Filed 10/1/20 P. v. Wickersham CA2/1

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

KAMROM DANIELLE 

WICKERSHAM,

Defendant and Appellant.

 B301276

 (Los Angeles County

 Super. Ct. No. YA094410)

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los

Angeles County, Alan B. Honeycutt, Judge. Affirmed.

Rudolph J. Alejo, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, 

for Defendant and Appellant.

Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief

Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant 

Attorney General, Jaime L. Fuster and Joseph P. Lee, Deputy 

Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

_____________________
2

Kamron Danielle Wickersham was charged with attempted 

first degree murder for attacking her spouse with a knife. The jury 

acquitted her of that charge but convicted her of the lesser included 

offense of attempted involuntary manslaughter in violation of Penal 

Code1 sections 192, subdivision (a)(1), and 664,2 from which she 

now appeals.

Appellant argues we must reverse her conviction because the 

trial court’s instructions on one of her two defenses—voluntary 

intoxication—was misleading. While the trial court properly 

instructed the jury that being voluntary intoxicated negates the 

specific intent required for attempted murder, it did not explicitly 

indicate that being voluntary intoxicated also negates the specific 

intent required for the lesser included offense of attempted 

voluntary manslaughter.

We affirm. There was no error in the trial court’s 

instructions. Moreover, insofar as the jury was not better informed 

that voluntary intoxication is also a defense against the lesser 

included offense for which she was convicted, any such error would 

be harmless under People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818 (Watson).

1 Subsequent undesignated statutory citations are to the 

Penal Code.

2 Kamron was also convicted of two counts of injuring a 

spouse, in violation of section 273.5, subdivision (a). She does not 

appeal these two convictions. The jury also found true two 

sentencing enhancements: that she personally used a deadly 

weapon, a knife, in connection with her conviction for attempted 

voluntary manslaughter in violation of section 12022, subdivision 

(b)(1); and that she personally inflicted great bodily injury upon a 

spouse, within the meaning of section 12022.7, subdivision (e). 

Kamron’s brief does not appeal either enhancement.
3

BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

A. Factual Background

Kamron met Jeffrey Wickersham in 1998 or 1999.3 She was 

22 years old and delivered pizzas for Pizza Hut. Jeffrey was 31 

years old and worked as a programmer at CCH Wolters Kluwer. 

They met in the elevator at Jeffrey’s office building when Kamron 

was delivering a pizza. They began dating and had a sporadic 

relationship until getting married in 2013.

At some point early in their relationship Jeffrey began using 

methamphetamine. He persuaded Kamron to try it. Jeffrey 

eventually stopped taking the drug (it caused him mouth sores), 

and switched to Adderall, a prescription stimulant. Jeffrey testified 

that Kamron did not stop using methamphetamine.

Their relationship of 15 years was at times violent and 

abusive. Kamron relied on Jeffrey for food, shelter, and necessities. 

Jeffrey admitted that he was emotionally, physically, and verbally 

abusive towards Kamron. He testified that he “needed to control

the money supply.”

Jeffrey admitted that he once headbutted Kamron and broke 

her nose while “getting up.” In Jeffrey’s words, he “tripped.”

Jeffrey also admitted the two engaged in “scuffles.” He claimed 

these scuffles were “mutual” and involved “arguments, yelling, 

screaming, throwing things, grappling, pushing, some striking. 

Pretty much stuff like that.” When asked if he ever struck Kamron, 

Jeffrey testified he could not remember, but pointed out: “It means 

3 Because they share the same last name, we use Kamron’s 

and Jeffrey’s first names for clarity and ease of reference and intend 

no disrespect. (See In re Marriage of Olsen (1994) 24 Cal.App.4th 

1702, 1704, fn. 1.)
4

I have no memory of [striking Kamron]. It doesn’t mean it didn’t 

happen.”

On Valentine’s Day of 2016, Kamron wanted to go out but 

Jeffrey was too tired and wanted to go to bed. Jeffrey was by then 

an engineer at Raytheon Corporation. But Kamron nevertheless 

put on a red dress and asked him to get ready to go out. Kamron 

kept the lights on in the bedroom and was using a small vanity to 

put on her makeup. Jeffrey first attempted to unplug the vanity so 

he could close the bedroom door and sleep. After they continued to 

fight, Jeffrey threw the mirror against the closet wall. While 

pushing and shoving each other, one of Jeffrey’s fingers ended up in 

Kamron’s mouth, and she bit it. Kamron swung at Jeffrey as well, 

striking him a few times with a closed fist and causing a black eye.

A few days later, on February 17, 2016, Jeffrey went to the 

Torrance police station and reported the assault because he “needed 

to start thinking about a divorce.” But Jeffrey asked the police not 

to arrest Kamron.

The marriage had gotten to the point where neither Jeffrey 

nor Kamron was comfortable. They argued about Kamron being 

unemployed, going back to school, and not keeping the apartment 

clean.

The charged crimes in this case involved two different 

incidents.4

The first occurred on June 26, 2016. At 2:00 a.m. that 

morning, Kamron came home and told Jeffrey she was pregnant. 

Jeffrey knew it was someone else’s baby because they had stopped 

intercourse some time before. Kamron asked Jeffrey for some 

money to pay for the cab that had just taken her home from the 

4 The trial court granted the defense’s motion for a judgment 

of acquittal involving a third incident.
5

hospital. He refused and told her the marriage was over. Kamron 

then put some hard drives into a bag and hit Jeffrey over the 

shoulder. This assault was the basis for the charge in count 3.

The second incident occurred the following evening and 

involved the charges in counts 1 and 2. Jeffrey came home around 

4:30 or 5:00 p.m. that night after speaking with a divorce attorney. 

He brought in two bags of groceries and noticed that Kamron was 

under the kitchen sink apparently attempting to repair a clog or the 

garbage disposal, which they had a problem with earlier. Jeffrey 

stepped over Kamron’s legs, and put the groceries away. As he did 

this, he grew angry because Kamron had told him less than 24 

hours earlier that she had become pregnant by another man. He 

then noticed that Kamron was in fact “[t]aking apart and 

attempting to put together things,” a behavior he had observed in 

Kamron when she was high on methamphetamine. This made him 

even more angry, since she was pregnant and appeared to be using 

drugs.

Jeffrey took a bottle of beer from the groceries and began 

berating and belittling Kamron because he wanted to hurt her by 

making her feel bad. He walked into the living room, stood there, 

and continued yelling insults for about 20 minutes. Kamron then 

left the kitchen and charged at Jeffrey with her fist raised in the 

air, striking him with a knife. Jeffrey raised his left hand to block 

Kamron, the two fell, and the knife went into his left wrist, causing 

the tip to break.

Jeffrey took the broken part of the knife blade out of his wrist 

and dropped it on the ground. Kamron retrieved the broken knife 

and proceeded to strike him twice on the top of his head. While she 

was hitting him, Jeffrey tried to push Kamron back so he could 

escape and leave the apartment. Jeffrey eventually got up and 

tried to open the door, but had difficulty doing so. Kamron 
6

proceeded to pummel Jeffrey’s head five times with the remainder 

of the knife consisting of its handle and a broken blade. As he 

struggled to open the door, Kamron struck Jeffrey in the shoulder 

with a different knife—a two-and-a-half-inch paring knife.

Jeffrey was finally able to open the apartment door and run

as fast as he could across the apartment courtyard to the front of 

the apartment complex. A neighbor, Melissa Camberos, heard 

Jeffrey yell, “Help, help. My wife stabbed me,” and called 911. 

Jeffrey collapsed in front of the apartment manager’s apartment. 

Another neighbor, John O’Neill, attempted to provide first aid. 

Jeffrey told O’Neill that Kamron may have been on drugs.

When Police Officer Brian Kawamoto arrived at the scene, he 

found Kamron in the bathtub of her bathroom holding a razor blade 

in her hands which he directed her to put down. Kamron seemed “a 

little surprised.” Officer Kawamoto did not have enough 

information to accurately determine whether Kamron was under 

the influence of a controlled substance, but she was cooperative and 

interacted with him in a manner he considered rational. A 

transcript of an audio recording made during the arrest indicates 

that after she was handcuffed, Kamron asked the police officers to 

cover her “like Rocky please. Balboa.” She also asked the police 

officers where all the blood came from.

Jeffrey was taken to Harbor-UCLA Medical Center where he 

received medical treatment, including stitches. In a letter he sent 

to detectives during the middle of trial that was read into evidence, 

Jeffrey asked the court for leniency for Kamron. He also stated that 

he healed from his wounds and sustained no permanent injuries.

B. Charges, Trial, and Sentencing

Kamron was charged in a four-count information with 

attempted premeditated murder on June 27, 2016 (§§ 187, subd. (a), 

664), that she used a knife within the meaning of section 12022, 
7

subdivision (b)(1), and inflicted great bodily injury within the 

meaning of section 12022.7, subdivision (e)(1) (count 1); injuring a 

spouse (§ 273.5, subd. (a)) on June 27, 2016, adding the same knife 

and great bodily injury allegations (count 2); injuring a spouse 

(§ 273.5, subd. (a)) on June 26, 2016 (count 3); and injuring a spouse 

(§ 273.5, subd. (a)) on February 14, 2016 (count 4).

Count 4 was dismissed following defense counsel’s motion 

pursuant to section 1118.1.

The jury unanimously acquitted Kamron of the attempted 

murder charged in count 1, but convicted her of the lesser included 

offense of attempted voluntary manslaughter. She was also 

convicted of two counts of injuring a spouse, and the jury returned 

true findings on the enhancements.

The trial court sentenced Kamron to a total term of eight 

years in state prison, calculated as follows: the middle term of three 

years on the lesser of count 1, plus four years for the section 

12022.7, subdivision (e) enhancement, plus one year for the section 

12022, subdivision (b)(1) enhancement. The sentence on count 2 

and the corresponding enhancements was ordered stayed pursuant 

to section 654, while the three-year sentence imposed on count 3 

was ordered to run concurrently to that of count 1.

Kamron filed a timely notice of appeal.

DISCUSSION

Kamron argues prejudicial error in the jury instructions 

requires reversal. The court’s instructions on voluntary 

intoxication and attempted voluntary manslaughter did not inform 

the jury that voluntary intoxication was a defense to both

attempted first degree murder and attempted voluntary 

manslaughter. Instead, the voluntary intoxication instruction only 

explicitly referenced the attempted murder charge. Moreover, the 
8

prosecutor compounded the error during closing argument by 

telling the jurors that voluntary intoxication only applied “to 

count 1, the attempted murder.” This meant the jury did not know, 

according to Kamron, that if it found Kamron was voluntarily 

intoxicated, her intoxication not only negated the specific intent 

necessary for attempted murder, but also the specific intent 

necessary for attempted voluntary manslaughter. She also argues 

the trial court was under a sua sponte duty to accurately instruct 

the jury once it agreed to instruct on voluntary intoxication but it 

did not, and thus, reversal is required. We disagree.

Kamron’s counsel below advanced two defense theories. One 

theory was that involuntary intoxication negated the specific intent

necessary for both attempted murder and attempted voluntary 

manslaughter. The second theory was imperfect self-defense: 

Kamron was a victim of prolonged domestic violence, “a battered 

woman,” and she was under the influence.

It is therefore untrue that the jury necessarily found Kamron 

voluntarily intoxicated to the point she was incapable of forming 

specific intent and then failed to make the subsequent, logically 

necessary step of also acquitting her of the lesser included offense of 

attempted voluntary manslaughter because the jury had two paths 

to convict on the lesser included offense, not one. The jury could 

also have simply believed her alternative theory that her counsel 

repeatedly stressed below: imperfect self-defense by a battered, 

economically vulnerable, controlled woman who was also under the 

influence of methamphetamine. Defense counsel repeatedly 

stressed to the jury she could also be convicted of the lesser 

included offense based on imperfect self-defense. Because that 

theory does not depend on what Kamron argues is only a partially 

correct voluntary intoxication instruction, Kamron cannot 

demonstrate prejudice, and any error was harmless We also 
9

disagree that the trial court committed prejudicial instructional 

error because the record reveals that the jury was adequately 

instructed when it was informed Kamron’s intoxication negated 

specific intent to kill, and the jury was properly instructed specific 

intent to kill was an element of both attempted murder and 

attempted voluntary manslaughter.

A. Standard of Review

We review the jury instructions as a whole to determine 

whether “reasonably likely the jury misconstrued the instructions 

as precluding it from considering” voluntary intoxication as a 

defense against attempted voluntary manslaughter. (People v. 

Castillo (1997) 16 Cal.4th 1009, 1017.) A trial court has no sua 

sponte duty to issue an instruction on voluntary intoxication, but if 

it chooses to do so, it must do so correctly. (People v. Mendoza

(1998) 18 Cal.4th 1114, 1134.) We may reverse a conviction only if 

the alleged error was prejudicial. (See Cal. Const., Art. VI, § 13). 

Whether error is prejudicial under California law is evaluated 

under the probability test of Watson. Reversal is appropriate under

Watson review only if “ ‘after an examination of the entire cause, 

including the evidence,’ [we are] of the ‘opinion’ that it is reasonably 

probable that a result more favorable to the appealing party would 

have been reached in the absence of the error.” (Watson, supra, 46 

Cal.2d at p. 836.)

Kamron concedes in her opening brief that our Supreme 

Court has held that we review alleged instructional errors involving 

the defense of voluntary intoxication under the Watson probability 

test. (See People v. Atkins (2001) 25 Cal.4th 76, 93 [preventing jury 

from considering evidence of voluntary intoxication did not violate 

due process]; People v. Humphrey (1996) 13 Cal.4th 1073, 1089 

[misinstruction on voluntary intoxication defense violates state law 

only].) The more searching “harmless beyond a reasonable doubt” 
10

test articulated by the United States Supreme Court in Chapman v. 

California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24 [87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705] 

does not apply here.

B. Applicable Law

Kamron was charged with attempted first degree murder, but 

was convicted of the lesser included offense of attempted voluntary 

manslaughter. She put forth two defenses at trial: imperfect selfdefense and voluntary intoxication. We briefly review the elements 

of these two crimes and these two defenses.

All attempt crimes require specific intent. “The crime of 

attempt occurs when there is a specific intent to commit a crime 

and a direct but ineffectual act done towards its commission.” 

(People v. Bonner (2000) 80 Cal.App.4th 759, 764; see generally 1 

Witkin, Cal. Criminal Law (4th ed. 2020) Elements, § 57.) Proof of 

attempted murder “requires the specific intent to kill and the 

commission of a direct but ineffectual act toward accomplishing the 

intended killing.” (People v. Lee (2003) 31 Cal.4th 613, 623.)

“Attempted voluntary manslaughter is the unlawful killing of 

a person without malice. [Citation.]” (People v. Speight (2014) 227 

Cal.App.4th 1229, 1241.) Manslaughter is voluntary when the 

killing is “upon a sudden quarrel or heat of passion.” (§ 192, subd. 

(a).)

The malicious intent required for attempted murder can be 

negated and the defendant can be convicted of the lesser included 

offense of attempted voluntary manslaughter in two ways pertinent 

here. First, “[u]nder the doctrine of imperfect self-defense, when 

the trier of fact finds that a defendant killed another person 

because the defendant actually, but unreasonably, believed he was 

in imminent danger of death or great bodily injury, the defendant is 

deemed to have acted without malice and thus can be convicted of 
11

no crime greater than voluntary manslaughter.” (In re Christian S. 

(1994) 7 Cal.4th 768, 771.)

Second, “evidence of voluntary intoxication is relevant to the 

extent it bears upon the question whether the defendant actually

had the requisite specific mental state required for commission of 

the crimes at issue.” (People v. Horton (1995) 11 Cal.4th 1068, 

1119; see also People v. Williams (2001) 26 Cal.4th 779, 789 

[“evidence of voluntary intoxication would be admissible with 

regard to whether a defendant had the requisite intent for a 

criminal attempt”].)

C. The Court’s Instructions

Because this is an appeal arguing prejudicial instructional 

error, we review the pertinent instructions.

The trial court instructed the jury on the lesser included 

offense of attempted voluntary manslaughter with CALCRIM 

Nos. 603 and 604. CALCRIM No. 603 instructed the jury that it 

could acquit on the attempted murder charge and convict on the 

lesser included crime of attempted voluntary manslaughter via the 

heat of passion or sudden quarrel defense. CALCRIM No. 604 gave 

the corresponding instruction that it may reduce the attempted 

murder charge via the imperfect self-defense doctrine. (See People 

v. Lopez (2011) 199 Cal.App.4th 1297, 1307 [approving CALCRIM 

No. 604].)

As to voluntary intoxication, the court instructed the jury

with CALCRIM No. 625 as follows: “You may consider evidence, if 

any, of the defendant’s voluntary intoxication only in a limited way. 

You may consider that evidence only in deciding whether the 

defendant acted with an intent to kill or, the defendant acted with 

deliberation and premeditation. [¶] A person is voluntarily 

intoxicated if she becomes intoxicated by willingly using any 

intoxicating drug, drink, or other substance knowing that it could 
12

produce an intoxicating effect, or willingly assuming the risk of that 

effect. [¶] You may not consider evidence of voluntary intoxication 

for any other purpose. [¶] Voluntary intoxication is not a defense 

to [c]ounts 2 and 3, inflicting injury on a spouse.”

D. The Court’s Instructions Were Correct, and Any Error 

Would be Harmless

Kamron begins her argument by observing that neither the 

voluntary intoxication instruction nor the manslaughter 

instructions ever informed the jury that voluntary intoxication was 

a defense to attempted voluntary manslaughter. Kamron further 

argues that the attempted voluntary manslaughter instruction 

affirmatively misled the jury because it specifically indicated that 

the defense was only applicable to count 1.5 And, finally, count 1 

charged “attempted murder”—it did not charge attempted 

voluntary manslaughter.

Kamron next observes the prosecutor obscured the matter 

further by arguing during rebuttal: “Now addressing voluntary 

intoxication. This only goes to count 1, the attempted murder. You 

can consider it only in a limited way, whether or not the voluntary 

intoxication of that person, of the defendant, affected or negated her 

intent to kill or her ability to deliberate and premeditate.”

Moreover, Kamron argues the jury’s acquittal on the 

attempted murder charge suggests it was evidently persuaded 

Kamron was voluntarily intoxicated to the point she lacked the 

capacity to form the requisite specific intent for attempt.

5 To be precise, the instruction indicated voluntary 

intoxication only applied to the attempted murder charge indirectly: 

“Voluntary intoxication is not a defense to [c]ounts 2 and 3” 

logically implies it is a defense to the remaining count, viz., count 1.
13

Kamron also argues the trial court erred as well by failing to 

sua sponte instruct the jury that voluntary intoxication could also 

negate the specific intent required for the crime of attempted 

voluntary manslaughter.

We disagree for two reasons. First, the jury was given a 

correct set of instructions. Second, any instructional error was 

harmless.

1. The Trial Court Issued Correct Instructions

The trial court’s instructions correctly stated the law. In 

People v. Blakeley (2000) 23 Cal.4th 82, 85, our Supreme Court held 

that a defendant is guilty of voluntary manslaughter if either (i) the 

defendant “unlawfully kills in a sudden quarrel or [in] the heat of 

passion,” or (ii) “unlawfully kills while having an unreasonable but 

good faith belief in the need to act in self-defense.” CALCRIM 

Nos. 603 and 604 correctly reflect Blakely.

Our Supreme Court has also expressly approved the 

voluntary intoxication instruction, CALCRIM No. 625 in People v. 

Soto (2018) 4 Cal.5th 968, 970: “CALCRIM No. 625 correctly 

permits the jury to consider evidence of voluntary intoxication on 

the question of whether defendant intended to kill . . . .”

CALCRIM No. 625 clearly stated that evidence of voluntary 

intoxication could be considered in determining whether Kamron 

“acted with an intent to kill.” And the two attempted voluntary 

manslaughter instructions, CALCRIM Nos. 603 and 604, both listed 

as elements, “The defendant intended to kill.”

Assuming for a moment that the jury acquitted Kamron on 

count 1 by applying the voluntary intoxication defense (and not by 

relying on imperfect self-defense), nothing in these instructions 

prevented the jury from also applying the voluntary intoxication 

defense to negate the intent to kill element of attempted voluntary 

manslaughter. Being voluntarily intoxicated negates the specific 
14

intent to kill, whether it appears as an element of attempted 

murder or as an element of attempted voluntary manslaughter. 

(See People v. Van Ronk (1985) 171 Cal.App.3d 818, 824 [“The 

requisite intent for first degree murder on a premeditation and 

deliberation theory and the intent necessary for voluntary 

manslaughter are identical: both crimes require the specific intent 

to kill”].) Moreover, “ ‘It is fundamental that jurors are presumed to 

be intelligent and capable of understanding and applying the court’s 

instructions.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Bryant, Smith and Wheeler

(2014) 60 Cal.4th 335, 433.)

Finally, as we explain in the next subsection, defense counsel 

argued voluntary intoxication was a defense to both attempted 

murder and attempted voluntary manslaughter.

We do not find instructional error on this record. It is not 

“ ‘reasonably likely the jury misconstrued the instructions as 

precluding it from considering’ the intoxication evidence” (People v. 

Mendoza, supra, 18 Cal.4th at p. 1134), as it applied to both count 1 

and the lesser included offense of attempted voluntary 

manslaughter since the intoxication defense functions in the same 

way for both crimes: it negates the necessary element of an intent to 

kill.

2. Any Error Was Harmless

We are also unable to find prejudice on this record under 

Watson review.

Defense counsel argued the following during her closing: “I 

believe that as far as the remaining counts, count 1, the attempted 

murder, there is absolutely no evidence that she intended to kill 

[Jeffrey]. And as I said, there are two reasons for that, two very big 

legal reasons plus many factual reasons.”
15

The “two very big legal reasons” counsel was referring to were 

Kamron’s imperfect self-defense theory and her involuntary 

intoxication defense.

As defense counsel explained: “We also believe that [Kamron] 

acted in self-defense. And based on her inability to intend to kill 

and the actual wounds that were inflicted, she’s not guilty. She’s 

not guilty of attempted murder. She’s not guilty of attempted 

voluntary manslaughter. [Jeffrey] was the aggressor, and he 

admitted it. He came in that afternoon itching for a fight. He says 

I wanted to make her feel like she had made me feel, but of course, 

he thinks he’s smart enough to know that he can say anything and 

not be held accountable for it. Anything up to the edge. But that 

coupled with his physical aggression toward [Kamron] is not only 

words, it’s the accumulation of that abuse and words with actual 

physical behavior.”

The reason why Kamron attacked Jeffrey, her counsel offered, 

was that she was “a battered woman.” “The law and the psychology 

of intimate partner abuse,” counsel explained, shows “how years 

and years of abuse build up and make you respond differently.” 

This is why, although “there’s no denying that [Jeffrey] was cut, 

[Kamron] didn’t intend to kill him.”6

Thus, as Kamron’s counsel repeatedly stressed, the jury had 

two different paths to acquit on attempted murder and acquit on 

the lesser included offense of attempted voluntary manslaughter: 

imperfect self-defense and voluntary intoxication. Thus it does not 

follow from the jury’s acquittal on count 1 that the jury found 

Kamron was voluntarily intoxicated. The jury could also have 

6 Kamron also called Dr. Michelle Margules as an expert 

witness to testify to the effects of prolonged spousal abuse and 

domestic violence.
16

acquitted on count 1 because the jury found Kamron sincerely, but 

unreasonably, believed she was in imminent danger of death or 

great bodily injury under the imperfect self-defense doctrine.

Only one of these two hypothetical explanations is arguably 

tainted by lack of instructional clarity, viz., the jury’s inconsistent 

application of the voluntary intoxication defense. The alternative 

explanation that the jury applied the imperfect self-defense doctrine 

cannot be declared improbable on this record.

We therefore affirm the jury’s verdict. Any error the court 

made by failing to give a more particularized voluntary intoxication 

instruction that also applied to the lesser included offense would 

not have made it “reasonably probable” Kamron would not have

been convicted of attempted voluntary manslaughter.

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

SINANIAN, J.*

We concur:

CHANEY, J.

BENDIX, Acting P. J.

* Judge of the Los Angeles Superior Court, assigned by the 

Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California 

Constitution.