alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
A89A1693.

#### OVIEDO v. CONNECTICUT NATIONAL BANK.

(391 SE2d 417)

Beasley, Judge.

Oviedo appeals a final order of confirmation and approval of foreclosure sales of his real property in favor of The Connecticut National Bank.

The bank purchased Oviedo’s lots at foreclosure sale on October 4, 1988. Pursuant to requirements in the security deeds held by the bank prior to foreclosure, Oviedo was given timely written notice of the foreclosure sale and of the bank’s intention to claim attorney fees under OCGA § 13-1-11. Also prior to the sale, the bank ran the required advertisements.

On November 1, it presented its application for confirmation of the sales to a judge of the superior court of the county in which the land was located. On the same day, the court directed that notice be given of a hearing on December 13 on the application for confirmation. The bank’s counsel requested the sheriff of the county of Oviedo’s residence to serve the pleadings and order on Oviedo, which was done on December 6. By consent of the parties, the hearing was rescheduled for February 13, 1989, and notice of the new hearing date was served by mail on Oviedo’s counsel.

Oviedo’s contention is that OCGA § 44-14-161 (a) contains a thirty-day “statute of limitation” requiring that he be served with the application for confirmation within thirty days of the foreclosure sale and that the trial court erred in concluding that the statute did not contain such a condition.

The plain language of the statute does not impose this requirement for service of the report on the debtor within the thirty days. The thirty-day report to the judge is not intended to give notice to the debtor. See *Goodman v. Vinson,*142 Ga. App. 420 (236 SE2d 153) (1977). The notice requirement for the debtor is that he be given at least five days notice of the confirmation hearing. OCGA § 44-14-161 (c); *Goodman,*supra at 421; see *Parnell v. Etowah Bank,*144 Ga. App. 794, 795 (1) (242 SE2d 487) (1978). As in this case, this would include a copy of the report.

We recognize that the confirmation statute is in derogation of the common law, and must be strictly construed. *First Nat. Bank &c. Co. v. Kunes,*128 Ga. App. 565, 566 (1) (197 SE2d 446) (1973). We also recognize that it is “a debtor’s relief Act,” *Wall v. Fed. Land Bank of Columbia,*240 Ga. 236, 237 (240 SE2d 76) (1977), and that it is the debtor who seeks construction of the statute so as to favor him. However, the statutory language is plain and neither needs construction nor, if it needed construction, would it carry the meaning urged by appellant, which amounts to a foreign import. Finally, despite appellant’s suggestion, there is no indication of a legislative intent to incor*627porate within the reporting provision the time requirement of the Civil Practice Act, OCGA § 9-11-4 (c), for service on the debtor within five days from the day the report is presented to the judge.

Decided February 5, 1990

Rehearing denied February 23, 1990

*Glennville Haldi,*for appellant.

*Hansell & Post, Lowell H. Hughen,*for appellee.

*Judgment affirmed.*

*Carley, C. J., and McMurray, P. J., concur.*
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the Atlantic

and Maryland Reporters. Users are requested to notify the Clerk of the Court of

any formal errors so that corrections may be made before the bound volumes go

to press.



## District of Columbia

**Court of Appeals**

No. 1 9

- BG

- 368

IN RE CAROLYN M. CROWLEY

A M ember of the Bar of the 201 9 DDN 40

Distri ct of Columbia Court of Appeals

Bar Reg istration No. 444797

BEFORE: McLeese

, Associate Judge, and Washington and Nebeker , Senior

Judges.

O R D E R

(FILED

- July 25, 2019)

On consideration of the certified order of the Supreme Court of Florida

suspending respondent from the practice of law in the state of Florida for 91 days;

this court’s May 3, 2019

, order suspending respondent pending further action of the

court and directing h er to show cause why the functional

- equivalent reciprocal

discipline of a 91

- day suspension with a fitness requirement should not be imposed ;

the statement of Disciplinary Counsel regarding reciprocal discipline ; and it

appearing that respondent failed to file a response to the court’s show cause order

but did file her D.C. Bar R. XI § 14(g) a ffidavit on May 29, 2019; it is

ORDERED that Carolyn M. Crowley, also known as Carolyn M. Holt, is

hereby suspended from the practice of law in the District of Columbia for a period

of 91 days nunc pro tunc to May 29, 2019, with reinstatement contingent on a showing of fitness. See In re Sibley , 990 A.2d 483 (D.C. 2010), and In re Fuller

, 930 A.2d 194, 198 (D.C. 2007) (rebuttable presumption of identical reciprocal

discipline applies to all cases in which the respondent does not participate).

PER CURIAM
```

[Congressional Bills 106th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H. Con. Res. 446 Enrolled Bill (ENR)]

        H.Con.Res.446
                                     Agreed to December 15, 2000        

                       One Hundred Sixth Congress

                                 of the

                        United States of America

                          AT THE SECOND SESSION

           Begun and held at the City of Washington on Monday,
             the twenty-fourth day of January, two thousand

                          Concurrent Resolution

    Resolved by the House of Representatives (the Senate concurring), 
That when the House adjourns on the legislative day of Friday, December 
15, 2000, Saturday, December 16, 2000, or Sunday, December 17, 2000, on 
a motion offered pursuant to this concurrent resolution by its Majority 
Leader or his designee, it shall stand adjourned sine die, or until 
noon on the second day after Members are notified to reassemble 
pursuant to section 2 of this concurrent resolution; and that when the 
Senate adjourns on Friday, December 15, 2000, Saturday, December 16, 
2000, or Sunday, December 17, 2000, on a motion offered pursuant to 
this concurrent resolution by its Majority Leader or his designee, it 
shall stand adjourned sine die, or until noon on the second day after 
Members are notified to reassemble pursuant to section 2 of this 
concurrent resolution.
    Sec. 2. The Speaker of the House and the Majority Leader of the 
Senate, acting jointly after consultation with the Minority Leader of 
the House and the Minority Leader of the Senate, shall notify the 
Members of the House and Senate, respectively, to reassemble whenever, 
in their opinion, the public interest shall warrant it.
  Attest:

                                 Clerk of the House of Representatives.

  Attest:

                                               Secretary of the Senate.
```
Exhibit 32.1

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350, AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

The undersigned, David O'Neill, President, Chief Executive Officer and Chief Financial Officer of Global Electronic Recovery Corp., hereby certifies, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

(1)	the annual report on Form 10-KSB of Global Electronic Recovery Corp. for the year ended January 31, 2007 (the "Report") fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

(2)	the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of Global Electronic Recovery Corp.

Dated: June 1, 2007

/s/ David O'NeillDavid O'Neill
President, Chief Executive Officer (Principal Executive Officer) Chief Financial Officer
(Principal Financial Officer and Principal Accounting Officer)
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000
<CURRENCY> U.S. DOLLARS

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   9-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          JAN-30-2000
<PERIOD-START>                             FEB-01-1999
<PERIOD-END>                               OCT-31-1999
<EXCHANGE-RATE>                                      1
<CASH>                                          13,576
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                   74,498
<ALLOWANCES>                                   (2,617)
<INVENTORY>                                    611,212
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                               723,087
<PP&E>                                         298,101
<DEPRECIATION>                               (144,294)
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                               1,029,913
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                          274,841
<BONDS>                                         81,250
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                           278
<OTHER-SE>                                     140,215
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                 1,029,913
<SALES>                                        903,044
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               903,044
<CGS>                                          469,790
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                  820,544
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                              27,016
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                 55,484
<INCOME-TAX>                                    21,261
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                             34,223
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                        (741)
<NET-INCOME>                                    33,482
<EPS-BASIC>                                       1.20
<EPS-DILUTED>                                     1.17


</TABLE>
Court of Appeals, State of Michigan 

ORDER 

Gilbert Stanow v William Beaumont Hospital 

Docket No. 346641 I 347275 

LC No. 2018-167805 NH/ 2018-1658 19-NH 

Amy Ronayne Krause 

Presiding Judge 

Mark J. Cavanagh 

Douglas B. Shapiro 

Judges 

The Court orders that the motion for reconsideration is GRANTED, and this Court's 

opinion issued December 17, 2019 is hereby VACATED. A new opinion is attached to this order. 

A true copy entered and certified by Jerome W. Zimmer Jr., Chief Clerk, on 

MAR 1 7 2020 

Date 

~ ,{,;f- 9-. 

Chielerk
**Exhibit 31.1: Sarbanes-Oxley Certification**Re:  Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage Securities Corp. Home Equity Asset Trust 2005-5 Home Equity Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2005-5 I, Bruce Kaiserman, certify that: 1. I have reviewed this annual report on Form 10-K, and all reports on Form 8-K containing distribution and servicing reports filed in respect of periods included in the year covered by this annual report, of Home Equity Asset Trust 2005-5 (the "Trust"); 2. Based on my knowledge, the information in these reports, taken as a whole, does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading as of the last day of the period covered by this annual report; 3. Based on my knowledge, the distribution information required to be prepared by the Trustee based upon the servicing information required to be provided by the Servicers under the Pooling and Servicing Agreement is included in these reports; 4. Based on my knowledge and upon the annual compliance statements included in the report and required to be delivered to the Trustee in accordance with the terms of the Pooling and Servicing Agreement and based upon the review required under the Pooling and Servicing Agreement, and except as disclosed in the report, the Servicers have fulfilled their obligations under the Pooling and Servicing Agreement; and 5. The reports disclose all significant deficiencies relating to the Servicers' compliance with the minimum servicing standards based, in each case, upon the report provided by an independent public accountant, after conducting a review in compliance with the Uniform Single Attestation Program for Mortgage Bankers or similar standard as set forth in the Pooling and Servicing Agreement that is included in these reports. In giving the certifications above, I have reasonably relied on the information provided to me by the following unaffiliated parties: the Servicers (other than Select Portfolio Servicing, Inc.) and the Trustee. Capitalized terms used but not defined herein have the meanings ascribed to them in the Pooling and Servicing Agreement, dated as of July 1, 2005 (the "Pooling and Servicing Agreement"), among Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage Securities Corp., as depositor (the "Depositor"), DLJ Mortgage Capital, Inc., as seller (in such capacity, the "Seller"), Select Portfolio Servicing, Inc. ("SPS"), as a servicer (in such capacity, a "Servicer"), Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC  ("Ocwen"), as a servicer (in such capacity, a "Servicer"), Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. ("WFBNA"), as master servicer (in such capacity, the "Master Servicer") and as a servicer (in such capacity, a "Servicer" and together with Ocwen and SPS, the "Servicers"), The Murrayhill Company, as credit risk manager (in such capacity, the "Credit Risk Manager") and U.S. Bank National Association as trustee (in such capacity, the "Trustee"). /s/ Bruce Kaiserman     Bruce Kaiserman Vice President March 30, 2006
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM THE
FINANCIAL STATEMENTS OF AMERICA SERVICE GROUP INC FOR THE THREE MONTHS ENDED
MARCH 31, 1999 AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH FINANCIAL
STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1999
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-1999
<PERIOD-END>                               MAR-31-1999
<CASH>                                       1,477,000
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                               55,138,000
<ALLOWANCES>                                  (237,000)
<INVENTORY>                                    921,000
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                            63,390,000
<PP&E>                                       6,683,000
<DEPRECIATION>                              (3,419,000)
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                             114,755,000
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                       57,362,000
<BONDS>                                     37,000,000
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                        6,842,000
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                        36,000
<OTHER-SE>                                  12,038,000
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>               114,755,000
<SALES>                                     58,281,000
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                            58,281,000
<CGS>                                       52,478,000
<TOTAL-COSTS>                               56,165,000
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                           1,024,000
<INCOME-PRETAX>                              1,092,000
<INCOME-TAX>                                   612,000
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                            480,000
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                   480,000
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                    $0.12
<EPS-DILUTED>                                    $0.12
        

</TABLE>
No. 51796.

#### Shreveport Coca Cola Bottling Co. et al. *v.*United States,

petitions 6574-R, etc. (Laredo).

Opinion by

Lawrence, J.

The uncontradieted evidence established that the merchandise was entered and appraised at the invoice price of 55 cents per case; that prior to making such entry, petitioners consulted with the appraiser who approved such price as representing the true value of the merchandise; and that it was not until an appeal was taken by the collector and a reappraisement made by the court that the merchandise was finally appraised at 58 cents per case. From a careful examination of the record and a consideration of all the facts, the court was satisfied as to the good faith of the petitioners in the premises, and held that the entry of the merchandise at less than the value returned upon final appraisement was without any intention to defraud the revenue of the United States or to conceal or misrepresent the facts of the case or to deceive the appraiser as to the value of the merchandise. The petitions were therefore granted.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM (A)
BALANCE SHEET AND STATEMENT OF OPERATIONS
</LEGEND>
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000
<CURRENCY> U.S. DOLLARS
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          JUN-28-1997
<PERIOD-START>                             JUN-29-1996
<PERIOD-END>                               SEP-28-1996
<EXCHANGE-RATE>                                      1
<CASH>                                              10
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                   29,316
<ALLOWANCES>                                     2,527
<INVENTORY>                                     39,382
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                72,474
<PP&E>                                          15,516
<DEPRECIATION>                                   8,893
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                  96,751
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                           61,675
<BONDS>                                            889
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                           130
<OTHER-SE>                                      34,057
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                    96,751
<SALES>                                         34,862
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                34,862
<CGS>                                           23,380
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                   25,173
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                 940
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                  1,737
<INCOME-TAX>                                       608
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                                  0
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                     1,129
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                      .09
<EPS-DILUTED>                                      .09
        

</TABLE>
Exhibit 31       Rule 13a-14(d) Certification



                                            CERTIFICATION

I, Thomas G. Lehmann, President of Washington Mutual Mortgage Securities Corp.,
certify that:

1. I have reviewed this annual report on Form 10-K, and all reports on Form 8-K
containing distribution or servicing reports filed in respect of periods
included in the year covered by this
annual report, of Washington Mutual Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, WMALT
Series 2005-6;

2. Based on my knowledge, the information in these reports, taken as a whole,
does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a
material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the
circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading as of the
last day of the period covered by this annual report;

3. Based on my knowledge, the distribution or servicing information required to
be provided to the trustee by the servicer under the pooling and servicing, or
similar, agreement, for inclusion in these reports is included in these reports;

4. Based on my knowledge and upon the annual  compliance  statement  included in
the report and required to be delivered  to the trustee in  accordance  with the
terms of the  pooling  and  servicing,  or  similar,  agreement,  and  except as
disclosed in the reports,  the servicer has fulfilled its obligations  under the
servicing agreement; and

5. The reports disclose all significant deficiencies relating to the servicer's
compliance with the minimum servicing standards based upon the report provided
by an independent public accountant, after conducting a review in compliance
with the Uniform Single Attestation Program for Mortgage Bankers or similar
procedure, as set forth in the pooling and servicing, or similar, agreement,
that is included in these reports.

In giving the certifications above, I have reasonably relied on information
provided to me by the following unaffiliated third parties acting as servicers
and sub-servicers:




Irwin Mortgage Corporation, RBC Mortgage Company


Dated: March 30, 2006


                                     /s/ Thomas G. Lehmann
                                     ----------------------------------------
                                     Thomas G. Lehmann
                                     President
* Pursuant to 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5, the court has determined

that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5.4. IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 98-31148 Summary Calendar

JESSERENE DINGER, Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus KENNETH S. APFEL, COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, Defendant-Appellee.

-------------------- Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Louisiana

USDC No. 97-CV-1858

-------------------- September 16, 1999 Before SMITH, BARKSDALE, and BENAVIDES, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM: * Jesserene Dinger appeals from the judgment affirming the denial of her applications for Social Security disability and supplemental security income (SSI) benefits. Dinger argues that the Commissioner’s decision was not supported by substantial evidence. Dinger did not raise this contention before the Appeals Council; therefore, she did not exhaust administrative remedies as to this issue. We find no reason to waive the exhaustion requirement in Dinger’s case. Consequently, we lackNo. 98-31148 -2- jurisdiction over Dinger’s appeal. Paul v. Shalala , 29 F.3d 208, 210 (5th Cir. 1994); see Giannakos v. M/V BRAVO TRADER , 762 F.2d 1295, 1297 (5th Cir. 1985) (court must observe lack of subject-matter jurisdiction sua sponte).
APPEAL DISMISSED.