### I N THE UNI TED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FI F TH CI RCUI T

No. 12-30375 Summary Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee

v. COREY LYNDELL BLOUNT, Defendant-Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Louisiana USDC No. 2:03-CV-1934 USDC No. 2:98-CR-20058-1

Before WIENER, ELROD, and GRAVES, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM: * Corey Lyndell Blount, f ederal prisoner # 83126-079, was convicted of use of a communication facility to facilitate or cause controlled s u b s t a n c e offenses and p articipation in a c ontinuing criminal enterprise, a nd he was sentenced to life imprisonment. He filed a 2 8 U .S.C. § 2255 motion challenging his conviction

a n d sentence that was denied. In 2007, after Blount filed multiple pos t

judgment motions in his § 2255 case, the district court s anctioned Blount by U n i t e d S t a te s C o u rt o f A p p e al s

F i f t h C i rc u i t 

### F I L E D April 4, 2013 Ly l e W . Cay ce Clerk

* Purs uant to 5 T H C I R

. R

. 47. 5, the court has d eterm ined that this op inion should not be p ublis hed and is not p reced ent excep t und er the lim ited circum s tances s et forth in 5 T H C I R

. R. 47. 5. 4. Case: 12-30375 Document: 00512197373 Page: 1 Date Filed: 04/04/2013No. 12-30375

requiring that h e seek leave of c ourt pri o r to filing a ny further motions in the § 2255 case. In 2012, Bloun t f i l e d a F ederal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(4) motion f or relief from the judgment denying his § 2255 motion, a motion for the district court to take judicial notice of d o cuments filed in his case a nd a codefendant’s c ase, and two motions in which h e sought to amend claims that he raised in his § 2 255 motion. Blount appeals the d i s t r ict c ourt’s order striking those motions pursuant t o the 2007 sanction order and the district court’s denial of h is Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) motion to alter or amend the district court’s order striking his motions. Blount argues that the d i s trict court’s 2007 sanction order amounts to a

sua sponte pre-filing i njuncti o n a gainst him. He m aintains that the 2007 sanction order violated h is due process rights because i t w as entered without notice a nd a hearing or opportunity t o respond. He further argues that the 2007 sanction order constituted an abuse of discretion because i t was based upon a clearly erroneous finding of fact. While Blount did t ake a timely appeal from the 2007 order that included the sanction, Blount d i d n o t challenge the sanction in that appeal. Blount’s present notice of appeal was filed on April 2, 2012, a nd the d i strict court’s sanction o r d e r was entered on May 14, 2007. Accordingly, Blount’s notice of appeal was n ot a timely n otice of appeal from the May 14, 2007, sanction order, and B lount cannot challenge that order in this appeal. See F E D R

. AP P

. P. 4(a)(1)(B); Garcia v. Boldin , 691 F.2d 1172, 1181 (5th Cir. 1982). Blount argues that the district court’s order striking his motions was a sua sponte injunction i ssued by th e district court without notice and an opportunity to respond that violated his due p r ocess rights. He maintains that the order striking his motions violated his right of access to the courts because it extended the sanction order to include motions b eyond those similar to the motions that led t o the entry of the sanction order. He contends that the order s t r i k ing his motions was a n abuse of discretion because it w as based upon an erroneous
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factual f inding that the motions were r epetitive, frivolous, and successive § 2255 motions. He a sserts that the striking of his motions prejudiced him because the motions raised nonfrivolous claims. While the imposition of a sanction without a p rior w a r n i ng should generally b e avoided, this rule is not always applicable to an inmate who has f i l e d many frivolous pleadings. Moody v. Baker , 857 F.2d 256, 258 ( 5th Cir. 1988). Furthermore, the district court’s o rder at issue in the present appeal did not impose a sanction, it m erely e nforced the earlier sanction order. The district court was permi t t e d t o enforce the e arlier sanction order requiring Blount to receive leave o f court p rior to filing f u rther motions. See Balawajde r v . Sc o tt , 160 F.3d 1066, 1067 (5th Cir. 1998). Although B lount argues that t h e district court expanded the s anction order by striking motions that were unrelated to the m otions that led the district court to impose the sanction, the s anction r equires Blount “to seek leave of Court before any further motions in the instant matter are filed.” As the motions that the district court struck were filed in the same case without leave of court, the district court’s s triking of Blount’s motions was an enforcement of the s anction order, not an expansion of the sanction order. Blount’s Rule 60(b)(4) motion w as based on his contention that the district court erroneously denied some of the claims i n his § 2 255 motion, a n d t h i s is insufficient to show that the judgment was void, making B lount’s Rule 60(b)(4) motion meritless. See New York Life Ins. Co. v. B rown , 84 F .3d 137, 1 43 (5th Cir. 1 996). As Blount’s R u le 60(b)(4) motion was without merit, his motions seeking to amend claims that he raised in his § 2255 motion were also without merit because, after a judgment has been issued, a party “may request leave to amend only by either appealing the judgment, or seeking t o alter or reopen the judgment under [Rule] 59 or 6 0.” Rosenzweig v. Azurix Corp. , 332 F.3d 854, 864 (5th Cir. 2003). As Blount’s motion for the court to take judicial notice did not seek any affirmative relief in th e ab s e n ce of his other m otions, Blount cannot
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show th at this motion raised a nonfrivolous claim. B e cause Blount has not shown that h is motions r aised a n onfrivolous claim, Blount has not s hown that the district court abused its discretion or denied him access to t h e c o urts by enforcing the sanction order and strikin g h i s m o t ions. See Christopher v. Harbury , 536 U.S. 403, 415 (2002); Ge la b e r t v. Lynaugh , 894 F.2d 746, 747-48 (5th Cir. 1990). Blount’s appeal is without arguable merit and, therefore, frivo l o u s. See H o w a r d v . King , 707 F.2d 215, 220 (5th Cir. 1 983). Accordingly, it is DISMISSED. See 5 T H C I R

. R. 42.2.

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