F I L E D

United States Court of Appeals

Tenth Circuit

JUL 18 1997

PATRICK FISHER

Clerk

PUBLISH

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

TENTH CIRCUIT

WILFRED KEYES, individually and

on behalf of CHRISTI KEYES, a

minor; CHRISTINE A. COLLEY,

individually and on behalf of KRIS M.

COLLEY, and MARK A. WILLIAMS,

minors; IRMA J. JENNINGS,

individually and on behalf of

RHONDA O. JENNINGS, a minor;

ROBERTA R. WADE, individually

and on behalf of GREGORY L.

WADE, a minor; EDWARD J.

STARKS, JR., individually and on

behalf of DENISE MICHELLE

STARKS, a minor; JOSEPHINE

PEREZ, individually and on behalf of

CARLOS A. PEREZ, SHIELA R.

PEREZ and TERRY J. PEREZ,

minors; MAXINE N. BECKER,

individually and on behalf of DINAH

L. BECKER, a minor; EUGENE R.

WEINER, individually and on behalf

of SARAH S. WEINER, a minor,

Plaintiffs-Appellants, 

No. 95-1487
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 and

CONGRESS OF HISPANIC

EDUCATORS, an unincorporated

association; MONTBELLO

CITIZENS’ COMMITTEE, INC.;

ARTURO ESCOBEDO and JOANNE

ESCOBEDO, individually and on

behalf of LINDA ESCOBEDO and

MARK ESCOBEDO, minors; EDDIE

R. CORDOVA, individually and on

behalf of RENEE CORDOVA, and

BARBARA CORDOVA, minors; 

ROBERT PENA, individually and on

behalf of THERESA K. PENA and

CRAIG R. PENA, minors; ROBERT

L. HERNANDEZ and MARGARET

M. HERNANDEZ, individually and on

behalf of RANDY R. HERNANDEZ;

ROGER L. HERNANDEZ, RUSSELL

C. HERNANDEZ, RACHELLE J.

HERNANDEZ, minors; FRANK

MADRID, individually and on behalf

of JEANNE S. MADRID, a minor;

RONALD E. MONTOYA and NAOMI

R. MONTOYA, individually and on

behalf of RONALD C. MONTOYA, a

minor; JOHN E. DOMINGUEZ and

ESTHER E. DOMINGUEZ,

 
-3-

individually and on behalf of JOHN E.

DOMINGUEZ, MARK E.

DOMINGUEZ and MICHAEL J.

DOMINGUEZ, minors; JOHN H.

FLORES and ANNA, individually and

on behalf of THERESA FLORES,

JONI A. FLORES and LUIS E.

FLORES, minors; MOORE SCHOOL

COMMUNITY ASSOCIATION, and

MOORE SCHOOL LAY ADVISORY

COMMITTEE; CITIZENS

ASSOCIATION FOR

NEIGHBORHOOD SCHOOLS, an

unincorporated association, and on

behalf of all others similarly situated,

Plaintiffs-Intervenors,

v.

SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 1, Denver,

Colorado; THE BOARD OF

EDUCATION, SCHOOL DISTRICT 

NUMBER ONE, DENVER,

COLORADO; WILLIAM C. BERGE, 

individually and as President, Board of

Education, School District Number

One, Denver, Colorado; STEPHEN J.

KNIGHT, JR., individually and as

Vice President, Board of Education,

School District Number One, Denver,

Colorado; JAMES C. PERRILL;

FRANK K. SOUTHWORTH; JOHN

H. AMESSE; JAMES D. VOORHEES,

JR. and RACHEL B. NOEL,
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individually and as members, Board

Education, School District Number

One, Denver, Colorado; ROBERT D.

GILBERTS, individually and as

Superintendent of Schools, School

District Number One, Denver,

Colorado,

Defendants-Appellees,

MR. AND MRS. DOUGLAS

BARNETT, individually and on behalf

of JADE BARNETT, a minor; MR.

AND MRS. JACK PIERCE,

individually and on behalf of

REBECCA PIERCE and CYNTHIA

PIERCE, minors; JANE WALDEN,

individually and on behalf of JAMES

CRAIG WALDEN, a minor; MR. AND

MRS. WILLIAM B. BRICE,

individually and on behalf of KRISTIE

BRICE, a minor; MR. AND MRS.

CARL ANDERSON, individually and

on behalf of GREGORY ANDERSON,

CINDY ANDERSON, JEFFERY

ANDERSON and TAMMY

ANDERSON, minors; MR. AND

MRS. CHARLES SIMPSON,

individually and on behalf of

DOUGLAS SIMPSON, a minor; MR.

AND MRS. PATRICK McCARTHY,

individually and on behalf of

CASSANDRA McCARTHY, a minor;

RICHARD KLEIN, individually and

on behalf of JANET KLEIN, a minor;

MR. AND MRS. FRANK RUPERT, 
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individually and on behalf of

MICHAEL RUPERT and SCOTT

RUPERT, minors; STATE OF

COLORADO, ex rel. Gale Norton,

Defendants-Intervenors,

________________________________

SUSAN TARRANT, WADE POTTER,

DEBORAH POTTER, DANIEL J.

PATCH, MARILYN Y. PATCH,

CHRIS ANDRES, RONALD GRIEGO,

DORA GRIEGO and RANDY

FRENCH,

Intervenors.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Colorado

(D.C. No. 69-M-1499)

Gordon G. Greiner, Holland & Hart, Denver, CO, (Dennis D. Parker, NAACP

Legal Defense and Education Fund, Inc., New York, NY, on the briefs), for

Plaintiffs-Appellants.

Michael H. Jackson, Semple & Jackson, Denver, CO (Phil C. Neal, Neal, Gerber

& Eisenberg, Chicago, IL, on the briefs), for Defendants-Appellees.

Timothy M. Tymkovich, Solicitor General, State of Colorado, Denver, CO (Gale

A. Norton, Attorney General of Colorado, Denver, CO, and William E. Thro,

Assistant Attorney General of Colorado, Denver, CO, on the briefs), for

Defendant-Intervenor-Appellee State of Colorado.

Before ANDERSON, HENRY, and MURPHY, Circuit Judges.
1The district court removed the claims of the Congress of Hispanic

Educators to a separate and independent civil action under the Equal Educational

Opportunities Act of 1974. See Keyes v. Congress of Hispanic Educators, 902 F.

Supp. 1274, 1275 (D. Colo. 1995).

MURPHY, Circuit Judge.

Since 1969 the United States District Court for the District of Colorado has

maintained jurisdiction over School District No. 1, Denver, Colorado (“the School

District”), for the purpose of eliminating de jure segregation in the Denver

schools. This appeal arises from the district court’s 1995 decision to terminate its

jurisdiction over the School District, finding the School District had eliminated

the vestiges of de jure discrimination to the extent practicable. Appellants

Wilfred Keyes and others1

 (”Appellants”) do not appeal the termination of

jurisdiction, but rather appeal the district court’s decision insofar as it opined

upon the constitutionality of Article IX, Section 8 of the Colorado Constitution

(“the Busing Clause”) and two Colorado statutory provisions. See Colo. Rev.

Stat. §§ 22-36-101(3), 22-30.5-104(3). Those issues, however, are not justiciable. 

As a consequence, there is no case or controversy as required by Article III,

Section 2 of the United States Constitution, and this appeal is dismissed for lack

of jurisdiction.
2

See Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 303 F. Supp. 279 (D. Colo. 1969) (“Keyes

I”), modified, 303 F. Supp. 289 (D. Colo. 1969) (“Keyes II”), order reinstated,

396 U.S. 1215 (1969) (Brennan, J., in chambers) (“Keyes III”); Keyes v. School

Dist. No. 1, 313 F. Supp. 61 (D. Colo. 1970) (“Keyes IV”); supplemented, Keyes

v. School Dist. No. 1, 313 F. Supp. 90 (D. Colo. 1970) (“Keyes V”), aff’d in part

and rev’d in part, 445 F.2d 990 (10th Cir. 1971) (“Keyes VI”), cert. granted, 404

U.S. 1036 (1972) and cert. denied sub. nom. School Dist. No. 1 v. Keyes, 413 U.S.

921 (1973), modified and remanded, 413 U.S. 189 (1973) (“Keyes VII”), reh’g

denied, 414 U.S. 883 (1973), on remand, 368 F. Supp. 207 (D. Colo. 1973)

(“Keyes VIII”) and 380 F. Supp. 673 (D. Colo. 1974) (“Keyes IX”), aff’d in part

and rev’d in part, 521 F.2d 465 (10th Cir. 1975) (“Keyes X”), cert. denied, 423

U.S. 1066 (1976); Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 474 F. Supp. 1265 (D. Colo. 1979)

(“Keyes XI”); Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 540 F. Supp. 399 (D. Colo. 1982)

(“Keyes XII”); Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 576 F. Supp. 1503 (D. Colo. 1983)

(“Keyes XIII”); Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 609 F. Supp. 1491 (D. Colo. 1985)

(“Keyes XIV”); Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, No. C-1499 (D. Colo. Oct. 29, 1985)

(“Keyes XV”) (Order for Further Proceedings); Keyes v. School Dist No. 1, 653 F.

Supp. 1536 (D. Colo. 1987) (“Keyes XVI”); Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 670 F.

Supp. 1513 (D. Colo. 1987) (“Keyes XVII”), aff’d, 895 F.2d 659 (10th Cir. 1990)

(“Keyes XVIII”), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1082 (1991); Keyes v. Congress of

Hispanic Educators, 902 F. Supp. 1274 (D. Colo. 1995) (“Keyes XIX”). 

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I. BACKGROUND

This case originated in June of 1969, when children in the Denver public

schools challenged the School District’s deliberate policy of racial segregation. 

See Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 303 F. Supp. 279 (D. Colo. 1969). Since that

challenge, this case has evolved through several stages of litigation during which

this and other courts have rendered numerous opinions.2 A brief summary of the

history of the case provides necessary context.

From 1960 through 1969, the School District established and maintained de

jure segregation in the Denver public schools. Keyes XIX, 902 F. Supp. 1274,
3The Supreme Court stated: “[W]here plaintiffs prove that the school

authorities have carried out a systematic program of segregation affecting a

substantial portion of the students, schools, teachers, and facilities within the

school system, it is only common sense to conclude that there exists a predicate

for a finding of the existence of a dual system.” Keyes VII, 413 U.S. at 201. On

remand, the district court conducted a second trial and concluded: “The Supreme

Court’s viewpoint based on the record before it is that the Denver school system

is a dual system. There can be no doubt as to its view . . . .” Keyes VIII, 368 F.

Supp. at 210.

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1276 (D. Colo. 1995). In 1969 and 1970, the district court found that the School

District had engaged in seven specific de jure segregative acts by attempting to

maintain predominantly white schools in the Park Hill neighborhood. See Keyes

XIX, 902 F. Supp. 1274, 1278 (D. Colo. 1995) (citing Keyes I, 303 F. Supp. 279,

282-85 (D. Colo. 1969); Keyes II, 303 F. Supp. 289, 295 (D. Colo. 1969); Keyes

IV, 313 F. Supp. 61 (D. Colo., 1970)). As a consequence, it ordered a

desegregation plan for the Park Hill area schools in 1970. Keyes V, 313 F. Supp.

90, 96-99 (10th Cir. 1970).

On appeal, the United States Supreme Court broadened the scope of the

district court’s jurisdiction. Instead of limiting the desegregation plan to the Park

Hill area, the Supreme Court determined that the entire Denver school system was

a dual system3 requiring desegregation. Keyes VII, 413 U.S. 189, 201-02 (1973). 

Thus, in 1974, the district court ordered a city-wide desegregation plan. See

Keyes XIX, 902 F. Supp. at 1279. This court, however, found that plan

inadequate. Keyes X, 521 F.2d 465, 475-79 (10th Cir. 1975). Finally in 1976, the
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parties agreed to a remedial plan which was approved and implemented. See

Keyes XIX, 902 F. Supp. at 1279. The remedial plan required, among other

things, pairing elementary schools, changing attendance zones, establishing

percentage ratios of Anglo to minority students, and transporting students by bus

to implement the plan. Id. 

Following the implementation of the remedial plan, the School District

passed Resolution 2233 to direct continued desegregation efforts. In 1984, the

School District moved to terminate the court’s jurisdiction. Keyes XIV, 609 F.

Supp. 1491, 1518-20 (D. Colo. 1985). The district court denied the motion,

finding the School District had not yet achieved unitary status and that Resolution

2233 was too vague. Id. 

In an effort to remedy the vagueness of Resolution 2233, the School

District passed Resolution 2314 in 1987. Resolution 2314 called for continuing

teacher assignment and student transfer policies that enhanced integration and

required annual reports of progress toward achieving a unitary school district. 

The School District again sought to terminate jurisdiction and the court again

refused. Instead, the court authorized existing plans to remedy the vestiges of

past discrimination and ordered a meeting with counsel to issue a permanent

injunction against the School District. Keyes XVI, 653 F. Supp. 1536, 1539-40,

42 (D. Colo. 1987). Still later that same year, the court entered an Interim
4Appellants argued the district court should not completely terminate its

jurisdiction. Although Appellants agreed that “the indicia of de jure segregation

ha[d] been removed from student assignments, faculty, staff, transportation, extra

curricular activities and facilities,” they requested the court retain residual control

over the School District on the ground that vestiges of the dual system remained

in the form of racial disparity in discipline, drop-out rates, and gifted and talented

programs.

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Decree, superseding all prior remedial actions. Keyes XVII, 670 F. Supp. at 1516-

17. That decree diminished the court’s jurisdiction by freeing the School District

to make changes in its existing plans to accommodate new situations. Id.

On appeal, this court affirmed the denials of the motions to terminate

jurisdiction, but invalidated some portions of the Interim Decree which merely

required the School District to obey the law. See Keyes XIX, 902 F. Supp. at

1281; Keyes XVIII, 895 F.2d 659, 666-69 (10th Cir. 1990). The School District

thus remained under the district court’s jurisdiction to remedy past discrimination,

but could develop its own plans to do so. See Keyes XIX, 902 F. Supp. at 1281.

In 1992 the School District moved again to terminate the district court’s

jurisdiction. See id. at 1275. This time Appellants requested the court to rule on

the constitutionality of Colorado’s Busing Clause before it decided whether to

terminate jurisdiction.4 The Busing Clause, Article IX, Section 8 of the Colorado

Constitution, provides in pertinent part that no school pupil shall “be assigned or

transported to any public educational institution for the purpose of achieving

racial balance.” Appellants asserted that after termination of the court’s
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jurisdiction, the Busing Clause would impede the School District’s ability to

implement Resolutions 2233 and 2314 and other policies adopted to change pupil

assignments. Keyes XIX, 902 F. Supp. at 1275. 

The School District agreed with that claim and stipulated that the School

District’s plans would conflict with the Busing Clause. Id. at 1275, 1283.

Appellants also requested a determination of the constitutionality of certain

sections of two Colorado statutory provisions: The Colorado Public Schools of

Choice Act, Colo. Rev. Stat. § 22-36-101(3)(d), and the Colorado Charter Schools

Act, Colo. Rev. Stat. § 22-30.5-104(3). The Attorney General of the State of

Colorado was allowed to intervene and defend the validity of the Busing Clause. 

Keyes XIX, 902 F. Supp at 1275.

In a comprehensive opinion based on evidence received during hearings on

August 23-25, 1994, the district court granted the School District’s motion to

terminate jurisdiction, stating the School District had complied with the

desegregation decrees and that past de jure segregation had been eliminated to the

extent practicable. Id. at 1275, 1285, 1308-09. Additionally, the district court

found that the School District’s existing policies did not conflict with the Busing

Clause. Id. at 1285. In dicta, the court passed upon the issue of the

constitutionality of the Busing Clause itself, indicating that it is consistent with

the 14th Amendment. Id. The district court stated that its consideration of the
5After the district court’s decision was issued in 1995, Appellants made a

Motion for Clarification pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(b). Specifically,

Appellants requested clarification regarding whether the district court had

determined the School District could or could not maintain its existing plans in

light of the Busing Clause. In denying the motion, the district court stated that its

opinion “resolved the only question properly presented on the record before it

regarding the validity of the Busing Clause under the United States Constitution. 

To extend the findings and conclusions in the manner suggested would violate the

prohibition against rendering advisory opinions.”

6The district court was correct to refuse to address the constitutionality of

the Public Schools of Choice Act and the Charter Schools Act, and we likewise

do not address them in this opinion. For the same reason this court does not have

jurisdiction to determine the constitutionality of the Busing Clause, we cannot

pass upon the constitutionality of the Public Schools of Choice Act or the Charter

Schools Act. As is further elucidated below, the only justiciable issue before the

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Busing Clause issue was “to guide the District upon termination of . . .

jurisdiction.” Id. at 1275. The district court did not decide whether the Colorado

Schools of Choice Act and the Charter Schools Act are valid under the Fourteenth

Amendment to the United States Constitution, stating only: “Comment on each

[of the state and federal statutory requirements which the School District must

now follow] is inappropriate, and this court may not give advisory opinions.” Id.

at 1285.

It is from the district court’s decision that Appellants now appeal. 

Appellants do not, however, appeal the termination of jurisdiction. They instead

argue that the district court’s opinion was ambiguous5 and, to the extent that the

issue was actually decided, appeal any determination that the Busing Clause, the

Public Schools of Choice Act, and the Charter Schools Act are constitutional.6
district court was whether or not to terminate jurisdiction. Any additional

discussion of the constitutionality of either the Busing Clause or Colorado

statutes is merely advisory “to guide the district upon termination of . . .

jurisdiction.” Keyes XIX at 1275. Such “guidance” is dicta.

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II. ANALYSIS

This appeal presents serious issues concerning the court’s jurisdiction. 

Under Article III, Section 2 of the United States Constitution, federal courts are

courts of limited jurisdiction. Superimposed upon the specified subject matter of

federal court jurisdiction is the general limitation of that jurisdiction to cases or

controversies. See U.S. Const. art. III, § 2; United States National Bank of

Oregon v. Independent Insur. Agents of America, 508 U.S. 439, 446 (1993). The

constitutional case or controversy requirement for federal court jurisdiction in

turn includes the necessity of justiciability, the very issue before the court in this

appeal. See Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 95 (1968).

The Memorandum Opinion and Order of the district court elaborately

provides the context for consideration of this court’s jurisdiction under Article III

and the referenced restrictions on that jurisdiction. Both the format and content

of the district court’s opinion is instructive. The format includes three sections:

“History;” “The Future;” and “Findings of Fact,” analyzing the status of the

School District as of the August, 1994 hearing. Keyes XIX, 902 F. Supp. at 1276,

1282, 1286. While there is necessary overlap in the various sections of the
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district court’s opinion, it essentially divides this case and the desegregation of

the School District into the past, the present, and the future. Those time frames

are critical in this court’s consideration of jurisdiction.

The district court was charged with the obligation to determine whether the

School District had complied in good faith with the court’s various desegregation

decrees, had eliminated to the extent practicable the vestiges and effects of its

past discriminatory acts, and had thereby altered the Denver schools from a

segregated dual system to unitary status. See Board of Educ. v. Dowell, 498 U.S.

237, 245-50 (1991). As a consequence, it was necessary to analyze the present in

light of the past. The district court resolved the issues in favor of the School

District. The district court further held that the pupil assignment plan in place at

the time of the hearing did not violate the Busing Clause. Keyes XIX, 902 F. Supp

at 1285. The court held that the School District’s motivation in implementing the

plan was the eradication of segregation vestiges, rather than the achievement of

racial balance, which would be prohibited by the Busing Clause. Id.

Beyond addressing the past and present, the district court considered the

Busing Clause in the future. Having resolved that the School District’s pupil

assignment plan did not conflict with the Colorado Busing Clause, the court

nevertheless unnecessarily opined that the clause was consistent with the
7The district court stated: “The Busing Clause is preceded by a prohibition

on the use of race or color in making any distinction or classification of pupils. 

That is entirely consistent with the 14th Amendment.” Keyes XIX, 902 F. Supp. at

1285.

8

In their Opening Brief, Appellants state: “The district court, over the

limited objections of the plaintiffs and plaintiffs-intervenors, granted the School

District’s Motion to Terminate Jurisdiction and issued a final Judgment

dismissing the case. No parties are appealing from that determination.” 

Appellant Br. at 6 (citation omitted).

9Rather than specifically appealing the latter determination, Appellants

argue that it is unclear whether the district court found there was a conflict

between the School District’s policies and the Busing Clause and ask this court to

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Fourteenth Amendment. Id.7 The court also opined that the Busing Clause and

related education statutes will provide challenges to the School District and will

be fodder for future litigation. Id. at 1283. The district court, however, chose not

to comment further on the effect or applicability of federal or state statutes,

premising its reticence on the prohibition of advisory opinions. Id. at 1285.

A. RIPENESS

Adhering to the district court’s past, present and future format, we address

Appellants’ claims. Specifically, Appellants only challenge the district court’s

dicta concerning the future. Appellants do not challenge any of the court’s

rulings with respect to the present. They neither challenge the district court’s

decision to terminate jurisdiction,8 nor do they appear to challenge the district

court’s statement that the School District’s policies in effect at the time of the

August, 1995 hearing did not conflict with the Busing Clause.9 Appellants’ sole
“resolve the ambiguity.” Appellant Reply Br. at 12. We have difficulty

understanding the thrust of this argument, in light of the district court’s

unequivocal statement: “The pupil assignment plan in effect at the time of the

August, 1994 hearing does not violate the Busing Clause because it was not

adopted for the purpose of achieving racial balance.” Keyes XIX, 902 F. Supp. at

1285.

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request is that this court resolve whether the Busing Clause is constitutional, an

issue for the future. 

The case or controversy requirement of Article III admonishes federal

courts to avoid “premature adjudication” and to abstain from “entangling

themselves in abstract disagreements.” Abbott Lab. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136,

148 (1967). “[T]he doctrine of ripeness is intended to forestall judicial

determinations of disputes until the controversy is presented in clean-cut and

concrete form.” Trierweiler v. Croxton & Trench Holding Corp., 90 F.3d 1523,

1545 (10th Cir. 1996) (quoting New Mexicans for Bill Richardson v. Gonzales, 64

F.3d 1495, 1499 (10th Cir. 1995) (citations and quotations omitted)).

Ripeness is a question of law, reviewed de novo. See New Mexicans for

Bill Richardson v. Gonzalez, 64 F.3d 1495, 1499 (10th Cir. 1995) (citing Powder

River Basin Resource Council v. Babbitt, 54 F.3d 1477, 1483 (10th Cir. 1995)). 

As a jurisdictional prerequisite, ripeness may be examined by this court sua

sponte. See Metropolitan Wash. Airports Auth. v. Citizens for the Abatement of

Aircraft Noise, Inc., 501 U.S. 252, 265 n.13 (1991). The resolution of ripeness
10The School District sought “to remove [the Busing Clause] as a possible

obstacle to terminating jurisdiction over the District and to clarify what the

District’s duties would be once jurisdiction was terminated.” The School District

acknowledged in its brief that it is now satisfied that by terminating jurisdiction

and stating that there was no conflict between any extant policies and the Busing

Clause, the district court’s opinion resolved both matters.

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“requir[es] us to evaluate both the fitness of the issues for judicial decision and

the hardship to the parties of withholding court consideration.” Abbott, 387 U.S.

at 149. This court must therefore apply the ripeness factors of fitness and

hardship to the sole issue appealed, the constitutionality of the Busing Clause.

Appellants and the School District requested that the district court resolve

the constitutionality of the Busing Clause in order to guide the School District for

the future after the termination of jurisdiction.10 The parties essentially stipulated

to the existence of a conflict between the School District’s policies and the

Busing Clause in order to receive a ruling on the constitutionality of the clause. 

The parties, however, cannot create a case or controversy simply by agreement. 

See Wilson v. Glenwood Intermountain Properties, Inc., 98 F.3d 590, 593 (10th

Cir. 1996) (finding “parties cannot confer subject matter jurisdiction on the courts

by agreement”).

Appellants did not challenge an extant School District policy, nor did they

claim the Busing Clause caused the School District to refrain from adopting a

specific policy. Rather, they requested the district court to render an opinion in a
11During oral arguments, Timothy M. Tymkovich, Solicitor General for the

State of Colorado, acknowledged that the decision to terminate jurisdiction could

have been made without a discussion of the constitutionality of the Busing

Clause:

The Court: Could the district court in your view have

terminated jurisdiction without passing on the constitutional

questions?

Mr. Tymkovich: Yes. In fact we argued--that was our lead

argument below to Judge Matsch. We thought that a future problem

of the Busing Clause on Denver School District’s post-Keyes conduct

was a case for another day, so we asked Judge Matsch not to rule on

the constitutionality. We said it was irrelevant to the finding of

unitary status . . . . 

. . . . 

Mr. Tymkovich: I think the court made that clear in his

response on the motion to clarify because he said that for him to

comment on the post-decree conduct of the school district would be

advisory--and by that I mean dicta.

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vacuum. Any statement by the district court in response, however, was

necessarily dicta.11

 

Constitutional analysis requires the application of the challenged provision

in a case or controversy. Appellants’ failure to appeal rulings relevant to the

present and failure to reference a conflict between the Busing Clause and an

actual or proposed School District policy deprives the analysis of a case or

controversy within which to test the clause’s constitutionality. See Wilson, 98

F.3d at 594 (because plaintiffs did not appeal district court’s denial of claims of

religious discrimination in housing, a case or controversy surrounding gender 
12The following colloquy between this court and Mr. Tymkovich occurred

at oral argument:

The Court: Are you then saying on behalf of the State of

Colorado that Colorado does not believe that the present programs in

effect which involve busing in the Denver School District constitute

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discrimination claims was lacking). As a consequence, the issue is not fit for a

judicial resolution and lacks ripeness. See Abbott, 387 U.S. at 149. 

 Appellants argue that the Busing Clause prevents or has prevented the

School District and individual schools from instituting any potential voluntary

integration plans based on race. They argue that this exemplifies a violation of

the Equal Protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by interdicting benefits,

such as integration plans, to citizens when those benefits are based solely on race. 

Appellants, however, make no effort to establish that any particular school desires

to implement voluntary integration plans, let alone that any school has been

deterred by the Busing Clause from implementing such a plan. This court cannot

speculate whether any school will propose an integration plan, what the plan

might be, and thus whether such a plan is prohibited by Colorado’s Busing

Clause. Appellants have failed to present this court with any specific integration

proposal to juxtapose with the Busing Clause. Moreover, the State of Colorado

has expressly and unequivocally conceded that it has no plans to challenge the

School District’s existing policies, thus confirming the absence of a case or

controversy.12
busing for the purpose of achieving racial balance?

Mr. Tymkovich: Yes, your Honor. I want to be very clear

about that because I think what we’re talking about is a potential

issue for another day as to whether the school district has

impermissibly intruded on the commands of the Busing Clause. . . . 

We don’t believe that the school district today is violating those

provisions of law. . . .

. . . .

. . . The Court: My question now is, under the practices and

policies now in effect, the State of Colorado, are they committing

that they will not challenge those under the state constitutional

provision prohibiting busing for the purpose of achieving racial

balance?

Mr. Tymkovich: As we understand those policies today, your

Honor, the answer is “no.” 

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This court may not speculate about future conflicts between the Busing

Clause and the School District’s policies, but rather must focus its analysis on any

controversy as it exists today. See Sierra Club v. Yuetter, 911 F.2d 1405, 1416

(10th Cir. 1990) (holding court must avoid “decision where the harm [is]

contingent upon uncertain or speculative future administrative action”). Because

Appellants cannot demonstrate a present controversy, we lack jurisdiction to hear

this appeal. 

B. STANDING

For many of the same reasons this case is not ripe for review, Appellants do

not have standing to appeal. Standing is a threshold, jurisdictional issue. Doyle

v. Oklahoma Bar Ass’n, 998 F.2d 1559, 1566 (10th Cir. 1993). “[A] plaintiff

must maintain standing at all times throughout the litigation for a court to retain
13Although not reflected in the record, the School District has begun

dismantling aspects of its prior plans which involved race-based pupil assignment

or transportation. Appellants suggest that the only reason the School District has

begun dismantling its existing policies is because of a perceived conflict with the

Busing Clause. They offer no support for this reasoning, and Michael H. Jackson,

counsel for the School District, expressly denied at oral argument any nexus

between the Busing Clause and the dismantling of any plan or program:

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jurisdiction.” Powder River, 54 F.3d at 1485 (finding that when plaintiff no

longer has injury, Article III requirements of case or controversy are no longer

met).

To have standing, plaintiffs “must have suffered an ‘injury-in-fact.’” 

Clajon Production Corp. v. Petera, 70 F.3d 1566, 1572 (10th Cir. 1995) (quoting

Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992)). This injury-in-fact

element in turn requires plaintiffs to demonstrate “an invasion of a legally

protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized, and (b) actual or

imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.” Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560 (citations and

quotations omitted).

The impediments to ripeness are equally impediments to standing. This

court’s focus is on past and present injury; possible future injury is insufficient to

create standing. See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560-61. Appellants have failed to

demonstrate that the School District or any school has withdrawn policies,

instituted policies, or refrained from withdrawing or instituting policies as a result

of the Busing Clause.13 Consequently, any injury flowing from the application of
The Court: Does the existence of the Busing Clause cause the

district to feel compelled to dismantle any remedial plan in effect? 

Mr. Jackson: I do not believe so.

The Court: So you’re representing that the district feels no

compulsion from the presence of the Busing Clause, either on its face

or as applied?

Mr. Jackson: That’s correct.

The Court: So any fears that Mr. Greiner or his clients have

would not be fears based on the present, they would be fears based

upon the as yet, inchoate, future?

Mr. Jackson: I believe that’s true and I believe that the

arguments of Mr. Greiner and Mr. Tymkovich this morning confirm

that.

14Appellants’ final argument in their attempt to create standing is indeed

creative. They argue that any statements about the constitutionality of the Busing

Clause in the district court’s opinion could be used by the State of Colorado and

the School District under the doctrines of claim preclusion or issue preclusion to

prevent further litigation over the Busing Clause. Claim preclusion bars claims

when “the prior action involved identical claims and the same parties or their

privies.” Frandsen v. Westinghouse Corp., 46 F.3d 975, 978 (10th Cir. 1995). 

On the other hand, issue preclusion can bar future litigation even when the parties

are not identical. Id.

It is true that the district court’s opinion contains a discussion regarding the

constitutionality of the Busing Clause. That discussion, however, was not

essential to any issue properly before the district court. Because the court’s

statements regarding the constitutionality of the Busing Clause were not essential

to the decision to terminate jurisdiction, the sole issue before the court, that

language was dicta. See Rohrbaugh v. Celotex Corp., 53 F.3d 1181, 1184 (10th

Cir. 1995). As such, it presents no threat under the doctrines of claim or issue

preclusion.

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the Busing Clause constitutes possible future injury, not past or present injury. 

Appellants thus lack standing.14
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III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, this appeal is DISMISSED for lack of

jurisdiction.