UN IT ED ST AT ES CO UR T O F A PP EA LS FO R V ET ER AN S C LA IMS

N O
. 03-0181
K ARE N G ORDO N , A P P EL LA NT ,

V
. R. J A M ES N I CHOL S ON , S ECR ETA RY OF V ETER A N S A FF AI RS , A PP ELL EE
. B ET H G ORDO N S A M A R G IN , I NT ER VE NOR
.
On Ap pe al f rom the Bo ard

of Ve ter an s' Ap pe als
(Decided May 31, 2007 )

Glenn R. Bergmann , o f Be rri enSp rin gs , M ich igan , f or t he ap pe llant. Ti m S . Mc Cl ain , G en era l C ou

ns el; R

. R a n d

all Ca mp be ll , A ssi stant G en era l C ouns el; Edwar d V. Cassid y, Jr ., Deputy Assis tant General Counsel; and Christine D. Senseman , all of Washington, D. C. , f or t he ap pe lle e. Before KASOLD , LANCE, and SCHOELEN, Judge s. SCHOEL EN, Judge , filed the opini on of the Court. LANCE, Judge , fileda dissenti ng opinion. SCHOEL EN, Judge : T he ap pe llant, Karen Go rdo n, thr ou ghco un sel , a ppeals an October 17, 2002, Board of Veterans' Appeals (Boar d or B VA) decision thatdenied her cl aim, on behalf of her two minor children (Keli n A. Gordon and Hunter M. Gordon), for equal shares of the proceeds of the Nati on al S er vi ce Life Ins urance (NSLI) pol icy of her decease d father, Edward E. Go rdo n. Be th G . S am arg in, an oth er o ne of Mr. Go rdo n' s d au gh ter s, is an Inter ve no r in thi s ca se. The Board determined that Ms . Samargin's two m inor chil dren (Aline E. Wylie and Krist iana L. Wylie) were the only benefici aries underthe policy. Re co rd(R.) at 1-13. The appe llant and t he Secretary filed briefs. Additi onally, Ms. Gordon and t he Secr etary filed s upplemental briefs and a
su pp lem en tal m em orand

um of law

. Ms. S am arg in did

n ot fi le any bri ef

s in thi s cas e. T his ap pe al2

is t im ely , and

the Co urt h as jur isd ict ion

o ve r t he c ase p urs uant to 38 U .S .C

. §§ 72 52 (a) an d 7 26 6(a ). Because VA f

ail ed to p rov ide the ap pe llant V CAA n oti ce a s to the inf orm ati on an d e vid en ce
ne ces sar y to s ub stanti ate h er cla im , the C ourt wi ll va cat e an d rem an d the Bo ard de cis ion fo r f urt he r proceedings c onsistentwith this opi nion.

I. BACKGROUND In September 1943, Veteran Edward E. Gordon purchas ed a $10,000 NSLI policy. R . at 17. In December 1992, a VA regional office (RO) receive d a p roperly wit nessed "Decla ration of Be ne fi ciary" fo rm

sig ne d b y M r. G ord on . R . at 47 . In that do cum ent, tw o o f h is g ran dd au gh ter s, Al ine E. Wyli e an d K

ris tiana L. Wyli e, the da

ug hte rs o f M s. Sam argin, were n am ed pri nc ipa l beneficiari es. Each was designat ed to take hal f of the proceeds of the policy. Id. Th e v ete ran

die d in Au gu st 1 99 5. R. at 64 . O n S ep tem be r 11 , 1 99 5, Ms. Sam arg in n oti fi ed the RO o f he r f

ath er' s de ath

an d f ile d a cla im fo r th e p roc eed s o f h is N SL I po lic y o n b eh alf of he r minor children (Aline and Kristia na). R. at 63. O nO c to b e r 1 3 , 1 9 9 5 , M s . G o rd o nf il e d ac la im s e e k in g ap o rt io no f

th e p ro c e e d s o f

Mr. Gordon's NSLI policy on behalf of her two children (Kelin and H unter). R. at 91-93. In support of her clai m, she submitted a copy of a 1994 divorce settl ement agreement between Mr. Gordon and Martha Gordon, hermother. Under the terms of the divorce set tl eme nt agre ement, Mr. Gordon agreed to name each of his four grandchil dren as co-be neficiarie s of his NSLI policy. R. at 79-82. The pertinentprovision of the di vorce sett lement agreement provided:

1. T hat husband is a warded as his sol e and exclusi ve property t he ownership and accumulated cas h value of the National Service Life Ins uranc e p oli cyon

his lif e. 2. Th atas l on g a s s ai d p ol ic y r ema in s i n e ffe ct , h us ba ndsh al l n ame his following grandchildr en as equal co-beneficiaries on said policy: Al ine , K ris tiana , K eli n, an d H unter

. R. at 53. On Oc tob er 2 0, 19 95 , th e R O and ins urance centeriss ue d an a dm ini str ati ve de cis ion that dis all ow ed

Ms. Go rdo n' s cl aim . R . at 95 . The RO dete rm ine d that the pro cee ds of the NS LI po lic y were payable t o Aline and Krist iana Wylie i n ac co rdance with Mr . Gordon's Decem ber 1992 beneficiary des ignation. Id . In Decem ber 1995, Ms. Gordon appealed the RO decision. R. at 406.T h e a p p e llan t' s c u rre n t co u n se l d id n o t rep re se n t t h e a p p e llan t i n th e 2 0 0 1 a p p e a l t o th e C o u rt. 1 3 In A pri l 19 96 , th e R O i ssued a Statem ent of the Ca se ( SO C) . R . at 11 5-2 0. In Aug us t 19 97 , M s. Gordon te sti fi ed at an RO h ear ingth at the v ete ran s tat ed th at he inten de d to inc lud e Kelin and Hunter as co-be neficiarie s on the NSLI policy " but di d not get around t o doing it." R. at138-39. In h er S ub stanti ve Ap pe al, Ms. Go rdo n a sse rte d th at the 19 94 div orc e d ecr ee and he r f ath er' s v erb al pro m ise s to he r an d h er two ch ild ren in dic ate d his intent t o m ak e a b en ef ici ary ch an ge , b ut t

hat Mr

. Go rdo n h ad

a h ist ory of "no t ge tti ng aro un d to thi ng s . . . in a tim ely m anne r" and

that he "w as v ery sick [and] possessed li ttle ene rgy." R. at 122. In December 1997, the RO and insurance c en te r is sued a Suppl emental SOC (SSOC ) ind icating that "the re w as n o e vid en ce t hat th e in sured

eit he r inten de d and

/or too k th e re qu ire d act ion to m ak e a b en ef

ici ary change su

bs eq ue nt t o th e d esi gn ati on

of De cem be r 15 , 1 99 2. " R . at 168. In J anuary 1 99 9, the Bo ard grante d M s. Go rdo n' s cl aim fo r eq ua l sh are s o n b ehalf of h er
so ns . R . at 172-79. Th e B oard f ound that th e d ivo rce settle m ent ag ree m ent w as t he "la st
expre ssi on " o f

th e ap p e ll an t' s inte n t an d th a t t h e f il in g o f th e 1 9 9 4 d iv o rc e d e c re e in s tate c o urt showed evidence of an overtact to make such a change. R. at 179. Ms. Samargin appealed the J anuary 1999 Board deci sion to thi s Court. R. at 180-82. Ms. Gord on

w as no t a

p arty to the a

pp eal b ef ore th e Co urt

. In

F eb ruary 20 00 , Ms. S am arg in and the Secret ary moved the Court for an order r emanding this appeal for consi deration of Fa ga n v . We

st , 1 3 V et. Ap p. 48 (19 99 ), whic h was iss ue d s ub seq ue nt t o th e Janu ary

19 99 Bo ard decision. R. at 193-96. In February 2000, the Courtgrant ed the joi nt motion for remand. R. at 192. In J anuary 2 00 1, the B oard is su ed a dec isi on

fi nd ingthat Ms . G ord on ' s m ino r ch ild ren we re
no t am on g th e b en eficiarie s o f t he ve ter an ' s N SL I po lic y. R. at 2 14 -21 . T he Bo ard , a ft er consideri ng Fagan , fo un d t ha t a lt ho ug h t he re wa s c le aran d c on vi nc in g e vi de nc e o f the ve te r a n 's int en t to ch an ge the be ne fi ciarie s of his N SL I po lic y, he ne ve r pe rf orm ed anov ert act su ff ici ent to further his i ntent to cha nge the beneficia ries of the poli cy. R. at 219-21. In M ay20 01 , M s. Go rdo n, thr ou ghco un sel , a pp eal ed that deci sio n to the Co urt

. Ms. 1 Samargin was not a party to t he appeal before t he Court. In June 2001, t he S ec re tary moved,
un op po se d, to r e ma n dt he mat te r f orco ns id er at io n o f the ap pl ic ab il it y o f the Ve te ra ns Cl ai ms4

As sis tan ce A ct o f 2 00 0 (V CAA) , P ub . L . N o. 106-47 5, 11 4 S tat . 2 09 6, in a cco rdanc e w iththi s Court's decision in Holliday v. Princ ipi , 14 Vet.App. 280 (2001). R. at237-41. In September 2001, the Court grant ed the Secret ary's m otion. R. at 236. On April 26, 2002, the Board notified Ms. Gordon's attorney that she ha d 90 days from the da te of th e le tt erto submi t an y ad di ti on al evi de nc e orarg umen t i n supp or t of Ms. Gor do n's cl ai m. R. at 2 46 -47 . T he re i s n o ind icatio n in th e rec ord that Ms. G ord on ' s attor

ne y re sp on de d to thi s le tte r. On October 17, 2002, the Board is sued t he deci sion now on appeal. R. at 1- 12. The Board found that th e div orc e settle m ent wa s cle ar an d c onvin cin g e vid en ce o f t he ve ter an ' s intent to ch an ge his be ne fi ciary. Ho we ve r, i t co nc lud ed that t he re wa s no e vid en ce that th e v ete ran ha d p erf orm ed an overt act re aso na bly d esi gn ed to e ff ect uate his intent t o ch an ge h is be ne fi ciarie s. R. at 11. The ap pe llant a

pp eal ed the 20 02 Bo ard

de cis ion to t his Co urt

.
II. PARTIES' CONT ENTIONS Ms. Go rdo n rai ses s ev era l argum ents be fo re the Co urt . S he ass ert s as fo llo ws : (1 ) V A f ail ed to fulfill its notice obli gatio ns u nder 38 U.S.C. § 5103(a) (Appella nt's Brief (Br. at 8-12)) ; (2) the Bo ard pro vid ed an ina de qu ate stat em ent of rea so ns or b ase s f

or i ts d eci sio n a s a r esu lt o f i ts f ail ure to discuss whet her a VA hearing officer complied with the requirement in 38 C.F.R. § 3.103(c)(2) (2006) to sugges t the submission of evidence favorable to a claimant (Appellant's Br. at 13-16); (3) VAfa ile d to co ns ide r Ms . G ord on ' s ar gument that he r f ath er' s in cap aci ty r en de red him inc ap ab le of ef fe ctu ati ng the ch an ge in b en ef ici ary (App ell ant' s B r. at 16 -17 ). Th e S ecr etary c ounte rs that b eca us e anN SL I be ne fi ciary c lai m ant is no t a " cla im ant" w ith in the m ean ingo f 38 U. S. C. §§ 51 00 an d 5 10 3(a ), V A d id n ot h av e d uty to p rov ide Ms. Go rdo n w ith any section 5103( a) notice . Appellee's Br. at 11-12. Alternat ively, he maintains t hat the appel lant was adequately not ified of her rights under t he VCAA and any noti ce errorwas not prejudi cial. Id

. at 1 3-1 9. Fi na lly , th e S ecr etary s ub m its that th ere is a plau sib le b asi s f or t he Bo ard ' s f

ind ingthat the ve ter andid

no t m ak e an

ov ert act infur the ran ce of

his i nte nt t o c hang e th e b en ef ici ari es o f h is NSLI policy. Id . at 20-23.

III . A NA LY SI S A. N SLI Be ne fi ci ary Cl ai ms5

Th e N SL I is a b en ef

it p rog ram

fo un d in part I I (p ert ain ingto " GENE RA L B EN EF IT S" ), chapter 19 of tit le 38 of the U.S. Code. An NSLI policy is a contr act between a vet eran and the U.S. Government. Se e 38 U.S.C. § 1917. Se e Wh itev. Uni ted Sta tes , 27 0 U .S . 1 75 (19 26 ); Wol fe v . G ob er, 11 Ve t.A

pp . 1 , 2 (199 7). Un de r sec tio n 19 17 , the insured vete ran has th e rig ht t o change the benefici ary of an NSLI policy at any tim e, with or withoutthe knowledge or cons ent of
any p res en t or

pri or b en ef

ici ari es. Se e 3 8 U .S .C . § 19 17 (a); 38 C.F.R. § 8.1 9 (2 00 6); seeals o Wis sn er v . Wi

ssn er, 3 38 U. S. 65 5, 65 8 (1 95 0); Yo ung v . D erw ins ki, 2 V et. Ap p. 59 (19 92 ). VA w ill not recogniz e a beneficiary change unless t here is evidence of an insured's intent to make a change in the de signated bene ficiary and an affirmative act t o effectuate that i ntent. In F aga n v . West , 13 Ve t.A pp . 48 (1 99 9), th e C ourt s et f ort h th e te st t o d ete rm ine wh eth er an N SL I- i ns ure d v ete ran ha d e ff ect ed a b en ef ici ary ch an ge : First, a per son seeking to s how that the NSLI i ns ured ve teran had effected a beneficiary change [hereinafter "the claimant"] m ay prevail by proving tha t t he ins ure d v ete ran

co m pli ed wi th th e reg ulatio ns in f

ili ng a v ali d c hang e o f b en ef ici ary with VA. Second, if thi s cannot be shown, then, i n order to pr evail, the claimant m us t pr ov e b y c lear and

c onvin cin g ev ide nc e that t he in sured

ve ter anint en de d th at the clai mant should be the beneficiary and al so prove thatthe insure d veteran t ook anov ert action re ason ab ly d esi gn ed to e ff ect uate t hat intent. T hir d, if

the ins ure d veteran's intentcannot be proven by c lear and convi ncing evidence , then the cla im ant m us t pro ve the in sured

vete ran ' s int ent by a pr ep on de ran ce of the ev ide nc e and

m us t als o p rov e th at the ins ure d ve ter andid ev erythi ng reas on ab ly ne ces sar y, or at le ast ev erythi ng he or s he su bje cti ve ly and

rea so na bly be lie ve d was necessary , to ef fe ctu ate h is int entio n. . . . [ D] uri ng th is pro ces s, th e cla im ant al ways ha s th e b urd en of proof. 13 Ve t.A pp . at 57 (ci tat ion s o m itt ed ). F urt he r, t he Co urt he ld t hat, " [b] ecause this issu e o f o ve rt act ion wi ll g en era llyhave to b e d eci de d b y e xam ini ng the tot ali ty o f t he cir cum stanc es, it i s im p o rt an t f o r t h e c la im an t t o s u

b m it an d th e f a c t f in d e r t o w e ig ha ll a v a il ab le e v id e n c e o ns u ch fa cto rs a s whe the r . . . th e in sured ve ter anha d th e o pp ort

un ityto t ak e f

urt he r ac tio n. " Id. (citing Ci rsc uo lo v . U

nited Sta tes , 239 F.2d 280, 282 (7th Cir. 1956) (recogni zing a change i n beneficiary, in p art , b ase d u

po n a ve ter an ' s in ab ility t o compl ete the be ne fi ciary f orm be cau se o f p hy sic al inc ap aci ty) ). Whe n q ue sti on s ar ise reg ard ingth e "de nia l o f ap pli cat ion s fo r in suran ce" or " dis all ow an ce of claims for insurance benefits," the clai mant has a right to appea l that dec ision to t he Board by initia ting a Notice of Disagreement. Se e 38 C. F. R. § 8 .3 0 (2 00 6) ( "[ t] he pro vis ion s o f P art 19 of thi s6

chapter wil l be followed in connect ion with appeal s to the Board of Vet erans['] Appeals involving questions per taining t o the denial of applications for insurance, total disabili ty i ncome provision, or rei ns tat em ent; d isa llo wanc e o f c lai m s f or i ns uranc e b en ef

its

. . . . "). B. Ap pli cab ili ty o f t

he VC AANo tic e P rov isi on s to Cl aim s f or N SL I B en ef

its Th e V CAA w as e na cte d "t o re af fi rm and clar if y the duty of the Se cre tar

y o f V ete ran s A ff

air s to assist claimants for benefits under l aws administered by the Secr etary." 146 C ONG
. REC . H9,912 (da ilyed . O ct. 17 , 2 00 0) ( statem ent of Re p. St um p); s ee 146 C ONG
. REC . S9,205 (daily ed. Sept. 2 5, 2 00 0) (st ate m ent o f Se n. B rownb ack f or Se n. S pe cte r). Th e VC AAm ad e a series of amendm ents to chapt er 51 ("CLAIMS, EFFECTIVE DA TES, A ND PAYMENTS ") of title 38, U.S. Code, which, included addi ng 38 U.S.C. § 5100 to define the term "claimant"; amending 38 U. S. C. § 5 10 2(b ) to req uir e th at the Se cre tar

y inform "clai m ants" wh o s ub m it i nc om ple te ap pli cat ion s o f t

he information necessary to c omplete the applicat ion; amending 38 U.S.C. § 5 10 3(a ) to a dd res s the Sec ret ary ' s d

uty to n oti fy cla im ants o f r eq

uir ed inf orm ati on an d e vid en ce n ece ssary to s ub stanti ate the ir c lai m s; a dd ing38 U. S. C. § 5 10 3Ato a dd res s th e S ecr etary' s duty t o a ssi st claimants in developi ng evidence per tinent t o their cl aims. Section 38 U.S.C. § 5100 defines a "c laimant" as "any individual applyi ng for, or submitting a cl aim for , any be ne fi t und er th e law s adm ini ste red by the Sec ret ary ." T he Se cre tar y' s d uti es u nd er the VCAA essentia lly fall into two categori es: Collecting evidence that could result in a successful claim, see38 U. S. C. § 5 10 3A , and giv ingno tic e to a cla im ant. Pursu ant to 38 U.S .C . § 51 02 (b) , if the Sec retary receives an incomplete "applicati on for a benefit under t he laws administered by t he Se cre tar y, " he is c harge d w iththe duty o f n oti fy ing"th e cl aim ant . . . o f the in fo rm ati on ne ces sar y to complete the appli cation." Pur suant to sec tion 5103(a) , "[u]pon receipt o f a c ompl ete or substanti ally complete appli cation" t he S ecretary is obligat ed to notify the cl aimant of any information .

. . no t p re vi ou sl y p ro vi de d t o t he Se cr et ary t ha t i s n ec es sa ry to subs ta nt ia te th e c la im"
an d who is r esp on sib le f

or p rov idi ng su chinf

orm ati on or e vid en ce. Th e S ecr etary argu es t

hat th e n oti ce p rov isi on s of 38 U .S .C . § 51 03 (a) do no t ap ply to ind ivi du als see kin g th e p roc eed s o f an N SL I po lic y b eca us e su chind ivi du als are n ot " cla im ants" within the meaning of 38 U.S.C. § 5100. Secretary's Br. at 1 1. Th e Court inter prets a st atute de
novo. See Butts v. Brown, 5 Vet.A pp . 53 2, 539 (1993) (en banc). A fundamental principa l of statut ory co ns tru cti on

is that "[ t] he starti ng po int in i nte rpre tin g a

statut e is its lan gu ag e. " Good7

Sa ma rit an Ho sp . v . S

ha lal a , 50 8 U .S . 4 02 , 4 09 (19 93 ); Le e ( Ra ym on d) v. Wes t, 13 Vet.App. 388, 39 4 (2 00 0). Furth erm ore , "' eac h p art or se cti on

[of a statut e] sh ou ld b e co ns tru ed in c onne cti on

wi th
ev ery oth er p art or s ect ion

so as t o pro du ce a harm on iou s who le. ' " Mee ks v . We st, 12 Vet.App. 352, 354 (1999) (quoti ng 2 A N. S I NGER S UT HE RL AND O N S TA TU TO RY C ONS TR UCT I ON § 46.01 (5th ed.1992)) , aff'd, 21 6 F .3 d 1 36 3 (F ed . C ir. 20 00 ); seeCo ttle v. Pr inc ipi , 14 Vet.App. 329, 334 (20 01 ); T a lle yv
. D e rwi ns ki, 2 V et. Ap p. 28 2, 28 6 (1 99 2). In t his reg ard , o ne sec tio n o f a statut e sh ou ld n ot b e rea d in is olatio n fr om the co nte xt of

the w ho le ac t. Th e Co urt doe s no t loo k to a s ing le sentence orpart of a sentenc e, but l ooks to the pr ovisions of the "'whole law, and to its obj ect and po lic y. ' " Morea u v . B rown, 9 Vet.App. 389, 396 (1996) (quoti ng Ri ch ar ds v. Un ite d S

tates, 369 U. S. 1, 11 (19 62 )). Th e "p lai n m ean ing[o f a statut e] must be giv enef fe ct unle ss a

' lit era l ap pli cat ion

of [t he ] st atut e [o r r eg ul at io n] w il l p ro du ce a r es ul t d emon strabl y atodd s wi th the in te nt io n o f i ts dr aft er s. '" Ga rd ne r v. De rw ins ki , 1 Vet. App. 584, 586-87 (1991), aff'd sub nom

. Gar dn er v . Brown, 5 F.3d 1456 (Fed. Cir. 1993), aff 'd, 5 13 U. S. 11 5 (1 99 4); Lee, 13 Vet.App. at 394. Ther efore, "[i]f the intent o f Co ng res s is cle ar, th at is the e nd of the m att er. " Skinne r v. Brown , 27 F.3d 1571, 1572 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (quot ing Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc ., 467 U.S. 837, 842 (19 84 )). Th e S ecr etary co nte nd s that a p ers on c lai m ingto b e a be ne fi ciary un de r an NS LI p oli cyis
no t a " cla im ant", wi thi n th e m ean ingof s ect ion 5 10 0, b eca

us e the p roc eed s o f t

he NS LI po lic y are
no t " be n e fi ts " w ithi n t he mea ni ng of t he st atut e a ndin st ea d a re mer el y p ro ce ed s, re su lt in g fr om a contractbetween the vet eran and VA. Secretary's Br. at11-12. He attempts to make a disti nction between veter ans who apply for NSLI policies and beneficiari es who seek proceeds under the policies

. Id . He argues thatveterans a re clai mants but beneficiaries are not. Id

. The Court is not per suaded by th is a rgument. Section 5100 governs the definition of "cl aim an t" f

or t he purpo ses of

c ha pte r 5 1. It pro vid es t

hat th e te rm

"' cla im ant' m ean s any in div idu al applying for, or submitting a claim for, any benefit under the laws administered by the Secr etary." 38 U.S.C. § 5100. VAregulati ons defin e a "clai m" as a written reques t for "deter mination of
en tit lem en t . .

. to a be ne fi t." 3 8 C .F .R . § 3. 1(p ) (2 00 5); seeals o 38 C.F.R. § 20.3(f) (2006) (defining "claim" as, inte r alia, a n "applica tion made under tit le 38, United Stat es Code, and implem enting directi ves for entitl ement to [VA ] benefits.").8

Th e st atute d oe s n ot d ef

ine the ter m "be ne fi t." Ho we ve r, a

fu nd am ental can on

of statut ory construct ion is thatwhen interpre ting a sta tute, the words of a statute ar e given "the ir ordinary,
co nt empo ra ry , c ommon mea ni ng , a b s e n ta n i nd ic at io n Co ng re ss in te nd edth em t o b ea r s ome dif fe rent im po rt. " Wil lia ms v. Ta

ylo r, 52 9 U .S . 4 20 , 4 31 (20 00 ); Sm ith (J oh n A nu s) v. Un ite d S

tates, 508 U.S. 223 (1993) (citi ng Pe rri n v. Un ite d S tates, 444 U.S. 37, (1979) (st ating that"words [in a statute ], unless otherwise defined, will be int erprete d as taking th ei r ordi nary, contemporary,
comm on meaning."). The term "benefit" i s de fined in its common, ordinary usage to mean a "paym en t m ad e byan ins uranc e co m pany , p ub lic ag en cy , w elf are so cie ty, etc ., as d

uri ng sic kn ess , ret ire m en t, un em

plo ym ent, et c. or fo r de ath ." W EBS TER ' S N E W W ORL D D I CTION A RY OF A MER I CAN E N G LI SH 12 9 (3d . C oll eg e E dit ion 19 88 ). T he Co urt

als o n ote s th at V A r eg ulatio ns de fi ne the ter m "be ne fi ts" to m ean

"anyp aym ent, ser

vic e, c om m od ity , fu

nc tio n, or s tat

us , e nti tle m ent to wh ich

is determined by the laws administer ed by the Department of Veterans Affairs pertaini ng to vetera ns
an d s urv ivo rs. " 20 C. F. R. § 2 0. 3(e ). The only limiting cri teria i mposed by the plain language of sect ion 510 0 is t ha t the "claimant" must be seeking a "benefit under the laws administered by the Secr etary." Ther e is no qu est ion that the N SL I pr og ram

wa s cr eat ed

byco ng res sio na l st atute and that th e S ecr etary i s ch arg ed wi th t he autho rity to adm ini ste r th e p rog ram un de r th e st an dards cre ate d by C on gre ss. Indeed, as the Secret ary recogni zes in his br ief, NSLI policies " 'are governed by federal st atutes and
re gu la ti on [s] [i n] de te rmi ni ng wh o is t o s ha re in th e b en efi ts ar is in g fr om su ch po li ci es .'" Se cr et ary's Br. at 11 (quoti ng Sm ith (J am es E.) v. Un ite d S

tates , 2 26 F. Su

pp . 6 56 , 6 58 (W .D . 1 96 4)) ; seeals o Cu rti s v. Wes t , 1 1 V et. Ap p. 12 9, 132 (199 8) (" [T ]h e con str uc tio n of a life insuran ce p oli cyiss ue d by the United Stat es is governe d by federal law.") . The factt ha t Congress chose to ha ve the pro cee ds of

the NS LI po lic ies f

low to b en ef ici ari es thr ou ghth e m ech an ism of a st atutor ilycre ate d contr act d oe s no t c hang e the c harac ter o f the p roc eed s. Th eyare "be ne fi ts un de r t he laws administered by the Secr etary." The Secretary is correct that the veteran's "benefit" under the NSLI program is different from the N SL I be ne fi ciary' s "b en ef it. " O n th e o ne hand , th e "b en ef it" to t he ve ter anis the ab ili ty t o purch ase lif

e in suran ce at a r elativ ely

low co st, to p rov ide fo r hi s f

am ilyaf ter his de ath . O n th e o the r hand , th e "b en ef

it" to t he be ne fi ciary i s th e m on etary p roc eed s und er t he po lic y. Th e C ourt r eje cts the Secret ary's argument that the ter m "benefit" as used by t he st atute re quires VCAA notification9

fo r vet erans ' clai m s un de r the NSL I pro gram but no t fo r NS LI ben ef

ici ary clai m s. Th e lang ua ge in
sec tio n 5 10 0 b roa dly

def ine s "clai m ant" as an "in div idu al ap ply ingfor , or su bm itt inga cl aim

fo r, anybe ne fi t un de r th e laws adm ini ste red bythe Se cre tar

y. " (E m ph asi s add ed ). T he statut e cl ear ly ap pli es t o anybe ne fi t th at a cla im ant se ek s an d m ak es n o d ist inc tio n th at w ou ld e xc lude c ert ain typ es o f " be ne fi ts. " Th e Co urt s im ilarlyre fu ses to d

rawth e dis tin cti on

urge d b y th e S ecr etary t

hat has no basis i n the statutory language itself. See Jones v. Brown , 41 F.3d 634, 640 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (h ol di ng th atbe caus e t he st at u t o ry p hr as e " ca se pe nd in g" in se ct io n 5 06 of t he Fe de ra l C ou rt 's Adm inistr ation Act of 1992 made no distincti on betwee n th e fee applicat ion stage of a case and
co ns ide rat ion

of the cas e o n th e m eri ts, th e co urt w ou ld l ike wi se m ak e n o d ist inc tio n). Thus , whil e the re i s a di ff

ere nc e in the natur e o f t

he "be ne fi ts" fl ow ingto t he ve ter anan d h is b en ef

ici ary , e ach "be ne fi t" is go ve rne d byth e ter m s an d c on dit ion s se t f

ort h in the Fe de ral law s en act ed

byCo ng res s and "administered by t he Secretary." As such, both veteran and beneficiary are "cl aimants" seeking "benefits" wit hin the meaning of section 5100. In Livesay v. Principi , 1 5 V et. Ap p. 16 5, 17 9 (2 00 1) ( enbanc ), t his Co urt rec og niz ed

that a "cl aim an t" wi thi n the m ean ingo f sec tio n 51 00 in clu de s a "pe rso n ap ply ingfo r or see kin g b en ef

its under part II ["GENER

AL BENEFITS] or III ["READJU STED AN D RELAT ED BENE FITS"] of title 38." In Livesay , the C ourt determined that the V CAA did not apply to clai ms f or revisi ons of decisions ba sed on clearand unmistakable error[CUE] because a CUE li tigant i s not pursuing a cla im fo r be ne fi ts und er p art s II or I II o f c ha pte r 38 , b ut r ath er i s co llater ally atta ck inga f ina l decision pur suant to parts IV ("GEN ERAL ADMINISTRATIVE PRO VISIONS"), or V ("BOAR D, ADMINISTRATION S, AND SE RVICES") of title 38. S e e als o Sims v. Nicholson , 19 Vet.App. 453, 456 (2006) (holding VCAA notice not appli cable to appl ications for restorat ion of competency; applicantis not seeki ng benefits under chapter 51 of title 38, but, r ather, is s ee king a decisi on reg ard ing ho w h is b en ef

its wi ll b e d istrib ute d und er c ha pte r 55 (" Min ors , Inc om

pe tents, and

oth er W ard s") ); Lu era s v. Pr inc ipi , 18 Ve t. App . 43 5, 439 (20 04 ) ( ho ld in g VCA A doe s n otap pl y t o c la ims for waiver of overpayment of pension benefits under chapter 53 because an applicantfor waiver of overpayment is not seeki ng benefits under chapter 51; r ather the applic ant is re questing a waive r of
rec ov ery of ind eb ted ne ss) . A s d isc us sed

ear lie r, t he NS LI ben ef

it pr og ram

is loc ate d wi thi n p art

II ("GENERAL B ENEFITS") of titl e 38. Thus, when viewed within the context of tit le 38, NSLI-beneficiary cl aimants are "cla imants" within the meaning of section 5100.10

The Secretary's argument also ignores the plain language of section 5103(a). That section pro vid es: § 5 10 3. No tic e to cla im ants o f r eq uir ed inf orm ati on an d e vid en ce (a) Re qu ire d inf

orm ati on an d e vid en ce. Up on

rec eip t of

a co m ple te or substant ially complete appl ication, t he Secretary shall noti fy the claimant and the claimant's representative, if any, of any information, and any medical or lay evi dence, not previ ously provided t o the Se cretarythat is ne ces sar y to su bs tantiate t

he cla im . A s p art

of that notice, the Secre tary shall indicate which portion of that i nform ation an d e vid en ce, if

any, is t o b e p rov ide d b y th e cl aim ant an d whic h portion, if any, t he S ec retary, i n accordance with section 5103A of thi s ti tle an d anyoth er a

pplica ble pro vis ion s o f l aw , w ill att em pt t o ob tai n o n b eh alf

of the cla im ant. (b) Time limitation. (1) In the c ase o f inf

orm ati on or e vid en ce t

hat th e cl aim ant is no tif

ied un de r s ub sec tio n (a) is to b e pro vid ed b y the c lai m ant, suc h information or evidence must be recei ved by the Secretary within one ye ar f rom the date s uc h n oti ce i s se nt. (2) This subse ction shal l not apply t o any applicat ion or clai m f or Go ve rnm ent li fe ins uranc e b en ef its

. (3) Nothing in paragraph (1) shall be construed to prohib it the Secretary from

making a decision on a claim before the expira tion of the period r eferred to in t hat subsect ion. In s um m ary , s ub sec tio n (a ) se ts f ort h th e Se cre tar

y' s no tic e ob lig ati on s. Su

bs ect ion (b) (1) set s f

ort h
a o ne -ye ar l im it, wh ich

be gin s to run af

ter sub sec tio n 51 03 (a) noti ce ha s bee n pro vid ed , to su bm it the inf orm ati on or e vid en ce s pe cif

ied in 5 10 3(a ). S ect ion

51 03 (b) (3) autho riz es t

he Se cret ary

to make a decision o n a claim prior to t he expirat ion of the one-yearperiod for submitting the inf orm ati on or e vid en ce i de nti fi ed

un de r su bs ect ion (a) . S ub sec tio n (b )(2 ) expre ssl y pro vid es t hat the time limitation in subsecti on (b) does not apply "to any appl ication orclaim for Governm ent life in sura nce benefits." A pla in reading of the s tatute i ndicates t hat secti on 5103(a) noti ce is to be pro vid ed to a ll claimants f

or VA b en ef

its . Unli ke oth er " cla im ants, " an ind ivi du al who fi les an "ap pli cat ion

or c lai m fo r Governm ent li fe ins uranc e b en ef its " is no t li m ite d to on e y ear to s ub m it the inf orm ati on or e vid en ce t

hat the Secretary n oti fi ed the cla im ant th at h e m aypro vid e toT h e C o u rt also no t es t h at 38 U .S.C

. § 51 0 2 m i rr o rs sec t i o n 51 0 3

. S ec t i o n 5 1 0 2 (b)(2) req u i res the S ec retary 2 t o not i f y a c l ai mant w ho s ub mi t s a n i nc ompl et e ap pl i ca t i on f or V A be ne f

i t s a s t o what i s ne ed ed t o c ompl et e t he appl i cat i on. Sect i on 5102( c) ( 1) pr ovi des t hat f ol l ow i ng not i f

i cat i on f r om V A of

t he i nf or m at i on ne eded t o compl et e a n i ncom pl et e a ppl i cat i on, t he s t at ut e pr ovi des a one - year l i m i t w i t hi n w hi ch t he c l ai m ant m ay s ubm i t t he i nf or m at i on. Li ke se ct i on 5103( b) ( 2) , s ect i on 5102( c) ( 2) s t at es t hat t he one

- yea r l i m i t do es not appl y t o " any a ppl i cat i on or cl ai m f or G over nm ent l i f

e i nsur ance bene f

i t s. " I n 2003, C ongr es s am ended s ect i on 5102 and added t he l anguage i n s ubse ct i on (c ) to m irro r se c tion 5 1 0 3 (b )(2 ). See P u b

. L

. N o . 1 0 8 -18 3 , T i t l e V II , § 70 1 (a), 11 7 S t at. 26 7 0 (D ec . 1 6 , 2 0 0 3 ). 11 subs ta nt ia te th e c la im. 2 If the Se cre tar

y w ere co rre ct that se cti on 5 10 3(a ) n oti ce did

n ot ap ply to N SL I be ne fi ciary claims, there would be no need for the section 5103(b)(2) exception. This Court has re cognized the
can on of statut ory co ns tru cti on

that "l eg isl ati on

m us t b e co ns tru ed

in li gh t o f the v en era

ble ru le that

"' wh ere Co ng res s in clu de s p articular l anguage in o ne sec tio n o f a statut e b ut o m its it i n ano the r
sec tio n o f t

he sam e A ct, it i s g en era llypres um ed that Con gre ss ac ts intentio na llyand purpo sel y in the dispar ate inc lus ion

or e xc lus ion .' " Di

pp el v . We

st , 12 Vet. App. 466, 474 (1999) (quoti ng Ga rd ne r , 513 U.S. at 120 (quoting Ru sse llo v . U nited Sta tes , 4 64 U. S. 16 , 2 3 (1 98 3)) ); seeals o L ee (Raymond) , 13 Vet. App. at 396. Clearly, i f Congress had intended t hat the Secr et ar y's sec tion 51 03 (a) no ti c e o b li g ati o n s d id n o t a p p ly to NS LI be ne fi ciary c lai m ants, Co ng res s, we be lie ve , w ou ld have made its intenti on clear i n the statute and used la nguage t o thateffect. After examining the plain meaning of sections 5100 and 5103, i t is cle ar that Congre ss intended t hat a "cl aimant" for VCAA purposes includes an indi vidual seeki ng the proceeds of a deceased vet eran's NSLI policy. Our d iss entin g co lle ag ue ra ise s num ero us co nc ern s w iththi s d ete rm inatio n; h ow ev er, the se
co nc ern s ar e eithe r u

nf ound ed o r m att ers o f po lic y to be a dd res sed n ot in a co urt

o f law , b ut r ath er by the executive or l egislat ive branches

. Se e R ep ub lic an Pa rty of M inn . v . Wh ite , 536 U.S. 765, 798 (2002). F or e xam

ple , c on cer

n th at the VC AAsh ou ld n ot b e m ad e ap pli cab le t o a dv ers ari al proceedings wher e the Secret ary is a st akeholder i s a policy matter. Signi ficantly, however, t he statute s and regulat ions governing t he VA contemplate adv er sa ri al proceedi ngs on claims, see38 U.S.C. § 7105A ( simultaneously contes ted clai ms); 38 C.F.R. §§ 19.100-102, 20.500-504, 20.713, 20.1408 (2006), and there is no indication in these provisions that com peting claimant s a re not
en tit led to V CAA n oti ce. Ind eed , it is w ell settled that s urv ivi ng sp ou ses see kin g b en ef its are entitl ed to VCAA notice, see Sachs v. Princ ipi , 1 4 V et. Ap p. 29 8 (2 00 1); see al so Vali ao v. Princ ipi , 17 Ve t.A pp . 2 29 (20 03 ), e ve n th ou ghthe re m aybe com pe tin g cla im s f

or b en ef its wh ere "th e v ali dit

y and legal effects of marriage ( ceremonial or otherwise), divorc e, ostensibl e marriage, void marriage12

and adopt ion orlegi timacy of children" are at i ssue, VA A DJ UDI CAT I ON P ROCEDURE M ANU AL M21, part IV , c h. 5, § 5 .0 5; see also id. a t § 5

. 0 3 (r e qu ir in g V Ato "[ s ] im u lt an e o u s ly

d e v e lo p co nte ste d cla im s, giv ingall int ere ste d p art ies ev ery op po rtunit

y to su bm it a ll ava ila

ble ev ide nc e")

. Furth e r, th e c o n c e rn

th a t V C A An o ti ce m ig h t n o wb e re qu ir e d f o r c la im s f

il e d in Fe de ral distri ct c ou rt i s unfounded. Such notice is requir ed when a claim is filed with the Secretary. Se e 38 U.S .C . § 51 03 (a) . Und er th e statut ory sche m e, a suit

m ayno t be co mm en ced

in a Fe de ral dis tri ct court unti l after th e Se cretary makes a initial dec ision on a benefici ary clai m. Se e 38 U.S.C. §1984(a) and (h). Because VCAAnotice is required t o be provided to a claimant prior to VA' s in iti al d eci sio n on such a c lai m , whe the r li tig ati on en su es i n F ed era l di str ict co urt is irrel evant. Fi nall y, the concern t hat multiple VCAA notices will now be re quired, cre ating "continuous mini-adj udicat io ns " al so is unfounded. All t hat is re quired is t hat each cl aimant for be ne fi ts b e p rov ide d th e n oti ce r eq uir ed bysec tio n 5 10 3(a ). C. VC AANo tic e Section 5103(a) of title 38, U.S. Code, requir es the Secre tary to i nform a claimant of any in form ation and evi dence not of record ( 1) that i s necessary to substant iate the claim, (2) that t he Secretary will seek t o obtain, if any, and (3) that the c laimant is expec ted to provi de, if any. Se e Quartuccio v. Princ ipi , 16 Vet.App. 183, 187 (2002). Fur ther, VA will "requestthat the c laimant provide any evi dence in the c laimant's possession that pe rtains t o the clai m." 38 C.F.R. § 3. 15 9(b )(1 ) (2 00 6); see Pelegri ni v. Principi , 1 8 V et. Ap p. 112, 121 (2004). Th e C ourt r ef ers to the se n oti ce r eq

uir em ents a s n oti ce e lem ents. Se cti on 51 03 (a) wa s en act ed

to en sure that V A a dv ise cl ai mant s, e ar ly in th e c la ims pr oc es s, of w ha t i nfo rma ti onis ne ce ss ary t o s ub st an ti at e t he ircl ai ms and who would be responsibl e for obtaining t hat information. Pelegrini , 1 8 V et. Ap p. at 1 20 -22 ; see also Mayfi eld v. Nicholson, 44 4 F .3 d 1 32 8, 13 33 (F ed . C ir. 20 06 ). T hu s, the no tic e req uir ed un de r statutory section 5103( a) and regul atory § 3.159(b) must be provi ded upon re ceipt of a complete or
su bs tantia llyco m

ple te a pp lic ati on

fo r be ne fi ts and

be fo re an in iti al un favo rab le d eci sio n o n a cla im by an agency of original jurisdi ction. Id .; see Pelegri ni , 18 V et. Ap p. at 1 20

. As the Fe de ral Ci rcu it recognized i n May

fie ld, Congress envisi oned a deliber ate act of noti fication dir ected to meeting the requirements of section 5103. May fie ld, 4 44 F. 3d

at 1 33 3. A t im ingerr or m aybe cured , h ow ev er, by a Boa rd remand to the RO for a new VCAAnotificati on followed by a readjudi cation of the13

claim. May

fie ld, su pra. Failur e to co m

ply wi th anyof

the se r eq

uir em ents m ayco ns tit

ute remandable error. Qu ar tuc cio , 16 Vet.App. at 187. A B oard d eterm ination of wh eth er s ect ion

51 03 (a) statut ory

an d re gu lat ory

no tic e requirements have been c omplied with is "a subst antiall y factu al d ete rm ina tio n. " May

field, 444 F.3d at 1 33 5. Th e B oard' s f

ind ing s of f act are rev iew ed

und er the "c learlye rro ne ou s" s tan dard o f r ev iew in 38 U.S.C. § 7261(a)(4). Gi lbe rt v . D erw ins ki , 1 V et. Ap p. 49 , 5 2 (1 99 0). In d ete rm ini ng wh eth er a finding is clearl y erroneous, the Court is not permitted to substitute its own judgment for that of the Board on issue s of m ateria l fact. Id . at 53 . Und er th is s tan dard o f r ev iew , th e C ourt m us t se t aside a finding of material fact when, afterreviewing the r ec or d as a whole, itis "'left with the de fi nit e an d f

irm co nv ict ion

that a m ist ak e has be enco mm itt ed .' " Id. at 52 (quoti ng Un ite d States v. U.S. Gypsum Co. , 333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948)). Bo ard err or i s as ses sed

un de r th e ru le o f p rej ud ici al e rro r. 3 8 U .S .C . § 7261(b) (2). If a
no tic e er ror ha s b een co mm itt ed , w e m

us t "t ak e d

ue acc ount o f t

he rule of prejudi cia l er

ror ." Id .; see Conway v. Principi , 3 53 F. 3d 13 69 , 1 37 4-7 5 (F ed . C ir. 20 04 ); Overton v. Nicholson , 20 Ve t.A pp . 4 27 , 4 33 (2 00 6). B eca us e VC AAn oti ce err or is i nh ere ntl y p rej ud ici al, the burde n s hif ts to the Secre tary to demonstrate thatther e was no err or orthatthe appellantwas not prejudi ced by any failure to gi ve notice. Sanders v. Nicholson,

__ F3 d. __ , N o. 06 -70 01 (May 1 6, 20 07 ).
Here, the ap pe llant a sse rts that V A f ail ed to s ati sf y it s d uty to p rov ide VC AA -co m

pliant
no tic e as to a ll f

our V CAA n oti ce e lem ents. Ap pe llant' s B r. at 8- 12 . B eca us e Ms

. Go rdo n' s cl aim
wa s o n app ea l b efo re VA i n Nov embe r 20 00 , an d th us wa s pe nd in g atVA a t t he ti me of th e VCA A's enactment, the VCAA applied to her cl aim. See Pelegrini, supra. In its 2002 dec ision, the Boar d stated: [T ]h e B oard f

ind s that t he R O & I C [I ns ura

nc e Ce nte r] n oti fi ed

bo th part ie s of th e reason for it s decision, a s well as the laws and reg ulatio ns app lic ab le t o h is c lai m . T his inf orm ati on wa s p rov ide d in the April 1996 Statement of t he Case, and i n the November 1997 Su pp lem ental St ate m ent of

the Ca se. Num erous let ters have be en sent to bo th p art ies. In Octoberand No ve m be r 19 95 , the RO & IC se nt le tte rs t o b oth parti es t ell ingthe m that th e ap pe llant' s cl aim had been

de nie d. Th e ap pe llant w as af fo rde d a he aring in Aug us t 19 97 , and the ap pe lle e w as p rov ide d14 information about the heari ng. Letters were written to the appe llant an d th e ap pe lle e in

Oc tob er 1 99 7 a sk ingthe m to provide m ore inf orm ati on ab out th eir

parents' sett lem ent agr eem ent. A letter wa s also sent to the attorney who prepared the agree ment, asking him f or inf orm ati on ab out th e agreeme nt. Th e cl aim s f old er i s re ple te w ith letter s an d re po rts of

co nta ct be tw een

VAand the i nte res ted

parti es. In s h o rt , th e R O & I C h a [ v e ] i n f o rm e d th e a p p e ll an t an d

ap pe lle e wh ich inf orm ati on an d e vid en ce t

hat th e ap pe llant w as t o p rov ide to VA and which information and evidence that the VA would attempt to obtain on beha lf of the appellant. R. at 6. W e h old that th e B oard err on eo us ly rel ied o n p os tde cis ion al d oc um ents i n th e re co rd, wh ich
we re unre lat ed

to s ect ion

5 10 3(a ) n oti ce, to c on clu de th at Ms. G ord on h ad b een p rov ide d a de qu ate section 5103(a) and § 3.159(b) noti ce. May fie ld, 444 F.3d at 1335. Th e tim inge rro r in thi s ca se w as not cured by VCAA notificati on followed by a readjudic ation of the claim. Mayfield, supra. In t his case, Ms. Gordon neverreceiveda ny n ot ic e tha t was direct ed to sati sfying the requir ements of
sec tio n 5 10 3(a ). A dd iti on all y, no thi ng in t he rec ord rel ied up on bythe Bo ard

indicate s th at Ms. Gordon was ever adequa tely informed of what evidence was neces sary to subst antiate her NSLI be ne fi ciary c lai m . T he Se cre tar y's failure to satis fy

the fi rst VC AAreq

uir em ent ne ces sar ily
su bs um es a co nc lus ion

that he als o f

ail ed to s ati sf y th e se co nd

an d th ird VC AAele m ents. Therefore, ha ving establ ished first- element VCAAnotice error, the bur den shifts to the Secretary to demonstrate a lac k of prejudice in t erms of th e fairne ss of the adjudica tion and op po rtunit

y f or M s. Go rdo n' s m ean ing fu l par tic ipatio n in

the pro ces sin g o f h er c lai m . T he Se cre tar y ha s f ail ed to m eet his burde n in

thi s ca se t o s ho w that th e er ror was not p rej ud ici al. Th e S ecr etary arg ue s that anyf

irs t-e lem ent V CAA no tic e err or wa s no np rej ud ici al be cau se the a ppellant "had actual knowledge of t he e vi dence requir ed to substant iate herclaim and that a rea sonable pers on
co uld be expe cte d to un de rst an d f rom the noti ce pr ov ide d byVAwhat wa s nee de d to su bs tantiate her clai m." Secretary's Supplemental Br. at 5. Th e o nly do cum ents r eli ed

upo n bythe S ecr etary t o d em on str ate a la ck of pre jud ice are all po std eci sio na l do cum ents that co uld no t have ass ist ed

Ms. Go rdo n in

partici patin g in

the ini tia l adjudicat ion of her claim, particul arly where t here was no VC AA no ti fi cat ion followed by a readjudic ation of the cla im. See Overton , 20 Vet.App. at 443 (hol ding t hat VA could not rel y on a June 20 02 SSO C, whi chwas a post de cis ion al do cum ent to sat isf y it s b urd ento d em on str ate that aO ur di ss ent i ng col l eague w oul d f i nd t hat M s. G or don w ai ved he r r i ght t o pr oper not i ce beca use s he di d not 3 submi t addi t i onal evi dence af t er bei ng af

f or ded t he oppor t uni t y t o do so. A l t hough t her e i s no doubt t hat M s. G or don m ay w ai ve her r i ght t o have pr oper not i ce pr ovi ded t o her , s uch a w ai ver m ust be i nf or m ed a nd vol unt ar y t o be e f f ect i ve. See Jans se n v. Pri nci

pi , 15 V et

. A pp. 370, 374 ( 2001) ( ci t i ng Uni t ed St at es v. O l ano , 5 0 7 U .S. 72 5 , 7 3 2 -33 (19 9 3 ))

. In t he a bse nce of

cont ent

- com pl i ant V C A A not i ce or ac t ual know l edge as t o t he i nf or m at i on nec es sa r y t o s ubst ant i at e he r cl ai m , t he a ppel l ant' s f ai l ur e t o s ubm i t addi t i onal evi dence ca nnot cons t i t ut e a w ai ver of t he r i ght t o not i ce of

t he in fo rm a tion n e c e ss a ry to su b sta n tiate a c la im

.

W e ne ed no t addr es s t he not i ce pr ovi ded t o t he i nt er venor , M s. Sam ar gi n, bec aus e t hat i ss ue i s si m pl y not 4 before us. 15 first- ele m ent V CAA e rro r w as n on pre jud ici al) ; cf. Medrano v. Nichols on ,

__ V et. Ap p. __, No. 04 -10 09 (Apr. 23 , 2 00 7) (holdin g th at V CAA t im ing -no tic e er ror wa s n on

pre jud ica l whe re following postadjudi catory, cont ent-complaint VCAA notice, the vet eran affirmati vely indica ted, thr ou ghco un sel , th at h e h ad no fu rth er e vid ence to subm it; ret urn ingthe cla im

to t he RO wo uld have res ult ed

in a read jud icatio n o f t

he m att er o n e xa ctl y th e sam e ev ide nc e an d law p rev iou sly
co ns ide red

byRO ). Mo reo ve r, de sp ite th e Se cre tar y' s arg um ent t o the c ontrary, th e re co rd d oe s 3

no t de m o n s tr a te th a t M s . G o rd o nh a d k n o w le d g e o f

th e e v id e n c e an d

i n f o rm a ti o nn e e d e d to
su bs tantiate he r c lai m , parti cu lar ly wi th reg ard to th e ev ide nc e ne ed ed

to s up po rt he r a sse rti on

that her father was unabl e to effectuate his intent bec ause of incapacit y. See Fagan, su pra . Th e C ourt als o no tes that

it app ear s that Ms. Gor do n wa s rep res ented by he r fo rm er c ouns el fr om May 20 01 unti l O cto be r 1 7, 2 00 2, the date o f t he Bo ard de cis ion on ap pe al. Ho we ve r, t

he re is n oth ing in M s. Go rdo n' s f ormer counsel' s ac tio ns an d c om m un icatio ns to VA t

hat de m on str ate th att he app el la nth adamea ni ng ful o pp or tu ni ty t o pa rt ic ip at e eff ec ti ve ly in th e p ro ce ss in g h ercl ai m. Se e R. a t 243- 44. Therefore, we conclude that the Sec retary has notmet his burden of dem onstrati ng a la ck of pre jud ice . B eca

us e we are n ot c onvin ced that Ms . G ord on

wa s ab le t o m ean ing fu lly parti cip ate in th e adj ud icatio n of this clai m , we cann ot c on clu de that th e p res um ed no tic e er ror wa s nonprej ud ici al. Accordingl y, a remand is required t o correctthat err or and to provi de VC AA -co m

pli ant no tic e. Th e C ourt d oe s n ot n eed

to a dd res s the o the r i ssu es that M s. G ord on h as r ais ed

on ap pe al at thi s ti m e. On

rem an d, Ms. G ord on

is fre e to su

bm it a dd iti on al e vid en ce and rai se t he se argum ents 4 to VA, and VA m

ust address any such evidence and arguments. See Best v. Princ ipi , 15 Vet.App. 18 , 20 (200 1) ( pe r curiam ord er) ; Ku tsc he ro us ky v . We st, 12 Ve t.A

pp . 3 69 , 3 72 (19 99 ) (p er c uri am ord er)

.16 IV . C ON CL US ION Upon considerati on of the foregoing, the October 17, 2002, Board decision is VACATED and that matter is REMANDE D to the Boar d for further a djudicati on consistentwith this opi nion.

LA NC E: Judge , d iss entin g: I be lie ve that th e ap pe llant h ad a m ean ing fu l op po rtunit y to partici pate in the Board decision on appeal and thatthe Co ur t ne edg o no furtherthan such a
co nc lus ion

to re so lve thi s ap pe al. I al so have grave do ub ts a bo ut t he co nc lus ion

that th e n oti ce requirements of the VCAA apply to adversar ial proce edings where the Secretary's role is t hat of a
ne utr al s tak eh old er. It d oe s n ot s eem to m e that the lang ua ge of th e statut e or the int ent of Co ng res s to f aci lit ate the ge ne ral ly n on adve rsaria l cl aim pro ces s can b e ap plied to req uir e th e S ecr etary t o give notice to two competing gr oups as to how to defeateach other's ass ertions of entit lement to a
sum of m on eythat

can on ly be awarde d to on e or th e oth er. Th e m ajo rity' s fa ilure to rec og niz e th at Co ng res s d

raf ted the VC AAto f

aci lit ate nonadversarial

claims and its failur e to de scribe wit h any sp ec if ic it y wh atmustbe in cl ud edto pr ov id e v al idno ti ce to pa rt ie s se ek in g to dis pr ov e ea ch ot he r's positions l eaves the Sec retary in t he awkward position of having not provided val id notice wit hout sufficient guidance as to how to provide val id notice whil e remaining a neutral stakeholder . Leaving the Secret ary in thi s position i s both unfair and unnece ssary.17

I. MS. GORDON'S PARTICIPAT ION IN THE DECISION ON A PPEAL Fo r t he la st sev eny ear s, th e on ly su bs tantiv e is su e in

thi s ca se h as b een

wh eth er t he ve ter an performed an overt act sufficient t o effectuate his int ent to change t he benefi ci ari es of his NSLI po licy. R. at 1 92 -96 . E ve n th ou ghMs. Go rdo n w as n ot a partyto t

he Fe bru ary

20 00 Co urt proceeding where this iss ue became the focus of the dispute, she was a p ar ty t o th e Ja nuary 2001 Board decision that there was no sufficient overt act. R . at 219-21. In May 2 00 1 M s. Gordon ap pe ale d the 200 1 B oard d eci sio n to thi s C ourt throu gh co un sel

and obtained a r emand. R. at 236. Counsel continued t o representher on readj udication a t the Board. R. at 244. Prior to the decision
on ap pe al, the Bo ard

sent co un sel a le tte r expli cit ly g ivi ng co un sel 90 days to su bm it a dd iti on al argument and evidence. R. at 246. To m e, thi s cl ear ly p rov ide d M s. Go rdo n th e o pp ort un ityto m ean ing fu llyparti cip ate in h er cla im . T he so le s ub stanti ve dis pute d uri ng the enti re tim e Ms . G ord on wa s re pre sented

byco un sel before VA was whether she had proven t he veteran t ook an over t act sufficientto effectuate the intent he e xpressed in t he divorce agr eement. E ve n assuming–as the majority did in Overton v. Nicholson , 20 Vet.App. 427 (2006)–thatatt orneys do not know how to prove a claim unless the record demonstrates otherwise, i t i s difficult to see how the majority finds attorney lack of kn ow led ge in t

his cas e. As stated ab ov e, durin g th e entir e p eri od that co un sel rep res ented Ms. Gordon before the Sec retary there has onl y been one substanti ve issue in di spute. Such would be ob vio us to anyatt orn eywh o re vie we d th e C ourt' s F eb ruary 20 00 rem an d o r th e B oard' s Janu ary 20 01 de cis ion . M ore ov er, un like a cl aim fo r be ne fi ts b ase d u

po n m ed ica l di sab ili ty, thi s f act in dispute does not require any expert evidence nor does it raise any potentiall y complicated issues of causation. The onl y way to conclude thatMs. Gordon's attorney did notknow what evidence she needed to submit is to pr esume that the attorney did not even take the minim al step of revi ewing the basic hist ory of this case; and that pr esumption, I beli eve, is unfair t o counsel and herreputati on. For the reas ons stated i n my di ssent in Overton , I b eli ev e th e m ajo rity' s p res um pti on of att orn ey
error oroversight makes even les s sense when appli ed to the facts of this case. 20 Vet.App. at 444- 46 (L an ce, J. , d iss entin g in part)

. Mo reo ve r, I do no t ag ree wi th t he m ajo rity' s co nc lus ion

that failing to su

bm it e vid en ce i n resp on se t o th e B oard' s expli cit letter inv iti ng fu

rth er e vid en ce and

arg um ent is pro of

that Ms

. Gordon did not have a meaningful opportunit y to parti cipate i n the adjudic ation of her cla im. As18

the Court noted recent ly in Prickett v. Nicholson , 20 Vet .App . 37 0, 377 n.2 (200 6), the f ail ure of an inf orm ed party to su

bm it e vid en ce m aybe reg ard ed as a wa ive r of

the rig ht t o s ub m it a dd iti on al
ev ide nc e. G ive n the e xp lic it letter f rom th e Bo ard

to c ouns el p rov idi ng the op po rtunit y to su bm it
ev ide nc e p rio r to the Bo ard ' s d ecision, I wo uld co ns tru e th e la ck

of a re sp on se a s a w aiv er r ath er than evidence that counsel does not know how to prove an over t act by the ve teran. Accordingly, I do no t be lie ve that it

is n ece ssary t o d eci de any thi ng m ore than whe the r th e ap pe llant w as a ble to meaningfully participat e in the proc eedings below.

II. THE APPLICA BILITY OF VC AA NOTICE Fo r th e re aso ns stated

ab ov e, I w ou ld n ot r eac h th e q ue sti on of wh eth er V CAA n oti ce a

pp lie s to d isp ute s b etw een

po tentia l be ne fi ciarie s o f an N SL I po lic y. I b eli ev e th at this qu est ion is m uc h
m ore dif fi cu lt than th e m ajo rity ack no wl ed ge s. Al tho ug h the ma jor ityopin ion

corr ect ly st ate s th at the statutory questi on must be re so lv edb y looking at t he "'"whole law, and to it s object and po lic y, "' " an te at 7 (quoti ng Mo re au v. Brown, 9 Vet.App. 389, 396 (1996) (quoti ng Ri ch ar ds v. Uni ted Sta tes , 3 69 U .S

. 1, 1 1 (19 62 ))) , the ana lys is is act ua llyn arr ow ly dra ft ed

s o as to rea d 38 U.S.C. § 5103(a) in isolation from the whole of title 38 and the intent and policy behind the VCAA. A. The Purpose of the VCAA Congress passed t he VCAA because it believe d Mor ton v. Wes t , 1 2 V et. Ap p. 47 7 (1 99 9), "construc ted a signi ficant barri er to vete rans who need assi stance in obt aining informatio n and evidence in or der to rec eive benefits from the VA." 146 C ONG
. REC
. H9913 (Oc t. 1 7, 2000) (st ate m en t o f Mr. S tum

p). In Morton , the Co urt int erp ret ed

the ve rsi on

of 38 U. S. C. § 5 10 7 th en in e ff ect as p roh ibi tin g the S ecr etary fr om pro vid ingm os t f

orm s o f a ssi stanc e to be ne fi ts c lai m ants who had not submitted "well grounded" claims. 12 Vet.App. at 480-85. The legislat ive history of the VCAAis reple te with sta tements citing Morton as t he ba sis fo r en act ingthe VC AA . O ve ral l, the sentim ent m oti vatin g th e V CAA w as c ap tur ed bySe nator Rock ef

ell er whe n h e in dic ate d th at the VC AAwa s n ece ssary b eca us e "[ t] he sy ste m

to pr ov ide ben ef

its to vet erans was nev er i nte nd ed to be adversa rial." 146 C ONG
. REC . S 92 12 (S ep t. 2 5, 20 00 ). Th is p urp os e w as r eco gn ize d b y U.S. Court of Ap pe als fo r th e F ed era l C irc uit (F ed era l Circuit) in P a ra ly

z e d V e te ra n s o f A m e r ic a v
. S

e c r e ta r yo f V e te ran s A ffa irs , 345 F.3d 1334, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2003) when itinvalidat ed part of the Secr etary's implem entation of 38 U.S.C. § 5013 by concluding tha t the chal lenged "re gulatio n is parti cularly pr ejudicia l to clai mants during the19

no n-a dv ers ari al s tag es o f d isp ute s o ve r b en ef its , wh encla im ants r ely

on the str on gly

an d uniq ue ly pro -cl aim ant charact er of the ve ter an s' be ne fi ts s ys tem an d p urs ue the ir s tat

uto ry e nti tle m ents wi tho ut t he ass ist an ce o f l eg al c ouns el. " (i nte rna l qu otatio n o m itt ed ). De sp ite the int en de d f

oc us of th e VC AA , the m ajo rity ap pli es the no tic e p rov isi on s o f t hat statut e to a proc eed ingthat is inhe rentlyadve rsaria l. I n a dis pute o ve r N SL I pr oc eed s, the Se cre tar y acts as a s takeholderfor m oney tha t ca nnot be awarded t o all competing parti es such as in a n action in interpleader. Se e F ED
. R. C IV
. P. 22 (autho riz ingint erp lea de r of parti es) ; 67 (allo wi ng a ho lde r of disputed funds to depositthose funds with the cour t). In fact, t he notes accompanying Rule 22 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure st ate thatwhen Rule 22 was original ly adopted in 1937, t he advisory comm ittee i ntended it to appl y to "actions upon veterans' c ontracts of i nsurance with t he Un ite d S tat es. " F ED
. R. C IV
. P. 22 Adviso ry Co mmitt ee Note. No matter what decisi on the Se cre tar y m ak es, the re w ill be wi nn ers an d lo ser s. In suc h a cir cum stanc e, I belie ve that it is s im ply inappropri ate to say t hat the pro- veteran cha racterof the veterans be nefits s ys te m r equires t he Secretary to notify each par ty as to how to defeat t he other's as sertion of enti tlement and then take up the role a s neutral arbiteras to which part y should prevai l. In any NS LI d ec is io n, the obvi ous conflict of inter est is ver y likely t o lead to the percepti on thatthe outcome of the Secretary's decision
wa s ta int ed

be cau se t he Se cre tar

y p rov ide d b ett er a dv ice to t he partywh o w on . S uc h a res ult wo uld unfairly undermine the Secre tary's reputat ion as fai r and neutra l administratorof Title 38. I have strong doubts t hat such a re sult is r equired or de sired. B. Th e P lai n L an gu ag e o f 3 8 U .S .C . § 51 03 (a) Starting wit h the plain l anguage of the s tatute, 38 U.S.C. § 5103(a) states: "Upon rec eipt of a complete or substant ially complete appl icati on , the Secret ary shall notify the clai mant and the cla im an t' s re pre sentat ive , if any, of any in fo rm ati on , and

anyme dic al or

lay ev ide nc e, not p rev iou sly provided to t he Secretar y that is ne cessary t o substanti ate the c lai m." As to this language, the Se cre tar y arg ue s that a per so n see kin g the proc eed s of an N SL I po lic y is no t a " cla im ant" b eca us e the procee ds are no t a " be ne fi t." Al tho ug h th e m ajo rity m ak es a pla us ibl e ca se f

or t he op po sit e result, I tend to agre e with the Secr etary's positi on. Rather than r eh ash this ar gument, I focus on the fact that the pl ain language of ti tle 38 p re s e n ts a d d it io n a l p ro b le m s w it hth e m a jo ri ty ' s p o s it io nth a t a

d is p u te o v e r N S L I p ro c e e d s is a "claim" for benefits. Fi rs t, the not ice requi rement is introduce d with a key timing clause. The20

req uir ed no tic e m

us t be pro vid ed

"[ u] po n re cei pt of

a com ple te o r su

bs tantia llyco m

ple te applicat ion." In Locklear v. Nichol son , 2 0 V et. Ap p. 41 0, 415 (200 6), the C ourt r eco gn ize d th at this timing requirement was crucial to understanding the i ntended scope of VCAA notice. Accordingly, the Co urt rul ed that se cti on

51 03 (a) req

uir es o nly

a si ng le, ini tia l notice; not cont inu ou s m ini

ad jud icatio ns in t

he gu ise of

no tic e. Ho we ve r, th e m ajo rit y' s co nc lus ion

am ounts to a

ho ldi ng that
m ult ipl e VC AAn oti ces are req uir ed

. T he a

pp ell ant i n thi s cas e did

n ot su bm it the "claim" that st arted the adjudicat ion to award the NSLI proceeds at i ssue. That "cl aim" was subm itted by t he intervenor . Although the VCAA was not in effect at the time that the ini tial " claim" was filed, the majority opinion seems to requir e VCAA notice be issued not just upon receipt of the initial " claim," but also whenever a new intervenor becomes involved. This is difficult t o square with t he timing language of the VCAA. I also note that 38 U.S.C. § 5103(a) has no clause limiting i t t o a particul ar forum. Unlike the tradi ti on al n onadver sarial claims that the Secr etary adj udicates, di sputes over NSLI proc eeds may also be broughtin Federal di strictcourt, a dis tinctl y adversari al forum. Se e 38 U.S.C. § 1984 (gr an ting jurisdic tion

to F ed era l di str ict

co urt s); Yo ung v . D erw ins ki , 1 Vet.App. 70, 72 (1990) (holding tha t secti on 1984 jurisdi ction is notexc lu si ve ). Th at statute also r efers to "cl aims" for NSLI benefits. Id. Ba sed on the pla in- lan gu ag e an aly sis us ed bythe m ajo rit

y, it w ou ld a

pp ear that the S ecr etary is als o req

uir ed to p rov ide V CAA no tic e to NS LI p roc eed s "cl aim ants" in Fede ral dis tri ct c ourt. It s eem s q

uit e do ub tf

ul t o m e th at C on gre ss i nte nd ed to c hang e th e ru les of

pro ced ure in f ed era l di str ict

co urt wh enit e na cte d th e V CAA. Ac tio ns in F ed era l di str ict co urt ov er int erp lea de d f

un ds are adve rsaria l an d in that f orum lic en ced co un sel are pre sum ed

co m pe tent to rep res ent th eir

cli ent' s inter est s. Furthermore, applying the plain-l anguage analysi s used by t he majority to otherprovisions in t itl e 3 8 le ad s to hig hly

su sp ect res ult s. If

the m ajo rity' s an aly sis is c orr ect , the n it w ou ld a pp ear that 38 U. S. C. § 5 10 8 a

pp lie s to NS LI "cl aim s. " T hat pr ov isi on pro vid es: "If

new and m ate ria l
ev ide nc e is pre sented

or sec ure d wi th res pe ct to a cla im whic h ha s be end isa llo we d, the Se cre tar y sh al l r eo pe n t he cl ai m andre vi ew th e fo rme r d is po si ti on o f the cl ai m." Gi ve n t he maj or it y's
co nc lus ion

that a dis pute ov er NS LI p roc eed s is a "cl aim " w ith in t he m ean ingof

ch ap ter 51 of tit le 38, then the use of thatword in s ect ion 5108 means that a decisi on by the Secret ary on an NSLI "claim" can be reope ned at any time based on the submission of new and m ateria l evidence s o long21

as one disappoi nted clai mant lives. If the Secret ary changes t he outcome on reopening this " claim,"
wo uld he hav e to se ek

disg org em ent fr om

the or igi na l ben ef

ici ari es? I hav e ver

y ser iou s d ou

bts that Co ng res s inten de d to ex ten d th e ex tre m ely loose lev el o f f

ina lity a pp rop riate f

or n on adve rsaria l pro cee dings to an advers ari al p roc eed inglik e th is o ne ev enif the pla in l an gu ag e o f t

he statut e
su gg ests such an out come. Se e a lso 3 8 U. S. C. § § 51 09 A, 7 11 1 (pe rm itt ingd eci sio ns of the Se cre tar y to be rev ise d at any ti m e u po n s ho wing c lear an d unm ist ak ab le e rro r). It i s unf ort un ate that ev enaf

ter 12 ye ars of

lit igatio n (s o far) the inter ve no r h ere w ill s til l n ot have anyf ina lity. It is more unfortunate that whoever pr evails on remand m ust stil l be concerne d about the finali ty of the award even decades after the proc eeds are r eceived. For these re asons, I do not believe that the majorit y's conclusion that the pl ain l anguage of the statute is controll ing is based on an exam ination of the "whole law, and its object and policy." To fairly conclude that a dis pute ove r NSLI proceeds is a "cl aim" within the meaning of chapter 51 of title 38, the conclusion shoul d be based on more than just t he language of one section. Given t he bre adth o f p rov isi on s th at u se t he wo rd " cla im ," a

bro ad er v iewis required b ef ore att ach ingthat
wo rd t o th e d isp ute he re. C. The Legislative History of 38 U.S.C. § 5103 Eve n accepting t hat the pla in language of the st atute re quires the result r eached, I bel ieve there is at leasta colorabl e issue of whether t he use of the word "subsec ti on " i n 38 U.S.C. § 5103(b)(2) i s a drafting error. As the majority opi nion admits, ev en wh er e the l anguage of the statut e is fo un d to be un am big uo us , the Cou

rt m us t stil l an aly ze whe the r th e ap parent re su lt " ' "w ill pro du ce a res ult de m on str ab ly at odd s w iththe int entio n o f i ts d raf ter s. "' " An te at 7 (quoti ng Ga rd ne r
v. De rw ins ki , 1 Vet.App. 584, 586-87 (1991) (quoting Gr iff in v . O cea nic Co ntrac tor

s, Inc

. , 458 U.S. 564 (1982))). Alt hough , the majority specul ates how Congress would have phr ased 38 U.S.C. § 5 10 3(a ) if

it h ad int en de d a

dif fe rent result , it does not a ctu all y lo ok at h owthat pr ov isi on

wa s drafted or at t he expressed i ntent in t he legisl ative his tory. Pr ior to t he VC AA , 38 U.S .C . § 51 03 (a) (199 1) re qu ire d the Se cre tar y to inf orm cla im ants of the ev ide nc e n ece ssary to co m ple te an in co m

ple te a pp lic ati on . S ect ion

51 03 (b) sp eci fi cal ly pro vid ed that "[ t] his section shal l no t ap pl y to any applicati on or claim for Government life insurance benefits." (emphasis added). These provisions were identical to the 1958 ve rsion of 38 U. S. C. § 30 03 (renum

be red in 1 99 1). He nc e, wh ile the pre sent ve rsi on of 38 U. S. C. § 5 10 3 a

pp ear s22

to s tat e that sub sec tio n (a) app lie s to G ov ernm ent li fe ins uranc e b en ef its wh ile su

bs ect ion (b) do es not, no pa rt

of the pre -V CAA v ers ion

s ect ion 5 10 3 ap pli ed

to G ov ernm ent li fe ins uranc e b en ef its

. Turni ng to t

he his tor y o f th e V CAA, the ch an ge fr om "se cti on " to "su

bs ect ion " oc curre d in the m idd le o f th e dra ft ingproc ess whe n tw o dif fe rent pr op os als we re m erg ed . In Ju ly 2 00 0, wh en the Ho us e o f R ep res entat ive s p rop os ed H. R. 486 4, 106 th C on g. (200 0), it c ontin ue d to us e th e w ord "se cti on " in

the ne w v ers ion

of sec tio n 5 10 3. H. R. 48 64 pro po sed that se ction

51 02 de al w ith inc om ple te a pp lic ati on s, a s we ll as VA ' s duty to no tif y o f a dd iti on al i nf

orm ati on , lay and

m ed ica l
ev ide nc e, ne ces sar

y to sub stanti ate the cla im . S ub sec tio n (d ) of 51 02 wa s entit led

"In ap pli cab ili ty to C ert ain Be ne fi ts" and

ma int ain ed

the id entic al lang ua ge to the 199 1 and 19 58 ve rsi on s, i.e ., "th is section shall not apply to an y ap pli cation or c laim for Governm ent life insur ance benefits." The Se nate v ers ion

of the V CAA, s ect ion

1 01 o f S. 18 10 , 10 6th

C on g. (2 00 0), d id no t a dd res s any d uty to notify clai mants. The Senate's sole concern was the dut y to assistin developing e vidence. To
summ arize, t he House bill contained a duty to not ify thatexpli citly did notapply t o Government life ins uranc e b en ef

its wh ile the Se nate b ill ha d n o d uty to n oti fy at a ll. Th e S en ate and

Hou se C om

m itt ees on Ve ter an ' s Af

fa irs pro du ced

a co m pro m ise ve rsi on

to reconcil e the two bill s. The comprom ise bill divided the House's proposed s ection 5102 (a ) through (d) int o s ect ion s 5 10 2 an d 51 03 . S ect ion 51 02 ret ain ed

su bs ect ion s (a ) an d (b ). T he ne w 5 10 3(a ) expanded on the duty t o notify and took on what were subsecti ons (c) and (d) of H .R. 4894. W ithout
any e xp lan ati on , th e w ord "s ect ion " w as co nv ert ed

to "s ub sec tio n. " H .R . 9 91 2, 10 6th Co ng . (2 00 0). In o the r w ord s, de sp ite the fa ct that the pri or v ers ion of sec tio n 5 10 3 e xp lic itl y d id n ot a pp ly t o Go ve rnm ent li fe ins uranc e b en ef its an d th e fa ct that n eithe r o f the o rig ina l b ill s co nta ine d a d uty to notify that appl ied to Government life insura nce benefits, whe n the proposal s merged during the
reo rganiz ati on

of the tw o b ill s b ein g c om bin ed , th at d

uty wa s su dd en ly created

wh enthe wo rd "secti on" was changed to " subsection." The legisla tive hist ory does not suppor t the proposi tion thatthis change was t he resultof any intenti onal decisi on to expand the duty to notify proposed by the original House bill. Nothing in the his tor y o f e ith er o rig ina l bi ll s ug ge sts that anyo ne ev er e xp res sed a beli ef that th e o rig ina lly pro po sed duty to not if

y s ho uld be expand ed

to i nc lud e G ov ernm ent li fe ins uranc e b en ef its

. Mo reo ve r, not

hin g in the statem ents e xp lai ningthe m erg er o f t he tw o p rop os als ack

no wl ed ge s a change in the s cope of the proposed duty to notify, m uch less provides a rati onale for expanding t he23

duty. Senator Spect er pr esented the "comprom ise agree ment" to the Senate, Amendm ent No. 4189, and stated i n relevantpart: " The Senate and House comm ittees have now reached . . . an agreement
an d h av e re co nc ile d th e d if fe ren ces be tw een

the Se nate- an d H ou se- pa sse d p rov isi on s. Th os e differences–which are, pr incipall y matters of t on e an d emphasis, no t–s ub sta nc e–are c ontai ne d in the p ro po se d amendm ent to H.R. 4864 . . . ." 146 C ONG
. REC
. S9 20 5 (S ep t. 2 5, 20 00 ) (e m ph asi s added). Represent ative Stump provid edt he following r elevant st atements in his sta tement to the Ho us e intro du cin g th e co m pro m ise ag ree m ent: As revised sec tion 5102 would contai n alm ost all of exis ting sect ions 5102 and 5103. . . . Subsections ( c) and (d) o f p ro po sed secti on 5102 ar e identical to existing s ections ( a) and (b) o f e xi st in g subsection 5103. . . . Pr oposed secti on 51 02 (b) c lar if

ies th e Se cre tar

y' s ob lig ati on

to s en d no tic es to the c lai m ant .

. . a s to inf orm atio n th e cl aim ant m

us t su bm it t o c om

ple te t he ap pli cat ion . It

wo uld als o req ui re t he Secretary to notify the cl aimant . . . of any additional information and medi ca l a ndla y e vi de nc e n ec es sa ry to subs ta nt ia te th e c la im. 146 C ONG
. REC . H 99 14 (O ct. 17 , 2 00 0) ( em ph asi s ad de d). By

ref err ingto t

he fi nal ver sio n a s "id en tic al" to t

he duty t o n oti fy

ori gin all y p rop os ed

in t he Ho us e, Representat ive St um p s tro ng ly indicate s that the reorganiz ation was not i ntended to expand the duty to noti fy beyond the version original ly proposed. Furth erm ore , R ep res entat ive St um p a lso stated

in d isc us sin g th e co m

pro m ise ag ree m ent: The compromise version of revised sect ion 5103 . . . substantial ly maintains the curre nt pr ovisions of secti on 5103. However, it renames the title of t he section . . . [and] enhances the notice the Sec retary is now re quired to pr ovide to a cl aimant regarding i nform ation thatis ne ce ss ary t o complete the applica tion. . . . The comprom ise agree ment also maintains the language in current secti on 5103 relati ng to t im e li m its , but exp an ds that lang ua ge to in clu de "in fo rm ati on or e vid en ce. " It

is not the Comm ittee's purpose t o modif y the historica l applica tion of this provi sion . . . ." Id. (em ph asi s ad de d). Ag ain , h is s tate m e nts s u g g e s t t h at t h e c o m p ro m is e "m a intai ne d" t

he ori gin all y proposed duty to not ify; not that i t expanded thatduty. De sp ite the su

bs tantia l qu est ion s ra ise d b y th is h ist ory , th e m ajo rity d oe s n ot ev endis cu ss it or ent ertain t he possibil it y that itis a mere drafting err or that 38 U.S.C. § 5103(b)(2) says "subsecti on" instea d of "section." I recognize a nd strongly agr ee with the Feder al C irc uit ' s statem ent that it tak es " anex tra ord inaril y s tro ng sh ow ingof cle ar l eg isl ati ve int ent in

ord er t o co nv inc e us that Co ng res s m ean s o the r th anwh at i t ul tim ate ly s aid ." Gardner v. Brown , 5 F. 3d 14 56 , 1 46 0 (F ed . C ir.24

19 93 ); see Tropf v. Nicholson , 20 Vet.App. 317, 321 n.1 (2006) ("Without sta ndard word meanings
an d ru les of

co ns tru cti on , n eithe r C on gre ss n or t he Se cre tar

y c ankn owho w to wr ite autho rit ies in
a w ay th at co nv ey s th eir

int ent an d n o p rac tit ion er o r–m ore im po rtantl y–

ve ter ancan

rel y o n a statut e
or r eg ulatio n to m ean

wh at i t ap pe ars to s ay ."). However, in th is c ase , th e av ail ab le m ate ria l necessit ates a more comprehensive analysi s tha n the majority undert akes.

III . T HE CO NT EN T O F V CAA N OT IC E O N N SL I C LA IMS Myfi na l con cer

n wi th th e m ajo rity o pin ion is that it do es n ot a de qu ate ly i nd icate what w ou ld be acceptabl e VCAA not ic e in this case . Although the majority deci sion stat es: "nothi ng in the
rec ord rel ied up on b y the B oard ind icates th at Ms. G ord on w as ev er ad eq

uatel y in fo rm ed

of wh at
ev ide nc e wa s n ece ssary t o s ub stanti ate he r N SL I be ne fi ciary c lai m ," An te at 14 , it do es n ot e lab orate on what would be adequate not ice in thi s case. In Kent v. Nicholson , 2 0 V et. Ap p. 1, 9-1 0 (2 00 6), the Co urt m ad e cl ear

that ade qu ate VC AAnoti ce re qu ire s the Se cre tar y to co nd uc t a b asi c re vie w of the status of the cl aim to determine what propositions must be substantia ted. As to the appe llant he re i t w ou ld s eem

that ad eq uate V CAA n oti ce w ou ld r eq uir e th e S ecr etary to see wh at the ori gin al "c la ima nt " h ads ub mi t t e da ndin for m th e n ew "c la ima nt " h ow t o d is pr ov e t he in it ia l c la im. Furth erm ore , if

we ass um e th at i n f

utu re ca ses the Se cre tar

y wi ll s up ply

pro m pt V CAA n oti ce, the n it w ou ld ap pe ar th at inter

ve no rs w ill gen era llyhav e the adv antag e in th at th eysho uld rece ive no tic e that m ayco ns ide r w hat th e in iti al c lai m ant su bm itt ed an d h owto r eb ut i t. This raise s another ques tion ignore d by the majority. What does the Secret ar y ne ed to do to provide ade quate VCAA notice to Ms. Samargin? Under the majority's a na ly sis, both the ap pe llant and

the int erv en or are " cla im ants. " Y et, the m ajo rity d oe s n ot c on sid er whe the r Ms

. Sam arg in r ece ive d a de qu ate V CAA no tic e. As sum ings he h as no t y et r ece ive d a de qu ate no tic e, it would appear thatany notice suppl ied to her at this point would be focused on how to disprove the pro po sit ion

that th e v ete ran

pe rf orm ed anov ert act to e ff ect uate h is i nte nt. Or

perh ap s th e m ajo rity thi nk s th at s he is n ot e nti tle d to no tic e b eca us e, as t he curre nt t

he pre va ili ng party, he r cl aim ha s been substant iated. Se e Dingess v. Nicholson , 1 9 V et. Ap p. 47 3, 49 1 (2 00 6). Of co urs e, thi s ra ise s the qu est ion

of wh eth er p rev ail ingbe low am ounts to s ub stanti ati on of the claim where the m eri ts are sti ll being appe aled. W ould the logic of Di ngess apply to a cl aim that was "substant iated" a t the tim e th e V CAA wa s pa sse d but b ecam e un su bs tantiated

the rea ft er? P erh ap s th e C ourt w ill be fa ced with this pr oblem if the appellant pre vails on re mand. I would also note that i t appears fro m the25

rec ord that, be cau se thi s dis pute ha s co nti nu ed f or 12 y ear s, th

ree o f the f

our c hil dre n invo lve d are
no lon ge r m inors. R. at 8 5, 89 . T his rai ses the qu est ion of wh eth er anyof

the m wo uld req uir e VCAA notice and whether notice would still be require d for Ms. Gordon and Ms. Samargin. Regardless o f t he part icular r esult on re mand, I fear that the lack of guidanc e provided by thi s o pin ion

wi ll m ean

that th e f ourthtim e th is d isp ute is app eal ed to the Cou

rt, the ar gum ents r ais ed wi ll a ga in b e p roc ed

ura l. IV . C ON CL US ION Ultimately, I beli eve t hat t he majority's de cision to expa nd the scope of the VCAA to include adv e rs ari a l p ro c e e d in g s is in s u f f ic ie n tl yju s ti f

ie d an d ra is e s m anym o re c o n c e rn s th anare acknowledged. I also believe that the Board's decision can be aff irmed w ithout even ruli ng up on thi s is su e. Ho we ve r, a ssum ingth at the qu est ion we re s qu are ly p res ented , I d o n ot s ee h owit c ou ld be pro pe rlyad dre sse d w ith out takin g a bro ad er l oo k at the VCA A and the cas e th at i ns pir ed

it, Morton . The nonadversari al proceedi ngs at issue in Morton are simply not comparable to the inherentl y adversari al proceedi ng on appeal h ere . Nonetheless, i f there is one as pect of Morton applicabl e here, then i t would be t he conclusion. After r eaching the r esult in Morton , th e C ourt
en de d th e o pin ion

byob ser vin g th at " it i s p os sib le that af ter ev alu ati ng su chco ns ide rat ion s as fairness, equit y, and the personne l, facilit y, and financial exp enditures which would be requir ed, Con gr es s mig ht well opt" t o reverse t he outcome reached. 12 Vet.App. at 485-86. Similarl y, the outcome reached here is so inconsist ent with the una mbiguous intent of the VCAA thatit would not be unrea so na

ble fo r t he C ourt to su gg est

to C on gre ss t

hat it m aywant t o re vis e th e st atute t o re ve rse this deci sion. Accordingl y, I respect fully dissent from the majority opinion.