Secretariat’s activity on submissions on

enforcement matters under Articles 14 and 15 since August 2000.

The NAAEC citizen submissions process allows the public to

request that the CEC investigate concerns regarding environmental

enforcement in Canada, Mexico or the United States. The Secretariat

administers the process in accordance with NAAEC Articles 14 and 15

and the Guidelines for Submissions on Enforcement Matters, adopted by the

Council in October 1995 and revised in June 1999. The Secretariat may

consider a submission from any person or nongovernmental organization asserting that a Party to NAAEC is failing to effectively enforce its

environmental law. Subject to certain conditions, the Secretariat may

request a response from the concerned Party. The Secretariat may then

inform the Council that it considers that the submission, in light of the

response provided by the Party, if any, warrants developing a “factual

record.” Preparation of factual records requires a two-thirds affirmative

vote by the Council, as does publication of final factual records.

The Secretariat has received 34 citizen submissions since 1995.

Twelve concern Canada, fourteen concern Mexico and eight concern the

United States. Some submissions—mostly those concerning Mexico—

focus on a specific project or incident, while others allege a widespread

failure to effectively enforce environmental provisions against an entire

XI
industry. Many different types of environmental protection provisions

are at play in the different submissions, though habitat protection, pollution prevention and environmental assessment provisions are most frequently invoked. Twenty-two submissions are now closed, following

either publication of a factual record or termination at an earlier stage.

Since 1994, three submissions have resulted in the publication of a

factual record. The first, Cozumel, concerned environmental assessment

requirements in connection with the construction of a cruise ship pier in

Cozumel, Mexico. The second, BC Hydro, related to enforcing rules for

fish habitat protection at hydroelectric installations in British Columbia,

Canada. The third, Metales y Derivados, concerned clean-up and other

obligations in connection with an abandoned lead smelter in Tijuana,

Mexico.

As of 20 June 2002, twelve submissions are active. The Secretariat is

currently developing seven factual records, as instructed by the Council,

in connection with the following submissions: SEM-97-006 (Oldman

River II); SEM-98-004 (BC Mining); SEM-98-006 (Aquanova); SEM-99-002

(Migratory Birds); SEM-00-004 (BC Logging); SEM-97-002 (Río Magdalena);

and SEM-00-005 (Molymex II). The Secretariat is reviewing four submissions in light of the Parties’ responses to determine whether they

warrant the development of factual records: SEM-01-001 (Cytrar II);

SEM-00-006 (Tarahumara); SEM-02-001 (Ontario Logging); and SEM-02-

002 (Mexico City Airport). The Secretariat is awaiting a response from the

Party for SEM-02-003 (Pulp and Paper).

In June 2000, the CEC Council established a process for the Joint

Public Advisory Committee (JPAC) to conduct public reviews and provide advice to Council regarding issues concerning the implementation

and further elaboration of Articles 14 and 15. The Council also requested

that JPAC review the public history of citizen submissions and prepare a

report on lessons learned. JPAC published its report on lessons learned

in June 2001, with recommendations regarding timeliness, the independence of the Secretariat, follow-up to factual records and the transparency of the process. The report is available on the CEC website.

Council adopted some of JPAC’s recommendations in Council Resolution 01-06. In June 2002, JPAC completed a public review of the requirement in recent Council resolutions that the Secretariat provide the

Parties the overall work plan for preparation of a factual record and provide the Parties an opportunity to comment on the plan. Council has also

approved JPAC’s request to conduct a public review regarding recent

Council instructions defining the scope of factual records. The Council

XII NORTH AMERICAN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY
authorized that the review take place after the relevant factual records

are completed.

All submissions, Party responses, Secretariat determinations, factual records, and related documents are available on the CEC website at

<www.cec.org> under Citizen Submissions on Enforcement Matters

and can also be requested from <info@ccemtl.org>. The Secretariat’s

determinations and other documents released through 31 August 1997

were compiled in the Winter 1998 issue of this series. Determinations

and other documents released from September 1997 through 31 August

2000 were compiled in the Fall 2000 issue (Volume 5). The BC Hydro and

Metales y Derivados factual records were published in Volumes 6 and 8,

respectively. For information about previous issues, please contact

Les Éditions Yvon Blais Inc. at commandes@editionsyvonblais.qc.ca or

<http://www.editionsyvon blais.qc.ca> or at (800) 363-3047 (Canada)

or (450) 266-1086.

The following table captures the status of submissions and actions

taken by the Secretariat at different stages of the process.

4 July 2002

PREFACE XIII
* Note: See North American Environmental Law and Policy, Volume 5 (Fall 2000) for a listing of determinations made in 1995 and 1996.

History 2002 2001 2000 1999 1998 1997

(to 30 June)

Submissions

received

SEM-02-001/Ontario Logging(Can)(6 February)SEM-02-002/Mexico City Airport(Mx)(7 February)SEM-02-003/Pulp and Paper(Can)(8 May)

SEM-01-001/Cytrar II (Mx)(14 February)SEM-01-002/

AAA Packaging

(Can)(12 April)SEM-01-003/Dermet (Mx)(14 June)

SEM-00-001/Molymex I (Mx)(27 January)SEM-00-002/Neste Canada (US)(21 January)SEM-00-003/Jamaica Bay (US)(2 March)SEM-00-004/B.C Logging (Can)(15 March)SEM-00-005/Molymex II (Mx)(6 April—Resubmitted31 July)SEM-00-006/Tarahumara (Mx)(9 June)

SEM-99-001/Methanex (US)(18 October)SEM-99-002/Migratory Birds (US)(19 November)

SEM-98-001/Guadalajara (Mx)(9 January—Resubmitted15 October 1999)SEM-98-002/Ortíz Martínez (Mx)(Revised—4 August)SEM-98-003/Great Lakes (US)(27 May—Resubmitted5 January 1999)SEM-98-004/B.C. Mining (Can)(29 June)SEM-98-005/Cytrar I (Mx)(23 July)SEM-98-006/Aquanova (Mx)(20 October)SEM-98-007/Metalesy Derivados (Mx)(23 October)

SEM-97-001/BC Hydro (Can)(2 April)SEM-97-002/Río Magdalena (Mx)(15 March)SEM-97-003/Quebec HogFarms (Can)(9 April)SEM-97-004/Canadian Env.Defence Fund (Can)(26 May)SEM-97-005/Biodiversity (Can)(21 July)SEM-97-006/Oldman River II(Can)(4 October)SEM-97-007/Lake Chapala (Mx)(10 October)

A History of the 34 CEC Submissions on Enforcement Matters, 1997 – 30 June 2002*

XIV NORTH AMERICAN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY
** The Secretariat issued a single determination covering both Article 14(1) and 14(2) for several of these submissions.

14(1), 14(2)**

and 14(3)

Determinations

continuing

the process

SEM-02-002(22 February)SEM-02-001(25 February)SEM-02-003(7 June)

SEM-01-001(24 April)SEM-01-001(13 June)SEM-00-006(6 November)

SEM-99-001(30 March)SEM-00-002(17 April,consolidated withSEM-99-001)SEM-00-004(8 May)SEM-00-005(19 October)

SEM-98-007(5 March)SEM-98-006(17 March)SEM-98-005(9 April)SEM-98-004(25 June)SEM-98-003(8 September)SEM-99-002(23 December)

SEM-97-002(8 May)SEM-97-006(23 January and8 May)SEM-97-007(2 October)SEM-98-004(30 November)

SEM-96-004(22 January)SEM-97-001(1st and 15 May)

SEM-97-002(6 October)SEM-97-003(8 May and 9 July)

14(1), 14(2)

DIsmissals

SEM-01-002(24 April)SEM-01-003(19 September)

SEM-98-001(11 January)SEM-00-003(12 April)SEM-00-001(25 April)SEM-00-005(13 July—Resubmitted31 July 2000)

SEM-98-002(18 March)SEM-98-001(13 September)

SEM-97-005(26 May)SEM-98-002(23 June)SEM-98-003(14 December)

SEM-97-004(25 August)

PREFACE XV

History 2002 2001 2000 1999 1998 1997

(to 30 June)
Article 21(1)(b)

Requests for

additional

information

from the Party

SEM-98-003(24 March)

SEM-97-002(13 September)

SEM-97-003(16 February)

Dismissals

following

response

SEM-98-003(5 October)

SEM-00-002 andSEM-99-001(30 June)SEM-97-007(14 July)

SEM-96-003(2 April)

Notifications

that a factual

record is

warranted

SEM-97-002(5 February)

SEM-98-004(11 May)SEM-00-004(27 July)SEM-00-005(20 December)

SEM-98-007(6 March)SEM-98-006(4 August)

SEM-97-006(19 July)SEM-97-003(29 October)

SEM-97-001(27 April)

Final factual

records

completed

SEM-98-007(11 February)

SEM-97-001(11 June)

SEM-96-001(24 October)

XVI NORTH AMERICAN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY History 2002 2001 2000 1999 1998 1997 (to 30 June)
Secretariat Determinations

under Articles 14 and 15

of the North American

Agreement on Environmental

Cooperation—August 1997

Through June 2002

SEM-97-002

(Rio Magdalena)

SUBMITTER: COMITÉ PRO LIMPIEZA DEL RÍO

MAGDALENA

PARTY: United Mexican States

DATE: 15 March 1997

SUMMARY: The Submitters allege that waste water originating in the municipalities of Imuris, Magdalena de

Kino, and Santa Ana, located in the Mexican state

of Sonora, is being discharged into the Magdalena

River without prior treatment. According to the

Submitters, the above contravenes Mexican environmental legislation governing the disposal of

waste water.

SECRETARIAT DETERMINATIONS:

ART. 14(1)*

(6 October 1997)

Determination that criteria under Article 14(1)

have been met.

ART. 14(2)*

(8 May 1998)

Determination pursuant to Article 14(2) that the

submission merits requesting a response from the

Party.

ART. 15(1)

(5 February 2002)

Notification to Council that a factual record is

warranted in accordance with Article 15(1).

* Published in Volume 5 (Fall 2000) of the North American Environmental Law and Policy

Series.

3

Secretariat of the Commission for

Environmental Cooperation of North America

Article 15(1) Notification to Council that

Development of a Factual Record is Warranted

Submission Number: SEM-97-002 (Rio Magdalena)

Submitter: Comité Pro Limpieza del Río Magdalena

Concerned Party: United Mexican States

Date of Receipt: 15 March 1997

Date of this Notification: 5 February 2002

I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Under Articles 14 and 15 of the North American Agreement on

Environmental Cooperation (the “NAAEC”), the Secretariat of the Commission for Environmental Cooperation (the “Secretariat”) may consider submissions asserting that a Party to the NAAEC is failing to

effectively enforce its environmental law. If the Secretariat finds that the

submission meets the requirements of Article 14(1), it shall then determine whether the submission warrants requesting a response from the

Party named in the submission, in accordance with Article 14(2). The

Secretariat may notify the Council under Article 15(1) that it considers

that the submission, in light of any response from the Party, warrants

developing an Article 15 factual record. By a two-thirds vote, the Council may instruct the Secretariat to prepare a factual record. The final factual record, again by a vote of two-thirds of the members of the Council,

may then be made public.

This Notification contains the Secretariat’s Article 15(1) analysis

with respect to the submission filed 7 April 1997, by Comité Pro

Limpieza del Río Magdalena (the Submitter).

5
The Submitter asserts that Mexico is failing to effectively enforce its

environmental law with respect to the discharge of wastewater from the

municipalities of Imuris, Magdalena de Kino and Santa Ana in the Mexican state of Sonora, which allegedly is discharged into the Magdalena

River without proper treatment.

On 7 April 1997, the Secretariat received the submission from

Comité Pro Limpieza del Río Magdalena, in accordance with Article 14

of the NAAEC. On 2 June 1997, the Secretariat requested that the

Submitter specify the chapters or provisions of law whose failure to

enforce was alleged. In response to that request, the Secretariat received

the additional filing to the submission on 18 July 1997.

On 6 October 1997, the Secretariat determined that the submission

met the requirements of Article 14(1) of the NAAEC and, considering the

criteria set forth in NAAEC Article 14(2), on 8 May 1998, it requested a

response from the Party. The Secretariat received the Party’s response

on 29 July 1998, in accordance with NAAEC Article 14(3). Given the

complexity of the matter, and to better understand some aspects of the

legal and administrative framework referenced in Mexico’s response,

the Secretariat, relying on NAAEC Article 21(1)(b), requested but did

not receive additional information from the Party. The requests were

sent on 13 September 1999, 13 January 2000 and 23 October 2000.

In order to continue with the processing of this submission, the

Secretariat proceeded with its analysis based on the available information. Having examined the submission in light of the Party’s response, in

accordance with NAAEC Article 15(1), the Secretariat hereby notifies

Council that the submission warrants the development of a factual

record with respect to some of the assertions, while others do not warrant further consideration in this process or the development of a factual

record. The Secretariat sets forth the reasons for these determinations in

the body of this document.

In summary, this submission warrants the development of a factual record in regard to the assertions of the Submitter relating to the

alleged failure to effectively enforce provisions on the prevention and

control of water pollution, with respect to the discharge of untreated

wastewater from the municipalities of Imuris, Magdalena de Kino and

Santa Ana in the Mexican state of Sonora. Specifically, the development

of a factual record is warranted on the effective enforcement, for the

aforementioned municipalities, of Articles 88 paragraph IV, 89 paragraph VI, 92, 93, 117, 121, 122, 123, 124, 126 and 133 of the General Law of

Ecological Balance and Environmental Protection (Ley General del

6 NORTH AMERICAN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY
Equilibrio Ecológico y la Protección al Ambiente—LGEEPA), and Mexican

Official Standard NOM-001.

II. SUMMARY OF THE SUBMISSION

The submission asserts that the municipalities of Imuris,

Magdalena de Kino and Santa Ana in the Mexican state of Sonora discharge their wastewater into the Magdalena River without prior treatment, in contravention of Mexican environmental law. Comité Pro

Limpieza del Río Magdalena asserts that it has undertaken efforts to prevent the pollution of the Magdalena River for the past 17 years, and

describes the main relevant events occurring since then.

The Submitter states that:

...in the case of the water pollution in question, the procedures and standards that apply in this case have been in force since 1971, and basically

show no major changes. All laws in this matter, issued to date, continue to

impose on the Government full responsibility to demand the effective

enforcement of the laws, at any social level, to minimize the problem, and

the Towns or Municipalities have always been responsible for taking care

of water pollution. This responsibility has been diminished repeatedly,

due to the six-year transitions in government administrations (sexenios),

the name changes of the respective enforcement agencies, and the lack of

political will to provide a concrete solution. The authorities do NOT (sic)

want to see reality, they do NOT (sic) want to measure the damages we are

inflicting upon our environment for this and future generations, they do

NOT (sic) want to have any continuity over the six-year transitions, for

programs and positive laws, and as a result the regulations have been

enforced irregularly and ineffectively, without force. (translation from

original)1

The Submitter asserts that the pollution of the waters of the

Magdalena River has caused harm to farmers and users of the

Magdalena River’s surface water, who have used such water for the irrigation of traditional crops and for regional family sustenance. The submission asserts that farmers and water users have even been fined by the

National Water Commission (Comisión Nacional del Agua—CNA) under

Mexican Official Standard NOM-CCA-033-ECOL/19932 (NOM-033),

because those waters do not meet the specific parameters of the standard

SEM-97-002 7

1. Additional filing to the submission, p. 10.

2. Establishing the bacteriological conditions for the use of urban or municipal wastewater, or the mixture thereof in bodies of water, in crop irrigation and garden products. Note that the nomenclature of this Standard changed to NOM-033-ECOL-93, as

of 30 November 1994.
for use in crop irrigation. The Submitter also asserts that many fruit trees

have been found to have irreversible rotting in their roots.

Lastly, the submission denounces the failure of the three levels of

government (federal, state and municipal) to attend to and solve the

stated problem. The Submitter states:

Who controls whom? The municipalities do NOT (sic) have the official

classification of a receiving body for the Magdalena River for this purpose,

nor the defined parameters that by law must be had along with the official

legal authorizations in order to dispose of such duly treated wastewater.

However, without regard to law or authority, the municipalities of Imuris,

Magdalena de Kino, and Santa Ana in Sonora, Mexico, continue to blatantly dump into the receiving body of the Magdalena River, illegally mixing polluted waters with water that has historically been used as a source

of drinking water for human consumption, for the irrigation of farmlands,

and as regional family sustenance. (translation from original)3

As stated above, the Secretariat requested that the Submitter indicate which environmental laws in particular were considered not to be

effectively enforced, with respect to the facts stated in the submission.

The Submitter responded to this request in an additional filing. In that

filing, the Submitter cites various laws that are no longer in force, indicating that there have been laws for the prevention and control of water

pollution for some time, and that in its opinion they have been modified

every six-year term but they have not been enforced.4 As for laws currently in force, the Submitter indicated that it considers, in this case, that

Mexico is failing to effectively enforce the following provisions of law:

(i) The General Law of Ecological Balance and Environmental Protection (Ley General del Equilibrio Ecológico y la Protección al Ambiente—

LGEEPA): Article 1 paragraphs I, II, III, V, VI, VIII, IX and X; 4; 5

paragraphs I, II, III, V, VII, XVI, XVII, XVIII and XIX; 6; 7 paragraphs I, II, VIII, XIX, XI, XII, XIV, XV, XVIII, XIX and XXI; 8 paragraphs I, II, VII, IX, X, XI, XIII and XV; 10; 15; 16; 23 paragraph VII;

36; 88; 89 paragraphs II, VI and VII; 90; 91; 92; 93; 96; 98 paragraph

IV; 104; 108 paragraph I; 109 BIS; 117; 118 paragraphs I, II, III, V and

VI; 119; 119 BIS; 120; 121; 122; 123; 124; 126; 127; 128; 129; 133; 157;

159 BIS 3; 159 BIS 4; 159 BIS 5; 189; 190; 191; 192; 199; and 200.

(ii) The Law of Ecological Balance and Environmental Protection for

the State of Sonora: Article 3 paragraphs I, IV, and V; 6 paragraphs

8 NORTH AMERICAN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY

3. Additional filing to the submission, p. 11.

4. Additional filing to the submission, p. 1, 10 and 11.
II, III, VIII, X and XII; 7 paragraphs III and VII; 8 paragraphs II, VI

and IX; 52, 95 paragraph IV; 96 paragraphs I and III; 97 paragraphs

I and II; 98 paragraphs I, II and IV; 99, 101, 102, 104, 105, 163, 164,

165, 166, 167 and 168.

(iii) The Waters Law for the State of Sonora, Article 73 paragraph I.

(iv) The Health Law for the State of Sonora: Article 3 paragraph XI; 4

paragraph VI; 5 paragraph I; 6 paragraphs I and II; 8 paragraph V;

18 paragraph V; 86 paragraph III; 90, 91 paragraphs I and II; 94; 95;

194; 195; 196; 200 and 201.

III. SUMMARY OF THE RESPONSE OF MEXICO

The Party, in its response filed 29 July 1998, first claims that most of

the facts set forth by the Submitter arose prior to the entry into force of

the NAAEC, that is, before 1 January 1994, and thus it considers the

application thereof in this particular case would be retroactive, to the

Party’s detriment. The response indicates that this would be contrary to

the general principle of law that requires disputes to be evaluated

according to previously established bodies and rules.

Secondly, the Party argues that the submission is inappropriate

pursuant to NAAEC Article 14(2)(c). According to the Party, this article

establishes that “the submitters must exhaust the remedies set forth in

domestic law” before filing any submission.5 In this respect, the Party

alleges that while the Submitter sent several communications to various

federal, state and municipal authorities, these did not constitute the filing of legal actions as provided in the environmental laws. The Party

asserts that the Submitter had several legal remedies available to it, such

as appellate review, a nullification suit before the Federal Tax Court

(now called the Federal Court for Tax and Administrative Justice (Tribunal Federal de Justicia Fiscal y Administrativa)) and a suit for an injunction.

Mexico’s response describes the problems of the Magdalena River

and the situation of the three municipalities in question. The response

includes as exhibits copies of the construction or extension projects of

the treatment systems of each municipality with which the treatment

deficiencies of the three municipalities supposedly will be handled,

among other documents.

SEM-97-002 9

5. Response of Mexico, p. 11.
Lastly, the Party dedicates a section of its response to refute the

supposed failure by Mexico to effectively enforce Mexican environmental law, making reference to each of the provisions invoked by the

Submitter. The Party argues that some of the provisions cited by the

Submitter do not apply to the subject matter of the submission, and that

those that do apply have been complied with.

The Party disputes the applicability of the environmental laws of

the State of Sonora with regard to the submission, holding that the matter of wastewater discharge in nationally owned waters falls under federal jurisdiction.6 The Party asserts that the Magdalena River is national

property in accordance with Declaration 207, dated 25 June 1924, published in the Official Gazette of the Federation (Diario Oficial de la

Federación) on 22 August 1924.7 The Party concludes that only federal

laws apply to the case at hand.8

IV. ANALYSIS

IV.1 Introduction

The process in regard to this submission is currently at the NAAEC

Article 15(1) stage. To reach this stage, the Secretariat must first determine that a submission meets the requirements of Article 14(1) and that

it merits a response from the Party, in consideration of the criteria of

Article 14(2). At the time the Secretariat made its determination under

these NAAEC articles, the Guidelines for Submissions on Enforcement

Matters Under Articles 14 and 15 of the North American Agreement on

Environmental Cooperation (the “Guidelines”) in force did not require the

Secretariat to state the reasons of its determinations. Given that the

Guidelines were revised in June 1999 and now do so require, the Secretariat states its reasons herein.

Second, the Secretariat addresses the Party’s argument that the

application of the NAAEC is retroactive to its detriment since, according

to the Party, most of the facts addressed by the submission arose prior to

the entry into force of the NAAEC.

Third, the Secretariat sets forth the reasons why some environmental provisions invoked in the submission do not warrant consideration

in the processing of this submission nor in the development of a factual

record.

10 NORTH AMERICAN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY

6. Response of Mexico, p. 30 et seq.

7. Response of Mexico, p. 31.

8. Response of Mexico, p. 33, third paragraph.
Lastly, the Secretariat explains the reasons why it considers that, in

light of the Party’s response, the submission warrants the development

of a factual record on the alleged failure to effectively enforce some of the

provisions relating to water, due to the alleged discharge of untreated

wastewater into the Magdalena River from the municipalities of Imuris,

Magdalena de Kino and Santa Ana in the Mexican state of Sonora.

IV.2 NAAEC Article 14(1) and (2) Analysis of the Submission

In its 6 October 1997 determination,9 the Secretariat concluded that

the submission met the requirements of NAAEC Article 14(1). The

Submitter clearly identified itself in the submission as a nongovernmental organization located in Terrenate, Imuris Municipality, Sonora,

Mexico.10 The submission was filed with the Secretariat in Spanish, the

language designated by Mexico.

The Submitter asserts that Mexico is failing to effectively enforce

various articles of the LGEEPA, as well as three laws of the state of

Sonora: the Law of Ecological Balance and Environmental Protection,

the Waters Law and the Health Law. The Secretariat considered that the

submission referred to “environmental laws” pursuant to the definition

contained in NAAEC Article 45(2), because the main purpose of the

aforesaid laws is environmental protection or the prevention of a hazard

to human health, principally through the prevention and control of pollutant releases.

The Secretariat determined that the information and documents

provided by the Submitters are sufficient to allow the Secretariat to analyze the submission. The submission describes the pollution problems of

the Magdalena River and the lack of adequate treatment of the discharged wastewater, in alleged violation of the laws prohibiting the

release of pollutants into bodies of water and the obligations to prevent

and control water pollution. The submission describes the efforts undertaken by Comité Pro Limpieza del Río Magdalena to protect the river

over 17 years. Copies of the various communications sent to several

authorities since 1989 and the answers thereto, relating to the situation

of the river and the lack of adequate treatment of municipal wastewater,

are attached to the submission, along with some samples of the propaganda used by Comité Pro Limpieza del Río Magdalena to promote the

protection of the river. In its additional filing of 18 July 1997, the

Submitter identified the provisions of law that it considers have not been

SEM-97-002 11

9. SEM-97-002 (Río Magdalena), Article 14(2) determination (6 October 1997).

10. Submission, p. 1.
effectively enforced. The Secretariat concluded that the submission is

not aimed at harassing industry because it does not single out any particular industry, but rather seeks the enforcement of the environmental

laws to prevent water pollution in Mexico. It also considered that the

matter has been notified in writing to the pertinent authorities in Mexico,

given that three citizen complaints have been filed in this regard, among

other filings.11

Having complied with all Article 14(1) requirements, the Secretariat proceeded to evaluate the submission taking account of the criteria of

NAAEC Article 14(2). The Submitter asserts that there are damages and

harmful effects to the environment and health. It states that fruit trees,

such as plum, quince and pomegranate trees, show irreversible levels of

rotting,12 that in 1991 “the results of bacteriological analyses performed

on waters of the Magdalena de Kino Irrigation District showed a high

number of fecal coliforms in several agricultural samples,”13 and that

these results appear again in bacteriological analyses reported in 1996.14

The submission addresses the remedies available under the laws of

the Party that were pursued, and the Secretariat considers that a reasonable effort has been made to use them. As stated above, the Submitter

filed a citizen complaint three times under the LGEEPA to make the

authorities aware of the alleged violations of environmental law, with

respect to the pollution of the Magdalena River.15 The last one was made

12 NORTH AMERICAN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY

11. Additional filing to the submission, p. 2, 3 and 8.

12. Submission, p. 1, and additional filing to the submission, p. 8 and 9.

13. Additional filing to the submission, p. 2.

14. Additional filing to the submission, p. 3.

15. Mexico’s objection to this point, set forth in its response, should be noted. The Party

considers that the submission is inappropriate and that NAAEC Article 14(2)(c) has

been contravened because, according to the Party, that article “states that submitters must exhaust the remedies provided in domestic law before preparing any

submission” (p. 11 of the Party’s response). The Party alleges that while the

Submitter sent various communications to several federal, state and municipal

environmental authorities, these do not constitute the legal remedies set forth in

law. According to the Party, the Submitter had several legal remedies available to it

under Mexican law, such as the appellate review, the nullification suit before the

Federal Tax Court, and the injunction suit. The Party also argues that the Submitter

should have waited for a ruling on the citizen complaint filed in 1996 (p. 11 of Mexico’s response). As stated elsewhere, the Article 14(2) criteria are considerations that

guide the Secretariat in deciding whether a submission warrants a response from the

Party, in contrast to Article 14(1), which establishes the requirements to be met by

the submissions in order for the Secretariat to proceed with its review. Among

these considerations, Article 14(2)(c) includes the question of “whether private

remedies available under the Party’s law have been pursued.” Furthermore, sections 5.6(c) and 7.5(b) of the Guidelines state, respectively, that “the submission

should address [...] the actions, including private remedies, available under the
by means of a statement filed 10 October 1996.16 As indicated in other

determinations, in the Secretariat’s opinion, for purposes of NAAEC

Article 14, the citizen complaint is a remedy contemplated by the Party’s

laws and available to the Submitter to be used before filing a submission.17 The submission further states:

For now, we are pages away from recording all our activities in these years

of struggle, in visits, work meetings, different types of actions, awareness

campaigns, chats and exchanges with school students, etc., at all levels of

government and with society in general, and in the end doing everything

within our reach to let us give rise to positive actions to save our River

from pollution, but to date there is no indication of a concrete solution

from the persons and authorities responsible for effectively enforcing the

law in Mexico. (translation from original)18

The Secretariat considers that further study in this process of the

alleged failure to effectively enforce the laws on water pollution control

and prevention to which this submission refers would contribute to furthering the objectives of the NAAEC, particularly the promotion of environmental protection and the improved observance and enforcement of

laws and regulations to attain higher levels of environmental protection,

as established in Articles 1 and 2 of the Agreement. The submission does

not appear to be based exclusively on media reports, but rather the

Submitter seems to have broad, direct knowledge of the matter. The submission states that the members of the submitting organization have

been fighting 17 years for the clean-up of the Magdalena River, without

success.19 On the basis of all of this, in the Determination of 8 May 1998,20

the Secretariat requested a response to the submission from the Party,

which Mexico presented to the Secretariat 29 July 1998.

SEM-97-002 13

Party’s law that have been pursued,” and that in evaluating the matter, “the Secretariat will be guided by whether ... reasonable actions have been taken to pursue

such remedies prior to initiating a submission ...”

16. Additional filing to the submission, p. 9 and exhibits to the submission.

17. The citizen complaint provided in LGEEPA Articles 189 through 204 allows any

person to approach the environmental authority to denounce presumed violations

of the environmental laws or regulations, or environmental damages. The authority must consider the complaint and, as applicable, take the pertinent measures and

inform the complainant of any ruling made in regard thereof. Thus, the citizen

complaint appears to be a remedy contemplated by the Party and available to the

Submitter before that Party, prior to filing an Article 14 submission. See the following determinations: SEM-98-006 (Grupo Ecológico Manglar) NAAEC Article 15(1)

determination (4 August 2000), and SEM-97-007 (Instituto de Derecho Ambiental)

NAAEC Article 15(1) determination (14 July 2000).

18. Additional filing to the submission, p. 11.

19. Submission, p. 1.

20. SEM-97-002 (Río Magdalena), Article 14(2) determination (8 May 1998).
IV.3 Claims by the Party relating to the alleged retroactive

application of the NAAEC

The Party states that most of the facts set forth by the Submitter

arose before 1 January 1994, when the NAAEC entered into force, and

thus the application of the NAAEC would be retroactive to the Party’s

detriment. It indicates that this would be contrary to the general principle of law that requires disputes to be evaluated according to previously

established bodies and rules.21

Based on the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties,22 the Secretariat considers that NAAEC Article 14 allows the review of an alleged failure to effectively enforce environmental laws that occurs, or the effects

of which persist, during the effective period of the NAAEC, even if the

facts to which this alleged failure refers arose before the entry into force

thereof. The facts to which NAAEC Article 14 applies are not those

underlying the violation for which there was an alleged failure to effectively enforce, but rather those underlying the alleged failure to effectively enforce the environmental laws.23 In other words, the fact that

must be after the entry into force of the NAAEC is the alleged failure to

effectively enforce the environmental laws.

The Submitter describes the pollution problems of the Magdalena

River that have arisen from 1988, six years prior to the entry into force of

the NAAEC, to the April 1997 filing date of the submission. However,

the submission clearly indicates that the failures to effectively enforce

the environmental laws regarding the alleged discharges of untreated

wastewater into the Magdalena River, by the municipalities of Imuris,

Magdalena de Kino and Santa Ana, continued as of the time the submission was filed. Because the alleged violations were continuing at the time

the submission was filed, the application of NAAEC Article 14 is not

retroactive with respect to the alleged failure to effectively enforce the

environmental laws. It does not matter that the alleged discharges of

untreated municipal wastewater into the Magdalena River and other

facts mentioned in the submission began to occur prior to I January 1994.

14 NORTH AMERICAN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY

21. Response of Mexico, p. 8 and 9.

22. Article 28 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties provides that “Unless a

different intention appears from the treaty or is otherwise established, its provisions do not bind a party in relation to any act or fact which took place or any situation which ceased to exist before the date of the entry into force of the treaty with

respect to that party.”

23. See SEM-96-01 (Cozumel) Article 14 and 15 recommendation (7 June 1996) and

SEM-98-001 (Guadalajara) Article 14(1) determination (11 January 2000).
IV.4 Are the provisions invoked by the Submitter applicable

to the facts stated in the submission?

As stated above, the Submitter asserts that Mexico is failing to

effectively enforce its environmental laws with respect to the discharge

of wastewater from the municipalities of Imuris, Magdalena de Kino

and Santa Ana into the Magdalena River, and it invokes 82 legal provisions, although it does not relate them individually to those facts. In its

response to the submission, Mexico argues that the Submitters should

have specified “... which norms actually apply and what aspects thereof

were not enforced; in this perspective it is impossible to establish any

relationship between the environmental problems claimed in the submission and the law that actually applies to the case at hand.”24 Notwithstanding this objection, Mexico’s response addresses these provisions

one by one, indicating how they have been enforced in the case in question and further indicating which provisions the Party deems inapplicable to the facts set forth in the submission.25 Following is a summary of

the analysis of applicability of the provisions cited to the facts set forth in

the submission, in light of Mexico’s response. This analysis took into

account the fact that while the submitters’ arguments on the specific provisions facilitate an analysis of the submission, neither the NAAEC nor

the Guidelines require the submitters to specify the actual provisions of

law whose failure to effectively enforce is alleged. In the case of the

LGEEPA, it suffices to indicate the applicable chapter.26

IV.4.1 Provisions not applicable by reason of jurisdiction

The submission asserts that Mexico is failing to effectively enforce

several provisions of three state laws: the Law of Ecological Balance and

Environmental Protection for the State of Sonora, the Waters Law for the

State of Sonora, and the Health Law for the State of Sonora. Mexico’s

response denies that these state laws are applicable to the facts under the

submission.27 The Party states that pollution prevention and control for

national waters, and specifically the control of wastewater discharges

into national rivers, corresponds to the federal authority through the

CNA, in accordance with the Political Constitution of the United Mexican States, the National Waters Law (Ley de Aguas Nacionales—LAN) and

the LGEEPA. The response indicates that the Magdalena River is a

national property, pursuant to Declaration 207 dated 25 June 1924, pubSEM-97-002 15

24. Response of Mexico, p. 30.

25. Response of Mexico, p. 29 et seq.

26. See Section 5.2 of the Guidelines.

27. Response of Mexico, p. 31 through 33.
lished in the Official Gazette of the Federation on 22 August of that year,

and thus the discharge of wastewater into that river falls under federal

jurisdiction.

LGEEPA Article 5 paragraph XI and Article 86 paragraph III of the

National Waters Law clearly establish such an allocation of jurisdictions.28 Therefore, the Secretariat determines that further review of the

submission’s claims, with respect to the state provisions invoked, is

unwarranted.

IV.4.2 Provisions not applicable by reason of the subject

matter

The submission asserts that Mexico is failing to effectively enforce

its environmental laws by allowing the municipalities of Imuris,

Magdalena de Kino and Santa Ana in the Mexican state of Sonora to discharge wastewater into the Magdalena River without prior treatment.

The provisions cited by the Submitter refer to various aspects of the

regulatory framework regarding water: they establish jurisdictions,

general principles, criteria, obligations and prohibitions for the sustainable use of water, and the prevention and control of water pollution.

However, not all are directly applicable to the facts in the submission,

even though they are all generally related thereto. Considering the arguments set forth in Mexico’s response, and given the lack of concrete arguments from the Submitter as to the reason the Party is deemed to have

failed to effectively enforce each of the cited provisions, the Secretariat

considers that the following provisions of the LGEEPA are not directly

applicable to the subject matter of the submission:

– Article 1 paragraphs I, II, III, V, VI, VIII, IX and X, regarding the

regulatory nature of the LGEEPA;

– Articles 4; 5 paragraphs I, II, III, V, VII, XVI, XVII, XVIII and XIX;

6; 7 paragraphs I, II, VIII, XIX, XI, XII, XIV, XV, XVIII, XIX

16 NORTH AMERICAN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY

28. LGEEPA Article 5.- The following are powers of the Federation:

...XI. The regulation of sustainable use, the protection and preservation of forestry

resources, the soil, national waters, biodiversity, flora, fauna and all other natural

resources under its jurisdiction; ...

LAN Article 86.- “The Commission” (the CNA) shall be responsible for:

...III. Establishing and ensuring compliance with the particular discharge conditions to be met by wastewater generated in properties and zones under federal jurisdiction; of wastewater run off directly into national waters and properties, or onto

any land when such discharges may pollute the subsoil or aquifers; and in all other

cases set forth in the LGEEPA.
and XXI; 8 paragraphs I, II, VII, IX, X, XI, XIII and XV; and 10,

regarding the allocation of jurisdictions and coordination

among authorities;

– Articles 15 and 16, regarding environmental policy;

– Article 23 paragraph VII, regarding the regulation of human settlements;

– Articles 36, 90 and 119, regarding the issuance of Mexican official standards;

– Article 88 paragraphs I through III, containing criteria for the

use of aquatic ecosystems and the hydrological cycle;

– Article 89 paragraphs II and VII, regarding the consideration of

sustainable water use criteria in the granting of permits, concessions and authorizations that may affect the hydrological cycle,

and in the governing program for the urban development of the

Federal District;

– Article 91, regarding the granting of authorizations to affect the

course or currents of waterways;

– Article 96, referring to aquatic ecosystems;

– Articles 98 paragraph IV and 104, regarding the preservation

and sustainable use of the soil;

– Article 108 paragraph I, regarding the exploration and exploitation of nonrenewable resources;

– Article 109 BIS, regarding the inventory of releases and discharges to be kept by the Ministry;

– Article 118 paragraphs I, II, III, V and VI, indicating the governmental activities in which the prevention and control of water

pollution should be considered;

– Article 119 BIS, regarding the powers and obligations of the

state and municipal governments, relating to the prevention

and control of water pollution;

– Article 120, establishing that certain activities are subject to federal or local regulation, in order to prevent water pollution;

– Article 126, providing that urban wastewater treatment systems

must comply with the requirements established in the Mexican

official standards;

SEM-97-002 17
– Article 127, regarding industrial wastewater purification facilities;

– Article 128, providing that wastewater from urban drainage

and sewer systems may be used in industry and farming if it is

treated as provided in the Mexican official standards;

– Article 129, requiring the treatment of waters used in economic

activities likely to pollute them;

– Article 134, establishing criteria for the prevention of soil contamination;

– Article 157, referring to citizen participation in environmental

policy;

– Articles 159 BIS 3, 159 BIS 4 and 159 BIS 5, regarding the right to

environmental information; and

– Article 200, providing that state laws must allow for citizen

complaints.

These articles of the LGEEPA and the cited provisions of the state

laws on environmental protection, water and health will not be further

analyzed in this process, and it is not deemed necessary to analyze them

in respect of the factual record warranted for this submission.

IV.4.3 Provisions relevant to the facts under the submission

Contrarily, also having considered the arguments set forth in

Mexico’s response, the Secretariat finds that LGEEPA Articles 88 paragraph IV, 89 paragraph VI, 93, 117, 121, 122, 123, 124, 133, 189, 190, 191,

192 and 199 are directly applicable to the subject matter of the submission.

Article 88 paragraph IV establishes that water users are responsible for preserving it and using it in a sustainable manner.29 Article 89

paragraph VI establishes that the criteria for the preservation and sustainable use of water (as mentioned in Article 88 paragraph IV, among

others) must be considered in the operation and administration of drinking water and sewer systems serving population centers and indus18 NORTH AMERICAN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY

29. Article 88.- The following criteria shall be considered for the sustainable use of

water and aquatic ecosystems:

...IV.- The preservation and sustainable use of water, as well as of aquatic ecosystems, is the responsibility of the users thereof and of anyone undertaking works or

activities affecting such resources.
tries.30 The municipalities of Imuris, Magdalena de Kino and Santa Ana,

all users of the Magdalena River as receiving bodies for their wastewater

discharges, are responsible for considering these criteria for the sustainable use of the water.

Article 92 refers to the treatment of wastewater, among the actions

that the authorities must promote in order to ensure the availability of

water and to reduce levels of waste.31 LGEEPA Articles 93, 117, 121, 122,

123, 124 and 133 establish obligations, prohibitions, criteria and measures for the prevention and control of water pollution, all of which are

applicable to the discharge of wastewater and to the assertions of the

submission.32 Likewise, LGEEPA Articles 189, 190, 191, 192 and 199

are relevant to the subject matter of the submission, as they regulate

SEM-97-002 19

30. Article 89.- The criteria for the sustainable use of water and aquatic ecosystems

shall be considered in:

...VI.- The operation and administration of drinking water and sewer systems serving population centers and industries;

31. Article 92.- In order to ensure the availability of water and to reduce the levels of

waste, the competent authorities shall promote the saving and efficient use of

water and the treatment and reuse of wastewater.

32. Article 93.- The Secretariat shall undertake the necessary actions to avoid, and as

applicable control, the eutrophication, salinization and any other pollution process

in national waters.

Article 117.- The following criteria shall be considered for the prevention and control of water pollution:

I. The prevention and control of water pollution is fundamental to avoid the

reduced availability thereof and to protect the country’s ecosystems;

II. The State and society have shared responsibility for preventing the pollution of

rivers, basins, vessels, sea waters and other water deposits and currents, including subsoil waters;

III. The use of water in production activities susceptible to producing the pollution

thereof implies the responsibility for treating discharges, returning it to appropriate conditions for use in other activities, and maintaining the balance of ecosystems;

IV. Urban wastewater must receive treatment before being discharged into rivers,

basins, vessels, sea waters and other water deposits and currents, including subsoil waters; and

V. The participation and responsibility of society is an indispensable condition to

prevent water pollution.

Article 121.- Wastewater containing pollutants may not be discharged or leaked

into any body or current of water or into the soil or subsoil, without prior treatment

or without the permit or authorization from the federal authority, or from the local

authority in cases of discharges into waters under local jurisdiction or into the

drainage and sewer systems of population centers.

Article 122.- Wastewater arising from urban public uses and from industrial or

agricultural uses, discharged into the drainage and sewer systems of population

centers or into basins, rivers, waterways, vessels and other water deposits or currents, as well as waters leaked into the subsoil by any means, and in general waters

spilled into the soil, must meet the necessary conditions in order to prevent:

I. Pollution of the receiving bodies;

II. Interference in water filtering processes; and
the citizen complaint procedure.33 The Submitter used this remedy to

denounce the pollution of the Magdalena River from discharges of

wastewater by the municipalities in question.

IV.5 Does the submission warrant the development of a

factual record?

The submission asserts that Mexico is failing to effectively enforce

its environmental laws by not preventing the pollution of the Magdalena River with the discharge of untreated wastewater by the municipalities of Imuris, Magdalena de Kino and Santa Ana in the Mexican state of

Sonora. Taking account of the applicable provisions, the assertions of the

submission that should be examined are:

1. the alleged failure to effectively enforce Articles 93, 117 and 122 of

the LGEEPA, with respect to the general obligation to prevent and

control water pollution in the case of the Magdalena River;

20 NORTH AMERICAN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY

III. Disorders, impediments or alterations in the correct uses or in the appropriate

functioning of the systems, and in the hydraulic capacity of the basins, waterways, vessels, water tables and other deposits in the national domain, as well as

of the sewer systems.

Article 123.- All discharges into the collection networks, rivers, aquifers, basins,

waterways, vessels, sea waters and other water deposits and currents, and spills of

wastewater into soils or the leakage thereof onto lands, must meet the Mexican official standards issued for such purpose and, as applicable, the particular discharge

conditions thereof determined by the Secretariat or the local authorities. The person generating said discharges shall be responsible for the required prior treatment.

Article 124.- When wastewater affects or may affect water supply sources, the Secretariat shall notify the Secretariat of Health and deny or revoke the corresponding

permit or authorization, as the case may be, and as applicable order the suspension

of the supply.

Article 133.- With the corresponding participation of the Secretariat of Health,

applicable pursuant to other provisions of law, the Secretariat shall perform a systematic and ongoing monitoring of water quality, in order to detect the presence of

pollutants or excesses of organic wastes, and apply the appropriate measures. In

the case of waters under local jurisdiction, such actions shall be coordinated with

the authorities of the states, the Federal District and the municipalities.

33. Article 189.- Any person, social group, nongovernmental organization, association

and society may denounce, before the Office of the Federal Attorney General for

Environmental Protection or other authorities, any fact, act or omission that leads

to or may lead to ecological imbalance or damages to the environment or to natural

resources, or which contravene the provisions of this Law and all other provisions

regulating matters related to environmental protection and the preservation of

ecological balance...

Articles 190, 191, 192 and 199 establish the requirements and procedures applicable

to citizen complaints.

Article 200.- The state laws shall establish the procedure for attending to citizen

complaints in the case of acts, facts or omissions that lead to or may lead to ecological imbalance or environmental damages, due to violations of the local environmental laws.
2. the alleged failure to effectively enforce Article 88 paragraph IV

and Article 89 paragraph VI of the LGEEPA, with respect to the

responsibility of the municipalities of Imuris, Magdalena de Kino

and Santa Ana, as users of the (national) waters of the Magdalena

River, to use them sustainably;

3. the alleged failure to effectively enforce Articles 92, 117 paragraph

IV, 121 and 123 of the LGEEPA, with respect to the discharges of

wastewater from the municipalities of Imuris, Magdalena de Kino

and Santa Ana into the Magdalena River, regarding the obligation

of any person discharging wastewater to give prior treatment to

the discharges in order to prevent the pollution of the receiving

bodies;

4. the alleged failure to effectively enforce Articles 121 and 124 of the

LGEEPA, with respect to the granting and cancellation of the

wastewater permits for the municipalities of Imuris, Magdalena de

Kino and Santa Ana;

5. the alleged failure to effectively enforce Article 123 of the LGEEPA,

with respect to the wastewater discharges into the Magdalena

River, regarding compliance with the applicable Mexican official

standards;

6. the alleged failure to effectively enforce Article 133 of the LGEEPA,

by not performing an ongoing and systematic monitoring of the

water quality of the Magdalena River; and

7. the alleged failure to effectively enforce Articles 189 through 192

and 199 of the LGEEPA, with respect to the citizen complaints filed

on the pollution of the Magdalena River.

Following is an examination of these assertions in light of Mexico’s

response, and an explanation of the reasons why the Secretariat considers that the submission warrants the development of a factual record.

IV.5.1 Alleged failure to effectively enforce the general

obligation to prevent and control water pollution

(LGEEPA Articles 93, 117 and 122)

Article 93 provides that the federal authority shall undertake the

necessary actions to prevent or control the pollution of national waters.

Article 117 provides that for preventing and controlling water pollution,

SEM-97-002 21
criteria must be considered that, in essence, establish the principles of

prevention and control of water pollution, of the prior treatment of

wastewater discharges, and of the State’s and society’s shared responsibility to prevent water pollution. Article 122 of the LGEEPA requires

that wastewater arising from urban public uses meet the necessary conditions to prevent the pollution of the receiving bodies.

In Chapter IV of Mexico’s response, the Party describes the environmental problems of the Magdalena River at that time. Mexico’s

response asserts: “According to the water quality monitoring performed

by the CNA for the classification thereof, it can be seen that the waterway

has the capacity to assimilate or attenuate the impact of the wastewater

discharges it receives.”34 However, the party did not provide more

information on the classification of the waters of the Magdalena River,

nor did its response specify the parameters used to characterize the

wastewater referenced therein.35 The Party confirms that the municipalities of Imuris, Magdalena de Kino and Santa Ana discharge their

wastewater into the aforesaid river, but it clarifies that in the case of

Imuris and Magdalena de Kino the discharges are treated in oxidation

lagoons,36 and further recognizes that these systems show deficiencies.37

Mexico’s response indicates:

It should be mentioned that the treatment of wastewater from the country’s various population centers is a goal that the Mexican government has

not been able to fully attain, and that the progress in this area is subject to

the availability of budgetary resources. Given the foregoing, it should be

noted that, despite the existence of a general obligation to treat wastewater

from the population centers under both federal and state laws, the economic limitations faced by the country still make it impossible to fully

enforce this provision, while the corresponding government plans now

set a clear strategy for the gradual solution of the nationwide problem of

wastewater treatment.38

Specifically with respect to Article 93, Mexico’s response asserts

that due compliance has been given to this article through the creation of

a regulatory framework to control the pollution processes of national

waters, and through the oversight of compliance with the corresponding Mexican official standards.39 The issuance of Mexican official standards and the oversight of compliance therewith constitute measures

22 NORTH AMERICAN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY

34. Response of Mexico, p. 13.

35. Response of Mexico, Exhibit 23, p. 40 of the Magdalena, Sonora project.

36. Response of Mexico, p. 13.

37. Response of Mexico, p. 34 and 35.

38. Ibid.

39. Response of Mexico, p. 47.
that may contribute to the prevention of pollution processes in national

waters. However, those measures do not in and of themselves constitute

effective enforcement of Article 93, the purpose of which is not the issuance of standards but the prevention and control of water pollution. The

submission states precisely that in spite of the issuance of various laws to

prevent water pollution and the fact that these laws and the institutional

oversight frameworks have undergone numerous modifications,

according to the Submitters, measures for the effective enforcement of

these provisions have not been taken.40 Mexico’s response asserts that

the CNA oversees compliance with the applicable Mexican official standards, but does not provide information to support the statement that

such oversight is effectively carried out, and thus the central questions

raised in the submission on this matter remain open.

With respect to the effective enforcement of LGEEPA Article 117,

the Party’s response refers only to Paragraph IV, establishing the need to

give treatment to urban wastewater discharges and stating that this has

been done because treatment infrastructure exists in two of the municipalities and there is a project to build one in the third.41 With respect to

the latter, the municipality of Santa Ana, the Party asserts that it does not

have a water wastewater treatment system, and such waters are discharged near the Magdalena River, although a project exists to build an

oxidation lagoon.42 In the other two municipalities, there are projects to

extend or build the treatment infrastructure to correct the deficiencies.

The Party accompanied its response with copies of documents describing those projects.43 The prior treatment of discharges is one of the criteria provided in Article 117, but it is not independent of the purpose of

that provision, namely the prevention and control of water pollution.

The response asserts that the infrastructure exists for wastewater treatment, as do projects to improve such infrastructure, but the information

provided does not indicate that such infrastructure is meeting the objective of preventing and controlling water pollution of the Magdalena

River, in the case of the municipalities of Imuris, Magdalena de Kino and

Santa Ana, and thus the issue raised in the submission as to the lack of

effective enforcement of the Article 117 criteria remains unresolved.

With regard to LGEEPA Article 122, which sets forth the concrete

obligation that wastewater from urban public uses must meet the necesSEM-97-002 23

40. Submission, p. 10 and 11.

41. Response of Mexico, p. 49.

42. Response of Mexico, p. 17.

43. Response of Mexico, p. 13 through 16, 28, 29 and Exhibit 23 “Project for Adaptation

and/or Extension of the Sanitary Sewer Systems and Wastewater Treatment Plants

for the Cities of Imuris, Magdalena, and Santa Ana.”
sary conditions to prevent the pollution of receiving bodies, again the

Party responds by indicating that the infrastructure exists for the treatment of wastewater discharges.44 As in the case of Articles 93 and 117,

the purpose of this provision is to prevent the pollution of the receiving

bodies, and thus the existence of treatment plants (which the Party itself

deems deficient) does not seem to be sufficient to resolve the issue raised

in the submission of a failure to effectively enforce this provision.

The measures mentioned by the Party do not seem to have ensured

that the wastewater from urban public uses (specifically, the discharges

from the municipalities of Imuris, Magdalena de Kino and Santa Ana)

meet the necessary conditions to prevent the pollution of the Magdalena

River, in effective enforcement of the corresponding criteria and of the

general obligation to prevent or control water pollution, pursuant to

Articles 93, 117 and 122 of the LGEEPA. Therefore, the Secretariat considers that the alleged failure to effectively enforce these provisions, as

set forth in this submission, warrants the development of a factual

record with respect to the discharge of wastewater from the municipalities of Imuris, Magdalena de Kino and Santa Ana in the Mexican state of

Sonora.

IV.5.2 Alleged failure to effectively enforce the responsibility

of users of water for its preservation and sustainable

use (LGEEPA Articles 88 paragraph IV and 89

paragraph VI)

Articles 88 paragraph IV and 89 paragraph VI of the LGEEPA

establish the responsibility of users of water for its preservation and

sustainable use. Under these articles, the municipalities of Imuris,

Magdalena de Kino and Santa Ana, as users of the Magdalena River as a

receiving body of their wastewater discharges, are responsible for the

preservation and sustainable use of the water and must consider the sustainable water use criteria with respect to the wastewater discharges

from their sewer systems. Mexico’s response does not refer to the

enforcement of Article 88. As for Article 89, it asserts that it does not fall

under the subject matter of the submission and that since the concepts of

sustainable use and aquatic ecosystems are so broad, the Party cannot

refute any violation that may be denounced.45

It is clear that these provisions, by establishing the responsibility of

the municipalities as users of water, do fall under the subject matter of

24 NORTH AMERICAN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY

44. Response of Mexico, p. 51.

45. Response of Mexico, p. 44 and 45.
the submission. Although the provisions are broad, the responsibility

they provide for is part of the context that frames the other enforceable

obligations of prevention and control of water pollution that are the subject of the submission. These provisions are relevant in this contextual

sense and should be considered in the factual record the development of

which is warranted with respect to this submission.

IV.5.3 Alleged failure to effectively enforce the obligation

to give prior treatment to wastewater discharges

(LGEEPA Articles 92, 117 paragraph IV, 121 and 123)

The main allegation of the submission is that Mexico is failing to

effectively enforce its environmental laws because it allows the municipalities of Imuris, Magdalena de Kino and Santa Ana to discharge their

wastewater into the Magdalena River without giving it the treatment

necessary to prevent pollution of the river. Article 92 provides that treatment and reuse of wastewater shall be promoted to ensure the availability and reduce its waste, while Articles 117 paragraph IV, 121 and 123

of the LGEEPA set forth the obligation to give prior treatment to

wastewater discharges to prevent the pollution of the receiving bodies.

In its response, Mexico admits that there are deficiencies in the

treatment of wastewater discharged into the Magdalena River.46 However, the response indicates that “the economic conditions of the municipalities, state and federation limit the execution of action plans for the

construction of sanitation systems.”47 Additional information is warranted on this statement, especially in light of the submission’s claim

that sufficient funds do exist to attend to these matters. The Submitter

asserts that the municipalities “collect 35 % on each monthly bill for

drinking water consumption, drainage and sewer”48 and that the money

is spent on works that the Submitter deems unnecessary.49

With regard to Article 92, the question of whether this provision

is effectively enforced does not stand in light of Mexico’s response,

because the purpose of this provision is only to promote wastewater

SEM-97-002 25

46. According to the response, the oxidation lagoons with which the municipality of

Magdalena de Kino treats its wastewater are obsolete and insufficient. In the case of

the municipality of Santa Ana there is not a wastewater treatment system. As for

Imuris, the Party asserts that, according to information provided by the state and

municipal governments, an anaerobic lagoon and a facultative lagoon began operation 11 June 1998 for the treatment of wastewater. Response of Mexico, p. 14.

47. Response of Mexico, p. 23.

48. Additional filing to the submission, p. 11.

49. Submission, p. 2.
treatment, and the actions described by the Party are precisely actions to

promote the treatment of wastewater.50

Unlike Article 92, in the case of Article 117, the obligation is not to

promote treatment but rather that the result of such promotion efforts be

the prevention and control of water pollution. As stated above, the

Party’s response refers only to paragraph IV, which establishes the need

to give treatment to urban wastewater discharges, and asserts that this

has been fulfilled because the treatment infrastructure exists in two of

the municipalities, with a construction project in the third.51 The obligation to give prior treatment to the discharges as a measure to prevent and

control water pollution is not satisfied by the mere existence of treatment

plants, but rather such treatment must effectively prevent or control

water pollution. The Party’s argument also does not suffice to show

effective enforcement of Article 117, by having programmed and budgeted the necessary investment to solve the deficiencies or lack of

wastewater treatment in the municipalities of Magdalena de Kino and

Santa Ana, since planning the future compliance with that provision is

insufficient to consider that there has been effective enforcement.

In addition, while the response states that projects exist and have

been budgeted, it does not state that such projects are being implemented nor does it show that the corresponding financing has actually

been allocated in an approved budget. It also is not clear whether the

budget would be covered by the CNA or the municipalities. This fact

was noted and the respective documents were requested in the request

for additional information sent by the Secretariat to the Party 13 September 2000. For example, the Secretariat sought information on the development of these projects by also requesting information from the Party

on the filing, with the corresponding authority, of the preventive

environmental impact statement for the three projects, referenced in

numeral 11 of each project report, under the heading “Environmental

Impact Study,” and on the procedure that would have applied to such

preventive statements. As indicated, no response to that request has

been received.

Article 121 of the LGEEPA may be summarized as a prohibition to

discharge wastewater containing pollutants, without prior treatment

and without authorization from the competent authority. In light of the

Party’s response, the alleged failure to effectively enforce this provision

cannot be dismissed. Mexico’s response is limited to indicating that, as

of the filing date of the response, the municipalities involved have not

26 NORTH AMERICAN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY

50. Response of Mexico, p. 46 and 47.

51. Response of Mexico, p. 49.
received the corresponding wastewater discharge permits. Particularly

in the case of the municipality of Santa Ana, the matter of the effective

enforcement of Article 121 persists, insofar as this municipality has been

allowed to discharge its wastewater with no prior treatment whatsoever, in contravention of the express prohibition established in that article.

In sum, the alleged failure to effectively enforce Article 92 does not

warrant further consideration, while the allegation relating to Articles

117, 121 and 123 cannot be dismissed in light of Mexico’s response, and

thus the development of a factual record is warranted with respect to

those provisions. The factual record is appropriate to develop information relating to the undertaking of the necessary works in the municipality of Santa Ana to treat the wastewater prior to discharge, the correction

of deficiencies in the treatment system of the municipality of Magdalena

de Kino, and the operating efficiency of the Imuris treatment system, in

order to attain the objectives of these provisions with respect to the

Magdalena River, namely the prevention or control of water pollution.

IV.5.4 Alleged failure to effectively enforce the requirement

to have a wastewater discharge permit, and the

potential cancellation thereof in the case of pollution

of waters intended for human consumption

(LGEEPA Articles 121 and 124)

The discharge of wastewater containing pollutants requires a permit or authorization from the competent authority pursuant to Article

121, which shall not be granted or shall be revoked when the wastewater

affects or may affect water supply sources, in accordance with Article

124. The Submitter asserts that the Magdalena River is the only water

supply source in the region and that it has been subjected to pollution

and environmental damage due to the discharges of wastewater from

the municipalities of Imuris, Magdalena de Kino and Santa Ana, for

17 years prior to the filing of the submission.52 The information provided

in Mexico’s response confirms that the municipalities in question discharge their wastewater into the Magdalena River and that they do not

have the corresponding discharge permits, although those permits were

supposedly being processed at the time the response was filed.53

As regards the use of the Magdalena River for human consumption, in its description of the municipal water infrastructure provided in

the response, the Party asserts that the drinking water supply in the

SEM-97-002 27

52. Submission, p. 2 last paragraph, and additional filing to the submission, p. 1 and 12.

53. Response of Mexico, p. 36.
three municipalities in question comes from deep wells: two in Imuris,

four in Magdalena de Kino and four in Santa Ana. Mexico’s response

specifies that two of the wells in Magdalena de Kino are adjacent to the

left bank of the Magdalena River.54 While this information is useful for

understanding the context of the matter raised in the submission, this

information does not counter the Submitters’ assertion that the wastewater discharges from these municipalities pollute waters intended for

human consumption in the towns of the region.55

The Party’s response recognizes that the waters of the Magdalena

River are polluted, and that it has even sanctioned farmers who use it for

irrigation. The Party nevertheless asserts that, according to a CNA

study, the pollution is due to “open-air defecation practices, discharges

of domestic drainage, and the disposal of trash and organic matter.”56 In

the same sense, the response states that a well was closed in Imuris

(without specifying the date) because it was seriously polluted, and indicates that the cause of the pollution was that most people in the town

discharge their wastewater in outhouses, wastewater wells and septic

tanks.57

These affirmations by the Party do not demonstrate that the

Magdalena River is not polluted, nor that the wastewater discharges

into the Magdalena River do not pollute water supply sources or that

they are being done with the authorization required under law. Furthermore, they are not supported by information allowing for confirmation

of the data upon which they are based. Given that the information provided by the Party in its response confirms the Submitters’ assertion that

the municipalities of Imuris, Magdalena de Kino and Santa Ana do not

have discharge permits and does not refute the assertion that these

wastewater discharges pollute water supply sources, review of the effective enforcement of Articles 121 and 124 is warranted in the factual

record the development of which is warranted with respect to this

submission.

IV.5.5 Alleged failure to effectively enforce the applicable

Mexican official standards (LGEEPA Article 123)

The Submitter alleges a failure to effectively enforce Article 123,

which establishes among other things that all discharges into rivers

must satisfy the Mexican official standards issued for such purpose.

28 NORTH AMERICAN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY

54. Response of Mexico, p. 14-16.

55. Submission, p. 1 and additional filing to the submission, p. 11.

56. Response of Mexico, p. 18-23.

57. Response of Mexico, p. 14.
On 6 January 1996, Mexican Official Standard NOM-001-ECOL1996 (NOM-001), establishing the maximum allowable limits of pollutants in wastewater discharges into national waters and properties, was

published in the Official Gazette of the Federation. NOM-001 is binding

for the municipalities involved, establishing the following obligations

for those responsible for wastewater discharges into receiving bodies or

properties under federal jurisdiction:

• The discharges of wastewater must comply with the parameters

established in the standard, before being released.

• The persons responsible for the wastewater discharges must

monitor the quality of the discharges and report it periodically

to the CNA.

• The persons responsible for wastewater discharges that exceed

the maximum allowable limits established therein must file a

works and actions plan with the CNA, for controlling the quality of its discharges.

• Once said plans are filed, the CNA must be informed semiannually on the progress in the control of discharges.

Compliance deadlines are established for some of the obligations

contained in this standard. Accordingly, point 4.5 of NOM-001 establishes that the date as of which the municipalities’ discharges must comply with the respective parameters is determined based on the number

of inhabitants in the municipalities.58 Considering the data provided by

the Party in its response,59 the municipalities of Imuris and Santa Ana

must comply with the parameters of NOM-001 as of 1 January 2010,

while the municipality of Magdalena de Kino must do so as of 1 January

2005.

The filing date of the works and actions plan also varies according

to the population size of each municipality. The municipalities of Imuris

and Santa Ana were to have filed by 31 December 1999, while the municipality of Magdalena de Kino was to have filed by 31 December 1998.

However, there is no basis for concluding that the deadline for the

municipalities to comply with the parameters of NOM-001 implies that

SEM-97-002 29

58. The number of inhabitants is determined by the data found in the XI National Population and Housing Census, corresponding to 1990, published by the National

Institute of Statistics, Geography and Information (Instituto Nacional de Estadística,

Geografía e Informática–Inegi).

59. Response of Mexico, p. 24.
the municipalities are exempt from compliance with their other enforceable obligations under the LGEEPA and the NOM-001. For example,

there is no deadline or exemption with respect to compliance with the

municipalities’ obligation to treat their wastewater. The obligation to

monitor the discharges and report them periodically is not subject to

deadlines either. In accordance with point 4.8 of NOM-001, and according to the data reported by the Party as to the number of inhabitants, the

municipalities of Imuris and Santa Ana are required to take semiannual

measurements and report them annually to the CNA, while Magdalena

de Kino must take quarterly measurements and report them semiannually to the CNA. Mexico’s response does not indicate that this monitoring has been performed and reported.

The Party asserts that in 1997 the CNA entered into an agreement

for the development of a “Project for Adaptation and/or Extension of

the Sanitary Sewer Systems and Wastewater Treatment Plants for the

Cities of Imuris, Magdalena, and Santa Ana” as a measure to solve the

environmental problems of the Magdalena River, copies of which were

included in the response.60 However, while the pollutant levels in

wastewater discharges are not yet enforceable, it is not clear whether the

Party has started the works and adaptations that it claims to have

planned in order to comply with those obligations.

Mexico’s response does not include information on the enforcement for the municipalities in question, with respect to the NOM-001

obligations that are not subject to deadlines, nor on the execution of the

project that is intended to allow the municipalities in question to comply

with the pollutant limits set forth in the standard, when applicable.

Thus, the Secretariat considers that the development of a factual record,

with respect to the alleged failure to effectively enforce LGEEPA Article

123 regarding NOM-001, is warranted.

IV.5.6 Alleged failure to effectively enforce the monitoring of

water quality (LGEEPA Article 133)

Article 133 establishes the obligation of the Secretariat of Environment and Natural Resources (Secretaría del Medio Ambiente y Recursos

Naturales—Semarnat) to perform, with the corresponding participation

of the Secretariat of Health, the systematic and ongoing monitoring of

water quality in order to detect pollutants or excess organic waste, and

apply appropriate measures. The Party indicates in its response that in

applying this provision, the CNA has performed water quality monitor30 NORTH AMERICAN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY

60. Response of Mexico, p. 28 and Exhibit 23.
ing on the Magdalena River and that inspection visits have been performed, companies closed and farmers fined (pursuant to NOM-033)

based on such monitoring.61 These actions carried out by the CNA

clearly fall under the provisions of Article 133. However, the information provided by the Party is limited to describing one instance in which

monitoring resulted in measures and does not refer to “systematic and

ongoing” monitoring, as provided in Article 133.

In this sense, consideration of the effective enforcement of Article

133 in the factual record, the development of which is warranted with

respect to this submission, is justified.

IV.5.7 Alleged failure to effectively enforce the citizen

complaint procedure (LGEEPA Articles 189 through

192 and 199)

The Submitter asserts that on numerous occasions it approached

various federal and local authorities to notify them of the environmental

problems of the Magdalena River, requesting that solutions be adopted,

without receiving any response to its demands.62

The Party asserts that it has handled three complaints filed by the

Submitter, detailing the procedure and results thereof. Two of the complaints refer to the submission filed in 1992 and, according to the Party,

they were processed in accordance with the LGEEPA.63 Given that those

two complaints were filed before the NAAEC entered into force and

were concluded in 1992 and 1993, the alleged failure to effectively

enforce the LGEEPA regarding them is not reviewed further. Only the

citizen complaint filed in January 1997 is examined.

The Party confirms that in 1997 the Office of the Federal Attorney

General for Environmental Protection (Procuraduría Federal de Protección

al Ambiente—Profepa) received a filing from the Submitter, denouncing

the problems of the Magdalena River, which was remitted to the Profepa

delegation in the state of Sonora to be handled as a citizen complaint.

Simultaneously—the Party asserts—information was requested from

the CNA on the problems described, and the complainants were

informed of the processing of their filing. The Party describes other CNA

actions relating to this citizen complaint and asserts that, at the time its

response was filed, the processing of the citizen complaint had not yet

been concluded.64

SEM-97-002 31

61. Response of Mexico, p. 18 through 23 and 55.

62. Submission, p. 1.

63. Response of Mexico, p. 24 through 27.

64. Response of Mexico, p. 28.
The Secretariat considers that, since the submission does not

express a specific argument as to the supposed failure to effectively

enforce Articles 189, 190, 191, 192 and 199 of the LGEEPA relating to the

citizen complaint procedure and, given the actions described in Mexico’s response, it is not necessary to continue reviewing this assertion in

the factual record warranted with respect to this submission, beyond the

inclusion of the results of the processing thereof, which had not yet

concluded.

IV.5.8 Summary

In sum, the Secretariat considers that the development of a factual

record is warranted on the effective enforcement of some of the provisions invoked by the submission. In addition to providing relevant

information on whether Mexico effectively enforces its environmental

laws regarding the discharges of wastewater from the municipalities of

Imuris, Magdalena de Kino and Santa Ana into the Magdalena River, the

factual record could allow for a better understanding of the actions

undertaken by the Party to effectively enforce its environmental laws on

the prevention of water pollution, with respect to the discharge of those

municipalities’ wastewater. It will also allow for a clarification of the

relationship between NOM-001 and the general obligations of the federation and municipalities, regarding the prevention of the pollution of

national waters, and as to drainage, sewer and municipal wastewater

treatment services. Likewise, it would gather information to clarify

which functions, responsibilities and obligations fall upon the operating

agencies, the municipal government and the federal government with

respect to the “Project for Adaptation and/or Extension of the Sanitary

Sewer Systems and Wastewater Treatment Plants for the Cities of

Imuris, Magdalena, and Santa Ana” that accompanies Mexico’s

response,65 and information on the progress made in this Project.

Furthermore, based on the reasons set forth in this determination,

the Secretariat considers that the development of a factual record is not

warranted with respect to the failure to effectively enforce articles 1

paragraphs I, II, III, V, VI, VIII, IX and X, 4, 5 paragraphs I, II, III, V, VII,

XVI, XVII, XVIII and XIX, 6, 7 paragraphs I, II, VIII, XIX, XI, XII, XIV, XV,

XVIII, XIX and XXI, 8 paragraphs I, II, VII, IX, X, XI, XIII and XV, 10, 15,

16, 23 paragraph VII, 36, 88 paragraphs I through III, 89 paragraphs II

32 NORTH AMERICAN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY

65. The functions arising under this project do not seem to coincide with those established in the LGEEPA, the LAN or NOM-001. (LGEEPA Articles 88 paragraph IV,

89 paragraph VI, 93, 117 paragraph IV, 118 paragraph V, 119 BIS, 121, 122, 123 and

133; LAN Articles 88, 89 and 90.)
and VII, 90, 91, 96, 98 paragraph IV, 104, 108 paragraph I, 109 BIS, 118

paragraphs I, II, III, V and VI, 119, 119 BIS, 120, 126, 127, 128, 129, 134, 157,

159 BIS 3, 159 BIS 4 and 159 BIS 5, 189, 190, 191, 192, 199 and 200 of the

LGEEPA; as well as with respect to all provisions invoked of the following state laws: the Law of Ecological Balance and Environmental Protection for the State of Sonora, the Waters Law for the State of Sonora, and

the Health Law for the State of Sonora.

V. NOTIFICATION TO COUNCIL IN ACCORDANCE

WITH ARTICLE 15(1) OF THE NAAEC

In accordance with NAAEC Article 15(1), the Secretariat hereby

notifies Council that, based on the reasons set forth in this determination, it considers that submission SEM-97-002 filed by Comité Pro

Limpieza del Río Magdalena warrants the development of a factual

record with respect to the assertion that Mexico is failing to effectively

enforce Articles 88 paragraph IV, 89 paragraph VI, 92, 93, 117, 121, 122,

123, 124 and 133 of the LGEEPA, as of 1 January 1994, with respect to the

pollution of the Magdalena River by the discharge of the wastewater of

the municipalities of Imuris, Magdalena de Kino and Santa Ana in the

Mexican state of Sonora.

Respectfully submitted for your consideration on this 5 of February 2002.

Janine Ferretti

Executive Director

SEM-97-002 33

SEM-98-003

(Great Lakes)

SUBMITTER: DEPARTMENT OF THE PLANET EARTH,

ET AL.

PARTY: United States of America

DATE: 27 May 1998

SUMMARY: The Submitters assert that the US Environmental

Protection Agency’s regulations drafted and programs adopted to control airborne emissions of

dioxins and furans, mercury and other persistent

toxic substances from solid waste and medical

waste incinerators violate and fail to enforce both:

1) US domestic laws, and; 2) the ratified USCanadian treaties designed to protect the Great

Lakes that are partly referenced in the US Clean

Air Act.

SECRETARIAT DETERMINATIONS:

ART. 14(1)*

(14 December 1998)

Determination that criteria under Article 14(1)

have not been met.

REV. SUBM.

ART. 14(1)(2)*

(8 September 1999)

Determination that criteria under Article 14(1)

have been met and determination pursuant

to Article 14(2) that the submission merits

requesting a response from the Party.

ART. 15(1)

(5 October 2001)

Determination under Article 15(1) that development of a factual record is not warranted.

* Published in Volume 5 (Fall 2000) of the North American Environmental Law and Policy

Series.

35

Secretariat of the Commission for

Environmental Cooperation of North America

Secretariat Determination under Article 15(1) that

Development of a Factual Record is Not Warranted

Submission Number: SEM-98-003 (Great Lakes)

Submitter(s): Department of the Planet Earth;

Sierra Club of Canada;

Friends of the Earth;

Washington Toxics Coalition;

National Coalition Against Misuse of Pesticides;

WASHPIRG;

International Institute of Concern for Public

Health;

Dr. Joseph Cummins; and

Reach for Unbleached

Concerned Party: United States

Date Received: 27 May 1998

Date of this Notification: 5 October 2001

I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Article 14 of theNorth American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation (NAAEC or the “Agreement”) creates a mechanism for citizens to

file submissions in which they assert that a Party to the NAAEC is failing

to effectively enforce its environmental law. The Secretariat of the Commission for Environmental Cooperation (the “CEC”) initially considers

these submissions based on criteria contained in Article 14(1) of the

NAAEC. When the Secretariat determines that a submission meets these

criteria, the Secretariat then determines based on factors contained in

Article 14(2) whether the submission merits requesting a response from

37
the Party named in the submission. If the Secretariat considers that the

submission, in light of any response from the Party, warrants developing a factual record, the Secretariat must inform Council and provide its

reasons (Article 15(1)). The Secretariat dismisses the submission if it

believes that development of a factual record is not warranted.

On 27 May 1998, the Submitters filed with the Secretariat a submission alleging that the United States is failing to effectively enforce certain

obligations regarding the deposition into the Great Lakes of airborne

emissions of dioxin and mercury from solid and medical waste incinerators. Following the Secretariat’s dismissal of that original submission,

the Submitters filed an amended submission on 4 January 1999. The

amended submission included allegations that the United States is failing to effectively enforce certain obligations to inspect and monitor

incinerators emitting dioxin and mercury, to notify certain states that

they must reduce such dioxin and mercury emissions because of adverse

impacts of the emissions in Canada and to implement measures that

would lead to the virtual elimination of all such dioxin and mercury

emissions.

On 8 September 1999, the Secretariat concluded that the two assertions in the 4 January 1999 amended submission regarding the United

States’ inspection and monitoring of incinerators and its alleged failure

to notify states in light of adverse impacts in Canada merited a response from the United States. On 1 December 1999, the United States

responded to the submission. On 24 July 2000, 6 November 2000 and

14 November 2000, the United States provided additional information

regarding the allegations in the submission in response to a 24 March

2000 request from the Secretariat for information pursuant to Article 21

of the NAAEC.

The Secretariat has determined that the submission does not warrant preparation of a factual record, and that the submission should

therefore be dismissed. The rationale for this conclusion is presented

below

II. SUMMARY OF THE ORIGINAL AND AMENDED

SUBMISSIONS

A. The Original Submission

On 27 May 1998, the Submitters filed with the Secretariat a submission on enforcement matters pursuant to Article 14 of the NAAEC. The

submission concerned airborne emissions of dioxin and mercury into

38 NORTH AMERICAN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY
the Great Lakes and claimed that those emissions posed a significant

threat to public health and the environment. The submission alleged

that solid and medical waste incinerators in the United States are substantial sources of these emissions and that regulations issued by the US

Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) governing emissions from

those incinerators conflict with the domestic laws of the United States

and with certain provisions of ratified US-Canadian agreements

because the regulations authorize greater emissions than contemplated

by these statutes and agreements. The submission claimed that these

purported inconsistencies constituted a failure to effectively enforce for

purposes of Article 14.

On 14 December 1998, the Secretariat determined that the Article

14 process was not an appropriate forum for the issues raised in the

27 May 1998 submission because the core of the submission was the

assertion that the Party has created an inconsistency in its substantive

emission standards. The Secretariat explained its conclusion as follows:

We do not believe that the adoption of regulations that contain emission

standards that allegedly are less stringent than the standards established

in governing legislation constitutes a “failure to effectively enforce” for

purposes of Article 14. Instead, the regulations in such a case would represent an inconsistency in the governing legal standards. Addressing purported inconsistencies of this sort is, in our view, beyond the scope of

Article 14.1

The Secretariat accordingly dismissed the Submission.

B. The “New and Amended” Submission

On 4 January 1999, the Submitters filed a “new and amended submission.” This submission continued to assert that solid waste and medical incinerators in the United States are substantial sources of dioxin

and mercury emissions. The submission further asserted that various

domestic and international legal instruments obligated EPA to take several actions to address those emissions. These actions included (1)

inspecting and otherwise monitoring emissions from such incinerators;

(2) advising “host states” that incinerators within their jurisdictions are

contributing air pollution that may be endangering public health or welfare in a foreign country, thereby triggering such states’ obligation to

reduce such pollution; and (3) requiring such incinerators to implement

SEM-98-003 39

1. See SEM-98-003 (Great Lakes), Determination pursuant to Article 14(1) (14 December

1998).
pollution prevention approaches and the like to achieve the goal of virtually eliminating those emissions. The submission claimed that the

United States has not fulfilled those obligations and that this asserted

failure constitutes a failure to “effectively enforce” for purposes of Article 14 of the NAAEC.

In a determination dated 8 September 1999, the Secretariat concluded that two assertions in the 4 January 1999 submission met the criteria in Article 14 and that those assertions merited a response from the

Party in light of the factors listed in Article 14(2). The first assertion

related to the Party’s alleged failure to inspect and monitor incinerator

emissions adequately. The Secretariat determined that maintaining an

adequate inspection/compliance monitoring scheme is an inherent part

of enforcement, noting that Article 5(1)(b) specifically identifies “monitoring compliance” as a type of government enforcement action. The

second assertion related to the Party’s alleged failure to effectively

enforce § 115 of the Clean Air Act, 42 USC. § 7415. According to the submission, EPA had failed to notify the Governor of states in which emissions originated that those emissions could reasonably be anticipated to

endanger public health or welfare in a foreign country — in this case,

Canada. The Secretariat found that the submission alleged that EPA was

failing to effectively enforce a clear, specific legal obligation and therefore that the allegation satisfied the requirements of Article 14(1).

The Secretariat concluded in its 8 September 1999 determination

that a third assertion in the 4 January 1999 submission — notably that the

Clean Air Act and the Pollution Prevention Act provide a hierarchy

of strategies for addressing waste that favors pollution prevention

approaches, and that EPA has failed to propose pollution prevention as

a mandatory component with regard to regulation of incinerators —

raised an issue relating to general legislative direction that is not the

proper ground for an Article 14 submission because it has little in common with the types of government actions that qualify as enforcement

under the NAAEC. The Secretariat therefore did not request a response

from the United States as to this third assertion.

The Secretariat dismissed the assertions relating to alleged failures

to enforce the Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement or the 1986 Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the

Government of Canada Concerning the Transboundary Movement of

Hazardous Waste because it was not persuaded that these agreements

are “environmental laws” for purposes of Article 14. The Secretariat

noted that, “by making this determination, the Secretariat is not exclud40 NORTH AMERICAN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY
ing the possibility that future submissions may raise questions concerning a Party’s international obligations that would meet the criteria in

Article 14(1).”2

III. SUMMARY OF THE RESPONSE AND INFORMATION

OBTAINED UNDER ARTICLE 21

A. The United States’ Response

The United States submitted a response dated 1 December 1999. In

that response, the United States claimed that preparation of a factual

record on the Submitters’ claims would not significantly advance the

goals of the NAAEC. According to the United States, the allegation concerning EPA’s inspection and monitoring activities does not meet the

requirements of the NAAEC because the submission failed to refer to the

specific environmental laws that the United States is allegedly failing to

enforce,3 and it failed to indicate that the Submitters had ever communicated to the United States the allegation that EPA was failing to enforce

United States law due to inadequate inspection and compliance monitoring, as required by Article 14(1)(e) (see also Guideline 5.5). The

United States also asserted that the Submitters failed to comply with

Article 14(2)(c), which relates to the pursuit of private remedies under

the domestic laws of the Party.

Further, the United States asserted that even if the submission satisfies these provisions of the NAAEC and the Guidelines, the United

States is not failing to effectively enforce its environmental law relating

to the inspection and compliance monitoring of mercury and dioxin

emissions from municipal waste combustors (“MWCs”) and hospital/medical/infectious waste incinerators (“HMIWIs”). Among other

things, the United States asserted that for most MWCs and HMIWIs,

there were no United States legal provisions in effect which required

testing of dioxin emissions during much of the period covered by the

Submission. The United States claimed in its response that EPA monitoring programs for dioxins and mercury emissions from MWCs and

HMIWIs satisfy the requirements of applicable United States law and

enable the United States to determine whether these facilities are in compliance with applicable emission requirements.

SEM-98-003 41

2. See SEM-98-003 (Great Lakes), Determination pursuant to Articles 14(1) and (2)

(8 September 1999).

3. See Guideline 5.2 of the Guidelines for Submissions on Enforcement Matters Under

Article 14 and 15 of the North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation.
The United States also claimed that it is not failing to effectively

enforce § 115 of the Clean Air Act. The United States claimed that it is not

aware that EPA has ever received any request by a duly constituted

international agency that EPA take action to address the impacts of

dioxin and mercury emissions in the Great Lakes region on Canada and

therefore that EPA was not obligated to take any action under § 115. In

addition, the United States claimed that it is not failing to enforce the

provisions of § 115 because EPA retains discretion whether or not to

issue an endangerment finding and EPA has not delayed unreasonably

in exercising that discretion.

Finally, the United States asserted that it is taking significant action

to reduce atmospheric deposition of dioxins and mercury from MWCs

and HMIWIs, including deposition to the Great Lakes ecosystem. As a

result, the United States believes that preparation of a factual record

would be of limited utility and would not significantly advance the goals

of the NAAEC. In particular, the United States pointed to the implementation of binational frameworks that include the Great Lakes Binational

Toxics Strategy of April 1997, the US-Canada Great Lakes Water Quality

Agreement, and other cooperation among the governments of the

two countries and the International Joint Commission (“IJC”) on persistent toxic pollution, including dioxins and mercury air pollution. The

response indicated that the April 1997 Strategy sets target reduction

levels for persistent toxic substances and has received broad-based support from Great Lakes stakeholders.

B. The Secretariat’s Article 21 Request

On 24 March 2000, the Secretariat issued to the United States a

request for information under Article 21 of the NAAEC. Article 21

directs a Party, upon request of the Secretariat, to provide such information as the Secretariat may require, including (a) promptly making available any information in its possession required for the preparation of a

report or factual record, including compliance and enforcement data;

and (b) taking all reasonable steps to make available any other such

information requested.

Commentators and courts alike have highlighted the complexity

of the Clean Air Act.4 The Article 21 request was designed to assist the

42 NORTH AMERICAN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY

4. See, e.g., Chevron USA., Inc. v. NRDC, 467 US 837, 848 (1984) (the Clean Air Act is

“lengthy, detailed, technical, [and] complex”); Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. New York

State Dep’t of Envtl. Conservation, 17 F.3d 521, 524-25 (2d Cir. 1994) (describing the Act

as “one of the most comprehensive pieces of legislation in our nation’s history”

and as “an extremely complex law”); Frederick R. Anderson, et al., Environmental
Secretariat in determining the obligations the statute imposes on the

types of air emission sources identified in the submission, the compliance status of those sources, and the status and scope of monitoring and

enforcement efforts under the Act. The request related in particular to

various aspects of the implementation of § 129 of the Clean Air Act, 42

USC. § 7429. That provision requires that EPA establish standards

of performance for new solid waste incineration units (MWCs and

HMIWIs) and guidelines for existing MWCs and HMIWIs and that EPA

require the owners or operators of these facilities to comply with monitoring requirements and report to EPA on monitoring results.

The Article 21 request was intended to clarify the Secretariat’s

understanding, based on the United States response, that the majority of

incineration units were not subject to emission standards or monitoring

requirements under the Clean Air Act at the time the submission was

filed or even as of the time of the Article 21 request. The Article 21

request also was intended to produce detailed information on the monitoring requirements currently in effect under the Clean Air Act for

MWCs and HMIWIs, the number of sources currently subject to these

requirements, and the compliance status of those sources, among other

things. The Secretariat separated the information requested into several

categories of MWCs and HMIWIs, based on its understanding that

EPA’s regulatory scheme was categorized in this way.

EPA provided an interim response to the Article 21 request for

information in a letter dated 28 July 2000, which was accompanied by a

memorandum dated 24 July 2000. The 24 July 2000 memorandum provided information about the new MWCs and new HMIWIs, while EPA

provided additional information on 6 November 2000 and 14 November

2000 relating to existing MWCs and existing HMIWIs.

IV. ANALYSIS

The Secretariat has concluded, after reviewing the information

provided by the Submitters and by the Party, that, as further explained

below, a factual record is not warranted for the submission.

A. Introduction

This submission has reached the stage at which, under Article

15(1), the Secretariat must consider whether the submission, in light of

SEM-98-003 43

Protection: Law and Policy 378 (3d ed. 1999) (the 1990 amendments to the Act “greatly

increased the length, specificity, and scope of the Act”).
the Party’s response, warrants developing a factual record. Prior to

reaching this stage, as noted above, on 8 September 1999 the Secretariat

determined that the amended submission filed on 4 January 1999 meets

the criteria in Article 14(1) and that it merited a response from the United

States based upon a review of the factors in Article 14(2).5

The Secretariat first determined that the submission meets the six

criteria set out in Article 14(1)(a) through (f). The submission is in English, satisfying the criteria in Article 14(1)(a). It clearly identifies the

persons and organizations making the submission (Article 14(1)(b)). It

provides scientific reports and other information sufficient to allow the

Secretariat to review the submission (Article 14(1)(c)). It appears to be

aimed at promoting enforcement rather than at harassing industry (Article 14(1)(d)). It indicates that the matter has been communicated in writing to the relevant authorities and indicates the Party’s response (Article

14(1)(e)). And, the Submitters reside in or were established in the United

States or Canada (Article 14(1)(f)).

The Secretariat also concluded that two of the assertions in the 4

January 1999 amended submission meet the criteria inherent in the

opening sentence of Article 14(1). The assertions that the United States is

failing adequately to inspect and monitor incinerator emissions and to

fulfill specific obligations set out in Clean Air Act § 115, 42 USC.

§ 7415(a), (b), meet the requirements that a submission involve “environmental laws,” assert a failure to “effectively enforce,” and satisfy the

temporal condition inherent in the phrase “is failing.” The Secretariat

concluded that the Submitters’ other assertions do not meet the criteria

in the first sentence of Article 14(1).

The Secretariat further concluded that the two assertions satisfying

the criteria in Article 14(1) also warranted a response from the United

States based on the guiding factors in Article 14(2). The amended submission alleges harm to the Submitters (Article 14(2)(a)), raises matters

whose further study would advance the goals of the NAAEC (Article 14(2)(b)), indicates that a private remedy was being pursued with

respect to some of the issues raised in the submission (Article 14(2)(c)),

and is not drawn exclusively from mass media reports (Article 14(2)(d)).

44 NORTH AMERICAN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY

5. For a more detailed analysis of the Secretariat’s determination under Articles 14(1)

and (2), see SEM-98-003 (Great Lakes), Determination pursuant to Articles 14(1) and

(2) (8 September 1999).
B. A Factual Record is Not Warranted Regarding the Inspection

and Monitoring Allegations

As noted above, the submitters’ assertion that the United States’

monitoring and inspection strategy constituted a failure to effectively

enforce the Clean Air Act was one of the two reasons the Secretariat

requested a response from the United States. The essence of the assertion, as also mentioned above, was that the inspection/monitoring

scheme allegedly constitutes a failure to effectively enforce for purposes

of Articles 14 and 15 because: 1) many MWCs and HMIWIs have never

had their emissions actually measured for mercury/dioxin; 2) of those

incinerators that have had their emissions measured, in many instances

this has only occurred once; and 3) the measurements that have been

taken often are taken under near-ideal conditions that do not reflect

actual emission levels.6

The United States’ response to these three assertions has five major

elements. The first four elements are as follows: 1) regarding the submitters’ first assertion — that many incinerators have never had their emissions actually measured for mercury/dioxin — most incinerators were

not subject to regulatory or monitoring requirements at the time the submission was filed,7 and therefore the assertion goes to the adequacy of

the regulatory requirements themselves, not to whether there is (or has

been) a failure to effectively enforce; 2) this first assertion also is outdated — many facilities have conducted emissions monitoring even

though they legally were not required to have done so at the time of the

submission or even at the time of the United States response, in order to

ensure that they will be in compliance when the requirements become

effective;8 3) EPA, consistent with its regulations, uses a variety of

strategies to monitor compliance with emissions standards — such

monitoring is not done on a “one-time-only” basis; and 4) EPA requires

representative sampling, not testing under “near-ideal” conditions. A

fifth major point is that a factual record is not warranted here because

EPA regulatory efforts already have achieved significant reductions in

emissions, with additional substantial reductions to follow in the near

future as regulatory requirements become effective. As an example of

this last point, the United States advises that its 1995 regulations concerning MWCs have “already reduced dioxins emissions from MWCs

by slightly over 90 % from 1990 levels and, when fully implemented in

December 2000, will reduce dioxins emissions from MWCs by 99 % from

1990 levels.”9

SEM-98-003 45

6. See, e.g., January 4, 1999 submission at 12.

7. See, e.g., 1 December 1999 response at 29; 6 November 2000 US memorandum at 2.

8. See, e.g., 1 December 1999 response at 29.

9. 1 December 1999 response at 30; see also 6 November 2000 US memorandum at 5.
A statement from the United States’ 1 December 1999 response

captures clearly the Party’s position that the submission inappropriately

focuses on the adequacy of the Party’s law, rather than on an asserted

failure to effectively enforce that law, because the substantial majority of

incinerators covered by the submission were not subject to legal requirements at the time of the submission:

The Submitters have presented no information . . . supporting their assertion that EPA is not enforcing the requirements it has adopted for incinerators under section 129, or even that MWC or MWI facilities are not

complying with those requirements. Indeed, it would be extremely difficult for the Submitters to present information demonstrating that MWCs

or MWIs are not in compliance with the regulations governing mercury

and dioxins emissions from those facilities because, aside from the 1991

NSPS that apply to a small number of MWCs, the regulations do not

require that MWC and MWI facilities be in compliance until December,

2000 and September, 2002, respectively.10

In response to the Secretariat’s Article 21 request, the Party elaborated upon this general statement by providing detailed information

concerning when regulatory requirements became (or will become)

effective as to different types of incinerators, the types of monitoring that

have occurred to date and that will be required in the future, and the

level of compliance with regulatory requirements. In the remainder of

this section, the Secretariat reviews the information provided concerning each of the different types of incinerators whose emissions are of

concern in the submission.

1. The 1991 Standards for New MWCs

EPA reports in its 24 July 2000 response to the Secretariat’s Article

21 request for information that sixteen new MWC units at seven plants

are subject to the 1991 standards for new MWCs contained in its “NSPS

Subpart Ea” regulations.11 The Subpart Ea regulations establish emission standards for dioxin/furans. The regulation does not establish

mercury standards for new MWC units, but states may require more

stringent regulations for their new MWC units. The Secretariat is assum46 NORTH AMERICAN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY

10. See, e.g., 1 December 1999 response at 34.

11. 40 C.F.R. Part 60, Subpart Ea. EPA’s 24 July 2000 memorandum indicates that there

is another category of new MWC units regulated under the Standards of Performance for Large Municipal Waste Combustors for which Construction is Commenced after 20 September 1994, or for which Modification or Reconstruction is

Commenced after 19 June 1996. 40 C.F.R. Part 60, Subpart Eb. These standards were

promulgated on 19 December 1995. EPA’s response appears to indicate that there

are currently no facilities in this category. See 24 July 2000 US memorandum at 1.
ing for purposes of its analysis that all sixteen were subject to these regulations at the time the new and amended submission was filed in

January 1999.

EPA indicates that it uses several strategies to monitor compliance

of these sixteen facilities with emission standards. First, there is a

required initial performance test conducted at the time of start-up. Next,

each MWC unit must conduct an annual performance test for dioxin

emissions. Third, continuous emissions monitors (“CEMs”) operated

by each unit produce results for emissions of sulfur dioxide and nitrogen

oxide, which act as operating parameters that are surrogates for dioxin

emissions, and those results are reported to EPA every six months.

Finally, EPA and the states conduct inspections of the units. EPA reports

that during the past five years, “a total of 129 inspections have been conducted by EPA and/or the states at the seven MWC plants.” EPA provides in tabular form the number of inspections conducted at each of the

plants and the date of the last inspection.12

In addition, Table 1 of EPA’s 24 July 2000 response lists the compliance status of each of the seven plants as “[i]n compliance with mercury

and dioxin” for the period January-March 2000. EPA further indicates

concerning compliance status that the five-year compliance history from

EPA’s database does not indicate any violations relating to dioxin or

mercury emissions, apparently based on the 129 government inspections.

Thus, the United States’ 24 July 2000 memorandum indicates that,

with regard to the 16 facilities covered by the NSPS Subpart Ea regulations, little or no evidence likely exists to support the Submitters’ general

assertions that many facilities either have not had their emissions tested

at all, or have had them tested once. The Secretariat’s understanding,

from the United States’ 1 December 1999 response, is that EPA requires

that testing be done in a way that will produce samples that are representative of the gases in the stack — i.e., EPA’s response indicates that testing is done under other than “near-ideal” conditions, the other assertion

of the Submitters.13

SEM-98-003 47

12. All from the Attachment to 24 July 2000 US memorandum, at 1.

13. See, e.g., 1 December 1999 response at 30-31. The discussion at pages 30-32 of the

December 1999 response relates to the Eb regulated facilities (i.e., NSPS for large

new MWCs for which construction is commenced after 20/09/94), not the Ea facilities discussed in this section, although the United States asserts generally that EPA

regulations regarding MWC and MWI testing and monitoring meet applicable

CAA requirements. The discussion of the Eb regulations appears to be by way of

example, but there is nothing in the response that refers specifically to the way
The Secretariat has determined that development of a factual

record is not warranted concerning the 16 facilities that were subject to

the Subpart Ea regulatory requirements at the time the submission was

filed. EPA has provided information that appears to controvert the

assertions contained in the submission that many of these facilities either

have never had their emissions tested or such tests have only been conducted on a one-time basis. The regulations do not appear to contemplate testing under near-ideal conditions. In short, the extensive

information that the United States provided lays to rest any serious

question regarding whether its monitoring and inspection approach

amounts to a failure to effectively enforce the emissions regulations

applicable to these 16 facilities. Accordingly, development of a factual

record is not warranted in connection with those facilities.

2. The 1995 Guidelines for Large Existing MWCs

The United States reports that only two of the 163 large existing

MWCs subject to the 1995 Guidelines had final compliance dates for

meeting dioxins and mercury emission limitations as of the date the new

and amended submission was filed (January 1999).14 It notes that even as

of approximately 1 September 2000, only a small minority (roughly 11

percent, or 18 out of 163 large existing MWCs subject to the 1995 Guidelines),15 had final compliance dates for meeting dioxins and mercury

emission limits.16 In the Secretariat’s view, a factual record is not

warranted concerning the 161 facilities not subject to regulatory requirements prior to the filing of the submission because the assertions concerning these facilities go to the adequacy of the legal requirements

themselves, not to whether there is a failure to effectively enforce such

requirements. There was no legal requirement for most of these facilities

48 NORTH AMERICAN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY

facilities subject to the Ea regulations are tested. Nonetheless, the Ea regulations

appear to impose requirements that are essentially the same as those imposed by

the Eb regulations.

14. See, e.g., Table 4 of EPA’s 6 November 2000 memorandum.

15. The United States advises that EPA initially established emission guidelines for

existing small MWCs on 19 December 1995, but these guidelines were invalidated

by court decree. EPA did not reissue these guidelines until 6 December 2000 and

they did not become effective until 5 February 2001. 65 Fed. Reg. 76377 (2000). See 6

November 2000 memorandum at 3. Because there were no federal emission limitations in place for these MWCs at the time EPA formulated its response to the Article

21 request, its response generally does not address small MWCs, other than the six

discussed below that are subject to State Implementation Plans (“SIPs”).

16. See,e.g., 6 November 2000 US memorandum at 3 and 4, indicating that there are 163

large existing large MWC units subject to the 1995 Guidelines at 65 MWC plants,

and that as of 1 September 2000, final compliance dates were in effect for 18 facilities located at 17 MWC plants.
to meet emission limitations at the time the submission was filed, or to

monitor emissions from such facilities.17

The two existing large MWCs subject to the 1995 Guidelines that

were subject to emission standards and monitoring requirements as of

the date the submission was filed are the Montgomery County Resource

facility in Dickerson, Maryland (final compliance date 22 April 1991),

and the Robbins RRF facility in Robbins, Illinois (final compliance date 2

June 1997).18 The United States advises that facilities must take at least

four steps to monitor compliance: (1) conduct an annual performance

test; (2) submit an annual report, which “must include[ ] a list of dioxins

and mercury emissions levels achieved during the most recent performance tests”; (3) conduct continuous monitoring for a number of parameters or surrogates to “ensure that dioxins and mercury emissions

remain below the emission limitations . . .”; and (4) maintain records

(“e.g., performance test results, concerning compliance information with

applicable dioxins and mercury emission limits”) for review during

periodic government inspections.19 The Party further advises that EPA

and the relevant state undertake the following actions to monitor compliance with emission limits once they become effective: (1) validate the

initial performance test and confirm compliance based on that test; and

(2) monitor for continued compliance through periodic performance

tests, inspections, review of submitted reports, and/or compliance certifications by facilities. The United States indicates that it and the states

use a variety of factors in determining the frequency of inspections for

particular facilities, including: (a) compliance history; (b) density of

other pollution sources; (c) facility location; and (d) monitoring equipment.20 The United States indicates that there have been 15 inspections

of the Montgomery facility and 43 inspections of the Robbins facility.21

Finally, the United States also identifies a series of efforts EPA has made

to promote compliance by large MWCs. The United States reports that

since promulgating the regulations for large existing MWCs, EPA headquarters and regional offices have held monthly conference calls to

address concerns with regulatory implementation and to track the progress of the states and the affected MWC facilities. In addition, EPA and

SEM-98-003 49

17. Section 60.39b(c)(1)(i) refers to certain circumstances in which state plans “shall

include measurable and enforceable incremental steps of progress toward compliance.” However, the submission does not raise any concerns regarding whether

state plans contain such requirements, or regarding whether sources are meeting

any such incremental steps, and nothing in either the submission or the Party’s

response indicates that this is a potential area of ineffective enforcement.

18. See, e.g., 6 November 2000 US memorandum Table 4.

19. See, e.g., 6 November 2000 US memorandum at 4.

20. See, e.g., 6 November 2000 US memorandum at 2.

21. See, e.g., 6 November 2000 US memorandum Table 4.
the states have worked with MWCs to deal with how to meet the requirements outlined in the state or federal plans.22

In sum, for the two facilities that were subject to the Guidelines at

the time the submission was filed, it appears that, with respect to the

concerns the Submitters raised about a lack of emissions testing and a

lack of representative testing, each facility has conducted extensive

self-monitoring, and that there have been numerous government

inspections of the facilities. While the information provided to the Secretariat regarding compliance of these facilities with emissions standards

is limited, such information indicates that each of the two facilities was

in compliance with dioxins and mercury as of April-June 2000.23 Moreover, nothing in the submission or the response indicates that the United

States’ enforcement approach regarding these two facilities has resulted

in ongoing compliance problems or other circumstances that might warrant a more in-depth development of factual information. Accordingly,

a factual record regarding these assertions is not warranted.

In addition to the two large existing MWCs subject to the 1995

guidelines as of the time the submission was filed, the United States

gives separate treatment in its 6 November 2000 memorandum to six

existing MWCs, five located in Pennsylvania and one in Utah, that

are subject to regulation under a State Implementation Plan (“SIP”).

The United States explains that the five facilities in Pennsylvania are

required to meet “Best Available Technology” (“BAT”) emission limitations, which include annual ambient concentration limits for dioxins

and mercury. It reports that over the past five years 48 inspections have

been conducted at these five MWCs. It indicates that all five were in compliance for the period April-June 2000. It does not indicate their compliance status for other than that period or provide information concerning

the types of monitoring undertaken for these facilities.24 The United

States indicates that violations have been identified for dioxin emissions

from the Utah facility, that Utah has reached a settlement agreement

with the facility for these past violations, but that EPA suspects that the

facility is not in continuous compliance and EPA recently ordered the

facility to perform more frequent stack testing.25

The final point the United States offers in connection with these

facilities involves anticipated reductions in emission levels. The United

States indicates as follows:

50 NORTH AMERICAN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY

22. See, e.g., 6 November 2000 US memorandum at 3.

23. See, e.g., 6 November 2000 US memorandum Table 4.

24. See, e.g., 6 November 2000 US memorandum Table 5.

25. See, e.g., 6 November 2000 US memorandum Table 5.
EPA estimates that the New Source Performance Standard (NSPS) and EG

Subpart Cb applicable to large MWCs, in combination with various EPA

dioxins initiatives and MWC plant closures, will significantly reduce dioxins emissions from MWCs. The estimated reduction is ninety-nine percent from 1990 levels when the NSPS and EG Subpart Cb are fully

implemented in December 2000. The 1990 emissions from MWCs are calculated as 4,173 grams per year toxic equivalent quantity and the dioxins

emissions levels after December 2000 are estimated as 41 grams per year.

EPA estimates the NSPS and EG will bring about an eighty-eight percent

reduction in mercury emissions from 1990 levels. This represents a

decrease to 6.1 tons per year after December, 2000 from 51.2 tons per year

in 1990.26

Based on a series of factors, including the limited number of facilities subject to regulation and monitoring at the time the submission was

filed, the monitoring apparently required of those facilities, the significant reductions to be achieved in emissions, and the lack of any evidence

of serious ongoing or unaddressed compliance problems, the Secretariat

does not believe a factual record is warranted concerning this category

of incinerators.

3. New Source Standards for Solid Waste Incineration Units

with Capacity Equal to or Less than 250 Tons Per Day

Section 129(a)(1)(C) of the Clean Air Act requires that EPA promulgate by 15 November 1992 new source standards of performance applicable to solid waste incineration units with capacity equal to or less than

250 tons per day combusting municipal waste and to units combusting

hospital waste, medical waste, and infectious waste.27 In its 24 March

2000 request for information, the Secretariat inquired of the United

States whether EPA has issued such standards and, if so, what efforts the

agency has made to determine the compliance status of regulated units

and what information those efforts revealed.

In its 24 July 2000 response, the United States divided this question

into two categories of facilities. It first addressed the small MWCs. The

United States reported that at the time of that response, MWCs were not

subject to a new source performance standard under § 129 of the Clean

Air Act. The United States advised that while EPA had promulgated

such standards for small MWC units, the US Court of Appeals for the

District of Columbia Circuit had vacated the rule as it applied to new

small MWC units. The United States further advised that the agency

SEM-98-003 51

26. See, e.g., 6 November 2000 US memorandum at 5.

27. 42 USC. § 7429(a)(1)(C).
expected to issue the final regulations for small MWC units by the end of

2000. Subsequently, EPA issued final new source performance standards for new small MWC units, which did not become effective until 5

February 2001.28

Based on the United States response, it appears that small MWCs

were not subject to regulatory requirements governing emissions of

dioxins and/or mercury at the time the submission was filed, in part

because of litigation involving the validity of these requirements. As a

result, there does not seem to be a basis for developing a factual record

involving an asserted failure to effectively enforce these requirements.

Because the United States addressed the second type of facilities

identified in this question, namely HMIWIs, in its response to question 4

of the 24 March 2000 request for information, the compliance status of

those facilities is discussed in the next section below.

4. New Source Standards of Performance for HMIWIs

In its fourth question in the Article 21 request for information, the

Secretariat focused on the standards of performance that EPA issued for

new HMIWIs in its Subpart Ec regulations, promulgated on 15 September 1997 (entitled Standards of Performance for Hospital/Medical/

Infectious Waste Incinerators for which Construction is Commenced

after 20 June 1996, 40 C.F.R. Part 60).

The United States reports that there are four new HMIWI units

located at four facilities subject to these regulations.29 The United States

indicates that the compliance status of these units is monitored in several

ways, including: (1) initial performance tests at the time of start-up; (2)

annual performance tests, which, under the regulations, do not directly

require testing of emissions of dioxin or mercury; (3) annual review of

the operation of plant control technology, which includes monitoring

of dioxin and mercury emissions;30 and (4) government inspections.

Regarding the inspections, the United States notes that the “appropriate

state lead agencies have conducted on-site level 2 compliance monitoring inspections . . . every year since each new HMIWI commenced operation.”31 It reports that a total of 23 government inspections have been

conducted at the four plants in the past five years, it indicates the num52 NORTH AMERICAN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY

28. 65 Fed. Reg. 76349 (2000).

29. See, e.g., 24 July 2000 US memorandum.

30. See, e.g., 24 July 2000 US memorandum at 2.

31. See, e.g., 24 July 2000 US memorandum Table 2.
ber of inspections conducted at each plant during the past five years, and

it provides the date of the last inspection at each plant.32

Thus, the United States’ 24 July 2000 memorandum appears to

show that each of the four units covered by the 1997 regulations is subject to a regularized monitoring scheme that goes well beyond the

“one-time-only” approach that the Submitters assert exists. The United

States’ 1 December 1999 response indicates that EPA requires that testing be done under other than “near-ideal” conditions, the other assertion of the Submitters. After describing at some length the circumstances

in which testing is required of MWCs, the 1 December 1999 response

indicates that “[t]he regulatory program established for [HMIWIs]

closely parallels that outlined above for MWCs.” In particular, the

response continues, EPA’s monitoring requirements for HMIWIs

require “routine stack testing coupled with continuous monitoring of

operating parameters for units equipped with air pollution control

devices.” Monitoring requirements for HMIWIs that are not equipped

with add-on air pollution control devices consist of an initial stack

test coupled with continuous monitoring of operating parameters and

annual inspections. According to the response, “[a]fter the performance

test, monitoring of operating parameters is the only way to determine,

on a continuous basis, whether the source is operating in compliance.”

Operation outside the bounds of one or more parameter limits “constitutes a violation of a specific emission limit.” In short, “[t]he initial and

repeat testing requirements will ensure, on a continuous basis, that the

air pollution control devices used at [HMIWIs] operate properly, that no

deterioration in performance occurs, and that no changes are made to

the operating system or the type of waste burned.... Where repeat testing is not required, annual inspections, annual opacity testing, and

parameter monitoring will ensure that [HMIWI] units are functioning

properly.”33

In the Secretariat’s view, the information provided does not support development of a factual record. The number of facilities involved

is quite limited; the United States has provided considerable information showing that its monitoring and inspection scheme is not limited in

the ways the Submitters allege it is; and the Submitters have not provided information supporting the notion that the inspection approach,

in design or implementation, may constitute a failure to effectively

enforce. Further, the information the United States has provided concerning compliance status reflects that compliance is generally good and

SEM-98-003 53

32. See, e.g., 24 July 2000 US memorandum.

33. See, e.g., 1 December 1999 response at 33.
the Submitters have not provided information suggesting that compliance levels may constitute a failure to effectively enforce. In particular,

the compliance status information the United States has provided indicates that each of the covered facilities was in compliance with dioxin

and mercury standards during the government inspections and, further,

that each facility was in compliance during the period from January-March 2000. The United States reports that “EPA’s database indicate[s] that each new HMIWI has continually been in compliance with

the requirements... since commencing operation.” It further notes that

none of the 23 inspections revealed violations of the regulations for

dioxin and/or mercury. Accordingly, the information before the Secretariat does not leave unresolved a central question as to whether there is

a failure to effectively enforce the new source standards of performance

applicable to HMIWIs or to justify development of a factual record to

determine whether such a failure has occurred.

5. Large Existing HMIWIs

The final set of questions in the Secretariat’s Article 21 request for

information relates to compliance with the emission guidelines for existing HMIWIs that EPA issued on 15 September 1997, the same date that

EPA issued its new source performance standards for HMIWIs. The

United States reports in response to the Article 21 information request

that none of these facilities was required to be in compliance as of the

date the submission was filed, and that only a small minority of existing

large HMIWIs (18 out of between approximately 764 and 1,862) were

required to be in compliance as of 2 November 2000, a few days before

the United States response.34 As a result, a factual record is not warranted concerning the asserted failure to effectively enforce regarding

these facilities.

This conclusion is buttressed by other information that the United

States provided, such as its strategy for monitoring compliance (which

appears to address the concerns the Submitters have raised), the degree

of compliance to date, the existence of follow-up action concerning the

instances of non-compliance identified, and the significant decline in

emissions to be anticipated from this set of facilities. The United States

54 NORTH AMERICAN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY

34. See 6 November 2000 US memorandum at 6 and Table 11. HMIWIs subject to the

federal plan must comply with increments of progress, beginning with submission

of final control plans to EPA by 15 September 2000 for HMIWIs that expect to operate after 15 August 2001. These increments, all of which went into effect subsequent

to the filing of the new and amended submission, are described in Table 9 of EPA’s

6 November 2000 memorandum responding to the Secretariat’s Article 21 request

for information.
reports that EPA and the relevant state undertake the following actions

to monitor compliance with emission limits once they become effective:

(1) validate the initial performance test and confirm compliance based

on that test; and (2) monitor for continued compliance through periodic

performance tests, inspections, review of submitted reports, and/or

compliance certifications by facilities.35 EPA states that it and the states

use a variety of factors in determining the frequency of inspections for

particular facilities, including: (a) compliance history; (b) density of

other pollution sources; (c) facility location; and (d) monitoring equipment.36 Thus, it appears that the United States’ monitoring scheme

addresses the concerns the Submitters raised about the adequacy of

monitoring efforts.

Compliance levels post-submission would not appear to provide a

basis for a factual record, based on the information provided. Of the total

of 18 incinerators that had final compliance dates for dioxin and mercury

emission limits as of November 2000, by which time regulated HMIWIs

must have the required air pollution control equipment installed and

operating,37 sixteen are listed in Table 11 as in compliance (with initial

performance tests being due very soon after EPA developed its response

for seven of the 16). Table 11 identifies two facilities located in Georgia as

not being in compliance. From the information in Table 11, Georgia

appears to be monitoring the situation and is awaiting information from

the facilities about follow-up work they have conducted to come into

and demonstrate compliance.

The United States further reports in Table 12 that seven additional

existing large HMIWIs subject to the federal plan are subject to emission

limitations or monitoring requirements contained in a SIP that is not part

of an approved state plan under §§ 111(d) and 129 of the Clean Air Act.38

These facilities are all located in Pennsylvania. The United States lists in

Table 12 the number of inspections conducted of each facility over the

past five years. The United States indicates that each facility is in compliance with the requirements contained in the SIP. As the United States

has explained, existing HMIWIs must comply with the emission guidelines for those facilities, at the latest, by 15 September 2002. Individual

state plans may establish an earlier compliance deadline, and eleven

states and one Pennsylvania county have set compliance dates earlier

than that date.39 Pending EPA approval of Pennsylvania’s plan, the

SEM-98-003 55

35. See 6 November 2000 US memorandum at 7.

36. See 6 November 2000 US memorandum at 2.

37. See 6 November 2000 US memorandum at 6-7.

38. See 6 November 2000 US memorandum at 6 and Table 12.

39. See 6 November 2000 US memorandum at 5-6.
seven facilities listed in Table 12 remain subject to the final compliance

deadline that applies to HMIWIs subject to the federal plan.

A final point that the United States makes concerning this category

of incinerators is that the Party anticipates a significant decline in the

number of facilities, from 1,862 to 764, that will continue to operate after

the final compliance date established under the applicable state plans or

federal plan.40 Related, the United States advises that “[t]he continued

closure of existing HMIWIs corresponds to a significant reduction in

dioxins and mercury emissions.”41 It notes that it expects, “when the

emissions guidelines are fully implemented, to achieve a reduction of

HMIWI dioxins and mercury emissions by ninety-seven percent and

ninety-five percent, respectively.”42

6. Summary

The information provided to the Secretariat does not support

development of a factual record concerning the assertion that there is a

failure to effectively enforce because of deficiencies in monitoring compliance. For the limited universe of facilities that were subject to monitoring and other regulatory requirements at the time the submission was

filed, the information provided indicates that an extensive monitoring

scheme is in place and that, in particular, these facilities have had their

emissions tested; the tests occur on a more than one-time-only basis; and

sampling is intended to produce representative results, not results

under near-ideal conditions. Among other things, the United States

states that while the Submitters “assert that most ‘plants’ are ‘tested only

once during startup,’ [a]ctually, the 1995 regulations, which apply to

most MWCs, require that those facilities be tested annually after the

facilities are required to come into full compliance with the dioxins emission limitations established by those regulations.”43 The United States

indicates that the regulations require annual emissions tests for mercury

from MWCs as well. The United States further indicates that additional

56 NORTH AMERICAN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY

40. See 6 November 2000 US memorandum at 6 and Table 12. Emissions from the facilities that may shut down are likely to continue until the facilities shut down. It does

not appear that these facilities are subject to monitoring requirements or emission

limitations, and, as a result, there is no failure to effectively enforce regarding them.

Even if some of the increments described at pages 5 and 6 of the United States’ 6

November 2000 memorandum apply, it does not appear that any such increments

would apply to monitoring or emission standards. In any event, neither the submission nor the response provides any information indicating that there is a particular compliance problem with this narrow subset of facilities.

41. See 6 November 2000 US memorandum at 6 and Table 12.

42. See 6 November 2000 US memorandum at 7 and Table 12.

43. See 1 December 1999 response at 31.
monitoring and inspections are also conducted.44 Further, while the

compliance-related information provided by the United States is limited

in nature, there is no indication of a serious, widespread compliance

problem and no unaddressed compliance problems have been presented.

The vast majority of facilities were not subject to regulatory

requirements (including monitoring) at the time the new and amended

submission was filed in January 1999. Thus, as to these facilities, there

was no obligation, or legal authority, to enforce via monitoring at that

time, and, a fortiori, there could have been no failure to enforce effectively. The United States also has explained the monitoring scheme that

will be used for these facilities once regulatory requirements become

effective. This monitoring scheme appears to address the Submitters’

concerns. Further, while only limited information concerning compliance status has been provided, no unaddressed compliance problems

have been presented with respect to the subset of this group of facilities

that became subject to monitoring and other regulatory obligations after

the submission was filed.

C. A Factual Record is Not Warranted Regarding the Clean Air Act

Section 115 Allegations

The second Submitter claim is that the United States is failing to

effectively enforce § 115(a) of the Clean Air Act, which under certain circumstances requires that EPA notify “host” states of pollution migrating

from their borders to a foreign country, thereby requiring those states to

amend their SIPs to address emissions that reasonably may be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare in that foreign country.

Section 115(a) provides as follows:

Whenever the Administrator [of EPA], upon receipt of reports, surveys or

studies from any duly constituted international agency has reason to

believe that any air pollutant or pollutants emitted in the United States

cause or contribute to air pollution which may reasonably be anticipated

to endanger public health or welfare in a foreign country or whenever the

Secretary requests him to do so with respect to such pollution which the

Secretary of State alleges is of such a nature, the Administrator shall give

formal notification thereof to the Governor of the State in which such emissions originate.

42 USC. § 7415(a). Any such notification issued by the Administrator is deemed to be a finding under § 110(a)(2)(H)(ii) of the Clean Air

SEM-98-003 57

44. See, e.g., 1 December 1999 response at 31-34.
Act45 that the SIP of the state in which the emissions originate is inadequate to prevent or eliminate the endangerment. 42 USC. § 7511(b). That

finding, in turn, triggers an obligation on the part of the state whose SIP

has been deemed inadequate to amend its SIP to eliminate the inadequacy. These provisions only apply to a foreign country which the

Administrator determines has given the United States essentially the

same rights with respect to the prevention or control of air pollution

occurring in that country as is given that country by § 115 of the Clean

Air Act.46

The 4 January 1999 submission alleges that the United States is failing to effectively enforce these provisions of the Clean Air Act. The submission alleges that numerous reports from the IJC have indicated

serious Great Lakes pollution problems stemming from dioxin and mercury, specifically from incinerators. According to the submission, the

CEC released a report in 1997 on the long-range transport of pollutants

that reached similar conclusions. The submission asserts that, despite

having received these reports, EPA has failed to require SIP upgrades

that could prevent or eliminate the ongoing “endangerment” of health

and welfare in Canada.

In its 1 December 1999 response, the United States alleged that it is

not failing to effectively enforce § 115 for two reasons. First, the United

States contends that the § 115 process is not initiated until EPA receives

either a request from a duly constituted international agency or a request

from the Secretary of State that EPA take action under § 115. According

to the response, EPA is unaware of ever having received any request

from a duly constituted international agency or from the Secretary of

State asking EPA to take action under § 115 to address impacts associated with atmospheric deposition of hazardous air pollutants such as

dioxins and mercury in the region near the Great Lakes or in Canada.47

Accordingly, the United States asserts that EPA has never been, and is

not now, obligated to take any action under § 115 regarding such emissions.

58 NORTH AMERICAN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY

45. 42 USC. § 7410(a)(2)(H)(ii).

46. 42 USC. § 7415(c). EPA determined in 1985 that reciprocity existed between the

United States and Canada for purposes of § 115(c). Thomas v. New York, 802 F.2d

1443, 1446 (D.C. Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 482 US 919 (1987). See also Jeffrey L. Roelofs,

United States-Canada Air Quality Agreement: A Framework for Addressing

Transboundary Air Pollution Problems, 26 Cornell Int’l L.J. 421, 436 n.141 (1993)

(“Most commentators agree that Canada has satisfied the reciprocity requirement.”).

47. See 1 December 1999 response at 38.
Second, even if the IJC and other reports triggered EPA’s § 115 obligations, the United States denies that it is failing to enforce the provisions of § 115. The United States asserts that EPA retains discretion

whether or not to issue a finding that an endangerment exists (a

so-called “endangerment finding”). According to the United States,

given the complexity of making an endangerment finding and identifying the states with emissions sources that cause or contribute to the

endangerment, EPA has not been in receipt of the requisite “request” for

a finding of endangerment long enough to have amounted to unreasonable delay or an abuse of the agency’s discretion. The United States also

contends that, in light of ongoing efforts to address mercury and dioxin

deposition in the Great Lakes, a factual record regarding the § 115 issue

would not advance the goals of the NAAEC.

The United States’ response raises two main questions relevant to

whether a factual record is warranted in regard to the alleged failure to

effectively enforce § 115 of the Clean Air Act. First, must the EPA receive

a request from a duly constituted international agency for a finding of

endangerment — in addition to a report, survey, or study that gives EPA

reason to believe that United States air pollution may reasonably be

anticipated to endanger public health or welfare in a foreign country —

as a prerequisite to other obligations under § 115?48 Second, assuming

that EPA can be obligated to take action under § 115 even without such a

request, does the submission raise central questions that the Party’s

response leaves unresolved regarding whether the EPA’s exercise of its

discretion in responding to the IJC reports and others amounts to a failure to effectively enforce § 115?

Regarding the first issue, a factual record would not be warranted

if the United States is correct that an international agency must make a

“request” to trigger EPA’s obligations under § 115, and that the IJC and

other reports do not contain such a request. The Secretariat has found no

United States court cases addressing the issue of whether a request by an

international agency is a prerequisite to EPA’s other obligations under

§ 115.

The Clean Air Act does not on its face require that the EPA receive a

“request” from a “duly constituted international agency” in order to be

obliged to take action under § 115. Instead, the plain language of § 115(a)

SEM-98-003 59

48. The submitters have not alleged that the Secretary of State has ever requested that

EPA provide formal notification to a state in which emissions originate that are

endangering public health or welfare in a foreign country, and there is no evidence

that the Secretary has ever issued such a request to EPA with respect to emissions of

dioxins or mercury in the Great Lakes region.
suggests that EPA’s “receipt” of “reports, surveys or studies” indicating

that air pollution originating in the United States may reasonably be

anticipated to cause or contribute to an endangerment in a foreign country is enough to trigger EPA’s obligation to take further action. Further,

whereas § 115(a) requires that EPA give formal notification if upon

receipt of reports, surveys, or studies from a duly constituted international agency, the Administrator has reason to believe that United States

emissions may be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare in a

foreign country, it alternatively requires such notification “whenever

the Secretary of State requests him to do so.” Therefore, the absence of

any explicit requirement that reports of international agencies include

requests for EPA to notify polluting states indicates that such a request is

not required.

Notably, nothing in the § 115 cases that the United States cites in its

response indicates that during the time period at issue in those cases

(involving an alleged failure to comply with § 115 in connection with

acid rain damage in Canada) EPA viewed a request from an international agency as a prerequisite to further action.49 In those cases, EPA

relied on the IJC Seventh Annual Report of Great Lakes Water Quality to

make an endangerment finding, and there is no indication that the

report contained a request for notification.50 Indeed, it would seem quite

unusual for the mandate of the IJC or most other international agencies,

including the CEC, to include making requests to countries to take

actions such as those set out in § 115.

Despite these considerations, the United States contends that the

legislative history of § 115 suggests that EPA’s § 115 obligations are not

triggered unless the Administrator receives a request from a duly constituted international agency to take formal action under § 115.51 Under

60 NORTH AMERICAN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY

49. “An agency interpretation of a relevant provision which conflicts with the agency’s

earlier interpretation is ’entitled to considerably less deference’ than a consistently

held agency view.” Lal v. INS, 255 F. 3d 998, — (9th Cir. 2001).

50. See Thomas v. New York, 802 F.2d at 1444-46, and Her Majesty the Queen in Right of

Ontario v. United States, 912 F.2d 1525, 1529-33 (D.C. Cir. 1990). Although it is not

perfectly clear, it appears that EPA issued the endangerment and reciprocity findings at issue in those cases based solely on the IJC’s Seventh Annual Report on

Great Lakes Water Quality. See 912 F.2d at 1529.

51. 1 December 1999 response at 38. The version of § 115 in the Senate bill leading to the

1977 Clean Air Act amendments provided that EPA’s obligation to call for SIP revisions would be triggered by the “receipt of requests, reports, surveys, or studies”

that provide EPA with the requisite “reason to believe.” S. Rep. No. 95-127, at 175

(1977). However, the Conference Report on the 1977 amendments describes the

Senate bill as providing a mechanism for the Administrator to trigger a revision of

an SIP “upon the petition of an international agency or the Secretary of State if he finds

that emissions originating in a State endanger the health or welfare of persons in a
well-established principles of statutory interpretation in the United

States, a statute should be given its plain meaning, and if a statute’s

meaning is unambiguous on its face, the legislative history is generally

immaterial and deference to an agency interpretation contrary to the

plain meaning is not warranted.52 In the Secretariat’s view, it is not clear

that the legislative history supporting the United States’ position would

overcome the plain language indicating that a “request” from an international agency is not required to trigger action under § 115.

In the absence of a dispositive court ruling or other evidence that

irrefutably demonstrates the meaning of § 115, the Secretariat reaches no

conclusion on the question whether a “request” from an international

agency is required to trigger EPA’s obligations under section 115. A factual record would do little to illuminate this legal question. Nonetheless,

it is appropriate to consider other factors relevant to whether a factual

record is warranted regarding the submitters’ § 115 assertion.

Assuming that even absent a request,53 the receipt from an international body of information providing EPA with the requisite “reason to

believe” that United States emissions “may reasonably be anticipated to

endanger public health or welfare” in Canada is enough to compel EPA

to take further action, it is appropriate to consider whether a factual

record is warranted to examine 1) what information EPA has received or

developed, or has available to it, relevant to whether dioxin or mercury

emissions from the United States cause or contribute to an endangerment of public health or welfare in Canada, including identification of

sources of such emissions and 2) whether, in light of this information,

EPA’s actions amount to ineffective enforcement of § 115 in regard to

deposition of mercury and dioxin emissions into the Great Lakes.

SEM-98-003 61

foreign country.” H. R. Rep. No. 95-564, at 136 (1977), reprinted in 1977 USC.C. &

A.N. 1502, 1517 (emphasis added). The Report further states that the Conference

adopted the Senate’s approach by “requir[ing] a request by a duly constituted

international agency as a condition for the Administrator to act.” Id.

52. See Her Majesty the Queen, 912 F.2d at 1533. See also, Falro v. Owasso Independent

School District No. 1-011, 229 F. 3d. 956, 972 (10th Cir. 2000), United States v. Hilario,

218 F.3d 19, 23 (1st Cir. 2000), Catapalt Entertainment Inc. 165, F,3d 747, 754 (9th Cir.

1999). Although a court need not follow the plain language of a statute if the legislative history indicates a “clear expression of contrary legislative intent”, United

States v. Hilario, 218 F.3d at 23, the legislative history does not appear to be crystal

clear.

53. Although the IJC’s recent biennial reports do not explicitly purport to “request”

EPA to take action under section 115, they do contain recommendations for the

United States to take action to further limit deposition of dioxin and mercury from

incinerators into the Great Lakes. These reports are available on the IJC website at

<www.ijc.org>. However, the Secretariat sees no reason to address here whether

the IJC’s recommendations might be considered “requests” for purposes of § 115,

even under the United States’ interpretation.
The United States contends that a factual record is not warranted to

address these questions because the EPA has discretion in determining

when to notify states under § 115. The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals in

the Thomas v. New York case cited above stated in dicta that “[h]ow and

when the agency chooses to proceed to the stage of notification triggered

by the findings is within the agency’s discretion and not subject to judicial compulsion.”54 Likewise, the same court in Her Majesty the Queen in

Right of Ontario v. United States EPA stated that “[t]he words ‘whenever’

the Administrator ‘has reason to believe’ imply a degree of discretion

underlying the endangerment finding.”55 Nonetheless, the D.C. Circuit

Court of Appeals has left open the possibility that, in an appropriate

case, a citizen plaintiff might be able to show that EPA has unreasonably

delayed taking action or otherwise abused its discretion under § 115.56

The court in Thomas made note of the “complex, multi-source pollution problem” involving acid rain that confronted the agency in that

case. In addition, in Her Majesty the Queen, the D.C. Circuit accepted the

EPA’s view that the agency need not make an endangerment finding

triggering the obligation to notify states causing or contributing to the

endangerment until the agency has identified those states, and it noted

“the unusual complexity of the factors facing the agency in determining

the effects of acid rain and in tracing the pollutants from the point of

deposition back to their sources.”57 The court also saw “little basis for

questioning [EPA’s] own assessment of its current capabilities” for making the endangerment finding.58 The court therefore concluded that

EPA’s failure to initiate a rulemaking leading to formal notification

under § 115(a) did not amount to unreasonable delay.

The United States, in its 1 December 1999 response, claims that the

subject of this submission is similarly complex, thereby precluding any

“rapid response” by the agency. The United States points out in particular that the lag between receipt of the relevant IJC reports and the failure

to issue formal notification in this instance is considerably shorter than it

was in the acid rain case.59The United States does not dispute that the IJC

and CEC reports to which the Submitters refer indicate a serious concern

regarding the impacts on public welfare of mercury and dioxin emissions from incinerators and other sources. However, those reports, as

62 NORTH AMERICAN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY

54. Thomas, 802 F.2d at 1448.

55. See Her Majesty the Queen, 912 F.2d at 1533.

56. See Her Majesty the Queen, 912 F.2d at 1534.

57. See Her Majesty the Queen, 912 F.2d at 1533.

58. See Id. at 1534.

59. See Roelofs, supra, at 438 (scientific uncertainty concerning transboundary pollution “can be used to justify the Administrator’s decision not to initiate Section 115

proceedings”).
well as the United States’ response, also indicate the complexity of determining source-receptor relationships and other matters inherent in

identifying those sources of mercury and dioxin deposition in the Great

Lakes that could be subject to stricter control through EPA-mandated

SIP revisions.

The United States further points out a recent decreasing trend in

actual emissions of dioxins and mercury from the incinerators covered

by the submission. EPA has estimated that new regulatory requirements

and other initiatives will reduce dioxins emissions from MWCs by 99

percent from 1990 levels (from 4,173 grams per year toxic equivalent

quantity in 1990 to 41 grams per year after December 2000). EPA estimates that there will be an 88 percent reduction in mercury emissions

from 1990 levels after December 2000, from 51.2 tons per year in 1990 to

6.1 tons per year after December 2000. EPA similarly notes that emissions of dioxins and mercury from HMIWIs are likely to decline dramatically because a substantial percentage of such facilities intend to close.60

Because EPA is not aware of any request to take action under § 115

in regard to mercury and dioxin emissions, it is not clear that EPA has

undertaken any actions under § 115 in regard to the Submitters’ concerns. However, the United States provides some details on other activities that EPA is pursuing to address deposition of mercury and dioxins

into the Great Lakes. One example are binational frameworks that

include “(1) implementing the Great Lakes Binational Toxics Strategy

(BNS) of April 1997, (2) implementing the US-Canada Great Lakes

Water Quality Agreement (GLWQA) with respect to HAPS, and (3)

other cooperation among the governments and the IJC on persistent

toxic pollution which also address issues of dioxins and mercury air pollution.”61 The United States also identifies unilateral efforts it is undertaking to address mercury and dioxin deposition into the Great Lakes,

such as programs under the Clean Water Act that are geared toward

addressing persistent toxic pollutants in the Great Lakes. In particular,

the United States points to the possibility that Total Maximum Daily

Loads (“TMDLs”) could be developed for persistent toxic pollutants in

Great Lakes waters, and that those TMDLs might be applied in a manner

that sets limits or reduction targets for long-range deposition sources of

those pollutants.62 As the United States explains, “[a]lthough a TMDL

itself imposes no enforceable requirements, it can serve as an assessment

and planning tool that local, state, and federal authorities can use to

SEM-98-003 63

60. See 6 November 2000 US memorandum at 6.

61. 1 December 1999 response at 41.

62. 1 December 1999 response at 43.
impose controls or pollution reduction targets for the purpose of achieving the applicable water quality standards.”63 The United States notes

that it has made progress in understanding and modeling the sourcereceptor relationships that trace air pollutants deposited in the Great

Lakes to their sources.

The response therefore makes clear that the dioxin and mercury

emissions scenario at issue in this submission is not static; it is changing,

and it is significantly improving. The fact that efforts are still underway

in the United States to reduce mercury and dioxin emissions from incinerators would likely make any attempt to make the findings necessary to

implement § 115 especially complicated. For example, it would be difficult to determine whether SIP revisions that might be imposed as a result

of § 115 would result in any significant improvement in public welfare in

Canada beyond whatever improvement is being achieved, and will continue to be achieved, as a result of the United States’ current and ongoing

efforts to reduce dioxin and mercury emissions.

As courts in the United States have noted, EPA’s flexibility regarding when, whether and how to implement § 115 is very broad, and determining whether the factual circumstances warranting an endangerment

finding exist is very complicated in general. Based on the submission

and the response, it appears that it would be especially complicated to

make such a finding regarding any endangerment in Canada due to

mercury and dioxin emissions in the United States. Whether the United

States is effectively enforcing § 115 is intricately tied in this case to the

broad scope of the EPA’s discretion under that provision, and whether a

factual record is warranted must be viewed in light of the complex,

dynamic and improving situation described in the United States’

responses. Relevant as well is the lack of any indication in the submission or in the materials the United States has provided of any significant

noncompliance with emissions regulations applicable to the incinerators at issue in this submission.

In light of these considerations, the Secretariat finds that the submission and the response do not leave open a central question regarding

whether the United States is ineffectively addressing an ongoing environmental violation under § 115 or exercising its discretion in a manner

legally contrary to § 115. Accordingly, the Secretariat finds that a factual

record is not warranted regarding the Submitters’ § 115 claim, and that

claim is therefore dismissed.

64 NORTH AMERICAN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY

63. 1 December 1999 response at 43.
V. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, the Secretariat considers that the submission does not warrant developing a factual record and pursuant to

section 9.6 of the Guidelines hereby notifies the Submitters and the

Council of its reasons and that the process is terminated with respect to

the submission.

Respectfully submitted on this 5th day of October, 2001.

Janine Ferretti

Executive Director

SEM-98-003 65

SEM-98-004

(BC Mining)

SUBMITTER: SIERRA CLUB OF BRITISH COLUMBIA, ET AL.

PARTY: Canada

DATE: 29 June 1998

SUMMARY: The submission alleges a systemic failure of Canada to enforce section 36(3) of the Fisheries Act to

protect fish and fish habitat from the destructive

environmental impacts of the mining industry in

British Columbia.

SECRETARIAT DETERMINATIONS:

ART. 14(1)*

(30 November 1998)

Determination that criteria under Article 14(1)

have been met.

ART. 14(2)*

(25 June 1999)

Determination pursuant to Article 14(2) that the

submission merits requesting a response from the

Party.

ART. 15(1)

(11 May 2001)

Notification to Council that a factual record is

warranted in accordance with Article 15(1).

* Published in Volume 5 (Fall 2000) of the North American Environmental Law and Policy

Series.

67

Commission for Environmental

Cooperation — Secretariat

Article 15(1) Notification to Council that

Development of a Factual Record is Warranted

Submission Number: SEM-98-004 (BC Mining)

Submitter(s): Sierra Club of British Columbia

Environmental Mining Council of British

Columbia

Taku Wilderness Association

Concerned Party: Canada

Date of Submission: 29 June 1998

Date of this Notification: 11 May 2001

I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Article 14 of theNorth American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation (NAAEC or the “Agreement”) creates a mechanism for citizens to

file submissions in which they assert that a Party to the NAAEC is failing

to effectively enforce its environmental law. The Secretariat of the North

American Commission for Environmental Cooperation (the “Secretariat”) initially considers these submissions based on criteria contained in

Article 14(1) of the NAAEC. When the Secretariat determines that a

submission meets these criteria, the Secretariat then determines based

on factors contained in Article 14(2) whether the submission merits

requesting a response from the Party named in the submission. In light

of any response from the Party, the Secretariat may inform the Council

that the Secretariat considers that development of a factual record is

warranted (Article 15(1)). The Council may then instruct the Secretariat

to prepare a factual record for the submission (Article 15(2)).1

69

1. This is the eighth Secretariat Notification to Council that the Secretariat considers

development of a factual record to be warranted for a submission. Regarding the
On 29 June 1998, the Submitters filed this submission, alleging «the

systemic failure of the Government of Canada to enforce section 36(3) of

the Fisheries Act to protect fish and fish habitat from the destructive environmental impacts of the mining industry in British Columbia.2” On 30

November 1998, the Secretariat determined that the submission met the

requirements of Article 14(1), and on 25 June 1999, the Secretariat

requested a response from the Party under Article 14(2). The Party submitted its response on 8 September 1999. Canada contends that it is protecting fish and fish habitat by implementing a range of enforcement

actions, including prosecution where appropriate, and, therefore, development of a factual record is unwarranted. In accordance with Article

15(1), the Secretariat informs the Council that the Secretariat considers

that the submission, in light of the response, warrants developing a

factual record, and provides its reasons.

II. SUMMARY OF THE SUBMISSION

The Submitters assert that Canada is failing to effectively enforce

section 36(3) of the Fisheries Act to protect fish and fish habitat from the

destructive environmental impacts of the mining industry in British

Columbia. Section 36(3), together with section 40(2), make it an offence

«to deposit or permit the deposit of a deleterious substance of any type in

water frequented by fish or in any place under any conditions where the

deleterious substance or any other deleterious substance that results

from the deposit of the deleterious substance may enter such water.3”

The Submitters claim that mining frequently causes serious water

pollution due to acid mine drainage and heavy metal contamination.

According to the submission, acid mine drainage occurs when rocks

containing sulphides are exposed to air and water, creating sulphuric

acid. The sulphuric acid then dissolves the metals in the surrounding

rock. In addition to acid mine drainage, the Submitters claim that processing chemicals and erosion and sedimentation resulting from mining

activities also contribute to water pollution from mines.4 The Submitters

contend that the toxic substances that mining generates flow into water

70 NORTH AMERICAN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY

previous seven, the Council has directed the Secretariat to develop a factual record

for three (SEM-96-001 Cozumel, SEM-97-001 BC Hydro and SEM-98-007 Metales y

Derivados), deferred its decision on one (SEM-97-006 Oldman River II), rejected

the fifth (SEM-97-003 Quebec Hog Farms), and is currently considering the sixth

(SEM-98-006 Aquanova) and seventh (SEM-99-002 Migratory Birds). The pertinent

Council Resolutions (96-08, 98-07, 00-01, 00-02 and 00-03), are available on the CEC

home page, <www.cec.org>.

2. Submission, at 5.

3. Fisheries Act, s. 36(3).

4. Submission, at 7-8.
systems, causing harm to fish, fish habitat, water quality and human

health.5

In support of the submission, the Submitters include a report, prepared by the Environmental Mining Council of B.C. (Exhibit 1), which

states that acid mine drainage is the mining industry’s greatest environmental problem and its greatest liability, especially to waterways.6

Relying on the 1994 B.C. State of the Environment Report, the Environmental Mining Council report notes that “there were an estimated 240

million tonnes of acid-generating waste rock and 72 million tonnes of

acid-generating mine tailings in the province. Each year, the stockpile of

acidic and heavy metal-generating tailings and waste rock from mining

in the province grows by 25 million tonnes.7”

The submission focuses on three mines that the Submitters allege

have been leaching toxic, deleterious substances into salmon-bearing

waters for over 25 years — the Tulsequah Chief Mine, the Mt. Washington Mine and the Britannia Mine. However, the Submitters assert that

there are at least 25 additional mines in British Columbia that are known

to be acid-generating and at least 17 other mines identified as potentially

acid-generating.8

The Submitters claim that violations of section 36(3) are ongoing at

each of the three mines highlighted in the submission. According to the

Submitters, the Tulsequah Chief Mine, an abandoned copper mine

located on the Tulsequah River in northwest British Columbia, has been

discharging high levels of zinc, lead and copper into the river since the

mine began operating in the 1950s. These toxic substances are having a

significant impact on downstream water quality and are acutely toxic to

fish.9 The Britannia Mine, located 50 km north of Vancouver, discharges

high levels of minerals, especially copper and zinc, into Britannia Creek

and Howe Sound and has been described as “the single worst point

source of metal pollution on the North American continent.10” The Mt.

Washington Mine on Vancouver Island, which operated for two years,

from 1964 to 1966, has been leaching copper-laced acid mine drainage

SEM-98-004 71

5. Submission, at 5.

6. Submission, Exhibit 1, at 5.

7. Submission, Exhibit 1, at 7.

8. Submission, at 8. The Submitters attach a list of these 42 mines as Appendix 1 to the

Submission.

9. Submission, at 10. The Submitters attach a copy of a letter from Environment Canada to the British Columbia Ministry of Environment, Lands and Parks describing

the presence of copper, zinc and lead as acutely toxic to fish.

10. Submission, at 10, citing a mining specialist working with Environment Canada,

quoted in the Vancouver Sun, June 13, 1996.
into nearby streams which flow into the Tsolum River. The Tsolum

River’s salmon population has been virtually destroyed.11

The Submitters claim no charges have ever been laid against the

owners or operators of any of the three mines. They state that they were

able to find only three prosecutions of mining companies in British

Columbia for violations of section 36(3) of the Fisheries Act, one in 1983,

one in 1984 and one in 1985, despite Canada’s knowledge of ongoing

violations of the Fisheries Act. The Submitters assert:

Given the clear and compelling evidence of chronic ongoing violations of

s. 36(3) of the Fisheries Act and the clear evidence of declining salmon populations in B.C., the facts reveal a consistent failure by the Government of

Canada to effectively enforce the law against mining companies in B.C.12

The Submitters attribute Canada’s failure to effectively enforce the

Fisheries Act in part to a severe shortage of staff and resources. They refer

to a Memorandum of Understanding between the Department of Fisheries and Oceans and Environment Canada that assigns responsibility

for enforcing section 36(3) to Environment Canada. They state that, in

recent years, Environment Canada’s budget has shrunk by about 40 %

and that Environment Canada has only 15 enforcement staff for all of

British Columbia and the Yukon. They point to Environment Canada’s

1996-97 enforcement statistics which indicate that only 5 prosecutions

under section 36(3) were initiated in all of Canada during that time

period.13

The Submitters cite Canada’s efforts to devolve responsibility for

enforcing environment laws to the provinces as another factor contributing to Canada’s alleged failure to enforce the Fisheries Act. They claim

this devolution has caused deterioration in transparency and accountability. This and the previous factor, they claim, lead to the conclusion

that the examples of the three mines highlighted in the submission demonstrate a persistent, widespread pattern of ineffective enforcement of

section 36(3) with respect to mining operations in British Columbia.14

The Submitters assert that Canada’s alleged failure to enforce section 36(3) of the Fisheries Act effectively against the mining industry in

British Columbia has contributed to the decline in salmon runs in the

province. They cite studies linking the decline, in part, to pollution from

72 NORTH AMERICAN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY

11. Submission, at 10.

12. Submission, at 15.

13. Submission, at 12-13.

14. Submission, at 11-12.
mining.15 They describe the extinction of fish runs as “an irreversible

loss” and state that the decline in fisheries has had a significant impact

on communities and individuals that depend on fisheries for their livelihood and cultural identity.16 These communities include First Nations

and those involved in the recreational fishing industry.

The Submitters also assert that Canada’s alleged failure to enforce

the Fisheries Act effectively against the mining industry may be creating

trade or market distortions because British Columbia “may be viewed

as a ‘pollution haven’ where lax environmental laws and a lack of

enforcement enable mining corporations to operate with lower costs

than other more stringently regulated jurisdictions such as the United

States.17” They claim that this gives mining companies in British Columbia an unfair competitive advantage over mining companies in other

countries, particularly the United States.

III. SUMMARY OF THE RESPONSE

In its response, Canada submits that, both generally and in relation

to the three mines described in detail in the submission, “it is protecting

fish and fish habitat through the enforcement of its environmental laws,

by implementing a range of enforcement actions, including prosecutions where appropriate.18”

A. Canada’s Enforcement Activities Generally

Canada points to the high degree of cooperation and coordination

in the management of fisheries and environmental issues that Canada

asserts is a natural consequence of the Canadian legislative framework.

Canada refers to the constitutional division of responsibilities between

the federal and provincial government with respect to environmental

matters. Canada states that while the mining industry in British Columbia is regulated primarily by the province under various pieces of provincial legislation, the federal government retains responsibility for the

habitat and pollution prevention provisions of the Fisheries Act. In addition, Canada and British Columbia each has its own environmental

assessment laws and they have agreed on a harmonized review mechanism.19

SEM-98-004 73

15. Submission, at 8-9.

16. Submission, at 9.

17. Submission, at 13.

18. Response, at 3.

19. All found in Response, at 9.
Canada asserts that under this legislative framework, compliance

promotion and enforcement activities are carried out by both federal

and provincial environmental regulatory agencies and that, in practice,

the federal and provincial governments cooperate in setting goals,

enacting complementary legislation, and achieving compliance in a

manner that most effectively avoids gaps, overlaps or conflicts in government enforcement action.20 Canada reviews section 36(3) of the Fisheries Act and refers briefly to the applicable provincial statutes, the Waste

Management Act and the Mines Act.21 Canada states that, under a 1985

Memorandum of Understanding, Environment Canada is responsible

for the administration of section 36(3) on behalf of the Minister of Fisheries and Oceans.

Canada asserts that it is enforcing section 36(3) against mines in

British Columbia and other industrial facilities. According to Canada,

the Submitters fail to appreciate that, consistent with Article 5 of

NAAEC, government enforcement action encompasses actions broader

than just prosecutions. Canada claims that its general approach to

enforcement and compliance is broad and comprehensive, is consistent

with the approach contemplated by Article 5, and recognizes the complexity of the mining industry in British Columbia and of pollution

issues related to mining.22

Canada describes the range of enforcement and compliance mechanisms at its disposal and states that “in dealing with pollution problems, such as those from the three abandoned mines, the mechanism

determined to be the most effective in bringing about compliance is

always the preferred one.23” In particular, Canada refers to its ongoing

work on developing a compliance and enforcement policy for the habitat and pollution prevention provisions of the Fisheries Act,24 and attaches to the response the July, 1999 draft of the Fisheries Act Habitat

Protection and Pollution Prevention Provisions Compliance and Enforcement

Policy (the Draft Compliance and Enforcement Policy).25

Compliance promotion measures addressed in the Draft Compliance and Enforcement Policy include education and information,

promotion of technology development, technology transfer, the development of guidelines and codes of practice, and the promotion of envi74 NORTH AMERICAN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY

20. Response, at 10.

21. Response, at 10-11.

22. All found in Response, at 11.

23. Response, at 11.

24. Response, at 13.

25. Response, Exhibit 4.
ronmental audits. Under the draft policy, actions that might be taken in

response to suspected violations include site inspections and investigations, warnings, directions by inspectors, ministerial orders and prosecutions. Canada states that although this policy is still being developed,

Environment Canada follows the working draft at the regional level in

its enforcement of section 36(3).26

Canada explains that it prosecutes section 36(3) violations solely in

criminal court, as civil proceedings are only available for recovering

damages or cleanup costs and not for seeking penalties.27 It asserts that

because criminal prosecutions have more rigorous evidentiary requirements and require proof beyond a reasonable doubt, a prosecution may

not always be feasible, particularly in relation to an abandoned mine.

The likelihood of success is not as great, there may be no person available to answer to the charges, and the environmental problem may not

be resolved if the alleged offender does not have the financial resources

to clean up the pollution.28 Finally, Canada asserts that, despite these

limitations, it does prosecute violations of both section 35(1) (habitat

protection) and 36(3) of the Fisheries Act and points to charges laid in

April 1999 under both sections against the owners of Kemess Mine.29

With respect to mines specifically, Canada states that Canada and

British Columbia “have legislation, regulations, policies and procedures including a range of compliance promotion and other enforcement tools in place to prevent mining operations from harming fish and

fish habitat.30” Canada states:

In the case of mining operations, extensive monitoring, research and other

data gathering activities over the past 15 years have led to a better understanding of the acid rock generation problems associated with mining

including the drainages emanating from abandoned mines in BC. A range

of different activities has been directed toward solving the unique discharge problems at each of the three abandoned mines referenced in the

Submission. Canada’s actions with each of these three abandoned mines

. . . and other mines clearly demonstrate a comprehensive and productive

strategy aimed at eliminating the discharge of deleterious substances and

thereby achieving compliance with the Act.31

SEM-98-004 75

26. Response, at 13.

27. Response, at 14.

28. Response, at 14.

29. Response, at 15. Kemess Mine is included in the list of mines attached to the Submission.

30. Response, at 15.

31. Response, at 12.
Canada also points to the federal Fisheries Act Metal Mining Liquid

Effluent Regulations (the MMLER) which prescribe certain substances as

deleterious under section 36(3) and set permissible levels of deposits

from operating mines. Canada states that these regulations do not apply

to abandoned mines.

Canada denies the allegation in the submission that there is a pattern of non-enforcement because of staff and resource shortages. It

points to a comprehensive review of its enforcement program launched

in May 1998, the object of which is to further strengthen the enforcement

program, to counteract this allegation.32 Canada provides no information in its response about the results of that review.

B. Canada’s Enforcement Activities in Relation to Specific Mines

Canada submits that actions it has taken in relation to the Britannia, Tulsequah Chief and Mt. Washington mines constitute pending

judicial or administrative proceedings within the meaning of Articles

14(3)(a) and 45(3)(a) of NAAEC. Canada states that the actions were

pursued in a timely manner, are consistent with the Draft Compliance

and Enforcement Policy, and are expected to resolve the many issues

raised in the submission.33

Aside from noting the enforcement action taken against owners of

the Kemess Mine, Canada does not include information about any of the

mines listed in Appendix 1 of the submission because in Canada’s view

the Submitters did not include specific assertions about those mines.34

Canada adds, however, that it regularly reviews and evaluates monitoring data from over 80 operating and abandoned mines in British Columbia, including those listed in Appendix 1, to ensure compliance with the

Fisheries Act.

1. Britannia Mine

Canada acknowledges that Britannia Mine is a source of pollution

to the marine environment and has been at least since the mine ceased

operation in 1974. Canada describes the history of actions taken by Canada and British Columbia in response to the problems at Brittania Mine,

including a series of studies conducted between 1996 and 1998 by Environment Canada and the British Columbia Ministry of the Environment,

Lands and Parks (MELP) to ascertain the feasibility of a treatment plant

76 NORTH AMERICAN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY

32. Response, at 16.

33. Response, at 5.

34. Response, at 16.
to treat the acutely lethal effluent. The two jurisdictions also carry out a

joint program of effluent and stream monitoring which began in 1995.35

Canada reports that the studies, monitoring and other field

research culminated in an application by the mine owner to MELP for a

permit to construct a treatment plant to be funded by tipping fees for

non-hazardous industrial wastes in a landfill which will help seal the old

mine workings and decrease drainage flows.36 Canada asserts that it

reviewed and commented on the permit applications and accepted the

plans in principle, subject to various conditions. According to Canada,

British Columbia issued the permits on September 8, 1999, with treatment plant construction and operation expected within a year of that

date.37

Canada claims that the treatment plant will significantly reduce

the pollution caused by the mine and allow recovery of fish habitat38 and

that Canada’s participation to date constitutes “administrative proceedings” within the meaning of Article 14(3)(a) and Article 45(3)(a).39 Canada also asserts that the provincial permitting process in which Canada

participated constitutes a “pending judicial or administrative proceeding” and that the Secretariat therefore should proceed no further.40

2. Mt. Washington Mine

Canada acknowledges the pollution problems at Mt. Washington

Mine, commenting that the environmental damage caused by toxic levels of copper released from the mine into the drainage basin of the

Tsolum River on Vancouver Island has been apparent since 1985.41 The

mine closed in 1967. Canada states that since 1985 it has been an active

participant in studies and research to find a solution to the problem,

including participation on a technical committee and, later, on a community-based task force that addressed environmental problems in the

area.42 The task force issued its final report in 1999.

Canada states that in June 1999 it collected and analyzed samples

of the mine drainage from the mine site and found that the samples were

SEM-98-004 77

35. All found in Response, at 17-18.

36. Response, at 18-19.

37. Response, at 4. Canada attaches its comments and the draft permits to the Response

as Exhibits 1 and 2.

38. Response, at 20.

39. Response, at 17.

40. Response, at 4.

41. Response, at 20.

42. Response, at 21.
acutely lethal to fish. Canada further states it sent a letter on July 30, 1999

to four companies that have ownership or other interests in the Mt.

Washington Mine property advising them of the pollution problem and

that the deposit of the acutely lethal discharge violates section 36(3) of

the Fisheries Act.43

Canada submits that these latter activities, carried out after its earlier participation in the studies, research and task force, are proper and

timely administrative proceedings.44 Canada also asserts that these latter activities, which it claims are consistent with the Draft Compliance

and Enforcement Policy, constitute “pending judicial or administrative

proceedings” that require the Secretariat to proceed no further.45

3. Tulsequah Chief Mine

Canada acknowledges that water draining from the Tulsequah

Chief mine contains substances that are acutely lethal to fish. Canada

states that the owner of Tulsequah Chief mine, which ceased operating

in 1957, applied to the province in 1994 for permission to develop the

mine. This application triggered a harmonized federal provincial environmental assessment process in which Canada participated. The environmental assessment was completed in 1998 and it was determined

that the most beneficial site remediation results would be accomplished

by allowing the company to pursue its development plans.46

Canada states that at the end of the environmental assessment process, it advised British Columbia that, subject to the successful implementation of certain conditions, the project was not likely to cause

significant environmental effects. British Columbia issued a project

approval certificate for the mine development in March 1998, one of the

conditions of which was construction of a temporary water treatment

plant.47

Canada states that it conducted an inspection of the mine site in

June 1998 to determine the status of any works undertaken by the owner

and obtain drainage samples. Canada found violations of section 36(3)

and wrote a warning letter to the owner referring to the letter as “the

minimum enforcement response”. The letter warned of further inspections and possible further enforcement action.48

78 NORTH AMERICAN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY

43. All found in Response, at 22.

44. Response, at 20.

45. Response, at 4-5.

46. All found in Response, at 23.

47. All found in Response, at 23-24.

48. Response, at 24. The letter is attached to the Response as Exhibit 5.
Canada and the mine owner subsequently held meetings to discuss the compliance issue and review the company’s technical control

options. The owner then produced a plan to treat the mine effluent and,

as of May 1999, had taken an interim step to reduce the potential mine

drainage impacts on the Tulsequah River.49

Canada submits that the warning letter constitutes an “administrative order” and that the warning letter, together with subsequent

inspections of the mine site, constitute “pending judicial or administrative proceedings” that require the Secretariat to proceed no further.50

C. Other Issues Raised in the Response

Canada submits that the Secretariat should proceed no further

with development of a factual record for the following additional reasons:

• Canada claims that the Submitters did not provide Canada with

a reasonable opportunity to respond to the concerns raised in

the submission as contemplated by Article 14(1)(e). The Submitters wrote to Canada on June 1, 1998, requesting a response

within 7 days, and subsequently filed the submission with the

Secretariat on June 29, 1998, claiming Canada did not respond.

Canada asserts that continuing the factual record process in

these circumstances would go against both the letter and spirit

of NAAEC by bypassing domestic processes for handling environmental matters.51

• Noting that the provisions of NAAEC cannot be applied retroactively to assertions of a failure to effectively enforce environmental laws prior to the coming into force of NAAEC on

January 1, 1994, Canada submits that any assertions of failure to

enforce environmental laws in relation to the three mines before

NAAEC came into force on January 1, 1994 should not be

addressed in the factual record process.52

• Canada notes that the Submitters appear not to have pursued

private remedies as contemplated under Article 14(2)(c) of

NAAEC. Specifically, Canada states that the Submitters appear

SEM-98-004 79

49. Response, at 24.

50. Response, at 6.

51. Response, at 6.

52. Response, at 6-7.
not to have requested government departments and agencies to

investigate the alleged violations of the Fisheries Act, although

access to the government departments and agencies is readily

available. In addition, Canada notes that the Submitters do not

appear to have pursued civil suits for damages, initiated private

prosecutions, sought injunctions in relation to the alleged violations or pursued administrative remedies either provincially or

federally even though they have access to the courts and, generally, to administrative tribunals.53

• Canada asserts that the development of a factual record would

not further the objectives of NAAEC given the detailed information provided in the response and that Canada is pursuing

administrative proceedings in a timely fashion and in accordance with its law.54

IV. ANALYSIS

A. Introduction

We are now at the Article 15(1) stage of the factual record process.

Previously, the Secretariat determined that the submission met the criteria in Article 14(1) and, on the basis of the factors in Article 14(2),

requested a response from Canada. As the Secretariat has noted in previous Article 14(1) determinations, the requirements contained in Article

14 are not intended to place an undue burden on submitters or present

an insurmountable screening device.55

The revised Guidelines for Submissions on Enforcement Matters under

Articles 14 and 15 of the North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation (the “Guidelines”)56 require the Secretariat to provide in its notifi80 NORTH AMERICAN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY

53. Response, at 7.

54. Response, at 7.

55. See, for example, SEM-97-005 (Biodiversity), Article 14(1) Determination (26 May

1998) and SEM-98-003 (Great Lakes), Article 14(1) and (2) Determination (8 September 1999). Although the Secretariat is not bound by the principle of stare decisis,

references to previous determinations help to ensure consistency in the Secretariat’s decisionmaking. See, SEM-97-001 (BC Hydro), Article 15(1) Notification (27

April 1998).

56. In June 1999, the Council adopted revised Guidelines, which are available on the

CEC web page, <www.cec.org> under Citizen Submissions. The Secretariat has

previously noted that the revised Guidelines provide further support for a relatively low burden on submitters with respect to Article 14, in that the revised

Guidelines require submitters to address at least 13 criteria in 15 pages. See,

SEM-97-003 (Quebec Hog Farms), Article 15(1) Notification (29 October 1999).
cations concerning Articles 14(1) and 14(2) an explanation of how the

submission meets, or fails to meet, the Article 14(1) criteria and of the factors that guided the Secretariat in determining that the submission merits a response. Because the Article 14(1) and 14(2) determinations in

relation to this submission predate the revised Guidelines, these explanations are included in this notification.

1. Article 14(1)

As indicated above, the Secretariat found on November 30, 1998

that the submission met the criteria for continued review included in

Article 14(1).

First, the submission satisfies the criteria in the first sentence of

Article 14(1). The submission asserts that Canada, a Party, is failing to

effectively enforce its environmental law. Section 36(3) of the Fisheries

Act qualifies as environmental law for the purposes of NAAEC. The submission emphasizes the extent to which Canada has allegedly failed to

effectively enforce section 36(3) rather than the effectiveness of section

36(3). The submission also meets the temporal requirements inherent in

Article 14(1). The Submitters assert that, even for those mines that allegedly have been violating section 36(3) for many years, the violations are

continuing and have been ongoing since January 1, 1994.

Like other submissions the Secretariat has considered, the submission alleges a failure to enforce effectively both in specific cases and

more broadly. Although the submission focuses on three mines, it

alleges a widespread failure by Canada to enforce section 36(3) of the

Fisheries Act effectively against mines in British Columbia generally,

resulting in ongoing and widespread harm to an important public

resource. The Secretariat has previously found, after considerable analysis, that none of the criteria in Articles 14(1) and 14(2) reflects an intent,

either direct or indirect, to limit the citizen submission process either to

submissions alleging failures to enforce effectively in regard to particularized incidents or to submissions that focus on alleged failures to effectively enforce that are broad in scope.57 The Secretariat concluded that

SEM-98-004 81

57. For a detailed discussion of the rationale for this conclusion, see, SEM-99-002

(Migratory Birds), Article 15(1) Notification (December 15, 2000). See also,

SEM-97-003 (Quebec Hog Farms), Article 15(1) Notification (29 October 1999)

(“Submissions... which focus on the effectiveness of enforcement in the context of

asserted widespread violations . . . are inherently more likely to warrant scrutiny

by the Commission than allegations of failures to enforce concerning single violations. This is so even though it may be appropriate for the Commission to address

the latter, depending on the circumstances.”).
allowing either type of submission would promote the objects and purposes of the NAAEC. Further, the Council has instructed the Secretariat

to prepare factual records with respect to both particularized allegations

of ineffective enforcement58 and allegations of a widespread, systemic

failure to enforce effectively.59 With respect to this submission, the Secretariat affirms that approach and concludes that both the alleged failure

to enforce section 36(3) with respect to the three particular mines and the

alleged failure to enforce section 36(3) against mining operations in British Columbia generally are within the scope of Article 14.

The submission also meets the criteria in Articles 14(1)(a)-(f). First,

the submission is in English, one of the languages designated by Canada

(Article 14(1)(a)). Second, the submission clearly identifies the organizations making the submission, on its cover page and at page 5 (Article

14(1)(b)). Third, the submission appears to be aimed at promoting

enforcement rather than harassing industry (Article 14(1)(d)). The Submitters are organizations committed to environmental protection, not

competitors of the entities that are the subject of the concerns raised in

the submission. Fourth, the submission indicates that the matter was

communicated in writing to Canada and that Canada did not respond

prior to the filing of the submission (Article 14(1)(e)).60 Fifth, the Submitters are organizations that have been established in Canada (Article

14(1)(f)).

The Submitters also provided sufficient information under Article

14(1)(c)61 to allow the Secretariat to review the submission, as to both the

alleged failure to enforce section 36(3) effectively with regard to the

three specific mines discussed at length in the submission and the

alleged widespread failure to enforce section 36(3) effectively. The submission explains in detail the persistent and ongoing problems with controlling acid mine drainage at the Britannia, Tulsequah Chief and Mt.

Washington mines and attaches several government reports, reports of

non-governmental organizations and other documents that allow the

Secretariat to review the issues raised in the submission regarding the

three mines.

82 NORTH AMERICAN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY

58. SEM-96-001 (Cozumel) and SEM-98-007 (Metales y Derivados).

59. SEM-97-001 (BC Hydro).

60. Letter of June 1, 1998 from counsel for the Submitters to the Minister of Fisheries

and Oceans, attached to the Submission at Exhibit 8 requesting information about

enforcement actions being taken against polluting mines in British Columbia and

advising of the possibility of a submission under NAAEC if Canada did not

respond by June 8, 1998.

61. Failure to meet this criterion can be a basis for terminating a submission. See

SEM-00-003 (Jamaica Bay), Article 14(1) Determination (12 April 2000).
The submission and its attachments also include information supporting the Submitters’ allegation of a widespread failure to enforce section 36(3) effectively. The Submitters include three studies that present

information regarding the overall decline of and ongoing threats to fisheries in British Columbia, including the manner in which acid mine

drainage and heavy metal contamination result from mining operations

and cause harm to fish and fish habitat.62 As well, the studies outline the

significant technical challenges in controlling acid mine drainage effectively, including examples both in British Columbia and elsewhere of

failed attempts to control acid mine drainage.63 The Submitters also provide some information regarding the forty-two mines in British Columbia, in addition to the three highlighted in the submission, that are

known to be or potentially are acid-generating.64 Finally, the Submitters

provide information regarding the overall use of prosecutions to enforce

section 36(3)65 and regarding recent reductions in the staff and resources

available to Environment Canada to enforce section 36(3).66

Taken together, this information, along with the information

regarding the three mines highlighted in the submission, is sufficient to

allow the Secretariat to review the alleged widespread failure to enforce

section 36(3) effectively. Many submitters are non-government environmental organizations with limited financial and human resources for

monitoring compliance with environmental laws and gathering evidence of specific breaches. These constraints provide additional support

for concluding that the Submitters have submitted sufficient information regarding the alleged widespread failure to enforce section 36(3)

effectively to meet the threshold requirements of Article 14.

2. Article 14(2)

The Secretariat also determined on 25 June 1999 that the submission merited a response from Canada. In deciding whether a submission

merits a response, the Secretariat considers the four factors enumerated

in Article 14(2). Article 14(2) lists these four factors as follows:

In deciding whether to request a response, the Secretariat shall be guided

by whether:

(a) the submission alleges harm to the person or organization making the

submission;

SEM-98-004 83

62. Submission, Exhibits 1, 2 and 3.

63. See, e.g., Submission, Exhibit 1, at 11, 15-16.

64. See also Submission, Exhibit 1, at 13 and generally, and Exhibit 2.

65. Submission, at 14-15, and Exhibit 7, at 7.

66. Submission, at 11 (and cited references).
(b) the submission, alone or in combination with other submissions,

raises matters whose further study in this process would advance the

goals of this Agreement;

(c) private remedies available under the Party’s law have been pursued;

and

(d) the submission is drawn exclusively from mass media reports.

The submission alleges harm to the Submitters within the meaning

of Article 14(2)(a).67 The Submitters refer to their common interest in

protecting British Columbia’s threatened wild salmon population and

to the importance of salmon to the province as a whole. The Submitters

state that they each have a strong concern about Canada’s failure to

enforce the Fisheries Act against mining operations and about the resulting industrial pollution and its effect on fish, fish habitat, and water generally. They allege that the failure to enforce fisheries legislation against

the mining industry has contributed to the decline of anadromous fish

stocks and to destruction of fish habitat and valuable fisheries and has

had a significant effect on communities and individuals who depend on

fisheries for livelihood and cultural identity.68

Second, the submission raises matters whose further study in the

factual record process would advance the goals of NAAEC. At the very

least, further study of the matters raised in the submission would

help “foster the protection and improvement of the environment...

for present and future generations;69” “enhance compliance with, and

enforcement of, environmental laws and regulations;70” and “promote

pollution prevention policies and practices.71” Further, as the Secretariat

has noted in connection with other submissions, allegations of widespread patterns of ineffectual enforcement, such as those contained in

this submission, “are particularly strong candidates for Article 14 consideration.72”

84 NORTH AMERICAN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY

67. The Secretariat considered the issue of harm in “Recommendations of the Secretariat to Council for the development of a Factual Record” in relation to Submission

SEM-96-001 (Cozumel). After noting the importance and public nature of the

marine resource in question, the Secretariat stated:

While the Secretariat recognizes that the submitters may not have alleged the particularized, individual harm required to acquire legal standing to bring suit in

some civil proceedings in North America, the especially public nature of marine

resources brings the submitters within the spirit and intent of Article 14.

68. Submission, at 9.

69. Article 1(a).

70. Article 1(g).

71. Article 1(j).

72. SEM-99-002 (Migratory Birds), Article 14(1) and (2) Determination (23 December

1999).
Third, the Secretariat considered the extent to which the Submitters pursued private remedies under the Party’s law. The Submitters

assert that they have urged Canada to enforce section 36(3) but that Canada has failed to respond.73 They also state that environmental groups,

First Nations, local communities and others have made extensive efforts

to have the law enforced so as to prevent contamination of fisheries from

mines in British Columbia.74 The Submitters acknowledge the right of

Canadian citizens to initiate private prosecutions under the Fisheries Act

but claim that this is not an effective remedy. They point to several private prosecutions of alleged Fisheries Act violations commenced by the

Sierra Legal Defence Fund which were taken over and terminated by the

provincial Attorney General.75 Given the widespread nature of the

alleged failure to enforce section 36(3) effectively, the burden on the Submitters of pursuing remedies with regard to all of the mines involved

and the Submitters’ experience with futile private prosecutions, “reasonable actions have been taken76” to pursue specific private remedies

with respect to the violations alleged in the submission.

Finally, the submission relies on a number of government reports

and reports by non-governmental organizations.77 Therefore, the submission is not drawn exclusively from mass media reports.

B. Whether the Matter is Subject to Pending Administrative or

Judicial Proceedings

As noted above, Canada submits that the assertions in the submission concerning the enforcement of the Fisheries Act in relation to Britannia, Mt. Washington and Tulsequah Chief Mines are the subject of

pending judicial or administrative proceedings within the meaning of

Article 14(3)(a) and Article 45(3)(a). Because Article 14(3)(a) provides

that the Secretariat “shall proceed no further” where the matter alleged

in the submission is the subject of “a pending judicial or administrative

proceeding,” the Secretariat considers whether any pending judicial or

administrative proceedings preclude or limit development of a factual

record before considering other factors relevant to whether a factual

record is warranted.

SEM-98-004 85

73. Submission, at 18.

74. Submission, at 15.

75. Submission, at 18.

76. Guideline 7.5(b).

77. The Submission relies on reports such as “Acid Mine Drainage: Mining and Water

Pollution Issues in B.C.”, by the Environmental Mining Council of B.C. (Exhibit 1)

and “Water Quality Assessment and Objectives for the Tsolum River Basin,” by

B.C. Ministry of Environment (Exhibit 5).
A “judicial or administrative proceeding” is defined in Article

45(3) as

(a) a domestic judicial, quasi-judicial or administrative action pursued

by the Party in a timely fashion and in accordance with its law. Such

actions comprise: mediation; arbitration; the process of issuing a

license, permit, or authorization; seeking an assurance of voluntary

compliance or a compliance agreement; seeking sanctions or remedies in an administrative or judicial forum; and the process of issuing

an administrative order; and

(b) an international dispute resolution proceeding to which the Party is

party.

In order to fall within the definition of “judicial or administrative

proceeding” in Article 45(3)(a), a proceeding must be “specifically delineated in Article 45(3)(a), pursued by a Party in a timely manner, and in

accordance with a Party’s law.78” Further, such a proceeding must concern the same subject matter as the allegations raised in the submission.

Finally, “this initial threshold consideration should be construed narrowly so as to give full effect to the object and purpose of the NAAEC,

and more particularly, to Article 14(3).79”

Applying these principles in considering whether Article 14(3)(a)

precludes further consideration of a submission, the Secretariat has

stated previously that

[o]nly proceedings which are designed to culminate in a specific decision,

ruling or agreement within a definable period of time should be considered as falling within Article 14(3)(a). Activities that are solely consultative, information-gathering or research-based in nature, without a

definable goal, should not be sufficient to trigger the automatic termination clause. If such a proceeding were included within the definition, a

Party could effectively shield non-enforcement of its environmental laws

from scrutiny simply by commissioning studies or holding consultations.80

Bearing these parameters in mind, none of the actions Canada has

taken in relation to the three mines falls within the definition of “judicial

or administrative proceedings” under Articles 14(3) and 45(3). With

respect to Britannia Mine, neither Canada’s historic participation in

86 NORTH AMERICAN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY

78. SEM-97-001 (BC Hydro), Article 15(1) Notification (28 April 1998).

79. SEM-97-001 (BC Hydro), Article 15(1) Notification (28 April 1998).

80. SEM-97-001 (BC Hydro), Article 15(1) Notification (28 April 1998).
studies and other efforts intended to address the pollution problem, nor

its participation in the provincial permitting process, meets the definition. Issuing certain permits clearly falls within the definition of “judicial or administrative proceeding.” However, according to Canada, the

provincial permits for the treatment plant and landfill operations associated with Britannia Mine were issued on September 8, 1999. Therefore,

even assuming that a proceeding for issuing a provincial permit under

British Columbia’s Waste Management Act would constitute an administrative proceeding respecting the alleged failure to enforce the Fisheries

Act effectively,81 the provincial permits are no longer the subject of

pending proceedings.

Similarly, Canada’s collection of samples of mine drainage, its participation on the Tsolum River Task Force, and its letter of July 30, 1999 to

the four companies believed to have an interest in the land on which Mt.

Washington Mine is located82 do not fall within the kinds of actions

described in Article 45(3)(a). They are not proceedings of any kind

against any person to enforce the Fisheries Act. Further, they are not

designed to reach a compliance agreement or to culminate in a specific

decision or ruling within a specified time. Last, the response makes clear

that at the time of the response, the June 30, 1999 letter had been sent, the

Task Force had issued its final report and its funding had been terminated and Canada had not determined what future enforcement or other

action, if any, it would pursue. Canada’s actions in relation to Mt. Washington Mine have not proceeded to the point where they can be seen as

an integral step in any of the actions specified in Article 45(3)(a).

With respect to Tulsequah Chief Mine, Canada points to the

inspections, testing and subsequent warning letter83 to the mine owner

as pending judicial or administrative proceedings within the meaning of

Articles 14(3) and 45(3). Construing the Article 45(3) definition narrowly, inspections and testing do not fall within any of the actions

described in Article 45(3), because by themselves they are not designed

to culminate in a specific ruling, decision or agreement. Rather, they are

information-gathering steps that might, but do not necessarily, lead to

further enforcement action within a specified timeframe.

SEM-98-004 87

81. Because the provincial permit proceedings are no longer pending, it is not necessary to address this question. Notably, however, while a violation of some of the

conditions in the provincial permits might, as a factual matter, also result in a violation of section 36(3), there is no indication that the permits are Fisheries Act authorizations.

82. Response, Exhibit 3.

83. Response, Exhibit 5.
Nor does the warning letter to the owner of the Tulsequah Chief

Mine fall within the Article 45(3) definition. Canada asserts that the

warning letter is an “administrative order”. However, applying the

principles set out above, an “administrative order” in the context of Article 45(3) must at the very least contain a directive with immediate legal

effect that compels or enjoins an activity so as to promote compliance

with the law. An administrative order, unlike the warning letter, is a ruling from which legal rights and obligations flow.84 Indeed, the Draft

Compliance and Enforcement Policy provides for the issuance of ministerial orders as a distinct, and more consequential, alternative to warning letters. Warning letters as contemplated in the Draft Compliance and

Enforcement Policy85 may be a legitimate enforcement measure, and

they may lay the groundwork for further action. However, given the

indefinite nature of any future action that may follow, the warning letter

attached to the response is not an administrative order issued under the

Fisheries Act within the meaning of Article 45(3).

Only in relation to Kemess Mine has Canada shown that there is a

pending judicial or administrative proceeding within the meaning of

Article 45(3)(a). By laying charges against the mine owner, Canada is

seeking sanctions in a judicial forum. If a factual record is developed as a

result of the submission, the Secretariat will be precluded from considering whether Canada is failing to effectively enforce the provisions of the

Fisheries Act in relation to Kemess Mine as long as the charges and prosecution are pending. However, Article 14(3)(a) would not preclude the

Secretariat from looking at certain matters relating to Kemess Mine as

they pertain to the allegation of a widespread failure to enforce section

36(3) effectively against mining operations. For example, the Secretariat

may want to examine the circumstances leading to charges against the

owners of Kemess Mine in order to provide information about why

charges are laid in some circumstances and not others.

In sum, Article 14(3)(a) does not preclude the Secretariat from proceeding further, except with respect to whether Canada is effectively

enforcing section 36(3) in regard to the Kemess Mine. Under Article

88 NORTH AMERICAN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY

84. The following definitions support this interpretation of “administrative order.”

Black’s Law Dictionary, 7th ed., defines “administrative order” as

1. An order issued by a government agency after an adjudicatory hearing. 2. An

agency regulation that interprets or applies a statutory provision.

The Dictionary of Canadian Law (Dukelow, 1991) includes the following definition of

“order” taken from the Court of Appeal Act (BC):

(a) A judgment and a decree, and (b) an opinion, advice, direction, determination,

decision or declaration that is specifically authorized or required under an enactment to be given or made.

85. Response, Exhibit 4.
15(1), the Secretariat’s next step is to consider whether the submission, in

light of the Party’s response, warrants developing a factual record.86

C. Why Preparation of a Factual Record is Warranted

The Secretariat is of the view that development of a factual record

is warranted regarding the matters raised in the submission. Section

36(3), the key provision at issue, is the central pollution prevention provision in the Fisheries Act. As described in detail above, the Submitters

allege a pattern of ineffective enforcement of section 36(3) in relation to

mines operating in British Columbia.

Throughout the response, Canada disputes this allegation. First,

Canada describes measures it has undertaken to promote compliance

with and enforce section 36(3) of the Fisheries Act in relation to the three

mines that the Submitters use to illustrate this alleged pattern of ineffective enforcement. Canada’s response also includes numerous claims

about the overall effectiveness of its enforcement activities in connection

with mining operations in British Columbia, but provides few specific

details to support those claims in relation to the mines listed in the

Appendix. The centerpiece of Canada’s assertions regarding its

approach to enforcement of section 36(3) is the Draft Compliance and

Enforcement Policy. As explained below, a factual record would afford

an opportunity to develop additional information concerning both the

effectiveness of the actions Canada has taken with respect to the three

highlighted mines and the actual application of the various measures

Canada claims it employs generally in the enforcement of section 36(3)

in relation to mines in British Columbia.

1. The Britannia, Mt. Washington and Tulsequah Chief Mines

The Secretariat first considers whether development of a factual

record is warranted in relation to the Britannia, Mt. Washington and

Tulsequah Chief mines, taking into account the details that Canada has

provided regarding concrete compliance and enforcement action it has

taken in relation to the mines. Clearly, Canada acknowledges and has

made attempts to address the longstanding issues related to acid mine

drainage at these mines. Significantly, however, Canada provides no

information indicating that the actions it or British Columbia has taken

SEM-98-004 89

86. On 18 April 2000, the Submitters filed a reply to the Party’s response. There is, however, no provision in the NAAEC for consideration of such a reply from a submitter

at this stage of the citizen submission process. If the Council directs preparation of a

factual record for this submission, the Secretariat may consider additional information from the Submitters in its development of the factual record. See Article 15(4).
to address the serious and persistent water pollution problems at any of

the mines have ensured, or will in the future ensure, compliance with

section 36(3). In short, it appears undisputed that at least as of the date of

Canada’s response, acid mine drainage from each of the three mines –

one of which has been described as the single worst point source of metal

pollution in North America87 – was continuing to enter and affect fish

habitat and Fisheries Act violations were ongoing. Accordingly, the Secretariat has determined that development of a factual record is warranted to examine in greater detail the effectiveness of the enforcement

approach taken in relation to each mine, whether those approaches

serve as models for effective enforcement with respect to mines in British

Columbia generally, and whether and how Canada’s approach prevents

Fisheries Act violations at the mines in the long term.

The Secretariat considers preparation of a factual record to be

appropriate with respect to all three mines despite the effluent treatment

works planned or underway at the Britannia and Tulsequah Chief

mines. With respect to Britannia Mine, development of a factual record

would provide an opportunity to examine the progress in implementing

the treatment plant and landfill, their effectiveness as a solution to acid

mine drainage from the mine and the steps Canada has taken to ensure

long-term compliance with section 36(3) at the mine. As to the Tulsequah Chief mine, Canada explains that inspection and sampling it conducted in August 1999 indicated treatment works beyond those initially

anticipated were likely necessary to address Fisheries Act violations. A

factual record is warranted to examine in more detail whether those

additional works have been required and implemented, whether they

have been effective in controlling the violations, and what steps Canada

has taken to ensure that violations of section 36(3) do not persist at the

mine.

The Tulsequah Chief mine also raises questions regarding Canada’s assertion that current environmental assessment and environmental protection regimes preclude problems similar to those at older mines

such as the Britannia, Mt. Washington and Tulsequah Chief mines from

occurring at newer mines in production or proposed for development in

British Columbia.88 In particular, Canada points to the harmonized environmental assessment process between British Columbia and Canada,

as well as other licensing and permitting processes. Canada reports that

between 1994 and 1998, Canada and British Columbia conducted a comprehensive environmental review of a new Tulsequah mining project

and concluded that the development of the project improved the ability

90 NORTH AMERICAN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY

87. Submission, at 9.

88. Response, at 9-10.
to properly rehabilitate the site for long-term closure. In March 1998,

following Canada’s determination that the project was not likely to

cause significant environmental impacts if certain conditions were met,

British Columbia issued a project approval certificate. One condition of

approval was construction of a temporary water treatment plant, scheduled to be in place by September-October 1998, followed by full effluent

treatment, scheduled to be in place by November 1999. However, in

spite of the environmental assessment and the conditions placed on the

project approval by the province, Canada issued a warning letter to the

mine owner89 on September 28, 1998 and concluded in August 1999 that

additional works were likely necessary to control Fisheries Act violations. A factual record is warranted to examine the extent to which

section 36(3) is enforced effectively through application of the environmental assessment process at the Tulsequah Chief mine and other

mines.90

2. The Alleged Widespread Failure to Enforce Section 36(3)

Effectively

The submission asserts a widespread failure by Canada to enforce

section 36(3) to protect fish and fish habitat from the environmental

impacts of mining operations in British Columbia. While it focuses most

heavily on the Britannia, Mt. Washington and Tulsequah Chief Mines,

those mines are clearly intended to illustrate a more widespread concern. The submission also lists 25 “known acid generating mines” and 17

“potentially acid generating mines” in Appendix 1. The submission provides no specific details of alleged violations in relation to these additional mines and Canada provides no specific information in this regard

except as to the Kemess Mine. Canada maintains that, in the absence of

specific assertions regarding the other mines in British Columbia, it is

unable to respond to the Submitters’ claims about those other mines.

However, the allegations regarding widespread ineffective enforcement

of section 36(3) against the mines listed in the Appendix must be viewed

in light of all of the information presented in the submission.

SEM-98-004 91

89. Response, Exhibit 5.

90. The Kemess Mine provides another example. According to materials attached to

the submission, the Kemess Mine project was approved in 1996 after undergoing

the harmonized environmental assessment process. Submission, Exhibit 2, at 48.

As of the date of Canada’s response, British Columbia was pursuing charges

against owners of the mine under sections 35(1), 36(3), 40(1) and 40(2) of the Fisheries Act. Response, Exhibit 7. Although these pending proceedings preclude a factual record regarding effectiveness of Fisheries Act enforcement at the mine, the

mere fact that these violations occurred despite application of the harmonized

environmental assessment process raises questions as to the limits on the ability of

the process to prevent Fisheries Act violations.
The Submitters support with three studies their assertion that

there are or may be a number of mines polluting fish habitat in addition

to the three discussed in detail in the body of the submission.91 Together,

these studies present information regarding the overall decline of and

ongoing threats to fisheries in British Columbia, including threats due to

acid mine drainage. The studies also discuss the manner in which acid

mine drainage and heavy metal contamination result from mining

operations and cause harm to fish and fish habitat. As well, the studies

outline the significant technical challenges in controlling acid mine

drainage effectively, including examples both in British Columbia and

elsewhere of failed attempts to control acid mine drainage.92 These studies support the conclusion that acid mine drainage and heavy metal contamination are a predictable result of mining in the absence of – and

sometimes despite – preventive and containment measures.93

The Submitters also provide information on several of the fortytwo mines listed in the Appendix.94 The attachments to the submission

describe impacts acid mine drainage from some of these mines has had

on associated fisheries historically and recount attempts, with varying

degrees of success, to control acid mine drainage from some of the mines

so as to prevent contamination that might threaten fisheries.95 For at

least two of the mines, the attachments note ongoing surface or ground

water pollution concerns related to the mines.96

The Submitters also provide information indicating that Canada

initiated only 5 prosecutions Canada-wide under section 36(3) in 1996-

9797 and state they were able to find only three cases (dating from the

1980’s) in which mining companies have been prosecuted for violations

of section 36(3).98 They maintain that enforcement mechanisms other

than prosecution have been “complete and utter failures” given that the

three mines described in the submission have been allowed to continue

to pollute fish habitat.99 Finally, they provide information regarding

recent reductions in the staff and resources available to Environment

Canada to enforce section 36(3).100

92 NORTH AMERICAN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY

91. Submission, Exhibits 1, 2 and 3.

92. See, for example, Submission, Exhibit 1, at 11, 15-16

93. See, for example, Submission, Exhibit 1, at 1-5, Exhibit 2, at 10-11.

94. Submission, Exhibits 1 and 2.

95. See Submission, Exhibit 1, at 11, 14, 19-20; Exhibit 2, at 3-4, 32-42.

96. Submission, Exhibit 2, at 41 (citing elevated copper and zinc levels in water bodies

located near the Myra Falls mine) and at 37 (citing ongoing groundwater contamination at the Sullivan mine).

97. Submission, Exhibit 7, at 7.

98. Submission, at 14-15.

99. Submission, at 17.

100. Submission, at 11 (and cited references).
Taken together, this information, along with the detailed information regarding the ongoing Fisheries Act violations at the Britannia,

Tulsequah Chief and Mt. Washington mines, raises central questions

regarding the effectiveness of Canada’s enforcement efforts with respect

to mines in British Columbia generally. Notably, the additional

forty-two mines that the Submitters identify have in common a crucial

characteristic relevant to their potential to violate section 36(3), namely

their known or potential capacity to generate acid mine drainage. The

information presented in the submission, especially in view of the experience at the three highlighted mines, raises important questions regarding the extent to which these mines are contaminating or threaten to

contaminate fisheries and Canada’s efforts to address problems associated with those mines through enforcement of section 36(3).

Canada’s response does not adequately answer these questions.

Canada does not deny the Submitters’ assertion that water pollution

caused by mining has a deleterious environmental impact. As well, Canada notes that “mining operations are often situated near water bodies,

and discharge effluents into waters frequented by fish.101” However,

Canada states that “Canada and BC have legislation, regulations, policies and procedures including a range of compliance promotion and

other enforcement tools in place to prevent mining operations from

harming fish and fish habitat.102” Canada contends that whereas the

submission appears to equate enforcement only with prosecutions,

“Canada’s actions with each of these three abandoned mines and other

mines clearly demonstrate a comprehensive and productive strategy

aimed at eliminating the discharge of deleterious substances and

thereby achieving compliance with the Act.103” Canada adds that pollution problems associated with older mines are being addressed in new

mines under federal and provincial environmental assessment and protection legislation and procedures.104

As the Secretariat has previously indicated, varied principles and

approaches are encompassed in the term “effective enforcement,” and

under certain circumstances, enforcement measures other than prosecution may be more effective in securing compliance with a Party’s environmental law.105 Nonetheless, the response fails to make a sufficient

connection between the full range of enforcement tools available to Canada and whether the tools are being used effectively to enforce section

36(3) of the Fisheries Act with respect to mines in British Columbia.

SEM-98-004 93

101. Response, at 9.

102. Response, at 15.

103. Response, at 12.

104. Response, at 15

105. SEM-97-001 (BC Hydro), Article 15(1) Recommendation (27 April 1998).
The response does provide a detailed and helpful description of

the tools available to the federal government and British Columbia for

addressing violations of section 36(3). Central to this description is the

Draft Compliance and Enforcement Policy.106 The purpose and scope of

the Draft Compliance and Enforcement Policy is described in the following terms:

This Compliance and Enforcement Policy lays out general principles for

application of the habitat protection and pollution prevention provisions

of the Act and explains the role of regulatory officials in promoting, monitoring and enforcing the legislation. It is a national policy which applies to

all those who exercise regulatory authority, from ministers to enforcement

personnel.107

Thus, the Draft Compliance and Enforcement Policy provides a

template for what Canada asserts constitutes effective enforcement of

section 36(3) of the Fisheries Act. It includes eight sections containing the

framework and the specifics of the policy, listed under the following

headings:

• What are enforcement and compliance?

• Guiding principles

• Jurisdiction and responsibilities

• Measures to promote compliance

• Inspection and investigation

• Responses to violation

• Penalties and Court Orders upon conviction

• Civil suit by the Crown to recover costs.

The Draft Compliance and Enforcement Policy defines compliance

as the state of conformity with the law and instructs regulatory officials

to secure compliance through two types of activities, compliance promotion and enforcement. It lists the following measures for promoting

compliance:

• communication and publication of information;

94 NORTH AMERICAN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY

106. Canada also attaches to its response a document describing British Columbia’s

overall approach to and policies regarding environmental enforcement and compliance assurance. Response, Exhibit 8.

107. Response, Exhibit 4, at 1.
• public education;

• consultation with parties affected by these provisions of the

Fisheries Act; and

• technical assistance.

It defines enforcement as compelling adherence to the law through

the exercise or application of powers granted under the legislation and

states that enforcement is to be carried out through the following measures:

• inspections to monitor or verify compliance;

• investigations of violations;

• issuance of warnings, directions by inspectors, authorizations,

and Ministerial orders, without resorting to court action; and

• court actions, such as injunctions, prosecution, court orders

upon conviction, and civil suits for recovery of costs.108

What the response lacks is a detailed explanation regarding the

actual implementation and effectiveness of this policy and related federal and provincial measures with respect to mining operations in British Columbia. While the Draft Enforcement and Compliance Policy

provides a helpful framework for assessing Canada’s statement that it is

systematically enforcing the pollution prevention provisions of the Fisheries Act against British Columbia’s mines, the draft policy alone does

not show the extent to which it has been implemented in practice or that

its implementation has been effective.

Canada asserts that it regularly reviews and evaluates monitoring

data and fisheries resource information for mines in British Columbia to

ensure compliance, protect fisheries resources and select mines for

inspection.109 Canada states that the extensive monitoring, research and

other data gathering activities it has conducted for over 15 years have

resulted in a better understanding of the acid rock generation problems

associated with mining.110 However, Canada provides few specific

details to show how it has used this information in enforcing section

36(3), through application of the Draft Enforcement and Compliance

SEM-98-004 95

108. Response, Exhibit 4, at 3.

109. Response, at 16.

110. Response, at 12.
Policy or otherwise, in relation to mining operations in British Columbia. Since Canada claims that the federal and provincial governments

have consistently taken action to address the threat to fish and fish habitat posed by British Columbia mines in general, additional specific information should be available for development in a factual record.

Canada’s response also indicates that the MMLER apply where a

mine, as defined in those regulations, is in operation, and that as of the

date of the response, revisions to MMLER were under consideration.111

However, Canada does not provide information about whether the

MMLER are being applied to any of the mines listed in the Appendix to

the submission or the extent to which the MMLER are applied and

enforced so as to ensure compliance with section 36(3).

Finally, while Canada “categorically denies the assertion in the

submission that there is a pattern of non-enforcement due to staff and

resource shortages,112” it provides no detailed information regarding

whether and to what extent reductions in enforcement resources have

had an impact on implementation of the Draft Enforcement and Compliance Policy and on the overall effectiveness of the enforcement of section

36(3) with respect to mines in British Columbia. Canada provides no

details about the current level of enforcement staff and resources, how

the allocation of those resources has changed over time, and whether

there is any correlation between the level of enforcement staff and

resources and the degree of the impact on fisheries from mining activities. Canada also offers no information about the progress or results of

Environment Canada’s 1998 review of its enforcement program, and

how those results relate to the allegations raised in the submission.

In sum, a factual record is warranted to develop information

regarding enforcement of section 36(3), through application of the Draft

Compliance and Enforcement Policy or otherwise, at mines other than

the three mines highlighted in the submission, except in regard to the

effectiveness of the enforcement of section 36(3) at the Kemess Mine. In

particular, a factual record is warranted for the following purposes:

• To develop information regarding the extent to which the mines

listed in Appendix 1 discharge deleterious substances to fishbearing waters, including information on whether any such discharges are authorized under the Fisheries Act and on whether

the mines are violating section 36(3);

96 NORTH AMERICAN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY

111. Response, at 15.

112. Response, at 16.
• To develop information regarding the extent to which the harmonized environmental assessment process or other federal or

provincial compliance-promoting measures have been effective

in preventing or addressing violations of section 36(3) at those

mines;

• To develop information regarding the nature, extent and

frequency of compliance monitoring for those mines;

• To examine the findings of compliance monitoring activities

at those mines, including the frequency and seriousness of

non-compliance with section 36(3) and, where applicable, the

MMLER;

• To develop information regarding investigations, prosecutions

or other enforcement action taken by the federal government or

British Columbia in response to findings of non-compliance

with section 36(3) of the Fisheries Act or the MMLER at those

mines, including action taken when non-compliance persists;

• To examine the results and effectiveness of the enforcement

or other action taken by Canada as a result of findings of

non-compliance with section 36(3) at those mines; and

• To examine the results of Environment Canada’s 1998 review

of its enforcement program and other information relevant

to whether reductions in enforcement resources have had an

impact on the effectiveness of Canada’s enforcement of section

36(3) with respect to mines in British Columbia.

A factual record would also provide an opportunity to examine the

results of the “extensive monitoring, research and other data gathering

activities” that Canada indicates has led to a better understanding of

problems associated with acid mine drainage in British Columbia.113 As

well, the materials attached to the submission indicate that efforts to

control acid mine drainage at some of the mines in the Appendix have, at

least for the time being, had some success. Therefore, a factual record

would also potentially provide an opportunity to present information

regarding preventive or remedial measures that so far have been

successful in controlling acid mine drainage.

SEM-98-004 97

113. Response, at 12.
3. Private Remedies

Under Article 14(3)(b)(ii), a Party may submit information regarding whether private remedies in connection with the matters raised in a

submission are available to the submitter and whether they have been

pursued. In its response, Canada asserts that interested persons may

request government agencies to investigate alleged violations of environmental legislation and the Submitters appear not to have taken this

step.114 Canada also asserts that the Submitters do not appear to have

pursued other administrative, quasi-judicial or judicial proceedings

available to them, including civil actions for damages, private prosecutions and injunctions. Finally, Canada asserts that the one week that the

Submitters gave the Party to respond regarding matters raised in the

submission was not a reasonable opportunity and that proceeding

further would encourage submitters to bypass domestic processes.

While nothing in the NAAEC compels termination of a submission if a

submitter fails to pursue private remedies or to allow a certain amount

of time for a Party to respond to matters raised in the submission, in Canada’s view, these are additional reasons why a factual record is not warranted here.

As noted above, the Submitters have described prior efforts they

have made to pursue private remedies, in particular private prosecutions. In their view, those efforts were not satisfactory. Further, the Submitters do not have access to the same range of enforcement options as

Canada or to the same range of monitoring and compliance information

for pursuing private remedies. Canada acknowledges that, aside from

the possibility of seeking damages or recovery of cleanup costs, there are

no civil proceedings available for enforcing section 36(3) and enforcement is solely in the criminal courts.115 Moreover, Canada identifies no

potential avenue for the Submitters to seek redress of the alleged widespread failure to enforce section 36(3) effectively other than seeking remedies against individual mines. Given the number of mines of potential

concern to the Submitters, the burden of seeking private remedies

to address the alleged widespread pattern of ineffective enforcement

would be significant.

Additionally, the response indicates that the pollution problems

caused by the Britannia, Mt. Washington and Tulsequah Chief mines are

long-standing and have each been the subject of a public process to

98 NORTH AMERICAN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY

114. Response, at 7.

115. Response, at 14.
attempt to deal with the problems. Both the submission and the response

indicate that citizens, as well as government agencies, have been aware

of and concerned for years about the extent of the pollution caused by

the three mines highlighted in the submission. Further, the two reports

attached to the submission116 that discuss more generally the environmental problems caused by mines in British Columbia were publicly

released, demonstrating the efforts the Submitters have made to bring

these issues to the attention of Canada and the general public.

For these reasons, the short period of time that the Submitters gave

Canada to respond to their June 1, 1998 letter prior to filing the Submission is not a compelling reason to preclude preparation of a factual

record. Further, the Secretariat is satisfied with the Submitters’ explanation of why they did not pursue a private prosecution or other specific

remedies in relation to any of the mines.

IV. RECOMMENDATION

For the reasons stated above, the Secretariat considers that the submission, in light of the Party’s response, warrants development of a factual record. Using three mines as examples, the submission raises central

questions regarding the Party’s efforts to control and prevent acid mine

drainage so as to enforce compliance with section 36(3) of the Fisheries

Act in relation to mining operations in British Columbia. The response

reflects an appreciation for the importance of the environmental laws

and natural resources at issue in this submission. However, while the

response asserts that Canada is protecting fish and fish habitat through

the effective use of different enforcement and compliance tools with

respect to mining operations in British Columbia, it leaves open questions regarding the Submitters’ assertions. The Secretariat concludes

that the lack of information concerning Canada’s actual use of various

enforcement and compliance tools and their effectiveness in achieving

and maintaining compliance with section 36(3) at the three highlighted

mines as well as other mines known to be or to have the potential to be

acid-generating supports developing additional information through

the factual record process. Accordingly, in accordance with Article

15(1), and for the reasons set forth in this document, the Secretariat

informs that Council of its determination that the purposes of the

NAAEC would be well served by developing in a factual record regarding the Submission.

SEM-98-004 99

116. Submission, Exhibits 1 and 2.
Respectfully submitted on this 11th day of May, 2001.

Geoffrey Garver

Director, Submissions on Enforcement Matters Unit

c.c.: Janine Ferretti, Executive Director, CEC

100 NORTH AMERICAN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY
SEM-98-005

(Cytrar I)

SUBMITTER: ACADEMIA SONORENSE DE DERECHOS

HUMANOS

PARTY: United Mexican States

DATE: 11 August 1998

SUMMARY: The Submitters allege that Mexico has failed to

effectively enforce environmental law by having

authorized the operation of a hazardous waste

landfill (CYTRAR) less than six kilometers away

from Hermosillo, Sonora.

SECRETARIAT DETERMINATIONS:

ART. 14(1)(2)*

(9 April 1999)

Determination that criteria under Article 14(1)

have been met and that the submission merits

requesting a response from the Party.

ART. 15(1)

(26 October 2000)

Determination under Article 15(1) that development of a factual record is not warranted

* Published in Volume 5 (Fall 2000) of the North American Environmental Law and Policy

Series.

101

Secretariado de la Comisión para la Cooperación

Ambiental de América del Norte

Determinación del Secretariado en conformidad con el artículo 15(1)

del Acuerdo de Cooperación Ambiental de América del Norte

Número de petición: SEM-98-005 (Cytrar I)

Peticionario: Academia Sonorense de Derechos

Humanos, A.C.

Domingo Gutiérrez Mendívil

Parte: Estados Unidos Mexicanos

Fecha de recepción: 11 de agosto de 1998

Fecha de esta determinación: 26 de octubre de 2000

I. INTRODUCCIÓN

El Artículo 14 del Acuerdo de Cooperación Ambiental de América del

Norte (en adelante, “ACAAN”) permite al Secretariado de la Comisión

para la Cooperación Ambiental de América del Norte* (en adelante,

“CCAAN”) examinar las peticiones presentadas por personas u organizaciones sin vinculación gubernamental, en las que se asevere que una

de las partes firmantes del ACAAN está incurriendo en omisiones en la

aplicación efectiva de su legislación ambiental, siempre que la petición

cumpla con los criterios del Artículo 14(1). Cuando considera que una

petición cumple con estos criterios, el Secretariado determina si se

amerita solicitar una respuesta de la Parte aludida. A la luz de la

respuesta proporcionada por la Parte, el Secretariado puede notificar

al Consejo de la CCAAN que considera que la petición amerita la

103

* A partir del mes de octubre de 2000, la Comisión para la Cooperación Ambiental

creada por el ACAAN, empleará el nombre Comisión para la Cooperación

Ambiental de América del Norte para efectos de uso común.
elaboración de un expediente de hechos, en términos del Artículo 15

del Acuerdo. Mediante el voto de al menos dos terceras partes de

sus miembros, el Consejo puede entonces ordenar al Secretariado la

elaboración del expediente de hechos y, una vez concluido, autorizar su

difusión pública.

Mediante esta Determinación conforme al artículo 15(1) del

ACAAN, el Secretariado notifica a los peticionarios y al Consejo de la

CCAAN las razones por las que considera que la petición SEM-98-005

no amerita la elaboración de un expediente de hechos, dándose por

terminado el proceso respecto de esa petición.

II. ANTECEDENTES PROCESALES

El Secretariado de la CCAAN recibió el 23 de julio de 1998 una

petición de la Academia Sonorense de Derechos Humanos, A.C., y

Domingo Gutiérrez Mendívil (en adelante, “Peticionarios”), de acuerdo

a lo dispuesto en los artículos 14 y 15 del ACAAN. En ella, los

Peticionarios aseveran que ha habido una omisión en la aplicación

efectiva de la legislación ambiental mexicana respecto de la autorización

de operación del confinamiento controlado de residuos peligrosos

Cytrar, S.A. de C.V. en Hermosillo, Sonora, México (en adelante, Cytrar).

El 29 de julio del mismo año, el Secretariado comunicó a los Peticionarios ciertos errores menores de forma, mismos que éstos corrigieron

mediante comunicación del 11 de agosto de 1998, fecha en que se

considera formalmente recibida la petición.

Por las razones expuestas en la sección II de este documento, el 9 de

abril de 1999, el Secretariado determinó que la petición cumple con los

requisitos establecidos en el artículo 14(1) del ACAAN. Considerando

los factores previstos en el artículo 14(2) del ACAAN, el Secretariado

decidió que la petición ameritaría una respuesta de la Parte, por lo que

en la propia determinación del 9 de abril solicitó a México su respuesta.

El 19 de julio de 1999 el Secretariado acusó recibo de la respuesta de

México, recibida el 12 de julio de 1999. El 20 de julio de 1999, México

informó al Secretariado que la sección segunda de la respuesta contenía

información que se refería a una empresa no mencionada en la petición,

por lo que debía mantenerse su confidencialidad con fundamento

en el artículo 39(1)(b) del ACAAN. El 13 de septiembre de 1999, el

Secretariado solicitó al gobierno de México ciertas aclaraciones respecto

de su solicitud de confidencialidad, así como un resumen de la información confidencial para los efectos señalados en el apartado 17.3 de las

104 NORTH AMERICAN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY
Directrices para la presentación de peticiones relativas a la aplicación efectiva

de la legislación ambiental conforme a los artículos 14 y 15 del ACAAN

(en adelante, “Directrices”). El 13 de octubre de 1999, el Secretariado

presentó el asunto al Consejo para su consideración. Estando pendiente

una decisión del Consejo al respecto, dada la aserción de confidencialidad y a falta de un resumen de la Parte para efectos del apartado 17.3

de las Directrices,1 la presente Determinación no incluye información

de la sección segunda de la respuesta en cuanto a la otra empresa

mencionada por la Parte. El resto de la respuesta de la Parte se resume en

la sección III de este documento.

En la sección IV de esta Determinación se analiza la petición a luz

de la respuesta de la Parte conforme al artículo 15(1), y se exponen las

razones por las que el Secretariado considera que la petición SEM-98-005

no amerita la elaboración de un expediente de hechos conforme al

ACAAN. Esta Determinación del Secretariado se refiere a las aseveraciones específicas de esta petición y no prejuzga de manera alguna sobre

otros aspectos del asunto planteados fuera de la petición, o que pudieran

plantearse en una petición distinta.2 Esta Determinación se hace también

sin perjuicio de reconocer que la aplicación efectiva de la legislación

ambiental de las Partes sobre la disposición adecuada de los residuos

peligrosos, es un compromiso que contribuye a la consecución de las

metas del ACAAN.

III. ANÁLISIS DE LA PETICIÓN CONFORME A LOS

ARTÍCULOS 14(1) Y 14(2) DEL ACAAN

El 9 de abril de 1999 el Secretariado determinó que la petición

cumple con los requisitos del artículo 14(1) del ACAAN y, considerando

los factores del artículo 14(2), solicitó una respuesta a la Parte. En esta

SEM-98-005 105

1. El apartado 17.3 de las Directrices establece:

Tomando en consideración que la información confidencial o privada proporcionada por una Parte, organización sin vinculación gubernamental o persona

puede contribuir de manera sustancial a la opinión del Secretariado en cuanto a si

se amerita o no la elaboración de un expediente de hechos, los suministradores

de esa información deberían esforzarse por proporcionar un resumen de esa

información o explicación general de por qué esa información se considera como

confidencial o privada.

2. Esta aclaración se hace en virtud de que, después de que fue presentada la petición,

los Peticionarios y otras personas interesadas han proporcionado al Secretariado

información relacionada con el confinamiento Cytrar. Dado que tal información

no formó parte de la petición, no fue considerada en la elaboración de esta

Determinación, porque el ACAAN y las Directrices no prevén un fundamento para

hacerlo en esta etapa del proceso.
sección el Secretariado explica las razones y consideraciones de esas

determinaciones.3

El artículo 14(1) del Acuerdo establece que:

El Secretariado podrá examinar peticiones de cualquier persona u

organización sin vinculación gubernamental que asevere que una Parte

está incurriendo en omisiones en la aplicación efectiva de su legislación

ambiental, si el Secretariado juzga que la petición:

(a) se presenta por escrito en un idioma designado por esa Parte en una

notificación al Secretariado;

(b) identifica claramente a la persona u organización que presenta la

petición;

(c) proporciona información suficiente que permita al Secretariado

revisarla, e incluyendo las pruebas documentales que puedan

sustentarla;

(d) parece encaminada a promover la aplicación de la ley y no a hostigar

una industria;

(e) señala que el asunto ha sido comunicado por escrito a las autoridades

pertinentes de la Parte y, si la hay, la respuesta de la Parte; y

(f) la presenta una persona u organización que reside o está establecida

en territorio de una Parte.

Si bien el artículo 14(1) no pretende colocar una gran carga sobre

los peticionarios, sí se requiere en esta etapa cierta revisión inicial.4 El

Secretariado examinó esta petición con tal perspectiva en mente.

La primera cuestión es si la petición entraña, como se requiere, la

aserción de una omisión en la aplicación efectiva de la legislación

ambiental. El Secretariado determinó que la petición sí cumple con tales

requisitos por las siguientes razones.

La petición “asevera” que México está incurriendo en omisiones en

la aplicación efectiva de la Norma Oficial Mexicana NOM-CRP-004-

106 NORTH AMERICAN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY

3. Este análisis se hizo estando en vigor las Directrices anteriores a las modificaciones

adoptadas en junio de 1999, que no exigían al Secretariado explicar su razonamiento

en cada paso, como lo hace ahora el apartado 7.2 de las Directrices.

4. Véanse en este sentido, e. g., la Determinación conforme al artículo 14(1) en relación

con la petición SEM-97-005/Animal Alliance of Canada, et al.; y la Determinación

conforme a los artículos 14(1) y (2) relativa a la petición SEM-98-003/Department of

the Planet Earth, et al., en su versión revisada.
ECOL/1993- Que establece los requisitos que deben reunir los sitios destinados

al confinamiento controlado de residuos peligrosos, excepto de los radioactivos5

(en adelante, NOM-055-ECOL-1993); y del artículo 159 Bis 3 de la Ley

General del Equilibrio Ecológico y la Protección al Ambiente (en adelante,

LGEEPA). A efecto de calificar para el proceso del artículo 14(1), las

disposiciones citadas en una petición deben satisfacer la definición de

“legislación ambiental” contenida en el artículo 45(2) del ACAAN, que

se refiere al propósito principal de tales disposiciones.6

De la simple lectura de las disposiciones citadas, se desprende

claramente que califican como legislación ambiental para efectos de

los artículos 45(2) y 14 del ACAAN, porque son disposiciones cuyo

propósito principal coincide con “... la protección del medio ambiente, o

la prevención de un peligro contra la vida o la salud humana, a través de

[...] el control de químicos, sustancias, materiales o desechos peligrosos o

tóxicos, y la diseminación de información relacionada con ello...”.7

SEM-98-005 107

5. Publicada en el Diario Oficial de la Federación (en adelante, “DOF”), el 22 de octubre de

1993, la cual quedaría con la nomenclatura que actualmente ostenta, NOM-055-

ECOL-1993, en virtud de Acuerdo publicado el 28 de noviembre de 1994 en el DOF.

6. El artículo 45(2) del ACAAN establece:

Para los efectos del Artículo 14(1) y la Quinta Parte:

(a) “legislación ambiental” significa cualquier ley o reglamento de una Parte, o sus

disposiciones, cuyo propósito principal sea la protección del medio ambiente, o

la prevención de un peligro contra la vida o la salud humana, a través de:

(i) la prevención, el abatimiento o el control de una fuga, descarga, o emisión

de contaminantes ambientales,

(ii) el control de químicos, sustancias, materiales o desechos peligrosos o

tóxicos, y la diseminación de información relacionada con ello; o

(iii) la protección de la flora y fauna silvestres, incluso especies en peligro de

extinción, su hábitat, y las áreas naturales protegidas

en territorio de la Parte, pero no incluye cualquier ley o reglamento, ni sus

disposiciones, directamente relacionados con la seguridad e higiene del trabajador.

(b) Para mayor certidumbre, el término “legislación ambiental” no incluye

ninguna ley ni reglamento, ni sus disposiciones, cuyo propósito principal sea la

administración de la recolección, extracción o explotación de recursos naturales

con fines comerciales, ni la recolección o extracción de recursos naturales con

propósitos de subsistencia o por poblaciones indígenas.

(c) El propósito principal de una disposición legislativa o reglamentaria en particular, para efectos de los incisos (a) y (b) se determinará por su propósito principal

y no por el de la ley o del reglamento del que forma parte.

Véanse en este sentido, e. g., las determinaciones del Secretariado, conforme al

artículo 14(1) del ACAAN, para las siguientes peticiones: SEM-98-001/Instituto de

Derecho Ambiental et al. (13 de septiembre de 1999), SEM-98-002/Héctor Gregorio

Ortiz Martínez (18 de marzo de 1999) y SEM-97-005/Animal Alliance of Canada,

et al. (26 de mayo de 1998).

7. En su preámbulo, por ejemplo, la NOM-055-ECOL-1993 establece: “Que la

construcción de confinamientos controlados para la disposición final de residuos

peligrosos debe reunir condiciones de máxima seguridad, a fin de garantizar la

protección de la población y el equilibrio ecológico...”.
Asimismo, el Secretariado determinó en marzo de 1999 que la

petición satisface los seis requisitos listados en el artículo 14(1). La

petición se presentó por escrito en español, que es el idioma designado

por la Parte mexicana.8 Los Peticionarios se identificaron como la Academia Sonorense de Derechos Humanos, A.C. y Domingo Gutiérrez

Mendívil. La primera es una organización sin vinculación gubernamental y el segundo un particular, vinculado a esa organización, ambos

con residencia en Hermosillo, Sonora, México.9

La petición contiene información suficiente, que permitió al

Secretariado revisarla, en particular respecto del alegato principal de

la petición, que se refiere a la aplicación efectiva de la NOM-055-

ECOL-1993. La petición incluye información sobre la ubicación del

confinamiento de residuos peligrosos Cytrar respecto de la ciudad de

Hermosillo, información sobre el número de habitantes de esa ciudad,

copia de las autorizaciones otorgadas para la operación de Cytrar a que

hace referencia la petición, y copia de la Norma Oficial Mexicana que

invocan los Peticionarios.10

Los Peticionarios manifiestan que la Parte ha incurrido en omisiones en la aplicación efectiva de su legislación ambiental, respecto del

confinamiento de residuos peligrosos Cytrar. El alegato principal de la

petición es que en noviembre de 1996 y de 1997, México expidió a Cytrar,

S.A. de C.V. una autorización para la operación de un confinamiento de

residuos peligrosos situado a menos de seis kilómetros de la ciudad de

Hermosillo, Sonora, en contravención del artículo 5.1.5.1 de la NOM055-ECOL-1993, que establece una distancia respectiva de al menos

veinticinco kilómetros.11 Cabe aclarar aquí que en ese sitio existía un

108 NORTH AMERICAN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY

Por su parte, el artículo 159 Bis 3 de la LGEEPA señala: “Toda persona tendrá

derecho a que la Secretaría, los Estados, el Distrito Federal y los Municipios pongan

a su disposición la información ambiental que les soliciten, en los términos previstos por esta Ley. En su caso, los gastos que se generen, correrán por cuenta

del solicitante. Para los efectos de lo dispuesto en el presente ordenamiento, se

considera información ambiental, cualquier información escrita, visual o en forma

de base de datos, de que dispongan las autoridades ambientales en materia de

agua, aire, suelo, flora, fauna y recursos naturales en general, así como sobre las

actividades o medidas que les afectan o puedan afectarlos. Toda petición de

información ambiental deberá presentarse por escrito, especificando claramente la

información que se solicita y los motivos de la petición. Los solicitantes deberán

identificarse indicando su nombre o razón social y domicilio.”

8. Véase el artículo 14(1)(a) del ACAAN y el apartado 3.2 de las Directrices.

9. Véanse los artículos 14(1)(b) y (f) y 45(1) del ACAAN.

10. Véase el artículo 14(1)(c) del ACAAN y las páginas 1 a 3 y los anexos I a VII de la

petición.

11. La autorización se concedió mediante los oficios DOO-800/005480, fechado al 11

de noviembre de 1996, y DOO-800-007251, de fecha 19 de noviembre de 1997,

ambos emitidos por el Instituto Nacional de Ecología (en adelante, “INE”), órgano
confinamiento de residuos peligrosos desde 1988, y que el acto al que se

refiere la petición es la autorización de operación otorgada a Cytrar, S.A.

de C.V., que lo empezó a operar aparentemente en 1996.12

La petición indica también, que el confinamiento de residuos

peligrosos será reubicado debido a las quejas ciudadanas, pero afirman

los Peticionarios que la Parte pretende reubicarlo sin remediar o sanear

la contaminación del sitio.13 Los Peticionarios también aseveran que

México ha violado el derecho a la información ambiental contemplado

en el artículo 159 Bis 3 de la LGEEPA, al negarse a revelar en qué parte de

Sonora se proyecta establecer el nuevo confinamiento.14

Aunque las presuntas omisiones en la aplicación efectiva de la

legislación ambiental se refieren en particular a la empresa Cytrar, la

petición no parece encaminada a hostigar una industria. La petición

parece encaminada, antes bien, a promover la aplicación de la legislación ambiental respecto del confinamiento controlado de residuos

peligrosos, para prevenir posibles daños a la salud de la población y al

medio ambiente, en particular dada la distancia a que se encuentra el

confinamiento Cytrar de la población de Hermosillo.15

La petición incluye copias de documentos relativos a un recurso de

revisión y a un juicio de amparo iniciados por uno de los Peticionarios en

relación con el asunto materia de la petición, y acompaña copia del oficio

por el que la autoridad confirma la autorización impugnada.16

Habiendo revisado la petición de conformidad con el artículo 14(1)

y constatado que satisface los requisitos en él establecidos, como ya se

mencionó, el Secretariado determinó solicitar una respuesta a la Parte

mexicana. La decisión del Secretariado se orientó por las consideraciones del artículo 14(2) del ACAAN, que dispone:

Cuando considere que una petición cumple con los requisitos estipulados

en el párrafo 1, el Secretariado determinará si la petición amerita solicitar

SEM-98-005 109

desconcentrado de la Secretaría de Medio Ambiente, Recursos Naturales y Pesca

(en adelante, “Semarnap”). Página 3 de la petición.

12. Lo anterior con base en la sección segunda de la respuesta de México, que la Parte

ha designado como confidencial respecto del nombre de otras empresas mencionadas en esta sección, y que no se mencionan en la petición.

13. Cabe mencionar a modo de contexto, que a la fecha de la presente Determinación, el

Secretariado tiene entendido que ese confinamiento ya no está operando, y que no

ha sido reubicado ni se han anunciado los detalles de su supuesta reubicación.

14. Páginas 4 y 5 de la petición.

15. Véase el artículo 14(1)(d) del ACAAN y página 2 de la petición.

16. Véanse el artículo 14(1)(e) del ACAAN y los anexos VIII a X de la petición.
una respuesta de la Parte. Para decidir si debe solicitar una respuesta, el

Secretariado se orientará por las siguientes consideraciones:

(a) si la petición alega daño a la persona u organización que la presenta;

(b) si la petición, por sí sola o conjuntamente con otras, plantea asuntos

cuyo ulterior estudio en este proceso contribuiría a la consecución de

las metas de este Acuerdo;

(c) si se ha acudido a los recursos al alcance de los particulares conforme

a la legislación de la Parte; y

(d) si la petición se basa exclusivamente en noticias de los medios de

comunicación.

Al decidir si la petición ameritaría solicitar una respuesta a la Parte,

el Secretariado tomó en cuenta todos estos criterios en conjunto.

Los Peticionarios alegan que existe enorme preocupación e inconformidad entre los habitantes de la ciudad de Hermosillo por la operación del confinamiento Cytrar que, aseveran, se encuentra ilegalmente

ubicado a menos de 6 kilómetros de esa ciudad. Señalan también que

existen cuatro colonias habitacionales en el límite de la ciudad próximo

al confinamiento, destacando las Colonias Costa del Sol y Casa Linda.17

En opinión del Secretariado, la presunta omisión de una Parte en la

aplicación efectiva de su legislación ambiental en materia de residuos

peligrosos y su disposición final, constituye un asunto cuyo ulterior

estudio en este proceso contribuiría a la consecución de las metas del

ACAAN, especialmente las planteadas en los artículos 1 y 5, dado que

los residuos de ese tipo pudieran causar daños a la salud humana y al

medio ambiente en caso de no manejarse con la diligencia que exijan las

leyes.18

El Secretariado también tomó en consideración si se ha acudido a

los recursos al alcance de los particulares, conforme al artículo 14(2)(c)

del ACAAN. La petición abordó los recursos disponibles que fueron

perseguidos, mostrando que con anterioridad a la presentación de la

petición se tomaron “acciones razonables para acudir a dichos recursos”. La petición indica que los Peticionarios han presentado un recurso

de revisión y un juicio de amparo relacionados con la autorización de

operación del confinamiento que es materia de la petición.19

110 NORTH AMERICAN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY

17. Página 4 y anexo III de la petición.

18. Véanse los artículos 14(2)(a) y (b) del ACAAN.

19. Véanse el artículo 14(2)(c), los apartados 5.6(c) y 7.5(b) de las Directrices (estas

disposiciones de las Directrices entraron en vigor en junio de 1999, después de que

se presentó la petición el 11 de agosto de 1998, pero ello no afecta la conclusión del

Secretariado) y la página 3 de la petición.
A propósito de la consideración prevista en el artículo 14(2)(c) del

ACAAN, cabe abordar brevemente la opinión que la Parte ha manifestado al respecto, si bien es claro que le corresponde al Secretariado

llevar a cabo esa consideración, como antecedente a que el Secretariado

solicita una respuesta a la Parte. En su respuesta a la petición, la Parte

afirma que considera que la petición resulta improcedente y que no

debió ser admitida por el Secretariado, puesto que los Peticionarios no

agotaron los recursos internos a su alcance conforme a la legislación

mexicana. La Parte informa que los Peticionarios han promovido una

denuncia popular, un recurso de revisión y dos juicios de amparo,

afirmando que se encuentran pendientes de resolución. Según la

respuesta de la Parte, ello implica que no se han agotado los recursos

internos, lo cual a se vez constituye una transgresión al artículo 14(2)(c)

del ACAAN por el Secretariado.

Como se ha mencionado ya, el artículo 14(2) plantea una serie de

consideraciones que orientan al Secretariado en su determinación de si

la petición amerita solicitar una respuesta de la Parte, una vez que ha

decidido que una petición reúne los requisitos establecidos en el artículo

14(1). Entre esos criterios, el artículo 14(2)(c) incluye la cuestión de “...si

se ha acudido a los recursos al alcance de los particulares conforme a la

legislación de la Parte...”. La Parte en su respuesta parece interpretar ese

artículo 14(2)(c) como estableciendo el requisito de que los Peticionarios

agoten los recursos legales disponibles, en lugar de una consideración

del Secretariado sobre si los Peticionarios han acudido a ellos. Al parecer

del Secretariado, que difiere respetuosamente con lo asentado en la

respuesta de la Parte, el texto del ACAAN es claro en este aspecto. Según

lo que ese artículo señala, los factores en él listados son criterios que

orientan la consideración del Secretariado para decidir si una petición

amerita solicitar una respuesta a la Parte, a diferencia del artículo 14(1),

que establece los requisitos que deben cumplir las peticiones.20 Además,

SEM-98-005 111

20. Véanse los apartados 5.6 y 7.5 de las Directrices, que proporcionan mayor orientación sobre el sentido del artículo 14(2)(c) del ACAAN. El apartado 5.6 de las

Directrices, establece: “La petición deberá abordar los factores a ser considerados y

que se encuentran identificados en el artículo 14(2) del Acuerdo para asistir al

Secretariado en su revisión conforme a esta disposición. Consecuentemente, la

petición deberá abordar: ... los recursos que estén al alcance de los particulares y

disponibles bajo las leyes de la Parte, que se han perseguido (artículo 14(2)(c))...” El

apartado 7.5 de las Directrices estipula que el Secretariado “[p]ara evaluar si se ha

acudido a los recursos al alcance de los particulares en los términos de la legislación

de la Parte [...] se orientará por las siguientes consideraciones [...] b) si con

anterioridad a la presentación de la petición se han tomado las acciones razonables

para acudir a dichos recursos, considerando que en algunos casos podrían existir

obstáculos para acudir a tales recursos.” Véase en el mismo sentido, la Determinación del Secretariado conforme al artículo 15(1) del ACAAN respecto de la

petición SEM-97-007/Insituto de Derecho Ambiental (14 de julio de 2000).
la Parte mexicana explica que considera que la denuncia popular prevista en la LGEEPA no es un recurso. Sobre este asunto, el Secretariado

también difiere respetuosamente de la opinión de la Parte, y considera

que para efectos del ACAAN, la denuncia popular contemplada por la

LGEEPA es un recurso conforme a la legislación mexicana, disponible

a los particulares para que planteen a la Parte cuestiones sobre

cumplimiento de la legislación ambiental o daños al medio ambiente,

previamente a la presentación de una petición.21

Finalmente, volviendo a la última de las consideraciones del

artículo 14(2), el Secretariado observó que la petición no estuvo basada

exclusivamente en noticias de los medios de comunicación, ya que no

hay referencia en la petición a dicha fuente de información.22

Con base en todos estos factores, el Secretariado determinó que

ameritaría solicitar a la Parte una respuesta a esta petición, de conformidad con el artículo 14(2) del ACAAN, y así lo hizo el 9 de abril de 1999.

El Secretariado recibió la respuesta de México el 12 de julio de 1999.

IV. RESUMEN DE LA RESPUESTA DE LA PARTE Y

CONSIDERACIONES CONFORME AL ARTÍCULO 14(3)

DEL ACAAN

Como se ha indicado, la presente determinación no incluye información de la sección segunda de la respuesta de la Parte en cuanto a las

otras empresas que la Parte menciona y que no se mencionan en la

petición, dado que México considera que esa información debe mantenerse como confidencial.

En su respuesta, recibida el 12 de julio de 1999, México argumenta

que la norma que invocan los Peticionarios respecto a la distancia

requerida entre un confinamiento controlado de residuos peligrosos y

los centros de población, no es aplicable en lo tocante a autorizaciones de

operación de confinamientos de residuos peligrosos, sino a la selección

del sitio para ubicarlos. La Parte afirma también que la selección del

sitio donde se ubica el confinamiento fue autorizada en 1987, con

anterioridad a la entrada en vigor de la NOM-055-ECOL-1993 u otro

requisito equivalente. Además, la Parte señala que aún cuando fuera

aplicable, esa disposición no es una disposición rígida, sino que la norma

112 NORTH AMERICAN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY

21. Véase en este sentido, la Determinación del Secretariado conforme al artículo 15(1)

del ACAAN respecto de la petición SEM-97-007/Insituto de Derecho Ambiental

(14 de julio de 2000).

22. Véase el artículo 14(2)(d) del ACAAN.
misma plantea que su exigibilidad puede exceptuarse si se realizan

medidas equivalentes a ese requisito.

La respuesta de la Parte niega que haya depósito ilegal de residuos

peligrosos en el confinamiento. La Parte señala que no es posible

remediar el sitio, dada la naturaleza misma de un confinamiento

controlado, que define como la “obra de ingeniería para la disposición

final de residuos peligrosos, que garantice su aislamiento definitivo.”23

Por último, sobre la supuesta reubicación del confinamiento y la

supuesta violación del derecho a la información ambiental, la Parte en su

respuesta indica que es verdad que la Secretaria de la Semarnap ha

manifestado que Cytrar se va a reubicar, pero la Parte afirma que la

ubicación del nuevo sitio no se ha determinado aún, por lo que no puede

proporcionarse información al respecto.

Como se ha mencionado, la respuesta de la Parte manifiesta que

algunos asuntos supuestamente materia de la petición, están pendientes

de resolución, y menciona una denuncia popular, un recurso de revisión

y dos juicios de amparo. De estos cuatro procedimientos, dos se mencionan también en la petición: el recurso de revisión y uno de los juicios

de amparo (número 365/98). En vista de lo anterior, el Secretariado

evaluó si de acuerdo con el artículo 14(3)(a) del ACAAN, debiera

abandonar el trámite respecto de esta petición, porque las aseveraciones

de la petición fuesen materia de un procedimiento judicial o administrativo pendiente de resolución. Conforme a dichos artículos, las

aseveraciones de una petición no se revisarían más si el procedimiento

aún está “pendiente de resolución”, si se trata de un procedimiento

“iniciado por la Parte de manera oportuna y conforme a su legislación”,

y si los asuntos materia de ese procedimiento son los mismos que los de

la petición.24 El Secretariado determinó que no está impedido para

continuar la revisión de la petición, por las razones siguientes.

SEM-98-005 113

23. Esta definición está prevista en el artículo 3o del Reglamento de la LGEEPA en

Materia de Residuos Peligrosos (publicado en el DOF el 25 de noviembre de 1988;

en adelante, “RRP”).

24. El artículo 14(3) dispone:

3. La Parte notificará al Secretariado en un plazo de 30 días y, en circunstancias

excepcionales en un plazo de 60 días posteriores a la entrega de la solicitud:

(a) si el asunto es materia de un procedimiento judicial o administrativo pendiente de resolución, en cuyo caso el Secretariado no continuará con el trámite;

y

(b) cualquier otra información que la Parte desee presentar, tal como:

(i) si el asunto ha sido previamente materia de un procedimiento judicial o

administrativo; y

(ii) si hay recursos internos relacionados con el asunto que estén al alcance de

la persona u organización que presenta la petición y si se ha acudido a

ellos.
En primer lugar, al mencionar la existencia de algunos procedimientos pendientes de resolución, la respuesta de la Parte no señala

que deba detenerse la revisión de la petición conforme a los artículos

14(3)(a) y 45(3) del ACAAN.25 Además, y de mayor relevancia, es que en

el caso que nos ocupa, el Secretariado concluyó que no es claro si todos

los procedimientos mencionados por la Parte están aún pendientes de

resolución, ni es claro tampoco si los dos procedimientos mencionados

por la Parte, pero no mencionados por los Peticionarios, coinciden en su

materia con el asunto materia de la petición.26 Lo que sí es claro, es que

los procedimientos en cuestión no actualizan el supuesto del artículo

14(3)(a) del ACAAN, porque no fueron iniciados por la Parte, sino por

uno de los Peticionarios. Por ello, el Secretariado no está impedido para

continuar la revisión de estas aseveraciones, y procedió a considerar la

114 NORTH AMERICAN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY

Por su parte, el artículo 45(3) define:

3. Para los efectos del Artículo 14(3), “procedimiento judicial o administrativo”

significa:

(a) una actuación judicial, cuasi judicial o administrativa realizada por una Parte

de manera oportuna y conforme a su legislación. Dichas actuaciones comprenden: la mediación; el arbitraje; la expedición de una licencia, permiso, o

autorización; la obtención de una promesa de cumplimiento voluntario o un

acuerdo de cumplimiento; la solicitud de sanciones o de medidas de reparación en un foro administrativo o judicial; la expedición de una resolución

administrativa; y

(b) un procedimiento de solución de controversias internacional del que la Parte

sea parte.

Véase, e.g., la Determinación del Secretariado de conformidad con el artículo 15(1)

con relación a la petición SEM-96-003/The Friends of the Oldman River (2 de abril

de 1997); y la Notificación del Secretariado al Consejo sobre la elaboración de un

expediente de hechos con relación a la petición SEM-97-001/B.C. Aboriginal Fisheries Commission, et al. (27 de abril de 1998).

25. La respuesta de la Parte menciona la existencia de esos procedimientos pendientes

en sustento de su consideración de que la petición no es procedente porque

los Peticionarios no han agotado los recursos legales disponibles, en relación al

artículo 14(2)(c) del ACAAN. Como se planteó en la sección anterior de esta

Determinación, el Secretariado considera que no ha habido transgresión alguna a

dicho artículo respecto de esta petición. Véase supra, página 7, y páginas 4, 5 y 12 de

la respuesta de la Parte.

26. Véanse las páginas 2 a 4 de la respuesta de la Parte. El asunto materia de la denuncia

popular interpuesta por los Peticionarios en contra de Cytrar, S.A. de C.V. que cita

la Parte, no parece coincidir con los alegatos materia de la petición. Como la propia

Parte señala, esa denuncia popular se refirió a supuestas violaciones a la legislación

ambiental relativa a residuos peligrosos por parte de esa empresa, sin aparente

referencia a su ubicación o autorización de operación. Respecto del juicio de

amparo 0936/98 aludido por la Parte y que se refiere a un escrito por el que uno de

los Peticionarios solicitó información a la Semarnap, al parecer del Secretariado,

ese asunto podría estar relacionado con el alegato de la petición referente al artículo

159 Bis 3 de la LGEEPA, aunque no puede establecerse en definitiva que el

mencionado escrito se refiera al mismo asunto que ese alegato de la petición, dado

que ni los Peticionarios ni la Parte proporcionaron copia de los documentos

relativos a esa solicitud.
petición a la luz de la respuesta de la Parte, para determinar si amerita la

elaboración de un expediente de hechos.27

V. ANÁLISIS DE LA PETICIÓN CONFORME AL ARTÍCULO

15(1) DEL ACAAN

El artículo 15(1) del ACAAN establece:

1. Cuando considere que, a la luz de la respuesta dada por la Parte, la

petición amerita que se elabore un expediente de hechos, el Secretariado lo

informará al Consejo e indicará sus razones.

Al efecto, el Secretariado consideró la petición a la luz de la

respuesta proporcionada por la Parte, y en esta sección presenta las

razones por las que considera que los alegatos de omisiones en la

aplicación efectiva de la legislación ambiental planteados en la petición,

no ameritan la elaboración de un expediente de hechos. Se abordan tres

argumentos por separado. La aseveración principal, que es la supuesta

omisión en la aplicación efectiva de la NOM-055-ECOL-1993 por la

autorización de operación de Cytrar en 1996 y 1997. Y dos aseveraciones

accesorias, que se refieren, una, a la supuesta omisión en la aplicación

efectiva de la legislación ambiental dado que la Parte pretende dejar

abandonada escoria que ha sido ilegalmente depositada en el sitio, sin

sanear o remediar la contaminación del sitio. Y la otra, a la presunta

omisión en la aplicación efectiva del derecho a la información ambiental

respecto del sitio al que sería reubicado el confinamiento, conforme al

artículo 159 Bis 3 de la LGEEPA.

El alegato principal de la petición es que la Parte autorizó en dos

ocasiones, en 1996 y en 1997, la operación del confinamiento de residuos

peligrosos Cytrar, a una distancia menor a 6 kilómetros de la ciudad de

Hermosillo, Sonora, cuya población era de 448,966 habitantes en 1990,

y que ello contraviene el artículo 5.1.5.1 de la NOM-055-ECOL-1993,

que dispone que los confinamientos deben estar alejados al menos

25 kilómetros de los centros de población con 10,000 habitantes, con

SEM-98-005 115

27. El Secretariado en otras ocasiones similares ha considerado, como parte de su

decisión sobre si una petición amerita que se elabore un expediente de hechos,

la posibilidad de que elaborarlo implique duplicación o interferencia con un

procedimiento pendiente, aunque el procedimiento no actualice el supuesto del

artículo 14(3)(a). Véase en este sentido, la Determinación del Secretariado de

conformidad con el artículo 15(1) con relación a la petición SEM-96-003/The

Friends of the Oldman River (2 de abril de 1997). En el caso que nos ocupa, sin

embargo, no se abordó este aspecto en esta Determinación, dado que por las

otras razones que en ella se expresan, el Secretariado consideró que no amerita

elaborarse un expediente de hechos respecto de esta petición.
proyección al año 2010.28 Como se ha dicho, la Parte en su respuesta

confirma los hechos mencionados, pero plantea tres argumentos

refutando esta aseveración. En primer lugar, la Parte afirma que la

NOM-055-ECOL-1993 no es aplicable a la autorización de operación de

los confinamientos de residuos peligrosos, sino que se refiere a la

selección de los sitios para ubicarlos. La Parte también señala que al

momento de seleccionarse el sitio en que se ubicó el confinamiento, en

1987, no existía disposición que regulara la ubicación de confinamientos

controlados de residuos peligrosos. Finalmente, la Parte afirma que

suponiendo que se considere aplicable la disposición citada, dicha

disposición no es rígida, sino que la norma misma plantea que su

exigibilidad puede exceptuarse si se realizan medidas equivalentes a ese

requisito.29

Sobre el primero de los argumentos de la Parte, es cierto que la

NOM-055-ECOL-1993, en estricto sentido, no es aplicable a la operación

de los confinamientos controlados de residuos peligrosos, sino a la

selección de los sitios para ubicarlos.30 Sin embargo, es importante

aclarar la relación entre estos dos aspectos. El requisito de distancia

relativa entre los confinamientos controlados de residuos peligrosos y

los centros de población previsto en la NOM-055-ECOL-1993, es parte

de un marco jurídico más amplio, que regula el manejo de residuos

peligrosos y los servicios de manejo respectivos. La LGEEPA, cuyas

disposiciones son de orden público e interés social, establece los fundamentos de ese marco jurídico, que se precisan a través de disposiciones

reglamentarias y normas oficiales mexicanas.31 Dicho marco jurídico

está sucintamente descrito en el Procedimiento que debe cumplir una

empresa para obtener la autorización de instalación y operación para otorgar

servicios de manejo de residuos peligrosos.32 Según se precisa en ese

116 NORTH AMERICAN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY

28. Página 3 y anexos I a VII de la petición.

29. Páginas 7 a 9 de la respuesta.

30. En su artículo 2, la NOM-055-ECOL-1993 establece: “Campo de aplicación. La

presente norma oficial mexicana es de observancia obligatoria para la selección de

sitios destinados al confinamiento controlado de residuos peligrosos.”

31. De la LGEEPA, destacan los artículos 1, 4 fracción VI, 6, y los Títulos primero,

capítulo IV, sección V; y capítulos V y VI, entre otros. Son también parte de este

marco jurídico los Reglamentos de la LGEEPA en materia de impacto ambiental, y

de residuos peligrosos, así como las normas oficiales mexicanas NOM-052-ECOL1993 Listado de Residuos Peligrosos por su toxicidad al ambiente, NOM-053-ECOL-1993

Determinación de Residuos Peligrosos por su Toxicidad al ambiente, NOM-054-ECOL1993 Incompatibilidad entre dos o más Residuos Peligrosos según la NOM-052-ECOL1993, NOM-056-ECOL-1993 Obras complementarias de un confinamiento controlado de

Residuos Peligrosos, NOM-057-ECOL-1993 Diseño, construcción y Operación de celdas

de un confinamiento controlado para Residuos Peligrosos, y NOM-058-ECOL-1993

Operación de un confinamiento controlado de Residuos Peligrosos.

32. Programa para la Minimización y Manejo Integral de Residuos Industriales Peligrosos en México 1996-2000, publicado en la Gaceta Ecológica número 39 verano de
procedimiento, algunos aspectos del trámite actual, son: la selección del

sitio (atendiendo a los criterios establecidos en la NOM-055-ECOL-1993,

de modo que se demuestre la viabilidad del sitio); la presentación de una

fianza de cumplimiento y el pago de derechos; la obtención del permiso

para la construcción en materia de impacto y riesgo ambiental, el cual

se podrá instrumentar una vez satisfechos inclusive los requisitos que

establezcan las autoridades estatales y/o municipales que correspondan; y la obtención del permiso para la operación en materia de impacto

y riesgo ambiental (previa presentación de solicitud para el Manejo de

Residuos Peligrosos -MRP), entre otros.33 En este contexto, el hecho de

que la petición haya asociado el requisito de distancia relativa a la

operación del confinamiento, mientras que la norma que contiene ese

requisito no es estrictamente aplicable a la operación del mismo, sino a la

selección del sitio, no parece ser razón suficiente para considerar que la

aplicación efectiva de ese requisito no amerite abordarse en este proceso

de peticiones ciudadanas. En opinión del Secretariado, el proceso de

peticiones ciudadanas puede contribuir mejor a la consecución de las

metas del ACAAN, si los argumentos de las peticiones se abordan en

contexto.

El segundo de los argumentos ofrecido por la Parte para desacreditar la aseveración de los Peticionarios, es que el sitio se aprobó antes de

que entrara en vigor la NOM-055-ECOL-1993, o de que existiera un

requisito equivalente. La primera disposición ambiental mexicana sobre

este asunto, de que el Secretariado tiene conocimiento, entró en vigor el 7

de junio de 1988.34 Según la respuesta de la Parte, la autorización de la

ubicación del confinamiento se solicitó y se obtuvo en 1987, por lo que es

claro que el requisito de distancia relativa aún no era aplicable en ese

momento.35

SEM-98-005 117

1996, en su capítulo IV, punto 2; y página de Internet del INE (www.ine.gob.mx/

usi/desydel/procedimie/proc-rp20.html).

33. En materia de impacto ambiental, véanse, el artículo 28 en relación con el 29

fracción VI, y 32 de la LGEEPA, en vigor a partir del 29 de enero de 1988, y artículo

28 fracción IV, del mismo ordenamiento en vigor a partir del 14 de diciembre de

1996; en ambos casos en consonancia con el artículo 11 del RRP.

34. Norma técnica ecológica NTE-CRP-008/88, que establece los requisitos que deben reunir

los sitios destinados al confinamiento controlado de residuos peligrosos, excepto de los

radioactivos, publicada en el DOF el 6 de junio de 1988 y que entró en vigor el día

siguiente a su publicación. Esta NTE se abrogó al entrar en vigor la mencionada

NOM-055-ECOL-1993.

35. Página 7 de la respuesta. En la sección segunda de la respuesta de la Parte, que está

designada como confidencial, se detallan diversos actos específicos relacionados

con la autorización del sitio, ocurridos entre el 29 de enero y el 22 de diciembre de

1987.
Por último, México argumenta que la disposición citada no es

rígida, puesto que la norma contempla una excepción.36 En efecto, la

norma plantea la posibilidad de aplicar medidas equivalentes a los

requisitos que establece, y dispone que la efectividad de las mismas debe

demostrarse. Sin embargo, dicha excepción no parece haberse aplicado

en el caso del confinamiento que operaría después Cytrar. Más allá de

indicar que al confinamiento se le han establecido las condicionantes

necesarias para que opere sin dañar el medio ambiente,37 la Parte en su

respuesta no explica por qué las condiciones que se exigieron tienen

efectos equivalentes a una ubicación relativa mínima de 25 kilómetros,

ni ello se desprende de la respuesta. En diversos documentos anexos a la

respuesta de la Parte, se plantean las consideraciones que realizaron las

distintas autoridades que han sido competentes respecto del sitio, pero

esas consideraciones no incluyen mención alguna del requisito de

distancia relativa de 25 kilómetros, ni plantean que se hubiese

acreditado técnicamente la efectividad de medidas alternativas para

exceptuar ese requisito, según la excepción en cuestión.38 En consecuencia, este argumento ofrecido por la Parte no se acredita y no parece

ser relevante.

Resumiendo, la aseveración de los Peticionarios de que México

ha incurrido en omisiones en la aplicación efectiva de su legislación

ambiental en el caso del confinamiento de residuos peligrosos Cytrar, se

basa en la afirmación de que su ubicación respecto de la ciudad de

Hermosillo es ilegal, porque viola un requisito de distancia relativa entre

los confinamientos controlados de residuos peligrosos y los centros de

población. Según se explicó anteriormente, la supuesta ilegalidad de la

ubicación de Cytrar no se confirma con base en los argumentos de los

Peticionarios, porque a la luz de la respuesta de la Parte, resulta que la

norma que citan no estaba vigente al seleccionarse el sitio para ubicarlo.

El Secretariado consideró la posibilidad de acudir a los Peticionarios

para confirmar si esa es la única razón por la que consideran que Cytrar

operaba de manera ilegal, y también la posibilidad de tomar en cuenta

otra información relacionada con Cytrar, que los Peticionarios y otros

interesados proporcionaron después de que se presentó la petición. Sin

embargo, el Secretariado no encontró fundamento para hacerlo en el

118 NORTH AMERICAN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY

36. En su punto 6.1, la NOM-055-ECOL-1993 establece: “La Secretaría de Desarrollo

Social podrá autorizar la realización de medidas y obras cuyos efectos resulten

equivalentes a los que se obtendrán del cumplimiento de los requisitos previstos en

los puntos anteriores, cuando se acredite técnicamente su efectividad.”

37. Página 10 de la respuesta.

38. Estos documentos, son anexos a la sección segunda de la respuesta de México,

que dicha Parte ha designado como confidencial, salvo las autorizaciones de

noviembre de 1996 y 1997, que se acompañaron también como anexos a la petición.
ACAAN y en las Directrices.39 Limitado así el análisis a la aplicación

efectiva del requisito de distancia relativa entre los confinamientos

controlados y los centros de población, el Secretariado considera que

este alegato de la petición no amerita la elaboración de un expediente de

hechos porque ese requisito entró en vigor por primera vez el 7 de junio

de 1988, y según lo afirma la Parte en su respuesta, la autorización para la

ubicación del confinamiento que después operaría Cytrar, S.A. de C.V.,

se había solicitado y otorgado desde 1987.

Otro de los alegatos que hacen los Peticionarios es que con motivo

de la supuesta reubicación del confinamiento, la Parte pretende dejar

abandonada escoria que ha sido ilegalmente depositada en el

confinamiento, sin sanear o remediar la contaminación del sitio.40 La

Parte en su respuesta no se pronuncia expresamente sobre si el sitio

está o no contaminado, pero la Parte niega que se hayan depositado

ilegalmente residuos peligrosos en el confinamiento. Los Peticionarios y

la Parte parecen coincidir en que la reubicación del confinamiento

implicará de hecho el cese de la operación actual del confinamiento y la

apertura de un confinamiento nuevo, sin remoción de los residuos

peligrosos existentes en el sitio actual.41 La Parte sostiene que la legislación ambiental aplicable no exige remediar el sitio, sino que la remediación sería contraria a la naturaleza de un confinamiento controlado

de residuos peligrosos.42 Ahora bien, el único argumento concreto

planteado por los Peticionarios para fundar la aseveración de que el sitio

debe remediarse es la supuesta operación ilegal del sitio por la alegada

violación a la NOM-055-ECOL-1993, que como se ha visto, no parece

haber sido aplicable al momento de seleccionarse el sitio. Los Peticionarios no invocan otras disposiciones legales que sustenten una

aseveración de que México incurre en una omisión en la aplicación

efectiva de su legislación ambiental al no remediar el sitio. La petición

tampoco contiene datos específicos sobre la supuesta contaminación

ilegal del confinamiento. De nuevo, el Secretariado se limitó a considerar

este alegato de la petición en estos términos, sin poder acudir a los

Peticionarios para que detallaran su alegato, porque la posibilidad de

hacerlo en esta etapa del proceso no está prevista en el ACAAN o en las

Directrices. Estando limitado el análisis al alegato de que al reubicarse

Cytrar, el sitio debe remediarse porque el confinamiento estaba

ilegalmente ubicado, el Secretariado considera que no amerita que se

SEM-98-005 119

39. Véase en este sentido, la Determinación del Secretariado conforme al artículo 15(1)

del ACAAN respecto de la petición SEM-97-007/Insituto de Derecho Ambiental

(14 de julio de 2000).

40. Página 4 de la petición.

41. Véase supra, nota al pie número 13.

42. Página 12 de la respuesta.
elabore un expediente de hechos respecto de ese alegato, porque con

base en la disposición que invocan los Peticionarios y a la luz de la

respuesta de la Parte, no se confirma que el confinamiento se haya

ubicado ilegalmente.

El último alegato de los Peticionarios a considerar, es que México

se ha venido negando a revelar en qué parte del estado de Sonora se

proyecta reubicar el confinamiento Cytrar, violando en consecuencia el

derecho a la información ambiental previsto en el artículo 159 Bis 3 de la

LGEEPA.43 La respuesta de México afirma que aunque la Secretaria de la

Semarnap ha dicho que el confinamiento Cytrar será reubicado, el sitio

para ello aún no se ha determinado, y en consecuencia no podría

proporcionarse esa información.44 Dado que la aseveración de los Peticionarios no está respaldada por otra información, la respuesta de la

Parte basta para descartar este alegato. En consecuencia, el Secretariado

considera que no se amerita la elaboración de un expediente de hechos

respecto de la supuesta omisión por parte de México en la aplicación

efectiva del artículo 159 Bis 3 de la LGEEPA al no informar a los

Peticionarios sobre el lugar a dónde será reubicado el confinamiento

Cytrar.

VI. DETERMINACIÓN DEL SECRETARIADO

El Secretariado de la CCAAN ha revisado la petición SEM-98-005,

presentada por la Academia Sonorense de Derechos Humanos y

Domingo Gutiérrez Mendívil, conforme al artículo 15(1) del ACAAN.

La petición se basa en la afirmación de que el confinamiento controlado

de residuos peligrosos Cytrar opera ilegalmente por estar ubicado a

menos de 6 kilómetros de la ciudad de Hermosillo, Sonora, México. Sin

embargo, a la luz de la respuesta de la Parte, es claro que la norma en que

se funda esa afirmación no estaba aún vigente cuando se autorizó el sitio

ahora conocido como Cytrar. Principalmente en vista de lo anterior, y

según se explica en el cuerpo de esta Determinación, el Secretariado

considera que no se amerita la elaboración de un expediente de hechos

respecto de esta petición.

Ahora bien, cabe aclarar que esta Determinación se refiere exclusivamente a los alegatos contenidos en dicha petición, y no contempla

otros aspectos del asunto planteados fuera de la petición, o que pudieran

plantearse en una petición distinta. Además, esta Determinación se hace

sin perjuicio de reconocer que la aplicación efectiva de la legislación

120 NORTH AMERICAN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY

43. Página 5 de la petición y supra, nota al pie número 7.

44. Página 12 de la respuesta.
ambiental sobre manejo adecuado de los residuos peligrosos, es un

compromiso de las Partes que contribuye a la consecución de las metas

del ACAAN.

Conforme a lo dispuesto por el apartado 9.6 de las Directrices,

el Secretariado da por concluido el proceso respecto de la petición

SEM-98-005 y explica sus razones a los Peticionarios y al Consejo de la

CCAAN en este documento.

Secretariado de la Comisión para la Cooperación Ambiental de

América del Norte

por: Janine Ferretti

Directora Ejecutiva

c.c.: Lic. Domingo Gutiérrez Mendívil (original)

Lic. José Luis Samaniego, SEMARNAP

Sra. Norine Smith, Environment Canada

Sr. William Nitze, US-EPA

SEM-98-005 121

SEM-99-002

(Migratory Birds)

SUBMITTER: ALLIANCE FOR THE WILD ROCKIES,

CENTER FOR INTERNATIONAL

ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, ET AL.

PARTY: United States of America

DATE: 19 November 1999

SUMMARY: The Submitters allege that the United States is

failing to effectively enforce the Migratory Bird

Treaty Act (MBTA), which prohibits the killing of

migratory birds without a permit.

SECRETARIAT DETERMINATIONS:

ART. 14(1)(2)*

(23 December 1999)

Determination that criteria under Article 14(1)

have been met and that the submission merits

requesting a response from the Party.

ART. 15(1)

(15 December 2000)

Notification to Council that a factual record is

warranted in accordance with Article 15(1).

* Published in Volume 5 (Fall 2000) of the North American Environmental Law and Policy

Series.

123

North American Commission for

Environmental Cooperation — Secretariat

Article 15(1) Notification to Council that

Development of a Factual Record is Warranted

Submission Number: SEM-99-002 (Migratory Birds)

Submitter(s): Alliance for the Wild Rockies

Center for International Environmental Law

Centro de Derecho Ambiental del Noreste de

Mexico

Centro Mexicano de Derecho Ambiental

Friends of the Earth

Instituto de Derecho Ambiental

Pacific Environment and Resources Center

Sierra Club of Canada

West Coast Environmental Law Association

Concerned Party: United States of America

Date of this

Determination: 15 December 2000

I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Article 14 of theNorth American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation (NAAEC or the “Agreement”) creates a mechanism for citizens to

file submissions in which they assert that a Party to the NAAEC is failing

to effectively enforce its environmental law. The Secretariat of the North

American Commission for Environmental Cooperation* (the “Secretariat”) initially considers these submissions based on criteria contained in

Article 14(1) of the NAAEC. When the Secretariat determines that a submission meets these criteria, the Secretariat then determines based on

125

* As of October 2000, the Commission for Environmental Cooperation, created by

NAAEC, has used the name North American Commission for Environmental Cooperation (NACEC).
factors contained in Article 14(2) whether the submission merits

requesting a response from the Party named in the submission. In light

of any response from the Party, the Secretariat may inform the Council

that the Secretariat considers that development of a factual record is

warranted (Article 15(1)). The Council may then instruct the Secretariat

to prepare a factual record for the submission (Article 15(2)).1

The Submitters filed this submission, involving the asserted failure

to effectively enforce the United States Migratory Bird Treaty Act

(MBTA or the “Act”), on 19 November 1999. On 23 December 1999 the

Secretariat determined that the submission met the criteria in Article

14(1) and that it merited a response from the Party in light of the factors

listed in Article 14(2). On 29 February 2000 the Secretariat received a

response from the Party. In accordance with Article 15(1), the Secretariat

informs the Council that the Secretariat considers that the submission, in

light of the response, warrants developing a factual record, and provides

its reasons.

II. SUMMARY OF THE SUBMISSION

The Submitters assert that the United States Government is “failing to effectively enforce” section 703 of the MBTA, 16 U.S.C. § 703,

which prohibits the killing or “taking” of migratory birds under certain

circumstances. This assertion rests on a three-step analysis. The Submitters first assert that section 703 of the MBTA prohibits any person from

killing or “taking” migratory birds, including destroying nests, crushing

eggs, and killing nestlings and fledglings, “by any means or in any manner,” unless the U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service (FWS) issues a valid permit.2

Second, the Submitters assert that loggers, logging companies, and

logging contractors consistently engage in practices that violate the Act.3

The Submitters assert that, for example, “the number of young migratory birds killed, nests destroyed, and eggs crushed annually as a direct

result of logging operations is enormous.4”

126 NORTH AMERICAN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY

1. This is the seventh Secretariat Notification to Council that the Secretariat considers

development of a factual record to be warranted for a submission. Regarding the previous six, the Council has directed the Secretariat to develop a factual record for three

(SEM-96-001, SEM-97-001 and SEM-98-007), deferred its decision on one

(SEM-97-006), rejected the fifth (SEM-97-003), and is currently considering the sixth

(SEM-98-006). The pertinent Council Resolutions (96-08, 98-07, 00-01, 00-02 and

00-03), are available on the CEC home page, <www.cec.org>.

2. Submission at 1.

3. Submission at 1-4, Appendix C.

4. Submission at 4.
Finally, the Submitters claim that the United States is failing to

effectively enforce this requirement of the Act because of its failure to

prosecute logging operations that violate the Act by killing birds.5 The

Submitters assert that, furthermore, the United States is failing to

enforce against logging operations even though it is fully aware that

they consistently violate the law.6 The Submitters assert that the United

States “has completely abdicated its enforcement obligations” under the

MBTA because of its failure to prosecute logging operations that the

Submitters claim routinely violate the Act.7

III. SUMMARY OF THE RESPONSE

The United States advances four arguments to support its position

that development of a factual record is not warranted. First, the United

States asserts that the Submitters have relied heavily on an unapproved

7 March 1996 draft Memorandum purporting to reflect a policy of the

United States Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) to exempt logging activities from enforcement actions under the MBTA. According to the United

States, the Memorandum is unapproved and unofficial and embodies

no FWS policy, formal or unwritten.8

Second, the United States asserts that development of a factual

record is not warranted because under NAAEC Article 45(1)(a) the

United States has not failed to effectively enforce the MBTA. Article

45(1)(a) of the NAAEC provides that a Party “has not failed to ‘effectively enforce its environmental law’... where the action or inaction in

question by agencies or officials of that Party reflects a reasonable exercise of their discretion in respect of investigatory, prosecutorial, regulatory or compliance matters.” The United States asserts that Article

45(1)(a) precludes a finding that the United States is failing to effectively

enforce the MBTA because the current enforcement policies of the FWS

“reflect a reasonable exercise of the agency’s discretion regarding investigatory, prosecutorial, regulatory, and compliance matters.9”

Third, the United States makes the same assertion with respect to

Article 45(1)(b). Article 45(1)(b) of the NAAEC provides that agency

action or inaction does not amount to a failure to effectively enforce if it

“results from bona fide decisions to allocate resources to enforcement in

respect of other environmental matters determined to have higher priorSEM-99-002 127

5. See Submission at 4-8.

6. See, e.g., Submission at 1,5.

7. Submission at 1.

8. See Response at 7-8.

9. Response at 2.
ities.” The United States asserts that the NAAEC precludes a determination that the United States is failing to effectively enforce the MBTA

because “the current enforcement policies of the FWS result from ‘bona

fide decisions to allocate resources to enforcement in respect of other

environmental matters determined to have higher priorities.’10”

Fourth, the response takes the position that the submission does

not warrant development of a factual record because it fails to discuss

the steps the United States is taking to protect migratory birds from logging activities. The United States asserts that it has used its authority

under the Endangered Species Act (ESA) to protect migratory birds that

are listed as endangered or threatened under that law. It states that it has

used a number of “non-enforcement mechanisms” to provide additional

protection.11 The United States claims that because the submission does

not acknowledge these efforts, it does not reflect “the complete framework under which the United States protects migratory birds.12”

IV. ANALYSIS

A. Introduction

In its 23 December 1999 Determination, the Secretariat concluded

that the submission met each of the criteria contained in Article 14(1).13

The CIEL submission is in English,14 it clearly identifies the organizations making the submission,15 it indicates that the matter had been

appropriately communicated to the United States,16 and it was filed by

organizations established in the territory of a Party.17 The submission is

not aimed at harassing industry.18

Article 14(2) establishes guiding factors for the Secretariat to determine whether to request the Party to submit a response to a submission

that meets the criteria in Article 14(1). The CIEL submission alleges harm

from the alleged failure to effectively enforce environmental law in part

because of the great public importance of migratory birds. The submis128 NORTH AMERICAN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY

10. Response at 2.

11. Response at 2.

12. Response at 2.

13. Determination for SEM-99-002 (23 December 1999) at 3.

14. Article 14(1)(a).

15. Article 14(1)(b).

16. Article 14(1)(e).

17. Article 14(1)(f).

18. Article 14(1)(d).
sion also raises matters whose further study in the Article 14 process

would advance the goals of the Agreement.19 The submission asserts

that private remedies to require the United States to enforce the MBTA

are not available.20 The submission indicates that it is not based exclusively on mass media reports.21 Guided by these factors, on 23 December

1999, the Secretariat requested a response from the Party. A response

from the Party was received on 29 February 2000.

Article 15(1) of the NAAEC directs the Secretariat to determine,

based on its review of a submission and the Party’s response, whether to

dismiss a submission or to inform the Council that the Secretariat considers that the submission warrants developing a factual record. The text

of Article 15(1) reads as follows:

If the Secretariat considers that the submission, in the light of any response

provided by the Party, warrants developing a factual record, the Secretariat shall so inform the Council and provide its reasons.

B. Analysis of the Submission in Light of the U.S. Response

The Submitters assert that the United States Government is “failing to effectively enforce” section 703 of the MBTA, 16 U.S.C. § 703,

which prohibits the killing or “taking” of migratory birds under certain

circumstances. The Submitters assert that loggers, logging companies,

and logging contractors consistently engage in practices that violate the

Act.22 The Submitters assert that, furthermore, the United States is failing to enforce against logging operations even though it is fully aware

that they consistently violate the law.23 The Submitters assert that the

United States “has completely abdicated its enforcement obligations”

under the MBTA because of its failure to prosecute logging operations

that the Submitters claim routinely violate the Act. 24

SEM-99-002 129

19. Article 14(2)(b). The NACEC Secretariat noted that the sort of assertions in the submission “– that there is a widespread pattern of ineffectual enforcement – are particularly strong candidates for Article 14 consideration . . . .” Determination for

SEM 99-002 (23 December 1999) at 5.

20. See Article 14(2)(c). The response does not take issue with this assertion (see Article

14(3)(b)(ii), providing that “[t]he Party shall advise the Secretariat . . . of any other

information that the Party wishes to submit, such as . . . ii) whether private remedies in connection with the matter are available to the person or organization making the submission and whether they have been pursued.”).

21. See Article 14(2)(d).

22. Submission at 1-4, Appendix C.

23. See, e.g., Submission at 1,5.

24. Submission at 1.
1. Information Supporting the Submitters’ Assertion that the

United States is Failing to Effectively Enforce the MBTA

Against Logging Operations

The Submitters cite a 7 March 1996 FWS Memorandum for the

proposition that the United States has a longstanding policy not to

enforce against logging operations that violate the MBTA. The Submitters claim that the Memorandum provides support for their assertion

that the United States is failing to effectively enforce the MBTA against

logging operations.25 The Memorandum states that the FWS “has had a

long standing, unwritten policy relative to the MBTA that no enforcement or investigative action should be taken in incidents involving

logging operations, that result in the taking of non-endangered, nonthreatened, migratory birds and/or their nests.26”

The United States claims in its response to the Submission that the

Memorandum is not the official United States policy the Submitters say

it is. The United States characterizes the 7 March 1996 Memorandum as

“an unapproved and unofficial draft memorandum,” and as “a working

document that had limited distribution, and was distributed solely for

the purpose of soliciting comments during an internal decision-making

process of the FWS.27” Thus, the United States asserts, the draft memorandum embodies no FWS policy, formal or unwritten, and the submission “misrepresents the true status of the FWS enforcement policy with

respect to the MBTA.28”

The Submitters do not rely exclusively on the 7 March 1996 Memorandum to support their assertion that the United States is failing to

effectively enforce the MBTA as it applies to logging activities by failing

to prosecute violators. Instead, the Submitters provide other support for

this assertion as well.

The Submitters identify specific situations in which they allege the

Act was violated and no enforcement action was taken. Specifically, the

Submitters identify two recent instances in which the Party did not initiate an enforcement action against logging operations that allegedly violated the MBTA by killing covered birds and destroying nests.29 The

Submitters assert that the failure to respond to these alleged violations

constitutes a failure to effectively enforce the MBTA. The Party does not

address these assertions.

130 NORTH AMERICAN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY

25. See e.g., Submission at 1.

26. Submission, Appendix A.

27. Response at 7.

28. Response at 8.

29. Submission at 6.
The Submitters also assert that violations for which no enforcement action is taken occur on a nationwide basis. They note the impacts

in violation of the Act that logging has on birds and nests found on

logged federal and non-federal lands throughout the United States. The

Submitters further state that as far as they have been able to discern, the

Party has never undertaken a single prosecution under the MBTA

against a logging operation. The Submitters advise that they made a concerted effort to obtain from the Party information on any such prosecutions but that the Party indicated in its responses to the Submitters’

requests for such information that they had no information that there

have been any such prosecutions:

[A] review of government files in response to the Submitting Party’s

requests, indicates that the United States has never enforced the MBTA

against loggers, logging companies, or private landowners—in any context—no matter how egregious the violation may have been. In response

to CIEL’s request for information, FWS, the Forest Service, and the Department of Justice all responded that they had no documents relating to

enforcement actions against anyone involved in a logging operation.30

Significantly, the United States does not appear to challenge either

assertion by the Submitters — that logging operations cause deaths of

birds covered by the MBTA and destruction of nests of such birds, or that

the Party has never enforced against such operations. With respect to the

level of enforcement issue, the United States appears to acknowledge

that it has made little if any use of the enforcement provisions in the

MBTA against logging operations, at least unless the migratory birds

involved are protected under the Endangered Species Act. The United

States reports that “the FWS has not taken enforcement actions against

logging activities regarding their impacts on migratory birds that are not

listed pursuant to the ESA... .31” Along the same lines, the United States

notes that “[t]o date, the FWS has no record of prosecutions having been

brought exclusively under the MBTA for takes caused by logging of

migratory birds not listed under the [Endangered Species Act].32” The

United States also indicates that the FWS “has not routinely reviewed

[logging] activities with regard to whether or not a permit is required.33”

In sum, the Submitters’ assertion that there is a failure to effectively

enforce the MBTA against logging operations does not rely exclusively

SEM-99-002 131

30. Submission at 6. The Submitters also identify two specific incidents in which logging operations allegedly committed significant violations of the MBTA but for

which no enforcement action was taken. Submission at 6.

31. Response at 8.

32. Response at 11.

33. Response at 11.
on the existence of an official FWS “non-enforcement” policy of the sort

contained in the 7 March 1996 Memorandum. The Submitters have

offered other information to support this assertion, notably an apparent

lack of prosecutions nationwide as well a failure to prosecute alleged

logging operation violators in particular circumstances. The United

States does not seek to controvert the assertion that prosecutions under

the MBTA against logging operations have been rare and it does not

address the alleged failure to effectively enforce with respect to the particular examples provided. The information provided by the United

States appears to support the assertion that logging operations that violate the MBTA are rarely prosecuted, if ever, at least so long as the operations do not violate the ESA as well.

2. Application of Articles 14 and 15 to Assertions of a Wide-ranging

Failure to Enforce Environmental Law Effectively

The focus of the submission is on an asserted failure to effectively

enforce that is nationwide in scope. While the Submitters identify some

specific logging operations that allegedly violated the MBTA,34 the reference to particular operations is clearly intended to be illustrative. The

Submitters’ primary concern is with an asserted nationwide failure on

the part of the Party to investigate or prosecute logging operations that

violate the MBTA by killing birds or destroying bird nests.

Given the Submitters’ broad focus on an asserted nationwide failure to effectively enforce, the Secretariat now considers whether the citizen submission process is intended for assertions of this sort. One

possible view is that the citizen submission process is reserved for assertions of particularized failures to effectively enforce. Under this view a

factual record would be warranted, only when a submitter asserts that a

Party is failing to effectively enforce with respect to one or more particular facilities or projects. This view of the Article 14 process, in short, reads

the opening sentence of Article 14(1) to confine the citizen submission

process to asserted failures to effectively enforce with respect to particular facilities or projects. Under this view, assertions of a wide-ranging

failure to effectively enforce that do not focus on individual facilities or

projects would not be subject to review under the citizen submission

process.

The text of Article 14 does not appear to support limiting the scope

of the citizen submission process in this way. The opening sentence of

Article 14 establishes three specific parameters for the citizen submis132 NORTH AMERICAN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY

34. See, e.g., Submission at 6.
sion process. It thereby limits assertions of failures to effectively enforce

to those meeting these three elements. First, the assertions must involve

an “environmental law.” Next, they must involve an asserted failure to

“effectively enforce” that law (the assertion may not focus on purported

deficiencies in the law itself). Third, assertions must meet the temporal

requirement of claiming that there is a failure to effectively enforce.

The Parties’ inclusion of these three limitations on the scope of the

Article 14 process reflects that they knew how to confine the scope of

the process and that they decided to do so in specific ways.35 The

Parties could have limited the species of actionable failures to effectively

enforce to either particularized incidents of such, or to asserted failures

that are of a broad scope, in the same way that they included the limits

referenced above. They did not do so. The fact that the Parties did not

limit assertions to either particularized incidents or to widespread failures to effectively enforce provides a strong basis for the view that the

Parties intended the citizen submission process to cover both kinds of

alleged enforcement failures.36 Thus, the text of the opening sentence of

Article 14(1) supports the view that a submission may warrant preparation of a factual record, regardless of the scope of the alleged enforcement failure, so long as the submission focuses on an asserted failure to

effectively enforce an environmental law.37

SEM-99-002 133

35. The Secretariat routinely considers whether submissions meet these three criteria;

indeed, the Secretariat has dismissed several submissions on the ground that they

failed to meet one or more of them. See,e.g., Determination for SEM-95-001 (21 September 1995) (submission did not involve alleged failure to enforce because it challenged adequacy of legislative act); Determination for SEM-98-002 (23 June 1998)

(submission involved commercial forestry dispute, rather than an alleged failure to

enforce an “environmental law”); Determination for SEM-97-004 (25 August 1997)

(dismissing submission for failure to allege that Party “is failing” to effectively

enforce); Determination for SEM-00-003 (12 April 2000) (dismissing submission as

premature).

36. See Determination for SEM 99-002 (23 December 1999) at 5 (“Assertions of this sort

– that there is a widespread pattern of ineffectual enforcement – are particularly

strong candidates for Article 14 consideration, although submissions that focus on

asserted failures to enforce concerning individual facilities may warrant consideration under Article 14 under some circumstances, depending on other factors.”)

37. Article 14(1)(a)-(f), which establishes additional limits on the types of submissions

subject to review under the Article 14 process, similarly does not reflect an intent to

limit submissions to asserted failures to effectively enforce that focus exclusively

either on particularized incidents or on asserted failures that are broad in scope.

These provisions create certain threshold requirements that appear equally applicable to a submission focused on either type of asserted failure to effectively

enforce (particularized incidents or widespread failures). For example, either type

of submission must be in writing in an appropriate language (Article 14(1)(a)),

clearly identify the submitter(s) (Article 14(1)(b)), and have been filed by an eligible

entity (Article 14(1)(f)). Similarly, the requirement that a submitter provide sufficient information for the Secretariat to review the submission (Article 14(1)(c)) and

that the submission appear to be aimed at promoting enforcement rather than at
Moreover, in deciding whether to request a response from a Party,

Article 14(2) of the NAAEC directs the Secretariat to be guided by

whether a submission “raises matters whose further study in this

process would advance the goals” of the Agreement. The goals of

the NAAEC are ambitious and broad in scope. These goals include,

for example, “foster[ing] the protection and improvement of the environment in the territories of the Parties for the well-being of present

and future generations,” as well as “enhanc[ing] compliance with, and

enforcement of, environmental laws and regulations.38”

Assertions that there is a failure to enforce with respect to a single

incident or project may raise matters whose further study would

advance these goals. Indeed, the Secretariat has concluded that such

assertions merit developing a factual record in several instances and the

Council has concurred.39 But also, assertions that the failure to enforce

extends beyond a single facility or project portend, at least potentially, a

more extensive or broad-based issue concerning the effectiveness of a

Party’s efforts to enforce its environmental laws and regulations. In

other words, the larger the scale of the asserted failure, the more likely it

may be to warrant developing a factual record, other things being equal.

If the citizen submission process were construed to bar consideration of

alleged widespread enforcement failures, the failures that potentially

pose the greatest threats to accomplishment of the Agreement’s objectives, and the most serious and far-reaching threats of harm to the environment, would be beyond the scope of that process. This limitation in

scope would seem to be counter to the objects and purposes of the

NAAEC. The Secretariat declines to adopt a reading of the Agreement

that would yield such a result.40

134 NORTH AMERICAN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY

harassing industry (Article 14(1)(d)) are potentially relevant both to an alleged particularized failure and to an alleged widespread enforcement failure. Finally, the

submission must indicate that the matter has been communicated in writing to the

relevant authorities of the Party and indicate the Party’s response, if any (Article

14(1)(e)). None of these requirements reflects a direct, or even an indirect, intent to

exclude submissions that focus on alleged failures to effectively enforce involving

particularized incidents or submissions that focus on alleged failures to effectively

enforce that are broad in scope.

38. Article 1(a) and (g).

39. The treatment of SEM-98-007 by the Secretariat and Council is illustrative. This

submission involves an asserted failure to effectively enforce for a single facility in

Mexico. The Secretariat initially requested a response and later advised the Council

that a factual record was warranted. The Council recently directed the Secretariat

to proceed with such a factual record.

40. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Article 31, providing that “[a] treaty

shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be

given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose.”
In sum, Article 14(1) establishes parameters for the scope of the citizen submission process. These parameters limit the scope of the process

in several ways but they do not reflect an intention only to allow “particularized” assertions of a failure to effectively enforce and to exclude

assertions such as those made here that there is a widespread failure to

effectively enforce. Article 14(2) provides further support for the notion

that the citizen submission process may include either type of assertion.

Preparing factual records on submissions that take either approach

would promote the objects and purposes of the NAAEC.

3. Analysis of the Asserted Failure to Effectively Enforce the MBTA

Against Logging Operations in Light of the U.S. Response

The Submitters assert that logging operations have consistently

violated the MBTA and that the Party has never prosecuted such violations, as noted above.41 As indicated above, the response denies that the

7 March 1996 Memorandum accurately states a longstanding formal

policy not to enforce the MBTA against logging activities. The response

also confirms, however, that the United States has never prosecuted an

MBTA violation in the context of logging activities, at least unless an

endangered or threatened species was involved. As a result, the

response appears to confirm that the lack of prosecutions under the

MBTA (regardless of whether it is the result of a formal policy) is both

longstanding (given that the MBTA has been in effect since 1918) and

broad in geographical scope.

The Submitters assert that the alleged failure to effectively enforce

against logging operations has significant consequences in that logging

causes tens of thousands of direct deaths of migratory birds and

destroys or crushes nests, eggs, nestlings and fledglings. Appendix C to

the submission claims that logging, and the failure to enforce the MBTA

against logging operations, have had “severe negative consequences for

migratory bird populations.” The United States alleges in its response

that logging activities are not as significant a source of migratory bird

takes as certain other causes, such as power line electrocution or feral

cats.42 The fact that there may be activities that have more significant

consequences, however, does not necessarily mean that logging does

not also have significant consequences. The response acknowledges that

SEM-99-002 135

41. Submission at 4.

42. See Response at 5 (“Although, logging activities are one of a long list of activities

that may contribute to bird fatalities, they are not the most significant cause of bird

mortality in the United States.”).
logging can result in unlawful takes when it kills birds or crushes eggs.43

As noted above, the response also confirms the importance of migratory

birds. The Council itself has characterized migratory birds as “a particularly important component of North American biodiversity.”

There is one portion of the United States’ response that has particular bearing on the issue of whether preparing a factual record with

respect to this submission is warranted. The response contends that the

CIEL submission fails to take into consideration a “multitude of ‘nonprosecutorial’ alternatives” for protecting migratory birds that represent “a more productive use of limited resources.” Because, as the

response itself indicates, these alternatives are “non-enforcement initiatives,44” the Party’s decision to pursue them in lieu of MBTA prosecutions cannot qualify as bona fide decisions to allocate resources to higher

priority enforcement matters under Article 45(1)(b).45 It may be, however,

that in summarizing these non-enforcement strategies the response is

suggesting that the issue of effective enforcement of the MBTA with

respect to logging operations may not be worth studying through development of a factual record, if such non-enforcement strategies are effective in achieving the underlying goals of the governing statute.

The response describes several different types of “non-prosecutorial” or “non-enforcement” initiatives that, according to the United

States, amount to a “proactive, preventative management” approach to

the protection of migratory birds. Having considered the response’s discussion of these initiatives, in the Secretariat’s view, further study of the

matters raised in the submission is warranted. Among other things, reasonable questions remain as to whether any of these alternatives, either

alone or in combination, is effective in protecting migratory birds in the

absence of enforcement against logging operations that violate § 703 of

the MBTA.

136 NORTH AMERICAN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY

43. Response at 4. The Secretariat notes that it received a memorandum from the American Forest & Paper Association (AFPA) that is relevant to this issue. The AFPA, the

“national trade association representing the forest products and paper industries

in the United States,” asserts that the U.S. case law holds that logging operations

are not subject to the MBTA even if such operations kill birds covered by the Act.

The Secretariat appreciates AFPA’s interest in this proceeding. There is, however,

no provision in the NAAEC for consideration of such memoranda at this stage of

the citizen submission process. The Secretariat declines to adopt a more narrow

reading of a Party’s legislation than the one the Party itself appears to endorse. If

the Council directs preparation of a factual record for this submission, the AFPA

may submit comments, which the Secretariat may consider in its development of

the factual record. (Article 15(4)).

44. Response at 18.

45. The response discusses these initiatives in the section devoted to analysis of the

Party’s “Resource Allocation.”
The first alternative is population monitoring of migratory birds to

facilitate identification of migratory bird species that are of most concern.46 Although this kind of monitoring is unquestionably valuable in

alerting the FWS to the existence of problems related to the health of

migratory bird populations and the state of their habitat, monitoring

alone is a means of facilitating, enhancing, and evaluating the value of

other kinds of protective efforts. Information on the results of this monitoring that shows the government’s approach is effective was not provided.

A second non-enforcement alternative is public outreach. Initiatives such as International Migratory Bird Day may educate members of

the public on the importance of protecting migratory birds, but the

response does not address issues such as the resources that have been

committed to outreach efforts, whether these programs have addressed

all significant sources of threats to migratory birds (including logging),

the extent of their actual beneficial effect, or the comparative educational

benefits of public outreach efforts and the use of MBTA prosecutions as

“leveraging” tools.47

Another alternative identified by the response, avian mortality

studies and management, goes beyond study and monitoring to encompass potential protective efforts.48 According to the response, the FWS

recommends management actions to reduce adverse impacts based on

population trends data and monitoring. In “appropriate instances,”

monitoring can lead to enforcement action against entities such as electric utilities that install power lines that can electrocute birds.49 The

response does not provide information about how effective the identified management actions (such as those initiated by the Communications Tower Working Group) have been in avoiding migratory bird

deaths and habitat losses. It also does not explain why the resources

available to the United States to protect migratory birds have not been

sufficient to target logging activities by, for example, developing a working group for logging that is similar to the communications tower group.

The response seems to indicate that the United States has not targeted

logging because it does not have a “great level of impact.” As indicated

elsewhere, however, the response fails to provide adequate information

SEM-99-002 137

46. Response at 19.

47. It is not clear from the response how the FWS would determine how successful

these outreach efforts have been.

48. See Response at 19.

49. E.g., United States v. Moon Lake Elec. Ass’n, Inc., 45 F.Supp.2d 1070 (D. Colo. 1999).
about the absolute and relative aggregate impact of logging on migratory birds and their habitat. Finally, the response implies that the

adverse effects of logging on migratory birds cannot be “readily

addressed.” But as indicated below, the response describes efforts by the

United States Forest Service to require or induce the use of best management practices. Accordingly, there are important unresolved questions

about whether the avian mortality studies and management actions

described in the response are sufficiently effective to negate the utility of

preparing a factual record as a means of advancing the goals of the

NAAEC.

The response identifies landscape level bird planning as an additional means of protecting migratory birds and their habitat.50 This kind

of planning has the potential to protect migratory birds, but the plans

described in the response do not appear to have been implemented yet

and an assessment of their effectiveness in protecting migratory birds is

therefore necessarily speculative. Moreover, the response does not indicate what component of the migratory bird problems identified through

monitoring or otherwise will be addressed through implementation of

the plans. Similarly, the participating countries apparently have just

begun to implement initiatives such as the North American Bird Conservation Initiative and the Trilateral Committee for Wildlife and Ecosystem Conservation and Management.51 The response does not indicate

what resources the United States has committed to these endeavors,

what powers the entities involved have to take actions or require those

engaged in logging to take actions to protect migratory birds, what kinds

of protections, if any, these endeavors have already achieved, or what

kinds of protections the United States hopes to achieve through the

activities of these agencies.

In sum, the assertions contained in the submission of a nationwide

failure to effectively enforce the MBTA with respect to logging operations are of substantial importance. Further study of the assertions

would advance several goals of the Agreement, including enhancing

compliance with, and enforcement of, environmental laws and regulations,52 and promoting transparency and public participation in the

development of environmental laws, regulations, and policies.53

138 NORTH AMERICAN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY

50. Response at 20.

51. See Response at 21.

52. Article 1(g).

53. Article 1(h).
C. Consideration of Article 45(1)(a) and (b)

1. Preliminary Framework for Analysis of Article 45(1) Issues

The submission charges that the United States has failed to effectively enforce the MBTA. As indicated above, Article 45(1) of the

NAAEC provides that a Party has not failed to effectively enforce its

environmental law if the action or inaction in question by agencies or

officials of that Party either “reflects a reasonable exercise of their discretion in respect of investigatory, prosecutorial, regulatory or compliance

matters” or “results from bona fide decisions to allocate resources to

enforcement in respect of other environmental matters determined to

have higher priorities.54” The United States asserts that it has not failed

to effectively enforce the MBTA for both of these reasons.

The purpose of the citizen submission process suggests that the

Secretariat should dismiss a submission if the relevant Party establishes

that there is no failure to effectively enforce. A fundamental purpose of

the process is to enhance domestic environmental enforcement by the

three Parties.55 Accordingly, if a Party has made a persuasive case that

there is no failure to effectively enforce, there will be little point in going

forward.

This is the first Party response in which a Party has made a detailed

assertion that Article 45 makes continued review of the submission inappropriate. The nature of the Secretariat’s review of the submission in

light of the response with respect to these issues will likely be determined on a case-by-case basis.56 The Secretariat anticipates, however,

that the following analysis will generally be relevant.

In a particular submission, if a Party has asserted that its enforcement reflects a reasonable exercise of its discretion, the Secretariat

should review at least two questions in assessing the extent to which the

SEM-99-002 139

54. Article 45(1)(a) and (b).

55. See, e.g., Sarah Richardson, “Sovereignty Revisited: Sovereignty, Trade, and the

Environment–The North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation”,

(1998) 24 Can.-U.S. L.J. 183, 190 (noting that “[t]aken together, Articles 14 and 15

...represent a critical institutional mechanism to encourage the effective enforcement by the Parties of their domestic environmental law”).

56. Cf. Scott C. Fulton & Lawrence I. Sperling, “The Network of Environmental

Enforcement and Compliance Cooperation in North America and the Western

Hemisphere”, (1996) 30 Int’l Law 111, 128-29, 138 (noting that the NAAEC leaves to

“future development” determination of standards for determining the effectiveness of each the Parties’ enforcement efforts rather than “setting forth precise standards”).
Party provides support for this assertion. First, to what extent has the

Party explained how it has exercised its discretion? Second, to what

extent has the Party explained why its exercise of discretion is reasonable under the circumstances? If the Party has provided a persuasive

explanation of how it has exercised its discretion, and why its exercise of

discretion is reasonable, then under Article 45(1)(a), the Party would not

have failed to effectively enforce its environmental law. In such a situation there would seem to be little reason to continue with further study

of the matters raised in the submission. If, on the other hand, the Party

has not explained how it exercised its discretion or why its exercise of

discretion is reasonable, dismissal would not be warranted under Article 45(1)(a). The Secretariat might nevertheless determine that dismissal

is warranted for other reasons.

With respect to the assertion that a Party’s enforcement practices

result “from bona fide decisions to allocate resources to enforcement in

respect of other environmental matters determined to have higher priorities,” the Secretariat should review the extent to which the Party has

explained at least three points: 1) its allocation of resources; 2) its priorities; and 3) the reasons why the Party’s allocation of resources constitutes a bona fide allocation given the Party’s priorities. If a Party has

explained its allocation of resources and its priorities, and has provided

a persuasive explanation of why its allocation of resources is bona fide in

light of those priorities, then, again, under Article 45(1)(b), there is not a

failure to effectively enforce. As a result, there is little reason to continue

with further study of the submission.

2. Application of this Framework to the CIEL Submission and

the Party’s Response

A) How has the party exercised its discretion?

In the Secretariat’s view, the Party has provided substantial information concerning how it has exercised its discretion for purposes of

Article 45(1)(a). The Party has done so by offering three basic points.

First, the Party identifies its significant “enforcement”-related initiatives. These include creation and implementation of a permitting

scheme, issuance of regulations for the hunting of game birds that are

designed to keep harvest levels in balance with a sustainable population,

and related monitoring of game bird populations. The Party also identifies law enforcement investigations and prosecutions as enforcement-related approaches.

140 NORTH AMERICAN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY
Next, the Party explains that its resources are limited. With respect

to permitting, for example, the United States asserts that the FWS’ Office

of Migratory Bird Management lacks sufficient personnel to write permits for every incoming request.57 The response asserts that on average,

approximately three million people each year engage in 22 million days

of migratory bird hunting. The FWS has been able to commit 18 staff

positions and a total nationwide budget of just over $1 million in an

effort to manage approximately 40,000 active permits and process

approximately 13,000 applications for intentional take permits annually.58 According to the United States, these resources are insufficient to

the task and the agency faces “significant resource limitations.59” Thus,

the Party asserts that simply addressing the large number of hunters and

prospective hunters keeps its permitting resources more than fully occupied.

With respect to the impact of resource limitations on enforcement,

the Party’s response explains that the FWS’ Division of Law Enforcement has “tremendous responsibilities” that include enforcement of a

wide variety of statutes other than the MBTA that are designed to protect fish, wildlife, and plants.60 The combination of this broad range of

responsibilities and existing personnel shortages makes resource allocation decisions and the application of discretion in enforcement matters

“unavoidable.61”

Third, the Party identifies the different types of activities that

potentially violate the Act and it explains how it has exercised its discretion in using the applicable enforcement approaches to address these

different types of activities. The Party indicates that in light of its limited

resources and the significant workload created by managing “intentional” killers of migratory birds through the permitting process, it has

exercised its discretion to focus its permitting program exclusively on

such intentional actors and not to allocate permitting resources to

address unintentional or incidental killings.62 Logging operations fit

into this “unintentional” or “incidental” killings category, as do several

other activities discussed in more detail below, such as electric wires, oil

pits, and other “attractive nuisance”-type enterprises that the Party indicates attract birds, causing some to die. In addition, the Party asserts

SEM-99-002 141

57. Permits are the mechanism the FWS has chosen in connection with the regulations

it has issued to control the taking of migratory birds through hunting and other

activities. 50 C.F.R. Parts 20-21. See Response at 9-10.

58. Response at 10.

59. Response at 11.

60. Response at 15.

61. Response at 16.

62. See Response at 11.
that, due to its limited resources, it has “legitimately concentrated its

regulatory, enforcement, and scientific efforts to reducing unintentional

takes of migratory birds caused by those activities where industry has

created hazardous conditions which often attract migratory birds to

their death.63” According to the Party, the FWS therefore “focuses less on

preventing takes ensuing from otherwise legal activities that modify the

local environment (logging, road construction)” than from intentional

kills (such as from hunting) and from “activities where industry has

created hazardous conditions which ...attract migratory birds to their

death.64”

In sum, the United States provides much of the information

needed to determine whether it is exercising its discretion in a reasonable way. It identifies its enforcement tools. It further explains and substantiates limits in the Party’s resources. Further, it describes the types of

activities that violate the Act, and explains that it has judged it more

important to use permitting to regulate one type of activity (intentional

killing) in lieu of using it to regulate another (incidental or unintentional

killing). Similarly, the United States explains that it focuses its enforcement efforts on other types of incidental killing (electric wires, etc.)

rather than on logging operations.

B) Is the Party’s Exercise of Its Discretion Reasonable and/or its allocation

of resources bona fide under the Circumstances?

1) Scope of the Regulations and Permitting Scheme

The Party falls short in one respect in showing that it has exercised

its discretion reasonably and allocated its resources in a bona fide way

by deciding to focus its regulatory and permitting resources exclusively

on activities “where the take is the purpose of the activity in question”

and to exempt incidental killing activities from this permitting scheme.

What is missing is a showing as to why this exclusive focus on intentional killings, and this decision to ignore incidental killings for purposes of the regulation development and permit process, is reasonable

and a bona fide allocation of resources. Section 703 of the MBTA makes it

unlawful to take protected migratory birds “[u]nless and except as permitted by regulations” issued under the statute.65 Section 704 authorizes

the Secretary of the Interior to determine “when, to what extent, if at all,

142 NORTH AMERICAN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY

63. Response at 11.

64. Response at 11-12.

65. 16 U.S.C. § 703.
and by what means ... to allow hunting, taking, ... [or] killing” of migratory birds by permit.66 As the United States Supreme Court has

described it, the MBTA is a “conservation statute[ ] designed to prevent

the destruction of [migratory] birds.67” The Party indicates that the primary goals of the FWS in its management of migratory birds are “to

conserve migratory bird populations and their habitats in sufficient

quantities to prevent them from being considered as threatened or

endangered and to ensure the citizens of the United States continued

opportunities to enjoy consumptive and nonconsumptive uses of migratory birds and their habitats.68” The Party asserts that its approach is a

reasonable strategy to achieve these goals, but it provides no support for

this assertion that would allow for independent review.

The NAAEC is silent on the type of showing a Party should make

in claiming under Article 45(1) that it is not failing to effectively enforce

its environmental law. The NAAEC similarly is silent on how the Secretariat should review such a claim in deciding whether to dismiss a submission or advise the Council that development of a factual record is

warranted. Neither the Council nor the Secretariat have addressed these

issues in detail previously.

It would appear that, to support dismissal on the basis of an Article

45(1) claim, a Party must support the reasonableness, or bona fide nature,

of its decisions, as well as address the issues outlined above. To do so,

a Party should provide a careful identification of the reasons why it

chose to follow one course rather than another.69 Here, such a showing

includes providing a careful identification of the reasons why the Party

chose not to include logging operations in its permitting scheme.

It is precisely that kind of explanation, justifying the reasonableness of the Party’s exercise of enforcement discretion in declining to

establish a permitting scheme under § 704 of the MBTA for activities, like

logging operations, which result in incidental killings, that is lacking in

the response in this case. The United States does not provide information, for example, on the relative number of birds killed through intenSEM-99-002 143

66. 16 U.S.C. § 704(a).

67. Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 52-53 (1979).

68. Response at 5 (internal quotation marks omitted).

69. In its 19 July 1999 Article 15(1) Notification to Council that Development of a Factual Record is Warranted for SEM-97-006, the Secretariat noted that a Party must

provide support for its statement under Article 45 that it has reasonably exercised

its enforcement discretion and/or that its enforcement approach resulted from

bona fide decisions to allocate resources to enforcement in respect of other matters

determined to have higher priorities.
tional and incidental activities. Nor does the United States provide any

other examples of where it has exercised its enforcement discretion

under any of its environmental laws so as to categorically exclude a portion of the regulated community from permitting or prosecution. The

U.S. has not provided this information, or any other facts, that explain

why, as a policy matter, a regulation and permitting scheme focused

solely on intentional killings is a reasonable exercise of discretion and

bona fide allocation of resources to achieve the MBTA’s goal of preventing the destruction of migratory birds.

The one assertion that the Party offers to support limiting the permit program to activities, such as hunting, whose purpose is to take

migratory birds is that it is easier to monitor hunting than logging.70 The

Party presumably is thereby asserting that the ease of monitoring hunters enhances the likelihood that permits issued will be complied with,

thereby enhancing the value of the permitting scheme. Presumably, the

Party is suggesting that the difficulty in monitoring compliance by loggers with any permits that are issued undermines the utility of a permitting scheme focused on them. Again, however, the Party does not

provide factual documentation or other support for this assertion. Nor

does the Party refute the Submitters’ contention that the FWS has the

flexibility to impose and enforce nesting and breeding season logging

restrictions.71 It simply asserts that it is easier to monitor compliance by

hunters than it would be to monitor compliance by loggers. This may

well be the case, but in the Secretariat’s view the Party needs to provide

some support for its assertion that it is.

Thus, a factual record concerning the permitting issue would

involve developing information concerning whether the Party’s decision to exercise its discretion to focus its permitting efforts solely on

intentional killing is reasonable in terms of achieving the purposes of the

MBTA. Relevant information would include information on the numbers of birds saved through current permitting practices and information on the number of birds that could be saved through alternative

permitting practices that included logging. It also would be useful to

develop information on whether, and if so, why, it is easier to monitor

compliance by hunters with permitting requirements than it is to monitor compliance by logging operations, and the challenges in each sphere.

144 NORTH AMERICAN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY

70. See Response at 11.

71. Submission at 17-18. To the contrary, the response notes that the Forest Service

restricts operating seasons in timber sale contracts. Response at 22.
2) Prosecutions

The Party justifies the decision to initiate prosecutions under the

MBTA against certain kinds of activities that result in unintentional

takes of migratory birds but not others under the rubric of both a reasonable exercise of enforcement discretion (which, according to the Party,

shields its decisions from further scrutiny under Article 45(1)(a)) and a

bona fide allocation of resources to higher priority matters (which also,

according to the Party, shields its decisions involving logging operations from further scrutiny under Article 45(1)(b)). As noted above,

activities that result in unintentional or incidental takes include logging

operations, as well as a host of other activities. The response provides a

long list of other such activities, including the construction of power

lines or open oil pits that attract birds, the use of fishing vessel nets and

gear, oil spills and other industrial accidents, and the operation of

wind generators, communication towers, and cars and aircraft.72 The

response indicates that the Party has decided to concentrate its regulatory and enforcement efforts on “reducing unintentional takes of migratory birds caused by those activities where industry has created

hazardous conditions which often attract migratory birds to their

death... Comparatively, the FWS focuses less on preventing takes ensuing from otherwise legal activities that modify the local environment

(logging, road construction).73”

The Party invokes both of the Article 45(1) defenses to justify drawing this distinction. First, the Party asserts that the U.S. Congress and

courts accept and acknowledge that non-prosecution of some violations

of the MBTA is integral to the statutory scheme, and therefore that the

Party is entitled to exercise some degree of enforcement discretion under

the Act.74 The Secretariat agrees that the MBTA provides the United

States the authority to exercise some degree of enforcement discretion.

However, in view of the categorical exemption from permitting and

prosecution that the Submitters assert, this threshold acknowledgment

does not answer whether the exercise of discretion here was reasonable

or the result of a bona fide allocation of resources. Moreover, where

a Party’s environmental law itself does not contain an enforcement

exemption for a particular sector of the regulated community, the likelihood that discretionary administrative actions creating such an exemption are not reasonable or bona fide increases as the scope of the

exemption increases. Indeed, at the extreme, such administrative

SEM-99-002 145

72. Response at 6.

73. Response at 11.

74. Response at 12-13.
exemptions could completely undermine the effectiveness of an environmental law.

The Party further asserts that it has limited resources, just as it did

in explaining why it has not extended the regulatory and permit program to logging operations. According to the response, the FWS’ Division of Law Enforcement “struggles with a shortage of personnel and a

lack of necessary funding to adequately staff itself in order to meet

increasing demands.75” The Division has only about four enforcement

officers per state or territory, so that each officer must cover a vast geographic area.76

Given this resource shortage, the Party asserts that it has justifiably

decided to allocate its resources to the enforcement of activities other

than logging that result in the incidental taking of migratory birds.

According to the Party, the FWS guidance manual characterizes as a

high investigative priority “unlawful commercial activities and activities involving pollution or energy production facilities which are

destructive and detrimental to efforts to conserve wildlife.77” The question before the Secretariat is whether the Party has provided a persuasive explanation that it has exercised its enforcement discretion

reasonably for purposes of Article 45(1)(a) in making these high priority

matters, and that its allocation of enforcement resources to matters in the

high priority category, which does not include logging, constitutes a

bona fide allocation for purposes of Article 45(1)(b). The Secretariat’s

view is that the Party has not done so with respect to either of the Article

45(1) exclusions from the definition of a failure to effectively enforce

environmental law. A more detailed review of the information provided

in the response may be helpful.

146 NORTH AMERICAN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY

75. Response at 16.

76. Response at 16.

77. Response at 13-14. The response does not provide a persuasive explanation for why

it has limited the “High Priority” category in the fashion it has. The response indicates only that “the FWS views [the activities placed in the High Priority category]

as areas where protective efforts will have the greatest success.” Id. at 14. But the

reasons why enforcement of activities in the High Priority category will provide

greater success is not clear. Among the possible explanations are the availability of

best management practices to avoid certain kinds of unintentional takes, the ease or

difficulty of building a case against a violator, and the ability to “leverage” a prosecution against one violator into voluntary protective actions by others engaged in

the same activity. Each of these explanations is addressed below. The response

states simply that “[p]rosecution for electrocution of birds on powerlines ... is critical not because of how many birds [are] killed, but because of the thousands of

miles of powerlines that cross the United States.” Id. at 14. The response does not

indicate how many acres of forest land are logged each year and why prosecution

of loggers is less “critical” in light of the number of birds at risk in connection with

each type of activity.
a) Absolute and Comparative Numbers of Violations

The Party provides several reasons why it believes it has exercised

its discretion reasonably and made a bona fide allocation of enforcement

and related resources. First, the Party asserts that more birds are killed

through other types of activities that cause incidental deaths than are

killed from logging operations. The response asserts that “[a]lthough

logging activities are one of a long list of activities that may contribute to

bird fatalities, they are not the most significant cause of bird mortality in

the United States.78” Thus, the Party suggests that the scope of the problem is greater elsewhere than it is in the context of logging operations.

It may well be the case that other types of activities cause far more

incidental deaths to migratory birds than occur from logging operations.

The information supplied in the response, however, does not establish

that this is the case. To some extent, at least superficially the information

supplied in the response is not a like comparison. The response indicates

that, for example, pesticide ingestion is estimated to kill millions of birds

each year. It also indicates that electrocutions and power line impacts

kill thousands to tens of thousands of birds annually.79 These are aggregate numbers that purport to describe the cumulative effect of these

activities on migratory birds throughout the Party’s territory. The

response next asserts that these numbers contrast sharply with the numbers provided in the submission concerning birds killed by timber harvesting. But the numbers provided in the submission relate to a small

number of individual timber sales described in studies of which the

Submitters were aware.80 The response does not provide an estimate of

the aggregate number of migratory birds killed by timber harvesting

throughout the territory of the Party. Again, it would be helpful to be

able to put this information in context by developing aggregate numbers

of deaths of protected birds and destruction of bird nests each year from

logging operations. This information, along with information on avian

mortality due to causes other than logging, also would be useful for

examining whether the overall migratory bird mortality allowed under

FWS’s policy of pursuing enforcement to conserve migratory bird populations and habitats so as to prevent them from being considered as

threatened or endangered, particularly as it is applied to migratory bird

species that are currently far from being threatened or endangered, is

consistent with the broad goals of the MBTA.

SEM-99-002 147

78. Response at 5.

79. Response at 6.

80. Submission at 4.
Thus, it would be useful to have a better understanding of the

actual numbers of birds protected under the MBTA that are killed by

logging operations each year—in terms of absolute numbers of deaths

and with respect to numbers of deaths relative to other types of activities

that result in incidental takes to which the Party indicates it has assigned

a higher investigative and enforcement priority. The submission asserts

that “the number of young migratory birds killed, nests destroyed, and

eggs crushed annually as a direct result of logging operations is enormous.81” The information supplied in the response does not refute this

assertion. Extrapolating from the numbers supplied in both the submission and the response in connection with just a handful of timber sales

(666 nests likely to be destroyed by four timber sales in Arkansas and

9,000 young birds expected to be killed as a direct result of seven logging

sales in Georgia),82 it appears that logging operations likely cause the

deaths of significant numbers of birds each year.

b) Management Practices

The second assertion the Party offers to show that it has exercised

its discretion reasonably is that it can encourage parties engaged in

non-logging activities that lead to incidental migratory bird deaths to

engage in management practices that will minimize the risk of incidental

takes, whereas such practices are not available for logging.83 The essence

of this assertion appears to be that it is reasonable to focus more on other

activities that cause incidental deaths than on logging because more

things can be done in these other areas to reduce or minimize such

deaths. Again, on its face, this appears to amount to a reasonable basis

for allocating resources to pursuing such other activities as a higher priority than logging.

The Party has not provided support, however, for the underlying

factual premise that best management practices are more readily available for other kinds of activities that result in incidental bird takes than

for logging.84 The Party has not explained what such best management

practices are for activities other than logging or how effective they are, or

148 NORTH AMERICAN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY

81. Submission at 4.

82. Submission at 4. See also Response at 6.

83. Response at 14-15. As an example, the Party cites the case of Moon Lake, where prosecution of one operator encouraged operators of other power lines voluntarily to

install equipment to minimize the hazard that powerlines pose to migratory birds

from perching on them. Response at 14.

84. The Party states simply that “migratory bird mortality caused by logging activities

is not susceptible to a simple technological fix. Logging activities modify habitat, as

opposed to creating a hazardous attraction to migratory birds such as open oil

pits.” Response at 15.
are likely to be, in reducing deaths of migratory birds. In addition, the

Party’s response refers to a United States Forest Service Manual that

apparently details “special measures” that loggers are told or encouraged to use to minimize bird deaths and nest destruction for threatened,

endangered or sensitive bird species.85 The Party does not provide a

copy of relevant portions of the Manual or explain what these “special

measures” are.86 It also does not reconcile its reference to the Forest Service Manual (which apparently includes “special measures” for logging

operations) with its statement earlier in the response that best management practices do not exist for logging.87 Thus, there appears to be an

internal inconsistency relating to this point in the response. This apparent inconsistency warrants clarification.

In short, it would be helpful to develop information regarding the

types of best practices available to reduce incidental deaths of birds and

destruction of migratory bird nests from various activities, as well as

information concerning any reasons why it is easier for the Party to

require or encourage the use of such best practices in contexts other than

logging, or why the use of such practices in other contexts is likely to be

more effective than it is likely to be in the logging context.

c) Leveraging Resources

Third, the response indicates that the FWS evaluates potential

enforcement cases by analyzing whether it can “leverage its resources”

by taking enforcement actions against one violator that serve to encourage voluntary efforts by similarly situated entities to protect migratory

birds.88 The response asserts that this discretionary technique works

well in situations in which an industry can voluntarily make a relatively

inexpensive alteration in operations or equipment. Once again, a greater

ability to leverage resources in contexts other than logging would support giving priority to enforcement in these other areas. Because the

Party has not provided sufficient information to permit the Secretariat to

assess the relative availability of management practices and related

“alterations” in logging and other contexts, it fails to provide a persuasive case that the Party is likely to be more effective in achieving this aim

of leveraging its enforcement cases in other contexts than in connection

with logging operations. It would be useful to develop information on

why this is the case, including information from previous efforts to

“leverage resources” in this way.

SEM-99-002 149

85. Response at 22.

86. The Response contains only a parenthetical reference to one such “special measure”–”restricting the operating season.” Response at 22.

87. See Response at 14-15.

88. Response at 14.
d) Litigation Risks/Difficulties

Fourth, the Party justifies its decision not to enforce against logging

operations that kill birds or destroy nests in violation of the MBTA by

asserting that it is more difficult to build successful enforcement cases

against logging operations due to difficulties in the governing legal

scheme and difficulties in developing the necessary facts because of the

large geographic areas covered (such as the difficulty of finding nests

and dead birds).89 Assuming that cases against logging operations are

more difficult to bring than cases against other activities that incidentally kill birds, it is not clear from the response why the Party’s failure

to bring or pursue a single prosecution against logging operations

given the apparently significant numbers of bird deaths amounts to a

reasonable exercise of enforcement discretion or a bona fide allocation of

enforcement and related resources. The response does not indicate, for

example, whether there has ever been a case in which the evidence of a

taking in violation of the MBTA attributable to logging has been readily

available, and if so, why the FWS decided not to pursue enforcement of

that violation. It would therefore be helpful to develop additional information about how difficult it is to accumulate the information necessary

to pursue enforcement of § 703 of the MBTA against logging operations,

as compared to enforcement against other kinds of activities that the

Party has decided to pursue. It also would be helpful to develop information about what efforts the Party has made to substantiate an enforcement case against loggers and what the results of any such efforts have

been.

e) The Endangered Species Act

Finally, the Party asserts in its response that it does focus on logging that kills birds when an endangered species is involved.90 The Party

seems to assert that endangered species are inherently more important

and therefore deserve priority in terms of enforcement effort. The Party

indicates that it uses the ESA as the basis for such prosecutions. One

question concerning this assertion in the response is whether, as a matter

of achieving the environmental protection goals of the MBTA and ESA

statutes, it is always the case that prosecutions are of greater benefit

when endangered species are involved than when they are not. It would

be helpful to develop information concerning this exercise of discretion—e.g., it would be useful to know whether there are situations in

which it may be more effective from an environmental protection stand150 NORTH AMERICAN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY

89. Response at 18.

90. Response at 17.
point to pursue loggers who are killing migratory birds not covered by

the ESA (perhaps many in number) than to pursue loggers who are killing migratory birds that are covered by that Act (perhaps few in number). Again, the critical factual backdrop here is that the Party has

apparently neverinitiated a single prosecution under the MBTA, regardless of context. It would be helpful to develop information concerning

why it has exercised its discretion in this way in terms of its choice of

prosecution targets among alleged ESA and MBTA offenders. Another

question here is whether the Party is asserting that it focuses on ESA

prosecutions because they are easier to bring than MBTA prosecutions.

3. Conclusion on Article 45(1) Issues

To sum up, this submission and response raise an issue of central

importance to the citizen submission process—how should the Secretariat, in fulfilling its responsibilities under Article 15(1), address a Party’s

claim that it is not failing to effectively enforce based on the definition of

that term in Article 45(1)(a) and/or (b). One option is for the Secretariat

automatically to dismiss the submission on the theory that if a Party

makes an assertion that it has engaged in a reasonable exercise of discretion for purposes of Article 45(1)(a) or made a bona fide allocation of

resources for purposes of Article 45(1)(b), the Secretariat is bound to

accept it. There is nothing in the Agreement to suggest that the Secretariat is bound to adopt a Party’s view that it qualifies for one of the Article

45(1) exclusions from the definition of a failure to effectively enforce

environmental laws. Article 31(1) of the Vienna Convention on the Law

of Treaties provides that “[a] treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in

accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the

treaty in their context and in light of its object and purpose.91” As indicated above, one of the Parties’ fundamental purposes in establishing a

citizen submission process under the NAAEC was “to enlist the participation of the North American public to help ensure that the Parties abide

by their obligation to enforce their respective environmental laws.92” If

SEM-99-002 151

91. 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 8 I.L.M. 679 (1969). The United States has signed but not ratified

the Vienna Convention. The Convention is generally regarded as an authoritative

statement of the principles of treaty interpretation.

92. Raymond MacCallum, Comment, “Evaluating the Citizen Submission Procedure

Under the North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation”, (1997) 8

Colo. J. Int’l Envtl. L. & Pol’y 395, 400. See also Four-Year Review of the North American

Agreement on Environmental Cooperation: Report of the Independent Review Committee 5

(June 1998) (noting that the citizen submission process makes it possible for “some

350 million pairs of eyes to alert the Council of any ‘race to the bottom’ through lax

enforcement.”) Cf. Article 1(h) of the NAAEC (stating as one of the objectives of the

Agreement the promotion of “public participation in the development of environmental laws, regulations and policies”).
the Secretariat were obliged to accept at face value every assertion by a

Party that it is not failing to effectively enforce its environmental laws

because it qualifies for one of the Article 45(1) defenses, a Party could

unilaterally force the termination of every single citizen submission simply by asserting such a defense. The effect would be the nullification of

the opportunities nominally afforded by Articles 14 and 15 for citizen

participation in the environmental enforcement process. Such a result

would seriously undermine the utility of the submission process in promoting the Agreement’s other goals, including fostering the protection

and improvement of the environment in the territories of the Parties93

and enhancing compliance with and enforcement of environmental

laws.94

As a result, the Secretariat declines to read the Agreement as

requiring dismissal of a submission simply on the basis of a Party’s

assertion that one of the Article 45(1) defenses applies. Instead, the Secretariat has determined that its role, and responsibility, is to evaluate each

such Party claim on its individual merits. Thus, if a Party asserts that it is

exercising its discretion reasonably, the Secretariat’s responsibility is to

review whether the Party has explained how it exercised its discretion.

The Secretariat’s responsibility is also to review whether the exercise of

discretion was “reasonable.” If a Party asserts that it has engaged in a

bona fide resource allocation to higher priority matters, the Secretariat’s

responsibility is to review how the party has allocated its resources in

light of its stated priorities. The Secretariat’s responsibility is also to

review whether that allocation is indeed bona fide. In this case, the Secretariat finds that the Party has not provided enough information regarding the exercise of its enforcement discretion and the allocation of its

resources to enable the Secretariat to find that either Article 45(1)(a) or

(b) justifies terminating this proceeding. Instead, additional information

of the sort identified above is needed concerning whether the Party is

failing to effectively enforce the MBTA based on Article 45(1)(a) and (b).

V. NOTIFICATION TO COUNCIL IN ACCORDANCE

WITH ARTICLE 15(1) OF THE NAAEC

For the reasons stated above, the Secretariat considers that the submission, in light of the Party’s response, warrants development of a factual record. The Submitters assert that logging operations have violated

and are continuing to violate the MBTA on a nationwide basis and in

particular identified situations. The Submitters further assert that the

152 NORTH AMERICAN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY

93. Article 1(a).

94. Article 1(g).
Party has not brought a single prosecution under the MBTA for such

alleged violations. In its response the Party does not challenge the first

assertion. The Party acknowledges that no prosecution under the MBTA

has been brought against a logging operation. In the Secretariat’s view

the Party has not adequately supported its claim that its failure to bring a

single prosecution against logging operations is the result of a reasonable exercise of its discretion or a bona fide allocation of its resources.

The Secretariat is not expressing a view as to the ultimate resolution of

these issues. Instead, it has determined that the purposes of the NAAEC

would be well served by developing in a factual record additional information of the types referred to above concerning them. In accordance

with Article 15(1) of the NAAEC, the Secretariat so informs the Council

and in this document provides its reasons.

Respectfully submitted on this 15th day of December 2000.

Janine Ferretti

Executive Director

SEM-99-002 153

SEM-00-004

(BC Logging)

SUBMITTER: DAVID SUZUKI FOUNDATION, ET AL.

PARTY: Canada

DATE: 15 March 2000

SUMMARY: The Submitters allege that the Government of

Canada “is in breach of its commitments under

NAAEC to effectively enforce its environmental

laws and to provide high levels of environmental

protection.”

SECRETARIAT DETERMINATIONS:

ART. 14(1)(2)*

(8 May 2000)

Determination that criteria under Article 14(1)

have been met and that the submission merits

requesting a response from the Party.

ART. 15(1)

(27 July 2001)

Notification to Council that a factual record is

warranted in accordance with Article 15(1).

* Published in Volume 5 (Fall 2000) of the North American Environmental Law and Policy

Series.

155

Secretariat of the Commission for

Environmental Cooperation of North America

Article 15(1) Notification to Council that

Development of a Factual Record is Warranted

Submission Number: SEM-00-004 (BC Logging)

Submitter(s): David Suzuki Foundation

Greenpeace Canada

Sierra Club of British Columbia

Northwest Ecosystem Alliance

National Resources Defence Council

Represented by: Sierra Legal Defence Fund

Earthjustice Legal Defence Fund

Concerned Party: Canada

Date Received: 15 March 2000

Date of this Determination: 27 July 2001

I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Article 14 of the North American Agreement on Environmental

Cooperation (“NAAEC” or “Agreement”) provides that the Secretariat

of the Commission for Environmental Cooperation of North America

(the “Secretariat”) may consider a submission from any non-governmental organization or person asserting that a Party to the Agreement is

failing to effectively enforce its environmental law if the Secretariat finds

that the submission meets the requirements in Article 14(1). When the

Secretariat determines that a submission meets the requirements in Article 14(1), it then determines based on factors set out in Article 14(2)

whether the submission merits requesting a response from the Party

named in the submission. If the Secretariat considers that the submis157
sion, in light of any response from the Party, warrants developing a factual record, the Secretariat must inform the Council and provide its

reasons (Article 15(1)). By a two-thirds vote, the Council may instruct the

Secretariat to prepare a factual record (Article 15(2)).

On 15 March 2000, the Submitters filed with the Secretariat a submission alleging that Canada is failing systemically to enforce sections

35(1) and 36(3) of the Fisheries Act effectively in connection with logging

operations on public and private land in British Columbia and is also

failing to meet its obligation in Article 7 of the NAAEC to ensure that its

judicial proceedings comply with due process of law and are sufficiently

open to the public. To support their allegations, the Submitters included

information indicating that: 1) salmon populations in British Columbia

are seriously declining; 2) logging has contributed to this decline in

salmon populations; 3) certain logging activities that are likely to have

harmful impacts on fish and fish habitat are allowed system-wide on

public and private lands in British Columbia under provincial forestry

laws and regulations; 4) in reliance on these provincial laws and regulations, Canada has scaled back its review of whether logging plans will

ensure compliance with the Fisheries Act; 5) Canada rarely prosecutes

Fisheries Act violations resulting from logging operations in British

Columbia; and 6) Fisheries and Oceans Canada (the Department of Fisheries and Oceans, referred to hereafter as DFO) staff are concerned that

British Columbia forestry laws and regulations are not sufficiently protecting fish and fish habitat. The Submitters described TimberWest’s

logging in three areas in the Sooke watershed as an example of a logging

operation on private land that resulted in Fisheries Act violations as to

which Canada’s enforcement response was inadequate.

On 8 May 2000, the Secretariat determined that the Submitters’

allegations regarding enforcement of the Fisheries Act, but not the allegation regarding Article 7, met the criteria in Article 14(1) and merited a

response from the Party in light of the factors listed in Article 14(2).1 On

6 July 2000, the Secretariat received a response from the Party. Canada

responded to the Submitters’ assertions regarding logging activity by

TimberWest in three areas in the Sooke watershed but did not provide

any response to the allegation in the submission of a province-wide failure to effectively enforce the Fisheries Act generally in connection with

logging operations. This determination is the Secretariat’s notification to

Council, in accordance with Article 15(1), that certain aspects of the Submission, in light of the Response, warrant developing a factual record.

158 NORTH AMERICAN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY

1. See SEM-00-004 (BC Logging), Determination pursuant to Articles 14(1) and (2)

(8 May 2000).
II. SUMMARY OF THE SUBMISSION

The submission contains two basic assertions. First, the Submitters

assert that the Party is failing to effectively enforce sections 35 and 36 of

the federal Fisheries Act in connection with logging operations on public

and private lands throughout British Columbia. Section 35(1) prohibits

the harmful alteration, disruption or destruction of fish habitat in the

absence of an authorization issued or regulations made under section

35(2). Section 36(3) prohibits the deposit of deleterious substances in

waters frequented by fish unless the deposit is authorized by regulation.

Second, the Submitters assert that the Party is failing to effectively

enforce certain Articles of NAAEC. In its 8 May 2000 determination pursuant to Article 14(1) and (2), the Secretariat determined that this second

assertion did not satisfy the requirements of Article 14(1) and did not

request a response to this assertion from the Party. This notification will

address only the first assertion, which is summarized briefly below.2

The Submitters assert that although Canada has the jurisdiction

and responsibility under the Fisheries Act to protect fish and fish habitat,

it is not doing so effectively in regard to logging activity in British

Columbia. They claim that Canada relies heavily on British Columbia’s

regulation of forest practices under its 1995 Forest Practices Code to

ensure compliance with the Fisheries Act but state that British Columbia

routinely allows logging practices under the Forest Practices Code that

result in Fisheries Act violations on public lands.3 They further claim that

on private lands, “no effective provincial environmental protections

apply.4” Harmful logging practices on both public and private lands that

the Submitters assert result in Fisheries Act violations for which Canada

is failing to take effective enforcement action include clearcutting to the

edge of small fish-bearing and non-fish bearing streams; logging, especially clearcutting, on steep, landslide-prone slopes adjacent to streams;

and falling and yarding trees across small streams.5

To be clear, the Submitters do not contend that a factual record is

warranted regarding whether British Columbia’s laws and regulations

regarding forest practices on public and private lands are adequate or

effective for the purposes under provincial law for which they were

adopted. Rather, they contend that Canada’s reliance on those provincial laws and regulations amounts to an ineffective means for enforcing

SEM-00-004 159

2. A more detailed summary is presented in the Secretariat’s determination pursuant to

Articles 14(1) and (2) for this submission.

3. Submission at 10-12.

4. Submission at 1.

5. Submission at 10-12.
provisions of the federal Fisheries Act. Further, they contend that Canada

has made a broad policy decision to reduce the federal role in reviewing

logging practices for compliance with the Fisheries Act in reliance on

those provincial laws and regulations, and therefore that the alleged

ineffective enforcement is systemic throughout British Columbia.

A. Logging on Lands Subject to the B.C. Forest Practices Code

The Submitters point to the failure of the Forest Practices Code to

ensure adequate protection on public lands of so-called “S4 streams,”

which are defined in the Forest Practices Code as fish-bearing streams less

than 1.5 metres wide. They refer to a 1997 report examining a number of

cutblocks logged or approved for logging in 1996 and indicating that

79 % of S4 streams in four forest districts in coastal British Columbia

were clearcut to both banks, a practice permissible under the Forest Practices Code.6 As evidence that these practices are continuing, the Submitters attach portions of two specific forest development plans for the

years 2000 to 2004. Both plans anticipate an average of only 30 % retention of trees along S4 streams, with no minimum level of retention

required, and one plan requires that at least 40 % of the riparian management zone of S4 streams be cut.7

With respect to non-fish bearing streams, classified in the Forest

Practices Code as “S5 and S6 streams,” the Submitters claim that “[w]hile

the impact of increased sedimentation or higher temperatures may

be minimal in any one stream, the cumulative effect of all tributaries

flowing into fish streams can have significant negative impacts on fish

habitat.8” The Submitters state that these streams receive little or no protection under the Forest Practices Code and that clearcutting to the banks

of these streams is common.

The Submitters identify the logging of landslide-prone areas as

another potentially destructive logging practice routinely permitted on

public lands under the Forest Practices Code. They claim that clearcutting

is allowed on Class V terrain, terrain for which the landslide risk is 70 %

or greater, in a number of instances in British Columbia. They state, for

example, that a review of 13 forest development plans showed that 28 %

of all logging planned was scheduled for Class V terrain and that 97 % of

that terrain was scheduled for clearcutting, the logging method most

likely to cause landslides.9

160 NORTH AMERICAN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY

6. Submission at 11 and Attachment 2.

7. Submission at 11-12 and Attachments 9 and 10.

8. Submission at 5.

9. Submission at 11 and Attachment 8.
The Submitters also assert that falling and yarding of trees across

S4 fish-bearing streams is regularly permitted under the Forest Practices

Code. They refer to a 1997 report indicating that falling and yarding was

permitted across 79 % of the S4 streams reviewed for the report.10 The

Submitters also assert that falling and yarding across non-fish bearing

streams (S5 and S6 streams) is permitted and routinely occurs under the

Forest Practices Code.11

The Submitters claim that sections 35(1) and 36(3) of the Fisheries

Act “are routinely and systematically violated” by these logging practices and that “no effective and appropriate enforcement action is being

taken.12” According to the Submitters, the harmful logging practices on

which they focus lead to Fisheries Act violations in several ways. First,

they result in loss of streamside vegetation, which can cause a long-term

decline in the availability of naturally-occurring woody debris that is

needed to create a variety of habitat types beneficial to fish. Second, they

can lead to increased stream temperatures due to both the loss of shade

along the streams and increased sedimentation. Third, they can adversely affect water quality and quantity, for example by destabilizing

stream banks and increasing sedimentation that damages fish respiratory organs, fills in gravel beds necessary for spawning and certain life

stages, and reduces dissolved oxygen.13 The Submitters list a number of

specific areas where, they assert, logging operations have caused or are

causing harm to fish and fish habitat.14

SEM-00-004 161

10. The Submitters appear to refer to Attachment 2. Attachment 2, however, suggests a

somewhat higher figure. According to the report, falling and yarding through

streams was expressly prohibited for only 12 % of streams and occurred on 82 % of

streams in the audit of forest development plans, logging plans and silviculture

prescriptions (Attachment 2 at 20-21).

11. Submission at 10 and Attachment 2.

12. Executive Summary at iii.

13. Submission at iii and 3-6. Some of the publications that the Submitters cite in support of their assertions about the harmful consequences of certain logging practices

are not attached to the submission. The better practice is for submitters to attach relevant pages of all material to which a submission refers, even if in support of a

background assertion. At a minimum, to promote timely processing of submissions, submitters should make every effort to attach relevant portions of all documentation supporting assertions that are central to a submission, unless that

documentation is easily accessible to the public, the Parties and the Secretariat

through the internet or other widespread and readily available means.

14. Submission at 5, 6, 8-9 and Attachments 2, 6, 8 and 14. Although a number of these

examples relate to logging that took place prior to 1994, they are used to illustrate

the effects of practices that the Submitters allege are continuing today. The Submitters do not make any allegation that the Party failed to effectively enforce its laws

prior to 1994.
B. Logging on Private Lands

The Submitters also assert that neither British Columbia nor

Canada effectively ensures that logging on private land in British

Columbia complies with the Fisheries Act, “particularly with respect to

practices such as clearcutting to the streambanks of small streams and

clearcutting landslide prone areas.15” They assert that the Forest Practices

Code does not apply to private land and that the proposed Private

Land Forest Practices Regulation16 is “sorely inadequate given its lack of

enforceable standards” and its lack of protection for small streams.17

Specifically, they contend that the regulation, which is now in effect,

provides no protection along streams less than 1.5 metres wide, nominal

protection along larger streams, and no meaningful restrictions on

clearcutting landslide-prone lands. Consequently, the Submitters contend, Canada’s reliance on the regulation as means for ensuring compliance with the Fisheries Act amounts to ineffective enforcement of the

Fisheries Act.

The Submitters cite logging by TimberWest of its private land in

three areas in the Sooke watershed as “[o]ne particularly troubling

example of private land logging. . . .18” and claim that while Canada has

been made aware of these activities, it has taken no action against

TimberWest. The Submitters indicate that, although requested to do

so by the Submitters, Canada has not used its power under section 37(2)

of the Fisheries Act to formally request plans and specifications from

TimberWest and to order modifications to TimberWest’s operations as

necessary to comply with the Fisheries Act.19

C. Alleged Ineffective Enforcement

The Submitters assert that even though the damage described

above is foreseeable and “the functioning of the Forest Practices Code does

not assure compliance with the Fisheries Act, the Government of Canada

seems to have simply left the protection of fish and fish habitat to the

provincial government....20” They state that Canada has stopped active

involvement in the planning process relating to logging operations and

162 NORTH AMERICAN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY

15. Submission at 8.

16. This regulation came into force 1 April 2000, after the date of the submission.

17. Submission at 9.

18. Submission at 8-9. See also Attachment 6 [referred to in the Submission as Attachment 5].

19. See Attachment 6 [referred to in the Submission as Attachment 5].

20. Submission at 12.
also is failing to take remedial action after damage has occurred. They

point in particular to a 31 January 1996 DFO letter explaining that

[DFO] is changing its logging referral procedures in view of the increased

stream protection afforded by the Forest Practices Code. The Code

enhances protection for fish habitat by broadening the definition of a fish

stream and widening streamside buffers to include wildlife considerations. In view of this enhanced protection for fish streams detailed block

by block responses will no longer be provided on Forest Development

Plans. We will continue to participate in planning meetings and watershed restoration plans when our involvement is expected to be beneficial

to the fishery resource.21

The Submitters also provided documentation indicating a widespread concern among staff of DFO that the Forest Practices Codeis inadequate to ensure compliance with the Fisheries Act.22 Specifically, DFO

staff expressed concern that “current logging practices in [British

Columbia] rarely provide riparian leave strips or setbacks that adequately protect [S4, S5 and S6] streams” and confirmed that the federal

Fisheries Act continues to apply to the practice of logging adjacent to

small streams in this province.23 DFO staff also outlined interim standards considered acceptable to meet fish habitat objectives, including

retention levels approaching 100 % in the riparian management zones of

S4 streams (fish-bearing) and S5 and S6 streams (non- fish-bearing) that

are direct tributaries to fish-bearing streams.24

With respect to DFO’s alleged failure to take preventive action by

being involved in the planning process, the Submitters appear to assert

that Canada is failing effectively to use its powers under section 37 to

protect fish and fish habitat proactively from the impacts of logging

operations.25 With respect to remedial action, the Submitters state that,

despite prosecuting homeowners and others for Fisheries Act violations,

“DFO statistics for the last three years in BC show that only one prosecuSEM-00-004 163

21. Submission at 12, and Attachment 11.

22. Submission at 12; Attachment 12, at 17; letters attached to Submitters’ 31 March

2000 letter to the Secretariat.

23. Letter of 28 February 2000 from D.M. Petrachenko, Director General, Pacific

Region, DFO, to Lee Doney, Deputy Minister, Ministry of Forests (attached to Submitters’ 31 March 2000 letter to the Secretariat). This letter also expresses DFO

staff’s view that a review of the riparian provisions of the B.C. Forest Practices Code

is required.

24. Letter of 7 March 2000 from G.T. Kosakoski to John Wenger (attached to the Submitters’ 31 March 2000 letter to the Secretariat).

25. Submission at iii and 8; Attachment 6; Submitters’ 31 March 2000 letter to the Secretariat.
tion . . . for the type of activities outlined in this complaint has been

brought26” and that “[t]hat prosecution was abandoned by DFO due to

delay in pursuing the charges.27”

III. SUMMARY OF THE RESPONSE

Canada does not respond to the Submitters’ assertion that logging

activities in British Columbia routinely violate sections 35(1) and 36(3) of

the Fisheries Act and that Canada is not taking appropriate and effective

enforcement action. In this regard, Canada states:

While the submission contains a number of general allegations, Canada

has found in the submission only three documented assertions of alleged

failures to effectively enforce the Fisheries Act. These are the only assertions that provide sufficient information to enable Canada to provide a

meaningful response to the submission.28

Canada responds only to the Submitters’ assertions that Canada is

not enforcing sections 35(1) and 36(3) of the Fisheries Act in relation to

TimberWest’s logging operations on privately managed forest lands

adjacent to the Sooke River, Martins Gulch (tributary to the Leech River),

and De Mamiel Creek (referred to in the Submission as Demanuelle

Creek).

(a) Sooke River

Canada asserts that it carried out investigations of TimberWest’s

logging operations on these lands from March to June 1999, and, as a

result of the investigation, sent TimberWest a warning letter dated 27

June 200029 indicating that although the riparian zone had been compromised, there was insufficient observable evidence to proceed with a

charge under either section of the Fisheries Act. The letter also indicated

that the site would require monitoring in the future and that Canada

would proceed with a further investigation if it appeared that harm to

fish habitat would likely occur. Canada asserts that a subsequent inspection on 4 July 2000 did not reveal any harmful impact on fish habitat at

the site.

164 NORTH AMERICAN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY

26. Submission at 12.

27. Submission at 12.

28. Response at 1.

29. Annex 2 to the Response.
(b) Martins Gulch

Canada asserts that field inspections on 17 March 1999 and 4 July

2000 indicated that logging operations in that area do not appear to have

damaged fish habitat and that the site is low risk for future impacts.30

(c) De Mamiel Creek

Canada states that it cannot comment on the Submitters’ assertions

about logging in this area as the logging is being investigated as a potential offence under the Fisheries Act. Canada asserts that, pursuant to Articles 14(3) and 45(3)(a) of NAAEC, it therefore would be inappropriate

for the Secretariat to proceed further with respect to De Mamiel Creek.31

IV. ANALYSIS

A. Introduction

This submission has reached the Article 15(1) stage of the factual

record process. To reach this stage, the Secretariat must first determine

that a submission meets the criteria in Article 14(1) and that it merits

requesting a response from the Party based upon a review of the factors

in Article 14(2). As indicated above, the Secretariat determined on 8 May

2000 that the submission meets the criteria for continued review

included in Article 14(1) and that, based on the factors in Article 14(2),

the submission warranted a response from the Party.32

The Secretariat concluded that the submission meets the criteria in

the opening sentence of Article 14(1). The assertion in the submission

that the Party is failing to effectively enforce the federal Fisheries Act

focuses on a Party’s asserted failure to effectively enforce the law, not on

the effectiveness of the law itself. In addition, the Fisheries Act qualifies as

an “environmental law” for purposes of NAAEC in that its primary purpose is “protection of the environment, or the prevention of a danger to

human life or health....33” Finally, the submission focuses on asserted

failures to enforce that are ongoing, thereby meeting the requirement in

Article 14(1) that a submission assert that a Party “is failing” to effectively enforce its environmental law.

SEM-00-004 165

30. Response at 2.

31. Response at 2.

32. SEM-00-004 (BC Logging), Determination pursuant to Articles 14(1) and (2) (8 May

2000).

33. Article 45(2)(a).
The Secretariat also found that the submission meets the six specific criteria listed in Article 14(1). The submission is in English, a

language designated by the Parties (Article 14(1)(a)). It identifies the

organizations making the submission (Article 14(1)(b)). The submission

provides sufficient information to allow the Secretariat to review the

submission (Article 14(1)(c)). It appears to be aimed at promoting

enforcement rather than at harassing industry in that it is focused on the

acts or omissions of a Party rather than on compliance by a particular

company or business (Article 14(1)(d)). The submission states that the

Submitters communicated the issues raised in the submission to the

Party and includes both copies of correspondence the Submitters sent

to the Party, and correspondence they received in response (Article

14(1)(e)). And, finally, the submission was filed by a “person or organization residing or established in the territory of a Party” (Article

14(1)(f)).

In regard to the factors in Article 14(2), the Secretariat determined

that the Submitters allege that violations by logging operations of Fisheries Act sections 35 and 36 cause substantial harm to the environment

(Article 14(2)(a)). Further, the submission raises matters whose further

study in the Article 14 process would advance the goals of the Agreement in that it asserts that the failure to enforce is significant in scope and

that effective enforcement would “foster the protection of an important

environmental resource. . .,” “promote[.] sustainable development . . .,”

and “enhance compliance with, and enforcement of, environmental

laws and regulations.34” (Article 14(2)(b)). The Submitters indicate that

various parties have “urged DFO to enforce the Fisheries Act. . . .” and

that they, and others, have brought prosecutions under the Fisheries Act

which, in each instance, have been taken over by the Provincial Attorney

General who stayed the proceedings (Article 14(2)(c)). Finally, the submission is not based exclusively on mass media reports but is supported

by considerable documentation (Article 14(2)(d)).

Like previous submissions, this submission alleges a failure to

enforce effectively both in specific cases and more broadly. It asserts a

widespread, systemic failure by Canada to enforce sections 35(1) and

36(3) against logging operations in British Columbia and illustrates that

alleged failure with, among other information, DFO’s policy decision to

discontinue block-by-block review of Forest Development Plans in reliance on the stream protection afforded in provincial forestry regulations. It also provides the specific example of TimberWest’s operations

in the Sooke watershed. The Secretariat has previously concluded that

166 NORTH AMERICAN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY

34. Submission at 15, referencing NAAEC Article 1(a), (b), and (g).
Articles 14 and 15 apply both to submissions alleging failures to enforce

effectively in regard to particularized incidents and to submissions

alleging failures to enforce effectively more broadly or systemically.35

Likewise, the Council unanimously has instructed the Secretariat to prepare factual records with respect to both particularized allegations of

ineffective enforcement36 and allegations of a widespread, systemic failure to enforce effectively.37

The kind of systemic ineffective enforcement alleged in this submission is analogous to the systemic failure to effectively enforce alleged

in the BC Hydro submission. The submitters of the BC Hydro submission

contended in part that Canada’s systemic reliance on British Columbia’s

Water Use Planning Process as sufficient to eliminate the need to issue

authorizations to BC Hydro facilities to harm fish habitat under section

35(2) of the Fisheries Act amounted to a systemic failure to effectively

enforce the Fisheries Act and the Canadian Environmental Assessment

Act.38 Similarly, the Submitters here contend that Canada’s systemic

reliance on British Columbia’s regulation of forest practices to justify a

reduced federal role in enforcing the Fisheries Act amounts to a failure to

effectively enforce the Fisheries Act.

Accordingly, following the same approach consistently taken in

previous submissions, the Secretariat concluded that both the alleged

failure to enforce sections 35(1) and 36(3) with respect to TimberWest’s

logging operations in the Sooke watershed and the alleged systemic failure to enforce sections 35(1) and 36(3) against logging operations in British Columbia are within the scope of Article 14.

Article 15(1) of NAAEC now requires the Secretariat to consider

whether the submission, in light of Canada’s response, warrants developing a factual record. Article 15(1) requires that if the Secretariat determines that a factual record is warranted, it must inform the Council and

provide reasons for its determination. As discussed below, the Secretariat has determined that development of a factual record is warranted to

SEM-00-004 167

35. See SEM-98-004 (BC Mining), Article 15(1) Notification (11 May 2001). For a

detailed discussion of the rationale for this conclusion, see, SEM-99-002 (Migratory

Birds), Article 15(1) Notification (15 December 2000). See also, SEM-97-003 (Quebec

Hog Farms), Article 15(1) Notification (29 October 1999) (“Submissions . . . which

focus on the effectiveness of enforcement in the context of asserted widespread violations . . . are inherently more likely to warrant scrutiny by the Commission than

allegations of failures to enforce concerning single violations. This is so even

though it may be appropriate for the Commission to address the latter, depending

on the circumstances.”).

36. SEM-96-001 (Cozumel) and SEM-98-007 (Metales y Derivados).

37. SEM-97-001 (BC Hydro).

38. SEM-97-001 (BC Hydro), Final Factual Record at para. 54 (11 June 2000).
compile additional information concerning the effectiveness of Canada’s enforcement of the Fisheries Act in relation to logging operations in

British Columbia.

B. Why Development of a Factual Record is Warranted

The Secretariat is of the view that development of a factual record

is warranted regarding several matters raised in the Submission. The

Submitters allege a widespread failure by Canada to effectively enforce

sections 35 and 36 of the Fisheries Act in the context of logging on both

public and privately owned land in British Columbia. Against a background of a documented serious decline in the salmon fishery in British

Columbia, the submission raises central questions regarding Canada’s

reliance on British Columbia’s regulation of forest practices as a means

for enforcing and ensuring compliance with sections 35 and 36 of the

Fisheries Act.

The submission contains detailed information regarding only one

specific logging operation — TimberWest’s logging in the Sooke watershed — that according to the Submitters violated sections 35 and 36 in

three instances. However, the Secretariat does not share Canada’s view

that the Submitters do not provide enough information about the Submitters’ allegation of a widespread, systemic failure of effective enforcement to allow for a meaningful response or further review.

The Submitters allege that Canada places undue reliance on provincial forestry laws and regulations that as written and as applied do

not, in the Submitters’ view, provide adequate protection of small

fish-bearing streams and non-fish-bearing streams tributary to fishbearing streams. The Submitters support these assertions with, among

other things, information regarding the serious decline in salmon populations in British Columbia, information regarding how British Columbia’s regulation of logging practices on both public and private lands do

not prohibit activities likely to harm fish and fish habitat, statistics

regarding the extent to which forest development plans that British

Columbia has approved have allowed — as written and as implemented

— logging practices that are likely to harm fish and fish habitat, information on the ways in which those practices harm fish and fish habitat, documentation of DFO’s relaxed review of forest development plans in light

of British Columbia’s Forest Practices Code,39 information regarding the

lack of Fisheries Act prosecutions regarding logging operations in British

Columbia and documentation of concern among DFO staff that provin168 NORTH AMERICAN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY

39. Submission at 12, and Attachment 11.
cial forestry regulations are failing to ensure adequate protection of fish

habitat. The submission also provides an example of a logging operation

that, in the Submitters’ view, and apparently in the view of Canada as

well, appears to have resulted in Fisheries Act violations.

While Canada has responded to the allegations regarding

TimberWest, it provided no response to the Submitters’ allegation of a

widespread, systemic failure to enforce the Fisheries Act effectively in

regard to logging operations in British Columbia. Specifically, Canada

provided no information regarding its approach for ensuring that logging operations in British Columbia comply with sections 35 and 36, and

for taking enforcement action when violations occur, and no information regarding whether that enforcement approach is effective.40 This

lack of a response leaves unanswered the central questions that the submission raises. Accordingly, development of a factual record is warranted in relation to the matters described below.

1. The Asserted Widespread Ineffective Enforcement of Fisheries Act

Sections 35(1) and 36(3) in British Columbia

The Submitters make a number of assertions, for which they cite to

supporting documentation, regarding Canada’s alleged ineffective

enforcement of the Fisheries Act in relation to logging on public and private lands in British Columbia. Taken together, these assertions raise

central questions regarding whether, as the Submitters allege, Canada is

ineffectively enforcing the Fisheries Act in British Columbia with regard

to logging.

First, by way of background, the Submitters assert that fisheries are

an important Canadian resource and that the decline and extinction of

fish stocks in western Canada has a significant adverse impact from an

ecological, aboriginal and economic perspective.41 The enactment of the

pollution prevention and habitat protection provisions of the Fisheries

Actreflects a broad recognition in Canada of the importance of Canadian

fisheries. Citing to several studies, the Submitters also describe the

importance of riparian areas in forests as fish habitat.42

SEM-00-004 169

40. Presumably, however, information regarding these issues is available or could be

developed. For example, it would be relevant to gather any analysis Canada may

have conducted to support its province-wide policy decision to reduce the level of

federal review of Forest Development Plans in light of the stream protections provided under provincial regulations.

41. Submission at 2.

42. Submission at 2-3. In support of these background assertions, notes ii and iii of the

submission refer to two publications that are not attached to the submission and

were not readily available to the Secretariat.
Next, the Submitters assert that certain logging activities have profound, long-term, and destructive impacts on fish habitat, including loss

of streamside vegetation; altered water temperature; and degradation of

water quality and quantity by, among other things, the deposit of silt or

sediment.43 Canada’s response confirms that logging practices as to

which the Submitters voice concern can result in impacts to fish and fish

habitat that violate the Fisheries Act.44 The Submitters point out that in

addition to fish-bearing streams, non-fish bearing streams play a significant role in preserving fish habitat and are also prone to destructive

impacts from logging, which in turn harm fish and fish habitat.45

The Submitters also point to studies in specific areas in British

Columbia that link a decline in salmon numbers and salmon health to

logging.46 While the studies referred to by the Submitters appear to have

examined primarily logging practices that pre-date enactment of the

Forest Practices Code and the entry into force of the NAAEC, the Submitters assert that logging activities contributing to a decline in salmon

numbers and salmon health continue today. In particular, they point to

TimberWest’s operations and identify recent logging plans that allow

logging practices likely to harm fish and fish habitat to occur.47 Moreover, they contend that the harm to fisheries due to the logging practices

on which they focus is systemic because those practices are routinely

and systemically allowed under British Columbia’s forest practices regulations.

Finally, and most significantly, the Submitters make assertions

regarding the ineffectiveness of Canada’s reliance on provincial regulation of forest practices to ensure compliance with the Fisheries Act. They

170 NORTH AMERICAN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY

In addition to the reports that the Submitters cite, some of the material that the Submitters did attach to the submission support their assertions regarding the importance of riparian areas in forests as fish habitat. See Attachment 2 at 1, 3; Attachment

3 (bull trout); Attachment 14 at 9-14; Letter of 28 February 2000 from D.M.

Petrachenko, Director General, Pacific Region, DFO, to Lee Doney, Deputy Minister, Ministry of Forests; Letter of 7 March 2000 from G.T. Kosakoski to John Wenger.

43. Submission at 3-5 and Attachment 2. In support of this assertion, the Submitters

cite a number of publications that they do not attach to the Submission. See Submission, notes v-xvi. These assertions find additional support in the materials attached

to the submission. See Attachment 2 at 1, 3: Attachment 3 (bull trout); Attachment

8 at 9.

44. Response at Annex 2. Canada’s warning letter to TimberWest notes that clearcutting all but a narrow strip of trees in a riparian area could lead to increased water

temperatures, streambank destabilization and introduction of sediment.

45. Submission at 5 and publications referred to in the submission, notes xvii and xviii,

but not attached to the Submission. These assertions find additional support in the

materials attached to the submission. See Attachment 2; Attachment 14 at 12.

46. Submission at 5-6 and publications referred to in Submission, notes xix-xxxi.

47. See notes 7-11 supra and accompanying text.
point to provincial regulation of forest practices on public lands as well

as to British Columbia’s regulation of forestry on private lands. Further,

to show that the alleged failure to effectively enforced is widespread and

systemic, they point to a specific DFO policy decision to reduce the level

of review of Forest Development Plans throughout the province in light

of the stream protections provided by provincial regulation of forest

practices.

With regard to public lands, they assert that British Columbia regulates logging on public land under the Forest Practices Code but routinely permits activities that are likely to result in damage to fish and fish

habitat. They focus in particular on the falling and yarding of logs across

fish habitat, logging of landslide-prone lands, and clearcutting of riparian areas, with an emphasis on the adverse impacts of those practices

on small fish-bearing streams (classified as S4 streams) and non-fishbearing streams (classified as S5 and S6 streams).48 The Submitters note

that protections that apply to larger fish-bearing streams (S1, S2 and S3

streams) under the Forest Practices Code do not apply to S4, S5 and S6

streams.49 Among other information, they rely on a 1997 paper and field

audit report of 13 forest development plans in British Columbia showing

that falling and yarding, as well as clearcutting to both banks, was

allowed for 79 % of S4 streams and that 28 % of all logging was planned

for Class V terrain — terrain for which the risk of landslides is 70 % or

greater. They also identify specific forest development plans containing

no mandatory retention of trees along S4 streams and, in one case, a

requirement to cut at least 40 % of the riparian area along S4 streams.

These planned and actual retention levels are far less than the 100 %

retention along S4 streams and along S5 and S6 streams directly tributary to fish-bearing streams that DFO staff proposed as interim standards that would provide adequate protection for fish.50

The Submitters assert that the logging practices that harm fish and

fish habitat on public land also are common on private land. They assert

that the overall harm caused by logging activities in British Columbia

includes harm due to logging activities on private land and that certain

logging activity on private lands results in violations of the Fisheries Act.

The Submitters’ assertion of Canada’s widespread failure to enforce the

Fisheries Act provisions in relation to logging on private land in British

Columbia must be viewed in light of the Submitters’ specific allegations

regarding TimberWest as well as the concerns they set forth regarding

SEM-00-004 171

48. Submission at 10-12; Attachments 2, 9, 10, and 14.

49. Submission at 9, 11.

50. See notes 22-24 supra and accompanying text.
the alleged inadequacy of the Private Land Forest Practices Regulation for

ensuring compliance with the Fisheries Act. They claim that regulation of

logging practices on private land in British Columbia is less stringent

and less effective than on public land. In particular, they allege that the

Forest Practices Code does not apply to private land and that the Private

Land Forest Practices Regulation,51 which applies to some but not all private land,52 is (where applicable) inadequate as a means for enforcing

the Fisheries Act because it does not contain enforceable standards or

protect small fish-bearing and non-fish-bearing streams.53

In light of the cumulative information regarding the decline of fisheries in British Columbia, the logging practices likely harmful to fish and

fish habitat that are allowed under British Columbia’s forest practices

laws and regulations, and Canada’s seeming reliance on provincial forest regulations as a means for enforcing the Fisheries Act, the Submitters

conclude that Canada is failing to enforce the Fisheries Act effectively on

a widespread basis by not prosecuting violations of sections 35(1) and

36(3) under section 40; by not exercising its powers under section 35(2);

and by not exercising its powers under section 37. In particular, the Submitters make the following assertions regarding Canada’s allegedly

ineffective enforcement approach in relation to logging in British

Columbia:

• Even though damage from activities associated with logging is

foreseeable, and harmful alteration, disruption or destruction of

fish habitat and the deposit of deleterious substances is likely to

be occurring despite compliance with the Forest Practices Code,

Canada is not enforcing the Fisheries Act in relation to these

172 NORTH AMERICAN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY

51. The Regulation came into force 1 April 2000.

52. The Submitters criticize the overall regulatory approach of the Private Land Forest

Practices Regulation, claiming that it applies not to all logging on private lands but

only where owners of private land have volunteered to abide by the Regulation in

exchange for beneficial tax treatment. They conclude that «[t]here is no regulation

of private lands where a landowner foregoes government subsidies» and that the

Private Land Forest Practices Regulation is «far worse thant having no regulation at

all.” Submission at 9. However, it appears that while it is correct that the Private

Land Forest Practices Regulation does not apply to all private land, it could apply to

logging practices on private land in the Forest Land Reserve in British Columbia

that is not eligible for maximum property tax benefits under the Assessment Act. For

purposes of this submission, the essential point is that the regulation does appear

to leave logging on some private land unregulated.

53. Submission at 9. Again, the Submitters do not contend that the regulation is ineffective for the purposes for which it was adopted under provincial law, and the Secretariat would not examine that issue in a factual record. Instead, the issue is whether

Canada’s reliance on the regulation as a means for enforcing and ensuring compliance with the federal Fisheries Act amounts to effective enforcement of the Fisheries

Act.
destructive logging activities permitted on public land under

the Forest Practices Code.54

• As with logging on public lands, Canada has not addressed the

limitations of British Columbia’s regulation of forest practices

on private lands by exercising its powers to prevent violations

of the Fisheries Act from occurring or to take remedial action

once violations have occurred. The Submitters cite one example

of Canada’s allegedly ineffective approach in regard to destructive logging practices on private land – TimberWest’s logging of

its land in the Sooke watershed.55 They assert that despite Canada’s knowledge that TimberWest’s logging practices were violating the Fisheries Act, Canada took no enforcement action.

• In the last three years only one prosecution, abandoned because

of delay, has been brought for Fisheries Act violations by logging

operations even though Fisheries Act prosecutions have been

brought in relation to other kinds of activities.56

• Canada effectively withdrew from enforcing the preventive

provisions of the Fisheries Act in relation to logging activities in

British Columbia after the province introduced the Forest Practices Code, as evidenced by Canada’s province-wide policy

decision to provide for reduced federal review in the logging

referral process.57 Specifically, Canada no longer provides block

by block responses on Forest Development Plans in relation to

stream protection even though DFO staff perceive the Forest

Practices Code as not providing adequate protection for fish

and fish habitat along small fish-bearing and non-fish-bearing

streams.58

SEM-00-004 173

54. Submission at 12-13.

55. Submission at 8-9; Attachments 5, 6, and 7.

56. Submission at 12 and Attachment 13.

57. Submission at 1.

58. Submission at 12 and Attachments 11, 12 and 13 (p. 5). Attachment 12 is a report by

Dovetail Consulting which describes itself as a «summary of a two-day workshop», «the purpose of which was to consult with scientists to obtain their input on

ecological aspects of MacMillan Bloedel’s BC Coastal Forest Project.» The Submission indicates in Note xlvi that Dovetail Consulting prepared the report, which is

dated 5 March 1999 for DFO. The letters from the Department of Fisheries and

Oceans to the BC Ministry of Forests provided to the Secretariat subsequent to the

submission, provide further support for the assertion that Canada has general concerns about logging practices adjacent to small fish-bearing streams and non-fish

bearing direct tributaries to fish-bearing streams. See notes 22-24 supra, and accompanying text.
• Canada does not exercise its powers under section 37 to require

logging companies to submit relevant information where the

logging activities will result or are likely to result in the harmful

alteration, disruption or destruction of fish habitat or the

deposit of a deleterious substance.59 By way of example, the

Submitters assert that although requested by the Submitters,

Canada did not use its powers under section 37(2) of the Fisheries

Act to request plans and specifications from TimberWest and to

order modifications to the work, if necessary. Nor, according

to the Submitters, does Canada invoke its permitting powers

under section 35 to allow harmful alteration, disruption or

destruction of fish habitat on conditions.60

These cumulative assertions, together with the supporting material, raise central questions about Canada’s enforcement of the Fisheries

Act in relation to logging on public and private land in British Columbia.

In effect, the Submitters assert that harm to fish and fish habitat is taking

place as a result of logging due to a gap in the protection of fish and fish

habitat in British Columbia. They maintain that provincial regulation of

forest practices is not effectively protecting fish and fish habitat, and that

because this deficiency is built into Canada’s province-wide approach

for ensuring the compliance of logging activities with the Fisheries Act, it

is systemic. They assert that Canada, by relying on British Columbia’s

regulation of forest practices instead of fulfilling its distinct responsibilities for enforcing the Fisheries Act, is allowing that province-wide gap to

persist. Most significantly, they identify a wide discrepancy between the

level of fish protection along S4, S5 and S6 streams that DFO staff indicate is needed and the level achieved in practice through implementation of British Columbia’s strictest forestry laws and regulations.

As indicated above, Canada has provided no information in

response to the Submitters’ allegations that Canada’s reliance on British

Columbia to ensure protection of fish and fish habitat from the adverse

impacts of logging amounts to ineffective enforcement of Fisheries Act

sections 35 and 36. Canada did provide information indicating that, in

response to concerns from residents in the Sooke watershed in March

174 NORTH AMERICAN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY

59. Submission at iii and 8, Attachment 6; Submitters’ 31 March 2000 letter to the Secretariat. Section 37 empowers the Minister to request information about a project

where the project will result or is likely to result in harmful alteration, disruption or

destruction of fish habitat or the deposit of a deleterious substance and, with Cabinet approval, to require modifications to or restrict or close the project.

60. Submission at iv and 8. Section 35(2) contemplates that a proponent of a work or

undertaking will seek authorization to commit harmful alteration, disruption or

destruction of fish habitat rather than that DFO will issue such authorizations on its

own initiative.
1999, it has commenced a criminal investigation and issued a warning

letter regarding the logging activities of TimberWest as to which the

Submitters voice concern in the submission. However, Canada is otherwise silent about the exercise of its powers under sections 35, 36, 37 and

40 of the Fisheries Act in regard to logging in British Columbia. In short,

Canada provides no information on its overall approach for enforcing

the Fisheries Act in the context of logging on public and private land in

British Columbia or on whether that approach is effective. This lack of a

response leaves unanswered the central questions that the Submission

raises regarding Canada’s reliance on provincial regulation of forestry

as a means for enforcing the Fisheries Act in relation to logging throughout British Columbia.

The Secretariat is therefore of the view that the Submission, in light

of Canada’s Response, warrants development of a factual record to consider the unanswered questions raised by the submission. Specifically, a

factual record is warranted to examine what formal or informal policies

Canada has in place for enforcing the Fisheries Act in respect to logging

on public and private lands in British Columbia, whether and how those

policies are being implemented, and whether those policies and their

implementation amount to effective enforcement of the Act. Within this

framework, and with a focus on the logging practices that the Submitters

discuss in the submission, matters to address in a factual record include:

• the extent to which, and the circumstances in which, Canada

exercises its powers under section 37 of the Fisheries Act in order

to prevent or mitigate harmful impacts to fish and fish habitat of

logging on public land and private land in British Columbia;

• the extent to which and the circumstances under which Canada

exercises its powers under section 35(2) in the context of logging

on public land in British Columbia and the effectiveness of

actions taken under section 35(2) to prevent the harmful alteration, disruption and destruction of fish habitat;

• information underlying or supporting Canada’s decision to

reduce the level of review of Forest Development Plans in British Columbia in light of stream protections provided in the Forest Practices Code;

• the extent to which Canada works with the British Columbia

Ministries of Forest and Environment, Lands and Parks, to prevent or mitigate harmful impacts to fish and fish habitat of logging activities on public and private land;

SEM-00-004 175
• the extent to which Canada monitors logging operations regulated in British Columbia by the Forest Practices Code or the Private Land Forest Practices Regulation to determine compliance

with the Fisheries Act, and the results of monitoring activities

including the frequency, number and severity of suspected violations of the Fisheries Act by logging operations on public and

private land in British Columbia;

• the extent to which Canada monitors logging operations in British Columbia that are not regulated by either the Forest Practices

Code or the Private Land Forest Practices Regulation to determine

compliance with the Fisheries Act, and the results of monitoring

activities including the frequency, number and severity of suspected violations of Fisheries Act by such logging operations;

• the extent to which and the circumstances under which Canada

investigates suspected violations of the Fisheries Act by logging

operations on public and private land in British Columbia;

• the type, number and effectiveness of enforcement actions taken

in recent years in connection with Fisheries Act violations by logging operations in British Columbia, including, but not limited

to, the number of Fisheries Act charges, prosecutions, and convictions, and the sentences handed down; and

• actions taken by Canada to follow up DFO’s letter of 28 February 2000 to the British Columbia Deputy Minister of Forests, and

related letters sent to the District Managers of the Ministry of

Forests.61

2. The Assertion of Ineffective Enforcement Against TimberWest

Canada responds briefly to the Submitters’ specific allegations

relating to TimberWest’s logging operations on private land in the Sooke

area, but not to their broader assertion of a widespread failure to enforce

the Fisheries Act effectively in relation to logging operations on private

land in British Columbia. The Secretariat is of the view that certain

aspects of the Submitters’ allegations regarding Canada’s enforcement

approach in regard to TimberWest’s logging operations warrant examination in a factual record, while other aspects do not warrant further

review.

176 NORTH AMERICAN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY

61. See notes 22-24 supra and accompanying text.
a. Whether the specific allegations regarding TimberWest’s De Mamiel

Creek logging operations are subject to pending administrative or

judicial proceedings

As noted above, Canada submits that the assertions in the Submission concerning the enforcement of the Fisheries Act in relation to

TimberWest’s logging operations in the vicinity of De Mamiel [or

Demanuelle] Creek in Sooke are the subject of pending judicial or

administrative proceedings within the meaning of Article 14(3)(a) and

Article 45(3)(a). Article 14(3)(a) provides that the Secretariat “shall proceed no further” where the matter alleged in the submission is the

subject of “a pending judicial or administrative proceeding.”

A “judicial or administrative proceeding” is defined in Article

45(3) as

(a) a domestic judicial, quasi-judicial or administrative action pursued

by the Party in a timely fashion and in accordance with its law. Such

actions comprise: mediation; arbitration; the process of issuing a

license, permit, or authorization; seeking an assurance of voluntary

compliance or a compliance agreement; seeking sanctions or remedies in an administrative or judicial forum; and the process of issuing

an administrative order; and

(b) an international dispute resolution proceeding to which the Party is

party.

In previous determinations, the Secretariat has stated that the

threshold consideration of whether an administrative or judicial proceeding is pending should be construed narrowly to give full effect to

the object and purpose of the NAAEC, and more particularly, to Article

14(3). Only those proceedings specifically delineated in Article 45(3)(a),

pursued by a Party in a timely manner, in accordance with a Party’s law,

and concerning the same subject matter as the allegations raised in the

submission should preclude the Secretariat from proceeding further

under Article 14(3).62 Activities that are solely consultative, information-gathering or research-based in nature, without a definable goal,

and that are not designed to culminate in a specific decision, ruling or

agreement within a definable period of time should not be considered as

falling within Article 45(3)(a).63

SEM-00-004 177

62. SEM-97-001 (BC Hydro), Article 15(1) Notification (28 April 1998); SEM-98-004 (BC

Mining), Article 15(1) Notification (11 May 2001).

63. SEM-97-001 (BC Hydro), Article 15(1) Notification (28 April 1998).
Bearing these parameters in mind, the investigative actions Canada has taken in relation to logging around De Mamiel Creek do not fall

within the definition of “judicial or administrative proceedings” within

the meaning of Articles 14(3) and 45(3). Most significantly, a criminal

investigation is not among or of the same nature as the actions explicitly

mentioned in Article 45(3)(a). While a criminal investigation might lead

in some cases to a proceeding listed in Article 45(3)(a), it is not an integral

part of “mediation; arbitration; the process of issuing a license, permit,

or authorization; seeking an assurance of voluntary compliance or a

compliance agreement; seeking sanctions or remedies in an administrative or judicial forum; [or] the process of issuing an administrative

order.”

It might result in a criminal charge leading to a judicial or administrative proceeding seeking sanctions or remedies within the scope of

Article 45(3)(a). On the other hand, an investigation could also culminate

in a warning letter, some other kind of enforcement action not contemplated in Article 45(3)(a) or no enforcement action at all. Further, a criminal investigation does not always have a clear and definable beginning

or endpoint. In short, therefore, a criminal investigation is not a pending

judicial or administrative proceeding designed to culminate in a specific

ruling or decision within a definable period of time and is not encompassed in Article 45(3)(a).

Although the ongoing criminal investigation regarding De

Mamiel Creek is not a judicial or administrative proceeding that under

Article 14(3)(a) requires the Secretariat to proceed no further, the Secretariat nonetheless believes that a factual record with respect to De

Mamiel Creek is not warranted as long as the criminal investigation

remains active and ongoing. In previous determinations, the Secretariat

considered the rationale underlying Article 14(3) and identified two reasons for excluding matters that fall within Article 45(3)(a) – a need to

avoid duplication of effort and a need to refrain from interfering with

pending litigation.64 The Secretariat has noted in the past that these considerations can also be relevant for a Party’s proceedings that fall outside

Article 45(3)(a) but nonetheless relate to the same subject matter as is

raised in a submission.65

The concerns that weigh against development of a factual record

when pending litigation is addressing the same subject matter as is

178 NORTH AMERICAN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY

64. SEM-97-001 (BC Hydro), Article 15(1) Notification (28 April 1998).

65. SEM-97-001 (BC Hydro), Article 15(1) Notification (28 April 1998).
raised in a submission66 are similar to the concerns relevant to whether a

factual record is warranted with regard to a matter that is also subject to

a timely, active, pending criminal investigation. The Secretariat has

observed that “[c]ivil litigation is a complex undertaking governed by

an immensely refined body of rules, procedures and practices,” and that

the factual record process “may unwittingly intrude on one or more of

the litigant’s strategic considerations.67” Similarly, a criminal investigation often involves a degree of secrecy and sensitivity that make it

uniquely vulnerable to unintended interference. The factual record process presents a risk of interfering, possibly seriously, with a criminal

investigation. In many cases, the mere fact that a criminal investigation

is underway is kept secret in order to ensure its success. If a Party is

required to disclose information relating to an ongoing criminal investigation, the disclosure could jeopardize or compromise the investigation

by disclosing closely-held investigative techniques or the identity of

investigators, informers or witnesses. The Secretariat is reluctant to

embark on a process which a party demonstrates may intrude in these

ways on timely, active and ongoing criminal investigations carried out

by a Party to ensure compliance with its environmental laws.

Here, Canada has stated that as of the time of its response, an investigation was ongoing regarding De Mamiel Creek, and the Secretariat

has no information indicating that Canada’s investigation relating to De

Mamiel Creek was not timely or that it is no longer active. Accordingly,

if a factual record is developed for this submission, the Secretariat will

not consider whether Canada is failing to effectively enforce the provisions of the Fisheries Act in relation to logging operations at De Mamiel

Creek as long as the investigation remains active and charges may result.

However, the Secretariat is not precluded from looking at all matters

relating to De Mamiel Creek. For example, in examining the Submitters’

allegation that Canada is failing to enforce the Fisheries Act effectively

against logging operations in British Columbia generally, information

regarding the circumstances leading to the TimberWest investigation

might be relevant to a description of why investigations are pursued in

some circumstances and not others.

SEM-00-004 179

66. The Secretariat is not precluding the possibility that in a future submission involving proceedings to which Article 14(3)(a) does not apply, these concerns might be

outweighed by other factors warranting preparation of a factual record.

67. SEM-96-003 (Oldman River I), Determination pursuant to Articles 14 and 15

(2 April 1997).
b. Whether a factual record is warranted in regard to TimberWest’s Sooke

River and Martins Gulch logging operations

Canada’s response indicates that TimberWest’s forest harvesting

practices at the Sooke River site gave rise to concerns over the year preceding the response. These concerns resulted in an investigation and,

ultimately, a warning letter detailing the concerns. After the investigation, DFO staff concluded that the riparian zone had been compromised

and was unstable.68 DFO staff also concluded that the site would require

monitoring in future years. The Secretariat considers a factual record to

be appropriate with respect to the Sooke River logging operation to

gather information as to whether the warning letter, any continued

monitoring of the site and other aspects of Canada’s enforcement

approach have been effective. Particularly in light of the widespread

nature of the allegations in the submission, this examination would provide an example of Canada’s ongoing compliance and enforcement

activities at a site where there is a known risk that logging activities

could result in violations of the Fisheries Act.

The Secretariat considers that development of a factual record is

not warranted in relation to TimberWest’s specific logging activities in

the Martins Gulch area. In its response, Canada indicates DFO inspected

these activities and the site and found little or no impact on fish habitat.

Canada also asserts that the site is considered low risk for future

impacts. The Secretariat sees no value in the development of a factual

record in relation to whether Canada is failing to take effective enforcement action in regard to the Martins Gulch logging operation given the

results of compliance activities already undertaken. Nonetheless, information regarding Canada’s approach in regard to Martins Gulch might

be useful in the broader context of examining how Canada generally

assesses the risk of future impacts due to particular logging operations

and the need for ongoing monitoring and enforcement.

V. RECOMMENDATION

For the reasons stated above, the Secretariat considers that the submission, in light of the Party’s response, warrants development of a factual record. The Submitters have raised central questions regarding the

effectiveness of Canada’s enforcement of the Fisheries Act in connection

with logging in British Columbia. They have supported their allegations

180 NORTH AMERICAN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY

68. Response at Annex 2.
with statistics on the extent to which logging practices likely to be harmful to fish and fish habitat are allowed under the British Columbia Forest

Practices Codes and Private Land Forest Practices Regulation, the example of

TimberWest’s logging practices on private land in the Sooke River

watershed, Canada’s province-wide policy to reduce the level of federal

review of Forest Development Plans in light of stream protections provided in provincial forest practices regulations and documentation of

concern among DFO staff regarding the ability of provincial forestry

regulations to ensure compliance with the Fisheries Act. The Submitters

have also described the declines in salmon populations in British

Columbia and the nature of the harm due to logging practices as to

which they contend Canada is failing to take effective enforcement

action. Canada’s response has persuaded the Secretariat that a factual

record is not warranted with respect to the allegations concerning ineffective enforcement of the Fisheries Actregarding TimberWest’s logging

near Martins Gulch and De Mamiel Creek. However, Canada’s response

leaves entirely unanswered the central questions the submission raises

regarding the effectiveness of Canada’s enforcement generally of sections 35(1) and 36(3) of the Fisheries Act in connection with logging on

public and private lands in British Columbia. Accordingly, in accordance with Article 15(1), and for the reasons set forth in this document,

the Secretariat informs the Council of its determination that the purposes of the NAAEC would be well served by developing a factual

record regarding the Submission.

Respectfully submitted on this 27th day of July 2001.

Janine Ferretti

Executive Director

SEM-00-004 181

SEM-00-005

(Molymex II)

SUBMITTERS: ACADEMIA SONORENSE DE DERECHOS

HUMANOS, A.C. AND DOMINGO

GUTIÉRREZ MENDÍVIL

PARTY: United Mexican States

DATE: 6 April 2000

SUMMARY: The Submitters allege that Mexico has failed to

effectively enforce the General Law of Ecological

Equilibrium and Environmental Protection (Ley

General del Equilibrio Ecologico y la Proteccion al

Ambiente—LGEEPA) in relation to the operation

of the company Molymex, S.A. de C.V. in the

town of Cumpas, Sonora, Mexico.

SECRETARIAT DETERMINATIONS:

ART. 14(1)*

(13 July 2000)

Determination that criteria under Article 14(1)

have not been met.

REV. SUB.

ART. 14(1)(2)

(19 October 2000)

Determination that criteria under Article 14(1)

have been met and that the submission merits

requesting a response from the Party.

ART. 15(1)

(20 December 2001)

Notification to Council that a factual record is

warranted in accordance with Article 15(1).

* Published in Volume 5 (Fall 2000) of the North American Environmental Law and Policy

Series.

183

Secretariado de la Comisión

para la Cooperación Ambiental

Determinación del Secretariado en conformidad

con los artículos 14(1) y 14 (2) del Acuerdo de

Cooperación Ambiental de América del Norte

Núm. de petición: SEM-00-005 (Molymex II)

Peticionaria(os): Academia Sonorense de Derechos

Humanos, A.C.

Lic. Domingo Gutiérrez Mendívil

Parte: Estados Unidos Mexicanos

Fecha de recepción: 6 de abril de 2000

Fecha de la determinación: 19 de octubre de 2000

I. ANTECEDENTES

El 6 de abril de 2000, la Academia Sonorense de Derechos

Humanos, A.C. y el Lic. Domingo Gutiérrez Mendivil (los “Peticionarios”), presentaron al Secretariado de la Comisión para la Cooperación

Ambiental (el “Secretariado”) una petición de conformidad con los

artículos 14 y 15 del Acuerdo de Cooperación Ambiental de América del Norte

(el “ACAAN” o “Acuerdo”).

El Secretariado puede examinar peticiones de cualquier persona u

organización sin vinculación gubernamental que asevere que una Parte

está incurriendo en omisiones en la aplicación efectiva de su legislación

ambiental, si el Secretariado juzga que la petición cumple con los requisitos señalados en el artículo 14(1) del ACAAN.

Con fecha del 13 de julio del 2000, el Secretariado determinó que la

Petición no cumplía con el requisito establecido en el inciso e) del

185
artículo 14(1) del Acuerdo, dado que la Petición no señalaba que el

asunto planteado en la Petición hubiese sido previamente comunicado

por escrito a las autoridades pertinentes en México.

Con base en el apartado 6.2 de las Directrices para la presentación de

peticiones relativas a la aplicación efectiva de la legislación ambiental conforme

a los artículos 14 y 15 del ACAAN (Directrices), los Peticionarios presentaron información adicional a la Petición, el 26 de julio de 2000. Tomando

en cuenta esta nueva información, el Secretariado determina que se

encuentran satisfechos los requisitos del artículo 14(1) del Acuerdo.

Asimismo, el Secretariado ha considerado la Petición a la luz de los

requisitos del artículo 14(2), y determina que amerita solicitar una

respuesta de la Parte respecto de algunas de sus aseveraciones, por las

razones que se expresan en este documento.1

II. RESUMEN DE LA PETICIÓN

Los Peticionarios aseveran que México ha omitido aplicar de

manera efectiva su legislación ambiental en relación con el funcionamiento de la planta productora de trióxido de molibdeno, operada por

la empresa Molymex, S.A. de C.V. (“Molymex”), ubicada en el municipio de Cumpas, en el estado de Sonora, México.

Según los Peticionarios, la autoridad en México ha dejado de

aplicar las siguientes disposiciones de la Ley General del Equilibrio Ecológico y la Protección al Ambiente(la “LGEEPA”): (i) los artículos 28, fracción

III, 29 fracciones IV y VI, y 32,2 al permitir la operación de la planta

Molymex sin autorización en materia de impacto ambiental; (ii) el

artículo 98, fracción I, al tolerar que la planta Molymex realice un uso de

suelo incompatible con la vocación natural del mismo; (iii) el artículo 99,

fracción III, toda vez que no se ha expedido el plan de desarrollo urbano

de Cumpas, en el que se definan los usos, reservas y destinos del suelo;

(iv) el artículo 112, fracción II, al omitir definir las zonas en las que se

permita la instalación de industrias contaminantes; (v) el artículo 153,

fracción VI, ya que se ha permitido que los residuos generados durante

el proceso de tostación de molibdeno (supuestamente introducidos al

186 NORTH AMERICAN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY

1. Véase el apartado 7.2 de las Directrices.

2. Aunque los Peticionarios mencionan estos tres artículos, las transcripciones que

aparecen en la petición corresponden al texto de la LGEEPA anterior a las reformas

publicadas en el Diario Oficial de la Federación el día 13 de diciembre de 1996. Esto

sin embargo, no modifica sustancialmente el sentido de los argumentos de los

Peticionarios, tanto por la naturaleza de los argumentos, como debido a que el texto

vigente de la LGEEPA incorpora en sus artículos 29 y 30, el contenido de los

anteriores artículos 28, 29 y 32.
país bajo el régimen de importación temporal) permanezcan en México;

(vi) el artículo 153, fracción VII, al otorgar autorizaciones a Molymex

para la importación de materiales supuestamente peligrosos, sin que se

haya garantizado el cumplimiento de la normatividad aplicable, ni la

reparación de los daños y perjuicios que pudieran causarse en el

territorio nacional.

Asimismo, los Peticionarios argumentan supuestas violaciones al

cumplimiento de la norma oficial mexicana NOM-022-SSA1-1993- Salud

Ambiental. Criterio para evaluar la calidad del aire ambiente con respecto al

bióxido de azufre (SO2). Valor normado para la concentración de bióxido de

azufre (SO2) en el aire ambiente, como medida de protección a la salud de la

población (la “NOM-022-SSA1-1993”).

Finalmente, los Peticionarios solicitan al Secretariado la elaboración de un informe en los términos del artículo 13 del Acuerdo. Sobre

este punto, en su determinación del 13 de julio de 2000, el Secretariado

informó a los Peticionarios que dicha consideración se haría al concluirse el proceso conforme a los artículos 14 y 15 del ACAAN.

III. ANÁLISIS DE LA PETICIÓN CONFORME A LOS

ARTÍCULOS 14(1) Y 14(2) DEL ACAAN

Artículo 14(1) del ACAAN

El artículo 14(1) del Acuerdo establece que:

El Secretariado podrá examinar peticiones de cualquier persona u

organización sin vinculación gubernamental que asevere que una Parte

está incurriendo en omisiones en la aplicación efectiva de su legislación

ambiental, si el Secretariado juzga que la petición:

(a) se presenta por escrito en un idioma designado por esa Parte en una

notificación al Secretariado;

(b) identifica claramente a la persona u organización que presenta la

petición;

(c) proporciona información suficiente que permita al Secretariado

revisarla, e incluyendo las pruebas documentales que puedan

sustentarla;

(d) parece encaminada a promover la aplicación de la ley y no a hostigar

una industria;

SEM-00-005 187
(e) señala que el asunto ha sido comunicado por escrito a las autoridades

pertinentes de la Parte y, si la hay, la respuesta de la Parte; y

(f) la presenta una persona u organización que reside o está establecida

en territorio de una Parte.

Previamente, en la Determinación del Secretariado conforme al

artículo 14(1) del ACAAN, del 13 de julio de 2000, se expusieron las

razones por las que la Petición en su versión inicial, cumple los requisitos

señalados en ese artículo, salvo el contenido en el inciso e).

Después de analizar la información adicional proporcionada por

los Peticionarios, en opinión del Secretariado se encuentra satisfecho

el requisito establecido en el referido inciso e) del artículo 14(1) del

Acuerdo, toda vez que los Peticionarios manifiestan que el asunto ha

sido previamente comunicado a las autoridades pertinentes en México

a través de diversos procedimientos administrativos y judiciales, y

acompañan copia de 24 documentos, incluyendo comunicaciones a las

autoridades y las respuestas que han recibido de aquéllas. Si bien todos

los documentos se refieren a la planta Molymex, cabe mencionar que

algunos parecen referirse a asuntos que no se plantearon específicamente en la Petición como omisiones en la aplicación efectiva de la

legislación ambiental.3

Artículo 14(2) del Acuerdo

Para determinar si la petición amerita una respuesta de la Parte,

el Secretariado debe guiarse por las consideraciones que establece el

artículo 14(2). Dichas consideraciones son las siguientes:

(a) si la petición alega daño a la persona u organización que la

presenta;

(b) si la petición, por sí sola o conjuntamente con otras, plantea

asuntos cuyo ulterior estudio en este proceso contribuiría a la

consecución de las metas de este Acuerdo;

(c) si se ha acudido a los recursos al alcance de los particulares

conforme a la legislación de la Parte; y

(d) si la petición se basa exclusivamente en noticias de los medios

de comunicación.

188 NORTH AMERICAN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY

3. Véase por ejemplo, el anexo listado en noveno lugar, de la información adicional a la

petición.
Al hacer esas consideraciones, el Secretariado contempló lo

siguiente.

Los Peticionarios afirman que existen riesgos a la salud de los

pobladores del municipio de Cumpas, Sonora, y diversos impactos

ambientales negativos en dicha localidad, supuestamente derivados de

las emisiones de trióxido de molibdeno y bióxido de azufre producidas

por Molymex.4 Según los Peticionarios, estos supuestos riesgos e

impactos ambientales han sido tolerados por las autoridades en México,

en violación a diversas disposiciones ambientales, que se refieren a la

evaluación del impacto ambiental, al uso del suelo, a la importación de

residuos peligrosos y a la emisión de contaminantes a la atmósfera. En

términos de daños directos a la Academia Sonorense de Derechos

Humanos, y a Domingo Guitérrez Mendívil, quien la preside, la Petición

indica que el hijo menor de éste último ha sufrido algunos efectos a la

salud,5 aunque la Petición se refiere, más bien, a daños y riesgos sufridos

en general por los habitantes del poblado de Cumpas, Sonora. La

Petición afirma que desde 1994 los habitantes de Cumpas han reclamado de manera constante la supuesta contaminación producida por

Molymex.6 Los daños a que se refieren los Peticionarios pueden resumirse como sigue.

Los Peticionarios afirman que se ha modificado la actividad que

realiza la planta Molymex sin contar con autorización en materia de

impacto ambiental, por lo que se han omitido aplicar los artículos 28,

fracción III, 29 fracciones IV y VI, y 32 de la LGEEPA.7 De la Petición y

los documentos anexos, se desprende que la empresa Molymex se

constituyó en 1979, que la planta Molymex operó hasta 1990 a base de

material con una pureza de 92 %, extraído de la mina Cumobabi, que

dejó de operar en 1991. Según la Petición, la planta Molymex reinició su

operación en 1994, utilizando una materia prima distinta a la original,

que aseveran es un residuo de la fundición de cobre que contiene 30 % de

impurezas, incluyendo arsénico, cadmio, mercurio, plomo y selenio, (en

cantidades que no se indican).8

Los Peticionarios también aseveran que las autoridades no han

aplicado de manera efectiva los artículos 99, fracción III y 112, fracción II,

de la LGEEPA al no establecer los usos de suelo en los planes de

SEM-00-005 189

4. Páginas 4 y 5 de la petición, y artículo 14(2)(a) del ACAAN.

5. Página 4 de la petición.

6. Página 3 de la petición.

7. Página 5 de la petición.

8. Página 3 de la petición.
desarrollo urbano del municipio de Cumpas, conforme a los criterios

para el uso sustentable del suelo y la prevención de la contaminación

ambiental, contenidos en esos artículos, y señalando las zonas en que

se permita la instalación de industrias contaminantes.9 Afirman que,

contrariamente a lo dispuesto por el artículo 98, fracción I, de la

LGEEPA, la operación de Molymex no es compatible con la vocación

natural del suelo, que es ganadera.10 La Petición indica también, que la

población originalmente se ubicaba a 2 km. de la planta, pero que ahora

la mancha urbana se extiende a 500 m. de la misma.11

Los Peticionarios afirman que se ha omitido aplicar algunas disposiciones de la legislación ambiental sobre materiales y residuos peligrosos (artículos 153, fracción VI y VII, de la LGEEPA). Afirman que

Molymex ha importado materiales supuestamente peligrosos, sin

garantizar el cumplimiento de la normatividad aplicable, ni la reparación de los daños y perjuicios que pudieran causarse en el territorio

nacional,12 y que los residuos generados a partir de esos materiales

(supuestamente introducidos al país bajo el régimen de importación

temporal) no se han repatriado.13

Finalmente, los Peticionarios argumentan que la norma oficial

mexicana NOM-022-SSA1, que se refiere a la protección de la salud de la

población respecto del bióxido de azufre (SO2) en el aire ambiente, no se

aplicado de manera efectiva. Afirman que se emite este contaminante

por encima de lo permitido por la norma, así como otros contaminantes

como partículas suspendidas totales, y partículas de trióxido de molibdeno y de sulfuro de molibdeno. Aseveran que en las modificaciones

realizadas a la licencia de funcionamiento de Molymex, la autoridad

autorizó a dicha empresa para que viole los límites máximos de emisión

establecidos en la NOM-022-SSA1.14 Señalan que la emisión de estos

contaminantes ha causado daños a la salud, principalmente enfermedades respiratorias, y al medio ambiente, afectando a los cultivos y al

ganado. También indica la Petición, que el trióxido de molibdeno tiene

efectos tóxicos generales, y que el sulfuro de molibdeno puede causar

daños al hígado y al riñón, y tener efectos carcinogénicos y teratogénicos.15

190 NORTH AMERICAN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY

9. Página 9 y 10 de la petición.

10. Página 8 de la petición.

11. Página 3 de la petición.

12. Página 12 de la petición.

13. Página 11 de la petición.

14. Página 5 de la petición.

15. Página 4 de la petición.
Cabe mencionar también, algunas acciones gubernamentales

relacionadas con el asunto, que se mencionan en la Petición y sus anexos:

la expedición de una licencia de funcionamiento el 11 de febrero de 1994,

y sus modificaciones el 27 de mayo de ese año y el 17 de junio de 1997;

una nota de la Profepa del 1o de abril de 1995, en que se plantean los

problemas de contaminación generados por la planta Molymex; la

clausura parcial temporal del horno de tostación de Molymex del 3 al

7 de abril de 1995; una nota de Semarnap sobre el caso de Molymex,

sin fecha pero aparentemente posterior al 22 de mayo de 1998; una

autorización en materia de impacto ambiental del 29 de enero de 1999

para un proyecto de ampliación de la planta Molymex.

Por lo que se refiere al artículo 14(2)(b) del ACAAN, el Secretariado

consideró que la aplicación efectiva de la legislación para la protección

de la salud humana y el medio ambiente respecto de emisiones contaminantes a que se refiere esta Petición, es un asunto cuyo ulterior

estudio en este proceso contribuiría a la consecución de las metas del

Acuerdo. En particular, el Secretariado considera que los asuntos que

esta Petición plantea, relacionados con la aplicación efectiva de los

límites de emisión de contaminantes establecidos para la protección de

la salud, de los requerimientos de evaluación del impacto ambiental, y

de los criterios para la planeación adecuada del uso del suelo y para la

prevención de la contaminación, son relevantes a las metas del ACAAN.

Específicamente, los artículos 1 y 5 del Acuerdo establecen, entre otras

metas, las de alentar la protección y el mejoramiento del ambiente para

el bienestar de las generaciones presentes y futuras, de mejorar la

aplicación y la observancia de las leyes ambientales, y de lograr niveles

altos de protección del ambiente y de cumplimiento de las leyes de las

Partes.

Con relación a la consideración prevista en el inciso c) del artículo

14(2) del ACAAN, la Petición aborda los recursos disponibles conforme

a la legislación de la Parte, a los que se ha acudido, y el Secretariado

considera que se ha hecho un esfuerzo razonable para acudir a ellos.16

Los Peticionarios indican que diversos procedimientos administrativos

y judiciales han sido iniciados por algunos individuos y organizaciones

ciudadanas con motivo de las actividades de Molymex, entre los cuales

se incluyen los siguientes: las denuncias populares números 9601/002/

2623 del 20 de diciembre de 1995, 9709/094/2623 del 8 de septiembre de

1997 y 9911/160/2623 del 17 de noviembre de 1999; la denuncia penal

de fecha 15 de noviembre de 1999, con base en la cual se inició la

SEM-00-005 191

16. Véanse también los apartados 5.6(c) y 7.5 de las Directrices.
averiguación previa penal número A.P. 1145/HM-IV/99; los juicios de

amparo números 168/2000 ante el Juez Segundo de Distrito en el Estado

de Sonora, del 25 de febrero de 2000 y 154/2000 ante el Juez Tercero de

Distrito en el Estado de Sonora, concluido mediante sentencia el día

6 de marzo de 2000.17 Es preciso hacer notar que algunos de esos

procedimientos iniciados por los Peticionarios, parecen estar pendientes

de resolución a la fecha de esta Determinación.18 En opinión del Secretariado es importante considerar la posibilidad de que elaboración de

un expediente de hechos respecto de una petición pudiera duplicar

o interferir con un procedimiento pendiente.19 Sin embargo, el Secretariado considera también, que es apropiado, en su caso, hacer esa

consideración al momento del análisis de la petición a la luz de la

respuesta proporcionada por la Parte para determinar si se amerita

elaborar un expediente de hechos, y no en la consideración de si se

amerita solicitar una respuesta a la Parte. En particular, es claro que en su

respuesta conforme al artículo 14(3), la Parte podrá proporcionar al

Secretariado información relevante a esa consideración.

Finalmente, la Petición no parece basarse exclusivamente en noticias de los medios de comunicación, aunque los Peticionarios sí hacen

referencia a algunas noticias de ese tipo.20

El Secretariado, conforme a lo anteriormente expuesto y considerando en conjunto los factores del artículo 14(2) del ACAAN,

determina que la Petición amerita solicitar una respuesta de la Parte,

respecto de algunas de sus aseveraciones. Al parecer del Secretariado, en

el caso de dos aseveraciones, la Petición no logra establecer con certeza

que exista una relación entre los hechos que plantea y una disposición

legal ambiental aplicable. En primer lugar, respecto de las aseveraciones

de que México incurre en una omisión en la aplicación efectiva de la

legislación ambiental al tolerar que la planta Molymex realice un uso de

suelo incompatible con la vocación natural del mismo, porque no se

desprende de la información proporcionada, que las actividades de

Molymex son legalmente incompatibles con la vocación natural de los

predios que ocupa. Y en segundo lugar, respecto de la aseveración de

192 NORTH AMERICAN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY

17. Véase la información adicional a la petición.

18. En particular, el juicio de amparo número 168/2000 y la denuncia penal presentada

el 15 de noviembre de 1999, listados respectivamente, como anexos séptimo y

décimo tercero de la información adicional a la petición.

19. Véase la Determinación del Secretariado de conformidad con el artículo 15(1) con

relación a la petición SEM-96-003/The Friends of the Oldman River (2 de abril de

1997).

20. Véase el artículo 14(2)(d) del ACAAN y páginas 5 de la información adicional a la

petición.
que los materiales que ha importado Molymex son materiales o residuos

peligrosos conforme a la legislación aplicable, y que se han importado

bajo el régimen de importación temporal. Por lo tanto, sobre estos

alegatos, que se refieren a los artículos 98, fracción I, y 153, fracciones VI

y VII de la LGEEPA, el Secretariado determina que no se amerita

solicitar una respuesta a la Parte.

Por el contrario, y habiendo considerado en conjunto los factores

del artículo 14(2) del ACAAN según lo anteriormente expuesto, el

Secretariado determina que la Petición amerita solicitar una repuesta de

la Parte respecto de los alegatos relativos a los artículos 28, fracción III, 29

fracciones IV y VI, 32, fracción III,21 y 112, fracción II de la LGEEPA y la

norma oficial mexicana NOM-022-SSA1.

IV. DETERMINACIÓN DEL SECRETARIADO

Después de revisar la información adicional a la Petición, recibida

el 26 de julio de 2000, conforme al apartado 6.2 de las Directrices, el

Secretariado determina que la Petición SEM-00-005 cumple con todos

los requisitos contenidos en el artículo 14(1) del ACAAN. Asimismo, el

Secretariado determina, tomando en cuenta el conjunto de los criterios

establecidos en el artículo 14(2) del ACAAN, que la Petición amerita

solicitar una respuesta a la Parte interesada sobre algunas de las aseveraciones que contiene la Petición SEM-00-005, presentada por la

Academia Sonorense de Derechos Humanos, A.C., et. al.

A través de esta Determinación, el Secretariado solicita una

respuesta de México respecto a los alegatos de esta Petición SEM-00-005,

relativos a la supuesta omisión en la aplicación efectiva de los artículos

28, fracción III, 29 fracciones IV y VI, 32, fracción III,22 y 112, fracción II de

la LGEEPA y la norma oficial mexicana NOM-022-SSA1. La Parte podrá

proporcionar una respuesta dentro de los 30 días siguientes a la recepción de esta notificación, y en circunstancias excepcionales, dentro de los

60 días siguientes a ella, conforme a lo establecido en el artículo 14(3) del

ACAAN.

Con esta Determinación se envía a la Parte interesada, una copia de

la Petición y de la información adicional proporcionada por los Peticionarios, así como de los anexos respectivos.

SEM-00-005 193

21. Ahora artículos 29 y 30 de la misma ley.

22. Idem.
Sometido respetuosamente a su consideración, el 19 de octubre de

2000.

Secretariado de la Comisión para la Cooperación Ambiental

por: Carla Sbert

Oficial Jurídica de la Unidad sobre Peticiones Ciudadanas

c.c.: Lic. José Luis Samaniego, SEMARNAP (con anexos)

Sra. Norine Smith, Environment Canada

Sr. William Nitze, US-EPA

Sra. Janine Ferretti, Directora Ejecutiva de la CCA

Lic. Domingo Gutiérrez Mendívil, Academia Sonorense

de Derechos Humanos

194 NORTH AMERICAN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY
Secretariat of the Commission for

Environmental Cooperation of North America

Article 15(1) Notification to Council that

Development of a Factual Record is Warranted

Submission Number: SEM-00-005 (Molymex II)

Submitters: Academia Sonorense de Derechos

Humanos, A.C.

Lic. Domingo Gutiérrez Mendívil

Party: United Mexican States

Date of Receipt: 6 April 2000

Date of this Notification: 20 December 2001

I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Under Articles 14 and 15 of the North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation (the “NAAEC”), the Secretariat of the Commission

for Environmental Cooperation (the “Secretariat”) may consider submissions asserting that a Party to the NAAEC is failing to effectively

enforce its environmental law. If the Secretariat finds that the submission meets the requirements of Article 14(1), it shall then determine

whether the submission warrants requesting a response from the Party

named in the submission, in accordance with Article 14(2). If the Secretariat considers that the submission, in light of any response from the

Party, warrants developing a factual record, the Secretariat must inform

the Council and provide its reasons (Article 15(1)). By a two-thirds vote,

the Council may instruct the Secretariat to prepare a factual record (Article 15(2)). The final factual record, again by a vote of two-thirds of the

members of the Council, may then be made public.

195
This Notification contains the Secretariat’s Article 15(1) analysis

with respect to the submission filed 6 April 2000 by Academia Sonorense

de Derechos Humanos, A.C. and Lic. Domingo Gutiérrez Mendivil (the

“Submitters”) in accordance with NAAEC Articles 14 and 15.

The submission asserted that Mexico is failing to effectively

enforce its environmental law in relation to the operation of a molybdenum plant by the company Molymex, S.A. de C.V. (“Molymex”), located

in the municipality of Cumpas, Sonora, Mexico.

On 13 July 2000, the Secretariat determined that the submission did

not meet all the requirements of NAAEC Article 14(1). Based on section

6.2 of the Guidelines for Submissions on Enforcement Matters under Articles

14 and 15 of the North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation

(the “Guidelines”), the Submitters filed a revised submission containing

additional information on 26 July 2000.

After consideration of this revised submission, the Secretariat

determined on 19 October 2000 that the requirements of NAAEC Article

14(1) were met in respect of the alleged failures to effectively enforce

Articles 28 paragraph III, 29 paragraphs IV and VI, 32, and 112 of the

General Law on Ecological Balance and Protection (Ley General del

Equilibrio Ecológico y la Protección al Ambiente—LGEEPA), and Mexican

Official Standard NOM-022-SSA1/1993, titled Environmental health. Criterion for the assessment of ambient air quality with respect to sulfur dioxide

(SO2). Standard value for sulfur dioxide (SO2) concentration in ambient air, as

a public health protection measure. (“NOM-022-SSA1-1993”).1 Furthermore, the Secretariat determined that in light of the criteria set out in

Article 14(2), the submission warranted requesting a response from the

Party as regards these provisions. On 18 January 2001, the Party filed its

response with the Secretariat in accordance with NAAEC Article 14(3).

Having examined the submission in light of the Party’s response,

in accordance with NAAEC Article 15(1), the Secretariat hereby notifies

Council that the submission warrants the development of a factual

record with respect to the assertions for which the Secretariat considered

the submission to warrant a response from the Party. The submission

raises matters relating to the Molymex plant that the response of Mexico

does not resolve, concerning the effective enforcement of Mexico’s

environmental laws governing environmental impact, the definition of

zones in which polluting facilities may be sited, and the emission of SO2

196 NORTH AMERICAN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY

1. Published in the Official Gazette of the Federation (Diario Oficial de la Federación–-

DOF) on 23 December 1994.
into the ambient air. The Secretariat considers that clarifying and documenting these matters in a factual record would advance the goals of the

NAAEC of promoting transparency, public participation, and the effective enforcement of environmental law.

II. SUMMARY OF THE SUBMISSION

The submission refers to the enforcement of environmental law in

connection with the Molymex plant, located in the vicinity of Cumpas,

Sonora. Molymex, S.A. de C.V., was incorporated on 30 May 1979, and

until 1990 operated a roasting furnace fed with ore of approximately

92 % purity. The ore was extracted from the Cumobabi mine, which

closed in 1991. Starting in 1994, Molymex began to process molybdenum

sulfide and unroasted molybdenum concentrate.2 In 1998, the company

was authorized to expand the plant, and added a second furnace. The

authorized production at the plant increased from 7,500 tons per year in

1994 to 4,200 tons per month (50,400 tons per year) as of the completion

of the authorized expansion project in 1999.3 Since 1994, there have been

constant complaints from the residents of Cumpas regarding the pollution generated by Molymex.4

The submission asserts that Mexican authorities failed to enforce

the following provisions of the LGEEPA: (i) Articles 28 paragraph III, 29

paragraphs IV and VI, and 32, by allowing the Molymex plant to operate

without an environmental impact authorization, despite the change in

the nature of its operations from 1991 to 1994;5 (ii) Article 98 paragraph I,

by tolerating a land use by the Molymex plant that is incompatible with

the appropriate categories of land use thereon;6 (iii) Article 99 paragraph

III, because of the failure to issue an urban development plan for

Cumpas, defining the allowed and prohibited land uses;7 (iv) Article 112

paragraph II, by failing to define the zones in which polluting facilities

may be sited;8 (v) Article 153 paragraph VI, since waste generated during the molybdenum roasting process (allegedly imported into the

country under the temporary import regime) was allowed to remain in

Mexico;9 and (vi) Article 153 paragraph VII, by issuing authorizations to

Molymex for the importation of allegedly hazardous materials without

SEM-00-005 197

2. The foregoing information from page 3 of the submission.

3. The foregoing information from page 8 of the submission.

4. Page 3 of the submission.

5. Page 5 of the submission.

6. Page 8 of the submission.

7. Page 9 of the submission.

8. Page 10 of the submission.

9. Page 11 of the submission.
requiring insurance in the event of non-compliance with the applicable

law and to cover harm caused on national territory.10 The Submitters

further assert that Mexico authorized Molymex to violate the SO2 concentration limits in ambient air established by Mexican Official Standard

NOM-022-SSA1-1993, for the protection of public health.11

The Secretariat, after reviewing the submission and the additional

information filed by the Submitters, requested a response from the Party

regarding only the alleged failures to enforce LGEEPA Articles 28 paragraph III, 29 paragraphs IV and VI, 32, and 112, as well as Mexican Official Standard NOM-022-SSA1/1993, for the reasons discussed in the

Determination of 19 October 2000.

III. SUMMARY OF THE RESPONSE OF THE PARTY

The Secretariat received Mexico’s response to the submission on 18

January 2001 (the “Response”). The Party argues that Molymex, when it

commenced operating in 1979, was not required to obtain an environmental impact authorization, since such an obligation was not prescribed by any legal provision in the Mexican legal system at that time.12

The Party asserts that obligating the company to submit to an environmental impact assessment procedure at present would amount to retroactive application of a law with prejudice to Molymex. This, it contends,

would violate Article 14 of the Political Constitution of the United Mexican States (the “Constitution”). The Party further contends that environmental impact assessment is an exclusively preventive procedure.13

The Party states that the Molymex expansion project submitted for

approval in 1998 was subjected to an environmental impact assessment

procedure, since on that date the LGEEPA did in fact require it.14

Furthermore, the Party states that it did not default on its obligation to define a zone where polluting facilities may be sited, as prescribed by LGEEPA Article 112(II), since the municipalities are the level

of government empowered by Mexican law to define such zones, and

the Municipal President and Secretary of Cumpas issued a zoning permit to Molymex on 7 September 1998. This, argues the Party, “implies

that, by means of this permit, the zone in which the company was permitted to situate its facility was defined.15”

198 NORTH AMERICAN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY

10. Page 12 of the submission.

11. Page 5 of the submission.

12. Page 3 of the Response.

13. Page 4 of the Response.

14. Page 5 of the Response.

15. Page 11 of the Response.
Finally, the Party states that “the company has not violated the

maximum contaminant limit for sulfur dioxide in ambient air established by the standard [NOM-022-SSAI/1993]” and states that at the

Cumpas sampling point, the limit of 0.13 ppm of SO2 was not exceeded

during any 24-hour period between 1995 and 2000. According to the

Response, during the same period, the annual arithmetic mean SO2 concentration has not exceeded or equaled the limit of 0.03 ppm.16

The Party, in its Response, concludes that “the evidence and information provided and cited in this response to the Secretariat indicate

that there is no failure to effectively enforce [Mexico’s] environmental

law.17”

IV. ANALYSIS

A. Introduction

The process in regard to this submission is currently at the NAAEC

Article 15(1) stage. To reach this stage, the Secretariat must first determine that the submission meets the requirements of Article 14(1) and

that it merits a response from the Party, in consideration of the criteria of

Article 14(2).

On 13 July 2000, the Secretariat determined that the submission did

not meet all the requirements of NAAEC Article 14(1),18 but the requirements of NAAEC Article 14(1)(a), (b), (c), (d) and (f) were deemed to be

met. As stated in that Determination, the submission was filed with the

Secretariat by a person and a non-governmental organization, asserting

that Mexico is failing to effectively enforce various articles of the

LGEEPA and NOM-022-SSA1-1993. These provisions qualify as “environmental law” under the definition contained in NAAEC Article 45(2).

The submission was filed in writing and in Spanish, the language designated by Mexico for such purposes. The Submitters clearly identify

themselves in the submission, and at least Academia Sonorense de

Derechos Humanos, A.C. is domiciled in the city of Hermosillo, Sonora,

Mexico. The Secretariat determined that the information and documents

provided by the Submitters are sufficient to enable the Secretariat to

review the submission, with the exception of the alleged failure to effectively enforce LGEEPA Articles 98 paragraph I and 153 paragraph VII

SEM-00-005 199

16. Page 16 of the Response.

17. Page 17 of the Response.

18. SEM-00-005 (Molymex II), Secretariat’s Determination under Article 14(1), (13 July

2000).
(i.e., the matter of Molymex having been allowed to carry on operations

that are incompatible with the appropriate categories of land use, and

the matter of authorizations having been issued to Molymex to import

allegedly hazardous material without guaranteeing compliance with

the applicable law, nor repair of any damage or injury that may be

caused on national territory). The Secretariat concluded that the submission is not aimed at harassing industry, but rather at promoting the

enforcement of environmental law in Mexico. However, the requirement of Article 14(1)(e) was deemed not to be met, since the submission

did not assert that the matter had been communicated in writing to the

relevant Mexican authorities.

To correct this deficiency, the Submitters filed a revised submission with the Secretariat on 31 July 2000 in accordance with section 6.2 of

the Guidelines. The Submitters state that the matter has previously been

communicated to the relevant authorities in Mexico through various

administrative and judicial proceedings, and they attach copies of 24

documents, including letters to the authorities and the responses to

those letters. Consequently, on 19 October 2000, the Secretariat determined that the submission as amended met all the requirements of

NAAEC Article 14(1). At the same time, it determined that in regard to

the alleged failures to effectively enforce LGEEPA Articles 98 paragraph

I and 153 paragraph VII, the submission does not provide sufficient

information.19

The Secretariat proceeded to evaluate the submission in view of

the criteria set out in NAAEC Article 14(2), concluding in its Determination of 19 October 2000 that the submission warranted a response from

the Party in respect of the alleged failures to effectively enforce LGEEPA

Articles 28 paragraph III, 29 paragraphs IV and VI, 32, and 112 paragraph II, as well as Mexican Official Standard NOM-022-SSA1/1993.20

The Submitters assert the existence of health risks to the residents of

Cumpas, Sonora, as well as various negative environmental impacts at

that locality, allegedly caused by molybdenum trioxide and sulfur dioxide emissions produced by Molymex. The submission discusses the

available remedies that have been pursued under the Party’s law, and

the Secretariat considers that a reasonable effort has been made to pursue them. The Submitters indicate that various administrative and

judicial actions have been brought by different individuals and civic

organizations in regard to Molymex’s activities. The submission does

200 NORTH AMERICAN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY

19. SEM-00-005 (Molymex II), Secretariat’s Determination under Articles 14(1) and (2),

(19 October 2000).

20. SEM-00-005 (Molymex II), Secretariat’s Determination under Articles 14(1) and (2),

(19 October 2000).
not appear to be based exclusively on media reports, although the Submitters do refer to certain reports of this type. Finally, the Secretariat

considered that further study in this process, of the effective enforcement of the public health and environmental protection provisions

referred to in the submission on pollutant emissions, environmental

impact assessment requirements, and land use planning criteria, would

advance the goals of the NAAEC.

As a consequence of that Determination, the Party filed its

response with the Secretariat on 18 January 2001.

B. Why Development of a Factual Record is Warranted

In accordance with NAAEC Article 15(1), and in light of Mexico’s

Response, the Secretariat considers the submission to warrant the development of a factual record. The submission raises matters of effective

enforcement that are not resolved by Mexico’s Response. These matters

relate to environmental impact assessment of the activities of Molymex

that began in 1994; to the definition of zones in Cumpas in which polluting facilities may be sited, and to sulfur dioxide emissions repeatedly

denounced by the residents of Cumpas (which the Federal Attorney

for Environmental Protection (Procuraduría Federal de Protección al

Ambiente—Profepa) described in 1995 as violating the concentration

limits for SO2 in ambient air established to protect public health).

The response asserts that the environmental impact procedure is

purely a preventive instrument that cannot be applied retroactively, and

states that the environmental authority has other instruments at its disposal with which to control any impacts that may occur. The factual

record is warranted to review the effective enforcement of the environmental impact provisions in the case of Molymex, including the matter

of retroactivity vis-à-vis environmental impact, which is not resolved by

the Party’s Response.

The response does not clarify the matter of whether there exists a

definition, based on general criteria, of the zones in Cumpas in which

polluting facilities may be sited, nor where Molymex is located with

respect to that general zoning, although the Party asserts that a zoning

permit issued to Molymex establishes such zoning. The factual record

would provide clarification on these matters.

Finally, Mexico’s response asserts that the company has not violated Mexican Official Standard NOM-022-SSA1/1993, but it does not

SEM-00-005 201
include information on the specific measures taken in regard to the company (for example, any inspection reports or any reports on perimeter

monitoring which the company allegedly filed with the authorities) to

support that assertion. This information would be compiled in the factual record whose development is warranted in regard to this submission.

The examination of these issues as a whole would provide an

understanding and an illustration of how the public health and environmental provisions relating to polluting facilities are applied to

Molymex. The factual record would also compile additional information on the health and environmental effects identified by Profepa in

1995, which are attributed to Molymex by the Submitters. The factual

record would provide a better understanding of the enforcement of the

environmental law referred to in this submission to Molymex, contributing to its effective enforcement, and thereby advancing the goals of the

NAAEC.

1. Alleged Failures to Effectively Enforce the LGEEPA

Environmental Impact Provisions

LGEEPA Article 28 provides that anyone who carries out works or

activities that may cause ecological imbalance or exceed the limits and

conditions set out in the applicable environmental provisions shall

obtain a prior environmental impact authorization. The activities of the

chemical industry, which encompass the molybdenum roasting activity

of Molymex, fall under this provision (pursuant to LGEEPA Article 28

paragraph III). Finally, the current Article 30 provides that in order to

obtain an environmental impact authorization, the interested parties

shall file an environmental impact statement with the Ministry of the

Environment, Natural Resources and Fisheries (Secretaría de Medio

Ambiente, Recursos Naturales y Pesca—Semarnap; the “Ministry” 21).22

202 NORTH AMERICAN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY

21. Now the Ministry of the Environment and Natural Resources (Semarnat).

22. The transcriptions appearing in the submission correspond to the text of the

LGEEPA in force prior to the reform published in the DOF of 13 December 1996.

This, however, does not substantially affect the force of the Submitter’s arguments,

due to both the nature of the arguments and the fact that the previous Articles 28, 29

and 32 are incorporated into the current LGEEPA Articles 29 and 30. Prior to the

reform of December 1996, the equivalent provisions of the LGEEPA provided as

follows:

“Article 28.- The performance of public or private works or activities that may cause

ecological imbalance, or exceed the limits and conditions set out in the environmental protection regulations and technical standards enacted by the Federation,

requires the prior authorization of the federal government acting by the Ministry,

the states, or the municipalities, according to the jurisdictions established by this
The Submitters argue that Molymex did not comply with these

provisions, since “it has been carrying on its activities in the municipality of Cumpas, Sonora without an environmental impact authorization.23” In its response, the Party responds to this assertion with three

arguments: first, that environmental impact assessment did not apply

because it was not required when Molymex commenced its operations;

second, that environmental impact assessment is a purely preventive

procedure; third, that the relevant environmental impact provisions

were in fact enforced in regard to Molymex, since the expansion project

of 1998 did undergo assessment and obtained the relevant authorization.

In its first argument, the Party states that when Molymex commenced its operations in 1979, “there was no obligation in Mexican law

to obtain an environmental impact authorization prior to initiating construction,” and for that reason, this requirement was not imposed on the

company.24 Indeed, both the submission and the response indicate that

Molymex commenced its operations in 1979, when no legal provision

required it to file an environmental impact statement.

However, the submission specifically contends that the authority

should have required Molymex to file an environmental impact statement once that obligation was incorporated into Mexican law in 1982,25

and especially when the company resumed its operations in 1994 after

having been idle since 1990. In this regard, the Party cites the first paragraph of Article 14 of the Constitution, which states that “no law may be

given retroactive effect with prejudice to any person.” With reference to

this article, the Party maintains that it cannot legally require Molymex to

submit an environmental impact statement, since when the company

commenced its operations, there was no such requirement in law. In

support of its assertion, the Party cites a 1921 decision of the Mexican

SEM-00-005 203

Law, and all such works or activities shall comply with any requirements imposed

upon them once the potential environmental impact is assessed, without prejudice

to any other authorizations within the purview of the competent authorities.” Article 29(III) invested the Federal Government with the responsibility of assessing

environmental impact, “particularly with regard to the following activities: III. The

chemical, petrochemical, steel, pulp and paper, sugar, beverage, cement, automotive, and electricity generation and transmission industries.” Article 32 provided

that “in order to obtain the authorization contemplated in Article 28 hereof, the

interested parties must file an environmental impact statement with the competent

authority.”

23. Page 6 of the submission.

24. Page 3 of the response.

25. The environmental impact procedure first appears as a requirement in the Federal

Environmental Protection Law (Ley Federal de Protección al Ambiente) of 1982 and, in

more detailed form, in the LGEEPA of 1988.
Supreme Court (Suprema Corte de Justicia de la Nación), which lays down

the prohibition against retroactive application of law.26

The Submitters argue that the retroactive application of a law is

valid in some cases. In justification, they cite two 1924 decisions in which

the Supreme Court ruled that where public or societal interest so dictates, a court decision may be held to have retroactive effect.27 The Party,

in its response, does not refer to this argument of the Submitters, merely

citing a previous decision to the contrary. It does not explain why the

subsequent court decisions cited by the Submitters would not be applicable, even though these might support the application of the environmental impact procedure to activities that commenced before it was

enacted.

Moreover, under the LGEEPA Environmental Impact Regulations

(RIA) in force as of 8 June 1988 and until 29 June 2000,28 the Party was

empowered to require Molymex to file an environmental impact statement, even though the company’s activities had commenced prior to the

enactment of this requirement in Mexican law. Transitory Article 5 of the

RIA empowered the Ministry to require an environmental impact statement even in cases of works or activities in place on 8 June 1988, provided that such works or activities met certain criteria set out in that

article: (i) that they covered by Article 5 of those regulations, and (ii) that

they cause ecological imbalance or exceed the limits or conditions set out

in the environmental protection regulations and technical standards.29

204 NORTH AMERICAN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY

26. Page 4 of the Response.

27. Page 7 of the submission.

28. The date when it was repealed by new regulations. We refer to these regulations

and not the current ones, since those were in force when the submission was filed.

29. Transitory Article 5 provides as follows:

“Article 5.- In cases of works or activities being carried out at the time this provision

comes into force, provided that they are contemplated by Article 5 of the Regulation

and that they cause environmental imbalance or exceed the limits and conditions

set out in the environmental protection regulations and technical standards

enacted to protect the environment, the Ministry may require their owners or the

persons carrying them out to file the general form of the environmental impact

statement within a period not exceeding thirty working days from the notice of

such requirement” (emphasis added). Article 5 of the Regulation states as follows:

“Article 5.- The following natural or legal persons shall possess prior environmental impact authorization from the Ministry: those who seek to carry out public or

private works or activities that may cause environmental imbalance or exceed the

limits and conditions set out in the environmental protection regulations and technical standards enacted by the Federation; they shall also fulfil any requirements

imposed on them in relation to the matters under federal jurisdiction by virtue of

Articles 5 and 29 of the Law, particularly the following:

...V. The chemical, petrochemical, steel, pulp and paper, sugar, beverage, cement,

automotive, and electricity generation and transmission industries;...”
But most important, since operations at the plant were suspended in

1991 (although whether the suspension was total or partial is unclear),

the application of the environmental impact procedure to the activities

commenced in 1994 would not appear to be retroactive.

In sum, then, the assertion that the Party cannot legally apply the

environmental impact procedure to the Molymex operations commenced in 1994 is questionable on at least three grounds. First, there are

mutually contradictory judicial interpretations of the retroactivity prohibition contained in Article 14 of the Constitution, particularly where

the public interest is at issue, as in the present case. Second, in cases of

ongoing activities where the activity is interrupted, it is not clear that the

application of a provision upon its resumption should be considered retroactive. Finally, RIA Transitory Article 5 authorized the Party in certain

cases to apply the legal provisions concerning environmental impact

retroactively.

Irrespective of the question of retroactivity, there are other factors

that appear to indicate that it was appropriate for the authority to

require Molymex to file an environmental impact statement. The Submitters assert that the Molymex plant operated until 1990 using material

of 92 % purity extracted from the Cumobabi mine, which closed in 1991.

According to the submission, Molymex resumed operations in 1994

using a different raw material which is a waste byproduct of the copper

smelting process containing 30 % impurities, including arsenic, cadmium, mercury, lead and selenium (in quantities not indicated). The

submission also asserts that Molymex operated a seven-hearth roasting

furnace until 1991, but when it resumed its operations in 1994, it added

three more hearths. Based on these facts, the Submitters argue that the

Molymex plant’s activity had changed, and as a consequence, the company should have been required to file an environmental impact statement for strict compliance with LGEEPA Articles 28 paragraph III, 29

paragraphs IV and VI, and 32.30

Although the response does not make direct reference to these

facts, its second argument about environmental impact relates to them.

The response states that “any claim that environmental impact assessment should be applied to existing industrial activities that neither

required an assessment at the time they commenced, nor were obligated

to obtain any such authorization, is contrary to the preventive nature of this

instrument” (emphasis added). The Party argues that environmental

impact assessment “is of an exclusively preventive nature, and thus its

SEM-00-005 205

30. The foregoing information on pages 3-8 of the submission.
precepts and provisions are prior to works and activities, not subsequent.” It further argues that “at all times, Semarnat has the power to

control all the works and activities within its sphere of jurisdiction that

may generate or are generating environmental impacts, using such

instruments as licenses, permits, standards, economic instruments,

registers, etc., above and beyond the environmental impact assessment

procedure.31”

Despite the fact that the environmental impact assessment procedure is essentially preventive, as indicated above, in some circumstances such an instrument may be employed to assess the environmental consequences of an ongoing work or activity, or of changes to an

activity. This is evidenced by the aforementioned RIA Transitory Article

5, which contemplates environmental impact assessment of activities

already in process. Moreover, the Party adduces, as its third argument

regarding this assertion, the fact that environmental impact assessment

was applied to the Molymex expansion project of 1998.

The Party states that the Molymex expansion project filed in 1998

was indeed subjected to the environmental impact procedure,32 since

this was a requirement of the version of LGEEPA in force at that time.33

The response does not explain why different treatment was accorded to

the changes made in 1994, which were also subsequent to the entry into

force of the LGEEPA. According to the submission, Molymex appears to

have suspended its operations for three years (presumably the period

1991–1994) and to have resumed its operations using a different raw

material from the original, with a roasting furnace consisting of ten

hearths instead of the original seven.34 Clearly, the activity with which

Molymex resumed its operations is different from the previous one, in

terms of both the raw material used and the production volume (both

having an obvious effect on the type and volume of the plant’s potential

emissions). It cannot be deduced from the response, nor from the environmental impact authorization itself, that the environmental impact

assessment process for the expansion project of 1998 covered the

changes of 1994. Consequently, the matters raised by the Submitters

regarding the effective enforcement of the environmental impact provisions with relation to the activities commenced in 1994 remain unresolved, since these activities are different from the expansion project.

206 NORTH AMERICAN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY

31. The foregoing information on page 5 of the Response.

32. The environmental impact authorization was issued to Molymex on 29 January

1999.

33. Page 5 of the Response.

34. Pages 3 and 7 of the submission.
In light of the foregoing, the three arguments adduced by the Party

in its response do not convincingly address the assertion that Mexico is

failing to effectively enforce the environmental impact assessment procedure in regard to the Molymex plant. In light of the response and the

foregoing reasoning, the Secretariat considers the development of a factual record in regard to the enforcement of LGEEPA Articles 28 paragraph III, 29 paragraphs IV and VI, and 32 paragraph III to be warranted

in respect of Molymex’s operations. In the preparation of the factual

record, additional information would be obtained on the activities with

which Molymex resumed its operations in 1994, and the application of

the environmental impact assessment procedure to these activities

would be reviewed.

2. Alleged Failures to Effectively Enforce LGEEPA Article 112

paragraph II

LGEEPA Article 112 paragraph II states as follows:

Article 112.- In respect of air pollution prevention and control, the governments of the States, the Federal District and the Municipalities, in accordance with the distribution of powers established by Articles 7, 8 and 9 of

this Law, as well as the relevant local laws:

II. Shall apply general criteria on air quality protection in the urban

development plans under their jurisdiction, defining zones in which

polluting facilities may be sited (emphasis added).

The Submitters contend that the Municipality of Cumpas, in violation of LGEEPA Article 112 paragraph II, did not issue the municipal

urban development plan, and thus it failed to define the zones in which

polluting facilities may be sited.35

The Party states in its response that “within its scope of jurisdiction

and by means of City Council Resolution Number Nineteen, Special Session no. Eleven of 4 September 1998 (sic), the President and Municipal

Secretary of Cumpas, Sonora, signed document no. 854-98 of 7 September 1998, whereby an industrial land use permit was issued to the Company; this permit may be implicitly construed as the instrument used to

define the zone in which the Company was permitted to situate its facility.36”

SEM-00-005 207

35. Page 11 of the submission.

36. Page 11 of the Response.
The provision in question establishes the municipal authority’s

responsibility to enact a general legal provision that defines the territorial parameters governing the authorities and private parties in regard

to the siting of polluting facilities.37 From paragraph II of that article

and related provisions, it is clear that the parameters contained in the

urban development plans are provisions of an impersonal, general and

abstract nature.

In contrast, a land use permit is a personalized, individualized,

concrete provision which, like any such provision, is based on a general

standard. Therefore, one cannot consider that the requirement of issuing

general criteria that define the zones in which polluting facilities may be

sited, as prescribed by LGEEPA Article 112 paragraph II, is met by issuing a land use permit.

Notwithstanding the foregoing, it should be noted that the submission contains contradictory statements on this point. On the one hand,

the Submitters argue that the Municipality of Cumpas “did not issue the

municipal urban development plan,” and that therefore, “it did not

define the zones in which polluting facilities may be sited.” On the other

hand, it states that the urban development masterplan for Cumpas

establishes a zone “devoted to industrial use” and that Molymex is

located outside of that zone.38

The Party, in its response, neither denies nor affirms the existence

or applicability of that urban development masterplan for Cumpas, nor

does it clarify whether that plan contains definitions of zones in which

polluting facilities may be sited. Based solely on the Submitters’ assertions,39 it would appear that the municipal authority did fulfill its

208 NORTH AMERICAN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY

37. This is a local power by virtue of Article 115(V)(a) of the Constitution, which states:

“V. The Municipalities, under the terms of the applicable federal and state laws, are

empowered to:

“a) Formulate, approve and administer zoning schemes and municipal urban

development plans;”

This same power is reiterated in Article 136(VIII) of the Political Constitution of the

State of Sonora; Article 37(V) of the Organic Law of Municipal Administration (Ley

Orgánica de Administración Municipal) (of the State of Sonora); and Article 6(X) of the

Sonora State LGEEPA. The government of the State of Sonora is empowered to

establish a Sectoral Urban Development Program and “to cooperate with the

municipalities in the definition of standards to govern projects carried out by the

public, private and civic sectors in relation to urban development.” (Article 29(IV)

of the Organic Law of the Executive Branch of the State of Sonora (Ley Orgánica del

Poder Ejecutivo del Estado de Sonora).

38. The foregoing information from page 11 and Appendix IV of the submission.

39. The submission attaches a copy of a document from November 1980 titled “Urban

Development Masterplan, Municipality of Cumpas, Strategic Guidelines” (Appendix IV), but that document is incomplete, consisting of only 3 poorly legible pages.
responsibility to establish a specific zone in which polluting industrial

activities may be carried on.

Neither is it possible to determine from the information provided

by the Submitters and the Party whether the Molymex plant is improperly located. While a zoning map and two photographs are annexed

to the submission,40 it is impossible to discern from them whether

Molymex is or is not located in a zone in which polluting facilities may be

sited.

Considering that the mere issuance of a land use permit does not

satisfy the obligations established by LGEEPA Articles 112 paragraph II,

additional information must be gathered to determine whether the

municipal urban development plan defines zones in which polluting

facilities may be sited, and whether the Molymex plant is located outside

of such zones. This matter should be relatively easy to clarify, and would

be appropriate to do so in the factual record that is warranted in regard

to the submission.

3. Alleged Failures to Effectively Enforce NOM-022-SSA1/1993

NOM-022-SSA1-1993 establishes that:

The concentration of sulfur dioxide as an air pollutant shall not exceed the

limit of 0.13 ppm, or the equivalent of 341 g/m3 in 24 hours once a year,

and 0.03 ppm (79 g/m3) in annual arithmetic mean, for the protection of

the health of the susceptible population.41

The Submitters append to their submission, and the Party to its

Response, an operating permit issued 11 February 1994 by means of

oficio No. DS-139-4-SPA-126, whose condition no. XVII sets out the following concentration limits for sulfur dioxide from the molybdenum

disulfide roasting process: 0.065 % in volume, at startup, shutdown or

machine failure in any 6-hour period, and 0.13 ppm during a 24-hour

period. This operating permit was amended numerous times:

• On 27 May 1994, the SO2 concentration limit was replaced by

650 ppmv (parts per million by volume) for 6 hour average, in

force as of 1 May 2005.42

SEM-00-005 209

40. Appendices I–III of the submission.

41. Point 4, “Specifications”, of NOM-022-SSA1-1993.

42. Page 3 of Appendix 5 of the Response.
• The oficio of 3 April 1996 changes the deadline for bringing the

emissions of the Molymex roasting furnace into compliance to 1

October 1997.43

• The operating permit was amended again on 30 May 1996, but

the limit for sulfur dioxide emissions was maintained at 650

ppmv, with a deadline for compliance of 31 December 1997. The

same permit grants a deadline of 9 December 1996 for installation of a stack for compliance with NOM-022-SSA1-1993.44

• The oficio of 17 June 1997 extends the deadline for compliance

with the concentration limit of 650 ppmv of sulfur dioxide to

1640 days, starting on 31 December 1997 (i.e., until mid-2002),

and additionally authorizes the plant to operate at its installed

capacity. The oficio further indicates that the company shall

comply with the concentration limits for SO2 in ambient air

established in oficio DFS-D-0114-97, although the Secretariat

ignores what those limits are because it was not provided a copy

of this oficio.45

• On 29 January 1999, the molybdenum sulfide roasting capacity

was increased to 4,200 tons per month, leading to an increase in

molybdenum trioxide production from 15 to 40 million pounds

per year, following the installation of the second roaster (expansion project of 1998).46

• Finally, on 29 November 2000, the operating permit was revised

to a production level of 30,000 tons per year of molybdenum trioxide. With respect to SO2, this revision again maintains the

limit of 650 ppmv, with a deadline for compliance of 31 December 2001.47

Regarding verification of Molymex’s compliance with the applicable environmental law and the conditions and measures imposed by the

authorities, the only document appended to Mexico’s response is a

report sent to the Semarnap Legal Affairs Branch (Dirección General de

Asuntos Jurídicos) on 17 January 2001, from the State Deputy Attorney for

Industrial Auditing (Subdelegación de Verificación Industrial) of the Sonora

State Profepa Office.48 The response and that document state that the

210 NORTH AMERICAN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY

43. Page 2 of Appendix 7 of the Response.

44. Pages 5–6 of Appendix 6 of the Response.

45. Page 2 of Appendix 8 of the Response.

46. Page 3 of Appendix 1 of the Response.

47. Pages 2 and 9 of Appendix 9 of the Response.

48. Appendix 10 of the Response.
company is in compliance with its air emissions obligations49 as well as

with certain conditions of its operating permit. According to the report,

the company filed the results of the perimeter monitoring stations with

the authority as of October 1994, although neither those results nor any

documents relating to acts of inspection and monitoring whereby the

authorities verified compliance by the company are annexed to the

response.

Meanwhile, the Submitters transcribe in their submission various

portions of a document produced by Sonora Branch Office B39 of the

Office of Profepa in April 1995. These transcriptions indicate that the

environmental authority of Mexico “authorized the company to violate

Mexican Official Standard NOM-022-SSA1/1993.50”

NOM-022-SSAI-1993 is a mandatory standard whose enforcement

is not left to the discretion of the authorities, and which does not allow

for extensions.51 Yet Molymex was granted extensions for compliance

with the applicable concentration limits, and the Party does not explain

in its response how those limits and extensions make for the effective

enforcement of NOM-022-SSA1-1993.52 First, the limit established by the

standard refers to concentrations in ambient air, whereas the limits and

extensions granted by means of oficios DFS-D-0986-97 and DS-SMAUNE-LF-282 refer to concentrations at the stack. The Party does not provide information on the relationship between stack emissions and compliance by the company with NOM-022-SSA1/1993. In addition, the

SEM-00-005 211

49. Specifically, that document asserts compliance with Article, 13(I) and (II), 16,

17(I)–(VIII), 23, and 26 of the LGEEPA Regulation respecting Air Pollution Prevention and Control (Reglamento de la LGEEPA en Materia de Prevención y Control de la

Contaminación de la Atmósfera) (presumably because the document does not so specify).

50. The foregoing information from pages 4–5 of the submission.

51. According to the Federal Metrology and Standardization Law (Ley Federal sobre

Metrología y Normalización), compliance with the Mexican Official Standards (such

as NOM-022-SSAI-1993) is not voluntary, and the authority is obligated to enforce

and guarantee compliance with them. In this regard, Article 52 of that Law states:

“Article 52.- All products, processes, methods, facilities, services and activities

shall comply with the Mexican Official Standards.” In addition, NOM-022-SSAI1993 states that: “This Mexican Official Standard shall be observed by the federal

and local authorities responsible for enforcement and assessment of air quality for

the purposes of public health protection... The competent authorities, within the

scope of their powers, shall enforce compliance with this Mexican Official Standard... This Mexican Official Standard comes into force as a mandatory standard

on the day following its publication in the Official Gazette of the Federation.”

52. It can be discerned from the documents relating to the operating permit that the

authority, in deciding to grant the permit, took account of the calculations performed by the company on dispersion of pollutants (including SO2), but nowhere is

the relationship between the limits established for stack emissions and compliance

with the ambient air concentration limits explained.
information provided with the response in regard to measurements of

SO2 in ambient air is scant. The Party does no more than assert, without

attaching supporting information, that “the State Profepa Office in

Sonora reported that in view of the annual results from 1995 to 2000 at

each of the four perimeter monitoring stations, the sulfur dioxide concentrations are within the limits established in the aforementioned official standard [referring to NOM-022-SSA1/1993].53” Notwithstanding

this statement, the question of whether the operating permit authorizes

the company to produce emissions above the limits for human health

protection established by NOM-022-SSA1-1993, as well as the question

of how that authorization would amount to effective enforcement of that

standard, remain unresolved.

In light of the foregoing, and despite the information provided by

the Party, the matters raised by the submission in regard to the alleged

failure to effectively enforce NOM-022-SSA1/1993 remain unresolved.

It would be appropriate to address these matters in the factual record

concerning this submission. In particular, the factual record should

present information on the relationship between the SO2 emissions permitted to Molymex and the observance of the maximum SO2 concentration in ambient air as established by NOM-022-SSA1/1993 for the

protection of human health. Likewise, further information would be

gathered on measurements and other acts of enforcement carried out

with respect to stack emissions and ambient SO2 concentration, and the

concrete results of such measurements, so as to illustrate the Party’s

assertion of compliance on the part of Molymex and effective enforcement of the NOM in question. Finally, the factual record would document the alleged human health and environmental effects or risks that

the Submitter, and previously the Mexican environmental authority,

attributed to SO2 emissions from the Molymex plant.

On balance, although the Submitters did not provide overwhelming evidence of failures to effectively enforce the environmental law on

the part of Mexico with respect to Molymex, the Secretariat considers

that the Profepa memorandum on which the Submitters base the central

concerns of their submission raises important matters that remain unresolved relating to the effective enforcement of environmental law in

regard to Molymex. In addition, the Secretariat finds that the development of a factual record on several of the assertions in this submission

would help to resolve the concerns of the Submitters and certain members of the community of Cumpas, Sonora, resulting in greater transparency, public participation and effective enforcement of environmental

law.

212 NORTH AMERICAN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY

53. Page 16 of the Response.
V. RECOMMENDATION

For the reasons set forth in this notification, the Secretariat hereby

informs the Council that in light of the response of Mexico, it considers

the development of a factual record to be warranted for the assertions

contained in submission SEM-00-005 regarding LGEEPA Articles 28

paragraph III, 29 paragraphs IV and VI, 32, and 112, and in regard to

Mexican Official Standard NOM-022-SSA1/1993, all in relation to the

operation of the Molymex plant in Sonora, Mexico. The submission

raises questions which the response leaves unresolved regarding the

effective enforcement of environmental law with respect to the

Molymex plant, in regard to the environmental impact authorization for

activities commenced in 1994; the definition of zones in Cumpas in

which polluting facilities may be sited; and the sulfur dioxide emissions

that have been of constant concern for the population of Cumpas (which

the environmental authority itself considers to have violated the SO2

concentration limits in ambient air). The factual record would clarify

unresolved matters and gather additional information on the effective

enforcement of these provisions with respect to Molymex. This would

serve to illustrate the enforcement of environmental law for the protection of public health and the environment, as it relates to polluting facilities, and thus contribute to effective enforcement and advance the goals

of the NAAEC.

Respectfully submitted for your consideration on this 20th of

December 2001.

Janine Ferretti

Executive Director

SEM-00-005 213

SEM-00-006

(Tarahumara)

SUBMITTERS: COMISION DE SOLIDARIDAD Y DEFENSA

DE LOS DERECHOS HUMANOS A.C.

(COSYDDHAC)

PARTY: United Mexican States

DATE: 9 June 2000

SUMMARY: The Submitters allege a failure by Mexico to effectively enforce its environmental law by denying

access to environmental justice to Indigenous

communities in the Sierra Tarahumara in the State

of Chihuahua. They particularly assert failures to

effectively enforce environmental law relative to

the citizen complaint process, to alleged environmental crimes and other to alleged violations with

respect to forest resources and the environment in

the Sierra Tarahumara.

SECRETARIAT DETERMINATIONS:

ART. 14(1)(2)

(6 November 2001)

Determination that criteria under Article 14(1)

have been met and determination pursuant to

Article 14(2) that the submission merits requesting a response from the Party.

215

Secretariado de la Comisión para la Cooperación

Ambiental de América del Norte

Determinación en conformidad con los artículos 14(1) y (2) del

Acuerdo de Cooperación Ambiental de América del Norte

Núm. Petición: SEM-00-006 (Tarahumara)

Peticionario: Comisión de Solidaridad y Defensa

de los Derechos Humanos A.C.

(COSYDDHAC)

Parte: Estados Unidos Mexicanos

Fecha de recepción: 9 de junio de 2000

Fecha de la determinación: 6 de noviembre de 2001

I. INTRODUCCIÓN

El 9 de junio del 2000, la “Comisión de Solidaridad y Defensa de los

Derechos Humanos A.C.” (la “Peticionaria”), presentó al Secretariado

de la Comisión para la Cooperación Ambiental de América del Norte (la

“CCA”) una petición de conformidad con los artículos 14 y 15 del

Acuerdo de Cooperación Ambiental de América del Norte (el “ACAAN” o

“Acuerdo”). La Peticionaria asevera que México ha incurrido en omisiones en la aplicación efectiva de su legislación ambiental por la

denegación de justicia ambiental a Pueblos Indígenas en la Sierra

Tarahumara en el Estado de Chihuahua. En particular asevera

omisiones en la aplicación efectiva de la legislación ambiental

relacionada con el proceso de denuncia popular, presuntos delitos

ambientales y otras supuestas violaciones relacionadas con los recursos

forestales y el medio ambiente en la Sierra Tarahumara.

El artículo 14 del ACAAN faculta al Secretariado para examinar

peticiones de cualquier persona u organización sin vinculación guber217
namental que asevere que una Parte está incurriendo en omisiones en la

aplicación efectiva de su legislación ambiental, si el Secretariado juzga

que la petición cumple con los requisitos señalados en el artículo 14(1)

del ACAAN.

La petición original constaba de cinco capítulos y 45 páginas. Las

Directrices para la presentación de peticiones (las “Directrices”), sugieren

una extensión máxima de 15 páginas para la presentación de peticiones,

excluyendo anexos e información de apoyo (véase el apartado 3.3 de las

Directrices). El 19 de junio del 2000, el 20 de febrero del 2001, y el 6 de

abril del 2001, el Secretariado solicitó a la Peticionaria que modificara la

petición para corregir este defecto de forma. En su última comunicación,

el Secretariado propuso a la Peticionaria un modo de proceder para

reducir la petición y posteriormente comenzó la revisión conforme al

artículo 14(1) con base en esa petición reducida.

Esta Determinación contiene el análisis de la petición con base en

los artículos 14(1) y (2) del ACAAN. El Secretariado ha determinado que

algunas de las aserciones de la petición no satisfacen los requisitos del

artículo 14(1), mientras que otras sí los satisfacen y ameritan solicitar a

México una respuesta atendiendo a los criterios del artículo 14(2).

II. RESUMEN DE LA PETICIÓN

En la petición, COSYDDHAC asevera que México está incurriendo

en omisiones en la aplicación efectiva de su legislación ambiental en

relación con el procesamiento efectivo de denuncias populares, la persecución de delitos ambientales, la consulta a Pueblos Indígenas previa a

la expedición de permisos de tala y el acceso a la información ambiental1.

Según la Peticionaria, la Parte está incurriendo en las siguientes omisiones en la aplicación efectiva de su legislación ambiental:

...

A. Omisión de la Parte, en la aplicación efectiva del artículo 189 en

relación con el 191 de la LGEEPA [Ley General del Equilibrio Ecológico y

la Protección al Ambiente], en su aspecto de garantizar a los Pueblos

Indígenas, en tanto grupos sociales, el acceso a la Justicia Ambiental

218 NORTH AMERICAN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY

1. En la petición se cuentan al menos 112 situaciones concretas, considerando los

ejemplos de la totalidad de los encabezados, donde se afirma que la Parte no aplicó su

ley ambiental de manera efectiva. La estructura original de la petición dedicaba un

capítulo de hechos (Capítulo III, ahora apéndice I) para narrar la historia procesal de

cada una de las denuncias populares y acciones de la autoridad que se emplean como

ejemplos para documentar cada una de las 21 aserciones (contenidas en el Capítulo

IV que se conservó en el cuerpo de la petición).
por medio de la interposición de Denuncia Popular, o desde otra

óptica, la omisión de la Parte al negarle a estos Pueblos interés jurídico

en sentido lato, tanto como legitimatio ad processum, y legitimatio ad

causam.

B. Omisión de la Parte, en la aplicación efectiva del artículo 189, en

relación con el 190 y 191, todos de la LGEEPA, relativa a la negativa de

admitir una Denuncia Popular que cumple con todos los requisitos

legales.

C. Omisión de la Parte en la aplicación efectiva del artículo 176 de la

LGEEPA, en su aspecto de garantizar a los afectados con motivo de

una resolución final dictada en un procedimiento administrativo, el

acceso a la Justicia Ambiental por medio de la interposición del

Recurso de Revisión, en contra de aquélla, o desde otra óptica, la

omisión de la Parte al negarle a los Pueblo Indígenas, interés jurídico

en sentido lato, tanto como legitimatio ad processum, y legitimatio ad

causam, en la materia señalada.

D. Omisión de la Parte en la aplicación efectiva del artículo 176 de la

LGEEPA, relativa a que a todo Recurso de Revisión debe recaer una

resolución que ponga fin al mismo.

E. Omisión de la Parte en la aplicación efectiva del artículo 15.2 del

Convenio 169 de la OIT [Organización Internacional del Trabajo], en

relación con autorizaciones otorgadas para el aprovechamiento de

recursos forestales maderables.

F. Omisión de la Parte en la aplicación efectiva del artículo 199 en

relación con el 189 de la LGEEPA, relativa a la falta de resolución o

conclusión de Denuncias Populares.

G. Omisión de la Parte en la aplicación efectiva del artículo 418 del CFPP

(sic), en lo tocante a no participar al MP [Ministerio Público] Federal,

la probable existencia de delitos ambientales consistentes en el

desmonte, destrucción de vegetación natural y cambio de uso de

suelo sin contar con autorización, a pesar de haber tenido conocimiento de los mismos en ejercicio de funciones.

H. Omisión de la Parte en la aplicación efectiva del artículo 418 del CPF,

en lo tocante al desmonte de terreno, y cambio de uso de suelo, sin

autorización de la Ley Forestal.

I. Omisión de la Parte en la aplicación efectiva del artículo 418 del CPF,

en lo tocante a no participar al MP Federal, la probable existencia de

delitos ambientales consistente en cortar, arrancar, derribar o talar

árboles sin autorización, a pesar de haber tenido conocimiento de los

mismos en ejercicio de funciones.

SEM-00-006 219
J. Omisión de la Parte en la aplicación efectiva del artículo 418 del CPF,

en lo relativo al delito de cortar, arrancar, derribar, talar arboles, o

realizar aprovechamiento de recursos forestales sin contar con la

autorización de la Ley Forestal.

K. Omisión de la Parte en la aplicación efectiva del artículo 418 del CPF,

en lo tocante a no participar al MP Federal, la probable existencia de

delitos ambientales consistente en ocasionar dolosamente incendio

en bosque y vegetación forestal dañando recursos naturales, la flora,

fauna silvestre y ecosistema.

L. Omisión de la Parte en la aplicación efectiva del artículo 418 del CPF,

en lo concerniente al delito de ocasionar dolosamente incendio en

bosque y vegetación forestal dañando recursos naturales, la flora,

fauna silvestre y ecosistema.

M. Omisión de la Parte en la aplicación efectiva del artículo 419 del CPF,

en lo tocante a no participar al MP Federal, la probable existencia

de delitos ambientales consistentes en el transporte, acopio, y

transformación de recursos forestales sin autorización de la Ley

Forestal, a pesar de haber tenido conocimiento de los mismos en

ejercicio de funciones.

N. Omisión de la Parte en la aplicación efectiva del artículo 416 del CPF,

en lo tocante a no participar al MP Federal, la probable existencia

de delitos ambientales consistentes en descargar y depositar aguas

residuales en aguas nacionales, en menoscabo de la salud pública,

recursos naturales, flora, fauna y calidad del agua.

O. Omisión de la Parte en la aplicación efectiva del artículo 169 in fine de

la LGEEPA, el cual establece en base a una lectura integral, que una

vez dictada la resolución a que hace referencia el numero 168 de la

ley en cito, de verificarse hechos, actos u omisiones que pudieran

configurar uno o más delitos, la autoridad ambiental deberá hacerlos

del conocimiento del MP.

P. Omisión de la Parte en la aplicación efectiva del artículo 202 de la

LGEEPA, en lo tocante a que la PROFEPA, Chihuahua, a pesar de

haber realizado visitas de inspección, derivadas en su mayoría de

Denuncias Populares, en las cuales constato de manera directa

la comisión de actos, hechos y omisiones constitutivos de delitos

ambientales, no interpuso Denuncia Penal sobre los mismos.

Q. Omisión de la Parte en la aplicación efectiva del artículo 191 de la

LGEEPA al no acumular una Denuncia Popular interpuesta a un

expediente preexistente abierto con motivo de una Denuncia Popular

previamente presentada de contenido igual.

220 NORTH AMERICAN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY
R. Omisión de la Parte en la aplicación efectiva del artículo 191 y 192

de la LGEEPA, al no haber acordado una Denuncia Popular, y en

consecuencia, dejado de efectuar las diligencias necesarias con el fin

de determinar la existencia de los actos, hechos u omisiones

planteadas en la misma.

S. Omisión de la Parte en la aplicación efectiva del artículo 191 en

relación con el 190 de la LGEEPA, en lo tocante a no acordar una

Denuncia Popular, al no haber sido turnada la misma al órgano

competente.

T. Omisión de la Parte en la aplicación efectiva del artículo 193 de la

LGEEPA, al resolver una Denuncia Popular sin informar al

Denunciante las consideraciones adoptadas respecto a las pruebas e

información aportada.

U. Omisión de la Parte en la aplicación efectiva del artículo 159 Bis 3,

en relación con el 159 Bis 4, ambos de la LGEEPA, al negarse a

proporcionar información ambiental solicitada.

La Peticionaria afirma que estas presuntas omisiones en la aplicación efectiva de la Ley General del Equilibrio Ecológico y la Protección al

Ambiente(LGEEPA), el Código Penal Federal (CPF), la Ley Forestal (LF) y el

Convenio sobre Pueblos Indígenas y Tribales No. 169 de la Organización

Internacional del Trabajo (Convenio 169 de la OIT) constituyen la denegación de justicia ambiental a Pueblos Indígenas en la Sierra Tarahumara en el Estado de Chihuahua, en contravención de lo dispuesto por

los artículos 6 y 7 del ACAAN. La parte final de la petición asevera que

las 21 aserciones y sus ejemplos “configuran una pauta persistente2”.

III. ANÁLISIS DE LA PETICIÓN CONFORME AL

ARTÍCULO 14(1)

El artículo 14(1) del Acuerdo establece que:

El Secretariado podrá examinar peticiones de cualquier persona u

organización sin vinculación gubernamental que asevere que una Parte

está incurriendo en omisiones en la aplicación efectiva de su legislación

ambiental, si el Secretariado juzga que la petición:

(a) se presenta por escrito en un idioma designado por esa Parte en una

notificación al Secretariado;

(b) identifica claramente a la persona u organización que presenta la

petición;

SEM-00-006 221

2. Petición, p. 18.
(c) proporciona información suficiente que permita al Secretariado

revisarla, e incluyendo las pruebas documentales que puedan

sustentarla;

(d) parece encaminada a promover la aplicación de la ley y no a hostigar

una industria;

(e) señala que el asunto ha sido comunicado por escrito a las autoridades

pertinentes de la Parte y, si la hay, la respuesta de la Parte; y

(f) la presenta una persona u organización que reside o está establecida

en territorio de una Parte.

Si bien el artículo 14(1) no pretende colocar una gran carga para los

peticionarios, en esta etapa se requiere de cierta revisión inicial para

verificar que la petición cumple con estos requisitos3. El Secretariado

examinó esta petición con tal perspectiva en mente.

La petición cumple con los requisitos establecidos en los incisos (a),

(b), (d) y (f) del artículo 14(1) porque fue presentada por escrito en

español, uno de los idiomas oficiales de las Partes4; la Peticionaria se

identifica claramente en la petición como una organización sin

vinculación gubernamental -COSYDDHAC- con domicilio en la Ciudad

de Chihuahua, Estado de Chihuahua, México5. Finalmente, la petición

parece encaminada a promover actividades de aplicación de la legislación ambiental y no a hostigar una industria, ya que se enfoca

principalmente en la forma en que la autoridad ambiental ha atendido

las denuncias presentadas por Pueblos Indígenas y otros grupos interesados en la protección de los recursos naturales en la Sierra

Tarahumara.

Se estima cumplido también el requisito señalado en el inciso (c)

porque la petición y sus anexos contienen suficiente información para

analizar las aseveraciones que se plantean. Se ha proporcionado al

Secretariado información suficiente sobre los medios por los que los

Pueblos Indígenas y otros grupos de la Sierra Tarahumara han

pretendido participar en la aplicación efectiva de la ley para la

protección de los recursos naturales de esa Sierra, sobre el trámite que la

autoridad le ha dado a las denuncias (populares y penales) que estos

222 NORTH AMERICAN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY

3. En este sentido, véanse SEM-97-005 (Biodiversidad) Determinación conforme al

artículo 14(1) en relación con la petición (26 de mayo de 1998); y SEM-98-003

(Grandes Lagos) Determinación conforme a los artículos 14(1) y (2) relativa a la

petición, en su versión revisada (8 de septiembre de 1999).

4. Véase también el apartado 3.2 de las Directrices para la Presentación de Peticiones.

5. Petición, p. 1 y anexo 0.
grupos han presentado6 y sobre las razones por las que la Peticionaria

considera omisa la actuación de la autoridad en cuanto a la aplicación

efectiva de la legislación ambiental7.

En cuanto al inciso (e), en la petición se afirma que el asunto se ha

comunicado a las autoridades pertinentes de la Parte y se anexan las

respuestas de la Parte a tales comunicaciones8. La mayoría de las

aseveraciones de la petición se refieren a asuntos que se han comunicado

a las autoridades pertinentes de la Parte9. Se han presentado 46 escritos

(incluyendo denuncias, recursos y amparos) que comunican a la

autoridad tanto los daños ambientales por actividades presuntamente

ilegales que afectan el bosque de la Sierra Tarahumara percibidos por

Pueblos Indígenas y otros grupos, como la falta de respuesta adecuada

por parte de la autoridad a esas denuncias. Por ejemplo, el Anexo 51 de la

petición contiene una denuncia sobre la destrucción del bosque de la

Sierra Tarahumara que afirma que: “[l]os daños culturales y sociales

provocados por esta situación son cada vez más críticos para los

pobladores, manifestándose en la pauperización, emigración y

degradación de las culturas serranas...” y solicita “dar trámite efectivo a

las denuncias ambientales que se han interpuesto ante la PROFEPA por

tala ilegal10”.

Además de los requisitos listados en el artículo 14(1), el preámbulo

de ese artículo plantea que una petición debe aseverar “que una Parte

está incurriendo en omisiones en la aplicación efectiva de su legislación

ambiental”. La mayoría de las aseveraciones de esta petición sí se ajustan

a lo dispuesto en este preámbulo, mientras que algunas de las aseveraciones no se ajustan porque no se refieren a disposiciones que sean

“legislación ambiental” en los términos del ACAAN11, o porque se

refieren a situaciones consumadas respecto de las cuales la autoridad

SEM-00-006 223

6. Véase el Apéndice 1 de la petición reducida que relata los hechos en que se basa la

petición.

7. Véase el Capítulo IV de la petición.

8. Petición, p. 18, Capítulo V. “Peticiones” y los anexos 3, 4, 6, 8, 9, 12, 14, 15, 19, 21, 27,

29 al 48, 50, 52, 53, 54, 56, 58, 60, 62, 64, 65, 67, 68, 69, 70, 72, 73, 75, 77, 78, 79, 80.

9. Véanse los anexos 5, 10, 20, 49 y 51 de la petición. Más adelante se indican sobre

cuáles de las aseveraciones no se estima cumplido este requisito.

10. Denuncia popular presentada por la Coalición Rural, 8 de noviembre de 1999,

encabezado F; contestación de la Parte en los anexos 53 y 54.

11. El artículo 45(2) del ACAAN establece la definición de legislación ambiental:

“Para efectos del Artículo 14 y la Quinta Parte

(a) “legislación ambiental” significa cualquier ley o reglamento de una Parte,

o sus disposiciones, cuyo propósito principal sea la protección del medio

ambiente, o la prevención de un peligro contra la vida o la salud humana, a

través de:

(i) la prevención, el abatimiento o el control de una fuga, descarga, o

emisión de contaminantes ambientales,
ambiental no podría haber realizado algún acto de aplicación de la

legislación ambiental al momento de presentarse la petición, y en consecuencia no puede afirmarse que México “está incurriendo” en una

omisión en esos casos.

En seguida se analizan con mayor detalle las presuntas omisiones

que alega la Peticionaria, agrupadas para facilitar su análisis en torno a

los cuatro temas principales a que se refiere la petición: atención a la

denuncia popular y el recurso de revisión; persecución de probables

delitos ambientales; aplicación del Convenio 169 de la OIT; y acceso a la

información ambiental.

i. Presuntas omisiones relacionadas con la denuncia popular y el recurso

de revisión12

La petición afirma que México está incurriendo en omisiones en la

aplicación efectiva de la legislación ambiental mexicana respecto de 36

denuncias populares sobre tala ilegal y destrucción del bosque de la

Sierra Tarahumara en Chihuahua, México. Estas denuncias populares

fueron promovidas entre febrero de 1998 y marzo de 2000 por diversos

grupos: la Comunidad de San Ignacio de Ararenco; las Comunidades

de los Ejidos de Ciénega de Guacayvo, de San Diego de Alcalá y de

El Consuelo; los Pueblos Indígenas Raramurí y Tepehuan; y por la

Coalición Rural/Rural Coalition. La petición asevera que México está

incurriendo en omisiones en la aplicación efectiva de su legislación

ambiental por el inadecuado procesamiento que la autoridad ambiental

ha dado a estas denunciasya3 recursos de revisión presentados en

relación con esas denuncias. Señala que estas omisiones se dan en

el contexto de los artículos 6 y 7 del ACAAN, que establecen el compromiso de las Partes del ACAAN de “iniciar de manera oportuna

procedimientos judiciales, como es la interposición de Denuncias

224 NORTH AMERICAN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY

(ii) el control de químicos, sustancias, materiales o desechos peligrosos o

tóxicos, y la diseminación de información relacionada con ello; o

(iii) la protección de la flora y fauna silvestres, incluso especies en peligro de

extinción, su hábitat, y las áreas naturales protegidas en territorio de la

Parte, pero no incluye cualquier ley o reglamento, ni sus disposiciones,

directamente relacionados con la seguridad e higiene del trabajador.

(b) Para mayor certidumbre, el término “legislación ambiental” no incluye

ninguna ley ni reglamento, ni sus disposiciones, cuyo propósito principal sea

la administración de la recolección, extracción o explotación de recursos

naturales con fines comerciales, ni la recolección o extracción de recursos

naturales con propósitos de subsistencia o por poblaciones indígenas.

(c) El propósito principal de una disposición legislativa o reglamentaria en particular, para efectos de los incisos (a) y (b) se determinará por su propósito principal y no por el de la ley o del reglamento del que forma parte.”

12. Planteadas en los encabezados A, B, C, D, F, Q, R, S, y T de la petición.
Penales, para procurar sanciones y soluciones adecuadas en caso de

violaciones a la legislación ambiental”, así como la garantía de “la

disponibilidad de mecanismos administrativos para la aplicación de la

legislación ambiental, que comprende[n], por principio, el acceso a [...]

lo[s] mismo[s], conforme a la legislación nacional13”.

La denuncia popular es un mecanismo que permite a cualquier

persona, organización o grupo social comunicar a la autoridad presuntas violaciones a la ley ambiental o daños al medio ambiente14. Como

se ha dicho al revisar otras peticiones relacionadas con el mecanismo de

denuncia popular, es evidente que las disposiciones de la LGEEPA que

establecen la denuncia popular califican como “legislación ambiental”

en los términos de la definición del artículo 45(2) del ACAAN, porque

son disposiciones cuyo propósito principal es la protección del medio

ambiente15.

La petición afirma que México está incurriendo en omisiones en la

aplicación efectiva de su legislación ambiental porque las denuncias

presentadas por los Pueblos Indígenas y otros grupos de la Sierra

Tarahumara no se han tramitado conforme a lo que establece la

LGEEPA: algunas no han sido admitidas; algunas que sí se han admitido

no se han resuelto ni tramitado como lo marca la ley; no se han realizado

las diligencias que la ley exige; además de que no se han admitido o

resuelto recursos de revisión relacionados con las denuncias populares

presentadas. En el caso de esta petición, la mayoría de las denuncias

populares se refieren a actividades o hechos que los denunciantes

consideran una amenaza al ecosistema de la Sierra Tarahumara, y a la

subsistencia y patrimonio cultural de las culturas serranas, aunque no

especifican las violaciones a disposiciones legales precisas en que se

basan16.

SEM-00-006 225

13. Para las dos referencias anteriores, véase la p. 1 de la petición.

14. El artículo 189 de la LGEEPA dispone: “Toda persona, grupos sociales, organizaciones no gubernamentales, asociaciones y sociedades podrán denunciar ante

la Procuraduría Federal de Protección al Ambiente o ante otras autoridades todo

hecho, acto u omisión que produzca o pueda producir desequilibrio ecológico o

daños al ambiente o a los recursos naturales, o contravenga las disposiciones de la

presente Ley y de los demás ordenamientos que regulen materias relacionadas con

la protección al ambiente y la preservación del equilibrio ecológico ...”

15. Véanse SEM 98-002 (Ortiz Martínez) Determinación conforme al artículo 14(1)

(23 de junio de 1998), y SEM-97-007 (Lago de Chapala) Determinación conforme

al artículo 15(1) (14 de julio del 2000).

16. La LGEEPA no exige como requisito que los denunciantes identifiquen las disposiciones legales que consideran infringidas con los hechos que denuncian (ver

artículo 190). Por su parte, el apartado 5.2 de las Directrices sólo exige que “en el

caso de la Ley General de Equilibrio Ecológico y la Protección al Ambiente de

México, el peticionario deberá identificar el capítulo o la disposición aplicable de la

ley.”
En cuanto al recurso de revisión, este es también un mecanismo

establecido por la LGEEPA para permitir a los particulares contribuir en

la aplicación de la ley ambiental. Los artículos 176 al 181 de la LGEEPA

disponen que las personas afectadas por una resolución administrativa

definitiva, y emitida con motivo de diversos actos de aplicación de la

ley citada pueden impugnar tales resoluciones. En ciertos casos, las

personas afectadas pueden solicitar que se lleven a cabo las acciones

necesarias “para que sean observadas las disposiciones jurídicas aplicables, siempre que demuestren en el procedimiento que dichas obras o

actividades originan o pueden originar un daño a los recursos naturales,

la flora o la fauna silvestre, la salud pública o la calidad de vida” (artículo

180 de la LGEEPA). Es claro entonces, que las disposiciones que establecen el recurso de revisión satisfacen la definición de legislación

ambiental del ACAAN porque al igual que en el caso de la denuncia

popular, estas disposiciones establecen un mecanismo cuyo propósito

principal es la protección del medio ambiente mediante la participación

de cualquier persona en la vigilancia del cumplimiento de la ley

ambiental17.

En resumen, estas aseveraciones se consideran procedentes conforme al artículo 14(1) del ACAAN en tanto se refieren principalmente a

la tramitación adecuada de la denuncia popular y el recurso de revisión

como mecanismos para la protección ambiental a los cuales la legislación ambiental de la Parte concede amplio acceso público. Por el

contrario, los hechos a los que se refieren las denuncias populares

mismas no son materia de esta petición y no serán materia de análisis

ulterior en este caso. El Peticionario tuvo cuidado de plantear en esta

petición las cuestiones de aplicación de la ley ambiental que enfrentan

las comunidades de la Sierra Tarahumara, sin plantear presuntas omisiones en la aplicación efectiva de “disposiciones, cuyo propósito principal sea la administración de la recolección, extracción o explotación de

recursos naturales con fines comerciales, ni la recolección o extracción de

recursos naturales con propósitos de subsistencia o por poblaciones

indígenas”, que podrían estar excluidas de revisión en este proceso en

virtud de lo dispuesto por el artículo 45(2)(b) del ACAAN. Como se ha

visto, la petición no se trata de los daños al medio ambiente reportados

en las denuncias populares, sino que se centra en la manera pre226 NORTH AMERICAN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY

17. Dado que se trata de disposiciones adjetivas, se evalúa si el recurso de revisión se

ha invocado en relación directa a una disposición sustantiva que no cumpla con la

definición de legislación ambiental. [Véase SEM 98-002 (23 de junio de 1998)

Determinación conforme al artículo 14(1) (Ortiz Martínez)] En el caso de esta

petición presentada por COSYDDHAC, los recursos de revisión se refieren al

acceso y tramitación adecuada de la denuncia popular, que a su vez satisface la

definición en cuestión.
suntamente omisa en que México aplica la denuncia popular como

herramienta de acceso a la justicia ambiental respecto de algunos

Pueblos Indígenas y otros grupos en la Sierra Tarahumara. En este

sentido, la petición logra enfocar el asunto de manera que (en su

mayoría) las presuntas omisiones que se plantean son omisiones en la

aplicación efectiva de disposiciones cuyo propósito principal es “la

protección de medio ambiente ... a través de ... la protección de la flora y

fauna silvestres...”, conforme al artículo 45(2)(a)(iii) del Acuerdo.

ii. Presuntas omisiones relacionadas con la persecución de probables delitos

ambientales18

La Peticionaria señala que México está incurriendo en omisiones

en la aplicación efectiva de probables delitos ambientales que se han

denunciado o sobre los que la autoridad ambiental ha tenido conocimiento durante inspecciones y en el ejercicio de otras funciones.

La petición asevera que México está incurriendo en omisiones en

dos sentidos: al no aplicar los artículos 416, 418, y 419 del CPF a hechos

presuntamente delictivos y al no ejercer las facultades que posee la

autoridad ambiental para iniciar investigaciones o dar parte al

Ministerio Público de hechos que pudieran configurar esos delitos,

conforme a los artículos 169 y 202 de la LGEEPA19.

SEM-00-006 227

18. Planteadas en los encabezados G, H, I , J ,K, L, M,N ,O y P de la petición.

19. “Artículo 416.- Se impondrá pena de tres meses a seis años de prisión y de mil

a veinte mil días multa, al que sin la autorización que en su caso se requiera, o

en contravención a las disposiciones legales, reglamentarias y normas oficiales

mexicanas:

I.- Descargue, deposite, o infiltre, o lo autorice u ordene, aguas residuales, líquidos

químicos o bioquímicos, desechos o contaminantes en los suelos, aguas marinas,

ríos, cuencas, vasos y demás depósitos o corrientes de agua de jurisdicción federal,

que ocasionen o puedan ocasionar daños a la salud pública, a los recursos naturales, a la flora, a la fauna, a la calidad del agua de las cuencas o a los ecosistemas.

Cuando se trate de aguas para ser entregadas en bloque a centros de población, la

pena se podrá elevar hasta tres años más; ...”

“Artículo 418.- Al que sin contar con la autorización que se requiera conforme a la

Ley Forestal, desmonte o destruya la vegetación natural, corte, arranque, derribe o

tale árboles, realice aprovechamientos de recursos forestales o cambios de uso del

suelo, se le impondrá pena de tres meses a seis años de prisión y por el equivalente

de cien a veinte mil días multa....La misma pena se aplicará a quien dolosamente

ocasione incendios en bosques, selva, o vegetación natural que dañen recursos

naturales, la flora o la fauna silvestre o los ecosistemas.”

“Artículo 419.- A quien transporte, comercie, acopie o transforme recursos

forestales maderables en cantidades superiores a cuatro metros cúbicos rollo o su

equivalente, para los cuales no se haya autorizado su aprovechamiento conforme a

la Ley Forestal, se impondrá pena de tres meses a seis años de prisión y de cien a

veinte mil días multa, excepto en los casos de aprovechamientos de recursos

forestales para uso doméstico, conforme a lo dispuesto en la Ley Forestal.”
Del texto de los artículos 416 y 418 del CPF se desprende claramente que éstos satisfacen la definición de legislación ambiental del

ACAAN porque su propósito principal es la protección del medio

ambiente a través de la protección de la flora y fauna silvestre. En el caso

del artículo 419 del CPF que tipifica como delitos la realización (en

determinadas circunstancias) de actividades de explotación comercial

de los recursos naturales, se satisface también la definición de “legislación ambiental”. La exclusión prevista en el artículo 45(2)(b) de disposiciones cuyo propósito principal sea la “administración” de actividades

de explotación comercial, de subsistencia o por poblaciones indígenas,

debe entenderse referida a actividades de ese tipo que sean lícitas, no a

actividades que constituyen delitos. Además, la exposición de motivos

que correspondió a la publicación del artículo 419 del CPF indica expresamente que el propósito principal de todas las disposiciones que contienen los delitos ambientales es la protección del medio ambiente y los

recursos naturales20.

Como se ha dicho, el segundo aspecto de las aseveraciones relacionadas con los delitos ambientales se refiere a las disposiciones

adjetivas relevantes. La petición señala que a través de denuncias

populares se hicieron del conocimiento de la autoridad ambiental

hechos que posiblemente constituyen delitos. Afirma que, además,

la autoridad realizó al menos 15 visitas de inspección en las que la

autoridad habría identificado posibles delitos ambientales. Según la

Peticionaria, en ninguno de esos casos se interpuso una denuncia penal,

lo que constituye una omisión en la aplicación efectiva de las disposiciones que establecen las facultades indagatorias y persecutorias de la

Parte, es decir, de los artículos 169 y 202 de la LGEEPA.

Las disposiciones mencionadas, son “legislación ambiental” para

efectos del artículo 14 del ACAAN porque su propósito principal, al

igual que el de los delitos ambientales, es la protección del medio

ambiente. Por otra parte, se trata de presuntas omisiones en las que la

228 NORTH AMERICAN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY

El párrafo relevante del artículo 169 dispone: “... En los casos en que proceda, la

autoridad federal hará del conocimiento del Ministerio Público la realización de

actos u omisiones constatados en el ejercicio de sus facultades que pudieran

configurar uno o más delitos.”

“Artículo 202.- La Procuraduría Federal de Protección al Ambiente en el ámbito de

sus atribuciones, está facultada para iniciar las acciones que procedan, ante las

autoridades judiciales competentes, cuando conozca de actos, hechos u omisiones

que constituyan violaciones a la legislación administrativa o penal.”

20. Exposición de motivos del Decreto que reforma, adiciona y deroga diversos

artículos del Código Penal para el Distrito Federal en materia de fuero común, y

para toda la República en materia de fuero federal. El Decreto se publicó en el

D.O.F. el 24 de diciembre de 1996.
Parte “está incurriendo”, en los términos del artículo 14(1), ya que las

facultades indagatorias en cuestión no parecen haber prescrito al

momento de presentarse la petición21. Sólo se excluyen de revisión ulterior las aseveraciones planteadas en los encabezados J y L, que se

refieren a hechos procesales consumados respecto de los cuales no había

otro acto de aplicación qué realizar al momento de presentarse la

petición: no “haber turnado de inmediato al MP Federal” las materias

denunciadas el 3 de julio de 1999 y el 9 de mayo de 1999, sino hasta el 16

de julio de 1999 en el primer caso citado, y hasta el 5 de julio de 1999, en el

segundo22.

iii. Presunta omisión relacionada con el Convenio 169 de la OIT23

La petición asevera que la Parte ha omitido aplicar de manera

efectiva el artículo 15.2 del Convenio 169 de la OIT al otorgar autorizaciones para el aprovechamiento de recursos forestales maderables

en la Sierra Tarahumara, sin consultar previamente a los Pueblos Indígenas que podrían resultar afectados por esas actividades.

Es claro que el Convenio 169 de la OIT es derecho interno vigente

de la Parte conforme al artículo 133 de la Constitución Política de los

Estados Unidos Mexicanos, pero no se desprende la misma certidumbre

sobre la forma en que la disposición invocada por la Peticionaria satisface la definición de “legislación ambiental” prevista en el ACAAN.

El citado artículo 15.2 del Convenio 169 de la OIT establece: “En caso de

que pertenezca al Estado la propiedad de los minerales o de los recursos

del subsuelo, o tenga derechos sobre otros recursos existentes en las

tierras, los gobiernos deberán establecer o mantener procedimientos con

miras a consultar a los pueblos interesados, a fin de determinar si los

intereses de estos pueblos serían perjudicados y en qué medida, antes

de emprender o autorizar cualquier programa de prospección o explotación de los recursos existentes en sus tierras ...”.

La aseveración de la Peticionaria es que ese Convenio no se ha

aplicado de manera efectiva porque se han concedido autorizaciones

para la explotación forestal de la Sierra Tarahumara sin consultar a los

Pueblos Indígenas que pudiesen resultar afectados (en concreto, a 9

comunidades). Como se ha visto, en virtud del artículo 45(2)(b) del

ACAAN están exceptuadas de revisión en el proceso del artículo 14

las disposiciones cuyo propósito principal es la “administración de la

SEM-00-006 229

21. Véanse los artículos 100 y subsiguientes del Código Penal Federal.

22. Petición, p. 12.

23. Planteada en el encabezado E de la petición.
recolección, extracción o explotación de recursos naturales con fines

comerciales, [y] la recolección o extracción de recursos naturales con

propósitos de subsistencia o por poblaciones indígenas”. Sin excluir que

en otro contexto pudiera llegarse a una conclusión distinta, en el caso de

este alegato la disposición invocada parece tener como propósito la

“administración” de la explotación de recursos de manera que se tomen

en cuenta los intereses de los Pueblos Indígenas que puedan resultar

afectados. Se sigue entonces, que en este caso concreto no puede revisarse esta aseveración porque no se satisface la definición de legislación

ambiental. Es importar subrayar, sin embargo, que esta conclusión se

refiere sólo a este caso concreto y que no se extiende a otras disposiciones

del Convenio de la OIT, sino únicamente al fragmento del artículo 15.2

sobre el que la petición afirma que existe una omisión en la aplicación

efectiva de la legislación ambiental al no consultar a esos grupos antes de

otorgar autorizaciones de aprovechamiento forestal. Por último, cabe

aclarar que esta conclusión tampoco implica determinación alguna

respecto de si el Convenio mismo se está o no aplicando de manera

efectiva.

Además, la petición no afirma, ni se desprende de ella, que esta

presunta omisión ha sido comunicada a la Parte como lo requiere el

artículo 14(1)(e). Por todo lo anterior, las aseveraciones planteadas en el

encabezado E de la petición no satisfacen los requisitos del artículo 14(1)

y no se analizarán más en el proceso de esta petición.

iv. Presunta omisión en relación con el acceso a la información ambiental24

Por último, la Peticionaria afirma que México está incurriendo en

omisiones en la aplicación efectiva de su legislación ambiental al negar

información ambiental sobre las denuncias que los Pueblos Indígenas y

otros grupos de la zona han presentado por daños y tala ilegal en la

Sierra Tarahumara. La petición relata que el 1 de marzo del 2000

“se presentó una petición de información ambiental para verificar lo

manifestado por la Profepa respecto de las denuncias populares que

ha recibido y atendido relativas a la materia forestal en la Sierra

Tarahumara, y sobre la cual recaería acuerdo negando la petición...25”.

La Peticionaria asevera que al negar esta solicitud la Parte omitió

aplicar de manera efectiva el artículo 159 Bis 3 de la LGEEPA en relación

con el artículo 159 Bis 4. La petición se refiere a la negativa de la

autoridad a proporcionar información ambiental en relación con las

230 NORTH AMERICAN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY

24. Planteada en el encabezado U de la petición.

25. Petición, p. 15.
denuncias. Al igual que el acceso al mecanismo de denuncia popular,

el acceso público a la información ambiental es un mecanismo para

la protección ambiental, por lo que estas disposiciones satisfacen la

definición de legislación ambiental para efectos del artículo 14.

Sin embargo, la petición no afirma ni se desprende de ella que se

haya comunicado a la Parte este asunto en concreto (el que se haya

negado información ambiental) como lo exige el artículo 14(1)(e). No

habiéndose cumplido en la petición uno de los requisitos previsto en

el artículo 14(1) respecto de este alegato, no puede continuarse ahora

la revisión de esta presunta omisión en la aplicación efectiva de la

legislación ambiental.

En resumen, las aseveraciones de que México incurre en omisiones

en la aplicación efectiva de su legislación ambiental respecto del

Convenio 169 de la OIT (encabezado E) y respecto del acceso a la

información ambiental (encabezado U) planteadas en la petición, así

como las señaladas en los encabezados B, J, L y Q de la petición, no

cumplen con todos los requisitos del artículo 14(1) del ACAAN y no se

revisarán más en este proceso. Por el contrario, los requisitos del artículo

14(1) sí se cumplen respecto de las aseveraciones de la petición contenidas en los encabezados A, C, D, F, R,SyT relativos a la denuncia

popular y el recurso de revisión, y las contenidas en los encabezados G,

H, I, K, M, N, O y P, relativos a la investigación y persecución de

probables delitos ambientales. En consecuencia, se emprendió el análisis

de la parte procedente de la petición, conforme al artículo 14(2) del

ACAAN.

IV. ANÁLISIS DE LA PETICIÓN CONFORME AL

ARTÍCULO 14(2)

Una vez que se ha determinado que las aserciones de una petición

satisfacen los requisitos del artículo 14(1), el Secretariado analiza la

petición para determinar si ésta amerita que el Secretariado solicite una

respuesta a la Parte. Conforme al articulo 14(2) del ACAAN, son cuatro

los criterios que guían la decisión del Secretariado en esta etapa:

a) si la petición alega daño a la persona u organización que la presenta;

b) si la petición, por sí sola o conjuntamente con otras, plantea asuntos

cuyo ulterior estudio en este proceso contribuiría a la consecución de

las metas de este Acuerdo;

SEM-00-006 231
c) si se ha acudido a los recursos al alcance de los particulares conforme

a la legislación de la Parte; y

d) si la petición se basa exclusivamente en noticias de los medios de

comunicación.

Al hacer esas consideraciones respecto de esta petición, el Secretariado contempló lo siguiente:

Al considerar la cuestión del daño [artículo 14(2)(a)], se observó

que la petición alega la presunta falta de aplicación efectiva de la

denuncia popular como herramienta de acceso a la justicia ambiental a

Pueblos Indígenas y otros grupos de la Sierra Tarahumara. Esa supuesta

falta de acceso a la denuncia popular representa un daño a los Pueblos

Indígenas y otros grupos de la Sierra Tarahumara en tanto restricción al

ejercicio del derecho otorgado por la ley ambiental a “toda persona,

grupos sociales, organizaciones no gubernamentales, asociaciones y

sociedades...26” de participar en la protección del medio ambiente

mediante la denuncia de posibles hechos que causen desequilibrio

ecológico o contravengan la ley ambiental.

Por lo que se refiere al artículo 14(2)(b) del ACAAN, el Secretariado

considera que la aplicación efectiva de la denuncia popular como herramienta de acceso a la justicia ambiental, a que se refiere la petición, así

como la aplicación efectiva de la legislación penal para la protección de

los recursos boscosos de la Sierra Tarahumara, es un asunto cuya ulterior consideración en este proceso contribuirá a la consecución de las

metas del Acuerdo. Específicamente, los artículos 1 y 5 del Acuerdo

establecen, entre otras metas, las de alentar la protección y el mejoramiento del ambiente para el bienestar de las generaciones presentes y

futuras, incrementar la cooperación entre las Partes para mejorar la

aplicación y la observancia de las leyes ambientales, y lograr niveles

altos de protección del ambiente y de cumplimiento de las leyes de las

Partes. Además, la petición hace referencia en particular a las metas de

acceso a los particulares a los procedimientos para la aplicación de las

leyes y reglamentos ambientales, y a las garantías procesales que deben

alcanzarse en esos procedimientos, plasmadas en los artículos 6 y 7 del

Acuerdo. Los objetivos del ACAAN se promoverían también con la

revisión de esta petición en tanto se relaciona directamente con la

participación en la protección ambiental de un sector de la sociedad

mexicana que históricamente ha estado marginado –los Pueblos Indígenas y otras comunidades rurales de la Sierra Tarahumara– y cuya

232 NORTH AMERICAN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY

26. LGEEPA, artículo 189.
contribución para la protección de los bosques de esa región es fundamental.

Con relación a la consideración prevista en el inciso c) del artículo

14(2) del ACAAN, la petición aborda los recursos disponibles conforme

a la legislación de la Parte a los que se ha acudido. Como se ha visto, el

asunto mismo que plantea la petición es que los esfuerzos de emplear los

recursos disponibles conforme a la legislación de la Parte para denunciar

daños al medio ambiente de la Sierra Tarahumara no fueron exitosos.

En vista de los múltiples intentos relatados en la petición de emplear

el mecanismo de denuncia popular y otros recursos, el Secretariado

considera que se ha hecho un esfuerzo razonable para acudir a ellos y

que no es razonable esperar que se hiciera más27.

Finalmente, la petición no parece basarse exclusivamente en noticias de los medios de comunicación, ya que ni siquiera hace referencia

a noticias de ese tipo [artículo 14(2)(d)].

Considerando en conjunto los factores del artículo 14(2) del

ACAAN, el Secretariado determina que esta petición sí amerita solicitar

una respuesta de la Parte, respecto de las aseveraciones que según la

determinación planteada en la sección anterior de este documento,

satisfacen los requisitos del artículo 14(1).

V. DETERMINACIÓN DEL SECRETARIADO

El Secretariado determina que la petición SEM-00-006

(Tarahumara), presentada por la Comisión de Solidaridad y Defensa de

los Derechos Humanos A.C. (COSYDDHAC), cumple con todos los

requisitos del Artículo 14(1) del ACAAN, respecto de las aseveraciones

contenidas en los encabezados A, C, D, F, R, S y T,relativos a la denuncia

popular y el recurso de revisión, y las contenidas en los encabezados G,

H, I, K, M, N, O y P, relativos a la investigación y persecución de

probables delitos ambientales. Asimismo, tomando en cuenta el conjunto de los criterios establecidos en el artículo 14(2) del ACAAN, el

Secretariado determina que, respecto de esas aseveraciones, la petición

SEM-00-006 amerita solicitar una respuesta a la Parte interesada, en este

caso los Estados Unidos Mexicanos, y así lo hace a través de esta

Determinación.

Conforme a lo establecido en el artículo 14(3) del ACAAN, la Parte

podrá proporcionar una respuesta a la petición dentro de los 30 días

SEM-00-006 233

27. Véanse los apartados 5.6(c) y 7.5 de las Directrices.
siguientes a la recepción de esta notificación, y en circunstancias excepcionales, dentro de los 60 días siguientes a la misma. Dado que ya se ha

enviado a la Parte interesada copia de la petición y de los anexos

respectivos, no se acompañan a esta Determinación.

Sometido respetuosamente a su consideración, el 6 de noviembre

de 2001.

Secretariado de la Comisión para la Cooperación Ambiental

por: Carla Sbert

Oficial Jurídica

Unidad de Peticiones Ciudadanas

c.c.p.: Dra. Olga Ojeda Cárdenas, SEMARNAT

Ms. Norine Smith, Environment Canada

Ms. Judith E. Ayres, US EPA

Sr. Javier Avila Aguirre, COSYDDHAC

Sra. Janine Ferretti, Directora Ejecutiva

234 NORTH AMERICAN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY
SEM-01-001

(Cytrar II)

SUBMITTERS: ACADEMIA SONORENSE DE DERECHOS

HUMANOS, A.C. AND LIC. DOMINGO

GUTIÉRREZ MENDÍVIL

PARTY: United Mexican States

DATE: 14 February 2001

SUMMARY: The submission asserts that Mexico is failing to

effectively enforce its environmental law in relation to the establishment and operation of the

Cytrar hazardous waste landfill near the city of

Hermosillo, Sonora, Mexico.

SECRETARIAT DETERMINATIONS:

ART. 14(1)(2)

(24 April 2001)

Determination that criteria under Article 14(1)

have been met and that the submission merits

requesting a response from the Party.

ART. 14(3)

(13 June 2001)

Determination that the Secretariat lacks sufficient

information to determine whether it should proceed no further with its consideration pursuant to

Article 14(3)(a).

235

Secretariado de la Comisión

para la Cooperación Ambiental

Determinación del Secretariado en conformidad

con los artículos 14(1) y (2) del Acuerdo de

Cooperación Ambiental de América del Norte

Núm. de petición: SEM-01-001 (Cytrar II)

Peticionarios: Academia Sonorense de Derechos

Humanos, A.C.

Lic. Domingo Gutiérrez Mendívil

Parte: Estados Unidos Mexicanos

Fecha de recepción: 14 de febrero de 2001

Fecha de la determinación: 24 de abril de 2001

I. INTRODUCCIÓN

El Secretariado de la Comisión para la Cooperación Ambiental

(el “Secretariado”) puede examinar peticiones de cualquier persona u

organización sin vinculación gubernamental que asevere que una Parte

signataria del Acuerdo de Cooperación Ambiental de América del Norte (el

“ACAAN” o “Acuerdo”) está incurriendo en omisiones en la aplicación

efectiva de su legislación ambiental, si el Secretariado juzga que la

petición cumple con los requisitos señalados en el artículo 14(1) del

ACAAN. Si la petición lo amerita, considerando los criterios del artículo

14(2), el Secretariado puede solicitar a esa Parte que proporcione una

respuesta a la petición.

El 14 de febrero de 2001, la Academia Sonorense de Derechos

Humanos, A.C. y el Lic. Domingo Gutiérrez Mendivil (los “Peticionarios”), presentaron al Secretariado una petición de conformidad con los

artículos 14 y 15 del ACAAN. Los Peticionarios aseveran que el gobierno

237
de México está incurriendo en omisiones en la aplicación efectiva de

su legislación ambiental respecto de presuntas irregularidades en la

construcción y operación del confinamiento de residuos peligrosos

conocido como Cytrar, y respecto al negado acceso a los Peticionarios a

la información relacionada con esas presuntas irregularidades. Esta es

la segunda petición presentada respecto de este asunto. La primera

petición puede consultarse bajo el número de identificación SEM-98-

005.

El Secretariado determina que esta petición satisface los requisitos

del artículo 14(1) del Acuerdo, y que amerita solicitar una respuesta a

la Parte mexicana conforme al artículo 14(2), por las razones que se

expresan en esta Determinación.

II. RESUMEN DE LA PETICIÓN

Los Peticionarios aseveran que México ha omitido aplicar de

manera efectiva su legislación ambiental en relación con el confinamiento de residuos peligrosos conocido como Cytrar, ubicado en la

proximidad de la ciudad de Hermosillo, en el estado de Sonora, México,

y con el derecho a la información ambiental relacionada con ese confinamiento. El confinamiento ya no está operando, debido a que en 1998 la

autoridad ambiental negó a Cytrar, S.A. de C.V. la renovación de su

autorización de operación. La petición asevera que México ha incurrido

en omisiones en la aplicación efectiva del artículo 7 de la Ley Federal de

Protección al Ambiente de 1982 (LPFA)1, de los artículos 28, 29, 32, 153 y

159 bis 3 de la Ley General del Equilibrio Ecológico y la Protección al Ambiente

(en adelante, LGEEPA), del artículo 7 del Reglamento de la LGEEPA en

Materia de Residuos Peligrosos (en adelante, RRP), del artículo 415 del

Código Penal Federal (en adelante, CPF), y de la Norma Oficial Mexicana

NOM-057-ECOL-1993 Que establece los requisitos que deben observarse en el

diseño, construcción y operación de celdas de un confinamiento controlado de

residuos peligrosos (en adelante, NOM-057).2

La petición plantea cinco aseveraciones que se describen

separadamente a continuación, si bien la relación entre todas ellas es

238 NORTH AMERICAN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY

1. La LFPA estuvo en vigor hasta 1988. La LGEEPA que la sustituyó conserva

disposiciones en materia de impacto ambiental equivalentes en lo esencial (artículos

28 al 30). En adelante se hace referencia sólo a las disposiciones vigentes.

2. Así como de la anterior Norma Técnica Ecológica NTE-CRP-010/88, publicada en el

Diario Oficial de la Federación (en adelante, “DOF”), el 14 de diciembre de 1988 y la

Norma Oficial Mexicana NOM-PA-CRP-006/93, la cual quedaría con la

nomenclatura que actualmente ostenta, NOM-057-ECOL-1993, en virtud del

Acuerdo publicado el 22 de octubre de 1993.
importante para la consideración de esta petición. La primera aseveración de la petición se refiere a la falta de autorización en materia de

impacto ambiental del confinamiento. Los Peticionarios aseveran que la

Parte mexicana omitió aplicar de manera efectiva los artículos 28, 29 y 32

de la LGEEPA, respecto del confinamiento de residuos peligrosos ahora

conocido como Cytrar, al no requerir una manifestación de impacto

ambiental previamente a la realización de las obras y actividades del

confinamiento y al permitir su operación a los subsecuentes responsables sin que contaran con autorización en esa materia. Afirman que la

evaluación de impacto ambiental era exigible al confinamiento desde el

inicio, porque el requisito en la LFPA data de 1982, además de que sería

exigible de manera retroactiva, al tratarse de una disposición de orden

público e interés social.3

La segunda aseveración de los Peticionarios es que la autoridad

ambiental omitió aplicar de manera efectiva los artículos 153 de la

LGEEPA y 7 del RRP que prohiben la importación de residuos peligrosos para su disposición final en territorio nacional y exigen la

repatriación de los residuos peligrosos generados bajo el régimen de

importación temporal. Esta afirmación se basa en el hecho de que

en 1997 el confinamiento Cytrar recibió tierras contaminadas y otros

residuos peligrosos abandonados por la empresa Alco Pacífico, S.A. de

C.V. para su disposición final. Según la petición, la fundidora de plomo

Alco Pacífico abandonó tierras contaminadas y residuos peligrosos

importados ilegalmente desde Estados Unidos y residuos generados

a partir de materia prima introducida al país bajo el régimen de

importación temporal, que debían haberse retornado al país de origen.

Esa empresa operaba bajo el régimen de maquila en el Florido, Tijuana,

BC. y fue clausurada por la autoridad ambiental en abril de 1991. Según

la petición y la información que la acompaña, la autoridad ambiental

gestionó la disposición final de esos residuos en Cytrar, para lo cual

recibió 2 millones de dólares estadounidenses asignados por el Juez del

Condado de Los Angeles, California, E.E. U.U. A.A. Al parecer, dicha

suma fue una parte de la multa impuesta por el mismo juez a la

compañía transportista S.R.S./Quemetco en virtud del transporte ilegal

de residuos peligrosos al sitio de Alco Pacífico. Esta aseveración se

entiende en el sentido de que México está omitiendo sancionar la

supuesta violación a los artículos 153 de la LGEEPA y 7 del RRP, que se

cometió presuntamente al depositar los residuos peligrosos en Cytrar

para su disposición final, siendo que según los Peticionarios, dichos

residuos peligrosos deben repatriarse.4

SEM-01-001 239

3. Véanse las páginas 3, 9 a 12 y los anexos 10 y 19 de la petición.

4. Véanse las páginas 3 a 6, 12 y 13, y los anexos 15 y 37 a 39 de la petición.
La tercera aseveración de la petición es que el confinamiento de

residuos peligrosos no observó las especificaciones de la NOM-057

respecto de la construcción de sus celdas y que la Parte mexicana no ha

sancionado esta supuesta violación de su legislación ambiental. Según

las autorizaciones concedidas por el Instituto Nacional de Ecología a

Cytrar, en 1996 el confinamiento contaba con una celda con capacidad de

16,200 m3, y contaba con una nueva celda con capacidad para 110,000 m3

en 1997.5 En apoyo a la afirmación de que se han incumplido estas

especificaciones, la petición incluye un extracto de una manifestación de

impacto ambiental presentada por Cytrar en 1994, que describe el diseño

de las celdas.6 Los Peticionarios afirman que “... los muros de contención

de las celdas del confinamiento CYTRAR no cuentan con la capa de

suelo cemento que se menciona en [la manifestación de impacto

ambiental] y en algunas áreas al parecer tampoco existe la capa de arena

de 30 cm. De ahí que los materiales que se utilizaron como alternativa al

muro de 60 cm de concreto que exige en su párrafo 5.1.5 la Norma Oficial

Mexicana NOM-CRP-006-ECOL/1993, ni remotamente tienen una

resistencia de 240 Kg/cm2.”7

La cuarta aseveración de la petición es que la Parte ha omitido

aplicar de manera efectiva el artículo 415 del CPF al no ejercer acción

penal tras la denuncia de hechos que el Peticionario presentó el 8 de

diciembre de 1997 y que amplió el 3 de diciembre de 1998. La fracción

primera del artículo 415 del CPF dispone una pena de tres meses a seis

años de prisión y de mil a veinte mil días de multa, a quien sin autorización de la autoridad federal competente o contraviniendo los

términos en que haya sido concedida, realice cualquier actividad con

materiales o residuos peligrosos que ocasionen o puedan ocasionar

daños a la salud pública, a los recursos naturales, la fauna, la flora o a los

ecosistemas. La denuncia que presentaron los Peticionarios se refiere a

los hechos que son objeto de las tres aseveraciones que se resumieron

en los párrafos precedentes. Esto es, a la presunta operación del confinamiento sin que haya mediado autorización en materia de impacto

ambiental, a la supuesta disposición final ilegal de residuos peligrosos

que debieron repatriarse y al presunto incumplimiento de las especificaciones sobre construcción de las celdas.8

Por último, la petición asevera que al negarse a proporcionar

diversa información ambiental relacionada con Cytrar a los Peticionarios, la Parte mexicana ha violado el derecho a la información ambiental

240 NORTH AMERICAN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY

5. Véanse los anexos 3 y 4 de la petición.

6. Misma que la autoridad ambiental no aprobó, según afirman los Peticionarios.

7. Véase las páginas 6, 7 y 12 y el anexo 19 de la petición.

8. Véanse las páginas 6, 14 y 15 y los anexos 8 y 15 de la petición.
contemplado en el artículo 159 Bis 3 de la LGEEPA. Se anexa a la petición

una solicitud de información escrita que se refirió principalmente a la

naturaleza y origen de los residuos depositados en el confinamiento

Cytrar. La respuesta mediante la cual la autoridad ambiental negó la

entrega de dicha información fue declarada por la justicia federal como

violatoria de la garantía de legalidad regulada en los artículos 14 y 16

constitucionales, por falta de motivación.9 Los Peticionarios indican que

a pesar del amparo de la justicia federal, la información solicitada aún no

se ha proporcionado y que por ello la Parte está incurriendo en una

omisión en la aplicación efectiva de su legislación ambiental.

Por otra parte, la petición afirma que el Secretariado está facultado

para elaborar un informe sobre el caso Cytrar según el artículo 13 del

ACAAN, por referirse a un asunto relacionado con las funciones de

cooperación del Acuerdo. Afirman que llevarlo a cabo propiciaría el

cumplimiento de los objetivos de la Agenda de América del Norte para

la Acción 2000-2002.

III. ANÁLISIS DE LA PETICIÓN CONFORME A LOS

ARTÍCULOS 14(1) Y 14(2) DEL ACAAN

Artículo 14(1) del ACAAN

El artículo 14(1) del Acuerdo establece que:

El Secretariado podrá examinar peticiones de cualquier persona u organización sin vinculación gubernamental que asevere que una Parte está

incurriendo en omisiones en la aplicación efectiva de su legislación

ambiental, si el Secretariado juzga que la petición:

(a) se presenta por escrito en un idioma designado por esa Parte en una

notificación al Secretariado;

(b) identifica claramente a la persona u organización que presenta la

petición;

(c) proporciona información suficiente que permita al Secretariado

revisarla, e incluyendo las pruebas documentales que puedan

sustentarla;

(d) parece encaminada a promover la aplicación de la ley y no a hostigar

una industria;

SEM-01-001 241

9. Véase el anexo 32 de la petición.
(e) señala que el asunto ha sido comunicado por escrito a las autoridades

pertinentes de la Parte y, si la hay, la respuesta de la Parte; y

(f) la presenta una persona u organización que reside o está establecida

en territorio de una Parte.

Si bien el artículo 14(1) no pretende colocar una gran carga sobre

los peticionarios, sí se requiere en esta etapa cierta revisión inicial.10 Con

tal perspectiva en mente el Secretariado determina que la petición sí

satisface los requisitos de ese artículo y explica a continuación las

razones de esta determinación.

Los artículos 28, 29, 32, 153 y 159 bis 3 de la LGEEPA, 415 del CPF

y la NOM-057 que invoca la petición satisfacen la definición de

“legislación ambiental” contenida en el artículo 45(2) del ACAAN, que

se refiere al propósito principal de tales disposiciones.11 De la simple

lectura de dichos artículos se desprende claramente que son disposiciones cuyo propósito principal coincide con “... la protección del

medio ambiente, o la prevención de un peligro contra la vida o la salud

humana, a través de [...] el control de químicos, sustancias, materiales

242 NORTH AMERICAN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY

10. Véanse en este sentido, e. g., SEM-97-005 (Biodiversidad), Determinación

conforme al artículo 14(1) (26 de mayo de 1998) y SEM-98-003 (Grandes Lagos),

Determinación conforme a los artículos 14(1) y (2) (8 de septiembre de 1999).

11. El artículo 45(2) del ACAAN establece:

Para los efectos del Artículo 14(1) y la Quinta Parte:

(a) “legislación ambiental” significa cualquier ley o reglamento de una Parte, o

sus disposiciones, cuyo propósito principal sea la protección del medio

ambiente, o la prevención de un peligro contra la vida o la salud humana, a

través de:

(i) la prevención, el abatimiento o el control de una fuga, descarga, o

emisión de contaminantes ambientales,

(ii) el control de químicos, sustancias, materiales o desechos peligrosos o

tóxicos, y la diseminación de información relacionada con ello; o

(iii) la protección de la flora y fauna silvestres, incluso especies en peligro de

extinción, su hábitat, y las áreas naturales protegidas en territorio de la

Parte, pero no incluye cualquier ley o reglamento, ni sus disposiciones,

directamente relacionados con la seguridad e higiene del trabajador.

(b) Para mayor certidumbre, el término “legislación ambiental” no incluye

ninguna ley ni reglamento, ni sus disposiciones, cuyo propósito principal sea

la administración de la recolección, extracción o explotación de recursos

naturales con fines comerciales, ni la recolección o extracción de recursos

naturales con propósitos de subsistencia o por poblaciones indígenas.

(c) El propósito principal de una disposición legislativa o reglamentaria en particular, para efectos de los incisos (a) y (b) se determinará por su propósito principal y no por el de la ley o del reglamento del que forma parte.

Véanse en este sentido, e.g., SEM-97-005 (Biodiversidad), Determinación conforme

al artículo 14(1) (26 de mayo de 1998), SEM-98-001 (Guadalajara), Determinación

conforme al artículo 14(1) (13 de septiembre de 1999) y SEM-98-002 (Ortiz

Martínez), Determinación conforme al artículo 14(1) (18 de marzo de 1999).
o desechos peligrosos o tóxicos, y la diseminación de información

relacionada con ello...”.12

La expresión “está incurriendo” en el artículo 14(1) impone una

consideración temporal respecto de las aseveraciones de una petición.13

Esta consideración se satisface si la Parte correspondiente puede tomar

medidas de aplicación de su legislación ambiental respecto de los

asuntos materia de la petición y está omitiendo hacerlo, si bien los

hechos a los que sea aplicable dicha legislación ambiental pueden ser

hechos pasados.14 Aunque los Peticionarios plantean sus aseveraciones

en términos de que México “ha incurrido” en omisiones respecto del

confinamiento Cytrar, que ya no está operando, las supuestas omisiones

en las que la Parte “ha incurrido”, sí corresponden a posibles acciones de

aplicación que la autoridad competente pudiera llevar a cabo, es decir, a

omisiones en que la Parte supuestamente “está incurriendo”.

De la información contenida en la petición se desprende que las

facultades para imponer sanciones administrativas no habían prescrito

al momento de presentarse la petición en febrero de 2001,15 suponiendo

que las presuntas violaciones administrativas sucedieron: hasta

noviembre de 1998 cuando parece haber cesado la operación presuntamente ilícita del confinamiento por falta de autorización de

impacto ambiental16; en 1997 cuando supuestamente se iniciaron los

SEM-01-001 243

12. De modo ilustrativo, se transcribe una de las disposiciones referidas:

LGEEPA, Artículo 153.- La importación o exportación de materiales o residuos

peligrosos se sujetará a las restricciones que establezca el Ejecutivo Federal, de

conformidad con lo dispuesto en la Ley de Comercio Exterior. En todo caso

deberán observarse las siguientes disposiciones:

... III.- No podrá autorizarse la importación de materiales o residuos peligrosos

cuyo único objeto sea su disposición final o simple depósito, almacenamiento o

confinamiento en el territorio nacional o en las zonas donde la nación ejerce su

soberanía y jurisdicción, o cuando su uso o fabricación no esté permitido en el país

en que se hubiere elaborado; ...

...VI.- Los materiales y residuos peligrosos generados en los procesos de producción, transformación, elaboración o reparación en los que se haya utilizado

materia prima introducida al país bajo el régimen de importación temporal, inclusive los regulados en el artículo 85 de la Ley Aduanera, deberán ser retornados al

país de procedencia dentro del plazo que para tal efecto determine la Secretaría;...

13. Véase en este sentido, e. g., SEM-97-004 (Canadian Env. Defence Fund),

Determinación conforme al artículo 14(1) (27 de agosto de 1997).

14. Véase en este sentido, e. g., SEM-96-001 (Cozumel), Recomendación conforme al

artículo 15(1) (7 de junio de 1997).

15. Véase el artículo 79 de la Ley Federal de Procedimiento Administrativo, que dispone

que la facultad para imponer sanciones administrativas prescribe en cinco años,

contados a partir del día en que se cometió la falta o infracción, si fueren

consumadas, o desde que cesó si fuere continua.

16. Véase el anexo 4 de la petición, del que se desprende que la autorización de

operación concedida a Cytrar por un año, expiró el 19 de noviembre de 1998.
envíos de Alco Pacífico a Cytrar17; y entre 1996 y 1997 cuando parece

haberse construido la última celda.18 Por otra parte, en cuanto a la

presunta omisión en la aplicación del artículo 415 del CPF, a partir de los

hechos descritos en la petición parece que las actuaciones realizadas por

las autoridades han interrumpido la prescripción de la acción penal, y

por lo tanto, la aseveración sí se refiere a una supuesta omisión en que

la Parte “está incurriendo”.19 Por último, dado que al momento de

presentarse la petición la Parte no había proporcionado la información

solicitada a los Peticionarios, la supuesta omisión en la aplicación del

artículo 159 bis 3 de la LGEEPA continuaba en ese momento, y esta

aseveración satisface también la consideración temporal del artículo

14(1).

En vista de todo lo anterior, no obstante que el confinamiento se

encuentre cerrado y que la petición se refiera a actos consumados, la

petición cumple con esta consideración temporal del artículo 14(1). Las

aseveraciones se entienden en el sentido de que México está incurriendo

en omisiones en la aplicación efectiva de su legislación ambiental al

no sancionar que la empresa Cytrar, S.A. de C.V. haya operado el

confinamiento sin contar con autorización en materia de impacto

ambiental, que supuestamente haya construido sus celdas sin observar

las especificaciones de la NOM-057, que presuntamente haya recibido

para su disposición final residuos peligrosos cuya importación está

prohibida y que debieron repatriarse, conforme al artículo 153 de la

LGEEPA, y al no proporcionar información en presunta violación al

artículo 159 bis 3 de la LGEEPA.

La petición también satisface los seis requisitos listados en el

artículo 14(1). La petición se presentó por escrito en español, que es el

idioma designado por la Parte mexicana.20 Los Peticionarios se identificaron como la Academia Sonorense de Derechos Humanos, A.C.

y Domingo Gutiérrez Mendívil. La primera es una organización sin

vinculación gubernamental y el segundo un particular, vinculado a esa

organización, ambos con residencia en Hermosillo, Sonora, México.21

La petición contiene información suficiente, que permitió al

Secretariado revisarla. La petición incluye información sobre los

244 NORTH AMERICAN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY

17. Véase el anexo 39 de la petición.

18. Véase el punto 1.1 de los anexos 3 y 4 de la petición.

19. Véase el anexo 9 de la petición y el artículo 110 del CPF, que dispone que las

actuaciones que se practiquen en averiguación del delito interrumpen la prescripción de las acción.

20. Véanse el artículo 14(1)(a) del ACAAN y el apartado 3.2 de las Directrices.

21. Véanse los artículos 14(1)(b) y (f) y 45(1) del ACAAN y los anexos 44 y 45 de la

petición.
antecedentes del confinamiento y sobre las acciones de la autoridad

ambiental respecto del confinamiento (incluyendo copia de las autorizaciones otorgadas para su operación y de algunas notas sobre los

residuos abandonados por la antigua fundidora Alco Pacífico y su

traslado a Cytrar). Asimismo, la petición describe y documenta los

esfuerzos de los Peticionarios por obtener de la autoridad ambiental

mayor información relacionada con el cumplimiento de la legislación

ambiental en la operación del confinamiento.22

Si bien respecto de algunos puntos tomados por separado la

información de apoyo no es concluyente, en conjunto la información

proporcionada en la petición es suficiente para que el Secretariado la

revise. Los Peticionarios como particulares no gozan de facultades de

verificación y pueden estar limitados por razones técnicas y económicas

para obtener información de fuentes externas a la autoridad ambiental.

Los Peticionarios indican que la autoridad les ha negado mayor información. Afirman que han solicitado que se verifique el cumplimiento de

las especificaciones de construcción, y que la autoridad se ha negado a

hacerlo.23 También señalan que se les ha negado información sobre la

naturaleza y origen de los residuos depositados en el confinamiento, y

sobre el convenio por el que la Profepa y el Juez del Condado de Los

Angeles determinaron disponer en Cytrar de los residuos abandonados

por Alco Pacífico.24 Considerando todo lo anterior, se estima que la

información proporcionada en la petición es suficiente para satisfacer el

requisito conforme al artículo 14(1)(c) del ACAAN.

La petición no parece encaminada a hostigar una industria aunque

las presuntas omisiones en la aplicación efectiva de la legislación

ambiental se refieren en particular a la empresa Cytrar, S. A. de C.V., que

fue la última empresa responsable del confinamiento a que se refiere la

petición. La petición parece encaminada, antes bien, a promover la

aplicación de la legislación ambiental, porque se centra en la aplicación

por la autoridad ambiental de diversas disposiciones sobre disposición

SEM-01-001 245

22. Véase el artículo 14(1)(c) del ACAAN. Posteriormente a la presentación de la

petición, otros interesados enviaron al Secretariado información relacionada con el

asunto materia de la petición. El Secretariado mantendrá dicha información en el

archivo para su consideración en el caso de que se llegue a elaborar un expediente

de hechos y hasta ese momento.

23. La petición señala que, no obstante la negativa de realizar la verificación de las

celdas, la autoridad ambiental anunció en julio de 1998 que se realizaría una

auditoría ambiental para garantizar que se tomarían las medidas necesarias de

prevención, o en su caso de remediación, antes de sellar las celdas del

confinamiento. Los Peticionarios consideran que no hay intención de realizar dicha

auditoría, ya que la autoridad ambiental anunció en febrero de 2001 que se fijó a la

empresa un plazo de 45 días para sellar el confinamiento.

24. Véanse las páginas 6 a 8, y los anexos 20 a 23 de la petición.
final de residuos peligrosos respecto del confinamiento y en la falta de

acceso que se ha dado a los Peticionarios a la información ambiental

relativa al posible incumplimiento de algunas obligaciones ambientales

del confinamiento. No parece que los Peticionarios hayan sido competidores de dicha empresa, ni en el momento en que se presentó la

petición, ni cuando dicha empresa estaba aún operando. La petición

no es intrascendente, ya que la disposición adecuada de residuos

peligrosos es una materia de importancia indiscutible, que representa

además un problema reconocido ampliamente en México.25

La petición incluye copias de múltiples comunicaciones por escrito

enviadas a la autoridad ambiental, mediante las cuales los Peticionarios

han comunicado el asunto materia de la petición a las autoridades

pertinentes de la Parte mexicana (en particular, al Ministerio Público

Federal mediante la denuncia penal de diciembre de 1997, ampliada en

diciembre de 1998; y a la Profepa mediante la denuncia popular de

marzo de 1998), así como las respuestas que aquéllos recibieron, además

de otros documentos que muestran que las autoridades están al tanto de

dicho asunto.26

Habiendo estimado cumplidos los requisitos del artículo 14(1)

respecto de esta petición por las razones arriba expuestas, el Secretariado pasa a la consideración de si la petición amerita solicitar una

respuesta a la Parte interesada.

Artículo 14(2) del ACAAN

Para determinar si la petición amerita una respuesta de la Parte,

el Secretariado debe guiarse por las consideraciones que establece el

artículo 14(2). Dichas consideraciones son las siguientes:

(a) si la petición alega daño a la persona u organización que la

presenta;

(b) si la petición, por sí sola o conjuntamente con otras, plantea

asuntos cuyo ulterior estudio en este proceso contribuiría a la

consecución de las metas de este Acuerdo;

(c) si se ha acudido a los recursos al alcance de los particulares

conforme a la legislación de la Parte; y

246 NORTH AMERICAN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY

25. Véase el artículo 14(1)(d) del ACAAN, el apartado 5.4 de las Directrices. y el anexo

44 de la petición.

26. Véanse el artículo 14(1)(e) del ACAAN y los anexos 13 a 15, 27 a 32 y 37 a 39 de la

petición.
(d) si la petición se basa exclusivamente en noticias de los medios

de comunicación.

Para hacer esta determinación, el Secretariado contempló lo

siguiente.

Los Peticionarios afirman que “resulta evidente el perjuicio que

[...] causa a todos los habitantes de Hermosillo, Sonora, la existencia del

confinamiento de residuos peligrosos CYTRAR, que está contaminando

el suelo y la atmósfera con desechos tóxicos expuestos al aire libre, y que

inminentemente contaminará si es que se contaminaron ya [sic] los

mantos freáticos que existen en el sitio”. De la información incluida en la

petición no se desprende certeza sobre la existencia o no de daños

relacionados con el confinamiento. Según la autoridad ambiental, ésta

negó a Cytrar la renovación de su autorización de operación sin que

el confinamiento hubiese alcanzado su capacidad instalada, no por

haberse comprobado que existan daños o incumplimiento por parte de

la empresa, sino en respuesta a las preocupaciones de la ciudadanía.

Ahora bien, dichas preocupaciones parecen basarse tanto en la

proximidad con la ciudad de Hermosillo de una actividad percibida

como altamente peligrosa, como en la falta de información que pudiera

cambiar dicha percepción. En particular, no parece haber información

disponible a la ciudadanía sobre el cumplimiento (por parte de Cytrar y

sus antecesoras) de las obligaciones y especificaciones diseñadas para

prevenir que el confinamiento de residuos peligrosos cause daños a la

salud humana y al medio ambiente, que se invocan en la petición.27

Los artículos 1 y 5 delACAAN plantean, entre otras metas, mejorar

la aplicación efectiva de la legislación ambiental, lograr niveles altos de

protección del medio ambiente y de cumplimiento de las leyes de las

Partes, así como promover la transparencia y la participación pública. La

observancia y la aplicación efectiva de la legislación relacionada con la

disposición final de residuos peligrosos y el acceso de los interesados

a la información relativa a ello, a que se refiere esta petición, están

directamente relacionados con dichas metas del ACAAN. El ulterior

estudio de los asuntos planteados en esta petición contribuiría a su

consecución.

Con relación a los recursos disponibles conforme a la legislación de

la Parte a los que se ha acudido, la Petición aborda este punto y muestra

SEM-01-001 247

27. Veánse las páginas 7 a 9 y los anexos 5, 8, 13, 15, 17, 20 a 23, 25, 26, 30, 32, 40 y 41 de la

petición.
que se ha hecho un esfuerzo razonable para acudir a ellos.28 Los

Peticionarios indican que han iniciado diversos procedimientos

administrativos y judiciales y proporcionan copia de los siguientes: la

denuncia popular del 11 de marzo de 1998; la denuncia penal del 8 de

diciembre de 1997, ampliada el 3 de diciembre de 1998, con base en la

cual se inició la averiguación previa penal número 56/98/H-11; la queja

ante la Comisión Estatal de Derechos Humanos del 2 de mayo de 1987;

los juicios de amparo números 85/98 ante el Juez Primero de Distrito

del Estado de Sonora, número 386/2000, número 679/99 y número

181/2000 (éste último concluido mediante sentencia en parte favorable

al Peticionario), todos ante el Juez Tercero de Distrito del Estado de

Sonora.29

Finalmente, la Petición no parece basarse exclusivamente en

noticias de los medios de comunicación, aunque los Peticionarios sí

hacen referencia a algunas noticias de ese tipo.30

Considerando en conjunto los factores del artículo 14(2) del

ACAAN, el Secretariado determina que esta petición sí amerita solicitar

una respuesta de la Parte.

IV. DETERMINACIÓN DEL SECRETARIADO

El Secretariado determina que la Petición SEM-01-001 (Cytrar II),

presentada por la Academia Sonorense de Derechos Humanos, A.C., et.

al cumple con todos los requisitos contenidos en el artículo 14(1) del

ACAAN. Asimismo, tomando en cuenta el conjunto de los criterios

establecidos en el artículo 14(2) del ACAAN, el Secretariado determina

que dicha petición amerita solicitar una respuesta a la Parte interesada,

en este caso México, y así lo hace a través de esta Determinación.

La Parte podrá proporcionar una respuesta dentro de los 30 días

siguientes a la recepción de esta notificación, y en circunstancias

excepcionales, dentro de los 60 días siguientes a ella, conforme a lo

establecido en el artículo 14(3) del ACAAN. Dado que ya se ha enviado a

la Parte interesada una copia de la petición y de los anexos respectivos,

no se acompañan a esta Determinación.

Por otra parte, se informa a los Peticionarios que su solicitud para

que el Secretariado lleve a cabo un informe conforme al artículo 13 del

248 NORTH AMERICAN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY

28. Véanse también los apartados 5.6(c) y 7.5 de las Directrices.

29. Véanse los anexos 5, 8, 12, 13, 15, 17, 27, 31 y 32 la petición.

30. Véanse los anexos 22, 23, 33, 36, 40 y 41 de la petición.
Acuerdo, sería tomada en consideración una vez concluido el proceso

conforme al artículo 14 del mismo.

Sometida respetuosamente a su consideración, el 24 de abril de

2001.

Secretariado de la Comisión para la Cooperación Ambiental

por: Carla Sbert

Oficial Jurídica

Unidad sobre Peticiones Ciudadanas

c.c.: Dra. Isabel Studer, SEMARNAT

Sra. Norine Smith, Environment Canada

Dr. Alan Hetch, US-EPA

Sra. Janine Ferretti, Directora Ejecutiva de la CCA

Lic. Domingo Gutiérrez Mendívil, Academia Sonorense

de Derechos Humanos

SEM-01-001 249

Secretariat of the Commission

for Environmental Cooperation

Determination pursuant to Article 14(3) of the

North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation

Submission Number: SEM-01-001 (Cytrar II)

Submitter(s): Academia Sonorense de Derechos

Humanos, A.C.

Lic. Domingo Gutiérrez Mendívil

Concerned Party: United Mexican States

Date Received: 14 February 2001

Date of this Determination: 13 June 2001

I. INTRODUCTION

The Secretariat of the Commission for Environmental Cooperation

(the “Secretariat”) may consider submissions from any nongovernmental person or organization who asserts that a Party to the North

American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation (the “NAAEC” or the

“Agreement”) is failing to effectively enforce its environmental law,

where the Secretariat deems that the submission meets the requirements

of NAAEC 14(1). Where the submission so merits, and with consideration to the criteria of Article 14(2), the Secretariat may request that the

Party provide a response to the submission. Within 30 days of delivery

of the request or, in exceptional circumstances, within 60 days, the Party

may notify the Secretariat whether the matter is the subject of a pending

judicial or administrative proceeding, in which case the Secretariat shall

proceed no further; and any other information that the Party wishes to

submit. Where it considers that, in light of the response of the Party, the

submission warrants developing a factual record, the Secretariat shall so

inform the Council and provide its reasons.

251
On 14 February 2001, Academia Sonorense de Derechos Humanos,

A.C. and Lic. Domingo Gutiérrez Mendívil (the “Submitters”) filed a

submission with the Secretariat in accordance with Articles 14 and 15 of

the NAAEC. On 24 April 2001, the Secretariat determined that this submission meets the criteria of NAAEC 14(1) and requested a response

from the Mexican government pursuant to Article 14(2).1On 4 June 2001,

the Party notified the Secretariat that it should proceed no further, due to

the existence of an arbitration proceeding to settle an international dispute. The Secretariat hereby provides its determination pursuant to

NAAEC 14(3)(a).

II. SUMMARY OF THE SUBMISSION

The Submitters assert that Mexico is failing to effectively enforce its

environmental law in relation to the hazardous waste landfill known as

Cytrar, located near the city of Hermosillo in the state of Sonora, Mexico,

and in relation to the right to environmental information concerning this

landfill. The landfill is no longer in operation, since in 1998, the environmental authority denied renewal of the operating authorization to

Cytrar, S.A. de C.V. The submission makes five separate assertions concerning the effective enforcement of environmental law by Mexico in

relation to the Cytrar landfill.

The Submitters assert that the Mexican government failed to effectively enforce Articles 28, 29 and 32 of the General Law on Ecological

Balance and Environmental Protection (hereinafter, “LGEEPA”), concerning the hazardous waste landfill known as Cytrar, through its failure to

require an environmental impact statement prior to the performance of

works and activities at the landfill site, and by allowing the persons subsequently responsible to operate the landfill without the appropriate

authorization.

The submission also asserts that the environmental authority

failed to effectively enforce Article 153 of the LGEEPA and Article 7 of

the LGEEPA Regulation on Hazardous Waste (Reglamento de la LGEEPA en

Materia de Residuos Peligrosos), which prohibit the importation of hazardous waste for final disposal and require the repatriation of hazardous

waste generated under the temporary import regime, since in 1997, the

Cytrar landfill received contaminated soil and other hazardous waste

abandoned by the company Alco Pacífico, S.A. de C.V. for final disposal,

which allegedly should have been returned to the country of origin.

252 NORTH AMERICAN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY

1. SEM–01–001 (Cytrar II), Determination under Articles 14(1) and (2) (24 April 2001).
According to the Submitters, the hazardous waste landfill did

not observe the specifications of Mexican Official Standard NOM-057-

ECOL-1993 Establishing the requirements for the design, construction and

operation of controlled hazardous waste landfill cells with regard to the construction of the cells, and the Mexican government did not sanction this

alleged violation of its environmental law.

The submission asserts that the Party failed to effectively enforce

Article 415 of the Federal Criminal Code (Código Penal Federal) by failing to

bring a criminal action following the report of the facts filed by the Submitters on 8 December 1997 and the additional information provided by

the Submitters on 3 December 1998.

Finally, the Submission asserts that in refusing to provide various

environmental information relating to Cytrar to the Submitters, the

Mexican government violated the right to environmental information

contemplated in LGEEPA Article 159 Bis 3.

III. RESPONSE OF THE PARTY

In its response, received 4 June 2001, the Party asserts that “the

Government of the United Mexican States is not legally able to respond

to the matter in question, since it is the subject of an arbitration proceeding to settle an international dispute with the company Técnicas

Medioambientales Tecmed, S.A. [an investment partner of Cytrar S.A.

de C.V.], presumably arising from alleged non-compliance with the

Acuerdo para la Promoción y Protección Recíproca de Inversiones(APRI) with

Spain.” [Translation.]2

The Party therefore requests that the Secretariat proceed no further

with its consideration of submission SEM-01-001, pursuant to the provisions of NAAEC 14(3)(a).

IV. ANALYSIS WITH REFERENCE TO NAAEC 14(3)

Although the NAAEC does not provide specific criteria for the Secretariat’s determination of whether a submission warrants the development of a factual record in light of a Party’s response,3 the Agreement

SEM-01-001 253

2. ICSID, Case No. ARB(AF)/00/2, listed as number 27 in the list of pending cases.

3. Article 15:Factual Record

1. If the Secretariat considers that the submission, in the light of any response provided by the Party, warrants developing a factual record, the Secretariat shall so

inform the Council and provide its reasons.
requires the Secretariat to proceed no further with its consideration of a

submission where the matter is the subject of a pending judicial or

administrative proceeding. Specifically, Article 14(3)(a) provides as follows:

3. The Party shall advise the Secretariat within 30 days or, in exceptional

circumstances and on notification to the Secretariat, within 60 days of

delivery of the request:

(a) whether the matter is the subject of a pending judicial or administrative proceeding, in which case the Secretariat shall proceed no further; and

(b) of any other information that the Party wishes to submit, such as

(i) whether the matter was previously the subject of a judicial or

administrative proceeding [...]

The Secretariat has, in the context of other submissions, considered

the provision invoked by the Party in its response, and it interpreted

Article 14(3)(a) as providing for termination of the processing of a submission in two factual situations: first, the existence of a pending judicial

or administrative proceeding, and second, the fact that the matter that is

the subject of the submission is also the subject of the proceeding.4 In the

case at hand, the Secretariat was able to confirm the existence of only the

first of these situations.

According to Article 45(3)(b), a “judicial or administrative proceeding” for purposes of Article 14(3), includes “an international dispute resolution proceeding to which the Party is party”. In this regard, it

is clear that an arbitration proceeding before the International Centre for

Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) for the settlement of an international dispute in relation to the alleged default by a Party to the

NAAEC of a bilateral agreement with another state (such as the Acuerdo

para la Promoción y Protección Recíproca de Inversiones entre los Estados

Unidos Mexicanos y el Reino de España) qualifies as an “international dispute resolution proceeding.” Mexico, in its response of 4 June 2001,

asserts, and the list of cases pending resolution before the ICSID confirms, that there is indeed a pending proceeding for the resolution of a

dispute initiated by Técnicas Medioambientales Tecmed, S.A. against

the United Mexican States.5

254 NORTH AMERICAN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY

4. See, in this regard, SEM–99–001 (Methanex) Determination pursuant to Article 14(3)

of the North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation (30 June 2000).

5. However, two clarifications are in order. First, Mexico is not a signatory to the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of
However, the Secretariat was unable to determine that the matter

that is the subject of submission SEM-01-001 (Cytrar II) is also the subject

of the pending international proceeding, since it could not ascertain the

subject of the international proceeding. In its response, Mexico asserts:

The relationship between these cases arises from the fact that the hazardous waste landfill referred to by the citizen submission was purchased on

17 November 1997 by the company Cytrar S.A. de C.V., of which the company Técnicas Medioambientales Tecmed S.A. is an investment partner.

[Translation]6

In the opinion of the Secretariat, the fact that there be an investment

relationship between the company that initiated the international proceeding in which Mexico is a Party (Técnicas Medioambientales Tecmed

S.A.) and the company whose operations are asserted by the submission

to be related to failures to effectively enforce the law (Cytrar, S.A. de

C.V.) does not necessarily imply that the subject of the international dispute is the same of that of the submission.

Under NAAEC 15(1), the Secretariat has broad discretion to determine whether or not a submission warrants the development of a factual

record, and must provide the reasons for its determination. Only in the

specific case where the matter that is the subject to a submission is the

subject of a pending proceeding is the Secretariat authorized to proceed

no further with its consideration of a submission without analyzing the

subject matter of the submission in greater depth to determine whether

it warrants the development of a factual record. In order to dismiss a

submission on these exceptional grounds, it is clear that the Secretariat

must ascertain that it is presented with a situation that requires dismissal under NAAEC 14(3)(a). Also, it follows from this article that the

Party will notify the Secretariat of all facts necessary to reach such a

determination. In view of the commitment to the principle of transparency pervading the NAAEC, the Secretariat cannot construe the Agreement as permitting it to base its determination that it is before the

SEM-01-001 255

Other States and we therefore assume that the framework within which this arbitration is occurring is that of the Rules Governing the Additional Facility for the Administration of Proceedings by the Secretariat of the International Centre for Settlement

of Investment Disputes. Second, that the foundation for the arbitration in question is

not «as provided by chapter 11 Investments, Articles 1005 and 1110, of the North

American Free Trade Agreement,» since said Articles of NAFTA do not apply to disputes with Spain; rather, we assume that it is Articles IV.1, V and XI of the Acuerdo

para la Promoción y Protección Recíproca de Inversiones entre los Estados Unidos Mexicanos

y el Reino de España.

6. Response of Mexico, 1 June 2001, received 4 June 2001.
situation contemplated by Article 14(3)(a), and that it shall proceed no

further with a submission, on the mere assertion of a Party to that effect.

For example, the Secretariat determined in one case that it should give

no further consideration to a submission based on an analysis of the

Party’s detailed explanation of the identity between the matter that was

the subject of the submission and the matter that was the subject of the

related international dispute, as supported by the arbitration notice for

that dispute.7

In the arbitration case to which Mexico refers, the Secretariat may

infer from the information available on the ICSID Web site that the proceeding has not gone beyond the constitution of the tribunal.8 To have

reached this stage (as set out in the Appendix to the Acuerdo, Title Three,

paragraph 1) the investor must have: (i) notified Mexico of its intention

to file a claim for arbitration and (ii) filed the arbitration claim with the

ICSID. Based on these documents, for example, it would be possible to

ascertain the nature of the dispute in this arbitration proceeding so as to

determine whether it coincides with the matter that is the subject of the

submission. However, neither these documents, nor any other detailed

description of the subject matter of the arbitration proceeding, have been

provided to the Secretariat.

V. DETERMINATION

The Secretariat considers that it lacks sufficient information to

determine that it should proceed no further with its consideration of the

submission pursuant to NAAEC 14(3)(a), as the Party asserts. However,

since only the regular period of time has elapsed for the Party to file a

response further to this request from the Secretariat, the Party has the

remaining 30 days in which to provide the Secretariat with a response to

the submission and/or the information necessary to determine that the

matter that is the subject of submission SEM-01-001 (Cytrar II) is the

same as the matter that is the subject of the international dispute

[ARB(AF)/00/2] in which Mexico is a party.

256 NORTH AMERICAN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY

7. See SEM-99-001 (Methanex) Determination in Accordance with Article 14(3) (30 June

2000).

8. <http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/cases/cases.htm>.
Respectfully submitted, 13 June 2001.

Secretariat of the Commission for Environmental Cooperation

per: Carla Sbert

Legal Officer

Submissions on Enforcement Matters Unit

c.c.: Dr. Isabel Studer, SEMARNAT

Ms. Norine Smith, Environment Canada

Dr. Alan Hetch, US-EPA

Ms. Janine Ferretti, Executive Director, CEC

Lic. Domingo Gutiérrez Mendívil, Academia Sonorense

de Derechos Humanos

SEM-01-001 257

SEM-01-002

(AAA Packaging)

SUBMITTERS: Names withheld pursuant to Article 11(8)(a)

PARTY: Canada

DATE: 12 April 2001

SUMMARY: The Submitters allege that the government of

Canada, is failing in its obligation as enumerated

in Article 2(3) of the North American Agreement

on Environmental Cooperation (NAAEC), which

states that ‘each Party shall consider prohibiting

the export to the territories of the other Parties of a

pesticide or toxic substance whose use is prohibited within the Party’s territory.

SECRETARIAT DETERMINATIONS:

ART. 14(1)

(24 April 2001)

Determination that criteria under Article 14(1)

have not been met.

259

Secretariat of the Commission

for Environmental Cooperation

Determination in accordance with Article 14(1) of the

North American Agreement for Environmental Cooperation

Submission I.D.: SEM-01-002 (AAA Packaging)

Submitter(s): Names withheld pursuant to

Article 11(8)(a)

Concerned Party: Canada

Date received: 12 April 2001

Date of this determination: 24 April 2001

I - INTRODUCTION

On April 12, 2001, the Submitters filed with the Secretariat of the

Commission for Environmental Cooperation (the “Secretariat”) a submission on enforcement matters pursuant to Article 14 of the North

American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation (“NAAEC” or “Agreement”). Under Article 14 of the NAAEC, the Secretariat may consider a

submission from any non-governmental organization or person asserting that a Party to the Agreement is failing to effectively enforce its environmental law if the Secretariat finds that the submission meets the

requirements of Article 14(1). When the Secretariat determines that

those requirements are met, it then determines whether the submission

merits requesting a response from the Party named in the submission

(Article 14(2)).

The Secretariat has determined that the submission does not meet

all of the requirements in Article 14(1) for further consideration. The

Secretariat’s reasons are set forth below in Section III.

261
II - SUMMARY OF THE SUBMISSION

The Submitters assert that Canada is failing to meet its obligations

under Article 2(3) of the NAAEC, which provides:

Each Party shall consider prohibiting the export to the territories of the

other Parties of a pesticide or toxic substance whose use is prohibited

within the Party’s territory. When a Party adopts a measure prohibiting or

severely restricting the use of a Pesticide or toxic substance in its territory,

it shall notify the other Parties of the measure, either directly or through an

appropriate international organization.

Specifically, the Submitters allege that Canada “has failed to issue

a prohibitory and/or injunctive order halting the export to the United

States, by AAA Packaging, of products containing the banned hazardous substance ’isobutyl nitrite’....1” The Submitters claim that under

United States law, isobutyl nitrite is a regulated hazardous substance

and its importation is banned. The only information provided in support

of the submission is a series of undated Vancouver Sun articles, which

the Submitters claim were published on or about January 2001.

III - ANALYSIS

Article 14 of the NAAEC directs the Secretariat to consider a submission from any non-governmental organization or person asserting

that a Party to theNAAECis failing to effectively enforce its environmental law. When the Secretariat determines that a submission meets the

Article 14(1) requirements, it then determines whether the submission

merits requesting a response from the Party named in the submission

based upon the factors contained in Article 14(2). As the Secretariat has

noted in previous Article 14(1) determinations,2 Article 14(1) is not

intended to be an insurmountable procedural screening device. Rather,

Article 14(1) should be given a large and liberal interpretation, consistent with the objectives of the NAAEC.3

The opening sentence of Article 14(1) authorizes the Secretariat to

consider a submission “from any non-governmental organization or

person asserting that a Party is failing to effectively enforce its environmental law. . . .” Following this first sentence, Article 14(1) lists six spe262 NORTH AMERICAN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY

1. Submission, at 1.

2. See e.g., SEM-97-005 (Animal Alliance), Determination pursuant to Article 14(1)

(May 26, 1998).

3. See SEM-97-005 (Animal Alliance), Determination pursuant to Article 14(1) (May 26,

1998).
cific criteria relevant to the Secretariat’s consideration of submissions.

The Secretariat must find that a submission:

(a) is in writing in a language designated by that Party in a notification

to the Secretariat;

(b) clearly identifies the person or organization making the submission;

(c) provides sufficient information to allow the Secretariat to review

the submission, including any documentary evidence on which

the submission may be based;

(d) appears to be aimed at promoting enforcement rather than at

harassing industry;

(e) indicates that the matter has been communicated in writing to the

relevant authorities of the Party and indicates the Party’s response,

if any; and

(f) is filed by a person or organization residing or established in the

territory of a Party.4

This submission contains two plain defects, either one of which is

alone sufficient to warrant dismissal at this stage. First, the submission

does not meet all of the criteria inherent in the first sentence of Article

14(1). Although the submission appears to meet the requirement that it

be filed by a “non-governmental organization or person5” and the temporal requirement inherent in the phrase “is failing,” it does not meet the

requirement that it focus on an asserted failure to enforce a Party’s environmental laws.6

Article 45(2) of the NAAEC prescribes, among other criteria, that

for purposes of Article 14 an “environmental law” is “any statue or regulation of a Party, or provision thereof.” The sole provision that the Submitters claim Canada is not enforcing is NAAEC Article 2(3).7 The

SEM-01-002 263

4. Article 14(1)(a)-(f).

5. Article 45(1) defines a “non-governmental organization” to include any non-profit

or public interest organization or association which is neither affiliated with, nor

under the direction of, a government. There is no indication from the submission that

either Submitter is affiliated with, or under the direction of, a government.

6. Cf. SEM-98-003 (Great Lakes), Determination pursuant to Article 14(1) (14 December

1998).

7. The Submitters assert that in the United States, isobutyl nitrite is regulated and its

importation banned under provisions of the Consumer Product Safety Act, citing
Secretariat has dismissed previous allegations of ineffective enforcement of a Party’s international obligations on the ground that the international obligations at issue, including in one case obligations set forth

in the NAAEC, had not been imported into a Party’s domestic law and

therefore did not meet the Article 45(2) definition of “environmental

law.8” As the Secretariat noted in regard to the B.C. Logging submission,

SEM-00-004, Canada does not appear to have taken action to incorporate

the NAAEC into its domestic law, as distinguished from its purely international obligations.9 Further, the Secretariat concluded with regard to

the B.C. Logging submission that, in general, the remedy for a NAAEC

Party’s alleged failure to fulfill any of its obligations under NAAEC Articles 6 and 7 lies with the other NAAEC Parties.10 The same holds true for

any obligations contained in NAAEC Article 2(3). Accordingly, although

the Secretariat is not excluding the possibility that future submissions

might raise questions concerning a Party’s international obligations that

would meet the criteria of Article 14(1), the Submitters here have not

alleged that Canada is failing to enforce its environmental law within the

meaning of Article 14.

The second fatal defect in the submission is that, while it appears to

meet some of the criteria contained in Article 14(1)(a)-(f), it plainly does

not meet the requirements of Article 14(1)(e).11 The only indication that

the government of Canada is aware generally of issues related to matters

raised in the submission is in a newspaper article attached to the submission reporting that Health Canada is investigating the Canadian company that allegedly produces and markets isobutyl nitrite to customers

in the United States and elsewhere. However, nothing in the submission

indicates that the specific matter addressed in the submission – Canada’s enforcement of NAAEC Article 2(3) – has been communicated in

writing by the Submitters or others to the relevant Canadian authorities,

and no copies of relevant correspondence is attached to the submis264 NORTH AMERICAN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY

15 U.S.C. §§ 2051-2084. However, these provisions of United States law clearly are

not environmental laws of Canada.

8. SEM-00-04 (B.C. Logging), Determination pursuant to Articles 14(1) and 14(2) (8

May 2000); SEM-98-003 (Great Lakes), Determination pursuant to Articles 14(1)

and 14(2) (4 January 1999); SEM-97-005 (Animal Alliance), Determination pursuant

to Article 14(1) (26 May 1998). While the Secretariat is not bound by principles of

stare decisis to follow these determinations, relying on them helps to ensure consistency in the Secretariat’s determinations under Articles 14 and 15.

9. SEM-00-04 (B.C. Logging), Determination under Articles 14(1) and 14(2) (8 May

2000).

10. SEM-00-04 (B.C. Logging), Determination under Articles 14(1) and 14(2) (8 May

2000).

11. Because either deficiency discussed in this determination clearly warrants dismissal, there is no need to address all of the criteria in Article 14(1)(a)-(f).
sion.12 Nor does the submission indicate or attach copies of the response,

if any, of the relevant Canadian authorities.

IV - CONCLUSION

Pursuant to Guideline 6.2, the Secretariat, for the foregoing reasons, will terminate the Article 14 process with respect to this submission, unless the Submitters provide the Secretariat with a submission

that conforms to the criteria of Article 14(1) within 30 days after receipt

of this Notification.13

Yours truly,

per: Geoffrey Garver

Director, Submissions on Enforcement Matters Unit

c.c.: Dr. Alan Hecht, US-EPA

Ms. Norine Smith, Environment Canada

Dra. Isabel Studer, SEMARNAT

Ms. Janine Ferretti, Executive Director

SEM-01-002 265

12. See Guideline 5.5.

13. See Guideline 6.2.

SEM-01-003

(Dermet)

SUBMITTERS: MERCERIZADOS Y TEÑIDOS DE

GUADALAJARA, S.A.

PARTY: United Mexican States

DATE: 14 June 2001

SUMMARY: The submitters assert that Mexico failed to enforce

effectively environmental laws, by denying probative value in a civil trial, in relation to groundwater contamination caused by the firm Dermet,

S.A. de C.V. of Guadalajara in Jalisco.

SECRETARIAT DETERMINATIONS:

ART. 14(1)

(19 September 2001)

Determination that criteria under Article 14(1)

have not been met.

267

Secretariado de la Comisión

para la Cooperación Ambiental

Determinación del Secretariado en conformidad con el artículo 14(1)

del Acuerdo de Cooperación Ambiental de América del Norte

Núm. de petición: SEM-01-003 (Dermet)

Peticionarios: Mercerizados y Teñidos de

Guadalajara, S.A.

Parte: Estados Unidos Mexicanos

Fecha de recepción: 14 de junio de 2001

Fecha de la determinación: 19 de septiembre de 2001

I. INTRODUCCIÓN

El Secretariado de la Comisión para la Cooperación Ambiental

(el “Secretariado”) puede examinar peticiones de cualquier persona u

organización sin vinculación gubernamental que asevere que una Parte

signataria del Acuerdo de Cooperación Ambiental de América del Norte (el

“ACAAN” o “Acuerdo”) está incurriendo en omisiones en la aplicación

efectiva de su legislación ambiental, si el Secretariado juzga que la

petición cumple con los requisitos señalados en el artículo 14(1) del

ACAAN. Si la petición lo amerita, considerando los criterios del artículo

14(2), el Secretariado puede solicitar a esa Parte que proporcione una

respuesta a la petición.

El 14 de junio de 2001, la empresa Mercerizados y Teñidos de

Guadalajara, S.A. (el “Peticionario”), presentó al Secretariado una

petición de conformidad con los artículos 14 y 15 del ACAAN. El

Peticionario asevera que México está incurriendo en omisiones en la

aplicación efectiva de su legislación ambiental al negar valor probatorio,

269
en juicio civil, a un dictamen técnico de la autoridad ambiental sobre la

contaminación del manto freático en una sección de la ciudad de

Guadalajara, ocurrida en 1992.

El Secretariado determina que esta petición no satisface lo

dispuesto por el artículo 14(1) del Acuerdo por las razones que se

expresan en esta Determinación.

II. RESUMEN DE LA PETICIÓN

Mercerizados y Teñidos de Guadalajara, S.A. (Mercerizados)

asevera que el Gobierno de México está incurriendo en omisiones en la

aplicación efectiva de su legislación ambiental al negar valor probatorio

en juicio civil, a un dictamen técnico de la Procuraduría Federal de

Protección al Ambiente (Profepa), relativo a la contaminación del manto

acuífero, generada en 1992 por la empresa productora de plaguicidas y

fungicidas Dermet, S.A. de C.V. (Dermet), en la ciudad de Guadalajara,

Jalisco.

De la información contenida en la petición y sus anexos, se

desprenden los siguientes antecedentes:

• Mercerizados es una empresa fabril en el ramo textil, que

anteriormente estaba ubicada en la calle seis número 2742 de la zona

industrial de la Ciudad de Guadalajara.

• En 1992, esta empresa solicitó la intervención de la Delegación de la

Procuraduría Federal de Protección al Medio Ambiente en Jalisco,

debido a que empezó a detectar daños en los equipos de las

instalaciones donde fabricaba hilo mercerizado y baja de calidad en la

producción, por la presencia de sales de cobre provenientes del pozo

de agua utilizado por la empresa. Profepa indicó a Mercerizados que

no contaba con presupuesto para hacer los estudios necesarios, por lo

que Mercerizados pagó $82,429.50 pesos para que se realizaran.1

270 NORTH AMERICAN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY

1. Mercerizados no parece haber planteado ningún recurso ante esa solicitud, más allá

de haber reclamado en el juicio contra Dermet el reembolso de este monto. No se

señala ni en la petición ni en los documentos anexos a ésta, cuál fue el fundamento

legal de esa solicitud de Profepa, ni se plantea algún alegato específico sobre este

aspecto como parte de la petición.
• En julio de 1993, la Profepa realizó un estudio para determinar

la presencia de sulfato de cobre en el interior de la empresa Dermet2 y

el 5 de enero de 1994 concluyó un dictamen técnico al respecto.3

• El 6 de enero de 1994, Profepa decretó la clausura total definitiva de

Dermet.4 Profepa revocó la clausura el 12 de enero de 1994, tras

celebrar un convenio de concertación con Dermet a fin de que ésta

llevara a cabo el saneamiento del subsuelo y del manto freático de la

zona ubicada frente al número 2734 de la calle 4 de la zona industrial

de Guadalajara, Jalisco.5

• El 10 de febrero de 1994, Profepa proporcionó un dictamen técnico

a Mercerizados sobre los daños y perjuicios sufridos, y señaló a

Mercerizados que ésta debía buscar la indemnización de esos daños

por la vía civil.6

• En septiembre de 1994, Mercerizados inició juicio civil contra Dermet

por daños y perjuicios. En enero de 1999, el juez determinó que

Mercerizados no había probado la acción, considerando que el dictamen técnico de Profepa era sólo una prueba documental privada que

no era suficiente para fijar las causas y el monto de los daños y

perjuicios reclamados, sino que conforme a lo dispuesto por el

Código Federal de Procedimientos Civiles (CFPC) era necesario fijarlos mediante prueba pericial desahogada en el juicio.7

SEM-01-003 271

2. “Estudio para determinar la presencia de sulfato de cobre en el interior de

la Compañía Dermet, S.A. de C.V.”, ordenado a través del oficio de comisión

P.FB27-002-0498-(93)-10321 del 30 de julio de 1993; elaborado por el Ing. Luis Javier

Rodríguez Ortiz. Véase el acuerdo de clausura (Anexo I de la petición) y la cláusula

segunda del Convenio de Concertación celebrado entre Dermet y la Profepa el 12 de

enero de 1994 (Anexo II de la petición).

3. Según el acuerdo de clausura (Anexo I de la petición), a través del oficio P.F.B27-

005-(93)-545-02038 de fecha 4 de noviembre de 1993, se ordenó la elaboración del

informe o dictamen técnico relativo al análisis del estudio para determinar la

presencia de sulfato de cobre; informe que fue concluido por el Ing. Ramón

Humberto González Núñez, Subdelegado de Verificación Normativa, Apoyo

Técnico y Auditoría, el 5 de enero de 1994.

4. Véase anexo I de la petición. Acuerdo de clausura contenido en el oficio P.F.B27/

005/004/94.

5. Véase Anexo II de la petición.

6. Véase la sentencia definitiva emitida el 28 de enero de 1999 correspondiente al juicio

civil ordinario número 28/94 promovido ante el Juzgado Segundo de Distrito en

Materia Civil en el Estado de Jalisco, por Mercerizados y Teñidos de Guadalajara,

S.A., en contra de Dermet, S.A. de C.V. (anexo IV de la petición, pág. 3).

7. Anexo IV de la petición, Sentencia definitiva emitida el 28 de enero de 1999

correspondiente al juicio civil ordinario número 28/94 promovido ante el Juzgado

Segundo de Distrito en Materia Civil en el Estado de Jalisco, por Mercerizados y

Teñidos de Guadalajara, S.A., en contra de Dermet, S.A. de C.V.
• Mercerizados recurrió esta sentencia en las instancias judiciales

correspondientes, más no logró la indemnización buscada porque

aunque se reconoció en la última instancia que el dictamen de Profepa

tenía valor de prueba plena como documental pública, el tribunal

competente confirmó que la acción para demandar el pago de los

daños y perjuicios había prescrito el 8 de febrero de 1994, antes de que

Mercerizados iniciase la acción civil, el 23 de septiembre de 1994.8

Respecto de estos hechos, el Peticionario afirma que “[l]a

Delegación Jalisco de la Procuraduría Federal de Protección al medio

Ambiente, cuando recibió de los técnicos que comisionó para realizar la

investigación los resultados y se percató que la contaminación provenía

de la citada empresa DERMET, S.A., ordenó y ejecutó la clausura de la

misma, pero por influencias políticas de sus dueños, escudándose en el

convenio de concertación [celebrado con Dermet] la levantó, no

importándole que no estuviera saneado el manto acuífero y menos que

se nos hubieran resarcido los costos de la investigación que financiamos,

ni los daños y perjuicios que resentimos y para desafanarse de nosotros,

invocando lo preceptuado por el artículo 194 de la Ley General del

Equilibrio Ecológico y la Protección al Ambiente, disponiendo que

cuando por infracción a las disposiciones de dicha ley, se ocasionen

daños y perjuicios, los afectados podrán solicitar a la Secretaría la

formulación de un dictamen técnico el cual tendrá valor de prueba en

caso de ser presentado en juicio, nos entregó dos dictámenes uno técnico

y el otro acerca del monto de los daños y nos conminó para que

acudiéramos a entablar demanda ante la autoridad judicial, ya que ella

dijo no podía hacer nada mas, por carecer de atribuciones y ser lo

procedente, presentar con base en tales dictámenes, la reclamación en

vía jurisdiccional y así fueran los Tribunales, los que decidieran nuestras

reclamaciones.(sic)”

Mercerizados argumenta que “...basta tener en cuenta lo preceptuado por el Acuerdo de Cooperación Ambiental de América del

Norte, en los artículos 5o., punto 2, incisos “j”. “l”, artículo 6o., punto 3,

incisos “a” y “d”, artículo 7, punto 1, inciso “d”; para reconocer que al

contrario de como arguyó, [la Delegación de la Procuraduría Federal de

Protección al Medio Ambiente] contaba con facultades para seguir el

procedimiento, hasta lograr que se saneara el pozo contaminado y nos

indemnizaran.”

Mercerizados afirma en la petición que México ha omitido aplicar

de manera efectiva los artículos 5(2)(j) y (l) , 6(3)(a) y (d) y 7(1)(d) del

272 NORTH AMERICAN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY

8. Anexos V a VIII de la petición.
ACAAN y el artículo 194 de la Ley General del Equilibrio Ecológico y la

Protección al Ambiente (LGEEPA)9 con relación a estos hechos.

III. ANÁLISIS DE LA PETICIÓN CONFORME AL ARTÍCULO

14(1) DEL ACAAN

El artículo 14(1) del Acuerdo establece que:

El Secretariado podrá examinar peticiones de cualquier persona u

organización sin vinculación gubernamental que asevere que una Parte

está incurriendo en omisiones en la aplicación efectiva de su legislación

ambiental, si el Secretariado juzga que la petición:

(a) se presenta por escrito en un idioma designado por esa Parte en una

notificación al Secretariado;

(b) identifica claramente a la persona u organización que presenta la

petición;

(c) proporciona información suficiente que permita al Secretariado

revisarla, e incluyendo las pruebas documentales que puedan

sustentarla;

(d) parece encaminada a promover la aplicación de la ley y no a hostigar

una industria;

(e) señala que el asunto ha sido comunicado por escrito a las autoridades

pertinentes de la Parte y, si la hay, la respuesta de la Parte; y

(f) la presenta una persona u organización que reside o está establecida

en territorio de una Parte.

Si bien el artículo 14(1) no pretende colocar una gran carga sobre

los peticionarios, sí se requiere en esta etapa cierta revisión inicial.10 El

Secretariado revisó la petición con tal perspectiva en mente y determina

que no satisface los requisitos umbrales contenidos en el preámbulo de

ese artículo, porque los hechos que plantea no constituyen posibles

“omisiones en la aplicación efectiva de la legislación ambiental” en que

la Parte “está incurriendo”. A continuación se explican las razones de

esta determinación.

SEM-01-003 273

9. A partir de la reforma a la LGEEPA de diciembre de 1996, esta disposición está

prevista en el artículo 204 de esa ley.

10. Véanse en este sentido, e.g., SEM-97-005 (Biodiversidad), Determinación conforme

al artículo 14(1) (26 de mayo de 1998) y SEM-98-003 (Grandes Lagos),

Determinación conforme a los artículos 14(1) y (2) (8 de septiembre de 1999).
El Peticionario alega omisiones en la aplicación efectiva de la

legislación ambiental por parte de la Delegación Estatal de Jalisco de

la Profepa, y por parte de la autoridad judicial federal (a través del

Segundo Juzgado de Distrito, el Segundo Tribunal Unitario y el Cuarto

Tribunal Colegiado, todos en materia civil, del Tercer Circuito del Poder

Judicial de la Federación).

Tras el análisis detallado de la petición y los anexos que la

acompañan, el Secretariado considera que los hechos planteados por el

Peticionario no sugieren posibles omisiones en la aplicación efectiva de la

legislación ambiental. A pesar de que el resultado de los procedimientos

seguidos por Mercerizados ante las autoridades ambiental y judicial

no fue la indemnización por los daños y perjuicios causados por la

contaminación producida por Dermet, es claro que esa indemnización

se negó en última instancia porque corrió el plazo de prescripción de la

acción civil por daños y perjuicios, y no a causa de una omisión en la

aplicación efectiva del artículo 194 de la LGEEPA, o de los artículos 5,

6 y 7 del ACAAN. A su vez, la razón por la que corrió el plazo de

prescripción sin que se ejerciera la acción no fue tampoco la supuesta

omisión en la aplicación efectiva de la legislación ambiental invocada en

la petición.

Los hechos en que se funda la petición no sostienen la aseveración

de que México “está incurriendo en omisiones en la aplicación efectiva

de su legislación ambiental”, por lo siguiente:

• Mercerizados tuvo acceso a procedimientos previstos en la legislación de la Parte para que un particular demande por daños a otro

particular, en congruencia con el artículo 6(3) del ACAAN.11

• Profepa emitió un dictamen técnico sobre los daños y perjuicios

causados a Mercerizados, conforme al artículo 194 de la LGEEPA,

mismo que Mercerizados presentó en juicio civil.12

274 NORTH AMERICAN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY

11. Los artículos 5(2), 6(3)(a)(d) y 7(1)(d) del ACAAN contemplan el compromiso

de las Partes del ACAAN de garantizar que los particulares tengan acceso a

procedimientos que sean sencillos, efectivos y con requisitos y tiempos razonables,

para demandar por daños a otras personas. Por su parte, la legislación civil

mexicana prevé que quien sufre daños y perjuicios derivados de hechos ilícitos

puede demandar una indemnización al responsable.Véase el artículo 1910 del

Código Civil.

12. Dictamen técnico relativo al análisis del estudio para determinar la presencia

de sulfato de cobre, Subdelegado de Verificación Normativa, Apoyo Técnico y

Auditoría, 5 de enero de 1994.
• Profepa no tiene facultades para ejercitar una acción civil por daños y

perjuicios a nombre de un particular.13

• En la última instancia, la autoridad judicial federal reconoció pleno

valor probatorio al dictamen de Profepa.14

• No es requisito para iniciar una acción por daños y perjuicios el contar

con un dictamen técnico de la autoridad ambiental.15

Por todo lo anterior, no pueden revisarse en el proceso del artículo

14 del ACAAN las aseveraciones de que México está incurriendo en una

omisión en la aplicación efectiva de los artículos 194 y 5, 6 y 7 del

ACAAN al haberse negado valor probatorio en juicio al dictamen de

la Profepa y al no haber ésta actuado para que se indemnizara a Mercerizados.16

SEM-01-003 275

13. Según el Peticionario, los artículos 5, 6 y 7 del ACAAN facultaban a la Profepa para

seguir el procedimiento iniciado por su denuncia popular, hasta lograr que se

indemnizara a Mercerizados. (Véase pág. 2 de la petición.) Al momento de la

presentación de la denuncia popular y de la elaboración del estudio y los

dictámenes por la Profepa, este órgano no contaba con facultades para iniciar

procedimientos en materia civil a nombre de un tercero. Las facultades de Profepa

se encontraban establecidas en el Reglamento Interior de la entonces Secretaría de

Desarrollo Social, y en el Acuerdo que regula la organización y funcionamiento

interno del Instituto Nacional de Ecología y de la Procuraduría de Protección al

Ambiente Publicados, respectivamente, en el DOF del 4 de junio de 1992 y del 17 de

julio de 1992. Tampoco en el ACAAN se establecen facultades de las autoridades

ambientales de las Partes para perseguir el pago de daños y perjuicios a nombre de

los particulares. Del artículo 6(3) del ACAAN se desprende claramente que

corresponde a los particulares iniciar los procedimientos para la reparación de los

daños originados como consecuencia de una violación a la legislación ambiental

vigente.

14. Véanse las sentencias correspondientes, anexas a la petición. En particular, véase la

pág. 79 de la Sentencia emitida por el Cuarto Tribunal Colegiado en Materia Civil

del Tercer Circuito el 26 de marzo de 2001 respecto del Amparo Directo número

3771/2000.

15. Véase la resolución del 26 de marzo de 2001 del Cuarto Tribunal Colegiado de

Circuito, en el sentido de que la LGEEPA no establece que el dictamen técnico a que

se refiere el artículo 194 de la LGEEPA sea un requisito de procedibilidad para el

ejercicio de la acción de pago de daños y perjuicios. (pág. 79)

16. La petición no se refiere a acciones que Profepa hubiese realizado u omitido

realizar respecto de la contaminación del manto freático en aplicación de la

legislación ambiental. Por ejemplo, en la petición se menciona que la Parte actuó sin

importar “que no estuviera saneado el manto acuífero” (petición párrafo Tercero),

pero la petición no asevera que se haya incurrido en una omisión en la aplicación

efectiva de alguna disposición de la legislación ambiental de la Parte sobre este

aspecto del caso, sino que se limita a aseverar una supuesta omisión por no haberse

obtenido una indemnización por los daños y perjuicios presuntamente sufridos

por Mecerizados. El Secretariado no expresa ninguna opinión sobre si esa u otra

aseveración hubiera satisfecho los criterios del artículo 14(1).
Sólo resta considerar el argumento del Peticionario en el sentido de

que el hecho de que el asunto haya tardado en resolverse desde febrero

de 1992 (cuando se presentó la denuncia a Profepa) hasta marzo de 2001

(cuando se dictó la resolución definitiva en amparo), es una omisión en

la aplicación efectiva de los artículos 5, 6 y 7 del ACAAN. En particular,

el artículo 7(1)(d) establece que los procedimientos previstos en la

legislación de cada Parte, “no sean innecesariamente complicados, no

impliquen costos o plazos irrazonables ni demoras injustificadas”.

Independientemente de la razón que pudiera asistir al Peticionario

para considerar el lapso de tiempo que tomó la resolución de su asunto

como irrazonable o injustificado, esa tardanza no es una omisión en que

la Parte “está incurriendo” o que continuase al momento de presentarse

la petición. Como se ha asentado al analizar otras peticiones, la expresión “está incurriendo” en el artículo 14(1) impone una consideración

temporal respecto de las aseveraciones de una petición.17 Esta consideración se satisface si al momento de presentarse la petición, la Parte

correspondiente puede tomar medidas de aplicación de su legislación

ambiental respecto de los asuntos materia de la petición y está omitiendo

hacerlo.18 En el caso del plazo que tardaron las autoridades mexicanas

correspondientes en resolver el asunto de Mercerizados, es evidente que

se trata de un hecho consumado que no puede modificarse, respecto del

cual no existen facultades que la Parte esté omitiendo aplicar. Por esta

razón, este último argumento tampoco puede revisarse conforme al

artículo 14 del ACAAN.

Habiendo determinado que la petición no se ajusta a los requisitos

umbrales del primer párrafo del artículo 14(1) del ACAAN, el Secretariado no analizó la petición a la luz de los requisitos listados en ese

artículo.

IV. DETERMINACIÓN DEL SECRETARIADO

El Secretariado determina que la petición SEM-01-003 (Dermet),

presentada por la empresa Mercerizados y Teñidos de Guadalajara, S. A.

no se refiere a omisiones en que la Parte está incurriendo en la aplicación

efectiva de su legislación ambiental conforme al artículo 14(1) del

ACAAN, por lo que el Secretariado no procederá a examinar la petición.

276 NORTH AMERICAN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY

17. Véase en este sentido, e.g., SEM-97-004 (Canadian Env. Defence Fund),

Determinación conforme al artículo 14(1) (27 de agosto de 1997).

18. Véase en este sentido, e.g., SEM-96-001 (Cozumel), Recomendación conforme al

artículo 15(1) (7 de junio de 1997).
En cumplimiento de lo dispuesto por el apartado 6.1 de las

Directrices, el Secretariado notifica esta determinación al Peticionario,

y le informa que no obstante, de acuerdo con el apartado 6.2 de

las Directrices, el Peticionario cuenta con 30 días para presentar una

petición que cumpla con el artículo 14(1) del ACAAN.

Secretariado de la Comisión para la Cooperación Ambiental

por: Janine Ferretti

Directora Ejecutiva

c.c.: Dra. Olga Ojeda, SEMARNAT

Sra. Norine Smith, Environment Canada

Dr. Alan Hecht, US-EPA

Lic. Andrés Garcen Vergara, Mercerizados y Teñidos

de Guadalajara, S.A.

SEM-01-003 277

SEM-02-001

(Ontario Logging)

SUBMITTERS: SIERRA LEGAL DEFENCE FUND, ET AL.

PARTY: Canada

DATE: 6 February 2002

SUMMARY: The Submitters assert that Canada is failing to

effectively enforce section 6(a) of the Migratory

Bird Regulations (MBR) adopted under the

Migratory Birds Convention Act, 1994 (MBCA)

against the logging industry in Ontario.

SECRETARIAT DETERMINATIONS:

ART. 14(1)(2)

(25 February 2002)

Determination that criteria under Article 14(1)

have been met and that the submission merits

requesting a response from the Party.

279

Secretariat of the Commission

for Environmental Cooperation

Determination in accordance with Article 14(1) and (2) of

the North American Agreement for Environmental Cooperation

Submission Number: SEM-02-001 (Ontario Logging)

Submitters: Canadian Nature Federation

Canadian Parks and Wilderness Society

Earthroots

Federation of Ontario Naturalists

Great Lakes United

Sierra Club (United States)

Sierra Club of Canada

Wildlands League

Represented by: Sierra Legal Defence Fund (SLDF)

Concerned Party: Canada

Date received: 6 February 2002

Date of this determination: 25 February 2002

I - INTRODUCTION

On 6 February 2002, the Submitters listed above filed with the Secretariat of the Commission for Environmental Cooperation (the “Secretariat”) a submission on enforcement matters pursuant to Article 14 of

the North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation (“NAAEC”

or “Agreement”). Under Article 14 of the NAAEC, the Secretariat may

consider a submission from any nongovernmental organization or person asserting that a Party to the Agreement is failing to effectively

enforce its environmental law if the Secretariat finds that the submission

meets the requirements of Article 14(1). When the Secretariat determines

281
that those requirements are met, it then determines whether the submission merits requesting a response from the Party named in the submission (Article 14(2)).

The Secretariat has determined that the submission meets all of the

requirements in Article 14(1) and merits requesting a response from the

Party in light of the factors listed in Article 14(2). The Secretariat’s reasons are set forth below in Section III.

II - SUMMARY OF THE SUBMISSION

The Submitters assert that Canada is failing to effectively enforce

section 6(a) of the Migratory Birds Regulations (“MBR”)1 adopted under

the Migratory Birds Convention Act, 1994 (“MBCA”)2 in regard to the logging industry in Ontario. Section 6(a) of the MBR provides that “[...] no

person shall (a) disturb, destroy or take a nest, egg, nest shelter, eider

duck shelter or duck box of a migratory bird [...] except under authority

of a permit therefor.” Violations of section 6(a) of the MBR may be prosecuted by way of summary conviction or as an indictable offence.3

The Submitters claim that their research, based on statistical data,

estimates that in the year 2001, clear-cutting activity destroyed over

85,000 migratory bird nests in areas of central and northern Ontario.4

The Submitters allege that Environment Canada (“EC”), through

its Canadian Wildlife Service (“CWS”), is primarily responsible for

enforcing the MBCA.5

The Submitters assert that logging activity in Ontario is carried out

under Forest Management Plans prepared under the supervision of the

Ontario Ministry of Natural Resources (“MNR”) in accordance with

provincial standards and without any input from federal authorities on

matters related to enforcing the MBCA, which is a federal act.6 They

282 NORTH AMERICAN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY

1. C.R.C., c. 1035.

2. S.C. 1994, c. 22.

3. Section 13 of the MBCA provides that for a summary conviction offence, a company

faces a maximum fine of $100,000, an individual a maximum $50,000 fine. Individuals are also liable to jail terms up to 6 months, or a combination of jail and a fine. For

indictable offences, the maximum fines are $250,000 for a company and $100,000 for

an individual. Individuals are also liable to jail terms up to 5 years, or to both a fine

and jail sentence. With subsequent offences the maximum fine to which an individual is liable is doubled.

4. Submission at 4 and Appendix 6 of the Submission: Dr. Elaine MacDonald & Kim

Mandzy, “Migratory Bird Nest Destruction in Ontario” (Toronto: SLDF, 2001).

5. Submission at 3.

6. Submission at 5.
assert that while EC can be contacted for input on Forest Management

Plans and has produced a non-binding guideline7 directing that activities be avoided during critical periods of migratory birds’ lifecycles, “EC

fails to take enforcement activities to ensure that this requirement [...] is

adhered to.8” The Submitters further assert that “despite the estimated

widespread destruction of bird nests,9” an access to information request

filed in 2001 revealed no investigations or charges in Ontario for violations of section 6(a) of the MBR.10

The Submitters claim that “EC itself acknowledges that migratory

bird nests are destroyed during logging operations.11” They assert that

the CWS considers nest destruction during logging to be “incidental” kill and that the CWS has decided not to use proactive enforcement

measures against the logging industry because violations of section 6(a)

of the MBR that occur during logging operations are not intentional.12

The Submitters assert that “[t]he term ‘incidental’ is not a recognized justification under the MBCA or MBR for destroying bird nests or

eggs.13” They assert that the MBCA is a public welfare law and that

“[w]hen these laws are infringed it is often the result of unintentional,

not wilful, conduct.”14

They allege that the CWS favours conservation initiatives over

enforcement in regard to the logging industry even though “[...] there is

no evidence that the existing vague strategy of the Wildlife Service is

effective compared to a more proactive strategy15” and “non-enforcement initiatives do not negate the need for enforcement.16” The Submitters further assert that through a “self-imposed prohibition against

using enforcement action” in cases of incidental kill, “Wildlife Service

officials appear to be making a choice about priorities without any

authority to do so.17” Finally, they contend that even though logging has

SEM-02-001 283

7. Environmental Assessment Guideline for Forest Habitat of Migratory Birds.

8. Submission at 5, note 32.

9. Submission at 1.

10. Submission at 6 and Appendices 7 and 8 of the submission (access to information

request respecting enforcement efforts under s. 6(a) of the MBR dated 13 July 2001

from Elaine MacDonald, SLDF to Michael Bogues, Chief Access to Information and

Privacy Secretary, Environment Canada, and materials received in response to

access to information request).

11. Submission at 5.

12. Submission at 8.

13. Ibid.

14. Ibid.

15. Ibid.

16. Submission at 11.

17. Submission at 8.
been an important industry in Canada and Ontario for many decades,

when the MBCA was updated in 1994, the Canadian government

[...] did not exempt the logging industry from laws to protect migratory

birds or their nests. The Wildlife Service cannot undermine Parliament’s

intention by arbitrarily failing to enforce the MBCA.18

The Submitters assert that Canada does not follow its own Compliance and Enforcement Policy for Wildlife Legislation, which states that

“[c]ompliance and enforcement activities must be securely founded in

law and must be fair, predictable, and consistent across Canada,” since

“the actual practice of enforcing some of the law and only against some

parties, but excluding the logging industry for subs. 6(a) violations, is

hardly ‘fair’ or ‘consistent’.19”

The Submitters assert that “[a] systematic failure to enforce against

an entire industry known to engage in practices that violate the MBCA

cannot be a legitimate exercise of [prosecutorial] discretion20” pursuant

to Article 45(1)(a) of the NAAEC “because the CWS has made a sweeping policy decision, not a case-by-case judgement associated with prosecutorial discretion.21”

The Submitters then cite two reasons why “[t]he failure to enforce

subs. 6(a), MBR against logging companies, contractors and individual

operators is not a bona fide decision to allocate resources to the enforcement of other environmental matters that have higher priority” pursuant to Article 45(1)(b) of the NAAEC. First,

despite their legal jurisdiction to do so, EC has failed to conduct an environmental assessment of a single Forest Management Plan or proposed logging operation for the threat to migratory birds. A reasonable exercise of

enforcement discretion presupposes some assessment of the relative costs

associated with each option.

Second, the Submitters list four reasons why “the cost of enforcing

[subs.] 6(a), MBR need not have a significant impact on EC’s enforcement budget:22” (i) because of competition, the logging industry would

be responsive to enforcement action; (ii) EC could work with MNR

to include MBCA requirements in the province’s Forest Management

284 NORTH AMERICAN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY

18. Submission at 9.

19. Submission at 11.

20. Submission at 10.

21. Submission at 9.

22. Submission at 10.
Planning Manual; (iii) surveyors must already search for certain nests

and the added cost of searching for all nests would be roughly similar

across companies; and (iv) logging operations could be scheduled to

reduce their impact during the nesting season. The Submitters further

claim that pursuant to Article 5(1) of the NAAEC, Canada is required to

effectively enforce its environmental laws.23

The Submitters assert that the alleged failure to enforce section 6(a)

of the MBR against the logging industry, in addition to the harmful

impact on the migratory bird population, has negative consequences for

wildlife biodiversity, tourism, respect for the law, fair competition

within the logging industry and healthy wood stocks.24

III - ANALYSIS

Article 14 of the NAAEC directs the Secretariat to consider a submission from any nongovernmental organization or person asserting

that a Party to the NAAEC is failing to effectively enforce its environmental law. When the Secretariat determines that a submission meets

the Article 14(1) requirements, it then determines whether the submission merits requesting a response from the Party named in the submission based upon the factors contained in Article 14(2). As the Secretariat

has noted in previous Article 14(1) determinations,25 Article 14(1) is not

intended to be an insurmountable procedural screening device. Rather,

Article 14(1) should be given a large and liberal interpretation, consistent with the objectives of the NAAEC.

A. Article 14(1)

The opening sentence of Article 14(1) authorizes the Secretariat to

consider a submission “from any nongovernmental organization or person asserting that a Party is failing to effectively enforce its environmental law [...].” The Submission meets these requirements.

The Submission is filed by nongovernmental organizations within

the meaning of Article 45(1) of the NAAEC. The Submission alleges that

SEM-02-001 285

23. Submission at 3.

24. Submission at 1. At pp. 3-4, the Submitters cite a Canadian government study, The

Economic Significance of Nature-Related Activities, as well as the Strategy and Action

Plan of the North American Bird Conservation Initiative, in support of their allegations.

25. See e.g. SEM-97-005 (Biodiversity), Determination pursuant to Article 14(1) (26

May 1998) and SEM-98-003 (Great Lakes), Determination pursuant to Article 14(1)

& (2) (8 September 1999).
a Party, Canada, is failing to effectively enforce section 6(a) of the MBR.

Section 6(a) of the MBR comes within the definition of “environmental

law” found in Article 45(2)(a) of the NAAEC, since it is a provision of a

regulation of a Party, the primary purpose of which is the protection of

the environment through the protection of wild flora or fauna. Section

6(a) of the MBR is not directly related to worker safety or health. The

Submission alleges an ongoing failure to effectively enforce section 6(a)

of the MBR against the logging industry in Ontario. Finally, the Submission alleges a failure to effectively enforce section 6(a) of the MBR and

not a deficiency in the law itself.

Article 14(1) then lists six specific criteria relevant to the Secretariat’s consideration of submissions. The Secretariat must find that a submission:

(a) is in writing in a language designated by that Party in a notification to the Secretariat;

(b) clearly identifies the person or organization making the submission;

(c) provides sufficient information to allow the Secretariat to

review the submission, including any documentary evidence

on which the submission may be based;

(d) appears to be aimed at promoting enforcement rather than at

harassing industry;

(e) indicates that the matter has been communicated in writing

to the relevant authorities of the Party and indicates the

Party’s response, if any; and

(f) is filed by a person or organization residing or established in

the territory of a Party.26

The submission meets these criteria. The submission is in English,

a language designated by the Parties.27 It clearly identifies the organizations making the submission.28

The submission provides sufficient information to allow the

Secretariat to review the submission with respect to the assertions of a

286 NORTH AMERICAN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY

26. Article 14(1)(a)-(f).

27. Article 14(1)(a), Guideline 3.2.

28. Article 14(1)(b) and submission at ii.
failure to effectively enforce the law cited.29 First, information about the

research method used and results obtained in estimating the number of

alleged violations of section 6(a) of the MBR referenced in the submission is provided in an appendix to the submission.30 Second, assertions

concerning the Party’s failure to effectively enforce section 6(a) of the

MBR are based on government materials available on the Internet,

caselaw, and information obtained pursuant to an access to information

request, all of which is reproduced in appendices to the submission.31

The submission appears to be aimed at promoting enforcement

rather than at harassing industry, as required by Article 14(1)(d) of the

NAAEC. It is focused on the acts or omissions of a Party rather than on

compliance by a particular company or business.32

The submission meets the criterion contained in Article 14(1)(e) of

the NAAEC, that it indicate that the matter has been communicated in

writing to the relevant authorities of the Party and the Party’s response,

if any. The submission states that the issues raised in the submission

have been communicated to the Party. The submission also provides

copies of correspondence sent to the Party, and copies of the reply

received. It states that a request for information on enforcement of and

compliance with section 6(a) of the MBR with respect to logging operations went unanswered.33

Finally, because the Submitters are established in the United States

or Canada, the submission meets the requirement in Article 14(1)(f) that

it be filed by a “person or organization residing or established in the territory of a Party.34”

B. Article 14(2)

The Secretariat reviews a submission under Article 14(2) if it finds

that the submission meets the criteria in Article 14(1). The purpose of

such a review is to determine whether to request that the Party concerned prepare a response to the submission. During its review under

Article 14(2), the Secretariat considers each of the four factors listed in

SEM-02-001 287

29. Article 14(1)(c), Guideline 5.2, 5.3.

30. Appendix 6 to the submission.

31. Appendices 1, 8, 10, 11 to the submission.

32. See Guideline 5.4(a).

33. Submission at 12-13 and Appendix 9 to the submission.

34. Submission at ii.
that provision based on the facts involved in a particular submission.

Article 14(2) lists these four factors as follows:

In deciding whether to request a response, the Secretariat shall be guided

by whether:

(a) the submission alleges harm to the person or organization making the

submission;

(b) the submission, alone or in combination with other submissions,

raises matters whose further study in this process would advance the

goals of this Agreement;

(c) private remedies available under the Party’s law have been pursued;

and

(d) the submission is drawn exclusively from mass media reports.35

The Secretariat, guided by the factors listed in Article 14(2), has

determined that the submission merits requesting a response from the

Party.

The Submitters allege harm to the persons they represent:

The Submitters represent many outdoor enthusiasts, birders and conservationists. Since birds are an integral part of the sounds, sights, and diversity of the natural landscape, a failure to protect them ultimately

diminishes the splendour of the outdoors for enthusiasts and birders. The

destruction of migratory bird nests and eggs harms conservationists by

destroying the subject of their study and by damaging the delicate balance

in the ecosystem. Moreover, birds have their own intrinsic value regardless of human benefit. All of this harm is beyond monetary calculation.36

Such assertions have been considered under Article 14(2)(a) for

other submissions and they are relevant here as well.37 We note that the

Submitters claim that “[t]he failure to enforce subs. 6(a), MBR is the

direct cause of the harm suffered by these groups.38”

288 NORTH AMERICAN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY

35. Article 14(2) of the NAAEC.

36. Submission at 13.

37. In SEM-96-001 (Cozumel), Recommendation to the Council for the Development of

a Factual Record (7 June 1996), for example, the Secretariat noted: “In considering

harm, the Secretariat notes the importance and character of the resource in question

– a portion of the magnificent Paradise coral reef located in the Caribbean waters of

Quintana Roo. While the Secretariat recognizes that the submitters may not have

alleged the particularized, individual harm required to acquire legal standing to

bring suit in some civil proceedings in North America, the especially public nature

of marine resources bring the submitters within the spirit and intent of Article 14 of

the NAAEC.”

38. Submission at 13.
The submission also raises matters whose further study in the Article 14 process would advance the goals of the Agreement.39 The Submitters allege that

[a] blanket absence of enforcement against the logging industry may

result in lower costs for timber harvests but higher costs to our environment because of the harm to migratory birds. This failure to enforce environmental law may thereby distort the significant trade in wood products

between the parties, contrary to Article 1(e) [of the NAAEC], by permitting some producers to externalise environmental costs.40

Article 1(e) of the Agreement lists as an objective of the NAAEC to

“avoid creating trade distortions or new trade barriers.” A failure by one

Party to effectively enforce a regulatory provision mirroring an obligation also undertaken by another Party pursuant to a bilateral treaty

could conceivably result in trade distortions in the regulated industry.

Therefore, a submission such as the one under review, seeking to ensure

effective enforcement of such provision, advances the goals of Article

1(e) of the Agreement.

The Submitters characterize the alleged failure by EC to effectively

enforce section 6(a) of the MBR as a “widespread pattern of ineffectual

enforcement.41” The Secretariat has previously determined that

“[a]ssertions of this sort – that there is a widespread pattern of ineffectual enforcement – are particularly strong candidates for Article 14 consideration.42”

The submission also furthers the Agreement’s objective of enhancing “compliance with and enforcement of environmental laws and regulations.43” Finally, the submission promotes the conservation of shared

bird populations “for the well-being of present and future generations.44”

The Submitters assert that “Canadian caselaw demonstrates the

difficulty of pursuing private remedies for MBCA violations” because

courts have refused to grant standing to private parties barring proof

that the applicant faces the infringement of some personal or private

right or will suffer personal damages.45 They also assert that charges

SEM-02-001 289

39. Article 14(2)(b) of the NAAEC.

40. Submission at 13.

41. Submission at 10.

42. SEM-99-002 (Migratory Birds), Determination pursuant to Article 14(1) and (2) of

the NAAEC (23 December 1999).

43. Article 1(g) of the NAAEC.

44. Article 1(a) of the NAAEC.

45. Submission at 14.
sworn by private individuals are not a viable alternative because logging operations are carried on in remote areas where access is often forbidden, making it difficult for citizens to witness violations of section

6(a) of the MBR; citizens usually do not have the expertise or financial

resources to prosecute charges in court; in any private prosecution, the

Crown could intervene to withdraw or stay the charge; and prosecutions

are after-the-fact events that do not remedy the harm done.46 It therefore

appears from the submission that private remedies may in effect not be

available.

Finally, the submission is not based exclusively on mass media

reports. The submission is based primarily on SLDF research, government information available on the Internet, caselaw and information

obtained pursuant to an access to information request.

In sum, having reviewed the submission in light of the factors contained in Article 14(2), the Secretariat has determined that the assertion

that there is a failure to effectively enforce section 6(a) of the MBR merits

requesting a response from the Party.

IV - CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Secretariat has determined that submission SEM-02-001 (Ontario Logging) meets the requirements of Article 14(1) and merits requesting a response from the Party in light of the

factors listed in Article 14(2). Accordingly, the Secretariat requests a

response from the Government of Canada subject to the provisions of

Article 14(3). A copy of the submission, along with supporting information provided with the submission, was previously forwarded to the

Party under separate cover.

Respectfully submitted,

Secretariat of the Commission for Environmental Cooperation

per: Katia Opalka

Legal Officer, Submissions on Enforcement Matters Unit

c.c.: Ms. Norine Smith, Environment Canada

Ms. Judith E. Ayres, US-EPA

Dra. Olga Ojeda, SEMARNAT

Ms. Janine Ferretti, CEC Executive Director

Mr. Albert Koehl, SLDF

290 NORTH AMERICAN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY

46. Submission at 15.
SEM-02-002

(Mexico City Airport)

SUBMITTERS: JORGE RAFAEL MARTINEZ AZUELA, ET AL.

PARTY: United Mexican States

DATE: 7 February 2002

SUMMARY: The submitters assert that Mexico is failing to

effectively enforce its environmental laws with

respect to the noise emissions originating at the

Mexico City International Airport (AICM).

According to the Submitters, there are studies

showing that the noise emissions of the AICM

exceed the limits established in environmental

law, causing irreversible damage to the thousands of persons living near the airport.

SECRETARIAT DETERMINATIONS:

ART. 14(1)

(22 February 2002)

Determination that criteria under Article14(1)

have been met and that the submission merits

requesting a response from the Party.

291

Secretariado de la Comisión

para la Cooperación Ambiental

Determinación del Secretariado en conformidad

con los artículos 14(1) y (2) del Acuerdo de

Cooperación Ambiental de América del Norte

Núm. de petición: SEM-02-002 (Aeropuerto de la Ciudad

de México)

Peticionarios: Jorge Rafael Martínez Azuela

Jorge Martínez Sánchez

Raúl Morelos C.

Jorge Alberto Tellez Murillo

Saúl Gutiérrez Hernández

Norma Guadalupe Viniegra Cantón

Parte: Estados Unidos Mexicanos

Fecha de recepción: 7 de febrero de 2002

Fecha de la determinación: 22 de febrero de 2002

I. INTRODUCCIÓN

El Secretariado de la Comisión para la Cooperación Ambiental

(el “Secretariado”) puede examinar peticiones de cualquier persona u

organización sin vinculación gubernamental que asevere que una Parte

signataria del Acuerdo de Cooperación Ambiental de América del Norte (el

“ACAAN” o “Acuerdo”) está incurriendo en omisiones en la aplicación

efectiva de su legislación ambiental, si el Secretariado juzga que la

petición cumple con los requisitos señalados en el artículo 14(1) del

ACAAN. Si la petición lo amerita, considerando los criterios del artículo

14(2), el Secretariado puede solicitar a esa Parte que proporcione una

respuesta a la petición.

293
El 7 de febrero de 2002, Jorge Rafael Martínez Azuela y otros

vecinos de la zona circundante al Aeropuerto Internacional de la ciudad

de México (AICM) (los “Peticionarios”), presentaron al Secretariado una

petición de conformidad con los artículos 14 y 15 del ACAAN. Los

Peticionarios aseveran que el gobierno de México está incurriendo en

omisiones en la aplicación efectiva de su legislación ambiental respecto

de las emisiones de ruido originadas por ese aeropuerto.

El Secretariado determina que esta petición satisface los requisitos

del artículo 14(1) del Acuerdo, y que amerita solicitar una respuesta a

la Parte mexicana conforme al artículo 14(2), por las razones que se

expresan en esta Determinación.

II. RESUMEN DE LA PETICIÓN

Los Peticionarios aseveran que existen estudios que muestran que

las emisiones de ruido del AICM exceden los límites establecidos en la

legislación ambiental, causando daños irreversibles a las miles de personas que residen en la periferia de ese aeropuerto. Los Peticionarios

afirman que las autoridades ambientales federales y locales han omitido

aplicar de manera efectiva los artículos 5 fracciones V y XIX, 8 fracción

VI, 155 y 189 al 204 de la Ley General del Equilibrio Ecológico y la

Protección al Ambiente (LGEEPA), la Norma Oficial Mexicana NOMECOL-081-19941 (NOM-081) y los artículos 80 al 84 de la Ley Ambiental

del Distrito Federal (LADF). La petición contiene dos aseveraciones:

a) que México incurre en omisiones en la aplicación efectiva de su

legislación ambiental por la nula vigilancia y aplicación de sanciones al

AICM, no obstante que sus operaciones rebasan los límites máximos

permisibles de emisión de ruido establecidos en la NOM-081; y b) que

México incurre en omisiones respecto de los procedimientos de denuncia popular y denuncia ciudadana iniciados ante el gobierno federal

y del Distrito Federal, respectivamente, relativos a las posibles

violaciones del artículo 155 de la LGEEPA y la NOM-081.

Los Peticionarios argumentan que conforme a los artículos 5

fracciones V y XIX y 155 la autoridad ambiental federal está obligada a

lo siguiente respecto del AICM: “...(i) vigilar el cumplimiento de la

NOM-081; (ii) adoptar medidas para evitar que se transgredan los

límites máximos permisibles de emisión de ruido establecidos en la

NOM-081, y; (iii) aplicar las sanciones correspondientes en caso de que

se transgredan dichos límites.” Señalan también que “... el artículo 8,

294 NORTH AMERICAN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY

1. Que establece los límites máximos permisibles de emisión de ruido de las fuentes

fijas y su método de medición. (Publicada en el D.O.F. de fecha 13 de enero de 1995.)
fracción VI de la LGEEPA, en relación con el artículo 9 del mismo

ordenamiento, confiere al gobierno del Distrito Federal la facultad de

aplicar las disposiciones jurídicas relativas a la prevención y control de

la contaminación por ruido, proveniente de fuentes fijas que funcionen

como establecimientos de servicios.”2

La petición afirma que como consecuencia de la falta de aplicación

por parte de México de su legislación ambiental en este caso, los vecinos

del AICM han sufrido daños al sistema auditivo, diversos efectos

negativos por la interrupción del sueño y la merma del desarrollo

académico de los niños de la zona, cuyas clases se interrumpen por el

paso de un avión aproximadamente cada 7 minutos. Según los

Peticionarios, los estudios concluyeron que “[n]o existe procedimiento

alguno que pueda mitigar el ruido aeroportuario cercano al AICM.3” La

petición afirma que: “Es claro por lo tanto, que la forma de proteger el

ambiente y salvaguardar la integridad física de los habitantes de las

inmediaciones del AICM, es cerrar la fuente fija que produce las

emisiones de ruido por encima de los estándares legal y mundialmente

aceptables. En la alternativa, solicitamos una recomendación en el

sentido de que se tomen las medidas pertinentes para reducir el ruido y

que se valore la posibilidad de compensar económicamente por los

daños sufridos a los vecinos del AICM.4”

III. ANÁLISIS DE LA PETICIÓN CONFORME A LOS

ARTÍCULOS 14(1) Y 14(2) DEL ACAAN

Artículo 14(1) del ACAAN

El artículo 14(1) del Acuerdo establece que:

El Secretariado podrá examinar peticiones de cualquier persona u

organización sin vinculación gubernamental que asevere que una Parte

está incurriendo en omisiones en la aplicación efectiva de su legislación

ambiental, si el Secretariado juzga que la petición:

(a) se presenta por escrito en un idioma designado por esa Parte en una

notificación al Secretariado;

(b) identifica claramente a la persona u organización que presenta la

petición;

SEM-02-002 295

2. Ambas citas vienen de la página 5 de la petición.

3. El estudio que citan los Peticionarios dice literalmente: «There are few, if any, mitigating procedures that could be implemented to reduce noise exposure at the

AICM».

4. Página 7 de la petición.
(c) proporciona información suficiente que permita al Secretariado

revisarla, e incluyendo las pruebas documentales que puedan

sustentarla;

(d) parece encaminada a promover la aplicación de la ley y no a hostigar

una industria;

(e) señala que el asunto ha sido comunicado por escrito a las autoridades

pertinentes de la Parte y, si la hay, la respuesta de la Parte; y

(f) la presenta una persona u organización que reside o está establecida

en territorio de una Parte.

Si bien el artículo 14(1) no pretende colocar una gran carga sobre

los peticionarios, sí se requiere en esta etapa cierta revisión inicial.5 Con

tal perspectiva en mente el Secretariado determina que la petición sí

satisface los requisitos de ese artículo y explica a continuación las

razones de esta determinación.

Las disposiciones legales que invoca la petición satisfacen la

definición de “legislación ambiental” contenida en el artículo 45(2) del

ACAAN, que se refiere al propósito principal de tales disposiciones.6

296 NORTH AMERICAN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY

5. Véanse en este sentido, e.g., SEM-97-005 (Biodiversidad), Determinación conforme

al artículo 14(1) (26 de mayo de 1998) y SEM-98-003 (Grandes Lagos), Determinación

conforme a los artículos 14(1) y (2) (8 de septiembre de 1999).

6. El artículo 45(2) del ACAAN establece:

Para los efectos del Artículo 14(1) y la Quinta Parte:

(a) “legislación ambiental” significa cualquier ley o reglamento de una Parte, o sus

disposiciones, cuyo propósito principal sea la protección del medio ambiente, o

la prevención de un peligro contra la vida o la salud humana, a través de:

(i) la prevención, el abatimiento o el control de una fuga, descarga, o emisión

de contaminantes ambientales,

(ii) el control de químicos, sustancias, materiales o desechos peligrosos o

tóxicos, y la diseminación de información relacionada con ello; o

(iii) la protección de la flora y fauna silvestres, incluso especies en peligro de

extinción, su hábitat, y las áreas naturales protegidas en territorio de la

Parte, pero no incluye cualquier ley o reglamento, ni sus disposiciones,

directamente relacionados con la seguridad e higiene del trabajador.

(b) Para mayor certidumbre, el término “legislación ambiental” no incluye

ninguna ley ni reglamento, ni sus disposiciones, cuyo propósito principal sea la

administración de la recolección, extracción o explotación de recursos naturales

con fines comerciales, ni la recolección o extracción de recursos naturales con

propósitos de subsistencia o por poblaciones indígenas.

(c) El propósito principal de una disposición legislativa o reglamentaria en particular, para efectos de los incisos (a) y (b) se determinará por su propósito principal

y no por el de la ley o del reglamento del que forma parte.

Véanse en este sentido, e.g., SEM-97-005 (Biodiversidad), Determinación conforme

al artículo 14(1) (26 de mayo de 1998), SEM-98-001 (Guadalajara), Determinación

conforme al artículo 14(1) (13 de septiembre de 1999) y SEM-98-002 (Ortiz Martínez),

Determinación conforme al artículo 14(1) (18 de marzo de 1999).
Los artículos 5 fracciones V y XIX, y 8 fracción VI de la LGEEPA

establecen simplemente la distribución de competencias entre la

federación y el Distrito Federal,7 para la vigilancia del cumplimiento de

las normas oficiales mexicanas y la aplicación de la legislación ambiental

en materia de ruido. Los artículos 155 y 189 al 204 de la LGEEPA, la

NOM-081 y los artículos 80 al 84 de LADF son disposiciones cuyo

propósito principal coincide con “... la prevención de un peligro contra

la vida o la salud humana, a través de [...] la prevención, el control o

el abatimiento de una fuga, descarga o emisión de contaminantes

ambientales...”.8

La petición también satisface los seis requisitos listados en el

artículo 14(1). La petición se presentó por escrito en español, que es

el idioma designado por la Parte mexicana.9 Los Peticionarios se identificaron como Jorge Rafael Martínez Azuela, Jorge Martínez Sánchez,

Raúl Morelos C., Jorge Alberto Tellez Murillo, Saúl Gutiérrez

Hernández y Norma Guadalupe Viniegra Cantón, personas que residen

en la zona circundante al AICM en el Distrito Federal.10

SEM-02-002 297

7. El artículo 8 9 de la LGEEPA establece las facultades de los municipios, que son

aplicables al Distrito Federal en los términos del artículo 9 de la LGEEPA.

8. El artículo 155 de la LGEEPA dispone: Quedan prohibidas las emisiones de ruido,

vibraciones, energía térmica y lumínica y la generación de contaminación visual,

en cuanto rebasen los límites máximos establecidos en las normas oficiales

mexicanas que para ese efecto expida la Secretaría, considerando los valores de

concentración máxima permisibles para el ser humano de contaminantes en el

ambiente que determine la Secretaría de Salud. Las autoridades federales o locales,

según su esfera de competencia, adoptarán las medidas para impedir que se

transgredan dichos límites y en su caso, aplicarán las sanciones correspondientes.

En la construcción de obras o instalaciones que generen energía térmica o lumínica,

ruido o vibraciones, así como en la operación o funcionamiento de las existentes

deberán llevarse a cabo acciones preventivas y correctivas para evitar los efectos

nocivos de tales contaminantes en el equilibrio ecológico y el ambiente.

Por su parte, la NOM-081 dispone:

1. OBJETO. Esta norma oficial mexicana establece los límites máximos permisibles

de emisión de ruido que genera el funcionamiento de las fuentes fijas y el método

de medición por el cual se determina su nivel emitido hacia el ambiente.

2. CAMPO DE APLICACION. Esta norma oficial mexicana se aplica en la pequeña,

mediana y gran industria, comercios establecidos, servicios públicos o privados y

actividades en la vía pública.

5. ESPECIFICACIONES ...5.4 Los límites máximos permisibles del nivel sonoro en

ponderación “A” emitido por fuentes fijas, son [... de 6:00 a 22:00 horas, 68 dB(A);

y de 22:00 a 6:00 horas, 65 dB(A)]...

6. VIGILANCIA... 6.1 La Secretaría de Desarrollo Social, por conducto de la

Procuraduría Federal de Protección al Ambiente, así como los Estados y en su caso

los Municipios, son las autoridades competentes para vigilar el cumplimiento de la

presente norma oficial mexicana.

9. Véanse el artículo 14(1)(a) del ACAAN y el apartado 3.2 de las Directrices.

10. Véanse los artículos 14(1)(b) y (f) y 45(1) del ACAAN y la página 2 y 8 de la petición.
La petición contiene información suficiente, que permitió al

Secretariado revisarla, satisfaciendo el requisito conforme al artículo

14(1)(c) del ACAAN. Incluye información sobre la exposición al ruido

generado por las operaciones del AICM de las personas que residen en

las inmediaciones de ese aeropuerto,11 sobre la legislación ambiental

aplicable12 y sobre los esfuerzos de algunos residentes para procurar la

aplicación efectiva de la legislación correspondiente por la autoridad

ambiental.13 Los Peticionarios sustentan sus aseveraciones en dos estudios realizados en torno a los efectos en la salud de las personas expuestas

a esas emisiones de ruido, ambos realizados por la organización MITRE.

Afirman haberse allegado de la información relativa al contenido de los

estudios a través de Internet. Anexan a la petición el estudio titulado

“Análisis de Ruido, Aeropuerto Internacional de la Ciudad de México”

de septiembre de 2001, pero señalan que no lograron obtener copia

del segundo estudio, titulado “Aeropuerto Internacional de la Ciudad

de México, Análisis de Ruido” de octubre del mismo año. También

acompañan a al petición un videocassette con un documental realizado

por el Instituto Mexicano de Recursos Naturales Renovables, A.C. sobre

la contaminación por ruido generada por el AICM, en el que se hace

referencia al estudio anexo.14

La petición no parece encaminada a hostigar a una industria, sino a

promover la aplicación de la legislación ambiental, porque se centra en

la presunta falta de aplicación por la autoridad ambiental de las disposiciones legales sobre la emisión de ruido. La petición no es intrascendente, ya que las emisiones de ruido por encima de los límites

establecidos en las normas respectivas a que se refiere la petición, están

prohibidas por la LGEEPA, que es una ley de orden público e interés

social. Asimismo, la petición no es intrascendente porque se refiere a

la presunta exposición de miles de personas que residen en las inmediaciones del AICM a los efectos nocivos para la salud relacionados con

estas emisiones de ruido. Los Peticionarios señalan que el propósito de

la petición es que la Parte aplique de manera efectiva la legislación

ambiental en cuestión. La petición invoca los objetivos planteados por el

ACAAN consistentes en alentar la protección y el mejoramiento del

medio ambiente en el territorio de las Partes, para el bienestar de las

generaciones presentes y futuras [artículo 1(a)]; y en mejorar la observancia y la aplicación de las leyes y reglamentos ambientales [artículo

1(g)].15

298 NORTH AMERICAN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY

11. Véanse las páginas 3 y 4 de la petición.

12. Véanse las páginas 1, 2, 4 y 5 de la petición.

13. Véanse las páginas 3, 9 a 12 y los anexos 3 y 4 de la petición.

14. Véanse las páginas 2, 5 a 7 y los anexos 1 y 2 de la petición.

15. Véase el artículo 14(1)(d) del ACAAN, el apartado 5.4 de las Directrices y la página

3 de la petición.
La petición incluye copia de dos comunicaciones por escrito

enviadas a la autoridad ambiental, mediante las cuales los Peticionarios

han comunicado el asunto materia de la petición a las autoridades

pertinentes de la Parte mexicana, tanto federales como del Distrito Federal, así como la respuesta a una de ellas, en la que la autoridad afirma

que está al tanto de dicho asunto.16

Habiendo estimado cumplidos los requisitos del artículo 14(1)

respecto de esta petición por las razones arriba expuestas, el

Secretariado pasa a la consideración de si la petición amerita solicitar

una respuesta a la Parte interesada.

Artículo 14(2) del ACAAN

Para determinar si la petición amerita una respuesta de la Parte,

el Secretariado debe guiarse por las consideraciones que establece el

artículo 14(2), que son:

(a) si la petición alega daño a la persona u organización que la

presenta;

(b) si la petición, por sí sola o conjuntamente con otras, plantea

asuntos cuyo ulterior estudio en este proceso contribuiría a la

consecución de las metas de este Acuerdo;

(c) si se ha acudido a los recursos al alcance de los particulares

conforme a la legislación de la Parte; y

(d) si la petición se basa exclusivamente en noticias de los medios

de comunicación.

Para hacer esta determinación, el Secretariado contempló lo

siguiente.

Según los Peticionarios, de los estudios que citan se desprende que

los habitantes localizados dentro de un radio de 51 km2 alrededor del

AICM, padecen emisiones de ruido superiores a los estándares mundialmente aceptables. Señalan que los estudios revelan que al menos

30 de esos 51 Km2 están densamente poblados, y que los estudios indican

que “[b]ajo cualquier estándar, la existencia de áreas residenciales localizadas inmediatamente fuera de un aeropuerto de alto tráfico debe ser

materia de seria preocupación ambiental.” El corto elaborado por el

SEM-02-002 299

16. Véanse el artículo 14(1)(e) del ACAAN, la página 3 y los anexos 3 y 4 de la petición.
Instituto Mexicano de Recursos Naturales Renovables, A.C. señala que

en el AICM se dan trescientas veinte mil operaciones aereonáuticas

anuales, y que en temporada alta y horas pico, llegan a darse cincuenta y

cinco operaciones por hora. El número de personas afectadas por estas

operaciones se estima entre medio millón y hasta dos millones de personas.17

En la petición se resumen los daños sufridos por los Peticionarios

en estos términos:

Lo mas preocupante de la situación es que la pérdida de la audición

inducida por el ruido es irreversible por la incapacidad de regeneración

de las células ciliares de la audición, de ahí la urgencia de que la Parte tome

las medidas legales pertinentes y aplique de manera inmediata los

recursos legales de que dispone para evitar que se siga violando la

normatividad ambiental en materia de ruido. (énfasis en el original)

La pérdida de la audición es sólo una de las tantas molestias y daños a la

salud que la exposición a las altas emisiones de ruido provoca; otros

efectos relacionados que hemos experimentado son: (i) aumento del

estrés; (ii) dificultad de concentración; y (iii) reducción del rendimiento,

como consecuencia de la interrupción del sueño por las noches debido a

las emisiones de ruido. Estos síntomas se presentan con mayor gravedad

en los niños quienes además de ser irascibles en extremo, ven mermado su

desarrollo académico pues como es de todos sabido en las escuelas es

necesario interrumpir las clases cada vez que pasa un avión lo cual sucede

cada 7 minutos aproximadamente.18

En relación con el apartado (b) del artículo 14(2) del ACAAN, el

Secretariado considera que el ulterior estudio de los asuntos planteados

en esta petición contribuiría a la consecución de las metas del Acuerdo y

promovería el acceso de los interesados a información adicional sobre la

presunta falta de aplicación de la legislación ambiental a que se refiere

esta petición. Los artículos 1 y 5 del ACAAN plantean, entre otras metas,

mejorar la aplicación efectiva de la legislación ambiental, lograr niveles

altos de protección del medio ambiente y de cumplimiento de las leyes

de las Partes, así como promover la transparencia y la participación

pública. La observancia y la aplicación efectiva de disposiciones cuyo

cumplimiento prevendría daños a la salud de miles de personas, están

directamente relacionados con estas metas del ACAAN.

Con relación a los recursos disponibles conforme a la legislación de

la Parte a los que se ha acudido, la Petición aborda este punto y muestra

300 NORTH AMERICAN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY

17. Véase el anexo 1 de la petición.

18. Véanse las páginas 3 y 4 de la petición.
que se ha hecho un esfuerzo razonable para acudir a ellos.19 Los

Peticionarios indican que presentaron una denuncia popular, el 31 de

octubre de 2001, a la Procuraduría Federal de Protección al Ambiente y

una denuncia ciudadana, el 23 de noviembre de 2001, ante la Secretaría

de Medio Ambiente del Distrito Federal. El 31 de enero de 2002,

la Dirección General de Desarrollo Delegacional de la Delegación

Venustiano Carranza del Distrito Federal notificó a los denunciantes, en

respuesta a la denuncia popular presentada el 31 de octubre de 2001 a la

Procuraduría Federal de Protección al Ambiente, que “... es un problema

del cual esta consiente (sic) la autoridad y que tomaremos en cuenta sus

observaciones.” Los Peticionarios indican que esa respuesta no se ajusta

al procedimiento previsto en la LGEEPA, por su extemporaneidad y

porque no indica las acciones que la autoridad lleva o llevará a cabo para

atender las presuntas violaciones a la NOM-081. A la fecha de la petición, los denunciantes no habían recibido respuesta alguna respecto de

la denuncia ciudadana del 23 de noviembre de 2001.20

Por último, la Petición no parece basarse exclusivamente en noticias de los medios de comunicación, ya que los Peticionarios tienen

conocimiento directo del asunto porque residen en las inmediaciones

del AICM.

Considerando en conjunto los factores del artículo 14(2) del

ACAAN, el Secretariado determina que esta petición sí amerita solicitar

una respuesta de la Parte.

IV. DETERMINACIÓN DEL SECRETARIADO

El Secretariado determina que la Petición SEM-02-002 (Aeropuerto

de la Ciudad de México), presentada por Jorge Rafael Martínez Azuela,

et. al cumple con todos los requisitos contenidos en el artículo 14(1) del

ACAAN. Asimismo, tomando en cuenta el conjunto de los criterios

establecidos en el artículo 14(2) del ACAAN, el Secretariado determina

que dicha petición amerita solicitar una respuesta a la Parte interesada,

en este caso México, y así lo hace a través de esta Determinación.

La Parte podrá proporcionar una respuesta dentro de los 30 días

siguientes a la recepción de esta notificación, y en circunstancias excepcionales, dentro de los 60 días siguientes a ella, conforme a lo establecido

en el artículo 14(3) del ACAAN. Dado que ya se ha enviado a la Parte

SEM-02-002 301

19. Véanse también los apartados 5.6(c) y 7.5 de las Directrices.

20. Véanse las páginas 9 a 11 de la petición.
interesada una copia de la petición y de los anexos respectivos, no se

acompañan a esta Determinación.

Sometida respetuosamente a su consideración, el 22 de febrero de

2002.

Secretariado de la Comisión para la Cooperación Ambiental

por: Carla Sbert

Oficial Jurídica

Unidad sobre Peticiones Ciudadanas

c.c.: Dra. Olga Ojeda, SEMARNAT

Sra. Norine Smith, Environment Canada

Sra. Judith E. Ayres, US-EPA

Sra. Janine Ferretti, Directora Ejecutiva de la CCA

Sr. Jorge Rafael Martínez Azuela

302 NORTH AMERICAN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY
SEM-02-003

(Pulp and Paper)

SUBMITTERS: SIERRA LEGAL DEFENCE FUND, ET AL.

PARTY: Canada

DATE: 8 May 2002

SUMMARY: While noting that pollution from pulp mills has

dropped since adoption of the PPER in 1992, the

Submitters have documented over 2,400 documented violations of the PPER at mills in central

and eastern Canada from 1995 to 2000 and claim

very few were prosecuted. They claim that low

numbers of prosecutions correlate with continuing high numbers of violations in Quebec and the

Atlantic Provinces.

SECRETARIAT DETERMINATIONS:

ART. 14(1)(2)

(7 June 2002)

Determination that criteria under Article 14(1)

have been met and that the submission merits

requesting a response from the Party.

303

Secretariat of the Commission

for Environmental Cooperation

Determination in accordance with Article 14(1) and (2) of

the North American Agreement for Environmental Cooperation

Submission Number: SEM-02-003 (Pulp and Paper)

Submitters: Friends of the Earth

Union Saint-Laurent

Grands Lacs

Conservation Council of New Brunswick

Ecology Action Centre

Environment North

Represented by: Sierra Legal Defence Fund (SLDF)

Concerned Party: Canada

Date received: 8 May 2002

Date of this

determination: 7 June 2002

I - INTRODUCTION

On 8 May 2002, the Submitters listed above filed with the Secretariat of the Commission for Environmental Cooperation (the “Secretariat”) a submission on enforcement matters pursuant to Article 14 of the

North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation (“NAAEC” or

“Agreement”). Under Article 14 of the NAAEC, the Secretariat may consider a submission from any nongovernmental organization or person

asserting that a Party to the Agreement is failing to effectively enforce its

environmental law if the Secretariat finds that the submission meets the

requirements of Article 14(1). When the Secretariat determines that

those requirements are met, it then determines whether the submission

merits requesting a response from the Party named in the submission

(Article 14(2)).

305
The Submitters assert that Canada is failing to effectively enforce

sections 34, 36, 40, 78 and 78.1 of the federal Fisheries Act and sections 5

and 6 and Schedules I and II of the Pulp and Paper Effluent Regulations

(PPER) against pulp and paper mills in Ontario, Quebec and the Atlantic

Provinces (i.e. New Brunswick, Nova Scotia and Newfoundland). The

Secretariat has determined that the submission meets all of the requirements in Article 14(1) and merits requesting a response from the Party in

light of the factors listed in Article 14(2). The Secretariat’s reasons are set

forth below in Section III.

II - SUMMARY OF THE SUBMISSION

The Submitters assert that Canada is failing to effectively enforce

sections 34, 36, 40, 78 and 78.1 of the federal Fisheries Act and sections 5

and 6 and Schedules I and II of the Pulp and Paper Effluent Regulations

(PPER) against pulp and paper mills in Ontario, Quebec and the Atlantic

Provinces.

The Submitters first provide general assertions regarding the

amount and pollutant content of effluent from Canada’s 157 pulp and

paper mills, contending the mills have “added tonnes of harmful substances to our waterways and caused extensive harm to aquatic ecosystems.1” They claim that the pulp and paper industry made progress in

investing in environmental upgrades in the early 1990’s but that those

investments have dropped sharply since 1995.2

Next, the Submitters describe the pollution prevention provisions

of the Fisheries Act and the PPER that they contend Canada is failing to

effectively enforce in Ontario, Quebec and the Atlantic Provinces. They

note that under the Fisheries Act, “it is an offence to deposit a deleterious

substance of any type in water frequented by fish that renders the water

deleterious to fish or fish habitat, unless the deposit is authorized by regulation.3” They identify as relevant to their submission two provisions of

the federal government’s Compliance and Enforcement Policy for the

pollution prevention and habitat protection provisions of the Fisheries

Act. First is the policy that “fair, predictable, and consistent enforcement

govern the application of the law, and responses by enforcement personnel to alleged violations.4” Second is the intent stated in the Policy “to

306 NORTH AMERICAN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY

1. Submission at 3.

2. Submission at 3.

3. Submission at 3. See Fisheries Act, s. 36(3).

4. Submission at 4 (quoting Fisheries Act Habitat Protection and Pollution Prevention

Provisions, Compliance and Enforcement Policy, Introduction).
ensure that violators will comply with the Fisheries Act within the shortest possible time, that violations are not repeated and that all available

enforcement tools are used.5”

The Submitters note that the 1991 PPER regulations, which took

effect in July 1992, define acutely lethal effluent, biological oxygen

demand (or BOD) and total suspended solids (or TSS) as deleterious

substances under the Fisheries Act. According to the Submitters, the

PPER authorize deposits of BOD and TSS as long as certain conditions

are met, but (at least since 1995) they strictly prohibit acutely lethal effluent.6 The Submitters describe the conditions on discharges of BOD and

TSS as “relating to monitoring equipment, monitoring reports, preparing a remedial plan in case the effluent fails certain acute lethality tests,

preparing and implementing an emergency response plan, and preparing environmental effects monitoring studies.7”

They also describe the test methods and effluent monitoring

requirements for BOD, TSS and acute lethality and note that each day on

which the PPER are violated constitutes a separate offence. They note

that trout acute lethality test failure is an automatic PPER (and hence

Fisheries Act) violation that requires accelerated follow-up testing, and

that failure of an acute lethality test forDaphnia magna, while not an automatic violation, also requires follow-up test procedures. For both kinds

of acute lethality test, failure to conduct required follow-up test procedures violates the PPER and the Fisheries Act.

The Submitters next present in detail their assertion that Canada is

failing to effectively enforce the Fisheries Act and the PPER in regard to

pulp and paper mills in Ontario, Quebec and the Atlantic Provinces. The

two categories of violations for which they contend enforcement is deficient are (1) failure to meet a “deleterious substances” test and (2) failure

to conduct follow-up testing when there is an effluent test failure.

In regard to Quebec, the Submitters obtained data that they claim

show 960 acute lethality, BOD and TSS violations from 1995 to 2000 at

nine mills. They claim that in 2000, 26 Quebec mills had 171 violations

(presumably acute lethality, BOD and TSS violations); 24 mills failed the

trout acute lethality test, 33.3 % of which also violated follow-up test procedures; and 28 mills, after failing the Daphnia magna acute lethality test,

SEM-02-003 307

5. Submission at 4.

6. Submission at 5.

7. Submission at 5.
violated the acute lethality follow-up procedures.8 In all, the Submitters

claim that there were at least 250 reported potential offences of the PPER

follow-up test procedures throughout Quebec in 2000. The Submitters

claim that, despite these violations, they could find no Fisheries Act prosecutions or convictions of any Quebec mills, and they state that they are

particularly concerned about apparent lack of effective enforcement at

six mills, based on data from 2000. Of these, they highlight especially the

Tembec Inc. mill in Temiscaming, for which they claim no prosecution

was brought under either federal or provincial effluent regulations

despite an alleged 275 reported violations from 1995 through 2000.

In Ontario, the Submitters contend that 13 mills had over 225 acute

lethality, BOD and TSS test failures between 1996 and 2000. In 2000

alone, they claim that 7 mills were responsible for 18 such test failures,

six of which mills failed the trout acute lethality test and two of which

also failed the trout lethality test follow-up procedures. They also claim

that 9 mills violated the Daphnia magna follow-up procedures. In all, the

Submitters claim there were at least 94 follow-up test procedure violations at Ontario mills in 2000. The Submitters assert that from 1995 to

2000, six Ontario mills were prosecuted under the PPER, which they

believe explains the lower number of violations in Ontario as compared

to Quebec and the Atlantic Provinces, where the Submitters claim there

have been fewer prosecutions. Nonetheless, on the basis of 2000 data, the

Submitters identify two Ontario mills for which they “have concerns

about the apparent lack of effective enforcement of the federal laws.9”

The Submitters obtained only partial data for mills in the Atlantic

Provinces for the years 1995 to 2000 and claim therefore that they understate the number of violations in those provinces. According to the Submitters, the data they obtained show that 19 mills reported 1,081 acute

lethality, BOD and TSS violations from 1995 to 2000. The Submitters did

not calculate follow-up test procedure violations for the Atlantic Provinces. They claim that despite the number of test failure violations, they

found only “two prosecutions of mills in the Atlantic Region under the

federal laws since the PPER came into force.10” Based on 2000 data, the

Submitters are particularly concerned about the apparent lack of effective enforcement regarding four Atlantic Provinces mills. According to

the Submitters, the Atlantic Provinces mill allegedly with the most violations from 1995 to 2000, the Irving Saint John mill, was prosecuted under

308 NORTH AMERICAN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY

8. Appendix 6 to the submission provides a flowchart showing the acute lethality

testing procedures and the points at which violations occur.

9. Submission at 9.

10. Submission at 10.
the federal laws in 1998 but still had 22 test failure violations and an

unknown number of follow-up test violations in 2000.

The Submitters contend that the exclusions in NAAEC Article

45(1) from the definition of “failure to effectively enforce environmental

law” do not apply. They claim that Canada’s alleged failure to effectively enforce the Fisheries Act and the PPER do not reflect a reasonable

exercise of discretion or result from bona fide decisions to allocate

resources to other enforcement matters within the meaning of Article

45(1). Among other things, they assert that “[i]t is not a reasonable exercise of discretion where an available enforcement tool, such as prosecutions, is used so infrequently in the face of widespread and numerous

violations.11”

Finally, as discussed further below, the Submitters present information in support of their contention that the submission meets the

requirements of Article 14(1)(a)-(f) and that the submission merits

requesting a response from Canada based on the criteria in Article 14(2).

III - ANALYSIS

Article 14 of the NAAEC directs the Secretariat to consider a submission from any nongovernmental organization or person asserting

that a Party to the NAAEC is failing to effectively enforce its environmental law. When the Secretariat determines that a submission meets

the Article 14(1) requirements, it then determines whether the submission merits requesting a response from the Party named in the submission based upon the factors contained in Article 14(2). As the Secretariat

has noted in previous Article 14(1) determinations,12 Article 14(1) is not

intended to be an insurmountable procedural screening device. Rather,

Article 14(1) should be given a large and liberal interpretation, consistent with the objectives of the NAAEC.

A. Article 14(1)

The opening sentence of Article 14(1) authorizes the Secretariat to

consider a submission “from any nongovernmental organization or person asserting that a Party is failing to effectively enforce its environmental law [...].” The Submission meets these requirements.

SEM-02-003 309

11. Submission at 11.

12. See e.g. SEM-97-005 (Biodiversity), Determination pursuant to Article 14(1) (26 May

1998) and SEM-98- 003 (Great Lakes), Determination pursuant to Article 14(1) & (2)

(8 September 1999).
First, the Submitters are nongovernmental organizations as

defined in Article 45(1) of the NAAEC. Second, the submission asserts

that a Party, Canada, is failing to effectively enforce section 36 and other

sections of the Fisheries Act related to pollution prevention, as well as

provisions of the PPER. As the Secretariat has found in other submissions, the pollution prevention provisions of the Fisheries Act are environmental law within the meaning of NAAEC Article 45(2).13 Third, as

the Submitters “assert that the Government of Canada is in breach of its

commitment under the NAAEC by failing to effectively enforce its Fisheries Act and [PPER],14” the submission alleges an ongoing failure to

effectively enforce the Fisheries Act and the PPER. Notably, it appears

Canada could still take enforcement action with respect to at least some

of the alleged violations that the Submitters specifically identify.15

Finally, the submission alleges a failure to effectively enforce the cited

provisions of law and not a deficiency in the law itself.

Article 14(1) then lists six specific criteria relevant to the Secretariat’s consideration of submissions. The Secretariat must find that a submission:

(a) is in writing in a language designated by that Party in a notification to the Secretariat;

(b) clearly identifies the person or organization making the submission;

(c) provides sufficient information to allow the Secretariat to

review the submission, including any documentary evidence

on which the submission may be based;

(d) appears to be aimed at promoting enforcement rather than at

harassing industry;

(e) indicates that the matter has been communicated in writing

to the relevant authorities of the Party and indicates the

Party’s response, if any; and

(f) is filed by a person or organization residing or established in

the territory of a Party.16

310 NORTH AMERICAN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY

13. See SEM-98-004 (BC Mining), Article 15(1) Notification at 11 (11 May 2001).

14. Submission at 2 (emphasis added).

15. See, e.g., Fisheries Act s. 82(1).

16. Article 14(1)(a)-(f).
The submission meets these criteria. The submission is in English,

a language designated by the Parties.17 It clearly identifies the organizations making the submission.18

The submission provides sufficient information to allow the Secretariat to review the submission.19 The Submitters provide extensive data

regarding numerous specific violations of thePPERand the Fisheries Act,

as well as data regarding the extent to which Canada has taken enforcement action in response to those violations.20

The submission appears to be aimed at promoting enforcement

rather than at harassing industry. It is focused on the acts or omissions of

a Party rather than on compliance by a particular company or business,

the Submitters are not competitors of any of the mills alleged to have violated the PPER, and the submission does not appear frivolous.21

The Submitters indicate that the matter “has been communicated

in writing to the Government of Canada in a report released in 2001 entitled Pulping the Law.22” As the Submitters noted, the report indicated

that the Submitters were planning to file a submission with the CEC on

matters addressed in the report.23 The Submitters also note that newspaper articles that they attach as an appendix to the submission demonstrate that the relevant authorities of Canada were aware of and

responded to the report. In addition, the Submitters show that Sierra

Legal Defence Fund raised the enforcement matters at issue in the submission in a written summary presented to the House of Commons

Standing Committee on Environment and Sustainable Development in

1998, in connection with proceedings that Environment Canada and

Fisheries and Oceans Canada attended. Accordingly, the submission

meets the requirements of Article 14(1)(e).24

SEM-02-003 311

17. Article 14(1)(a), Guideline 3.2; submission at 12.

18. Article 14(1)(b); submission at 12.

19. Article 14(1)(c), Guideline 5.2, 5.3.

20. See, e.g., Submission, Appendix 5.

21. See Guideline 5.4.

22. Submission at 13.

23. Submission, Appendix 3, at 4.

24. As the communications mentioned here, taken together, are sufficient for purposes

of Article 14(1)(e), the Secretariat takes no position as to whether, as the Submitters

claim, the mills’ self-reporting of PPER violations to Environment Canada would

be sufficient to meet Article 14(1)(e). Notably, while this self-reporting brings violations to the attention of the government, it differs from the other communications

on which the Submitters rely in that it does not clearly communicate a concern

regarding a possible failure to effectively enforce environmental law.
Finally, because the Submitters are established in the United States

or Canada, the submission meets the requirement in Article 14(1)(f) that

it be filed by a “person or organization residing or established in the territory of a Party.25”

B. Article 14(2)

The Secretariat reviews a submission under Article 14(2) if it finds

that the submission meets the criteria in Article 14(1). The purpose of

such a review is to determine whether to request that the Party concerned prepare a response to the submission. During its review under

Article 14(2), the Secretariat considers each of the four factors listed in

that provision based on the facts involved in a particular submission.

Article 14(2) lists these four factors as follows:

In deciding whether to request a response, the Secretariat shall be guided

by whether:

(a) the submission alleges harm to the person or organization making the

submission;

(b) the submission, alone or in combination with other submissions,

raises matters whose further study in this process would advance the

goals of this Agreement;

(c) private remedies available under the Party’s law have been pursued;

and

(d) the submission is drawn exclusively from mass media reports.26

The Secretariat, guided by the factors listed in Article 14(2), has

determined that the submission merits requesting a response from the

Party.

Citing in particular to the Pulping the Law report in Appendix 3 to

the submission, the Submitters explicitly allege harm to the persons they

represent:

The Submitters are non-governmental environmental organizations

whose members include thousands of individuals who have a shared

interest in protecting the waters of Canada, including the reduction and

312 NORTH AMERICAN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY

25. Submission at ii.

26. Article 14(2) of the NAAEC.
elimination of pollution from pulp and paper mills in central and eastern

Canada. The members make use of these waters and water pollution

harms the entire ecosystem, including people, fish and their habitat.27

Similar assertions have been considered under Article 14(2)(a) for

other submissions and they are relevant here as well.28

The submission also raises matters whose further study in the Article 14 process would advance the goals of the Agreement.29 The Submitters note, inter alia, that further study in the citizen submission process

would foster the protection and improvement of the environment as

contemplated in NAAEC Article 1(a); promote sustainable development based on cooperation and mutually supportive environmental

and economic policies, as contemplated in NAAEC Article 1(b); increase

cooperation between governments to better conserve, protect and

enhance the environment, as contemplated in NAAEC Article 1(c);

avoid creating trade distortions or new trade barriers, as contemplated

in NAAEC Article 1(e); strengthen cooperation on the development and

improvement of environmental laws, regulations, procedures, policies

and practices, as contemplated in NAAEC Article 1(f); enhance compliance with, and enforcement of, environmental law and regulations, as

contemplated in NAAEC Article 1(g); and promote pollution prevention policies and practices, as contemplated in NAAEC Article 1(j). The

Secretariat agrees that further study of the matters raised in the submission would advance these goals, particularly those set out in NAAEC

Articles 1(a), 1(e), 1(g) and 1(j).

The submission is particularly likely to advance the goals of the

NAAEC in that the Submitters allege a failure to effectively enforce environmental law in numerous specific cases over a wide geographic area

and time period, so as to illustrate a “systemic problem of persistent

non-enforcement by the Canadian government.30” The Secretariat has

previously noted that assertions of a widespread failure to effectively

SEM-02-003 313

27. Submission at 14.

28. In SEM-96-001 (Cozumel), Recommendation to the Council for the Development of

a Factual Record (7 June 1996), for example, the Secretariat noted: “In considering

harm, the Secretariat notes the importance and character of the resource in question

– a portion of the magnificent Paradise coral reef located in the Caribbean waters of

Quintana Roo. While the Secretariat recognizes that the submitters may not have

alleged the particularized, individual harm required to acquire legal standing to

bring suit in some civil proceedings in North America, the especially public nature

of marine resources bring the submitters within the spirit and intent of Article 14 of

the NAAEC.”

29. Article 14(2)(b) of the NAAEC.

30. Submission at 15.
enforce an environmental law “are particularly strong candidates for

Article 14 consideration.31”

The Submitters assert that “[t]here are no realistic alternative private remedies available.32” They claim that they either do not have status

for civil remedies or such remedies would be impractical to pursue.

They also claim that bringing private prosecutions, which the government can stay, is a financial burden and not a viable option in light of the

number of alleged violations and alleged failures to take enforcement

action included in the submission. Taking note of these burdens, and

noting also that the Submitters or others have made Canadian authorities aware of their enforcement concerns as long ago as 1998, the Secretariat gives considerable weight to the assertion that further pursuit of

private remedies was not a practicable option for the Submitters in

regard to the matters raised in the submission.

Finally, the submission is not based exclusively on mass media

reports. As the Submitters note, the submission is based primarily on

information obtained from the federal government, industry and SLDF

research, and not simply mass media reports.

In sum, having reviewed the submission in light of the factors contained in Article 14(2), the Secretariat has determined that the assertion

that Canada is failing to effectively enforce provisions of the PPER and

the Fisheries Actin regard to pulp and paper mills in Ontario, Quebec and

the Atlantic Provinces merits a response from Canada.

IV - CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Secretariat has determined that submission SEM-02-003 (Pulp and Paper) meets the requirements of Article

14(1) and merits requesting a response from the Party in light of the

factors listed in Article 14(2). Accordingly, the Secretariat requests a

response from the Government of Canada subject to the provisions of

Article 14(3). A copy of the submission, along with supporting information provided with the submission, was previously forwarded to the

Party under separate cover.

314 NORTH AMERICAN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY

31. SEM-99-002 (Migratory Birds), Determination pursuant to Article 14(1) and (2) of

the NAAEC (23 December 1999).

32. Submission at 15.
Respectfully submitted,

Secretariat of the Commission for Environmental Cooperation

Geoffrey Garver

Director, Submissions on Enforcement Matters Unit

c.c.: Ms. Norine Smith, Environment Canada

Ms. Judith E. Ayres, US-EPA

Dra. Olga Ojeda, SEMARNAT

Ms. Janine Ferretti, CEC Executive Director

Mr. Robert Wright, SLDF

SEM-02-003 315