IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA

No. 22–0089

Submitted September 14, 2023—Filed October 27, 2023

STATE OF IOWA,

Appellee,

vs.

JOHNNY BLAHNIK CHURCH a/k/a DREW ALAN BLAHNIK,

Appellant.

On review from the Iowa Court of Appeals.

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Linn County, Christopher L. 

Bruns, Judge.

The defendant challenges the propriety of a verdict-urging instruction. 

DECISION OF COURT OF APPEALS VACATED; DISTRICT COURT JUDGMENT 

AFFIRMED.

McDonald, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which all justices 

joined.

Leon F. Spies of Spies & Pavelich, Iowa City, for appellant.

Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Nicholas E. Siefert and Louis S. 

Sloven, Assistant Attorneys General, for appellee.
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MCDONALD, Justice. 

When a jury in deliberations communicates to a judge that they may be 

deadlocked, the judge has considerable discretion to give to the jury a 

supplemental instruction, known as a verdict-urging instruction, to encourage 

continued deliberations. The judge’s decision to give a verdict-urging instruction 

will be reversed only where the circumstances show the verdict-urging 

instruction coerced the jury’s verdict. The sole question presented in this appeal 

is whether the district court abused its considerable discretion and coerced the

jury’s verdict by giving a verdict-urging instruction after being told that the jury 

was divided 11–1 and that one juror was not following the judge’s instructions.

I.

Johnny Blahnik Church, also known as Drew Alan Blahnik, stabbed and 

killed Christopher Bagley. Bagley suffered at least thirteen different stab 

wounds, including wounds to his neck, chest, and abdomen. After Church killed 

Bagley, Church helped bury Bagley’s body and then lied to investigators and a 

grand jury about what had happened.

Church was indicted for murder in the first degree, in violation of Iowa 

Code sections 707.1 and 707.2(1)(a) (2018), obstructing prosecution, in violation 

of Iowa Code section 709.3(1), and abuse of a corpse, in violation of Iowa Code

section 708.14(1)(b). The facts and circumstances of Church’s offenses are 

largely immaterial to the resolution of this appeal, and we need not discuss them 

any further. What is material to the resolution of this appeal are the facts and 

circumstances related to Church’s trial and the jury’s deliberations, and we 

discuss those facts and circumstances at some length. 

Church’s trial began on Friday, July 16, 2021. At trial, Church asserted a 

defense of justification. The case was submitted to the jury at approximately 

4:06 p.m. on Monday, July 26. The jury met for thirty-five minutes, separating 
3

at 4:41 p.m. that day. The jury resumed deliberations the following day, 

Tuesday, meeting for nearly three hours total between 9 a.m. and noon. On 

Wednesday, the jury deliberated for approximately seven hours in total.

The jury reconvened on Thursday, July 29. At approximately 10:06 a.m., 

the jury sent a note to the district court: “A juror is failing to follow specific rules 

set forth by you in the rule packet provided. In regards to 45 + 52.” 

Instruction 45 related to Church’s justification defense, and instruction 52 

related to a person’s duties after using deadly force. Based on this note, the court 

believed the jurors were deadlocked. Nonetheless, after conferring with counsel, 

the district court responded with a written note to the jury: “As previously 

instructed, you are required to apply the law set forth in the instructions already 

provided to you.” 

Approximately one hour later, the jury informed the court attendant that 

it was deadlocked. After conferring with the attorneys, the district court 

instructed the jury to communicate with the court in writing, and the jury sent 

the following note signed by the foreperson: 

We have a juror that is refusing to follow certain rules set forth by 

you. We took a vote to whether or not we felt this person was 

deliberately not following a rule. The vote was 11 to 1. We have gone 

over this rule numerous times with this juror. The response has 

been “I don’t care, I’m not changing my opinion.” 

The court made a record with the attorneys after receiving the jury’s note. The 

State requested the district court issue a verdict-urging instruction. Church’s 

counsel objected. The court denied the prosecutor’s request to issue a 

verdict-urging instruction. Instead, the court sent a question to the jury: “Do you 

believe further deliberations would be fruitful?”

Shortly thereafter, at 11:37 a.m., the jury sent the following response, 

signed by the foreperson, to the district court’s question: “No, we feel that 
4

because the rules set forth by this court are not being followed by a single juror 

that deliberations would NOT be fruitful.” After receiving the jury’s response, the 

district court again met with the lawyers. The prosecutor renewed his request 

for a verdict-urging instruction, and Church’s counsel objected. Church’s 

counsel argued that issuing a verdict-urging instruction under these

circumstances would be coercive. After considering the parties’ arguments, the 

district court issued the following written verdict-urging instruction:

You have been deliberating upon this case for a considerable 

period of time, and the Court deems it proper to advise you further 

in regard to the desirability of agreement, if possible.

The case has been exhaustively and carefully tried by both 

sides and has been submitted to you for decision and verdict, if 

possible. It is the law that a unanimous verdict is required. While 

this verdict must be the conclusion of each juror and not a mere

acquiescence of the jurors in order to reach an agreement, it is still 

necessary for all of the jurors to examine the issues and questions 

submitted to them with candor and fairness and with a proper 

regard for, and deference to, the opinion of each other. A proper 

regard for the judgment of others will greatly aid us informing our 

own judgment.

Each juror should listen to the arguments of other jurors with 

a disposition to be convinced by them; and if the members of the 

jury differ in their views of the evidence, such difference of opinion 

should cause them all to scrutinize the evidence more closely and to 

reexamine the grounds of their problem. Your duty is to decide the 

issues of fact which have been submitted to you, if you can 

conscientiously do so. In conferring, you should lay aside all mere 

pride of opinion and should bear in mind that the jury room is no 

place for espousing and maintaining, in a spirit of controversy, 

either side of a cause. The aim ever to be kept in view is the truth as 

it appears from the evidence, examined in light of the instructions 

of the Court.

Please continue your deliberations.

The district court issued the instruction at approximately 12:08 p.m. 

Three and one-half hours later, at 3:39 p.m., the jury informed the district 

court it had reached a verdict. The jury found Church guilty of murder in the 
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second degree, obstructing prosecution, and abusing a corpse. The district court 

polled the jurors in open court, asking each one: “Is this your verdict?” Each 

juror answered in the affirmative without any doubt or hesitation noted in the 

record.

Church appealed his convictions, and we transferred the case to the court 

of appeals. The court of appeals concluded the jury’s verdict was coerced, vacated 

Church’s convictions, and remanded the case for a new trial. We granted the 

State’s application for further review. 

II.

“Supplemental instructions urging a jury to reach a unanimous verdict 

have ‘long been sanctioned.’ ” State v. Piper, 663 N.W.2d 894, 911 (Iowa 2003) 

(quoting Lowenfield v. Phelps, 484 U.S. 231, 237 (1988)), overruled on other 

grounds by State v. Hanes, 790 N.W.2d 545 (Iowa 2010). The district court “has 

considerable discretion in determining whether [a] verdict-urging instruction[] 

should be given.” State v. Campbell, 294 N.W.2d 803, 808–09 (Iowa 1980). We 

will reverse a district court’s decision to give a verdict-urging instruction only 

where the verdict-urging instruction coerced or helped coerce the jury’s verdict. 

See State v. Davis, 975 N.W.2d 1, 18 (Iowa 2022). In determining whether the 

instruction coerced or helped coerce the jury’s verdict, we generally look at “the 

content of the verdict-urging instruction,” “the timing surrounding the verdict,”

and the “responses from juror polling to ensure each juror was not coerced into 

their verdict.” Id. These considerations are not exclusive, however, and each case 

must be decided based on the totality of the circumstances. See id. “The ultimate 

test is whether the instruction improperly coerced or helped coerce a verdict or 

merely initiated a new train of real deliberation which terminated the 

disagreement.” Campbell, 294 N.W.2d at 808. 
6

A.

The disposition of this case is largely controlled by our recent decision in 

State v. Davis, 975 N.W.2d 1. In that case, the defendant was charged with 

first-degree murder. Id. at 7. “After seven hours of jury deliberation, the court 

attendant informed the court that the jury may be deadlocked.” Id. at 17. Over 

the defendant’s objection, the district court gave the jury a verdict-urging 

instruction. Id. After the jury was provided with an oral verdict-urging 

instruction, “they deliberated for approximately four and a half hours before 

returning with a guilty verdict.” Id. On appeal, the defendant contended that the 

verdict-urging instruction coerced the jury’s verdict and that he was entitled to 

a new trial. Id. We concluded the defendant failed to establish coercion or 

potential coercion of the jury’s verdict. In analyzing the most relevant factors, we 

concluded the content of the instruction was not coercive, id. at 18, the timing 

of the jury’s verdict did not evidence coercion, id. at 20, and the jury poll did not 

evidence coercion, id. at 21.

As in Davis, none of the most relevant factors support the conclusion that 

the district court’s verdict-urging instruction coerced or helped coerce the jury’s 

verdict. With respect to the content of the instruction, the instruction in this case 

contained none of the language our courts have found coercive or potentially 

coercive. The instruction did “not target jurors in the minority.” Id. at 18. The 

instruction “did not identify the number of jurors with a minority opinion.” Id.

The instruction did “not express any requirement that the jury reach a verdict.” 

Id. The instruction did “not discuss the possibility of a retrial or the mounting 

litigation expenses.” Id.

In addition to not containing coercive or potentially coercive language, the 

instruction contained appropriate language to prevent potential coercion. The 

instruction was broad and was directed to “each” and “all” of the jurors rather 
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than those in the minority. The instruction urged unanimity but also provided 

that the jury should do so only “if possible” and only if the jurors could

“conscientiously do so.”

In short, the content of the district court’s verdict-urging instruction is

materially indistinguishable from that found to be noncoercive in Davis and 

other decisions. See, e.g., Davis, 975 N.W.2d at 18–19; Piper, 663 N.W.2d at 912; 

Campbell, 294 N.W.2d at 808; State v. Gibbs, No. 22–0006, 2023 WL 152568, 

at *4 (Iowa Ct. App. Jan. 11, 2023); State v. Parmer, No. 13–2033, 

2015 WL 2393652, at *6 (Iowa Ct. App. May 20, 2015); State v. Power, 

No. 13–0052, 2014 WL 2600214, at *4–5 (Iowa Ct. App. June 11, 2014).

1

The timing of the verdict does not support the conclusion the jury’s verdict 

in this case was coerced or potentially coerced. When we examine the timing of 

the jury’s verdict, the essence of the inquiry is whether the length of the jury’s 

post-instruction deliberations evidenced the jury engaged in new, real, and

worthwhile deliberations that terminated the disagreement. See Davis, 

1A verdict-urging instruction is frequently referred to as an “Allen charge,” originating 

from the Supreme Court case Allen v. United States, 164 U.S. 492, 501–02 (1896), which 

approved the use of a verdict-urging instruction. The language approved in Allen included 

language that directed jurors in the minority to rethink their position in light of the view of the 

majority, among other things. See id. at 501. Because the language in the instruction in this 

case does not include some of the language approved in Allen but later thought to be problematic, 

the instruction is not a true “Allen charge.” See State v. Lamb, 261 S.E.2d 130, 131–32 

(N.C. 1979) (discussing deficiencies in the instruction approved in Allen and subsequent 

developments in improving a verdict-urging instruction); Commonwealth v. Greer, 951 A.2d 346, 

355 (Pa. 2008) (“The Allen charge came to be commonly used in both the state and federal courts, 

but over time, various courts raised concerns respecting that part of the charge encouraging 

jurors in the minority to reconsider their views in light of the majority vote, with the fear being 

that such an emphasis might be unduly coercive.”); State v. Steven G.B., No. 93-1658-CR, 

1996 WL 426089, at *5 (Wis. Ct. App. July 31, 1996) (explaining that the modified instruction 

“is not the instruction used in the case giving rise to the term ‘Allen’ charge” but that “attorneys 

and trial courts continue to refer to the instruction as the Allen charge”); 6 Wayne R. LaFave et 

al., Criminal Procedure § 24.9(d), at 674 (4th ed. 2015) (“But many courts have turned away 

from the Allen charge, some of these approving the use of more guarded language.”). We thus 

refer to the instruction in this case as a verdict-urging instruction.
8

975 N.W.2d at 19; Campbell, 294 N.W.2d at 808. In Davis, we concluded that

“[f]our and a half hours was ample time for the jurors to engage in meaningful 

conversation on the evidence presented and thoroughly evaluate each other’s 

opinions.” 975 N.W.2d at 20. In State v. Myers, we found post-instruction 

deliberations of forty-one minutes were sufficient to show the jury commenced 

new, real deliberations that terminated the jury’s prior disagreement. 

140 N.W.2d 891, 898 (Iowa 1966). In this case, the jury deliberated three and 

one-half hours after receiving the district court’s verdict-urging instruction. This 

negates any suggestion of coercion. See State v. Quitt, 204 N.W.2d 913, 914 

(Iowa 1973) (“The record here does not suggest coercion. In fact, it rather 

demonstratively negatives it. The fact the jury deliberated 3 hours 52 minutes 

following the giving of the verdict-urging instruction (which elapsed time 

included time out for the evening meal), indicates the jury gave additional 

consideration to the record before a verdict was reached.”); Campbell, 

294 N.W.2d at 811 (finding no coercion where jury deliberated two and a half 

hours post-instruction); State v. Kelley, 161 N.W.2d 123, 126 (Iowa 1968) 

(holding there was “nothing here to suggest coercion” where the jury deliberated 

for twenty-two hours and returned a verdict two and one-half hours 

post-instruction); State v. Bogardus, 176 N.W. 327, 329 (Iowa 1920) (holding 

there was no coercion where jury returned a verdict one and one-half hours 

post-instruction).

With respect to the third consideration, the jury poll did not reveal any 

evidence of coercion or potential coercion. “The purpose of polling the jury is to 

determine that the verdict returned is actually the verdict of each individual 

member.” Davis, 975 N.W.2d at 20 (quoting State v. Morelock, 164 N.W.2d 819, 

823 (Iowa 1969)). In this case, each juror was polled in open court before the 

judge, the prosecutor, defense counsel, and the defendant and asked, “[I]s this 
9

your verdict?” Each juror responded with “it is” or “yes.” As in Davis, “neither 

party nor the trial court judge identified any hesitation, comments, or body 

language from the jurors during polling that would indicate coercion.”

975 N.W.2d at 21.

In sum, we conclude this case is materially indistinguishable from our 

recent decision in Davis. As in Davis, the most relevant facts and circumstances 

do not support the conclusion the district court’s verdict-urging instruction 

coerced or potentially coerced the jury’s verdict. Instead, the record reflects the 

district court issued an instruction with appropriate content. After receiving the 

instruction, the jury resumed deliberations for an additional three and one-half 

hours, which our precedents hold is sufficient to demonstrate they commenced 

a train of new deliberations to resolve their prior disagreement. After the jury 

returned its verdict in open court, each of the jurors affirmed the verdict without 

any hesitation.

B.

The court of appeals reached a different conclusion. The court of appeals 

held the jury’s verdict was coerced, vacated Church’s convictions, and remanded 

the case for a new trial. In reaching the conclusion that the jury’s verdict was 

coerced, the court of appeals attempted to distinguish Davis. The court of 

appeals focused its attention on the timing of the jury’s verdict, the jury’s 

disclosure of their numerical division to the district court, and the majority 

jurors’ purported feelings of “open hostility toward [the] lone holdout juror.” We 

conclude the court of appeals erred in its analysis.

With respect to the timing of the jury’s verdict, rather than focusing on the 

absolute length of the jury’s post-instruction deliberations, the court of appeals 

focused on the “more intricate gauge” of the “ratio of the deliberations before and 

after” the verdict-urging instruction. In Davis, we did recognize that some of our 
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cases have “looked at the ratio of ‘the time spent in deliberation before, and the 

duration of the deliberations after, such an instruction was given.’ ” 975 N.W.2d

at 20 (quoting State v. Peirce, 159 N.W. 1050, 1054 (Iowa 1916), abrogated on 

other grounds by State v. McLaughlin, 94 N.W.2d 303 (Iowa 1959)). However, in 

Davis, we stated the ratio was a “less relevant” consideration than the absolute 

length of the jury’s post-instruction deliberations. Id. Regardless, relying 

primarily on State v. Peirce, 159 N.W. 1050, the court of appeals concluded that 

the ratio of pre- and post-instruction deliberations in this case “point[ed] to 

coercion and prejudice.”

Peirce does not support the court of appeals’ coercion analysis for two 

reasons. First, Peirce announced a presumption of prejudice not applicable here. 

In Peirce, “the jury had been kept together some 13 days and had been 

deliberating upon its verdict some 48 hours.” Id. at 1054. “It stood three for 

acquittal and nine for conviction when the additional instruction was given, and 

returned a verdict of guilty in something less than 4 hours thereafter.” Id. The 

Peirce court conducted a thorough review of the relevant cases and concluded 

that “where the disagreement is of more than ordinary and usual duration,” a 

presumption of prejudice arises if the “verdict is reached in a time short in 

comparison.” Id. at 1055. In this case, the jury’s pre-instruction deliberations of 

thirteen hours were not of more than ordinary and usual duration than one 

would expect in a multi-count case involving first-degree murder and a 

justification defense. The presumption of prejudice articulated in Peirce is 

inapplicable here. 

Second, the critical fact in Peirce was not the ratio of pre- and postinstruction deliberations. Instead, it was the fact that the jury was confined over 

the weekend and had to reach a verdict to avoid continued confinement for an 

additional day:
11

After some 48 hours of disagreement three stood for acquittal when 

the instruction was given. That it was late on Saturday night. That 

it got into the jury room the trial judge had gone home and out of 

town for over Sunday, and that, while there was a judge in town, he 

could only act to receive a verdict. It fairly had conveyed to it the 

idea that failure to agree meant confinement over Sunday at least.

We think this raises a presumption of prejudice.

Id. In stark contrast, in this case, the jury was not confined, and the jury 

returned its verdict on a Thursday in the middle of the afternoon. Unlike the jury 

in Peirce, the jury in this case was not subject to continued restraint over the 

weekend to reach a verdict. 

The court of appeals also focused its attention on the fact that the jury 

disclosed its numerical division to the district court. The mere fact that the jury 

made the district court aware that the members were split 11–1 does not support 

the conclusion that the district court’s verdict-urging instruction was coercive or 

potentially coercive. We addressed a similar issue in State v. Piper, 633 N.W.2d 

894. In that case, the jury “sent a note to the judge stating, ‘We are a hung jury. 

Ten guilty; two not guilty.’ ” Id. at 911. The district court ordered the jury to 

continue deliberations, and two hours later the jury returned a guilty verdict. 

See id. On appeal, we concluded the jury’s verdict was not coerced even though 

the numerical division “was volunteered by the foreperson in the notes sent to 

the trial judge.” Id. at 912. Critically, as in this case, “the court did not inquire 

into the voting breakdown.” Id. Courts throughout the country are in accord with 

Piper and conclude that giving a verdict-urging instruction is not reversible error 

merely because the trial judge inadvertently learned of the numerical division of 

the jury, including where the jury was divided 11–1. See, e.g., United States v. 

Santiago, 834 F. App’x 417, 418 (9th Cir. 2021); United States v. Lorenzo, 43 F.3d 

1303, 1307 (9th Cir. 1995); United States v. Norton, 867 F.2d 1354, 1364–65 

(11th Cir. 1989); United States v. Hotz, 620 F.2d 5, 7 (1st Cir. 1980); Sanders v. 
12

United States, 415 F.2d 621, 631–32 (5th Cir. 1969); Drayton v. State, 778 S.E.2d 

179, 182, 183–84 (Ga. 2015); Jackson v. State, 782 S.E.2d 287, 292–93 (Ga. Ct. 

App. 2016); Henson v. Commonwealth, No. 2020–SC–0343–MR, 2021

WL 5984690, at *14–15 (Ky. Dec. 16, 2021); Barnett v. State, No. 2012, Sept.

term, 2019, 2021 WL 1040498, at *6 n.4 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. Mar. 18, 2021); 

People v. Parker, No. 263276, 2007 WL 486485, at *5 (Mich. Ct. App. Feb. 15, 

2007) (per curiam); State v. Blackwell, 747 S.E.2d 137, 142 (N.C. Ct. App. 2013);

Commonwealth v. Greer, 951 A.2d 346, 360–61 (Pa. 2008); Draper v. State, 335 

S.W.3d 412, 415, 417–18 (Tex. App. 2011); State v. Evans, No. 18–1044, 2020 

WL 1487808, at *7–8 (W. Va. Mar. 23, 2020).

The court of appeals recognized that the district court’s knowledge of the 

numerical division did not, in and of itself, prohibit the verdict-urging 

instruction. In the court of appeals’ view, however, there was more: Not only was

the district court aware the jury was split 11–1, but the district court was also 

aware the majority jurors had expressed “animosity” toward the lone holdout. In 

particular, the court of appeals found that the jury’s notes “disparaged” the lone 

holdout, that the notes had a “harsh tone,” that the jury “revealed open hostility 

toward a lone holdout juror,” and “that the jury had turned its ire on the lone 

holdout.” The notes were “an unusually open expression of animosity from the 

majority jurors toward the lone holdout.” In the court of appeals’ view, the district 

court’s awareness of the majority jurors’ open hostility toward the lone holdout 

supports the conclusion that the jury’s verdict was coerced. 

We conclude the court of appeals erred in two respects. First, the record 

does not support the court of appeals’ characterization of the majority jurors’ 

feelings toward the holdout juror. The jury’s notes to the district court stated 

that a single juror was “failing to follow,” “refusing to follow,” and “deliberately 

not following” the district court’s instructions, a point the jury determined by 
13

vote. The notes were direct, but they do not evidence “disparagement,” “hostility,” 

“ire,” or “an unusually open expression of animosity.” Neither the district court 

nor the attorneys characterized the majority jurors’ views in this way after 

receiving the notes from the jury. In Church’s motion for new trial, he did not 

characterize the majority jurors’ views in this way. Even on appeal, Church does 

not characterize the majority jurors’ views in this way. The court of appeals took 

artistic license here, but the picture painted lacks fidelity to the record and the 

parties’ arguments.

Second, the court of appeals’ focus on the purported ire of the majority 

jurors missed the relevant inquiry in analyzing a verdict-urging instruction. The 

psychological pressure jurors place on each other to try and reach a unanimous 

verdict is inherent in the jury process. “No doubt, jurors in a minority position 

always feel some form of pressure to bow down to the will of the majority.” Greer, 

951 A.2d at 361. Similarly, jurors in the majority also “feel pressure to switch 

views, if only to get the matter over with.” Id. In determining the propriety of a 

verdict-urging instruction, however, we are not so concerned with the inherent 

psychological pressure jurors place on each other during deliberations. See id.

(“These sorts of ephemeral psychological pressures are both inherent in the jury 

function and difficult to measure. . . . [W]e should tread carefully before allowing 

speculation about such effects to control the relevant jurisprudence.”). Instead,

we are more concerned with whether “the instruction improperly coerced or 

helped coerce a verdict.” Campbell, 294 N.W.2d at 808 (emphasis added). And, 

in particular, whether the instruction encouraged jurors to abandon their 

conscientiously held positions.

This distinction is evident in the primary case upon which the court of 

appeals relied, Smalls v. Batista, 191 F.3d 272 (2d Cir. 1999). Smalls did not 

conclude the jury’s verdict was coerced due to psychological pressure and 
14

small-group dynamics inherent in the jury process. The verdict-urging 

instruction in Smalls was found defective only because it “failed to include 

instructions reminding jurors not to abandon their conscientiously held views, 

even if holding firm would leave a minority of the jurors unconvinced.” 191 F.3d 

at 280. It was the “lack of cautionary language . . . that render[ed] the charge 

coercive and a violation of Smalls’ constitutional rights to due process and a fair 

trial.” Id. As discussed above, that instructional defect is not present in this case. 

III.

For these reasons, we vacate the decision of the court of appeals, and we 

affirm Church’s convictions.

DECISION OF COURT OF APPEALS VACATED; DISTRICT COURT JUDGMENT

AFFIRMED.