In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit ____________

No. 05-2925

CHRISTOPHER KOLUPA,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

ROSELLE PARK DISTRICT,

Defendant-Appellee.

____________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.

No. 04 C 6385—Harry D. Leinenweber, Judge.

____________

ARGUED JANUARY 19, 2006—DECIDED FEBRUARY 10, 2006

____________

Before EASTERBROOK, MANION, and KANNE, Circuit

Judges.

EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge. Christopher Kolupa contends that the Roselle Park District fired him because of his

religion. If that’s so, then it violated Title VII of the Civil

Rights Act of 1964. See 42 U.S.C. §2000e-2(a)(1). Yet the

district judge dismissed his complaint under Fed. R. Civ. P.

12(b)(6), ruling that he had not stated a claim on which

relief may be granted. 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13599 (N.D. Ill.

Apr. 28, 2005). That disposition reflects a misunderstanding

of what a complaint must contain.

Religious discrimination in employment is prohibited by

federal law. Accordingly, all a complaint in federal court
2 No. 05-2925

need do to state a claim for relief is recite that the employer

has caused some concrete injury by holding the worker’s

religion against him. See Bennett v. Schmidt, 153 F.3d 516

(7th Cir. 1998). Federal complaints plead claims rather

than facts. The appendix to the Rules of Civil Procedure

contains models that illustrate the short and simple

allegations that Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a) calls for. It is enough to

name the plaintiff and the defendant, state the nature of

the grievance, and give a few tidbits (such as the date) that

will let the defendant investigate. A full narrative is

unnecessary. See, e.g., Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534

U.S. 506 (2002); McDonald v. Household International, Inc.,

425 F.3d 424, 427-28 (7th Cir. 2005); Bartholet v. Reishauer

A.G. (Zürich), 953 F.2d 1073, 1077-78 (7th Cir. 1992).

Details come later, usually after discovery—though occasionally sooner if, as the rules allow, either side

seeks summary judgment in advance of discovery, or the

district court orders the plaintiff to supply a more definite statement. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(e).

What the district judge demanded, by contrast, is that the

complaint allege facts corresponding to each aspect

of a “prima facie case” under Title VII. The judge summarized what plaintiffs must prove to make out a prima

facie case of religious discrimination and then faulted

the complaint for omitting some points. One aspect of a

prima facie case is that the employer treated differently

persons who are similarly situated except with respect to

the protected attribute (race, sex, religion, and so on). See

McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802

(1973). The district judge wrote that this complaint is

defective because, although Kolupa “attempts to describe

several situations where other Roselle Park District

employees allegedly were treated more favorably than

[Kolupa], he fails to allege that the employees were similarly situated in their conduct or that any of the [other]

employees were [sic] outside of his protected class.” The
No. 05-2925 3

judge did not explain why a complaint must include such

allegations (let alone why a plaintiff must use the indirect

McDonnell Douglas method even though direct proof may

be available).

“Any district judge (for that matter, any defendant)

tempted to write ‘this complaint is deficient because it does

not contain. . .’ should stop and think: What rule of law

requires a complaint to contain that allegation?” Doe v.

Smith, 429 F.3d 706, 708 (7th Cir. 2005) (emphasis in

original). The question presented in Swierkiewicz was

whether the complaint in a Title VII case must include

factual allegations corresponding to each aspect of a

prima facie case; the Court held that it need not, writing

that “[t]he prima facie case under McDonnell Douglas . . . is

an evidentiary standard, not a pleading requirement.” 534

U.S. at 510. Yet the district court dismissed Kolupa’s

complaint on the same ground that Swierkiewicz had

disapproved. The Court held, and we reiterate, that complaints need not plead facts and need not narrate events

that correspond to each aspect of the applicable legal rule.

Any decision declaring “this complaint is deficient because

it does not allege X” is a candidate for summary reversal,

unless X is on the list in Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b).

According to the Park District, the complaint contains too

much rather than too little, and Kolupa has pleaded himself

out of court. The complaint attributes most of the allegedly

discriminatory conduct to Jim Bassett, the Park District’s

Interim Director during 2003. But the decision to discharge

Kolupa was made by Tom Kruse, who took over as Director

late in 2003 and fired Kolupa that December. By omitting

any allegation that Kruse was motivated by animosity

toward his religion, the argument goes, Kolupa conceded

the absence of such an improper motive by the decisionmaker and thus foreclosed relief. If the complaint actually

conceded that Kruse was neutral with respect to Kolupa’s

religion, then it would indeed foreclose relief, see Venturelli
4 No. 05-2925

v. ARC Community Services, Inc., 350 F.3d 592, 600 (7th

Cir. 2003), but silence is not a concession.

Silence is just silence and does not justify dismissal

unless Rule 9(b) requires details. Arguments that rest on

negative implications from silence are poorly disguised

demands for fact pleading. A plaintiff pleads himself out

of court when it would be necessary to contradict the

complaint in order to prevail on the merits. See, e.g.,

Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984); Conley

v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957); Walker v. Thompson, 288

F.3d 1005 (7th Cir. 2002). Kolupa would not need to

contradict any allegation in order to demonstrate that

he would have remained on the payroll had he held different religious views. Even if Kruse is indifferent

to employees’ religious beliefs and activities, his decision

may have been influenced by Bassett’s recommendation.

Nor is the complaint deficient because it does not allege

that the four warnings Bassett put in Kolupa’s file amount

to “adverse employment actions.” See Dunn v. Washington

County Hospital, 429 F.3d 689 (7th Cir. 2005). The judge

assumed that warnings are harmless. When dealing with

complaints, however, judges must assume in the plaintiff’s favor everything that could be shown consistent with

the allegations, and it is not hard to imagine proof that

would make the claim viable. Warnings may have been

accompanied by suspensions or contributed to a paper

record that led to suspension or discharge later. See Oest v.

Illinois Department of Corrections, 240 F.3d 605, 613 (7th

Cir. 2001). Whether any given step is an adverse employment action (alone or in combination with some other act)

goes to the merits; these details may be explored in discovery, on motion for summary judgment, and if necessary at

trial, but need not be included in complaints.

Kolupa also contends that the Park District failed to

accommodate his religious beliefs, failed to promote him,
No. 05-2925 5

and retaliated against him when he tried to protect his

rights. The district judge dismissed the accommodation and

failure-to-promote theories because Kolupa omitted them

from his administrative charge of discrimination. (He

dismissed the retaliation charge on other grounds, but it is

equally open to this objection, which the Park District has

urged in support of the favorable judgment.) The charge is

part of the record, and the district judge should have

treated the Park District’s motion as one for summary

judgment, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b) (final sentence), but

Kolupa does not contend that the use of Rule 56’s procedures would have made any practical difference.

The administrative charge covers less than half a typed

page. Kolupa complained about his discharge, the four

written warnings, and one of Barrett’s oral comments. He

did not mention promotion, accommodation, or retaliation,

and he did not check the box that the form provided for

people who wish to complain about retaliation. The charge

does not hint at any activity that could have been the

basis of retaliation; it does not say, for example, that

Kolupa had made a prior complaint (or supported another

employee’s complaint) and that a campaign of discrimination then commenced. It does not mention any promotion

that Kolupa sought but did not receive. Nor does it hint at

what “accommodation” Kolupa wanted; even on appeal he

does not tell us what he asked the Park District to do, other

than disregard his religion. He kept a Bible on his desk and

contends that the Park District was obliged to treat him no

worse than someone who had Plato’s Republic or Nozick’s

Anarchy, State, and Utopia in view; that’s a request for

neutrality, not accommodation. The promotion, accommodation, and retaliation theories therefore are beyond the scope

of the charge. See Cheek v. Western & Southern Life

Insurance Co., 31 F.3d 497, 500 (7th Cir. 1994).

The parties’ briefs debate the question whether the

district court erred in striking documents that Kolupa had
6 No. 05-2925

attached to his complaint. The judge did not give any

reason for this decision, and it is hard to see one; the

documents are not alleged to be “redundant, immaterial,

impertinent, or scandalous matter.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f).

The district judge seems to have assumed that papers

attached to a complaint must satisfy the requirements

for evidence at the summary-judgment stage. Indeed, the

whole course of proceedings in the district court suggests that the judge confused Rule 12(b) with Rule 56. But

no matter. The materials are not essential to the complaint’s sufficiency. If a motion for summary judgment

should be made, then these materials may be re-submitted

(should they be relevant) with appropriate authentication and affidavits evincing personal knowledge.

The judgment is affirmed to the extent that it concerns

promotion, accommodation, and retaliation but otherwise is

reversed, and the case is remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

A true Copy:

Teste: 

 ________________________________

Clerk of the United States Court of

Appeals for the Seventh Circuit 

USCA-02-C-0072—2-10-06