J-S03040-18

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* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF 

PENNSYLVANIA

v.

LAQUANTA CHAPMAN 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 2963 EDA 2016

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence August 16, 2016

In the Court of Common Pleas of Chester County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-15-CR-0002897-2009, 

CP-15-CR-0004895-2008

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., PANELLA, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY STEVENS, P.J.E.: FILED MARCH 27, 2018

Appellant Laquanta Chapman appeals from the judgment of sentence 

entered by the Court of Common Pleas of Chester County imposing a term of 

life imprisonment without parole upon remand from the Pennsylvania 

Supreme Court. Appellant’s counsel seeks to withdraw his representation 

pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967) and Commonwealth 

v. Santiago, 602 Pa. 159, 978 A.2d 349 (2009). We affirm the judgment of 

sentence and grant counsel’s petition to withdraw.

Our Supreme Court summarized the factual background of this case as 

follows:

On October 30, 2008, Appellant shot and killed his sixteenyear-old neighbor, Aaron Turner, in the basement of Appellant’s 

residence. Subsequently, with the assistance of his younger 
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cousin, Bryan Bird, Appellant dismembered the victim’s body and 

disposed of the remains in the trash.

Weeks later, law enforcement investigating the sale of illicit 

drugs from Appellant’s premises obtained a warrant to search 

them for evidence of drug activity. In the course of the ensuing 

search, police discovered an abundance of residual, physical 

evidence from the killing and dismemberment.

Commonwealth v. Chapman, 635 Pa. 273, 276-77, 136 A.3d 126, 127-28

(2016).

Appellant was charged for the murder of Aaron Turner and related 

crimes at docket CP-15-CR-0002897-2009. He was also charged on a 

separate docket, CP-15-CR-0004895-2008, for numerous counts of drug and 

weapons charges for contraband found in his residence as well as receiving 

stolen property and cruelty to animals. Appellant was tried on both dockets 

in a consolidated trial.

A jury subsequently convicted Appellant of first-degree murder, 

conspiracy to commit murder, possession of an instrument of crime (nine

counts), abuse of corpse, hindering apprehension (two counts), receiving 

stolen property (two counts), possession of a controlled substance with intent 

to deliver, simple possession of a controlled substance, possession of drug 

paraphernalia, and cruelty to animals. The trial court separately convicted 

Appellant of seven counts of Persons Not to Possess Firearm. 

After a separate penalty phase, the jury sentenced Appellant to the 

death penalty for the murder charge. The trial court also imposed a
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consecutive, aggregate sentence of 85-170 years’ imprisonment for the 

remaining charges at both dockets.

On direct appeal of this capital murder case, the Supreme Court vacated 

Appellant’s death sentence upon finding that the Commonwealth had not 

presented sufficient evidence of an aggravating circumstance warranting 

capital punishment. Specifically, the Supreme Court found that Appellant’s 

prior out-of-state convictions did not qualify as felonies and thus, could not 

serve as the basis for the aggravating circumstance in 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 

9711(d)(9), which requires a finding of a significant history of violent felony 

convictions. Therefore, the Supreme Court remanded for the trial court to 

impose a sentence of life imprisonment.

In the same opinion, the Supreme Court disposed of Appellant’s 

remaining issues raised on direct appeal. Thereafter, the Supreme Court 

concluded that it was not necessary to remand for this Court to complete direct 

appellate review:

In some recent decisions, this Court has transferred death-penalty 

appeals to the Superior Court, which administers as-of-right direct 

appellate review in non-capital cases, when it has become clear in 

our own review that a death sentence is unavailable. See, e.g., 

Commonwealth v. Gibson, 592 Pa. 411, 418, 925 A.2d 167, 

171 (2007). Here, however, the guilt-phase review is not 

burdensome and was complete as of the time it became clear that 

imposition of a life sentence was required. Therefore, and to 

promote efficiency, we have completed the guilt-phase review, 

above.

Chapman, 635 Pa. at 287, 136 A.3d at 134, n.8.
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Thereafter, on August 16, 2016, upon remand, the trial court imposed 

a sentence of life imprisonment as directed by the Supreme Court. At this

point, Appellant was represented by P.J. Redmond, Esq. Approximately three 

weeks later, Appellant fired Atty. Redmond and instructed him not to file 

anything further in the case. Appellant filed a pro se notice of appeal at both 

dockets that was self-dated September 13, 2016. The Clerk of Courts did not 

docket the notice of appeal until September 19, 2016.1 

This Court remanded for the trial court to conduct a Grazier hearing to 

assess Appellant’s choice to represent himself. On December 8, 2016, the 

lower court held a hearing at which Appellant confirmed that he had chosen 

to represent himself. The trial court determined that Appellant’s choice to 

waive his right to representation to counsel was knowing and intelligent.

However, three months later, Appellant petitioned this Court for the 

appointment of counsel. This Court denied Appellant’s request for alternative 

counsel but indicated that Appellant could reapply to this Court for relief if he 

wished to have the assistance of the Chester County Public Defender’s Office. 

When Appellant filed a pro se letter indicating that he desired this 

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1 Appellant’s notice of appeal was time-stamped by the Clerk of Courts on 

September 19, 2016, which is beyond the thirty-day jurisdictional limitation 

imposed by Pa.R.A.P. 903(a). However, Appellant’s notice of appeal is dated 

September 13, 2016, which is within the required time frame. Pursuant to 

the “prisoner mailbox rule,” we deem Appellant’s notice of appeal to be timely 

filed. See Commonwealth v. Chambers, 35 A.3d 34 (Pa.Super. 2011), 

appeal denied, 616 Pa. 625, 46 A.3d 715 (2012) (explaining that a document 

is considered filed on date pro se prisoner delivers it to prison authorities for 

mailing).
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representation, this Court reappointed Atty. Redmond and remanded for the 

filing of a counseled Rule 1925(b) statement. On August 1, 2017, Atty. 

Redmond filed a concise statement raising the following issue for our review:

Appellant should not have been exposed to a death-qualified jury 

(i.e. a non-representative cross section and one more likely to 

impose a conviction) in a case where there was no legal basis for 

the prosecution to do so. This action as applied to Appellant was 

a violation of his Article I, § 9 right to an “impartial jury,” as well 

as his federal rights contained in Amendments XI and XIV, along 

with his due process rights of Amendments V and XIV.

1925(b) statement, 8/1/17, at 1. 

Thereafter, instead of filing an advocate’s brief, Appellant’s counsel filed 

a petition to withdraw his representation and a corresponding Anders brief. 

Appellant filed an additional motion for counsel, claiming that counsel 

abandoned him by filing the petition to withdraw. This Court filed an order, 

reiterating that Appellant had the option of proceeding pro se or through 

privately-retained counsel. Appellant did not file a response. 

When faced with a purported Anders brief, this Court may not review 

the merits of the issues raised therein without first passing on the request to 

withdraw. Commonwealth v. Rojas, 874 A.2d 638, 639 (Pa.Super. 2005). 

Prior to withdrawing as counsel on a direct appeal under Anders, counsel 

must file a brief that meets the requirements established by our Supreme 

Court in Santiago. The brief must:

(1) provide a summary of the procedural history and facts, with 

citations to the record; (2) refer to anything in the record that 

counsel believes arguably supports the appeal; (3) set forth 

counsel’s conclusion that the appeal is frivolous; and (4) state 
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counsel’s reasons for concluding that the appeal is frivolous. 

Counsel should articulate the relevant facts of record, controlling 

case law, and/or statutes on point that have led to the conclusion 

that the appeal is frivolous.

Santiago, 602 Pa. at 178-79, 978 A.2d at 361. Counsel must also provide 

the appellant with a copy of the Anders brief, together with a letter that 

advises the appellant of his or her right to “(1) retain new counsel to pursue 

the appeal; (2) proceed pro se on appeal; or (3) raise any points that the 

appellant deems worthy of the court's attention in addition to the points raised 

by counsel in the Anders brief.” Commonwealth v. Nischan, 928 A.2d 349, 

353 (Pa.Super. 2007) (citation omitted). 

In this case, appellate counsel summarized the history of the case, 

referred to an issue in the record that he believed arguably supported the 

appeal and set forth his conclusion that the appeal is frivolous along with 

citation to supporting precedent. Moreover, counsel has provided this Court 

with a copy of the letter, which counsel sent to Appellant informing him of his

right to retain new counsel, proceed pro se, or raise any points Appellant 

deems worthy of this Court’s attention. Accordingly, we conclude counsel has 

substantially complied with the requirements of Anders and Santiago. We, 

therefore, turn to the issue presented in the Anders brief to make an 

independent judgment as to whether the appeal is, in fact, wholly frivolous. 

Commonwealth v. Bynum-Hamilton, 135 A.3d 179 (Pa.Super. 2016). 

On appeal, the sole issue presented by Appellant is whether he is 

entitled to a new trial on both dockets on non-capital offenses before a jury 
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that is not “death-qualified;” Appellant specifically argues that a death-penalty 

jury is “mathematically skewed in favor of conviction by the selection process.” 

Anders brief, at 10. 

First, we note that Appellant failed to raise this issue on his initial direct 

appeal before the Supreme Court. Despite arguing that the Commonwealth 

had not presented sufficient evidence in support of aggravating circumstances 

that would warrant the death penalty, Appellant did not challenge the fact that 

he had been tried by a death-qualified jury. Thus, to the extent that Appellant 

argues that he should have not been tried by a death-qualified jury in a case 

where there was no legal basis for the prosecution to do so, Appellant should 

have raised this challenge before the Supreme Court if he expected to prevail 

on his challenge to the aggravating circumstances supporting his death 

sentence. 

The Supreme Court, before vacating the death penalty and remanding 

for the limited purpose of directing the imposition of a life sentence, reviewed 

the merits of all of Appellant’s claims on direct appeal. As a result, as 

Appellant did not raise this specific argument with respect to his death 

qualified jury in his initial direct capital appeal, it is waived.2

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2 Even assuming arguendo that this issue is properly preserved for this appeal, 

it has no arguable merit. Both the United States Supreme Court and the 

Pennsylvania Supreme Court have consistently rejected similar constitutional 

challenges arguing that death-qualified juries are unfairly biased towards 

conviction. See Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 106 S.Ct. 1758, 90 
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For all of the foregoing reasons, and after an independent review, we 

conclude Appellant is not entitled to relief and we grant counsel's petition to 

withdraw his representation.

Judgment of Sentence Affirmed. Counsel’s Petition to Withdraw 

Granted.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 3/27/18

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L.Ed.2d 137 (1986); Commonwealth v. Woodard, 634 Pa. 162, 129 A.3d 

480 (2015), cert. denied sub nom., Woodard v. Pennsylvania, 137 S.Ct. 

92, 196 L.Ed. 2d 79 (2016).