UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 13-4783

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

JEFFORY HARRISON,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern 

District of West Virginia, at Huntington. Robert C. Chambers,

Chief District Judge. (3:09-cr-00234-1)

Submitted: April 22, 2014 Decided: April 25, 2014

Before WILKINSON and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, 

Senior Circuit Judge.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Brian J. Kornbrath, Acting Federal Public Defender, Jonathan D. 

Byrne, Appellate Counsel, Lex A. Coleman, Assistant Federal 

Public Defender, Charleston, West Virginia, for Appellant. R. 

Booth Goodwin II, United States Attorney, Lisa G. Johnston, 

Assistant United States Attorney, Charleston, West Virginia, for 

Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:

Jeffory Harrison appeals the twenty-four-month 

sentence imposed following the revocation of his term of 

supervised release. Before this court, Harrison asserts several 

bases for his contention that this sentence is plainly 

unreasonable. For the reasons that follow, we reject his 

arguments and affirm the revocation judgment. 

“A district court has broad discretion when imposing a 

sentence upon revocation of supervised release.” United States 

v. Webb, 738 F.3d 638, 640 (4th Cir. 2013). A revocation 

sentence that is both within the applicable statutory maximum 

and not “plainly unreasonable” will be affirmed on appeal.*

United States v. Crudup, 461 F.3d 433, 437-38 (4th Cir. 2006). 

In determining whether a revocation sentence is plainly 

unreasonable, we first assess the sentence for reasonableness, 

utilizing “the procedural and substantive considerations” 

employed in evaluating an original criminal sentence. Id. at 

438. 

A revocation sentence is procedurally reasonable if 

the district court has considered both the policy statements 

 * Harrison concedes that this is the controlling standard of 

review in this circuit, but seeks to preserve the issue for 

further review by noting the existence of a circuit split as to 

the appropriate standard.
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contained in Chapter Seven of the Sentencing Guidelines and the 

18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2012) factors identified in 18 U.S.C. 

§ 3583(e) (2012). Id. at 439. The district court must also 

explain the chosen sentence, although this explanation “need not 

be as detailed or specific” as is required for an original 

sentence. United States v. Thompson, 595 F.3d 544, 547 (4th 

Cir. 2010). A sentence is substantively reasonable if the 

district court states a proper basis for concluding that the 

defendant should receive the sentence imposed. Crudup, 461 F.3d 

at 440.

If, after considering the above, we decide that the 

sentence is reasonable, we will affirm. Id. at 439. Only if we 

find the sentence to be procedurally or substantively 

unreasonable will we evaluate whether it is “plainly” so. Id.

Against these well-established principles, we readily 

conclude that Harrison’s sentence is reasonable. The sentence 

is within the two-year statutory maximum authorized for the 

underlying Class C felony offense that resulted in the 

supervised release order. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3559(a)(3), 

3583(e)(3) (2012); 18 U.S.C. § 924(l) (2012). Our review of the 

record confirms that the district court considered the advisory 

policy statement range of three to nine months’ imprisonment, 

the calculation of which was not disputed in the district court 

and is not challenged on appeal, and heard the parties’ 
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arguments regarding the appropriate sentence to be imposed. 

Furthermore, the district court drew upon the § 3553(a) factors 

enumerated in § 3583(e) in sentencing Harrison. The transcript 

makes clear that, despite the court’s prior lenient treatment 

and strong admonitions, Harrison simply could not (or would not) 

abide by the terms of his supervised release. The court’s 

decision to impose the statutory maximum in this case was driven 

by Harrison’s repeated drug use, his ongoing failure to present 

himself for drug testing at the pre-assigned time and place, and 

his non-compliance with his drug treatment plan. We thus cannot 

accept Harrison’s claim that his sentence is “unduly punitive.” 

(Appellant’s Br. at 8); see Crudup, 461 F.3d at 440 (holding 

that imposition of statutory maximum term of imprisonment was 

substantively reasonable, given that the district court 

expressly relied on defendant’s “admitted pattern of violating 

numerous conditions of his supervised release,” despite numerous

extensions of leniency by the district court). 

Harrison also argues that the revocation sentence is 

unreasonable because it “does nothing to address the source of 

Harrison’s problems on supervised release — his drug use.” 

(Appellant’s Br. at 8). But this argument fails to acknowledge 

the court’s continuous efforts to aid Harrison in overcoming his 

substance abuse issues, all of which he spurned. As the 

district court noted, the probation office did everything within 
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its power to help Harrison conquer his addiction, but it was 

incumbent upon Harrison to avail himself of the treatment 

options secured for and provided to him, which he would not do. 

By the time he last appeared in court, there simply was nothing 

left for the court to do in this vein.

Finally, Harrison suggests that the purpose of 

supervised release — “to ease a defendant’s transition back into 

the community” — would have been better served by “[a] much 

shorter sentence[.]” (Appellant’s Br. at 9). We reject this 

argument as it improperly conflates the purposes that underlie 

the imposition of a term of supervised release in the first 

instance with the purpose for penalizing the defendant’s 

violation of those terms. The revocation sentence is designed 

to punish the defendant’s failure to abide by the terms of his 

supervised release, see Crudup, 461 F.3d at 438 (“‘[T]he 

sentence imposed upon revocation [is] intended to sanction the 

violator for failing to abide by the conditions of the courtordered supervision.’” (alteration in original) (quoting U.S. 

Sentencing Guidelines Manual ch. 7, pt. A, introductory cmt. 

3(b))), and the district court’s comments make plain that it 

chose the twenty-four-month sentence to sanction Harrison’s 

substantial breach of the trust and leniency that the court 

previously afforded him.
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Accordingly, we affirm the revocation judgment. We 

dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal 

contentions are adequately presented in the materials before 

this court and argument would not aid the decisional process. 

AFFIRMED