U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

WASHINGTON : 

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office

Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512–1800; DC area (202) 512–1800

Fax: (202) 512–2104 Mail: Stop IDCC, Washington, DC 20402–0001

i 

44-782 2009

[H.A.S.C. No. 110–114] 

MILITARY READINESS: IMPLICATIONS 

FOR OUR STRATEGIC POSTURE 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

HEARING HELD 

FEBRUARY 14, 2008 


Congress.#13
(II) 

HOUSE COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS

IKE SKELTON, Missouri, Chairman 

JOHN SPRATT, South Carolina 

SOLOMON P. ORTIZ, Texas 

GENE TAYLOR, Mississippi 

NEIL ABERCROMBIE, Hawaii 

SILVESTRE REYES, Texas 

VIC SNYDER, Arkansas 

ADAM SMITH, Washington 

LORETTA SANCHEZ, California 

MIKE MCINTYRE, North Carolina 

ELLEN O. TAUSCHER, California 

ROBERT A. BRADY, Pennsylvania 

ROBERT ANDREWS, New Jersey 

SUSAN A. DAVIS, California 

RICK LARSEN, Washington 

JIM COOPER, Tennessee 

JIM MARSHALL, Georgia 

MADELEINE Z. BORDALLO, Guam 

MARK E. UDALL, Colorado 

DAN BOREN, Oklahoma 

BRAD ELLSWORTH, Indiana 

NANCY BOYDA, Kansas 

PATRICK J. MURPHY, Pennsylvania 

HANK JOHNSON, Georgia 

CAROL SHEA-PORTER, New Hampshire 

JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut 

DAVID LOEBSACK, Iowa 

KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York 

JOE SESTAK, Pennsylvania 

GABRIELLE GIFFORDS, Arizona 

NIKI TSONGAS, Massachusetts 

ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland 

KENDRICK B. MEEK, Florida 

KATHY CASTOR, Florida 

DUNCAN HUNTER, California 

JIM SAXTON, New Jersey 

JOHN M. MCHUGH, New York 

TERRY EVERETT, Alabama 

ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, Maryland 

HOWARD P. ‘‘BUCK’’ MCKEON, California 

MAC THORNBERRY, Texas 

WALTER B. JONES, North Carolina 

ROBIN HAYES, North Carolina 

W. TODD AKIN, Missouri 

J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia 

JEFF MILLER, Florida 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

FRANK A. LOBIONDO, New Jersey 

TOM COLE, Oklahoma 

ROB BISHOP, Utah 

MICHAEL TURNER, Ohio 

JOHN KLINE, Minnesota 

CANDICE S. MILLER, Michigan 

PHIL GINGREY, Georgia 

MIKE ROGERS, Alabama 

TRENT FRANKS, Arizona 

BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania 

THELMA DRAKE, Virginia 

CATHY MCMORRIS RODGERS, Washington 

K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas 

GEOFF DAVIS, Kentucky 

DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado 

ERIN C. CONATON, Staff Director 

MICHAEL CASEY, Professional Staff Member 

STEPHANIE SANOK, Professional Staff Member 

CATERINA DUTTO, Staff Assistant 

(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS 

2008 

Page 

HEARING: 

Thursday, February 14, 2008, Military Readiness: Implications for Our Strategic Posture ......................................................................................................... 1 

APPENDIX: 

Thursday, February 14, 2008 ................................................................................. 31 

THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 14, 2008 

MILITARY READINESS: IMPLICATIONS FOR OUR STRATEGIC 

POSTURE 

STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS 

Hunter, Hon. Duncan, a Representative from California, Ranking Member, 

Committee on Armed Services ............................................................................ 2 

Skelton, Hon. Ike, a Representative from Missouri, Chairman, Committee 

on Armed Services ................................................................................................ 1 

WITNESSES 

Flournoy, Miche`le A., President and Co-Founder, Center for a New American 

Security (CNAS) ................................................................................................... 5 

Kosiak, Steven M., Vice President of Budget Studies, Center for Strategic 

and Budgetary Assessments (CSBA) .................................................................. 8 

Pickup, Sharon L., Director, Defense Resources and Business Transformation 

Issues, U.S. Government Accountability Office, accompanied by William 

Solis, Director, Defense Capability and Management, Government Accountability Office ......................................................................................................... 11 

APPENDIX 

PREPARED STATEMENTS: 

Flournoy, Miche`le A. ........................................................................................ 35 

Kosiak, Steven M. ............................................................................................. 44 

Pickup, Sharon L. ............................................................................................. 53 

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD: 

[There were no Documents submitted.] 

WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING THE HEARING: 

[There were no Questions submitted during the hearing.] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING: 

Mr. Cummings .................................................................................................. 73 

(1) 

MILITARY READINESS: IMPLICATIONS FOR OUR 

STRATEGIC POSTURE 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, Washington, DC, Thursday, February 14, 2008. 

The committee met, pursuant to call, at 11:30 a.m., in room 

2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ike Skelton (chairman 

of the committee) presiding. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. IKE SKELTON, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM MISSOURI, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON ARMED 

SERVICES 

The CHAIRMAN. Ladies and gentlemen, our hearing will come to 

order. We meet today to consider the implications of our strategic 

posture that is created by the state of our military readiness. 

Our witnesses today are Miche`le Flournoy, the President and CoFounder of the Center for a New American Security and a former 

Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense; Steve Kosiak, the 

Vice President of Budget Studies at the Center for Strategic and 

Budgetary Assessments; and Sharon Pickup, a Director of Defense 

Capabilities Management at the Government Accounting Office. 

We thank you each for being with us today. 

Our military has been at war for over six years. And it is not any 

secret that this has strained and stressed our armed forces, in particular, the Army and, of course, the Marine Corps. The Navy and 

the Air Force are also being stretched. And the constant strain of 

Iraq has meant that our personnel are under stress, our equipment 

is wearing out, and our brigades have almost no time to train, and 

then, of course, causes a serious problem. 

In the past 30 years, our Nation has been involved in 12 significant military actions, several of which were major conflicts forceon-force, 4 of them to be exact. We expected none of them actually. 

And yesterday, we heard from the intelligence community on the 

global security environment. 

Our country, our interests, and our allies face a multitude of potential threats all over the world. We have to be ready and capable 

in the days ahead. And just last week, Admiral Mullen, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, sat at this witness table and said 

that our current strategic risk is significant. 

So I am hopeful that our witnesses today can help explain how 

the current state of readiness affects the strategic posture of our 

forces around the world. Every member of the Armed Services 

Committee should understand the level and significance of the 

strategic risk of an expected contingency arises. What will be the 

2 

cost to us in lives as well as in dollars? It is that cost that we question as to whether we are truly prepared to accept. 

We must also evaluate the initiatives and programs which the 

Department of Defense is proposing to address our strategic risk 

and determine whether they are realistic, and whether their scope 

and their pace is sufficient to protect national security. It is our 

task to do our constitutional duty to raise and maintain the military as well as to write the rules and regulations therefore. 

I hope that our witnesses today will be able to give us some significant help. And I thank you each for being with us today. 

Mr. Hunter. 

STATEMENT OF HON. DUNCAN HUNTER, A REPRESENTATIVE 

FROM CALIFORNIA, RANKING MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON 

ARMED SERVICES 

Mr. HUNTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this hearing. 

I want to join you in thanking our witnesses for being here and 

having to put up with this crazy schedule that left you at the desk 

here for a long time before we were able to engage with you. 

Thanks for the hearing. I think it is very timely. 

Yesterday the committee received testimony from key members 

of the intelligence community on the current and foreseeable international security environment, including challenges that are increasing in complexity, diversity, and range. So today it is against 

that backdrop that we further examine the relationship between 

our military’s readiness and our Nation’s strategic posture. 

And I want to again thank our witnesses for being here. This 

topic, the relationship between readiness and strategic decision 

making has been at the crux of robust congressional debate over 

the last couple of years. And as my good friend, Chairman Skelton, 

knows, the committee wrestled hard and long during the last Congress to review the range of war fighting and other strategic requirements of the national military strategy to try to determine 

what future structure and capabilities would be necessary. 

Clearly, that exercise highlighted not only the significant equipment, the force structure, and capabilities shortfalls that existed 

prior to September 11, 2001, but also the challenges facing this Nation trying to rebuild, reset, modernize, transform, and grow our 

armed forces while actively engaging in combat. Our committee 

members, and especially those on the Readiness Subcommittee, 

have engaged regularly in discussions about the impact of ongoing 

operations on our military personnel and equipment. 

Recently we have begun to analyze the President’s fiscal year 

2009 budget request and restarted dialogue on the potential advantages of spending four percent of GDP, of our gross domestic product, on defense. All these conversations highlight the relationship 

between the current readiness of our forces and the big picture decisions that will shape their future readiness. 

With that said, I think sometimes we lose sight of two important 

facts, both of which were highlighted by Secretary of Defense Gates 

in his testimony last week. The first is that the Defense Department readiness efforts are focused at least in the Army on fighting 

the wars that we are in in both Afghanistan and Iraq. And the 

3 

forces that are being sent there are fully trained and are ready 

when they go. 

In fact, some might argue that many of the forces fielded today 

have the most combat experience of any force in recent memory. 

They might also argue that it is in large part because of this experience that the military surge is succeeding in Iraq and that our 

special forces and others are excelling in their missions around the 

world. Simply put, when compared to other nations and when compared to historical examples, our military men and women today 

are unrivaled. 

In fact, Ms. Flournoy, in her written testimony, today observed 

that while in Iraq earlier this month she witnessed, ‘‘A U.S. military that is the most experienced, adaptive, professional, and capable force this country has ever fielded.’’ These war fighters are 

trained. They are capable. They are accomplishing their missions. 

The other fact that Secretary Gates emphasized last week is that 

current readiness ratings are not just the result of ongoing operations. While Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom 

have clearly highlighted the very real readiness challenges our soldiers, sailors, airmen, and Marines face, he argued that we need 

perspective. 

He said, ‘‘In the mid-1990’s, readiness was considered differently. 

For example, on equipment, readiness was considered a 65 percent 

fill. Units that had 65 percent were considered to be in the green. 

Those counting rules were changed. And so, now readiness is at the 

100 percent level for equipment. And so, many of the units are in 

the red. And they are in the red for specific kinds of missions.’’ 

So it seems to me that the goalposts were moved and that contrasting the readiness of current forces to the readiness of past 

forces is not necessarily an apples-to-apples comparison. I wonder 

how the readiness ratings of the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps of the first Gulf War would fare if held up against today’s forces. 

In fact, we looked at that once, I believe, with the unit of the 

101st Airborne with all of the new equipment that we now have, 

which is now considered to be standard and the lack of which will 

give you a poor readiness rating. And looking, as I recall, at one 

of the units of the 101st Airborne in 2000, it would have, under today’s rating system, been very low, although it had enormous combat capability at the time. 

Finally, I also wonder how we can best address unique challenges facing the readiness of each military service and how the recently delivered budget request aims at reducing readiness shortfalls. For example, it has become clear that the Air Force and Navy 

readiness suffer from the burden of aging equipment. Isn’t this particular challenge due in part to woefully inadequate defense spending in the 1990’s? And what steps are we taking to rectify that 

shortfall? 

And that is, of course, the old shortfall that the former chief of 

the Army used to refer to as the holes in the yard, the funding 

holes. Also in recognizing that Army and Marine Corps readiness 

challenges are primarily personnel related, I wonder how the Grow 

the Force initiatives will impact the longer term readiness of those 

4 

services. What other steps should we take to address these deficiencies? 

Also the Army and Marine Corps readiness challenges extend 

across personnel, training, and equipment areas and are made 

more difficult to solve by the Grow the Force initiatives. As I see 

it, we are asking the Army and Marine Corps to tear down and rebuild themselves as fighting forces while at the same time asking 

them to conduct high operations tempo, difficult missions that are 

in this Nation’s interest. 

Our challenge is to understand best the additional steps we 

should be taking to address those readiness deficiencies. We must 

also acknowledge the full cost of achieving readiness. 

In 2006, this committee inserted $20 billion into the procurement 

and operations and maintenance accounts to address many shortfalls in our combat forces. We are just today beginning to see gains 

being made. 

Long-term procurement items and the cycling of equipment 

through depots can’t occur overnight. We will not see the benefits 

of Grow the Force overnight, either. These things take time. And 

we must remain vigilant to ensure steady progress. 

At the end of the day, there is a strong bipartisan support to engage in an open, frank dialogue about the personnel, equipment, 

and training challenges that comprise our military’s readiness. It 

seems to me that part of the solution should be to provide adequate 

funding to support efforts to increase force readiness, whether it is 

the Grow the Force initiatives, key research and development programs or procurement of critical equipment. 

In my view, we should begin by spending at least four percent 

of GDP on defense. And I ask what more should we be thinking 

about. 

So to our distinguished panel, thanks a lot for being with us 

today. 

And, Mr. Chairman, one thing that I think we need to do is this. 

We have had lots of units move into the theater, especially in Iraq, 

and come back without major pieces of their equipment. We have 

had major evolutions of equipment while in Iraq. 

For example, the changeover from what I call the soft Humvees 

to Marine Armor Kit (MAK)-kitted Humvees to up-armored 114s, 

for example, now to mine resistant ambush protected vehicles 

(MRAPs). And part of that exercise and that transition has been 

to have large stables of equipment parked at various areas around 

Iraq. For example, we discovered some 1,800 MAK-kitted Humvees 

from the Marine changeover from MAK kits to 114s, I believe at 

Takatum, 1,800 vehicles, probably with very low mileage on those 

vehicles, parked there. 

Also in talking to members of the Guard and Reserve, there are 

enormous expenditures of domestic platforms like big trucks, big 

construction equipment presently in Iraq. And in my estimation, 

we have a fairly vague accounting for how much we have got. 

So I think one thing we ought to do is figure out first before we 

move out and try to figure out exactly what we need for readiness, 

let us figure what we have got and let us find out what we have 

got. And I haven’t seen what I would consider to be a complete acVerDate Nov 24 2008 14:51 Aug 03, 2009 Jkt 044782 PO 00000 Frm 00008 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 P:\MARY\DOCS\110-114\045000.000 HARM2 PsN: MARY
5 

counting of the major platforms and the sub-platforms, the less important platforms that are in Iraq and Afghanistan right now. 

And the last thing, I think it would be bad for this country if 

some of these things get lost in the shuffle and we end up seeing 

major pieces of U.S. military equipment sold for a dime on the dollar in some type of a foreign military sale while you have a corresponding inadequacy in that unit that comes back from the theater without that particular equipment. So let us figure out what 

we have got, what we need to become ready. 

And let us all acknowledge that there is no force in the world 

that is more ready than when it is totally at rest, when it is totally 

unused. At that point when it is totally at rest and it is totally in 

garrison with all of its equipment, we will all stipulate that at that 

point it has the highest amount of—the highest availability of soldiers, personnel, and equipment than it will ever have. 

When you move out into the war fighting theater and you start 

exercising both the equipment and the personnel, at that point, by 

definition, your readiness rate and your availability rate goes 

down. That doesn’t mean that you have lost combat capability. And 

I would argue that our soldiers and our units with the combination 

of personnel and equipment have never been more combat capable. 

Having said that, I think it is important for us to take an inventory of, by golly, what have we got. What do we have right now 

parked in theater, in Iraq and Afghanistan? Let us get a handle 

on that. And if possible, I think we ought to match up some of that 

stuff, especially stuff that was taken from the Guard, which now 

may be parked in depot in theater and may not be in such a rate 

of utilization that it has to go through full depot maintenance. 

If we can, I think we ought to start looking at marrying up some 

of that equipment that was left by Guard units when they went 

over and returned to the U.S. without their equipment, marrying 

some of that equipment up with units that have a deficiency. And 

after the dust settles on that exercise, let us see what we need. 

So thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the hearing. I look forward to 

the testimony. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. Please note there is another vote on. But let us begin and do our very best. 

Miche`le Flournoy. 

STATEMENT OF MICHE` LE A. FLOURNOY, PRESIDENT AND COFOUNDER, CENTER FOR A NEW AMERICAN SECURITY (CNAS) 

Ms. FLOURNOY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Hunter, distinguished members of the committee. Thank you for giving me the 

opportunity to speak to you today about the readiness of the U.S. 

military for current and future missions and ways that we can 

strengthen our strategic posture. 

I would like to address both the question of readiness and some 

practical steps we can take to improve the situation. Since the attacks of September 11th, I think it is fair to say that our military 

has been performing Herculean tasks to protect and advance our 

national security. And as Mr. Hunter mentioned, having just spent 

two weeks in Iraq, I can personally attest to the fact that the military we have today is probably the most experienced, adaptive, professional, and capable force we have ever fielded as a Nation. 

6 

But more than six years of continuous, large-scale operations 

have also taken a toll on these forces. Multiple back-to-back deployments with shorter dwell times between longer tours have put unprecedented strain on military personnel and their families, especially the Army where soldiers are now deploying with 15 months 

with less than a year or so between tours. 

And we can see the results of that in terms of increases in suicide rates, post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) cases, alcoholism, 

divorce, et cetera, huge stresses on the personnel of the force. 

Given the high tempo of operations and the very harsh operating 

environment, equipment is also being worn out, lost in battle or 

damaged almost more quickly than the services can repair or replace it. Army equipment in Iraq and Afghanistan is wearing out 

almost in some cases nine times the normal rate. 

Equipment scarcity has led to the widespread practicing of crossleveling between units. That means drawing equipment and personnel from one unit to plus it up in another. And that has been 

particularly acute in the Reserve units, which have only a small 

portion of their authorized level of equipment at this point. 

So far, the good news is that these measures have, as was said 

before, met the readiness needs of units in theater. But they have 

also sharply decreased the readiness of our nondeployed units and 

impeded their ability to train. 

Meanwhile, compressed training time between deployments 

mean that many of our personnel have the time to train only for 

the operations that are immediately before them, either Iraq or Afghanistan, not for missions over the horizon. Army units are literally racing to get certified for their next deployment. This justin-time training condition has reduced our readiness for the full 

spectrum of operations and, you know, for a range of possible contingencies, and has created a larger degree of strategic risk. 

While this Congress has rightly authorized an expansion of our 

Nation’s ground forces which should reduce some of the strain and 

some of the risk, recruiting and retention have become much greater challenges for the services at a time when they actually need to 

keep more experienced, high-quality warriors in the force. The 

Army, in particular, has had to take a number of fairly extraordinary measures to meet its recruiting targets since 2005. 

It has done things like offering increasing enlistment bonuses to 

attract what is very much a shrinking population of young Americans who can meet the military standards, only 3 in 10. But it has 

also taken some potentially worrisome steps, most notably, increasing the number of waivers granted for enlistment by 18 percent. 

Right now, one in five accessions has to have a waiver to be accepted into the force and also accepting a larger percentage of people who do not have high school diplomas. The most worrisome figure in my mind is the increase of the use of moral waivers by 160 

percent since 2003. 

The Army is also beginning to face some retention challenges, 

particularly as it grows the force and has to retain more noncommissioned officers and officers to fill out a larger structure. 

While company grade loss rates have remained fairly stable in recent years, there is some cause for concern, particularly the percentage of recent West Point classes that are choosing not to reVerDate Nov 24 2008 14:51 Aug 03, 2009 Jkt 044782 PO 00000 Frm 00010 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 P:\MARY\DOCS\110-114\045000.000 HARM2 PsN: MARY
7 

main in service after year five or six. We have lost about half of 

the class of 2000 and 2001, whereas the historical rate is closer to 

about 40 percent. 

Meanwhile, the number of officers the Army needs has grown by 

about 8,000 since 2002 with 58 percent of this growth in the grades 

of captain and major. This has created very significant shortfalls 

in both of those grades. As the Army expands, it is going to face 

some real challenges in trying to increase retention, again, to fill 

out the ranks of a larger force. 

So the bottom line here is that the readiness of our military is 

just barely keeping pace with the demands of current operations. 

And in the Army, in particular, there is only a minimal number of 

brigade combat teams (BCTs) that are considered fully ready who 

are not already deployed. In other words, we don’t have an adequate number of ready units in reserve for other possible contingencies. 

And the cost of building and regaining readiness are increasing 

dramatically. In my written statement I laid out 10 steps that we 

could take to try to increase the supply of forces available and improve readiness conditions. 

We really have to step up to the challenge of both enabling our 

deployed forces to accomplish their assigned mission, but also making sure that we are investing adequately to be sure the military 

is ready for future contingencies. So the 10 things I would propose 

in my limited amount of time is first, increase the supply of ground 

forces. Go ahead and grow the Army, the Marine Corps Special Operations Forces as planned to try to achieve at least a minimum 

of a one-to-two deployment to dwell time ratio. 

But the caveat I would emphasize to you is we have got to make 

sure that the pace of expansion does not outstrip our ability to recruit the quality of candidates we need for this force. And if we 

can’t recruit the quality we need, we should vary the pace accordingly. We should slow it as necessary to ensure that we maintain 

the highest quality standards. 

Two, adjust force commitments based on conditions on the 

ground in Iraq and Afghanistan. And as conditions permit over 

time, seek to increase the dwell time between deployments to reduce the strain on the force and their families. 

Number three, over time, very important, try to reestablish a 

larger reserve of ready ground forces, I would say at least several 

brigades, to enable rapid response to other potential contingencies 

that may arise in the future. We don’t have that reserve now, and 

that is one of the things that is creating strategic risk. We need 

to reestablish it as a matter of urgent priority. 

Number four, fully fund our service reset costs as well as investment in the equipment and personnel necessary for a larger force. 

Five, continue to assess and enhance our recruiting and retention 

incentives. And particularly, I would underscore the importance of 

offering increased educational and professional development opportunities for those who have experienced multiple combat tours. 

Six, improve force management. Get it down to the individual 

level so that individuals who are returning from deployment who 

end up changing units don’t go right back out the door to deployment again without adequate time at home in between. 

8 

Seven, very important, we have got to look at the balance between the operational Army and the institutional Army and try to 

shift more billets, more slots from the institutional Army to the 

deployable Army so that we have a larger operational pool to deal 

with and to reduce strain over time. 

Eighth, invest in recapitalizing and modernizing the aging fleet 

of both the Air Force and the Navy. And I think in recent years 

this has not been given adequate priority. 

Nine, expand the variety of service contracts we offer to personnel so that there is—it is easier to move between Reserve duty, 

active duty, easier to take time out of the military and then come 

back for qualified personnel. 

And finally, although this is a little bit beyond the purview of 

this committee, it is very important to invest in the deployable 

operational capacity of our civilian agencies to reduce the burden 

on the military and increase the chances of mission success. 

So, Mr. Chairman, my bottom line is that our Nation’s armed 

forces have gone above and beyond the call of duty in recent years. 

We owe it to them to give them the resources they need, not only 

to meet the demands of current missions, but also to be fully ready 

and prepared for possible contingencies in the future. Thank you 

very much. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Flournoy can be found in the Appendix on page 35.] 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. 

Mr. Kosiak, please. 

STATEMENT OF STEVEN M. KOSIAK, VICE PRESIDENT OF 

BUDGET STUDIES, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND BUDGETARY ASSESSMENTS (CSBA) 

Mr. KOSIAK. I want to thank Chairman Skelton, Congressman 

Hunter, and the rest of the members of the committee for inviting 

me to testify here this morning on this very important subject. 

The U.S. military has been under enormous strain for the past 

five plus years beginning especially after 9/11 and, even more so, 

after the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003. In my testimony I want to 

focus on three key readiness-related elements of the Defense Department’s plans. First, reset the issue of reset; second, the issue 

of force expansion; and third, the longer-term issue of modernizing 

and transforming the U.S. military. And as requested, I will focus 

primarily on budgetary aspects of these issues. 

First, a few words about reset. In 2006, the Army estimated that 

they would need something like $13 billion a year to pay for the 

costs of repairing and replacing equipment destroyed and damaged 

in Iraq and Afghanistan. It also estimated at that time that they 

would need something like that amount per year for a couple of 

years after the wars ended in Iraq and Afghanistan or wound down 

in order to fully recover their readiness levels. 

Since then, the amount of funding provided for reset and for 

Army procurement has grown dramatically. Assuming that Congress ultimately approves all of the money that has been requested 

for 2008 in the war supplemental, the Army will have been provided, over about 8 years in these war supplementals, about $100 

billion for procurement. 

9 

By contrast or by comparison, the Congressional Budget Office 

estimates that if you add up the value of all of the equipment that 

the Army has, all of the major equipment that the Army has in 

theater in Iraq and Afghanistan, you come to a total of about $30 

billion. These figures suggest that the Army is receiving, I think, 

sufficient funds for reset. 

That said, I want to be clear. I do think the Army faces some 

very severe challenges in trying to recover from the operations in 

Iraq and Afghanistan. One of the biggest problems is sort of related, I think, to industrial base capacity. 

We have put in a lot of money into getting equipment back into 

the field, but it takes a lot of time, sometimes two years between 

a time a system is taken out to be overhauled and it gets back to 

the services or from the time money is appropriated and it gets off 

the assembly line if it is a new piece of equipment. And this is a 

big problem and has created, I think, very significant problems in 

terms of readiness, especially for nondeployed units. 

A more serious problem even than that, I think, is the problem 

that the war has created for recruitment and retention for the 

Army, which has—recruitment, in particular, which has suffered 

some significant degradation over the past couple of years. And I 

think this is potentially a very serious long-term problem. 

I think we all hope that this is a sort of a temporary blip. But 

even if it is a blip, it is going to take years and perhaps decades 

to work its way through the system. And if it is more than a blip, 

this is a very serious problem that will need to be addressed. And 

it is partly a budgetary problem. Although I don’t think it is primarily a budgetary problem. 

The second area I want to comment on are plans to expand the 

size of the military. The Congressional Budget Office has estimated 

that expanding the Army and the Marine Corps by the 92,000 

troops that have been suggested by the Administration will cost 

about $108 billion over 5 years and perhaps $10 billion or $15 billion a year thereafter. 

If the current plan is carried out as envisioned, we will basically 

buy additional combat brigade teams for the Army. This will have 

a relatively modest impact on our ability to carry out long-term, 

large-scale stability operations, maybe increasing that capability by 

15 or 20 percent. 

By contrast, the impact could be far greater if we were to use 

these people to fill out additional new types of units specializing especially on training, equipping, and advising indigenous forces. And 

this could give us, I think, much greater bang for the buck in terms 

of our ability to carry out long-term, large-scale stability operations. 

The Army argues that it doesn’t now and will not, even after the 

expansion, have enough troops to fill out specialized units, that it 

has to have all of its units be, what they call, full spectrum capable 

units. And this essentially means, I think, general purpose forces, 

which have traditionally been focused on conventional military operations. 

It is difficult to see why, especially given the burden of stability 

operations, we need to really focus on buying additional capability 

for conventional warfare operations. As such, absent a change in 

10 

course by the Army, which would involve, I think, rethinking how 

they are going to add these additional troops, I think it is far from 

clear that the investment in additional—the expansion of the 

Army, in particular, necessarily represents a cost-effective investment for the United States. 

The third and last area I want to comment on are the services’ 

modernization plans. Implementing the current plan, the current 

modernization plans, will require increasing funding for procurement from about $99 billion in this year’s budget, in the 2008 

budget, in the base budget to about $135 billion or $140 billion a 

year and sustaining at that level over the long term. That is to actually execute the current long-term modernization plan. 

This may be difficult to do, given internal pressures within the 

Department of Defense (DOD), especially people-related costs, 

which will be exacerbated by plans to increase the size of the Army 

and Marine Corps and also by potential downward pressure caused 

by, among other things, for example, efforts to reduce the deficit in 

future years. In any event, I think there are some areas of the 

services’ modernization plans where the plans may not be appropriately aligned with what our real requirements are. 

Among the most questionable plans is the projected purchase of 

some 2,500 F–35 Joint Strike Fighters. I think this is going to be 

a great fighter. Clearly, we need to buy some number of these systems. But do we really need to buy 2,500 of these systems at a 

price tag that is going to amount to about $300 billion? 

The F–35 also doesn’t seem quite aligned with—the focus on 

short-range aviation doesn’t seem quite aligned with potential future conflicts where we may have a difficult time getting access to 

regions, as we had difficult times getting access in the case of both 

Afghanistan and Iraq. 

Next to the F–35 program, the most costly Defense Department 

modernization program is the Future Combat System, the FCS. 

This program is estimated by DOD to cost about $160 billion. 

Other estimates place the cost upwards of $200 billion or even $230 

billion. 

Unfortunately, I am concerned that the design of the Future 

Combat System may be focused first and foremost on an ability to 

defeat conventional kinds of opponents, Republican Guard-type opponents that we defeated decisively in Iraq in 2003. This is perhaps 

the least likely kind of adversary we are going to face in the future 

and certainly very different from the kinds of adversaries we are 

currently facing in Iraq and Afghanistan. 

There is also, I think, a danger that the host cost of the future 

combat system, which is aimed at only equipping about a third of 

the active duty Army, will make it very difficult to adequately fund 

other areas of the Army, the other two-thirds of the Army to adequately modernize and maintain readiness of that other two-thirds 

of the Army. And that other two-thirds is going to be very critical 

if we do stay in Iraq or Afghanistan or if we get involved in other 

kinds of stability operations. 

With that, I will end my comments and look forward to answering any questions. Thanks. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Kosiak can be found in the Appendix on page 44.] 

11 

STATEMENT OF SHARON L. PICKUP, DIRECTOR, DEFENSE RESOURCES AND BUSINESS TRANSFORMATION ISSUES, U.S. 

GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, ACCOMPANIED BY 

WILLIAM SOLIS, DIRECTOR, DEFENSE CAPABILITY AND 

MANAGEMENT, GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE 

Ms. PICKUP. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Hunter, and members of the 

committee, thank you for the opportunity to be here today to discuss the Government Accountability Office (GAO)’s work on military readiness. I think that my opening remarks would reflect 

those of the chairman and Mr. Hunter and the other witnesses in 

terms of the high pace of operations and its effect on the military 

and also that the military now has a ground force with considerable experience and is battle tested, but also stressed. 

Clearly, Congress and this committee, in particular, has been focused on the impact of these commitments on readiness and has 

taken some decisive action such as establishing a defense material 

readiness board and requiring roles and missions review. I would 

also like to add that the Congress has provided unprecedented levels of funding in response to DOD’s requests, which have consistently emphasized the need for resources to maintain readiness. In fiscal year 2007 alone, DOD had about $600 billion in combined available funding to cover base needs and costs of ongoing 

operations. Just as an aside, I would like to add that while the Department still separates these needs into two sets, we believe the 

lines are becoming increasingly blurred. 

GAO has evaluated military readiness for decades, including personnel and equipment, and training. And my statement today will 

cover two topics: first, the readiness implications of DOD’s continued efforts to support current operations; and second, recommendations that GAO has made which we believe will improve the Department’s ability to manage and improve readiness. 

It is clear that DOD has overcome difficult challenges in maintaining a high pace of operations. But these commitments have had 

significant consequences for readiness and that the Department 

has taken a number of extraordinary measures to support the ongoing rotation, such as increasing the length of deployments and 

the frequency of Reserve mobilizations. While it has adjusted some 

of the standards for recruiting and retention, it is unclear what the 

long-term impact will be, especially with the Growing the Force initiative in terms of the Department’s ability to recruit and retain a 

high-quality force. 

Transfer of equipment and prepositioned stocks has effected the 

availability of items for nondeployed units. And training has been 

refocused on counterinsurgency missions with little time to train on 

a fuller range of missions. 

And finally, the Department has adopted strategies such as relying more on the Air Force and Navy and contractors to perform 

some tasks typically handled by ground forces. If current operations continue at the present level of intensity, DOD could face 

difficulty in balancing these commitments with the need to rebuild 

and maintain readiness. 

On the second point, rebuilding readiness of the ground forces 

while maintaining current commitments, is clearly a long-term and 

complex process and will require hundreds of billions of dollars. At 

12 

the same time, DOD faces competing demands for resources, given 

other initiatives to grow, modernize, and transform its forces. 

There are no quick fixes, but we believe the Department can take 

measures to advance progress in both the short and long-term. 

Given the significant funding implications, it is imperative that 

DOD take a more strategic approach that promotes transparency 

and ensures that investments are based on sound plans with measurable goals, validated requirements, and performance measures to 

gauge progress. This is a long way of saying that DOD must have 

a solid basis for its funding requests and be able to demonstrate 

to the Congress and taxpayer what it is getting for the money in 

terms of improved readiness. 

Broadly, we have recommended that DOD develop a near-term 

plan for improving readiness of ground forces that, among other 

things, establish specific goals for improving readiness, prioritizes 

as actions needed to achieve those goals, and outlines an investment strategy to clearly increase certain needs and funding requests. We have also recommended actions in specific areas which 

are included in my statement. 

This concludes my remarks. And I look forward to answering 

your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Pickup can be found in the Appendix on page 53.] 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. Let me ask you a couple 

of questions first. 

Ms. Flournoy, General McCaffrey testified before the Oversight 

and Investigations Subcommittee just several days ago. And he 

stated that 10 percent of the Army recruits should not be in uniform. Do you have any thought regarding the status of those recruits, how good they are or to the contrary? 

Ms. FLOURNOY. Well, the figures I had suggested that 1 in 5, so 

about 20 percent, are receiving some kind of waiver, educational, 

moral or medical, to enter into the force. I know that the Army has 

begun tracking what happens to those people once they are in the 

force in terms of how their performance in various areas measures 

against the sort of average for the rest of the force. But I think it 

is very early days, since this is a fairly new practice, the extensive 

use of waivers. I think it is fairly early days to be judging how this 

is working. 

What I can say is I have talked to a number of commanders who 

anecdotally have cited concerns. The experience of having to spend 

more and more of their command time worrying about a certain 

number of problem children in their units. So I think it is something that it is hard to make an absolute judgment at this early 

point in time. But it is something that I would encourage you all 

to start tracking very closely because I think it has the potential 

to be a quality issue if not managed very carefully. 

The CHAIRMAN. Did you say the Army is beginning to track that 

now? 

Ms. FLOURNOY. That is my understanding, yes. 

The CHAIRMAN. To your knowledge, will there be a report—— 

Ms. FLOURNOY. I don’t know if there is a report, but I have some 

data that suggests they are tracking it closely. And I would encourage you to ask to be briefed on that. 

13 

The CHAIRMAN. Well then, we can ask the Army when they reach 

a conclusion thereon. 

Let me ask each of you this. The chairman of the Joint Chiefs, 

Admiral Mullen, and his predecessor, General Pace, assess the current risk—at General Pace’s time, the current risk then, in executing the national military strategy, to be significant and increased from the risk assessment of two years. Do you agree, disagree? And tell us your conclusion thereof. 

Ms. Flournoy, start with you. 

Ms. FLOURNOY. I would agree with that assessment simply because when you look at security environment, there are a number 

of scenarios where crises could arise and require some kind of U.S. 

military response. And although it is certainly fair to say that we 

have ready Air Force and Navy units that would be prepared to respond, there are some contingencies that would require a rapid 

ground response. And right now, we have very, very limited capacity, given how heavily taxed our units are in Iraq and Afghanistan. 

You know, I believe that we need to fully resource the current 

missions that we have. But I also think that we should acknowledge that we are accepting a significant level of strategic risk in 

so doing. And it is very important to try to take steps to expand 

the reserve of ready ground force brigades or mobile units (MUs) 

that could be available for contingency response because right now, 

we do not have what we should have as a global power with global 

interests. 

The CHAIRMAN. If you look over the past 30 to 31 years and 

count the military contingencies that we have had, they have been 

scattered over the 30, 31 years roughly 2 to 3, 4 years in between, 

and all of them unexpected. And our challenge is to be ready 

should one of those come to pass in the near future. And that, of 

course, is a concern of this committee. 

Mr. Kosiak. 

Mr. KOSIAK. Well, I guess I would sort of echo what Miche`le said. 

And I don’t want to get too far away from my budgetary expertise. 

But I think it does depend on what kind of scenarios you are looking at. 

I think the stress that the Army and Marine Corps are under is 

enormous. The stress that the Navy and the Air Force are under 

is substantial, but significantly less. I think if it is a contingency 

that can be managed with air or naval forces, you know, we are 

sitting much better. 

In the event it does require ground forces, that could depend in 

part on obviously the size of the operation, but especially the duration of the operation. I think we can scrape together something to, 

you know, wage a short-term conflict, I think. But I think we have 

very little capability to certainly expand any kind of long-term conflict somewhere else that is on the ground. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Ms. Pickup. 

Ms. PICKUP. Right. We haven’t quantified in any way the risk. 

And I wouldn’t want to underestimate the ability of our military 

to respond. But clearly, all the different things that DOD is doing 

to support the current operations can have an effect on our ability 

to respond. 

14 

And I think, you know, in particular, the amount of time that it 

would take to train forces and to cross-level equipment with the 

situation that we find ourselves with our prepositioned stocks and 

to man and deploy units, you know, clearly would be stressful, 

which is one of the reasons why we have kind of in our recommendations to the Department talked about the need to, you 

know, start rebuilding and do it in a sound manner that maximizes 

the funds available to it. But, you know, clearly, in the near-term, 

the longer the operations go on at the current levels strains our 

readiness and effects our ability to respond quickly to other events. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. 

Mr. Saxton. 

Mr. SAXTON. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Ms. Flournoy, in your statement you made a number of statements that I would just like to ask you about. The one statement 

that you made which was troubling I think you may have modified 

a bit in answer to one of the chairman’s questions. You said that 

since 2006 the Army has met yearly recruiting goals, but it has 

taken some fairly extraordinary steps to do so, including moral 

waivers. 

But in the answer to your question you said that it is hard to 

make an absolute judgment on those issues. And I am glad that 

you modified what you said in your statement because we have 

looked at this issue at some length, and we have found that in 

some cases, soldiers with waivers actually do better than soldiers 

without waivers. 

For example, waivered soldiers had a lower loss rate in entrylevel performance. The waivered soldiers’ loss rate was three percent while the nonwaivered soldiers’ loss rate was four-and-a-half 

percent. They also had lower rates of personal disorder. The 

waivered soldiers’ rate was about .9 percent. The nonwaivered soldiers’ rate was 1.1 percent. 

The waivered soldiers had lower rates of unsatisfactory performance. Their rate of unsatisfactory performance was about .26 percent. The nonwaivered soldiers’ rates was about double that. And 

I could go on down the list. And then there were some areas where 

waivered soldiers didn’t do as well. 

And so, I think it is a bit premature, let us say, to say that the 

waiver process in itself is inherently flawed because some of the 

waivers are given for things like one use of marijuana. That would 

deserve a waiver. 

And so, I guess I would just like you to respond. And again, I 

am glad that you modified your statement by saying it is hard to 

make an absolute judgment in these cases because of varying results and performance by soldiers with waivers. 

Ms. FLOURNOY. Sir, I flagged this as an area to watch because 

I am aware of the data that you cited. And I think it is a mixed 

bag. In some cases, these waivered soldiers become, you know, 

models in the Army. In other cases, they don’t, and they show 

greater difficulty in meeting Army standards. 

So I think it is something that we need to watch over time and 

watch carefully because the hallmark of the force has always been 

its quality. And as we grow, the biggest challenge is to maintain 

that quality of a larger force. 

15 

So again, I think the jury is out. I think there is some very positive data, but also some data of concern. And we just need to watch 

it very closely over time. 

Mr. SAXTON. Okay, thank you. That is good. 

Let me ask you retention goals. In your statement you stated 

that although the Army continues to meet its overall retention 

goals, it is beginning to experience serious retention problems in 

key parts of the force. My information is that the active Army is 

actually doing quite well in meeting its overall retention goals in 

all categories. 

The Army is actually exceeding its goals in many. The most deployed Army divisions have an exceptionally high reenlistment 

rate, for example in all categories. And I think you have probably 

seen the information that back that up. 

In the Army National Guard, which measures retention against 

a specific annual expected attrition of 19.5 percent, the actual annual attrition rate for 1999 was 5.4 percent. For 2006, it was 4.7 

percent. And for 2007, it was 4.3 percent. And in the Reserve, 

which has an expected attrition of 28.6 percent. The actual annual 

attrition was 6.5 percent in 1999. In 2006, it was 4.9 percent. I am 

sorry, in 2007, it was 4.9 percent. 

Those seem to be pretty good, particularly when taken in the 

context of your statement, which says that the overall retention 

goals are beginning to experience serious problems. I don’t understand. Maybe you can clear that up. 

Ms. FLOURNOY. Yes. In my statement, I acknowledged that the 

good news is that company-grade loss rates have remained fairly 

stable, which, I think, is what you are citing. The challenge really 

comes from the combination of multiple—you know, the high ops 

tempo, but more importantly, the growth, so that as the force 

grows, the denominator changes. 

You actually have to have a higher than historical retention rate 

in order to fill out the ranks of company-grade officers and noncommissioned officers (NCOs) in the force. And so, we have to do 

better on retention than we ever have before in order to have the 

quality of leadership we need in a larger force. 

So I was trying to flag that. At a time when, I think, we are finding it challenging to meet historical rates of retention, we actually 

have to retain even more to be able to support expansion. 

Mr. SAXTON. Unfortunately, I don’t have the numbers here for 

the active Army. But I do have the numbers—or at least some 

numbers—for the Army Guard and the Army Reserve. And they 

appear to be doing just what you suggest, doing better than they 

have historically been expected to do. Would you agree with that? 

Ms. FLOURNOY. Well, I would balance that against the very real 

shortages that we see in both company-grade and majors. Major 

shortage is at least 17 percent at this point. So I think there is a 

problem in terms of meeting some of the targets associated with expansion. 

Mr. SAXTON. Yes, you made the point in your statement with regard to the West Point class of 2001. Forty-six percent of the West 

Point class of 2001 and 54 percent of the West Point class of 2000 

have already left the Army. Army data is a little bit different. The 

Army does not dispute that reducing officer attrition is an imporVerDate Nov 24 2008 14:51 Aug 03, 2009 Jkt 044782 PO 00000 Frm 00019 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 P:\MARY\DOCS\110-114\045000.000 HARM2 PsN: MARY
16 

tant objective and asserts that an unprecedented effort is underway 

to accomplish that goal. 

Army data shows that the U.S. Military Academy attrition at the 

end of 5 years is actually 30 percent for classes graduating from 

1992 to 2002. And at the 6-year mark, the attrition for classes of 

1992 through 2001 is 46 percent. So those numbers are a little different than what you said, I believe, in your testimony. 

Ms. FLOURNOY. Yes. I think we have dueling data here, sir. I 

have a data released by the U.S. Military Academy. And the overall 

historical average since 1976 is about 40 percent loss, the last 10 

classes, 45 percent loss, and then the most recent 2 classes, closer 

to 50 percent loss. So I think I am happy to get with your staff and 

compare data to see if we can sort that out. 

Mr. SAXTON. We appreciate that. Let me just ask you one final 

question with regard to high school diplomas. In your statement 

you said that in fiscal year 2007, only 79 percent of the recruits 

had high school diplomas. I was wondering if you included in that 

79 percent the National Guard Youth Challenge Program General 

Educational Development (GED) certificates, which we continue to 

be hopeful will hold up as a level of accomplishment that will permit people to be gainfully retained, recruited and retained in the 

Army. 

Ms. FLOURNOY. Sir, I believe that figure is for active duty, but 

I can double-check that for you. 

Mr. SAXTON. Right. My understanding of your statement was 

that 79 percent of the recruits had high school diplomas. 

Ms. FLOURNOY. Right. 

Mr. SAXTON. And do you question whether or not the National 

Guard Youth Challenge Program GED is an appropriate level of accomplishment and achievement which we would require to join the 

Army? 

Ms. FLOURNOY. Well, I was simply noting that the—I think the 

historical standard has been 90 percent with a high school diploma. 

And I think it is important to try to continue to meet that goal. 

Mr. SAXTON. So you don’t have an opinion on the National Guard 

Youth Challenge Program? 

Ms. FLOURNOY. No, I don’t. I haven’t looked at it closely. 

Mr. SAXTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Ms. FLOURNOY. Thank you. 

Mr. ORTIZ [presiding]. Thank you so much for joining us this 

morning. You know, the readiness challenges faced by the United 

States military, especially the ground forces are extremely concerning on many different levels. My good friend, Representative 

Abercrombie, and I have a resolution that speaks to the declining 

readiness of the ground forces and acknowledges the strategic risk 

that the United States has in assuming because of the shortfalls 

that we have—we have introduced House Resolution 834. 

Unfortunately, with continuous operations in Iraq and the Department’s inability to offset readiness decline, the time it will take 

to restore military readiness gets longer and longer every day. At 

this point, over what timeframe is it realistic to expect that those 

challenges could be fully addressed? Maybe you can give us a little 

what you think as to how long it will take to really fully address 

that issue. 

17 

Ms. PICKUP. Well, I don’t know that I would be comfortable saying in years. But, you know, I mean, it is obviously a long-term and 

complex prospect. And I think in the near-term as long as the current operations are sustained at the current pace and intensity, rebuilding readiness while engaging in those commitments is just 

going to be difficult. 

But I do think, as I said in my opening remarks, that the Department has some things that it can do, one of which is to come 

up with a plan as to, given the funding that it receives on an annual basis and then if there are supplemental fundings, to establish some goals as to which part of the force and at what level they 

want to increase and improve readiness over time. Because right 

now I think what we see is very difficult to equate the funding to 

any, you know, tangible outcome as far as improved readiness. 

And I think with the Grow the Force initiatives and the 

modularity, I mean, clearly, you are actually talking in the long 

term to have more people and units to train and equip. So I think 

that is a long-term prospect as well. But in the short term I think 

it is quite reasonable for the Congress to expect the Department to 

be able to say in the next two to five years this is what our plan 

is and this is what our goal is, to get more units at the higher levels of readiness. 

Mr. ORTIZ. Anybody else that would like to respond to that question? 

Mr. KOSIAK. I would add a little to that. I guess there are three 

parts to it. One is it is hard to know how long it will take to recover when we are not likely to simply end the operations in Iraq 

and Afghanistan. So they are likely to continue at some level. So 

it is sort of going to be an ongoing process, I think, of trying to, 

you know, build up readiness. 

I would say in the case of equipment, in many cases—I think I 

mentioned in my statement, you know, it takes two years to get a 

piece of equipment, you know, from the time it is appropriated, 

funding is appropriated for it to get it into the hands of 

servicemembers. So I think at a minimum, even when you are 

done, there is going to be a lag of a couple of years before the services get all their equipment. 

And then beyond that, I think the personnel issue is a more serious, potentially long-term issue in terms of recovering because, you 

know, obviously some members of the military are only there for 

a few years. Some are there for 20 years, some for more. 

But I think that is also a very complicated issue, as Congressman Saxton and Miche`le pointed out. It is hard to know just how 

serious the problems are in that area. But I think it is an area 

that, you know, potentially—and that is the reason you really want 

to look at it so closely and you want to track things so closely because that is potentially sort of the longest term kind of problem 

area to recover from. 

Mr. ORTIZ. You know, we have seen that the Department has initiated some initiatives, such as the Grow the Force and reset. I was 

just wondering whether that is adequate enough to fully address 

the seriousness. You know, because we are going through a lot of— 

it is a big ball of wax when we look at the prepositioning stock. 

Then we have grown the force by at least 70,000 soldiers. And 

18 

when you don’t have the equipment, how are you going to train 

them? 

Because it has come to our knowledge that in many instances 

maybe a year ago some of the soldiers did not have the equipment 

to go fight a war until they arrived in Kuwait. So, you know, and 

to build the equipment takes several years. You don’t just say you 

need, you know, 40 Humvees or 50 tanks and you are going to get 

them the next day. It takes time. And some of that equipment has 

been damaged. 

Do you think that those initiatives are adequate to fully address 

the needs that we encounter today? 

Ms. PICKUP. Well, I am going to have my colleague, Bill Solis, 

come up to address some of the specific prepositioning and equipment issues that you are asking about. But I do think it is important to note that the Department itself has some pretty significant 

and lengthy timelines in terms of some of their reset and 

prepositioning plans. And I also think that some of our other work 

suggests that while they do have strategies, it is not really clear 

to what extent, particularly with equipment, that their strategies 

are addressing the near-term versus the long-term needs. 

And one last thing in terms of the training area, we have said 

that because of the focus on counterinsurgency that they do need 

to look at some near-term potential adjustments that they can 

make to start incorporating more full spectrum training into the 

curriculum. But I will have Mr. Solis address some of the more specifics about equipment. 

Mr. ORTIZ. Sure. Go ahead. 

Ms. FLOURNOY. Sir, if I may just add to that, I think in addition 

to the Grow the Force initiative and the reset and the modernization investment, there are some force management things that I 

think should be looked at in terms of whether we can shift the balance even further between the institutional Army, meaning the 

nondeployed Army, and the deployable part, the operational part of 

the Army. I think it is worth looking carefully at whether more of 

the Army could be made deployable and whether we can get force 

management to actually identify additional individuals who could 

deploy that haven’t deployed yet. 

I have heard many anecdotal examples of people who are dying 

to get to the fight and have trouble getting there because of how 

they are coded or their certain Military Occupational Specialty 

(MOS) or what have you. So I think the force management issue 

is another area that we might help in the short term. 

Mr. SOLIS. I would just offer in terms of the prepositioned equipment issues, the recent work that we have just completed for the 

committee indicates that the reset of prepositioned equipment will 

not occur, at least until 2015, and that is with the download of 

APS–3 and the reset of APS–5. So it is going to take some time. 

I think the estimate is somewhere between $10 billion to $12 billion to do that, although it is not really clear if that number—what 

that really covers because it is not clear in the budget estimates. 

But that is one example in terms of answering the question how 

long is this going to take. 

I think in reset—what we heard—now, some of this is pre- surge—it would cost the Army somewhere between $10 billion to 

19 

$12 billion, $13 billion a year for reset for up to 2 years after end 

of operations. But again, I am not sure if that number still holds 

or if, given things like the surge or other commitments or the 

amount of time that passes, if that number will go up. But clearly, 

it is going to take more time after the, you know, operations substantially end in Iraq and Afghanistan. 

Mr. ORTIZ. Thank you so much. And another question would be, 

you know, whether we are utilizing our depot facilities to do some 

of this work. But I don’t want to take all the time. 

Mr. Hunter. 

Mr. HUNTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And excuse me for having to break out of this very important hearing a couple of times. 

Let me ask you if you folks have any idea on how we get a good 

handle on precisely what we have in theater, both the stuff that 

is what you might consider war fighting equipment and the stuff 

that is support in nature. 

I talked to some of our Reserve folks last night and yesterday, 

and they talked about enormous expenditures purchasing things 

like freightliner trucks which are now over in theater. I think we 

have got lots of dirt-moving equipment, things that could be used 

by the Guard and Reserve back here in their domestic capacity 

when the governor puts his hat on and moves the Guard out to perform homeland missions, domestic missions. 

I think the first thing we have got to do is figure out what we 

have got. And do you have any ideas on how we would structure 

this inventory-taking, if you will? And first, do you think we should 

do it? 

Ms. FLOURNOY. Sir, I actually think it is a very important idea, 

and it is something we should do, both to know what we can bring 

home as part of resetting the force, what it would be better just to 

leave, and what we might want to cascade to the Iraqis as we build 

the institution of their army and their police forces. I would be 

loathe to add that burden to the operational force right now in 

terms of what they are trying to do. But it might be possible to 

task the individual services to send teams over to do that assessment for you. 

Mr. HUNTER. Okay. Okay. 

Mr. KOSIAK. Sir, I absolutely believe that is a great idea, and I 

think it should be done. I think, I believe, and I am not absolutely 

sure, but I believe the Army G–4 has undertaken something like 

this. So I think that would be a starting point to see what exactly 

they have done to try to get a handle around all the equipment 

that is not only in theater, but back here in the states. But I do 

think that is an absolutely good thing to do before we go about 

looking at what we need to buy for the future in terms of equipping 

the troops, not only back here, but for other conflicts. 

Mr. HUNTER. Well, I have sure talked to lots of folks that came 

back and didn’t bring their stuff back and largely because they 

said, hey, we will keep it here, and other people may need it when 

they get here. 

One of the members of this blue ribbon panel on the National 

Guard recommended the—he said, you know, here we have got this 

domestic system where we barcode everything, and you have got 

these vast inventories that are instantly retrievable in terms of 

20 

numbers and what you have got. Do we barcode our equipment in 

the services and the Guard? Do you know if we have any kind of 

a barcode system? 

Mr. KOSIAK. There is a unique identifier code, but once it goes 

into the pool of theater provided equipment I am not sure exactly 

how they account for that over there. 

Mr. HUNTER. Okay. Okay. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN [presiding]. Dr. Snyder. 

Dr. SNYDER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The title of this hearing today is military readiness implications 

for our strategic posture and just make two or three comments and 

then get you all’s response to that, will be all I will do. But ultimately will we be better off as a country when we in the Congress 

are having a hearing, perhaps joint hearings, called—rather than 

call it military readiness implications for our strategic posture we 

call it national security implications or national security readiness 

implications for our strategic posture? 

I note, Ms. Flournoy, number 10 on your list was you said—I 

think your words were ‘‘this is perhaps beyond the purview,’’ were 

your words. But number 10 on your list was increase the 

deployable operational capacity of civilian agencies to reduce the 

burden on the U.S. military and increase the chances of mission 

success. 

And then this study by RAND—not the RAND study that has 

been in the paper the last few days, but one called, ‘‘War By Other 

Means.’’ And in their section on investment priorities, they talk 

about the additional money that they think it will take to do counterinsurgency. And they get up in the range of $20 billion to $30 

billion additionally to do the kind of counterinsurgency that we 

ought to do. 

But a substantial amount of it is not going for additional military 

readiness. It has to do with other kinds of capacity. So I would like 

you all to respond to the question. Are we perhaps asking the 

wrong question? Should we be having a more expansive question 

when we talk about our national security readiness? 

And we will begin with you, Ms. Flournoy. 

Ms. FLOURNOY. I do think we should think more broadly in terms 

of the whole of government readiness, you know, for not only current operations, but future operations. Many of the—I would say, 

the majority—of the tasks that are critical to success in either Afghanistan, Iraq or just about any other operation you can imagine 

in the future are going to be fundamentally nonmilitary in nature. 

They are going to be economic, political, governance-related, and so 

forth. 

And right now what we are seeing is the absence of deployable 

operational civilian capacity as having two very detrimental effects 

on our military. One is they are experiencing tremendous mission 

creep as they have to undertake tasks for which, you know, really 

belong to—should belong to someone else. 

And two, it impairs our exit strategy as it becomes very difficult 

to achieve the nonsecurity-related goals that would enable our ultimate transition out. So I think looking more broadly, as you sugVerDate Nov 24 2008 14:51 Aug 03, 2009 Jkt 044782 PO 00000 Frm 00024 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 P:\MARY\DOCS\110-114\045000.000 HARM2 PsN: MARY
21 

gest, at the national security requirements and readiness for future 

operations would be a very useful thing to do. 

Dr. SNYDER. Mr. Kosiak. 

Ms. PICKUP. The only thing I would add to that, too, is—and I 

agree. You have to look at both. You have to look at the impact on 

our military. But you have to look at the broader issue. And I think 

this is where the committee and the Congress have been going with 

requiring the roles and missions review. 

And, you know, the question is how much more can our military 

handle and what should it take on, and what adjustments does it 

have to make in its own force structure if there are certain things 

that it will take on, such as stability operations. And as Miche`le 

mentioned, you know, the participation of the military in, not only 

the transition teams, but the provincial reconstruction teams and 

some of the economic development, et cetera, I mean, that just 

raises the broader question as to, from an interagency perspective, 

you know, what should the Department handle vis a vis the other 

agencies. So I think it is a very good question. 

Mr. KOSIAK. Yes, I would agree. It is, I think, a very good idea 

to look at in a sort of broader definition of national security. And 

I think in budgetary terms, of course, you have a significant 

amount of money going to the Department of Defense, you have a 

significant amount of money going to international affairs areas, 

and you have a significant amount going to homeland security. 

And those are all obviously important areas. And then sort of 

thinking in budgetary terms, you want to, you know, understand 

how much you are spending in each of those areas and what the 

cost and benefits of each of those areas are. 

Also, there is a lot of overlap. I mean, DOD is involved in all of 

those. DOD is involved obviously in Iraq and Afghanistan and 

those kinds of operations. But they are heavily involved in homeland security and would be, certainly, if we had any kind of weapons of mass destruction used here. And they are also involved 

heavily in a lot of important areas in sort of executing our foreign 

policy and foreign assistance. So I think that would be great. 

Dr. SNYDER. Ms. Flournoy’s statement there about increasing the 

operational capacity of civilian agencies also leaves off the question 

of the whole issue of interagency relationships, just having a 

deployable capacity doesn’t mean that you will actually get the job 

done or that they will get there in a timely fashion or do what you 

want them to do in the way that you want them to do in terms of 

working with other agencies. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Randy Forbes. 

Mr. FORBES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And thank all of you for being here. I am going to talk quickly 

because I only have a limited amount of time. But I think sometimes we get so far down in the weeds that we lose sight of the 

overall landscape. 

I remember a few years ago I walked in on a conversation with 

two friends of mine. And one of them was talking about a baseball 

team, and he was talking about how terrible the second baseman 

was, how bad the pitchers were, the weakness of the left field or 

how bad their batting was. And I looked to my other friend. I said 

22 

who is he talking about. And he rolled his eyes, and he said he is 

talking about the team that just won the World Series. 

And I think as I look, Ms. Flournoy, at your statement, one of 

the big things we need to keep in mind is—and I am assuming this 

is still correct because it is dated today’s date. But you said having 

just gotten back from two weeks in Iraq that you had the privilege 

of witnessing a U.S. military that is the most experienced, adaptive, professional, and capable force this country has ever fielded. 

And I assume that we all know they are more experienced. But 

I would assume that that means they are a more adaptive, more 

professional, more capable force than they were in 2000? 

Ms. FLOURNOY. I would say because of the incredible operational 

experience they have had, yes. 

Mr. FORBES. More adaptive, professional, and capable force than 

2003? 

Ms. FLOURNOY. As I said, I think the most—probably more 

than—— 

Mr. FORBES. More than 2005? 

Ms. FLOURNOY. In terms of the operational force, yes. 

Mr. FORBES. So then basically the force we have today is more 

adaptive, professional, and capable than they were in 2000, 2003, 

2005. You also say in your testimony—you say the bottom line of 

these most recent findings is that while the Reserve component is 

intended for use in overseas operations and homeland defense, it 

is not fully manned, trained or equipped to perform these missions. 

The gap in Reserve readiness creates a significant and little-noticed 

vulnerability in both disaster response and readiness for operations 

abroad. 

Can you tell me if the Reserve component was fully manned, 

trained, and equipped for the missions you describe on September 

10, 2001 or, for that matter, any time prior to 2000? 

Ms. FLOURNOY. I think the Reserve component has been chronically under-resourced. But I think the degree of its underresourcing is particularly acute now. I think the contrast I was trying to draw, sir—— 

Mr. FORBES. And you can put whatever you want in writing. I 

have just got five minutes. You have got to talk quick. 

Ms. FLOURNOY. Okay, I am sorry. 

Mr. FORBES. Can you answer my question? Were they at September 10, 2001 or any time prior to 2000—were they fully 

manned, trained, and equipped for the missions you describe? 

Ms. FLOURNOY. No. 

Mr. FORBES. They were not? So we had, in your opinion, then a 

vulnerability in both disaster response and readiness for operations 

abroad in September of 2001 as well. 

Ms. FLOURNOY. Yes, we did. And it has gotten worse. 

Mr. FORBES. Okay. 

Mr. Kosiak, I would like to ask you a question now. If you can 

answer it today, fine. If you can’t, if you would get back to us. 

Based on your experience, can you tell us what it would cost 

today to create and sustain an Army, a Navy, and an Air Force 

that are all C–1 fully resourced and ready across the board to support the national military strategy? 

23 

Mr. KOSIAK. Well, I think I certainly couldn’t really answer that. 

I think the Congressional Budget Office has done some work in 

that area looking at plans over the next 10 or 20 years. Their estimate, I think, to actually execute the current plan, which includes 

modernization as well as readiness-related areas, you would have 

to probably increase spending on the order of $50 billion a year 

more. So you would have a steady state budget that would be $50 

billion higher than what we are currently projecting, something of 

that magnitude. 

Mr. FORBES. $50 billion if you were going to reach that goal? 

Mr. KOSIAK. Correct. 

Mr. FORBES. Now, back to the question I asked Ms. Flournoy, if 

you were listening there. If we made the choice as a nation to fully 

man, train, and equip our Reserve component at C–1 levels, current C–1 levels the way we measure them today, what would that 

cost? And would we, in fact, even be able to sustain a C–1 Reserve 

component? Wouldn’t our Reservists have to be in every weekend 

to train if they were to maintain a C–1 level? What is your 

thoughts? 

Mr. KOSIAK. I am not really suited to answer that question, I am 

afraid. 

Mr. FORBES. So you don’t have any estimates of cost on—— 

Mr. KOSIAK. No. 

Mr. FORBES. Okay, good. 

Mr. Chairman, I yield back. 

The CHAIRMAN. Ms. Flournoy, you stated that the Reserve forces 

are worse today than they were? Mr. Forbes asked you about the 

initial date. 

Ms. FLOURNOY. I think what I would like to highlight is the degree of equipment shortage and the degree of personnel shortage 

is, to my knowledge, higher now than it has been in recent memory 

because of the extent to which we have used the Guard and Reserve components in operations and the extent to which we have 

under-resourced them budgetarily. 

The CHAIRMAN. Ms. Gillibrand. 

Mrs. GILLIBRAND. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you all for your testimony. I want to go back to the issue 

that we began to address of the Reserve components. What recommendations do you have for how we can strengthen them. Particularly I am concerned about recruitment and retention because 

you cited some statistics in your testimony about the reduction in 

recruitment and retention. 

And Mr. Chairman had asked a number of us under the leadership of Congressman Cooper to work on a roles and missions panel 

to begin to think about these issues, think outside the box, make 

some suggested recommendations about areas to review. And one 

of the areas that we discussed for the Reserve component was to 

increase recruitment by offering some flexibility in terms of whether new members would prefer to be stateside mission only or take 

on foreign missions as a recruitment tool that would be non-binding. So obviously if we needed them all in theater abroad, they 

could all be sent abroad. 

In your opinion, would that increase retention and recruitment? 

Also, a second suggestion that was discussed was whether or not 

24 

we could train the Reserve components to be stabilization forces because they have some traditional training in terms of rebuilding efforts. They have a skill set unique to the National Guard and Reserve, some being engineers, some being plumbers, some being 

transportation specialists and having those unique backgrounds of 

being in the private sector. 

Do you think it would be possible to look to the Reserve component, particularly the Guard as a stability force, both for natural 

disasters, terrorist attacks here at home, but also for rebuilding 

forces when we need them abroad? Because your initial testimony 

was about engaging the civil agencies. This might be another place 

to look to create a stronger force, greater readiness, greater recruitment and retention down the road. And I just want your thoughts 

if that is something worth discussing or you see some problems in 

that area. 

Ms. FLOURNOY. Thank you. Let me start with your last point. I 

do think we can make better use of our Reservists in terms of looking for critical civilian skills that reside in the Reserves when we 

are conducting stability operations, counterinsurgency, and so 

forth. I am actually the wife of a Reservist who is mobilized mainly 

for his civilian skills to be deployed in support of Afghanistan. 

So I think we could do a better job of that. Although I would advise against restricting the mission of the National Guard or any 

part of the Reserves to only stabilization because I think they play 

important roles across the spectrum. 

In terms of your idea of recruiting—— 

Mrs. GILLIBRAND. But would you expand it, not necessarily restrict it, but expand it to make sure that they could do all of the 

various new missions? Because you were talking earlier about how 

the missions of all our active duty and Reserve components have 

been expanded under the current operations required for Afghanistan and Iraq. 

Ms. FLOURNOY. Yes. 

Mrs. GILLIBRAND. So I am not really talking about reducing it at 

all. I would keep them having—have their military readiness for 

combat but adding to that the specialized training to be a real force 

that can do stability operations and rebuilding if necessary if we 

find ourselves in this kind of situation again. 

Ms. FLOURNOY. I think greater attention to preparation and 

training for the full range of missions, including stability operations in terms of the irregular warfare part of the spectrum—I 

think that would be a positive thing. 

In terms of recruitment, I will just preface this by—I haven’t 

looked at this closely, but my concern about the idea of recruiting 

separately for sort of a domestic Guard versus an overseas is that 

you might undermine—I mean, you might actually get an overwhelming response for the domestic side and actually undercut 

your ability to effectively recruit for overseas missions or vice 

versa. It also presents some fairly significant force management 

challenges in terms of managing individuals who have different 

preferences within the same unit and maintaining unit cohesion. 

So I am not sure exactly how that would work. But I think two 

of the areas that Congress can take definite action on is bringing 

the Reserves up to their authorized level of equipment in terms of 

25 

fully funding them and personnel and also looking at the variety 

of contracts. 

Right now we have got this sort of weekend warrior model and 

the active duty model. And I think there is ample room to create 

levels of service and commitments in that middle range that would 

allow us to get more out of our Reserve component in support of 

current demands. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. Before I call Mrs. Davis, what about 

the readiness of our National Guard to assist in natural disasters? 

Ms. FLOURNOY. Sir, my understanding is that, you know, the 

issue there is for units that have left equipment overseas that is 

somewhat constraining their readiness to respond to some contingencies at home. It is not universal, but some units it is a problem. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mrs. Davis. 

Mrs. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. Thank you very much. And I am 

sorry I missed your testimony. But if I could try and just pick up 

from a few of the other thoughts and a few of your brief remarks, 

Ms. Flournoy. You cite the need for mid-level officers and the need 

for incentives. And part of that, I think, we would greatly support 

because it speaks to the need for more education, more dwell time, 

more think time that is really needed for people to be the great officers that we hope for in this country. 

And I am wondering how that then really jives with the need 

that we have to keep people engaged in an active way. How do you 

think we best do that? Is that through greater end strength? Is 

that through allowing us to have people take that time off in order 

to do that? 

Ms. FLOURNOY. Again, I think it is a very important issue. I 

think the way to create that additional flextime is to grow the overall size of the force, but particularly the operational part of the 

force. 

I think it would be very interesting to try to do a survey of people who are choosing to get out as to why they are choosing to get 

out because my anecdotal information suggests that a lot of these 

people love the service, love serving their country, would love to 

stay in, but they just, after deployment three or deployment four, 

they just need a little bit of a break. They need a year to go to 

school. They need a year to see their family, and then they are willing to go at it again. 

So that is anecdotal information. But I think if we grow the 

force, and particularly move more of the institutional force into the 

operational force, grow the size of the pool for deployment, we 

would hopefully over time create more of the flextime that would 

allow us to do a better job of retaining the best quality officers. 

Ms. PICKUP. And I guess what I would add to that is that these 

operations have also given us some more information on this reliance on the other services as well. And, you know, one of the things 

that we have recommended is that DOD have better data on these 

strategies that they have used to, in particular, rely on the Air 

Force and the Navy to perform some of the tasks formally handled 

by ground force missions—ground forces and also to evaluate the 

impact and the feasibility of either continuing those strategies or 

modifying those strategies. 

26 

And I guess it is a long way of saying it is looking at joint 

sourcing solutions as well because there have been some experiences gained in that manner. So that might be something to look 

toward the future. And the fact of the matter is the reason why 

they have had to rely on the Air Force and Navy is because exactly 

what you were talking about. 

There are certain areas where folks have been repeatedly deployed because of their specialty skills. And it has placed more 

stress on them. 

Mrs. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. Yes. Do you see being able to expand 

that? And I know several of my colleagues have talked about the 

interagency reform, the ideas that we have been trying to put forth 

to help us go beyond the military solutions. And I am wondering 

do you see a way of conjointly training for missions that would 

have the military capability, but in many ways, reaching out to civilians who, in fact, want to have the opportunity to serve in a 

fashion but are not in the service or are not in the military. Are 

we missing something in not being able to deal with that in a much 

more creative fashion? 

Ms. FLOURNOY. Yes. I think we are missing an opportunity. And 

again, just coming out of Iraq, I saw many, many military officers 

doing jobs that I would have thought should be done by civilian experts. But they were doing them—and power to them, and thank 

God to them. But, you know, they were doing it because there was 

nobody else to do it. 

There was not adequate capacity, and they were stepping up to 

the plate and doing governance and doing rule of law and doing negotiations between parties because they were the only ones there. 

So I think augmenting our military with effective civilian capacity 

could be a huge benefit to the Nation. 

Mrs. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. Do any of you see doing that in a 

more formal fashion? I mean, civilian academies—we obviously 

have schools that have great conflict resolution programs and 

whatever. But I am just thinking of the ideas that have been put 

forth that really would create those kind of academies that would 

bring in more civilian personnel, the kind of folks who might work 

for nongovernmental agencies but, you know, don’t. 

Ms. PICKUP. Well, I guess the only thing I would add is that I 

think it needs to start with a fundamental reassessment of the 

roles and missions and, you know, what the role of the military is 

and what exactly should the military be doing versus the other 

agencies. And then from there you can decide what the mechanisms are and what the educational requirements are and what the 

coordination mechanisms are to reflect those roles and missions. 

Mrs. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. Murphy. 

Mr. MURPHY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you, panel, for testifying today. I know my neighbors were 

called to other hearings and other votes. 

I would just like to mention that we all know that our servicemen and women in Iraq and Afghanistan are doing a fantastic job. 

And in many of their cases, they are doing actually civil affair jobs, 

27 

so-called nation building, some of which aren’t really trained to do 

that. But they do their job without complaining. 

When I visited Afghanistan last year and asked some of the 

troops about their experiences, one said to me, ‘‘Sir, we are here. 

Where the hell is everybody else.’’ He wanted to know why his soldiers were doing the civil and political jobs that are really the responsibility of the U.S. Agency for International Development 

(USAID) and the State Department. 

Ms. Flournoy, one of your recommendations is that to increase 

the deployable operational capacity of civilian agencies to reduce 

the burden on the U.S. military, increase the chances of mission 

success. I agree. I think the question for the group is how. So I will 

ask the panel quickly. 

Our Army is at a breaking point because of repeated deployments to Iraq. So what can we do to get the rest of our government 

off the sidelines right now so that our troops can focus on being the 

war fighters and not the nation builders? Thank you. 

Ms. FLOURNOY. I would start by saying I think there are three 

or four components. The first is billets. We don’t have enough civilian spaces, if you will. We need more civilian personnel in government. I think we need to create a civilian reserve, and I think we 

need to enhance our ability to contract civilian personnel with the 

required specialties. 

Second, incentives—right now the incentive structure in our various agencies does not necessarily reward or promote operational 

experience or preparation therefore. So I think creating incentive 

structures that say if you want to make senior executive service, 

you have got to be, you know, doing operational things—— 

And the final thing is the education and training. We don’t invest 

in the professional development of our civilians the way we do in 

our military. We need to create a serious professional development 

program if we are going to grow the kind of civilians that can do 

the integrating function for operations as complex as Afghanistan 

or Iraq. 

Ms. PICKUP. One other thing I would add to that—and we have 

some work going on, for example, on these provincial reconstruction 

teams which are, in some cases, a shared responsibility between 

the military and State and AID. And I think one of the things that 

we are looking at is whether there needs to be any policies and procedural changes from a personnel standpoint to incentivize and to, 

you know, kind of change the rules of engagement for civilians 

overseas in the foreign service—— 

Because, you know, the military obviously has an obligation to 

be mobilized and deployed. Whereas the rules governing civilians 

in combat environments are not quite the same obligations. 

Mr. MURPHY. I think a follow-up that I would have is that under 

the incentives, the system doesn’t reward operational experience. 

Can you expound on that? 

Ms. FLOURNOY. Well, if you take, for example, within the State 

Department, the kinds of embassy assignments that historically 

have gotten you promotions have been in the capitals of major allies, not necessarily in conflict zones. Nor have we focused on the 

sort of operational skill sets. 

28 

A lot of our diplomats—their training has been focused on representing the United States and reporting back on what they see 

in whatever embassy they are as opposed to the sort of nitty gritty 

negotiation, conflict resolution, political type of skills. So I think 

that there is room for creating a cadre of people who are really focused on operational issues and who are signing up for careers of 

going to multiple operations over time. 

And we should reward that. And we should incentivize it appropriately. And we just don’t do that today within the State Department or USAID or any other civilian agency. 

Mr. MURPHY. And does that type of change have to be mandated 

by Congress? Or does it have to just be—it sounds like a different 

culture is needed. But how do we make that change become a reality? 

Ms. FLOURNOY. I think the incentive changes could be done at 

the leadership level in the departments. But the resources are 

needed—Congress needs to provide the necessary resources to support both the expansion of the number of people, their training and 

professional development and so forth. 

I think if the agencies fail to change that incentive, you have the 

precedent of something like Goldwater-Nichols where you make a 

legislative change that fundamentally changes an incentive. 

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman. 

Mr. Solis, may I ask you a question? I assume the GAO has 

looked at the training of our forces. Am I correct? 

Mr. SOLIS. That is correct. 

The CHAIRMAN. Do our Army brigades receive enough training to 

be able to undertake a combined arms operations against a conventional military right now? 

Mr. SOLIS. Well, I think if you look at what we used to do—for 

example, we had rotations to the National Training Center to do 

maneuver operations. We had the Joint Readiness Training Center 

(JRTC) where we did operations for our light infantry. 

Those rotations are not—we are not doing the same level of that 

kind of thing anymore. Most of the time when we come back for 

the training, it is to get ready to go back to do the counterinsurgency type. So I think in terms of those kinds of things, we are not 

doing the heavy maneuver-type of operations or training that we 

did in the past. 

The CHAIRMAN. Those skills are perishable, am I correct? 

Mr. SOLIS. Yes. 

The CHAIRMAN. In your opinion, how long would it take to restore that capability, Mr. Solis? 

Mr. SOLIS. I think, you know, it depends in terms of the intensity. For example, it is what you are training for. Some of this 

would occur at home station in small, company-level exercises. You 

would begin to do that as well as the graduate-level exercise, as I 

mentioned, in the National Training Center. 

So it takes time. I mean, it takes time to do a lot of these different things in terms of the different missions. The one thing I 

would add—and I would think that needs to be discussed at some 

point is how many more missions can the military do in terms of 

the types of missions, not only the high-end, but the stability operVerDate Nov 24 2008 14:51 Aug 03, 2009 Jkt 044782 PO 00000 Frm 00032 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 P:\MARY\DOCS\110-114\045000.000 HARM2 PsN: MARY
29 

ations, which General Casey has now said is going to be a core mission, the reconstruction-type things. 

There is a lot of things that are being put on the plate of the 

military right now, particularly the Army. So I think when you 

start putting all those things together, it creates a lot of time constraints on the ability to train in any circumstance. 

The CHAIRMAN. As was brought out in the discussion with Mr. 

Murphy a few moments ago, the other agencies have not lived up 

to their billing in assisting and so much has fallen on the backs 

of the military. Am I correct in Afghanistan and Iraq? 

Mr. SOLIS. That is correct. And another thing that I think this 

committee may want to look into and we allude to in the testimony 

is the use of contractors in deployed locations in contingency operations. Today in Iraq and Afghanistan, I believe we have almost 

200,000 contractors that are supporting DOD alone. 

And that is not just with Logistics Civil Augmentation Program 

(LOGCAP). That is with linguist intel officers, unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) operators, a whole host of folks who are providing support to the military. And the question becomes from a strategic 

piece into the future well, how will the reliance upon contractors, 

particularly for operations, be looked at, particularly in the war 

plans and operational plans and will they be there when we need 

them. 

The CHAIRMAN. I have no further requests for a time. So, ladies 

and gentlemen, we really appreciate your being with us. It has 

been very helpful. It is an area that our committee intends to continue working on. It is the right thing to do, plus it is our constitutional duty. So we appreciate it so much. 

The meeting is adjourned. Thank you. 

[Whereupon, at 1:04 p.m., the committee was adjourned.] 

A P P E N D I X 

FEBRUARY 14, 2008 

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD 

FEBRUARY 14, 2008 

(35) 


44782.001
36 


44782.002
37 


44782.003
38 


44782.004
39 


44782.005
40 


44782.006
41 


44782.007
42 


44782.008
43 


44782.009
44 


44782.010
45 


44782.011
46 


44782.012
47 


44782.013
48 


44782.014
49 


44782.015
50 


44782.016
51 


44782.017
52 


44782.018
53 


44782.019
54 


44782.020
55 


44782.021
56 


44782.022
57 


44782.023
58 


44782.024
59 


44782.025
60 


44782.026
61 


44782.027
62 


44782.028
63 


44782.029
64 


44782.030
65 


44782.031
66 


44782.032
67 


44782.033
68 


44782.034
69 


44782.035
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING 

FEBRUARY 14, 2008 

(73) 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. CUMMINGS 

Mr. CUMMINGS. The suicide rate among active-duty soldiers in 2007 is at the highest level ever experienced since the Army started keeping record of suicide statistics 

amongst our troops. The Marine Corps have also seen a slight increase of suicides 

during 2007 with a rate of 17.5 per 100,000. a) During your research and study did 

you see any efforts or reports at the Department of Defense that capture suicide statistics and trends for all military Services, to include Reservists and National 

Guardsmen and family members? b) What efforts at the DOD level are in place to 

provide a complete Department-wide analysis of these high suicide rates? In addition how much is the Defense budget is dedicated to decreasing the suicide rate? 

Ms. FLOURNOY. I received your question and appreciate your close attention to the 

readiness challenges of the U.S. military, especially the ground forces. The active 

involvement of the Congress in these issues is vital to improving the health of the 

armed forces and to guarding against strategic risk to the nation. I look forward 

to doing what I can to continue to support your efforts. 

Regarding your question about the suicide rates among active-duty soldiers in 

2007, I have not seen any DOD reports, but the Army does appear to be tracking 

those trend lines. My own statements about the rise in suicide rates come from conversations with colleagues in the office of the Army Chief of Staff and from recent 

press reports. If I do learn more about DOD reporting on suicide trends in the 

Army, I will contact your staff to share what I learn. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. In October 2007 ‘‘A Comprehensive Strategy for 21st Century 

Seapower’’ was introduced at the International Sea Power Symposium as the new 

Maritime Strategy. The strategy called for combined operations of the United States 

Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard to act across the full range of military operations to secure the United States from direct attack; secure strategic access and 

retain global freedom of action; while strengthening existing and emerging alliances. 

Throughout your research were you able to take a look at this proposed strategy 

in regards to readiness taking in consideration the United States Navy, Marine 

Corps and Coast Guards unique missions and current operational tempo, personnel, 

and equipment statistics? 

Ms. FLOURNOY. I am familiar with the new maritime strategy, but I have not assessed its implications for the readiness of the U.S. Navy, U.S. Marine Corps, or 

U.S. Coast Guard in detail. However, I understand that many of the engagement 

ventures described in the strategy would be conducted as part of steady-state activities under the normal rotation cycles of the services. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. The current Defense Budget request includes $389 million or $246 

million above previously enacted funds, to launch the new Africa Command initiative. Particularly, funds will be utilize to, 1) strengthen the U.S. security cooperation with African countries; 2) train and equip our partners; 3) improve health, education, and economic development; and 4) promote peace and stability. As you are 

aware, Africa Command officially attained its initial operation capability as of October 1, 2007 and is scheduled to achieve full operation capability a little less than 

a year from now—on October 1, 2008. To achieve this targeted goal, a number of 

issues relevant to the location of the headquarters, composition and overall apprehensiveness by some key leaders within the continent of Africa must be resolved. 

What is your opinion of how great of a strain the development of AFRICOM will 

place on our current military, especially given that the President has requested 

nearly $389 million for FY09 funding for this initiative? 

Mr. KOSIAK. It is difficult to assess how significant a strain the development of 

AFRICOM will be for the U.S. military. Much will depend on how the command operates and the range of activities it becomes involved in. In the context of at $518 

billion FY 2009 request for the Department of Defense (DOD), $389 million for 

AFRICOM should be manageable. On the other hand, given the extent to which the 

Services are currently overstretched with operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, one 

needs to be cautious about any expansion of U.S. military commitments. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. My question is in regards to the recruitment and retention of minority officers and the Department of Defense’s efforts to increase the demographics 

of Flag Officers across the DOD. Secretary Gates stated in his testimony before this 

74 

committee last week that the FY2009 base budget provides $15.5 billion to increase 

the active Army’s end strength 532,400 and grow the Marine Corps’ end strength 

to 194,000. First, do you believe that this funding is enough to really increase the 

force to these levels and thereby, improve readiness? Second, do you believe that a 

portion of the funding should be targeted toward the recruitment and retention of 

minority officers given that the current levels are dangerously low? 

Mr. KOSIAK. I believe that $15.5 billion should be roughly adequate to fund the 

planned increase in Army and Marine Corps end strength. This figure is close to 

the estimates of those costs provided by the Congressional Budget Office (CBO). 

Given the recent decline in recruitment rates for African Americans in particular, 

which have—since the beginning of the All Volunteer Force (AVF)—traditionally figured especially prominently in the Army’s ability to sustain a high quality force, it 

may be appropriate to target additional funding to recruiting and retaining African 

American and other minority personnel. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. What impact is the use of individual augmentees and in-lieu of 

forces having on individual and unit readiness? And how does the Department of 

Defense’s strategic plan resolve these issues in the short term and long term? 

Ms. PICKUP. While DOD has established metrics to formally report unit readiness, 

it does not formally report individual readiness. Nonetheless, CENTCOM’s demands 

for individual augmentees and in-lieu of forces have created challenges for individuals from across the force. Leaders and personnel from selected high demand occupations—engineers, explosive ordnance disposal, security forces, intelligence, and 

others—have experienced high deployment rates, with many personnel deployed at 

rates above DOD’s deployment goals. These goals generally call for active forces to 

spend twice as much time at home as deployed and for reserve component forces 

to spend five times as much time at home as mobilized. CENTCOM’s demands for 

individual augmentees and in-lieu of forces have had a mixed impact on unit readiness. CENTCOM’s high demand for leaders to fill individual augmentee and other 

requirements, such as transition teams, have left fewer of these key personnel available to fill units that are not deployed to the CENTCOM area of operations. Shortages in personnel, including leaders, reduce units’ readiness levels. However, because deployed units generally have higher readiness levels than non-deployed 

units, the high deployment rates in the communities that are deploying in-lieu of 

units may actually cause readiness rates to increase within those communities. To 

our knowledge, DOD does not have a strategic plan that specifically addresses these 

issues. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. On January 31st the Commission on the National Guard and Reserve issued its final report and cited substantial shortcomings, notably in equipment, training, and personnel of the reserve components. The report also noted that 

the U.S. military is not prepared for a catastrophic attack on the country, and NG 

forces do not have the equipment or training they need in order to do their job. 

Fewer Army National Guard units are combat-ready today than were nearly a year 

ago when the Commission on the National Guard and Reserves determined that 88 

percent of the units were not prepared. What plans are being considered in the future of the reserve components readiness posture and ensuring their ability to respond to a major Weapons of Mass Destruction attack on our nation? 

Ms. PICKUP. The reserve components of the Army—the Army National Guard and 

the Army Reserve—have borne a heavy burden in continuing to support the ongoing 

high operational tempo. Because the Army’s reserve components were considered 

primarily later-deploying forces, they were maintained at lower levels of readiness 

for combat than their active counterparts. However, to support operational requirements with ready units, the reserve components transferred personnel and equipment to deploying units, which left fewer personnel and less equipment with nondeployed forces to train for future missions and for the National Guard units to use 

for their state missions, such as responding to natural disasters. The Army has 

taken steps, such as providing additional equipment directly to deploying units to 

ensure that they are equipped for their missions, although in some cases units are 

provided certain equipment items only while they are in the theater of operations. 

The Army has stated its intent to equip Guard and reserve forces to a readiness 

level similar to that of active Army units in the future. However, the timeframe for 

equipping Guard units has been delayed by 8 years from initial estimates to 2019, 

and costs have not been fully defined. In addition, the Army has a number of initiatives, including growing the force and prepositioning equipment, that will compete 

for funding over the period. 

As we have reported, how ready the nation is to respond to a large scale, multistate incident, such as an attack involving weapons of mass destruction is not clear 

because the multiple state and federal agencies that would be involved in responding have not yet completed and integrated their plans. This planning is the first 

75 

step toward identifying the types and quantities of personnel and equipment that 

would be needed to respond to such an event. The Department of Homeland Security, which is the lead federal agency responsible for preventing, preparing for, and 

responding to a wide range of major domestic disasters and other emergencies, conducts strategic level planning. DHS does not conduct detailed operational planning 

that identifies specific types and quantities of personnel and equipment needed to 

respond relying instead on the states or other federal agencies such as DOD to identify specific requirements. The recent National Planning annex to Homeland Security Presidential Directive 8 requires DHS and other federal agencies to conduct 

much more detailed operational planning as well as integrate their combined planning efforts. If this effort is consistently and diligently pursued, the key federal 

agencies, particularly DHS and DOD, may begin to have a much better understanding of the requirements necessary to respond to an incident involving a weapon of mass destruction (WMD) in the United States. In its 2005 Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support, the Department of Defense has stated that it will 

be prepared to provide forces and capabilities in support of domestic chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear and high yield explosive (CBRNE) consequence management, with an emphasis on preparing for multiple, simultaneous mass casualty incidents. DOD has created some specialized capability for CBRNE response, such as 

• a dedicated command and control element (currently the Joint Task Force— 

Civil Support); 

• National Guard Weapons of Mass Destruction Civil Support Teams and 

CBRNE Enhanced Response Force Packages; 

• and an active component CBRNE Consequence Management Response Force 

(CCMRF). 

However, these forces are only meant to provide an initial response to a CBRNE 

incident. Further, DOD has not fully resourced the CCMRF, and DOD plans to rely 

on dual-capable forces for the domestic CBRNE consequence management mission, 

just as it does for missions of support to civil authorities for natural disasters. 

The National Guard Bureau has initiatives under way to enhance the capability 

of the National Guard to respond to some types of mass destruction attacks. For 

example, in addition to the establishment of 55 22-person WMD Civil Support 

Teams, the National Guard Bureau established 17 CBRNE enhanced response force 

packages, which are designed to locate and extract victims from a contaminated environment, perform mass casualty/patient decontamination, and provide medical 

treatment in response to one of these events. The National Guard Bureau is also 

in the final stage of defining and identifying resourcing for temporarily covering the 

CCMRF requirements, which are expected to include more than 15,000 personnel 

trained and equipped for a response to a domestic WMD attack. However, it is not 

clear to what extent DOD will fund these initiatives or the level of preparedness 

DOD funding will achieve. 

The 2008 National Defense Authorization Act directed DOD to include reports on 

the National Guard’s readiness to perform tasks required to support civil authorities 

during events envisioned by the National Response Plan in its quarterly reports on 

personnel and unit readiness. However, until DOD issues these reports, the readiness posture of National Guard for domestic missions, including readiness to respond to a major weapons of mass destruction attack, will remain unclear. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. What actions are being taken to protect the funding and budget 

of the operational forces to meet their readiness requirements for security of our 

homeland? 

Ms. PICKUP. As stated above, with a few exceptions, it is DOD’s policy to rely on 

dual capable forces to support homeland missions, and it has dedicated few forces 

specifically for this mission. For example, the 55 National Guard CSTs are dedicated 

solely to the mission of assisting civil authorities in responding to WMD incidents 

in the United States. While the National Guard CBRNE Enhanced Response Force 

Packages are designed to meet the domestic response mission, they are composed 

of units and personnel who may be activated and deployed as part of overseas missions. This is also the case with the larger CBRNE consequence management response force (CCMRF). This means that the readiness of these forces will be subject 

to DOD’s warfighting priorities. U.S. Northern Command, which is responsible for 

DOD’s homeland defense and civil support missions in the continental United 

States, has very few actual forces assigned to it. As a result, the command must 

rely on the same pool of dual-capable forces that can be tasked with other DOD missions. The CBRNE consequence management response force (CCMRF) is intended 

to be an active component force to provide assistance to civil authorities in the event 

of one or more weapons of mass destruction incidents. However, due to the scope 

76 

1Pub. L. No. 110–181, § 1815 (2008). 

and pace of ongoing operations overseas, DOD has been unsuccessful in fully activating these units. There remains a significant amount of confusion about how these 

units will be fully manned and equipped. In the short term, the use of National 

Guard units to fill the requirements raises funding concerns and questions about 

whether state or federal authorities would exercise command and control during a 

CCMRF response. In the long term, it is not clear how DOD intends to fully source 

the CCMRF with active duty units. 

With the exception of the CSTs, there are therefore very few funds ‘‘protected’’ in 

terms of being dedicated solely to homeland missions. However, the fiscal year 2008 

National Defense Authorization Act requires DOD to develop a plan for funding 

military-unique capabilities for civil support.1 The act calls for the Secretary of Defense to develop and implement a plan, in coordination with the Secretaries of the 

military departments and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, for providing 

funds and resources necessary to develop and maintain, among other things, the 

military-unique capabilities needed to be provided by the DOD to support civil authorities in an incident of national significance or a catastrophic incident. However, 

while this may help DOD gain a better understanding of its civil support requirements and the capabilities it needs to maintain to meet them, none of these provisions requires DOD to establish and fund capabilities that would be dedicated solely 

to the homeland mission. 

Æ