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******************************************************PETER LEE v. RICHARD H. STANZIALE (AC 36519)
Gruendel, Lavine and Bishop, Js. Argued September 25—officially released December 1, 2015 (Appeal from Superior Court, judicial district of

Hartford, Woods, J.)
Robert Shluger, for the appellant (defendant).
Adam J, Teller, for the appellee (plaintiff).Opinion GRUENDEL, J. In this landlord-tenant case, the defendant, Richard H. Stanziale, appeals from thejudgment of the trial court awarding the plaintiff, Peter Lee, a total of $18,122.50 in attorney’s fees and costs pursuant to General Statutes § 52-251a. The defendant contends that the court abused its discretion in so doing. We disagree and, accordingly, affirm the judgment of the trial court.
In its memorandum of decision, the court found the following facts. The defendant is the owner ofresidential rental property known as 56 Brace Road in West Hartford (property). InApril, 2010, the plaintiffentered into awritten agreement to lease the property from the defendant from May 1, 2010, to April 30, 2011, at a rate of $2500 per month. At that time, the plaintiff paid a $5000 security deposit to the defendant. During his tenancy, the plaintiff notified the defendant of various problems he claimed to have encountered with the property. Those problems included inadequate heat on the third floor of the residence, electrical wiring issues, and an asbestos wrapped furnace.
In early September, 2010, the plaintiff informed the defendant ofhis intentiontovacate the propertybefore the lease expired. The parties thereafter discussed the termination of the lease agreement. On November 12, 2010, the defendant listed the property with a realtor, and soonreceivedmultiple offers fromprospective tenants. On December 15, 2010, the defendant entered into
a lease agreement with a new tenant for a term oftwo years commencing on January 1, 2011, at a monthly rate of $2500. Although he paid rent to the defendant through December 31, 2010, the plaintiff vacated the property
on December 19, 2010. On that date, he completed a walk-through ofthe property with the defendant’s realtor, who found the property to be in clean condition.1 At the defendant’s request, the plaintiff topped off the oil tank and returned the keys to the property. On December 20, 2010, the plaintiff requested the return of his $5000 security deposit. In early January, 2011, the defendant sent the plaintiff a ‘‘preliminary deposit accounting’’ alleging that, beyond exhausting that security deposit, the plaintiff owed him $1518.50. Nine dayslater, the defendantsenttheplaintiffasecond accounting, claiming that the plaintiff owed him $2405.57 due to, inter alia, certain repairs for damages tothepropertyallegedlycausedbytheplaintiff, a$5000 realtor fee incurred by the defendant in renting the property to new tenants, and $720 in legal fees for an initial consultation with the defendant’s attorney. A small claims action ensued. On May 19, 2011, theplaintiff, who at the time was self-represented, commenced this action in the small claims session of the Superior Court to recover his security deposit. The small claims writ and notice ofsuit filed bythe plaintiff specified that the amount claimed was $10,000.2 It further alleged: ‘‘You did not provide a final complete accountingforkeepingourentire$5000securitydeposit plus interest. The damages and expenses on your ‘preliminary accounting’ are not reasonable, e.g., realtor fees ($5000), legal fees, damages, etc. At your request, Ivacated on December 19, 2010, despitepayingfullrent through December 31, 2010. You owe me $967.74 for rent paid from December 20, 2010 through December 31, 2010. You failed to repair multiple items including but not limited to lack of heat on the third floor.’’
The defendant, through his legal counsel, responded by filing a motion to transfer the matter to the regular docket ofthe Superior Courtpursuantto Practice Book § 24-21. The plaintiff filed an opposition to the motion, in which he argued that the substance of the controversy between the parties properly was within the purview of the small claims court. The plaintiff also represented that ‘‘[i]t would be a financial burden to pursue this case in regular civil court, as I planned to represent myselfin small claims court, and most likely will not be able to do so in regular civil court.’’ Despite that opposition, the matterwas transferred to the regular docket of the Superior Court. The notice of that transfer provided to the parties by the court stated in relevant part that ‘‘[i]f the plaintiff hires a lawyer and the court rules in his or her favor after a case has been transferred to the regular civil docket at the request of
a defendant, the court may allow the plaintiffa reasonable lawyer’s fee as part of the costs to be paid by the defendant.’’
The defendant then filed a counterclaim predicated
on the plaintiff’s anticipatory breach of the lease agreement, which sought a setoff of $7468.07 in damages.3Inresponse, theplaintiffretainedan attorneyand filed his answer to the defendant’s counterclaim, as well as an amended complaint. As the court noted in
a subsequent articulation ofits decision, ‘‘the complexity ofthe case increased when it was transferred to the regular civil docket, by the defendant’s motion

. . . . The parties conducted discovery, filed pretrial memoranda pursuant to a pretrial management order

. . . and filed other pretrial motions and requests. Trial spanned five days and almost eight months. The parties submitted almost one hundred exhibits, and the court took testimony from a variety of witnesses. Posttrial briefs were subsequently submitted by the parties

. . . . On August 9, 2013, after more than two years since the case was commenced in small claims court, the plaintiff obtained judgment in his favor.’’
In its August 9, 2013 memorandum of decision, thecourt found in relevant part that ‘‘the plaintiff is the prevailing party in this action for return ofhis security deposit.

. . . The plaintifftenant has established, by a fair preponderance of the evidence, that he is entitled to a portion of his security deposit, plus interest.’’ At the same time, the court found that the defendant was entitled to a setoff of $1320.78 for certain damages sustainedas aresultoftheplaintiff’sbreachofthe lease agreement. The court thus renderedjudgment in favor ofthe plaintiffin the amount of $4788.01, as well as an awardof‘‘reasonable attorney’s fees andcosts, pending the submission of the plaintiff’s affidavit.’’ The defendantfiledamotionforreconsideration, whichthe court denied on December 13, 2013.
At the court’s behest, the plaintiff’s counsel filed a sworn affidavit stating that her hourly rate for services rendered in the case was $250 and that she had spent approximately sixty-three hours on the matter over the
course of more than twenty-five months. She thus averred that the attorney’s fees and costs expended in the matter totaled $15,975. Following an objection by the defendant, the court, on January 17, 2014, awarded the plaintiff $14,750 in attorney’s fees and costs pursuant to § 52-251a.
On February 6, 2014, the defendant appealed to this court. His appeal form indicated that he was appealing from not only the court’s January 17, 2014 judgment awarding attorney’s fees to the plaintiff, but also from the court’s August 9, 2013 judgment on the merits of theunderlyinglitigationanditsDecember 13, 2013judgment denying his motion for reconsideration. In response, the plaintiff moved to dismiss the appeal in part as untimely. By order dated April 10, 2014, this court granted the motion to dismiss the defendant’s appeal ‘‘as it relates to the August 9, 2013judgment and the December 13, 2013 denial ofthe defendant’s motion for reconsideration. The appeal remains pending as it relatestotheJanuary 17, 2014awardofattorney’sfees.’’ Approximately one month later, the plaintiff, pursuant to § 52-251a, filed with the trial court a motion ‘‘for
an award ofadditional attorney’s fees as the ‘prevailing party’ in connection with the successful defense ofthe defendant’s untimely appeal ofthejudgment ofAugust 9, 2013, in this matter.’’ Appended to that motion was an affidavit of attorney’s fees, in which the plaintiff’s appellate counsel, AttorneyAdamJ. Teller, averredthat the ‘‘total expense related to obtaining dismissal ofthe appeal as to the August 2013 judgment’’ was $3372.50. Following ahearing, the court grantedthat motion. The defendantthereafteramendedhisappealwiththiscourt to include a challenge to that additional award ofattorney’s fees. On April 30, 2014, the defendant filed with this court
a motion for review, in which he sought, inter alia,
an order that the trial court articulate the basis of itsdeterminationthatthe plaintiffwas the prevailingparty in this action and what portion of the $14,750 in attorney’s fees and costs originally awarded to the plaintiff
wasforworkexpendedonsuccessfulclaims. Thiscourt granted that motion by order dated June 25, 2014. One monthlater, the trial courtissued amemorandum articulating the basis of its decision. The court first noted that it had found in favor of the plaintiff on his action to recover his security deposit. As it explained: ‘‘The plaintiffis the prevailing party because the court found thathe was entitledtothe returnofhis securitydeposit. The defendant alleged that he was entitled to retain the security deposit and collect additional funds from the plaintiff. However, [the] court did not find that the defendant was entitled to any amount in addition to the security deposit. In fact, [the] court found that the defendant owed the plaintiff a majority of the security deposit, plus interest.’’ With regard to the apportionment of legal fees awarded for what this court in its order had termed ‘‘successful’’ versus ‘‘unsuccessful’’ claims, the trial court stated that it was ‘‘unaware of any authority requiring the court to discern between successful and unsuccessful claims when determining the reasonableness of attorney’s fees.’’ The court also emphasized that the plaintiff initially commenced the action as a self-represented party in the small claims court and that the complexity and duration ofthe case increased dramatically when it was transferred to the regular docket on the motion of the defendant. One week later, the defendant filed with this court another motion for review that sought to have the trial court articulate ‘‘whether any portion of the amount awardedforattorney’sfeeswasforhoursworkedsolely
on the prosecution of wholly unsuccessful claims,’’ which this court granted by order dated September 10, 2014. In its subsequent articulation, the trial court clarified that ‘‘the amount awarded for attorney’s fees
was strictly for the prosecution of successful claims.

. . . The trial court reviewed the presentation of evidence, the effort expended by the plaintiff’s counsel,
as well as the complexity of the legal issues in the
case. Counsel was awarded reasonable attorney’s fees specifically for the prosecution of successful claims.’’
Before considering the specific claims of error alleged by the defendant in this appeal, we first note what is not in dispute. In its August 9, 2013 memorandum of decision, the court expressly found that the plaintiff was the prevailing party in this action to
recover a security deposit. The court further explained the basis forthatfindinginitsJuly23, 2014 articulation. In this appeal, the defendant does not challenge the propriety of that determination. To the contrary, he concedesinhisappellatebriefthat‘‘theAppellate Court is not ableto reversethe findings ofthe courtto correct who the prevailing party was, for purposes of this appeal of the discretionary award of § 52-251a attor-ney’s fees

. . . .’’ We therefore do not revisit the court’s determinationthatthe plaintiffwas the prevailingparty in the proceeding below.
I
The defendant’s principal claim concerns the proper application of § 52-251a. He maintains that the court improperly awarded the plaintiff attorney’s fees and costs pursuant to that statute. We do not agree. ‘‘[T]he common law rule in Connecticut, also known
as the American Rule, is that attorney’s fees and ordinary expenses andburdens oflitigation are not allowed tothe successfulpartyabsentacontractual orstatutory exception.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Berzins v. Berzins, 306 Conn. 651, 661, 51 A.3d 941 (2012). Section 52-251a is such an exception, permitting ‘‘the imposition of costs and fees, including attorney’s fees, to be imposed on a defendant who has transferred the
case from small claims to the regular docket of the Superior Court and has not prevailed in the action.’’ Welch v. Stonybrook Gardens Cooperative, Inc., 158 Conn. App. 185, 191 n.6, 118 A.3d 675, cert. denied, 318 Conn. 905, A.3d (2015).
In their respective appellate briefs, the parties misconstrue that statute. The defendant posits that a prevailing party may recover attorney’s fees and costs thereunder only ifthe trial court first makes ‘‘a finding that the defendant, in the transfer of this case to the regular docket, engaged in some identifiable misconduct sufficient enough to be punished by the penalty of attorney’s fees.’’ The plaintiff, by contrast, submits thatatrialcourt‘‘arguablywouldhaveabuseditsdiscretion if it had awarded the plaintiff no attorney’s fees’’ under § 52-251a once it found the plaintiff to be the prevailing party. Both claims are wide of the mark.
Theproperconstructionof§ 52-251apresents aquestionoflawoverwhichourreviewisplenary. SeeSpears

v. Elder, 156 Conn. App. 778, 785, 115 A.3d 482 (2015). ‘‘In making such determinations, we are guided by fundamental principles of statutory construction.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Ulbrich v. Groth, 310 Conn. 375, 448, 78 A.3d 76 (2013); see General Statutes § 1-2z (statutory interpretation process). We therefore begin with the language of the statute. Section52-251aprovides: ‘‘Whenevertheplaintiffprevails in a small claims matter which was transferred to the regular docket in the Superior Court on the motion of the defendant, the court may allow to the plaintiff his costs, together with reasonable attorney’s fees to be taxed by the court.’’ (Emphasis added.) The statute plainly sets forth the following essential elements: (1) that the action originally was commenced in the small claims docket ofthe Superior Court; (2) that the defendant moved to transfer the action to the regular docket ofthe Superior Court; (3) that the action was so trans-ferred; (4) that the plaintiffprevailed in the action; and (5) that the trial court deemed an award of attorney’s fees and costs appropriate.
Distilled to its essence, the defendant’s claim asks this courtto expand the statutory requirements of § 52- 251a to require ‘‘a finding

. . . [of] some identifiable misconduct’’warrantingapplicationthereof. The defendant maintains that because he presented good faith claims and defenses—on which he prevailed in part when the court awarded him a setoff of $1320.78— rather than frivolous ones, the court could not justifiablyrenderanawardunder § 52-251a. Hefurtherclaims thatthecourtfailedtoconsiderthepurposesunderlying that statute. For multiple reasons, we disagree. First, and most significantly, § 52-251a contains no such requirement. It is fundamental that this court is obligated to ‘‘construe a statute as written.

. . . Courts may not by construction supply omissions

. . . or add exceptions

. . . . The intent of the legislature

. . . is to be found not in what the legislature meant to say, but in the meaning ofwhat it did say.

. . . It is axiomatic that the court itself cannot rewrite a statute

. . . . Thatis afunctionofthe legislature.’’ (Internalquotation marksomitted.)Doev.NorwichRomanCatholicDiocesan Corp., 279 Conn. 207, 216, 901 A.2d 673 (2006); see also Lucarelli v. State, 16 Conn. App. 65, 70, 546 A.2d 940 (1988) (‘‘[c]ourts must interpret statutes as they are written

. . . and cannot, byjudicial construction, read intothemprovisionswhich are not clearlystated’’ [citation omitted]). In addition, when the General Assembly wants to depart from a broad grant of discretion to
our trialjudges in awarding attorney’s fees, it certainly knows how to do so. See, e.g., General Statutes § 52- 240a (authorizing court to award reasonable attorney’s fees inproduct liability action only ‘‘[i]fthe court determines that the claim or defense is frivolous’’); accord Fedus v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 278 Conn. 751, 770–71 n.17, 900 A.2d 1 (2006) (noting that legislature knows how to enact legislation consistent with its intent); Genesky v. EastLyme, 275 Conn. 246, 258, 881 A.2d 114 (2005) (‘‘ifthe legislature wants to [engage in
a certain action], it knows how to do so’’). Furthermore, in construing § 52-251a, ‘‘we do not write on a clean slate, but are bound by our previous judicialinterpretations ofthislanguage andthepurpose of the statute.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) CommissionerofPublicSafetyv.FreedomofInformation Commission, 312 Conn. 513, 527, 93 A.3d 1142 (2014). Our courts have rejected attempts by litigants to graft additional requirements onto that legislative enactment. For example, in Forastiere v. Higbie, 95 Conn. App. 652, 657, 897 A.2d 722, cert. denied, 280 Conn. 902, 907 A.2d 89 (2006), the defendant argued thatthe courtimproperlyawardedattorney’sfeesunder § 52-251a because the parties were ‘‘equally sophisti-catedlitigants’’ andbecausethe courthadruledinfavor of the defendant on one of the counts of the plaintiffs’ complaint. This court disagreed, emphasizing that the statute ‘‘does not require a party to be more sophisticated than the opposing party or that a party must prevail as to every claim. The court’s discretion to award attorney’s fees under § 52-251a

. . . is not limited by the relative sophistication of the parties or the number of counts on which the plaintiffs prevail.’’ Id. Similarly, inPetti v. BalanceRockAssociates, 12 Conn. App. 353, 363, 530 A.2d 1083 (1987), this court rejected
a claim that the plaintiff was not entitled to recover under § 52-251a because her attorney had filed an appearance and had begun work on the case prior to its transfer to the regular docket ofthe Superior Court. After noting that ‘‘no such limitation’’ is contained in § 52-251a, this court declined to engage in a ‘‘judicial expansion of the statutory requirements of § 52-251a.’’ Id. To the extent that the defendant invites this court to rewrite the parameters of § 52-251a, we decline to do so, as that remains properly the province of our General Assembly. Second, we note that the policy underlying § 52-251a is broader than the question of frivolity. Although, as this court has noted, one purpose of § 52-251a is to provide ‘‘a substantial and effective disincentive for a defendant who might otherwise raise defenses bordering on the frivolous’’; Burns v. Bennett, 220 Conn. 162, 169, 595 A.2d 877 (1991); the larger aim ‘‘is to deter

. . . defendants from transferring a case from the small claims session and turning a relatively clear-cut case into a pitched legal battle.’’ Krack v. Action Motors Corp., 87 Conn. App. 687, 697, 867A.2d 86, cert. denied, 273 Conn. 926, 871 A.2d 1031 (2005). That aim serves to protect not only the interests of litigants who often proceed on a self-representedbasis; see id., 697 (noting the ‘‘undesirabilityto attorneys’’ in small claims cases); and over whom a defendant often possesses ‘‘superior economic resources’’; id., 695; but also the interests of judicial economy by not clogging our courts with noncomplex litigation in which modest sums are sought.
Thepresentcaseinvolvesanactiontorecovera$5000 security deposit. The trial court ultimately concluded that the plaintiff had demonstrated his entitlement thereto, less a $1320.78 setoff to the defendant. Although the court did not specifically reference a ‘‘pitchedlegalbattle,’’itsDecember 19, 2014articulation of its memorandum of decision portrays exactly that. As the court recounted: ‘‘[T]he plaintiff, as a pro se party, initially filed this matter in small claims court on May 19, 2011. However, the complexity of the case increased when it was transferred to the regular civil docket, by the defendant’s motion

. . . . The parties conducted discovery, filed pretrial memoranda pursuant to apretrial management order

. . . and filed otherpretrial motions and requests. Trial spanned five days and almost eight months. The parties submitted almost
one hundred exhibits, and the court took testimony from avariety ofwitnesses. Posttrial briefs were subsequently submitted by the parties

. . . . On August 9, 2013

. . . more than two years since the case was commenced in small claims court, the plaintiff obtained judgment in his favor.’’4 Such protracted litigation is precisely what § 52-251a is intended to deter. SeeRana

v. Terdjanian, 136 Conn. App. 99, 117, 46 A.3d 175, cert. denied, 305 Conn. 926, 47 A.3d 886 (2012). Third, the record does not substantiate the defendant’s assertion that the trial court failed to consider those underlying purposes in this case. In his appellate brief, the defendant contends that ‘‘[i]t is clear from [the court’s] articulation that the trial court never considered the purposes behind the statute.’’ We disagree. Despitefilingamotionforreconsideration, anobjection to the award of attorney’s fees and costs, and multiple requests for articulation, at no time did the defendant raise that distinct claim before the trial court. ‘‘It is fundamental that claims of error must be distinctly raised and decided in the trial court.’’ State v. Faison, 112 Conn. App. 373, 379, 962 A.2d 860, cert. denied, 291 Conn. 903, 967 A.2d 507 (2009). Our rules of practice require a party, as a prerequisite to appellate review, to distinctly raise such claims before the trial court. See Practice Book § 5-2 (‘‘[a]ny party intending to raise any question of law which may be the subject of an appeal must

. . . state the question distinctly to the judicial authority’’); see also Practice Book § 60-5 (‘‘[t]he court shall not be bound to consider a claim unless it was distinctly raised at trial or arose subsequent to trial’’); accord Remillard v. Remillard, 297 Conn. 345, 351, 999 A.2d 713 (2010) (raised distinctly
means party must bring to attention of trial court precise matter on which decision is being asked). As our Supreme Courthas explained, ‘‘[t]he reasonforthe rule is obvious: to permit a party to raise a claim on appeal that has not been raised at trial—after it is too late for the trial court or the opposing party to address the claim—would encourage trial by ambuscade, which is unfair to both the trial court and the opposing party.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Travelers Casualty & Surety Co. ofAmerica v. Netherlands Ins. Co., 312 Conn. 714, 761–62, 95 A.3d 1031 (2014). For that reason, Connecticutappellate courts generally‘‘willnot address issues not decided by the trial court.’’ Willow Springs Condominium Assn., Inc. v. Seventh BRT Development Corp., 245 Conn. 1, 52, 717A.2d 77 (1998);
see also Crest Pontiac Cadillac, Inc. v. Hadley, 239 Conn. 437, 444n.10, 685A.2d670 (1996) (claims‘‘neither addressed nor decided’’ by trial court are not properly before appellate tribunal).
The record before us nonetheless belies the defendant’s claim. ‘‘In Connecticut, our appellate courts donotpresume error on the part ofthe trial court.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Jalbert v. Mulligan, 153 Conn. App. 124, 145, 101 A.3d 279, cert. denied, 315 Conn. 901, 104 A.3d 107 (2014). Rather, absent a showing to the contrary, we presume thatthe court properly considered all relevant criteria in awarding the plaintiff attorney’s fees and costs pursuant to § 52-251a. See Kaczynski v. Kaczynski, 294 Conn. 121, 129–30, 981 A.2d 1068 (2009) (presume court undertook proper analysisoflawandfactsandactedproperlyinrendering judgment). As we read the court’s articulations of its memorandum of decision, it was indeed cognizant of the policies underlying § 52-251a, and fashioned its award mindful that a relatively straightforward small claims action to recover a security deposit was transformed into a pitched legal battle once it was transferred to the regular docket of the Superior Court. We therefore reject the defendant’s bald assertion that the court failed to consider those policies.5
At that same time, we also cannot agree with the plaintiff’s suggestion that atrial court abuses its discretion if it declines to award a plaintiff attorney’s fees and costs under § 52-251a when that plaintiff is the prevailing party. That statute specifically provides that
atrialcourt ‘‘mayallow’’ aprevailingplaintiffto recover reasonable attorney’s fees and costs when a small claims matter was transferred to the regular docket on the motion of the defendant. Accordingly, our courts consistently have interpreted that grant of authority as discretionary in nature. As this court has held, ‘‘[a]n awardofattorney’sfeesisnotamatterofright. Whether any award is to be made and the amount thereof lie within the discretion of the trial court, which is in the best position to evaluate the particular circumstances ofa case.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) LaMontagne v. Musano, Inc., 61 Conn. App. 60, 63–64, 762 A.2d 508 (2000); see alsoKrack v. ActionMotors Corp., supra, 87 Conn. App. 694 (‘‘[w]e review the award of attorney’s fees [pursuantto § 52-251a] for a clear abuse ofdiscretion’’);Pettiv.BalanceRockAssociates, supra, 12 Conn. App. 363 (language of § 52-251a ‘‘allows the court discretion in whether attorney’s fees should be awarded’’). That precedent is consistent with the preceptthattheuse oftheterm ‘‘may’’ inastatutegenerally is construed as ‘‘directory rather than mandatory.

. . . The word may, unless the context in which it is employed requires otherwise, ordinarily does not connote a command. Rather, the word generally imports permissive conduct and the conferral of discretion.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Office ofConsumer Counsel v. Dept. ofPublic Utility Control, 252 Conn. 115, 122, 742 A.2d 1257 (2000). We adhere to that precedent, and conclude that whether to award attorney’s fees and costs pursuant to § 52- 251a is a matter left to the sound discretion of the trial court.II
The remaining question is whether the court abused its discretion in awarding the plaintiff attorney’s fees and costs in the present case. ‘‘A court has few duties of a more delicate nature than that of fixing counsel fees. The issue grows even more delicate on appeal;
we may not alter an award ofattorney’s fees unless the trial court has clearly abused its discretion

. . . . Becausethetrialcourtisinthebestpositionto evaluate the circumstances of each case, we will not substitute
our opinion concerning counsel fees or alter an award of attorney’s fees [pursuant to § 52-251a] unless the trial court has clearly abused its discretion.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) LaMontagne v. Musano, Inc., supra, 61 Conn. App. 64.
In its first articulation of its decision, the court detailed how a relatively minor dispute over a security deposit became a protracted legal battle once the matter, on the defendant’s motion, was transferred from the small claims session to the regular docket of the SuperiorCourt. The courtexplainedthat, followingthat transfer, both the complexity and the duration of the
case dramatically increased. In its second articulation, the court, citingrelevantcaselaw, emphasizedthat‘‘the fact-finding function is vested in the trial court with its unique opportunity to view the evidence presented in
a totality ofthe circumstances, i.e., including its observations of the demeanor and conduct of the witnesses and parties.

. . . Nothing in our law is more elementary than that the trier [offact] is the finaljudge ofthe credibility of witnesses and the weight to be accorded tothetestimony.’’ (Citations omitted; internalquotation marks omitted.) The courtthen statedthat it ‘‘reviewed the presentation of evidence, the effort expended by the plaintiff’s counsel, as well as the complexity ofthe legal issues in the case’’ in deciding whether to award attorney’s fees and costs to the plaintiff. In addition, the court clarified that ‘‘[t]he amount awarded

. . . was strictly for the prosecution of successful claims.’’6 Having presided over a five day trial over the course ofeight months, the trial court was in the best position to evaluate the particular circumstances of this case, as well as the reasonableness of the attorney’s fees requestedbythe plaintiff. Given the nature ofthe plaintiff’s initial action before the small claims court, the years oflitigation that followed its transfer to the regular docket, and the court’s specific findings of fact as detailed in its memorandum ofdecision and two subsequent articulations, we cannot conclude that the court clearly abused its discretion in awarding reasonable attorney’sfeesandcoststotheplaintiffastheprevailing party pursuant to § 52-251a.
The judgment is affirmed.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.1 Attrial, an e-mail dated December 19, 2010, fromthe defendant’s realtor, Abbe Friedman, to the defendant was admitted into evidence. In that correspondence, Friedman stated that ‘‘[t]he house is in pristine condition, with the exception ofa leaking pipe in the master bedroom sink.

. . . The house will notneedto be cleaned forthe newtenants as it isvery clean.’’ Friedman also indicated that, during the walk-through earlier that day, the plaintiff attempted to surrender his keys to the residence, but she refused. As Friedman stated: ‘‘I refused to sign anything today acknowledging receipt of [the keys]. I did not know if by signing anything it would be harmful to your future action, so I decided notto sign. He will mailthem byregistered mail.’’

2 Although thejurisdiction ofthe small claims court generally is confined to actions in which a party claims ‘‘money damages not in excess of five thousand dollars’’; General Statutes § 51-15 (d); our General Statutes permit

a plaintiff tenant seeking the return of a security deposit from a landlord to recovertwice the amount thereof. See General Statutes §§ 47a-21 (d) and 51-15 (d).

3 General Statutes § 52-139 (a) provides: ‘‘In any action brought for the recoveryofadebt, iftherearemutualdebtsbetweentheplaintifforplaintiffs,

or any of them, and the defendant or defendants, or any of them, one debt may be set off against the other.’’

4 The docket summary in this case contains more than 100 entries subsequent to its transfer to the regular docket of the Superior Court.

5 Costanzo v. Mulshine, 94 Conn. App 655, 893 A.2d 905, cert. denied, 279 Conn. 911, 902A.2d 1070 (2006), thereforeis distinguishablefromthepresent

case. In Constanzo, this court held that the trial court abused its discretion in failing to award the plaintiff a larger amount ofattorney’s fees and costs pursuantto § 52-251adueto, interalia, ‘‘thecourt’sapparentlackofconsideration’’ of the policies underlying that statute. Id., 663. Constanzo thus instructs that consideration of those policies is not a prerequisite to the court’s exercise of discretion pursuant to § 52-251a, but rather constitutes

a factor in that discretionary determination.
6 We note that the court did not award the plaintiff the full amount of attorney’sfeesandcostsrequested, butratherreducedthatamountby$1225.