J-S36030-19

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* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

WILLIAM EDWARD HALSEY 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 2074 MDA 2018

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered November 19, 2018

In the Court of Common Pleas of York County Criminal Division at No(s): 

CP-67-CR-0001712-2008

BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J., SHOGAN, J., and PELLEGRINI*, J.

MEMORANDUM BY SHOGAN, J.: FILED SEPTEMBER 09, 2019

Appellant, William Edward Halsey, appeals from the judgment of 

sentence entered on November 19, 2018, in the York County Court of Common 

Pleas. We affirm.

The trial court summarized the relevant facts and procedural history of 

this matter as follows:

On October 30, 2007, officers with the Pennsylvania State 

Police (PSP) executed a search warrant at [Appellant’s] residence 

situated at 25 Plank Road, Shrewsbury Borough, York County,

Pennsylvania. Officers discovered 25 grams of cocaine, some of 

which was packaged for sale and $6,600.00 cash in [Appellant’s]

bedroom. [Appellant] admitted the cocaine was his property and 

that he sells it. He was subsequently charged with possession with 

intent to deliver a controlled substance pursuant to 35 P.S. § 780-

113(30).

Frank C. Arcuri, Esquire represented [Appellant] during trial 

proceedings. On June 24, 2008, [Appellant] entered an open 

guilty plea before the Honorable Judge Michael J. Brillhart and the 

[trial c]ourt deferred sentencing to August 25, 2008. On August 
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25, 2008, in the interest of justice, sentencing was again deferred 

to October 27, 2008. On October 27, 2008, [Appellant] appeared 

for sentencing, but left the building to purportedly smoke a 

cigarette and never returned, thereby effectively failing to appear. 

The [t]rial [c]ourt issued a bench warrant, which remained active 

until [Appellant’s] reemergence in York County ten years later on

October 10, 2018.

On October 10, 2018, this [t]rial [c]ourt vacated

[Appellant’s] bench warrant and scheduled sentencing at the 

instant docket and [a probation1] violation matter docketed at CP67-CR-3160-2006 for October 22, 2018. On October 22, 2018, 

[Appellant’s] newly retained counsel, J. Rick Robinson, Esquire, 

filed a Motion to Enforce Plea Agreement alleging the

Commonwealth’s breach of performance duties relative to what 

was [a] bargained-for-exchange at the time of [Appellant’s] guilty 

plea, specifically, a recommendation for a probationary sentence 

in exchange for [Appellant] forfeiting $50,000.00 cash derived 

from illicit drug sales and providing valuable intelligence to the 

York County Drug Task Force. Additionally, counsel requested a 

continuance so as to familiarize himself with [Appellant’s] matter. 

This [t]rial [c]ourt granted counsel’s continuance request and 

moved sentencing to November 19, 2018.

On November 19, 2018, this Court first convened a hearing 

on [Appellant’s] Motion to Enforce Plea Agreement. After taking 

the testimony of [Appellant], former PSP Corporal Craig 

Fensteracher, former assistant prosecutor William Graff, Esquire, 

and Donna Halsey - [Appellant’s] sister, this [c]ourt denied 

[Appellant’s] motion, citing that the evidence was insufficient to

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1 The trial court refers to the matter at trial court docket 3160-2006 as a 

parole violation, Trial Court Opinion, 1/25/19, at 2, and both the 

Commonwealth and Appellant reference a parole violation or detainer. 

Commonwealth’s Brief at 15; Appellant’s Brief at 5. After our review of the 

record, it appears that the action taken relative to trial court docket 3160-

2006 was a probation violation and resentencing. N.T., 11/19/18, at 1, 29. 

However, it is possible there was a parole detainer at a separate trial court 

docket. Nevertheless, because Appellant appealed only the judgment of 

sentence at trial court docket 1712-2008, the references to parole and 

probation matters at separate trial court docket numbers do not impact our 

discussion. 
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establish the existence of any agreement particularly in light of 

the fact that [Appellant] agreed to [an open guilty plea].

The Motion Hearing segued into [Appellant’s] Sentencing 

Hearing where this [c]ourt sentenced [Appellant] as follows: three 

(3) to six (6) years of confinement in a State Correctional 

Institution at Docket Number 1712-2008; two and one half (2 1⁄2) 

to five (5) years of confinement in a State Correctional Institution 

at Docket Number 3160-2006[, which was the probation

revocation case], to run concurrently with the sentence imposed 

at 1712-2008. This [t]rial [c]ourt awarded [Appellant] 66 days of 

credit for time spent in custody and indicated on the record that 

he is eligible for a reduced sentence pursuant to the Recidivism 

Risk Reduction Incentive (RRRI) statute.

[Appellant] timely filed a Post-Sentence Motion on 

November 29, 2018, requesting a sentence modification based on 

[Appellant’s] reputation, age, and health ailments. This [c]ourt

denied [Appellant’s] Post-Sentence Motion, without hearing, by 

Order on December 4, 2018. On December 18, 2018, [Appellant], 

by and through counsel, filed a timely Notice of Appeal to the 

Superior Court [at trial court docket 1712-2008]. 

Trial Court Opinion, 1/25/19, at 2-4 (internal footnote omitted) (footnote 

added). Both the trial court and Appellant complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.2

On appeal, Appellant presents the following issues for this Court’s 

consideration:

I. Whether the honorable trial court erred in denying Appellant’s 

motion to enforce plea agreement in that the Appellant negotiated 

a proposed plea agreement with the Commonwealth and fulfilled 

all of his conditions/obligations and the Commonwealth did not 

follow through with the proposed agreement as to sentencing?

II. Whether the honorable trial court erred in denying Appellant’s 

post sentence motion without a hearing/argument in that the 

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2

It does not appear that Appellant filed an appeal at trial court docket 3160-

2006. 
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Appellant had proposed additional factors to consider which were 

not presented at sentencing?

Appellant’s Brief at 4 (full capitalization omitted).

In his first issue, Appellant avers that the trial court erred when it denied 

his motion to enforce the plea agreement. Appellant’s Brief at 4. In its 

opinion, the trial court concluded that Appellant waived this issue when he 

failed to move to withdraw his guilty plea. Trial Court Opinion, 1/25/19, at 6. 

Insofar as the trial court concluded that Appellant never moved to withdraw 

his guilty plea, we agree with that conclusion. The record reflects that 

Appellant did not move to withdraw his plea prior to sentencing pursuant to 

Pa.R.Crim.P. 591 or after sentence was imposed under Pa.R.Crim.P. 720. 

As noted above, Appellant absconded prior to sentencing and was a 

fugitive for ten years. In Commonwealth v. Deemer, 705 A.2d 827, 829 

(Pa. 1997), our Supreme Court addressed the impact of fugitive status as 

follows:

[A] fugitive who has returned to the jurisdiction of the court should 

be allowed to exercise his post-trial rights in the same manner he 

would have done had he not become a fugitive. If he returns in 

time for post-trial motions, he should be allowed to file them. If 

he returns after the time for post-trial motions has expired, his 

request to file post-trial motions or to reinstate post-trial motions 

should be denied. If he became a fugitive between post-trial 

motions and an appeal and he returns before the time for appeal 

has expired and files an appeal, he should be allowed to appeal. 

If he returns after the time for filing an appeal has elapsed, his 

request to file an appeal should be denied. If he becomes a fugitive 

after an appeal has been filed, his appeal should be decided and 

any fugitive status should be addressed separately. In short, a 

fugitive who returns to court should be allowed to take the system 
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of criminal justice as he finds it upon his return: if time for filing 

has elapsed, he may not file; if it has not, he may.

Deemer, 705 A.2d at 829.

Accordingly, because Appellant returned to the jurisdiction of the trial 

court prior to sentencing, he had available to him the opportunity to move to 

withdraw his guilty plea before and after sentencing. Deemer, 705 A.2d at 

829. Appellant availed himself of neither prospect. Therefore, any issue 

regarding the validity of the plea is waived. Pa.R.A.P. 302(a).

However, we decline to base our affirmance of Appellant’s judgment of 

sentence on waiver. Appellant did not challenge the validity of his plea; 

rather, Appellant challenged the trial court’s ruling on his motion to enforce 

the plea agreement. Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) Statement, 12/31/18. Nevertheless, 

after review, we affirm the trial court’s denial of relief, although we do so on 

separate grounds. See Commonwealth v. Yale, 150 A.3d 979, 985 (Pa. 

Super. 2016) (stating that this Court may affirm the trial court’s decision on 

any proper basis).

3

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3 On the record, the trial court found that there was no evidence of a plea 

agreement. N.T., 11/19/18, at 27. However, in its Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinion, 

the trial court concluded that Appellant waived this issue because he did not 

move to withdraw the plea. Trial Court Opinion, 1/25/19, at 6. Despite the 

trial court’s finding of waiver, we agree with the trial court’s on-the-record 

conclusion that there is no evidence of a plea agreement. As discussed herein, 

we affirm on that basis. 
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It is well settled that plea agreements must be enforced to avoid the 

perversion of the plea-bargaining system. Commonwealth v. Farabaugh, 

136 A.3d 995, 1001 (Pa. Super. 2016) (citation omitted).

The disposition of criminal charges by agreement between the 

prosecutor and the accused, ... is an essential component of the 

administration of justice. Properly administered, it is to be 

encouraged. In this Commonwealth, the practice of plea 

bargaining is generally regarded favorably, and is legitimized and 

governed by court rule.... A mutuality of advantage to defendants 

and prosecutors flows from the ratification of the bargain.

Id. (citing Commonwealth v. Parsons, 969 A.2d 1259, 1267-1268 (Pa. 

Super. 2009) (en banc)). “Assuming the plea agreement is legally possible to 

fulfill, when the parties enter the plea agreement and the court accepts and 

approves the plea, then the parties and the court must abide by the terms of 

the agreement.” Id. (citation omitted). “Although a plea agreement occurs 

in a criminal context, it remains contractual in nature and is to be analyzed 

under contract-law standards.” Id. Disputes over the terms of a plea 

agreement must be resolved by objective standards. Id. “A determination of 

exactly what promises constitute the plea bargain must be based upon the 

totality of the surrounding circumstances and involves a case-by-case 

adjudication.” Id. at 1001-1002.

In the case at bar, the record reveals that although Appellant entered a 

plea of guilty, there was no agreement relative to the sentence that the trial 
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court would impose. Guilty Plea Colloquy, 6/24/08, at ¶¶25-38.4 Thus, there 

was no agreement that could be enforced or breached. Accordingly, we 

discern no error in the trial court denying Appellant’s motion to enforce a plea 

agreement as there was no plea agreement.

In his second issue, Appellant avers that the trial court erred when it 

denied Appellant’s post-sentence motion requesting a hearing on proposed 

mitigating sentencing factors that the trial court allegedly overlooked. 

Appellant’s Brief at 4. An allegation that the sentencing court failed to 

consider mitigating factors implicates the discretionary aspects of one’s 

sentence. Commonwealth v. McLaine, 150 A.3d 70, 77 (Pa. Super. 2016). 

However, we are constrained to point out that, although Appellant mentions 

sentencing factors,5 he has waived any challenge to the discretionary aspects 

of his sentence. Appellant has not included in his brief a Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f) 

statement, discussed the requirements necessary for appellate review of the 

discretionary aspects of a sentence, or developed any argument in this 

respect. See Commonwealth v. Moury, 992 A.2d 162, 170 (Pa. Super. 

2010) (discussing the requirements that must be satisfied in order to invoke 

this Court’s jurisdiction and to obtain review of a challenge to the discretionary 

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4 The only reference to sentencing was a handwritten addendum to paragraph 

30, which read: “Any cooperation to be reported to Judge at sentencing.” 

Guilty Plea Colloquy, 6/24/08, at ¶30.

5 Appellant’s Brief at 9.
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aspects of one’s sentence); see also Commonwealth v. Simmons, 846 

A.2d 142, 145 (Pa. Super. 2004) (finding issues concerning discretionary 

aspects of sentence waived where Appellant failed to develop any argument 

for the claims). Appellant challenges only the trial court’s failure to hold a 

hearing on his post-sentence motion. Appellant’s Brief at 9-10. After review, 

we conclude that no relief is due.

After a post-sentence motion is filed, the trial court determines whether 

a hearing on the motion is necessary. Pa.R.Crim.P. 720(B)(2)(b). The 

decision to hold a hearing on a post-sentence motion is within the discretion 

of the trial court. Commonwealth v. Gaffney, 702 A.2d 565, 566 (Pa.

Super. 1997); Commonwealth v. Fowler, 523 A.2d 784, 788 (Pa. Super. 

1987).

Appellant argues that he attached to his post-sentence motion four 

letters attesting to his good character. Appellant’s Brief at 10. However, 

Appellant asserts that because the trial court declined to hold a hearing, these 

letters were not considered, and it would have been “beneficial for the court 

to hear factors and input which was not received at the time of sentencing.” 

Id.

The record reveals that the trial court heard testimony concerning 

mitigating sentencing factors including Appellant’s age and cooperation with 

police. N.T., 11/19/18, at 6, 10. Additionally, in fashioning Appellant’s 

sentence, the trial court specifically considered Appellant’s prior criminal 
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record, the Sentencing Guidelines, and that Appellant was a fugitive for ten 

years. Id. at 21-31. The fact that Appellant is unhappy with his sentence 

does not permit this Court to second guess the trial court’s discretion 

concerning the denial of his post-sentence motion or allow this Court to disturb 

the sentence the trial court imposed. If Appellant wanted this Court to review 

the trial court’s consideration of mitigating factors as they relate to the 

duration of the sentence, Appellant should have challenged the discretionary 

aspects of his sentence. As noted, however, Appellant did not appeal the 

discretionary aspects of his sentence, and we will not review his claim in that 

context. After review, we conclude that Appellant has failed to establish that 

the trial court abused its discretion in declining to hold a hearing on his postsentence motion.

For the reasons set forth above, we conclude that Appellant is entitled 

to no relief. Accordingly, we affirm Appellant’s judgment of sentence.

Judgment of sentence affirmed.

 Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 9/9/2019