Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-746 | December 7, 2018 Page 1 of 7

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral 

estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

R. Patrick Magrath

Alcorn Sage Schwartz & Magrath, LLP

Madison, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Curtis T. Hill, Jr.

Attorney General of Indiana

Caroline G. Templeton

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

IN THE

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Andrew Douglas,

Appellant-Defendant,

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Plaintiff

December 7, 2018

Court of Appeals Case No.

18A-CR-746

Appeal from the Bartholomew 

Superior Court

The Honorable Kathleen Tighe 

Coriden, Judge

Trial Court Cause No.

03D02-1707-CM-3706

May, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-746 | December 7, 2018 Page 2 of 7

[1] Andrew Douglas appeals his conviction of Class A misdemeanor battery 

resulting in bodily injury.

1

 He argues the State produced insufficient evidence 

to rebut his claims of self-defense and defense of other. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] Douglas separated from his wife, M.D., on February 15, 2017. Following their 

separation, the couple’s sons, twelve-year-old K.D. and five-year-old B.D., lived 

primarily with Douglas at his parents’ house. On April 3, 2017, while M.D. 

had custody of their sons, Douglas informed M.D that he wanted a divorce. 

That same day, M.D. moved into Turning Point shelter with K.D. and B.D., 

and she refused to return the boys to Douglas. 

[3] On April 15, 2017, Douglas was driving in Columbus, and he passed a car 

driven by M.D.’s mother, Lynette Armstrong. Douglas noticed that his sons 

were in the car, so he turned around and followed Armstrong to her 

destination, McDonald’s. Douglas waited outside for Armstrong to exit with 

the boys, but he got impatient as they sat inside eating, so he went in to get 

them. Douglas picked up B.D., told K.D. to come with him, and began 

walking out with the children. B.D. appeared afraid and told Armstrong he did 

not want to go with Douglas. Armstrong yelled for someone to call the police, 

 

1 Ind. Code § 35-42-2-1.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-746 | December 7, 2018 Page 3 of 7

which the manager of McDonald’s did, and Armstrong followed Douglas and 

the boys out of the restaurant. 

[4] Outside the restaurant, K.D. climbed into the front passenger seat of Douglas’ 

car and buckled his seatbelt. Douglas buckled B.D. into his booster seat, which 

was behind the driver’s seat, and shut the back door of the car. B.D. was 

crying, so Armstrong opened the driver-side back door, perched herself on the 

edge of the back seat, with one foot in the car and one foot on the ground, and

tried to console B.D. While she was there, Douglas shut the driver-side back

door with such force that Armstrong sustained a painful contusion on her lower 

left leg. Police arrived on the scene, took statements from numerous people, 

and determined the children would leave with Armstrong.

[5] The State charged Douglas with Class A misdemeanor battery resulting in 

bodily injury because he shut the door on Armstrong’s leg. The court held a 

bench trial at which Douglas, Armstrong, and the manager of McDonald’s 

testified. Douglas testified Armstrong was injured because she jumped in the 

way when he was shutting the car door. The court found Douglas guilty, 

specifically remarking: 

Mr. Douglas one of the things that I have to do is look at 

creditability and in doing that I am going to find that you are 

guilty of Battery Resulting in Bodily Injury as an A 

Misdemeanor. I’m finding that you did knowingly, or 

intentionally touch Lynette Armstrong in a rude insolent or 

angry manor resulting in bodily injury. What you did is beyond 

stupid, for a parent, but it’s also criminal. So I’m going to set this 

out for sentencing . . . .
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-746 | December 7, 2018 Page 4 of 7

(Tr. Vol. 2 at 44 (errors in original).)

Discussion and Decision

[6] Class A misdemeanor battery resulting in bodily injury occurs when a person 

“knowingly or intentionally touches another person in a rude, insolent, or angry 

manner” and that touching “results in bodily injury to any other person.” Ind.

Code § 35-42-2-1. Bodily injury is “any impairment of physical condition, 

including physical pain.” Ind. Code § 35-31.5-2-29. Douglas does not deny 

that he shut the car door on Armstrong’s leg, causing her injury. Instead he 

argues Armstrong was acting illegally and he therefore was “absolutely justified 

in actively attempting to prevent Armstrong’s illegal conduct.” (Appellant’s Br. 

at 12.) Under the circumstances that unfolded in this case, we must disagree. 

[7] Douglas essentially asserts he was acting in defense of himself or the boys. Our

standard for reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of evidence to rebut a 

claim of self-defense is the same standard used for any claim of insufficient 

evidence. Wallace v. State, 725 N.E.2d 837, 840 (Ind. 2000). We neither 

reweigh the evidence nor judge the credibility of the witnesses. Adetokunbo v. 

State, 29 N.E.3d 1277, 1280 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015). We consider only the 

probative evidence and reasonable inferences supporting the trial court’s 

decision. Id. “A conviction will be affirmed if there is substantial evidence of 

probative value such that a reasonable trier of fact could have concluded the 

defendant was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. at 1280-81.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-746 | December 7, 2018 Page 5 of 7

[8] “A valid claim of self-defense is legal justification for an otherwise criminal 

act[,]” Wallace, 725 N.E.2d at 840, and a claim of defense of other is analogous 

to a claim of self-defense. Rondeau v. State, 48 N.E.3d 907, 919 (Ind. Ct. App. 

2016), trans. denied. 

A person is justified in using reasonable force against any other 

person to protect the person or a third person from what the 

person reasonably believes to be the imminent use of unlawful 

force. However, a person:

(1) is justified in using deadly force; and

(2) does not have a duty to retreat;

if the person reasonably believes that that force is necessary to 

prevent serious bodily injury to the person or a third person or 

the commission of a forcible felony. No person in this state shall 

be placed in legal jeopardy of any kind whatsoever for protecting 

the person or a third person by reasonable means necessary.

Ind. Code § 35-41-3-2(c). 

[9] To prevail on such claims, a defendant must show he: (1) was in a place where 

he had a right to be; (2) did not provoke, instigate, or participate willingly in the 

violence; and (3) had a reasonable fear of death or great bodily harm. Wilson v. 

State, 770 N.E.2d 799, 800 (Ind. 2002). “When a claim of self-defense is raised 

and finds support in the evidence, the State bears the burden of negating at least 

one of the necessary elements.” King v. State, 61 N.E.3d 1275, 1283 (Ind. Ct. 

App. 2016), trans. denied. “The State may meet this burden by rebutting the 

defense directly, by affirmatively showing the defendant did not act in self-
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-746 | December 7, 2018 Page 6 of 7

defense, or by simply relying upon the sufficiency of its evidence in chief.” Id. 

If a defendant is convicted despite his claim of self-defense, we will reverse only 

if no reasonable person could say that self-defense was negated beyond a 

reasonable doubt. Wilson, 770 N.E.2d at 801.

[10] We cannot provide Douglas the relief he seeks because he provoked, instigated, 

and willingly participated in the circumstances that led to his slamming the 

door on Armstrong’s leg. See id. at 800 (defendant must show he did not 

provoke, instigate or participate willingly in the violence). Armstrong is the 

grandmother of K.D. and B.D., and they were placed in her care by M.D. 

Armstrong therefore was acting on M.D.’s authority when she took the boys to 

McDonald’s. Douglas arrived at McDonald’s without warning and, without 

speaking to Armstrong or explaining his behavior to the boys, grabbed B.D. and 

began to leave the restaurant, ordering K.D. to follow him. Douglas’ behavior 

understandably upset B.D. and Armstrong, and if B.D. had not been upset, 

Armstrong might not have felt the need to enter Douglas’ car to console him.

2

 

Because Douglas willingly instigated and provoked Armstrong’s behavior, 

 

2 Douglas argues Armstrong was committing: (1) Class B misdemeanor entering a motor vehicle without 

permission, Ind. Code § 35-43-4-2.7(d); (2) Class A misdemeanor criminal trespass for interfering with his 

possession of the vehicle, Ind. Code § 35-43-2-2(b); and (3) Class C misdemeanor interference with custody, 

Ind. Code § 35-42-3-4(b). (See Appellant’s Br. at 11-12.) Even if Armstrong had entered the car without 

Douglas’ permission and was interfering with his ability to abscond with his children, there was absolutely no 

evidence to suggest Armstrong was a threat to Douglas or the boys. Accordingly, if Douglas believed 

Armstrong was committing crimes, he should have waited for the police to arrive and reported those crimes

to the police. Douglas’ impatience to leave cannot justify his injuring his mother-in-law as she consoled his 

son in the car. As we note above, Douglas instigated, provoked, and willingly participated in the situation 

that resulted in his injuring Armstrong, and he therefore cannot claim he acted in defense of self or others. 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-746 | December 7, 2018 Page 7 of 7

Douglas cannot claim self-defense. See Wolf v. State, 76 N.E.3d 911, 917 (Ind. 

Ct. App. 2017) (where Wolf “initiated and willingly participated in the fight” 

trial court properly rejected his claim of self-defense). 

[11] We empathize with the circumstances that brought Douglas to McDonald’s on 

the day in question -- because he recently had separated from his wife and he 

not seen his sons for more than a week. We cannot, however, condone his 

behavior. Parents who cannot amicably reach an agreement regarding custody

of and visitation with their children need to turn to a court of law for assistance

with implementation of a schedule. Permitting parents to abscond with their 

children whenever and wherever they happen to find them would create chaos 

for children, which would be anxiety provoking, unhealthy, and unjust. As the 

State has a substantial interest in protecting the welfare of children, In re I.P., 5 

N.E.3d 750, 752 (Ind. 2014), we do not hesitate to affirm Douglas’ conviction. 

Conclusion

[12] Because Douglas’ rash behavior instigated and precipitated the injury to 

Armstrong, he cannot claim he was acting in defense of self or others. As such, 

we affirm his conviction of Class A misdemeanor battery resulting in bodily 

injury. 

[13] Affirmed.

Baker, J., and Robb, J., concur.