### T E X A S C O U R T O F A P P E A L S , T H I R D D I S T R I C T , A T A U S T I N

NO. 03-12-00128- CR

The State of Texas, App ellant

v. John Wi lliam V illegas, App ellee

F ROM TH E CO UNTY COURT AT LAW NO . 1 O F H AY S CO UNTY NO. 100 582, H ONO RAB LE ROB ERT UP DEGROVE, J UDGE P RESIDING

M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N

The State of Texas appea ls a pretria l order g ranting the motion to suppress of appellee J ohn Wil liam Villega s. In g ranting the motion to suppress, the trial court c oncluded that Villeg as had been unlawfully detained by a peac e office r prior to Villeg as’s arr est for the offe nse of driving while i ntox icated. In two points of error on appeal, the State a sserts that (1) the initial interac tion betwee n Villeg as and the office r wa s a consensual encounter rather tha n a dete ntion; and (2) eve n if the interac tion was a detention, the detention was justified by the office r’s community -ca retaking function. We will affirm the tr ial court’s or der.

BACK GR OUND The sole witness at the hear ing on the m o t i o n to suppress was Offic er Br ady T em p l eton of the San Marc os Police Depa rtment. Templeton testified that on the night of J uly 18, 2011, he was “dispatche d to a n acc ident investiga

tion near the intersec tion of Posey Road and the a cce ss road of I H 35, within the city limit s of San Marc os.” The dispatch was in r esponseto a 911 ca ll that ha d repor ted that a car had run off the road “into a bar ditch,” and that a man had been seen “running from the vehicle.” There was also appar ently a separ ate repor t that the vehicle

was on fire. Templeton testified that dispatch had provided him with “an are a to respond to” rathe r

1 than a prec ise location and that he had a rrived a t the are a at a

pproxi mately

10:50 p.m. Templeton also testified that dispatch had not provided him with a specific descr iption of the vehicle that had been involved in t h e accident and that, when he arr ived at the area, he had informed dispatch t hat he was “not sure” if the vehicle at the scene was the same vehicle that had been repor ted to dispatch. Templeton explained, “Part of the re ason I

made that state ment was be cause of the position of the

car , I co u l d n ’t see that it was stuck on top of an object in the ditch or the draina g e are a in that ditch rig ht there

. I t didn’t appea r to be wre cked at first from my ang le.” He added, “[T] here was no proper ty damag e that I could see.” Templeton further testified that, in addition to the vehicle not
appea ring to have been involved in an acc ident, the vehicle d i d n o t have its hazard lights on, its
eng ine appe are d to be off, there was no sign of smoke or fire comingfrom the ve hicle, ther e we re

no skid marks in the road or g rass nea r t h e v eh i cl e, and he saw no one in the vehicle exhibi ting
any sort of distress or seeking help. Templeton also could not tell if the vehicle was actua lly “stuck.” Templeton testified that when he arr ived at the scene , he parke d behind the vehicle. His patrol car ’s red and blue emer g ency lights wer e activate d, and his front-f acing lights re m ained on. The only person Te mpleton observed in the ve hicle wa s the driver , later ide ntified as Villeg as.

A video rec ording of Templeton’s interac tion with Villeg as, taken from Templeton’s patrol-c ar dash came ra, was admitted into evidenc e. In the rec ording , Templeton can be seen g etting

In addition to the rec ording of the call to 911, a rec ording of an office r’s call back to 911 1 was admitt ed int o evidenc e. In this call, the office r i nquires about a report o f a vehicle fire in the same are a. The 911 opera tor expresses surprise at the repor t of a vehicle fire, advising the office r, “We just got a

call of a white vehicle that ran of

f the a cce ss road into a ditch.” 2out of his patrol car and approa ching the vehicle, which was pulled over on the side o f t h e ro ad

. 2

Templeton uses what appea rs to be a flashlig ht to sear ch the are a around t h e v eh i cl e. When Templeton appr oache s the driver ’s side door of the vehicle , Villeg as appea rs to beg in openingthe door, but Templeton g rabs the door from him and fi n i s h es o p ening it himself. As Templeton is doing this, he announce s in a loud voice, “San Marc os Police. Are y ou okay ? ” Villeg as responds, “Ye s.” Templeton then asks, “Did y ou wre ck out? ” Villeg as replies, “I ’m stuck here .” I mmediately there afte r, Templeton tells Villeg as, “Why don ’t y o u s t ep out of the vehicle for me.” Villeg as complies.
T empleton testified that he had asked Villeg as to step out of the vehicle “t o m ak e

sure he was okay and to fig ure out if there was indeed smoke coming from the vehicle or if there was a problem with the vehicle.” Templeton also claimed that he did so for “ office r saf ety conce rns,” beca use “[i] f he’s outside of the vehicle, it makes me more comforta ble with the situa tion.” 3 Templeton claimed that, when he asked Vi l l egas to step out of the vehicle, Villeg as was fre e to decline and to drive awa

y . Templeton also testified that no signs of criminal activity wer e observe d prior to Villeg as exit ing the vehicle. When Templeton was asked if, at the time he had inquired into whether Villeg as was okay , Templeton had “any suspicion that [Vil leg as] had committed a crime,” Templeton answe red, “No.”

I t is difficult for us to deter mine from the r ecor ding whether the vehicle w as ac tually “in 2 a bar ditch” as had been re ported to 911. Howe ver, the trial court e x pressly found t hat i t was not, and we defe r to that fac tual deter mination. See Montanez v. State , 195 S.W .3d 101, 109 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006) (holding that “the defe rential s t andar d of revie w in Guzman [ v. State , 955 S.W .2d 85 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997),] applies to a trial court’s deter mination o f h i s t o ri cal fac ts when that deter mination is based on a videotape rec ording admitted into evidenc e at a suppression hear ing” ). Howeve r, no testimony was elicited as to how this sp ec i fi c s i tu ati on or Villeg as in 3 particula r pre sented a

conce rn to Templeton’s sa fety

. 3After Villeg as had stepped out of the vehicle, howeve r, Templeton then observe d

signs that Villeg as had been drinking. Templeton testified that he proce eded to question Villeg as about whether he had been drinkin g an d h ad Villeg as perf orm field sobriety tests. Subsequently , Templeton ar

rested V illega s for drivingwhile intox icated. Concluding that Villeg as had been detained by Templeton prior to his arr est, and that the detention was not justified by either rea sonable suspicion or the office r’s community -ca retaking function, the trial court g rante d Villeg as’s motion to suppress. Subsequently , it enter ed finding s of fac t and conc lusions of law, including the following :

• “B y pulling up behind Def endant J ohn Villeg as in his motor vehicle with his red and blue flashing lights activate d on his marke d police car, Of fi cer Templeton detained the Def

endant.”

• “The Court finds that a display of red an d blue flashing lights under such circ umstances is a strong showing of authority sy nony mous with an instruction to stop and rema in at the prese nt p l ac e, and a rea sonable person under the circ umstances would not fee l fre e t o l ea v e, and the Def endant yielded to the office r’s display

of authority .”

• “The Court finds the office r’s testimony that the Def endant was fre e to leave not cre dible or rea sonable based on the evidenc e pre s en t ed to the court, and the office r’s subjec tive intent in turning on his red a nd blue flashinglights wa s not rele vant to the inquiry of whether the objective fac ts constituted a detention of the Def endant.”

• “At the moment of the detention, there was no rea sonable suspicion based upon the totality of specific , o b j ec tive and articula

ble fac ts, and rational infere nces from those fac ts, that the Def endant was co m mitti ng , had committed, or soon would be about to commit any criminal ac t, or had a

war rant for his arre st.”

• “At the inception of the detention, the community -ca reta king e x ception did not justify the detention of the Def

endant.”

• “At the time of the detention, the Offic er d i d n o t rea sonably believe that the Def endant neede d help in that the nature and level of the distress exhibi ted by the Def endant wa s non-exist ent.”

4• “The re wer e no signs of a motor vehicle acc ident, proper ty damag e, skid marks, smoke, fire, injured persons, hazard lights, a disabl ed vehicle, or that the Def endant or any other pe rson nee ded any

assistance whatsoeve r.”

• “The Court finds that t h e l o ca tion of t he Defenda nt was withi n the C ity L imits of San Marc os on the side of the road at an intersec tion (rather than “in a ditch” as refer red to be the Office r) a

nd on one of the m ost heavily trave led roadway s in the state and c an har dly be conside red r emote or ina cce ssible.”

• “Similarly , the location of the Def endant g ave him acc ess to assistance other than that offe red by

the offic er if he neede d it.”

• “The Court further finds that at the time of the detention, it was not appar ent that the Def endant, if not a ssisted, presente d a dang er to himself or othe rs.”

• “The Court also notes t h at when the Offic er first spoke to the Def endant, the Def endant stated that he was OK, which further indicated that no assistance was neede d, and the office r order ed the Def end an t t o get out of the vehicle in a manner in which a r easona

ble per son would fee l compelled by law to do so.”

• “The Court further finds that the dispatch that led the Offic er to the scene did not specific ally identify the l ocation where the Def en d ant was ult imately detained, nor did it identify

the Def endant a nd/or his vehicle.”

• “The Court finds that at the mom en t the detention occur red, the information possessed by the Offic er did not sufficie n t l y connec t the dispatch to the Def endant, and the court’s conclusion is based on the Offic er’ s testimony that he was dispatched to a g ener al are a with no descr iption of the vehicle and the video which indicates that upon arr iving at the scene the Offic er indicated on the radio that he was ‘in the are a’ and ‘not sure if this was it’ and only later, well afte r the detention occur

red and the Def

endant was remove d from his vehicle did the Offic er a nnounce on his ra dio ‘this is goingto be it.’”

• “The Court further considere d the fac t that the dispatch was not consistent with the objective f

acts that e x isted when the O ffice r ar rived at the scene .”

• “Any evidence seized or acquir ed at the time of said detention, or at any later time are the produc t of the unlawf ul detention . . . and, ther efor e, said evidenc e is suppressed a

nd excluded . . . .”

The State a

ppeals the tria l court’s orde r suppre ssing the e vidence

.

5STANDARD OF REVIEW “In revie w of a trial c ourt’s rulingon a motion to suppress, an appe llate cour t must apply a standa rd of abuse of discretion and overturn the trial court’s ruling only if it is outs ide the

zone of rea sonable disag ree ment.” Martinez v. State , 348 S.W .3d 919, 922 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011) (citing State v. Dixon , 206 S.W .3d 587, 590 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006)). We are to apply a bifurcated standard of revie w, g iving almost total defe renc e to a trial court’s deter mination of historic fac ts and mix ed questions of lawand fa ct that re ly upon the cr edibility of a witness, but applying a de novo standard of

revie w to pure que stions of law and mix ed questions that do notdepend on c redibility deter minations. Id

. (citing Guzman v. State , 955 S.W .2d 85, 87-89 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997)). When revie wing a trial court’s ruling on a motion to sup p ress, we view the evidenc e in the light
most favor able to the ruling

. State v. Robinson , 334 S.W .3d 776, 778 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011) (citing State v. K elly , 204 S.W .3d 808, 818 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006)). I f t he trial court makes finding s of fac t, as it did here , we deter mine whether the evidenc e supports those finding s. Id

. We then revie w the trial cour

t’s leg al ruling s de novo unless the finding s are dispositi ve. Id . “We will sustain the trial court’s ruling if that ruling is ‘ rea sonably supported by the rec ord and is corr ect on any theory of law applicable to the case. ’” Valtierra v. State , 310 S.W .3d 442, 448 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (quoting Dixon , 206 S.W .3d at 590).

Encoun tervs. Dete ntion

In its fir st issue, the State asser ts that the initial intera ction betwee n Templeton and Villeg as was an encounter and not a detention. There fore , in the S tate’s view, Templeton di d not need r easona

ble suspicion or any

other justification to ask Villeg as to step out of the ve hicle.

6Encounter s a r e c o n s e n s u a l in

te r a c ti o ns betwee n citizens and police that do not require

rea sonable suspicion and do not implicate constitutional rig hts. See Florida v. Roye r , 460 U.S. 491, 497-98 (19 8 3 ); S t a t e v. Garcia-Cantu , 253 S.W .3d 236, 238 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008); Franks

v. State , 241 S.W .3d 135, 141 (Tex. App.—Austi n 2 0 0 7 , p et. ref ’d). Encounter s occur when police officer s approa ch an individual in a publi c place to ask questions , reque st identification, or
reque st consent to sear ch as long as the interac tion is consensua l—that is, as long as an office r does
not convey a messag e that compliance with the office r’s reque st is require d. See Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 42 9 , 4 3 4 -35 (1991) (holding that encounte rs are consensua l if “re asonable person would fee l free ‘to disreg ard the police and g o about hi s business’” (quoting Calif ornia v. Hodari D. , 499 U.S. 621, 628 (1991)))

.

An i n v est igative detention occur s when an individual is confr onted by a police office r, yields to the office r’s display o f au thority , and is temporar ily detained for purposes of an investigation. Johnson v. State , 912 S.W .2d 227, 235 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995); Franks , 241 S.W .3d
at 141. “Such a seizure occur s when, ‘taking into acc ount all of the circ umstances surrounding the
encounte r, the police cond uct would have communicated to a rea sonable person that he was
not at liberty to ignor e the police prese nce and g o about his business.’” Garcia-Cantu , 253 S.W .3d at 242 (quoting Kaupp v. T exas , 538 U.S. 626, 629 (2003)). “ It is the di splay of official authority

an d the implication that this authority cannot be ignor ed, avoided, or terminated, that results i n a Four th Amendment seizure.” Id

. at 243. “Ea ch citizen-police encounte r must be fac tually evaluated

on its own terms; there are no per se rules.

. . . The office r’s conduct is the primary focus, but time, place , and attenda

nt circumstanc es matter a s well.” Id

. Her e, the trial court emphas i z ed o n e fac t in particula r—the activation of the office r’s red and blue flashing lights—and conclude d that the display of those l ights “under such
7circ umstances is a strong showing of authority sy nony mous w ith a

n instruction to stop and rema in
at the prese nt place , and a rea sonable person under the circ umstances would not fee l fre e to leave .” This Court has held befor e that the use of patrol- car overhe ad lig hts during a

traff ic stop, standing alone, does not nece ssarily constitute a detention. See Franks , 241 S.W .3d at 142 (citing Martin

v. State , 104 S.W .3d 298, 301 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2003, no pet.)). Howeve r, the use of an office r’s

emer g ency lights “combined with other circ ums t an ce s , may well establish a Four th Amendment detention.” Ga r ci a -Ca n tu , 253 S.W .3d at 249 n.43. The trial court would not have abused its discretion in finding that “such circ umstances” wer e prese nt h er e. According to the evidenc e prese nted, at approximately 10:50 p.m., Temp l et on exit ed I H-35 and parke d his patrol car behind Villeg as’s vehicle, which was p u l l ed o v er on the side of the acc ess road. The video rec ording ref lects t hat there was no other traff ic on the acc ess road at that time. Then, afte r parking behind Villeg as’s vehicle with his overhe ad emer g ency lights and his front-facing lights still activate d, Templeton approa ched the vehicle, sear ched the are a around the vehicle with his flashlig ht, g rabbe d the driver’ s side door as Villeg as was beg inning to open it, announce d in a loud voice, “San Marc os Police,” and then, afte r inquiring into whether Villeg as was okay , asked or told Villeg as, “Why don’t
y ou g et out of the vehicle for me.” Villeg as complied. Although Templeton cl ai m ed t h at , at 4 that point, Villeg as was fre e t o re m ai n in the vehicle and to drive awa y , the trial court would
not have abused its discretion in finding otherwise, particula rly in light of the above circ umstances surrounding Templeton’s “re quest” that Villeg as exit the vehicle, as well as the fa ct t h at ,

In his testimony , Templeton repe atedly char acte rizes his statement as “asking ” Villeg as to 4 exit the vehicle , and that is also how the S tate chara cter izes it on appea l. Howeve r, the trial c ourt expressly found that “the office r order ed the Def endant to g et out of the vehicle in a manner in which a rea sonable person would fee l compelled to do so.” Ba sed on our revie w of the rec ording , in which the officer’ s statement sounds more li ke a command t h an a reque st, we conclude that this finding is supported by

the re cord. 8immediately prior to being told to g et out of the vehicle, Villeg as had just informed Templeton that

he was “stuck,” and thus, quite possibly , did not have the ability to drive awa y . Taking into acc ount all of the circ umstances surrounding the interac tion, we cannot conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in finding t h at t he office r’s conduct in this case would have communicated to a

rea sonable person that he was “n o t at liberty to ignor e the police prese nce and g o about his business,” and that, conseque ntly , Templeto n h ad detained Villeg as. See Garcia-Cantu , 253 S.W .3d
at 244-49; Crain v. State , 315 S.W .3d 43, 5 1 -5 2 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010); Johnson v. State , 658 S.W .2d 623, 626 (Tex. Crim. App

. 1 9 8 3 ); Ebarb v. State , 598 S.W .2d 842, 849 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980) (op. on r eh’g ). We overr ule the State’s f

irst point of error

.
Com m uni ty-Car etaking Function

Be cause Villeg as was detained without a war rant, his detention can be justified only if, at the mom en t o f t h e d etention, Templeton had rea sonable suspicion to believe that Villeg as
was, had been, or soon would be eng ag ed in c riminal activity , or, if not, that some other exception
to the war

rant require ment applied. See Terry v. Ohio , 392 U. S

. 1, 21-22 (1968); Ford v. State , 158 S.W .3d 488, 492 (Tex. Crim. App. 2 005); W right v. State , 7 S.W .3d 148, 150 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999). In this case , the State does not dispute that, at the moment of the detention, Templeton l ac k ed re as onable suspicion to believe that, Villeg as was, had been, or soon would be enga g ed i n criminal activity

. Instead, in its second point of er ro r, the State asser ts that the detention “wa s 5 justified u n d e r O f f ic e r T e mp le to n ’ s c o mm

u n it y- c a r e ta k in g f u n c tion, neg ating the need for rea sonable suspicion.”

In fac t, Templeton denied ha ving “ any suspicion that [ Villeg as] had committed a crime” 5 immediately

befor e tellingVilleg as to g et out of the ve hicle. 9The Supreme Court has char acte rized a police office r’s j o b as encompa ssing

a community -ca

reta king function which is “t o t al ly divorce d from the detec tion, investigation,

or acquisition of evidenc e relating to the violation of a criminal statute.” See Cady v. Dombrowski , 413 U.S. 433, 441 (1973). “As part of an office r’s duty to ‘ser ve and protec t,’ an office r ‘may stop and assist an individual whom a rea sonable person, g iv en t h e t o t ality of the circ umstances,

wo u l d believe is in need of help.’” Corbin v. State , 85 S.W .3d 272, 276 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) (quoting W

right , 7 S.W .3d at 151). Whether an office r proper ly invoked his community -ca retaking function require s a two-step inqui ry : (1 ) whether the office r was primarily motivated by a community -ca

retaking purpose; and (2) whether the office r’s belief t hat t he indi vidual needs help

was rea sonable. Gonzales v. State , 369 S.W .3d 851, 854-55 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012). To deter mine the rea sonablene ss of the police office r’s belief that an i n d i v i d ual needs assistance , courts are
to consider the following non-exclusive fac tors: (1) the nature and level of the distress exhibi ted by the individual; (2) the location of the individual; (3) whether or not the individual was alone and/or h ad acc ess to assistance independe nt of that offe red by the office r; and (4) to what ex t en t t h e individual—if not assisted—presented a dang er to himself or othe rs. Id . (citing W right , 7 S.W .3d
at 151-52). No one fac tor is dispositi ve, and, in some case s, not all fac tors may apply : “The W right fac tors wer e intended to assist courts in deter mining rea sonablene s s i n t h i s context; they are not elements of r easona

bleness.” Id

. The issue of whether Templeton wa s p r im a rily motivated by a community -ca retaking
purpose was n o t contested below—Te mpleton testified that he was responding to a 911 call of a vehicle a ccide nt and a possible vehicle fire and that he had no rea son to suspect that the per son in

10the vehicle had committed a crime, and this testimony was undisputed. There fore , in this case , the 6 inquiry turns on the re asonable ness of Te mpleton’s belief that Villega s neede d help.
In concluding that Templeton’s belief that Villeg as neede d help was not rea sonable, the trial cour

t, in its fac t findings, f

ocused on the following :

• “At the time of the detention

. . . the nature and level of the distress exh i b i t ed by the Def endant wa s non-exist ent.”

• “The re wer e no signs of a motor vehicle acc ident, proper ty damag e, skid marks, smoke, fire, injured persons, hazard lights, a disabled vehicle, or that the Def endant or any other person ne eded a

ny assistance whatsoeve r.”

• “[T] he location of the Def endant was within the City L imits of San Marc os on the side of the road at an intersec tion (ra ther than ‘in a ditch’ as ref err ed to by the Offic er) and on o ne of the most heavily trave led roadw ay s in the state and can hardly be co n s i d er ed remote or inacc essible.”

• “[T] he location of the Def endant g ave him acc ess to assistance other than that offe red by the offic er if he neede d it.”

• “[A]t the time of the detention, it was not app ar en t t h at the Def endant, if not assisted, prese nted a da

ng er to himself or othe rs.”

• “[W ]hen the Offic er first spoke to the Def endant, the Def

endant stated that he was OK, which fur ther indicated that no assistance was ne eded.”

• “[T] he dispatch that led the Offic er to the scene did not specific ally identify the location wher e the Def

endant was ultimately detained, nor did it identify the Def endant and/or his vehicle.”

• “[A]t the moment the detention occ urre d, the information possessed by the Off icer did not sufficie ntly connec t the dispatch to the Def endant, and the court’s conclusion is based on the Off

icer ’s testimony

that he wa s dispatched to a g ener al ar ea w ith no description of the ve hicle and the video which indicates that upon arr iving at the scene the Off icer indicated on the r adio that he wa s “in the ar ea” and “not sure if this was it.”

Perhaps ref

lecting the undisputed nature of this fac t, the trial court made no express finding 6 conce rningthe offic er’ s motivation. 11• “[T] he dispatch was not consistent with the objective fac ts that exis ted when the Offic er

arr ived at the sc ene.”

These fac t fin d i n g s are supported by both Templeton’s testimony and the video

rec ording of the detention. The testimony and t h e re co rd i n g tend to show that when Templeton

arr ived at the location of the vehicle—which had not been specific ally descr ibed to Templeton and wh ich Templeton, by his own admis sion, was “not sure” was the corr ect location—th er e we re n o

s igns of an acc ident or a vehicle fire, no proper ty damag e to the vehicle, and no ind i ca t i o n t h at individuals wer e in distress or need of assistance

. Also, when Templeton asked Villeg as, “Ar e y ou okay ? ”, Templeton answe red, “Ye s.” Thus, the trial court could have rea sonably found that Villeg as did not ex h i bit any distress at t he ti me of the detention. Additionally , the evidence tends to show that Villeg as was pulled o v er on the side of the acc ess road just off of I H-35, which was, as Templeton acknowledg ed in his testimony , one of the m ost well-traveled highw ay s i n Texas, and within the city

limit s of San Marc os, near an int erse ction. This evidence supports the trial cour t’s finding that “the location of the Def endant g ave him acc ess to assistance other than that offe red by the office r if he neede d it.” And, beca use Villeg as was pulled over on the side of the acc ess road as opposed to the actua l highw ay , and beca use there was no indication at the time of the detention that the vehicle was on fire or otherwise prese nted a threat to Villeg as or passing motorists, the evidenc e also supports the trial court’s finding that, “at the time of the detention, it was not appar ent that the Def endant, if not a ssisted, presente d a dang er to himself or othe rs.”

Although there are other fac ts in the rec ord whi ch might support a conclusion that Templeton’s belief that Villeg as n ee d ed h el p was rea sonable—including that it was 10:50 p.m.
at n i gh t , that Villeg as was alone in the vehicle, and that he had told Templeton that h e wa s “stuck” —we are to sustain the trial court’s ruling if it is “re asonably support ed b y the rec ord,” 12and we can overturn the ruling only if it i s “o u t s ide the zone of rea sonable disag ree ment.” See

Martinez , 348 S.W .3d at 922; Valtierra , 310 S.W .3d at 448. Ba sed on the totality of circ umstances summarized a

bove, the trial court’s deter mination that Templeton did not have a rea sonable belief that Villeg as neede d help was “re asonably supported by the rec ord” and was not “outside the zone of

rea sonable disag ree ment.” Acc ording ly , we cannot conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in finding that the community -ca retaking exception to the war rant require ment did not apply to the detention in this case. We over rule the State’ s second point of e rror .
CONCLUSION We affir m the trial court’ s order

g rantingthe motion to suppress.

__________________________________________ Bob Pembe rton, J ustice Be fore J ustices Pury ear , Pemberton and F ield Affir med Filed: June 20, 2013 Do Not Publish

13