III

105TH CONGRESS

1ST SESSION S. RES. 17

On the ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention.

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

JANUARY 21, 1997

Mr. LUGAR submitted the following resolution; which was referred to the

Committee on Foreign Relations

RESOLUTION

On the ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention.

1 Resolved, That (a) the Senate hereby expresses its in2 tention to give its advice and consent to the ratification

3 of the Chemical Weapons Convention at the appropriate

4 time after the Senate has proceeded to the consideration

5 of the Convention, subject to the conditions of subsection

6 (b) and the declarations of subsection (c):

7 (b) CONDITIONS.—It is the sense of the Senate that

8 the advice and consent of the Senate to the ratification

9 of the Convention should be subject to the following condi10 tions, which would be binding upon the President:

11 (1) AMENDMENT CONFERENCES.—The United

12 States will be present and participate fully in all
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1 Amendment Conferences and will cast its vote, either

2 affirmatively or negatively, on all proposed amend3 ments made at such conferences, to ensure that—

4 (A) the United States has an opportunity

5 to consider any and all amendments in accord6 ance with its Constitutional processes; and

7 (B) no amendment to the Convention en8 ters into force without the approval of the Unit9 ed States.

10 (2) PRESIDENTIAL CERTIFICATION ON DATA

11 DECLARATIONS.—(A) Not later than 10 days after

12 the Convention enters into force, or not later than

13 10 days after the deposit of the Russian instrument

14 of ratification of the Convention, whichever is later,

15 the President shall either—

16 (i) certify to the Senate that Russia has

17 complied satisfactorily with the data declaration

18 requirements of the Wyoming Memorandum of

19 Understanding; or

20 (ii) submit to the Senate a report on ap21 parent discrepancies in Russia’s data under the

22 Wyoming Memorandum of Understanding and

23 the results of any bilateral discussions regard24 ing those discrepancies.
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1 (B) For purposes of this paragraph, the term

2 ‘‘Wyoming Memorandum of Understanding’’ means

3 the Memorandum of Understanding Between the

4 Government of the United States of America and

5 the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Re6 publics Regarding a Bilateral Verification Experi7 ment and Data Exchange Related to Prohibition on

8 Chemical Weapons, signed at Jackson Hole, Wyo9 ming, on September 23, 1989.

10 (3) PRESIDENTIAL CERTIFICATION ON THE BI11 LATERAL DESTRUCTION AGREEMENT.—Before the

12 deposit of the United States instrument of ratifica13 tion of the Convention, the President shall certify in

14 writing to the Senate that—

15 (A) a United States-Russian agreement on

16 implementation of the Bilateral Destruction

17 Agreement has been or will shortly be con18 cluded, and that the verification procedures

19 under that agreement will meet or exceed those

20 mandated by the Convention, or

21 (B) the Technical Secretariat of the Orga22 nization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weap23 ons will be prepared, when the Convention en24 ters into force, to submit a plan for meeting the

25 Organization’s full monitoring responsibilities
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1 that will include United States and Russian fa2 cilities as well as those of other parties to the

3 Convention.

4 (4) NONCOMPLIANCE.—If the President deter5 mines that a party to the Convention is in violation

6 of the Convention and that the actions of such party

7 threaten the national security interests of the United

8 States, the President shall—

9 (A) consult with, and promptly submit a

10 report to, the Senate detailing the effect of such

11 actions on the Convention;

12 (B) seek on an urgent basis a meeting at

13 the highest diplomatic level with the Organiza14 tion for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons

15 (in this resolution referred to as the ‘‘Organiza16 tion’’) and the noncompliant party with the ob17 jective of bringing the noncompliant party into

18 compliance;

19 (C) in the event that a party to the Con20 vention is determined not to be in compliance

21 with the Convention, request consultations with

22 the Organization on whether to—

23 (i) restrict or suspend the noncompli24 ant party’s rights and privileges under the
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1 Convention until the party complies with

2 its obligations;

3 (ii) recommend collective measures in

4 conformity with international law; or

5 (iii) bring the issue to the attention of

6 the United Nations General Assembly and

7 Security Council; and

8 (D) in the event that noncompliance con9 tinues, determine whether or not continued ad10 herence to the Convention is in the national se11 curity interests of the United States and so in12 form the Senate.

13 (5) FINANCING IMPLEMENTATION.—The Unit14 ed States understands that in order to ensure the

15 commitment of Russia to destroy its chemical stock16 piles, in the event that Russia ratifies the Conven17 tion, Russia must maintain a substantial stake in fi18 nancing the implementation of the Convention. The

19 costs of implementing the Convention should be

20 borne by all parties to the Convention. The deposit

21 of the United States instrument of ratification of the

22 Convention shall not be contingent upon the United

23 States providing financial guarantees to pay for im24 plementation of commitments by Russia or any

25 other party to the Convention.
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1 (6) IMPLEMENTATION ARRANGEMENTS.—If the

2 Convention does not enter into force or if the Con3 vention comes into force with the United States hav4 ing ratified the Convention but with Russia having

5 taken no action to ratify or accede to the Conven6 tion, then the President shall, if he plans to imple7 ment reductions of United States chemical forces as

8 a matter of national policy or in a manner consistent

9 with the Convention—

10 (A) consult with the Senate regarding the

11 effect of such reductions on the national secu12 rity of the United States; and

13 (B) take no action to reduce the United

14 States chemical stockpile at a pace faster than

15 that currently planned and consistent with the

16 Convention until the President submits to the

17 Senate his determination that such reductions

18 are in the national security interests of the

19 United States.

20 (7) PRESIDENTIAL CERTIFICATION AND RE21 PORT ON NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS.—Not later

22 than 90 days after the deposit of the United States

23 instrument of ratification of the Convention, the

24 President shall certify that the United States Na25 tional Technical Means and the provisions of the
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1 Convention on verification of compliance, when

2 viewed together, are sufficient to ensure effective

3 verification of compliance with the provisions of the

4 Convention. This certification shall be accompanied

5 by a report, which may be supplemented by a classi6 fied annex, indicating how the United States Na7 tional Technical Means, including collection, process8 ing and analytic resources, will be marshalled, to9 gether with the Convention’s verification provisions,

10 to ensure effective verification of compliance. Such

11 certification and report shall be submitted to the

12 Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on

13 Appropriations, the Committee on Armed Services,

14 and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Sen15 ate.

16 (c) DECLARATIONS.—It is the sense of the Senate

17 that the advice and consent of the Senate to ratification

18 of the Convention should be subject to the following dec19 larations, which would express the intent of the Senate:

20 (1) TREATY INTERPRETATION.—The Senate af21 firms the applicability to all treaties of the constitu22 tionally based principles of treaty interpretation set

23 forth in Condition (1) of the Resolution of Ratifica24 tion with respect to the INF Treaty, approved by

25 the Senate on May 27, 1988. For purposes of this
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1 declaration, the term ‘‘INF Treaty’’ refers to the

2 Treaty Between the United States of America and

3 the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimi4 nation of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter

5 Range Missiles, together with the related memoran6 dum of understanding and protocols, approved by

7 the Senate on May 27, 1988.

8 (2) FURTHER ARMS REDUCTION OBLIGA9 TIONS.—The Senate declares its intention to con10 sider for approval international agreements that

11 would obligate the United States to reduce or limit

12 the Armed Forces or armaments of the United

13 States in a militarily significant manner only pursu14 ant to the treaty power set forth in Article II, Sec15 tion 2, Clause 2 of the Constitution.

16 (3) RETALIATORY POLICY.—The Senate de17 clares that the United States should strongly reit18 erate its retaliatory policy that the use of chemical

19 weapons against United States military forces or ci20 vilians would result in an overwhelming and dev21 astating response, which may include the whole

22 range of available weaponry.

23 (4) CHEMICAL DEFENSE PROGRAM.—The Sen24 ate declares that ratification of the Convention will

25 not obviate the need for a robust, adequately funded
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1 chemical defense program, together with improved

2 national intelligence capabilities in the nonprolifera3 tion area, maintenance of an effective deterrent

4 through capable conventional forces, trade-enabling

5 export controls, and other capabilities. In giving its

6 advice and consent to ratification of the Convention,

7 the Senate does so with full appreciation that the

8 entry into force of the Convention enhances the re9 sponsibility of the Senate to ensure that the United

10 States continues an effective and adequately funded

11 chemical defense program. The Senate further de12 clares that the United States should continue to de13 velop theater missile defense to intercept ballistic

14 missiles that might carry chemical weapons and

15 should enhance defenses of the United States Armed

16 Forces against the use of chemical weapons in the

17 field.

18 (5) ENFORCEMENT POLICY.—The Senate urges

19 the President to pursue compliance questions under

20 the Convention vigorously and to seek international

21 sanctions if a party to the Convention does not com22 ply with the Convention, including the ‘‘obligation to

23 make every reasonable effort to demonstrate its com24 pliance with this Convention’’, pursuant to para25 graph 11 of Article IX. It should not be necessary
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1 to prove the noncompliance of a party to the Con2 vention before the United States raises issues bilat3 erally or in appropriate international fora and takes

4 appropriate actions.

5 (6) APPROVAL OF INSPECTORS.—The Senate

6 expects that the United States will exercise its right

7 to reject a proposed inspector or inspection assistant

8 when the facts indicate that this person is likely to

9 seek information to which the inspection team is not

10 entitled or to mishandle information that the team

11 obtains.

12 (7) ASSISTANCE TO RUSSIA.—The Senate de13 clares that, if the United States provides limited fi14 nancial assistance for the destruction of Russian

15 chemical weapons, the United States should, in ex16 change for such assistance, require Russia to destroy

17 its chemical weapons stocks at a proportional rate to

18 the destruction of United States chemical weapons

19 stocks, and to take the action before the Convention

20 deadline. In addition, the Senate urges the President

21 to request Russia to allow inspections of former mili22 tary facilities that have been converted to commer23 cial production, given the possibility that these

24 plants could one day be reconverted to military use,

25 and that any United States assistance for the de-
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1 struction of the Russian chemical stockpile be appor2 tioned according to Russia’s openness to these broad

3 based inspections.

4 (8) EXPANDING CHEMICAL ARSENALS IN COUN5 TRIES NOT PARTY TO THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CON6 VENTION.—It is the sense of the Senate that, if dur7 ing the time the Convention remains in force the

8 President determines that there has been an expan9 sion of the chemical weapons arsenals of any country

10 not a party to the Convention so as to jeopardize the

11 supreme national interests of the United States,

12 then the President should consult on an urgent basis

13 with the Senate to determine whether adherence to

14 the Convention remains in the national interest of

15 the United States.

16 (9) COMPLIANCE.—Concerned by the clear pat17 tern of Soviet noncompliance with arms control

18 agreements and continued cases of noncompliance by

19 Russia, the Senate declares the following:

20 (A) The Convention is in the interest of

21 the United States only if both the United

22 States and Russia, among others, are in strict

23 compliance with the terms of the Convention as

24 submitted to the Senate for its advice and con25 sent to ratification, such compliance being
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1 measured by performance and not by efforts,

2 intentions, or commitments to comply.

3 (B)(i) Given its concern about compliance

4 issues, the Senate expects the President to offer

5 regular briefings, but not less than several

6 times a year, to the Committees on Foreign Re7 lations and Armed Services and the Select Com8 mittee on Intelligence of the Senate on compli9 ance issues related to the Convention. Such

10 briefings shall include a description of all Unit11 ed States efforts in diplomatic channels and bi12 lateral as well as the multilateral Organization

13 fora to resolve the compliance issues and shall

14 include, but would not necessarily be limited to

15 a description of—

16 (I) any compliance issues, other than

17 those requiring challenge inspections, that

18 the United States plans to raise with the

19 Organization; and

20 (II) any compliance issues raised at

21 the Organization, within 30 days.

22 (ii) Any Presidential determination that

23 Russia is in noncompliance with the Convention

24 shall be transmitted to the committees specified

25 in clause (i) within 30 days of such a deter-
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1 mination, together with a written report, includ2 ing an unclassified summary, explaining why it

3 is in the national security interests of the Unit4 ed States to continue as a party to the Conven5 tion.

6 (10) SUBMISSION OF FUTURE AGREEMENTS AS

7 TREATIES.—The Senate declares that after the Sen8 ate gives its advice and consent to ratification of the

9 Convention, any agreement or understanding which

10 in any material way modifies, amends, or reinter11 prets United States and Russian obligations, or

12 those of any other country, under the Convention,

13 including the time frame for implementation of the

14 Convention, should be submitted to the Senate for

15 its advice and consent to ratification.

16 (11) RIOT CONTROL AGENTS.—(A) The Senate,

17 recognizing that the Convention’s prohibition on the

18 use of riot control agents as a ‘‘method of warfare’’

19 precludes the use of such agents against combatants,

20 including use for humanitarian purposes where com21 batants and noncombatants intermingled, urges the

22 President—

23 (i) to give high priority to continuing ef24 forts to develop effective nonchemical, nonlethal

25 alternatives to riot control agents for use in sit-
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1 uations where combatants and noncombatants

2 are intermingled; and

3 (ii) to ensure that the United States ac4 tively participates with other parties to the Con5 vention in any reassessment of the appropriate6 ness of the prohibition as it might apply to such

7 situations as the rescue of drowned air crews

8 and passengers and escaping prisoners or in sit9 uations in which civilians are being used to

10 mask or screen attacks.

11 (B) For purposes of this paragraph, the term

12 ‘‘riot control agents’’ is used within the meaning of

13 Article II(4) of the Convention.

14 (d) DEFINITION.—For purposes of this resolution,

15 the term ‘‘Chemical Weapons Convention’’ and the term

16 ‘‘Convention’’ refer to the Convention on the Prohibition

17 of Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of

18 Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction, opened for

19 signature and signed by the United States at Paris on

20 January 13, 1993, including the following annexes and as21 sociated documents, all such documents being integral

22 parts of and collectively referred to in this resolution as

23 the ‘‘Convention’’ (contained in Treaty Document 103–

24 21):

25 (1) The Annex on Chemicals.
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1 (2) The Annex on Implementation and Verifica2 tion (also known as the ‘‘Verification Annex’’).

3 (3) The Annex on the Protection of Confiden4 tial Information (also known as the ‘‘Confidentiality

5 Annex’’).

6 (4) The Resolution Establishing the Pre7 paratory Commission for the Organization for the

8 Prohibition of Chemical Weapons.

9 (5) The Text on the Establishment of a Pre10 paratory Commission.

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